

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy
1950–1951**

**The Korean War
Part One**

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

Volume III
1950–1951

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Part One

James F. Schnabel
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Office of Joint History
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC, 1998

The Library of Congress has catalogued volume 5 as follows:

Watson, Robert J., 1920—

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954

(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v. 5)

Includes index.

1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff—History. 2. United States—Military policy. I. Title. II. Series: Watson, Robert J., 1920—. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.

UA23.W366 1986

355.3'3042'0973

86-4621

Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean war, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications.

Volume III describes the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Korean War; their other activities during the period are covered in Volume IV, except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This volume was originally planned by Mr. Wilber W. Hoare, who developed an outline and drafted six of the first seven chapters. Following a lapse of some years, these drafts were revised and expanded by Dr. Walter S. Poole, under the direction of Mr. Kenneth W. Condit. Meanwhile, other chapters, or portions thereof, had been prepared by Miss Martha Derthick, Mr. Morris MacGregor, and Miss Barbara Sorrill. In 1968, Dr. Robert J. Watson was assigned as the responsible author. He reviewed existing drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote Chapters 1 through 9 in essentially their present form. When he was transferred to other duties, Mr. James F. Schnabel assumed responsibility for the volume and planned,

Foreword

researched, and wrote the remaining eight chapters. Subsequently, all of the chapters were reviewed and revised by both Mr. Schnabel and Dr. Watson. Final revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of Dr. Watson in his capacity as Chief, Histories Branch, and of his successor in that position, Mr. Kenneth W. Condit. Resource constraints have prevented further revision to reflect more recent scholarship.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC
March 1998

DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Director for Joint History

Preface

At the time it was fought, the war in Korea was unique in recent American military experience. Unlike World Wars I and II, which were vigorously prosecuted on the battlefield until the enemy surrendered unconditionally, the Korean conflict ended without clear-cut military victory for either side. It was fought with limited means for limited objectives. In fact, political efforts to resolve the conflict at the negotiating table predominated during the last two years of the conflict. During this period, neither side sought a decision by military means.

The conflict in Korea also was an important milestone in the "cold war" relations between the Communist and non-Communist nations. By launching an unprovoked attack on a militarily insignificant country located in an area where none of their vital interests were involved, the Communists appeared to leaders of the non-Communist states to be giving proof of their aggressive designs for world domination. As a result, the United States reversed the policy of reducing its military establishment and launched an impressive expansion of its armed forces. At the same time, the United States joined with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to create a military command for the alliance and to incorporate German forces in it. In the Far East, the United States also acted to shore up the defenses of the non-Communist world by entering into treaties with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China.

The Korean War provided the first wartime test for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as part of the machinery set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. In this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by which President Truman exercised overall control of war strategy. When the focus shifted from combat to armistice negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role. They participated in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they provided the channel of communications between the Government in Washington and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and his armistice negotiating team in Korea.

The focus of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as they were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe the context in which they functioned. To this end, the actions of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning overall military strategy and armistice negotiations have been described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of

Preface

these actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been sketched in broad outline.

The authors received help from many sources during the preparation of this volume and gladly acknowledge their indebtedness. A special debt is owed to Mr. Ernest H. Giusti and Mr. Vernon E. Davis, respectively Chief of the Historical Division and Chief of the Special Projects Branch during most of the time this volume was being written, for their support and encouragement. Without the research assistance of Mr. Sigmund W. Musinski and his staff in the JCS Records Information and Retrieval Branch, and of the Modern Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, the authors' task would have been far more difficult. Special thanks are due to CWO William A. Barbee and Janet M. Lekang of the JCS Declassification Branch for the many hours they devoted to reviewing and declassifying JCS documents cited in the volume. The maps were prepared by the JCS Graphics Branch. Mrs. Janet W. Ball, Editorial Assistant, made an invaluable contribution through her cheerful and efficient direction of all phases of preparing the original manuscript. We thank Ms. Susan Carroll for preparing the Index, and Ms. Penny Norman for performing the manifold tasks necessary to put the manuscript into publishable form.

JAMES F. SCHNABEL
ROBERT J. WATSON

Contents

1. Korea in US Policy, 1945–1950	1
The Partition of Korea	1
Establishment of the Republic of Korea	6
Withdrawal of US Occupation Forces	9
The Problem of Taiwan	13
Policy for the Far East: NSC 48/2.....	16
The Balance of Forces in the Far East.....	19
The Eve of the Conflict.....	22
2. The Attack and the Response	25
Washington Learns of the Invasion.....	25
The Initial US Response	29
Air and Naval Forces Committed to the Battle	36
The Failure of Limited Intervention.....	41
Expansion of the US Role	45
The Decision to Send Combat Troops.....	47
The Die Is Cast	52
3. The United States and the United Nations	55
Formation of the United Nations Command	55
General MacArthur's Role and Status	57
The Beginning of an International Armed Force	59
Should Help Be Solicited?	61
Procedures for Handling Offers of Assistance	63
Results of the Secretary-General's Appeal	67
4. The Buildup and the Strategy	73
Initial Reinforcements for CINCFE	73
MacArthur Raises the Ante.....	76
Enlarging the Military Establishment.....	77
More Troops for the Far East.....	79
A Strategy for Victory	84

5. The Conflict Almost Won	93
Policies for a New Situation	93
Looking beyond the 38th Parallel	98
The United Nations in a Quandary.....	102
Danger along the Borders.....	107
The Wake Island Conference.....	113
Curtaiment of the UN Military Effort.....	116
Heading for the Yalu	117
Enter a New Enemy.....	119
6. A Time of Uncertainty	123
Effects of the First Chinese Attack	123
The Manchurian Border Issue.....	125
Policy Reexamined in Washington.....	130
Political and Diplomatic Maneuvers	135
“Hot Pursuit”	138
Reconsideration of Force Cutbacks.....	139
Preparations for the Final Attack	141
7. The New War.....	147
MacArthur's Attack Begins	147
Disaster Strikes.....	148
The Reaction in Washington	149
Repercussions on the International Scene.....	154
The Conference of 3 December	158
Bleak Prospects	162
8. The UN Command in the Balance.....	165
General Collins Goes to Korea.....	165
Prime Minister Attlee Comes to Washington	167
The General Assembly Seeks a Cease-Fire	171
Events in Korea	175
Another Search for Reinforcements	176
Evacuation or Escalation?.....	179
The Crisis Deepens	185
New Instructions for CINCFE	188
Secretary Acheson Wins a Gamble.....	191
A Rift in the Clouds?.....	193
9. The Conflict Stabilized	199
The Breathing Spell	199
The Emerging Consensus in Washington	201
Issues of Strategic Bombing	203

The 38th Parallel Again.....	206
Abortive Peace Efforts.....	212
Operations along the Parallel.....	215
NSC 48/5	216
Directives for a New Commander	219
Another Futile UN Appeal.....	226
Stalemate and Opportunity.....	228
10. The Relief of General MacArthur	231
The Disagreement over Taiwan.....	232
The VFW Incident.....	235
Effects of the Chinese Intervention	238
The Issue Is Joined.....	243
The Decision Is Reached	249
Epilogue: The MacArthur Hearings	251
Maps	
1. Korea.....	3
2. The North Korean Invasion.....	28
3. South Korea	91
4. General MacArthur's Plans for the Invasion of North Korea	105
5. The UN Command Strikes Back.....	223
Appendices	
1. General MacArthur's Message of 30 June 1950.....	259
2. Records of the Wake Island Conference	261
3. The JCS-MacArthur Relationship.....	263
4. List of Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	265
5. List of Principal Military and Civilian Officers.....	267
Notes	271
Bibliographic Note	325
Index	327

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Korea in US Policy, 1945–1950

The Partition of Korea

One of the war aims formulated by the Allied Powers in World War II was to dismantle the Japanese Empire and to force Japan to contract within her own ethnic boundaries. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek promised that, on the conclusion of the war, Japan would be expelled from “all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War,” from “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,” and from “all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” These “other territories” included Korea, an ancient kingdom that had been a Japanese dependency since 1910. The Cairo Declaration promised that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”

Representatives of the same three powers met at Potsdam on 26 July 1945, after the end of the war in Europe. They issued a proclamation calling upon Japan to surrender upon certain specified conditions, one of which was that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out.” This demand was rejected by Japan.¹

The Soviet Union was not at war with Japan in July 1945 and was not a party to these declarations. However, President Roosevelt and his successor, President Harry S Truman, had briefly discussed the Korean question with Prime Minister Josef V. Stalin, who had accepted a suggestion by Mr. Roosevelt that Korea be placed under an international trusteeship pending establishment of an independent government for that nation.²

Beyond this general agreement, comparatively little thought was given to the future of Korea while World War II was in progress. More immediate concerns engaged the attention of military and political planners in Washington. Preparation of policy recommendations regarding the surrender and occupation of enemy territory was the responsibility of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The Committee had established a Far East Subcommittee, which in March and April 1945 circulated several papers relating to the occupa-

tion of Korea. These, however, dealt with the procedure by which policy was to be formulated, rather than with the substance of policy. Of particular interest was SWNCC 79, concerning occupation forces for Korea. It provided that the Department of State would prepare a preliminary draft containing recommendations for the national composition of the occupying forces, which would be circulated for comment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments and subsequently revised and issued in final form.³

In May 1945 Admiral William D. Leahy, the senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, received from the White House a proposal submitted by Mr. Soon K. Hahn, a Korean. Mr. Hahn argued that Korea and Manchuria were strategically of cardinal importance and urged that the United States "permanently occupy" both regions with its armed forces in order to prevent Russia from gaining control over them. Admiral Leahy passed this extraordinary proposal to his colleagues, asking that some appropriate JCS committee provide an informal opinion on which a reply might be based. The matter was referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), the members of which replied tersely that the diversion of resources for this purpose from military operations against Japan would be unjustified at that time.⁴

The subject of Korea was touched on during discussions between US and Soviet representatives at the Potsdam Conference. The Soviet Union was committed to enter the war against Japan, and it was recognized that lines of demarcation would be necessary between US and Soviet forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this subject with the Chiefs of Staff of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The two parties agreed on zones of operation for air and naval forces in the general area of Japan and Manchuria, but the question of a boundary for ground operations in Korea did not arise. US officers had been prepared to suggest a line that would place the capital, Seoul, and at least one other major port in the US zone. Presumably such a line would have been very near the one ultimately selected—the 38th parallel.⁵

A few weeks after the Potsdam Conference, Japanese resistance suddenly collapsed. On 6 August 1945 the US Army Air Force dropped the world's first atomic bomb upon the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Two days later, Soviet Russia declared war on Japan. On 9 August a second nuclear weapon was dropped on Nagasaki. The next day the Japanese Government announced over the radio its willingness to surrender, subject only to the stipulation that the Emperor be allowed to retain his position—a condition that was acceptable to the allies.

With these developments, the disposition of Korea and other territories under Japanese rule suddenly became a matter of urgency. The leisurely procedural schedule drawn up by the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC for regulating the occupation of Korea went into discard. On the night of 10 to 11 August 1945, officers of the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff began drafting General Order No. 1, which was intended to instruct General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, regarding the surrender and occupation of Japan. The first paragraph of this directive, written by Colonel C. H. Bonesteel, III, USA, designated the various commands and countries that would accept the surrender of Japanese forces in each area.

Colonel Bonesteel was aware that Soviet troops were within easy reach of Korea, while those of the United States were hundreds of miles away. At the same time, he deemed it advisable to minimize as far as possible the area of Korea that would fall into Soviet hands. He therefore wrote into his draft a provision that Soviet forces would be responsible for accepting the surrender of Japanese troops north of latitude 38°, while enemy units south thereof would surrender to US forces. This line, bisecting the Korean peninsula near the center of its length, would place Seoul and its port, Inch'on, within the US area of responsibility, as well as the important port of Pusan in southeastern Korea.⁶

The completed draft of General Order No. 1 was at once forwarded to the Joint Staff Planners (JPS). The Navy member of that body, Rear Admiral M. B. Gardner, USN, registered the only known disagreement with the 38th parallel proposal. He advocated moving the line north to 39°, in order to bring the important city of Dairen, on the Liaotung peninsula of Manchuria, within the US zone. Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, USA, the Army member, replied that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept a line so far north. A State Department representative (Assistant Secretary James C. Dunn) was informally consulted; he upheld the Army view, and Admiral Gardner's suggestion was rejected. The draft was then circulated for review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries, together with two other documents: a proposed directive to General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and an "instrument of surrender" to be signed by Japan.⁷

The two latter documents were rushed through the machinery of government and were approved by the President on 13 August 1945.⁸ General Order No. 1, however, was held up for minor changes that reflected the swiftly changing situation. As written, it had specified that the "Commanding General, U.S. Expeditionary Forces in Korea" would be responsible for receiving the Japanese surrender in southern Korea. The Joint Staff Planners, formally reviewing General Order No. 1 preparatory to JCS action, recommended that this task be assigned to General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made him responsible for the occupation of Korea. The Planners also endorsed a request by the British Chiefs of Staff for a larger role for Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander for South East Asia.⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the JPS recommendations in the comments on General Order No. 1 that they sent to the SWNCC on 14 August. Concerning the general subject of the division and occupation of Korea, they commented as follows:

The parallel 38° north has been selected in Korea since this gives to U.S. forces the port and communications area of Keijo [Seoul] and a sufficient portion of Korea so that parts of it might be apportioned to the Chinese and the British in case some sort of quadripartite administration eventuates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not know of any detailed arrangements for the administration and government of Korea after the Japanese surrender and urge that the appropriate governmental authorities take steps at once in order that guidance may be made available to the U.S. commander charged with the occupation responsibilities in Korea.¹⁰

The amendments sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were accepted by SWNCC in the version of General Order No. 1 that was sent to President Truman

on 15 August. The President at once approved it subject to the concurrence of the three major allies. All of them gave their approval; the Soviet Government asked for certain changes (none of them involving Korea) when President Truman rejected the request.¹¹

General MacArthur designated the XXIV Corps, consisting of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions, to occupy the southern half of Korea and to disarm the Japanese forces there. On 8 September 1945, troops from these units began landing in Korea. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, who commanded the XXIV Corps, became Commanding General, US Army Forces in Korea (CGUSAFIK).¹²

During the next two years, the United States sought to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the establishment of a government for Korea. The Soviets had committed themselves to the goal of independence for Korea by announcing their adherence to the Potsdam Declaration when they entered the war against Japan. Nevertheless in the Far East, as in Europe, the government of Premier Josef V. Stalin demonstrated that its objective was to impose Communist rule on all those territories that its forces had liberated from Axis control. Pending establishment of a unified Korean government, the United States administered southern Korea through a military government. Embryonic political and administrative institutions were established in order to afford the Koreans some experience in self-government.¹³

For General Hodge, as CGUSAFIK, the chain of command ran through General MacArthur to Army headquarters in Washington and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General MacArthur held the position of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP). Under the Unified Command Plan promulgated on 1 January 1947, he became Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), while also serving as Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East (CGUSAFFE). The Chief of Staff, US Army, became the JCS executive agent for the occupation of Japan and Korea. Policy directives were issued by the SWNCC through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given an opportunity to comment on directives in draft form and thus participated in the determination of policy. Military aspects of the occupation were often handled directly between General MacArthur and Army authorities, without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁴

A question that arose in the early days of the US occupation of southern Korea was the advisability of establishing a Korean military force. In November 1945 officers in General Hodge's headquarters drafted a plan to create regular forces (army, navy, air force, and coast guard) which would be equipped with US surplus stocks. General MacArthur referred the proposal to Washington, but it was disapproved by the SWNCC, on the grounds that it might jeopardize negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning the unification of Korea. The Committee would go only so far as to authorize the issue of surplus US weapons to the Korean National Civil Police.¹⁵

Thereupon General Hodge, on his own initiative, established a reserve organization to supplement the Civil Police in emergencies. It was allowed a strength of 25,000 men, who were to be given infantry training under US advisors and were to be equipped with captured Japanese weapons. This organization, known as the Constabulary, was later to evolve into the Army of the Republic of Korea.¹⁶

North of the 38th parallel, events had meanwhile taken a very different course, guided by an occupying power whose objective—to incorporate Korea into the Soviet system—was clear from the outset. The Soviet Army that entered Korea in August 1945 brought in its train a subservient group of Korean communist exiles. These men, aided by their ideological brethren who had hidden out in Korea under the Japanese occupation, provided the raw material for a nominally civilian and independent government. Initially this puppet regime, like those set up by the Soviets in eastern Europe, was camouflaged by allowing other groups to participate. It was headed by a man who took the name of Kim Il Sung, a legendary Korean hero.¹⁷

The Soviets also lost no time in building an army in north Korea. A “people’s militia,” equipped with captured Japanese weapons, was set up immediately.¹⁸ As early as September 1947, General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA, who had recently completed a tour of the Far East at the request of President Truman, estimated the strength of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) at 125,000, and pointed to the contrast between this powerful force and the South Korean Constabulary, which at that time stood at 16,000 men.¹⁹

Establishment of the Republic of Korea

Two years of weary and futile discussions of the Korean problem with the Soviet Union at length convinced the US Government that a different approach was necessary. In August 1947 the SWNCC decided that the time had come to devise some way of withdrawing from Korea without abandoning the entire nation to the Communists. The members recommended that a final effort be made to seek an agreement, through a four-power conference with Soviet Russia, the United Kingdom, and China, to establish a Korean provisional government under United Nations (UN) observation. If the Soviet Government rejected this approach, the United States should then submit the problem of Korea to the UN General Assembly.²⁰

This conference proposal was approved by the British and Chinese Governments, but, as expected, was pronounced unacceptable by the Soviet Union.²¹ The next step, therefore, was to approach the United Nations. Just before the General Assembly opened, the Department of State asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an opinion regarding the US interest in the continuing military occupation of south Korea.

The JCS reply was addressed to the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, on 25 September 1947. The conclusion reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that the United States “has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea,” for the following reasons:

In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.

If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands. Such interferences would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area where they would be subject to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large scale ground operations.

In view of the current shortage of military manpower, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the occupation force in Korea, totaling approximately 45,000 men, "could well be used elsewhere." Withdrawal of these troops "would not impair the military position of the Far East Command," unless the Soviets subsequently established a base in south Korea from which they could mount an assault on Japan. An additional argument for withdrawal was that the continued lack of progress toward Korean independence might eventually result in "violent disorder" that would make the position of the US occupation forces untenable. To be forced to withdraw hastily under such circumstances would severely damage US prestige, "quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States."²²

Secretary Forrestal forwarded the JCS views to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, without comment, on 26 September.²³ The Department of State made no official reply, but the objective of withdrawal from Korea was approved a few days later. Secretary Marshall discussed the matter with his advisors on 29 September. They agreed that the United States could not remain in Korea indefinitely, but on the other hand, that it could not "scuttle and run" without severe damage to its political standing in the world. Therefore, an effort would be made to reach a settlement that would enable the United States to withdraw "as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effects."²⁴

Already the United States had laid the problem before the General Assembly. A resolution submitted by the US delegation called for elections in each occupation zone to select representatives for a national assembly. A UN commission would supervise the elections and the subsequent organization of a government, and would arrange with the occupying powers for withdrawal of their forces. Over Soviet opposition the General Assembly on 14 November 1947 approved the US resolution, amending it to provide for a single election throughout the entire country, which was to take place not later than 31 March 1948.²⁵

Following this Assembly action, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) turned again to the subject of Korea.²⁶ In a report submitted on 14 January 1948, SANACC 176/35, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SANACC foresaw that the Soviet Union would forbid any elections under UN sponsorship in its occupation zone. In the event of such refusal, the Subcommittee recommended that the United States proceed with elections in the south. For planning purposes, it was assumed that these elections would take place by 31 March as scheduled; that a new government would be established by 15 August 1948; and that withdrawal of occupation forces would begin at once and would be completed by 15 November 1948. To avoid subsequent Soviet domination of south Korea, the United States should build up the Constabulary (within limits of

available funds, personnel, and equipment), and should provide military and economic aid to the new government.²⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with these recommendations. In commenting upon SANACC 176/35, they reaffirmed their view that the United States had "little strategic interest" in maintaining in Korea forces that were sorely needed elsewhere. They accordingly wished SANACC 176/35 to include an unequivocal declaration that US troops would be withdrawn "at the earliest practicable date," instead of a statement that withdrawal "may be assumed." They warned that it was unlikely that the Constabulary could be brought to a level of strength that would enable it to defend the country alone, and that eventual Soviet domination of all Korea would therefore have to be accepted as probable. However, a stronger Constabulary might deter attacks from Communist Korea, and limited military aid to south Korea was therefore justifiable provided it did not detract from more important programs of assistance.²⁸

SANACC 176/35 was never officially approved and is of interest only in that it elicited from the Joint Chiefs of Staff another declaration of their desire to disengage from Korea. The Executive Secretary of the newly established National Security Council pointed out to the members of SANACC that the actions recommended in SANACC 176/35 would have a "far-reaching effect." Consequently, before these actions were carried out, the President and the Council should first consider and approve a basic "position paper" on Korea.²⁹

For this purpose, SANACC's Far Eastern Subcommittee drafted a new report, SANACC 176/39, which the parent Committee approved on 25 March 1948. The shape of events had now become somewhat clearer. The UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) had been forbidden to enter the Soviet zone and had decided to proceed with the establishment of a separate government in the south.³⁰ The US relationship with this prospective new regime was the subject of SANACC 176/39. Two possible courses of action were rejected: to abandon entirely the Korean Government, or to guarantee by force of arms its political independence and territorial integrity. The recommended alternative was to provide support "within practicable and feasible limits," as a means of enabling the United States to withdraw from Korea with a minimum of adverse effects. Every effort should be made to create conditions for withdrawal by 31 December 1948. To this end, the United States should expand, equip, and train the Constabulary to protect south Korea against anything short of an "overt act of aggression." Preparations should also be made to provide economic and military aid, the latter to include the establishment of a military advisory group. But the United States "should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a *casus belli* for the U.S."³¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their endorsement to SANACC 176/39.³² The National Security Council and the President subsequently approved it as NSC 8.³³

Plans for expanding the Constabulary, as called for by NSC 8, were already in existence. General Hodge, with the approval of General MacArthur, had recommended an increase to 50,000 men, who would be furnished with equipment

transferred from US Army Forces in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this plan on 18 March 1948.³⁴

Elections in the US occupation zone, the first step toward the establishment of a government, took place on 10 May 1948, somewhat later than originally planned. The UN Temporary Commission on Korea observed the electoral process and certified the results as “a valid expression of the free will of the electorate” in those parts of the country that were accessible to it. The winning candidates convened as a National Assembly, approved a constitution, and elected Dr. Syngman Rhee, an elderly patriot who had spent years of exile in the West, as their President. On 15 August 1948 the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally inaugurated and the US military government in Korea came to an end.³⁵

President Truman appointed Mr. John J. Muccio as his Special Representative to the Republic of Korea with the personal rank of Ambassador. Mr. Muccio established the US diplomatic mission in Korea on 26 August.³⁶

A counterpart of the Republic of Korea sprang into existence on the other side of the 38th parallel several weeks later. The origin of this Communist government actually dated from 1947, when a “People’s Assembly” gathered in P’yongyang, the northern capital. In April 1948 this body approved a constitution for a “Democratic Republic” on the Soviet model. Even earlier, in February 1948, the Assembly had officially announced the establishment of a “People’s Army.”³⁷ Elections for a new assembly were held in August 1948. This new body formally ratified the constitution and on 9 September 1948 proclaimed the existence of the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”³⁸

The political cleavage of Korea was now complete. Two separate and hostile governments glowered at one another across a boundary that had originally been devised solely for the temporary convenience of military commanders in the closing days of World War II. The seeds of war thus sown along the 38th parallel were to bear fruit within less than two years.

Withdrawal of US Occupation Forces

Withdrawal of US troops from Korea had originally been scheduled to begin on 15 August 1948. This intention had been written into SANACC 176/35, as already noted. Later, however, the Department of the Army agreed to postpone the movement by a month and to allow until 15 January 1949 for its completion. The delay was granted at the request of the Department of State in order to afford the new South Korean Government more time in which to establish itself.³⁹

Removal of troops began on schedule,⁴⁰ but it was not certain that the process would be completed by the planned deadline. The administration decided that the Korean question should first be reconsidered by the General Assembly. When the Soviet Government informed the United States on 18 September that all its troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year and expressed the “hope” that the United States would follow suit, the US reply was that the withdrawal issue

was “part of the larger question of Korean unity and independence,” on which the US views would be presented “at the appropriate time” to the Assembly.⁴¹

Before the General Assembly could act, two developments cast doubt upon the advisability of a complete US withdrawal in the near future. In October and November 1948 the new South Korean Government was severely shaken by rebellions, instigated by Communists, of units of the Constabulary.⁴² About the same time, the civil war in China swung decisively against the Nationalists; Mao Tse-Tung’s Communist forces, sweeping from one victory to another, completed their conquest of Manchuria and regrouped for a move southward.⁴³ It became evident that South Korea would soon have a third hostile Communist neighbor—a very large and populous one.

Confronted with these events, President Rhee sought to delay the departure of US forces until those of his own country had grown strong enough to defend their new nation.⁴⁴

In Seoul, Ambassador Muccio backed up South Korea’s request; he considered that full withdrawal by mid-January would be “inopportune.” Both he and the Commander of US Army Forces in Korea (Major General John B. Coulter, who had succeeded General Hodge) thought that an invasion from North Korea was possible in the near future.⁴⁵

In Washington, postponement had in fact already been decided upon. On 9 November 1948 the Department of State, asked by the Department of the Army to confirm the deadline of 15 January 1949, pronounced an opinion that it would be unwise to enter into the “final and irreversible stages of troop withdrawal” until the UN General Assembly had acted on the Korean problem.⁴⁶ Accordingly, on 15 November 1948 the Army instructed General MacArthur to retain in Korea, for an indefinite period, one reinforced regimental combat team, with a maximum strength of 7,500 men.⁴⁷

This decision was not at once communicated to President Rhee, who continued to seek assurances that US troops would remain.⁴⁸ At the same time, the ROK Government moved to strengthen its forces. In November 1948 the National Assembly enacted legislation converting the Constabulary into a regular army and establishing a Department of National Defense.⁴⁹ The new army soon outstripped the 50,000-man limit underwritten by the United States; by early 1949 its strength stood at 65,000.⁵⁰ US advisory assistance was continued in accord with an agreement that had been worked out between President Rhee and General Hodge. The strength of the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) at Headquarters, USAFIK, increased from 100 to 241 between 15 August and 31 December 1948.⁵¹

On 12 December 1948 the UN General Assembly declared the Republic of Korea to be the only lawful government in that country and established a permanent Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to pursue the goal of unification. At the same time, the Assembly recommended that all occupation forces be removed from both north and south “as early as practicable.”⁵²

The Soviet Union, true to its word, removed the last of its troops before the end of the year.⁵³ The United States was committed to eventual withdrawal, but it remained to be determined when such a step would be “practicable.” The

Department of the Army sought the advice of General MacArthur, who replied on 19 January 1949 that the long-range prospects of the Republic of Korea were poor. It was, he declared, "not within the capabilities of the US to establish Korean security forces capable of meeting successfully a full-scale invasion from North Korea supported by Communist-inspired internal disorder." Therefore, the withdrawal date should be based on short-range military and political considerations. The approaching spring would afford a favorable opportunity to withdraw, he believed; the harvest of winter cereals would be in, US economic aid would be showing results, and South Korea's internal politics would therefore be more stable. General MacArthur suggested the anniversary of the election (10 May 1949) for the final withdrawal. There was no military reason for prolonging the occupation beyond that date. Establishment of Korean forces adequate to ensure internal security was "substantially complete," and further training assistance, if necessary, could be dispensed through a military mission.⁵⁴

General MacArthur's implied conviction that South Korea would never be able to defend herself was not shared by President Rhee and his advisors, who planned a massive increase in the forces at their disposal. They contemplated a six-division army, 100,000 strong, which would include an air force of 6,000 men equipped with 350 combat and transport aircraft, as well as a navy of sixty-seven vessels and 10,000 men that would supplant the small coast guard then in existence. Early in 1949 the South Korean Government disclosed these plans to the US Embassy in Seoul, with a request that the United States furnish the assistance that would be necessary for their execution.

The plans were forwarded to the Chief of Staff, US Army, General Omar N. Bradley, who in turn relayed them to his JCS colleagues. General Bradley considered them far too ambitious. He recommended that the United States confine itself to provision of minimum support for the manpower levels already approved (50,000 for the Constabulary and 3,000 for the Coast Guard). He favored establishment of an air detachment but believed that it should be equipped only with liaison aircraft.⁵⁵

The two issues of the size of South Korea's forces and the final withdrawal of US troops were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with a review of US policy toward Korea that was instigated by the Department of State after the action of the UN General Assembly.⁵⁶ The National Security Council (NSC) staff circulated a draft report on the subject, NSC 8/1, on 16 March 1949. The conclusion reached in this paper was that the United States should continue to provide political support as well as economic, technical, and military assistance to South Korea. Military assistance for an army of 65,000 men should also be furnished. The existing PMAG should be given a permanent basis and should be responsible for advising both the ROK Army and the Navy. Legislative authorization should be sought to continue military and economic assistance through fiscal year 1950.

The drafters of NSC 8/1 had recognized that US assistance might not suffice to prevent the North Koreans from attempting to overthrow the Republic of Korea by subversion or by outright aggression. The opinion of the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), however, was cited in support of the conclusion that this danger would exist no matter when US forces withdrew, and that no advan-

tage would accrue from postponing the withdrawal. It was, therefore, recommended that the last US forces be removed by 30 June 1949, subject to consultation with the UN Commission on Korea and with the ROK Government.⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed NSC 8/1 with reservations. While favoring the withdrawal deadline of 30 June 1949, they did not believe that it should be subject to international consultation. Moreover, they believed, there should be no commitment to provide major naval or air support for the Republic of Korea. References to a South Korean "Navy" should be deleted from NSC 8/1, and it should be made clear that any air force would be a part of the ROK Army.⁵⁸

The National Security Council approved NSC 8/1 on 22 March 1949, amending it as the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired.⁵⁹ President Truman approved it on the following day as NSC 8/2.⁶⁰

Thus the United States was committed to removal of the last of its forces from Korea by the end of fiscal year 1949. Just before the deadline, however, one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the National Security Council should take another look at Korean policy. General Bradley, fearing that the withdrawal might be followed by an invasion from North Korea, had his staff prepare a study of the courses of action that would be open to the United States in that situation. When it was completed, he submitted it to his colleagues on 10 June 1949, asking that it be forwarded to the NSC.

The study considered the possibility that the United States might, in case of war, apply the Truman Doctrine to South Korea (supplying military aid on a scale sufficient to enable the ROK Government to defeat the Communists) or intervene unilaterally with its own forces. Both of these courses of action were rejected on the grounds that the resulting commitment of US resources would be out of proportion to the low strategic value of Korea. Instead, it was recommended that the United States appeal to the UN Security Council. Depending on the decision taken by that body, the United States might subsequently participate in a "police action" under UN sanction, furnishing US units as part of an international force. Such military action should, however, be regarded as a last resort. If it became necessary, the US position "should be firm and unequivocal and call for complete cooperation and full participation by other member nations."

The authors of the study foresaw that the Security Council might well be paralyzed by a Soviet veto. On the other hand, it was possible that the Soviets might abstain. Such an abstention, "although a non-committal approach, will permit police action measures and sanctions if such appear warranted later." The prophetic accuracy of this remark was to become evident a year later.⁶¹

On the advice of the JSSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided not to forward the Army study to the NSC, because of its "predominantly political tenor" and because they had already made clear their views on the strategic position of Korea. At General Bradley's request, however, they issued a memorandum for his guidance in which they declared that Korea was of "little strategic value to the United States," that any commitment of US military force in Korea would be ill advised, and that the introduction of an international army under UN sanction would be practicable only if the forces envisioned by Article 43 of the UN Charter were in existence.⁶²

The last elements of the USAFIK departed on 29 June 1949, under observation of the UN Commission on Korea. Effective at midnight, 30 June, Headquarters USAFIK was discontinued.⁶³ On the following day the provisional US advisory mission in Korea assumed permanent status as the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). General MacArthur, as CINCFE, relinquished all responsibility in Korea except for logistic support of KMAG as far as the waterline and for emergency evacuation of US personnel if necessary.⁶⁴

The departing US troops left behind small arms and ammunition, plus light artillery, mortars, and some vehicles, sufficient for a force of 50,000 men. Subsequently, equipment for an additional 15,000, as approved in NSC 8/2, was furnished from US stocks in Japan.⁶⁵

Congress showed itself agreeable to the provision of further military assistance. Legislation enacted in October 1949 appropriated \$27,640,000 for the Republic of Korea, Iran, and the Philippines, leaving it to the administration to divide up the total.⁶⁶ A bilateral agreement with South Korea, required by law as a condition of eligibility, was signed in Seoul on 26 January 1950.⁶⁷

The US military aid program for South Korea was intended to support an army of 84,000 men.⁶⁸ The South Korean Government, however, planned to expand beyond that figure. By August 1949 the ROK Army had almost reached the goal of 100,000 men, and eight infantry divisions had been established instead of the six originally projected. Two months later the air detachment was removed from the Army and given the status of a separate Air Force. US advisors had opposed these developments, believing that they would severely strain South Korea's manpower and economy. Nevertheless, once the South Korean Air Force was established, KMAG accepted the responsibility of advising it and recommended that the United States provide a limited number of fighter aircraft for South Korea.⁶⁹

The Problem of Taiwan

With the end of the US occupation, the subject of Korea receded into the background, and a new difficulty arose to engage the attention of US policymakers. In China, Mao Tse-tung's forces began a southward drive that was to bring all China under their control. Chiang Kai-shek's forces (to which the United States had furnished large amounts of military aid) proved utterly incapable of stemming the advance of the "People's Liberation Army." On 1 October 1949, with most of mainland China in their grasp and the outcome no longer in doubt, the new rulers of China proclaimed the foundation of the "Chinese People's Republic."⁷⁰

It could safely be assumed that Communist China would stand shoulder to shoulder with Soviet Russia on major world issues. Thus the world balance of power seemed likely to tip in favor of the Communist bloc. For the administration, the new Far Eastern situation presented internal as well as external problems. Some elements of US public opinion, and their spokesmen in Congress,

ascribed the collapse of the Chiang regime to mistaken US policies and urged a massive last-minute aid program to try to shore up the crumbling Chinese Nationalist regime.⁷¹

In the hope of silencing its critics by spreading all the facts on record, the Truman administration in August 1949 released a voluminous compilation of documents tracing the history of US relations with China, some of them going back to the nineteenth century but most dating from World War II or later. They seemed to point to the conclusion that, in Secretary Dean G. Acheson's words, the outcome of the Chinese civil war was "the product of internal Chinese forces . . . which this country tried to influence but could not," and that the United States had no choice but to accept the new situation that had come into being in China. But this "White Paper" failed to put an end to the controversy.⁷²

The long-range consequences of the collapse of Nationalist China were for the future to determine, but one of the results had to be faced immediately. The island of Taiwan, or Formosa, off the coast of China, had historically been a part of the Chinese Empire.⁷³ Seized by Japan in 1895, it was returned to China at the end of World War II, in accord with the Cairo Declaration. A victorious Communist regime in China could be expected as a matter of course to lay claim to Taiwan. In hostile hands, it would jeopardize the US position in the Western Pacific, which was anchored in the nearby Philippine and Ryukyu Islands.

Beginning in November 1948, while the outcome of the Chinese Civil War was still in doubt, the President and the National Security Council devoted considerable attention to the problem of Taiwan. They recognized the importance of preventing the island from falling into unfriendly hands but agreed that no military forces should be committed for the purpose; political, diplomatic, and economic measures would be used instead. This policy, which accorded with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was reaffirmed in October 1949, after the proclamation of the "Chinese People's Republic."⁷⁴

Driven from the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters took refuge on Taiwan, where they maintained their claim to be regarded as the legal government of all China. The United States continued to accord diplomatic recognition to Chiang's regime. In October 1949 the National Security Council recommended, and the President agreed, that economic aid to the Nationalists would be furnished to the extent authorized by existing legislation. Whether or not such future assistance would be provided was a matter for later decision, to be made in the light of Chiang's ability to govern the island effectively and democratically. The Council considered the resumption of military aid but decided against it.⁷⁵

This latter decision ran counter to the efforts of Chiang's Congressional supporters to include Nationalist China among the beneficiaries of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949. The administration opposed this attempt, and the debate grew acrimonious but was settled by a compromise. The final law, approved in October 1949, authorized \$75 million to accomplish in the "general area" of China the "policies and purposes" of the act. There was no mention of the Nationalist Government, nor was it specified that the money was to be used for military aid.⁷⁶

For the moment, the administration took no action to make use of this discretionary authority. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, Chiang's regime was beginning to appear in a new light. With mainland China in the hands of a power that defiantly trumpeted its hostility to the United States, the importance of Taiwan had to be reassessed. At the suggestion of General Collins, the Joint Chiefs of Staff restudied its strategic value. They concluded that, while armed US intervention to defend Taiwan would be unjustified, a "modest, well-directed, and closely-supervised program of military aid" to the Nationalists would serve US interests. On 23 December 1949 they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that such a program be undertaken as "part of the overall problem of resisting the spread of Communist domination in East Asia." Subject to his approval, they continued, they proposed to direct CINCFE and the Commander, 7th Fleet, to make a survey to ascertain the kind and amount of aid required to hold Taiwan against attack.⁷⁷

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, who had replaced Mr. James Forrestal in March 1949, was in full agreement with these recommendations and urged the President to approve them.⁷⁸ Secretary Acheson, however, was opposed. He was convinced that nothing short of armed intervention could save Taiwan, and that any lesser involvement, through failure, would do "further damage to our prestige and to our whole position in the Far East."⁷⁹

The issue came before the National Security Council on 29 December 1949 in connection with NSC 48/1, a policy paper relating to the Far East as a whole (the origin of which is described in the next section). In drafting NSC 48/1, the NSC Staff left the question unresolved and incorporated the views of both Departments, leaving the Council and the President to make the choice.⁸⁰ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on NSC 48/1, had of course endorsed the Defense view. They had also taken the opportunity to recommend the formulation of a program to make use of the \$75 million authorization in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, although they did not specifically suggest that the money be used for the Chinese Nationalists.⁸¹

The Council rejected the Defense Department view and declined to commit the United States to provide military aid to Chiang. However, the amended version of the paper that was ultimately adopted (NSC 48/2) included a recommendation for use of the \$75 million authorization.⁸² President Truman approved NSC 48/2 but withheld judgment on the application of this money. "A program will be all right," he said, "but whether we implement it depends on circumstances."⁸³

In a public statement on 5 January 1950, President Truman settled the issue of military aid for Taiwan and made clear the US policy regarding the status of the island. The following two paragraphs constituted the most important part of this announcement:

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa, or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in the present situation. The

United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the island. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] program of economic assistance.⁸⁴

The President's statement did not touch on the question of diplomatic recognition of the Chiang regime. This matter had been dealt with in NSC 48/2. The Council had recommended that the United States continue to recognize the Nationalist Government "until the situation is further clarified" and avoid recognizing the Chinese Communists "until it is clearly in the United States interest to do so."⁸⁵

The application of this policy was to have an influence upon the Korean War that, although wholly unexpected, was of the utmost importance. The Soviet Union began an unsuccessful campaign to have Communist China admitted to the United Nations and to the permanent seat on the UN Security Council that was allotted to China in the UN Charter. On 13 January 1950 the Soviet delegate, Yakov A. Malik, left the Council, announcing that his country would not participate in its proceedings or recognize the legality of its actions until the representative of the "Kuomintang group" had been ousted.⁸⁶ Quite inadvertently, the Soviet Union thus left the Security Council free to act, unfettered by a Soviet veto, when the Korean crisis erupted five months later.

Policy for the Far East: NSC 48/2

When Secretary of Defense Johnson came into office, he observed with misgivings that the United States seemed to have no overall policy for Asia. In a memorandum for the National Security Council on 10 June 1949, he criticized the "day-to-day, country-by-country approach" that had hitherto characterized the US response to the alarming course of Far Eastern developments. There was a need, in his opinion, for a "carefully considered and comprehensive plan" aimed at containing Communism in Asia.⁸⁷

The Secretary's suggestion eventually resulted in NSC 48/2, which the President approved on 30 December 1949. Some of its provisions have already been noted. Its general effect was to apply the doctrine of "containment" to the Far East. The US objectives, as defined in NSC 48/2, were to strengthen non-Communist Asia and to reduce the power of the USSR in the Far East. They were to be pursued by nonmilitary means, such as the promotion of economic and political development through suitable trade and investment policies and through the application of US assistance. Regional associations of friendly Asiatic nations were to be encouraged. Political support, as well as economic and military aid, would be provided to the Republic of Korea. But it was recognized that the

United States would have to “develop and strengthen the security of the area from Communist external aggression or internal subversion.” Therefore, the United States should “improve” its position with respect to “Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines.”⁸⁸

In these words, the National Security Council gave implied approval to a conviction that was to be explicitly stated in later NSC papers: that the United States had a vital interest, to be defended by force if necessary, in the major islands off the coast of Asia. This doctrine was publicly expounded by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 12 January 1950. Discussing the crisis in Asia before the National Press Club in Washington, the Secretary defined the nation’s military interest in the Far East. He stressed particularly the importance of Japan, which, he promised, would not be abandoned under any circumstances. The US “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific, he continued, ran along the Aleutians to Japan, thence to the Ryukyus and the Philippine Islands. These positions would be defended militarily by the United States in case of necessity. He did not include either Korea or Formosa in the “defensive perimeter.” Elsewhere in his speech, however, he spoke of “other areas in the Pacific.” “It must be clear,” he said, “that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. . . . Should such an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.”⁸⁹

Secretary Acheson was later to be criticized for this virtual public admission that the United States would not defend Korea.⁹⁰ Lacking access to the archives of the Soviet Union or North Korea, one cannot say how far, if at all, the statement contributed to the attack on South Korea. It should be remembered, however, that Secretary Acheson was only stating an established policy decision (based in part on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) which might well have become known to hostile nations by other means. In fact, General MacArthur, almost a year earlier, had made a similar statement in an interview with a British journalist. “Our line of defense,” he said, “runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia.” From south to north, he identified these islands as the Philippines, the Ryukyus, Japan, and the Aleutians.⁹¹ Significantly, the General omitted from this list not only Korea but also Taiwan.

Public debate over the Far Eastern situation went on from 1949 to 1950 with no lessening of intensity. Attention centered upon the future of the two rival claimants to the government of China. Administration critics continued to press for military aid to Chiang and vigorously assailed any thought of diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China.⁹²

The subject of Korea drew relatively little attention in this discussion. At one point, however, economic aid to the Republic of Korea almost became a casualty of the verbal war over China. In January 1950 the House of Representatives rejected an administration proposal to authorize \$60 million for this purpose. The opposition was ascribed partly to a conviction that the money would be wasted but also to irritation at the administration’s refusal to provide military aid to the Chinese Nationalists. Following pleas from the President and from

Secretary Acheson, the House reversed itself and the money for Korea was made available.⁹³

Within the administration, it appeared at first that the President's statement of 5 January 1950 had permanently settled the question of aid to Chiang. Secretary Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff abandoned the subject. In laying down guidance for the preparation of a program for using the \$75 million MDAA authorization, the Secretary specified that no assistance could be provided for Taiwan except for covert operations. The "general area" of China was expanded to include practically the entire Far East. In line with this interpretation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that most of the money be allocated to Indochina, where French and loyalist forces were battling Communist insurgents.⁹⁴

The progress of the Indochina revolt, and the evidence that Communist China was aiding the Viet Minh rebels, were among the facts that impelled the Joint Chiefs of Staff to question the policy of denying military aid to Nationalist China. Early in May 1950 they pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that conditions had changed since the preceding January. As evidence, they cited the Indochinese situation, the Communists' seizure of Hainan, and the arrival in China of aircraft and amphibious vessels supplied by the Soviet Union. They observed that the Nationalists "are presently absorbing the major attention and efforts of which the Chinese Communist forces are capable of exerting outside their borders" and expressed the view that it was in the US interest to ensure continued successful resistance by Chiang's forces. They renewed their recommendation that a survey mission be sent to Taiwan to determine aid requirements.⁹⁵

From Tokyo, General MacArthur—who, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had altered his views on the strategic importance of Taiwan—added his persuasive voice. In a long message on 29 May 1950, he described the threat that a hostile Taiwan would offer to the US position in the Pacific. Taiwan, he said, "is the equivalent of an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender." Operating from the island, Chinese or Soviet forces could strike at US bases on Okinawa and in the Philippines and sever the shipping lanes running southward from Japan. While he did not advocate military aid to the Nationalists, he warned that the United States must take some measures to prevent Communist seizure of Taiwan or else prepare to reinforce its positions in the Far East.⁹⁶

These views were presumably transmitted to Secretary Johnson, who, however, took no action at the moment. He was planning a trip to the Far East and doubtless wished to examine the situation for himself before reopening the issue of military assistance. In mid-June, accompanied by General Bradley (who had by then become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), he toured US military installations in the Far East and the Pacific and held extensive discussions in Tokyo with General MacArthur. The prospective Japanese peace treaty was the principal topic of these conversations, but Taiwan was also discussed. General MacArthur gave the two visitors a lengthy memorandum in which he again stressed the importance of Taiwan and endorsed the JCS suggestion for a military aid survey.⁹⁷

There the matter stood when the Korean War broke out. Secretary Johnson and General Bradley returned to Washington only a few hours before the news of

North Korea's attack. General Bradley drafted a memorandum for Secretary Johnson to send to the President, urging the sending of an aid mission to Taiwan, but it was overtaken by events and never used.⁹⁸ The crisis in Korea led the President quickly to abandon the "hands-off" policy toward Taiwan that he had announced on 5 January and ultimately to reverse his decision against furnishing military aid to Chiang. In the months that followed, the subject of Taiwan became bound up with that of Korea, partly because of General MacArthur's increasing advocacy of the cause of the Chinese Nationalists. When General MacArthur was dismissed in April 1951, the political currents that had shaped the partisan debate over Far Eastern policy rose powerfully to the surface. Many of the same voices that had clamored for aid to Chiang were raised in the General's defense, and recriminations over the disastrous outcome of the Chinese Civil War lent added bitterness to the ensuing debate.

The Balance of Forces in the Far East

By June 1950 the rival governments in North and South Korea had been in existence almost two years. Each possessed military forces, but those of North Korea were appreciably larger and better equipped. The Democratic People's Republic had available a force that, according to later information, approximated 135,000 men at the time of the invasion. Most of this strength was represented by the North Korean People's Army, which boasted seven infantry divisions at their full combat strength of 11,000 men each, plus a separate infantry regiment of 3,000, a tank brigade of 6,000, and a 2,000-man motorcycle regiment—a total combat force of almost 89,000 men. Three other divisions, newly activated, plus various other units, brought the NKPA to a total of over 116,000. It was backed up by a Border Constabulary of 18,600 men.

The heavy equipment available to the NKPA gave it an impressive superiority in fire power. Its artillery (mostly from Soviet sources) included 122-mm howitzers and 76-mm guns. The Soviet Union had also supplied 150 T-34 tanks of World War II vintage, as well as approximately 180 aircraft (of which 120 were of combat type) for the North Korean Air Force.⁹⁹

The ROK Army was outnumbered by its prospective foe and was deficient in several important respects. The South Koreans had eight infantry divisions totaling 65,000 men, plus an additional 33,000 in headquarters and service troops. All of the divisions were below their nominal strength of 10,000. Artillery was inferior in numbers, range, and caliber to that of the NKPA, and there were no tanks at all. Supplies of ammunition and of spare parts were inadequate. Training had not progressed beyond battalion level. The ROK Air Force of 1,865 men had available a total of 12 liaison aircraft and 10 trainers; the fighter aircraft recommended by KMAC had not yet been provided. In naval forces, the two nations were about equal; each possessed small numbers of patrol and other light craft.¹⁰⁰

Although some US military advisors in Korea expressed confidence in the ROK Army, its weaknesses in equipment and training left it wholly unready to

meet an all-out onslaught and nearly proved fatal to the Republic itself.¹⁰¹ To a large extent, they reflected the limited mission envisioned for the ROK Army in US plans. The purpose of the military assistance program for South Korea, as defined in NSC 8/2, was to provide an army "suitable for maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife and inspired disorder and for maintaining border security." To create a force able to repel a massive onslaught by a modern, well-equipped enemy army had been considered impossible. An additional consideration was a belief held by US advisory personnel that tanks could not operate effectively in Korea because of the rugged terrain and the poor condition of roads and bridges. This conviction, plus the scarcity of funds available, had led the Military Advisory Group to reject a request for tanks submitted by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense in October 1949.¹⁰²

Besides being limited in scope, the US aid program for South Korea was slow in execution. Over \$10 million was allocated for the purpose in FY 1950, but none of this assistance had reached South Korea when the war broke out. Signal equipment and spare parts totaling approximately \$350,000 in value were en route at that moment, together with another \$235,000 worth of equipment and armament for training aircraft and naval vessels which had been purchased by South Korea as "reimbursable" aid.¹⁰³

Ultimately, the salvation of South Korea was to be made possible by the proximity of US forces—notably troops from Japan, which was still under Allied occupation. US Army units in Japan consisted of four divisions—7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry—making up the Eighth Army under Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA. The average strength of these divisions was about 13,000 each—far below their authorized war strength of 18,900. They were widely scattered throughout the Japanese islands; the 24th and 25th, in the south, were closest to Korea and were to be drawn on first in the emergency. Nearby, in Okinawa, was the 29th Regiment, which was part of the separate Ryukyus Command (RYCOM).¹⁰⁴

Air Force elements in the Far East were divided among three numbered forces: 5th (Japan), 13th (Philippines), and 20th (Okinawa). Collectively, they constituted the Far East Air Force (FEAF), commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF. Their aggregate strength totaled 18 groups of fighters or fighter-bombers (approximately 350 aircraft), one wing of light bombers (B-26s) and one of medium bombers (B-29s), and several troop carrier units.¹⁰⁵

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, commanded the Navy Forces Far East (NAVFE), consisting of one light cruiser, four destroyers, and various mine, auxiliary, and amphibious craft. Not far away was the more powerful Seventh Fleet, based in Philippine waters and commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, with one aircraft carrier, one heavy cruiser, eight destroyers, and three submarines. It was a part of the forces assigned to the Pacific Command, headed by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, who, as Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), was General MacArthur's coequal.¹⁰⁶

The outbreak of war was to reveal that these forces were suffering from severe defects, largely stemming from the administration's effort to hold military appropriations and expenditures to a minimum. President Truman had laid down this economy objective in 1948 and had held to it in the preparation of the budgets for

fiscal years 1950 and 1951. Its effect was to force the Services to abandon the plans that they had drawn, following the hasty and ill-considered demobilization at the end of World War II, to expand their forces to levels judged necessary for the “cold war.” Thus the Army, which in 1947 had set a goal of twenty-five divisions, cut this back to ten and maintained the lower figure only with some difficulty. Secretary of Defense Johnson, when he took office in 1949, had forcefully supported the President’s economy program. He soon became wholly identified with it in the public mind, as a result of his frequent public statements, in which he proclaimed that “fat” was being excised without reducing “muscle.”¹⁰⁷

The Services were in fact well below the manpower strength authorized by Congress, and the administration intended to keep them so. The following table makes these facts clear:

	Authorized Strength	Actual Strength (30 June 50)	Objective in FY 51 Budget
Army	837,000	593,167	630,000
Navy		381,538	
Marine Corps		75,370	
(Navy-Marine Corps combined)	666,882	(456,908)	461,000
Air Force	502,000	411,277	416,000
Total	2,005,882	1,461,352	1,507,000 ¹⁰⁸

The effects of budgetary austerity were most readily apparent in the Army, which was to bear the brunt of the fighting in Korea. Fund restrictions were reflected in worn-out or obsolete equipment, inadequate stocks of supplies, shortened training periods, and other serious deficiencies. Although the number of divisions remained constant, the figures masked a serious decline in effectiveness. In the Eighth Army, for example, most combat units were short one-third of their combat strength so that (with one exception) infantry requirements had only two battalions, and artillery battalions only two batteries, instead of three.¹⁰⁹

Several months before the Korean War, President Truman had second thoughts about the wisdom of the rigid budget ceilings he had put into effect. In the light of Soviet progress in nuclear weaponry (signaled by the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949, some years ahead of US expectations), he had instructed the Secretaries of State and Defense to reexamine US strategic objectives and plans. A working group convened for this purpose concluded in April 1950 that programs devoted to national security should be substantially increased. The members of the group did not spell out detailed proposals, nor did they indicate how much additional money was needed. Their report (NSC 68) was awaiting consideration by the National Security Council when the Korean War began.¹¹⁰

It was not expected that the US forces in the Far East would play a major role in a general conflict. The Joint Outline Emergency War Plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1949 envisioned that Western Europe would be the principal theater of action. In the face of an expected Soviet/satellite thrust

westwards, the United States would seek to hold a bridgehead on the continent or to return as soon as possible. In the Far East, the United States would defend the Philippines, Japan, and Okinawa and would attempt to deny the enemy the use of Taiwan. No mention was made of Korea, which was presumably to be written off entirely.¹¹¹

The Eve of the Conflict

No one foresaw that the weak, underequipped occupation forces in Japan would one day be thrown into combat in Korea. It was known, however, that the border could erupt into war at any time, and Americans in Korea generally believed that a North Korean attack was certain.¹¹² Rumors of an impending invasion had been current at least as far back as 1948, as already described. Indeed, beginning in the spring of 1949 there were constant clashes along the 38th parallel. Most were on a small scale, but some involved artillery and resulted in heavy casualties. The ROK Army gave a good account of itself in these actions; some, in fact, were instigated by South Korean forces that crossed the border, inadvertently or on purpose.¹¹³

Frequent guerrilla activity in South Korea testified further to hostile Communist designs on President Rhee's government. A steady stream of trained North Korean agitators slipped southward across the border to instigate violent dissension. But the Communists failed to produce any outbreaks comparable in scale to the 1948 mutinies of the Constabulary, and by June 1950 the guerrilla situation was under control.¹¹⁴ Ambassador Muccio, speaking to a Congressional committee in the spring of 1950 in support of new military assistance legislation, reported that guerrilla strength had dropped from a peak of 2,000 in September 1949 to 577 in April 1950, and that "the threat of north Korean aggression seems, temporarily at least, to have been successfully contained." He warned, however, that "the undeniable materiel superiority of the [N]orth Korean forces would provide [N]orth Korea with the margin of victory in the event of a full-scale invasion of the Republic."¹¹⁵

The North Korean rulers made no secret of their desire to "liberate" their brethren in the south. Like President Syngman Rhee and his colleagues in Seoul, the Communists in P'yongyang regarded their own government as the only legitimate one in all of Korea. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General in October 1949, North Korea declared that it reserved the right to unify Korea by force.¹¹⁶ Communist demands for "unity" increased as the time of the attack drew near. In June 1950 the P'yongyang radio broadcast a proposal to establish a single government by 15 August 1950, the fifth anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan. President Rhee rejected this plan.¹¹⁷

Despite general awareness that a dangerous situation existed along the 38th parallel, the North Korean invasion came unexpectedly. The Far East Command, the intelligence community in general, and military and civilian policymakers and advisors in Washington (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) were alike taken

by surprise.¹¹⁸ The situation resembled that on the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. It was known that the prospective enemy (in this instance, the Soviet Union and its satellites) was quite *capable* of launching an attack in Korea (as in many other parts of the world). But evidences of an *intention* to attack at a specific time and place, however clear they looked when illuminated by hindsight, were difficult, at the time, to separate from mere “noise.”¹¹⁹ The Joint Intelligence Committee, speaking several days after the outbreak of the war, summed up the available intelligence as follows:

There were prior indications of the North Korean pushoff, including reports of civilian evacuation along [the] 38th parallel, but these were not regarded as sufficiently significant, in view of the fluid military situation in the general area, to justify prediction of military action.¹²⁰

Not everyone agreed with this assessment, and consequently there was some controversy over the extent to which Washington officialdom should have been forewarned. The disagreement began on 26 June 1950, when the Senate Appropriations Committee, which was then holding hearings on military aid, decided to question the Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter. His answers seemed to imply that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had provided ample clues to North Korea’s impending action, but that these had not been properly evaluated by other agencies of the government.¹²¹

As a result of this testimony, when the Director of Foreign Military Assistance in the Department of Defense, Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, USA, appeared before the same Committee, he was subjected to questions that he later described as “sharp and provocative.” Not having had complete access to all available intelligence himself, General Lemnitzer was at a disadvantage in trying to defend the Department. But he was able to assure the Committee that such intelligence as he had seen had warned only that North Korea was one of many places in which trouble might occur. After the testimony, General Lemnitzer reviewed all available CIA reports and satisfied himself that they did not support the implication that the Agency had provided specific warnings that were ignored.¹²²

Somewhat later, Colonel Reginald F. C. Vance, USAF, of the Joint Intelligence Committee, studied the evidence to determine to what extent the JCS organization had been warned by the CIA. He focused particularly on a report entitled “Current Capabilities of the Northern Korea Regime” (ORE 18–50), dated 19 June, with data complete as of 15 May, which, he believed, “may be considered the last word on CIA opinion as to an impending invasion.” As its title indicated, this report dealt only with possibilities. It did not, as had been rumored, contain specific statements that a military highway was under construction or that villages along the border were being evacuated. These two bits of information, according to Colonel Vance, had never reached Army Intelligence, G–2, which would have treated them as “critical intelligence.” “We are positively clear of accusation that we received any indication of invasion from CIA,” was his conclusion.¹²³

Several months thereafter, when press comments suggested that the Far East Command had alerted Washington, the Army’s G–2, Major General A. R. Bolling,

conducted his own review of intelligence from all sources. His conclusion, which supported General Lemnitzer and Colonel Vance, was that

all reporting agencies were aware of the consistently increasing strength of the North Korean armed forces and of their capability to invade the Republic of Korea. At no time, however, did any of the reporting agencies give a definite date for the opening of hostilities, or state that an invasion was imminent. On the contrary, the general tenor of the reporting agency comments was such as to indicate that, rather than resorting to the overt employment of military forces for the subjugation of the Republic of Korea, the North Korean regime would continue to employ guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and other means to attain their objective.¹²⁴

The UN Commission on Korea, which had observers along the border, noted an increase in border incidents and recommended "careful diplomatic explorations" with the Soviet Union to determine North Korea's intentions. Secretary-General Trygve Lie made an approach to the Soviets but learned nothing. Early in June 1950, the Commission took alarm from North Korea's increasing radio demands for the "liberation" of the south and expanded its observation teams. But at worst, the Commission expected only "some demonstration of force" as part of an "anticipated political offensive."¹²⁵

As to the reasons why North Korea decided to strike in June 1950, one can only conjecture. It was widely assumed at the time that the decision was made by the government of Premier Josef V. Stalin of Soviet Russia. Possibly, as was suggested later, the Soviets were stirred to action by the prospect of a peace treaty between the United States and Japan; they may have hoped that extension of Communist control to the entire Korean peninsula would counterbalance the strategic advantage that the United States could expect to obtain by allying itself with an independent Japan.¹²⁶ Certainly the degree of Soviet control over the North Korean People's Army, exerted through advisors at all levels, must have necessitated advance approval from Premier Stalin.

There is no proof, however, that the Soviet Government actually instigated the invasion. Evidence purportedly from Soviet sources—the reputed memoirs of Nikita S. Khrushchev, who later became Prime Minister of the USSR—indicates, for whatever it may be worth, that the initiative came from Kim Il Sung. Premier Stalin is said to have exercised a measure of restraint, fearing US intervention, though in the end he concurred. Mao Tse-tung is also said to have been consulted.¹²⁷

But that North Korea was guilty of flagrant aggression can hardly be doubted.¹²⁸ The superiority of the NKPA over that of South Korea, the apparent US unwillingness to defend Korea, and the relative weakness and wide dispersion of US forces doubtless combined to make the conquest of South Korea appear a reasonably safe venture.

The Attack and the Response

Washington Learns of the Invasion

North Korea's carefully prepared attack against its southern neighbor burst forth at approximately 0400 on Sunday, 25 June 1950.¹ The invasion force comprised seven infantry divisions, plus smaller units of the North Korean People's Army and the Border Constabulary—a total of 90,000 men. Supported by tanks and aircraft, the attackers surged forward against the five ROK divisions deployed along the border. The heaviest assault came in the west, where the North Korean I Corps had been weighted with four divisions and an armored brigade for an assault on Seoul. Two of these divisions moved along the road paralleling the coast, quickly capturing the city of Kaesong, just below the border, and mopping up the isolated South Korean troops on the Ongjin Peninsula. Other forces advanced along roads that converged at Uijongbu, some 20 miles north of South Korea's capital.

Near the center of the peninsula, two of the three divisions of the NK II Corps drove toward Ch'unch'on and Hongch'on, whence they could either continue southward or swing to the west to join the assault on the capital. The remaining division, aided by an independent infantry regiment, attacked along the east coast, with some units moving by road and others making amphibious landings well inside South Korean territory.

At 1100, after the invasion had been in progress for some hours, the North Korean Government, in a radio broadcast from P'yongyang, announced that war had been declared. A startled world learned that the Democratic People's Republic had been treacherously invaded by the forces of the "puppet" regime in Seoul and had been forced to strike back in self-defense.²

In Washington, DC, halfway around the world, it was still Saturday afternoon, 24 June, when the North Koreans struck. Government officials, wholly unaware of any impending crisis, had begun a leisurely schedule of weekend activities. President Truman had left to visit his family home in Independence, Missouri, after stopping off enroute to dedicate the new Friendship Airport, near

Baltimore. General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, US Army, was at his beach cottage on the Chesapeake Bay. Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter was on vacation in New England, as was Warren R. Austin, chief US delegate to the United Nations. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson was relaxing at his farm in suburban Maryland.³

Secretary Johnson and General Bradley, winding up a tour to the Far East, had returned to Washington about noon. During the trip, the Secretary, in his conversations, had indicated great interest in Taiwan. General Bradley concluded that he planned to discuss the subject with President Truman at an early opportunity.⁴

News of the North Korean attack took some hours to reach Washington. US military advisors with front line South Korean units reported the first contacts to KMAC headquarters in Seoul. As the reports accumulated, it became evident that something more than a mere border raid was under way.⁵

From Seoul, a United Press reporter, the US Military Attaché, and Ambassador John J. Muccio all relayed the news to Washington some time around 0930 Korean time, or approximately 2030 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) (Saturday night) in Washington.⁶ The reporter's dispatch was the first to arrive. At 2104 United Press officials were attempting to have it confirmed by the Department of State.⁷ Ambassador Muccio's message reached the Department at 2126 EDT.⁸ It read as follows:

According Korean Army reports which partly confirmed by KMAC field advisor reports, North Korean forces invaded ROK territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 A.M. Ongjin blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 A.M. North Korean infantry commenced crossing parallel in Ongjin area, Kaesong area, Chunchon area and amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 A.M. with some 10 North Korean tanks participating in operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of fighting in Kangnung area unclear, although it seems North Korean forces have cut highway. Am conferring with KMAC advisors and Korean officials this morning re situation.

It would appear from nature of attack and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes all out offensive against ROK.⁹

Officials of the Department of State at once relayed their information to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, who in turn notified Secretary of Defense Johnson. In fact, both of these officials had already been contacted by reporters seeking confirmation of the news from Seoul. At the moment, there was no occasion for either official to act. Secretary Johnson eventually retired after delegating to Mr. Pace the responsibility for acting in behalf of the Department of Defense.¹⁰

Messages from the Military Attaché in Seoul provided official notification to the Department of the Army. In the Operations Division (G-3) of the Army's General Staff, the duty officer had been alerted at 2200 by an officer of the Public Information Division who had heard press reports of fighting along the 38th parallel and wanted information about the status of US forces in Korea. The inquirer was referred to the Far East-Pacific Branch of G-3. The first message from the Attaché, briefer than Ambassador Muccio's but with much of the same information, was available in G-3 at 2245. Forty-five minutes later came a second mes-

sage, reporting that North Korea had declared war and that civilian refugees were already beginning to clog the roads. At this point, the duty officer notified Major General Charles L. Bolte, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, and his deputy, Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman.¹¹


Assuming the burden of acting for the Department of the Army, General Timberman established liaison with the ranking State Department official on duty, Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. At 0010 on 25 June, General Timberman ordered the establishment of a command post in G-3 and instructed the duty officer to make certain that any information forwarded by the Department of State was relayed to CINCFE.

At 0035 EDT a third message from the Attaché, reporting two YAK aircraft over Seoul, was received in G-3. Two minutes later a copy of Ambassador Muccio's dispatch came in. The duty officer contacted his opposite numbers in the Navy and the Air Force and found that they were already aware of the situation.¹²

Meanwhile, word of the attack had also reached the JCS organization, with the Washington press representatives providing the early notification. Lieutenant Colonel C. V. Clifton, USA, of the Chairman's office, was the JCS duty officer on the evening of 24 to 25 June. At 2330 he received an inquiry from a reporter who had sought information in vain from Department of Defense (DOD) officials. Checking with the JCS Message Center, Colonel Clifton learned that the rumored invasion had been officially verified and that Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, Director of the Joint Staff, had already been notified. Colonel Clifton called his superior, Colonel W. S. Matthews, USA, who at first considered it unnecessary to notify General Bradley, but eventually agreed to do so. (In fact, General Bradley, like others, had already received inquiries from reporters, whom he could not enlighten.)

Subsequently Colonel Clifton, after consulting with Admiral Davis, concerned himself with the preparation of a brief news announcement that the US Government knew of the invasion and that no US troops were involved. This statement, drafted with the aid of members of the DOD Office of Public Information and hastily cleared with the Department of State, was released to the press early on Sunday morning.¹³

As the night wore on, further information trickled in. Noteworthy was CINCFE's first message, based on reports from the Attaché and from KMAG, which was received in G-3 at 0502. It reported that all territory west of the Imjin River—the extreme northwestern part of South Korea, including the Ongjin Peninsula and the cities of Yonan, Kaesong, and Panmunjom—was considered lost. CINCFE believed that South Korea would try to defend along a line running from the southeast bank of the Imjin eastward through Ch'unch'on to Kangnung.¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, however, the Chief of KMAG, Colonel W.H.S. Wright, reported that two North Korean regiments had already crossed the Imjin 25 miles north of Seoul, though they were presently being contained.¹⁵ At 0610 the Military Attaché reported that three North Korean fighter aircraft had strafed Kimpo airfield, near Seoul.¹⁶ Later came a message from Ambassador Muccio urging the Department of State to support an urgent request that KMAG had made to CINCFE for immediate shipment of a ten days' supply of ammunition for the ROK Army.¹⁷



Map 2

None of these messages required immediate decision by military authorities. Indeed, there was no opportunity for any action on their part, since, as Secretary Johnson later said, "we really had very little to go on."¹⁸ There is no evidence that any JCS members, other than General Bradley, were notified that night.¹⁹

In contrast, the Department of State hummed with activity all night long. Secretary Acheson had been informed promptly and had tentatively decided that the United States should put the matter before the Security Council as soon as possible. The Secretary then telephoned President Truman in Independence, gave him the news of the crisis, and obtained his approval for the UN appeal. The UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie of Norway, had already been alerted. Assistant Secretary Rusk and his colleagues spent the rest of the night in making preparations for a meeting of the Security Council. They also kept in close touch with G-3.²⁰

The Initial US Response

When Sunday morning dawned in Washington, it was evening in Korea and the invasion had been in progress for more than twelve hours. At first the messages that poured into the capital from Seoul and Tokyo, adding further details to the store of information available there, did not sound excessively alarming. A CINCFE summary, received in G-3 at 1035,²¹ estimated the balance of forces as three NK divisions against four for South Korea, with a fifth ROK division moving up toward the battle front. The relinquishment of the territory west of the Imjin was reported to be in accord with an existing defense plan; it did not represent a "vital loss." North Korea's intentions were obscure, but the attack was "serious in strength and strategic intent," and had achieved tactical surprise, from which South Korean forces were struggling to recover. CINCFE concluded with a report that he was expediting the shipment of munitions to Korea and a suggestion that the Seventh Fleet be moved toward Korean waters as a precautionary measure.²²

About the same time, however, Major General C. A. Willoughby, G-2 of the Far East Command, was rendering a less reassuring report in a teletype conference (telecon) with officers in Washington—the first of many such conferences to be held in the days that followed. General Collins, hastily summoned from his vacation retreat, took part in this conference, along with his principal subordinates and representatives of the other Services, of CIA, and of the Department of State. General Willoughby told the Washington conferees that two North Korean divisions were attacking along the roads toward Uijongbu and that forty tanks were reported within five kilometers of that important road junction. "General situation points to tank breakthrough via Uijongbu," he declared. Already Ambassador Muccio had ordered US dependents evacuated from Seoul. On the other hand, according to General Willoughby, the withdrawal of ROK units had been orderly; the morale of the people was good, and the Government of South Korea was "reported to be standing firm and maintaining internal order."²³

In a message probably received in Washington soon after the telecon began, K MAG assessed the North Korean attack as a "full scale deliberate offensive" that was supported directly by armor and artillery and indirectly by aircraft. The attack had penetrated the border at five separate points, to a depth of approximately six miles. K MAG forecast that the attack would continue the next day, with direct air support and possibly with additional amphibious landings, this time on the west coast. Any additional forces thrown in by North Korea would divert South Korea's reserves and make it impossible to launch the counterattacks that were planned by the ROK Army.²⁴

Before the day was out, it was clear beyond a doubt that South Korea's military position was deteriorating. A CIA report gave information that the Capitol Division of the ROK Army was reinforcing the 7th Division for the "final defense" of Seoul. There was "brisk fighting," but "no effective resistance" except in the vicinity of Uijongbu, while on the east coast, an amphibious landing by a North Korean battalion below Kangnung had succeeded in severing both the road along the coast and the one that swung westward toward the interior.²⁵ And a second message from the Chief of K MAG, sent apparently some time after midnight in Korea, or about noon in Washington, announced that Ch'unch'on, P'och'on, and Tongduch'on-ni—key points on three of the roads leading to Seoul—had all fallen to the invaders.²⁶

Alarming messages also flowed into Washington via diplomatic channels. Ambassador Muccio's report that he had decided to order evacuation of US dependents reached the Department of State at 1132 hours.²⁷ Later the Ambassador reported an interview with a distraught President Syngman Rhee, who announced that the government would move to Taejon, approximately 100 air-line miles south of Seoul.²⁸

In addition to Ambassador Muccio, the Department of State happened to have in the Far East another source of information and advice in the person of John Foster Dulles, who three years later was to occupy the Secretaryship. Earlier in 1950 he had been appointed a special advisor to Secretary Acheson in the interests of bipartisan foreign policy. At the moment of the North Korean attack, he was in Japan, investigating the possibility of a peace treaty.²⁹ His companion on this journey was Mr. John M. Allison, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in the Department of State. On Sunday morning, about 1030,³⁰ the Department received from Messrs. Dulles and Allison a message containing the first recommendation for strong US action in the crisis. It read as follows:

It is possible that South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appears they cannot do so then we believe that US forces should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond.³¹

This message pointed the way toward the course of action that the United States was ultimately to adopt. At the time it was received, however, the question

of employing force to rescue South Korea had not arisen. Diplomatic action—an appeal to the United Nations—was the chosen course of action, and as during the night just passed, military planners played a secondary role on Sunday morning. General Bradley, the JCS Chairman, had been scheduled to fly to Norfolk that afternoon with Secretary Johnson to attend an orientation conference for civilian leaders. After discussing the matter informally with the other JCS members, the General and the Secretary concluded that there was no reason why they should not go through with the trip.³²

Before leaving, General Bradley put on record some of his thoughts on the new crisis for the benefit of his colleagues. He did so in connection with a memorandum on the subject of Taiwan, which, in his eyes, clearly outstripped Korea in importance. Aware of Secretary Johnson's intention to discuss Taiwan with President Truman, General Bradley sent the other JCS members a draft memorandum, intended for the Secretary to send to the President, which recommended that a survey team be sent to the island to ascertain how it could be prevented from falling into unfriendly hands.

While in the Far East, General Bradley had discussed the ROK Army with Brigadier General William L. Roberts, USA, the outgoing Chief of the KMAG. On the basis of what he had then learned, General Bradley felt somewhat optimistic regarding South Korea's ability to survive, since, like others in Washington at that time, he underrated the military strength of North Korea. "I am of the opinion," he wrote to his colleagues, "that South Korea will not fall in the present attack unless the Russians actively participate in the operation. Therefore," he continued, "if Korea falls, we may want to recommend even stronger action in the case of Formosa in order to offset the effect of the fall of South Korea on the rest of East Asia." General Bradley evidently had little or no thought that the United States might reverse its earlier decision and fight to save South Korea.³³

The constant round of activity in the State Department that had begun on Saturday night continued into Sunday. Preparations for a forthcoming meeting of the UN Security Council went hand in hand with consideration of a graver contingency—that North Korea's invasion might continue regardless of any action that might be taken by the United Nations. To consider what to do in this event, officials of State and Army held a joint meeting beginning at 1130 on Sunday morning. Secretary Acheson took part in this meeting, along with Under Secretary Webb, Assistant Secretary Rusk, and others. General Collins and General Timberman were the principal Army representatives.³⁴

At this conference, the State representatives suggested a program of action to provide a measure of US support for the hard-pressed South Korean forces.³⁵ After some discussion, during which other JCS members were apparently consulted,³⁶ the State Department suggestions were tentatively approved. Since most of them involved action by CINCFE, the Army representatives at once transmitted them to that commander by telecon, as follows:

1. CINCFE should be authorized to send to Korea any military equipment recommended by the US mission to Korea, regardless of current programs.

2. US military advisors should remain with South Korean forces so long as the latter were combat effective.

3. CINCFE's area of responsibility should be extended to include operational control of all US military activities in Korea.

4. Forces from CINCFE's command (principally Navy and Air) should be employed to establish a protective zone around Seoul, Kimpo Air Base, and Inchon, to ensure safe evacuation of US nationals and to gain time for reaction to political measures now before the United Nations.

5. In the event that the UN Security Council called on member nations to take direct action in Korea, CINCFE should be authorized and directed to employ forces of his command, plus units from the Seventh Fleet, to stabilize the combat situation, including if feasible the restoration of original boundaries at the 38th parallel.

The last of these suggestions was particularly significant. The planners had already faced up to the possibility that the United States might find it necessary to resort to force. It was made clear to CINCFE, however, that the recommendations had not yet been approved by the President and that they were being transmitted merely for planning purposes. CINCFE was told also that the Department of State had concurred that a survey group from the Far East Command should be sent to South Korea at once to determine how much aid would be needed (including the possible use of military forces) to hold the Seoul-Kimpo-Inch'on area.³⁷

Meanwhile Secretary Acheson had again called President Truman early in the afternoon. He read to the President the draft of a US resolution for the Security Council, which would call on North Korea to end hostilities and withdraw to the original border, but he warned that North Korea probably would not comply. The President foresaw that some painful decisions would soon be required and that his presence in Washington was essential. He told the Secretary that he would return immediately and asked that suitable recommendations be drawn up for presentation to him as soon as he arrived. Later, enroute home via aircraft, the President directed his radio operator to send another message to the Secretary, asking him to assemble the chief military and diplomatic policy advisors for a dinner and conference at Blair House, across from the White House (which was at that time being repaired).³⁸

The President had become convinced that the United States could not afford to let South Korea fall to aggression. According to his later account, he spent his time on the return trip reviewing those instances before World War II in which the Western democracies had evaded direct challenges and had allowed Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Austria to be seized by totalitarian powers whose appetites grew instead of diminishing. As he wrote:

I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.³⁹

Secretary Acheson was also thinking along similar lines, as indicated in the following account of his state of mind on Sunday evening, taken from his memoirs:

Plainly, this attack did not amount to a *casus belli* against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore, we could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with no more resistance than words and gestures in the Security Council. It looked as though we must steel ourselves for the use of force. That did not mean, in words used later by General Mark Clark, that we must be prepared "to shoot the works for victory," but rather to see that the attack failed.⁴⁰

While the President was in flight toward Washington, the UN Security Council, called into emergency session, was meeting at Lake Success, New York, to consider the new threat to peace. The Soviet representative, Yakov A. Malik, was absent by choice, so the Council was free of the threat of a Soviet veto. After several hours of debate, the Council approved with slight amendment a resolution presented by the US delegation. As finally passed, this resolution noted with "grave concern" the "armed attack" upon South Korea and characterized this action as "a breach of the peace." It called for "immediate cessation of hostilities" by both sides and for withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. All UN members were urged "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The vote on the resolution was 9-0, with Yugoslavia abstaining because that country's principal delegate was on vacation and could not be reached.⁴¹

Also during Sunday afternoon, the Department of State instructed the US Embassy in Moscow to deliver a note asking the Soviet Union to disavow responsibility for the "unprovoked and unwarranted attack" on South Korea and to "use its influence with North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately."⁴² The purpose of this step, as later explained by the Secretary of State, was twofold: (1) to make it clear to the Soviets that they could not use their satellites as cat's paws for aggressive action without directly involving their own prestige and (2) to counteract the Soviet "peace" offensive, which had been under way for some months and was apparently deluding many people.⁴³

Late in the afternoon, President Truman's plane landed at Washington Airport and he hurried to Blair House to meet with his advisors. The conference began about 1945 and lasted until approximately 2300. Those present included General Bradley and Secretary Johnson, who had returned from Norfolk, as well as the other three JCS members: General J. Lawton Collins, USA; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF. The Service Secretaries were also present: Frank Pace (Army), Francis P. Matthews (Navy), and Thomas K. Finletter (Air Force). The Department of State was represented by Secretary Acheson and his principal assistants.⁴⁴

In the opening conversation that preceded dinner, Secretary Johnson, as General Bradley had foreseen, seized the opportunity to introduce the subject of Taiwan, which in his view, as he later said, "entered into our security more than Korea." At his request, General Bradley read aloud a memorandum given them by General MacArthur during their recent visit to Tokyo, urging that CINCFE be authorized to send a survey party to determine the amount of aid needed to keep the island out of Communist hands. The President, instead of responding directly, ruled that all discussion of the Far Eastern situation would be postponed until after dinner.⁴⁵

When dinner was over and the staff had withdrawn, the President asked Secretary Acheson for his views on the Korean crisis. The Secretary, as he wrote later, "gave a darkening report of great confusion," and then presented the major recommendations drawn up in the State-Army conference earlier that day: that arms and equipment be sent to Korea at once by CINCFE and that US forces be ordered to protect the evacuation of US nationals. He recommended also that the Seventh Fleet be ordered to proceed northward from its station in the Philippine Islands and given a mission of preventing any attack from mainland China against Taiwan or vice versa. The Secretary described his proposals as the joint recommendation of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These recommendations were endorsed, tacitly or explicitly, by all those present. General Bradley expressed the feelings of the group with his remark, "We must draw the line somewhere." In Mr. Truman's later words, there was

complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States could back away from it. This was the test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security.

The conferees went on to discuss the effectiveness of Secretary Acheson's measures in the light of the probability that the North Korean aggression would continue. General Bradley and Secretary Pace doubted the advisability of sending US ground forces to Korea. Admiral Sherman stressed the importance of protecting South Korea's coasts. General Vandenberg thought that US aircraft could stop the North Korean armed forces if the Soviets did not intervene. The President asked a number of penetrating questions regarding the size and readiness of US forces in the Far East—questions that showed that he was facing up to the possibility of US intervention.

In the end, the President approved all of the recommendations made by Secretary Acheson, with the stipulation that the Seventh Fleet mission would be subject to review when the units had reached position in the Taiwan Straits. The Secretary had said nothing about a CINCFE survey mission to Korea; General Collins brought up the subject, evidently feeling the need for a high-level decision on this question, and the President approved it. At the same time, Mr. Truman, looking beyond the immediate situation, directed certain steps that would be necessary if the United States were ultimately to intervene in Korea. He

instructed the Service Chiefs to prepare orders for use of US military forces if the Security Council should call for such action. Also, at the suggestion of Secretary Johnson, he authorized a shift of jet aircraft to US bases in the Ryukyus.⁴⁶

Following the meeting, three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Collins and Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman—accompanied by Secretaries Pace and Finletter, conferred by teletype with General MacArthur and his immediate subordinates. The President's decisions were conveyed to CINCFE in the following words:

1. CINCFE authorized to dispatch survey party to Korea for purposes outlined in . . . earlier telecon this date.

2. CINCFE authorized to send any ammunition and equipment to Korea he deems necessary to prevent loss of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area with appropriate air and naval cover to insure safe arrival.

3. FECOM [Far East Command] authorized to take such action by air and Navy as necessary to prevent overrunning of Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area in order to insure safe evacuation US dependents and such other US noncombatants as determined by USEmb Korea.

4. 7th Fleet ordered to proceed immediately to Sasebo and report [to] COMNAVFEC [Commander, Naval Forces Far East] for operational control.

CINCFE was warned that "further high level decisions may be expected as military and political situations develop." Asked if further instructions were necessary, General MacArthur replied "no." He gave a rather reassuring report on the situation in Korea. The Ambassador and the Chief of KMAG reported "increased steadiness" of South Korean troops in the vicinity of Seoul; the landing in the vicinity of Kangnung had been contained, and Ch'unch'on had been retaken.⁴⁷

As Sunday evening, 25 June 1950, drew to a close in Washington, the steps that the United States had taken toward intervention in Korea were highly tentative. It would have been easy, with no sacrifice of national prestige, to have stopped with these measures, writing off South Korea as a total loss in accord with the policy adopted in 1949. But the President and the Secretary of State had made up their minds that they would do no such thing. If the North Korean attack should continue, in defiance of the United Nations, they were prepared to move toward stronger action.

On the following morning, about 1145 EDT,⁴⁸ President Truman released a brief statement that the US Government "is pleased with the speed and determination with which the United Nations Security Council acted" and "will vigorously support the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace." Nothing was said about the kind of support that the United States might offer. But the final paragraph carried a solemn warning that the government of Premier Kim Il Sung in North Korea might well have heeded more carefully:

Those responsible for this act of aggression must realize how seriously the Government of the United States views such threats to the peace of the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that support the United Nations Charter.⁴⁹

Air and Naval Forces Committed to the Battle

The dawn of Monday, 26 June 1950, in Washington brought an end to the cautious optimism that CINCFE had expressed on Sunday night in his teletype conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Korea, the ROK Army had planned a counterattack to remove the threat to Uijongbu, with two divisions operating along the roads leading north and northeast from that city. The operation began on the morning of 26 June in Korea, or Sunday evening in Washington. At first it showed some promise; the ROK 7th Division, moving northward, drove back the North Korean 4th Division.⁵⁰ It was perhaps this early success that was responsible in part for CINCFE's encouraging report on Sunday night, and also for a similar message by Ambassador Muccio about the same time. ROK troops, according to the Ambassador, had made a "gallant comeback" and had stabilized the situation; there was some evidence that North Korean armor and artillery was "withdrawing all along the line."⁵¹

But this promising start was nullified by the utter failure of the second prong of the attack, along the northeastern road. The ROK 2d Division, charged with this mission, was soon in retreat before the NK 3d Division. By the end of the day both ROK divisions had fallen back toward Seoul, abandoning Uijongbu to the foe. Elsewhere, other ROK units stood firm; the 1st Division on the south bank of the Imjin northwest of Seoul, the 6th at Ch'unch'on in the center, and the 8th on the east coast north of Kangnung. The collapse of the counterattack, however, had sealed the fate of South Korea's capital. In the words of an official US Army historian, "The failure of the 2d Division above Uijongbu portended the gravest consequences. The ROK Army had at hand no other organized force that could materially affect the battle above Seoul."⁵²

When Uijongbu fell, it was Monday morning, 26 June 1950, in Washington. The passing hours brought messages warning of the grave threat to Seoul.⁵³ In midafternoon, CINCFE reported the opinion of Colonel Wright, Chief of KMAG, that, as of 270145 Korean time, the situation was "critical" owing to the "demoralization" of South Korea's Chief of Staff, General Chae Byong Duk. The 2d and 7th Divisions were under orders to resume their counterattack at daybreak, but Colonel Wright saw little prospect of their success. With the exception of a single regiment in the vicinity of Pusan, far to the south, the entire South Korean Army was now committed to the battle. Colonel Wright believed that the North Koreans could take Seoul within twenty-four hours. Apparently few plans were being made to fight on after the capital was lost. General Chae's attitude was that the fall of Seoul meant the fall of South Korea. "The situation is practically hopeless, but it need not be," was Colonel Wright's summary, according to CINCFE.⁵⁴

In a later message, CINCFE gave his own highly alarming assessment of the situation as of 271000 Korean time (262100 EDT). "Piecemeal" commitment of two reserve ROK divisions (the 3d and 5th), he reported, "has not succeeded in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main effort for the past 2 days." North Korean tanks were reported to be entering the suburbs of Seoul, and the South Korean Government had fled southward. CINCFE's conclusion was:

South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive. Contributory factor exclusive enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that complete collapse is imminent.⁵⁵

The departure of President Rhee and his cabinet had been reported by Ambassador Muccio, who was not sure of their destination, though he had heard a rumor that the President was bound for Chinhae, a naval base on the south coast near Pusan. The Ambassador was able to counterbalance this news with an encouraging item: he had been assured by the acting Prime Minister that the ROK Army was determined to go on fighting.⁵⁶

Before leaving Seoul, the Korean National Assembly had approved an urgent appeal to the United States asking "effective and timely aid" in defeating the aggression, with another similarly worded plea to the UN General Assembly. Ambassador Muccio forwarded the texts of these appeals to Washington on Monday morning.⁵⁷ In the afternoon, South Korea's Ambassador to the United States, Mr. John M. Chang, went to the White House to deliver a copy of this appeal and to pass on the substance of another plea communicated to him several hours earlier by President Rhee via telephone. The Ambassador's mien reflected the increasingly desperate situation of his government. President Truman tried to cheer him up by telling him that military materiel for his country's forces was on its way.⁵⁸

The forecasts of impending catastrophe voiced by US representatives in the Far East and by the Government of South Korea on 26 June were reinforced by a report submitted by the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK). This message, sent to Washington by Ambassador Muccio for relay to the UN Secretary-General, warned that:

North Korean advances have created dangerous situation with possibilities of rapid deterioration. Impossible estimate situation which will exist tomorrow in Seoul. In view commission's past experience and existing situation commission convinced North Korea will not heed council resolution nor accept UNCOK good offices. Suggests for council consideration either invitation both parties agree on neutral mediator to negotiate peace or request a member government undertake immediate mediation. Commission decided standby in Seoul. Danger is that critical operations now in progress may end in matter of days and question of cease fire and withdrawal North Korean forces as suggested council resolution prove academic.⁵⁹

Amid this succession of gloomy reports, one bright spot for the United States was the beginning of the successful evacuation of US nationals from Korea, under the supervision of Ambassador Muccio. Early on Monday morning, 26 June (Korea time), Americans from Seoul were transported to the port of Inch'on, where as many as possible crowded aboard a Norwegian freighter in the harbor. By 1630 the vessel was loaded and weighed anchor, bound for Japan. Those who could not find places on this ship were subsequently evacuated by airlift from Kimpo airfield, near Seoul, or from Suwon, farther south. Other nonessential US nationals from Taejon, Taegu, and Pusan made their escape by

ship from the last-named city. By 29 June the evacuation had been completed without a single casualty.⁶⁰

During the evacuation, F-82 fighter aircraft of the Far East Air Force, operating from Japanese bases, prevented any interference by North Korean aircraft. In the process, US and NK forces clashed for the first time. At 270810 in Korea (261910 EDT), two US pilots shot down a YAK-3 fighter over Kimpo airfield. Several others were subsequently destroyed in the next few days, with no US losses.⁶¹

Throughout the day of 26 June, the Korean crisis doubtless weighed heavily upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the afternoon, they met formally for the first time in four days to discuss Taiwan and various other subjects; no doubt the situation in Korea was touched upon during the meeting.⁶² Earlier, General Collins had received a report of developments by teleconference from FECOM. Two of his senior subordinates, General Wade H. Haislip and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, again consulted FECOM at 1930 that evening.⁶³

Admiral Sherman conferred with Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, who happened to be in Washington when the Korean crisis broke. He had been scheduled to return to the Far East on Sunday, 25 June, but at Admiral Sherman's request, postponed his departure until after the conclusion of the pending Sunday evening talks with the President. On the following day, 26 June, Admiral Sherman told him that US forces "would definitely be committed in Korea."⁶⁴ Presumably Admiral Sherman based this forecast on his observation of the attitude of the President as revealed at the Sunday meeting.

Since it was becoming clear that North Korea had no intention of complying with the Security Council resolution of 25 June, the Department of State, which continued to take the initiative, drew up plans for the next step. On Monday morning, 26 June, Secretary Acheson had testified before Congress concerning forthcoming appropriations. When he returned to his office, the Secretary spent the afternoon preparing a new set of proposals to submit to President Truman. After conferring with officials of the Department of Defense (who are not named in available sources), Secretary Acheson telephoned the President about 1930 and persuaded him to call another meeting at Blair House later that evening.⁶⁵

At 2100 on 26 June, most of those who had taken part in the Sunday night conference, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assembled at Blair House once more.⁶⁶ There was a brief discussion of the alarming news from South Korea. General Bradley described the military situation, indicating General MacArthur's expectation that Seoul would soon fall. When General Vandenberg reported the destruction of the first North Korean fighter aircraft, the President expressed the hope that it would not be the last.

General Vandenberg then read the orders that had been sent to US Air Force (USAF) units operating in Korea, directing them to take "aggressive action" against any aircraft interfering with their mission or operating in a manner unfriendly to South Korean forces. He added, however, that USAF aircraft had been avoiding combat in situations where the direct execution of their orders was not involved.

Secretary Acheson proposed that US air and naval forces be instructed to waive all restrictions on their operations within Korea and to offer the fullest pos-

sible help to South Korean forces, including attacks on North Korean troops, armor, and artillery. He hoped that such action would provide the ROK forces a breathing spell in which to regroup. The President approved this suggestion, but stipulated that, for the time being at least, no action was to be taken north of the 38th parallel.

In order to give international sanction to this open military intervention, Secretary Acheson proposed that a resolution be presented to the UN Security Council, which was scheduled to meet the next day. Such a resolution, he believed, would receive full support from all UN members except the Communist nations. A draft resolution for this purpose, recommending that UN members render such assistance as was needed to help South Korea repel the attack, was read to the group by Mr. John D. Hickerson of the State Department. The Chief Executive emphatically endorsed it, saying he wanted "everyone in on this, including Hong Kong."

Continuing his proposals, Secretary Acheson again recommended that the US Seventh Fleet be charged with preventing hostilities between Taiwan and Communist China. He also recommended accelerated military assistance to the Government of the Philippines, which was beset with a Communist insurgency, in order that the United States might have a "firm base" there. Ranging farther afield, he urged that aid to Indochina be stepped up and that a strong military mission be sent there. Secretary Johnson expressed complete agreement with these recommendations, and President Truman approved them.

General Collins characterized the military situation in Korea as "bad" and expressed doubt that air power would suffice to stabilize the situation. Secretaries Acheson and Johnson stressed that the United States must do something, even if its efforts proved unsuccessful. The Secretary of Defense then queried each of the military representatives regarding the actions that had been approved, and found that none had any objections. There was some discussion of possible Soviet reaction, but the consensus was that this was unlikely.

President Truman observed that he had exerted his utmost for five years to prevent the kind of situation that had now developed in Korea. Nevertheless, he went on, the United States must do everything possible to meet the situation—"for the United Nations." General Bradley warned that if US ground forces were sent to Korea, it would be impossible to meet other commitments without mobilization. The President instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the question of mobilization. "I don't want to go to war," he added. It was agreed, after a short discussion, that no decision on mobilization would be made for a few days.

Throughout the meeting, it was apparent that Secretary Acheson was the motivating force and that his proposals commanded the assent of all concerned. When the meeting adjourned (after lasting only an hour or so), the President had approved all of the Secretary's recommendations.⁶⁷

Following the meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, held a teleconference with General MacArthur and his principal subordinates. The following instructions were given to CINCFE:

All restrictions on employment of FECOM Navy and Air Forces are removed. They will offer fullest possible support to South Korean (SK) forces so as to permit these forces to reform.

Purpose of above action is to support SK forces in accordance with resolution of United Nations approved 25 June.

In addition 7th Fleet will take station so as to prevent invasion of Formosa and to insure that Formosa not be used as base of operations against Chinese mainland.

Detailed instructions reference Navy and Air Forces follow:

All restrictions which have previously prevented the full utilization of the U.S. Far East Air Forces to support and assist the defense of the South Korean territory are lifted for operations below the 38th parallel. All North Korean tanks, guns, military columns and other military targets south of the 38th parallel are cleared for attack by U.S. Air Forces. The purpose is to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. Similarly Naval forces may be used without restriction in coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea south of 38th parallel against forces engaged in aggression against South Korea.

General MacArthur was also instructed to use every available method to inform South Korea's civilian and military leaders, as well as Ambassador Muccio, of these decisions. On his part, the General was able to report that the first ship carrying ammunition and artillery would be ready to depart Yokohama later that day and would reach Pusan within three days; additional ammunition and other vital supplies would be airlifted as soon as a suitable landing point could be determined.⁶⁸

By a separate message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transferred operational control of the Seventh Fleet from CINCPAC to CINCFE and assigned it the mission of preventing, by naval and air action, any attack on Formosa or any sea or air offensives from Formosa against the Chinese mainland.⁶⁹

The decisions made on the evening of 26 June were announced to the nation in a statement released by President Truman on the following morning. This statement had been drafted in the Department of State and revised in consultation with officials of the Department of Defense (including Secretary Johnson and General Bradley) after the evening meeting.⁷⁰ News of the gravest step of all—the interposition of US forces in the fighting in Korea—was contained in a single, brief sentence: "... I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support." The President justified this measure on the grounds that North Korea had ignored the Security Council resolution demanding an end to hostilities. He urged all UN members to "consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs," he pointed out, "would have far-reaching effects."

The President devoted two paragraphs of his statement to the subject of Taiwan. He made it clear that the policy of nonintervention in the Chinese civil war, announced on 5 January 1950, no longer obtained. As he said:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. ... In these circumstances the occupation of

Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.⁷¹

Before releasing this statement, President Truman had read it to a group of key Congressional leaders of both parties whom he had invited to attend a meeting at the White House on the morning of 27 June. The Joint Chiefs of Staff attended this meeting, as did the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Service Secretaries. After hearing a full exposition of the Korean situation from Mr. Acheson, the Congressmen expressed approval of the steps that had been taken thus far.⁷²

On the afternoon of 27 June, Congress discussed the Korean situation and the President's response. An overwhelming majority in both houses supported what the President had done. A few conservative Republican Senators questioned the President's right to act as he had without first consulting Congress, while one member of the House of Representatives who represented the extreme left side of the political spectrum was harsh in his denunciation. The general conviction that strong action was needed became evident when the House, by a vote of 315-4, approved a one-year extension of the Selective Service Act, incorporating a provision authorizing the President to mobilize reservists of all the Services. On the next day, the Senate approved the measure by 70-0.⁷³

The UN Security Council also met on the afternoon of 27 June. Once more the Soviet representative failed to attend. Ambassador Austin submitted a resolution urging that UN members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." Some Council members drew back in alarm before this forthright call for action. But eventually, just before midnight, the resolution was approved, with one negative vote (Yugoslavia) and two abstentions (Egypt and India).⁷⁴

In Moscow, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN (Ret.), had, with some difficulty, delivered a note to the Soviet Government on 27 June. The note requested that the USSR use its influence with North Korea to halt the attack upon South Korea. However, this request was rejected, as might have been foreseen.⁷⁵

The Failure of Limited Intervention

Decisions taken in Washington or in Lake Success could not in themselves retrieve the worsening situation in South Korea. In Tokyo, General MacArthur,

as soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed him of President Truman's decision to intervene, had ordered the Far East Air Force to hurl everything possible against the advancing foe. Aerial operations began with attacks by B-26 bombers on the night of 27 to 28 June (Korea time), but their effectiveness was curtailed by adverse weather. More extensive action took place the next day. B-26s and F-80 fighter aircraft were supplemented by the use of B-29s, hastily deployed from Guam to Japan and pressed into service as tactical weapons. Targets were North Korean troops, tanks, artillery, and road and rail traffic.⁷⁶

As a forward headquarters to aid in directing the US military effort in Korea, General MacArthur was able to make use of the survey mission that had been authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their initial directive on Sunday night, 25 June (or Monday morning in Tokyo). Brigadier General John H. Church was selected to head this group. By the time he was ready to depart on 27 June, the second JCS message, ordering air and naval support for South Korea, had been received. General MacArthur accordingly redesignated the survey group as the General Headquarters (GHQ) Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM).

General Church reached Korea about 1900 on 27 June. He at once established liaison with the ROK Chief of Staff, General Chae, and stressed to that officer the vital importance of holding the line of the Han River. But it soon became evident to General Church that it would not be possible to drive the invaders back to the 38th parallel unless US troops were employed. He advised CINCFE of this opinion on 28 June.⁷⁷

The interposition of US air and naval forces was of enormous significance for the future course of the war, but it did not save Seoul. The city had been under assault as early as the evening of 27 June, when elements of the NK 3d Division, fresh from the seizure of Uijongbu, reached the northern outskirts. These first invaders were repelled, but they were soon followed by others. During the night of 27 to 28 June the bridges over the Han River, on the southern edge of the city, were destroyed by explosions, apparently by command of someone of authority in the ROK defense establishment. This catastrophe, in which many civilian refugees lost their lives, prevented any orderly withdrawal of troops and especially of heavy equipment.

Nevertheless the defenders of Seoul hung on through the night and on into the following day. Elements of the enemy's 3d and 4th Divisions finally forced their way into the city about noon on 28 June—just about the time when the Security Council, in New York, was approving the resolution calling on member nations to help save South Korea. During the afternoon the remaining ROK troops withdrew and the North Koreans took complete control, aided by a native fifth column organized in advance by quislings.⁷⁸

Seoul had fallen, but by no means could the US response be ridiculed as "too little and too late." Its psychological effect had been enormous—perhaps decisive. On the morning of 28 June in Korea, while the fate of Seoul was still in doubt, Ambassador Muccio appraised this result as follows:

Situation had deteriorated so rapidly had not President's decision plus arrival General Church party become known here, doubtful any organized Korean resis-

tance would have continued through night. Combat aid decision plus Church's orders have had great morale effect, forthcoming air strikes hoped demoralize enemy make possible reform Korean Army south bank Han River.⁷⁹

In a later message, the Ambassador stressed that it was vital to provide constant visible evidence of the presence of US airpower, even if no profitable military targets were struck.⁸⁰

The fall of Seoul was accompanied by other alarming developments. Though the bulk of the North Korean Army remained north of the Han, elements of the NK 6th Division crossed the river west of Seoul and seized Kimpo airfield. The central front collapsed when the ROK 6th Division, still undefeated but now in an untenable position, withdrew southward toward Wonju, abandoning Ch'unch'on and Kap'yong.⁸¹

A brief lull, lasting a day or two, then ensued while North Korean forces regrouped for a massive thrust southward across the Han. As a result, policy-makers in Washington had a chance to pause and take a look at the effectiveness of the measures upon which they had embarked. The news of the fall of Seoul reached Washington on the morning of 28 June,⁸² but occasioned no action, since there was nothing the United States could do at the moment. It was, as Secretary Acheson later wrote, "a day of pause in the rush of decisions."⁸³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 28 June and assigned two tasks to subordinate organizations.⁸⁴ The Joint Strategic Survey Committee was to prepare, by 0800 on 30 June, an answer to the following question:

In the event that the current course of action now being undertaken in Korea is unsuccessful, what course of action, from a military point of view, should be taken?

The Committee was instructed to consider the possibility of US aircraft operations north of the 38th parallel, as well as other actions that could be taken "in lieu of committing ground troops." The use of this phrase betokened a desire to avoid complete involvement in Korea. In passing this assignment to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), the Director of the Joint Staff, Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "do *not* want to commit troops."⁸⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed the JSPC to prepare a directive for General MacArthur that would codify all the instructions given him thus far. This draft directive should be available in time for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit it to the Secretary of Defense by 0900 on 29 June. It was to contain instructions applicable in case of Soviet intervention. As guidance for this contingency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appended to their instructions a policy statement drafted by the Department of State. It declared that the decision to intervene in Korea with air and naval forces, though taken in the "full realization" of the risk of war with the Soviet Union, did not in itself constitute a decision to fight a major war with that country in Korea. Hence, if substantial Soviet forces appeared, US forces should report to Washington and await instructions, meanwhile eschewing any action that might aggravate the situation. This statement had been transmitted earlier that day to Secretary Johnson; he had approved it and directed the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to include it in a "comprehensive document" to be sent to the President and the Secretary of State when completed.⁸⁶

In another action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a proposal by Admiral Sherman to temporarily assign one attack carrier, one destroyer squadron, and various auxiliaries to the Seventh Fleet, and another attack carrier and a destroyer division to the Sixth Fleet (in the Mediterranean). The effect would be to double the carrier strength of each fleet. They sought the approval of Secretary Johnson for these measures and received it on the following day.⁸⁷

On the afternoon of 28 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the Service Secretaries, attended a meeting of the NSC—the first since 18 May and the eighth since the beginning of 1950. The entire meeting dealt with the Korean crisis and its implications elsewhere in the world. The possibility of a Soviet reaction was discussed. President Truman took note of, and approved, the State Department's policy statement regarding Soviet intervention in Korea. He wanted a special effort to gather intelligence on Soviet participation in Korean hostilities and on Soviet activities in other sensitive areas, notably Yugoslavia and Iran. He directed the NSC to make a survey of all policies relating to the entire perimeter of the USSR and approved a suggestion by Secretary Acheson that the Department of Defense prepare a review of US military capabilities as a guide to the range of available options.

The President observed that he was doing his best to avoid creating a feeling of panic among the American people. Secretary Acheson warned that the United States would face a serious situation if the crisis in Korea dragged on instead of being quickly resolved. Mr. Truman replied however, that he "did not intend to back out" unless it became necessary to meet another crisis elsewhere.

The NSC members discussed a British offer of naval aid that had been made public that day and agreed that it should be accepted. President Truman reaffirmed his decision against air operations north of the 38th parallel, but indicated that he might in the future be willing to authorize attacks on North Korean air bases and fuel sources.⁸⁸

On the following day, 29 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had available the draft directive for CINCFE that had been drawn up by the JSPC. The Committee's version went beyond a mere collation of existing instructions; in effect, it called for a significant extension of currently authorized military activity. In the view of the JSPC, CINCFE should be authorized to use naval and air forces to provide the "fullest possible support" to South Korean troops. He should be reminded that the United States would be in a "strong political position" if its forces succeeded in repelling the invaders without undertaking action north of the 38th parallel. Nonetheless, he should be authorized to extend his operations into North Korea when, in his judgment, "serious risk of loss of Southern Korea might be obviated thereby." If possible, however, he should consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff before taking such action. Regarding the possibility of Soviet intervention, the JSPC proposed only that CINCFE be guided by the policy statement that had been furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this draft directive and tentatively approved it. They then took it up with Secretary of Defense Johnson, who like-

wise gave his approval and obtained the concurrence of the Department of State.⁹⁰ In the course of these discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary agreed that it would be necessary to seek Presidential authorization for General MacArthur to introduce American troops into South Korea: service troops for communications and transport, and combat forces in sufficient strength to protect the port and airfield of Pusan. They accordingly incorporated suitable provisions for this purpose in their draft directive.⁹¹

It was probably with considerable reluctance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the conviction that the use of US troops in Korea could no longer be avoided. It is to be noted that they envisioned a strictly limited mission for ground forces. There yet remained a hope that the steps taken thus far could shore up the crumbling resistance of the ROK Army and enable it to halt the advancing North Koreans.

But suppose this hope proved vain? This question was faced by the JSSC, which met on 29 June. In its report the Committee concluded that, on the assumption that North Korea continued its attack with no overt assistance from the Soviet Union, CINCFE should be given the mission of driving North Korean forces back across the border. For this purpose, he should be authorized to use "any and all forces under his command," plus any others that might be made available by any nation. The present restrictions regarding the use of the Army and the Marine Corps in Korea should be removed, in the Committee's view. Military operations against North Korean territory should be authorized, and a blockade against that country should be established. Reinforcements should be made available to CINCFE "as a matter of urgency." Portions of the National Guard and of the Service Reserves should be mobilized; UN member nations should be called on to provide at least token forces for use in Korea. If the USSR should openly intervene with military force in Korea or seize the opportunity to take aggressive action in Western Europe, a new situation would arise. The United States should then mobilize fully, evacuate US dependents from overseas, and seek UN sanctions against the Soviet Union.⁹²

Expansion of the US Role

Following his conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Johnson called President Truman and suggested another conference with his advisors.⁹³ The President acquiesced and called a meeting of the National Security Council for 1700 that afternoon, 29 June.⁹⁴

At the appointed time, the NSC assembled with all four JCS members in attendance, as well as the Service Secretaries.⁹⁵ Secretary Johnson at once submitted the draft directive for CINCFE, drawing attention to the proposal to authorize the introduction of US troops into South Korea. He justified this step by citing the need to establish a secure base in Korea for effective air operations. His reasoning, which doubtless reflected the tenor of the arguments put forth by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier in the day, was summed up as follows in an account written some months after the meeting:

Louis Johnson said our planes, operating from distant bases in Japan, were handicapped by having little time over the target area and by lack of clear communication with the ROK ground forces. Also, our planes and ships were hampered by their restriction to South Korea; they could not strike at Communist supplies and reinforcements north of the 38th parallel. And the primitive Korean transport system made it hard for us to get supplies to the ROK troops. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs believed that stronger measures were needed, not only to help the ROK's but to ensure evacuation of remaining American nationals. We must have at least an American foothold in South Korea.⁹⁶

The prospective enlargement of the US military role in Korea drew no opposition. Secretaries Pace and Acheson, however, stressed that operations north of the 38th parallel must be carefully controlled in order to limit them to military targets and to prevent border violations; President Truman agreed. The President's principal concern was with the paragraph relating to possible Soviet intervention, which he had seen the day before but apparently had not read carefully. The wording seemed to him, as he later wrote, to permit "an implication that we were planning to go to war against the Soviet Union," and he insisted that there be not the "slightest implication of such a plan." He instructed the Departments of State and Defense to amend the directive to CINCFE to reflect his views.

The NSC then turned to other aspects of the crisis. Secretary Acheson read to the members the Soviet answer to the US note of 27 June; it alleged that the war had been instigated by South Korea and declared that the Soviet Union would continue to adhere to "the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea." This reply, in Mr. Acheson's view, indicated that the USSR did not intend to commit forces to Korea. The Secretary also read a statement that had been broadcast by the Government of Communist China denouncing US support of South Korea. The President decided that the texts of the notes exchanged between the United States and the USSR should be released to the public.

Before the meeting ended, the President laid down two more decisions. He wished instructions sent to General MacArthur to submit a complete daily report on the Far Eastern situation. More important, he directed that all offers of forces from other UN members for use in Korea should be accepted, in order that the defense of South Korea would be a truly international effort.⁹⁷

Following the meeting, a revised directive for CINCFE was put into final form by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in cooperation with representatives of the Department of State, and was approved by the two Secretaries.⁹⁸ It was then transmitted to General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. The significant portions were the following:

You will employ naval and air forces available to the Far East Command to provide fullest possible support to South Korean forces by attack on military targets so as to permit these forces to clear South Korea of North Korean forces.

Employment of army forces will be limited to essential communications and other essential service units, except that you are authorized to employ such army combat and service forces as to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area Pusan-Chinhae.

By naval and air action you will defend Formosa against invasion or attack by Chinese Communists and will insure that Formosa will not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists. . . .

You are authorized to extend your operations into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions . . . or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces. Special care will be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union. . . .

The decision to commit United States air and naval forces and limited army forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in full realization of the risks involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation, and you should report the situation to Washington.⁹⁹

This message was sent to CINCFE early on the evening of 29 June in Washington and reached its recipient on the morning of 30 June, Tokyo time.¹⁰⁰ This was some twelve hours or so after General MacArthur had returned to Tokyo from his survey of the situation in Korea, which as described below, was to lead to final, complete US involvement in hostilities there. While en route from Tokyo to Korea, General MacArthur had, on his own initiative, issued orders by radio to FEAF Headquarters in Japan to launch air strikes against airfields north of the 38th parallel. He took this action on the morning of 29 June (Far Eastern Time), or almost twenty-four hours before he received the JCS authorization.¹⁰¹

The Decision to Send Combat Troops

General MacArthur's determination to visit the battlefield in Korea sprang from a desire to see the situation for himself and to give the hard-pressed South Koreans further visible evidence of US support and encouragement. Accompanied by key members of his staff and several newsmen, he left Japan in his private aircraft at 0610 on the morning of 29 June. Landing at Suwon, some 20 miles south of Seoul, he conferred with General Church, Ambassador Muccio, and President Rhee. He then drove northward to the Han River, through swarms of refugees and of fleeing soldiers—the shattered remnants of an army that numbered 100,000 men only a few days earlier but could now account for barely a quarter of that number. From the south bank of the Han, the General and his party could observe the damage done to Seoul and the bursts of artillery fired from across the river.

Returning to Suwon, General MacArthur departed for Japan about 1815 and was back in Tokyo some four hours later. His trip had convinced him that US

ships and aircraft alone could not retrieve the situation. The ROK Army could no longer be counted on for effective resistance; South Korea could be saved only by throwing US troops into the battle.¹⁰²

The General set forth these convictions in a message for Washington that he drafted on the return trip to Japan.¹⁰³ For unknown reasons, he did not send it until the next day, the evening of 29 June in Washington.¹⁰⁴ As finally dispatched, this message read as follows:

I have today inspected the South Korean battle area from Suwon north to the Han River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission.

The Korean army and coastal forces are in confusion, have not seriously fought, and lack leadership through their own means. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order they were unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as that embodied in the North Korean army.

The Korean army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made, not executed, for the destruction of supplies or materiel in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost, or abandoned, their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no system of inter-communication. In most cases the individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars, and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance and example of leadership of high quality.

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according to their scale of living. They have retained a high national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.

South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well trained, well directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of Communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at Suwon and the southern port of Pusan. The air-head is most vital but is subject to constant air attack. Since air cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment, and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean air, operating from nearby bases, has been savage in its attacks in the Suwon area.

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon-Seoul corridor is essential to the retention of the only air-head in Central Korea.

The Korean army is entirely incapable of counter action and there is grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of US ground combat forces into

the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a US regimental combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible buildup to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.

Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worse, it might even be doomed to failure.¹⁰⁵

This message reached Washington around the middle of the night of 29 to 30 June.¹⁰⁶ It was passed for action to General Collins, who decided to seek further information before going to the President with CINCFE's request. He accordingly arranged a teleconference between the Pentagon and General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo.

At 0400 on 30 June (1700 in the Far East), arrangements for the conference were completed and communications were opened. Conferees in Washington included General Collins; his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Lieutenant General A. M. Gruenther; the heads of the G-2, G-3, and G-4 divisions of the General Staff; Assistant Secretary of State Rusk and Mr. Neil W. Bond, the Korean desk officer in the State Department. The Tokyo contingent consisted of General MacArthur himself; his Chief of Staff, Major General E. M. Almond; and several other high-ranking officers.¹⁰⁷

General Collins began the conference by pointing out that CINCFE's request for permission to use American troops on the battlefield in Korea was a matter for a decision by the President, which would require several hours to obtain. Meanwhile, he authorized General MacArthur at once to move one regimental combat team to Pusan, in accord with the terms of the JCS directive transmitted earlier that night (JCS 84681).

General Collins then explained why General MacArthur's request was likely to run into opposition:

I was present at White House conference late afternoon June 29th when decision was made by President to authorize action covered in JCS 84681. Tenor of decision clearly indicated to me that the President would wish carefully to consider with his top advisors before authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle area.

Would the permission to move a regimental combat team suffice for the present, asked General Collins? It seems likely that by the time this movement was completed, the President would have acted on the request for the two divisions.

General MacArthur made it clear that he wanted immediate action on his request. His reply was:

Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that US ground combat troops may be used in Korea does not give sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation. It does not satisfy the basic requirements contained in my message C 56942. Time is of the essence and a clear cut decision without delay is imperative.

General Collins thereupon answered that he would at once request approval of the President, through the Secretary of the Army, for the projected movement of a Regimental Combat Team (RCT) to the combat zone. He then passed the request by telephone to Secretary Pace, who had already been alerted.¹⁰⁸

While they awaited word from the President, the conferees continued their long-distance conversation. The Washington party queried CINCFE for information and learned that air strikes, with undetermined results, had been made on airfields in North Korea following receipt of the JCS authorization. Naval operations in Korean waters so far were "not of positive nature," owing to a lack of targets. There was little prospect that the North Koreans would have any difficulty in getting across the Han; three railroad bridges south of Seoul were still intact, and barges and ferries were available to transport heavy equipment. CINCFE declined to try to estimate how long it would take to get a regimental combat team into action; it would depend on the extent of the enemy breakthrough along the Han, and airlift to the combat zone would not be feasible because Suwon airfield was not secure.

At about 0500, Secretary of the Army Pace, via telephone, reached President Truman, who was already up and getting dressed. Mr. Pace told him of General MacArthur's request and asked for a decision. The President immediately authorized the commitment of a regimental combat team, reserving for the moment his decision regarding the further buildup to two divisions.¹⁰⁹

This decision was at once relayed to the waiting General Collins, who passed it to General MacArthur. "Your recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved," CINCFE was told. "You will be advised later as to further buildup." The Army Chief of Staff then closed the conference with a word of praise for the distinguished commander in Tokyo:

Everyone here delighted your prompt action in personally securing first hand view of situation. Congratulations and best wishes. We all have full confidence in you and your command.

Immediately after the teleconference, General Collins telephoned his JCS colleagues and told them of the President's decision.¹¹⁰ One of them—Admiral Sherman—felt some unease. As he later described his reaction:

The decision [to send troops] had been taken on the recommendation of General MacArthur, who was on the spot. I had some apprehensions about it, and in the following days I felt that the decision was a sound one. It was unavoidable, but I was fully aware of the hazards involved in fighting Asiatics on the Asiatic mainland, which is something that, as a naval officer, I have grown up to believe should be avoided if possible.

It does not appear, however, that he or any other JCS members made any protest.¹¹¹

Shortly after 0700 on 30 June, after being briefed by an officer from G-2 on the situation in Korea, President Truman called Secretaries Pace and Johnson and told them that he was calling a meeting to discuss CINCFE's request.¹¹² In prepa-

ration for this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries at 0830 to discuss the proposed buildup to two divisions in Korea. They approved a draft directive that would give CINCFE the necessary authority and then adjourned to the White House at 0930 to meet with the President and the Secretary of State.¹¹³

When all the group was assembled, the President opened the meeting by announcing that he had approved the sending of a US RCT to Korea and then asked for advice regarding additional forces. He informed the others that Chiang Kai-shek had offered to furnish 33,000 men for service in Korea if the United States would transport them from Taiwan.¹¹⁴ President Truman was inclined to accept the offer, but Secretary Acheson objected that the use of Nationalist Chinese forces might stimulate Communist China to intervene. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that Chiang's troops were no better equipped than those of South Korea, which had proved unable to cope with North Korean tanks, and that transport facilities could be more profitably used to send US troops and supplies to Korea. Thus dissuaded, the President agreed to reject Chiang's offer. He then announced that he would give General MacArthur full authority to use the ground forces under his command, with no limit on the number of divisions to be sent to Korea. He also approved a suggestion by Admiral Sherman that a naval blockade of North Korea be established.

These momentous decisions had the approval of all those present and entailed little discussion. The entire meeting lasted approximately one-half hour.¹¹⁵

Immediately afterward, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a meeting, probably to revise the directive to General MacArthur in the light of the President's decision.¹¹⁶ At 1100, along with the Secretaries of State and Defense, they attended another meeting in which the President informed Congressional leaders of both parties that US troops would be sent to Korea. With one exception, all the hearers indicated approval of this decision.¹¹⁷

Following this meeting, the White House released a brief announcement, as follows:

In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.¹¹⁸

This statement conveyed to the public the substance of the decisions taken on the previous evening, as well as those reached that morning. The restrained wording of the last sentence, which fails utterly to indicate the scope of the authority granted General MacArthur, suggests that it may have been drafted at an earlier stage of the decision-making process and allowed to stand.¹¹⁹ The JSSC, in a memorandum evidently drafted early on the morning of 30 June, in preparation for impending consideration of its report (JCS 1776/8) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended a more sweeping announcement that the United States would use "all of its resources, including ground combat troops . . . to execute the

United Nations mandate.”¹²⁰ This advice was not followed; probably the suggestion never reached the President. It does not appear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted in the preparation of the announcement.

Early in the afternoon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE of the President’s decision, in the following terse message:

Restrictions on use of Army Forces imposed by JCS 84681 are hereby removed and authority granted to utilize Army Forces available to you as proposed your C 56942 subject only to requirements for safety of Japan in the present situation which is a matter for your judgment.¹²¹

Next the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a two-hour meeting at which they considered JCS 1776/8, the report drafted by the JSSC.¹²² This paper would have brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff face to face with the question of troop use in Korea even without General MacArthur’s message, but most of its recommendations had been overtaken by the events of the last few hours. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JSPC to study the provision of reinforcements to General MacArthur and the advisability of mobilizing the reserves. The JSSC had recommended that political arrangements be made by the Department of State to place General MacArthur in command of all forces made available by any country; the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided simply that the example set by the United Kingdom, in placing its forces at the disposal of General MacArthur, should be followed as a precedent.¹²³

There yet remained one action needed to give effect to the decisions made by President Truman on 30 June. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took this step on the following day, when they authorized General MacArthur to establish a naval blockade of Korea.¹²⁴

The Die Is Cast

After 30 June, there could be no turning back. The United States had fully committed its prestige to the defense of South Korea; it was to keep its forces engaged in action on the peninsula for three years, until a lengthy military stalemate was finally ended by an armistice. This commitment had been made in a series of four separate steps, which may be recapitulated as follows:

- (1) Air and naval protection for the withdrawal of US civilian personnel.
- (2) Air and naval action against North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel in support of the ROK Army.
- (3) Extension of air and naval action north of the 38th parallel, to be undertaken in part from bases within South Korea.
- (4) Introduction of US troops into the combat zone.

The second step was perhaps the most significant. It reversed a policy decision made several years earlier and, when it failed to achieve its purpose, led inexorably to the steps that followed. It was based primarily on political consid-

erations—a realization that North Korea had openly defied the United States and the United Nations, and a fear that grave consequences for the future peace and order of the world would follow if the challenge were shirked. Not unnaturally, the initiative for this decision came from the Secretary of State, who dominated the policymaking machinery during the first two or three days of the crisis. His thinking was clearly in harmony with that of his superior, President Truman.¹²⁵

Although the President's military advisors were not the prime movers in the decision to respond to the Communist challenge, they did not dissent from it. "Neither I nor any member of the Military Establishment in my presence recommended we go into Korea," said Secretary Johnson a year later, in testifying during the Congressional inquiry into the relief of General MacArthur. "The recommendation came from the Secretary of State, but I want to repeat that it was not opposed by the Defense Department, all the members of which had severally pointed out the trouble, the trials, tribulations, and the difficulties."¹²⁶

Once it had been determined that the United States could not afford to allow South Korea to be destroyed, discussion shifted from ends to means—from "what" to "how." Military considerations came to the fore, and the voice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by that of the Secretary of Defense, was heard more clearly. The decision in favor of limited air and naval intervention had been taken in the hope that it would suffice to enable South Korea's own defenders to throw back the invaders. As realization dawned that this hope was in vain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were moved to urge a broader range of air and naval action. They still sought to avoid outright US intervention in the ground war. But when told by General MacArthur that only a US infantry force could save the day, they accepted the view of their theater commander, whose brilliant reputation, stemming from his outstanding accomplishments during World War II, lent enormous weight to his counsel.

The full burden of repelling the invasion had now been laid on General MacArthur's shoulders, and he lost no time in meeting it. Before dawn on 1 July, "Task Force Smith"—a battalion from the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith—had started on a hurried journey that in a few days was to bring it into contact with the North Korean spearheads thrusting southward from Seoul. In the ten weeks that ensued, other elements of the 24th and 25th Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Divisions were flung into the battle. Though outnumbered and poorly trained, these forces, together with the remnants of the ROK Army, slowed the rush of the enemy and provided precious time for the United States and the United Nations to mobilize their resources for a counterblow. While the defenders hung on to a precarious foothold in southeastern Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in constant communication with General MacArthur, struggled with the new tasks that had been thrust upon them at a moment's notice: to establish an international army with an appropriate command structure, to reverse the disastrous effects of months of ill-advised economy in defense planning, to create a force and a strategy that would bring victory in Korea while enabling the United States to meet the commitments it had undertaken elsewhere in the world. The JCS efforts in these directions are the subject of the two chapters that follow.

The United States and the United Nations

Formation of the United Nations Command

The events of the last week of June 1950 launched the United States upon a course of action that was without parallel in the nation's history. As the leader of a military coalition of non-Communist countries, the United States was about to embark upon a war fought under the aegis of an international body whose decrees provided the political sanction for the operation. The three-way relationship among the United States, the United Nations, and the military command in Korea raised a host of problems. How would the political objectives of the conflict be determined? Who would provide strategic guidance to the UN Commander? Would the latter communicate with the United Nations directly, or only through the United States? How could the resources of the numerous UN member nations best be mobilized for the fight? Experience provided at best only partial answers to these questions.

In the solution of these and similar problems, political and military considerations were intermingled to an unusual degree. Decisions that might be strategically correct if US forces were fighting alone could become grave errors if their effect was to alienate nations whose support and friendship were essential. Nor was it possible to ignore the dangers inherent in conducting military operations near the borders of North Korea's powerful Communist neighbor nations. "I don't think you can ever in modern war divorce purely military considerations from political or overall considerations," said General Collins during the MacArthur hearings in 1951.¹ He was referring to a controversy over the bombing of Rashin, a North Korean port city near the Manchurian border. But many other examples could be cited of the complexities faced by General Collins and his colleagues in conducting this unprecedented war.

Although offers of military assistance from other UN members were received in Washington before the invasion was four days old, it was obvious that the burden of the fighting would fall most heavily on the United States, with its greater

resources. The United Nations was prompt to confirm the predominant role and authority of the United States in Korea.

On 4 July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff received from the Department of State a draft resolution, which had already been discussed informally with UN officials, to guide the formation of an international force. It provided that all forces fighting in Korea would be placed under a unified command, to be headed by an officer designated by the United States. This command would be authorized to fly the UN flag, as would the armed forces of member nations serving under it. The United States would be requested to provide the Security Council with "periodic reports" on actions taken by the unified command. These reports would go to a special committee of the Security Council, which would also receive offers of assistance from member nations and transmit them to the unified command, and would advise the Security Council concerning actions taken by members to support the resolutions of 25 and 27 June.²

After reviewing the draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested several changes. They saw no objection either to the establishment of a unified command under a US officer, or to the requirement that the United States furnish reports to the Security Council. They recommended, however, that the resolution be amended to call for "reports as appropriate" rather than "periodic reports," in order to make this provision "realistic and practicable." They believed that use of the UN flag should be restricted to the headquarters of the UN commander, fearing that its use by participating nations might lead to confusion in combat.

Their most serious objection was to the proposal to establish a special committee of the Security Council. They preferred that this provision be omitted entirely, but recognized that its inclusion might be politically necessary. If so, it was essential to ensure that the committee was strictly limited to the functions listed in the draft and that it did not seek to exercise "operational control" of the forces in Korea. Moreover, in accord with normal command procedures, the channel of communication between the committee and the unified command should run through the United States. At no time should there be any direct communication between General MacArthur and the Security Council.³

Secretary Johnson forwarded these comments to the Department of State with his endorsement. A revised version of the resolution, reflecting the JCS recommendations, was thereupon approved by the President and sent to the Security Council, where it was approved on 7 July.⁴ As finally passed, the key provisions of this resolution were the following:

The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, . . .

Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance . . . make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.⁵

The United States lost no time in complying with the request to designate the unified commander. There was only one conceivable choice: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. On 8 July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally recommended his appointment.⁶ President Truman approved this recommendation and announced the appointment the same day. On 10 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched to CINCFE a directive officially appointing him commander of the combined forces.⁷

On 14 July 1950 General Collins, on the first of what was to prove a series of visits to the Far East, formally presented a UN flag to General MacArthur at the Dai Ichi building in Tokyo. The Far East Commander, fully aware of the symbolic importance of the occasion, accepted the gift "with the deepest emotion," as he himself said.⁸ On 25 July General MacArthur established the United Nations Command (UNC), with general headquarters in Tokyo.⁹ Earlier, on 12 July, he had made the Eighth Army responsible for directing ground operations in Korea. The Commanding General, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, moved to Korea and set up the headquarters of the Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK). With the approval of President Rhee, EUSAK also assumed command of the South Korean Army.¹⁰

General MacArthur's Role and Status

In shaping the command and administrative structure necessary to conduct military operations in Korea, US leaders were guided by two fundamental policies, both of which had the full support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first of these defined the Korean struggle as essentially a cooperative international effort—a collective UN resistance. This principle stemmed from President Truman's statement to the National Security Council on 29 June, that the forces aiding South Korea should be "truly representative of the United Nations."¹¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff manifested their conscientious regard for this principle in numerous decisions, but nowhere did they display it more clearly than in their instructions to General MacArthur on the subject of his communiques. "For worldwide political reasons," they told him on 12 July 1950, "it is important to emphasize repeatedly the fact that our operations are in support of UNSC [United Nations Security Council]." He was to identify himself, wherever practicable, as Commander in Chief of UN Forces, and to stress the activities of the forces of other countries whenever the facts justified him in doing so.¹² In later instructions, General MacArthur was directed to issue communiques or releases from General Headquarters, UN Command, instead of from the (US) Far East

Command. Moreover, US units were to be identified by prefacing their names with their national designation, like those of other countries, in order to emphasize the fact that US forces were only one element of an international army.¹³

The second basic policy was that control of the operation was to be centered in Washington, not at Lake Success or in Tokyo. The principle of unity of command forbade the United Nations from exercising any control beyond the most general overall guidance. At the same time, political considerations made it essential that basic decisions be made by someone with a broader view than the theater commander in the Far East.

It was to prevent the United Nations from involvement in strategy or tactics that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had successfully opposed the establishment of a Security Council committee in direct communications with the UN Command. They manifested the same concern in formulating regulations for the preparation and handling of the reports that, under the Council resolution of 7 July, were to be submitted by General MacArthur.

The impetus to begin the flow of these reports was provided by the Department of State. The occasion was the naval blockade of North Korea that was authorized by President Truman on 30 June 1950 and publicly proclaimed three days later in a warning to all shipping.¹⁴ It was not entirely certain that the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June provided sufficient authority for this action. The Department of State believed the blockade to be legal but, nevertheless, wished the substance of the President's proclamation to be brought to the attention of the Security Council, in order to remove all doubt. An initial report from the unified command, of the kind called for by the resolution of 7 July, seemed an appropriate vehicle for transmitting this information. It would afford Council members an opportunity to object to the blockade; if they failed to do so, they would tacitly confirm its legality.

On 13 July 1950 Assistant Secretary Hickerson sent the Department of Defense a draft of a report, prepared for this purpose in the Department of State after informal consultation with G-3. It was brief, consisting of six sentences in four paragraphs, and in effect said only that UN forces were in action. Naval forces were described as "taking the necessary action to prevent movement by sea of [enemy] forces and supplies." The word "blockade" had intentionally been avoided. Secretary Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the draft and to recommend procedures for the preparation and transmission of such reports.¹⁵

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which considered the question of procedure, pointed out that important command problems were involved. The members noted that the Security Council had in no wise established a "chain of command" running to General MacArthur, nor had it authorized him to deal directly with the United Nations. The Council resolution of 7 July had spoken of the unified command as being "under the United States" and had specified that reports would be furnished by the US Government, not by the UN Commander. Reporting procedures should reflect these considerations, in the Committee's view. Hence, reports should be prepared under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not by the Department of State, and should be forwarded to State via the Secretary of Defense, for transmittal to the Security Council. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff endorsed this suggested procedure, amending it only to specify that reports should initially be drafted by General MacArthur and then sent to them for review. Secretaries Johnson and Acheson both approved this plan.¹⁶

Anticipating this approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already instructed General MacArthur to begin preparing periodic reports. The first was to be submitted before 4 August, and successors at intervals of approximately two weeks thereafter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that "certain political factors which must be determined in Washington" might make it necessary to amend his reports, but they promised that any alterations would be cleared with him in advance.¹⁷

In the meantime, the Department of State had withdrawn its draft of the initial report, having decided that a longer and more informative version was needed. Ambassador Austin had unfavorably contrasted State's draft with a report that General MacArthur had released in Tokyo on 16 July 1950. By direction of Major General James H. Burns, of Secretary Johnson's office, the Department of the Army conferred with the Department of State in the preparation of a new and more detailed report. Concurrence was obtained from the other Military Services and from General MacArthur, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not officially consulted. The revised version was formally submitted to the UN Security Council on 25 July.¹⁸

Later reports followed the procedure set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They originated at UNC headquarters and were transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who referred them to General Collins. He consulted the Military Services, the Department of State, and General MacArthur and, after making any necessary changes, returned the reports to his colleagues. Thence they were forwarded successively to the Secretaries of Defense and State and the UN Security Council.¹⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had thus succeeded in establishing the principle that the UN Commander would be responsible to the US Government, which, as the executive agent of the United Nations, would serve as an intermediary between General MacArthur and the Security Council. The General himself later described this relationship as follows:

[M]y connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. . . . [T]he entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the Army Chief of Staff. Even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatever.²⁰

The Beginning of an International Armed Force

A more difficult and time-consuming group of problems involved the relationship between the United States and those members of the United Nations who joined in the battle. Military units from a disparate group of nations scattered around the globe had to be assembled and welded into an efficient fighting

force under US leadership. The many difficulties, political and military, involved in this process had to be settled as they arose.

The first nations to contribute to the joint effort were, as would be expected, the members of the British Commonwealth, led by the English homeland. Prime Minister Clement Attlee of the United Kingdom told the House of Commons on 28 June 1950 that British naval forces in Japanese waters would at once be placed "at the disposal of United States authorities on behalf of the Security Council in support of the Republic of Korea."²¹ When the NSC met on the afternoon of 28 June, President Truman told the members that the British offer was to be accepted as soon as it was officially received.²² On the same day, Air Marshal Lord Arthur Tedder, head of the British Joint Services Mission, formally notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the British decision. He listed the composition of the British force as one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and five destroyers and frigates. At the same time, he stipulated that no British forces were to participate in operations involving Taiwan.²³ On 29 June the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied with an expression of gratitude. They also informed CINCFE of the British contribution.²⁴

Other Commonwealth countries promptly followed suit. On 29 June the Australian Ambassador told Secretary Acheson that his country's ships then in Japanese waters (a destroyer and a frigate) would be made available to the UN effort. He also offered a squadron of Mustang fighter aircraft based in Japan. At the same time, New Zealand offered to furnish naval forces if the United States so requested. In Ottawa, the Canadian Parliament was scheduled to meet on the afternoon of 29 June, and it was hoped that that body would approve the dispatch of naval vessels from Vancouver to the Far East.

The Department of State immediately accepted the proffered Australian ships, then consulted the Department of Defense concerning the replies that should be made to New Zealand and Canada. Secretary Johnson passed the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, setting forth at the same time his own view that "considerations of national policy make it important that such offers be accepted to the maximum extent practicable from the military point of view."²⁵

When the Security Council met again on 29 June, Secretary Acheson reported the receipt of offers from these British Commonwealth countries and also one from the Netherlands. President Truman, laying down the policy that the international aspects of the defense of South Korea should be emphasized, expressed a "desire" that all assistance offered by UN members be accepted by the United States.²⁶

This statement was not interpreted as a binding directive that every offer from any member nation must be uncritically accepted. Secretary Johnson's instructions had implied that there existed a certain minimum standard of military effectiveness that, if not met, might make it necessary to refuse some proffered forces, in spite of their political desirability. It became the task of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine and apply this standard.

There was little difficulty in appraising the value of forces from the British Commonwealth. On 30 June the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Johnson that the offers from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand should be accepted.²⁷ Three days later Secretary Johnson sent this advice to the Secretary of State, with his concurrence.²⁸

The Netherlands offered a destroyer based at Surabaya. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed of this fact on 5 July 1950, at once replied that this vessel would be acceptable.²⁹ In fact, the Dutch destroyer had already been ordered into action. None of the early contributors had awaited formal US approval before committing their forces.³⁰

All of these countries followed the example of the United Kingdom and placed their forces under General MacArthur's command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in acting on JCS 1776/8, had decided on 30 June 1950 that this practice should be followed in each case.³¹ They thus sought to avoid the traditional bugbear of coalition warfare—divided command.

The only other government that tendered assistance during the first week of the invasion was that of Nationalist China, which offered a force of 33,000 troops.³² President Truman and his advisors considered this offer on the morning of 30 June and rejected it, partly for political reasons adduced by the Department of State, partly because of the JCS advice that Nationalist troops were of uncertain value and that the required transport could be put to better use.³³ Accordingly, Chiang was tactfully informed that his offer was appreciated, but that any removal of troops from Taiwan would weaken the defenses of the island and should be carefully discussed with representatives of CINCFE before being carried out.³⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time told General MacArthur that the Nationalist offer was to be declined. Should the Nationalist Government make such an offer directly to him, he was to refer it to the Department of State. "The decision whether to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly be made at highest levels in Washington," they cautioned.³⁵

No other offers of military forces were forthcoming before the middle of July. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed that Pakistan was willing to contribute a regiment, and decided on 3 July that this offer, if made, should be accepted, but it never materialized.³⁶

Should Help Be Solicited?

On 29 June 1950 Secretary-General Trygve Lie transmitted a message to all member nations asking what kind of assistance they were prepared to offer South Korea in repelling the attack, as urged by the Security Council resolution of 27 June. Most replied with expressions of general approval of the resolution, although the Communist governments denounced it as illegal, and India made it clear that her "acceptance" of the resolution did not imply a change in her neutralist foreign policy. But aside from the countries discussed above, none offered anything more than moral support except Denmark, which promised medical supplies.³⁷

It was clear that the majority of UN member nations were in no hurry to meet the obligations to which the Security Council had committed them. Some still clung to the unrealistic hope that the Korean crisis could be settled by a compromise. The month of July was to see two efforts to induce Soviet Russia to mediate. The British Government undertook a discreet inquiry in Moscow but

declined to be drawn into a discussion of possible concessions. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India pursued a scheme for the admission of Communist China to the UN Security Council in order to induce the Soviet representative to return and thus, it was hoped, begin negotiations that would end the conflict. The United States sought to hold the UN nations to the issue of North Korea's defiance and took the position that any concessions in return for an end of hostilities would amount to rewarding aggression.³⁸

Observing the reluctance of UN members to come forward, US officials considered the possibility of a deliberate effort to prod them. The possibility was raised as early as 1 July, when Secretary of the Army Pace, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, addressed the following question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Should the U.S. act further to stimulate military contributions from other members of the UN? In this connection there are indications that certain Latin American countries, which have not yet acted, might easily be induced to come forward with assistance offers. From a military point of view, would such offers be helpful, and if so, what categories of forces would be most useful?³⁹

Two weeks elapsed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied. During the interval, Mr. Pace and the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force pursued the matter further. On 7 July they told Secretary Johnson that, in their opinion, "the United Nations character of the Korean operation is not being sufficiently emphasized." They stressed particularly the importance of obtaining ground forces from other countries. For their symbolic value if nothing else, troops were desirable from the United Kingdom, France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, Canada, and various Asiatic countries, especially India. Admittedly the British and French were already heavily engaged in Malaya and Indochina, respectively, but they should be able to spare at least small forces. The Secretaries urged that the Department of State be directed to seek aid from other nations. Secretary Johnson discussed this memorandum with General Bradley; both approved it, and it was forwarded to President Truman, who, however, apparently took no action.⁴⁰

When no action ensued, the Service Secretaries followed up with a second memorandum on 13 July, in which they indicated to Secretary Johnson their growing irritation that the United States was preparing to do so much and the other nations seemed to be doing so little. As they wrote:

It is imperative that the maximum amount of pressure be exerted on all member nations of the United Nations to provide ground troops for action in Korea. We are aware of the problems that face the State Department in that respect, but the results are most unsatisfactory. It is a difficult thing for the American people to understand why this country provides all of the ground troops for United Nations action, undertakes a draft, and contemplates some form of general mobilization while other countries who are members of the United Nations, subject to the same requirements as member nations of the United Nations and generally benefitting from the decision to implement United Nations principles in Korea, should not participate beyond token contributions in the air and on the sea. It is further difficult to understand why some minor measures of mobilization cannot be undertaken elsewhere to provide at least a partially supporting effort on the ground.

They pointed out that the situation had implications for the nascent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The American people would hardly make sacrifices for NATO as long as the countries of Western Europe were dragging their feet.⁴¹

The tone of this memorandum reflected the military situation in Korea, which was steadily deteriorating. US troops were falling back continuously in the face of greatly superior enemy forces. General MacArthur had been compelled to make drastic upward revisions in estimating his requirements. On 30 June, as described in the last chapter, he had asked permission to use two US divisions in Korea. On 7 July he submitted a more carefully considered estimate of four or four and a half infantry divisions, plus various other units. Only two days later, he made a further request for a complete army of four divisions, over and above his previous estimates.⁴²

The strenuous efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide CINCFE with the forces that he needed are recounted in the following chapter. Since there were only five Army divisions available in the entire continental United States, the need for some other source of troops was manifest. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already considered the solution proposed by the Service Secretaries. On 10 July 1950, at the suggestion of General Collins, they directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to examine the possibility of asking British Commonwealth nations, particularly Australia and New Zealand, to send troops to Korea.⁴³

It was becoming clear that there was no alternative but to seek help. On 13 July Secretary Johnson's office requested comments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a State Department proposal to inform the British Ambassador that the United States intended to "increase substantially" its forces in Korea and that additional forces were needed from other countries.⁴⁴ On the following day the Secretary asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether aid was desired from Pakistan, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Italy, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and, if so, what type of assistance would be most useful. The information was desired "as a matter of urgency" in reply to a telephone inquiry from the Secretary of State.⁴⁵ In fact, the administration had already made up its mind that it was time to call on other countries to pick up a larger share of the burden.

Procedures for Handling Offers of Assistance

On 14 July Secretary-General Lie, after consulting with US officials, addressed a general appeal to the fifty-three governments that had indicated their support of the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June. The text of this message, worked out in consultation with US Ambassador Austin, read substantially as follows:

1. I am informed that the Government of the United States which, under the resolution of 7 July 1950 has been given the responsibility for the Unified Com-

mand, is now preparing to engage in direct consultations with Governments with regard to the coordination of assistance in a general plan for the attainment of the objective set forth in the Security Council resolutions.

2. I have been advised that the Unified Command . . . is in urgent need of additional effective assistance. I should be grateful, therefore, if your Government would consider the possibility of such assistance, including combat forces, particularly ground forces.

3. Offers of assistance should be communicated to the Secretary-General. In the case of military assistance, offers should be communicated to the Secretary-General in general terms, leaving detailed arrangements for such an agreement between the Government and the Unified Command.⁴⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were apparently not consulted about this action, but they presumably knew that it was under consideration. At all events, they decided to seek General MacArthur's advice. The wording of their message to him on this subject indicated that they felt some uneasiness over the trend of official thinking in Washington. Possibly they feared that CINCFE might be overwhelmed by a flood of military units too small to be effective, sent by countries that wished to demonstrate support of the United Nations at little or no real cost to themselves. "Pressure is building up from numerous sources within the United States for early action by other UN members to contribute ground forces for the Korean campaign," they told General MacArthur on 14 July. "Apparently it is a popular view here that the spirit and intent of the UN resolution is that as many nations as practicable should contribute." They were considering a proposal to solicit contributions and wanted his advice about the advisability of making such a request to other countries, together with recommendations concerning the minimum size of units that would be useful and the amount of support that would be required for them. They drew his attention to the President's desire that the forces aiding South Korea be "truly representative" of the United Nations.⁴⁷

While awaiting General MacArthur's reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary Johnson with a quick appraisal of the value of forces from the nations about which he had inquired. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Pakistan, they said, could provide useful aid, especially ground units. But none should be sought from the Philippines, Italy, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, since those countries had need for all their slender military resources. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that "the military implication of offers of specific assistance are of great importance," and urged that they be consulted in each instance before any proffered forces were accepted.⁴⁸

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned an answer to Secretary Pace's memorandum of 1 July. To the basic question raised in that paper—whether the United States should actively solicit military forces for the Korean operation—they made no reply, probably realizing that it had already been settled. Instead, they confined themselves to a discussion of the response to be made when other countries offered forces. They believed that such tenders of assistance should be judged on the basis of military considerations, such as the efficiency of the units offered, their availability for prompt use, and the adequacy

of supply and transportation. Again they stressed the importance of allowing them to evaluate each offer before it was accepted.⁴⁹

On the following day, 15 July, General MacArthur sent in his recommendations. He fully understood the political necessity for an international force, he said, and was in "complete sympathy" with the concept. Ground force elements sent to Korea, in his view, should consist of infantry units of the strength of a reinforced battalion (approximately 1,000 men), with their own artillery support. It was preferable, but not strictly necessary, that their weapons be able to fire American ammunition. They would be attached to US regiments or divisions and should therefore contain enough English-speaking personnel to maintain liaison and to avoid confusion in combat. Service units would be acceptable provided they were large enough to be usable. As for naval or air components, practically anything that was offered should be accepted, on the same basis as ground forces.

To the problem of supply, always a difficult one in an international operation, General MacArthur sketched a simple solution. Foreign troops should arrive accompanied by their own supplies sufficient to last them sixty days. Thereafter they would be supplied by the United States, insofar as permitted by their nationalistic and religious preferences regarding diet and dress. The US Government, however, should be reimbursed for all material thus provided.⁵⁰

This reply provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a basis for screening UN contributions to make certain that only militarily useful units were actually sent to Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately applied General MacArthur's criteria in judging the offers of aid that began to flow in following the Secretary-General's message. Thus when Secretary Johnson, heeding their request that they be consulted, asked them to evaluate potential troop offers from New Zealand and Lebanon and a warship tendered by France, they replied that the two former should be accepted provided that battalion-size units, with combat and service support, were furnished.⁵¹ The French vessel was also acceptable, they believed, assuming that it would be ready for operation immediately; the United States should supply logistic support, subject to later reimbursement by France.⁵²

In a memorandum of 21 July, Secretary Johnson gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff categorical assurance that their advice would be sought in every instance. He was in full agreement, he said, with the opinion of the Service Secretaries that other countries should make a greater contribution. Thus far, he continued, each offer had been preceded by an informal, exploratory approach to the US Government. To guide the Department of State in these initial discussions, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to furnish "general criteria of useful assistance," together with a list of countries that might be expected to furnish such aid.⁵³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 7 August 1950. In answer to the first request, they set forth the standards drawn up by General MacArthur, with two significant alterations. While expressing a preference for units of at least 1,000 men, they indicated that those as small as a company might be accepted. This change, which would of course allow many smaller countries to make at least a token contribution, was perhaps made to meet Secretary Johnson's expressed desire for more emphasis on the international aspect of the Korean operation. The second change related to the proposals for US logistic support. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff recommended that parent nations provide continuing support for their own forces; only if they were unable to do so should their forces be integrated into the US supply system. Regarding Secretary Johnson's second request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not submit a list of countries from which aid was desired; they merely affirmed that offers when received should be judged on a case-by-case basis.⁵⁴ Secretary Johnson made no formal reply, but subsequent events showed that he accepted the substance of these JCS recommendations.

Earlier, Secretary Johnson had discussed with the Secretary of State the response of the US Government to offers of assistance. In a letter dated 24 July, Secretary Acheson set forth his understanding of the substance of the informal agreement that they had reached—an agreement that was, he said, in accord with the "expressed wishes of the President" and also had the support of Congressional leaders. The general US policy was to encourage maximum participation by other UN members. Hence all offers of direct aid, military or other, were to be tentatively accepted, even though subsequent examination might reveal that some were not usable. Offers should be addressed to the United Nations, which would refer them to the US Government. Details would be worked out in direct discussions between representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and of the country concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the UN Command would evaluate each potential contribution. If an offer could not be accepted, an effort would be made to persuade the country involved to modify the terms so as to make it acceptable, or to hold it in abeyance. In other words, outright rejection was to be avoided insofar as possible. In order not to mislead other countries, the United States would not, through either military or diplomatic channels, unilaterally solicit aid from other countries, except in specific instances where units were desired for service "in the combat area." In those cases, every effort would be made to obtain commitments.

Secretary Johnson referred this letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 31 July, suggesting some supplements or modifications. Thus he proposed that representatives of the Services, as well as of OSD, take part in discussions with offering countries. He had misgivings about initially accepting offers that might subsequently prove impracticable to use; hence, he suggested that it might be well to seek modification of President Truman's sweeping pronouncement to the National Security Council on 29 June. As for the implied intention of the Department of State to seek commitments for units "on the basis of their employment in the combat area," he believed that this matter should be carefully considered; such efforts, he feared, might lead the United States to assume obligations that might later prove embarrassing.⁵⁵

For reasons not indicated in available sources, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not formally reply until 8 September. They accepted the substance of the State-Defense agreement and suggested only minor modifications. In discussions with other nations, they recommended, it should be stressed that General MacArthur's need was immediate and that units already in being should be sent. Moreover, all units should conform as far as practicable to the criteria that they had set forth in their memorandum of 7 August. Offers that did not meet these

standards should be scrutinized to determine whether the United States might provide equipment and training sufficient to bring the proffered forces up to an acceptable level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the participation of Service representatives in discussions with other countries. They opposed any modification of the President's broad directive that all offers be accepted. Initial acceptance in principle, they maintained, did not imply a commitment to use the proffered forces in combat; if an offer proved unsuitable, a reply could be given that would be at once encouraging and temporizing. As for unilateral solicitation of forces from other countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubted that any embarrassment would ensue for the United States, since presumably any such action would be "the result of a considered action in which all attendant obligations have been determined." However, the United States should not commit itself to use any foreign forces "in the combat area," and this phrase should be deleted from the agreement.⁵⁶

On 25 September 1950 Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, who had succeeded Mr. Johnson, formally replied to Secretary Acheson's letter of 24 July. He noted that the handling of offers of assistance had followed the procedure set forth in that letter. He passed along the substance of the JCS comments, indicating his agreement.⁵⁷ By that time, however, the entire subject had lost much of its importance; most offers had already been received and processed.

The Department of State also drafted, and sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, a directive that would make clear the role of the Secretary-General in the process. According to this draft, member nations would transmit offers to the Secretary-General, who would pass them, via the US delegation at Lake Success, to the "Unified Command (United States Government)." The reply would follow the same channel. In the interests of military security, all offers were to be of a general nature; details would be left for settlement between the United States and the contributing country.⁵⁸

In giving their assent to this procedure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a change in the wording to eliminate the term "Unified Command." It should be made unmistakably clear, they believed, that all offers would pass through the US Government, both to make sure that they were properly evaluated in Washington and to avoid any direct communications between General MacArthur and the United Nations. Secretary Johnson considered this change unnecessary, since, in his view, "the phrase 'Unified Command' has through common usage become identified as being the United States Government." The final agreement, promulgated on 2 October 1950, used the phrase to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had objected.⁵⁹

Results of the Secretary-General's Appeal

After the middle of July, there was a noticeable increase in the number of UN member nations that stepped forward to help out in Korea. Secretary-General Lie was disappointed at the initial response to his circular message of 14

July, and personally urged some of the larger nations to provide forces.⁶⁰ Quite possibly, prodding from the US Government also helped to stimulate some countries to action.

Whatever the reasons, the result was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the next few months, were called upon to evaluate over two dozen proposed troop contributions or other forms of military assistance. Some of the offers were tentative and failed to materialize; others involved only token contributions, calculated merely to display the parent nation's support of the UN undertaking. Only a few countries sent forces of real military value.⁶¹

The United Kingdom, which had been the first to tender naval forces, was likewise the first to offer troops. On 25 July, the British Government offered a brigade comprising three infantry battalions, an armored regiment, and supporting artillery and other units, 7,000 men in all. The Joint Chiefs of Staff showed no hesitation in accepting this offer despite the fact that the brigade would not be ready to sail from England before late October (more than a month after General MacArthur's proposed offensive, which was scheduled for mid-September).⁶²

Almost a month later, on 20 August, the British Government announced that it would send immediately a smaller brigade of two battalions from its Hong Kong garrison. This step was apparently in response to the second report of the UN Command, dated 16 August 1950, in which General MacArthur expressed a "sincere hope" that UN member nations "will without delay build up the strength of our ground forces."⁶³

Early in August, Canada too offered a brigade of three infantry battalions. It was to be a special force made up of men drawn from existing units and could not be ready for many weeks. Nevertheless the Canadian offer was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁶⁴ Canada also contributed, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a long-range air transport squadron and, later, commercial air facilities between Vancouver and Tokyo.⁶⁵

Smaller army units were offered by two other members of the British Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand. Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia visited Washington on 28 July and discussed the Korean situation with President Truman and Secretary Acheson; shortly thereafter the Australian Government announced that it would send a battalion of 1,000 infantrymen from its occupation forces in Japan.⁶⁶ New Zealand's offer took the form of a 1,000-man artillery battalion.⁶⁷

Other significant proffers of troop assistance were made by Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and Greece. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the 4,500-man regimental combat team made available by Turkey be accepted, despite their former advice that Turkey should not be asked for troops. They considered this force too small to impair by its absence the overall effectiveness of the Turkish Army in its own area.

The troops that the Thai Government proposed to send to Korea were not, at first glance, so readily acceptable. Thailand offered a combat team of 4,000 men, which, by US standards, was poorly equipped and trained. Nevertheless the political and propaganda value of these Asian troops in Korea was thought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to outweigh the disadvantages of trying to employ this

relatively inefficient force. Participation of the Thai Army could effectively blunt Communist charges that the UN action was a white man's war against Asia.⁶⁸

A similar consideration justified the use of troops from the Republic of the Philippines, which, after making an initial contribution of seventeen Sherman tanks, followed with an offer of a regimental combat team of 5,000 men. The wisdom of sending these forces could be doubted, since the government of President Elpidio Quirino was already beset by the armed resistance of the Philippine Communist rebel forces (Hukbalahaps). The Chief of the Joint US Military Advisory Group in the Philippines, Major General Leland S. Hobbs, believed that the Philippine Government could best serve the United States and the United Nations by maintaining order at home. Nevertheless the Department of State accepted the offer, doubtless for political reasons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not express an official opinion on the matter.⁶⁹

Greece tendered six C-47 transport planes and a brigade of mountain infantry, 3,800 strong. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been about to recommend rejection of the aircraft on the grounds that their use in Korea would weaken too greatly the Greek air potential. But they changed their minds on recommendation of Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA, who had been closely associated with Greece's own struggle against Communist guerrillas. He stressed the importance of having the Hellenic flag flown in Korea. Later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also approved the use of the mountain brigade after consulting General MacArthur, who thought it would be valuable in Korea.⁷⁰

France, which had promptly placed a naval patrol vessel at the disposal of the United Nations in reply to the message of 14 July, later also offered an infantry battalion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the value of this unit in Korea would more than offset the effect of its removal from the defensive forces in Western Europe.⁷¹

Secretary Johnson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July that Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were contemplating the establishment of a joint military force for Korean duty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that such a force would be acceptable, though they would prefer separate national contingents.⁷² In the end, the two larger countries each sent a force approximating battalion size and Luxembourg raised a body of fifty volunteers to be integrated with that of Belgium.⁷³

A proffer of a fighter aircraft squadron by the Union of South Africa received JCS approval, even though the personnel of the unit (including both pilots and ground crews) would be shipped without aircraft. South Africa was well able to pay for the materiel to be furnished by the United States.⁷⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also called upon to evaluate several offers of noncombat forces, all of which they judged desirable. Denmark tendered a motor vessel for use as a hospital ship, with a crew of doctors and nurses; Sweden, a military field hospital; and Norway, vessels for transporting troops. Even neutralist India offered an ambulance unit.⁷⁵

In working out the details of the employment of the various proffered forces, the individual JCS members in effect acted as executive agents, depending on the nature of the forces involved. Offers of ground forces, for example, were referred

to the Chief of Staff, US Army. This procedure was followed from the beginning and was later informally approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.⁷⁶

The JCS recommendation that each contributing nation be expected to provide its own logistic support as far as possible proved unduly rigid and had to be abandoned. Discussions between representatives of the US Military Services and of foreign nations whose offers of aid had been accepted showed that some could not send fully equipped combat units or furnish their own logistic support. Secretary Johnson's Assistant for Foreign Military Assistance, Major General James H. Burns, USA (Ret.), discussed the problem with representatives of the Services, OSD, and of the State and Treasury Departments. The outcome of these conversations was an agreement that, for those foreign forces determined by the US Military Services to be "capable of effective participation in the Korean operations," the United States would furnish "necessary logistic support and supplies which the foreign governments themselves cannot furnish." The costs of such aid would be charged to the appropriations of the Military Departments. Whenever possible, however, each recipient nation would be expected to reimburse the United States. The United States Service representatives would be authorized to negotiate directly with their foreign counterparts concerning the supplying and equipping of their forces.⁷⁷

This procedure, after being endorsed by the Armed Forces Policy Council, was approved by the President and formally promulgated by Secretary Johnson on 1 September.⁷⁸ At no time was it formally submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review, although the individual JCS members had an opportunity to comment on it through their membership in the Council.

The United States policy was liberalized still further two weeks later, when the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, announced a decision that equipment furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program could be used by recipient countries to equip their forces for service in Korea. Replacement for equipment taken to Korea would not, however, be provided.⁷⁹

In all of the foregoing instances, the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were approved by the Secretary of Defense, and subsequently also by the Secretary of State. Only on one occasion were they overruled. On 20 July they had decided that a Belgian offer to send a C-54 aircraft to Korea should be declined because of logistic, operational, and language difficulties involved in its employment. Secretary Johnson, however, thought political considerations more important than the JCS objections in this case.⁸⁰

All of the above responses to the Secretary-General's plea were received before the middle of September 1950. Two later offers from minor countries were significant in broadening the geographic basis of UN support. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who had had bitter experience with an international organization that had proved impotent in dealing with aggression, told the Secretary-General initially that his government wished to provide military assistance but faced "almost insurmountable difficulties." It was not until November 1950 that his nation was able to offer a contingent of 1,069 troops. After consulting CINCFE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that this unit would be acceptable.⁸¹

From Latin America, a single nation—Colombia—offered and sent both naval and military aid. In September 1950, Colombia tendered the use of its one avail-

able frigate.⁸² Two months later, the same country agreed to contribute a battalion of infantry and to reimburse the United States for the equipment, supplies, and training that would be needed. The formal offer had been preceded by discussions with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, in the course of which the United States had already, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, committed itself to acceptance. Both Colombian offers were apparently made directly to the United States, not to the Secretary-General.⁸³

The interests of hemisphere solidarity dictated an effort to obtain greater support from Latin American countries. On 9 August 1950 the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, told the Department of Defense that many of these nations had expressed a desire to help but felt themselves too poor to make an effective contribution. Existing legislation required reimbursement for practically all military equipment provided Latin America other than limited amounts of surplus. Mr. Matthews believed that Congress could be induced to authorize the grant of equipment to Latin American forces organized specifically to assist the UN effort. He suggested either that the larger countries be induced to raise special contingents for service in Korea or that an international force of volunteers, drawn from all the Latin nations, be created. The advantages of widespread participation by the nations of this region were impressive, in his view. Latin America had abundant manpower; the nationalism and patriotism of the peoples of the region would be aroused in support of UN action; their governments would draw closer to the United States, thereby simplifying the problem of guarding the Western Hemisphere in case of general war.⁸⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that forces should be obtained from Latin America and that US assistance therefore was an indispensable prerequisite. They believed that the Department of State should take action to solicit aid from those countries. Even units below the preferred minimum strength of a battalion would be accepted. They were sympathetic to the creation of an inter-American force made up of national contingents, but they thought it "wholly impracticable and militarily unsound" to attempt to organize, train, and equip a unit composed of unorganized volunteers from a number of countries.⁸⁵

Nothing more was heard of an international force, and the few tentative offers made by countries other than Colombia ultimately produced no results. While Costa Rica, Bolivia, Panama, and Uruguay did in fact proffer troops, the forces tendered did not constitute organized units and were rejected on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Offers of bases by Costa Rica and Panama were accepted for possible future use.⁸⁶ Later discussions with other Latin American countries, recounted in subsequent chapters, came to nothing.

Ultimately, fifteen nations besides the United States contributed forces for the defense of South Korea. They were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. All tendered ground forces in at least battalion strength except Luxembourg, which sent only a single company, and South Africa, whose contribution took the form of an air unit. Most of the forces arrived before the end of 1950. The Belgian, Luxem-

bourg, and Ethiopian units and some of the Canadian troops did not arrive until early 1951. The last to arrive was the Colombian infantry in June 1951.⁸⁷

The only one of these units to arrive before the Inch'on landing was the British 27th Infantry Brigade from Hong Kong. Its men docked at Pusan on 29 August 1950 and were flung into battle in front of Taegu, where they helped to repulse the North Koreans' general offensive around the perimeter.⁸⁸

Another early arrival was the Australian battalion, which reached Pusan on 28 September. It took part in the advance across the 38th parallel and the invasion of North Korea. The 29th British Brigade, sailing from the United Kingdom, arrived in November, in time to participate in General MacArthur's disastrous "final" offensive toward the Yalu.⁸⁹

The British and Australian forces came ready for immediate action, but most of the others required a measure of preliminary training. Thus the Philippine unit (known as the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea, or PEFTOK), which arrived on 19 September 1950, saw only limited action for the first few months (although a contributing reason for delay in this instance was the uncooperative attitude of its commanding officer).⁹⁰ In contrast, the Turkish Brigade, reaching Korea on 18 October 1950, had been well trained under its accompanying American advisors, and, after only limited additional instruction, was able to move up to the battle line in time to suffer the full force of the first Chinese onslaught in November 1950.⁹¹

No more forces were to be available until after the Chinese intervention had sent the war into a new phase. During October 1950, when the war seemed to be approaching an end, the United States considered the possibility of cutting back the contributions from other countries. This plan was dropped, however, when Chinese forces first appeared in Korea. During the months that followed China's large-scale entry into the conflict, the United States made repeated, though fruitless, efforts to induce the UN member nations to step up their assistance. These developments are described later in this volume.⁹²

Ultimately, these UN contingents gave a good account of themselves, and several of them compiled outstanding combat records, notably the British, French, Turkish, Ethiopian, and Greek contingents. However, aside from the British Commonwealth Division, their aggregate strength was insufficient to have a significant effect on the overall course of the war. Their importance was political rather than military.⁹³ At all times, the United States and the Republic of Korea bore overwhelmingly the greater part of the burden of combat.⁹⁴ In proportion to their population, even the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe sent only minuscule contributions. Allowance must be made, however, for the fact that Western Europe was still suffering from the effects of World War II, and that the United Kingdom and France were already battling Communist insurgents in Southeast Asia. Moreover, a large number of countries that did not send troops contributed medical supplies, foodstuffs, or other nonmilitary aid.⁹⁵

In meeting the manifold problems involved in relations with other UN members, the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed patience, restraint, and a consistent awareness of the military limitations of friendly powers. Their attitude reflected a realization that, in Korea and elsewhere in the world, US foreign policy was based on the fullest possible measure of support for the United Nations.

The Buildup and the Strategy

Initial Reinforcements for CINCFE

The outbreak of the Korean War, coming without warning at a time when major emphasis in defense planning had been on the reduction of expenditures, severely strained the resources of the US Military Services, and particularly the meager, ten-division Army. Every man and every weapon sent to Korea diminished the forces available to meet a crisis in some other potential trouble spot, of which there were many in the summer of 1950. It was the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to weigh the demands of the conflict in Korea against the need to maintain a posture of readiness elsewhere. They had to make certain that forces sent to the Far East were replaced as soon as possible, in order to restore and maintain the ability to execute emergency war plans in the event of a wider conflict. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to devise a strategy that would bring victory in the shortest possible time with the forces that could be spared for Korea.

The urgency and the difficulty of these tasks were unappreciated by the Truman administration in the early days of the war. Inaccurate or incomplete reports from the battle zone, plus an initial underestimate of North Korean strength and an overly optimistic assessment of the ability and morale of the ROK Army, had influenced US officials to hope that the "police action" could be terminated before it evolved into a full-scale war. "The first few days we did not know just how good these North Koreans were," said General Bradley, "and it was some time before we could get a good picture."¹

Even General MacArthur at first misjudged the situation. "The South Korean soldiers are in good physical condition and could be rallied with example and leadership," he said to a correspondent, Miss Marguerite Higgins, after his visit to the front on 29 June. "Give me two American divisions and I can hold Korea."² It was for this reason that he asked Washington for permission to introduce a maximum of two divisions from Japan. In reply, he received more than he had sought: practically complete authority to use all his forces at will. But since he

already had twice as many divisions available as he had indicated were needed, there seemed no occasion immediately to send reinforcements from the United States. Consequently, although the Joint Strategic Survey Committee in JCS 1776/8, had recommended immediate reinforcement of the Far East Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt justified in putting off this recommendation for further study.³

When it became evident that two divisions would not suffice to repel the North Korean People's Army, General MacArthur decided to throw in a third division in an amphibious stroke against the enemy's rear. Having committed the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions directly to the battlefield, he earmarked the 1st Cavalry Division for his counterstroke. But the speed of the enemy advance disrupted this plan.⁴

General MacArthur's earliest plea for reinforcements showed that he was already thinking of an amphibious operation. "Request if practicable immediate dispatch of one Marine RCT [Regimental Combat Team] with comparable Marine air unit for tactical support," he wired the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 July. "Earliest arrival here imperative due to pressure of impending operations."⁵ At the same time, he also endorsed a request by General Stratemeyer, Commander of the Far East Air Forces, for approximately 700 aircraft to fill out Air Force units to war strength.⁶

General MacArthur had already received assurance that the Marine forces for which he was asking could be made available. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, had instituted inquiries on 1 July and had learned that a regimental combat team from the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), could be sent to the Far East in ten days. This information had been passed to CINCFE.⁷

Meeting on 3 July 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the sending of a Marine RCT, with air support, together with two groups of B-29 bombers, 22 B-26 bombers, and 150 F-51 fighters—all the aircraft that could be made available at that time. General Bradley obtained the approval of Secretary Johnson and President Truman for these movements, and General MacArthur was informed that they would be sent as soon as practicable.⁸

On 5 July General MacArthur followed with another plea, this time for much larger reinforcements. He asked for the 2d Infantry Division, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, and one regiment of the 82d Airborne Division, to be used in operations planned for some time between 20 July and 10 August.⁹

The Army units for which General MacArthur was now asking represented a sizeable proportion of the Army's General Reserve. Of the six divisions outside Japan, one was engaged in the occupation of Germany, so that only five were available in the continental United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly returned a temporizing reply. On 6 July they told him that, while they were giving sympathetic consideration to his needs, they were faced with certain difficulties. They pointed out that no increase in Service manpower had been authorized, and that it was necessary to maintain a suitable military posture in other parts of the world. Moreover, a shortage of shipping would make it impossible to send the desired forces by 20 July. Finally, approval for the deployment of most of these units would have to come from higher authority. It would aid them in presenting his case, they concluded, if General MacArthur would give them as

soon as possible his estimate of the total additional forces, from all Services, needed to clear South Korea of the invaders.¹⁰

CINCFE's reply, on 7 July, not only gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff the estimate they had asked for but also outlined the problem facing him and his plan for solving it. In his accustomed muscular style he wrote:

It is now apparent that we are confronted in Korea with an aggressive and well trained professional army equipped with tanks and perhaps other ground materiel quite equal and in some categories superior to that available here. Encouraged by the rout of the South Korean Army and determined on the complete victory he expects to achieve, this enemy is operating under excellent top level guidance and has demonstrated superior command of strategic and tactical principles in the exploitation of his break across the Han River.

To halt and then hurl back this powerful aggression will, in my estimation, require the use of the equivalent of not less than 4 to 4½ full strength infantry divisions, an airborne RCT complete with lift and an armored group composed of three medium tank battalions, together with reinforcing artillery and service elements appropriate for the support of such a force. My messages have requested the necessary increments to make available in Korea such a force without jeopardizing the safety of Japan. This total Army reinforcement amounts to less than 30,000 men. It is a minimum without which success will be extremely doubtful.

The Naval and Air Force reinforcements already directed by the JCS are believed to be adequate at this time. However, forward planning must anticipate a probable additional requirement for fighters and light bombers, as well as for another fast carrier task force.

Every human effort in this command is now geared to the overriding first essential—to halt the enemy advance. . . . Once he is fixed, it will be my purpose fully to exploit our air and sea control and, by amphibious maneuver, strike behind his mass of ground forces. . . .¹¹

Even before receiving this message, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken steps to provide the forces for which General MacArthur had asked. On 6 July, the same day they sent CINCFE their interim reply, they asked the Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC) to determine the lift requirements for these units.¹² At the same time they asked and obtained the approval of Secretary Johnson immediately to increase military strength by 108,500 men: 50,000 for the Army, 33,000 for the Navy, and 25,500 for the Air Force.¹³

On 7 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Secretary of Defense to approve the deployment of the units that CINCFE had requested. The Secretary and the President gave their approval several days later, and the Department of the Army at once alerted the units for shipment.¹⁴ One change was made: an RCT from the 11th Airborne Division was substituted in place of one from the 82d, which was considered too valuable to be broken up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff declined an offer by General Vandenberg to provide air transportation for this RCT, partly because some time must elapse before it could be made ready, partly because air transport capabilities were needed for shipments of still higher priority.¹⁵ Airlift facilities, according to the JMTC, were in short supply, although sea transport capacity was adequate to meet all known requirements through August.¹⁶

MacArthur Raises the Ante

One division and two regimental combat teams from the United States, added to three divisions drawn from the occupation force in Japan, would satisfy the requirement set forth by General MacArthur on 7 July for a force of approximately four and one-half divisions. But this figure (like the General's original estimate of two divisions) was based on insufficient combat experience and very soon proved to be inadequate.

United States forces had their first clash with the NKPA on 5 July 1950 (Far East time) a few miles north of the town of Osan, some 30 miles south of Seoul on the main highway to the port of Pusan. Enemy troops, fresh from the capture of the capital, quickly outflanked the heavily outnumbered men of Task Force Smith and forced them to withdraw. During the next few days, this pattern was repeated as other elements of the 24th Division were fed piecemeal into the battle.¹⁷

The experience of these first few days sufficed to show that the ability of the North Korean soldier and the quality of his materiel had been seriously underestimated. The Commanding General of the 24th Division, Major General William F. Dean, made this fact clear in a letter to General MacArthur on 8 July. Powerful, combat-ready reinforcements, equipped with tanks and heavy artillery, would be needed, he declared, to stop the surging North Korean infantry and armor.¹⁸

On the basis of such reports from the battlefield, General MacArthur was compelled to revise his estimates sharply upward. On 9 July he jolted the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the following alarming message:

The situation in Korea is critical. We are endeavoring by all means now available here to build up the force necessary to hold the enemy, but to date our efforts against his armor and mechanized forces have been ineffective. His armored equipment is of the best and the service thereof, as reported by qualified veteran observers, as good as any seen at any time in the last year. They further state that the enemy's infantry is of thoroughly first class quality.

This force more and more assumes the aspect of a combination of Soviet leadership and technical guidance with Chinese Communist ground elements. While it serves under the flag of North Korea, it can no longer be considered as an indigenous North Korean military effort.

Our own troops are fulfilling expectations and are fighting with valor against overwhelming odds of more than ten to one. To build up, under these circumstances, sufficiently to hold the southern tip of Korea is becoming increasingly problematical.

I strongly urge that in addition to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least four divisions, with all its component services, be dispatched to this area without delay and by every means of transportation available.

The situation has developed into a major operation.¹⁹

On the following day, CINCFE pressed for the augmentation of his four divisions to full war strength and asked that the Marine RCT that he had previously requested be build up to a division.²⁰ The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Radford, had, meanwhile, in a message to the Chief of Naval Operations, underlined General MacArthur's need for reinforcements from all the Services.²¹

Thus within the space of two days, General MacArthur had approximately doubled his estimates of the ultimate force required (eight divisions instead of four). To grant his new request was all but impossible at that moment. The departure of the 2d Infantry Division would leave only four divisions in the General Reserve, and one of these was an armored division that was not considered suitable for service in Korea.²² General MacArthur's message of 9 July, therefore, brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff face to face with some painful choices. As Admiral Sherman pointed out to his colleagues, it was time to grapple with certain basic questions in the realm of national strategy: how far the United States should commit troops for a land war in Asia, and how much risk should be accepted in other parts of the world in order to strengthen the Far East forces.²³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred General MacArthur's request to General Collins for further study. At the same time, they decided, with the President's approval, that Generals Collins and Vandenberg should at once go to the Far East to obtain more information about CINCFE's requirements.²⁴ During the absence of these two emissaries from 10 to 14 July, their colleagues approved plans drawn up by the Army to send to Korea the 29th Regiment from Okinawa and the 5th RCT from Hawaii.²⁵ They also set in motion a massive expansion of US forces, as an indispensable prerequisite to the dispatch of further large-scale reinforcements to the Far East.

Enlarging the Military Establishment

On 13 July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered an urgent recommendation from the Air Force for involuntary recall of men and units of the reserves. Voluntary recruitment had already proved ineffective, according to the Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this proposal and immediately sent it to the Secretary of Defense, who obtained the President's approval the same day.²⁶

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended another 115,000 men for the Services, distributed as follows: Army, 60,500; Navy, 29,000; Air Force, 25,500. They told Secretary Johnson that this additional manpower was needed to fill out the units being sent to the Far East and to activate additional forces that would serve to restore US capabilities in the Atlantic area. Commenting on General MacArthur's request for four more divisions, which they had under consideration, they noted that, if approved, it would call for yet another strength increase. The Secretary authorized the requested increase on 14 July.²⁷

Earlier, on 11 July, Secretary Johnson, in connection with preliminary budget planning for FY 1952, had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send him revised force objectives for FY 1951 that would reflect the effects of the Korean crisis.²⁸ Replying on 18 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the occasion to urge further increases. For example, the Army had been allowed an end strength of 630,000 men under the FY 1951 budget; the two recent increases, totaling 100,500 men, would have brought this figure to 730,500. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now proposed that the Army goal be enlarged to 834,000, a strength that would suffice to

maintain eleven divisions and twelve regiments. For the Navy, they recommended 579,805 men and 911 ships; for the Marine Corps, 138,013 men and two divisions; and for the Air Force, 569,000 men, with sixty-two combat wings, plus sixteen separate combat squadrons and twenty squadrons of transports. Although most of these manpower objectives exceeded statutory limits, the President approved them on the following day.²⁹

The expansion of the Services and the planned mobilization of reserves were announced to the public by President Truman on 19 July in a radio and television address devoted to the situation in Korea. The President declared that "our own national security and the peace of the world" were at stake there. It was necessary, he explained, to send more men and supplies to General MacArthur, to build up the Armed Forces beyond the immediate needs in Korea, and to speed up the establishment of an effective defense for Western Europe. In a separate message to Congress the same day, the President announced that he had authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted personnel strengths of the Services and to make use of the Selective Service system as necessary. He served notice that he would soon ask for additional funds for the Armed Forces, and urged the legislators to remove the statutory limits on military personnel.³⁰

Five days later, Congress received the supplementary appropriations request of which the President had spoken. The amount sought was \$10.5 billion, enough to finance the personnel increases that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought.³¹ Two months were to elapse before the money was finally made available.³² Early in August, however, Congress approved the President's plea to remove restrictions on military manpower.³³

Mobilization of the reserves got under way on 20 July, when Secretary Johnson granted the necessary authority to the Service Secretaries.³⁴ Detailed requirements were computed by the Services, following recommendations laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense. On 31 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a recommendation by General Collins to call up four divisions and two RCTs from the National Guard on or about 1 September. Secretary Johnson gave his approval on 10 August.³⁵ Another JCS recommendation on 31 July, however, was approved by the President the same day it was made; this was the expansion of both Marine divisions to full strength and the call-up of two Marine Reserve air squadrons.³⁶ On 22 August Secretary Johnson, again at the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, authorized the mobilization of four fighter bomber groups, two medium troop-carrier wings, and various other units of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.³⁷

By 28 August 1950, when the Korean conflict had been in progress for two months, the Army had mobilized 404 units of the Organized Reserve and 205 of the National Guard, with a total strength of 93,586 men, together with 10,584 individual officers. The Navy and Marine Corps combined had called up 103,883 reservists and the Air Force, 49,672.³⁸

The impending influx of reservists made it necessary to expand further the manpower ceilings of the Services, particularly the Army. In connection with the mobilization of the National Guard divisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought and obtained an increase in the Army's authorized strength from 834,000 to

1,061,000—an augmentation of over 25 percent.³⁹ The related call-up of Air Force units necessitated an expansion of 10,268 men for that Service.⁴⁰ For the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1950 recommended 9,235 more men, to reflect a speedup in the construction of destroyers and the reactivation of the battleship *USS New Jersey*. Secretary Johnson gave his approval.⁴¹

These measures completed the emergency expansion of the Services in the summer of 1950. In September the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented with requests for further increases, over and above the immediate needs of the Far Eastern crisis. Since these were not urgent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff simply referred them to their Program and Budget Advisors for consideration in connection with another supplemental appropriations request that was in preparation.⁴²

More Troops for the Far East

In quest of first-hand information about the nature of the war in Korea, Generals Collins and Vandenberg reached Tokyo on 13 July.⁴³ They spent portions of two days in conferences with CINCFE and his staff officers, interspersed with a visit to the front. At this time, the pattern of the conflict was still unfolding. General Walker had just moved to Korea to assume command of the forces there. The 24th Division was struggling to halt the main body of the NKPA along the barrier of the Kum River—an effort that was to end disastrously a few days later with the loss of Taejon, an important junction south of the Kum on the Seoul-Pusan road. The 25th Division was just beginning to arrive in Korea. The 1st Cavalry Division was loading on ships in Japan; its destination had been changed from Inch'on, in the enemy's rear, to P'ohang-dong, a small port on the east coast, where it could land without further congesting the port of Pusan and then rush to the front. In eastern and central Korea, elements of the ROK Army were conducting a fighting retreat, falling back in the face of superior enemy strength. No reinforcements had yet arrived from the United States.⁴⁴

In their first conference with CINCFE on the day of their arrival, the two JCS members heard General MacArthur describe the situation in Korea and pay high tribute to the ability of the NKPA. The General made an urgent plea for reinforcements, arguing frankly that Korea should be given priority over all other areas in which the United States had a strategic interest. The outcome of the Cold War, he contended, would be decided in the Far East. General Collins asked when CINCFE expected to be able to pass to the offensive and how many troops he would need to restore and maintain the 38th parallel. To the first question, General MacArthur declined to give a direct answer. He hoped, he said, to stabilize the front with the three divisions that had been committed and to use the reinforcements en route from the United States for an amphibious counterstroke. His intention was to destroy the North Korean forces, not merely to repulse them. His ultimate requirements for troops to take and hold Korea would be as he had previously stated: a total of eight divisions, plus another Army Headquarters.⁴⁵

On the second day (14 July), detailed discussion of FECOM requirements was combined with a consideration of the problems involved in an amphibious operation against North Korea. Meeting with members of General MacArthur's staff, General Collins again warned that resources were scarce. "Don't get too grandiose," he told them. Earlier that day, General Collins had conferred privately with General MacArthur and expressed the opinion that the 1st Marine Division could be made available. Otherwise, he said, General MacArthur would have to get along with what he had and with the reinforcements that had already been approved: the 2d Infantry Division, the 5th RCT, the 29th Regiment, and another RCT from the 11th Airborne Division. General MacArthur, in reply, recognized the danger of further depleting the General Reserve and agreed to adjust his plans to the available forces.

The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff returned to Washington on 14 July (local time) and reported their conclusions to their colleagues, also to Secretary Johnson and the President. General Collins believed that the US and ROK forces would be able to maintain a foothold in Korea, but he urged prompt reinforcement of CINCFE.⁴⁶

The basic problems raised by General MacArthur's message of 9 July were not yet resolved. This fact was reflected in a message sent to CINCFE on 20 July by the G-3 section of the Army General Staff, which recapitulated the forces thus far approved for shipment to the Far East and concluded with a reference to the request for four additional divisions. No decision could be reached regarding this matter, according to G-3, until it had been decided how far to reconstitute the General Reserve and until General MacArthur's requirements had been evaluated in the light of worldwide commitments.⁴⁷

Pending the resolution of these issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed with CINCFE his need for a full Marine division and an airborne RCT. General MacArthur touched off the discussion on 19 July when he renewed his request for the complete 1st Marine Division, with its attached air wing, by 10 September.⁴⁸ At the instance of Admiral Sherman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied the next day that it would be impossible to provide this unit before November without depleting the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, to an unacceptable degree.⁴⁹ General MacArthur thereupon restated his plea for the division in the strongest terms. "There can be no demand for its potential use elsewhere," he argued in a message on 21 July, "that can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it."⁵⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon restudied the question. After several more exchanges,⁵¹ Admiral Sherman decided that it would be feasible to provide CINCFE with another Marine RCT, with air and support elements, to supplement the First Provisional Marine Brigade then en route to the Far East.⁵² The additional manpower would be drawn from units of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT) and of Marine security forces in the United States. This plan, which would give General MacArthur the equivalent of two-thirds of a division, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 July 1950.⁵³ It was made feasible by the exceptional rapidity by which Marine Reservists had been summoned.⁵⁴

On 25 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Commandant, US Marine Corps, to bring the First Marine Division (less one RCT) to full war strength.⁵⁵ Six days later, as already described, they obtained the approval of the President to bring both Marine divisions to full war strength. This action eventually made it possible to provide CINCFE with a third Marine RCT, though not in time for the amphibious assault.

An airborne RCT was at first considered by General MacArthur to be an essential element of the shattering surprise that he was preparing for the North Korean Army. Operating from Japan, the paratroopers would be airdropped shortly after D-day to seize a "key communication center" immediately ahead of the advancing US forces and thus to facilitate the breakout from the beachhead.⁵⁶ As with the Marine division, the difficulty lay in meeting the specified deadline of 10 September. To do so, it would be necessary to draw on the 82d Airborne Division, which General Collins, in a message to CINCFE, characterized as "the only effective infantry unit left in the United States."⁵⁷ The condition of the 11th Airborne was such that it seemed impossible to prepare any of its component RCTs for combat before the latter part of October, especially since, in the eyes of officials of the Department of the Army, CINCFE's other requirements seemed much more important. When General MacArthur was given an arrival date of 23 October, he remonstrated and asked that its shipment be expedited. The Department of the Army accordingly undertook to speed up the completion of the selected unit (the 187th RCT of the 11th Airborne), drawing to some extent on the 82d. But no promises were made that it would be available in time for the amphibious operation, and eventually CINCFE eliminated the air-drop from his plan.⁵⁸

General Collins' proposed mobilization of National Guard divisions, which was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 July and subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense, would, when carried out, restore a measure of flexibility to US military strategy and force deployment. Depending on the situation after the divisions had been assembled and trained, they could be used either to reinforce FECOM or to rebuild the General Reserve. At the moment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made no recommendations regarding their eventual disposition.

Just at this point, CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves obliged to divert some attention to Taiwan, where it seemed possible that the Chinese Communists might choose the opportunity to open a new front. General MacArthur, in moving to meet this contingency, managed to arouse the suspicion of the President that he was somewhat less than wholehearted in his support of the administration's policy toward Nationalist China. President Truman therefore decided to send Ambassador-at-large W. Averell Harriman to the Far East to confer with the General.⁵⁹ Two of the Services took the opportunity to send representatives at the same time, for another discussion of CINCFE's operational plans and force requirements. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration (who was to become commander of the Eighth Army a few months later), was selected as the Army representative. The Air Force sent Lieutenant General Lauris A. Norstad, Acting Vice Chief of Staff.⁶⁰

When General Ridgway reached Tokyo on 6 August, he bore with him a long letter from General Collins to CINCFE describing the situation as seen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The decision to mobilize the National Guard, according to this letter, had been made with a view to meeting General MacArthur's expressed need for four more divisions, although the ultimate disposition of these units would be decided in the light of conditions prevailing at the time. General Collins expressed the hope that, with the passing of the rainy season, UN air power might exert its full effect on North Korean supply lines and enable CINCFE to counterattack earlier than expected. He reminded General MacArthur of his agreement to adapt his strategy to the forces already made available, which, he pointed out, would total almost seven divisions. On the other hand, he foresaw that the four additional divisions might be needed if the enemy continued to receive reinforcements. "I am confident," continued General Collins, "that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be prepared to accede to a definite request for these troops when the situation has stabilized and you are able to make more specific plans than is possible now. Meanwhile, we are going to proceed with the training of these divisions as rapidly as possible. . . . I think we must wait and see how the North Koreans react during the next couple of months." He closed with an assurance of his desire to provide all possible support to CINCFE.⁶¹

In conferences with the Washington representatives on 6 and 8 August, General MacArthur outlined his needs for additional forces. His principal request was for the 3d Infantry Division. As he doubtless knew, this was the one remaining division of the General Reserve that might be available; the 2d Armored was unsuitable, the 11th Airborne unready, and the 82d Airborne untouchable. The possibility of sending the 3d Division to the Far East had already been discussed. However, it had been "raided" for replacement battalions, and its combat readiness was doubtful. Nevertheless, General MacArthur convinced the Washington visitors that it should be sent. He proposed to use it for occupation duty in Japan, releasing the 7th Division (the one division remaining there) for combat in Korea.⁶²

At the time these conferences were held, the goal of a stabilized front seemed within reach. A more or less continuous front—the "Pusan Perimeter"—had coalesced in southeastern Korea. The forces available for its defense were minimal. General Ridgway learned that one division with only six battalions was holding a front of 21,000 yards, and that some rifle companies held 1,000-yard fronts. Under these conditions, it was impossible to prevent enemy infiltration. Moreover, the ground had not yet been thoroughly organized for defense. Nevertheless General Ridgway, like General Collins before him, concluded that the Pusan bridgehead could be held if reinforcements could be made available.⁶³

On returning to Washington, Generals Ridgway and Norstad presented their report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who at once undertook to resolve the problem of more forces for the Far East—a problem that at first glance looked nearly insoluble. Leaving aside the National Guard Divisions, which could not be ready for many weeks, the choice boiled down to sending the 3d Infantry Division, after piecing it out in some manner, or depriving General Collins of his "hole card," the 82d Airborne. The JCS members gave serious consideration to the latter alternative, in view of the poor condition of the 3d. They finally asked General Collins

and Admiral Sherman to restudy the problem and to submit recommendations within forty-eight hours.⁶⁴

To send the 3d Division to the Far East by the middle of September, in time for CINCFE's projected counterattack, at first seemed impossible. It would be necessary to divert the stream of combat replacements and to draw further on the General Reserve, and even with its strength restored, the division would not be combat-ready for several months. But the Department of the Army discovered an alternative, which General Collins presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 August. The division would be shipped to FECOM from Fort Benning, strengthened by the addition of various units and filler replacements, but still short one regiment. To make up this deficiency, the 65th Infantry Regiment, located in Puerto Rico, would be sent directly to the Far East as part of the 3d Division, its place to be taken by a regiment of the Puerto Rican National Guard called into Federal service. But the 65th was itself short one battalion; therefore, a battalion of the 33d Regiment, stationed in Panama, would be sent to the Far East to serve with it.⁶⁵

This complicated reshuffle was at once approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with another plan (doubtless submitted by Admiral Sherman) to provide General MacArthur with a third Marine RCT. The Commandant, US Marine Corps, had directed the formation of this unit on 4 August; it was to be activated by drawing on FMFLANT for cadres, which would be completed with reservists, and by sending an entire FMFLANT battalion direct to the Far East from the Mediterranean.⁶⁶ Shipping could be provided for both the Marine and the Army units, though it would be necessary to reactivate some transports and cargo ships and to divert amphibious vessels from the Atlantic. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the aircraft carrier USS *Leyte* and the battleship USS *Missouri* should also be sent to the Far East for temporary duty. In recommending these measures to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that they would lead to "a grave decrease in our capabilities in the Atlantic for a period of several months," but they believed that this risk should be accepted.⁶⁷

Because the sending of these forces involved a further depletion of the General Reserve, the JCS recommendations were carried to the President, who approved them on 10 August in a meeting at the White House.⁶⁸ Secretary Johnson gave formal approval in writing the following day.⁶⁹

General Collins at once notified CINCFE of the impending departure of the 3d Division, adding a warning, in the following terms, of the gravity of the risk that was involved:

In withdrawing this division from the general reserve, the JCS have accepted for the next few months a further serious reduction in US capabilities to meet other possible demands for combat ground forces, as well as a further serious reduction, during the same period, in the Army's capability to train additional forces for your theater. It is the understanding of the JCS that this division is furnished you as a theater reserve, because of your reported intention of committing all remaining combat reserves now in or en route to your theater in your planned offensive operation, and further that it is your intention that this division, which will arrive in your theater at a very low combat effective level, will, except for the

most compelling reasons, be permitted sufficient training time to reach a minimum acceptable training level before commitment to battle.⁷⁰

The forces approved for the Far Eastern theater on 10 August 1950 constituted the final increment of reinforcements sent during 1950. By the time this action was taken, the units requested earlier were at last arriving. The transports had begun to disgorge their cargoes of men and materiel at Pusan and the ports of Japan. The 29th Regiment, from nearby Okinawa, was the first to reach the battle front, on 24 July. The 5th RCT arrived from Hawaii on 31 July; it was followed within the next week by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and two regiments of the 2d Infantry Division. The remainder of the 2d Division landed at Pusan on 19 August. All of these units were flung into the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. The second Marine RCT arrived between 28 August and 6 September, going directly to Japan to load for the Inch'on assault.⁷¹

Of the reinforcements authorized on 10 August, the Marines arrived (in separate battalions) on 9 and 17 September⁷² and the elements of the 3d Infantry Division shortly thereafter. General MacArthur allowed himself considerable latitude in interpreting the JCS directive restricting the use of this division. At the time of the Inch'on landing, it was listed as constituting part of the GHQ Reserve, together with the 187th Airborne RCT, though both were still afloat.⁷³ "Compelling reasons" led CINCFE to land the 65th Regiment at Pusan on 22 September and send it into battle at once; the other two regiments of the division disembarked in Japan, where they remained until November.⁷⁴

From outside the Far Eastern Theater, therefore, General MacArthur received during 1950 three full divisions (two Army, one Marine) and two RCTs. They were added to the troops already in the Far East at the outbreak of the war (four divisions and one regiment). With this force, plus the remaining elements of the ROK Army and a few troops from other countries, General MacArthur carried out his amphibious envelopment, smashed the North Korean People's Army, and marched almost to the borders of Manchuria. With essentially this same force (and some additional UN contingents that brought the total roughly to the equivalent of a division), General Ridgway, taking over the Eighth Army after the disastrous intervention of the Chinese Communists, checked the enemy's southward surge and once more stabilized the battle line. General MacArthur's long-range forecast of his requirements—eight US divisions—thus proved essentially accurate. The four National Guard divisions mobilized in September did not become available until 1951 and played no role in the war during its first year. Two of them were shipped to the Far East in April 1951; they were at first used to garrison Japan but were later rotated to Korea.⁷⁵

A Strategy for Victory

During World War II, General MacArthur had used amphibious warfare with outstanding success, exploiting to the utmost the mobility of seaborne

forces. Inevitably, his mind turned to this strategy when war broke out again in Korea. Reference has already been made to his early plan to use a Marine RCT, in conjunction with the 1st Cavalry Division from Japan, to land at Inch'on and take the enemy in the rear. The operation was set for 22 July, but it was disrupted by the swiftness of the enemy advance. Not only the 1st Cavalry Division but the Marines as well had to be committed to the attempt to stabilize the front.⁷⁶

To halt the onrushing enemy—to fix his forces in place, so that they could be destroyed by a slashing stroke from the rear—was an essential prerequisite. Where could the enemy best be stopped? The choice of a defense line was considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in an estimate submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 July 1950. The JIC concluded that the North Koreans would be capable of threatening the security of Pusan by 25 July 1950. The members laid out three possible defense lines, each roughly in the form of an arc of a circle centered on Pusan, lying at distances of approximately 80, 50, and 35 air miles, respectively, from that city. All three lines were designed to exploit the topography of the rugged Sobaek range of hills in southeastern Korea, and all would cut across the valley of the Nakdong river at approximately a right angle.⁷⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff merely noted this JIC study and left it to CINCFE to decide where to make a stand. The line actually selected by General Walker and General MacArthur did not follow any of the plans drafted by the Joint Intelligence Committee.⁷⁸ The “Pusan Perimeter,” so-called, had the form of an inverted “L,” with the main portion running north-south along the Nakdong valley and the shorter arm bending eastward at right angles to reach the sea. This line took shape during late July and early August, as US units, facing the bulk of the NK Army in the central and western parts of the peninsula, were pressed inexorably backward until finally forced to withdraw behind the Nakdong. Fortunately their right flank was protected by the ROK Army, which held out in the east, though driven steadily southward.

At its smallest extent, the angle of the perimeter was approximately 60 air miles north of Masan, on the south coast, and the eastern anchor was in the vicinity of P'ohang-dong, which the North Koreans actually captured at one time. US troops held the longer (north-south) portion, assisted by the British force that arrived in late August. The ROK Army defended the east-west sector, but was frequently obliged to call on EUSAK for help. All along the line, the forces of the UN Command were stretched almost to the breaking point, which was nearly reached on several occasions. Through the tense days of August, and on into the middle of September, it was never certain whether the beachhead in southeastern Korea could be held until General MacArthur could retrieve the situation with his amphibious counterstroke.⁷⁹

Regarding the nature of this planned operation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had little information until the visit of Generals Collins and Vandenberg to Tokyo on 13 to 14 July. General MacArthur was deliberately closemouthed, evidently fearing a security leak in Washington. Even after the Collins-Vandenberg trip, when CINCFE's need for a full Marine division was under discussion, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 July that it would be “unwise” to describe fully in a message his plans for the use of this unit.⁸⁰

While in Tokyo, General Collins discussed the general outlines of the proposed amphibious attack with General Almond and other members of the FECOM staff. The choice of Inch'on, a port on the coast some 20 miles west of Seoul, as the site of the landing caused General Collins to feel somewhat uneasy. Strategically, Inch'on was indeed a tempting prize; it would place the invading forces within easy reach of the capital—the hub of South Korea's road and rail net—and of the airfield at Kimpo. Geographically, however, the dangers of a landing at that site were so manifest that one writer later referred to Inch'on as "probably the worst place ever selected for an amphibious invasion."⁸¹ Huge mudflats extended westward from the coast for a distance of three miles or so. Landing Ship Tanks (LST) could cross this area only when the tides were at least 30 feet deep, a condition that occurred on only a few days out of each month. Planners were thus severely constrained in choosing a date and hour for an assault. A narrow channel threaded the flats to reach the port, but it was difficult and tortuous even in daylight. Moreover, the channel was dominated by a small island, Wolmi-do, rugged in terrain and known to be fortified; the need to reduce this island before attacking the mainland would destroy the element of surprise. The city itself was protected by a 12-foot seawall. A further consideration was that Inch'on lay more than 100 air miles from the nearest part of the Pusan Perimeter, so that it was doubtful whether the invading force and EUSAK could link up as planned.⁸²

General Collins voiced his doubts about the suitability of Inch'on in his discussions with FECOM officers. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, USN, who commanded the amphibious forces in the Far East, admitted that the operation would be difficult but believed that it was possible.⁸³ But the Army Chief of Staff made it clear to his colleagues, on his return, that he was still unconvinced.⁸⁴

Despite General Collins' misgivings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not at once raise any question with General MacArthur about the choice of Inch'on. Nor did they question the desirability of an amphibious operation. Their immediate concern, as described earlier, was with General MacArthur's request for two major units—a full Marine division and an airborne RCT—by his specified deadline of mid-September. Asked to justify his need for these forces, CINCFE sketched the main outlines of his plan, which would combine an assault landing by a two-division corps with a subsequent airdrop. The exact date of D-day would depend in part on enemy actions, although it could perhaps be postponed to 25 September. But he stressed the need for haste. An "early and strong effort" behind the enemy's front lines, he believed, would "sever his main lines of communications and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity."⁸⁵

On 24 July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted General MacArthur by teleconference. Citing continued enemy gains, they asked him if he still considered it possible to plan a landing for the middle of September. CINCFE replied that "the chances to launch the movement in September would be excellent" if he were given a full Marine division. He emphasized the need for complete secrecy in terms that again revealed his suspicion of the level of security prevailing in Washington. "The spokesman for the Department of the Army should not reveal our grand strategy in the slightest degree," he warned.⁸⁶

Thereupon the Joint Chiefs of Staff dropped the subject of the date while they turned their attention to finding additional reinforcements for FECOM. Their misgivings, however, had not been removed. Apparently at this time they discussed the Inch'on operation with Secretary Johnson, who was wholeheartedly in favor of it.⁸⁷ At the White House meeting of 10 August 1950, when the dispatch of the 3d Division was approved, there was some discussion of strategy. Admiral Sherman made it clear, as he later wrote, that he was "confident that General MacArthur would make good use of the forces, but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have to pass on his plans for amphibious landings."⁸⁸

As time went on and CINCFE failed to take Washington into his confidence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that some of their members should go to Tokyo to discuss the General's plans with him.⁸⁹ General Collins and Admiral Sherman were chosen for this purpose. General Vandenberg sent his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards, to represent the Air Force.

The emissaries from Washington left on 19 August and reached Tokyo two days later, in time for a short preliminary conference with members of the staff of FECOM and of the newly activated X Corps, which would constitute the landing force. The next day was spent in a tour of the battlefield. Finally, on 23 August, they attended a full-scale briefing with General MacArthur and other officers at FECOM Headquarters in the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo. Here the Inch'on landing plan was subjected to a detailed examination.⁹⁰

Officers of the special planning staff within General MacArthur's headquarters (known as the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, or JSPOG), first outlined the concept of the operation.⁹¹ The assault would be made by the 1st Marine Division, which, after seizing Inch'on, would swing northeastward to capture Kimpo airfield. The 7th Infantry Division, following in the footsteps of the Marines, would secure the high ground southeast of Seoul. Thus the X Corps would constitute part of a gigantic nutcracker, of which the other jaw would be formed by the Eighth Army, surging out of its redoubt behind the Naktong. Together they would crush the North Korean forces.

A succession of Navy and Marine Corps officers then discussed the problems involved in a landing at Inch'on. They made no effort to conceal the dangers and difficulties. Admiral Doyle summed up this part of the discussion with the statement that, while the operation was not impossible, he did not recommend it.

In the discussion that ensued, General Collins voiced a fear that the X Corps, even if it managed at first to gain a toehold at Inch'on, might be driven into the sea before the Eighth Army could break out and join up with it. To avoid this possibility, he suggested a landing at Kunsan, some 100 miles south of Inch'on, which was much nearer to the Pusan Perimeter. It had fewer natural obstacles than Inch'on, and had the advantage of location close to the enemy's main supply routes, which ran through Nonsan (30 miles inland from Kunsan) and Taejon. This suggestion won the endorsement of Admiral Sherman.

General MacArthur himself then took the floor and held it for an hour or so, while he defended his plan with the forensic ability of a man who was a master of words as well as warfare. One by one, he disposed of or rejected the objections to the Inch'on landing. He admitted the physical obstacles but expressed

confidence that the Navy and Marine Corps would surmount them. A landing at Kunsan would afford only a shallow envelopment; the enemy would simply be driven back on his base of operations, not severed from it. There was no danger that the invading force at Inch'on would be overwhelmed; the enemy did not have sufficient reserves for that purpose. The very disadvantages of Inch'on would help to ensure surprise. Building skillfully toward a climax, he concluded with what General Collins later described as a "stirring peroration":

If my estimate is inaccurate and should I run into a defense with which I cannot cope, I will be there personally and will immediately withdraw our forces before they are committed to a bloody setback. The only loss then will be my professional reputation. But Inch'on will not fail. Inch'on will succeed. And it will save 100,000 lives.⁹²

This "brilliant exposition," according to General Collins, left the audience "spellbound."⁹³ It did not, however, fully convince the doubters. On the following day Admiral Sherman conferred with Admiral Joy (COMNAVFE), Admiral Radford (CINCPAC), and two Marine Corps officers, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding General of FMFPAC, and Major General Oliver P. Smith, who commanded the 1st Marine Division. They agreed that a better site for a landing would be Posung-Myon, 30 miles south of Inch'on, where the water was deep enough for a landing at any time. General Shepherd subsequently attempted to persuade General MacArthur to accept this change but met with no success.⁹⁴

Admiral Sherman also conferred privately with General MacArthur and restated the Navy's objections to Inch'on. The General went so far as to agree that the operation could succeed only if no opposition developed. Reportedly, Admiral Sherman remarked, at the end of the conference, "I wish I could share that man's optimism."⁹⁵

On returning to Washington, General Collins and Admiral Sherman reported the results of their conference to their colleagues, also to Secretary Johnson and President Truman.⁹⁶ The Secretary was firm in his support of General MacArthur's plan. He later took credit for winning over the President.⁹⁷

The reservations still held by General Collins and Admiral Sherman, and perhaps by other JCS members as well, were manifested in a message that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to CINCFE on 28 August. Although they gave general approval to the projected operation, they were careful not to fix any definite location and made it clear that they wished this aspect of the plan to be subject to reconsideration. Their message read as follows:

After reviewing the information brought back by General Collins and Admiral Sherman we concur in making preparations and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea either at Inch'on in the event that enemy defenses in vicinity of Inch'on prove ineffective or at a favorable beach south of Inch'on if one can be located. We further concur in preparation, if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We understand that alternative plans are being prepared in order best to exploit the situation as it develops.

We desire such information as becomes available with respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and timely information as to your intentions and plans for offensive operations.⁹⁸

On 30 August General MacArthur issued his operations order for the Inch'on landing.⁹⁹ He did not immediately send a copy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor did he respond to their message of 28 August.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, on 5 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt constrained to remind him that they "desire to be informed of any modification which may have been made in your plans for a mid-September amphibious operation."¹⁰¹ CINCFE replied briefly that the "general outline of plan remains as described to you," and that he was sending copies of the operation order and other relevant documents by a courier, who would arrive in Washington about 11 September.¹⁰²

This exchange of messages came at a time when events in Korea had taken a particularly dangerous turn. On 1 September the North Koreans opened a general offensive all around the perimeter. They broke through at several points and were repelled only with the utmost difficulty. The First Provisional Marine Brigade, which had been withdrawn from the front and was preparing to embark for Inch'on, had to be recalled and thrown against the most dangerous of these penetrations, in the center of the Naktong line opposite Taegu. At one time, General Walker was actually considering withdrawal to the final "Davidson line," closer to Pusan, which had been laid out for this purpose.¹⁰³

After reading the reports of these alarming developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send CINCFE a final warning of the disastrous consequences that would ensue if the Inch'on landing miscarried, or if it failed to produce a quick victory. On 7 September they transmitted the following message:

While we concur in launching a counter-offensive in Korea as early as is feasible, we have noted with considerable concern the recent trend of events there. In light of all factors including apparent commitment of practically all reserves available to Eighth Army, we desire your estimate as to feasibility and chance of success of projected operation if initiated on planned schedule. We are sure that you understand that all available trained Army units in the United States have been allocated to you except 82 Abn Div and that minimum of four months would elapse before first of partially trained National Guard Divisions could reach Korea in event that junction of main Eighth Army Forces with Tenth Corps bridgehead should not quickly be effected with forces now available to FECOM.¹⁰⁴

Without hesitation, General MacArthur wired back an answer radiating the confidence of a commander long accustomed to victory in similar maneuvers. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that

there is no question in my mind as to the feasibility of the operation and I regard its chance of success as excellent. I go further and believe that it represents the only hope of wresting the initiative from the enemy and thereby presenting an opportunity for a decisive blow. To do otherwise is to commit us to a war of indefinite duration, of gradual attrition and of doubtful results, as the enemy has potentialities of reinforcement and build-up which exceed those of our own


availability. . . . The situation within the perimeter is not critical. It is possible that there may be some contraction and defense positions have been selected for this contingency. There is no slightest possibility, however, of our force being ejected from the Pusan beachhead. The envelopment from the north will instantly relieve the pressure on the south perimeter and, indeed, is the only way that this can be accomplished. . . . The success of the enveloping movement from the north does not depend upon the rapid juncture of the X Corps and the 8th Army. The seizure of the heart of the enemy distributing system in the Seoul area will completely dislocate the logistical supply of his forces now operating in South Korea and therefore will ultimately result in their disintegration. . . . Caught between our northern and our southern forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy cannot fail to be ultimately shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities. The prompt junction of our two forces, while it would be dramatically symbolic of the complete collapse of the enemy, is not a vital part of the operation. For the reasons stated, there are no material changes under contemplation in the operation as planned and reported to you. The embarkation of the troops and the preliminary air and naval preparations are proceeding according to schedule. I repeat that I and all of my commanders and staff officers, without exception, are enthusiastic and confident of the success of the enveloping operation.¹⁰⁵

In the face of this declaration of confidence, clearly and cogently argued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff abandoned their objections to the Inch'on operation. "We approve your plan and President has been so informed," they told General MacArthur on 8 September.¹⁰⁶

Not until a few hours before the first troops hit the beach did the Joint Chiefs of Staff learn the details of the plan. The courier bearing the operations order (Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. Smith) left Tokyo on the morning of 10 September, with General MacArthur's injunction, "Don't get there too soon," probably spoken only partly in jest. The General gave him a further message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that showed that he still expected some opposition. "If they say it is too big a gamble," he told Smith, "tell them I said this is throwing a nickle in the pot after it has been opened for a dollar. The big gamble was Washington's decision to put American troops on the Asiatic mainland."

Lieutenant Colonel Smith reached Washington at 2300 on 13 September and appeared before the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1100 the following morning. By the time he had completed his presentation and had answered questions, it was too late for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have cancelled the plan. H-Hour had been set for 0630, Far East time, on 15 September, or 141730 in Washington.¹⁰⁷

It was perhaps inevitable that news of the long discussions between CINCFE and his superiors should leak to the press. Shortly after the landing, a newspaper reporter, who had evidently been talking to members of the FECOM staff, filed a dispatch asserting that General MacArthur had "sold" the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Inch'on landing "despite their unanimous objection to such an ambitious undertaking." No evidence was given in support of this statement, but "sources close to General MacArthur" were quoted to the effect that General Collins and Admiral Sherman had favored landings farther south. On reading this report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacArthur the text of a statement being



Map 3

released by General Collins and Admiral Sherman, in which they pointed out that they had been sent to Tokyo “to review plans for the Inch’on landing, possible alternate landings, and subsequent operations,” and that afterwards the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given “unanimous approval of the projected operations including the landing at Inch’on.”¹⁰⁸

The Conflict Almost Won

Policies for a New Situation

As General MacArthur had predicted, his amphibious enveloping maneuver proved a spectacular success. On 15 September 1950 the First Marine Division, after seizing the island of Wolmi-Do, stormed ashore at Inch'on. Quickly securing the city, the Marines pushed inland and swung northward toward Seoul. Three days later, the 7th Infantry Division landed and deployed to the southeast to form the right flank of the X Corps beachhead. Both forces moved steadily forward against ineffectual and poorly coordinated resistance.

The situation of the hard-pressed Eighth Army was not immediately improved. General Walker had ordered his "break-out" offensive to begin on 16 September, but at first the gains were slow and bitterly contested. Unaware at first of the new force in their rear, North Korean troops fought as tenaciously as ever. Gradually, however, opposition began to slacken as enemy units were pulled out of the line and hurried toward Inch'on. When it became apparent that enemy resistance was collapsing, General Walker on 22 September ordered all units to drive forward "without regard to lateral security." Spearheads of the Eighth Army fanned out to the north and west, racing to entrap the fleeing foe. On 27 September, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, Eighth Army, linked up with the 7th Division north of Osan, near where US troops had first encountered the North Korean People's Army almost three months earlier. On the east coast, the battered ROK forces gathered their strength and launched a northward drive that was to carry them almost to the Manchurian border before it was halted.

Meanwhile the battle for Seoul had begun. Marines and infantrymen fought their way into the city against stubborn resistance. Although the UN Command officially announced the liberation of the city on 26 September, fighting continued for two more days. By the time it ended, South Korea was practically free of invaders except for isolated forces trapped in various pockets. Of the powerful army of 90,000 men that had swept down the peninsula three months earlier, it was estimated that not more than 25,000 to 30,000 disorganized troops succeeded in recrossing the 38th parallel.¹

Accompanying these developments was an important change in the administration in Washington. Three days before the Inch'on landing, the nation was startled to learn that President Truman had "accepted" the resignation of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. Moreover, a replacement had already been designated: General of the Army George C. Marshall, then living in retirement after having served as Chief of Staff, US Army (1939–1945) and Secretary of State (1947–1949). Owing to General Marshall's military status, an act of Congress was necessary to allow him to occupy the Secretaryship. He was sworn into office on 21 September 1950.²

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an immediate result of the change in Secretaries was an easier relationship with their counterparts in the Department of State. Unlike his predecessor, who had tended to restrict contacts to formally designated liaison channels, Secretary Marshall encouraged free interdepartmental consultation. He himself enjoyed a cordial relationship with Mr. Acheson, who had served as his deputy at State (and whose difficult relations with Mr. Johnson were a matter of common knowledge). The frank and informal discussions of military and political problems during the dark days of the Chinese intervention in Korea, when the two Secretaries met frequently with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other advisors, would hardly have been conceivable under Mr. Johnson's regime.³

By chance, General Marshall's accession coincided with a promotion for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, who, by act of Congress, received a fifth star. In a brief White House ceremony on 22 September, President Truman awarded the General his new insignia, doing so "with obvious pleasure," as a reporter noted.⁴ Thus an anomaly in General Bradley's position was eliminated. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949, which created the JCS Chairmanship, had specified that the incumbent would "take precedence" over all other officers of the Armed Services; yet as a four-star general, General Bradley had actually been outranked by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the last of the five-star officers of World War II remaining on active duty.

The new Secretary of Defense took up his duties at a time when the overwhelming UN success at Inch'on had completely altered the military situation in Korea. But the administration had by no means been caught unprepared by this reversal of fortune. In mid-July, while the security of the US beachhead in Korea yet remained highly uncertain, President Truman had begun planning for the consequences of military victory. He had asked the National Security Council to submit proposals regarding the policies to be adopted "after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel."⁵

The issue to be resolved in this connection was whether the mere repulse of the invading army was to be considered sufficient, or whether the objective was the complete destruction of North Korea's warmaking capacity. In other words, two questions had to be answered: Should UN forces be allowed to invade North Korea? And if so, for what purpose? The first of these presented little difficulty. To require military commanders to break contact and stand on the defensive the

instant they reached the 38th parallel would be militarily absurd. As Secretary Acheson put it, troops could not be expected “to march up to a surveyor’s line and stop.”⁶

But merely to authorize UN forces to pursue the enemy across the border would not settle the larger question of Korea’s political future. Granted the defeat of the North Korean forces in contact with UN troops, what should follow? Should the UN Command withdraw, leaving the border as it was before, or at most adjusting it to make it militarily defensible? To do so would leave North Korea free to rebuild its forces and perhaps to resume the invasion later. The only way to ensure against another attack would be to destroy the North Korean regime and bring the whole country under a single government—thus attaining the “unification” of Korea, which various UN resolutions had proclaimed as desirable.

These questions did not arise in the early days of the Korean crisis. No one looked beyond the immediate need to restore the *status quo ante*.⁷ President Truman told the National Security Council on 29 June 1950 that he “wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border.”⁸ In a public address the same day, Secretary Acheson declared that the commitment of US air and naval forces was “solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion from the north and of reestablishing the peace broken by that aggression.”⁹ The UN Security Council resolutions had implied a similar limited objective: the first, enacted on 25 June, had called on North Korea to withdraw its forces to the 38th parallel, and the second, two days later, had urged member nations to furnish assistance “to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”

But if the North Korean Army could be thoroughly defeated, an opportunity might present itself to unite the entire country under a UN-sponsored government. Some members of the administration—particularly, it would appear, in the Department of Defense—believed that this opportunity should not be lost.¹⁰ The issue was also discussed outside the government, although it was not until after the success of the Inch’on operation that the debate became intense. Among the individuals who spoke out on the matter was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University. Though he apparently did not explicitly urge unification, he expressed the view that North Korean forces should not be permitted to retire safely behind the 38th parallel and that the intent of the UN resolutions would not be violated if UN forces found it necessary to cross the border. President Rhee, as would be expected, was loud in his announced determination to end the division of his country.¹¹

To a limited extent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had discussed Korea’s future with General MacArthur. The subject came up in mid-July, when Generals Collins and Vandenberg visited CINCFE. “I intend to destroy and not to drive back the North Korean forces,” said General MacArthur. “I may need to occupy all of North Korea. In the aftermath of operations, the problem is to compose and unite Korea.”¹² The two JCS members apparently did not pursue the matter further.

The following month, when General Collins returned to the Far East in company with Admiral Sherman, the conversation turned to the operations that should follow the Inch'on invasion. "We agreed with the General [MacArthur]," General Collins later wrote, "that he should be authorized to continue the attack across the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean forces, which otherwise would be a recurrent threat to the independence of South Korea."¹³ Apparently they also discussed the future occupation of Korea and agreed that it should be limited in extent and duration.¹⁴

In mid-August Ambassador Austin, speaking to the UN Security Council, clearly enunciated the goal of Korean unification. "The determination of the United Nations to insure that Korea shall be free, unified and independent of outside influence from any great power, on or off the continent, has never wavered," he said on 10 August. A week later, he contended that the General Assembly's decision in favor of "fair and free elections . . . throughout the whole of the Korean peninsula" was still valid, though its execution had been blocked by the North Korean regime. "As order is brought out of chaos," he continued, "some United Nations body should be on the spot to lend all practicable assistance to the Republic in establishing democratic government in the reunited Korea."¹⁵

The Ambassador seemed to imply that the United States intended to place the Rhee government in control of all Korea. However, "sources" in the US Delegation at Lake Success quickly made it clear that there had been no change in the instructions given General MacArthur, which were simply to drive the invaders back to the 38th parallel, and that it was hoped that the unification of Korea could be accomplished through negotiation.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the Service Secretaries interpreted Mr. Austin's words as implying a commitment to "the expulsion from Korea of the Communists as an organized political and military force." But, they pointed out, there had been no official directive from higher authority regarding Korea's future, and military planning was being hindered by the lack of guidance regarding operations north of the 38th parallel.¹⁷

This guidance was provided in NSC 81, prepared by the NSC Staff and circulated on 1 September. The recommendations in this paper were necessarily tentative and subject to modification after consultation with other UN members. The drafters of NSC 81 concluded that the Security Council resolutions of June and July provided a legal basis for military operations north of the 38th parallel for a strictly limited purpose: "to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces." The UN Commander should be authorized to undertake such operations, provided that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese Communists moved troops into North Korea, or announced an intention to do so. Should such action occur, General MacArthur should halt his forces at the border and await the action of the UN Security Council.

The probability of Soviet or Chinese intervention was carefully weighed in NSC 81. The conclusion was that some reaction by either or both of these nations was likely. It might well result in a clash that would bring on general war: however, this danger could be sharply reduced if operations on North Korean soil were conducted wholly by ROK troops. In any event, no forces of other countries

should be employed in the areas contiguous to the Soviet Union or to Manchuria. Plans for the occupation of North Korea should be drafted but should be carried out only with the approval of the President after consultation with the United Nations.

Courses of action were proposed in NSC 81 to cover the contingencies of "open employment" of "major" units of Soviet Russia or Communist China south of the 38th parallel and of "major" Soviet forces north thereof. Briefly, the UN Commander should in those cases shift to the defensive and refer the problem to Washington. Whether these instructions also applied if "major" Chinese forces intervened was not indicated.

The peace terms to be offered North Korea should at once be discussed with friendly UN members in case the NK Peoples Army should suddenly collapse. If the terms were offered and rejected, the UN Commander should continue his attempts to destroy the enemy forces before they could retreat across the parallel. He should, however, "request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea."

Within the United Nations, the United States should seek to encompass the unification of Korea through free elections, according to NSC 81. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Korea should be recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in the country and should be consulted on all matters relating unification.¹⁸

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff received NSC 81, they gave it a "cold review," in General Collins' words.¹⁹ Instead of suggesting changes, they told the Secretary of Defense on 7 September that the entire paper should be rewritten. Its approach was "unrealistic," since it "envisages the stabilization of a front on the 38th parallel." On the basis of consultation of two of their members (doubtless General Collins and Admiral Sherman) with General MacArthur, they agreed with CINCPAC that the initial objective should be the destruction of NK forces. It was expected that most of these forces could be destroyed south of the parallel, but subsequent operations both north and south of that line would be necessary. These actions, however, could be left to South Korean forces, as they would amount essentially to mopping up of guerrillas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed with General MacArthur's view that any UN occupation should be limited to the major cities south of the 38th parallel and should be ended as soon as possible. They added their "understanding" that General MacArthur had reached agreement with President Rhee on the restoration of the ROK Government in Seoul and the holding of elections for a unified all-Korean government.²⁰

At a meeting of the National Security Council on 7 September 1950, General Bradley presented the JCS views on NSC 81. Secretary Acheson disputed the JCS interpretation that the paper envisioned stabilization of the front at the parallel, and went on to suggest an amendment of his own, namely, a statement that military operations north of the parallel would be undertaken only after specific approval from Washington. The Council approved NSC 81 in principle but directed the Departments of State and Defense to draft an amended version to be submitted to the President.²¹

The revision, NSC 81/1, was approved by the President on 11 September.²² It incorporated a number of minor changes, some doubtless inserted at the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²³ The most important change, which can probably be ascribed to JCS influence, was to allow more flexibility in the conduct of military operations in northern Korea. Thus a statement in NSC 81 that UN operations "should not be permitted to extend into areas *close to* the Manchurian and U.S.S.R. borders of Korea" was altered to say that such operations should not be allowed *across* those borders. Again, where NSC 81 had declared that forces other than those of the Republic of Korea should "in no circumstances" be used in the border regions, NSC 81/1 stated merely that "it should be the policy" not to employ non-ROK forces there. These innocuous-sounding changes in phraseology contained the seeds of future difficulty. At the same time, it was made clear, as Secretary Acheson had desired, that Presidential approval would be required before UN troops crossed the 38th parallel.

The political disposition of North Korea was not dealt with in NSC 81/1. The administration had by now committed itself to the unification of Korea, as President Truman made clear in a speech on 1 September 1950. "We believe the Koreans have a right to be free, independent, and united—as they want to be," he said. "Under the direction and guidance of the United Nations, we, with others, will do our part to help them enjoy that right."²⁴ But "unification" was an objective and not a course of action. It did not even necessarily imply an invasion of North Korea. On this matter, the administration had not reached a decision. Assistant Secretary Rusk told the South Korean Ambassador on 8 September that the United States could not at that time assume a definite position regarding the 38th parallel and would not support any predetermined line of action until the United Nations could be consulted.²⁵

In the weeks that followed the President's speech, it became clear that the general opinion in the United States, at least as expressed by press editorials and Congressional statements, was that UN troops ought not to stop at the parallel.²⁶ Nevertheless President Truman told a reporter on 21 September 1950 that a decision on the crossing of the border would be left to the United Nations.²⁷

Looking beyond the 38th Parallel

On 15 September the Army's G-3 (Major General Charles L. Bolte) forwarded to General MacArthur the principal conclusions of NSC 81/1: that final policy decisions were yet to be made; that he had a legal basis for operating north of the 38th parallel; and that he was to avoid involvement with Soviet or Chinese forces. On the following day Secretary Johnson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue detailed instructions to CINCFE for compliance with NSC 81/1. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee accordingly drafted a directive based on NSC 81/1 which the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved on 25 September, submitting it to Secretary of Defense Marshall the same day.²⁸

Meanwhile, the Department of State had taken alarm at General MacArthur's intention to reestablish the Rhee government, as reported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It appeared that the UN Commander had touched upon matters under State Department cognizance, which were already being discussed with foreign governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore asked him to explain his plans in more detail.²⁹

General MacArthur at once disclaimed any desire to venture into political matters. "I do not know precisely to what your message refers," he replied, "but I have no plans whatsoever except scrupulously to implement the directives which I have received." His intention, in which Ambassador Muccio had concurred, was simply to return President Rhee to Seoul as soon as possible. Such a restoration of the lawful government of South Korea (which had never ceased to function) could in no way be characterized as a "reestablishment."³⁰

This reply did not wholly satisfy officials of the Department of State. When Secretary Marshall sent the draft JCS directive to them for comment, they approved it subject to the addition of a stipulation that ROK jurisdiction was to be restored only in South Korea, and that the political future of the northern half of the country must await UN action.³¹ With this addition, the directive, after approval by the President, was transmitted to CINCFE by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 September 1950.³²

The most important parts of this message were the two opening paragraphs, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed General MacArthur as follows:

This directive, based on NSC 81/1, is furnished in order to provide amplifying instructions as to further military actions to be taken by you in Korea. These instructions, however, cannot be considered to be final since they may require modification in accordance with developments. In this connection, you will continue to make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which will be reported to JCS as a matter of urgency.

Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th parallel will not include Air or Naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory.

If "major" Soviet forces intervened north of the 38th parallel, or those of the Soviets or of Communist China south thereof, CINCFE was to react as prescribed in NSC 81/1, i.e., to assume the defensive while consulting Washington. The question of occupying North Korea, and the nature of the occupation if it occurred, would be determined by "circumstances at the time." However, CINCFE was to forward his occupation plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

approval, as well as those relative to military operations north of the parallel. The final paragraph authorized General MacArthur to "facilitate the restoration" of the ROK Government in Seoul but, as the State Department had desired, cautioned him against involvement in the political future of North Korea.³³

The formal restoration of President Rhee and his government to office in Seoul on 29 September 1950 became the occasion for laudatory messages from Washington. President Truman, speaking for "the entire American people," tendered the UN Commander "warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea." The Joint Chiefs of Staff paid tribute to General MacArthur's "brilliant and audacious leadership" and expressed confidence "that the great task entrusted to you by the United Nations will be carried to a successful conclusion."³⁴

NSC 81/1 had recommended immediate discussions with UN members concerning the terms to be offered to the enemy. On 22 September 1950 the Department of State sent the Department of Defense a paper intended to provide a basis for these discussions. It called for surrender of all North Korean forces, occupation of key points in North Korea, and elections under UN supervision. Earlier, the Department had dropped provisions for an armistice to be imposed by General MacArthur in the event that the enemy should sue for peace in the immediate future (a contingency not provided for in NSC 81/1). After referring both sets of proposals to General MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that they were acceptable.³⁵

The Department of State also prepared a message to be broadcast by the UN Commander to the enemy forces, calling upon them to lay down their arms to prevent further bloodshed in view of their inevitable "early and total defeat." The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately forwarded this draft message to General MacArthur and authorized him to broadcast it at his discretion.³⁶ He replied on 28 September that he would make the announcement (in a slightly amended form) at 1200 on 1 October.³⁷

The draft of this message, and of the surrender terms proposed by the Department of State, had been referred for comment to the Service Secretaries, as well as to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁸ Secretary Johnson had set up the institution of the "Joint Secretaries" to provide a channel of advice paralleling the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his successor continued, for a time at least, to call upon the Secretaries, as a body, for their advice.³⁹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff were apparently unaware of the extent to which General Marshall consulted the civilian Secretaries. Had they known of it, they might well have protested this prospective infringement on their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors of the Secretary of Defense.⁴⁰

Concerning North Korea's probable response to the surrender message, General MacArthur was under no illusions. His staff had drawn up a plan to continue the war in North Korea, which he submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in outline on 28 September, promising later to supply complete details. The plan provided that Eighth Army would attack northwestward from Seoul across the 38th parallel to seize P'yongyang, the enemy capital. X Corps would reembark for an amphibious landing at Wonsan, whence it would drive westward to join

up with Eighth Army. In subsequent operations, the combined UN-ROK forces would advance to an objective line crossing northern Korea at its narrowest part, from Chongju through Yongwon to Hungnam; beyond this line, only ROK troops would be employed.

Tentative planning called for the operation to be initiated between 15 and 30 October. General MacArthur added that there was at that time no indication of the entry of major Soviet or Chinese forces into North Korea.⁴¹

In retrospect, it could be seen that this plan contained two questionable features. One was the diversion of X Corps to a seaborne end run around the southern tip of Korea to the middle of the east coast. Two UN divisions were thus temporarily removed from the battlefield; moreover, their outloading through Inch'on and Pusan tied up transportation facilities and thus increased the supply difficulties of the Eighth Army. The other object of later criticism was the command relationship envisioned under this plan. The Commanding General of X Corps, Major General Edward M. Almond, would remain independent of Eighth Army, responsible directly to CINCFE. There would thus be no unity of command in Korea except that exercised from Tokyo, 700 miles away.⁴²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not question the plan at that time. One member, General Collins, later recalled that he was "skeptical about the command arrangements," but that he and his colleagues were "perhaps somewhat overawed" by the success of the Inch'on operation.⁴³ On 29 September they told Secretary Marshall that they approved the plan but believed that it should be "cleared in principle on the highest Governmental level." They asked him to obtain such approval as soon as possible, since "certain ROK Army forces may even now be crossing the 38th parallel." The Secretary at once cleared it with the President and the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that his plan was approved.⁴⁴

The broadcast by CINUNC headquarters, calling on the enemy to cease resistance, was made as scheduled on 1 October 1950 (2200 EST on 30 September).⁴⁵ There was no response. It was clear that the enemy fully intended to fight on. His ability to do so, though gravely impaired, was by no means destroyed. The best North Korean units had been decimated, but the remnant that escaped included the enemy high command and most of the cadre of senior officers.⁴⁶ Nor were the enemy's reserves of military manpower exhausted. Expansion of the NK People's Army had been in process north of the 38th parallel all the while that fighting was going on in the south.⁴⁷

On 2 October General MacArthur promulgated an operations order for his assault against North Korea, leaving the date still to be determined.⁴⁸ At the same time, he described the situation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an optimistic message:

Probing by elements of the ROK Army are now well across the 38th parallel, Advances on the extreme right are between 10 and 30 miles in the coast sector with practically no resistance.

It is possible if enemy's weakness is pronounced that immediate exploitation may be put into effect before or in substitution for prepared plan. You will be kept fully informed.⁴⁹

The units that had already set foot on North Korean soil were the 3rd and Capital Divisions, constituting the I Corps of the ROK Army, which had advanced via the east coast road. Several days later, the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions (II Corps) crossed the border in central Korea, driving toward what was later to become known as the "Iron Triangle"—the region bounded by the three cities of Kumhwa, Ch'orwon, and P'yongyang.⁵⁰ But enemy resistance did not collapse; there was no opportunity for "immediate exploitation," and it became necessary to carry out the "prepared plan."

The United Nations in a Quandary

To decide the political future of Korea was the responsibility of the United Nations. But the pace of events during the latter half of September caught the members of the international body unprepared, so swift had been the success of the UN forces.

The ability of the Security Council to act decisively in June and July had been the product of an accident—the Soviet boycott. This state of affairs ended on 1 August, when Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik returned and took his turn as president of the Council. His presence was felt immediately. Besides seeking to exclude the representative of Nationalist China, he proposed to alter the agenda so as to steer the Council into a discussion of the recognition of Communist China and the "peaceful settlement" of the Korean question. Six weeks of inconclusive debate followed, until at length the Soviets vetoed a US resolution condemning North Korea's continuing defiance of the United Nations, while Soviet counterresolutions, demanding withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and denouncing US aerial bombardment of North Korea, were in turn voted down.

At Mr. Malik's request, however, the Council agreed to discuss a Chinese Communist complaint of US "aggression" toward Taiwan. The members debated the matter for three days, then decided to postpone further consideration until after the middle of November and to invite a representative from Communist China to be present at that time.⁵¹ This decision was later to prove important in connection with Korea.

Balked in the Security Council, the United States turned to the General Assembly, which opened its fifth regular session on 19 September. No attempt was made, however, to stampede that body into hasty action. On 20 September Secretary Acheson delivered what came to be known as his "Uniting for Peace" speech, proposing various steps to enhance the effectiveness of the Assembly in dealing with global dangers. He offered no suggestions regarding Korea except to urge establishment of a "UN recovery force" to supervise rehabilitation.⁵²

The broad US policy approved in NSC 81/1, encompassing military operations in North Korea and political unification of the country, proved to have considerable support among other UN members. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, for example, called for an end to the "artificial" division between North and South Korea.⁵³ Nor was this support limited to the countries of Western

Europe. In a report submitted on 4 September, the UN Commission on Korea, headed by an Indian diplomat, declared that "unification can be the only aim regarding Korea." Earlier, on 29 August, Secretary-General Lie's personal representative in Korea, Colonel Alfred G. Katzin of the Union of South Africa, had warned that even a brief halt at the parallel would allow the enemy to rebuild and reequip his forces, which would "constitute a continuing military threat not only to our own United Nations forces, but to South Korean freedom."⁵⁴

Should unification be sought by military means—ordering the UN Commander to enforce the UN writ throughout the length and breadth of Korea? Or should it be pursued through negotiations, perhaps while General MacArthur's forces were held under restraint? These alternatives were never clearly faced by the United Nations. The second one—unification through diplomacy—seemed an unlikely prospect. By the end of September it appeared that, in the words of Secretary-General Lie, UN forces had "no alternative to an advance north of the 38th parallel." Continued assertions by the North Korean Government that the retreat of its forces was only temporary betokened a determination eventually to renew the invasion, and thus gave force to the warning uttered by Colonel Katzin.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, most of the UN member governments, including the United States, sought to play down the significance of the "surveyor's line," and to allow the UN Commander to be guided by tactical considerations when he reached the parallel.⁵⁶

This attitude was made evident by Secretary Marshall in a message to General MacArthur on 29 September 1950. Referring to a reported announcement by Eighth Army that ROK divisions would halt at the parallel for "regrouping," the Secretary cautioned CINCFE as follows:

We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel. Announcement above referred to may precipitate embarrassment in UN where evident desire is not to be confronted with necessity of a vote on passage of 38th parallel, rather to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so.⁵⁷

General MacArthur replied the next day that he had received no confirmation of this alleged announcement and doubted the authenticity of the report, but that he was "cautioning Walker against any involvement connected with the nomenclature of the 38th parallel." He continued in words that reflected his tendency to interpret his authority in the broadest possible terms:

Parallel 38 is not a factor in the military employment of our forces. The logistical supply of our units is the main problem which limits our immediate advance. In exploiting the defeat of the enemy forces, our own troops may cross the parallel at any time in exploratory probing or exploiting local tactical conditions. My overall strategic plan for North Korea is known to you. Unless and until the enemy capitulates, I regard all of Korea open for our military operations.⁵⁸

The General planned to set forth these views in a directive that would be released to the public. When he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of this intention,

however, they replied that it was “unwise” to issue any such statement. Instead, he should, in accord with the Secretary’s message, proceed with his operations “without any further explanation or announcement and let action determine the matter. Our Government,” continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “desires to avoid having to make an issue of the 38 parallel until we have accomplished our mission of defeating the North Korean forces.”⁵⁹


A resolution intended to provide political guidance for military operations in Korea was introduced into the General Assembly on 30 September. Although the US delegation had helped to draft it, it was introduced by the UK representative and jointly sponsored by seven other countries, not including the United States. The resolution called for the establishment of “conditions of stability” throughout Korea, with a unified government for the entire country, to be followed by prompt withdrawal of troops. The Assembly spent a week in debate, during which Ambassador Austin and others spoke in favor of the proposal. Opposition came as expected from the Soviet delegate but also from the representatives of India and Yugoslavia, both of whom challenged the resolution on the grounds that it exceeded the original limited objective of repelling the invasion. It was passed on 7 October 1950 by a vote of 47–5, with seven abstentions.⁶⁰

As finally enacted, the key parts of this resolution lay in the following paragraphs, in which the Assembly recommended that:

- (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;
- (b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified independent and democratic Government of the sovereign State of Korea;
- (c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified Government;
- (d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.⁶¹

This resolution failed to answer a number of important questions. Did “conditions of stability” exist in North Korea, which had been firmly under Communist control for five years? If not, what steps would be “appropriate” to ensure such conditions there? The North Korean Government had repeatedly made clear that it had no intention whatever of cooperating with the United Nations; even before the conflict, it had forbidden UN representatives to set foot upon its soil or to conduct elections within its territory. What reason was there to expect that it would now accept an “invitation” to cooperate with the United Nations? If North Korea continued its defiance, were UN forces authorized to enter the country and enforce compliance, in order to “achieve the objectives” of the resolution?

To a degree, the ambiguity of the Assembly’s words was doubtless intentional—the product of the evasive attitude expressed in the messages to General MacArthur. But the inadequacy of the resolution also stemmed from the fact that it was based on beliefs that were to prove erroneous: that the fighting in Korea



Map 4

was approaching its end and that there remained only a task of pacification that could be entrusted to ROK soldiers. Secretary Acheson set forth assumptions and intentions back of this resolution in June 1951, during the MacArthur hearings. His statement on the subject is worth reproducing in full, as the most nearly contemporary explanation that is available:

After the Inch'on landing, General MacArthur called on these North Koreans to turn in their arms and cease their efforts; that they refused to do, and they retired into the north, and what General MacArthur's military mission was was to pursue them and round them up, as he was trying to round up that part of their army which remained in the south; and, as I said many times, we had the highest hopes that when you did that the whole of Korea would be united. That did not come to pass, because the Chinese intervened. . . . Our hope was that the rounding up, or the surrender of the forces which started this aggression, would result in the carrying out of the UN resolution of the 7th of October, which was to hold elections in the north and, under the United Nations aegis, try and bring that whole country together. . . . [If the Chinese Communists had not intervened] force would have been used to round up those people who were putting on the aggression. We were unifying it as a result of the request of the Koreans, and it would be through elections, and that sort of thing.⁶²

Had the position of UN Commander been held by an officer thoroughly attuned to the spirit and the letter of the administration's decisions (as General Ridgway was later to show himself to be), all might have been well. As it was, General MacArthur, in Secretary Acheson's words, "at once stripped from the resolution of October 7 its husk of ambivalence and gave it an interpretation that the enacting majority in the General Assembly would not have accepted."⁶³ He read it as assigning him the task of unifying Korea. "My mission," he said, during the Senate hearings on his removal from office, "was to clear out all North Korea, to unify it and to liberalize it."⁶⁴ In fact, this interpretation, however incorrect in the minds of those who voted for the UN resolution, could hardly be dismissed as far-fetched. The preamble of the resolution cited earlier ones of 1947, 1948, and 1949 calling for the unification of Korea and drew attention to the fact that this goal had not yet been attained. Reading these provisions along with the vaguely worded operative portion of the resolution, General MacArthur could readily conclude that the Assembly meant for him to impose unity on Korea by the sword.

At the request of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had forwarded the text of the resolution to CINCFE while it was under discussion in the Assembly. They informed him that it provided "general overall guidance" but that it was not to be construed as a directive. In the view of the US Government, they continued, the resolution provided support for operations north of the parallel and thus reinforced the authority implicit in the Security Council resolution of 27 June. As soon as he was notified of final approval of the resolution, he was to transmit its text to the North Korean authorities, calling on them to lay down their arms, in accord with his message of 1 October, and to cooperate with the United Nations in establishing a unified, democratic government.⁶⁵

Shortly before the Assembly completed action on the resolution, the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned that their British colleagues entertained doubts about the

wisdom of crossing the parallel. On 5 October 1950 Lord Tedder, the principal British military representative in Washington, informed General Bradley of certain conclusions reached by the British Chiefs of Staff after consultation with the Foreign Office. The principal objective, in the British view, should be to localize the war in Korea and avoid a protracted involvement. To send UN forces into North Korea at that moment was unnecessary and might extend and aggravate the conflict. The British Chiefs of Staff recommended that UN forces (other than those of the Republic of Korea) halt at the 38th parallel for a specified period of a week or two, and issue a warning that they would invade North Korea unless that country's forces surrendered.⁶⁶

General Bradley passed these recommendations to the other JCS members, while informing Lord Tedder that "this is just about what we are doing."⁶⁷ At that moment, no forces except those of the ROK Army had crossed the line, and General MacArthur's broadcast to the enemy on 1 October, calling on him to submit, might be regarded as serving the purposes of the warning recommended by the British Chiefs of Staff.

On 9 October 1950, General MacArthur, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disseminated by radio and leaflet the text of the resolution of 7 October. He accompanied it with a final warning to enemy forces to cease resistance "in whatever part of Korea situated." Premier Kim Il Sung replied the following day in a defiant message to his troops ordering them to fight to the end.⁶⁸

General MacArthur had anticipated this rejection and had already put into effect the invasion plans that he had outlined to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 1st Cavalry Division, which was to form the spearhead of the advance on P'yongyang, sent patrols across the border on 7 and 8 October. The full invasion began on 9 October, undertaken by the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, in concert with the ROK 1st Division and the 27th British Brigade. At the same time, the 1st Marine Division began loading at Inch'on for the attack on Wonsan. On 11 October, however, Wonsan was seized by the rapidly advancing forces of the ROK Army, five divisions of which were already well into central and eastern North Korea.⁶⁹

The resistance initially encountered by US forces demonstrated that the enemy had lost neither his will nor his ability to fight. The 1st Cavalry Division spent five days capturing Kumch'on, the first important town on the main Seoul-P'yongyang route. With its fall, however, enemy front lines ceased to exist. Thus the middle of October found the 1st Cavalry Division poised for a dash toward P'yongyang, with the 24th Division advancing on its left and the 1st ROK Division on its right.⁷⁰

Danger along the Borders

Prospects now looked highly promising for the forces of the United Nations Command. It appeared that only scattered and ineffectual North Korean troops stood in the way of their advance to the uttermost reaches of the country.

But already there were disturbing warnings of a possible new element in the situation—one that, within a few weeks, was to throw the war into yet another shattering reversal.

From the beginning of hostilities in Korea, the United States had faced the ominous possibility that either or both of North Korea's powerful Communist neighbors might come to her aid. Soviet Russia's intervention seemed the more probable, and at the same time more potentially disastrous. Very early in the crisis, the possibility of Soviet intervention was faced by the National Security Council. In response to a decision of the Council on 28 June,⁷¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the matter, and decided that, if major Soviet units entered the fight or appeared likely to do so, the United States should minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare for general war. The JCS views were circulated to the Council and referred to the NSC Staff, where they were pigeonholed.⁷²

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff first authorized General MacArthur to conduct air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel, they specified that "special care will be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union."⁷³ Not content with the issuance of this general directive, the Department of State sought and obtained an additional precaution. The Secretary of the Air Force instructed the Commanding General, Far East Air Force, to make certain that all pilots were briefed to comply with the JCS instructions.⁷⁴

Although Secretary Acheson hoped to avoid provocative incidents, he recognized the need for careful reconnaissance of the Korean borders to ascertain the extent of Chinese or Soviet aid to North Korea. On 27 July 1950 he recommended to the National Security Council that aerial surveillance, conducted from as far south as possible, be undertaken up to the Yalu River in northwestern Korea and up to, but short of, the Soviet boundary in the northeast. This suggestion was approved by the Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff so instructed CINCFE on 5 August 1950.⁷⁵

Instructions from Washington, no matter how carefully drafted, could not wholly prevent border violations. On 28 August 1950 Communist China broadcast a complaint that US aircraft had attacked targets in Manchuria. The Soviet Union formally protested, on behalf of China, to the UN Security Council.⁷⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once informed CINCFE that all US aircraft must "exercise particular caution not to violate Soviet or Chinese territory or territorial waters."⁷⁷ Subsequent investigation by the UN Command revealed that two US fighter aircraft had in fact strayed across the Yalu and strafed an airstrip near Antung.⁷⁸

The desire of the administration to avoid such incidents was evident in the conduct of the strategic bombing campaign against North Korea that took place during August and September. Of the few North Korean industrial targets worth attacking, most were near P'yongyang or else in the far northeast, not far from the Soviet border. On 31 July 1950 the Joint Chiefs of staff told General MacArthur that they considered it "highly desirable" to undertake air operations against certain specified industrial facilities in North Korea: munitions and chemical plants, petroleum production and storage facilities, and railroad shops and yards. Later, on 15 August, they enlarged the list of targets but specified that the

population in nearby cities must receive advance warning in each instance. "Dummy" warnings should also be given to other areas, so as to avoid pinpointing specific objectives.⁷⁹

Among the operations carried out by Far East Air Forces under these JCS directives was an attack on a petroleum storage plant at Najin (Rashin), a port within 17 miles of the Soviet border, which was bombed on 12 August.⁸⁰ When the news of this raid reached Washington, the Department of State objected strongly. Deputy Undersecretary Matthews called Major General Burns, in Secretary Johnson's office, and told him that the attack violated the JCS instructions against approaching the borders too closely. Secretary Johnson and General Bradley believed that the margin of distance was ample and that Rashin was a valid military target. The matter was carried to the President, who after some discussion, upheld his military advisors.⁸¹

Another border incident several weeks later, however, placed a different light on the matter. On 4 September 1950, US Navy fighters on combat air patrol over the Seventh Fleet, in the Yellow Sea, shot down an aircraft that had flown into the formation and opened fire on them. A US destroyer recovered the body of one of the crew members, who turned out to be a Soviet officer.⁸²

It was therefore at a somewhat inappropriate moment when, on 7 September, immediately after an NSC meeting, General Bradley and Secretary Johnson raised with President Truman the question of bombing Rashin again. They pointed out that most Soviet tanks for North Korea were shipped through Rashin and that approximately one-quarter of North Korea's oil supplies were stored there. They asked the President's approval for daylight raids on marshalling yards and other installations. Secretary Acheson, whom President Truman consulted, expressed fear of a violent Soviet reaction even if there were no actual violation of the border. Such a reaction was the more likely in view of the unfortunate incident in the Yellow Sea three days earlier. The President expressed "considerable worry" over the proposed bombing and asked that the matter be reviewed thoroughly by officials of State and Defense.⁸³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly instructed General MacArthur that no further attacks were to be made on Rashin "at present," owing to the tension caused by the destruction of the Soviet aircraft and the recent Manchurian border violation. They asked his views and were told that he concurred and that he had promulgated instructions accordingly.⁸⁴

Secretary Acheson elaborated on his views in a memorandum to the President that showed how gravely he viewed the proposal to attack Rashin. "It is our understanding," he wrote, "that the present policy of the United States, both military and political, is directed toward a localization of the conflict in Korea and the avoidance of any unnecessary extension of hostilities or the outbreak of a general war. If there is any lack of agreement on this point, it should be clarified without delay." The bombing of Rashin must be assessed in the light of its possible effects on this policy. Such an action involved "serious risks." CINCFE had been warned to stay "well clear" of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers—not merely to avoid violating them. Soviet leaders had an "almost pathological sensitivity" regarding their borders, especially in the Far East and around Vladivostok.

They might react to a bombing of Rashin by an overt attack on the US aircraft, by reoccupying North Korea, or by placing strategic bombers at North Korea's disposal. In short, the bombing of Rashin "runs the pressing danger of causing the Soviet Union to react in the very way we wish to avoid." Hence, before such action was taken, the specific military advantages must be "carefully weighed against the risk of the grave political and military consequences outlined above."⁸⁵

Secretary Acheson handed this memorandum to the President on 11 September and briefly discussed it with him. The President, he found, was "inclined strongly toward our point of view and believes that General Bradley is pretty much of that mind."⁸⁶

It does not appear that the proposal was pressed further. In any event, the issue disappeared with the military collapse of North Korea, which ended the strategic bombing campaign. On 26 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that FEAF be employed only against tactical objectives.⁸⁷

Shortly thereafter, however, came another mishap, potentially the most dangerous of all. On 8 October, according to the Soviet Government, two US aircraft crossed into Siberia and strafed an airfield some 60 miles north of the border.⁸⁸ As with the earlier Manchurian incident, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted at once, without awaiting confirmation of the Soviet charge. On 10 October they instructed General MacArthur to take "appropriate action" to ensure that subordinate echelons complied with their directives of 29 June and 28 August.⁸⁹ On the following day, at the request of the Department of State, they directed CINCFE to investigate the matter.⁹⁰ This investigation showed that the Soviet accusation was justified.⁹¹ Ambassador Austin formally apologized before the UN Security Council and announced that the United States was willing to pay for the damage inflicted.⁹²

As a result of this episode, the Department of State suggested that a precise northern boundary be established for the operations of US aircraft—perhaps latitude 39° 30' north, the limit laid down for the blockade. The question was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told the Secretary of Defense on 1 November that any such limitation was infeasible. Air interdiction operations and aerial reconnaissance had to be conducted contiguous to Korea's boundaries; moreover, UN troops were advancing toward the borders and would need air and naval support. They believed that General MacArthur was fully aware of the imperative need to avoid further violations. These conclusions were sent to the Department of State with the endorsement of the Secretary of Defense, and the matter was dropped.⁹³

It seemed that neither Soviet Russia nor Communist China was likely to be goaded into hostilities by accidental border crossings. But as time went on, the prospect of eventual Chinese intervention began to loom larger. At first such action did not seem probable, although it was by no means impossible. The Joint Intelligence Committee estimated on 6 July 1950 that there were 565,000 troops in Manchuria (of whom 70,000 were Koreans), plus 210,000 more farther south, around Peking and Tientsin. Many of these would be needed at home to maintain internal security, but some at least could be spared for Korea.⁹⁴ The Military Intelligence Section of the Far East Command essentially agreed with this appraisal, though giving a smaller estimate of the size of the forces available:

489,000 in Manchuria (115,000 regulars and the rest local militia), and 176,000 regulars in North China.⁹⁵

Public statements by Chinese officials and radio propaganda broadcasts from China were scrutinized for clues to the intentions of Mao Tse-Tung and his colleagues. During July and most of August this evidence, so far as it went, suggested that Communist China had relatively little interest in the Korean situation and was far more concerned about Taiwan. A change took place after the middle of August—significantly, about the time of Ambassador Austin's statements to the UN Security Council about the unification of Korea. After the success of the Inch'on landing, Chinese anxiety over the trend of events became still more apparent.⁹⁶

At the same time, additional troops were reported to be moving into Manchuria. The Military Intelligence Section of FECOM estimated that the number of regular troops there had risen to 246,000 by 31 August and to 450,000 by 21 September.⁹⁷ Part of this movement could be attributed to the return of the Fourth Field Army to its permanent stations in the north, following its successful 1945 campaign against the Nationalists. But units not known to constitute part of that Army were also involved.⁹⁸ And now US intelligence agencies began to receive specific reports either that Communist China's rulers had decided to intervene if necessary to save North Korea from defeat, or that Chinese troops had in fact already moved into Korea.⁹⁹

The overall appraisal of this intelligence in Washington was that Chinese intervention was "improbable," unless the Soviet Union had decided to risk all-out war.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless the administration acted to head off any Chinese participation. The Government of India was asked to transmit a message to Communist China's rulers that it would be in their best interests not to interfere in Korea. After delivering this message, the Indian Ambassador in Peking, K. M. Panikkar, reported that Communist China's direct participation in the Korean conflict appeared "beyond the range of possibility."¹⁰¹

President Truman, in a speech on 1 September 1950 that has been cited above, sought to prevent any widening of the conflict. "We hope in particular," he said, "that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people. . . . The Communist imperialists are the only ones who can gain if China moves into this fight." He added that "We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves."¹⁰²

The President's attempt to reassure the rulers of Communist China was rendered more difficult by certain ill-considered contemporary public statements by high-ranking US military officials. For example, General MacArthur, following a visit to Taiwan to discuss its defense with Chinese Nationalist leaders, had sent a message to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which, in some of its passages, could be interpreted as implying a US intention to occupy the island. This message had been released to the public on 25 August 1950.¹⁰³ On the same day, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews made a speech in which he suggested that the United States initiate a war "to compel cooperation for peace." Less than a week later, Major General Orvil A. Anderson, USAF, Commandant of the Air War College, asserted in a lecture that the United States

was already at war and boasted that he could "break up Russia's five A-bomb nests in a week."¹⁰⁴

During the weeks that followed the President's speech, warnings of prospective Chinese intervention became more authoritative. Ambassador Panikkar of India was twice used by the Chinese Government as a channel to transmit messages to this effect. On 25 September he was told by General Nieh Yen-Jung, China's Acting Chief of Staff, that China would not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to their border."¹⁰⁵ A week later, Mr. Panikkar was summoned to the residence of Premier Chou En-Lai, who informed him emphatically that Communist China would intervene if US troops crossed the parallel (but not if those of the Republic of Korea did so alone). The Ambassador immediately reported this interview to his government. On the following day, he notified the diplomatic representatives of the United Kingdom and Burma.¹⁰⁶

Through British channels, this indirect warning from Premier Chou En-lai reached Washington early on the morning of 3 October.¹⁰⁷ The Department of State passed it on to Secretary Marshall,¹⁰⁸ while the Department of the Army notified General MacArthur.¹⁰⁹ But it was not accepted with the finality that, in the light of subsequent events, should have been accorded it. President Truman, having observed that Ambassador Panikkar had "played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly," thought that Chou's statement might be intended as propaganda or as a bluff to keep the General Assembly from approving the pending resolution on Korea.¹¹⁰ Secretary Acheson thought that it was probably part of a joint Soviet-Chinese diplomatic effort to save the North Korean regime and to bring about withdrawal of UN forces.¹¹¹ Both he and the President were doubtless influenced by the Central Intelligence Agency, which issued several reports suggesting that Chou's statement was merely part of a war of words.¹¹²

Nevertheless additional preparations were made in Washington to cope with possible Chinese action. On 9 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with President Truman's approval, sent General MacArthur instructions to be applicable in case of "open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units." He was told to continue action as long as there seemed a "reasonable chance of success," and to undertake no actions against objectives within China unless he had received prior authorization from Washington.¹¹³

President Truman remained uneasy and instructed the CIA to provide a careful assessment of Soviet and Chinese intentions with regard to Korea and to other parts of Asia. The CIA reply, submitted on 12 October, bore the concurrence of the intelligence organizations of the Military Services and the Department of State. It reaffirmed earlier assessments by the Agency that China probably would not intervene, since the disadvantages of participation, from a Chinese viewpoint, appeared to outweigh the advantages. The conclusion was:

While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.¹¹⁴

This conclusion was evidently accepted by the administration. Nor was it challenged in Tokyo. The FECOM Daily Intelligence Summary for 15 October, while pointing out that China had nine armies, totaling 38 divisions, in Manchuria, characterized recent threats of intervention in Korea as “probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail.” It added the conclusion, however, that analysis of the intentions of the governments of Soviet Russia and Communist China was properly a responsibility of Washington.¹¹⁵

What should the United States do if the estimates of probability were not borne out and the Chinese did intervene? The administration had not faced this question, but in the minds of JCS members, the answer was clear. “We all agree that if the Chinese Communists come into Korea, we get out,” said General Bradley on 23 October 1950, during a meeting of the US and British Chiefs of Staff.¹¹⁶

The Wake Island Conference

The possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea was one of several reasons that impelled President Truman to hold a face-to-face meeting with his Far East Commander in mid-October 1950. The President wanted the benefit of the General’s “firsthand information and judgment” on the many reports and rumors. But he also had broader considerations in mind. He hoped that he could have better success than some of his emissaries in conveying an understanding of the foreign policy of his administration. He was convinced that some of his problems with General MacArthur stemmed from the fact that the General, having lived in the Orient for almost fourteen years, “had lost some of his contacts with the country and its people.”¹¹⁷

The President did not wish to ask General MacArthur to leave his command long enough to undertake a trip to the United States. With the General’s concurrence, he selected Wake Island, some 2,000 miles from Tokyo in the western Pacific, as the locale.¹¹⁸

The President at first wanted all the JCS members to accompany him to Wake Island, but they demurred on the grounds that it would be inadvisable for them to be absent from Washington at the same time. General Bradley was therefore chosen as their representative in the President’s party.¹¹⁹ Others in the group included Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President; and Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup. Ambassador Muccio also attended the conference, as did Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.¹²⁰

The meeting took place on Sunday morning, 15 October. When the President’s aircraft landed at Wake Island about 0630, he found General MacArthur awaiting him, and the two men at once went into a private conference lasting about an hour. According to the President’s account, they discussed the situation in both Korea and Japan. The General gave assurance that the Korean conflict was already won and that Chinese intervention was unlikely. When President

Truman mentioned his plans for Europe, General MacArthur expressed the belief that a division could be moved from Korea to Europe by January. The entire conversation was cordial—"much more so than I had expected," as Mr. Truman wrote later.¹²¹

The President and the General then adjourned to another building for a larger conference with their military and diplomatic advisors. No official transcript of this meeting was kept, but a memorandum prepared later, based on notes taken by General Bradley and others, indicates the substance of the discussion.¹²²

President Truman opened the conference with a question about the prospects for rehabilitating Korea. General MacArthur replied that military operations must be completed first and went on to summarize the military situation. "I believe that formal resistance will end throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving," he said. The 15,000 enemy troops remaining in the south would be mopped up or destroyed by the approaching winter. North Korea, he continued, was "pursuing a forlorn hope," using about 100,000 poorly trained replacements who "are only fighting to save face." He believed that, with the impending capture of P'yongyang, most of the remaining enemy troops would be trapped and the war ended.

"It is my hope," went on General MacArthur, "to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas." He proposed to leave the 2d and 3d US Divisions, plus UN detachments, as an occupation force, but he hoped that elections could be held as soon as possible and the occupying troops withdrawn. "Nothing is gained by military occupation," he said. "All occupations are failures." A ten-division ROK Army, supplied with US equipment, plus a "small but competent" Navy and Air Force, could "secure Korea" and constitute a "tremendous deterrent" to an attack by Communist China. As for rehabilitation, he believed that the Korean economy could not absorb more than \$150 million annually, and that several years of expenditure at that level would make the country self-sustaining. Ambassador Muccio concurred in these estimates.

The conferees moved into an extended discussion of rehabilitation, until President Truman brought them back to military matters by asking the question that had been largely responsible for his journey halfway around the world. "What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?" he inquired of the Far East Commander.

General MacArthur's answer discounted the prospect of Chinese intervention and indicated a low assessment of the capabilities of that country. According to the memorandum account of the meeting, the substance of his reply was as follows:

Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.¹²³

The General then dealt with Soviet Russia's probable actions. The Soviets, he said, had available some 1,300 aircraft, which were "probably no match for our Air Force." There were no Soviet troops readily available for Korea; it would take them six weeks to put troops into that country, "and six weeks brings the winter." Soviet air support of Chinese ground forces was possible but was unlikely to be effective, since air-ground coordination required intensive training.

The conversation swung to a possible Japanese peace treaty, which General MacArthur heartily favored. In this connection, he touched on the prospective return of the Eighth Army to Japan. General Bradley, noting a need for troops to be sent to Europe, asked if the 2d and 3d Divisions could be made available for this purpose by January. General MacArthur replied in the affirmative and recommended the 2d, as being better trained.

Other Asian problems were then discussed, including the situation in Indochina and the possibility of cooperative regional defense. The subject of Taiwan came up briefly; the President remarked that there was no need to discuss it, since he and the General had "talked fully" about it and were "in complete agreement."¹²⁴

General Bradley asked the Far East Commander about the value of UN troop contingents. Should the United States, he wondered, continue to underwrite the costs of those that had not yet arrived, with the end of the war approaching? "They are useless from the military point of view and probably would never see action," was General MacArthur's reply. "From the political point of view, they give a United Nations flavor. I think that the balance between these two considerations should be struck in Washington. I cannot do it."

Assistant Secretary Rusk commented upon an informal suggestion put forth by the Indian Government that Indian and Pakistani troops be stationed along Korea's northern frontiers. General MacArthur replied that such a step would be "indefensible from a military point of view." He planned to use South Korean troops to form a buffer, he said, and to pull back all other forces "south of a line from 20 miles north of P'yongyang to Hamhung."

The formal conference ended at 0912, but informal discussions among the participants continued for another hour and a half. In the course of these discussions, Assistant Secretary Rusk mentioned to General MacArthur the fact that the Chinese Communists had threatened to enter the war if UN forces crossed the parallel. The General confessed himself puzzled that the Chinese leaders should have "gone out on such a limb," and remarked that they "must be greatly embarrassed by the predicament in which they now find themselves."¹²⁵ Finally, the President awarded another Distinguished Service Medal to General MacArthur; then all the conferees departed.

On the conclusion of the conference, President Truman believed that it had served its purpose. He released a statement that it had been "highly satisfactory" and that "very complete unanimity of view" had prevailed.¹²⁶ But the understanding achieved at Wake Island was short lived, as the events of the next few months were to show. There had been no discussion of basic US and UN policy objectives in Korea, and thus no opportunity to reach a real meeting of the minds between the President and the General—or, alternatively, to bring into the open their disagreement. Such discussion did not take place because there seemed no

need for it. President Truman had been assured by the theater commander that the war would probably end soon and that Communist China was not likely to make trouble—two of the assumptions underlying the UN resolution of 7 October. On his part, General MacArthur could feel that he had a clear-cut mission assigned him by higher authority; he had no reason to doubt that his interpretation was shared by Washington.

Curtailment of the UN Military Effort

Plans to shift from war to peace were under way in Washington even before the Wake Island conference. On 4 October 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the suggestion of General Collins, directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to prepare a plan for redeploying US forces from Korea, together with recommendations concerning the future size of the ROK Army.¹²⁷

JCS redeployment planning quickly revealed a disagreement between General Bradley and General MacArthur regarding what had been said at the recent conference. On 20 October 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff told CINCFE that they planned to withdraw the 2d and 3d Divisions from the Far East as soon as practicable. They particularly desired the 2d Division to be made available in time to reach Europe by the end of 1950.¹²⁸ General MacArthur, in reply, protested that he was planning to retain the 3d Division in Korea for occupation purposes, at least until elections could be held, and had so indicated at Wake Island. "I was under the impression that this proposal had received the approval of all concerned," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "I resubmit it at this time for your consideration."¹²⁹

The matter remained unsettled until General Bolte visited Tokyo in late October. After discussions with General MacArthur, he recommended that the 3d Division be left in Korea as an occupation force until 1 May 1951, if necessary but not beyond that date.¹³⁰ The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this suggestion but instructed General MacArthur to make the 2d Division ready for departure from the theater on sixty days' notice.¹³¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also revised downward their estimates of troop requirements from other countries. On 25 October they approved, with minor changes, a proposal by General Collins, which was intended to reduce the logistic burden on the United States while retaining the political advantages of an international force. Under this plan, the French, Belgian, Netherlands, and Philippine infantry units and the New Zealand artillery battalion would be dropped. The Canadian and Greek forces would be reduced to a single battalion apiece. The Australian and Turkish contingents (already in Korea) and the Indian and Swedish hospital units would still be required, as would the UK 29th Brigade, then en route from Europe, which, on arrival, would release the 27th Brigade. The Thai force would be reduced from a regiment to a battalion, which was also on its way. Efforts to obtain Latin American contingents would be discontinued. These adjustments would leave CINCUNC a ground force of approximately

16,760 men from countries other than the United States and the Republic of Korea, instead of the 36,400 previously envisioned.¹³²

Secretary Marshall transmitted the JCS recommendations to the Secretary of State on 2 November, disagreeing only in one particular. He had been informed by Secretary Pace that negotiations with Colombia had proceeded so far that the cancellation of that country's offer would be "mutually embarrassing." Subject to this exception, he asked that the Department of State approach the countries affected by the JCS proposals.¹³³

Heading for the Yalu

All through these developments, the war in Korea continued to go well for the UN Command. The US 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions (supported by British and Australian forces now combined into the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade), drove northwestward toward P'yongyang and its port, Chinnamp'ŏ. At the same time, four divisions of the ROK Army converged on P'yongyang from the east and southeast. Both US and ROK troops entered the capital on 19 October. The surviving enemy forces withdrew northward just ahead of the paratroopers of the 187th Airborne RCT, who dropped down at Sukch'on and Sunch'on, some 25 miles north of P'yongyang, in a vain effort to trap the fleeing foe. The North Korean Government fled first to Sinuiju, near the mouth of the Yalu, then to Kanggye, in the mountain fastnesses of central Korea. The X Corps played no part in these events; its units were afloat off Wonsan, having found it impossible to land because the harbor had been thoroughly mined.¹³⁴

The next stage in the advance of the UN forces had been planned even before P'yongyang fell. CINCFE Operation Order No. 4, dated 17 October 1950, established a new objective line, beginning at Sonch'on on the west coast, then curving northwestward in an arc to Songjin in the east.¹³⁵ It ran roughly parallel to the northernmost boundary of Korea, approaching it in some places within 45 miles, and was approximately 30 miles north of the Ch'ongju-Hamhung line laid down in the plan of 28 September as the limit of advance for non-ROK troops. This earlier restriction was now removed; all UN forces could advance freely up to the new objective line, beyond which, however only ROK troops would operate "except on direct orders of CINCUNC." The X Corps was to continue independent of Eighth Army and was to confine its operations to the east of a line running generally through central Korea north almost to the Manchurian border. (See Map 4.)¹³⁶

Since this new plan still imposed restriction on the operations of non-Korean forces near the borders of the country, General MacArthur could perhaps maintain that he was acting within the letter of the JCS instructions of 27 September. But it hardly conformed with the administration's interpretation of the UN resolution of 7 October, according to which the task of pacifying the far northern part of the country, beyond the narrow "waist," was to be left to ROK troops. More-

over, in promulgating the new order, General MacArthur unilaterally introduced changes into a plan that had received the formal approval of his superiors. As General Collins later remarked, "This was the first, but not the last, stretching of MacArthur's orders beyond JCS instructions."¹³⁷ The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed no concern, however, over the prospect of a closer approach of US troops toward Chinese soil, nor did they record any comments regarding the continuing separation between Eighth Army and X Corps.

Two days later, General MacArthur gave further evidence of the latitude that he allowed himself. Ordering the new plan to be executed at 1200 on 20 October, he directed that "all concerned" make a "maximum effort" to seize the objective line rapidly and be "prepared for continued rapid advance to the border of North Korea."¹³⁸ The implication was that US troops would be free to march right up to the Yalu River. Again the Joint Chiefs of Staff made no protest.

Another message from CINCFE on 24 October, however, stirred the Joint Chiefs of Staff into action. By this time, the Eighth Army, fresh from the capture of P'yongyang, had pushed bridgeheads across the Ch'ongch'on River in north-western Korea, en route to the objective line specified in the operation order of 17 October.¹³⁹ General MacArthur now removed the restrictions on the advance of US troops that he had laid down in that order—restrictions that, he said, had been based on the assumption that the enemy would capitulate. Eighth Army and X Corps were "authorized to use any and all ground forces . . . as necessary to secure all of North Korea." However, it was added, non-Korean forces "should be withdrawn from border areas as feasible and replaced by ROK units." The objective line in Operation Order No. 4 was to be considered only as an "initial objective." Commanders were "enjoined to drive forward with all speed and with the full utilization of all their force."¹⁴⁰

When this message reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they at once reminded CINCFE of their directive of 27 September, which had specified that only South Korean forces would operate "in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border." While expressing confidence that he had "sound reasons" for his latest message, they asked to be informed what these were, as his action was "a matter of some concern here."¹⁴¹

General MacArthur replied that his instructions had been "a matter of military necessity." The ROK forces, he explained, were not strong enough to secure North Korea by themselves, and their commanders were often highly emotional and unreliable. He had not violated orders, inasmuch as the relevant portion of the JCS directive of 27 September had been characterized in that document as merely "a matter of policy." Moreover, he continued, the same directive had specified that its provisions "cannot be considered to be final since they may require modification" (although obviously, modification would be the prerogative of the authority who issued the directive, not of the recipient). He found further justification in Secretary Marshall's instructions that he was to "feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel." In fact, the Secretary had intended in this message only to induce the US Commander to cross the parallel with as little noise and delay as possible, but General MacArthur read it as granting him complete freedom to operate inside enemy territory.

Even while straining the interpretation of his orders, General MacArthur assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he was “fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent” of their directive of 27 September and that “every possible precaution is being taken in the premises.” However, he continued, any course of action other than the one he had chosen might produce “tactical hazards.” There was a touch of asperity in his conclusion: “This entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island.”¹⁴²

The General had by now sown the seeds of distrust in the minds of his military as well as his civilian superiors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently accepted his defense of his latest action; at any rate, they did not countermand his order. But six months later, General Collins cited this incident as the first instance in which General MacArthur violated a JCS directive. As he said:

I think this was one indication among many others which certainly have been clear, that General MacArthur was not in consonance with . . . basic policies . . . [it] led us gradually to fear that just as he violated a policy in this case without consulting us, perhaps the thing might be done in some other instance of a more serious nature.¹⁴³

Another contemporary incident also reflected the divergent outlook between General MacArthur and those in Washington. The Department of State, having been warned by the CIA that Communist China might send forces across the Yalu to protect the Suiho hydroelectric plant near Sinuiju, asked that General MacArthur send assurance to the UN Security Council that his command had no intention of interfering with the operations of the plant or of altering the distribution of its output. On 21 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff “authorized” CINCFE to take the action. The General, however, declined to issue any statement on the subject. He had no intention, he said, of interfering with any peaceful use of electric power on the border, but he nonetheless refused to commit the UN Command until he could assure himself that the output from the Suiho plant was not being used to manufacture munitions.¹⁴⁴

Despite these evidences of disharmony, it appeared that the end of October might see the Korean conflict ended for all practical purposes. In Washington, during the last few days of the month, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed action on a directive to govern the occupation of North Korea long enough to ensure the establishment of a United Korean Republic. After being modified in the light of General MacArthur’s comments and approved by the President, this directive was dispatched to CINCFE on 29 October.¹⁴⁵ But already events were in the making that were to impart an entirely new impetus to the war.

Enter a New Enemy

For the final advance to the border of Korea with “all speed,” General Walker selected the 24th Infantry Division and the 27th British Commonwealth

Brigade to constitute the left wing, operating along the coast. Farther inland would be the ROK 1st and 7th Divisions, under command of US I Corps. The ROK II Corps (6th and 8th Divisions) would advance on the extreme right. Little organized opposition was expected, and the UN forces were split into columns, each of which was instructed to drive for the boundary as rapidly as possible. The US 1st Cavalry Division remained behind to garrison P'yongyang.

The ROK 6th Division was the first to encounter trouble. On 25 October its 2d Regiment ran into sizable forces at Onjong, 15 miles northwest of the Ch'ongch'on River. In subsequent fighting on 25 to 26 October, the regiment was destroyed as an effective force. Within the next few days, four other ROK regiments were attacked and routed in the same area, including one that had reached the border at Ch'osan but had to be recalled.

The US and British forces also met some opposition but fared better. The 21st Regiment of the 24th Division, after passing through Sonch'on—the western terminus of the objective line in Operation Order No. 4—reached Chonggo-dong, 18 air miles from Sinuiju, on 1 November. This was the farthest advance achieved by any US element operating with Eighth Army.

Despite gains on the left, the overall situation of Eighth Army was somewhat precarious at the end of October. The remnants of ROK II Corps had fallen back below the Ch'ongch'on, leaving the ROK 1st Division, which was holding on at Unsan (near Onjong), occupying an exposed salient in the center of the front. General Walker had brought up the 1st Cavalry Division and had used its 8th Regiment to reinforce the ROKs at Unsan. From farther south, the 2d Division, which (with the 25th Division) had been fighting guerrillas and guarding communications below the parallel, was hurrying northward to plug a gap that had opened between US I Corps and the badly mauled ROK units on its right.¹⁴⁶

On the other side of the peninsula, separated from Eighth Army by as much as fifty miles of desolate country, the ROK I Corps had been moving steadily northward through the rugged terrain of the Taebaek mountains, the highest in Korea. The Capital Division captured Hamhung and its port, Hungnam, on 17 October, then swung northeastward along the coast and seized Songjin (Kimch'aek), the eastern anchor of General MacArthur's objective line, on 28 October. The 3d ROK Division moved due north from Hamhung. Its first major objective was the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, some fifty miles from the coast.

Following in the footsteps of the ROK troops came the US X Corps. The 1st Marine Division finally went ashore at Wonsan on 26 October; two of its regiments were ordered to secure the city, while the third started northward to assist the ROK 3d Division. The 7th Division landed farther north, at Iwon, some 40 miles southwest of Songjin; from here it would have a relatively short advance to the border at Hyesanjin, some eighty air miles away.¹⁴⁷

Halfway to the Changjin Reservoir, the ROK 3d Division hit an enemy blocking force and tried without success to break through. There was no recourse but to halt and await the arrival of the US Marines.¹⁴⁸

It was soon evident that the new opposition to the UN forces did not come entirely from the tattered remnants of Kim Il Sung's army. On both fronts, prisoners from organized units of the Chinese Communist Forces were captured on

the same day, 25 October. The first captive was taken by the ROK 1st Division near Unsan, where several others were seized in the next few days. At the same time the ROK 6th Division captured a Chinese soldier near Onjong.

When interrogated, these prisoners reported that other Chinese forces were present in large numbers. The Unsan captives gave somewhat conflicting statements but were consistent in reporting that they had crossed into Korea on or about 19 October, wearing North Korean uniforms. The prisoner from Onjong told his captors that he was a member of the 56th "unit," which FECOM G-2 interpreted as referring to the 56th Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) Army, known to be massed on the border. With other members of his force, he said, he had crossed the Yalu on 12 October after all insignia had been removed in order to create the fiction that the men were "volunteers."¹⁴⁹

In the east, the first capture was made by the 26th Regiment of the 3d ROK Division, which was leading the advance to the Changjin Reservoir. The captive reported that from 4,000 to 5,000 Chinese troops were nearby. On 29 October the ROKs captured 16 more Chinese prisoners, who provided full identification of their unit: the 370th Regiment, 124th Division, 42d Army, of the XIII Army Group. General Almond, Commander of X Corps, hurried to the ROK I Corps command post at Hamhung on 30 October to interview the prisoners. According to their story, they had crossed the Yalu at Manp'ojin northwest of Changjin, about the middle of the month.¹⁵⁰

Eighth Army headquarters was reluctant to believe that it was facing organized CCF units. It interpreted the Chinese presence as indicating "some further reinforcement of North Korean units with personnel taken from the Chinese Communist Forces," and saw "no indications of open intervention" on the part of China.¹⁵¹ These conclusions were not disputed by G-2, FECOM.¹⁵² On the eastern front, the presence of the 370th CCF Regiment could hardly be denied; it was accepted immediately, if tentatively, by X Corps and the Far East Command.¹⁵³ Nevertheless the report of the UN Command for the period 16 to 31 October, while reporting the capture of Chinese prisoners, concluded that "there is no positive evidence that Chinese Communist units, as such, have entered Korea."¹⁵⁴

Events were soon to show that this interpretation was excessively cautious, although the evidence available at the end of October was admittedly scanty. The basis for reluctance to accept the presence of major CCF forces was indicated in the FECOM daily intelligence summary for 28 October, which contained the following statement:

From a tactical viewpoint, with victorious U. S. Divisions in full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious time for such [Chinese] intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness.¹⁵⁵

The presence of Chinese soldiers in Korea was of course reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly but, it appears, with no particular sense of urgency. On 26 October the Central Intelligence Agency had available the results of Eighth Army's interrogation of the first Unsan prisoner. The information was

disseminated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other recipients, with an evaluation of "F-6," indicating the lowest possible appraisal of both source and content.¹⁵⁶ Further details were furnished by G-2, FECOM, on 27 October, in the daily teletype conference with G-2 in Washington.¹⁵⁷ The summaries of the Korean situation prepared each day for General Bradley made note of other captures and of the conclusions drawn by FECOM.¹⁵⁸

No one in Washington challenged the interpretation placed on the evidence in the field. As with the North Korean invasion four months earlier, there had been abundant warnings of what was possible, but no clear and specific evidence of precise Chinese intentions.¹⁵⁹ The belief prevailed that Communist China would have little to gain by intervening in Korea at that time. A paper prepared jointly by officials of the State and Defense Departments, apparently soon after the middle of October, concluded that North Korea was probably not of sufficient importance to China to be worth a direct clash with UN forces. Military action to the southward—toward Indochina, Tibet, or Macao—seemed far more likely to pay dividends for the men in Peking.¹⁶⁰ "We looked at all the factors that were available," said Secretary Acheson seven months later, "and on those factors I think we all came to the conclusion that it was more likely that they [the Chinese Communists] would not come in than that they would." And General Bradley was speaking for his colleagues as well as for himself when he said:

We had no intelligence that they were going to enter the war. We had the intelligence that they were concentrating in Manchuria. . . . They had the capability for intervening in the war. . . . we always had the thought that they might enter it, but we did not have any intelligence to the positive effect that they were going to intervene.¹⁶¹

The basis for miscalculation in Washington and Tokyo was a failure to view China's interests as they were seen in Peking. When full-scale Chinese intervention finally became obvious, it was widely assumed to have resulted in whole or in part from decisions taken in Moscow. But a careful reading of the available evidence suggests that the decision was made by the rulers of the People's Republic of China (PRC). They apparently acted out of genuine fear of a US presence close to China and of a possible alignment of a noncommunist Korea with the United States and Japan—considerations that dictated the preservation of at least a remnant of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Maintenance of China's prestige, as a leading power in Asia and as model for Communist movements elsewhere in the Far East, probably also played a part. Allen S. Whiting, a political scientist who has scrutinized the evidence with great care, concludes that "it would seem that a Soviet *diktat* was not needed to bring the PRC into the war. There may have been differences between the two allies as to the timing and extent of the move. . . . There undoubtedly were questions of mutual responsibility, some of which may have been resolved to the dissatisfaction of one or both partners. . . . But the final decision to fight appears to have been basically a Chinese decision, conditioned by Russian advice and encouraged by Russian support."¹⁶²

A Time of Uncertainty

Effects of the First Chinese Attack

Six Chinese armies totaling eighteen divisions had entered Korea during October 1950. Their nominal strength was about 180,000 men (10,000 per division). Five armies were assigned to the western front. The 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies deployed along the Ch'ongch'on, where they collided with Eighth Army. Behind them, in reserve, were the 50th and 66th Armies.¹

As October passed into November, these troops inflicted a disaster on one US unit of Eighth Army and temporarily halted the UN advance. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, moving up to Unsan to support ROK forces, came under heavy attack on the night of 1 to 2 November, and was trapped when the South Koreans gave way. Two US battalions fought their way out, with heavy losses; the third could not penetrate the enemy ring and was lost.

This reverse in the center of Eighth Army, coming on top of the rout of the ROK II Corps on the right, endangered the US and British forces on the left. In the face of this threat, General Walker called off the attack. By 7 November Eighth Army had withdrawn behind the Ch'ongch'on, holding only a few beachheads on the north bank of the river. In reply to an exasperated inquiry from General MacArthur, General Walker promised to resume the offensive as soon as possible.²

On the east side of the peninsula, where X Corps was operating independently of Eighth Army, another Chinese Army, the 42d, sought to block the road to the Changjin Reservoir. However, the 7th Marine Regiment, which relieved the ROK 3d Division as the spearhead of the advance, reached Koto-ri, about 10 miles south of the reservoir, on 10 November. At the same time, the 7th US Infantry Division was pushing northward from Iwon, and the ROK Capital Division, reinforced by the 3d ROK Division, moved along the coast. The US 3d Division, formerly held in Japan as a reserve, landed at Wonsan to free the rest of the First Marine Division for movement northward. Already the severity of the winter weather in northeastern Korea gave a foretaste of what was to come.³

Not only on the ground but also in the air, Communist China provided a fresh accession of strength for North Korea. During October, US aircraft that strayed close to the Manchurian border had drawn anti-aircraft fire from the other side of the Yalu. On 1 November, US F-80 jet aircraft clashed with YAK fighters near Sinuiju, at the mouth of the Yalu. During the course of the day, jet aircraft made their first appearance on the enemy side. Six MIG-15 fighters, of Soviet design, crossed the Yalu to attack the US pilots. Thus the foe signified his intention to contest the aerial supremacy that UN forces had enjoyed since the early days of the conflict.⁴

Seen from Washington, the situation in Korea at the beginning of November was thoroughly confused. General Bradley was puzzled to observe that the pattern of Chinese participation so far was one not foreseen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Organized Chinese units were present, with air and anti-aircraft support, but only in small numbers. The instruction that had been given General MacArthur concerning "major" Chinese intervention did not cover this "halfway between" situation.⁵

On 3 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked General MacArthur for an "interim appreciation" of the problem.⁶ His reply, received the following day, indicated that General MacArthur was as baffled as his superiors. He confessed that it was "impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea." On the basis of such intelligence as was available, however, he suggested the following possible explanations of Chinese policy:

(1) That the Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly proclaiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate time.

(2) That it will covertly render military assistance, but will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons.

(3) That it is permitting and abetting a flow of more or less voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea.

(4) That such intervention, as exists, has been in the belief that no UN Forces would be committed in the extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose may well have furnished the concept of salvaging something from the wreckage.

The first contingency, he pointed out, "would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance." He believed, however, that it was less likely than one of the other contingencies, or perhaps a combination of all three of them. He recommended against "hasty conclusions which might be premature," and urged that final appraisal "await a more complete accumulation of military facts."⁷

General MacArthur followed up this message with a special report to the United Nations on 5 November. He drew attention to the fact that UN forces "are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units." Twelve pieces of corroborative evidence were presented, beginning with the observation of anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu and con-

cluding with a statement that a total of 35 Chinese prisoners had been captured in Korea as of 4 November.⁸

In response to a US request, the UN Security Council assembled in a special session on 6 November, at which time Ambassador Austin presented this report. The Council, however, took no action and postponed discussion for two days.⁹

The Manchurian Border Issue

Just at this moment, with the United States looking toward the United Nations for support in meeting the changed situation in Korea, General MacArthur took a step laden with incipient danger. On 5 November he ordered General Stratemeyer, Commanding General, FFAF, to launch an intensive and widespread bombing effort to cripple enemy capabilities in northern Korea. All the bridges across the Yalu were to be destroyed at the Korean end, and, with a few exceptions (Rashin, the Suiho dam, and power plants), all installations, factories, means of communication, cities, and villages between the front line were to be demolished, using both explosive and incendiary weapons. UN aircraft were not to violate the border, however, and targets close to the border would be attacked only under visual conditions. This aerial offensive was to begin at 0300 on 7 November, Far East time (1300 EST, 6 November), and was to continue for a two-week period, during which combat crews would, if necessary, be flown to exhaustion.¹⁰

Apparently General MacArthur did not interpret this operation as violating the instructions given him to stay well clear of the borders of Korea. In any event, he did not seek the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the daily teleconference with G-2 in Washington that day, his staff merely gave the information that B-29 aircraft would be used to destroy the bridges between Sinuiju (Korea) and Antung (Manchuria).¹¹ Fortunately General Stratemeyer sent a message describing General MacArthur's instructions to his Service superior, General Vandenberg, who recognized the serious nature of the issue involved. He quickly brought the matter to the attention of Secretary Finletter of the Air Force, who, in turn, notified the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett.

Mr. Lovett at once hurried to the Department of State, where he conferred with Secretary Acheson and Assistant Secretary Rusk. It was then about 1000 on the morning of 6 November—only three hours before the bombers were to take off. In New York, the US delegation at the United Nations was trying to induce the Security Council to consider the special report on Chinese intervention; clearly it was no time to risk alienating other nations by undertaking massive operations near the Chinese border. Mr. Rusk revealed that the United States had promised the British Government (which was holding a cabinet meeting that day to consider policy toward China) to consult it before taking any action that might affect Manchuria. Both he and Secretary Acheson felt that, in the absence of some compelling military reason for immediate action, the risk was very large in relation to the possible benefits. Mr. Lovett explained that his department did not know the full reasons behind the order but assumed that they were important;

apparently the intention was to close off a major route for troops and supplies moving into North Korea from Manchuria. He was inclined to doubt the efficacy of the proposed bombing, since charts showed that the Yalu was shallow near its mouth and destruction of bridges would therefore not shut off troop movements, although rail traffic would be affected. A hasty telephone conference with Secretary Marshall resulted in an agreement that the air attack should be postponed until the President, who had gone home to Missouri to vote in the Congressional elections, could be consulted.

Fortunately Secretary Acheson was able to reach the President promptly. Mr. Truman indicated that his major concern was for the safety of UN troops but agreed that General MacArthur should be asked to justify the attack before it took place. His first thought was that the Secretary should call the General personally; however, when it was suggested that the matter should be handled through military channels, he agreed and left it to Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lovett to handle the matter as they thought best.

Secretary Lovett carried the President's decision to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who at once sent the following brief message to CINCFE:

1. Consideration being urgently given to Korean situation at governmental level. One factor is present commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consultation with the British.
2. Until further orders postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of Manchurian border.
3. Urgently need your estimate of situation and reason for ordering bombing Yalu River bridges as indicated in telecon this date.¹²

General MacArthur's reply, received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that evening, depicted the tactical situation in a manner that was startlingly at variance with his message of 4 November, in which he had counseled against hasty decisions. He said:

Men and materiel in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next few hours and the mission is actually already being mounted. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and carrying out your instructions. What I have ordered is entirely within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I have received from the United Nations and constitute no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I

believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order.¹³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff must have been jolted by this message, with its accusing tone, its virtual appeal to the President over their heads, and its unexpected revelation of a dangerous situation. General Bradley telephoned President Truman and read the message to him. The President was well aware of the danger of a serious border violation. But, accepting the judgment of the theater commander, he gave his approval for the operation.¹⁴

Following a meeting with Secretaries Acheson and Marshall and Deputy Secretary Lovett, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacArthur a carefully worded message authorizing the attack on the bridges while at the same time stressing its dangers. They did not fail to point out that the situation he had depicted was "considerably changed" from that reported on 4 November. They continued as follows:

... We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute materially to the security of the forces under your command unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of conflict and U.S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

However in view of first sentence your [message] you are authorized to go ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt of this message you still find such action essential to safety of your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of any dams or power plants on the Yalu River.

Because of necessity for maintaining optimum position with United Nations policy and directives and because it is vital in the national interest of the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea it is important that extreme care be taken to avoid violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report promptly hostile action from Manchuria.

It is essential that we be kept informed of important changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as requested in our [message of 3 November] be submitted as soon as possible.¹⁵

In reply to the final sentence of this message, General MacArthur submitted a fairly complete situation report and a further justification of the air operation. Intelligence received since 4 November, he said, had confirmed his appraisal of probable Chinese motives and intentions, while the presence of organized Chinese forces in Korea had been verified beyond question. The exact strength of these forces was unknown, but they had been able to seize the initiative in the west and to slow the advance in the east. If the enemy strength continued to increase, it might become necessary to give up hope of further advance or even to fall back. He intended to try to resume the attack in the west sector, possibly within ten days, if the enemy's flow of reinforcements could be checked. "Only

through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of enemy strength," he declared.

Air bombing of the targets under discussion, continued the General, was "the only resource left to me to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command." It amounted to interdiction of enemy communications within Korea and, as such, was "so plainly defensive that it is hard to conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war." Inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia had been a "cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of hostilities," and there had never been any intention to destroy hydroelectric installations.¹⁶

This exchange of messages was supplemented by another between the Secretary of Defense and the Far East Commander. General Marshall was obviously inspired by a desire to prevent any estrangement between Washington and Tokyo and to do everything possible to create an understanding of the policy pursued by the administration. On 7 November he sent General MacArthur the following dispatch:

This is a very personal and informal message to you from me. I have just talked to the President in Independence, Missouri. Though absent from Washington he has been kept almost hourly aware of the latest developments as reported by you. The discussions and decisions here are heavily weighted with the extremely delicate situation we have before the Security Council of the UN at the present time whose meeting tomorrow may have fateful consequences.

We all realize your difficulty in fighting a desperate battle in a mountainous region under winter conditions and with a multi-national force in all degrees of military preparedness. I also understand, I think, the difficulty involved in conducting such a battle under necessarily limiting conditions and the necessity of keeping far distant headquarters closely informed of developments and decisions. However, this appears to be unavoidable—but I want you to know that I understand your problem. Everyone here, Defense, State, and the President, is intensely desirous of supporting you in the most effective manner within our means. At the same time we are faced with an extremely grave international problem which could so easily lead to a world disaster.

Incidentally, for my personal information, do you feel that the hydroelectric and reservoir situation is probably the dominant consideration in this apparently last-minute move by the Chinese Communists incited by the Soviets to protect their interests in Vladivostok, Dairen, and Port Arthur?¹⁷

General MacArthur replied in the same spirit, expressing deep appreciation for this "cordial and understanding message," together with "complete agreement with the basic concept of localizing, if possible, the Korean struggle." He went on to explain why he did not believe that Chinese actions stemmed from concern for hydroelectric facilities on the border. The initial North Korean attack had been "launched with the complete moral and material support of the Chinese Communists," at a time when there was no possible threat to those installations. Moreover, the importance of these facilities had been greatly exaggerated; they had suffered so severely from "Soviet post-war looting" that they were "clearly of insufficient consequence to become provocative of major war." Ranging back into fifty years of history, General MacArthur found the explanation for Chinese behavior in the changing "character and culture" of the nation; formerly

divided, and animated by peaceful ideals, it had become increasingly unified, nationalistic, and aggressive. These tendencies had culminated under the present regime. General MacArthur had been convinced from the beginning

that the Chinese Communist support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are at present parallel to those of the Soviet, but I believe that the aggressiveness now displayed not only in Korea but in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the south reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.¹⁸

General Marshall acknowledged with thanks this "comprehensive analysis of the causes and effect of the present situation. I think you misunderstood my query re hydroelectric installations," he added. "I was referring only to the sudden developments of the past week. Don't bother to acknowledge this."¹⁹

Meanwhile the aerial onslaught that had occasioned this flurry of messages had gotten under way on 8 November. Carrier aircraft as well as land-based bombers took part in the assault on the Yalu bridges, from the mouth of the river as far northeast as Hyesan, and on other military targets in northern Korea. The destruction of supply and communication centers was thorough, but the attack on the bridges was less effective. UN aircraft were hindered by enemy fighters and antiaircraft fire and also by the need to avoid violations of the border, which severely limited the possible axes of attack. By the time the campaign was suspended on 5 December, four of the twelve rail and highway bridges linking Korea with Manchuria were severed and most others damaged. However, the enemy quickly threw up new pontoon bridges, and the river soon froze over, thus making bridges unnecessary. And it was subsequently determined that large numbers of Chinese troops had already entered Korea before the aerial offensive began.²⁰

Whatever the results of the operation, it had been carried out essentially as General MacArthur had proposed, despite the misgivings in Washington. But at the same time, the Far East Commander opened another issue that was even more disturbingly complex. The hostile aircraft that joined the battle for North Korea at the end of October 1950 operated from bases in Manchuria with almost complete impunity. They could swoop across the border in a quick run to the main line of contact, then retire behind their sanctuary. On 7 November 1950 General MacArthur drew the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to this situation. "The effect of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and ground troops is major," he declared. He asked instructions for dealing with this "new and threatening development," which might assume "decisive proportions" unless corrective measures were taken.²¹

Probably what General MacArthur had in mind was authority for UN aircraft to cross the Yalu to pursue enemy fighters or to carry out attacks on air bases, or both. If the matter of flying close to the Korean borders was politically sensitive, overt aerial invasion of Manchuria was vastly more so. The issue was one to be decided by the President after careful consultation with other countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore returned a temporizing reply at that time. "Situation and

urgent necessity corrective measures being presented for highest United States level consideration," they told CINCFE.²²

Policy Reexamined in Washington

As surprising as the sudden appearance of Chinese forces in Korea was the manner in which they withdrew from the fight and seemingly vanished into the hills. A dispatch from Tokyo dated 7 November reported that Chinese and North Korean troops had broken contact with Eighth Army in a "surprise maneuver," following repulse of their efforts to break through the UN line north of Anju.²³ Likewise, the forces that had contested the advance of the First Marine Division toward Changju Reservoir abandoned the struggle. There was little fighting for the next few weeks, while UN troops consolidated their positions and prepared to resume the advance.

The reasons for this abrupt withdrawal are as uncertain today as they were at the time. Did it reflect Mao Tse-tung's inherently cautious outlook, as revealed in his writings? Was the Chinese Government waiting to test the US reaction—perhaps meanwhile trying to signal a willingness to negotiate? Or did the Chinese simply need more time to reinforce their troops and prepare for the rigors of a winter campaign?²⁴

Whatever its explanation, the ensuing three-week lull on the battlefield, between what the Chinese later called their "First Phase" and "Second Phase" offensives, provided the United States with a breathing space in which to readjust its policy and strategy to a changed situation. Through indecision, vacillation, and faulty judgment this opportunity was lost. In Secretary Acheson's words, "the Government missed its last chance to halt the march to disaster in Korea. All the President's advisors in this matter, civilian and military, knew that something was badly wrong, though what it was, how to find out, and what to do about it they muffed." It was not from lack of effort; the flurry of meetings held in Washington during the month of November attested to the search for a formula that would avert disaster. But such a formula, if it existed, was never found.²⁵

At the very least, it was obviously necessary to take a hard look at the course of existing policy. The Department of State initiated this reexamination on 6 November 1950, when Deputy Under Secretary H. Freeman Mathews sent General Burns the draft of a resolution to be presented to the UN Security Council regarding Chinese intervention. He asked for comments on the draft and also on the "military significance of the Chinese intervention."²⁶

This request was passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who sought General MacArthur's advice. Speed was necessary, since the National Security Council intended to discuss the Korean situation on 9 November. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated their opinion that the scale of Chinese intervention, as reported by CINCFE, constituted "entry into North Korea by major . . . Chinese Communist forces," in the words of their directive of 27 September. Therefore, it appeared

necessary to reexamine the mission assigned CINCFE—"the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces"—which had been contingent upon the absence of such intervention. The implication, though the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not spell it out, was that General MacArthur should abandon his planned attack and fall back on the defensive.²⁷

General MacArthur, however, had no intention of giving up his attack. Although on 7 November he had affirmed that "the introduction of Chinese Communist forces in strength into the Korean campaign has completely changed the overall situation,"²⁸ he now emphatically rejected any thought of modifying his mission, and so informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The existing situation, he declared, was fully covered by the JCS message of 9 October, which had authorized him, in the event of "open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units," to continue operations so long as there remained a "reasonable chance of success." In his view, "it would be fatal to weaken the fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations to destroy all resisting armed forces in Korea and bring that country into a united and free nation." In this passage, General MacArthur combined the military mission given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the recommendations of the UN General Assembly resolution of 7 October 1950.

General MacArthur had every confidence that, using his superior air power, he could interdict Chinese reinforcements from Manchuria and destroy those already in Korea. He would begin his destruction of the enemy on 15 November with a major attack that would carry his forces to the northern borders of Korea. As he argued:

Any program short of this would completely destroy the morale of my forces and its psychological consequence would be inestimable. It would condemn us to an indefinite retention of our military forces along difficult defense lines in North Korea and would unquestionably arouse such resentment among the South Koreans that their forces would collapse or might even turn against us.

CINCFE scoffed at the idea of making political overtures aimed at restricting the southward advance of the Chinese Communists in Korea.

Alluding to a reported British plan to establish a buffer zone in northern Korea, General MacArthur denounced it as amounting to a giveaway of Korean territory, comparable to the cession of the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in 1938. The proper course of action for the United States was to press for a UN resolution that would condemn Communist China's defiance of the United Nations and would threaten military sanctions if Chinese forces were not withdrawn. "I recommend with all the earnestness that I possess," he concluded, "that there be no weakening at this crucial moment and that we press on to complete victory which I believe can be achieved if our determination and indomitable will do not desert us."²⁹

Little of General MacArthur's viewpoint appeared in the memorandum of advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of Defense on 9 November. They first considered and rejected the possibility that the Chinese Communist

forces in Korea were composed of mere volunteers. Available intelligence indicated that "well-organized, well-led and well-equipped Chinese Communist units, probably as large as divisions," were entering Korea. Admitting their inability to determine the motives of the rulers in Peiping, they offered three possible explanations for Chinese intentions. First, China might be seeking to protect the hydroelectric power complexes along the Yalu, and perhaps at the same time to establish a *cordon sanitaire* south of the river. If these were the motives, the Chinese forces might be willing to withdraw in return for a UN guarantee not to infringe on the sovereignty of Manchuria or to disturb the electric generating and distributing system. In any case, if such assurances were given and the Chinese nevertheless remained, one possible explanation for China's behavior could be eliminated.

A second possibility was that Communist China was seeking to maintain an undeclared war in Korea in order to tie down US forces at little cost to themselves. If so, it was essential for the United States not to allow the Korean conflict to sap its strength and leave it unprepared for trouble elsewhere. On the other hand, such an objective, being limited, might be compatible with a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Throughout their discussion of this possibility, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were obviously mindful of the dangers of Soviet involvement.

As a third alternative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the Chinese Communists might be seeking to drive the UN forces out of Korea entirely. They doubted that such an effort could succeed without the aid of Soviet naval and air power. Soviet intervention would signal the onset of World War III and would make it essential to withdraw UN forces from Korea as soon as possible.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw three courses of action open to the UN Command: to force the action to a successful conclusion; to establish and hold a defensive line short of the Korean border; or to withdraw. The choice among these three would depend on the strength of the Chinese commitment in Korea. The first would require additional UN forces even if the Chinese Communists' scale of effort were not materially increased; the third was unacceptable and, if forced upon the United States, "could only be accepted as the prelude to global war." The second course was feasible and "might be a temporary expedient pending clarification of the military and political problems raised by Chinese intervention." While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not specifically advise this line of action, their preference was implied in their recommendation that "every effort should be expended as a matter of urgency to settle the problem of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea by political means, preferably through the United Nations." This effort would include reassurances concerning UN intentions and, if necessary, direct negotiations through the good offices of nations that had recognized Communist China. In the meantime, they concluded, the present mission of the UN Commander should not be changed but should be kept under constant review, while the United States should develop its plans on the assumption that the risk of global war had increased.

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the opportunity to draw attention to the exploitation of the Manchurian boundary by Communist aircraft. The situation, they warned, "may well become intolerable," and it might be necessary

to authorize the UN Commander to take "appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China," as provided in NSC 81/1.³⁰

In preparation for the NSC meeting of 9 November, the NSC Senior Staff met on the day before. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented by their Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge; Secretary of the Air Force Finletter represented the Department of Defense. Both he and Admiral Wooldridge warned the others that General MacArthur might in the near future insist on the need for air attacks on Manchuria to cut off the flow of men and supplies into Korea. Admiral Wooldridge admitted that there were no JCS "evaluations" of the ability of the UN Command to hold its present positions against substantially increased pressure. The CIA representative estimated that there were 750,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria, available for use in Korea. The two Defense spokesmen observed that General MacArthur's situation would indeed be serious if these forces intervened and no action was allowed against Manchuria. It would be most undesirable, however, they recognized, to start a full-scale war with Communist China. The use of air power by the UN Command, they thought, would not be decisive but would impede enemy progress.³¹

The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were made available to the National Security Council on 9 November, together with a brief appraisal of the situation by the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter B. Smith, USA. The CIA conclusion was that the commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet materiel assistance, indicated that the Soviets were willing to risk general war in Korea. Whether or not they would actually undertake such a conflict, however, was uncertain. It was not probable that UN air attacks north of the Yalu would alone trigger such action, though they would probably lead to a materiel increase in the extent of Chinese participation in Korea.³²

The Council discussed these views at a meeting presided over by Secretary Acheson, in the absence of the President. General Bradley presented the JCS conclusions. In the ensuing discussion, General Bradley expressed the belief that UN forces could hold approximately along their present lines, but he was not sure how much pressure they could stand if not allowed to attack Chinese bases in Manchuria; however, he recognized that permission to operate across the border must come from the United Nations. He further expressed skepticism that bombing the Yalu bridges could, as General MacArthur believed, stem the flow of Chinese troops into Korea.

Secretary Marshall commented on the wide dispersal of UN forces on the eastern front in Korea. General Bradley replied that this disposition of forces had been made by General MacArthur in order to carry out his directive to occupy the entire country and hold elections. It appears that, significantly, no one questioned this sweeping interpretation, which, of course, coincided with General MacArthur's own.³³

Secretary Acheson asked if a line farther south would be easier to defend than the existing line. General Bradley replied that it would, but that any retreat of UN forces would impair the morale of the South Koreans. The Secretary of State pointed to the sensitivity of the Soviet Union toward its borders, and suggested that a buffer area be established in northeast Korea, to be policed by a

UN constabulary. As to the Chinese, he believed that their major interest was to keep the United States involved in Korea; they were also concerned with their border and the power plants along the Yalu. He recommended that the United States explore "privately" the possibility of a demilitarized zone ten miles wide on each side of the Manchurian border, though he admitted that such a proposal would undoubtedly cause the Chinese to insist on the departure of all foreign troops from Korea, which would abandon the country to the Communists.

It was finally agreed that no change would be made in General MacArthur's directive at that time; he would be free to act at his discretion (but not to attack Manchuria). At the same time, the Department of State would investigate the possibility of negotiating with the Chinese Communists.³⁴

The NSC Staff incorporated these conclusions in NSC 81/2, which was intended to provide interim recommendations pending a more complete study by the Senior Staff of possible alternatives.³⁵ But this latter study was never completed, and NSC 81/2 never went to the Council for approval.³⁶

In Tokyo, General MacArthur had a conversation on 14 November with his political advisor, Ambassador William J. Sebald, which illuminated the thinking behind his plans. His immediate objective, he said, was to destroy the Yalu bridges and thus to isolate the area between the present battle line and the border. He had ordered the FEAF to observe the border scrupulously, a fact resented by many pilots because they could not retaliate against enemy air attacks from Manchuria. At the same time, FEAF was to destroy built-up areas between his forces and the border so that the Communist forces could not "live off the country."

The drive to the Yalu was now in preparation. If his forces could reach the border before the Yalu froze, he told Mr. Sebald, the Korean campaign would be at an end. Should his attack fail and the enemy continue to pour reinforcements into Korea from Manchuria, he saw no alternative but to bomb key points in Manchuria. Admittedly, if this were done, "the fat would be in the fire"; the Soviet Union would almost certainly come in. He therefore hoped that such drastic action would not become necessary.

The General felt that Communist China's intervention in Korea was motivated by "imperialistic aspirations." He had no doubt that Chinese actions in North Korea, Tibet, and Indochina were taken on Communist China's own responsibility. Soviet Russia, while satisfied by these actions, had remained in the background.

If the drive to the border succeeded, General MacArthur believed that the war would be over. The Chinese would have demonstrated their desire to help their Communist neighbors and their ability to conduct a modern war, and thus would be satisfied. They had not intervened earlier, in General MacArthur's view, because they were confident that the North Koreans could defeat the UN forces without help. When they found out otherwise, it had taken them some time to shift their military center of gravity from central and southern China northward to Manchuria and Korea.³⁷

Three days later, talking with Ambassador Muccio, General MacArthur maintained that the Chinese Communists could not have infiltrated more than 30,000 soldiers into North Korea. Any larger numbers would have required overt troop

movements that would have been detected by air. He predicted that his coming offensive would clear all areas now held by the Communists within ten days. Immediately thereafter, to emphasize the end of the Korean military action, he would order the Eighth Army back to Japan, leaving X Corps, UN national units, and ROK forces to maintain stability. Korean prisoners of war would be released, with a warning that if they resumed fighting they would be dealt with as irregulars; the question of restoring their civil rights would be left to the ROK. Chinese prisoners would be taken to the border and released.³⁸

About the same time, one of Secretary Marshall's advisors in Washington proposed another face-to-face conference with the General in order to seek agreement. General James H. Burns, Assistant for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, pointed out on 14 November 1950 that the difference between Washington and Tokyo involved the relation between means and ends, not the ends themselves. No one doubted that "complete victory" was inherently desirable, but what price must be paid for it? General MacArthur's estimate of the probable cost was clearly lower than that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Burns suggested that the JCS members, accompanied by officials of State and Defense (below the secretarial level), journey to Tokyo to seek a "meeting of the minds" on these matters.³⁹

Secretary Marshall doubted the wisdom of "transferring such discussions from Washington to Tokyo" and of distracting General MacArthur at that moment. However, he asked General Burns to sound out the Department of State. Assistant Secretary Rusk and Ambassador at Large Philip E. Jessup, with whom General Burns conferred, indicated that they were opposed to such a meeting at that time, though they recognized that US objectives in Korea needed reexamination. Reporting this conference to Secretary Marshall, General Burns made clear his alarm over the drift of events. "Many people feel, and I am one of them," he wrote, "that if we continue to pursue our present military objectives in Korea we are running a serious risk of becoming involved in the world war we are trying to avoid."⁴⁰

Political and Diplomatic Maneuvers

President Truman and his advisors were fully aware of the need to coordinate their course of action with other UN members, and particularly with the major allies. At the same time, they sought, largely through UN channels, to sound out Chinese intentions and to reassure the Peiping Government with regard to its legitimate concern for the security of its borders. The UN Security Council reassembled on 8 November and decided, over a Soviet protest, to discuss General MacArthur's special report on Chinese intervention. The Council also agreed to invite a representative of Communist China to attend the discussion.⁴¹

The Department of State drafted a resolution to be presented to the Security Council, intended to bring about removal of Chinese troops from Korea. All states and authorities were urged to refrain from aiding the North Korean regime

in any way and to withdraw all of their nationals, including members or units of their armed forces. Assurance was given that UN forces would remain in Korea only long enough to establish a unified and democratic government there. The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which had been established by the Assembly resolution of 7 October, would be requested to aid in settling problems along the Korean border. This draft resolution was the one that had been sent to the Department of Defense for comment on 6 November. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed it and pronounced it acceptable.⁴²

Another resolution, prepared by the French delegation, reflected an assumption that Communist China's principal concern was with the sources of electrical power. The French proposal would request the UN Command, "with due consideration for the necessities of military safety," to take all measures needed to prevent any damage to the installations along the Yalu. The Department of State had suggested that the wording be changed to read "without prejudice to military necessity," so as to allow General MacArthur somewhat broader discretion. In conversations with US officials, however, the French representatives indicated that they would be willing to withdraw their resolution and accept that of the United States, subject to addition of a statement to the US draft affirming that it was UN policy "to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect Chinese legitimate interest in the frontier zone." The Joint Chiefs of Staff adjudged the original French resolution acceptable if amended as suggested by the Department of State. But the proposed French addition to the US resolution was "wholly unacceptable," since it would in effect "guarantee a sanctuary for attacking Chinese aircraft."⁴³

Although the JCS views had the endorsement of the Secretary of Defense,⁴⁴ the Department of State, after consulting the French and British UN delegations, agreed to accept the provision pronouncing the Chinese border "inviolate." Thus amended, the resolution was introduced into the Security Council on 10 November by the United States and five other sponsoring nations. Debate on the resolution then began, over the objection of the Soviet delegate, who contended that the subject should only be discussed in the presence of a representative of Communist China.

The session ended before a vote could be taken, and the matter was temporarily dropped. On 11 November Communist China notified the Council that it would not participate in discussion of the special UNC report. This refusal, plus the breaking off of contact by Chinese forces in Korea, apparently convinced most of the Council members that no immediate action was necessary. There was a feeling, as Ambassador Austin told General MacArthur in a message on 15 November, that the mere introduction of the resolution had served its purpose (presumably by reassuring China).⁴⁵

About the same time, however, came contrary evidence that Communist China had *not* been reassured. Two friendly neutrals, Sweden and Burma, both of which had embassies in Peiping, reported evidence that Communist China was planning a new and larger intervention. Less alarming information received from the Netherlands was that Communist China genuinely feared aggression and

would not act further if UN forces stopped fifty miles from the Yalu. The Central Intelligence Agency appraised all of these reports somewhat skeptically. Its opinion was that China's operations in Korea "will probably continue to be defensive in nature."⁴⁶

A citizens' conference on foreign affairs held in Washington on 15 November provided Secretary Acheson with an opportunity to send an indirect message to the Chinese Government. In an extemporaneous review of US foreign policy, the Secretary discussed Korea and the recent Chinese intervention there. It was essential, he said, to "clear away any possible misunderstanding that there may be in the minds of the Chinese." If they were actually worried about their frontiers, he continued, then "everything in the world should be done and is being done to make them understand that their proper interests will be taken care of." But if they were bent upon precipitating "a really grave crisis," then there was nothing to do but to meet the situation resolutely. "We must explore carefully and wisely," he declared, "every possibility of ending this Korean aggression in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."⁴⁷

On 16 November the Security Council resumed discussion of the six-power resolution on Korea. At a news conference that day, President Truman cited this resolution as one among many UN actions attesting that there was no intent to carry hostilities into Chinese territory. The policy of the United Nations, which was fully supported by the United States, was "to localize the conflict and to withdraw its forces from Korea as soon as the situation permits." The United States, he added,

will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East. If the Chinese Communist authorities or people believe otherwise, it can only be because they are being deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities in the Far East against the interests of all Far Eastern people.⁴⁸

United States Representative Ernest A. Gross read this statement to the Security Council but failed to induce the members to approve the resolution. Following a day of inconclusive discussion, the Council turned its attention to the perennial problem of Palestine, and, after enacting a resolution on this subject, adjourned *sine die*. Apparently the members were influenced by the fact that Communist China had announced its intention to accept the Council's invitation, issued two months earlier, to take part in a discussion of US "aggression" against Taiwan.⁴⁹ Why not wait until the Chinese spokesmen were present, and then discuss with them the entire Far Eastern situation? The hope of negotiation thus became justification for inaction, and the Security Council forfeited whatever opportunity it might have had to shape the course of events. By the time the men from Peiping arrived, the war had flared up again with unparalleled intensity and the situation had slipped out of control.⁵⁰

Outside the Council, however, there was considerable activity. The British proposal for a neutral buffer zone, of which General MacArthur had heard rumors, was presented to the US Government about the middle of November. It

specified that all the territory north of the narrow part of North Korea (approximately the Ch'ongju-Hungnam line) should be demilitarized and placed under the administration of some UN body on which Communist China would be represented. The British Government felt that this proposal offered the only hope of ending the Korean conflict without risking a wider war.⁵¹

This scheme was clearly in harmony with the views expressed by Secretary Acheson at the NSC meeting of 9 November. It would have dovetailed neatly with General MacArthur's original plan for military operations in North Korea. Now, however, its implementation would require that General MacArthur be ordered to halt his forces or to pull them back after they reached the border. Secretary Acheson was inclined to favor some sort of a buffer zone, as shown subsequently by the tenor of his remarks in the 21 November meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the moment, however, he persuaded the British not to advance their proposal in the United Nations.⁵² In any event, the prospects that the suspicious Chinese regime would agree to any such plan appeared doubtful at best. A broadcast from Peiping on 17 November heaped scorn on the recent reassuring statements by Secretary Acheson and President Truman and alleged that the United States intended to invade Manchuria.⁵³

"Hot Pursuit"

Meanwhile air operations along the northern border continued to raise dangerous problems. Taking advantage of UN unwillingness to violate the Manchurian border, Soviet-made jet aircraft, presumably piloted by Chinese and North Koreans, swept across the border in larger and larger numbers, attacking US planes, then darting back to the safety of Manchurian air space before US pilots could retaliate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shared General MacArthur's view that, in order to stop these attacks, the restrictions on his air operations should be lifted to allow his pilots to pursue enemy attackers 6 or 8 miles across the Manchurian border. Secretary Marshall agreed, as did Secretary Acheson and President Truman. But they were reluctant to grant permission for "hot pursuit" without consulting the other nations whose forces were in Korea. As was being amply demonstrated, these nations were growing more and more apprehensive that some rash move on the part of the United States, particularly in relation to the northern borders of Korea, might cause the conflict to spread.⁵⁴

On 13 November the Department of State made a cautious approach to various other countries. Five governments closely allied to the United States—those of the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, France, and Australia—were informed that it might become necessary to authorize UN aircraft to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft that fled into Manchuria after attacking UN forces. All five governments reacted unfavorably; they expressed fears of the spread of the conflict and indicated that any such action should be taken only after a formal UN decision had been announced and Chinese reaction had been tested. The US Ambassador in The Hague cabled his opinion that the Nether-

lands and possibly other NATO members might disassociate themselves from any such unilateral decision by the United States.⁵⁵

To some degree, the reaction of these countries may have been inspired by fears of Soviet intervention. Intelligence obtained by the United States through "reliable channels" reported that a Soviet diplomat in Peiping had told Ambassador Panikkar that the Soviet Air Force would enter the fray if UN aircraft bombed Manchuria.⁵⁶ In any case, the scale of enemy air action never reached the point where it became necessary for the United States to pursue the matter further.⁵⁷ But the incident provided an indication of the diverging viewpoints of the United States and its allies. Many UN member governments were willing to pay almost any price to avoid provoking Communist China or the Soviet Union.

Reconsideration of Force Cutbacks

Whatever China's ultimate objectives and intentions might be, the appearance of the new enemy clearly made it unwise to reduce the scale of the UN military effort. By the beginning of November 1950 it had become entirely possible that General MacArthur might need more assistance, rather than less.

On 4 November Deputy Secretary Lovett suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the advisability of reconsidering the general reductions in UN forces that they had approved only a little more than a week earlier.⁵⁸ Two days later, General Collins submitted to his colleagues his recommendations on this subject. "It now appears probable that the Korean operations will last longer than anticipated," he wrote, in what was to prove a major understatement. "Therefore I feel that we must avoid all possible cutbacks at this time in the foreign contingents already in Korea or scheduled for deployment to Korea, including medical units." He recommended that all the original requirements remain in force except that involving Greece, since logistic adjustments to reduce the Greek contingent to a single battalion had already been made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not immediately act on these proposals; they merely told the Secretary of Defense that action on their recommended reductions should be held in abeyance for the time being.⁵⁹

After further consideration, it was agreed among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Departments of State and Defense that the cutbacks previously agreed upon would be suspended. Plans would continue for the utilization of all the units then in Korea or projected for deployment thereto, except that the Canadian as well as the Greek force would be reduced to a battalion; in both of these instances, it was too late to reverse earlier decisions.⁶⁰

A prospective need to send additional US forces to Korea also confronted the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General MacArthur, as already noted, had asked for reinforcements in a message of 7 November. All units that he had previously requested, he said at that time, must now be regarded as a minimum requirement;

the alternatives to fulfilling these requests would be "either a stalemate or the prospect of losing all that has thus far been gained." The flow of Army replacements, which had been cut off, must be resumed; all naval and air units in the Far Eastern theater must remain there. It was possible that additional units of all the Services might later have to be requested.⁶¹

This message was turned over to the Department of the Army. With Secretary Marshall's approval, it was decided to send General MacArthur approximately sixty-four of the smaller service support units, from Reserve or National Guard sources, that he had requested. On 16 November General Collins assured CINCFE that the question of augmenting his forces was under consideration; there would be no reduction in naval forces, he added, and the flow of Army replacements had already been increased.⁶² General MacArthur's requests that remained unfilled at the end of November included three divisions,⁶³ twelve tank companies, three tank battalions, ten artillery and six engineer battalions, and various supporting units.⁶⁴ There was little hope of reducing this deficit until the National Guard divisions in process of mobilization were ready for service.

But there was one source of additional military manpower close at hand: the Republic of Korea. CINCFE had already undertaken to make use of this supply. Well before the Inch'on landing, he approved a suggestion by General Walker to reorganize and expand the ROK Army, of which only five divisions had survived the North Korean onslaught. Under the Walker plan, five new divisions would be created, at the rate of one per month, to be supplied with equipment shipped from the United States. Three of these new divisions had come into existence by the end of October 1950.⁶⁵

The legal authority for this plan was somewhat uncertain, since it involved the provision of US support beyond the 65,000-man limit that had been established in 1949 for the Korean MDA program. CINCFE and the Department of the Army proceeded on the assumption that the President's statement of 27 June 1950, announcing that US forces would support the ROK Army, authorized them to exceed this limit. However, on 1 November 1950 the Secretary of the Army asked President Truman to approve the ten-division plan and the steps already taken to put it into effect. The President did so three days later. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted; the matter was treated as a budgetary problem between the Department of the Army and the President.⁶⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, however, given some thought to the ultimate size of the ROK forces to be maintained after hostilities ended. At the suggestion of General Collins, the JSPC had studied this question and on 18 October had recommended a ten-division army with small naval and air forces. General Collins, however, pointed out that the expansion of the ROK Army to that goal was already under way and that the ultimate size of the ROK forces would be affected by the planned withdrawal of UN forces when fighting ended. He therefore recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, that the JSPC report be set aside for the time being.⁶⁷ Several days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly put off action on a study of the postwar ROK Air Force suggested by General Vandenberg.⁶⁸

Preparations for the Final Attack

During the interlude that followed Eighth Army's withdrawal behind the Ch'ongch'on, UN forces registered gains only in northeastern Korea. ROK troops, with US air and naval support, moved along the coast against stubborn North Korean resistance, drawing closer to Ch'ongjin, the last major city before the Siberian border. The 17th Regiment of the US 7th Infantry Division pushed north to the Yalu at Hyesanjin on 21 November, thus becoming the only US unit to reach the Korean border. The First Marine Division moved more slowly, with a caution that was soon to prove its salvation. The 7th Regiment advanced from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri, at the southern end of the Changjin Reservoir, and began constructing an advance base there, while the 5th Regiment moved into Koto-ri to strengthen the assault.⁶⁹

At the same time, Eighth Army was preparing to resume its interrupted advance to the northwestern borders. General Walker had issued an operational plan for this purpose on 6 November, even before the withdrawal was completed. The 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions were to be brought up to join the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions in the assault. The US forces, the ROK 1st Division, and the Turkish and British brigades would constitute the left and center of the advance, while the ROK II Corps, with three divisions, would operate on the right. The attack was at first scheduled to begin on 15 November, but supply difficulties necessitated postponement.⁷⁰

It was originally planned that X Corps would continue its northward advance in three roughly parallel columns, keeping pace with the Eighth Army. But since Eighth Army would be moving northwestward, the gap separating it from X Corps would grow broader as the two forces advanced into a widening spread of territory. Hence, after some discussion among planning staffs of Eighth Army, X Corps, and Far East Command, it was agreed that the Marines of X Corps would reorient their advance toward the west, aiming at the enemy's main supply route, which was believed to run southward from Man'ojin to Kanggye (the route recently used by the Chinese invaders) and thence southward through Koindong to Huich'on, in the upper Ch'ongch'on valley. The 3d Division was expected to provide flank protection for both Eighth Army and X Corps, while retaining responsibility for the security of Wonsan.⁷¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had of course been informed that a new attack was in preparation. On 18 November General MacArthur informed them that the Eighth Army offensive would begin on 24 November and would be aimed principally at enemy concentrations between Huich'on and Kanggye. "The air attack of the last 10 days," he added, "has been largely successful in isolating the battle area from added reinforcement and has greatly diminished the enemy flow of supply."⁷²

This prospective renewal of the northward offensive drew no objections from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Collins and General Bradley later recalled that, about that time, they felt some alarm about the exposed position of X Corps, but they did not attempt to interfere with the disposition of the troops. Secretary Acheson was "deeply apprehensive," but did not take it upon himself to try to have the attack called off or postponed.⁷³

The United States was at that time deeply engaged in exploring diplomatic approaches to the Korean problem. An important meeting of the President's advisors took place on 21 November 1950—the last, as it turned out, before General MacArthur's attack began. In preparation for the meeting, Secretary Acheson drafted a list of "broad political objectives," including: withdrawal of the Chinese and surrender of the remaining North Korean forces, through UN political action; unification of the country under the supervision of UNCURK; relinquishment of military responsibilities to the ROK; restriction of the fighting to Korea; and above all, avoidance of "major hostilities" with Communist China.⁷⁴

An air of mild concern pervaded the meeting, which was attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense, Deputy Secretary Lovett, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several high-ranking State Department officials, including Ambassador Harriman and Assistant Secretary Rusk. Secretary Acheson spoke first, presenting his list of political objectives. He stressed the fear of other UN members that the United States might become involved in war with Communist China. However, he agreed that General MacArthur's attack should proceed as planned—a view that the Secretary of Defense greeted with pleasure. Secretary Marshall believed that political initiatives should be postponed until after the attack had been carried out, on the assumption that it would be a success. Secretary Acheson was less inclined to make this assumption. He noted that he had discouraged the United Kingdom from pressing its proposal for a demilitarized zone, partly because he anticipated difficulty in reaching agreement on a zone covering both sides of the frontier. He continued to stress the need to terminate the Chinese intervention and the sensitivity of the Soviets toward their borders. Secretary Marshall urged that it was important for the United States to put forth proposals while the UN forces were advancing, instead of waiting for other countries to make proposals that might be unacceptable. Secretary Acheson thought that it might be possible to give assurance through the UN that would satisfy the Chinese Communists temporarily while a lasting solution was sought.

In the course of this discussion, Mr. Lovett suggested that, instead of an attempt to establish a demilitarized zone through negotiation, General MacArthur, after pushing his forces to the border of Manchuria, might simply pull them back to a defensible position south of the Yalu, thus, in effect, creating a *de facto* demilitarized zone by unilateral action. This possibility was considered by the conferees, most of whom favored it. Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg agreed that it would be militarily advantageous to hold the high ground south of the river rather than the river itself. With the aid of a map, General Collins traced a possible line that followed the terrain at distances ranging from 10 to 25 miles south of the Yalu. He suggested that General MacArthur might publicly announce that this line would be held with ROK forces alone and that the rest of the UN forces would be withdrawn to rear areas while a new government was formed. Mr. Lovett and General Vandenberg thought that it would be "weakness" for the United States to burden itself with self-imposed limitations in the absence of a negotiated settlement. Secretary Acheson pointed out that it would be advantageous if the Chinese Communists could be persuaded "to take through negotiation what we would do anyway," that is, withdrawal of US

forces south of the river; he thought that the administrative status of the intervening territory could be left for later determination or perhaps ignored.

After this discussion, Secretaries Marshall and Acheson withdrew, leaving the others to continue the meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that, if it were ultimately decided that General MacArthur should in fact withdraw his forces to the high line south of the river, his directive would have to be amended to make it clear that he was not required to occupy the intervening territory. The possibility that his offensive might bog down was considered. Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg believed that, in that eventuality, it might be necessary to threaten to attack Manchuria unless the Chinese withdrew. But the meeting ended with no consensus on this point.⁷⁵

At no time during the meeting, it appears, did anyone suggest that General MacArthur should be ordered to cancel or delay his proposed offensive. Thus almost by default, the conferees agreed to leave him a free hand.

Following this meeting, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk drafted a message to CINCPAC embodying the sense of the discussion and sent it to General Collins for review. While recognizing that it was not the responsibility of the State Department to draft directives for General MacArthur, he thought that this was "the most convenient means for setting forth our views for the consideration of the Department of Defense."⁷⁶ After further interdepartmental discussion and minor amendment, General Collins sent the message to General MacArthur on the evening of 23 November.⁷⁷

The introductory paragraph of this message warned General MacArthur that many UN members feared a general war growing out of the clash between UN troops and Chinese forces. For that reason, it was possible that proposals might be made in the United Nations for "unwelcome restrictions" on UN troop movements, "since some sentiment exists in UN for establishing a demilitarized zone between your forces and the frontier."

The Army Chief of Staff then set forth some proposals for modification of General MacArthur's plan. This portion of the message deserves full quotation, in order to indicate how carefully the authorities in Washington avoided issuing direct orders to the General.

The consensus of political and military opinion [at the meeting of 21 November] was that there should be no change in your mission, but that immediate action should be taken at top governmental level to formulate [a] course of action which would permit the establishment of a unified Korea and at the same time reduce risk of more general involvement. On the assumption that your coming attack will be successful, exploratory discussions were had [sic] to discover what military measures, which you might in any event wish to take, might lend themselves to political action which would reduce tension with Peiping and the Soviet Union and maintain a solid UN front. The following represent a search for such measures:

1. After advancing to or near the Yalu, you might secure the position which you had thus achieved by holding forces on terrain dominating the approaches from the Valley of the Yalu, from its mouth to approximately the position now held by the 17th Infantry. These forces would be principally ROK troops while other UN forces would be grouped in positions of readiness to ensure the hold-

ing of the established line. This, of course, would be contingent on the cessation of effective enemy resistance.

2. The above position would be extended to the Japan Sea along a general line approximately east from the 17th Infantry's position with an outpost at Chongjin, which would be the limit for the present of your advance to the northeast.

3. It was thought that the above would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission.

4. UN forces would continue to make every effort to spare all hydro-electric installations in North Korea; destruction of these facilities could result only as incident to resistance from enemy forces.

5. UNCURK would, at the appropriate time, enter into negotiation with appropriate representatives to ensure an equitable distribution of hydro-electric power.

6. In the event that the Chinese did not again attack in force across the Yalu, the conduct of orderly elections in North Korea and the unification of the country could proceed in accordance with UN action.

7. Ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive Northeast Province would await further UN procedures.

While it is recognized that from the point of view of the Commander in the field this course of action may leave much to be desired, it is felt that there may be other considerations which must be accepted and that the above procedures would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission. At the same time it might well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria without loss of face and might lessen the concern of the Russians as to the security of Vladivostok. This concern may be at the root of Russian pressure on the Chinese Communists to intervene in Korea.

The above is suggested as a course of action upon which we would appreciate your comments. If it should prove feasible the second question would arise as to whether and how such a course of action might be announced. This would have to be worked out in such a way as not to impede your operations, but in such a way that the Chinese and Russians could not mistake UN intentions. Your views as to timing and source of such an announcement would be appreciated.

Since there are many political and military implications involved in these ideas and since other nations would be involved, no action along these lines is contemplated until full opportunity has been given for further consideration of your views, final decision by the President, and possibly discussion with certain other governments.

This message unmistakably, though indirectly, authorized General MacArthur to launch his planned offensive on schedule. Its tentative, almost hesitant, suggestions for changes in his plan were out of date when sent. Both UN and Chinese forces were already poised for major assaults, on a scale larger than at any previous time in the war. There was no time for leisurely formulation of political agreements that would satisfy the government in Peiping. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of course had no knowledge of this fact, having been assured by CINCFE that the battlefield had been "isolated" by airpower.

Eighth Army's attack was set to begin on the morning of 24 November in Korea—about the time when, in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent this message. Just before the attack, General MacArthur flew to Eighth Army Headquarters for a tour of the front. According to his account, he observed that ROK troops were not in good condition and resolved that, if the Chinese were present in force, he

would at once withdraw and abandon the attempt to move north. For this purpose, he made a further aircraft observation tour behind enemy lines, from the Ch'ongch'on to the Yalu. Seeing no evidence of large enemy forces anywhere on the snow-covered landscape, he decided to allow the offensive to take its course.⁷⁸

On his return to Tokyo, General MacArthur found the latest JCS message waiting him.⁷⁹ But he did not reply until the next day.⁸⁰ He then told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he "fully understood and shared" the desire to confine the spread of the war, but that their approach "would be provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert." His reconnaissance of the objective area had, he said,

demonstrated conclusively that it would be utterly impossible for us to stop upon commanding terrain south of the river as suggested and there be in a position to hold under effective control [the] lines of approach to North Korea. The terrain ranging from the lowlands in the west to the rugged central and eastern sectors is not adaptable to such a system of defense were we, for any reason, to sacrifice the natural defense features of the river line itself, features to be found in no other natural defense line in all of Korea. Nor would it be either militarily or politically defensible to yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding the territorial integrity of Korea.

General MacArthur went on to argue against the "disastrous consequences" of failing to push the war to a successful conclusion. It would be regarded as a "betrayal" by the people of Korea and as weakness by other Asiatic nations. Soviet and Chinese propaganda provided no evidence that those countries were seriously disturbed by the prospect of UN control of the south bank of the Yalu. The possibility of Chinese intervention was a risk assumed when the United States first committed its forces to Korea. There had been no apparent Chinese or Soviet reaction to the presence of US troops at Hyesanjin. The UN Command had "repeatedly and publicly" emphasized the fact that it had no aggressive designs. His intention, as soon as he could consolidate the UN position along the Yalu, was to replace US forces with ROK troops as far as possible. He would then issue orders returning US troops to Japan and paroling all prisoners to their homes, leaving Korean unification to be carried out by the people of Korea, with UN assistance. He concluded by expressing the view that

the prompt implementation of this plan as soon as our military objectives have been reached will effectively appeal to reason in the Chinese mind. If it will not, then the resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing to a halt our military measures short of present commitments. By resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing our military mission as so often publicly delineated lies best—indeed only—hope that Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs may be checked before these countries are committed to a course from which for political reasons they cannot withdraw.⁸¹

Obviously General MacArthur did not share the concern felt in Washington over the danger of a wider war. "He seems very disdainful of our concern over the major conflict with the Chinese," Admiral Sherman commented after reading this message.⁸²

By the time this message reached Washington, UN troops were in motion all across the front, wholly ignorant of the size of the enemy forces lying in wait for them. The stage had been set for the shattering defeat that was soon to come. By not interfering with General MacArthur's plans, the administration had "missed its last chance to halt the march to disaster in Korea," as Secretary Acheson later wrote.⁸³ The Secretary's comments about the drift of events during the critical period in November, from the first appearance of Chinese troops to General MacArthur's final announcement of his impending offensive, deserve extensive quotation:

. . . All the dangers from dispersal of our own forces and intervention by the Chinese were manifest. We were all deeply apprehensive. We were frank with one another, but not quite frank enough. I was unwilling to urge on the President a military course that his military advisers would not propose. They would not propose it because it ran counter to American military tradition of the proper powers of the theater commander. . . If General Marshall and the Chiefs had proposed withdrawal to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and a continuous defensive position under united command across it—and if the President had backed them, as he undoubtedly would have—disaster would probably have been averted. But it would have meant a fight with MacArthur. . . and his relief under arguable circumstances. So they hesitated, wavered, and the chance was lost. While everyone acted correctly, no one, I suspect, was ever quite satisfied with himself afterward.⁸⁴

The New War

MacArthur's Attack Begins

The "final" offensive of the UN Command, intended to carry the troops right up to the northern boundary of Korea, began on the morning of 24 November 1950. On the same day, in Tokyo, UNC headquarters released a special communique setting forth the objectives and the general nature of the planned operation, as follows:

The United Nations massive compression envelopment of North Korea against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our Air Forces of all types, have, for the past three weeks, . . . successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer . . . has steadily advanced in a brilliant tactical movement and has now reached a commanding enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy's geographical potential. This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward in a general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise. If successful this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight.¹

The attacking forces jumped off at 0800. On the left of the battle line were the US 24th Infantry Division, the ROK 1st Division, and the 27th British Brigade, making up the US I Corps. The 25th and 2d Infantry Divisions and the Turkish Brigade (IX Corps) held the center, while the ROK II Corps (6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions) constituted the right wing. The 1st Cavalry Division was in reserve. The initial objective line (roughly one-quarter of the distance from the starting line to the northwestern boundary of Korea) ran from Napch'ongjong, seven or eight miles east of Chongju, through T'aech'on, Onjong, and Huich'on.²

The enemy's total strength was believed by FECOM to amount to almost 83,000 North Koreans and from 40,000 to 70,935 Chinese Communists.³ These figures were, however, far too low. Unknown to US intelligence, the IX Chinese Communist Army Group—12 divisions in three armies—had moved into Korea to oppose X Corps. This force, added to the 18 divisions on Eighth Army's front, gave a total of 30 divisions, or approximately 300,000 men.⁴

All went well at first. The US 24th Division, on the extreme left, led the pace, registering gains of three to four miles within the first two hours. Throughout the first day and most of the second, US forces moved steadily forward, finding little opposition. By the end of 25 November the 24th Division had already passed Napch'ongjong and was within a mile of Chongju. The ROK units were less successful. The 1st Division had been driven back by a counterattack southeast of T'aech'on, while the 7th and 8th Divisions had encountered resistance from the outset.⁵

Disaster Strikes

On the evening of 25 November the enemy unleashed his full force. A powerful attack erupted against the ROK 8th Division, on the extreme right, and drove it back in disorder. On the following day the attack spread to the ROK 7th Division and then all across Eighth Army's front. The enemy concentrated on the ROK troops, fully aware that they were the weakest elements in Eighth Army.

During the next two days, it became clear that the Chinese had wrested the initiative from Eighth Army. The ROK II Corps was all but destroyed; its remnants fell back to Pukch'ong, well below the beginning line of the advance, and sought to rally behind the protection of the ROK 6th Division. The right flank of US 2d Division, on the east edge of IX Corps, now stood exposed. On the left, the ROK 1st Division seemed likely to give way, thus endangering the 24th Division. By 28 November it had become clear that there was no hope of further advance. Once more Eighth Army headed back toward the Ch'ongch'on River, this time under extreme pressure.⁶

The "western sector of the pincer," as General MacArthur had described Eighth Army in his communique of 24 November, had been smashed. The eastern sector fared no better. On 27 November, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments moved westward from the Changjin Reservoir, in the direction of the enemy supply route. Heavy fighting limited their advance to less than a mile the first day. During the night, Chinese troops slipped into position all around them, cutting their line of retreat. By the next day, the attackers had become the besieged. The Marines reversed their direction and started to fight their way back to their base at Hagaru-ri.⁷

On 28 November General MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the complete collapse of the UN offensive in the following words:

The developments resulting from our assault movements have now assumed a clear definition. All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war. . . .

The "pattern of Chinese strategy," continued General MacArthur, had now become clear. The initial intervention had been intended to arrest the UN advance. Having done so, the Chinese had broken contact in order to build up overwhelming strength for an offensive, probably to be launched in the spring. The ultimate Chinese objective, in the General's view, was "the complete destruction of all United Nations forces in Korea."

General MacArthur went on to complain, as he was to continue to do in the weeks that followed, that his command had been given a task that was beyond its capacity. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff

At the present moment the freezing of the Yalu River increasingly opens up avenues of reinforcement and supply which it is impossible for our air potential to interdict. It is quite evident that our present strength of force is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength.

His present plan, he concluded, was, in accord with the JCS directives of 27 September and 9 October, "to pass from the offensive to the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a constantly fluid situation."⁸

The Reaction in Washington

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been following the developing tactical situation, and had observed that matters were not progressing as General MacArthur had predicted. They met on 27 November for a lengthy discussion of various topics, and doubtless touched upon the subject of Korea, but at that time matters did not seem excessively alarming.⁹ It was not until early the next morning that the magnitude of the defeat became apparent. Shortly after midnight, FECOM, by teletype, informed the Department of the Army of the collapse of ROK II Corps and of the impending withdrawal of Eighth Army to the Ch'ongch'on.¹⁰ General MacArthur's alarming message arrived several hours later.¹¹ At 0615, General Bradley called President Truman and broke the news that (as the President later said) the Chinese had "come in with both feet."¹²

The President at once convoked a meeting of the National Security Council for that afternoon. In the morning, the Armed Forces Policy Council held a meeting, which was attended by Assistant Secretary of State Rusk and Ambassador Harriman. Secretary Marshall asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries to prepare statements of their views.¹³ The Secretaries at once drafted a memorandum in which they recognized that a critical situation existed, but urged that the United States act through the United Nations and not alone. They recommended acceleration of US military expansion and an effort to obtain more troops for Korea from other countries. One of their assumptions, based on advice furnished by General Collins, was that it would be possible for UN forces to hold a line somewhere in Korea.¹⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff held a short meeting early in the afternoon, but apparently time did not allow them to prepare a written statement of their views.¹⁵ It was doubtless at this time that they decided to instruct the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to recommend appropriate courses of action in the event that the conflict escalated into at least an undeclared state of war with Communist China.¹⁶

The lengthy and inconclusive NSC meeting of 28 November was attended by a number of non-members of the Council, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. The generally somber tone of the meeting was set at the outset when General Bradley sketched the worsening military situation in Korea. The most serious threat was that posed by more than 200 Communist bombers in Manchuria. These were capable of striking severe blows against the crowded and highly vulnerable US airfields in Korea and Japan, which were essential to the airlift of supplies to UN forces. The best defense against enemy air attacks lay in preemptive strikes against Manchurian airfields. But, added General Bradley, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not favor violating the border, at least until developments had become clearer.

Secretary Marshall read the memorandum of the Service Secretaries, indicating his general agreement with their views. General Bradley observed that he and his colleagues, like the Secretaries, fully agreed that the United States should not be pulled into a war with China. Regarding reinforcements from other countries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that only militarily effective units were desirable, but would accept those in a less ready condition if political necessity so required. The United States had no more ground troops to send and it was inadvisable to call up more National Guard units at present. Moreover, said General Bradley, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that General MacArthur had enough ground forces in Korea already.

Secretary Marshall pointed out the large gap between Eighth Army and X Corps in the northeast sector. He assumed that General MacArthur would withdraw X Corps but did not wish to interfere with operations "on the spot." Vice President Alben W. Barkley mentioned General MacArthur's injudicious and now embarrassing remark about having the troops "home by Christmas,"¹⁷ which the General had officially denied having made, although the evidence was incontestable. President Truman remarked that public discussion of this matter must be carefully handled in order to avoid causing General MacArthur to lose face.

Recalling the meeting of State and Defense personnel on 21 November,¹⁸ General Marshall pointed out that the discussion at that time had assumed that General MacArthur's attack would succeed; in the face of failure, it was much harder to decide what to do. The United States, continued the Secretary, must not get "sewed up" in Korea but must get out without loss of prestige. General Collins expressed the belief that General MacArthur could "hold the line in the narrow neck of Korea"; President Truman agreed.

Secretary of State Acheson then entered the conversation for the first time. He warned that the United States had moved much closer to the danger of general war. There had always been some Chinese Communist involvement in Korea, but a full scale attack was another matter. Underlying the situation was the more dangerous possibility of the Soviet Union becoming involved. Therefore the decisions on Korea must be made not in isolation but in light of the worldwide problem of confronting the USSR as an antagonist. The US approach must include action in the United Nations to uncloak the Chinese Communist aggression without publicly pointing the finger at the Soviets. Also, the United States should seek to "make life harder" for the Chinese Communists in order to keep them under pressure.

Continuing, Secretary Acheson remarked that General MacArthur seemed to have misunderstood his directive. He had never been required to occupy the northeastern portion of Korea. The United States, he stressed, must get out of its present involvement. The Chinese could not be defeated in Korea; they could always put in more forces than the United States. If it were essential to save UN troops, air action in Manchuria might be necessary. But entering Manchuria might bring in the Soviet Union. It was imperative, he thought, to find a defensible line and turn it over to the ROK Army as soon as possible.

Secretary Finletter again warned of the danger of air attack by China or Russia, or both. Secretary Marshall observed that General MacArthur's offensive had been necessary in order to find out what the Communists were up to. "Now we know," he concluded ruefully.

The Secretary of State assured the others that there was no reason to believe that a political arrangement could be reached at that time. It would be "disastrous," however, if the United States simply pulled out of Korea at that time. Admiral Sherman thought that if Chinese air forces attacked from Manchuria, "we must hit back or we cannot stay there." The President agreed, but added "we will meet that when it comes."

The prospect that one of the UN member nations might come forward with a ceasefire proposal was cited by Ambassador Jessup. He thought it would be advantageous for the United States to accept any such proposal if it did not preclude the regrouping of UN forces. President Truman directed that this matter be discussed between the State and Defense Departments. The meeting ended with some remarks about the importance of a general increase in the level of US military forces.¹⁹

On the following day, 29 November, the press carried a special communique released by General MacArthur. It was essentially a condensation of his recent message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and included the characterization of the current

crisis as "an entirely new war." At the same time, the General declared that the Chinese plan for a "later surprise assault upon our lines in overwhelming force" had been disrupted by the UN offensive, which "forced upon the enemy a premature engagement." This claim had been implied, but not clearly stated, in his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 November.²⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued their review of the deteriorating situation. Admiral Sherman had become seriously alarmed over the situation in the north-eastern theater, where naval vessels supporting troop movements were operating dangerously close to Vladivostok, and the Marines around Changjin were in danger of being cut off. He urged that General MacArthur be instructed to withdraw X Corps to a consolidated defense line.²¹ The other JCS members, however, did not go so far as Admiral Sherman wished. Still reluctant to give direct orders to General MacArthur, they merely drew his attention to the danger. "What are your plans regarding the coordination of operations of the Eighth Army and X Corps," they asked, "and the positioning of X Corps, the units of which appear to us to be exposed?" At the same time, they concurred in his proposal to shift from offense to defense. "Any directive in conflict therewith is deferred," they told him. "Strategic and tactical considerations are now paramount."²²

Before being sent, this message was cleared by Secretary Marshall and President Truman.²³ Their approval might perhaps have been sought in any case, but it had now become mandatory. President Truman had telephoned Secretary Marshall and directed that all instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur must "be processed through the Secretary of Defense to the President personally."²⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also had to consider a new message from General MacArthur, received that morning, suggesting the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea. CINCFE pointed out that Chiang's earlier offer of troops had been declined because it was feared that an invasion of Taiwan might be imminent and that their use in Korea might afford Communist China a pretext for intervening. Obviously these considerations were no longer applicable, and there was no other readily available source of trained manpower. General MacArthur asked that he be authorized to negotiate directly with the Nationalist Government for the movement of these troops to Korea.²⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved a reply that the use of Nationalist troops would probably bring Taiwan into the war and would therefore be considered in connection with other measures to be taken in the event of a wider conflict. When this message was successively referred to Secretary Marshall and Secretary Acheson, it was amended to stress the political and diplomatic complications raised by General MacArthur's suggestion. The final answer, approved by the President and sent to CINCFE, was as follows:

Your proposal . . . is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and have us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most

seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization.²⁶

In Tokyo, meanwhile, General MacArthur, on the evening of 28 November, had summoned his two field commanders, Generals Walker and Almond, for a "council of war." Their discussion eventuated in a decision that Eighth Army should withdraw as far as necessary to keep from being outflanked by the Chinese forces, and that X Corps should be withdrawn into the Hamhung-Hungnam area. A westward strike from Wonsan by the 3d Division, against the Chinese operating on the right flank of Eighth Army, was briefly considered but rejected because of the unfavorable terrain and weather.²⁷

The planned withdrawal of X Corps was announced to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CINCFE on 30 November 1950, in a message replying to their query of the preceding day. General MacArthur discounted the JCS fears and vigorously defended his troop dispositions. X Corps, he contended, threatened the main supply lines of the enemy forces attacking Eighth Army and occupied the attention of six to eight Communist divisions that otherwise would have been free to act against that Army's flank. A physical combination of Eighth Army and X Corps in a continuous line across the narrow part of the peninsula, he continued, would be impracticable owing to the distance involved, the numerical weakness of his forces, and the logistical problems imposed by a north-south mountainous divide that would split the two forces. His plan was to have X Corps contract into the Hamhung-Wonsan sector as enemy pressure developed, making certain that his forces were not isolated piecemeal and trapped.²⁸

CINCUNC's message did little to quiet the anxieties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doubts about certain of the statements were registered by General Bradley in the margin of his copy of the dispatch. He apparently considered the X Corps threat to enemy supply lines as ineffective and its occupation of six to eight enemy divisions as doubtful. He placed a question mark beside the statement about the impracticability of a continuous line across Korea.²⁹

Less than two hours after the arrival of this message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received another from CINCFE giving further alarming news. The Chinese Communists were continuing to strengthen their forces, despite all efforts at air interdiction. Enemy reinforcements could reach the front in two night marches, making possible a "continuous and rapid buildup." Further withdrawals by Eighth Army were inevitable. "Everything leads to the conclusion," reported General MacArthur, "[that] the Chinese forces have as their objective the complete destruction of United Nations forces and the securing of all of Korea."³⁰

On the afternoon of 30 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met for the fourth time in as many days.³¹ Taking heed of Admiral Sherman's fears, they approved a draft message for General MacArthur giving instructions regarding X Corps. They expressed fear that a "progressively widening gap" might develop between Eighth Army, as it retreated down the peninsula, and X Corps, huddled in a beachhead between Hungnam and Wonsan. It seemed important to them that the units of X Corps be "extricated from their exposed position as soon as practicable," and that the forces on the two coasts "be sufficiently coordinated to prevent

large enemy forces from passing between them or outflanking either of them." The language was not that of a directive; rather the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the "hope" that CINCFE would take these considerations into account in formulating his plans.

Secretary Marshall approved this draft with the addition of an instruction to General MacArthur that "the entire region northeast of the waist of Korea should be ignored except for strategic and tactical considerations relating to the security of your command." With the President's approval, the message was sent to General MacArthur on the evening of 30 November.³²

Repercussions on the International Scene

In the United Nations, meanwhile, the United States strove to keep in line its frightened supporters. A special emissary from Communist China, sent in response to the Security Council's invitation, arrived on 27 November and the Council took up anew the consideration of Korea, along with the status of Taiwan. An acrimonious debate came to an end on 30 November, when the Council decisively defeated two resolutions sponsored by the Soviet representative condemning the United States for allegedly interfering in both Korea and Taiwan. Next the members voted on the six-nation resolution introduced several weeks earlier, assuring Communist China that its interests would be protected and asking it not to aid North Korea. Although this resolution received nine favorable votes (with India abstaining), it was defeated by a Soviet veto.³³

The impression of US-allied solidarity created by these developments was illusory. In fact, the collapse of General MacArthur's offensive was producing serious diplomatic and political problems. "There is no doubt that confidence in General Douglas MacArthur, even on Capitol Hill, has been shaken badly as a result of the events of the last few days," wrote a well-known correspondent, James Reston, in the *New York Times* on 30 November. "Similarly, there is no doubt that United States leadership in the Western world has been damaged by President Truman's acceptance of the bold MacArthur offensive."³⁴

The breach between the United States and its allies became evident when, after the Security Council vote of 30 November, Ambassador Austin suggested to his British and French colleagues that a much stronger resolution, condemning Communist China as an aggressor, be put before the General Assembly. "Both reacted vigorously against this," reported Mr. Austin. They strenuously opposed any action that might commit the United Nations to a fight against Communist China and leave Europe wide open to Soviet attack. While there was "general and widespread concern" about the situation in Korea, according to the Ambassador, the major allied countries felt that a defensive military position should be established before further UN action was taken. Some delegations from Asia and Latin America made it clear that public opinion in their countries would not support a war with Communist China. Mr. Austin felt that the infrequency of reports from the UN Command was making it harder to hold the principal allies

together. Moreover, the British idea of a buffer zone was gaining some support, adding to the general impression of disunity.³⁵

In an effort to provide other nations with a greater sense of participation, the United States initiated a series of informal conferences in Washington, in which Assistant Secretary Rusk or one of his colleagues met with the ambassadors of those nations contributing forces for Korea and explained the situation from the US viewpoint. The first such meeting took place on 30 November. Eventually this informal group grew into a "Committee of Sixteen," which met regularly and was given intelligence briefings as well as summaries of current military operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were apparently not consulted when this practice was begun.³⁶

President Truman inadvertently contributed to a straining of international relations by some injudicious remarks at a press conference on 30 November. At the opening of the conference, he released a statement that was intended to be reassuring. UN forces, he said, had "no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea." In subsequent questions, Mr. Truman was led into statements that the United States would take any steps necessary to meet the military situation, including the use of "every weapon that we have." When a reporter asked if this statement meant that the use of the atomic bomb was under "active consideration," the President replied that "there has always been active consideration of its use." Some of his further answers could be read as implying that it would be left to the field commander—General MacArthur—to decide whether or not to use this weapon.³⁷

The potentially disastrous effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. Before the day was over, a "damage-control party" (as Secretary Acheson characterized it) had hastily prepared and released, on behalf of the White House, an explanatory statement intended to reduce the President's replies to their proper significance. In this statement, it was pointed out that all weapons were always considered for use whenever US forces were in combat; that the mere possession of any weapon necessarily entailed "consideration" of its use; that by law, only the President could authorize employment of nuclear weapons; and that the situation with regard to those weapons had in no way been changed by the replies given at the press conference. But the original words could not be recalled; they were flashed around the world, with immediate repercussions, notably in the British House of Commons, which was then debating foreign policy. To quiet the ensuing uproar, Prime Minister Clement Attlee, after a hasty telegraphic consultation with the US Government, announced, to the accompaniment of cheers, that he would fly to Washington to confer with President Truman. The results of this important meeting, which took place the first week in December, are described in the ensuing chapter.³⁸

As December opened, the situation in Korea, as viewed from Washington, seemed even more dangerous than it had three months earlier, when the Pusan perimeter was under attack. The condition of UN forces grew more alarming hour by hour. Eighth Army, its right flank shattered, fell back across the Ch'ongch'on River, then began a fighting retreat down the peninsula. The 2d Division continued to suffer heavily from enemy blows; by 2 December it was no

longer fit for combat. The hard-won gains in northeastern Korea were abandoned; the US 7th Division and the ROK 3d and Capitol Divisions withdrew toward the safety of Hungnam. The Marines fought their way back to Hagaru-ri, but still faced the task of breaking through roadblocks to reach the coast. A new threat to X Corps developed when the enemy took advantage of the widening gap between that force and Eighth Army (precisely as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had foreseen) to send forces swinging westward toward Wonsan.³⁹

On 1 December Secretary Acheson and his principal assistants joined Secretary Marshall, Mr. Lovett, Mr. Harriman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries at a conference in the Pentagon. The Secretary of State noted that a "virtual state of panic" existed among US allies at the United Nations in New York. Many were complaining that US leadership had failed and were blaming General MacArthur for the military disaster in Korea. It was essential, said the Secretary, to restore confidence in the United States. If a line could be stabilized in Korea, an attempt could then be made to imbue it with an appropriate legal status. He suggested various other possible steps, such as a cease-fire resolution in the United Nations or the creation of armistice teams like those set up by General Marshall in China in 1947, during the Chinese civil war. Another possibility was that the United States might offer to withdraw from Korea if the Chinese Communists withdrew their military forces from Manchuria. In any event, the United States must take some action. He was considering an address to the General Assembly. But, recognizing that every political action must be geared to military considerations, Secretary Acheson requested guidance from the military men present.

General Bradley responded that it was impossible to make any firm predictions regarding the military situation. He could not tell whether a line could be held in Korea. Perhaps it could if X Corps succeeded in regrouping, if losses had not been too heavy, and if the reports of large enemy reinforcements were false. Secretary Acheson again pressed for an answer, asking whether the most advantageous course might be to seek a cease-fire in order to buy time. General Collins and Secretary Marshall backed General Bradley's conviction that it was impossible to forecast whether a line could be held in Korea. The Army Chief of Staff volunteered to fly to Japan immediately to find out what the situation really was. Secretary Marshall at once approved this suggestion.

Admiral Sherman thought that, "from a strategic point of view," it would be best to abandon Korea, were it not for the fact that Japan would thereby be endangered. Hence the best course of action would be to hold at the waist of Korea "as a long-term strategic plan." He noted with some surprise that the Communists had not challenged UN control of the air. This advantageous situation should not be jeopardized, he thought, and hence there should be no air raids into Manchuria at present. However, the United States should decide in advance what to do if the Chinese Communist air force entered on a large scale. Generals Bradley and Collins thought that it would be well to withhold retaliation in order to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. General Collins disputed the Admiral's view of the importance of holding Korea, which, he thought, "was not

worth a nickel while the Russians hold Vladivostok and positions on the other flank."

Further discussion of possible retaliation against Chinese air attacks ensued. Admiral Sherman believed that the United States should strike back; so did General Nathan F. Twining, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who was representing General Vandenberg. General Bradley did not disagree but pointed out that a decision to retaliate must be made in Washington as the situation developed; it should not be left to the Theater Commander. Admiral Sherman warned against any political commitment that did not leave the United States free to act quickly, a proposition with which Secretary Acheson fully agreed. But, added the Secretary, if retaliation brought in the Soviets, "we would go from the frying pan into the fire." In that case, General Bradley noted, the United States would have to evacuate Korea and would probably be engaged in general war.

Secretary Acheson then asked the military men whether a cease-fire along the 38th parallel would be the best solution, one that the United States would be "lucky" to get. Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Sherman answered affirmatively, although General Collins urged that no decision be made yet. Secretary Marshall, however, said that acceptance of a cease-fire would represent a "great weakness" on the part of the United States. The conferees then turned to a discussion of problems of European defense.⁴⁰

The only definite agreement that emerged from this meeting was that General Collins should leave for Tokyo that day.⁴¹ General Bradley, relying on the sense of the meeting, drew up a list of guidelines setting forth the subjects that General Collins was to discuss with the UN Commander. The first item was "the chances for a successful outcome of a defensive action by the United Nations forces in Korea." In this connection, General MacArthur was to be asked what line in North Korea could be held with available forces and for how long; also what additional forces would be required to hold the line for a longer period. Among other topics, General Collins was also to discuss the question of air (and possibly naval) attacks on military targets north of the Yalu; the feasibility of withdrawing UN forces, either to a bridgehead in South Korea or entirely from the peninsula; and the possible augmentation of UN air power. Another subject—the advantages and disadvantages of a cease-fire with the enemy—was considered for inclusion but was deleted by General Bradley, probably because he considered it a matter requiring political guidance.⁴²

On the following day, Secretary Acheson told his principal aides that "the Military were extremely pessimistic about the present situation" and that it was uncertain whether a line could be held in Korea. He laid down the following US objectives: to protect UN forces, to localize the conflict, to disengage US troops, to maintain a solid front among US allies, and to retain the support of a majority in the United Nations. For these purposes, he said, the United States would take the line in UN discussions that the Chinese Communist intervention was an extremely grave threat to the peace; that it was essential to stop the fighting in Korea immediately; that the United Nations could not settle the dispute while the fighting was going on; and that the United Nations should call upon the

Chinese Communists to halt their attack in return for assurances that UN forces would cease hostilities toward them.⁴³

The subject of UN action was discussed that evening by President Truman with Secretary Acheson, Secretary Marshall, and General Bradley. They agreed that the Chinese intervention in Korea would be brought before the General Assembly. They considered two possible ways of seeking a cease-fire: a resolution in the General Assembly or a diplomatic approach to the Soviets or the Chinese Communists. Decision on these alternatives was postponed pending General Collins' return and the outcome of the President's forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Attlee.

As for the price that the Chinese Communists might exact in return for a Korean settlement, Secretary Acheson thought that, as a minimum, they would demand withdrawal below the 38th parallel, and he agreed with General Marshall that it was most unlikely that they would ask no more. Other possible demands that Mr. Acheson foresaw were US withdrawal from Korea, a seat for Communist China in the General Assembly, US abandonment of Taiwan, and Chinese participation in the negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty (foreshadowing an effort to force the United States out of Japan). Secretary Marshall pointed out the difficulty of protecting US troops while avoiding any compromise with honor. He warned that the United States could not, "in good conscience," abandon the South Koreans, a statement with which the others agreed.

Discussion then turned to the domestic impact of the changed world situation. Secretary Acheson urged the President to declare a national emergency and to establish controls on prices, wages, and production. President Truman approved these measures and also agreed that US armed forces should be rapidly expanded. Finally, the President directed that the Secretaries confer again with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following morning and report to him immediately thereafter.⁴⁴

The Conference of 3 December

When the morning of 3 December 1950 dawned in Washington, the atmosphere there was thus described in a newspaper dispatch filed the same day:

Every official movement in the capital today, every official report from Tokyo, and every private estimate of the situation by well-informed men reflected a sense of emergency and even of alarm about the state of the United Nations Army in Korea. Not even on the fateful night twenty-three weeks ago when the Korean war started was the atmosphere more grim.⁴⁵

Reports from the battlefield indicated the magnitude of Eighth Army's defeat. Casualties for a two-day period (30 November–1 December) exceeded 11,000 men, according to preliminary estimates. The 2d Infantry Division had lost 6,380 men, nearly half its strength. The Turkish Brigade was believed to have lost 1,000

out of 5,000 men. Eighth Army and X Corps together could put slightly more than 110,000 men in the field, against an estimated 256,000 Chinese and 10,000 North Koreans.⁴⁶

Early that morning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a long and profoundly pessimistic report from General MacArthur, who told them that X Corps was being contracted into the Hamhung area as rapidly as possible and that the situation of Eighth Army was becoming "increasingly critical." It was clear, he continued, that General Walker could not hold P'yongyang and would have to withdraw to the vicinity of Seoul. To unite X Corps and Eighth Army would produce no advantage and would forfeit the flexibility resulting from separate lines of naval supply. A defensive line across Korea would have a road distance of at least 150 miles; were it held by the two combined forces, each of the seven US divisions would have to protect a front of 20 miles or more against greatly superior enemy numbers. "Such a line with no depth would have little strength," argued CINCFE, "and as a defensive concept would invite penetration with resultant envelopment and piecemeal destruction." It might have been practicable against the smaller North Korean forces but not against those of Communist China.

The General expressed the view that Washington did not yet fully understand "the basic changes which have been wrought by the undisguised entrance of the Chinese Army into the combat." Approximately 26 Chinese divisions were known to be in the battle line, with at least 200,000 more men moving up from the rear; the North Korean Army was also being reorganized. The nature of the terrain, plus the proximity of the Manchurian border, made it difficult for air power to interdict enemy supply lines; the concentration of enemy troops away from the coast lessened the effectiveness of naval gunfire support and eliminated any hope of amphibious maneuver. Thus the UN superiority in air and sea power was nullified, and the relative strength of ground forces became decisive. Unless substantial reinforcements were forthcoming, the UN Command would be forced into a series of withdrawals, its strength diminishing with each one, or else driven into beachheads where they could only strive to hang on. In short, the prospect for the UN Command, which was "facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war," was for "steady attrition leading to final destruction." Thus far, UN forces had exhibited "good morale and efficiency," but they were "mentally fatigued and physically battered." ROK units were of "negligible" combat effectiveness; the various UN units were too small to affect the battle. US divisions, except the 1st Marine, were far understrength.

In conclusion, General MacArthur restated the urgent need for a fresh understanding of the situation as it appeared to him:

The general evaluation of the situation here must be viewed on the basis of an entirely new war against an entirely new power of great military strength and under entirely new conditions.

The directives under which I am operating based upon the North Korean Forces as an enemy are completely outmoded by events. The fact must be clearly understood that our relatively small force now faces the full offensive power of the Chinese Communist nation augmented by extensive supply of Soviet

materiel. The strategic concept suitable for operations against the North Korean Army which was so successful is not susceptible to continued application against such power. This calls for political decisions and strategic plans in implementation thereof, adequate fully to meet the realities involved. In this, time is of the essence as every hour sees the enemy power increase and our decline.⁴⁷

With these developments as a background, it was small wonder that the State-Defense conference of 3 December took place "amid deepening gloom," in Secretary Acheson's later words.⁴⁸ Besides the two Secretaries, those present included Mr. Harriman, Mr. Rusk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with General Collins represented by his Vice Chief, General Wade H. Haislip), the Operations Deputies, and several other military officers, including the Director, Joint Staff, Admiral Davis. The meeting opened with a briefing by General Ridgway, who told his hearers that it was uncertain whether X Corps would be able to disengage and reach Hungnam, or whether the fleeing Eighth Army could beat the pursuing Chinese to Seoul. However, if UN forces could gain the beachheads at Inch'on, Hamhung, and Pusan, they could stay there "for some time" until the question of evacuation was decided. These judgments were of course based on General MacArthur's latest reports.

Had the military situation reached a point at which a cease-fire was necessary? This was the question put to General Bradley by Secretary Acheson. General Bradley replied that a cease-fire would be "fine" if the price were not too high. Indeed, he continued, if it could not be obtained promptly, the United States might have to take unilateral action—perhaps virtually declaring war on Communist China. He pointed out that the United States could blockade China, bomb the mainland, and do "a good many other things to bother them," although atomic weapons would "probably" not be used.

Discussing the possible terms of a cease-fire, the Secretary of State foresaw that the United States would face a "bitter choice." Withdrawal to the 38th parallel would be acceptable to the United States but probably not to the Communists, who might well demand total evacuation of Korea. The United States might counter with an offer to withdraw only X Corps, but this, if agreed and carried out, would leave Eighth Army vulnerable. Suppose the Communists further demanded withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Taiwan and a seat in the United Nations? "We must consider whether these are negotiable propositions," said Mr. Acheson. The Chinese might further demand to be made a party to the Japanese peace treaty, with a veto over the negotiations. "This would mean driving us out of the Far East," was his judgment.

The Secretary deplored the attitude of "our friends" in the United Nations, who tended to criticize the United States rather than Communist China. He feared that the United States would get little support in resisting any Chinese demands except on the issue of the 38th parallel; the retention of this line, he thought, was "a position with moral force." If there were no cease-fire and UN forces had to fight their way out, military actions against the Chinese must be limited to those connected directly with evacuation, since in any wider conflict with China, the United States would find itself without allies. General Bradley

countered that these cautions must be offset by consideration of the moral and political effects of expulsion from Korea and the consequent loss of prestige around the globe. In Europe the Germans were already saying that the United States had proved weak, and appeasement was making strong headway.

Admiral Sherman was adamantly opposed to asking for a cease-fire. The United States, he said, had lost a battle but not a war. He believed that the United States should warn the Chinese to stop their attack or face war with the United States. Should they choose war, then the United States should evacuate Korea and get down to business of defeating China. Any other course of action would lead other nations to begin to "push us around." Secretary Acheson pointed out that the United States was "fighting the second team"; the real enemy was the USSR, which would be delighted to see the United States embroiled with Communist China.

Assistant Secretary Rusk stressed the importance of maintaining solidarity with the United Nations and repeated Secretary Acheson's earlier statement that this could be done only on the basis of making a stand on the 38th parallel. If the Chinese subsequently crossed the parallel, it would solidify UN support for the United States; other countries would be unlikely to reward aggression by giving Communist China a UN seat. Secretary Marshall asked if he was proposing to confine any cease-fire simply to a line at the 38th parallel. Mr. Rusk answered yes; the United States, he said, should accept nothing by agreement except the 38th parallel, and anything else should be "taken only *de facto*."

The key question was put to the others by Secretary Acheson: Did anyone doubt the desirability of concluding a cease-fire at the 38th parallel if some other country made the proposal? There was no reply and therefore no objection.

General Bradley observed that, while the political question was whether or not to ask for a cease-fire, there was a military question to be answered: whether, after beachheads had been reached, evacuation should begin at once or US forces should fight until forced out. This question was discussed but not answered. Secretary Marshall pointed out that the two questions were related; withdrawal to the beachheads would leave the Chinese free to overrun the rest of Korea, hence it would be desirable to have a cease-fire before UN forces were driven south of the parallel. General Bradley again stressed the need for a decision on the question of evacuation. He thought that the time had come to "establish firm beachheads but do it on the principle that we are going to withdraw in an orderly way, then induce some other country to propose a cease-fire on the 38th parallel." Ambassador Jessup asked whether the United States should agree to the departure of all non-Korean forces from Korea; Admiral Sherman frankly replied that he would prefer war with China. General Bradley opposed such a conflict, but warned that the effects of withdrawing, or being forced out, without retaliation would be detrimental. However, he thought that no retaliation should be undertaken until after UN forces had been evacuated. Secretary Acheson pointed out that a course of continued hostilities against China would be irreconcilable with any sort of cease-fire.

After further discussion, it was agreed that no basic political decisions would be made until after President Truman had talked to the British Prime Minister;

however, General MacArthur would be ordered to concentrate his troops in beachheads. General Bradley read a draft message for this purpose, which was revised to reflect suggestions by Secretary Marshall and Admiral Sherman.⁴⁹

Immediately afterwards, Secretary Acheson, Secretary Marshall, and General Bradley went to the White House to report the outcome of the meeting to the President.⁵⁰ It was doubtless at this meeting that General Bradley secured the President's approval for the message ordering General MacArthur to concentrate his troops, which was dispatched that afternoon. It read as follows:

We consider that the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is concurred in.⁵¹

Prime Minister Attlee was scheduled to arrive in Washington on 4 December. Before his arrival, Secretary Acheson discussed the Korean situation with Assistant Secretary Rusk and several others in the State Department. All agreed that, if a cease-fire could not be achieved, the United States must hold on as long as possible and force the Chinese Communists to pay the highest possible price for expelling UN troops; simply to "bow out" would have disastrous effects on the US world position. To this end, it would be necessary to strengthen the will of military authorities to resist without allowing them to undertake reprisals against Chinese territory. Secretary Acheson reported these conclusions by telephone to Secretary Marshall, who agreed with two qualifications: first, it would be necessary to see whether X Corps could be evacuated; second, the United States "must not dig ourselves into a hole without an exit." Secretary Acheson in turn accepted these amendments.⁵²

On the same day, the Service Secretaries tendered advice to Secretary Marshall that ran directly opposite to that of Secretary Acheson. They urged that UN forces, if pursued south of the parallel, should be withdrawn. However, the United States should refuse to recognize defeat and should therefore blockade China and prepare to bomb China's lines of communication, while being careful to avoid commitment of ground forces on the Chinese mainland. "The broad lines of our policy," they wrote, "should be not to accept the present military defeat as any more than the loss of a battle or campaign." At the same time, they recommended that their reprisal measures be taken only with UN approval. Secretary Marshall undoubtedly recognized that this unrealistic qualification vitiated their proposals.⁵³

Bleak Prospects

At the beginning of December, UN troops faced the possibility of being driven into another Pusan perimeter or its equivalent, with no certainty that they would be able to maintain their beachhead. The hope for an early end to the Korean hostilities, which had glimmered brightly six weeks earlier, had vanished. The prospective establishment of a unified Korea under the United

Nations, which would have represented a towering accomplishment for the five-year-old organization, was likewise gone. At the least, it was clear that the world faced a period of acute international tension, lasting perhaps for many months. Such was the situation confronting President Truman as he sat down to confer with his closest ally, Prime Minister Clement Attlee.

The administration's difficulties were exacerbated by the loquacity of General MacArthur. He complained to press representatives about China's "privileged sanctuaries" and criticized those European countries that were reluctant to support strong measures in the Far East. President Truman was forced to issue a directive on 5 December that all public statements by government officials relating to foreign or military policy be cleared in advance with the Departments of State or Defense.⁵⁴

Over everything else, however, loomed one desperately serious question. How far were Communist China and its Soviet Russian ally prepared to go in seeking to inflict military reverses on UN forces in Korea? If they were willing at all costs to drive the United States off the peninsula, then World War III might well lurk around the corner. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were compelled to face this possibility. On 6 December 1950—the day when Chinese Communist forces moved into P'yongyang on the heels of the retreating Eighth Army—the following somber warning went out as a personal message to all joint commanders:

The JCS consider that the current situation in Korea has greatly increased the possibility of general war. Commanders addressed take such action as is feasible to increase readiness without creating atmosphere of alarm.⁵⁵

The UN Command in the Balance

General Collins Goes to Korea

Under urgent orders from the President to determine the true extent of the military catastrophe in Korea and to improve communications with General MacArthur, General Collins flew to the Far East, his third such mission in six months. Reaching Tokyo on 4 December, he called immediately upon General MacArthur.¹ The UN Commander expounded a position that he had already made clear and was to reiterate constantly in coming weeks: the United Nations, having committed itself to support the Republic of Korea against North Korean aggression, should accept the new challenge from Communist China and direct its full power toward the “entirely new and undeclared war.” Even if “material reinforcement in a reasonable time” could be sent, however, CINCFE warned General Collins, the UN Command could accomplish nothing more than withdrawal to successive positions, perhaps all the way back to Pusan. If no reinforcements were available, the Command should be evacuated “as possible.”

General Collins could promise little additional support. General MacArthur therefore outlined his plans, on the assumption that he would have to fight with what he had. Since the enemy’s forces (which he estimated at over 500,000 Chinese and 100,000 North Koreans) were superior, they could envelop any static defense position and thus force Eighth Army back to the Seoul-Inch’on area. X Corps was already concentrating around Hamhung. If a decision were made to evacuate Korea, said General MacArthur, every effort should be made to obtain an armistice on reasonable terms. UN troops could hold the Seoul and Hamhung bridgeheads during negotiations only if the enemy chose not to launch a full-scale attack. General Collins offered the “hopes” of himself and his JCS colleagues that the enemy’s course of action would afford the UN Command a breathing spell. He added that it was the “probable intention” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring Eighth Army back to Japan and then to reinforce it.²

After sending back to Washington a summary of the meeting,³ General Collins flew to Korea, where he found the situation serious but not desperate. General

Walker and General Almond, the commanders of Eighth Army and X Corps respectively, were confident that they could hold bridgeheads for a considerable length of time.⁴

Returning to Tokyo on 7 December, General Collins discussed with General MacArthur three possible courses of action. The first assumed that Communist China would continue all-out attack, that no air or naval action against China itself would be permitted, and that there would be no substantial reinforcement in Korea. General MacArthur believed that these conditions "would represent essentially a surrender." UN forces would have to be withdrawn; a cease-fire would not be necessary, since they could be evacuated even without one.

The second case assumed continued attack by Chinese troops, but with the UN Command free to blockade the China coast, to undertake air attacks against Chinese territory, and to employ Nationalist forces offensively. Under these conditions, General MacArthur proposed to evacuate X Corps to Pusan and reunite it with Eighth Army; the combined force would then hold a position as far north as possible. Whether to continue operations in Korea or to withdraw therefrom would depend upon the subsequent Chinese reaction.

Finally, in the event that the Chinese Communists agreed not to cross the 38th parallel, General MacArthur believed that the United Nations should accept an armistice, provided that it applied also to North Korean forces (including guerrillas). Eighth Army should remain in position covering Seoul and Inch'on; X Corps should be withdrawn to Pusan. General MacArthur believed that this would be the best arrangement that could be obtained unless the scale of UN support were increased.

Recurring to the need for reinforcements, General MacArthur again urged that Chinese Nationalist troops be used in Korea. Moreover, he added, all "major powers" in the United Nations "should increase their contingents in Korea to a total of at least 75,000."

The conferees considered what should be done with North Korean prisoners of war (estimated to number 140,000) and with ROK troops in event of a UN withdrawal. General MacArthur considered it inadvisable to evacuate either of these groups to Japan. General Collins had discussed the fate of the prisoners with Ambassador Muccio, who had suggested that they be relocated to Cheju-do (the largest of Korea's offshore islands, near the southwestern tip of the peninsula) or to Okinawa. As for the ROK forces, General MacArthur pointed out that the United Nations had a moral responsibility for them, but he had no solution to suggest at the moment.⁵

General Collins returned to Washington early in the morning on 8 December,⁶ in time to attend a JCS meeting at 1000 hours.⁷ In a memorandum for his colleagues, he recapitulated his recent conversations and indicated his general agreement with the views expressed by CINCFE. His final recommendation was as follows:

If UN decision is not to continue an all-out effort in Korea and if the Chinese Communist [sic] continue to attack, General MacArthur should be directed to take the necessary steps to prevent the destruction of his forces pending final evacuation from Korea.⁸

On the preceding day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had received an information copy of a message from CINCFE to General Walker and General Almond (probably sent shortly after the second Collins-MacArthur conference) briefly outlining an approved concept of operations. Eighth Army would withdraw in successive positions to Pusan, if necessary, and would attempt to hold Seoul as long as possible without allowing itself to be enveloped. X Corps would be removed from Hungnam, joined with Eighth Army, and placed under its command.⁹

This message was on the agenda for the JCS meeting of 8 December. After hearing a report by General Collins, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that they approved his plan, adding that the evacuation of X Corps should take place "as early as practicable."¹⁰

Details of the phased withdrawal plan for Eighth Army were set forth in another message from CINCFE to the field commands that reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the evening of 8 December. Nine defensive lines, successively farther south, were laid out; they were anchored on the west coast and took maximum advantage of rivers. The first ran from Kyomip'o, some 20 miles southwest of P'yongyang, to Sin'gye, about 50 miles inland; the last one was the Nakdong River line with an eastward extension to Yongdok—the old Pusan Perimeter.¹¹ This plan had been explained to General Collins during his visit,¹² and he doubtless passed along the information to the other JCS members, but there was no occasion for them to take any action.

Prime Minister Attlee Comes to Washington

While General Collins was in the Far East, President Truman was playing host to Prime Minister Clement Attlee—a "Job's comforter," as Secretary Acheson styled him.¹³ The initiative for the meeting, as described in the preceding chapter, had come from London, but the opportunity was accepted willingly by the United States, since the Truman administration set a high value on transatlantic unity. "The great concern, of course," General Haislip wired General Collins on 3 December 1950, summarizing the results of the State-Defense meeting of that day, "is the ability of the United States to solve the current crisis in such a manner as to preserve maximum solidarity in [the] UN and especially with British Commonwealth nations."¹⁴ Indeed, this was at all times a cardinal objective of policy under President Truman.

The talks were to cover a wide range of problems. The Department of State prepared fifteen "position papers," which were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 December with instructions that comments had to be submitted by the following day.¹⁵ The most significant, addressed specifically to the Korean situation, declared that the United States should try to reach a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th parallel before Chinese forces reached that line. However, it was added, such a settlement should not be conditioned upon agreement on other issues, such as Taiwan or Communist China's UN membership. Efforts to unify Korea by "political means" should continue after a cease-fire. If the Communists rejected an

armistice and advanced beyond the 38th parallel, the UN Command would probably have to evacuate Korea. Any such step "must be clearly the result of military necessity," since anything that looked like a voluntary abandonment of South Korea would have disastrous consequences. It should be followed by efforts to mobilize "political and economic measures" against Peiping, including UN condemnation of China as an aggressor. To seek a military defeat of China on the mainland would be unwise, but military harassment, instigation of guerrilla activities, and exploitation of Nationalist capabilities should be considered.¹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing this study, declined to endorse the recommendation for a cease-fire at the 38th parallel; they preferred a statement that an armistice would be "militarily advantageous" provided that its terms did not jeopardize the safety of UN forces. They believed that the United Nations should declare China an aggressor without waiting until the UN Command had been driven from Korea. And as a further possible means of harassment, they suggested naval blockade of Communist China and the bombing of communications in that country.¹⁷

In another paper, the Department of State amplified its list of measures that might be taken if, as seemed likely, Communist China continued its aggressive course in Korea and elsewhere around its borders. An economic embargo, severance of diplomatic relations, and assistance to opposition movements on the mainland were listed as possible, though it would be difficult to obtain Prime Minister Attlee's approval for them. Military options appeared quite limited. "Hot pursuit" of aircraft into Manchuria was of little importance now that UN forces had retreated from the border. Bombing and blockade would probably not be approved by the United Nations and might trigger Soviet intervention; in any case they could not have an immediate effect. Nationalist assaults on the mainland were unlikely to produce results without major US assistance, which was out of the question. The Department of State could only recommend continuing air and naval action against the Chinese in Korea, a course that would not require fresh UN sanction and would avoid accepting a political defeat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded this paper as acceptable, citing only one additional political measure that might be employed against China, namely, the denial of a UN seat.¹⁸

What of the possible use of nuclear weapons—the issue that had precipitated the Prime Minister's trip? This question was already under study within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a result of a suggestion made by General Collins on 20 November. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in a report submitted on 29 November, foresaw that a situation might develop in which the employment of these weapons would be necessary to prevent UN forces from being overwhelmed in Korea, and pointed out that a decision on the matter would have to be made at the highest level.¹⁹ The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, studying the use of nuclear weapons in case of Soviet intervention, concluded on 3 December 1950 that if the Soviets openly participated in the Korean conflict, they would do so because they were willing to risk global war; hence no US action, of any sort, would discourage them in Korea. In case of evacuation, nuclear weapons should be used against targets of opportunity if necessary to avert major disaster, and

immediate preparations for their employment in the Far East should be made.²⁰ Neither of these studies was officially acted upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and both were withdrawn from circulation a few weeks later.²¹

The Department of State, assessing the probable British position on this issue, believed that Prime Minister Attlee felt that he should be consulted, and should give his assent, before nuclear weapons were employed. The Department recommended that the President indicate his desire to avoid using these weapons and to “move in step” with the British but make no commitment that would restrict his freedom of action. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in commenting on this paper, recommended the addition of a proviso that situations might arise in which nuclear weapons might constitute the only means of averting a “major disaster.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, accepted the State draft as written, probably judging its language sufficiently elastic and considering that the proposed JSSC amendment would only alarm the Prime Minister.²²

The JCS comments on each of these papers were at once transmitted to Secretary Acheson.²³ Time did not permit the normal procedure of coordination, which would have meant the preparation of revised papers indicating the degree to which the JCS views were acceptable to State. In the course of the talks, however, the President and the Secretary of State generally upheld positions in line with JCS views.

Before departing for Washington, the British Prime Minister received a hurried visit on 2 December from Prime Minister Rene Pleven of France, with whom he established a “general identity of view.” Thus, when Mr. Attlee landed in Washington on the morning of 4 December, he arrived as spokesman for Western Europe as well as for his own country. Moreover, the general viewpoint that he upheld in talking to the President—that the West should at almost any cost avoid diverting its attention from Europe to the Far East—was shared by the opposition in Parliament, according to a statement by the Conservative leader, Sir Winston Churchill.²⁴

The conferences between the President and the Prime Minister lasted from 4 to 8 December inclusive. Secretaries Acheson and Marshall took part, as did General Bradley. On the British side, participants included Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who had accompanied the Prime Minister; Marshal of the RAF Lord Tedder, head of the British Joint Services Mission; and the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks.

By far the greater part of the discussion was devoted to the Far Eastern crisis, although other problems, such as NATO and British rearmament, were not neglected. Broad agreement on fundamentals was easily reached. The need to maintain Anglo-American unity, to uphold the prestige and authority of the United Nations, and to continue rebuilding the strength of Western Europe; the desirability of a “free and independent” Korea; the importance of avoiding general war—these were matters on which the two sides could readily agree.

Regarding the immediate situation in the Far East, it was also agreed that the time had come to seek a cease-fire through the United Nations. But what price should be paid for an end to the hostilities? Here the two nations differed. At the first meeting, President Truman introduced the State Department’s paper on the subject (rewritten to incorporate most of the changes recommended by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff), which stressed that a cease-fire in Korea must not be linked to other issues. The British did not comment on the paper at the time, but in subsequent conversations, Prime Minister Attlee frankly advocated concessions to Communist China that might encourage "Titoism" in that nation. While he agreed that *voluntary* withdrawal from Korea was unthinkable, he was willing to acquiesce in a forcible expulsion, which would mean that the United Nations would have "failed with honor." He and his advisors strongly opposed any reprisals—political, economic, or military—if China succeeded in driving the UN forces from Korea or rejected an armistice.

President Truman and Secretary Acheson believed that the United Nations should squarely face the issue of aggression in Korea. While not opposed to negotiation as such, they warned that it would be extremely difficult under the existing situation. "This moment for negotiation with the Communist movement is the worst since 1917," said Secretary Acheson. Moreover, they insisted that discussions with China must not begin with concessions on the matter of Taiwan or UN membership. They pointed out that, to all intents and purposes, China was already at war with the United Nations. Secretary Marshall and General Bradley warned that the US position in Japan and the Philippines would be jeopardized if Taiwan passed into Chinese Communist hands. Secretary Acheson noted that the Communists had come into power in China trumpeting their hostility to the United States, in defiance of fifty years of US efforts to cultivate friendship with the Chinese people. But the subject of action against China following expulsion from Korea was not pressed by the US participants.

In the end, the British reluctantly agreed that the cessation of Taiwan was too great a price to pay for a cease-fire in Korea. But they continued to favor admission of China to the United Nations, and the final communique recognized the disagreement on this issue.²⁵

As for nuclear weapons, the United States avoided a formal commitment. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee discussed the subject at a private conference on 7 December. The President recalled the British-US partnership in the development of atomic energy and said that he would not consider using the atomic bomb without consulting the United Kingdom. Mr. Attlee expressed his thanks for this promise and suggested that it be put in writing, but President Truman replied that an oral understanding would suffice. In fact, as Secretary Acheson pointed out later to the President, a formal agreement would have exceeded the President's authority and would have been unacceptable to Congress. The drafting of the portion of the communique covering this subject occasioned some difficulty. The British finally accepted a statement that spoke of the "hope" of the President "that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb" and of his "desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."²⁶

While all the discussions between the two Western leaders and their advisors were frank and open, the most candid took place on the evening of 6 December at the residence of the British Ambassador. Following dinner, members of the two delegations talked for two and a half hours in a "no holds barred" atmosphere. The Prime Minister, admitting he was raising a "difficult and delicate" matter,

questioned General MacArthur's direction of the UN effort in Korea. There was a feeling among Europeans, he said, that General MacArthur was "running the show" and that participating UN members had little voice in what was being done. Secretary Marshall and General Bradley replied that General MacArthur was simply doing what he was required to do by the United Nations and that he had followed strictly the terms of his directives based on UN resolutions. General Marshall outlined the joint control exercised by State and Defense over General MacArthur, and reminded Prime Minister Attlee that the British had been consulted on the questions of "hot pursuit" and the bombing of Manchuria.

When the British proposed that a committee be set up to direct the Korean War, General Bradley attacked the idea. He even went so far as to suggest that if other nations did not like the way the United States was handling the war in Korea, they "would be given assistance in withdrawing." If they wished to remain, however, then they must accept the responsibilities assigned to the UN Command.

President Truman reminded the others that the United Nations had asked the United States to set up a unified command. He was in charge, he said, and would run it so long as the United Nations wanted him to do so. The orders now going to General MacArthur were concerned only with the safety of his command. If Communist aircraft swept down to bomb UN forces, "every airfield in sight would be bombed in order to protect our troops." The President concluded that the United States would stay in Korea and fight, with or without help from others.²⁷

The last session, on 8 December, was attended by General Collins, fresh from his trip to the Far East, who gave a somewhat reassuring report. He believed it unlikely that UN forces would be driven out of Korea; X Corps would be able to rejoin Eighth Army and the combined force could probably hold the Pusan bridgehead indefinitely. In a word, as General Collins later wrote, the situation was "serious" but "no longer critical."

General Collins' report did not affect the outcome of the talks. The two sides had already reached conclusions and, immediately after hearing him, they turned to the drafting of a communique. But, as General Bradley remarked, it now seemed apparent that the United Nations would not have to negotiate under extreme pressure.²⁸

Although they did not reach full agreement during their five days of conferences, the President and the Prime Minister had succeeded in narrowing their differences and clarifying their respective viewpoints. Perhaps the most important result of the meetings, and of the preparatory deliberations, was that the administration placed itself firmly on record as willing to end the war on a basis of the old border—the 38th parallel. The hope of unifying Korea by force had been finally laid to rest.

The General Assembly Seeks a Cease-Fire

In the principal point of disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister—whether or not to "buy off" Communist China with concessions—

most of the nations of the world shared the British view. The members of the United Nations were willing, up to a point, to resist a defiant challenge from a small country like North Korea, but Communist China was quite another matter. It was by no means certain, therefore, that the United Nations would be willing to aid in reaching a settlement on terms that the United States could accept. In the words of a contemporary analyst:

Most of the non-Communist world seemed less troubled by Peking's bullying of the United Nations and generally lawless behavior than by the chance that the quarrel between the United States and Communist China would precipitate general war. . . . A good many delegations now seemed to consider restraint of Communist China less important than restraint of the United States.²⁹

During the second Truman-Attlee meeting, on 5 December—after both sides had agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices—Secretary Acheson was notified (by a telephone call from the US Delegation at Lake Success) that a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask the Chinese and North Koreans that their forces not cross the 38th parallel. The Indian delegate, Sir Benegal N. Rau, one of the sponsors of this proposal, wished to make certain that this plea was acceptable to the US and British Governments. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee quickly gave their assent.³⁰

Accordingly, a public statement to this effect was issued on the evening of 5 December, with Ambassador Rau acting as spokesman for the group.³¹ There was no direct reply, however, from either Peiping or P'yongyang. During the ensuing week, the scene of action in the United Nations shifted to the General Assembly. The Political and Security Committee (known as the "First Committee") of the Assembly spent several days discussing the Chinese presence in Korea.³² The Indian Government explored with Peiping the possibility of a cease-fire and reportedly sought and obtained from "responsible officials" in Washington assurances that UN forces would not renew their invasion of North Korea if Communist troops stopped at the parallel.³³

In Korea, the intensity of fighting slackened as Eighth Army broke contact and fell back down the peninsula. By 12 December the troops stood along the third of the nine withdrawal lines sketched by CINCFE, lying just north of the parallel. Chinese forces, unable or unwilling to press close pursuit, moved southward more slowly, massing for a possible assault. On the right of the UN line, ROK troops clashed with reconstituted North Korean units on or below the parallel. In northeastern Korea, US forces withdrew into a perimeter around Hungnam. The embattled Marines fought their way through the roadblock south of the Changjin Reservoir; the rearguard of the 1st Marine Division closed Hungnam before midnight on 11 December, when some elements of the same divisions were already embarking.³⁴

In the United Nations, the Arab-Asian bloc continued its diplomatic initiative. On 11 December the thirteen countries of this group agreed to introduce two resolutions into the Assembly. The first would establish a three-man commission to seek a cease-fire; the second would call for a conference on Far Eastern problems

to be held promptly thereafter. This twofold approach, it was hoped, would not only satisfy the US insistence upon an unconditional cease-fire but also assure China that there would be consideration of broader Asian problems.³⁵

The US Government had been informed that this plan was under consideration. The President and the National Security Council met on the afternoon of 11 December to consider the plan. Earlier, Assistant Secretary Rusk had discussed it with representatives of the Services, who had expressed a fear that it might leave the Communists free to strengthen their forces and thus put them in a favorable position if they subsequently decided to renew the attack. Reporting this view to the National Security Council, Mr. Rusk set forth the view that the conditions of a cease-fire should be negotiated before any resolution was introduced into the United Nations.

The Council then moved to a discussion of the terms of a cease-fire. Admiral Davis, Director of the Joint Staff, explained that the Joint Staff had not yet studied the question but gave as a preliminary opinion that any cease-fire should provide suitable guarantees against an enemy buildup and should allow the UN Command to redeploy X Corps from northeastern Korea. Secretary Marshall thought that the indispensable condition was supervision by a UN commission free to operate throughout Korea. General Smith, Director of CIA, was inclined to favor an immediate cease-fire on the basis of the 38th parallel; there was some evidence, he said, that the Chinese might be agreeable. President Truman replied that he was in agreement with what he understood to be General MacArthur's desire to hold "tenaciously" to his present positions north of the parallel. He had no objection, however, to withdrawing to the parallel if military necessity so dictated. The conferees reached no decision on this question. During the discussions, General Bradley and Secretary Marshall both expressed the view that the UN could hold a line somewhere in Korea.³⁶

The final recommendation, agreed on by the Council and approved by the President, was as follows:

We will consider a cease-fire, but must insist upon a cease-fire which does not place UN forces at a military disadvantage and which does not involve political concessions. Details of a cease-fire should be negotiated in order to protect the security of UN forces before a cease-fire is accepted.

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed "as a matter of urgency" to determine the military conditions that would be acceptable.³⁷

In framing their reply to this requirement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted General MacArthur, who set forth the following minimum terms:

- (1) All ground forces must remain in their positions or be withdrawn to the rear.
- (2) There must be no augmentation of combat strength by a buildup of military personnel, supplies, or equipment, (other than supplies needed for the health and comfort of the troops).
- (3) There must be no aircraft flights by either belligerent across the front lines.
- (4) Refugees must not be allowed to migrate across the front lines, in either direction.

(5) The foregoing provisions must be supervised by a commission made up of representatives of nations not having forces in the Korean conflict, which must have unlimited freedom of movement and must be given full support by both sides.³⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated these recommendations into a much longer and more detailed list that they sent to Secretary Marshall on 12 December. Any cease-fire, they believed, should be limited to Korea and remain in force until the Korean question was permanently settled. A demilitarized zone approximately 20 miles wide should be established, with its southern boundary following generally the 38th parallel. Any ban on the introduction of troops or supplies should extend to the replacement of personnel. Guerrillas fighting on either side should receive a safe conduct for transfer to the area of their respective main forces. Prisoners of war should be exchanged on a one-for-one basis.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff added a cautionary comment that the execution of any cease-fire resolution "will, in all probability, prevent the attainment of the United Nations objective of a free and united Korea." This gratuitous incursion into the realm of high policy drew unfavorable attention from Secretary Marshall. In sending the JCS recommendations to the Department of State, General Marshall generally approved them but made it clear that he thought their concluding remark was inappropriate. He had discussed it with the JCS members, he said, and had been assured that the intent was merely to draw attention to a probable result of a cease-fire; they were not advocating "a continued fight for the conquest of North Korea."³⁹

The Department of State condensed the JCS recommendations into a shorter list for the guidance of Ambassador Austin. It was hastily referred to the Department of Defense and, slightly amended, became the basis of the US position, although Admiral Davis felt that the complete JCS statement should have been used instead.⁴⁰

The cease-fire resolution of the Arab-Asian bloc had meanwhile been laid before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. It called for a three-man commission, headed by the President of the Assembly, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, to determine the basis upon which a cease-fire could be arranged. It was approved by the Committee on 13 December and by the Assembly on the day after, in each case by a large margin and with US support.⁴¹

The activities of this Cease-Fire Group swiftly illuminated Peiping's intentions and attitudes. After obtaining the US statement of cease-fire terms, the Group asked the Chinese Communist Government to instruct its special ambassador, General Wu Hsiu-chuan, who was scheduled to depart, to extend his stay long enough to discuss the subject. In another message, the members assured China of their "clear understanding" that, as soon as a cease-fire had been arranged, the negotiations envisioned under the second part of the Arab-Asian plan would take place. But the answer, received from Peiping on 21 December, was a flat rejection, on the grounds that all UN actions taken without the participation of Communist China were illegal. General Wu had already left on 19 December, without meeting the commission.⁴²

Any lingering hopes were dashed by a subsequent telegram from Foreign Minister Chou on 23 December 1950, the text of which was broadcast over the Peiping radio on 22 December (Washington time). Assailing US actions, the Chinese official declared that the 38th parallel, as a demarcation line, had been "obliterated forever" by the invasion of North Korea. He made it clear that Communist China would not consider a cease-fire apart from a favorable disposition of Far Eastern political issues: withdrawal of "foreign" troops from Korea, settlement of Korean affairs by "the Korean people themselves," withdrawal of "American aggression forces" from Taiwan, and the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations.

This harshly worded rebuff brought the peace effort to an end. On 2 January the commission reported to the Assembly that "no recommendation in regard to a cease-fire can usefully be made . . . at this time."⁴³

Events in Korea

Throughout December the situation on Eighth Army front continued relatively quiet. UN forces withdrew to a defensive line running northeastward along the Imjin River to a point just above the parallel, thence east to the coast. On the right, ROK forces grappled with North Korean troops and guerrillas in an attempt to straighten out the line. Toward the end of the month, the main body of Chinese forces, despite a punishing air interdiction campaign, moved up opposite Eighth Army, and enemy troops began infiltrating through a large gap between the ROK units. By the end of December, a new Communist offensive was clearly in the offing.

Evacuation of X Corps from Hungnam was completed on 24 December. The 1st Marine Division, the 3d and 7th US Infantry Divisions, and the ROK Capital Division were progressively outloaded in a skillfully executed operation, while tactical air and naval gunfire helped to hold the shrinking perimeter. Approximately 105,000 troops and 100,000 refugees were taken off, together with 350,000 tons of equipment. The evacuees headed for Pusan and P'ohangdong, there to unload and hurry northward in support of Eighth Army.⁴⁴

Shortly before X Corps completed its evacuation, a casualty forced a change in the command of Eighth Army—a change that was to prove of great significance for the course of the war. On 23 December 1950, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, driving northward from Seoul, was killed when his jeep was struck by a truck.⁴⁵

General Walker's successor had already been selected. General Collins, during his recent visit to Tokyo, had discussed with CINCFE the possibility of replacing General Walker if the necessity should arise. They agreed that a suitable choice would be Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, who had compiled a distinguished record as an airborne division and corps commander in World War II. On learning of General Walker's death, General MacArthur quickly consulted General

Collins by telephone. The appointment of General Ridgway was agreed upon and was made official after General Collins had cleared it with his superiors, including the President.⁴⁶

General Ridgway left Washington in time to reach Tokyo before midnight on Christmas Day. The next morning he had an interview with General MacArthur, who instructed him to hold as far forward as possible. Seoul should be retained, he said, for political and psychological reasons, but not if it became a "citadel position." General MacArthur observed that US forces were operating in a "mission vacuum" while diplomacy attempted to feel its way. "A military success," he remarked, "will strengthen our diplomacy." The most that could be hoped for, in his view, was to inflict on the enemy "a broadening defeat making possible the retention and security of South Korea."

At the conclusion of the interview, General Ridgway asked whether it would be permissible to attack if opportunity offered. General MacArthur gave him full discretion to do so. "The Eighth Army is yours, Matt," he said. "Do what you think best."⁴⁷

Departing for Korea, General Ridgway at once began the process by which, through a vigorous display of battlefield leadership, he was soon to revitalize the dispirited Eighth Army. He spent several days touring the front, to inspect the terrain and examine troop morale. He told President Rhee that he had "come to stay." Although General Ridgway looked forward ultimately to the resumption of the offensive, he recognized that the enemy would soon strike again and that further withdrawals would be inevitable; hence he began preparing positions farther south.⁴⁸

Another Search for Reinforcements

Spurred by the crisis of early December, the administration launched a broad expansion of the US military establishment and mobilization base.⁴⁹ President Truman announced this program to the nation on 15 December 1950, at the same time declaring his willingness to see the Korean conflict settled peaceably, though without yielding to aggression. On the following day, the President proclaimed the existence of a national emergency.⁵⁰ At the same time, the administration froze Chinese Communist funds in US territory and prohibited US ships from entering Chinese ports.⁵¹

None of these measures could bring immediate relief to the beleaguered UN forces in Korea. New forces created by the mobilization program could not be ready for many months. For that reason, as General Collins had told General MacArthur, there was little prospect that additional US troops could be sent to Korea. The dispatch of the last combat-ready division in the United States—the 82d Airborne—was considered by the Department of the Army early in December but was rejected on the advice of General Collins after his return from Tokyo.⁵²

Four National Guard divisions, called into Federal service in September, were still being trained. On 18 December 1950 General MacArthur suggested that they be sent to Japan to complete their training. He did not contemplate using them in Korea but thought that they might allay a growing apprehension of the Japanese people, fostered by Soviet propaganda broadcasts.⁵³

This request for a major reinforcement in the Far East had to be evaluated in the light of the broad question of US policy toward Korea and the Far East generally. The subject was discussed at a special meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 19 December. At the invitation of Secretary Marshall, Assistant Secretary Rusk attended in place of Secretary Acheson, who was in Brussels for a NATO meeting. Secretary Marshall opened the meeting by expressing great concern over the vulnerability of Japan to a Soviet attack. The question he wished to raise was whether there was any way the United States could withdraw from Korea "with honor." Mr. Rusk addressed the political problems involved in the question of withdrawal but professed to have no ready solution.

Admiral Sherman stated that, from the military point of view, withdrawal from Korea was preferable to sending more troops to that country. The United States, he thought, should consult its own interests and do whatever was necessary. If this meant withdrawal from Korea, he thought that Western European countries would be "delighted." The effects of any loss of prestige would be offset by the increased flexibility resulting from disengagement in Korea. "Certainly we should not send more troops West when our principal responsibility lies East [i.e., in Europe]," was his conclusion.

General Vandenberg urged that the United States withdraw troops from Korea and continue operations against China by sea and air. General Wade Haislip, representing General Collins (who was also in Europe), opposed sending General MacArthur the "large reinforcements" he had asked for. If it did prove necessary to send a division to the Far East, he thought that an equivalent division should be sent to Europe at the same time. And he noted that the divisions then in training would not complete basic training before March.

General Bradley did not believe that the UNC should withdraw any further until there was "serious indication" that the enemy meant to advance in strength south of the 38th parallel. He thought it unlikely that Eighth Army would be pinned up against Inch'on and believed that it could, if necessary, withdraw to Pusan. However, if the Chinese were really intent on driving the UNC out of Korea, they had the capability to do so even if General MacArthur received the reinforcements he was seeking. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the 38th parallel had no political significance. General Bradley observed that there had been considerable criticism of the action of Eighth Army in withdrawing so far without yet having been seriously engaged, other than in the initial Chinese attack.⁵⁴

In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed action. They told General MacArthur on 19 December that it was unlikely that any National Guard divisions could be sent, but that a definite answer would be given in a few days, after General Collins returned from Europe. Meanwhile, they suggested that part of X Corps might be landed in Japan, without prejudice to its future disposition.⁵⁵

What of the possibility of troops from other countries? Nationalist China was a source to which General MacArthur had drawn attention on several occasions. Following General Collins' return from Tokyo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to study the advisability of using Nationalist forces, in Korea or elsewhere, assuming that political considerations would allow their employment.⁵⁶ The Committee's report was submitted three weeks later and was considered in connection with a wide range of possible actions against Communist China urged by General MacArthur, as described below.

Additional units promised earlier by some of the UN member nations were now arriving in Korea, to join the British, Australians, Turks, and Filipinos. The French, Dutch, and Thai battalions arrived in November; the first two were attached to the US 2d Division and took part in the fight for Wonju in January 1951, but the Thai had to undergo an extensive period of reequipping and training. The Greek, Canadian, and New Zealand forces arrived in December and went into action during the next few weeks.⁵⁷

Two other troop offers, described in Chapter 3, took definite form during this phase of the war. The Colombian infantry battalion was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 November and the Ethiopian contingent on 6 December.⁵⁸ A number of weeks were to elapse before even these small reinforcements could arrive. An offer by Cuba to supply a single company was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December; for political reasons, they recommended approval, but urged that Cuba be requested to augment its force to a battalion. Their recommendation was approved, but ultimately nothing came of the Cuban offer.⁵⁹

The Department of State considered making another appeal to UN members for reinforcements. On 5 December 1950 Secretary Acheson informed Secretary Marshall that the prospects for success did not appear bright. "Apart from those countries which are already represented by units in the field, or for whom firm plans of which you are aware have been concluded, there appear to be very few further prospects," he wrote. Discussions were under way with some Latin American countries but seemed unlikely to yield results. The Department was prepared, if desired, to make another effort to obtain a Pakistani contingent but was "not hopeful" that it would succeed. There remained only the possibility of asking the nations that had cut back the size of their proffered forces to send the larger units they had originally tendered or of seeking more troops from the other countries that had already sent contingents. The Secretary asked whether it was desired that the above suggestions be pursued. His own view was that the expansion of the ROK forces represented the best prospect for increasing the strength of UN forces.⁶⁰

The Secretary's letter was referred to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which, for reasons not indicated in available sources, did not reply until 15 January 1951. The ultimate result, described in the following chapter, was simply another barren round of talks with other countries. Meanwhile, however, the question of expanding the ROK Army was raised by the Korean Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Chang. He suggested that the United States supply small arms for the members of the Korean Youth Corps (KYC), an organization of approximately

half a million men who had received some military training during their education and who, according to the Ambassador, were "eager" to defend their country.⁶¹

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee was inclined to favor this proposal. After surveying available stocks of weapons, the Committee suggested that from 75,000 to 100,000 South Koreans be organized into special units to guard lines of communication and to operate as guerrillas in enemy-held territory. General MacArthur, however, felt that existing ROK units had performed so poorly that there was little advantage in creating new ones. The available weapons could better be used in equipping the National Police Reserve of Japan, in his view, while the best way to use the members of the KYC would be as fillers for existing ROK divisions. This judgment was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was passed on to Secretary Marshall, who relayed it to Secretary Acheson. Presumably the ROK Government acquiesced, as nothing more was said about arming the KYC, nor were any other steps taken at that time to enlarge the ROK forces.⁶²

Evacuation or Escalation?

General MacArthur had told General Collins that, under existing conditions, the UN Command would be unable to remain in Korea. General Collins had privately disagreed. But if General MacArthur was right, then a refusal either to send reinforcements or to alter the rules of engagement would render evacuation unavoidable. The prospect had to be squarely faced.⁶³

On 22 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a critically important discussion on courses of action in Korea. The occasion was General MacArthur's request, still pending, for National Guard divisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a decision should be made now, "on the governmental level," that US forces would be evacuated as soon as it became apparent that the Chinese Communists intended to drive the United Nations from Korea. An attack in force on UN positions, accompanied by a continuing buildup of enemy forces, would constitute sufficient evidence of such intention, and if it took place, "it must be accepted that we are being militarily forced out of Korea." In any event, the original UN directive, under which the United States had gone into Korea, was now obsolete and should be revised. They directed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to prepare a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense that would serve to bring these issues to the attention of the National Security Council. Also, General MacArthur was informed that, pending decisions on the above matters, no additional divisions would be deployed to the Far East.⁶⁴

Before the Committee had replied to this directive, the President summoned Secretaries Acheson and Marshall and General Bradley to Blair House on 26 December, to discuss the Korean situation and the possibility of withdrawal. Secretary Acheson stressed that the US objective, resisting aggression "on a collective security basis" for as long as possible, was very clear and was accepted by all present. Reverses, he continued, did not warrant withdrawal; the UN Command was not "hopelessly outnumbered" and it enjoyed the inherent advantage

accruing to the defense. There should be no thought of withdrawal until General MacArthur had fully tested Chinese strength. Moreover, the United States could not “pull out of Korea and leave our friends there to be murdered”—a sentiment that the President promptly endorsed. On the other hand, the Secretary pointed out, eventual disentanglement was essential; the United States had never intended to leave a large force in Korea. Moreover, since the US troops there represented a major portion of overall US strength, any withdrawal must be conducted without major losses.

Secretary Acheson asked Secretary of Defense Marshall about the directives given General MacArthur. He was especially puzzled that the 3d Division had been thrown into battle instead of being used to garrison Japan.⁶⁵ Secretary Marshall agreed that there had been so many directives issued in connection with the Far East crisis that confusion might have arisen, and that they should be reexamined and possibly rewritten. He too was worried about Japan and feared that Communist air attacks might make it difficult to extricate US troops. He and General Bradley thought that UN forces would be able to hold the line of the Kum River but only by making use of all available forces, leaving none available for Japan. There was general agreement among all those at the meeting that General MacArthur must not risk the destruction of his forces, since they were the only ones available for defending Japan.⁶⁶

On the following day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a memorandum for Secretary Marshall reflecting the tenor of their discussion of 22 December. They pointed out that the Chinese Communists appeared strong enough to expel the UN forces, since other US commitments made it impossible to send reinforcements. If UN troops were to be driven out of Korea, the United States should select the time and place for evacuation, instead of being driven out “under conditions approximating a military rout.” There was no evidence of the viewpoint that had been expressed by Secretary Acheson, that political considerations required prolonged resistance. Indeed, it was expressly argued that “the decision to evacuate should not be based on political grounds; rather it should be based on our best military judgment as to whether and how long it is possible to maintain combat forces in Korea.” The last opportunity for orderly withdrawal would occur when UN troops reached the line of the Kum River, just north of Taejon (the seventh of the nine lines laid out in the CINCFE message of 8 December). If it became necessary to retreat to this line, and if the Chinese then began massing forces for a new assault, General MacArthur should be instructed to begin withdrawing his forces to Japan. A draft directive to this effect was enclosed with the memorandum.⁶⁷

This draft was discussed on 28 December by the JCS members along with Secretary Marshall, Deputy Secretary Lovett, Secretary Acheson, and Assistant Secretary Rusk.⁶⁸ The State Department officials wanted it rewritten to emphasize the great political advantage of resisting in Korea as long as possible and inflicting maximum damage upon enemy forces. After considerable discussion, an amended version was approved by both Departments and then by the President, to be forwarded to CINCFE.⁶⁹

This directive was sent to General MacArthur on 29 December. Its instructions (preceded by a warning of the extreme sensitivity of the matter) were as follows:

It appears from all estimates available that the Chinese Communists possess the capability of forcing UN forces out of Korea if they choose to exercise it. The execution of this capability might be prevented by making the effort so costly to the enemy that they would abandon it, or by committing substantial additional U.S. forces to that theater thus seriously jeopardizing other commitments including the safety of Japan. It is not practicable to obtain significant additional forces for Korea from other members of the United Nations. We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further, we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of general war. However, a successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression at some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests, if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses.

Your basic directive to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in that area requires modification in the light of the present situation.

You are now directed to defend in successive positions, as generally outlined in your CX 50635 [of 7 December], inflicting such damage to hostile forces in Korea as is possible, subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops. Every effort should be continued to mobilize the maximum Korean contribution to sustained resistance, including both conventional and unconventional means.

Since developments may force our withdrawal from Korea, it is important, particularly in view of the continued threat to Japan, to determine, in advance, our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation. It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in the vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward therefrom, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under these conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan.

Your views are requested as to the above-outlined conditions which should determine a decision to initiate evacuation, particularly in light of your continuing primary mission of defense of Japan for which only troops of the Eighth Army are available.

Following the receipt of your views you will be given a definite directive as to the conditions under which you should initiate evacuation.⁷⁰

To General MacArthur, this message "seemed to indicate a loss of the 'will to win' in Korea."⁷¹ In a reply on 30 December, later characterized by one of his subordinates as probably his "most important single comment on the Korean war,"⁷² he argued vigorously for a different policy. "A comprehensive estimate of relative capabilities in the Korean campaign," he began, "appears to be dependent upon political-military policies yet to be formulated." The "entire military resource of the Chinese Nation" had been committed against the UN Command. Because China's forces had been concentrated in Korea and Manchuria, other parts of the country were vulnerable, but existing policies prevented exploitation of this opportunity. He suggested four actions that might be undertaken in case

the administration decided "to recognize the State of War which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities":

- (1) To blockade China's coast.
- (2) To destroy the country's industrial war-making capacity, through air and naval bombardment.
- (3) To reinforce the UN Command with Nationalist contingents.
- (4) To allow the Nationalists to undertake diversionary action against the mainland.

Through these actions, General MacArthur contended, the United States, with a relatively small investment of military force, "could severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage aggressive war and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it." The pressure on the UN troops in Korea would be released, and a decision could then be made whether to carry on the fight there or to redeploy forces to the offshore islands, meanwhile continuing naval and air action against China.

General MacArthur recognized that such a course of action (which he characterized as "defending ourselves by way of military retaliation") had been rejected earlier as likely to provoke a major war. But, he argued, China was now fully committed, and "nothing we can do would further aggravate the situation" as far as that country was concerned. Whether the Soviets would intervene was "a matter of speculation." His own view was that the Soviet rulers would make their decision solely on the basis of their "own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities, with little regard for other factors." Admittedly the Soviets were showing increasing interest in Japan; it was for this reason that he had asked for four more divisions. "It has never been my thought," he added, "that they should be committed to the Korean campaign."⁷³ It was his understanding that the four National Guard divisions called up in September had been intended for use in the Far East.

To evacuate Korea without undertaking reprisals against China, continued CINCFE, would have the "most adverse effect" upon the Japanese and other peoples of Asia and would require a "material reinforcement of the forces now in this theater." Moreover, China's forces in Korea would be released for adventures elsewhere, and the ROK military potential "would disintegrate or become of negligible value."

Ranging into matters not touched on in the JCS message, General MacArthur challenged the fundamental priority of the administration's foreign policy. As he wrote:

I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat everywhere else—an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to ensure later defeat in Europe itself. The preparations for the defense of Europe, however, by the most optimistic estimate are aimed at a condition of readiness two years hence. The use of forces in the present emergency in the Far East would not in any way prejudice this basic concept. To the contrary it would ensure thoroughly

seasoned forces for later commitment in Europe synchronously with Europe's own development of military resources.

In conclusion, General MacArthur agreed that, given the continuance of restrictions on UN military operations, the tactical estimate in the JCS message was sound. Evacuation, if it were to take place, could only be accomplished through a "successively contracting defense line south to the Pusan beachhead." There was no need to make an "anticipatory decision" until the "beachhead line" was reached.⁷⁴

Before dealing with the issues raised in this message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt constrained to ask for clarification of the phrase "beachhead line" as used by CINCFE. It was not clear to them whether General MacArthur meant the old Naktong River line or one still closer to Pusan. Could he, perhaps, be referring to the Kum River line mentioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? In clarifying this confusion, General MacArthur once more took the opportunity to insist upon the relation between policy decisions and tactics and to intimate that Korea could not be held under existing limitations. Unless there were "some possibility of policy change or other external eventuality favorable to the strengthening of our effort in Korea," a JCS directive to begin withdrawal could be issued "at any time." However, "if a reasonable possibility does exist for favorable developments," then it would be well to wait until the old Naktong line was reached.⁷⁵

There existed one retaliatory measure short of carrying the war to Chinese soil: aerial destruction of the power installations on the Korean side of the Yalu River, including the dams on the river itself. On 26 December 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of Secretary Marshall, asked General MacArthur for his views as to the "possibility and desirability" of bombing these facilities "if the Chinese attack across the 38th parallel, thus demonstrating their intention of driving us out of South Korea." General MacArthur replied the next day that the hydroelectric installations in northeastern Korea were largely inactive. Those in the northwestern part of the country were of unknown value; they could be destroyed by medium bombers, but, he reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they had been placed off limits by decision of higher authority. Whether or not this decision should be reversed was a political rather than a military question.⁷⁶ Thereafter the matter was dropped; no such action was taken when the Chinese attacked in force across the parallel several days later.

When they received General MacArthur's message of 30 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had before them a report from the Joint Strategic Plans Committee dated 27 December 1950 (prepared in response to their directive of 28 November), regarding courses of action to be followed in the event that the Korean conflict escalated into a state of war between the United States and China. The Committee had been unable to agree.⁷⁷ The Navy and Air Force members wished to organize a strategic defense "in the Far East," including retention of "selected beachheads" in Korea, imposition of "economic sanctions" against China and encouragement of covert operations to create conditions "which will reduce Communist Chinese capabilities to attain their objectives." The more aggressive Army planner spoke of strategic defense "on the *Mainland* of Asia," retention of

"selected positions in Korea and Indochina," naval blockade, and covert operations to assist "the eventual overthrow of the Chinese Communist government."⁷⁸

The first JCS member to comment on this JSPC study, and on General MacArthur's message of 30 December, was Admiral Sherman. Indeed, the Chief of Naval Operations quickly emerged as a leading actor in these crucial weeks. In a memorandum for his colleagues that was to prove of considerable importance, he argued that

a state of open hostilities between the forces of Communist China and the forces of the United States exists in Korea. . . . Heavy losses and severe military reverses have been incurred by us in our attempt to prevent or delay the operation of the well-known principle that limited wars tend to become unlimited in character; that when one contestant begins to predominate in the limited area, the other . . . seeks through more general pressure or by striking his enemy at the sources of his power to achieve his own war objectives.

Initial restrictions imposed on operations in Korea, Admiral Sherman pointed out, stemmed from a desire to deter Chinese Communist intervention and to avoid a general conflict with the Soviet Union. But since the Chinese, with Soviet logistic support, had already "intervened effectively," the time had come to reexamine these limitations. US objectives now should be to hold the major Pacific islands, to provide for the security of Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and to prevent or delay further Chinese expansion, at the same time averting a clash with the Soviet Union until the nation was properly prepared.

In order to attain these objectives, Admiral Sherman recommended a number of actions, including some that had been proposed by General MacArthur. UN forces should "occupy advantageous defensive positions in South Korea as long as practicable and inflict maximum damage on enemy forces in Korea." No major ground reinforcements should be sent to the Far East unless it proved possible to hold Korea with the forces already there, in which case two partly trained divisions "might" be sent to Japan. A naval blockade of China should be initiated "as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea." Restrictions on operations of Nationalist forces should be removed "now," and logistic support should be furnished to guerrillas in China. Intermittent aerial reconnaissance of Manchuria and the Chinese coast should be undertaken at once. Naval and air attacks on targets within China should be initiated "at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea."

Admiral Sherman recognized that some of these actions, notably a blockade, would require UN approval. "Pressure should be instituted immediately to obtain concurrence," he urged, "together with UN denunciation of Communist China as an aggressor. If concurrence is not obtainable," he concluded, "the time has come for unilateral action by the United States."⁷⁹

Admiral Sherman said nothing about using Nationalist forces *in Korea*, a subject that was under study by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. On 5 January, the Committee submitted its conclusions, which were that the Nationalists could not significantly affect the outcome in Korea, and that the United States should instead provide military and technical aid for regular forces on Taiwan and

covert assistance to guerrillas on the mainland.⁸⁰ In commenting on the Committee's report, the Chief of Naval Operations noted that it assumed the continuance of the existing policy of "confining the undeclared war in Korea to that area"—a policy that forfeited the advantage of US air and naval superiority. While agreeing that the United States should avoid becoming entangled in a general war with Communist China, he pointed out that such an objective would not necessarily apply to the "appropriate use of those arms in which the United States now has great advantage," or to the "development and opportune use of Asiatic ground forces."⁸¹

The Crisis Deepens

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now confronted General MacArthur's challenging message of 30 December 1950, two committee reports bearing on Far Eastern policy, and Admiral Sherman's extended comments on all three. Their consideration of these papers took place against the background of a sudden fierce flare of action in Korea, which began on New Year's Eve (Far East time). Surging across the Imjin, the Chinese "People's Volunteer Army," with their North Korean allies, drove Eighth Army back toward the Han, concentrating their strength as usual against the ROK units. General Ridgway quickly realized that his forces were not strong enough to make a stand along the Han. There was no alternative to a further retreat, even though this meant the abandonment of Seoul. Evacuating the South Korean capital on 4 January, Eighth Army fell back to a prepared line some 35 miles farther south, running from P'yongtaek eastward through Wonju to the east coast at Samch'ok.⁸²

With their superior mobility, the units of Eighth Army were able to disengage and withdraw in reasonably good order. Moreover, after five days it became clear that the "Third Phase" offensive was losing its impetus. The enemy, however, shifted his attention to Wonju, in the center of the new UN line, where a northward bulge formed a broad salient. Wonju was defended by the reorganized 2d US Infantry Division and by the newly arrived French and Dutch battalions. But they were forced out of the city on 8 January.

By 10 January the fighting had temporarily died down. Behind the new defense line, there was only the Kum River, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering as the position from which withdrawal must be initiated, and then the Naktong line around Pusan and P'ohang-dong. But the UN forces, though they had been drawn back, had not been routed. And the divisions of X Corps had landed and were hurrying northward to strengthen the line.⁸³

The encouraging aspects of the situation were not apparent, except to General Ridgway, who, while the offensive was in progress, had expressed confidence in the strength of Eighth Army.⁸⁴ In Washington, the overriding facts were that the enemy had given a scornful reply to those who had asked him to stop along the parallel, and that he appeared both able and determined to drive the UN forces into the sea.

President Truman, in a news conference on 4 January 1951, was questioned about the situation in Korea and its increasing gravity. Asked whether the nation was “formally at war,” he replied with a flat negative. “We are carrying out an obligation for the United Nations,” he said. In reply to another query, he said that he did *not* contemplate asking the United Nations for “permission to bomb China.” As for prospects for a wider war during the coming year, he could only hope that it would not occur. “That has been my fight for 5 years,” he said.⁸⁵

On 9 January 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent General MacArthur an interim reply to his message of 30 December. They accepted the JSSC position on the use of Nationalist troops in Korea and borrowed Admiral Sherman’s suggestion regarding reinforcements for Japan. They assured General MacArthur that the four retaliatory measures he had suggested would be “given careful consideration.” However, “based on over-all considerations,” they told him, the following conclusions must be accepted:

(1) There is little possibility of policy change or other external eventuality justifying strengthening of our effort in Korea.

(2) Blockade of China Coast, if undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hongkong. It is considered necessary to obtain UN concurrence.

(3) Naval and Air attacks on objectives in Communist China probably can be authorized only if the Chinese Communists attack United States forces outside of Korea and decision must await that eventually [sic].

(4) Favorable action cannot be taken on the proposal . . . to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist Garrison in Formosa, in view of improbability of their decisive effort on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere.

(5) If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces now committed, 2 partly-trained National Guard Divisions could be deployed to Japan in order to increase the security of Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this purpose must be served by part of the troops evacuated from Korea. This is final reply to your C 51559 [of 18 December, asking for four more divisions].

(6) The program for the arming of Japanese Security Forces will be expedited.

(7) Effort is being made to intensify the economic blockade of trade with China.

In the light of these statements, and “after full consideration of all pertinent factors,” they directed General MacArthur as follows:

(1) Defend in successive positions as required by JCS 99935 [of 29 December], inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan.

(2) Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and material you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.⁸⁶

The alternatives in this twofold task—to hold out in Korea if possible, otherwise to withdraw—were interpreted by General MacArthur as contradictory.⁸⁷ His immediate response was to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for “clarification.” It

was "self-evident," he said, that the UN Command was not strong enough both to hold in Korea and to protect Japan. Strategic dispositions "must be based upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity of American interests in the Far East." A beachhead line could be held for a time but with inevitable losses. "Whether such losses were regarded as 'severe' or not," he wrote, "would to a certain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term."

The UN Command, as General MacArthur pointed out, had accomplished its original mission by destroying the North Korean Army. It had never been intended to "engage the armies of the Chinese Nation." The troops, he continued,

are tired from a long and difficult campaign, embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely condemned their courage and fighting qualities in misunderstood retrograde maneuver, and their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly delineated, fully understood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are cheerfully accepted.

In conclusion, General MacArthur thrust upon Washington the onus for deciding immediately whether or not to remain in Korea. This decision was, he said,

of highest national and international importance, far above the competence of a Theater Commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing upon a very limited field of action. Nor is it a decision which should be left to the initiative of enemy action which in effect would be the determining criteria [sic] under a reasonable interpretation of your message. My query therefore amounts to this: Is it the present objective of United States political policy to maintain a military position in Korea—indefinitely, for a limited time, or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?

As I have before pointed out, under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any length of time up to its complete destruction if overriding political considerations so dictate.⁸⁸

In Washington, this message, received on 10 January, produced profound dismay. President Truman was "deeply disturbed" to be told, in effect, "that the course of action decided upon by the National Security Council and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me was not feasible." He convoked a meeting of the National Security Council for 12 January 1951 to consider a reply.⁸⁹ Secretary Acheson read the message as a "posterity paper" designed to shift the blame from its author if things went wrong. He needed no further evidence that General MacArthur was "incurably recalcitrant and basically disloyal to the purposes of his Commander in Chief."⁹⁰

The President's military advisors were seriously alarmed by the General's estimate of the situation. Admiral Sherman, recalling several days of furious activity in Washington that followed the receipt of this message, later characterized the period as "a very difficult one." He added that he and his colleagues felt "some disappointment" at being asked to "clarify" instructions that had seemed perfectly clear to them.⁹¹ General Marshall testified that "we were at our lowest point" about the time this message came in.⁹²

New Instructions for CINCFE

General MacArthur's latest message reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the morning of 10 January.⁹³ They drafted a reply, cleared it with Secretary Marshall, and then, in the afternoon, presented it to Secretary Acheson and his advisors.⁹⁴ The principal point stressed by the State Department representatives in this meeting was the cardinal importance of continuing resistance in Korea.⁹⁵ Mr. Acheson agreed that military considerations should determine how long UN forces remained in Korea, and that no requirements should be placed on Eighth Army that would impair its later usefulness in Japan or elsewhere. But, he continued, it would be valuable to gain time. A new cease-fire effort was being made in the United Nations; if UN troops could hold out until it was completed, there would be a much better chance that, should it fail, the world organization would condemn China as an aggressor. Secretary Marshall commented that the morale of the UN forces, to which General MacArthur had drawn attention, might be the deciding factor. It was agreed that, if instructions for a later withdrawal were issued now, a damaging "leak" would be inevitable. The conferees finally directed General Collins, as the JCS executive agent for Korea, to revise the message, presumably to incorporate the considerations advanced by Secretary Acheson.⁹⁶

On the following day, 11 January, General Collins submitted a new draft, which was further revised in discussions with Mr. Rusk and Mr. Matthews of the Department of State and then approved at the Secretarial level. Subsequently, however, the Department of State prepared its own draft message to General MacArthur, stressing political considerations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered both of these messages on the morning of 12 January, shortly before the NSC meeting scheduled for that day. They decided that the State Department version was not appropriate as a JCS directive and that their own version, already approved at the Secretarial level, should be sent at once.⁹⁷

Immediately thereafter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted General Marshall and obtained his approval for these decisions. During the conversation, the Secretary decided that General Collins should pay still another visit to Korea, in order to obtain firsthand information ("stripped of MacArthur's colorful rhetoric," in the words of Secretary Acheson) on the morale and fighting efficiency of the troops. General Vandenberg decided to go also, to review Air Force evacuation plans. It was tentatively agreed that both officers should leave that afternoon.⁹⁸

Later on the morning of 12 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended a meeting of the National Security Council, at which the President approved the draft JCS directive as well as the plan to send Generals Collins and Vandenberg to the Far East. Secretary Acheson's proposal that the two JCS emissaries bear with them a message giving political guidance to CINCFE was turned down; it was agreed that a message for that purpose should be sent separately. The discussion touched on the possible withdrawal of UN forces. The President agreed that plans should be made for evacuating ROK troops and North Korean prisoners of war.⁹⁹

Following the meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent their directive to General MacArthur. The most important portion was the four opening paragraphs, which read as follows:

Based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those presented in your recent messages, we are forced to the conclusion that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold for a protracted period a position in Korea.

However, it would be to our national interest, and also to the interest of the UN, to gain some further time for essential diplomatic and military consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort before you issue firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from Korea.

It is important also to United States prestige worldwide, to future of UN and NATO organizations, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations, and that maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors.

It is not possible in Washington to evaluate present state of combat efficiency and morale of UN forces. However, we are concerned about effect on troops, particularly ROK forces, if it should become known to them that a decision to initiate troop evacuation were made at this stage in operations. Instructions to evacuate are almost certain to become known soon after issue. . . . this might well result in partial collapse of ROK troops, thus seriously jeopardizing the ability of Eighth Army to reach a relatively secure beachhead about Pusan and hold it during period required for actual evacuation.

Noting that General MacArthur had said that an “anticipatory decision to evacuate” need not be made until the old Pusan line had been reached, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked him to reconsider this question in the light of the above considerations and to submit new recommendations, if necessary. Meanwhile, the instructions given him in their message of 9 January—to hold out if possible, otherwise to withdraw to Japan—remained in force.¹⁰⁰

Still another action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 January, before Generals Collins and Vandenberg departed, was to complete formal action on the recent JSSC and JSPC reports, one dealing with the contingency of open war with China, the other with the employment of Nationalist forces. Admiral Sherman, in commenting on these, had laid out a detailed program of action tailored to a set of broad objectives. At their meeting on 12 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered a revision of Admiral Sherman’s paper submitted by General Collins, and also another by Admiral Sherman himself intended to reconcile the few differences between them. They approved the latter paper with a few changes and sent it to the Secretary of Defense immediately.¹⁰¹

In this memorandum (which was to become a subject of public controversy a few months later), the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth the following “tentatively agreed” objectives relating to Communist China and Korea: (1) to secure the off-shore defense line (Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines); (2) to deny Taiwan to the Communists; (3) to delay a general war with the Soviet Union until a degree of mobilization could be achieved; (4) to prevent the spread of communism on the mainland of Asia, especially in Indochina, Siam, and Malaya; (5) to support South Korea as long as practicable, maintaining a Korean government in exile if

forced to evacuate the country; and (6) to support the establishment of a government in China friendly to the United States. Then followed a list of sixteen proposed actions, of which the following were related to the Korean crisis:

a. With preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea or evacuate to Japan if forced out of Korea.

b. Limit major U.S. ground forces in the Far East to those now committed, unless:

(1) The outcome of the present Chinese offensive should indicate that we can profitably remain in Korea with the number of U.S. divisions now committed, in which event, if the Army could provide them and at the same time meet our commitments in Europe, not to exceed two partly trained divisions might be deployed to Japan to increase its security.

c. Expedite the build-up of Japanese defense forces.

d. Move troops to Japan from Korea as necessary to defend Japan.

e. Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

f. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

g. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

h. Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

i. Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.

j. Press now for UN action branding Communist China as an aggressor.

k. Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese Nationalists on Formosa.

l. Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.

m. Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea.¹⁰²

The list of recommended actions included three of those suggested by General MacArthur in his message of 30 December. But only one—removal of restrictions on Nationalist forces—was adopted without qualification. Two others, naval blockade and bombardment of Chinese territory, appeared as contingent possibilities; the fourth, use of Nationalist troops in Korea, had been rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was entirely omitted.

This memorandum was approved in time for General Collins and General Vandenberg to take a copy with them when they left for the Far East later that day. At the request of Secretary Marshall, it was placed on the calendar of the National Security Council, to be considered on 17 January.¹⁰³

A separate message from President Truman to General MacArthur, intended to furnish political guidance, was transmitted through JCS channels on 13 January. This communication, which Secretary Acheson characterized as “imaginatively kind and thoughtful,” was drafted in the Department of State, reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then carefully revised by Mr. Truman himself.¹⁰⁴ The President began by assuring General MacArthur that “the situation in Korea is receiving the utmost attention here,” and went on to explain:

I wish in this telegram to let you have my views as to our basic national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to the maximum effort which could reasonably be expected from the United Nations forces under your command to support the resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize on a world-wide basis. This present telegram is not to be taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to give you something of what is in our minds regarding the political factors.

The political and psychological importance of successful resistance in Korea was set forth. Then followed an important paragraph in which the President sought to explain the overriding objective of his foreign policy:

Our course of action at this time should be such as to consolidate the great majority of the United Nations. This majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities.

The President recognized that continued resistance with available forces might prove impossible, and also that it was necessary to preserve enough military strength to defend Japan. If the UN Command were driven out of Korea, it might be advisable to continue resistance from Cheju-do or other islands. It must be made clear to the world that any expulsion from Korea was the result of "military necessity" and that "we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified."

After commenting on the international political climate, which he believed was improving because the United States had supported UN peace efforts, the President closed with words of warm praise. "The entire nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea," he wrote, "and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances."¹⁰⁵

To General MacArthur, this message provided a clear-cut answer to a pivotal question. "That, gentlemen, finally settles the question of whether or not we evacuate Korea," he told his staff. "There will be no evacuation."¹⁰⁶ To the President, he returned a laconic answer: "We shall do our best."¹⁰⁷ But like previous efforts, this one failed to achieve a real understanding between Washington and Tokyo.

Secretary Acheson Wins a Gamble

The new offensive opened by Communist China on 31 December, coming after that nation's rejection of the overture from the three-man UN cease-fire commission, led the administration to envision a resolution condemning China for

aggression. In a circular sent out on 3 January 1951, Secretary Acheson cited these two actions as evidence of China's intention to make good its "oft-repeated threat" to expel the UN forces from Korea. It would, he wrote, be "incomprehensible" for the United Nations to ignore this intention, and thus to signal that "'big' aggressions can succeed with impunity." The administration was considering a resolution in the General Assembly declaring Communist China an aggressor and asking the Collective Measures Committee (established by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 3 November 1950) to suggest steps that might be taken. Recipients of the circular were instructed to sound out other countries regarding these proposals.¹⁰⁸

The cease-fire commission, however, refused to accept China's rejection as final and continued its work. The members drew up a new peace plan, intended to meet some of the demands put forth by Peiping, which proposed to establish peace in the Far East through the following five steps:

- (1) An immediate cease-fire in Korea.
- (2) Exploration of further measures to promote peace.
- (3) Withdrawal of armed forces from Korea, plus "appropriate arrangements" for the Korean people to express their wishes regarding their government.
- (4) Interim arrangements for unification of Korea and maintenance of peace and security therein.
- (5) Establishment of an "appropriate body," including representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Russia, and Communist China, to settle Far Eastern problems, including the status of Taiwan and China's representation in the United Nations.

This plan was submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly at 1500 hours on 11 January 1951. The United States had not known of it in advance, and had only a few hours to prepare a position on the matter.¹⁰⁹

The first four of these measures were innocuous enough. The fifth, however, with its implied willingness to consider surrendering Taiwan and admitting Communist China to the United Nations, presented the administration with a choice that Secretary Acheson described as "murderous." To support the plan would generate a torrent of criticism at home; to oppose it would cast the United States in the role of an obstructor of the search for peace. Secretary Acheson chose the former, as the lesser of two evils. He believed that Communist China would reject the plan and that other nations would then join with the United States in censuring Chinese aggression. President Truman accepted his recommendation. Consequently, when the plan was introduced into the First Committee, Ambassador Austin praised it and announced that he would vote in its favor; Soviet Ambassador Malik castigated it.¹¹⁰

At once, in the words of Secretary Acheson, "the political roof fell in." The principal arena of criticism was in the Senate, which was already debating the administration's plan to send troops to Europe.¹¹¹ Nevertheless the First Committee quickly approved the plan and invited the Secretary-General to transmit it to Communist China.¹¹²

On 17 January 1951 Communist China, having received and considered the offer, returned a reply that wholly vindicated Secretary Acheson. A cease-fire without political negotiations was pronounced wholly unacceptable. Counterproposals were submitted, which amounted to a repetition of China's earlier demands: admission to the United Nations and removal of US forces from Taiwan, as part of the price of negotiations on Korea. Secretary Acheson at once issued a statement characterizing the Chinese reply as further evidence of a "contemptuous disregard of a world-wide demand for peace." The United Nations, he said, had "explored every possibility of finding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now," he continued, "we must face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the United Nations."¹¹³

The Department of State already had drafted two alternative versions of a resolution to be submitted to the General Assembly. The preferred draft declared flatly that the Chinese People's Republic "has committed aggression in Korea" and called on all states to refrain from aiding the "aggressors." The other version, which avoided use of the terms "aggression" and "aggressors," might be used by the US Delegation if substantial additional support could be obtained thereby. Both versions were sent to the Department of Defense for information, together with a draft of a supplemental instruction for the US Delegation, on which comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was desired. This instruction explained that neither of the resolutions was considered to authorize extension of hostilities against the Chinese mainland, but that the United States, being responsible for the safety of the forces under the UN Command, reserved the right to bomb Manchurian airfields if these were used for large-scale air attacks against UN troops. Should such action become necessary, however, those nations participating in the Korean action would be informed in advance if possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that this instruction be strengthened to say that the United States "would" bomb Manchurian airfields (not merely that it "has the authority" to do so) under the conditions stated. They felt that time might not permit advance consultations, which, moreover, might jeopardize security.¹¹⁴

The resolution that Ambassador Austin submitted to the First Committee on 20 January, though in some respects a compromise between the two drafts, was forthright in characterizing Chinese action as "aggression."¹¹⁵ Many nations still shrank back from this action, but eventually the US resolution, with some amendments, was approved by the First Committee on 30 January and by the General Assembly on 1 February.¹¹⁶ The "wily" Chinese Communists had overreached themselves; they had rejected an opportunity to settle the war on better terms than they were to accept two and a half years later.

A Rift in the Clouds?

On 15 January 1951 General Collins, accompanied by General Vandenberg, landed in Tokyo on his fourth mission in six months. At once the two officers

went into conference with General MacArthur and his staff. General MacArthur complained that no one had made it clear to him just how long, and under what conditions, the Eighth Army was to remain in Korea, or who was responsible for the security of Japan. He then read the President's message, which he had recently received, and stated that it had removed part of the uncertainty. He characterized it as a "directive" to remain in Korea indefinitely.¹¹⁷ CINCFE now felt that Eighth Army could perform this task. However, he added, Japan would then be left defenseless, and he refused to assume the responsibility for its defense. General Collins replied that the President's message was merely explanatory background information; the real "directive" was the JCS message of 12 January, which had stressed the importance of remaining in Korea while leaving CINCFE to determine whether the UN Command could do so without being destroyed. However, he continued, the President had indicated that he attached great importance to a prolonged defense in Korea, in order to allow time for political action in the United Nations. As for Japan, the two JCS members pointed out that reinforcements, even if approved at once, could not arrive for at least six weeks, during which time CINCFE would still be responsible for securing Japan.¹¹⁸

General MacArthur emphasized that a withdrawal from Korea would have most serious repercussions throughout the Far East; it would be followed by the loss of Hong Kong, Indochina, and all of Southeast Asia. Recurring to the subject of Japan, he declared, "with some emotion," that he should not be held responsible for its defense while Eighth Army was in Korea. He repeated his suggestion that the four National Guard divisions be sent to Japan at once; Generals Collins and Vandenberg, however, replied that these divisions had not been called up for that purpose.¹¹⁹

The conversation swung to the disposition of the ROK Army and Government in case of evacuation. The JCS members told General MacArthur that the President had decided that they should be removed along with US forces. General MacArthur expressed satisfaction at this decision.¹²⁰

Next General Collins read aloud the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951 to the Secretary of Defense, with its list of sixteen actions that might be taken against China. He stressed that these were tentative proposals that were still under study. General MacArthur indicated his concurrence with them.¹²¹

After their conference with General MacArthur, the two visitors from Washington flew to Korea. Upon their arrival, General Collins told reporters that UN forces would "certainly stay in Korea and fight."¹²²

Their arrival coincided with a turn in the war that gave support to General Collins' optimistic forecast. Against the unanimous advice of his staff, General Ridgway on 15 January ordered a limited attack, or reconnaissance in force (Operation WOLFHOUND) by I Corps, on the extreme left of the UN line, against enemy forces between Osan and Suwon. The attacking force accomplished its mission, driving to the outskirts of Suwon against light opposition, then withdrew.¹²³

Temporary though it was, this recapture of the initiative on a part of the front, so soon after the enemy had driven I Corps all the way from the Imjin River back

to P'yongtaek, was to prove a portent for the future. During a two-day stay in Korea, the two JCS members saw further heartening evidence that Eighth Army was recovering. While General Vandenberg toured Air Force installations,¹²⁴ General Collins, in company with General Ridgway, visited the headquarters of a number of US, UN, and ROK units. He found that, contrary to what General MacArthur had said in one of his recent messages, the morale of the Eighth Army was "very good," and its condition was "improving daily under the vigorous leadership of General Ridgway." The condition of ROK forces was less favorable; they instinctively feared the Chinese, though capable of effective resistance against North Koreans. However, there was real danger of a complete collapse of the morale of the ROK Army if UN forces gave evidence of any intent to abandon Korea. Fortunately, there were signs that the enemy's morale was also suffering; prisoners reported shortages of food and ammunition. UN forces were well dug in along their defensive line, and General Ridgway was taking action to plug the gaps in the east, through which enemy forces had infiltrated. Moreover, X Corps now was available to aid in defending a continuous line across the peninsula.

Nevertheless the danger of expulsion remained, and the two Generals discussed the problem of evacuation. General Ridgway thought that Eighth Army could hold out for several months before being forced into the old Pusan beachhead. No preliminary steps toward evacuation should be taken, he believed, until UN forces had cleared the mountain barrier in south central Korea; it would be too easy for the lightly armed enemy to press the retreating columns winding through the hills with their heavy equipment. Once east of that range, General Ridgway would at first conduct an active defense, holding key strong points and undertaking local counterattacks. He would not go into a "perimeter defense," he said, unless forced back to the Pusan beachhead. Already a defensive line around Pusan was being prepared for this purpose. With both flanks resting on the sea, Eighth Army could, in General Ridgway's opinion, hold out indefinitely against any force that the Chinese could bring up.¹²⁵

Returning to Tokyo, Generals Collins and Vandenberg met again with General MacArthur on 18 January.¹²⁶ They discussed the evacuation of ROK troops and officials (estimated to number approximately a million, including dependents) and agreed that they should be placed on Cheju-do. As for the enemy prisoners in UN hands, the only solution seemed to be to move them to some other off-shore island and release them at the last minute. General MacArthur stressed that the disposition of the Koreans was a problem for the United Nations. From Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, General Collins received a study estimating that 500,000 troops and 2,000,000 metric tons of equipment could be brought off from Pusan in from six to eight weeks.

Regarding military prospects in Korea, General MacArthur, like General Ridgway, now believed that UN forces could hold a beachhead "indefinitely," because their air and sea power would enable them to interdict the lengthening Chinese lines of communication. But the decision whether to evacuate Korea was a political question, in his opinion. Turning to Japan, he asked for two of the four National Guard divisions, which, with four light Japanese divisions that he pro-

posed to establish as rapidly as possible, would suffice until the end of the Korean War. General Collins apparently did not give a direct answer.¹²⁷

Following this conference, General Collins and General Vandenberg headed back to Washington. During their absence, the National Security Council came to grips with the JCS proposals of 12 January for action against China. The NSC Senior Staff, in preparation for the Council meeting of 17 January, had reviewed the JCS recommendations and weakened several of them. For example, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had called for preparations to impose a naval blockade, subject only to reservations regarding "circumstances then obtaining," the staff members from State, Defense, Treasury, and Office of Defense Mobilization proposed that a "plan" for a blockade be prepared "for possible use only in cooperation with other friendly nations." Similarly, the State Department member "reserved his position" on the paragraph permitting air reconnaissance of China. In like vein, representatives of the Departments of State and Defense took exception to the proposed removal of restrictions on Nationalist forces; they recommended merely that the United States seek agreement of its allies for this step and "consider" acting unilaterally only if agreement could not be obtained.¹²⁸

On the morning of 17 January, before the NSC meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received General Collins' report from Tokyo summarizing his visit to the front and his conversations with the field commanders. The salient portions were the following:

Eighth Army in good shape and improving daily under Ridgway's leadership. Morale very satisfactory considering conditions. . . . Barring unforeseen development Ridgway confident he can obtain 2 to 3 months delay before having to initiate evacuation. . . . Chinese have not made any move so far to push south from Han River. When counter attacked they have usually fled. They are having supply difficulties and there are many indications of low morale. . . . On the whole Eighth Army now in position and prepared to punish severely any mass attack.¹²⁹

This message was promptly shown to President Truman.¹³⁰ It had an immediate effect upon the deliberations of the National Security Council later that day. The members focused on those actions listed in the JCS memorandum of 12 January that had been the subject of dispute in the Senior Staff: naval blockade, air operations against mainland China, and use of Nationalist forces. It now seemed that time would permit a more careful study of the entire range of actions against Communist China. Consequently, the NSC sent the JCS memorandum back to its Staff "for revision in the light of the discussion," with instructions to consider objectives as well as courses of action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to prepare a study of the effectiveness of using Nationalist forces against mainland China and of the resulting effect on the defense of Taiwan; the Department of State was to examine the political consequences of continued US support to Chiang.¹³¹

The next day, 18 January, Generals Collins and Vandenberg landed at National Airport at 1730. General Collins told reporters that he had found UN troops in "good fighting spirit," though he declined to answer questions about their ability

to remain in Korea.¹³² On the following day, 19 January, they reported their conclusions to their colleagues and also to the President and his Cabinet.¹³³ Besides the written summary of their trip, signed by both of them, General Collins tendered Secretary Marshall a special memorandum appraising the conditions of the troops. "There is no cause for alarm," wrote General Collins to the Secretary, "over the present state of morale and fighting efficiency of the Eighth Army and ROK Forces."¹³⁴

Here was welcome news indeed. "For the first time since the previous November," General Collins later wrote, "responsible authorities in Washington were no longer pessimistic about our being driven out of Korea."¹³⁵ Of course the degree of relief engendered by the findings of the two Generals was limited. President Truman, although he was "reassured," had only the day before received intelligence warnings of a new offensive in Korea and of possible actions against Japan or Hong Kong.¹³⁶ But if the world situation was still serious, at least there was hope that the United Nations would not have to make the grim choice between either abandoning Korea or striking directly at China. The statesmen had asked for time—time in which to concert measures in the United Nations and to seek ways of persuading the enemy to end the conflict on the basis of a restoration of the status quo ante. General Ridgway had now provided them with a breathing spell of at least two or three months. UN forces would by then have regained the 38th parallel; there was not the slightest danger that they would be driven into the sea, and armistice negotiations had become a distinct prospect.

In the two months that had elapsed since General MacArthur's "massive compression envelopment" in North Korea miscarried, the administration had firmly committed itself to a cease-fire and had, for all practical purposes, abandoned any thought of unifying Korea. It had sought to avoid war with China, to preserve allied solidarity, and to secure a settlement that would leave South Korea intact. There had been moments when it appeared doubtful that these goals were mutually compatible. All eventually proved possible of attainment, because of the revival of the Eighth Army and because the Chinese enemy, for whatever reason, limited his investment of resources in Korea.

During these weeks, there had been an invisible but important alteration in the command relationships involved in the Korean conflict. The organizational charts remained unaltered, except for the insertion of a new name in the box representing the Commanding General Eighth Army. But the imposing figure in Tokyo no longer towered quite so impressively. In every previous decision of crucial import—commitment of US troops in Korea, selection of the Inch'on landing site, separation of X Corps from Eighth Army, advance of UN forces to the Yalu—the recommendations of General MacArthur had proved decisive. Now, however, his prestige, which had gained an extraordinary luster after Inch'on, was badly tarnished. His credibility suffered in the unforeseen outcome of his late November offensive and declined further when General Collins contradicted his assertions about the sinking morale of Eighth Army.¹³⁷ There was indeed some reason to believe that General MacArthur's own morale had been affected. Cer-

tainly his frequently changing appraisals of the military prospects in Korea seemed difficult to account for on any other basis. And his superiors, their patience tried by numerous arguments necessitating the sending of emissaries to Tokyo, no longer reposed full confidence in him. "The normal relationships which are desirable between one echelon of command and another had been seriously impaired," remarked Admiral Sherman, describing the situation as of the middle of January.¹³⁸

For all these reasons, General MacArthur's counsels no longer commanded the respect that they had once enjoyed. Washington now exerted a closer and more direct control over the course of operations in Korea. Moreover, the misunderstanding between the General and his superiors was widening and his dismissal had moved a step closer. Within five months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves constrained to agree unanimously that General MacArthur's conduct had left the President no alternative but to remove him.

The Conflict Stabilized

The Breathing Spell

The keynote of the Korean situation during the last part of January 1951 was uncertainty. China's "Third Phase Offensive," which carried the enemy south of the 38th parallel, had run out of momentum. But no one could say for certain that the tide of battle had turned. In Washington, the administration, having renounced all thought of forcible unification of Korea, was groping for a clear alternative. Equal confusion reigned in New York, among the United Nations, where many hoped that Communist China might prove amenable to a peaceful settlement.

The unfolding of a new pattern began when General Ridgway proved that the success of his initial limited counterattack, Operation WOLFHOUD, was not a mere accident. On 25 January 1951 he launched a larger operation (THUNDERBOLT), intended to develop the enemy's main line of resistance and to keep him off balance. Elements of I and IX Corps, on the left of the UN line, moved out with orders to advance to the Han. The operation soon developed into a full-scale attack, in phase with another (Operation ROUNDUP) conducted on the central front by troops of the ROK Army and of X Corps, which had completed its move to the battle line. Inch'on was recaptured on 10 February. By that time, some elements of I Corps had reached the Han and could look across at Seoul, while others had registered gains ranging from 10 to 30 miles from the starting line.¹

While Eighth Army was approaching the Han, recapturing territory and regaining confidence, President Truman was conferring with Premier Rene Pleven of France, who visited Washington on 29 and 30 January. The French Prime Minister, like his British colleague earlier, was seeking reassurance about US intentions in the Far East. Position papers drafted by the Department of State suggested that the President assure M. Pleven that the United States intended to continue resisting in Korea in the hope that the enemy would eventually accept an honorable settlement. The United States would continue to try to confine

hostilities to Korea and would not seek authorization to extend the war to China (though in case of massive air attacks on UN troops from across the border, it might become necessary to make retaliatory strikes against the Chinese air fields used for the purpose). The President should also warn the Prime Minister that China's demonstrated willingness to use armed forces beyond its borders constituted a threat to neighboring states, notably Indochina—a threat that could best be met by refusal to reward aggression (for example, by recognizing the Communist regime or by admitting it to the United Nations). In commenting on these papers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made only one suggestion. They recommended deletion of a statement that the United States would continue to resist in Korea "unless superior force should require . . . evacuation." Eighth Army's recovery was already making an impression in Washington.²

President Truman upheld these positions during the conference, which was attended by Secretary Marshall and General Bradley. The final communique proclaimed that the two leaders were in "complete agreement as to the necessity of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their security and assure their independence." They also agreed that "aggression must not be rewarded or the menace of aggression appeased."³

Meanwhile the General Assembly was debating the resolution introduced by the US Delegation on 20 January asking condemnation of China.⁴ The US draft called for the creation of a subcommittee of the "Collective Measures Committee" (established by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 3 November 1950) to consider "additional measures" to meet the Chinese aggression, and another three-man committee (including the President of the General Assembly) to use its "good offices" to try to end the war in Korea. The US delegation accepted an amendment that would authorize postponement of consideration of "additional measures" until the Good Offices Committee had reported, and another deleting a statement that China had "rejected" UN peace efforts so far (the phrase "has not accepted" was used instead). With these amendments, the resolution was approved by the First Committee on 30 January 1951 and by the General Assembly on 1 February. Thus the allies, in the words of Secretary Acheson, returned to "comparative sanity."⁵

Needless to say, the passage of this resolution brought no immediate assistance to Eighth Army. Secretary Acheson had told the Department of Defense on 5 December that he was willing, if desired, to make another appeal for troops from selected UN members, though he doubted that it would succeed.⁶ The Joint Strategic Plans Committee, after considering the Secretary's offer, submitted a split report on 15 January. The Army member believed that a general appeal for troops should be made, exempting only the United Kingdom and the continental members of NATO. The Navy and Air Force argued that any additional ground forces likely to be obtained in that manner would be "inadequate to affect materially the issue in Korea."⁷ This view was obviously justifiable if the UN Command were in danger of expulsion from Korea.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the Committee's report on 24 January, the military situation in Korea had visibly improved. It was probably for this reason that the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the Army view that a fresh

troop appeal might serve a useful purpose. They so advised Secretary Marshall, who relayed their conclusion to Secretary Acheson.⁸ The Department of State thereupon undertook a new initiative, the results of which are described later in the chapter.

The Emerging Consensus in Washington

The National Security Council had not yet acted on the proposals that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had submitted to Secretary Marshall on 12 January 1951 for a wide range of actions to be taken or planned in response to the Far East crisis.⁹ In fact, the Council never did debate the JCS memorandum, and the issues raised therein were not to be settled for almost four months. They were initially discussed in a series of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State that began as an outgrowth of the national mobilization launched in December 1950. In approving NSC 68/4, which laid down guidelines for this mobilization, President Truman directed the Department of State to undertake a "joint review of the politico-military strategy of this Government."¹⁰ Obviously the Far East situation would be a key element in this review.

The first meeting was held on 14 January 1951 in the Pentagon. In attendance were members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, as well as the Operations Deputies. State Department representatives included Ambassador Jessup, Under Secretary Matthews, and Mr. Paul Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff.¹¹ The discussion was general, dealing with the danger of world war and means of meeting it. Consideration of Korea and other problem areas was deferred.¹²

The Far Eastern situation came in for discussion at the next meeting, 30 January. The conferees had before them a revised version of the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951, prepared by the Senior Staff after the NSC discussion of 17 January.¹³ They quickly approved the first five recommendations in the memorandum and focused most of their discussion on the last two, dealing with Taiwan and Southeast Asia. There was general agreement that these should be kept out of hostile hands and that military assistance should be provided to the governments in those areas.¹⁴

Near the end of the meeting, the subject of Korea was introduced by Assistant Secretary Rusk, who observed that it seemed unlikely that the 38th parallel would again become an issue. This forecast was soon to prove inaccurate, but at the time it appeared reasonable. "I can not at this time see any chance of a breakthrough to the North by us," agreed General Collins. Even if the opportunity did present itself, there seemed no advantage in going back into North Korean territory. "We would want to stay south of the 38th parallel," observed Mr. Nitze, with general assent.

From this introduction, the conferees moved into a discussion of related problems. General Collins stressed that the question of retaining US forces in Korea must be decided soon in connection with the disposition of two National Guard

divisions that would soon be ready for deployment. He also touched on the question of political support for the war. "Congress wants us out of Korea," he said, "and if we are going to stay any length of time we ought to be deciding as to the reason for our staying and getting the word to the people."

At the next conference, on 6 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had available studies bearing on two aspects of the war. One was the use of Chinese Nationalist forces. On 27 January 1951 the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, responding to an NSC decision ten days earlier,¹⁵ submitted a report on the military effectiveness of these units. The Committee concluded that their value would depend entirely on the scale of US aid and guidance. At a maximum, if given US air and naval support, the Nationalists might be able to hold large beachheads and perhaps induce large-scale defections by Communist forces. Such assaults alone could not be decisive, but the Committee believed that, in combination with other courses of action suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they might deny the Communists all of China south of the Yellow River and greatly reduce China's ability to threaten other countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively accepted the conclusions of this study and referred it to General MacArthur for his comments.¹⁶

The other study, forwarded by Admiral Sherman on 5 February, dealt with the effects of a naval blockade of Communist China. Its conclusion was that such an operation would substantially reduce China's war potential and would effectively impede preparations to invade Taiwan. Participation of other nations, especially the United Kingdom, would be desirable but not essential. It was unlikely that Soviet Russia would openly intervene, particularly if the United Nations could be induced to declare a blockade; however, if Port Arthur and Dairen were included, hostilities with the Soviet Union might result, since the Soviets exercised certain privileges there under a treaty with Communist China.¹⁷

The conference of 6 February opened with a discussion of five possible courses of action with respect to Korea, as follows:

- (1) Reinforcement of UN troops in order to unify Korea by force.
- (2) Deliberate withdrawal.
- (3) Military stalemate with no agreement of any sort.
- (4) A cease-fire with restoration of the status quo ante.
- (5) An attempt to "settle the Korean question" by defeating the Peiping regime.

It was agreed that the fourth of these was preferable. General Bradley made it clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to any reinforcement of the troops in Korea and hoped that they could be withdrawn before another winter. The conditions of an "acceptable" cease-fire, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1950,¹⁸ entered the discussion. The conferees agreed that a cease-fire on these terms, leaving the troops in place, would not in itself provide what was desired—"a political settlement that we can live with," as Assistant Secretary Rusk put it. They agreed further that the time was not ripe for the UN Command to seek a cease-fire and that nothing would be gained by trying to invade North Korea.

The discussion swung to the courses of action set forth in the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951. It was quickly recognized that the Far Eastern situation had undergone considerable change since the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared their recommendations. Mr. Jessup pointed out that a new paper on Far Eastern policy was in preparation, which would deal with the points raised in the JCS memorandum.¹⁹ Nevertheless some of the JCS recommendations were discussed, beginning with the proposal for a naval blockade. General Bradley pointed out that this recommendation was intended to apply only after UN troops had been forced out of Korea. "That is important to remember," added Admiral Sherman. The Admiral then read portions of the 5 February study, which had not yet been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The conclusion, as summed up by General Bradley, was that no blockade should be attempted at that time, but that if the Korean situation worsened, the question should be reconsidered.

Aerial reconnaissance of Manchuria and the China coast was then debated. The current restrictions on that activity were pronounced by Admiral Sherman to be "outmoded." With General Bradley's support, he stressed the need for coastal reconnaissance, particularly if a blockade were undertaken. Mr. Jessup indicated that the Department of State would agree but that reconnaissance over Manchuria would require further study.

In connection with the possible use of Nationalist troops, General Bradley presented the conclusions of the recent JSPC study. Admiral Sherman noted that it had been prepared "when we were being forced into a beachhead" and that the situation "is now different and far happier." "In other words, you are recommending nothing specific now," said Mr. Jessup, addressing the JCS members, who assented. The conferees agreed, however, that it would be desirable to establish a Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) mission on Taiwan to control the allocation of military aid. The discussion then turned to other subjects.²⁰

The meetings thus far had indicated a general convergence of thinking between the JCS members and their opposite numbers in the Department of State. They had agreed that there should be no new invasion of North Korea and that a diplomatic settlement should be sought. Most important, all of them—the military men no less than the civilians—were united in rejecting any major expansion of hostilities. The desperate urgency of December and January had threatened to bring on a terrible dilemma—to abandon Korea or to widen the war. That danger was now fading, dispelled by the recovery of Eighth Army under General Ridgway's leadership.

Issues of Strategic Bombing

At that point, General Ridgway foresaw no prospect of advancing beyond the Han. His intention, as he explained to General MacArthur on 3 February 1951, was to hold the line of the Han as far east as Yongp'yong, some 30 airline miles east of Seoul. Above this point, the Han has a south-to-north orientation and there is no readily defensible line to the east. However, General Ridgway

would take advantage of the terrain to extend his line through Hoengsong, due east of Seoul, and thence to Kangnung, on the coast some 18 miles below the 38th parallel. Nothing would be gained by trying to advance beyond this line, nor would he seek to recapture Seoul unless a favorable opportunity arose to do so. General MacArthur, replying on February, generally concurred, while pointing out the political and logistic importance of retaking the capital if possible.²¹

This exchange of messages was not relayed to Washington, and the Army's G-3, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, had to ask General MacArthur on 11 February what his plans were.²² General MacArthur, in reply, described the strategy of cautious limited advance on which he and General Ridgway had agreed. In doing so, he made it clear that he no longer feared that the enemy could drive UN forces from Korea. At the same time, he took the opportunity once again to call attention to the enemy's "privileged sanctuary" in Manchuria. His message said:

It is my purpose to continue ground advances until I develop the enemy's main line of resistance or the fact that there is no such line south of the 38th parallel. These advances serve to keep him off-balance so that his ground forces cannot get set for a blow, to enable our forces to realize the maximum from our superior artillery and armor and to flush the enemy from concealment where he may have escaped air attack. If it should develop that no major enemy strength is disposed south of the 38th parallel, report will be made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and instructions requested before proceeding further. It can be accepted as a basic fact that, unless the authority is given to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, our ground forces as presently constituted cannot with safety attempt major operations in North Korea.

It is evident that the enemy has lost his chance for achieving a decisive military decision in Korea, but he retains the potential, as long as his base of operations in Manchuria is immune to our attack, to employ a force which will enable him to resume the offensive and force retrograde movement upon us. We intend to hold the line of the Han up to the point of a major and decisive engagement. It is impossible to predict where, once we withdraw from this line, the situation will again stabilize, but stabilization will be certain. The capability of the enemy is inversely and geometrically proportionate to his distance from the Yalu.²³

Shortly after this message was sent, a new enemy offensive erupted on the central front, held by X Corps. Chinese and North Korean troops concentrated as usual on the ROK units in the line, routed them, and drove them back, wiping out many of the gains registered in Operation ROUNDUP. The battle came to a climax at the village of Chip'yong-ni, where a regiment of the US 2d Division, aided by the French Battalion, held out for several days against five enemy divisions. Finally a task force from the 1st Cavalry Division broke through and the attack tapered off.²⁴

It was perhaps this new enemy stroke that led General MacArthur, in a message on 15 February 1951, to raise anew the question of bombing Rashin, which had been placed off limits in September 1950.²⁵ He pointed out that the enemy was continuing to reinforce and supply his troops in Korea despite heavy attacks on his transportation centers. Rashin, with its large marshalling yards and dock areas, was the one important supply center that remained untouched. Favorable

weather for bombing Rashin could be expected during February but not thereafter. The city could "unquestionably" be attacked without danger of violating the Soviet border, and he considered its destruction "imperative" in order to disrupt the transport system on the east coast. He therefore requested that the JCS instructions issued in September 1950 be modified to permit visual bombing of Rashin.²⁶

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question of possible Soviet reaction was not to be so easily dismissed. They replied that in the past, Soviet ships had used Rashin when Vladivostok was icebound and asked if there were any current indications of the presence of Soviet vessels there. They also desired an estimate of the nature and quantity of the supplies that were causing him concern.²⁷ General MacArthur responded that no Soviet ships had been observed in Rashin and that Vladivostok was still open. UN aircraft, he pointed out, had often flown in the vicinity of Rashin without drawing any Soviet reaction. The exact nature of the supplies stored in and shipped through Rashin was unknown, but there were "unquestionably great depot accumulations"; photographs taken on 16 February showed approximately 332 railroad cars. Rashin was the "last major profitable strategic target in North Korea," and had remained untouched. "The destruction of this vital link in the enemy's East Coast transportation system by visual bombing will be a major loss to the enemy," he concluded, "and conversely its immunity from attack remains a major threat to our forces."²⁸

General Taylor recommended to General Collins that this request be granted.²⁹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, consulted their superiors, Secretary Marshall and Deputy Secretary Lovett, who thought that, in view of the known opposition of the Department of State, it would be useless to carry the matter to the President. Meeting on 20 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to reject General MacArthur's plea and to make it clear that the decision was a political rather than a military one. "Decision has been reached on higher governmental levels," they told CINCFE on 21 February, "that restrictions on Rashin must remain in effect for the present."³⁰

Similar reasoning led to a denial of General MacArthur's request for permission to attack the hydroelectric installations on the Yalu River. This issue had in fact been raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves in December 1950. At that time, they asked General MacArthur's opinion of the desirability of attacking these power plants in case the Chinese attacked across the parallel. General MacArthur replied that the installations were "mainly inactive" and hence the issue was primarily political rather than military.³¹

The Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Major General R. C. Lindsay, USAF, studied the question for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and concluded that it would be "militarily desirable" to destroy the Yalu power complex. There seemed no political reason to abstain, since large Chinese forces had already been committed with the declared intention of driving the United Nations from Korea.³² The Army and Navy members of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (Brigadier General C. D. Eddleman and Rear Admiral W. V. O'Regan) believed, however, that General Lindsay had underestimated the unfavorable political consequences of such action. The Committee decided on 18 January 1951 that the question should be studied further in collaboration with the Joint Intelligence Committee.³³

Before the results of this restudy could be reported, General MacArthur on 26 February forwarded an "urgent" request from General Stratemeyer for permission to destroy the entire North Korean power complex, including the plants on the Yalu River. General MacArthur thought it possible that the considerations that had influenced previous decisions might have changed.³⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, rejected the request, citing General MacArthur's own statement two months earlier about the inactivity of the plants. They also drew his attention to their message of 6 November 1950, replying to his plan to bomb the Yalu bridges, in which they had stressed the great importance of avoiding any violation of Manchurian territory or air space.³⁵

The Joint Intelligence Committee subsequently concluded that, while the destruction of the North Korean power complex would yield strategic benefits, it would endanger relations with other countries. The Joint Strategic Plans Group drafted a memorandum recommending an attack carefully limited to power installations on Korean soil; this recommendation was to be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the event that the Korean situation worsened. The JSPG draft was forwarded to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, where it was withheld and never used.³⁶

The 38th Parallel Again

By the end of February 1951, the winter crisis was fading. Three months after the massive Chinese intervention, the question of widening the war had almost become a dead issue. Unless the situation suddenly worsened, it was unlikely that the President's military advisors would urge upon him any politically dangerous measures like the bombing or even the blockade of Communist China. Indeed, the issue that was beginning to come to the fore was one that had been wholly unforeseen even a few weeks earlier. As in September 1950, the administration faced the question: What should be done if UN troops again reached the prewar boundary of North Korea?

The political and military situation was of course entirely different now. A sustained drive into North Korean territory, such as General MacArthur had carried out, was unlikely, at the very least, to be militarily feasible against the formidable armies of Communist China. Moreover, it could be expected that the majority of UN member nations would be highly circumspect in approving any northward move across the boundary, especially in the light of current discussion of a possible diplomatic settlement. The British Government was known to be extremely wary of any such step.³⁷

A staff study of the 38th parallel prepared in the Department of State was informally made available to General Bradley on 13 February by Mr. Matthews. In this paper, the Department of State ruled out any general advance into North Korean territory, while recognizing the need to go on fighting as long as the enemy refused a reasonable cease-fire. There might be some advantage in forcing the enemy back across the line, but serious risks should not be taken merely to

acquire territory. If enemy forces withdrew across the parallel, the main body of UN forces should remain south thereof but should retain freedom to thrust or patrol approximately 20 miles to the north, in order to control the situation and to keep the enemy off balance. In the absence of a cease-fire, the enemy should not be afforded a sanctuary behind the 38th parallel like the one he now enjoyed across the Yalu.³⁸

This paper guided the discussion when the JCS-State meetings were resumed on 13 February. At the outset, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their position regarding withdrawal from Korea. They would "prefer," they said, to have US forces out of the country "before next winter" because of other military commitments, but a withdrawal was not "mandatory." It was also agreed that the purpose of the conference was merely to exchange views, rather than to reach agreements.

The conferees then took up the State Department study. General Bradley expressed the view that the situation in Korea required a definition of political objectives as a basis for determining military requirements. US forces, he thought, were "capable of any action which might be required as a result of a political decision," except that a major offensive north of the 38th parallel would require additional UN forces. The parallel itself was of no military significance. "A decision to cross it in force should be based on political considerations," he said. Mr. Matthews, on the other hand, indicated that the Department of State "did not want to consider a political decision except in light of our military capabilities."³⁹

Assistant Secretary Rusk rejected the two extreme objectives of unilateral withdrawal and an attempt to drive the Chinese from Korea. The problem, he thought, was "to achieve a stabilization by which we could make progress toward our political objectives." Political and military problems, he observed, "are closely related." For the time being, the objective was "to punish the enemy severely," in order to attain a cease-fire and then a restoration of the status quo ante. Mr. Jessup asked whether the ROK Army could develop enough strength to hold the 38th parallel against anything short of a major assault. General Collins thought it might be two or three years before South Korean forces could do so; in fact, he agreed with General Vandenberg that they might never be able to defend themselves alone if the "Iron Curtain" again descended along the parallel, thus permitting North Korea to build up its strength without interference.

The only possible courses seemed to be to withdraw unilaterally, to hold on indefinitely, or to reach a political settlement that would permit withdrawal. The first could be ruled out; the second would require more troops. Attainment of the last depended partly on the ability of UN forces to increase the pressure on the enemy. General Vandenberg pointed out that the Air Force had already run out of profitable targets in North Korea; he wondered how long the US public would tolerate the trade of "irreplaceable Americans for expendable Chinese." Admiral Sherman and General Bradley stressed the importance of allied support. General Bradley thought that a cease-fire would not be advantageous at that time; it would probably be necessary, he said, to defeat the new enemy offensive, and

probably one more, before the Chinese Communists would be ready to consider an acceptable agreement.

Describing the military situation, General Collins believed that stabilization, or stalemate, was in the offing. There was little to be gained, he believed, by any UN advance across the parallel or even across the Han River. "We might even do better to fall back a bit from our present position . . .," he continued. "We are now close to the limit of our capabilities with present forces as long as there is no appreciable change in enemy strength, and positions are likely to remain approximately as they are now." But where, he asked, was the *politically* desirable line of stabilization? Mr. Matthews replied that "no agreement short of the 38th parallel would be politically acceptable." Somewhat ambiguously, however, he added that it was "not politically necessary to regain Seoul or to mount an offensive to seize ground along the 38th parallel. If it is militarily advantageous to hold about where we are now, as General Collins indicated, that is politically satisfactory."

Could retaliatory action be undertaken against China in the hope of inducing a settlement? The possibility was suggested, apparently by State Department representatives. The risk of Soviet intervention would be present. Generals Collins and Bradley thought the risk "excessive." Nevertheless Mr. Nitze believed that the mere *capability* for taking such action might be helpful. It was agreed that the question of Soviet response to various possible actions would be studied by the two Departments, with the collaboration of the Central Intelligence Agency.⁴⁰

Another conference a week later dealt only briefly with Korea. State's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Thomas C. Mann, told the others that it was planned to seek additional troops from Latin nations: a division each from Argentina and Brazil and a regiment from Mexico. However, the United States would have to supply equipment. General Collins thought that these additional troops would be desirable if they brought most of their equipment with them, leaving only small deficits to be made up by the United States. As for the situation in Korea, the conferees noted that there had been little change in the last week and agreed again that withdrawal of forces under a political arrangement was desirable. Mr. Nitze remarked that the Department of State "is assuming that it will be consulted before any decision is made to cross the 38th parallel in force."⁴¹

Three days later, on 23 February, Secretary Acheson sent General Marshall a draft memorandum for the President discussing the 38th parallel. By that time, Eighth Army had absorbed most of the punch of the enemy's latest offensive and had regained the initiative with Operation KILLER. As the month ended, this attack had achieved its purpose of straightening the UN line east of the Han. For the first time since the Chinese intervention, UN forces stood along a relatively stable line, with "no gaping holes, no soft spots, and no enemy salients threatening to tear it in two."⁴²

The outcome of Operation KILLER could not be foreseen on 23 February, but it was clear that, in Secretary Acheson's words, the problem of the parallel was "of some urgency," and he therefore desired the views of the Department of Defense as soon as possible. The draft memorandum was intended to become the basis for a new directive to General MacArthur. The first paragraph stressed the

need for instructions regarding the parallel. It was noted that other nations participating in the Korean action "are insisting upon full consultation" before any "substantial" UN forces crossed the line. The UN political objective in Korea was reaffirmed as "the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea." The military objective, however, was much more limited: "to repel the aggression against the Republic of Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area." Forcible unification was expressly rejected, and it was noted that most UN member countries supporting the action in Korea would oppose unification as a war aim (as distinct from an ultimate political goal).

The draft accepted the conclusion that large-scale incursions into North Korea could not be attempted without heavy reinforcements. Even if these were available, the wisdom of committing them to Korea was doubtful. If the object was to force a change in the enemy's policy by inflicting maximum damage on him at minimum cost, then a "battle of maneuver" approximately along the present line would be preferable to operations substantially farther north. Moreover, "virtually all members of the United Nations" were "strongly opposed to any general advance across the 38th parallel." Any such action by General MacArthur would "create a severe crisis within the free world" and might result in the withdrawal of some allied forces then in Korea. On the other hand, it would be "disastrous" for the UN forces if North Korea became a "safe haven." The UN Command "must be free to continue maximum air and naval action against North Korea and to take such action on the ground as is required to keep the enemy off balance. . . . The 38th parallel should not become a barrier to the conduct of aggressive defensive operations."⁴³

This draft was at once sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request for prompt comment.⁴⁴ The JCS conclusions, based on a study of the document by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, were forwarded to Secretary Marshall on 27 February 1951. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the State Department draft represented "an unsound approach." It would "predetermine future military courses of action" on the basis of "interim political factors," and would probably result in disclosing a US military decision to the enemy. The proper method was first to determine long-range political objectives, then to approve short-range political courses of action which would become the basis for military decisions. They agreed that there were "grave military risks" in trying to unify Korea by force, but stressed that, so long as the United States and United Nations retained their present political objectives in Korea, UN military forces should not be forbidden to advance north of the parallel. They opposed restoration of the status quo ante, fearing that it would enable the Communists to build up their strength so as to jeopardize the safety of UN forces in Korea. A political settlement in Korea was desirable, but it should "advance rather than jeopardize" the security of UN forces in Korea.

It was "premature," in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make any determination regarding the 38th parallel until General MacArthur had felt out the enemy's main line of resistance. The present courses of action in Korea should continue, and General MacArthur's directive should remain unchanged, until an agreed governmental policy, based on political objectives formulated by

the Department of State, could be promulgated. The draft memorandum should not be submitted to the President.⁴⁵

Others in the Department of Defense looked more favorably upon the State Department draft. General Burns appraised it as "sound" and thought that the "basic concepts" should be approved.⁴⁶ The Service Secretaries agreed that the United States should abide by any UN decision and should not advance across the parallel except for tactical reasons. Secretaries Pace of the Army and Finletter of the Air Force believed that this policy regarding the parallel should be announced to the world "as a matter of principle." Acting Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball believed that any such announcement, or even any discussion with other governments, would unduly hamper military action; he thought it would suffice to inform other troop-contributing countries that CINCFE had been told to make no major moves without consultation.⁴⁷

Secretary Marshall adopted the JCS views as his own, and so informed Mr. Acheson on 1 March 1951. Noting that Far Eastern policy was then under study by the NSC Senior Staff, he expressed the view that the National Security Council was the proper forum for working out the politico-military aspects of the Korean problem. In the meantime, it would suffice to inform President Truman, who was about to leave for a visit to Key West, that it was too early to settle the question of the parallel and to remind him of General MacArthur's promise to consult Washington before crossing the boundary. But, if it was felt necessary to forward the draft to the President, Secretary Marshall asked that the JCS comments be transmitted at the same time.⁴⁸

In the end, the draft memorandum was never sent. A DOD representative, Mr. Frank C. Nash, discussed it and the JCS objections with Assistant Secretary Rusk. Mr. Rusk felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were wrong in trying to make a "neat prescription" of political objectives in Korea as distinct from military objectives; the two could not be separated. He remarked on the value of the recent State-JCS discussions, and hoped that they might continue. Agreeing that there were good reasons for temporarily postponing a decision on the 38th parallel, he believed there should be a State-Defense agreement on the matter by the time UN forces reached the line. Speaking "in confidence," Mr. Rusk explained that the reason for the draft memorandum was that the President's Special Assistant, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, had thought it necessary to "firm up" the President's thinking on the 38th parallel. In view of the JCS objections, Mr. Rusk agreed that the memorandum would not be formally submitted to the President. Mr. Nash in turn agreed that Mr. Harriman might read the memorandum, together with the JCS comments and Secretary Marshall's letter, as background information to use in briefing the President. It was further agreed that the problem of Korea would be handled in the National Security Council, as Secretary Marshall had suggested, and that the question of the 38th parallel should be considered in connection with the overall Far East policy paper then in preparation.⁴⁹

It may be assumed that President Truman was duly informed of the substance of this discussion and thus learned of the consensus among his advisors that the matter of the 38th parallel did not require an immediate decision. In any event, the question was not pressed, and thus the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pre-

vailed. Indeed, the administration, as it had been five months earlier, was careful to avoid forcing the issue at the United Nations. When General MacArthur drafted this semimonthly report for the period 15 to 28 February (which was forwarded to Washington on 2 March 1951), he proposed to include a promise that he would not "arbitrarily exercise" his authority to cross the parallel if "cogent political reasons against crossing" should be advanced when the question actually arose. This statement, however, was deleted at the request of the State and Defense Departments, who agreed that it would be better to make no reference to the subject.⁵⁰

Nevertheless the need for a decision was drawing closer. After the enemy's February offensive tapered off, Eighth Army on 7 March 1951 launched Operation RIPPER, intended to drive a broad salient into the center of the enemy line and thus separate the Chinese in the west from the North Koreans in the east. A major target of this drive, Ch'unch'on, was less than 10 airline miles from the 38th parallel. The operation succeeded beyond expectations and yielded a major dividend in the recapture of Seoul. The northward advance in the center had the effect of outflanking the capital, and when Eighth Army seized the commanding heights east of the city, the enemy had to choose between abandoning Seoul or defending it at a disadvantage. He chose the former alternative, and thus the capital was liberated at minimum cost to UN forces. South Korean troops began reoccupying it on 14 March.⁵¹

With these developments, the issue of the 38th parallel became a matter of public discussion. On 15 March 1951 President Truman was asked by a reporter whether UN forces would be allowed to advance beyond the line. "That is a tactical matter for the field commander," he replied. "A commander in chief 7,000 miles away does not interfere with field operations. We are working to free the Republic of Korea and set it up as the United Nations wants it. That doesn't have anything to do with the 38th parallel."⁵²

The President's statement was somewhat vague—no doubt intentionally so—but it was clearly in keeping with JCS views in maintaining the freedom of General MacArthur and in separating the immediate question of the parallel from long-range UN political objectives. At the same time, the use of the word "tactical" implied that any operations across the line would have limited objectives and would thus be under some restraint.

On the same day—15 March—a draft of a revised Far East policy paper, prepared by the Department of State, was sent to the Senior Staff. It put in writing, while defining more carefully, the authority granted to CINCFE by the President's statement. The draft was intended, after approval, to supersede the existing Far East policy paper (NSC 48/2) and also to complete action on the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951 (which, as NSC 101, was still on the NSC agenda). The overall US objective in Korea, according to State's draft, was to settle the Korean problem along two lines, politically, by establishing a unified and independent nation, and militarily, by repelling aggression and restoring peace. UN forces should continue to inflict maximum losses on the enemy and should regain control over territory south of the 38th parallel; meanwhile the defenses of the Republic of Korea should be built up. UN ground forces should be permitted

to conduct “aggressive defensive operations” approximately 10 to 20 miles north of the parallel “as may be required by the tactical situation.” When the 38th parallel was reached in force, the United States should seek a cease-fire along the lines communicated to the UN Cease-fire Committee in December 1950. Should the enemy refuse an acceptable *modus vivendi*, UN forces should continue to inflict maximum attrition. They might undertake raids north of the parallel, to keep the enemy off balance and to disrupt his offensive preparations, but there should be no general advance, nor should any attempt be made to hold territory in North Korea. As for Communist China, the United States should seek to deflate its prestige by inflicting heavy losses on its forces in Korea and should continue current economic, political, and diplomatic actions against its government. But no military actions directly against mainland China were suggested in the draft.⁵³

The State Department paper was to pass through several revisions before it emerged in final form, two months later, as NSC 48/5. Its immediate importance was as a statement of the understanding that had been reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State—an agreement on some “fairly simple and sensible conclusions,” as Secretary Acheson called them.⁵⁴ There was to be no attempt at forcible unification of Korea; military and political objectives were to be distinguished; the right of the theater commander to operate across the parallel was recognized, within limits. The prospective wider war urged by General MacArthur—the operations against mainland China—was ruled out.

Abortive Peace Efforts

Eighth Army’s approach to the 38th parallel offered an auspicious occasion for a new try at peace. The prewar status quo had almost been restored, and the UN Command was in position to negotiate from something approaching equality of strength. Sentiment among UN member nations strongly favored another peace appeal before any attempt was made to cross the parallel in force.

In the hope of launching peace negotiations, President Truman decided to issue a public declaration that the UN Command was willing to consider a cease-fire. The Department of State prepared a draft declaration, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed on 19 March 1951 with Secretaries Marshall and Acheson. During the next few days, the draft was revised and was circulated to other governments for their approval. General MacArthur was notified that the statement was in the offing.

Without warning, General MacArthur on 24 March 1951 released a statement of his own that had the effect of completely undermining the administration plan. The General ridiculed Chinese military ability, threatened direct military action against China, and, though he closed with an offer to meet with the enemy command, made it clear that the only purpose of such a meeting would be to determine how the UN “political objectives” were to be accomplished “without further bloodshed.”⁵⁵

The tone of this pronouncement practically guaranteed against its acceptance by the enemy as an open door to negotiations. Its release by General MacArthur was the act that finally convinced President Truman that the General had to go. But, for the moment, the President and his advisors continued to study the particulars of a possible settlement, looking toward a moment when conditions for negotiation would again appear favorable.

At the JCS-State meeting on 19 March, there had been some discussion of the terms of a cease-fire. Secretary Acheson had asked whether the terms set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1950 were still acceptable.⁵⁶ The JCS reply, transmitted on 27 March, answered this inquiry and at the same time addressed the "broader problem" of ending the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the Chinese and North Korean forces were suffering severe losses and therefore stood to gain from a cease-fire that did not prejudice their position, particularly if it kept UN forces tied down in Korea. "From the military point of view, therefore," wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "an armistice arrangement of itself would not, even temporarily, constitute an acceptable solution of the Korean situation." The current military situation seemed to offer an opportunity for a political settlement that would end the fighting and ensure against its resumption. But any such arrangement must avoid prejudicing the US position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or the US stand with regard to Taiwan and Communist China's UN membership. In short, any armistice should "be contingent upon the acceptance of a general agreement which protects the overall security interests of the United States." In addition, it must include all the terms set forth in the JCS memorandum of 12 December 1950, and it must not become effective until a supervisory commission, adequately staffed, had been organized and was ready to function.⁵⁷

The influence of the improved military situation was clearly apparent here. Since Eighth Army was in a much stronger position than it had been in December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt able to raise the terms of settlement—to insist on a harder bargain. Acting Secretary Lovett did not entirely agree. Forwarding the JCS memorandum to the Secretary of State on 31 March, he expressed his "general agreement," but added that, in his opinion, it would be "fitting" to include the questions of Taiwan and of China's admission to the United Nations in considering terms of settlement for the Korean problem.⁵⁸

The JCS memorandum regarding terms of settlement had been drafted by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. On 30 March the Committee, on its own initiative, recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff amplify their views on Korea, particularly in the light of the proximity of Eighth Army to the 38th parallel. A draft memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, prepared by the Committee, was designed to encompass various eventualities. The Communist objective in Korea was seen as the establishment of an armistice on terms disadvantageous to the UN forces in order to keep US troops tied down there. The Korean problem was insoluble by military action alone, and, as a symptom of world tension, it probably could not be resolved by any politico-military action that was confined to Korea. In the light of these considerations, the Committee drew the following conclusions: (1) US forces in Korea should pursue their course of action until a

“political objective” could be attained there that would not jeopardize the US position on Taiwan or on Communist China’s UN membership. (2) “Dependable” ROK units should be generated in sufficient strength to take over the major burden of defense. (3) The possibility of naval and air action against the Chinese mainland should be kept under “continuing review.” (4) Action should be taken “as a matter of urgency” to ascertain the policies and objectives of the allies toward Korea and the Far East and their willingness to support possible action against mainland China.⁵⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this draft memorandum and approved it with a few changes. General Collins wanted the final conclusion deleted; any attempt to line up advance support for action against China, he feared, would suggest an actual intention to attack and would provoke “interminable discussion.” His colleagues rejected his suggestion, but they approved one by Admiral Sherman to amend the draft to state that “preparations should be made” for attacks against the mainland, rather than that such actions should be “kept under continuing review.” Thus amended, the memorandum was forwarded to Secretary Marshall on 5 April 1951. The Secretary in turn sent it to the President and the National Security Council, and it was considered in the revision of NSC 48/2, as described below.⁶⁰

For the moment, there seemed nothing for the United States to do but to mark time, giving consideration to the question of acceptable peace terms and awaiting a favorable occasion for a demarche of some sort. In any event, there was evidence that President Truman’s appeal, even if it had been issued, would have fallen on deaf ears. This evidence was found in Communist China’s failure to respond to the approaches tendered by the UN Good Offices Committee, created by the General Assembly resolution of 1 February, and by the Arab-Asian bloc in the United Nations.⁶¹

The British Government foresaw the failure of the Good Offices Committee and on 30 March 1951 suggested to the Department of State a “new approach.” “We must not miss the chance, now that we are near the parallel to examine whether further military operations can be avoided,” declared Foreign Secretary Bevin in a message to Secretary Acheson. No proclamation by President Truman alone, such as had recently been considered, was now likely to receive any attention from Communist China. The Foreign Secretary therefore suggested a joint statement by all the nations having forces in Korea, indicating their willingness to negotiate for a united Korea and for the withdrawal of all non-Korean troops. This statement would be accompanied by a declaration of support by President Truman and would be followed up by an approach to Communist China and perhaps also Soviet Russia to sound out their reaction.⁶² The reply from the Department of State has not been found, but the British suggestion was apparently not followed up. When negotiations finally started several months later, they resulted from discreet private conversations, not from public statements.

The failure of peace efforts brought into play the Additional Measures Committee, another creation of the 1 February resolution. This committee held its first meeting on 16 February. On 8 March a subcommittee was appointed to prepare initial recommendations. For some reason—perhaps in the hope that peace was

near—the subcommittee did not meet until 19 April, at which time it decided that economic reprisals against Communist China should be given priority. The upshot was that the United States submitted a resolution calling for an embargo on the shipment of all munitions and strategic materials to Communist China. This resolution was approved by the Committee and then, on 18 May 1951, by the General Assembly. It had no visible effect upon the course of the war.⁶³

Operations along the Parallel

When enemy forces withdrew in the face of Operation RIPPER, they fell back across the parallel to a strong line anchored by well-constructed fortifications in the center, along the southernmost edge of the “Iron Triangle”—the region bounded by the cities of Ch’orwon, Kumhwa, and P’yonggang. By the end of March, US forces, having moved up to their objective line (designated IDAHO), had passed it on both extremities. In the west, UN forces had crossed the Han and moved up to the Imjin, just below the 38th parallel. On the east coast, elements of the ROK Capital Division crossed the parallel on 27 March; by the end of the month the ROK forces had established positions near Yangyang, some five miles north of the old boundary. (See Map 5 on page 223.)⁶⁴

It was known that the enemy was preparing for another offensive, making full use of the supply centers and transportation facilities in and around the Iron Triangle. General Ridgway therefore decided to continue pushing ahead in order to keep the foe off balance. Taking advantage of the freedom granted him by President Truman’s statement of 15 March, he set a new objective line, KANSAS, which followed the Imjin to a point a few miles north of the parallel and then ran eastward to Yangyang. It would take advantage of a ten-mile water barrier in the center—the Hwach’on Reservoir, source of Seoul’s water supply. This plan was submitted to General MacArthur, who approved it without consulting Washington.⁶⁵

The new attack (Operation RUGGED) began on 5 April 1951. On the same day, General MacArthur, in one of his last messages to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained its objectives. He added that plans had already been drawn for further advances, at some future date, in the center. Two successive phase lines, UTAH and WYOMING, both modifications of the basic KANSAS line, had been drawn. Advance to the second of these would bring the UN forces within range of Ch’orwon and Kumhwa and thus enable them to dominate the Iron Triangle. Thereafter, according to General MacArthur, contact with the enemy would be maintained through battalion-sized patrols. Limitations of supply, weather, and terrain, together with the strength of the enemy, indicated that an advance beyond WYOMING “is not feasible at this time.”⁶⁶

Operation RUGGED proceeded generally according to plan. By 9 April US I and IX Corps had drawn up to the KANSAS line and began moving toward UTAH, while the forces on the center and the east (X Corps and ROK III Corps) plowed ahead through difficult terrain.⁶⁷

Just at this juncture came the startling news, on 11 April 1951, that President Truman had dismissed the Far East Commander. This important event and its aftermath are the subject of the following chapter. There was no immediate effect, however, on the course of the war. General Ridgway at once succeeded to the position of CINCFE. Command of Eighth Army went to Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, who arrived from Washington on 14 April.⁶⁸

Upon General Van Fleet fell the principal burden of meeting the new enemy offensive that erupted on 22 April, far surpassing the previous one in intensity and duration. The attack had been expected, and Eighth Army quickly fell back in accord with plans. There followed almost a month of bitter fighting. During the early days of the offensive, Chinese forces drove hard for Seoul. They were stopped within five miles of the city, but by the end of April, I and IX Corps had lost everything gained during the last six weeks.

A pause ensued, during which UN forces regained some territory on the western front. But now the enemy shifted his strength and delivered a powerful blow in the center, beginning on the night of 15 and 16 May. The repulse of this latest offensive paved the way for the UN Command to regain the initiative. By the time the enemy's force was spent, however, Eighth Army had been driven below the parallel for distances ranging from 10 to 30 miles except on the east coast, where ROK troops retained a foothold just north of the line.⁶⁹

NSC 48/5

By the time of General MacArthur's removal, a tacit agreement had emerged within the administration concerning policy toward Korea. The objective was an end to the fighting and a return to the status quo; the mission of Eighth Army was to inflict enough attrition on the foe to induce him to settle on these terms. As yet this agreement had been embodied only in the State Department's 15 March redraft of NSC 48/2, which awaited action by the President and the National Security Council.⁷⁰

The State Department draft was revised by an informal working group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The members of this group made several significant changes. They omitted all references to the 38th parallel, which had become a dead issue. They recommended that contingency plans be developed for several of those actions against Communist China that had been listed in the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951: naval and air blockade of the coast, attack on targets within mainland China, and employment of Nationalist forces, offensively or defensively. They also incorporated some provisions of the JCS memorandum of 5 April. On 26 April their version, further revised by the NSC Senior Staff, was placed on the Council's agenda as NSC 48/3.⁷¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting in this paper before the Council meeting, focused on the following key paragraph, which declared that the United States should

seek a settlement acceptable to the United States of the Korean problem which would, as a minimum, terminate hostilities, end the aggression, and provide against its resumption. Until such a settlement is achieved, military action should continue in order to penalize the aggressor and deny him the exploitation of his aggression.

This provision, in the JCS view, "is, in effect, a course of action and is not sufficiently comprehensive to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate therefrom necessary military policies."⁷²

When the Council discussed NSC 48/3, this JCS criticism apparently received considerable weight. The members sent the draft back to the Senior Staff.⁷³ The next version, NSC 48/4, considerably expanded the statement of Korean War objectives. The United States, it was said, should seek a settlement that would end the war "under appropriate armistice arrangements"; would "restore the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of the 38th parallel"; and would permit a buildup of ROK strength so that UN forces might be withdrawn. Such a settlement should not preclude a larger agreement that would provide for a "united, independent and democratic Korea." Meanwhile, resistance to aggression must continue.⁷⁴

This new version drew JCS criticism because it implied that the indefensible line of the 38th parallel might be restored as a political boundary. Any settlement, they told Secretary Marshall on 11 May, should give the Republic of Korea "a northern boundary so located as to facilitate both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th parallel."⁷⁵ This comment was transmitted to the Council, and on 15 May 1951 the Senior Staff circulated an amendment to NSC 48/4 altering the relevant paragraph to incorporate the substance of the JCS views.⁷⁶

NSC 48/4 was debated by the Council on 16 May. Most of the discussion centered around the paragraph defining objectives in Korea. One of the speakers (perhaps Secretary Acheson) remarked that at no time had the United States adopted unification of Korea as a *military* objective. General Collins, who represented General Bradley at the meeting, replied "that while this may not have been set as a clear-cut military objective, nevertheless CINCUNC had been directed to clear Communist aggressors from all Korea." The new CINCUNC (General Ridgway), he continued, had already requested clarification on this matter, pointing out that his forces were inadequate to accomplish such a task. General Collins made it clear that, if NSC 48/4 were approved, it was likely that this paragraph "probably would be used as a basis for a new military directive to CINCUNC which would not require his forces to drive all Communists from Korea by force. This statement on my part was not questioned by any member of the Council."⁷⁷

The Council approved NSC 48/4 with the understanding that it would replace NSC 48/2 and would constitute final action on various other papers, including NSC 101—the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951. On 17 May President Truman also gave his approval to the new directive, which, in its final form, became NSC 48/5.⁷⁸

The most important portion of this document consisted of two paragraphs setting forth objectives in Korea. They reflected careful thought, in which the influence of JCS views was apparent. These two paragraphs declared that the United States should:

Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

Consistent with [the] above [paragraph] and the protection of the security of U.S. and UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with Communist China, particularly without the support of our major allies.

Another paragraph specified that an "acceptable political settlement" in Korea would be one "that does not jeopardize the United States position with respect to the USSR, to Formosa, or to seating Communist China in the UN." In the absence of such a settlement, military action should continue, "without commitment to unify Korea by military force," in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, to prevent South Korea from being overrun, and to limit Communist capabilities for aggression elsewhere.

The overall US objective in Asia was to develop free and independent nations and to reduce or eliminate the "preponderant" power of the Soviet Union. Political, diplomatic, and economic action against Communist China would continue, and plans would be drawn for military action against that country in the event of "Chinese aggression outside Korea." The United States should "continue as a matter of urgency" to influence its allies to support such actions should they become necessary. The influence of the JCS memoranda of 12 January and 5 April was apparent here.

With the promulgation of NSC 48/5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained a policy directive of the kind that they desired. Admiral Sherman, writing on 28 May, expressed the satisfaction of himself and his colleagues with the Council's action. "The current political objectives of NSC 48/5," he remarked, "were recommended, in essence, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff so as to provide a statement of short range political objectives from which an appropriate military mission could be derived."⁷⁹ Such a statement was, of course, precisely what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought in their discussions with State Department representatives.

Directives for a New Commander

With the accession of General Ridgway as CINCFE/CINCUNC, the administration gained a commander who was wholly in sympathy with the wishes of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the conflict within bounds. General Ridgway made this fact clear in two messages sent to General Van Fleet on 19 April. The first said:

Confirming my oral instructions to you in presence of your Chief of Staff on afternoon of 14 April, I desire that there be no operations in force conducted beyond the WYOMING line without prior approval of this Headquarters. To the extent you feel the situation warrants, please inform me prior to advancing in force beyond UTAH.⁸⁰

The second and longer message was intended to provide interim guidance pending the issuance of more detailed instructions. The subject of this message, significantly, was "Prevention of World War III." General Ridgway warned of the "grave and ever present danger" of an enlargement of the conflict and ordered that every commander be constantly aware of this possibility. He intended to reserve to himself the responsibility for decisions that, by committing elements of the command to "retaliatory or other forms of offensive action," might extend the area of hostilities and thus "heighten the danger of precipitating a world conflict." Admittedly the result would be to impose "restrictions and restraints" that might be "viewed as unreasonable" by subordinates. However, he himself would accept full responsibility for these limitations, and would expect the "full and willing cooperation of all concerned."⁸¹

The same cautious spirit infused the more complete instructions sent to General Van Fleet on 22 April (and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for information, three days later). These had already been discussed with General Van Fleet, who had pronounced them "clear" and "adequate." The mission assigned Eighth Army was "to repel aggression against so much of the territory (and the people therein) of the Republic of Korea as you now occupy." In pursuit of this mission, Eighth Army was authorized to conduct military operations (including amphibious and airborne landings as well as ground operations) north of the 38th parallel. However, advance of "major elements" beyond the KANSAS-WYOMING line would take place only on order of CINCFE. Moreover, under no circumstances would any elements of Eighth Army, of whatever strength, cross the Manchurian or Soviet borders, nor would any non-Korean forces "operate in North Korean territory contiguous to those borders."

Subject to these limitations and to the preservation of his forces, General Van Fleet was to direct his efforts toward inflicting maximum casualties in the enemy. "The continued piecemeal destruction of the offensive potential of the Chinese Communist and North Korean armies," ran General Ridgway's directive, "contribute[s] materially to this objective, while concurrently destroying Communist China's military prestige." This attitude was in sharp contrast to

that of General MacArthur, who had proclaimed that merely destroying the enemy served no purpose.

General Van Fleet was instructed to “maintain the offensive spirit of your Army and retain the initiative, through maximum maneuver of firepower, within the limitations imposed by logistics and terrain, and without undue sacrifice of men or equipment.” The enemy’s every weakness was to be exploited, although mere acquisition of territory was of little value. The warnings against enlarging the area of hostilities were repeated. Finally, General Van Fleet was invited to discuss the instructions with General Ridgway at any time, either to seek clarification or to propose changes.⁸²

Separate instructions to the FECOM Naval and Air Force commanders likewise stressed the importance of confining the war. Except in direct support of UN military operations, forces under their command were not to approach within 20 miles of Soviet territory or within three miles of Chinese Communist territory north of 32 degrees latitude. Nor would they cross the Manchurian or Soviet borders of Korea except with prior authorization from CINCFE. No action was to be taken against Rashin or against the hydroelectric installations along the Yalu. If US forces outside Korea were subjected to attack, the commanders were authorized to take “immediate and aggressive” measures of defense, but there would be no retaliation against Chinese or Soviet Russian targets except on order from CINCFE.⁸³

While laying down careful guidelines for his subordinates, General Ridgway felt constrained to seek from the Joint Chiefs of Staff clarification and in some cases enlargement of his own authority. A matter requiring immediate attention was the possible appearance of a new enemy on the battlefield. Intelligence reports reaching the Far East Command suggested the prospect of massive Soviet Russian intervention, with troops and aircraft, in the near future.⁸⁴ With an eye to this possibility, General Ridgway on 17 April 1951 requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize him, in the event of a Soviet attack against the Far East Command, to withdraw UN forces from Korea and use them elsewhere in defense of the FECOM.⁸⁵

This request raised political problems, since obviously the governments that had contributed forces for service in Korea would have to be consulted about using them for any other purpose. From earlier discussions of the possibility of Soviet intervention, inspired apparently by the same alarming reports,⁸⁶ the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that the time was not propitious to approach these other governments—not even the British, the closest ally of all. On 5 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a draft order to CINCFE authorizing him, in the event of any “major” air attack on UN forces originating outside Korea, to attack air bases in Manchuria and on the Shantung peninsula. On the following day General Bradley and Admiral Sherman discussed the draft with Mr. Nitze, of the Department of State, Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, and Lord Tedder, representing the British Chiefs of Staff. The British spokesmen opposed any advance grant of such authority to the UN Commander, insisting that any decision for air retaliation against China must be made at governmental level. Within the next few days, the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained the concurrence of

Secretaries Marshall and Acheson and of President Truman for their draft order. The approval was subject to the understanding that before the order was executed, the President would be consulted if time permitted; otherwise the Joint Chiefs of Staff could direct the necessary action. In a subsequent discussion with British representatives on 12 April, General Bradley and Mr. Nitze stressed the fact that any decision for retaliation against China would be made by the President, rather than by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if at all possible. Nevertheless the British still felt that their government should have a say in the matter before any retaliatory attacks were launched.⁸⁷

The British attitude colored a discussion of General Ridgway's request that took place at a JCS-State meeting on 18 April. General Bradley told the State Department representatives that the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to reply to General Ridgway that, if the Soviets attacked, he should simply report the fact and await instructions. To go beyond these steps, seeking permission from other governments for the withdrawal and reuse of their forces, did not seem promising. "I would not favor an approach to other governments on this problem at this time," said Mr. Matthews, of the State Department.⁸⁸

Accordingly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consulting Secretary Marshall and the President, told General Ridgway on 19 April that they agreed "in principle" with his request and authorized him to plan accordingly. But, they added, "major withdrawal" would not actually begin until approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, pending further instructions, no plans would be made for use of any UN forces other than those of the United States in defense of the Far East Command outside of Korea.⁸⁹

General Ridgway did not protest this decision. In a further message on the subject of withdrawal, sent on 27 April, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the absence of a political settlement, it would probably be impracticable to withdraw any major elements until UN forces had fallen back to a line running from Masan northeastward through Samnangjin and thence to the east coast. Hence, the only forces currently available to defend Japan were those already there or those that might be created up to the moment of attack.⁹⁰

The order granting CINCFE authority to retaliate against enemy bases in Manchuria and China in case of a major air attack on UN forces, which President Truman had approved a few weeks earlier, had not been sent to CINCFE.⁹¹ On 27 April General Ridgway submitted, through special channels, a request for just such authority. He warned that enemy capabilities were growing and that an air attack in support of the ground assault seemed increasingly probable. The effectiveness of any UN counteraction, he pointed out, would depend entirely on the rapidity of its delivery. Moreover, he believed he should at once be authorized to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the areas in question.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied the next day in a message that had been cleared with the Secretary of State and the President. They granted General Ridgway all the authority he had requested. They warned, however, that

the consequences of the action authorized may set in chain a course of events making it of the utmost importance to have the support of the other countries

and the right to use facilities and bases controlled by them. This support may depend upon consulting or at least informing them of the action prior to its occurrence, if at all possible you should seek JCS advice before taking action and in any case you should inform the JCS immediately and withhold publicity until notification of allies has taken place.⁹²


These exchanges of messages amounted to piecemeal amendments to the instructions that had been given CINCFE over a period of almost a year. Already General Collins, in drafting a reply to General Ridgway's message of 17 April, had drawn his colleagues' attention to the advantage of compiling a comprehensive and up-to-date directive that would consolidate all previous instructions, while modifying them as necessary. By JCS decision, therefore, the Army Staff prepared a new directive for CINCFE, which General Collins submitted on 24 April 1951. With some changes, it was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 April and, after submission to the President, was forwarded to CINCFE on 1 May 1951.⁹³

The directive was addressed to CINCFE but dealt entirely with General Ridgway's responsibilities as CINUNC. The overall UN mission was "to assist [the] ROK in repelling the aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea." The military objective of CINUNC was "to destroy the armed forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto." The pursuit of this objective was subject to two overriding considerations, the security of the forces under CINUNC and his basic mission, as CINCFE, of defending Japan. He was authorized to conduct air and naval operations within Korea and adjacent waters, but *not* to carry out action against Manchuria, the territory of the Soviet Union, or the North Korean hydroelectric complex. As a "matter of policy," no operations were to be conducted within 15 miles of Soviet territory.

The concept of operations set forth in CINCFE's message of 5 April was approved. No "general advance" was to be undertaken beyond the limit set forth in that message without prior JCS approval. However, limited tactical operations (including guerrilla actions and amphibious and airborne landings) were authorized.

The forces available to CINUNC included all US forces in FECOM except the two National Guard divisions (40th and 45th Infantry) that had recently been sent to the theater.⁹⁴ These two were not to be employed outside Japan without JCS approval. Forces made available by the ROK and by other UN members were also to serve under CINUNC.

Under no circumstances were UN forces to cross the Manchurian or Soviet borders of Korea. Naval operations were to keep "well clear" of Chinese and Soviet coastal waters. Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory was authorized up to the Yalu River in the west but "short of" the Soviet-Korean boundary in the east. Reconnaissance over the coast of China was to be limited to areas south of the 32d parallel and north of Hong Kong. US naval and air forces might participate in the defense of Taiwan, but those of other nations would not do so without prior JCS approval. There were to be no naval or air attacks on Rashin. In



the event of Chinese Communist attacks on US forces outside Korea, immediate retaliation against the Chinese mainland was approved in principle; however, subject to the right of "immediate self-defense," CINUNC would obtain JCS approval before carrying out such retaliatory actions. Withdrawal from Korea in the event of Soviet attack was also approved in principle, as it had been earlier.

General Ridgway meanwhile had prepared a draft of his own and sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 April. Apparently his dispatch crossed that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It differed from their version in that it would have allowed CINCFE to send troops across the Manchurian and Soviet borders if he felt such a step necessary—a surprising proposal coming from General Ridgway, considering what he had said to his subordinates about the dangers of enlarging the war. His version would also allow CINCFE full freedom in the use of the two National Guard divisions.⁹⁵ After comparing the two drafts, General Ridgway told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 May that their version was unclear and that he was sending a staff officer to Washington to discuss "current ambiguities and conflicting instructions." Meanwhile he requested authority to operate under his own draft.⁹⁶

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to receive General Ridgway's proposed emissary. However, they instructed him for the time being to follow their directive of 1 May and to notify them by dispatch of those portions requiring immediate clarification.⁹⁷

There were three such matters, according to General Ridgway. In a message of 9 May, he drew attention to the following points:

(1) The mission assigned CINUNC in the JCS directive was "completely beyond the capabilities of this command to accomplish with forces presently available," particularly in view of the prohibition against advancing beyond the KANSAS-WYOMING line.

(2) The two overriding missions—security of UN forces and defense of Japan—were antithetical. Together with the requirement for JCS approval of withdrawal from Korea and the prohibition against using any UN forces other than those of the United States to defend Japan, they constituted a "serious abridgement" of General Ridgway's freedom of action. He believed that he should be authorized to evacuate Korea at his discretion in case of hostilities with the Soviet Union.

(3) No clear authorization had been given to conduct reconnaissance of Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula in preparation for possible air attacks there.⁹⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that the mission assigned in their directive was beyond the capabilities of CINCFE. However, it was in consonance with existing national objectives, which were currently under review by the President and the National Security Council; when the review was completed, the mission would if necessary be amended. Regarding withdrawal from Korea, "broad considerations" dictated that the decision be retained in their hands. Moreover, they had given CINCFE ample latitude for preliminary planning and preparation. The question of air reconnaissance, they added, was being dealt with in a separate message.⁹⁹

General Ridgway's liaison officer, Colonel Roy C. Hefelbower, USAF, reached Washington on 11 May 1951 (accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. Smith, USA, who had brought the Inch'on plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff eight months earlier).¹⁰⁰ They held extensive discussions with representatives of G-3 and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A matter apparently stressed by the FECOM representatives (though not mentioned by General Ridgway) was the importance of distinguishing between the responsibilities of CINCFE and those of CINCUNC. At one time, they proposed separate directives addressed to General Ridgway in each of these two capacities but compromised on a single message in two sections. Meanwhile NSC 48/5 had been approved and had to be reflected in the instructions to General Ridgway. At length a message mutually satisfactory to all was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dispatched on 31 May 1951.¹⁰¹

The first part of the directive, addressed to CINCFE, assigned General Ridgway the mission of supporting UN operations in Korea and defending Taiwan and the Pescadores by air and naval action. If US forces outside Korea were attacked, immediate measures of self-defense might be taken. Retaliatory attacks against targets in China, Manchuria, or the Soviet Union would not be made without prior JCS approval, but plans for possible action against China (as authorized by NSC 48/5) were to be drawn up. Aerial reconnaissance over the Chinese coast, between the 32d parallel and Hong Kong, might be undertaken to determine whether an attack on Taiwan was imminent. No US ground forces were to be used in defense of Taiwan. The 40th and 45th (National Guard) Infantry Divisions were to be used only in defense of Japan unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided otherwise.

The portion addressed to CINCUNC was much longer and more detailed. The overall mission of the United Nations in Korea, restated from the 1 May directive, was to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling aggression and to restore peace and security. CINCUNC's own mission was carefully stated in language drawn largely from NSC 48/5:

As CINCUNC you will, consistent with the security of forces under your command, inflict the maximum personnel and materiel losses on the forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto, in order to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum,

- a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements;
- b. Establish the authority of ROK over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and military defense, and in no case south of 38th parallel;
- c. Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea;
- d. Permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

In pursuit of the above mission, CINCUNC was authorized to conduct air and naval operations "within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous." This authority did

not extend to the conduct of operations against Manchuria, the Soviet Union, or the Yalu River power installations. However, restrictions on operations near the borders were eased by allowing an approach of 12 miles instead of the previous 15. The limit of ground advance was now stated in general terms as "some line passing approximately through the Hwach'on reservoir area"; this change had been urged by General Ridgway on 30 April, after his forces had outstripped the KANSAS-WYOMING line in places.¹⁰²

The prohibition against attacking Rashin was retained from the 1 May directive. Likewise, provisions governing aerial reconnaissance and those relating to withdrawal in case of Soviet intervention were repeated. Finally, in the event that enemy military leaders requested an armistice, CINCUNC was to report the fact immediately and await instructions.

This directive was sent to General Ridgway even before it had been approved at higher levels. A slightly modified version, bearing the approval of the President, was forwarded on 10 July 1951.¹⁰³ It became the directive under which CINCUNC operated until the time of the armistice two years later.

Another Futile UN Appeal

In January 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told Secretary Marshall that they favored another search for reinforcements for the UN Command.¹⁰⁴ The Department of State dutifully undertook the task, but the results were meager.

On 23 February Secretary Acheson informed Secretary Marshall that the Department of State was attempting to procure an additional battalion apiece from Australia and New Zealand, and that it was planned to ask Canada to increase her contingent to the size originally offered. Discussions with Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Peru would be held soon. Although it appeared "unwise" to press Greece or Turkey at that time, any voluntary offers from those countries would be encouraged, and in fact the Embassy in Athens had been asked to sound out the possibility of raising the Greek contribution from a battalion to a brigade. Finally, talks "at the technical military level" were planned with Uruguay, Ethiopia, and Cuba, which had already made offers. All other possible contributors, except those specifically excluded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been reviewed, but it appeared useless to approach any countries other than those already mentioned.¹⁰⁵

Additional Canadian troops had already been tentatively earmarked for Korea several months earlier and were in training at Fort Lewis, Washington. The United States asked the Canadian Government to speed up the dispatch of these troops, while at the same time General Collins discussed the matter with Canadian military representatives in Washington. On 21 February 1951 the Canadian Minister of Defence announced that the training of these troops was almost completed and that they would proceed to Korea "shortly." Their strength—two battalions, with support units—when added to the battalion already there, would give Canada the equivalent of a brigade group.¹⁰⁶

About the same time, two lesser nations, Argentina and Norway, came forward, apparently on their own initiative. On 8 February 1951 the Department of Defense was advised that Argentina was considering the offer of two air squadrons, with the understanding that US aircraft would be furnished on a loan basis. The political importance of Argentine participation was such that the Department of State hoped that the offer would be favorably considered if it materialized.¹⁰⁷ The JCS view was that the two Argentine squadrons would have "nominal" tactical value and that the aircraft could be more profitably used elsewhere, for example, in Indochina, Greece, or Iran. They would, however, approve the offer on the premise that it might be "a lever for procuring substantial Latin American ground forces." If this "token" from Argentina's "considerable military potential" were accepted with no indication that more was expected, Argentina might not only restrict her own participation but also influence other Latin American nations to act similarly.¹⁰⁸ Deputy Secretary Lovett forwarded these comments to State on 9 March 1951, with his concurrence,¹⁰⁹ but nothing more was heard of the matter; evidently the Argentine offer was never formally made.

Norway's offer, tendered on 9 March to the UN Secretary-General, was of a field hospital, with staff. Its value could hardly be debated. By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally submitted their approval to the Secretary of Defense, the Norwegian Embassy had already discussed the matter with US Army representatives, and the shipment of the hospital was expected to be completed by 25 May 1951.¹¹⁰

Secretary Acheson's letter of 23 February had defined the limits of what seemed possible. But Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett still hoped that more might be accomplished. He wrote the Secretary of State on 31 March that, while he appreciated the difficulties involved, he believed that "an opportune moment is at hand to renew the requests for fuller participation by members of the United Nations." Troops from other countries were needed to enable those of the United States to rest and refit or to be redeployed, either to other strategic areas or to the Zone of Interior to serve as mobilization cadres. He urged an effort to obtain "real rather than token assistance." In particular, he hoped that Australia, New Zealand, and Canada might further increase their forces and that British troops might be brought to division strength. Some of the Latin American republics, he thought, notably Brazil and Mexico, might also make effective contributions.¹¹¹

The Secretary of State replied on 26 April that the Department of State had exhausted the possibilities. All other countries that appeared to be in position to make "substantial contributions" had been approached. Regarding the United Kingdom, he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended against soliciting help from that country or from the continental NATO members. Australia and New Zealand had been asked for another battalion apiece. The Australian Government would not act until after its general election on 28 April; New Zealand had responded favorably, but must first discuss the subject with other Commonwealth governments. There was little prospect of any Canadian contribution other than the units already preparing at Fort Lewis. Turkey and Greece would be likely to meet any request with a counterdemand, the first for a full US security commitment, the other for additional financial help. Moreover,

Greece, like Iran, faced hostile neighbors. Israel and the Arab States were debarred by reason of their "modest" military establishments and by the extremity of Middle Eastern tensions. Pakistan was preoccupied with the Kashmir dispute; India obviously would not welcome a US approach. The Philippines confronted overriding internal security needs. The advisability of approaching Thailand was under study; the US Ambassador in Bangkok had been asked for his opinion.

As for Latin American countries, the subject had been broached at a recent meeting of their Foreign Ministers. Requests for a Brazilian division and a Peruvian RCT, made at that time, were awaiting further discussion. Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay had also agreed to consider the matter; Mexico had not.

The Secretary closed with earnest assurances that he was fully aware of the importance of larger contributions from other countries and would continue to seek them. He would also be receptive to any suggestions from the Department of Defense.¹¹²

Secretary Marshall passed this letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Secretaries on 18 May, asking for their suggestions.¹¹³ The result was another round of State-Defense discussions, no more productive than earlier ones.¹¹⁴ Meanwhile the Department of State learned that New Zealand would be unable to send another battalion; to do so would prejudice her ability to meet commitments to US-UK war plans. Hence, reinforcement would be limited to approximately 50 percent of New Zealand's force; even these troops would not be available before the end of September.¹¹⁵

What lessons could be learned from this first venture into collective military action in support of peace? At the request of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the question for the benefit of the UN Collective Measures Committee. On 13 April 1951 they furnished a summary and appraisal of the standardized procedures that had been developed for bringing UN forces into the field. They believed that these procedures "have generally worked well," but that they reflected in large measure the "unique financial and political position of the United States." There was "considerable doubt" whether the Korean example could serve as a model for future actions, particularly if some nation other than the United States were to hold the Unified Command. Moreover, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the logistic aspects could be improved; most of the contributing countries had not furnished either initial equipment or resupply for their forces. Any future actions should involve balanced forces from each nation, with proper logistic support. Finally, the cost of the operation could not yet be allocated among the participating nations. For all these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to make it clear that they were not endorsing the current procedures and practices for future use.¹¹⁶

Stalemate and Opportunity

The fierce enemy attack that erupted on 15 to 16 May 1951 was brought to a halt after three days, largely by artillery fire of unparalleled intensity and

volume. By 19 May it was clear that the enemy was overextended and vulnerable to a counteroffensive. Eighth Army drove forward against the disorganized foe, inflicting tremendous casualties. At the end of the month the UN forces had regained most of the length of the KANSAS line.¹¹⁷

On 30 May General Ridgway sent two important messages to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first informed them that, after personal reconnaissance and conferences with the field commanders, he had authorized Eighth Army to advance to a line curving northeastward from the Hwach'on Reservoir to reach the coast near Kansong. This line was north of KANSAS, but General Ridgway did not believe that it represented a "general advance," such as required prior JCS approval, since the purpose was merely to maintain contact with the enemy and keep him off balance.¹¹⁸ The Joint Chiefs of Staff tacitly approved this new line and, as already described, incorporated it into their 31 May directive.

The other message, considerably longer, opened with a detailed appraisal of the military situation. The enemy, declared General Ridgway, had suffered a "severe major defeat." Losses of troops had been enormous; field commanders' estimates of enemy dead were so great that General Ridgway could not accept them. Moreover, morale had been shaken. The enemy's fighting spirit was deteriorating; prisoners were being captured from all three US corps zones; increasing numbers of Chinese were surrendering; many captives reported shortages of food. Ammunition supplies were being captured in unprecedented quantities. "A plainly evident disorganization now exists among both CCF and NKPA forces," reported CINCFE.

Appraising enemy strength, General Ridgway estimated that there were thirteen Chinese armies in the battle area, of which only seven were believed capable of further strong offensive action at that time. There were also five North Korean corps, believed to be understrength and short of equipment. An additional Chinese army group in the west, between the Imjin and the Yesong, was reported but not confirmed. All these forces added up to a capability of resisting the UN advance or of attempting limited new attacks. Eighth Army was fully prepared for either prospect; it was "at near full strength with morale excellent and confidence high." Currently it was attacking toward a general line running from Ch'orwon and Kumhwa through Hwach'on Reservoir to the east coast (approximately the KANSAS-WYOMING line), in order to inflict maximum casualties on enemy troops and supplies. This attack was expected to reach its objective line within two weeks unless there were additional enemy forces between the Imjin and the Yesong. Should the attack continue, General Ridgway promised to submit, within the next few days, a new estimate, with recommendations for further action. But in any case, it was clear that the enemy could bring to bear a force no larger than the one that Eighth Army had twice defeated within the past two months.

These considerations led up to the following important conclusion by General Ridgway:

I therefore believe that for the next 60 days the United States government should be able to count with reasonable assurance upon a military situation in Korea offering optimum advantages in support of its diplomatic negotiations.¹¹⁹

Thus in Korea, as in Washington, the stage was set for a new attempt to end the war. Eighth Army had passed the crisis of midwinter and could hold its own. It had reached a defensible line that embraced substantially all of South Korea's prewar territory and was thus satisfactory to the United Nations as the basis for a settlement. Since any general advance into North Korea had been ruled out, the only course of action was to remain essentially along the present line and to bring maximum pressure against the enemy to bring him to the negotiating table. "If we break the morale of their armies," said Secretary Marshall on 7 May 1951, speaking to the committee investigating the MacArthur dismissal, "but, more particularly, if we destroy their best-trained armies as we have been in the process of doing, there, it seems to me, you develop the best probability of reaching a satisfactory negotiatory basis."¹²⁰

It remained to be seen how the enemy would react to the new situation. But before entering upon an account of the movement for a cease-fire that was soon to develop, it is necessary to interrupt the narrative to describe a dramatic diversion: President Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur on 11 April 1951 and the ensuing controversy in Congress, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were intimately involved.

The Relief of General MacArthur

The abrupt dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur on 10 April 1951 temporarily eclipsed events on the battlefield and set in motion a searching inquiry into the conduct of the war. President Truman summarily removed General MacArthur from all the positions that he held: Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East Command; and Commanding General, Army Forces Far East. His successor in all these positions was Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway.

The President took this drastic action only after the most painful and thorough deliberation and with the unanimous support of his principal civilian and military assistants. A surge of public indignation followed the General's removal, so intense that the President was burned in effigy and senior members of Congress seriously discussed his impeachment. Unfortunate errors in administrative handling of the relief gave unintentional and unnecessary affront to General MacArthur and aggravated the public reaction.¹

The firing of General MacArthur culminated a series of incidents that had been accumulating since early in the Korean War. Statements made by the General in direct disagreement with the President's policies and in violation of his orders had caused President Truman intermittent concern and annoyance. He had sought to avoid the ultimate action by polite warnings, by clear directives, and by explanation of the intent of his policy conveyed by several emissaries. These had failed to deter General MacArthur from publicly voicing his dissatisfaction and disagreement with the manner in which the President was directing US affairs in the Far East—and finally from violating the President's orders. The distinguished military leader paid a heavy price for his transgression—dismissal from his commands.

The Disagreement over Taiwan

The first hairline crack that was to widen into an unbridgeable gulf between President Truman and General MacArthur appeared in August 1950 in connection with Taiwan (Formosa). President Truman had announced on 27 June that the US Seventh Fleet would protect the island. The intent of this move was to neutralize the area and forestall military operations by either the Communists or the Nationalists. The JCS directive to General MacArthur two days later had made him responsible for defending Taiwan and had confirmed an earlier decision placing the Seventh Fleet under his operational control. But despite the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Secretary of Defense Johnson, the President had not yet authorized a military aid program for Chiang Kai-shek.²

Recognition of the strategic importance of Taiwan was one reason for JCS reluctance to accept Chiang's offer of troops for use in Korea. His forces lacked the training and equipment necessary to enable them to fight effectively in Korea, and their withdrawal would weaken Taiwan's defenses to no purpose. Accepting this view, the President had tactfully put off Chiang with a recommendation that any transfer of troops be carefully discussed with CINCFE in connection with plans for defending the island. "It is understood," concluded the aide-memoire on this subject that was given the Nationalists on 1 July 1950, "that General MacArthur's Headquarters will be in communication with the appropriate Chinese military authorities on Taiwan with a view to the dispatch from Tokyo of representatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters for this purpose."³

General MacArthur planned to make this trip himself as soon as the situation in Korea permitted him to do so. He so informed Generals Collins and Vandenberg during their visit to Tokyo in mid-July. Already Admiral Struble had visited Taiwan and had worked out a coordinated defense plan whereby the Seventh Fleet would guard the outer approaches, while the Nationalist forces would defend the inner zone. General MacArthur also made it clear that he was in full agreement with the decision not to use Nationalist troops in Korea, both because they were needed at home, and because their need for artillery and logistic support would make them "an albatross around our neck for months."⁴

The State Department's aide-memoire was not intended to authorize a survey of Nationalist China's military needs as a basis for an aid program. In a letter to General Burns on 7 July, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk made it clear that his department had agreed only to a reconnaissance to determine whether Chiang's troops could be spared for Korea. Secretary Johnson sent this letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, noting that he intended to have the subject of Taiwan placed on the NSC agenda in the near future.⁵

Replying on 27 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth their conviction that Taiwan was of strategic importance. Regardless of the situation in Korea, they believed, the United States should continue to deny the island to the Communists. Whether the Seventh Fleet could do so, in view of the demands placed on it by the Korean War, was doubtful; in any case the Nationalist forces should be enabled to defend themselves effectively. For this purpose, the United States should furnish materiel and supplies. Chiang's urgent needs in this respect,

which were already known, should be satisfied at once; other requirements should be determined through a survey made by FECOM.⁶

The JCS recommendations were discussed by the National Security Council on 27 July. The President approved them in principle, leaving the Secretaries of State and Defense to work out details.⁷ On 3 August 1950, following discussions with the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General MacArthur at once to initiate a survey of the assistance required to enable the Chinese Nationalists to defend Taiwan.⁸ CINCFE accordingly sent a mission headed by Major General Alonzo P. Fox. The report of this group, sent to Washington in September, became the basis for a mutual defense assistance program for Nationalist China, which was ultimately approved before the end of 1950.⁹

Near the end of July 1950, an alarming buildup of Chinese Communist forces on the mainland opposite Taiwan, plus the continuing deterioration of the situation on the island, led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a modification of the President's policy of neutralizing the Strait of Taiwan. On 25 July they instructed CINCFE to make a naval demonstration in the waters around the island, even though it meant withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from action in Korea at what General MacArthur considered a "critical moment."¹⁰ Three days later they spelled out the nature of the threat in a memorandum to Secretary Johnson. The Chinese Communists were believed capable of launching as many as 200,000 troops against Taiwan; even against US naval opposition, enough of these would probably get through to jeopardize the stability of the Nationalist Government and induce defections among its military forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly recommended that the President's statement of 27 June, forbidding Nationalist attacks on the mainland, be "clarified" to allow Chiang's forces to strike at amphibious concentrations and to mine the waters of the China coast opposite the island. Secretary Johnson endorsed this suggestion and forwarded it to Secretary Acheson, who, however, found grave objections. Mining operations, he thought, would be acceptable if suitable precautions, such as notification to international shipping, were observed. Preventive bombing of the mainland, however, was out of the question. Even if such operations were carried out solely by Chinese Nationalist forces, the responsibility of the United States would be manifest; the result would be at best a danger of estrangement of friendly governments, and at worst, war with Communist China.¹¹

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought General MacArthur's views and found him in full agreement. He stressed the resentment of Nationalist military officers occasioned by their inability to strike at growing Communist concentrations. He was planning a trip to Taiwan on 31 July, he said, "to make a brief reconnaissance of the situation there."¹²

This trip took place on schedule, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to CINCFE that he postpone it for a few days pending policy discussions between the Departments of State and Defense.¹³ It was to have fateful consequences, marking the beginning of the breach between General MacArthur and President Truman. Some of the General's actions and statements while on Taiwan suggested an inclination to identify the United States with the interests of

Nationalist China and to reject the administration's policy of neutralizing the island. Statements by Nationalist officials did nothing to discourage this impression, and the reaction in the world press was highly unfavorable. After he returned to Tokyo, General MacArthur denied that his visit had any political significance or that there was any disagreement between his headquarters and Washington. His trip, he said, had been "maliciously misinterpreted" by those who had "propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific."¹⁴

While en route to Taiwan, General MacArthur had sent a message to the Department of the Army in which he remarked that he intended to transfer three squadrons of F-80C fighters to the island in case it was attacked.¹⁵ The Department of State representative on Taiwan had reported this intention to his superiors in words that conveyed the impression that the transfer had already been decided on and would take place in a few days. Departmental concern was transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who warned CINCFE that any such action would have "strong political implications" and should not be undertaken until it had been considered at the "highest levels" in Washington. General MacArthur replied that there was no intention to transfer any aircraft to the island except in case of attack.¹⁶

Secretary Johnson apparently entertained a hope that the JCS recommendation to allow Chiang greater latitude in operations against mainland China would be approved at a meeting of the National Security Council scheduled for 3 August. At his request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a message that would grant CINCFE standing authority to permit the Nationalist Government to attack the mainland when intelligence indicated that a Communist attack was imminent.¹⁷

The outcome, however, was quite different from these expectations. The National Security Council considered the question and referred it to the Secretaries of State and Defense.¹⁸ In subsequent discussions, the President rejected Secretary Johnson's recommendations and instructed him to send CINCFE a sharp reminder that the decision of 27 June 1950 remained in force. This message, sent on 4 August, read as follows:

Under the President's decision of June 27, you are to repel any attack upon Formosa and the Pescadores. Likewise, you are to stop attacks from Formosa upon the mainland. No one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to order or authorize preventive action against concentrations on the mainland. You should report currently and urgently intelligence regarding such concentrations and make every effort to keep reconnaissance reports current. Your recommendations are desired from time to time to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on appropriate action which you recommend be taken to meet the facts you report. The most vital national interest requires that no action of ours precipitate general war or give excuse to others to do so. This message has the approval of the President and Secretary of State.¹⁹

General MacArthur's reply was all that any superior could ask of a subordinate. He told Secretary Johnson on 5 August that

the President's decision of June 27 is fully understood here and this headquarters has been and is operating meticulously in accordance therewith. . . . I understand

thoroughly the limitations of my authority as Theater Commander and you need have no anxiety that I will in any way exceed them. I hope neither the President nor you has been misled by false or speculative reports from whatever source, official or non-official.²⁰

Two days later, General MacArthur sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a formal report on his trip to Taiwan. He had found that while Chinese forces on Taiwan had a good potential, substantial improvements would be needed before they were fully effective. The only substantive actions that he had taken with respect to his responsibilities for Taiwan had been to direct US naval air forces to make periodic reconnaissance flights over some of the mainland coastal areas. As a means of developing some readiness to intervene if necessary, he had also directed familiarization flights on a low-intensity basis to include refueling landings on Taiwan by US fighter aircraft.²¹

In the hope of ensuring a genuine meeting of the minds with his Far East Commander, President Truman decided at this time to send Ambassador Harriman to Tokyo, as described earlier (Chapter 4). Accompanied by General Ridgway and General Norstad, Mr. Harriman proceeded to Japan and held extensive discussions with General MacArthur on 6 and 8 August. On his return, he reported that their talks were cordial and that the General had given assurances of his willingness to comply with instructions. Nevertheless the Ambassador came away with a feeling of unease. "For reasons which are rather difficult to explain," he told the President, "I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position and will act accordingly, but without full conviction."²²

President Truman, however, believed that the troubles had been smoothed over.²³ On 10 August he told a news conference that "General MacArthur and I are in perfect agreement, and have been ever since he has been in the job he is now. . . . I am satisfied with what he is doing."²⁴

In a further effort to remove any occasion for misunderstanding of administration policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the President, sent General MacArthur a message on 14 August 1950 clarifying the directive of 27 June. The President's intention, they explained, had been to limit the US defense of Taiwan to operations that could be carried out without committing any forces to the island itself. General MacArthur was therefore to make no commitment to the Nationalists to place fighter squadrons on Taiwan in case of attack. No US forces were to be based there without specific JCS approval.²⁵

The VFW Incident

Less than two weeks later, the relations between President and General were seriously and, as it turned out, irreparably damaged by another incident. General MacArthur had been invited to address the annual encampment of the

Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), which was scheduled to open in Chicago at the end of the month. Unable to appear in person, he sent a message to be read at the convention. As his theme, he chose Taiwan, which, he said, was the subject of "misconceptions currently being voiced." For the most part, his letter expressed, often in identical language, the views set forth in his memorandum of 14 June 1950, which Secretary Johnson had brought back from the Far East and had read to the Blair House meeting on 25 June.²⁶ It contained two paragraphs, however, that could be read as an attack on the administration's cautious policy regarding the island. They read as follows:

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia.

Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership—to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation—and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment, for few of its people fail accurately to appraise the safeguard such determination brings to their free institutions.²⁷

These words, preceded as they were by a vigorous assertion of Taiwan's strategic importance to the United States, were difficult to reconcile with the administration's public assurances that the United States had no ulterior motive in neutralizing the island. President Truman had made an authoritative statement to this effect on 19 July 1950, when, in his message to Congress dealing with the Far Eastern crisis, he had included the following passage.

In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. . . .²⁸

The General's message was to be read on 28 August, but it was released ahead of time and was published in a weekly news magazine that went to press on Friday evening, 25 August 1950.²⁹ Almost immediately it came to the attention of Secretary Acheson, who was "outraged" at its "effrontery and damaging effect at home and abroad."³⁰ President Truman learned of it the next day and at once concluded that it "could only serve to confuse the world as to just what our Formosa policy was."³¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also concerned. As General Collins said later, they did not question General MacArthur's assessment of the value of the island, but they were disturbed by "the sort of imputation contained in the letter that we wanted Formosa as a military base."³²

The statement came at a particularly inauspicious time. On 25 August the UN Security Council had received from Communist China a communication accusing the United States of "open encroachment" on Chinese territory and demanding the withdrawal of "armed invading forces from Taiwan and from other territories belonging to China." Ambassador Austin, in a letter to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, immediately denied any US aggression against China and gave assurance that the neutralization of Taiwan on 27 June "was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States."³³

The President had scheduled a meeting for the morning of 26 August with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this meeting, thoroughly aroused, he read the MacArthur message and asked those present if they had known of it in advance. All said no. He then directed Secretary Johnson to order General MacArthur to withdraw the statement.³⁴

Secretary Johnson thereupon sent the General the following terse message on the subject:

The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.³⁵

General MacArthur sought to have this order reconsidered. In a reply to the Secretary of Defense, he defended his VFW message as being in harmony with the President's statement of 27 June, which had characterized a Communist occupation of Taiwan as being "a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces . . . in that area." Moreover, the message had been published and any attempt to suppress it would, he believed, do more harm than good. But his protest was disallowed and the message was formally withdrawn.³⁶

Perhaps in order to lessen the abruptness of the withdrawal order, President Truman followed it on 29 August with a message to the General that was couched in conciliatory terms. He drew attention to Ambassador Austin's recent letter to the Secretary-General, which had restated the US policy of neutralizing Taiwan while awaiting a peaceful settlement of its permanent status. He believed that this letter would make it clear why he had felt it necessary to order the VFW message withdrawn. He added that the report by General Collins and Admiral Sherman of their recent conversations in Tokyo had been "most satisfying and highly gratifying."³⁷

The incident was over, but the consequences lingered. General Bradley later characterized the dispute over the VFW letter as the first in the sequence of events that were ultimately to lead to General MacArthur's dismissal.³⁸ Indeed, President Truman considered relieving the General at that time and actually discussed the possibility with the Secretary of Defense. His tentative plan was to appoint General Bradley as the field commander in the Far East, relegating General MacArthur to command of the occupation forces in Japan. He finally decided against this drastic step, however. "It would have been difficult to avoid

the appearance of a demotion," he later wrote, "and I had no desire to hurt General MacArthur personally."³⁹

Effects of the Chinese Intervention

The flurry over Taiwan subsided and in the next three months no untoward incidents marred the relationship between the President and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. The exchange of views over the proposed Inch'on landing, with General MacArthur prevailing, evoked no distrust of the General's motives. Although a public impression had been created that Washington officials had opposed General MacArthur's brilliant strategy, he proved generous in success and refrained from tactless statements. Nor did the potentially explosive issue of the crossing of the 38th parallel in October introduce any tension in relations between him and his superiors. Later that month, his strained interpretation of the JCS directive of 27 September 1950, adopted in order to justify his intention to advance to the Yalu, aroused misgivings in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁰ But they did not bring their concern to the attention of the President, and General MacArthur did not criticize the national policy on which the JCS directive was based.

The era of good feeling after the Wake Island meeting on 17 October, at which General MacArthur received a Distinguished Service Medal from President Truman and vowed that no American commander had ever received such fine support as he, proved ephemeral. For the adversities of early November brought with them new indications of differences between Washington and Tokyo.

On 6 November, without bothering to check with Washington or even to notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur ordered his air forces to bomb the Yalu river bridges. In so doing he was ignoring the orders that he had received on 29 June to stay well clear of the Manchurian and Soviet borders. The reaction in Washington was immediate and strongly adverse, although the bombing was finally authorized. There is little question that General MacArthur's actions in this case, in which it appeared he had intended to present the President with a *fait accompli*, reinforced the growing view among Washington officials that he was not to be entirely trusted.⁴¹

In justifying the bombing of the Yalu bridges, General MacArthur painted a picture of a worsening military situation, with enemy forces swelling as men and supplies poured in from Communist China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drew the conclusion that CINCFE's mission might have to be changed, and so suggested on 8 November. General MacArthur fired back a protest in strongest terms, blaming interference by other nations for this suggestion. His mission was not changed, but again the seeds of distrust were nourished.⁴²

Nevertheless, General MacArthur offered no public criticism of the national policy until after the main Chinese attack in late November. In two separate instances on 1 December, a magazine interview and a personal message to the head of the United Press, he criticized limitations against hot pursuit and against

attacks on Manchurian bases. These limitations he labeled "an enormous handicap, without precedent in military history." He came dangerously close to impugning the motives of European allies, speaking of their "selfish" and "short-sighted" viewpoints, and implying that they were responsible for the withholding of support for his forces.⁴³

The timing of these utterances could hardly have been worse. Western Europeans, to whom General MacArthur referred so disparagingly, were increasingly fearful that some intemperate action of his might involve them in a large-scale ground war with Communist China. This fear had been accentuated by the President's unfortunate statement of 30 November, which had inadvertently suggested possible use of atomic weapons in Korea. President Truman and his advisors were even then going to great pains to reassure Prime Minister Attlee and other allied leaders that the United States intended, if at all possible, to avoid a war with China.⁴⁴ As for the limitations of which he complained, these had been set by the President, taking into consideration factors that General MacArthur discounted or of which he was not fully aware.

The unfavorable JCS reaction to General MacArthur's statements was heightened by the fact that they believed him to be at least partly responsible for his own predicament in Korea. He had induced Washington to approve his plans for the disastrous November advances by persuasive insistence that the Chinese would not intervene effectively.⁴⁵

The effect of General MacArthur's statements, according to the President in his memoirs, was to cause "many people abroad" to believe that the United States would change its policy.⁴⁶ In reaction, the President issued an extraordinary instruction. On 5 December he sent a letter to all Cabinet members and other officials of the Executive Branch stating his wish

that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the executive branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.

No speech, press release or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

No speech, press release or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

At the same time the President forwarded to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense a memorandum as follows:

I wish the following steps to be taken: Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.

There can be little doubt of the intent of the President's instructions or of the fact that he was aiming them directly at General MacArthur. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff did not formulate a separate directive for CINCFE but merely forwarded the President's letter and memorandum to all major overseas commanders, including General MacArthur, stating that they were for "guidance" and "appropriate action."⁴⁷

Complying with the letter of this directive, General MacArthur submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 December a proposed communique for release to the press. In this he stated that his forces were now waiting for "political decisions and policies demanded by the entry of Communist China into the war. . . . The suggestion widely broadcast," he continued, "that the command has suffered a rout or debacle is pure nonsense." He further charged that advance notice of Communist China's decision to attack was "a matter for political intelligence," which, however, had "failed to filter from behind the Iron Curtain. Field intelligence was so handicapped that once the decision to commit was made, this new enemy power could move forward . . . without fear of detection." The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this communique to be out of line with the new directive and told General MacArthur that in the future he should confine his communiqués to completed phases of military operations. "Discussions of foreign and military policy, references to press comments, and comments relative to political or domestic matters should not be included in military communiqués issued in the field," they informed him.⁴⁸

In the meantime, General MacArthur had spelled out for General Collins in Tokyo those measures that he wanted taken against Communist China, including air attacks and a naval blockade, if the enemy attack in Korea continued. In ensuing weeks, he continued to insist forcefully that he should be allowed to carry the war to the Chinese outside Korea. But he confined his communications to official channels, in a manner quite proper for a theater commander.

Not until mid-February did General MacArthur, apparently out of frustration, take his case to the press once more. In a statement of 13 February, he reverted to his old tactics, charging that unless he were allowed to reduce Chinese superiority—by implication, through attacks on China—he could not consider major operations north of the 38th parallel. Three weeks later, in another blast at national policy, he asserted that vital decisions yet to be made must be provided on "the highest international levels" in order to dispel "the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea." These statements, containing comments on foreign and military policy of the United States, directly violated the President's orders of 5 December.⁴⁹

Although these intemperate remarks by General MacArthur were not forgotten in Washington, favorable developments on the field of battle took the edge off their effect for the moment. By mid-March it was apparent that General Ridgway was wresting the initiative from the enemy with such operations as RIPPER. Encouraged by these developments, Defense and State officials perceived that events might be ripening to a point where the enemy might be favorably disposed toward some form of settlement. He was being pushed back into North Korea and it might be possible to negotiate on the basis of the pre-war status.

On 19 March the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed a draft Presidential proclamation that would in effect invite the enemy

to negotiate. On the next day the Joint Chiefs of Staff received for consideration from the Secretary of Defense a revised draft of this document that had been written by State Department planners.⁵⁰

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed only minor changes in wording. The tenor of the announcement was that the aggressors had been driven back to the line from which they had launched their attack and that as a result, a basis now existed for restoring a generally acceptable peace. Consequently the UN Command would be willing to sit down with the Communists and discuss ways of ending the fighting and of establishing a unified, democratic government in Korea. This invitation to negotiate was, however, combined with a warning that, if it was rejected, the United Nations would carry on the fight.⁵¹

On 20 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General MacArthur that the President planned to make the announcement. They told him:

State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort towards settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of the 38th parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.⁵²

General MacArthur's reply constituted another in his series of protests against the restrictions placed on his operations and barely noticed the specific request in the JCS message. It read:

Recommend that no further military restrictions be imposed upon the United Nations Command in Korea. The inhibitions which already exist should not be increased. The military disadvantage arising from restrictions upon the scope of our Air and Naval operations coupled with the disparity between the size of our command and the enemy ground potential renders it completely impracticable to attempt to clear North Korea or to make any appreciable effort to that end. My present directives, establishing the security of the command as the paramount consideration, are adequate to cover the 2 points raised by the State Department.⁵³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this message on 21 March with Mr. Nitze and other State Department representatives. The conferees ignored General MacArthur's objections and approved a redraft of the proposed announcement. Later that day, a final version was approved by the President for clearance with other governments associated in the UN Command.⁵⁴

Three days later, while the draft declaration was being discussed with other governments, General MacArthur preempted the Presidential initiative with his own call on the enemy to parley with him in the field. He compounded this indiscretion by further derogatory observations on the national policy toward Korea, together with derision of Communist China and a threat to expand the

war. Had he deliberately sought to do so, the UN Commander could hardly have found a more effective way to arouse the President's wrath.

General MacArthur's statement, released to the public on 24 March (Far East time), proclaimed that Communist China was a vastly overrated military power. "Even under inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China," he declared, "it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea." The contrast between this confident assertion and the assessments that he had given several months earlier was striking. As before, however, General MacArthur set forth his belief that "the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere."

His statement continued:

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. . . .

Within my area of authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.⁵⁵

It appears that General MacArthur utterly failed to realize the political implications of this statement and regarded himself as acting well within his authority in issuing it. This conviction was reflected in the reference to his "authority as a military commander" and to the effort to find "military means" to realize UN objectives. In his memoirs, General MacArthur was later to speak of the statement as a "routine communique" in the "local voice of a theater commander." He pointed out that twice before in Korea he had called upon the enemy to surrender without the "slightest whisper of remonstrance" from Washington.⁵⁶

Unknown to the General, however, his message produced a "diplomatic furor," in President Truman's phrase. A flood of inquiries poured in from allied nations, asking if General MacArthur's words meant a shift in policy. Owing to this result, the President was not prepared to find excuses for General MacArthur's action. It was, he later wrote,

a most extraordinary statement for a military commander of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility. It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any declarations on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as President and as Commander in Chief. . . . By this act MacArthur left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination.⁵⁷

The President called in Secretary of State Acheson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lovett, and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk. All agreed that his 5

December instructions had been very clear. He thereupon directed that General MacArthur be reminded at once of his duty under the order.⁵⁸

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly sent a priority message to General MacArthur on the same day, telling him:

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted . . . [on] 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you . . . [on] 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December.

The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.⁵⁹

The relatively mild tone of this message scarcely presaged the violence of the storm that was about to break. A deed done before the receipt of this warning was to prove fatal to General MacArthur's military career. On 20 March he had replied to a letter from Congressman Joseph W. Martin, Jr., minority leader of the House of Representatives. Evidently sharing General MacArthur's outlook, Mr. Martin sought the General's endorsement of his views on the use of Chinese Nationalist forces. General MacArthur, in his reply, indicated his agreement and repeated his well-known contention that administration policy favored Europe at the expense of Asia. He concluded with a phrase that was to become famous in subsequent months: "There is no substitute for victory." Unfortunately for General MacArthur, Congressman Martin on 5 April 1951 chose to read the letter on the floor of the House of Representatives, thus publicizing it to the nation and the world.⁶⁰

General MacArthur later testified that the Martin letter was in his mind a "routine communication," of so little importance that he could scarcely recall it. But when President Truman learned of the letter he decided that, in his own words, "the time had come to draw the line."⁶¹

During the next few days, Washington was the scene of extraordinary conferences as the President consulted his chief advisors on what should be done about General MacArthur.

The Issue Is Joined

Any realistic consideration of the problem of what to do about General MacArthur had to take into account his almost unparalleled prestige with the American people and his popularity within Congress. He was the son of a well-known Civil War hero. His own career had been distinguished by unusual accomplishment almost from the day in 1903 when he had graduated from the United States Military Academy with a scholastic record of 98.14, one of the highest marks ever attained at that venerable institution. In World War I, as chief of staff of the 42d "Rainbow" Division and, later, as commander of one of its brigades, his courage and outstanding leadership in combat had earned him

enviable reputation and promotion to the rank of brigadier general at the youthful age of 38.⁶²

Following World War I, General MacArthur served with distinction as Superintendent of the United States Military Academy and ultimately, from 1930 to 1935, as Chief of Staff, United States Army. He retired from the Army on 31 December 1937, having served as a general officer on the active list for nearly twenty years. He became military advisor (with the rank of Field Marshal) to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, a post he held until mid-1941 when war with Japan threatened and he was called back into Army service. In 1944 he was given the newly created rank of General of the Army. The luster of his reputation following his remarkable strategic achievements in the war in the Pacific was heightened by his personal acceptance of the surrender of Japan aboard the USS *Missouri*.

General MacArthur's performance as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, to which high office he acceded in 1945, had, as expected, been of the highest calibre and he was widely regarded as an ideal "proconsul" for conquered Japan. This performance conferred upon him a considerable reputation as a soldier-diplomat.

On two occasions in late 1945, General MacArthur turned down "invitations" to come back to the United States, from which he had been absent since 1937, to receive honors from a grateful nation. On 17 September 1945 General Marshall, then Chief of Staff, US Army, "suggested," at President Truman's direction, that General MacArthur return to visit the United States. General Marshall outlined a schedule that included an address to a joint session of Congress, a Presidential reception, and appearances before Congressional committees studying postwar national defense. General MacArthur turned aside the suggestion on the grounds that conditions in the Far East were so unstable that it would not be safe for him to leave them to other hands, even briefly. And in any event he would not wish to appear before Congressional committees which might involve him in "controversial issues." On 19 October President Truman issued a second invitation to General MacArthur that sounded much like an order. "The President," wrote General Marshall, "has asked me to inform you that he wishes you to understand that he would like you to make a trip home at such time you feel you can safely leave your duties." General MacArthur took advantage of the loophole, saying that while he would ordinarily respond to such an invitation without delay he was unable to do so because of the "extraordinarily dangerous and inherently inflammable situation which exists here." He was not to return to the United States for almost six years.⁶³

At the height of World War II, General MacArthur had shown some signs of political ambition. Some sentiment and support had developed for his nomination as Republican candidate for President of the United States during the 1944 Presidential campaign. But after some equivocal correspondence with Republican congressmen on the matter, General MacArthur eventually announced that he was not a candidate for the office and did not seek it. No high military officer at the front, he maintained, should be considered for President.⁶⁴

During the 1948 Presidential campaign General MacArthur's name, as he stated, "was again precipitated into the struggle for the Republican nomination

for the Presidency." He declined to become a candidate. "I had not the slightest desire to become the head of state," he later wrote, "having had more than enough of such an office in the administration of Japan."⁶⁵

When the Korean War began, General MacArthur was to most Americans a legendary hero, surrounded by an aura of infallibility, an almost sacrosanct figure not to be attacked lightly. His success at Inch'on reinforced the legend. Strangely, the failure of his November offensive and the serious reversals from the Chinese entry into the war seem to have had little effect on his public image or popularity. Confidence in him remained at a high level as the battlefield situation stabilized under General Ridgway's combat leadership.

Underlying his official relationships with Washington authorities were unspoken but effective relationships that affected his attitudes and those of such men as President Truman, General Marshall, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When compared with other senior military commanders, General MacArthur was a man set apart. Washington's dealings with him were marked by a deference and caution not apparent in its dealings with other military leaders.

Before the Wake Island meeting, President Truman had never personally met General MacArthur. But, as he testified in his memoirs, the President, who had commanded a field artillery battery in World War I as a captain, had very high regard for the General's military reputation and considered him a "great American." General Marshall, the only true military contemporary of General MacArthur holding an official position in 1951, had respect for General MacArthur's abilities. Persistent rumors of jealousy and antipathy between the two distinguished soldiers were denied by General MacArthur.⁶⁶

Without exception, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considerably junior to General MacArthur. The senior of them, General Bradley, had graduated from West Point twelve years after General MacArthur, and had been a major when General MacArthur was a brigadier general in World War I. General Collins and Admiral Sherman, who graduated in 1917 from their respective Service academies, had been junior officers when General MacArthur headed the Military Academy. The former had been a member of the faculty during General MacArthur's tenure there but had little contact with him. General Vandenberg, a graduate of the West Point class of 1923, had been a cadet when General MacArthur was Superintendent. The effect of this status within the military system was sometimes apparent in General MacArthur's communications to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when a tolerant tone and, on rare occasion, even a hint of "lecturing" and condescension, could be detected. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seldom ordered General MacArthur in a decisive manner, and directives originating with them personally were couched in language calculated not to give offense to so senior an officer.⁶⁷

The part played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the action taken by the President against General MacArthur was in strict keeping with their statutory responsibilities as principal military advisors to the Commander in Chief. Although as individuals they had cause to suspect that the President was growing more and more displeased with General MacArthur as the war progressed,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not know that he was contemplating dismissal proceedings until the Martin letter brought the issue into the open.⁶⁸

Coincidentally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were at that moment engaged in a task that exemplified their lack of trust in General MacArthur. As described in the preceding chapter, they had become alarmed by warnings of possible large-scale Soviet intervention and, on 5 April 1951, had approved a draft order authorizing CINCFE, in the event of a major air attack on UN forces, to attack air bases in Manchuria and nearby China. Within the next few days, they secured approval of the Secretaries of Defense and State and of President Truman for this order. Normally the next step would have been to send the orders to CINCFE for use in contingency planning. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to withhold the order, and in fact even the knowledge of its existence, from General MacArthur, fearing that he might, as General Bradley later wrote, "make a premature decision in carrying it out."⁶⁹

Late in the afternoon of 5 April, General Bradley summoned his colleagues to a short meeting in his office. Only General Collins, who was out of town, was missing. The Chairman informed them that the President was "quite disturbed" by the letter that General MacArthur had written Congressman Martin and suggested that they think the matter over, since they would undoubtedly be called upon in the near future for their recommendations as to what should be done. The conferees discussed the possibility that President Truman might relieve General MacArthur, or, alternatively, that Secretary Marshall might go to the Far East to confer with the General or address a letter to him explaining the difficulties that his actions were causing the Government. They reached no conclusions, however.⁷⁰

The President called a meeting in his office on the morning of 6 April attended by Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, Special Assistant W. Averell Harriman, and General Bradley. What action should he take, he asked them, in the matter of General MacArthur's continuing defiance of his directives? Mr. Harriman did not hesitate to recommend that General MacArthur be relieved forthwith. Indeed, he believed that the General should have been dismissed two years earlier, in the spring of 1949, when he had not only declined to come home for consultation but had given evidence of an intent to violate US economic policy toward occupied Japan.⁷¹ General Marshall, on the other hand, opted for a more cautious approach, mentioning particularly the possible effect on Congressional attitudes toward the current military appropriation bill. He asked for more time to reflect on the question. General Bradley recommended against the immediate relief of General MacArthur.⁷²

The Secretary of State later recalled that from the moment he had read General MacArthur's telegram to Representative Martin, he had been clear on the nature of the problem and what should be done. The question was how to do it. Grave trouble would result from the relief of General MacArthur but no other action could resolve the situation. This trouble could only be surmounted, in Secretary Acheson's words, "if the President acted upon the carefully considered advice and unshakable support of all his civilian and military advisers. If he should get ahead of them or appear to take them for granted or be impetuous, the harm could be incalculable." The President was fully aware of this danger

and, as he wrote in his memoirs, was careful not to disclose that he had already decided upon dismissal; the recommendation must come from his advisers. Secretary Acheson further warned President Truman that firing General MacArthur would bring upon him "the biggest fight of your administration." General Marshall and General Bradley should, he said, take time for "unhurried discussion" with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, free from any pressure of prior conclusions, even tentative ones, from the Commander in Chief. "There was no doubt what General MacArthur deserved; the sole issue was the wisest way to administer it," in the Secretary's view. The President directed that the same four men confer later in the day and be prepared to discuss the matter with him again on the following morning.⁷³

In the afternoon the four advisors to the President met again, this time in General Marshall's office. For nearly two hours, they discussed a suggestion by General Marshall that General MacArthur be ordered back to the United States for consultation prior to a final decision by the President. Secretary Acheson characterized this as the "road to disaster," pointing out that to order General MacArthur back to Washington in the "full panoply of his commands" and with his future still undetermined might "gravely impair the President's freedom of decision" and imperil his political future. General Marshall did not press this suggestion. The group decided only that when they met with the President the next day—Saturday, 7 April—they would recommend deferral of any action until the following Monday.⁷⁴

Secretary Acheson, Mr. Harriman, and Generals Marshall and Bradley met again with the President for about an hour on the morning of 7 April. All four recommended that no decision be taken until after the weekend, in order to give President Truman time to confer with Congressional leaders of both parties. No one present had changed his position, as expressed earlier. Secretary Marshall and General Bradley continued to refrain from making specific recommendations for relief, although both felt that their "go-slow" approach was somewhat weakened by a new statement by General MacArthur, published in a magazine, in which he had disclaimed responsibility for the alleged failure of the UNC to make proper use of South Korean manpower.⁷⁵

General Bradley suggested to General Marshall, apparently outside the meetings, that the Secretary of Defense write a personal letter to General MacArthur pointing out to him the difficult position in which he was placing President Truman by his actions and statements. These officials went so far as to draft a letter jointly, but it was never sent.⁷⁶

General Bradley convened a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his office at 1400 on Sunday, 8 April. All were present. They discussed the "MacArthur problem" for nearly two hours. At 1600 the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a "sad and sober group," in General Collins' words—moved to General Marshall's office. The Secretary asked each officer separately to express his opinions on what to do about General MacArthur. Each prefaced his views by emphasizing that he was speaking from a "military point of view only." General Collins believed that the President "was entitled to have a commander in the field whose views were more in consonance with the basic policies of his government and who was more respon-

sive to the will of the President as Commander in Chief." Admiral Sherman maintained that if the United States were to be successful in limiting the conflict in Korea and in avoiding World War III, "we must have a Commander in whom we can confide and on whom we can rely." General MacArthur, in his view, had not been sufficiently responsive to the directives and to the policy guidance given him.⁷⁷

In essence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought, to a man, that General MacArthur should be relieved. But they realized that military considerations were only a part of the question and intended therefore to refrain from making a specific recommendation to the President for the relief of General MacArthur. They would merely give their views.

In reaching a consensus, the JCS members took their stand upon two considerations: the need for the President and for themselves to be able to rely completely on subordinate commanders, and the principle of civilian control of military power. They also displayed a keen, and perhaps surprising, awareness of the importance of public opinion. Their considered judgment was summarized several weeks later by General Bradley, in words that deserve extensive quotation:

a. That, since General MacArthur had indicated that he was not in entire sympathy with the policies being followed by the government in the Far East, it was difficult to have him do certain planning which was desirable but on which they were afraid General MacArthur might make a premature decision in carrying it out [for example, the draft order on retaliation against Manchurian air bases, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a few days earlier but had been careful to conceal from General MacArthur]. . . .

For military success we have always held that, whenever the superior authority loses full confidence in a subordinate, whether or not such loss of confidence is justified by the facts, the subordinate must be changed in any such important command.

In this instance, there is little evidence that General MacArthur ever failed to carry out a direct order of the Joint Chiefs, or acted in opposition to an order. However, it can be shown that at times, when General MacArthur did not receive the orders he desired, or disagreed with the basic policy being followed, he would take his case to the public. This sometimes would reveal what the Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning not to do, and it would cause considerable embarrassment and lack of confidence in General MacArthur's attitude on further operations when they did not coordinate with his ideas. All of this tended to create doubt, confusion, and uncertainty in the minds of the public of military leadership at a time when confidence in that military leadership was very essential.

b. All members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed from time to time their firm belief that the military must always be controlled by civil authorities. They were all concerned in this case that if General MacArthur was not relieved, a large segment of our people would charge that civil authorities no longer controlled the military.⁷⁸

The Decision Is Reached

Denouement came suddenly on Monday morning, 9 April, when the four principal advisors met in the President's office. The President, after informing them that he had discussed the problem with governmental leaders over the weekend, asked for the recommendations of those present. At General Marshall's suggestion, General Bradley gave the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He informed the President that the three Service members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that General MacArthur should be relieved, citing the two reasons that they had developed in their Sunday meeting. Secretary Marshall indicated his agreement with their conclusion, while the Secretary of State and Ambassador Harriman were "very emphatic" that General MacArthur should be relieved.

The President then announced his decision: that General MacArthur would be relieved. It was only then that he revealed that he had in fact made this determination after the General's statement of 24 March. Secretary Marshall and General Bradley recommended that General Ridgway be named as General MacArthur's successor. The President approved and instructed General Bradley to have the necessary orders prepared.⁷⁹

Following this meeting, Secretary Marshall met with Generals Bradley and Collins. The latter was instructed to prepare draft messages to be sent to Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, and Van Fleet, who had already been designated as General Ridgway's successor if occasion should arise.⁸⁰

On Tuesday afternoon, 10 April, the principals again met with President Truman in his office. Also present was Mr. Joseph Short, Presidential Press Secretary, who was directed to prepare a news release announcing the removal. General Bradley subsequently assisted in the preparation of this announcement.⁸¹

The President had originally planned to have the relief notice delivered to General MacArthur by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, who was then in the Far East on an inspection tour. Secretary Pace would carry the notice to General MacArthur at his home in the US Embassy, Tokyo, at 1000 hours 12 April Tokyo time (2000, 11 April, Washington time), prior to General MacArthur's departure for the Dai Ichi building for the day's business. Events combined to prevent this in a manner most unfortunate for all concerned.

At about 1500 on the afternoon of 10 April (Washington time), the President received and signed the draft orders. He gave them to Secretary Acheson for transmittal to Ambassador Muccio in Pusan for delivery to Secretary Pace, who was at the front with General Ridgway. Upon receipt of the orders, Mr. Pace would fly back to Tokyo and inform General MacArthur personally of his relief. Thus the General would be spared what Secretary Acheson described as "the embarrassment of direct transmission through Army communications, with the inevitable leaks of such interesting news."

As it turned out, this commendable effort to avoid embarrassing General MacArthur went astray, resulting in considerable embarrassment to the administration and increased public sympathy for General MacArthur. A breakdown in commercial communications facilities used by the State Department prevented delivery of the message intended for Secretary Pace. He had gone to Korea

knowing nothing of the problem with General MacArthur. While he was at the front, General Bradley, in Washington, was informed by Mr. Short at about 1900 on the evening of 10 April that the *Chicago Tribune* had somehow learned of the impending relief and was preparing to print the news in its morning edition. General Bradley immediately informed the President, who at once decided to send the relief orders to General MacArthur directly, using the Army communications system. He also directed a press conference be set up for 0100 on the morning of 11 April. At that conference, reporters were handed the announcement of General MacArthur's relief.

About an hour before the news conference, the message to General MacArthur notifying him of his relief had been hurriedly put on the Army wires. It was signed by General Bradley and read as follows:

I have been directed to relay the following message to you from President Truman: I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander In Chief, United Nations Command; Commander In Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, US Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands effective at once to Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you may select. My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message. Signed Harry S Truman.⁸²

The "next following message" stated:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his command and have designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case. Signed Harry S Truman.⁸³

In this event, Army communications facilities were little more swift than commercial lines. Before the official message reached General MacArthur, the results of the news conference in Washington had been broadcast over Tokyo radio. One

of the General's aides, hearing the broadcast, telephoned Mrs. MacArthur. Thus the General learned of his relief from his wife.⁸⁴

Epilogue: The MacArthur Hearings

Turning over his duties to General Ridgway, General MacArthur left Tokyo and landed at San Francisco on 17 April 1951, receiving a "hero's welcome." From there he proceeded to Washington and then to New York City, where he took up residence. Everywhere he was greeted by huge crowds and took part in triumphant parades. At Washington, where he landed shortly after midnight on 19 April, he was greeted cordially by Secretary Marshall and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the entire party was nearly overwhelmed by spectators who broke through restraining ropes. Later on 19 April, he delivered an eloquent address before a joint session of Congress, closing with a quotation from an old Army ballad: "Old soldiers never die, they just fade away." His welcoming parade in New York drew the largest crowds ever seen in that city.⁸⁵

But the bitterness aroused by his dismissal did not "just fade away." Angry outcries from his supporters continued, and the administration found itself under attack from many directions and in areas other than policy toward Korea.⁸⁶

The controversy came to a head in hearings conducted before two committees of the Senate, beginning on 3 May and lasting for almost two months. The initiative for these hearings was taken by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which on 13 April invited General MacArthur to appear and give his views on the military situation in the Far East, together with the circumstances leading up to his dismissal. After General MacArthur had accepted this invitation, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asked permission to take part in the proceedings. From this request sprang a decision that the two committees would meet jointly in continuous hearings, to question General MacArthur and those involved in his dismissal, as well as other individuals who could shed light on the general situation in the Far East.⁸⁷

These hearings occupied an inordinate amount of the time and attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the spring and summer of 1951. Each of these officials was called to testify before the committees following General MacArthur's testimony. They had known, of course, that their testimony would be required and, in a sense, participated as defendants of the national policy. In anticipation of this requirement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on 20 April to prepare from the available records a complete narrative account of the Korean developments from 25 June 1950 to the day of General MacArthur's relief. This study was forwarded by the Committee on 26 April 1951 with a warning that it did not tell the whole story. "The records alone fail to provide a complete perspective, or to indicate the atmosphere and the personal equations which were involved in the decisions and actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," wrote the Secretary of the JSSC, Colonel E. F. Cress, USA.⁸⁸

Colonel Cress cautioned that the hearings "will be of national and international importance and may have repercussions far transcending the matters at issue." He continued:

It is quite likely, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body and each individual Chief of Staff must expect, that the proceedings may involve personal attacks on the integrity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body and as individuals. These attacks may develop in connection with any phase of the investigation of the relations between Washington and General MacArthur.

The JSSC envisioned at least three separate issues that would be involved: (1) strategy in the Pacific and elsewhere around the globe; (2) the relief of General MacArthur; and (3) the timing and manner of his relief. The Committee feared that if any JCS member used prepared statements or documents in his testimony it would trigger a spate of calls from the Committee for the official records, thus jeopardizing military security and adversely affecting "current and projected operations as well as United States international relationships." Speaking for the JSSC, Colonel Cress recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff first agree on their approach to the issues in the hearings. "Thereafter, each Chief of Staff should then go into seclusion, as General MacArthur has done, and so prepare himself that he can testify without notes at the hearings," he concluded.⁸⁹

In some respects the predictions of the JSSC proved correct. The hearings did intrude into areas having little to do with General MacArthur's relief and did serve as a sounding board for the views of some members of the Congressional Committees. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were questioned closely, sometimes sharply, by Committee members. But their integrity as individuals or as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not attacked. In keeping with the advice of the JSSC, the JCS members did not speak from written statements. However, the chairman of the hearings, Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, called for and received at various times official documents or paraphrases of such documents, within the limits imposed by military security.

The hearings were closed to the public. Admiral Davis, Director of the Joint Staff, was made responsible for reviewing the transcript of each day's testimony and for deleting such testimony as threatened to reveal facts, statistics, or positions whose open publication would be detrimental to the national security. These deletions were kept to the absolute minimum so as not to arouse the opposition of the Committee members who might otherwise have called for open hearings.⁹⁰

The first witness was General MacArthur, who was greeted with warm praise and, during three days of testimony (3-5 May), was treated with great deference. General MacArthur gave his side of the controversy, denying that any of his actions had been improper or that he had ever been guilty of insubordination. He did not, however, question the right of the President to remove him or any other military officer. In turn, none of the subsequent witnesses accused him of actual insubordination or of any offense meriting a court-martial.⁹¹

General MacArthur's testimony quickly drew the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the controversy. In his speech to Congress, General MacArthur had outlined four steps that he considered necessary: intensification of the economic blockade of Communist China, imposition of a naval blockade, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of Manchuria and the Chinese coast, and removal of restrictions on the operations of Chinese Nationalist forces. These steps had been among the sixteen contingent courses of action listed in the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951. On the witness stand, General MacArthur cited this fact as evidence that "the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my own so far as I know were practically identical." Senator Russell, in questions, referred to these tentative courses of action as "recommendations" and suggested that, since they were not put into effect, they must have "encountered a veto" from the President or the Secretary of Defense. General MacArthur agreed. "I have no knowledge of what happened to this [JCS] study [of 12 January] after it reached the Secretary of Defense," he said, implying that it had been held up by Secretary Marshall.⁹²

A second matter cited by General MacArthur to show his agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerned the terms of a cease-fire. In addressing this question on 27 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stressed that the terms should not include acceptance of Communist China in the UN or surrender of Taiwan to Communist China.⁹³ "I was in fullest agreement," said General MacArthur. But it was his understanding that the JCS views had been "disapproved by the Secretary of Defense who said that he believed that those two items might well be considered at the conference, the peace conference."⁹⁴

General MacArthur was followed to the stand by Secretary Marshall, who quickly denied the accusation that he had overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The policy of the United States, he stressed, was "to deny Formosa to Communist China and to oppose the seating of the Communist Chinese in the United Nations." There had been "no deviation from that policy whatsoever," he said, and no wavering in the determination to exclude these matters from the armistice terms. The administration had agreed only that the United States would not oppose *discussion* of these issues, since they were certain to be raised by other parties during the negotiations.⁹⁵

Regarding the JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951, Secretary Marshall was questioned at some length. He explained that it had been written at a time when the military situation was quite different—when the United States was "faced with the very real possibility of having to evacuate our forces from Korea." The JCS courses of action had been put forward as tentative, to be considered for implementation "if and when this possibility came closer to reality." The memorandum had been sent to the National Security Council for consideration, but almost immediately the situation in Korea improved markedly, with UN troops regaining the initiative. As a result, it became unnecessary to put into effect any of the proposals advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "None of these proposed courses of action was vetoed or disapproved by me or by any higher authority," affirmed Secretary Marshall. "The ultimate decision with respect to them was simply rendered unnecessary at that time—or unwise, to put it better—in the view of the Chiefs of Staff."⁹⁶

Ranging into broader matters, Secretary Marshall spelled out what he called a "fundamental divergence" of judgment between General MacArthur and his superiors. This divergence, he said,

arises from the inherent difference between the position of a field commander, whose mission is limited to a particular area and a particular antagonist, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States, and who, to achieve and maintain this security, must weigh our interests and objectives in one part of the globe with those in other areas of the world so as to attain the best over-all balance.⁹⁷

On the general reason for General MacArthur's removal, Secretary Marshall spoke as follows:

It became apparent that General MacArthur had grown so far out of sympathy with the established policies of the United States that there was grave doubt as to whether he could any longer be permitted to exercise the authority in making decisions that normal command functions would assign to a theater commander. In this situation, there was no other recourse but to relieve him.⁹⁸

General Bradley, the next witness, also denied General MacArthur's contention that he and his colleagues had been overruled by the administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, were thoroughly in agreement with the administration's policy toward the war. The "fundamental military issue," in his view, was "whether to increase the risk of a global war by taking additional measures that are open to the United States and its allies." General MacArthur had suggested certain measures, and had said that they would not increase the risk. But, according to General Bradley, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these same measures do increase the risk of global war and that such a risk should not be taken unnecessarily." There was admittedly no guarantee that a policy of "using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism" would avoid a world conflict. "But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power," he said, "is one which we believe we must continue to follow."⁹⁹

Continuing in the same vein, General Bradley pointed out that military involvement with Communist China would mean a *misdirected effort*. He concluded his remarks on this score with words that were to be widely quoted:

Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war. The course of action often described as a "limited war" with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize. . . . Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.¹⁰⁰

General Bradley enlightened the Senators on the origin and purposes of the memorandum of 12 January 1951. It began on 28 November, he pointed out, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed a committee to study actions to be

taken in the event the United States became embroiled in an all-out war with China. The resulting committee report had carried a preamble setting forth this qualifying contingency, but it had been omitted from the final JCS memorandum, leaving only a statement that the listed courses of action had been "tentatively agreed." Questioned by Senator Russell, General Bradley declared that it was perfectly clear to him and his colleagues that the memorandum was merely a "study," not a directive or a set of instructions to General MacArthur.¹⁰¹

General Bradley testified that Generals Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman had all favored relieving General MacArthur for three reasons: (1) because he had made it clear that he was "not in sympathy" with the decision to limit the conflict to Korea; (2) because he had failed to comply with the President's directive to clear statements on policy with higher authority before release; and (3) because the JCS members "have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country." He had transmitted their views to the President. When asked about his own view, General Bradley replied, "I did not express any, one way or the other, because I pass on to him the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." But, he added, he had indicated his concurrence with the other JCS members through his failure to express any disagreement.¹⁰²

Disposing of another complaint that had been publicly expressed by General MacArthur and his adherents, General Bradley pointed out that the UN forces, like those of Communist China, enjoyed a "privileged sanctuary" of their own. The Communists, he noted, "are not bombing our ports and supply installations, and they are not bombing our troops."¹⁰³

Rather early in General Bradley's testimony, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin asked him to repeat what was said at his meeting on 6 April with the President and the other advisors. General Bradley declined to reveal this information. "Senator, at that time I was in a position of a confidential adviser to the President," replied General Bradley. "I do not feel at liberty to publicize what any of us said at that time." Immediately the Senators became embroiled in a discussion of the nature of the relation between the JCS Chairman and the President. At one point, Senator Russell issued a tentative ruling that General Bradley was not required to testify as to the content of any "private conversation" that he had with the President. But this ruling was not regarded as settling the question; discussion continued over the next two days, accompanied by a search for legal precedents. Finally, Senator Russell called for a vote on his ruling; it was upheld by a large majority.¹⁰⁴

Before General Bradley finished his testimony, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa moved that Secretary Acheson be called as the next witness and that the remaining JCS members, instead of being interrogated, merely be requested to indicate in writing how far they agreed or disagreed with previous testimony. He thought that any testimony they might give would be substantially a repetition of what General Bradley and Secretary Marshall had said. After considerable discussion, however, this motion was voted down by a narrow majority.¹⁰⁵

At the result of the defeat of this motion, General Bradley was followed to the witness stand by General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman, in that order. They corroborated and amplified General Bradley's statements that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the MacArthur dismissal and that they supported the administration's policy of limited war. General Collins cited General MacArthur's actions in October 1950 in unilaterally introducing changes into a plan that had received JCS approval—actions that, he said, had caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff "growing concern." It would have been a simple matter, he told the Senators, for General MacArthur to have cleared his new plans in advance with Washington. With regard to the memorandum of 12 January 1951, General Collins testified that on his visit to Tokyo in that month, he had made it clear that the courses of action in the memorandum were simply "under consideration" for execution under certain circumstances and had not been approved by the administration.¹⁰⁶

General Vandenberg pointed to the danger that General MacArthur's recommendations, if followed, would have involved the Air Force in operations in Manchuria, which was a peripheral theater of little strategic interest, and thus dissipated the strength of the Air Force, which was hardly adequate for its existing missions. "The United States is operating a shoestring air force in view of its global responsibilities," he said. Admiral Sherman stressed the lack of mutual confidence between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur as a result of the latter's actions. "The conduct of affairs was made difficult by a lack of responsiveness [on MacArthur's part] to the obvious intentions of the directives which were transmitted out there," he declared, "and a tendency to debate and in certain cases to criticize."¹⁰⁷

After hearing from of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senators called Secretary Acheson, who, as would be expected, was interrogated at considerable length. Next came several individuals who had been concerned with US policy toward China, followed by former Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. The concluding witness was Major General Emmett O'Donnell, USAF, formerly Commanding General, FEAF Bomber Command, who gave information about the air war in Korea.¹⁰⁸

By the time General O'Donnell completed his testimony on 25 June 1951, ten weeks had passed since General MacArthur's removal. UN forces were no longer in danger of expulsion; armistice negotiations were in prospect; and the issue of General MacArthur's relief had lost much of its emotional appeal. The Committees recessed on 27 June and met only once more, on 17 August 1951, to close out the hearings. At that time they decided, at the suggestion of Chairman Russell, not to put out a formal report of findings. "I think that the people have about made their own report in this case," said Senator Russell, "and any effort on our part now to issue a report would be an anticlimax to the hearings." The members decided instead to issue a public statement, drafted by Senator Russell, which was designed to counteract the impression of disunity created by the hearings. The concluding paragraph of this statement read:

The issues which might divide our people are far transcended by the things which unite them. If threatened danger becomes war, the aggressor would find at one stroke arrayed against him the united energies, the united resources, and the united devotion of all the American people.

The Committees agreed, however, that individual Senators might file their "views and conclusions." Thereupon a minority of eight of the twenty-six Senators issued their own report, which praised General MacArthur and was critical of the administration.¹⁰⁹

In the end, the principal importance of the MacArthur hearings probably lay in the political realm. In the words of one observer: "They provided a safety valve for letting off a dangerous excess of emotion in the body politic, which might have spent itself in some more damaging fashion."¹¹⁰ Militarily, the hearings were significant in providing an opportunity for a thorough public discussion of the administration's policy of limiting the US commitment in Korea and in the Far East in general. It was made clear that this policy, contrary to General MacArthur's allegations, commanded the firm support of the nation's highest military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, the American people learned much about how national security policy was formulated and about the JCS role in the process.

Appendix 1

General MacArthur's Message of 30 June 1950

On his return from Korea to Japan, General MacArthur was accompanied by a well-known correspondent, Miss Marguerite Higgins. "The moment I reach Tokyo," he told her, "I shall send President Truman my recommendation for the immediate dispatch of American divisions to Korea." (Marguerite Higgins, *War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent* (1951), pp. 33–34.) Writers on the Korean War have often assumed that the General carried out his intention with the promptitude indicated in this statement. For example, Smith ("Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 88) tells the reader that, when the message containing this recommendation arrived in Washington, General MacArthur had "just returned" to Tokyo. Evidence shows, however, that the General delayed almost 12 hours in sending this message. He returned to Japan on the evening of 25 June, Far East time (approximately 292215I, or 290915 EDT—see p. 47 above). Had the message been sent at once, it should have reached Washington within several hours. In fact, it did not reach Washington until shortly after midnight on 29 to 30 June, which of course was well after midday in Tokyo. A copy of the message in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS) incoming CINCFE message book was time-stamped at 300032 in the JCS Message Center. The G-3 log indicates that it was received there at 300050. General Collins' office received it at 300011, after the duty officer had been alerted at 292340 that it was on its way: (U) Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Duty Officer Log. All these times are local (EDT), and are 13 hours behind standard time in Japan and Korea.

As for the time the message was sent, an entry in the CSA Duty Officer Log indicates that it was handed to the code room in Tokyo at 292250 EDT, or 301150I. (The information was furnished to the Duty Officer by the Staff Communications Office, Office Chief of Staff, Department of the Army (DA); doubtless the operator queried his counterpart in the Tokyo office.) Corroboration is supplied by a note at the end of the message itself, which reads: "Dispatched Tokyo DT 301250 [i.e., Far East daylight time—301150I], dispatched Washington EDT 292200" (the latter figure doubtless a misprint for 292250).

Obviously, then, General MacArthur, after returning to Tokyo on 29 June, waited until the next day to send in his recommendation. The General himself, in his memoirs, wrote that he sent it "immediately" after his trip to Korea (Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (1964), p. 334). If this was truly his recollection, it was obviously inaccurate.

Entries in the CSA Duty Officer Log attest to the fact that, at the time he sent this message, General MacArthur had already received the JCS dispatch of 29 July (JCS 84681) authorizing limited troop use to defend Pusan. No doubt

his own message was by then already written out in full; however, it seems surprising that he did not amend it to include an acknowledgment of the JCS dispatch and an assurance that the limited troop use envisioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not meet the situation.

Curiously, it appears that only one writer on the Korean War has noticed, or at least commented on, General MacArthur's long delay in sending his recommendation (Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 239–240, note 15). Paige in fact exaggerates the length of the delay, since he states that the message did not reach Washington until 300300 EDT. This erroneous statement also appears in Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 46; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 88; and Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, p. 36 (evidently based on Smith). Appleman apparently saw a copy of the message in Army files that had been received at 0300 (see citation in Paige). This must have been one that had been time-stamped several hours after it first came in.

Paige also cites evidence (p. 253, note 2) that the Department of State already knew of General MacArthur's troop recommendation when informed by the Department of the Army. This statement is borne out by an entry for 0300 in the CSA Duty Officer Log. It records a telephone conversation with the duty officer in State's Far East Affairs section, who "asked if we had seen MacArthur message and one from Sebold [William J. Sebold, General MacArthur's political advisor], the latter which reported a telephone conversation with Ambassador Muccio, who urged that General MacArthur's request be approved." On his trip to Korea, General MacArthur had met with Ambassador Muccio, who apparently accompanied him to the front (Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 74–75). The General may have mentioned his intention to the Ambassador, who may have subsequently communicated it to Mr. Sebold, or possibly General MacArthur told Mr. Sebold himself after he returned to Tokyo.

Appendix 2

Records of the Wake Island Conference

There was no official transcript of the conversations at Wake Island. Various participants took notes at the time, including General Bradley, his executive officer (Colonel W. S. Matthews), Colonel A. L. Hamblen (representing the Department of Defense), and Ambassador Philip C. Jessup. When they returned to Washington, they undertook to prepare a memorandum for the White House files and pooled their notes for this purpose. Ambassador Jessup then learned that his secretary, Miss Vernice Anderson, whom he had taken to the conference primarily to assist in the preparation of the final communique, had also kept notes. She had been sitting in an adjoining room with the door open, and, finding herself within range of most of the conversation, had begun taking notes as a matter of course.

All these records were pieced together into a memorandum that was prepared by General Bradley. Fifty copies were made and distributed to various people, including General MacArthur. This is the source that has been cited in Chapter 5, note 122. Its origin was described by General Bradley during the MacArthur hearings (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 925–928, 950, 952, 959; pt 5, p. 329), and by Ambassador Jessup (in a letter printed in the *New York Times*, 10 Feb 56, p. 14).

During the controversy over General MacArthur's relief, this memorandum was leaked to the press (see *New York Times*, 21 Apr 51, p. 1, for a news story obviously based on it). It was subsequently published, with some deletions for security purposes, by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Military Affairs, in which form it has been reprinted in Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (1957), pp. 275–285. When it became generally known, General MacArthur's partisans characterized it as a "slanted" document prepared in order to discredit him by misrepresenting his statements about the prospects of Chinese intervention. (See Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 387–388, 391–392; Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–1951*, p. 383.) Thus the origin of the document became part of the inquiry into the circumstances of MacArthur's dismissal. The General's own statements on the subject during the hearings were temperate. Although he characterized the notes as the result of "surreptitious eavesdropping," he said he did not doubt "that in general they are an accurate report of what took place." When he received the memorandum in December 1950, he did not bother to read it, because the situation in Korea had changed so drastically by then. (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 27, 28–29, 164. The

entire text of the memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 948–960.)

Truman (*Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 365–367) gives an account of the Wake Island Conference, implying that it is based entirely on his own recollections, but including occasional verbatim quotes apparently drawn from the memorandum described above. Other accounts may be found in Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 387–393 (General Whitney was present at the conference); Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–1951*, pp. 380–383 (with quotations from “staff notes covering the meetings”); and MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 361–363. In later years, Mr. Truman gave another, shorter account to an interviewer, in which he asserted that General MacArthur deliberately kept him waiting for forth-five minutes after his aircraft landed at Wake Island and that, as a result, he administered a severe rebuke when the General finally did show up. (Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (1973, 1974), p. 294.) But an account written at the time, by a reporter who was present, relates that “at the moment that the Truman plane rolled to a stop . . . General MacArthur strode to the foot of the landing ramp and with hand outstretched greeted the President” (*NY Times*, 15 Oct 50, p. 4).

Appendix 3

The JCS-MacArthur Relationship

In preparation for the MacArthur hearings a thorough review was made of all radios from General MacArthur to Washington military authorities between 1 January 1941 and 13 April 1951. General Bradley reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense on 16 April 1951 that “the officers who conducted this search tell me that the most they could find from the general tenor of the messages, including all the files examined, was a uniformity in the incoming messages to contain what might well be called lectures to the ‘youngsters’ back here directing the operations” ((TS) Memo, GEN Bradley to Marx Leva, ASD, 16 Apr 51, CJCS File, 201 MacArthur, Douglas, GEN).

The following account by General Ridgway of a conversation between himself and General Vandenberg on 3 December 1950 is revealing. General Ridgway had asked General Vandenberg why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not send orders to MacArthur and tell him what to do. “Van shook his head. ‘What good would that do? He wouldn’t obey the orders. What *can* we do?’ At this I exploded. ‘You can relieve any commander, who won’t obey orders, can’t you?’ His lips parted and he looked at me with an expression both puzzled and amazed” (Ridgway, *The Korean War*, p. 62).

The sworn testimony of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning their opinions of General MacArthur, as given during the MacArthur hearings, is germane. This testimony was as follows (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3579–3580):

General Marshall: He is a brother Army officer, a man for whom I have tremendous respect as to his military abilities and military performances.

General Bradley: I want to make it clear that I would not say anything to discredit the long and illustrious career of General MacArthur. We may have different views on certain aspects of our Government’s military policy, but that is not unusual. Certainly there have been no personal considerations in our differences of opinion.

General Collins: I think he is one of the most brilliant military leaders that this country has ever produced. Throughout his career, he has been brilliantly successful.

General Vandenberg: I have a great admiration for him.

Admiral Sherman: I told General Marshall that I was very fond of General MacArthur, that I had been associated with him for many years and what I had to say, I said with the utmost regret. I would say that he was in the forefront among the strategists with respect to the coordinated use of land, sea, and air power.

General MacArthur in turn made the following comments on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 13):

I want to say that the relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself have been admirable. All members are personal friends of mine. I hold them individually and collectively in the greatest esteem. If there has been any friction between us, I am not aware of it.

The tenor of these statements, however, was at variance with those General MacArthur had made earlier to General Mark W. Clark, USA, who visited the Far East in February 1951. General Clark, according to his recollection, found General MacArthur bitter over the manner in which Washington had ignored many of his recommendations and had pursued a policy that he considered dangerously unwise. "Specifically," recalled General Clark, "he was most critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . . MacArthur's dismissal was not exactly unexpected in view of his feud with the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (GEN Mark W. Clark, USA (Ret.), *From the Danube to the Yalu* (1954), pp. 26–27).

Appendix 4

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADCOM	Advance Command and Liaison Group, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
CGUSAFFE	Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East
CGUSAFIK	Commanding General, US Army Forces in Korea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
COMNAVFE	Commander, Naval Forces Far East
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EDT	Eastern Daylight Time
EUSAK	Eighth US Army in Korea
FEAF	Far East Air Force
FECOM	Far East Command
FMFLANT	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
GHQ	General Headquarters
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JMTC	Joint Military Transportation Committee
JPS	Joint Staff Planners
JSPC	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
JSPOG	Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
KMAG	United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea

Appendix 4

KYC	Korean Youth Corps
LST	Landing Ship Tank
MDAA	Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFE	Navy Forces Far East
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
NSC	National Security Council
OCJCS	Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPD	Operations Division of the War Department General Staff
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PEFTOK	Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea
PMAG	Provisional Military Advisory Group
PRC	People's Republic of China
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
ROK	Republic of Korea
RYCOM	Ryukyus Command
SANACC	State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
SCAP	Supreme Commander, Allied Powers
SK	South Korea
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
telecon	teletype conference
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCOK	UN Commission on Korea
UNCURK	UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTCOK	UN Temporary Commission on Korea
USAF	United States Air Force
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VFW	Veterans of Foreign Wars

Appendix 5

Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief

Harry S Truman 12 Apr 45-20 Jan 53
Dwight D. Eisenhower 20 Jan 53-20 Jan 61

Secretary of State

Dean G. Acheson 21 Jan 49-20 Jan 53
John Foster Dulles 21 Jan 53-22 Apr 59

Secretary of Defense

Louis A. Johnson 28 Mar 49-19 Sep 50
George C. Marshall 21 Sep 50-12 Sep 51
Robert A. Lovett 17 Sep 51-20 Jan 53
Charles E. Wilson 28 Jan 53-08 Oct 57

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Stephen T. Early 10 Aug 49-30 Sep 50
Robert A. Lovett 04 Oct 50-16 Sep 51
William C. Foster 24 Sep 51-20 Jan 53
Roger M. Kyes 02 Feb 53-01 May 54

Secretary of the Army

Frank Pace, Jr. 12 Apr 50-20 Jan 53
Robert T. Stevens 04 Feb 53-20 Jul 55

Secretary of the Navy

Francis P. Matthews 25 May 49-30 Jul 51
Dan A. Kimball 31 Jul 51-20 Jan 53
Robert B. Anderson 04 Feb 53-02 May 54

Secretary of the Air Force

Thomas K. Finletter 24 Apr 50-20 Jan 53
Harold E. Talbott 04 Feb 53-13 Aug 55

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley 16 Aug 49-15 Aug 53

Appendix 5

<i>Chief of Staff, US Army</i> General J. Lawton Collins	16 Aug 49-15 Aug 53
<i>Chief of Naval Operations</i> Admiral Forrest P. Sherman Admiral William M. Fechteler	02 Nov 49-22 Jul 51 16 Aug 51-16 Aug 53
<i>Chief of Staff, US Air Force</i> General Hoyt S. Vandenberg General Nathan F. Twining	30 Apr 48-30 Jun 53 30 Jun 53-30 Jun 57
<i>Commandant, US Marine Corps</i> General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.	28 Jun 52-31 Dec 55
<i>Commander in Chief, Far East</i> General of the Army Douglas MacArthur General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA General Mark W. Clark, USA	01 Jan 47-11 Apr 51 11 Apr 51-09 May 52 09 May 52-05 Oct 53
<i>Commanding General, Eighth US Army</i> Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	03 Sep 48-23 Dec 50 26 Dec 50-14 Apr 51 14 Apr 51-11 Feb 53 11 Feb 53-25 Mar 55
<i>Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East</i> (Held by Commander in Chief, Far East)	
<i>Commander Naval Forces, Far East</i> Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN Vice Admiral Robert C. Briscoe, USN	27 Aug 49-21 May 51 04 Jun 52-02 Apr 54
<i>Commanding General, Far East Air Forces</i> Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USAF Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge, USAF General Otto P. Weyland, USAF	26 Apr 49-21 May 51 21 May 51-10 Jun 51 10 Jun 51-31 Mar 54
<i>Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan</i> General of the Army Douglas MacArthur General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA	15 Aug 45-11 Apr 51 11 Apr 51-28 Apr 52
<i>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</i> General of the Army Douglas MacArthur General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA General Mark W. Clark, USA	08 Jul 50-11 Apr 51 11 Apr 51-09 May 52 09 May 52-05 Oct 53

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN

30 Apr 49-10 Jul 53

Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN

10 Jul 53-31 Jul 58

Commander, Seventh Fleet

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN

19 May 50-28 Mar 51

Vice Admiral Harold M. Martin, USN

28 Mar 51-28 Mar 52

Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, USN

28 Mar 52-20 May 52

Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, USN

20 May 52-01 Dec 53

Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN

10 Jul 51-22 May 52

Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, USA

22 May 52-27 Jul 53

US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Ambassador John J. Muccio

07 Apr 49-08 Sep 52

Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs

25 Nov 52-12 Apr 55

*Political Advisor to the Supreme Commander,
Allied Powers, Japan*

Ambassador William J. Sebald

03 Dec 45-25 Apr 52

Notes

Chapter 1. Korea in US Policy, 1945–1950

1. Dept of State Publication 7084, *The Record on Korean Unification, 1943–1960* (1960), pp. 1–4, 42–43. Dept of State Bulletin, 29 Jul 45, pp. 137–138.

2. Soon Sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950* (1967), pp. 22, 31–32, 37–39. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (1956), pp. 316–317.

3. (U) SWNCC 76, 77, 78, and 79, 19 Mar 45, and (U) SWNCC 101, 7 Apr 45, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 1.

4. (U) SM–1990 to ADM Leahy, 2 Jun 45, w/encls, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 1.

5. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 317. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (*United States Army in the Korean War*) (1961), pp. 2–3. James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (*United States Army in the Korean War*) (1972), pp. 7–8. (Hereafter: Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*) Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 39–44. Manuscript history by LT Paul C. McGrath, bearing title, “U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict, Volume I, Part I,” n.d., pp. 23–27, describing evolution of US policy toward Korea before the Korean War; copy in Center of Military History (CMH), DA. (Hereafter: McGrath MS.) Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945* (1960), vol. II, pp. 344–353, 408–417, 1322–1334.

According to another document, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes told General Marshall during the Potsdam Conference that he wanted US troops “put into Korea upon the conclusion of the war with Japan.” This request was discussed with Army and Navy planners, who agreed that the United States should include Seoul and its port, Inch’ön, in the US occupation zone. They accordingly drew a line running across the peninsula more or less in the neighborhood of the 38th parallel; this recommendation was given to General Marshall, who presumably passed it to Secretary Byrnes. (U) Memo, CMH, DA (MG Orlando Ward) to LTG Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, “Establishment of the 38th Parallel in Korea,” n.d. [ca. 10 Oct 52], DA File, CSUSA 091 Korea (TS) 1951–52, Case 43. These statements doubtless rest upon information compiled by historians of the Department of the Army, but the evidence is not presented.

6. See Map 1, p.3.

7. McGrath MS, pp. 32–50, provides the most complete account of the events recounted in the two foregoing paragraphs. Several of those who took part later recorded their recollections. See letter from BG Lincoln to COL C. H. Donnelly, 18 Jul 49 (copy in JCS Hist Div); memorandum by Dean Rusk, AsstSecState (who in 1945 was on duty with OPD), in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, vol. VI, *The British Commonwealth: The Far East* (1969), p. 1039; and testimony given Congress by Under SecState James E. Webb, printed in “Background Information on Korea,” H. Report No. 2495, 81st Cong, 2d sess. The documents referred to in the concluding sentence above were circulated as (U) SWNCC 21/5, 11 Aug 45, CCS 387 Japan (2–7–45) sec 2.

In a statement made in October 1948, General Marshall (then Secretary of State) hinted at another rationale for the choice of the 38th parallel; he attributed it to “certain discoveries which were made in September 1945 concerning the attitude of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Korea.” Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. VI, *The Far East and Australasia* (1974), pp. 1314–1315 (memo of conversation 13 Oct 48). He did not elaborate on this statement, and no other information has been found that supports it or sheds additional light upon it.

8. (U) JCS 1467, 13 Aug 45, CCS 387 Japan (2–7–45) sec 2. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. I, *Year of Decisions* (1955), p. 439. *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VI, p. 647, note 81, gives the date of the President’s approval as 12 August. The absence of any written JCS comment on these two documents doubtless reflects the rapidity with which they were processed.

9. (U) JCS 1467/1, 13 Aug 45, CCS 387 Japan (2–7–45) sec 2.

10. (U) SM–2866 to SWNCC, 14 Aug 45, CCS 387 Japan (2–7–45) sec 2.

11. (U) McGrath MS. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 439–445. (U) Msg, JCS WARX 49961 to CINCAFPAC et al., 15 Aug 45; (U) General Order No. 1, Encl to JCS 1467/2, 17 Aug 45; CCS 387 Japan (2–7–45) sec 2.

12. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 13. MAJ Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAAG in Peace and War* (1962), p. 7. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, p. 63.

13. The definitive history of the period of military government is E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (1951). See also Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 4–7, 47–59; Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 61–158; George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (1950), pp. 61–64, 72–92; John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947–1948* (1948), pp. 167–177.

14. For examples of the JCS role in the drafting and issuing of directives, see the following (all U): JCS 1483/1, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 1; JCS 1483/15, same file, sec 2; JCS 1483/16, 1483/17, and 1483/21, same file, sec 3; JCS 1483/23, same file, sec 4; JCS 1483/36, 1483/38, same file, sec 10; JCS 1483/40, same file, sec 11. For examples of matters handled by the Department of the Army without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 42–46. Some of these matters required coordination with the State Department.

15. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 9–13. (U) Msg, CINCAFPAC Adv CAX 55238 to War Dept, 26 Nov 45, CM IN 9260; (U) SWN–3685 to Secy JCS, 29 Dec 45 (Encl A to JCS 1483/20); (U) Msg, JCS WARX 92187 to CINCAFPAC Adv (Tokyo) and CINCAFPAC Command (Manila), 9 Jan 46, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 3.

16. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 12–17.

17. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 81–89. McCune, *Korea Today*, pp. 44–45, 51–52, 172–181.

18. McCune, *Korea Today*, pp. 178–179.

19. “Korea,” Report to the President submitted by LIG A. C. Wedemeyer, Sep 47 (printed for S. Com on Armed Services, 1951), copy in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 12.

20. (U) SWNCC 176/30, 4 Aug 47, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 11, and Dec On SWNCC 176/30, 7 Aug 47, same file, sec 12. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VI, *The Far East* (1972), pp. 738–743.

21. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 7, 55–60.

22. (U) Encl A to Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Importance of Korea,” 25 Sep 47 (der from JCS 1483/44), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 13. Printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 325–326.

23. (U) Memo, SecDef to SecState, “The interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States,” 26 Sep 47, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 13.

24. (U) SANACC 176/35, 14 Jan 48, Encl to JCS 1483/49, 15 Jan 48, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 14, refers to a meeting held in the office of the Secretary of State on 29 Sep 47 at which the above agreements were reached. A shorter mention of what was apparently the same meeting is found in *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. VI, p. 818, note 27.

25. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 7–9, 69–71. Campbell, *United States in World Affairs, 1947–1948*, pp. 177–178.

26. SWNCC was renamed SANACC after it was enlarged to include membership from the Air Force, which became a separate Service in 1947.

27. (U) SANACC 176/35, 14 Jan 48, Encl to JCS 1483/49, 15 Jan 48, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 14.

28. (U) SM–9671 to SANACC, 21 Feb 48 (der from JCS 1483/50), same file, sec 15.

29. (U) SANACC 176/37, 29 Jan 48, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 14. (SANACC itself was soon superseded by the NSC.)

30. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 9–10.

31. (U) SANACC 176/39, 22 Mar 48, and Dec On, 25 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1483/52, 26 Mar 48, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 15.

32. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Policy in Korea,” 1 Apr 48 (der from JCS 1483/53), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–15–45) sec 15.

33. *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VI, pp. 1163–1169.

34. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 58437 to DA, 6 Feb 48; (U) Msg, JCS WARX 97866 to CINCFE, 18 Mar 48. For earlier discussions between CINCFE and DA, dating back to 16 Oct 47, see (U) JCS 1483/47, 24 Nov 47, Apps A, B, and C to Encl, same file, sec 13.

35. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 10–11; Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 205–211; John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949* (1949), pp. 306–307.

36. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 34.

37. The North Korean People’s Army had actually been in existence, under that name, as early as 1947; see GEN Wedemeyer’s report, referred to above on p. 6.

38. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 128, 211–213; McCune, *Korea Today*, pp. 172–178, 246–250; Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, pp. 307–308.

39. (U) Msg, CSGPO WARX 86130 to CINCFE, 20 Jul 48. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 29–301.

40. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 35.

41. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 12–13, 73–75.

42. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 231–232.
43. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, pp. 270–280. The erect of developments in China is described more fully in the following section of this chapter.
44. South Korean delegates in Paris for a meeting of the UN General Assembly took the opportunity to plead with US officials on this subject; they were supported by Nationalist China's representatives. (C) Msgs, Paris DELGA 506 and DELGA 510 to State, both dtd 28 Oct 48 (CM IN 5256, 5295), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 18.
45. (S) Msgs, COMGENUSAFIK ZPOL 1884 to State and COMGENUSAFIK ZTFGCG 1888 to CINCFE et al., both dtd 12 Nov 48 (CM IN 2639, 2722), same file.
46. (U) Encl to JCS 1483/58, 22 Nov 48, same file.
47. (U) Msg, CSGPO WARX 92575 to CINCFE, 15 Nov 48, same file.
48. (C) Msgs, COMGENUSAFIK ZPOL 1936 to State, 20 Nov 48, CM IN 4031; ZPOL 1941, 20 Nov 48, CM IN 4138; ZPOL 13451, 23 Nov 48, CM IN 4604; ZPOL 13468, 23 Nov 48, CM IN 4605; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 18.
49. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 41.
50. This figure had been reached by March 1949. (U) NSC 8/1, 16 Mar 49, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–15–45) sec 18.
51. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 35.
52. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 11, 75–77.
53. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, p. 310.
54. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 67198 to DA, 19 Jan 49, CM IN 17171.
55. (U) Memo by CSA, "Request of Government of Korea for Army, Air Force and Naval Equipment," n.d. [31 Jan 49], Encl to JCS 1483/60, 1 Feb 49, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 18. (U) Memo by CSA, "Strength of the South Korean Armed Forces," n.d. [10 Mar 49], JCS 1483/62, 12 Mar 49, same file, sec 19. (JCS 1483/62 did not include a detailed study prepared in the Department of the Army, transmitted with GEN Bradley's original memo, which provided considerable information about the current status of South Korea's forces and furnished the basis for GEN Bradley's recommendations.)
56. (U) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, "Reappraisal by National Security Council of United States Policy with Respect to Korea," 17 Jan 49, encl with (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, same subj and date (Encl and Att to JCS 1483/59, 19 Jan 49), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 18.
57. (U) NSC 8/1, 16 Mar 49, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 19.
58. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea," 22 Mar 49 (der from JCS 1483/63), same file.
59. (U) NSC Action No. 195, 22 Mar 49. (U) NSC 8/2, 22 Mar 49, same file.
60. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 23 Mar 49, same file.
61. Memo by CSA, "Implications of a Possible Full Scale Invasion from North Korea Subsequent to Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea," n.d. (memo of transmittal dtd 10 Jun 49), Encl to JCS 1776/2, 11 Jun 49, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 20.
62. (U) JCS 1776/3, 13 Jun 49; (U) JCS 1776/4, 20 Jun 49, and Dec On, 23 Jun 49; (U) SM-1163–49 to CSA, 23 Jun 49; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 20. There is no evidence that the Army study influenced the decision made a year later, when the North Korean invasion began.
63. (U) Progress Rpt by SecState on Implementation of NSC 8/2, 19 Jul 49, Encl to JCS 1483/72, 21 Jul 49, same file.
64. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 45–47.
65. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 35.
66. PL 329, 81st Congress (Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, approved 6 Oct 1949); PL 430, 81st Congress (Second Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1950, 28 Oct 49).
67. *NY Times*, 27 Jan 59, p. 7. Dept of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. I, 1950 (1952), pp. 137–144.
68. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (der from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29. (It is not clear how this objective was reconciled with the limitation of 65,000 men written into NSC 8/2.)
69. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 58, 93–95.
70. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949* (1950), pp. 50–52, 424–428.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–58.
72. Dept of State, *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (Dept of State Publication 3573, 1949). The quotation from Secretary Acheson is from his letter of transmittal to the President, which was published as part of the volume. For the background of this paper and its public reception, see Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1949*, pp. 58–59, and Dean G. Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (1969), pp. 302–307. (A full account of the evolution of US policy

toward China from the end of World War II to the outbreak of the Korean War, and of the JCS role in its formulation, will be found in Volumes I, II, and IV of this series of JCS Histories.)

73. “Formosa,” the Western name for the island, was the more commonly employed term in the early 1950s; its usage is all but universal in documents dating from that period.

74. US policy toward Taiwan before the Korean War is described in Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. II, 1947–1949, Ch. 13, and (TS) JCS Historical Division, *History of the Formosan Situation*, Chs. I–II. The policy decisions recounted in the foregoing paragraph were embodied in (U) NSC 37/2, 3 Feb 49, and (U) NSC 37/8, 6 Oct 49. JCS views are set forth in (U) JCS 1966/1, 10 Nov 48, JCS 1966/11, 9 Mar 49, and JCS 1966/17, 9 Aug 49. (These documents are in CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48), secs 1 and 2.)

75. (U) NSC 37/8, 6 Oct 49, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, vol. IX, *The Far East: China*, pp. 392–397.

76. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, pp. 82–83. PL 329, 81st Congress.

77. (U) Memo by CSA, “Strategic Importance of Taiwan,” n.d. (memo of transmittal dtd 6 Dec 49), Encl to JCS 1966/22, 7 Dec 49; (U) JCS 1966/24, 19 Dec 49; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 2. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan Not Involving Major Military Forces,” 23 Dec 49 (der from JCS 1966/24), same file, sec 3.

78. Secretary Johnson described his views during the hearings on General MacArthur’s dismissal (in which the subject of Taiwan drew considerable attention). Hearings, *Military Situation in the Far East*, S. Coms on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82d Cong, pt 4, pp. 2577–2579. (Hereafter: *Military Situation in the Far East*.)

79. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, pp. 1674–1675. The Secretary was apparently relying upon a CIA report issued in October 1949 that supported the above conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that conditions had changed and that the report was no longer applicable. See (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, pp. 38–39, and references therein cited.

80. (TS) NSC 48/1, 23 Dec 49, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 2. Paragraph 46 *h* presented the views of the two Departments on the issue of aid to Taiwan: Defense, that a military aid program like that suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be undertaken; State, that the United States should continue attempting to deny Taiwan to the Communists through “diplomatic and economic means” alone. According to Secretary Johnson, he had discussed this question with the President even before receiving the JCS memo of 23 December, and the President had replied that “on political grounds he would decide with the State Department.” *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2577–2578.

81. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” 29 Dec 49 (der from JCS 1992/7), CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 2. (This was also the memo in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff disputed the validity of the CIA conclusion that Taiwan could not be held without US military intervention, as pointed out in footnote 79 above.)

82. (U) NSC Action No. 268, 29 Dec 49. (U) NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 49, same file, sec 3. For a summary of the contents of NSC 48/2, see Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949*, pp. 516–520.

83. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” 30 Dec 49, Encl A to JCS 1992/8, 5 Jan 50, same file.

84. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1950* (1965), pp. 11–12. (Hereafter: *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*.)

85. (U) NSC 48/2, par 3 *f* (1).

86. Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1950* (1951), pp. 40–41.

87. (U) NSC 48, 10 Jun 49, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 1.

88. The quotation is from paragraph 3 *b* of NSC 48/2.

89. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 23 Jan 50, pp. 111–118.

90. See Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, p. 260, where the statement is characterized as “an unwise and unskilled diplomatic maneuver.” Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (1967), pp. 10–12, disputes the “gross and misleading simplification” that the Secretary was to be blamed for the outbreak of the war, but admits that the timing of the statement was open to criticism and that “this clear indication that we had no intention of defending Korea did nothing to give the enemy even momentary pause.” For the Secretary’s own account of his speech and his reply to his critics, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 355–358.

91. *NY Times*, 2 Mar 49, p. 22. The interviewer was G. Ward Price.

92. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 51–52.

93. *NY Times*, 20 Jan 50, p. 1; 22 Jan 50, p. 1; 1 Feb 50, p. 13; 10 Feb 50, p. 1; 11 Feb 50, p. 6. The legislation was the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950 (PL 447, 81st Congress).

94. (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, p. 43.
95. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Aid to Formosa," 2 May 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1966/25); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid to Anti-Communist Forces on Formosa," 5 May 50; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 3.
96. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 56410 to DA for JCS, 29 May 50, CM IN 4359, 4444.
97. (U) Memorandum on Formosa, signed by Douglas MacArthur, 14 Jun 50, Encl to (TS) Memo, GEN Bradley to other JCS members, 25 Jun 50, OCJCS File, 091 China (1950).
98. This memo is filed with the one by GEN Bradley cited in the preceding note, with an original in the General's handwriting.
99. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 8–12.
100. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–18.
101. US military advisors in South Korea apparently held a high opinion of the ROK Army. For the views of BG William L. Roberts, who headed KMAG until just before the invasion, see J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (1969), pp. 41–43; GEN Bradley's remarks after the invasion, based on conversations with BG Roberts, described in Ch. 2 below; and a statement by Sen. William F. Knowland, of California, on 15 March 1950, following a trip to the Far East, in Hearings, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951*, Subcom of S. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2d sess, p. 70. Members of a mission headed by John Foster Dulles (the future Secretary of State) visited Korea a few days before the attack and found the acting head of KMAG, COL Sterling Wright, and others "enthusiastic" about the fighting quality of the ROK Army: William R. Mathews, "Diary: Korea with the John Foster Dulles Mission, June 14 to June 29, 1950," William R. Mathews Papers, University of Pennsylvania. However, a report issued by KMAG on 15 June 1950 took note of South Korea's military weakness and warned that Korea "is threatened with the same disaster that befell China": Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 104.
102. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 36. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 16. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 100–101.
103. (U) Typewritten document, "U.S. Aid to Korea Since Close of World War II," n.d. [ca. 27 Jun 50], unsigned, OCJCS File, 091 Korea (1950). Testimony of SecState Acheson, *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, p. 1993. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 96–104, provides a general discussion of the military aid program for South Korea.
104. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 49–50. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 52–54.
105. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 50. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953* (1961), pp. 5–6. (Hereafter: Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*.)
106. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 50. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (1957), pp. 30–32.
107. A full discussion of trends in Service budgets, personnel strengths, and force levels from 1947 to the beginning of 1950 is provided in Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949*, Chs. 6, 7, and 8. For short summaries of the effects of budgetary ceilings, see the *Reports of the Secretary of Defense for FY 1948, FY 1949, and 1 Jan–30 Jun 50*.
108. Authorized strength figures in the above table are the ceilings laid down in the Selective Service Act of 1948 (PL 759, 80th Congress) for the average daily active duty strength of each Service (exclusive of one-year enlistees). The Act did not give separate ceilings for the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Army and Air Force limits were reenacted in the Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949, which was not finally approved until 10 July 1950 (PL 604, 81st Congress). Actual strengths are from *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan–30 Jun 50*, p. 206. FY 1951 budget objectives are as given by President Truman in his budget message on 9 Jan 1950: *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1950* (1965), p. 63.
109. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 53–60. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 49–50. The exception was the segregated (all-black) 24th Regiment, 25th Division, and its supporting artillery battalion, the 159th, which had normal complements.
110. (U) NSC 68, 14 Apr 50. The formulation of NSC 68 and its subsequent history are described in full in Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. IV, 1950–1952, Chs. 1–2.
111. (U) JCS 1844/46, 8 Nov 49, and Dec On, 8 Dec 49, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 41.
112. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 112. McCune, *Korea Today*, p. 265.
113. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 37–38.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
115. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 26 Jun 50, pp. 1048–1049.
116. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, pp. 215–216.
117. *Ibid.*, pp. 264–265. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1950*, p. 188.

118. Only four days before the invasion, Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that “We see no present indication that the people across the border [in North Korea] have any intention of fighting a major war” to take over South Korea. Hearings, *United States Policy in the Far East, Part 2*, House Committee on International Relations, *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943–50*, vol. VIII (1976), p. 464.

119. The best available discussion of the evidence bearing on the North Korean attack is to be found in Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 61–65. See also the remarks by Secretary Acheson in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, pp. 1990–1992 (with brief excerpts from several intelligence reports), and Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 331. Secretary Johnson and General Bradley, during their trip to the Far East on the eve of the invasion, received no impression that war was imminent: *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2583–2584.

For the somewhat similar Pearl Harbor situation nine years earlier, see Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (1962), *passim*, especially pp. 386–396, and also p. 399, where the author makes a comparison with the outbreak of the Korean War.

120. (U) Encl to JCS 1924/10, 30 Jun 50, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 45. (This is a written summary of an oral briefing presented by JIC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 June.)

121. *NY Times*, 27 Jun 50, p. 3. (But note that the story also reports RADM Hillenkoetter as admitting, before the Committee hearing, that “it had been impossible to predict the time-table under which [North Korean forces] would march, if at all.”)

122. (TS) Memo, Dir, OMA to SecDef, “Intelligence Aspects of Korean Situation,” 29 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

123. (TS) Memo, COL Vance to DDI (BG V. E. Megee, USMC), 10 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23. COL Vance’s statements seem difficult to reconcile with that by JIC quoted above. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 13–14, asserts that a CIA “field agency” reported on 19 June that residents were being evacuated along the parallel, that a railway line had been reserved for military transport, and that extensive troop movements were under way; such information should have indicated an imminent attack, but, according to GEN Ridgway, FECOM merely forwarded the report to Washington “in routine fashion, with no indication of urgency.” While GEN Ridgway does not cite his sources, it is evident that this part of his book is drawn from Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 63–64 (Ridgway having had access to Schnabel’s work while it was in draft). Schnabel cites a CIA report, M.I.S. 684595, 19 June 1950, which he had seen in a G–2 file. A search for this CIA report, and also for ORE 18–50 of 19 June, has proved fruitless.

124. (TS) “North Korean Intentions and Capabilities as Reported to Assistant Chief of Staff—G–2,” Encl to (TS) Memo, ACS, G–2, to DCS/Admin, 18 Oct 50, Army Files, 091 Korea (U) 1950, case 28. This compilation summarizes reports from FECOM, CIA, the US Embassy in Seoul, KMAG, as well as those prepared in G–2. An excerpt from ORE 18–50 is included; it is general in nature and relates only to capabilities.

125. Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (1954), p. 327.

126. Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (1960), Ch. III, pp. 34–46. Whiting also demonstrates that North Korea’s relations with Communist China were not particularly close in the months preceding the war, and concludes that Mao Tse-tung probably had little role in planning the invasion. (See Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 427–428, for a skeptical comment on the supposed role of the Japanese peace treaty in precipitating the attack.)

127. *Khrushchev Remembers*, with introduction, commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (1970), pp. 367–370. According to this account, Kim told Stalin late in 1949, while in Moscow, that he “wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet,” to which Stalin replied that he should consider the matter further. Then, on a subsequent visit, Kim again broached the subject and obtained the consent of Stalin after the latter had consulted Mao. The same source also says that Stalin withdrew all the Soviet military advisors just before the invasion, fearing their capture.

128. North Korea’s claim that it was itself the victim of aggression is accepted at face value in I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (1952, reprinted 1969), Chs. 1–10, pp. 1–66. The author suggests that an invasion of North Korea was plotted by the Truman administration, Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, and General MacArthur. The “evidence” consists of sinister interpretations placed on facts and events, together with maximum exploitation of minor discrepancies in various official statements.

A former Polish military attaché in North Korea later defected to the West and related a conversation he had with a high-ranking North Korean staff officer, who admitted that the attack had been very carefully planned in advance. Pawel Monat, “Russians in Korea: The Hidden Bosses,” *Life*, 27 Jun 60, pp. 77, 86. However, the author sheds no light on the initiative for the decision to attack at this time.

Two documents captured following the fall of North Korea in September and October 1950 have been authenticated as official attack orders issued by North Korean military officials to their commanders several days before the assault. Both documents—Reconnaissance Order No. 1, issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff of the 4th North Korean Division and discovered in Seoul on 4 October 1950, and Operations Order No. 4, 4th North Korean Division—were issued on 22 June 1950. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression), Part 2, in Army files. Also see Dept of State *Bulletin*, 21 May 51, pp. 828–830.

Chapter 2. The Attack and the Response

1. Unless otherwise noted, all times given in this study are for the locality indicated. Standard time in both Korea and Japan (Time Zone I) is fourteen hours ahead of EST, thirteen hours ahead of EDT, and nine hours ahead of GMT. (It is apparent, however, that FECOM Headquarters in Tokyo was operating on local daylight time, one hour ahead of standard Zone I time. This fact, which has seemingly been ignored by other writers on the Korean War, becomes relevant in connection with the exchange of messages between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur on 29–30 June. Evidence is presented in note 100 below and in Appendix 1.)

2. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 19–28. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 114–118. (TS) Hq FECOM, *History of the Korean War* (Preliminary Draft), pt II, vol. I, *General Headquarters Support and Participation* (25 June 1950–30 April 1951), Ch. II, pp. 1–4 (prepared by James F. Schnabel, cited hereafter as Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*; copy in JCS Hist Div files).

3. Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (1968), pp. 79–80, 95, 109. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 331–332. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 402. Collins, *War In Peacetime*, p. 1.

The book by Paige herein cited is of particular interest to students of the Korean War. On the basis of extensive interviews as well as of available published materials, the author, a political scientist, has reconstructed a detailed account, day by day and almost hour by hour, of the events of the fateful week of 24–30 June 1950. This account occupies Part III of the book; the remainder is of less interest to historians, exemplifying what Acheson (*op. cit.*, p. 374) has called “political science’s latest, most fashionable, and most boring study, the ‘decision-making process.’”

Shorter accounts of the events of this week are: Alfred L. Warner, “How the Korea Decision Was Made,” *Harper’s*, June 1951, pp. 99–106; Beverly Smith, “The White House Story: Why We Went to War in Korea,” *Saturday Evening Post*, 10 Nov 1951, pp. 22 ff; Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., “Truman (1945–1953),” in Ernest R. May, ed., *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief* (1960), pp. 189–193. The first two of these have been used by Paige.

4. (U) Memo, O.N.B[radley] to GEN Vandenberg, GEN Collins, ADM Sherman, and ADM Davis, 25 Jun 50, OCJCS File, 091 China (1950). Probably the Secretary intended to seek reversal of President Truman’s ban on military aid to Chiang.

5. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 114–119.

6. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 83–85.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 88 (where the dispatch is printed).

8. Department of State Publication 2933, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis* (Far Eastern Series 34, 1950), p. 11. (Hereafter: *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*.)

9. (U) Msg, Seoul 925 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7749 (evidently sent through Army channels). Reprinted in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 333–334, with one apparent misprint in the next to last sentence, first paragraph, which reads “Details of fighting in Kangnung are unclear. . . .” Another version, expanded from telegraphic to literary style, appears in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 11.

10. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 89–90. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2572.

11. (U) G–3 Log, 24 Jun 50 (entries for 2200, 2245, and 2330). (U) Msgs, USMILAT Seoul to DA, 25 Jun 50, ARMA 21, CM IN 7743, ARMA 22, CM IN 7745. All in DCSOPS Korean Message File, G–3 Journal, 24–27 June 1950.

12. (U) G–3 Log, 25 Jun 50 (entries for 0010, 0035, 0037, 0040). (U) Msg, USMILAT Seoul ARMA 23, to CINCFE, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7750.

13. (U) Memo for Record, LTC C.V. Clifton, “Statement About Korea,” 26 Jun 50, OCJCS File, 091 Korea (1950).

14. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 56772 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7759; G–3 Log, entry for 0502.

15. (U) Msg, CH KMAG ROB 078 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7760; G–3 Log, entry for 0530.

16. (U) Msg, USMILAT Seoul ARMA 24 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7761; G–3 Log, entry for 0610.

17. (U) Msg, Seoul 929 to State, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7763. (U) G–3 Log, entry for 0730. The request is in (U) Msg, CH KMAG WRI 077 to CINCFE, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7752 (received in G–3 0140).
18. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2572.
19. LTC Clifton was told by Army officials that they had decided not to notify General Collins (see Memo for Record by LTC Clifton, cited in note 13 above). GEN Collins himself later recalled that he was not notified until early Sunday morning (Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 1).
20. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 89–108. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 332. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 402–404. (U) G–3 Log, 25 Jun 50 (entries for 0215, 0240, 0305, 0405). Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 327–328.
21. (U) G–3 Log, 25 Jun 50, entry 1035.
22. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 56777 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7769 (received in G–3 1035).
23. (U) DA TT 3415, 25 Jun 50. The G–3 Log for 25 Jun 50 indicates that this telecon began at 0900, Washington time. The DT6 is 251244Z (0844 EDT).
24. (U) Msg, CH KMAG ROB 080 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7773. The G–3 Log does not indicate when this message was received; the DTG is 251300Z, or 250900 EDT, which is doubtless the approximate time it was sent.
25. (S) Msg, CIA DTG 251703Z to DA et al., 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7776.
26. (U) Msg, CH KMAG ROB 081 to DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7775. The report of the fall of Ch'unch'on was premature; North Korean forces had penetrated the city but were driven out shortly thereafter. See (U) DA TT's 3417, 25 Jun 50, FEC Item 4, and 3418, 26 Jun 50, FEC Item 2.
27. (U) Msg, Seoul DTG 251425Z to CINCFE and DA, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7766. (Received in G–3 at 1200, according to G–3 Log.) Paige, *The Korean Decision*, p. 110.
28. (U) Msg, Seoul 940 to State, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7796.
29. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 64–65.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
31. (U) Msg, Tokyo 619 to State, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7787. After his return to Washington, Mr. Dulles, in a conversation with Secretary Acheson and Secretary Pace on 1 July 1950, made it clear that by "US forces" he had meant air and naval forces only, and that he opposed the sending of troops to Korea. The North Korean Army, he pointed out, "was subject to maintenance and expansion out of the virtually unlimited resources controlled by the Soviet Union in East Asia, including Communist China. . . . It could [sic] be possible to evolve a political policy which would be adequately sustained by the use of air and sea power in relation to Korea. It would be awkward, but it would be better than a Dunkirk." "Memo of Conversation," 1 Jul 50, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University, 1950 folder, Section 1 G. This line of thought is interesting in that it foreshadows the "New Look" military strategy instituted by President Eisenhower, after Mr. Dulles had become Secretary of State, in which air-sea power was stressed and troop commitments overseas were minimized.
32. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 108–109. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2572–2573 (Johnson testimony).
33. (U) Memo, O.N.B[radley] to GEN Vandenberg, GEN Collins, ADM Sherman, and ADM Davis, 25 Jun 50, OCJCS File, 091 China (1950). For GEN Bradley's underestimate of North Korean military strength, see his remarks in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 893.
34. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 109–110. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 11. (U) G–3 Log, 25 Jun 50 (entries for 0955 and 1100).
35. (U) *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to the United Nations Operations in Korea from 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951*, p. 6. Prepared by JCS for S. Coms on Armed Forces and Foreign Relations, 30 Apr 51, at time of the MacArthur hearings. CCS 013.36 (4–20–51) BP. (Hereafter: *Record of JCS Actions Relative to Korea.*)
36. This was Secretary Acheson's later recollection. As he said during the MacArthur hearings, referring to the afternoon of 25 June: "I had been—my assistants had been working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and together we had drawn up a series of recommendations for the President." He excepted GEN Bradley, who was absent in Norfolk during the afternoon. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, p. 2055. The account in Acheson's memoirs (*Present at the Creation*, pp. 404–406) says nothing about the afternoon meeting and seems to imply, whether intentionally or otherwise, that the recommendations that were drawn up that afternoon emerged from his own solitary thought processes.
37. (U) DA TT–3417 to CINCFE, 25 Jun 50. (Wording of the five enumerated paragraphs above has been revised in the interests of brevity and grammatical uniformity.) The DTG is 252330Z (1930 EDT), which would indicate that the telecon probably began about the same time as the Blair House conference with the President described below. The G–3 Log gives 2100 EDT as the time for this telecon. GEN Collins did not participate; the senior officers were GEN Wade H. Haislip, Vice Chief of Staff, USA, in Washington, and MG E.M. Almond, Chief of Staff, GHQ FECOM, in Tokyo.

38. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 113–115. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 332–333. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 404.
39. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 332–333.
40. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 405. Both of these accounts were of course written some years after the event, but they are doubtless accurate as descriptions of the reasoning that led to the decision to intervene in Korea. See also a similar explanation given by Sec Johnson in 1951, in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2585.
41. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 116–121. Dept of State, *The Record on Korean Unification*, pp. 15, 92–93. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 204–206. Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 328–331.
42. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, p. 127. (U) Msg, State 538 to Moscow, 25 Jun 50, CM IN 7940. Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 63–64. According to Paige, the note was not delivered to the Soviet Government until two days later.
43. (TS) Msg, State 482 to SCAP Tokyo, 26 Jun 50, CM IN 8051.
44. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 333. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1049 (testimony of GEN Bradley, giving names of participants, with information as to duration of the meeting based on a log kept in his office). Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. VII, Korea (1976), p. 157 (memo by Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, who was present at the meeting). (U) Memo for Record, CNO (ADM Sherman), 29 Jan 51, copy in files of JCS Hist Div. (This is a memo summarizing actions by the JCS or by ADM Sherman himself; it is written in the form of brief diary entries for various dates, some as late as 11 April 1951.)
- GEN Collins used it in writing his book, *War in Peacetime*, p. 129. (It is cited hereafter as: Sherman Memo.)
45. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2579–2580 (Johnson testimony). Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 405–406. The memorandum herein referred to is the same one mentioned in Ch. 1, footnote 97. Whether the subject of Taiwan was subsequently debated at the meeting is uncertain; memories differed on this point. Sec Johnson's recollection was that he later sought to divert the conversation to this subject and that a "really violent discussion" ensued between himself and Sec Acheson. The latter had no recollection of any such incident, and recalled that, in the after-dinner discussion, the question of Taiwan came up only in connection with his recommendation regarding the stationing of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, a recommendation that was accepted without question. See *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, p. 2055, pt 4, pp. 2580, 2615; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," p. 78; Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was Made," p. 102.
- Sec Acheson's account is supported by Amb Jessup's memo of this meeting, which has been mentioned in the preceding note: *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 159–165. Amb Jessup was present at all the important meetings during the week of 25–29 June, and also at most of those held in November–December 1950, after the crisis caused by Chinese intervention. In each case, he evidently acted as a recorder and prepared "memorandums of conversation," presumably based on notes made during the meetings. These are extremely valuable, constituting as they do the most nearly contemporaneous accounts available. No comparable records of these meetings exist in JCS files.
46. The fullest accounts of this meeting by participants are those by Amb Jessup, in the memo already cited, and by Pres Truman (written several years later) in *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 333–336. For others, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 405–407; Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 13–14; Johnson testimony in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2573, 2579–2581, 2615; and (U) Sherman Memo (quite brief). Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 125–141, gives the best secondary account, drawing on Truman and on extensive interviews. Shorter treatments are in Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," pp. 76–80, and Warner, "How the Korea Decision Was Made," pp. 101–102.
47. (U) DA TT 3418, 25 Jun 50 (DTG 260355Z). The G–3 Log gives the time of this telecon at 0200. GEN Ridgway was present during this teletype conference; he asked GEN Bradley if the instructions to CINCFE were "deliberately intended to exclude the use of ground forces in Korea," and received an affirmative reply. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (1956), p. 192.
48. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, p. 149.
49. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 491–492.
50. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 28–29.
51. (U) Msg, Seoul 946 to State, 26 Jun 50, CM IN 7813.
52. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 30. (U) Msg, CH KMAG ROB 004 to DA, 26 Jun 50, CM IN 7989, giving situation report as of 262100, Korean time.
53. (U) G–3 Log, 26 Jun 50 (entries for 1215, 1335, 1502).
54. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56812 to DA, 26 Jun 50, CM IN 7904. Received in G–3 at 1420, according to G–3 Log. GEN Chae was relieved as Chief of Staff on 30 June (Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 56).
55. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56820 to DA, 27 Jun 50, CM IN 8043. It is not clear when this message was received in Washington. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 337, prints the text verbatim and

implies that it was available at the opening of the Monday evening conference at Blair House (2100 EDT). If so, the text must have been transmitted in some other manner, as the DTG of this message is 270207Z (262207 EDT). It may have been included in the telecon with CINCFE that took place about 1930 on 26 June (according to the G–3 Log), of which no copy has been found. (It was also included in a later telecon, following the Blair House meeting, to which reference is made later in this chapter.) G–3 did not receive a copy of this message until 0437 EDT on 27 June (see the G–3 Log for that date).

56. (S) Msgs, Seoul 964 and 967 to State, 27 Jun 50, CM IN 8023, 8028. Received in Washington at 262112 and 262214 EDT respectively, according to notations on the messages. Rhee actually moved his government first to Taegu, then to Pusan; Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 351.

57. (U) Msg, Seoul 951 to State, 26 Jun 50, MC IN 79043. Received by State Dept at 260602 EDT, according to a note on the message. Both appeals are printed in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 17.

58. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 156–159. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 336. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 407.

59. (U) Msg, Seoul 261315Z to State, unnumbered, 26 Jun 50, MC IN 78941. (Received in G–3 at 1300 EDT, according to G–3 Log.) A slightly different version is printed in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 21.

60. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. II, pp. 13–14. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 38–40. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 10–13.

61. (U) Msg, CINCFE C-56815 to DA, 26 Jun 50, CM IN 8014. Bears notation that it was dispatched from Tokyo at 270945 and received in Washington at 262008 EDT. The incident related in this message is presumably a part of the battle described in Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, p. 13: five YAK fighters appeared over Seoul, headed for Kimpo, and three were shot down. (Futrell dates this event as “about noon” on 27 June.) For subsequent clashes, see *ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

62. (U) Agenda for JCS Meeting to be held at 1450, 26 Jun 50, and record of those present (showing the meeting actually lasted from 1501 to 1627), in SJCS File of JCS Decisions. The last previous meeting had been on 22 June. The purpose of placing Taiwan on the agenda was presumably to consider an appeal to the President to reconsider the ban on military aid to the Nationalists. It may be assumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the draft memo for the President that has been mentioned in Ch. 1, footnote 98. It appears, however, that they reached no decision.

Hereafter, statements about the dates and times of JCS meetings and attendance thereat will be understood to be based on documents from the SJCS File of JCS Decisions. The contents of this file include memoranda by the Secretariat recording JCS decisions, agendas for forthcoming JCS meetings, and a record of the time each meeting began and ended, with a list of all those who were present (and a notation of their times of arrival and departure if they attended only part of the meeting). Sometimes other useful documents are also found.

63. (TS) G–3 Log, 26 Jun 50 (entries for 0844 and 1930). No copy of the text of these telecons has been found.

64. Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, p. 32 (quoting an interview with VADM Struble in Oct 1950). The Sherman Memo does not mention this meeting with VADM Struble.

65. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 80. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, p. 161. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 407.

66. Amb Jessup’s memo of this meeting indicates that it was attended by Secretaries Johnson and Acheson, all the JCS members, and all the Service Secretaries except Matthews (Navy), who arrived just as the meeting ended: *Foreign Relations, 1950 Korea*, pp. 178–183 (hereafter: Jessup Memorandum, 26 Jun 50). Other lists of those present vary slightly, but all agree that all the JCS members were present. See Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 337; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 407; Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 161–162 (based on State Department documentary sources); and Bradley, in testimony before Congress (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1050).

67. The above account is based primarily on Jessup Memorandum, 26 Jun 50. For other accounts, see Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 162–179; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 337–338; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 407–408; Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 80; Warner, “How the Korea Decision Was Made,” p. 103; *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 949, 1049–1050 (testimony of GEN Bradley), p. 1475 (GEN Vandenberg), p. 1643 (ADM Sherman), and pt 4, pp. 2574–2575, 2581–2582 (Sec Johnson).

68. (U) DA TT 3426, n.d. [26 or 27 Jun 50]. The G–3 Log gives the time of this telecon at 270026 EDT. Paige (*The Korean Decision*, p. 180) says the telecon “lasted until nearly midnight.”

69. (U) Msg, JCS NCC 14461 to CINCFE and CINCPAC, 27 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

70. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 408. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 179–182. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2581–2582 (Johnson testimony). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to the

Sherman Memo, had sought the deletion of any reference to strengthening the Philippines, but a statement on this subject was retained at the urging of the Department of State.

71. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 492. The ban on military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists remained in effect; this subject was dropped for the moment, but came up again a month later and was decided in accord with JCS views. See Ch. 4.

72. (U) Memo of Conversation by Amb Jessup, 27 Jun 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 200–202. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 338. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 187–191. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 409.

73. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 195–200, 219; PL 599, 81st Congress. The Senators who questioned the President's action were James P. Kem (Missouri), Arthur V. Watkins (Utah), and John W. Bricker (Ohio). The House opponent was Rep. Vito Marcantonio, of the American Labor Party, from New York.

74. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 202–206. Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 2–4, 23–24. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 408. The Council had been scheduled to meet in the morning, but the Indian and Egyptian representatives had secured a postponement to receive instructions from their governments. The Council's resolution thus came after US air and naval forces had been ordered into action on the evening of 26 June and after the President's public announcement on the morning of 27 June. However, the United States had previously sounded out the Council members and had ascertained that the necessary seven votes could be obtained in favor of armed assistance to the Republic of Korea. Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 331–332.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met twice on 27 June, in the morning and the afternoon, according to the official agenda of JCS meetings.

75. Msg, Moscow 1767 to State, 29 Jun 50, in *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 229–230.

76. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 24–27. Orders were also issued to Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE) to go into action, but these forces apparently found no targets in the first days (*ibid.*, p. 24; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, pp. 33–35).

77. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 42–44. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 28–29. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. II, pp. 18–20.

78. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 31–34. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 125–128. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 206–207. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. II, pp. 14–17.

79. (U) Msg, Seoul unnumbered to State, 28 Jun 50, CM IN 8321. The Ambassador was then at Suwon, while others of the Embassy staff had reached Taejon along with President Rhee and other ROK government officials. Later that day the Ambassador himself moved to Taejon; see (U) DA TT 3431, 28 Jun 50, FEC Item 13 (DTG 281050Z).

80. (S) Msg, Seoul unnumbered to State, 29 Jun 50, CM IN 8422. (Bears notation that it was sent to Washington at 290000 EDT.)

81. (C) Msg, Seoul unnumbered to State, 28 Jun 50, CM IN 8321. (U) Msg, GHQ ADCOM 281758Z to CINCFE et al., 28 Jun 50, CM IN 8388. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 27, 53.

82. (S) Unidentified document headed "Annex A," bearing pencil notation: "Briefing by Lt. Col. Gilchrist to Secy Pace, 281100." ODCSOPS File, G-3 Journal, 28 June [1950]. This was apparently an annex to a memo from G-3 to Sec A; see G-3 Log for 28 June, entry for 1125. The first knowledge of the fall of Seoul may have been given in a telecon between the G-2s in Washington and Tokyo (MG A.R. Bolling and MG C.A. Willoughby, respectively). Washington asked for an estimate of how long South Korea could hold out "if Seoul falls," and was told "Seoul has fallen." (U) DA TT 3431, 28 Jun 50 (DTG 281050Z). (This TT is in the ODCSOPS File referred to earlier in this note. All other TTs cited in this chapter are from G-2 File, #1 Special Folder—25 June thru 11 July [1950].) CINCFE's first situation report, covering the period 271400Z–280200Z, indicated that the battle for Seoul was continuing; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56885 to DA, et al., 28 Jun 50, CM IN 8314 (received in G-3 at 1404, according to G-3 Log).

83. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 411.

84. SM-1375-50 (cited in full in next note) expressly refers to a JCS meeting on 28 June. The official record, however, does not indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on this date. Probably they conferred hurriedly and informally, without awaiting the preparation of a formal agenda.

85. (U) SM-1375-50 to JSSC, 28 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 21. The above-quoted statement is from an informal memo attached to SM-1375-50, in same file, unsigned but in the handwriting of RADM Davis. This memo was seen by the authors during the preparation of this chapter, but has since disappeared and cannot now be located.

86. (U) PM-1113 to JSPC Members, 28 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 21. The policy statement regarding Soviet intervention, with an accompanying memo from SecState to SecDef, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, p. 217. The purpose of the statement, as Secretary Acheson explained

in sending it to Secretary Johnson, was “to ensure that major decisions about the extension of the Korean issue into a major war be taken in Washington and not be merely the result of a series of events in Korea.”

87. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 28 Jun 50 (with notation indicating Sec Johnson’s approval) (der from Encl to JCS 1776/7); (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 29 Jun 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

88. (U) NSC Action No. 308, 28 Jun 50. (C) *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, p. 216. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 340–341. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 221–226. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 411. (U) Sherman Memo. The British offer of naval assistance is treated in more detail in the next chapter.

89. (U) JCS 1776/6, 29 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

90. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 86.

91. Details of the JCS-SecDef discussion are apparently not on record, but the substance of their agreement emerges from Sec Johnson’s remarks to the NSC later the same day and from the directive that was ultimately sent to CINCFE that evening (see below). The record of JCS meetings shows that the Joint Chiefs of Staff met three times on 29 June and discussed the draft directive on each occasion. The Secretary of Defense was not present at any of these meetings, which were scheduled for 0930, 1330, and 1800.

92. (U) JCS 1776/8, 29 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21. This report was evidently completed on the evening of 29 June. Entries in the log of the duty officer in GEN Collins’ office on the night of 29–30 June show that it was in preparation at 1950 and was expected to be completed by 2130. (U) Log of Events, Duty Officer, Office of CSA, 29–30 Jun 50 (Army File, G–3 091 Korea (1950), case 93; copy in files of JCS Hist Div), entries for 1950 and 2010. (Hereafter: CSA Duty Officer Log.) Whether the Committee was influenced by decisions taken at the NSC meeting on the afternoon of 29 June (described in the next section of the chapter) is a question that cannot be answered with the information available.

93. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 86.

94. At 1600 on the same day, the President held a press conference in which he stated that “we are not at war,” and agreed with a reporter’s suggestion that the situation could be characterized as a “police action.” *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 502–506. When this phrase was later widely repeated, the fact that it was made before US troops were committed, and while US forces were still restricted to action south of the 38th parallel, was usually overlooked.

95. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 244–245.

96. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 86.

97. (U) NSC Action No. 309, 29 Jun 50. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 341–342. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 244–249. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” pp. 86–88. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 411–412. For the Soviet reply to the US note, see (U) Msg, Moscow 1767 to State, 29 Jun 50, CM IN 8698, and Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 64.

98. (U) Dec on JCS 1776/6, 29 Jun 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Instructions to General MacArthur Concerning Situation in Korea and Formosa,” with encl (copy of directive as dispatched); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21. Final revision of the directive was doubtless the purpose of the third JCS meeting that day, held at 1800, after the NSC had adjourned.

99. (U) Msg, JCS 84681 to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50. In another message sent a few minutes later, doubtless at the suggestion of ADM Sherman, the JCS told CINCFE that they did not mean to restrict his employment of the ships of the Seventh Fleet “as between support of Korea and defense of Formosa.” (U) Msg, JCS 84682 to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50.

100. Presumably the date-time group of 292259Z (1859 EDT) reflects the approximate time it was sent. (U) CSA Duty Officer Log states, on the authority of information from the JCS Duty Officer and from the Staff Communications Office (Staff Com), that it was given to GEN MacArthur in Tokyo at 292055 EDT, or 301055 “Tokyo local time.” This latter figure indicates the use of daylight saving time in Tokyo; by standard Zone I time, 292055 EDT would be 300955.

101. This incident is described in MG Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (1956), p. 326 (Hereafter: Whitney, *MacArthur*); Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 77, footnote 51; (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. II, pp. 21–22; Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 44; Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 230–231. The evidence consists entirely of oral statements by witnesses; no copy of the message to FEAF has been found.

102. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. II, pp. 20–24. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 44–45. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 229–239. Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 325–333. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 74–77.

103. Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 332.

104. See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the evidence leading to this conclusion.

105. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 56942 to DA for JCS, 30 Jun 50, CM IN 8776.

106. See Appendix 1.

107. (U) DA TT 3444, 30 Jun 50. (U) *Record of Actions Relative to Korea*, p. 12, gives the time of this telecon as “about 3 a.m.” The exact time is fixed by the log of the CSA duty officer, who supervised the arrangements. It began at 0400, after having been postponed from 0315 at the request of GEN MacArthur. (U) CSA Duty Officer Log, entries for 0240, 0241, 0305, 0358, 0405. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 20–23, quotes extensively from TT 3444 and gives the opening time of the conference at 0340, probably on the evidence of the date-time group, which is 300740Z (300340 EDT).

108. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 88.

109. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 88. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 342–343.

110. (U) Sherman Memo. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1650 (Sherman testimony), p. 1476 (Vandenberg testimony). Copies of the record of the telecon were also disseminated promptly to JCS members and other cognizant officials: (U) CSA Duty Officer Log, entries for 0535, 0545.

111. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1651.

112. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 343. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 88.

113. (U) *Record of JCS Actions Relative to Korea*, pp. 12–13; (U) Sherman Memo. Both of these sources state that, at the 0830 meeting, Sec Johnson asserted that he himself had authority to send two divisions to Korea. It is not clear whether this statement was based on the Sec’s own broad interpretation of his authority, or whether he had already discussed the matter with the Pres and obtained the latter’s approval. Mr. Truman’s account (*Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 343) does not mention any discussions with Sec Johnson preceding the 0830 meeting.

114. This offer had been received, through State Dept channels, on the preceding evening (29 June). The Pres discussed it briefly with the SecState but decided to put off action until he could obtain the advice of the JCS and SecDef. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 342; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 412.

115. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 343. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 88. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 257–260. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 412. (U) Sherman Memo. (Truman’s statement that this meeting began at 0830 instead of 0930 disagrees with other accounts and is almost certainly erroneous.)

An interesting exchange of memos, written while this meeting was in progress, is found in Army Files, G–3 091 Korea TS (1950), case 14/51. GEN Gruenther (DCS, Plans) informs GEN Bolte (G–3) that the JCS are then at the White House and will probably return with Presidential authority to send “additional divisions” to Korea (presumably meaning in addition to the RCT that had already been authorized). He asks whether any limitation should be put on the number of divisions sent from Japan, and whether replacement divisions should be sent to that country. GEN Bolte’s reply was that GEN MacArthur should be given full discretion to use his forces, as recommended in JCS 1776/8, and that no replacement divisions should be sent at that time; however, two National Guard divisions should be called up, as GEN Ridgway had recommended in commenting on JCS 1776/8. The Pres’s decision obviated the necessity for the JCS to consider GEN Gruenther’s first question; they touched on the matter of reinforcement of CINCFE and mobilization of the National Guard later that day, in considering JCS 1776/8 (see below).

116. (U) Agenda for JCS Meeting, 1000, 30 Jun 50. A list of those attending is filed with the agenda and indicates that the meeting began at 1013. The only subject on the agenda is “Removal of Restrictions on Use of Army Forces in Korea,” but there can be little doubt that the purpose of the meeting was as indicated above. The draft directive to GEN MacArthur had been written to authorize the sending of two divisions; hence it required amendment after the Pres announced his sweeping decision authorizing CINCFE to use *all* the forces under his command.

117. Paige, *The Korean Decision*, pp. 262–263. Smith, “Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 88. *NY Times*, 1 Jul 50, p. 1. The lone dissenter was Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry (R.-Neb.). The Sherman Memo records that GEN Bradley gave the Congressmen a briefing at this meeting.

118. *Public Papers, Truman*, 1950, p. 513.

119. An alternative explanation is that this restraint may have been intentional, stemming from a desire to avoid any implication that the United States was entering an “all-out” war, in keeping with the attitude shown by the President in his press conference on 29 June (see footnote 94 above). The press, however, correctly interpreted the announcement. The *NY Times* story cited in footnote 117 begins: “President Truman authorized today the employment of United States ground forces to repel

the invaders in South Korea. . . .” The reporter (Harold B. Hinton) had talked with Secretary Johnson; his story makes it evident that the Secretary, while withholding details for security reasons, made no effort to conceal the scope of the action contemplated by the administration. Clearly there was no intent to mislead the public.

120. (TS) Memo, JSSC to JCS, 30 Jun 50, Army Files, CS 091 Korea TS (1950), case 2. The memo (no copy of which has been found in JCS files) was evidently passed to the Army for action. Attached to it is an informal handwritten note to ADM Davis, DJS, from GEN Gruenther (obviously acting in his capacity as the Army’s Ops Deputy). It is dated 0830 on 30 June, and asks ADM Davis to have “some of your ‘idea’ men” consider a forceful message along the lines suggested by the JSSC, to be broadcast by the President to the North Korean Government; also a memo from ACS, G–3 (Bolte) to GEN Gruenther, recommending a more restrained announcement. These papers bear a stamp that they had been “noted” by DCS, Plans, USA (GEN Gruenther).

121. (U) Msg, JCS 84718 to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50. The DTG of this message is 301722Z (1322 EDT). This fact probably accounts for the statement by Smith (“Why We Went to War in Korea,” p. 88) that “At 1:22 p.m., the orders were on the way to MacArthur.” Doubtless this statement is approximately correct. It may be presumed that this message had the approval of Sec Johnson and the Pres, although the fact is not documented in available records. Strictly speaking, it would seem that the wording of this message merely authorized GEN MacArthur to send two divisions to Korea, as he had requested in his message C 56942, but it was interpreted by all concerned as giving him a completely free hand in disposing his forces.

122. They met from 1437 to 1638, according to the official record. Their agenda included, besides JCS 1776/8, the question of a warning message to unified commanders and proffers of aid by the British Commonwealth countries and by Nationalist China. It was probably in connection with the latter item that they approved a memo to Sec Johnson, putting in writing their opposition to the use of Nationalist forces, which was sent to the Secretary on the same day: (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proffer of Aid by Foreign Governments,” 30 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

123. (U) Dec on JCS 1776/8, 30 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

124. (U) Msg, JCS 84808 to CINCFE, 1 Jul 50.

125. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 415.

126. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2584. See also p. 2581 for a similar statement by Mr. Johnson.

Chapter 3. The United States and the United Nations

1. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1331.

2. (U) Memo, AsstSecState (Hickerson) to MG Burns, OSD, 4 Jul 50, App to Encl to JCS 1776/17, same date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 22. The UN Secretary-General had prepared a draft that was very similar except that it would have assigned a more prominent role to the proposed committee of the Security Council. Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 333–334.

3. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed U.S. Position with Regard to Forces in Korea,” 5 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/19), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 22. After preparing this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the use of the UN flag with VADM B.H. Bieri, one of their representatives in the UN Military Staff Committee. Ambassador Austin, head of the US delegation at the UN, told VADM Bieri that the JCS views on this point conflicted with the UN flag code, which allowed other countries the right to use the UN flag if they desired. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon agreed that the matter was not important and that the original wording in the draft would be acceptable. (U) Memo, COL Ladue to CAPT Lator, “Telephone Conversation with Admiral Bieri,” 5 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 22. In forwarding the JCS views to the Department of State, Secretary Johnson indicated that he would be willing to accept the original wording in the draft (see memo of 6 Jul 50 cited in the next note). However, as finally passed, the resolution authorized only the unified command to use the UN flag.

4. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 6 Jul 50; (TS) Memo, MG Burns (OSD) to SecDef, “Status of UN Resolution on Korean Forces,” 7 Jul 50; (U) Msg, USUN 34 to State, 7 Jul 50, MC IN 52857; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 22. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 347.

5. Text of resolution in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 66–67.

6. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Designation of a United Nations Unified Commander by the U.S.,” 8 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/24), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.

7. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 520; (U) Msg, JCS 85370 to CINCFE, 10 Jul 50. The President’s announcement had stated that General MacArthur was being directed, “pursuant to the Security

Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations.” Actually, this directive did not quite accord with the resolution, which left it to the UN Commander to decide for himself whether or not to use the UN flag. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this discretionary authority should be allowed; they were supported by the Department of State, which felt that the instructions to General MacArthur should follow the letter of the resolution. Consequently, the final directive to CINCFE included, with the President’s approval, an authorization for General MacArthur to use the UN flag as he saw fit. On this controversy, see (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Designation of a United Nations Unified Commander by the U.S.,” 8 Jul 50, and (C) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD (MG Leven C. Allen, USA) to JCS, “Use of UN Flag,” 10 Jul 50, both in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.

8. William J. Sebald with Russell Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (1965), p. 191.

9. GHQ, UNC, General Order No. 1, 25 Jul 50, reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3382.

10. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. III, pp. 12, 13–14. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 110–111. On 14 July President Rhee had assigned to General MacArthur, as CINCUNC, “command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the . . . present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or adjacent seas.” (U) Msg, CINCFE 251040Z to DA, 25 Feb 52, DA IN 109286, gives the complete text of this letter (in the form of a retransmission of a message from the US Embassy in Korea to CINCFE, originally sent on 14 Jul 50). It is also quoted in full in Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (1954), p. 169 (erroneously dated 15 July, and with the text of GEN MacArthur’s reply), and in part in Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 102.

11. (U) NSC Action No. 309 d, 29 Jun 50.

12. (U) Msg, CSGPO WAR 85743 to CINCFE, 12 Jul 50.

13. (U) Msg, CSGPO WAR 88843 to CINCFE, 15 Aug 50.

14. (U) Msg, JCS 84885 to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50.

15. (U) Memos, AsstSecState Hickerson to MG Burns, 13 Jul 50, Encls to (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS 17 Jul 50 (Encl and Apps to JCS 1776/39, 18 Jul 50), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 25. The draft report is appended to the second of these memos and is reproduced as Annex to App B to JCS 1776/39. For the G–3 role in its drafting and the deliberate avoidance of the word “blockade,” see (S) Memo, JW [unidentified; apparently head of G–3 International Branch] to GEN [C.V.R.] Schuyler, “Record of Conference Attended,” 13 Jul 50, Army Files, G–3 091 Korea (1950) case 57. A copy of the draft report is in OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 1. (29 Jun–10 Aug 50), with corrections in pencil and handwritten notes indicating approval by Army and Air Force.

16. (U) JCS 1776/54, 24 Jul 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reports by the United States Government to the United Nations Security Council,” 29 Jul 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/62); (S) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 50; (S) Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 8 Aug 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 26.

17. (U) Msg, JCS 87422 to CINCFE, 28 Jul 50.

18. (S) Memo, AsstSecState Hickerson to MG Burns, 18 Jul 50, Encl to (S) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD, to SecArmy, 19 Jul 50; (U) JCS 2155/1, 12 Aug 50; CCS 319.1 (7–19–50) sec 1. (S) Memo (“disposition form”), MG Bolte to CSA and SecArmy, “First Report to the Security Council Concerning Action in Korea,” 21 Jul 50; (S) Memo, SecArmy to SecState, “First Report to the Security Council Concerning Action in Korea,” 21 Jul 50; Army File, G–3 091 Korea (1950) case 58. The text of this report is printed in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3384–3389. For GEN MacArthur’s report on 16 July 1950, see *NY Times*, 17 Jul 50, p. 1.

19. The first report prepared by GHQ, FECOM covered the period 20–31 July 1950 and was officially dated 16 August. Subsequent reports covered semimonthly periods. They were published as JCS “greens” in the JCS 2155/– series (along with GEN Collins’ memoranda indicating interdepartmental concurrence), and are to be found in JCS file series CCS 319.1 (7–19–50). On the procedure followed, see also (S) Memo, ACS G–3 to CSA, “Report to the United Nations Command Operations in Korea,” 28 Aug 50, Army File, G–3 091 Korea (1950) case 58/15.

Texts of Reports Nos. 2–16, extending through 28 Feb 51, are printed in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3389–3462.

According to (U) *Record of JCS Actions Relative to Korea*, p. 45, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 Oct 1950 formalized GEN Collins’ responsibility for handling the reports. No other evidence of such action has been found. JCS 2155/2, 2155/3, and 2155/4, in CCS 319.1 (7–19–50) sec 1, show that the procedure described above was in use well before 3 October.

20. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 10. See also remarks by former Secretary Johnson, *ibid.*, pt 4, p. 2622.

21. *NY Times*, 29 Jun 50, p. 7.

22. (U) NSC Action No. 308 *f*, 28 Jun 50. When the British offer was discussed at this meeting, Sec Johnson expressed doubts about the advisability of assigning British naval forces to the UN Command. He recalled that during World War II, the US Navy had not wanted British units attached to the US Fleet, owing to “a difference in signals and other difficulties.” President Truman made it clear that the situation was now different. “We do want them now,” he said. (C) *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, Galleys 183–184 ANG (Jessup Memorandum).

23. (U) Memo, Chm BJSM to CJCS, 28 Jun 50, App to Encl A to JCS 1776/9, 30 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

24. (U) Memo, JCS to Chm BJSM, “Placing the British Naval Forces at Disposal of United States Naval Commander in Support of South Korea,” 29 Jun 50 (der from JCS 1776/9); (U) Msg, JCS 84622 to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50, same file.

25. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 29 Jun 50, w/encl, (U) Memo by MG Burns, OSD, “Telephone Message from Mr. Satterthwait of State Department . . .,” 29 Jun 50, App and Annex to Encl C to JCS 1776/9, 30 Jun 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

26. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 342. (U) NSC Action No. 309 *d*, 29 Jun 50.

27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proffer of Aid by Foreign Governments,” 30 Jun 50 (der from JCS 1776/9), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21.

28. (C) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 3 Jul 50, same file, sec 22.

29. Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, p. 46. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD, to JCS “Netherlands’ Force for Use in Korean Operations,” 5 Jul 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj and date (der from JCS 1776/22), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 22.

30. For the actions of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments, see their messages to the UN Secretary General reproduced in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 29–30, 47–48, and 47 respectively. Canada ordered three destroyers from the West Coast to the Far East on 30 June; and formally placed them at the disposal of the UN on 12 July; Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950–1955* (Naval Historical Section, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, 1965), pp. 4–5.

31. See Ch. 2.

32. (U) Aide Memoires from Chinese Embassy, 29 and 30 Jun 50, Encls with (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Chinese Offer of Forces to Assist in Korea,” 1 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21. (Encl and Apps to JCS 1776/16, 3 Jul 50, same file, sec 22. Reproduced also in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 59–60.

33. See Ch. 2.

34. (U) Aide Memoire to Chinese Embassy, 1 Jul 50, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, same date, cited in preceding note, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21; reproduced as App C to Encl to JCS 1776/16, same file, sec 22, also in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 60–61. Further results of this diplomatic exchange are described in Ch. 4.

35. (U) Msg, JCS 84737 to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50.

36. (U) JCS 1776/20, 6 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 22.

37. The message from the Secretary-General and the replies thereto are printed in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 28–59.

38. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 210–213, 224–229; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 416–420. An exchange of letters between Nehru and Stalin, furnished informally to Defense by State, was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as (TS) JCS 1776/41, 19 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 25. Nehru’s mediation effort ended when Soviet Ambassador Malik returned to the Security Council on 1 Aug 1950 (see Ch. 5).

39. (U) Memo, SecA (for SecDef) to JCS, 1 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21, Encl to JCS 1776/14, 3 Jul 50, same file, sec 22.

40. (S) Memo, SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF to SecDef, 7 Jul 50, with note by Secretary Johnson reading, “Mr. President—General Bradley and I concur,” and attached handwritten memo from MG Allen, ExecSecy, OSD, to DepSecDef, 10 Jul 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 1 (29 Jun–10 Aug 50).

41. (S) Memo, SecArmy, SecNav, and SecAF to SecDef, 13 Jul 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 1 (29 Jun–10 Jul 50). During 1950 and 1951 the Service Secretaries frequently expressed their joint views on matters connected with the Korean War. The practice started under Secretary Johnson and continued under his successor. See Ch. 5, p. 100.

42. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57379 to DA for JCS, 7 Jul 50, CM IN 10576; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57481 to JCS, 9 Jul 50, CM IN 11043.

43. (U) Memo, ACS, G–3, to DCS, Plans, “Ground Force Assistance for Korea from British Commonwealth Nations,” 10 Jul 50; (U) SM–1476–50 to JSPC, same date; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.

44. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 13 Jul 50, w/Encl and App to JCS 1776/33, same date. CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 24.
45. (U) Memo, OSD to JCS, 14 Jul 50, Encl B to JCS 1776/37, same date, same file.
46. UN Document S/1619, printed in UN Security Council, *Official Records*, Fifth Year, Supplement for Jun–Aug 50, p. 99. There was some variation in the messages to the various recipients; the above is described as typical. On the origin of this appeal, see Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 336–338. According to his account, the primary purpose was not so much to ask for assistance as to lay down a procedure to govern the offers that had already been made to him informally. The response to this message is described in the next section of the chapter.
47. (U) Msg, JCS 85971 to CINCFE, 14 Jul 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/36).
48. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Views on Proposed State Department Request for Assistance in Korea from Certain U.N. Nations,” 14 Jul 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/37), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 24. The substance of this memo was passed orally to the Dept of State; see (S) Ltr, MG Burns to DepUsecState, 27 Jul 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea), Folder No. 1 (29 Jun–10 Aug 50).
49. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Courses of Action in Korea,” 14 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/23), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.
50. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57957 to JCS, 15 Jul 50, CM IN 12762.
51. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 19 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/43, same date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 25; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Ground Forces Assistance for United Nations Forces, Korea from New Zealand and Lebanon,” 22 Jul 50, same file, sec 26 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/45), same file, sec 25. The Lebanese offer was tentative and never materialized.
52. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 20 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/48, same date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 25; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Naval Assistance for Korea from French Government,” 22 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 26 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/51), same file, sec 25.
53. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 21 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/53, same date, same file. Four days later, State asked Defense to furnish such criteria and inquired about the value of contributions from certain countries to which an approach was being considered. The reply was that the matter of criteria was under study and that the value of contributions from many of the countries listed by State had already been indicated. (U) Ltr, DepUsecState (Matthews) to MG Burns, 25 Jul 50, and reply, (S) Ltr MG Burns to DepUsecState, 27 Jul 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea), Folder No. 1 (29 Jun–10 Jul 50).
54. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Military Assistance in Korea from Certain U.N. Nations,” 7 Aug 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/68), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 27.
55. (C) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 31 Jul 50, w/Encl, (C) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 24 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 26, (C) Encl and App to JCS 1776/65, 1 Aug 50, same file, sec 27. The Department of State had already instructed its representatives abroad to follow the procedures outlined in Secretary Acheson’s letter: (C) Msg, State (unnumbered circular) to SCAP Tokyo, 24 Jul 50, CM IN 15284, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 1 (29 Jun–10 Aug 50).
56. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “General Policy for Conducting Conversations with Other Governments on Contributions to the Effort in Korea,” 8 Sep 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 31 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/86), same file, sec 29.
57. (C) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 25 Sep 50, Encl to JCS 1776/118, 29 Sep 50, same file, sec 34.
58. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 18 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/42, 19 Jul 50, same file, sec 25.
59. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Procedure for Transmitting Offers of Assistance to the Unified Commands [sic] Under the U.S.,” 8 Aug 50 (der from (U) JCS 1776/67), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 27; (S) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 Aug 50, same file, sec 28; (U) “Procedures for Co-ordination in Handling Assistance to Republic of Korea,” 2 Oct 50, same file, sec 34. The final version differed considerably in wording (though not in substance) from the draft sent the JCS. This fact, together with the delay of more than two months, indicates that there must have been considerable discussion, in which the JCS were not involved.
- For a convenient brief summary of the procedure followed in handling offers of contributions, see App A to (U) JCS 1776/203, 3 Apr 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44.
60. Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 338–339.
61. The replies to the Secretary-General’s message of 14 July (UN Docs S/1608 ff) are printed in UN Security Council, *Official Records*, Fifth Year, Supplements for Jun–Aug and Sep–Dec 50. Some were not received until after the arbitrary terminal date of 15 September 1950 assigned this chapter, but they will be considered here for convenience.
62. (U) Msg, USMILATT London 76843 to DA, 26 Jul 50, CM IN 15857; (S) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Offers of Assistance in the Korean Situation,” 28 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/61, same date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 26. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Aug 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/70), same file, sec 27. (S) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 10 Aug 50, same file, sec 28. UN Doc S/1638.

63. (U) Msg, US MILATT London 76914 to DA, 18 Aug 50, CM IN 2815. (U) Msg, US MILLIAS Hong Kong to DA, 21 Aug 50, CM IN 3589. UN Doc 5/1702. Appleman, *South to the Nakdong*, p. 382. Brigadier Cyril Nelson Barclay, *The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953* (1954), p. 14. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3393. It does not appear that this offer was formally submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

64. UN Docs S/1617, S/1700. (C) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Canadian Army Special Force,” 13 Sep 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 31. (U) Encl to JCS 1776/103, 15 Sep 50, same file, sec 32; (U) JCS 1776/113, 22 Sep 50, same file, see 33; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Canadian Army Special Force for Service in Korea,” 25 Sep 50, same file, sec 34. Historical Section, General Staff, [Canadian] Army Headquarters, *Canada’s Army in Korea* (1956), pp. 4–5. LTC Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (1966), pp. 19–26. The Canadian decision was transmitted directly to GEN Collins. (TS) Ltr, Brig. H.E. Taber, Canadian Joint Staff, to GEN Collins, 9 Aug 50, and reply, GEN Haislip (Actg CSA) to Brig. Taber, 24 Aug 50, with handwritten memo, GEN Gruenther to G–3, commenting that this was a departure from the usual State-Defense-JCS channel, and instructing G–3 to make certain that SecDef had been informed: Army File, G–3 091 Korea (1950) TS, case 81.

65. UN Docs S/1617, S/1685. (U) DM–422 to GENs Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg, and ADM Sherman, 25 Jul 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Canadian Offer of Transport Aircraft for Operations in Korea,” 28 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/59); (C) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 29 Jul 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 26. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Canadian Offer of Commercial Air Service for Support of Korean Operations,” 29 Aug 50, Encl to JCS 1776/85, 30 Aug 50, same file, sec 29. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Sep 50, same file, sec 31 (der from JCS 1776/92), same file, sec 30. The air transport squadron was offered informally by the RCAF to the USAF, and immediate arrangements were made to place it under the Commanding General, Military Air Transport Service. The JCS recommendation was that the “formal” offer of this squadron be accepted “when received.”

66. (U) Msg, USMILATT Melbourne to CSUSA, 3 Aug 50, CM IN 18278. UN Docs S/1637, S/1664. (U) JSPC 853/39, 10 Aug 50 (p. 6, par 4 c), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 28. *NY Times*, 28 Jul 50, p. 1, 29 Jul 50, p. 5, 2 Aug 50, p. 8. Apparently the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted, but they had already indicated their views regarding an Australian troop contribution (above, p. 64).

67. (S) JCS 1776/61, 28 Jul 50, same file, sec 26; (U) JCS 1776/70, 5 Aug 50, same file, sec 28.

68. For the Turkish and Thai offers and the JCS response, see JCS 1776/61 and JCS 1776/70, cited preceding note, and UN Docs S/1630 and S/1622.

69. UN Docs S/1613, S/1661, S/1681. (U) Ltrs, CHJUSMAG Philippines to Pres, Republic of Philippines, 11 Aug 50, and to CJCS, same date (later circulated as Encl to DM–445 to other JCS members, 17 Aug 50); (TS) Msg, State 241 to Manila, 11 Aug 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 28.

70. UN Docs S/1612, S/1755. (U) JCS 1776/70, 5 Aug 50; memo of telecon (no classification indicated), GEN Gruenther to JCS, 7 Aug 50; same file, sec 27. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61646 to DA, 30 Aug 50, CM IN 6801, (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Greek Offer of Assistance in Korea,” 15 Sep 50, same file, sec 32; (der from JCS 1776/101), same file, sec 31.

71. UN Docs S/1611, S/1760. (U) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “French Offer of Assistance for Korea,” 8 Sep 50; (U) JCS 1776/109, 21 Sep 50; same file, sec 33. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 25 Sep 50, same file, sec 34.

72. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 20 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/50, same date, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 25. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Assistance in Korea from Certain Nations,” 28 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/55), same file, sec 26.

73. UN Docs S/1787, S/1775. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 14 Sep 50, same file, sec 31. Encl to JCS 1776/104, 15 Sep 50, same file, sec 32. *NY Times*, 19 Sep 50, p. 5.

74. UN Doc S/1669. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 5 Aug 50, Encl to JCS 1776/71, 7 Aug 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 27. (U) JCS 1776/78, 21 Aug 50, same file, sec 28; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Assistance by the Union of South Africa in the Korean Situation,” 23 Aug 50, same file, sec 29.

75. These offers are detailed in UN Docs S/1699, S/1615, S/1609, and S/1647, and in the following JCS papers (in file series CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45), sections as indicated): (S) JCS 1776/58, (U) 1776/64, sec 26; (U) 1776/66, (U) 1776/69, sec 27; (U) 1776/79, (U) 1776/84, sec 29; (U) 1776/80, sec 30; (U) 1776/98, sec 31.

76. (U) SM–1830–50 to Ops Deps, 8 Aug 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 27. In recommending approval of a particular offer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff usually told the Secretary of Defense that, upon notification of favorable action, they would refer the matter to the Chiefs of the cognizant Service for implementation of details.

77. (C) Memo, MG Burns to SecDef, “Utilization of Offers of Foreign Assistance in Korea,” 18 Aug 50, w/encl, same file, sec 28.

78. (C) Memo, SecDef to Pres, "Utilization of Offers of Foreign Assistance in Korea," 29 Aug 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 29; (U) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., same subj, 1 Sep 50, Encl to JCS 1776/94, 2 Sep 50, same file, sec 30. The Secretary of Defense interpreted this directive to mean that, before any logistic support could be provided, the recipient country must acknowledge the 1776/116, obligation of reimbursement; (U) Encl and App to JCS 1776/116, 26 Sep 50, same file, sec 34.

79. (S) Memo, Dir OMA to DepAsst CSA, G–3, DA, Dir Intrnat Aff, DN, and OPO, DAF, "MDAP for Support of the United Nations Forces in Korea," 15 Sep 50, same file, sec 32.

80. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proffer of Assistance by Belgium," 20 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/47); (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Proffer of Assistance by Belgium," 20 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/52; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 25. (TS) Memo for Record, A.C. Murdaugh, 21 Jul 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 1 (29 Jun–10 Aug 50).

81. UN Docs S/1670, S/1896. (C) Msg, Addis Ababa 45 to State, 12 Aug 50, CM IN 1396. (U) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "Ethiopian Offer of Assistance in Korea," 8 Nov 50, Encl to JCS 1776/155, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 38. (U) JCS 1776/165, 29 Nov 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Ethiopian Offer of Assistance in Korea," 6 Dec 50; same file, sec 40.

82. (U) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "Colombian Offer of Assistance for Korea," 18 Sep 50, Encl to JCS 1776/106; same file, sec 32; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 25 Sep 50, same file, sec 34, (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/11, same file, sec 33).

83. (C) Msg, State 127 to Bogota, 18 Oct 50, CM IN 3148. (U) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "Colombian Offer of Military Assistance for Korea," 17 Nov 50, Encl to JCS 1776/163, (U) JCS 1776/164, 22 Nov 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 39. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Colombian Offer of Military Assistance for Korea," 29 Nov 50, same file, sec 40.

84. (S) Ltr, DepUSecState to MG Burns, 9 Aug 50, same file, sec 27. App to Encl to JCS 1776/76, 16 Aug 50, same file, sec 28.

85. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Governing Latin American Assistance to Korea," 6 Sep 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 31, (der from JCS 1776/80), same file, sec 29.

86. UN Docs S/1645, S/1618, S/1673, S/1666. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Bolivian and Costa Rican Offers of Assistance in Korea," 18 Aug 50 (der from JCS 1776/75), same file, sec 28. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Panamanian Offer of Assistance in Korean Operations," 2 Oct 50 (der from JCS 1776/117), same file, sec 34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 9 Nov 50, same file, sec 38 (N/H of JCS 1776/117, 9 Nov 50). (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Uruguayan Assistance for Korea," 8 Sep 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 31, (der from JCS 1776/77, same file, sec 28).

87. A complete list of the forces sent by each country and the dates of their arrival is given in (U) Maj. William J. Fox, *Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat Operations* (Military History Section, Hq FECOM, 2 vols, 1952; reproduced and distributed by OCMH, DA), vol I, pp. 1–50, 195–243. This work was written while the war was still in progress, but long after all contributions had been received. It also gives an excellent discussion of the problems involved in integrating the various national units into a single fighting force. A shorter list of forces from UN countries is given in Rutherford M. Poats, *Decision in Korea* (1954), Appendix B, pp. 335–336. The status of contributions as of the end of 1950 can be found in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950*, pp. 226–228.

88. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 382–383, 411. (U) Fox, *Inter-Allied Cooperation*, vol. I, pp. 5, 41, 218, 231. Barclay, *First Commonwealth Division*, pp. 17–19.

89. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 614, 644–646, 668. (U) Fox, *Inter-Allied Cooperation*, vol. I, pp. 41–42, 217, 219, 232–233. Barclay, *First Commonwealth Division*, pp. 21–29, 35–36. It was intended that the 29th British Brigade would relieve the 27th, but the critical situation at the end of November 1950 led to the temporary retention of both. In 1951 the British, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand units were amalgamated to form the First Commonwealth Division.

90. (U) Fox, *Inter-Allied Cooperation*, vol. I, pp. 5–11, 213, 231.

91. (U) Fox, *Inter-Allied Cooperation*, vol. I, pp. 11–15, 215, 232–233. Though comparable in strength to a US regimental combat team, the Turkish force was officially styled a "brigade" and arrived with both brigade and regimental headquarters. (The word "brigade" is of course here used in its older sense, referring to an echelon between regiment and division, not as employed in the US Army since the "ROAD" reorganization in the 1960s.) Similarly, Thailand, which had promised a regiment, sent only a battalion but accompanied it with an unwieldy regimental headquarters (*ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 16, 233–234).

92. One additional country, Italy, eventually contributed an ambulance unit.

93. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 110, 180 (MacArthur testimony). See also GEN MacArthur's remarks on this score at Wake Island (made, however, when UN troop contributions were only beginning to arrive).

94. As of 30 June 1951 (the earliest date for which figures are available), UN ground force strength totaled 554,577 men. Countries other than the United States and the Republic of Korea were contributing 28,061, or approximately 5.1 percent. For 31 July 1953 the corresponding figures were 932,539 and 39,145, or 4.2 percent. See Appendix 2 in “The Korean War” Part 2. These figures, of course, do not take account of contributions of air or naval strength.

95. See list in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950*, pp. 226–228.

Chapter 4. The Buildup and the Strategy

1. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 893.
2. Higgins, *War in Korea*, p. 33.
3. See Ch. 2, p. 52.
4. General MacArthur’s plans are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
5. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57061 to DA for JCS, 2 Jul 50, CM IN 9291.
6. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57066 to DA for JCS, 2 Jul 50, CM IN 9317. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 64–65.
7. Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol I, *The Pusan Perimeter* (1954), pp. 48–49.
8. (U) Memos for Record, Secy JCS, “CINCFE Dispatch No. C–56061 of 2 Jul 1950 (CM–IN–9291)” and “Memorandum by General Vandenberg re Reinforcement of the Far East Air Force,” both dtd 4 Jul 50. CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 1. (U) Msg, JCS 84876 to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50, Encl A to JCS 2147, 8 Jul 50, same file. For the Air Force response, see Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 65–66.
9. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 57218 to DA for JCS, 5 Jul 50, CM IN 9974; C 57248, CM IN 9997; CX 57243, CM IN 9994.
10. (U) Msg, JCS 85058 to CINCFE, 6 Jul 50.
11. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 57379 to DA for JCS, 7 Jul 50, CM IN 10570—(words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out).
12. (U) SM–1433–50 to JMTC, 6 Jul 50, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 1.
13. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Impact of Korean Situation Upon FY 1951 Program,” 6 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1800/96); (U) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., same date, Encl to JCS 1800/97, 12 Jul 50; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 25.
14. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 7 Jul 50, Encl B to JCS 2147, 8 Jul 50, and N/H of JCS 2147, 14 Jul 50, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 1. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 94.
15. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 94, 168–169.
16. (U) JCS 2148, 10 Jul 50, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 1.
17. Appleman, *South to the Nakdong*, pp. 60–91.
18. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 84.
19. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57481 to JCS, 9 Jul 50, CM IN 11043 (words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out). It is evident from this message, and from subsequent discussions, that General MacArthur originally intended to use this four-division army for combat in Korea. Later, however, he contended that he had wanted it for occupation duty in Japan; see Ch. 8.
20. (U) Msgs, CINCFE to DA for JCS, C 57561, CM IN 11161, C 57553, CM IN 11150, both dtd 10 Jul 50.
21. (U) Msg, CINCPACFLT to CNO, 080914Z Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1776/25, 9 Jul 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.
22. The four remaining were the 3d Infantry, the 11th and 82d Airborne, and the 2d Armored. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 44, 90.
23. (U) JCS 1776/27, 10 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 23.
24. (U) Informal Memo, GEN Gruenther, 9 Jul 50 (recording JCS action on CINCFE message of 9 Jul 50), Army File, C/S 320.2 1950 (case 9). (U) Msg, CSUSA WAR 85371 to CINCFE, 10 Jul 50. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 347. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 81. (Mr. Truman’s account implies that the Collins-Vandenberg trip was an outgrowth of General MacArthur’s requests of 2 and 5 July, and that it was not inspired by the 9 July message, which he does not mention.) The results of the trip are discussed later in this chapter.
25. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 91–92. (U) Msg, DCS/Admin WAR 85696 to CINCFE, 12 Jul 50. (U) Msg, CSGPO WAR 85854 to CINCFE, 13 Jul 50. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 57744 to DA, 13 Jul 50, CM IN 12036, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 1. General Collins participated in these decisions via teletype.

26. (U) JCS 1849/34, 13 Jul 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Call of Selected National Guard Units and Individuals of the Reserve Forces to Active Service," same date; CCS 320.2 (5–1–45) sec 5. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 21 Jul 50, same file, Encl to JCS 1849/39, 24 Jul 50, same file, sec 6.

27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Personnel Requirements in Support of Current Operations in the Far East (Second Increment)," 13 Jul 50, w/Encls (der from JCS 1800/99); (C) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 14 Jul 50; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 25.

28. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 11 Jul 50, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 25, Encl to JCS 1800/102, 19 Jul 50, same file, sec 26.

29. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Fiscal Year 1951 Force Requirements," 18 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1800/101), w/Corrig 19 Jul 50, amending Air Force goals; (C) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 19 Jul 50, Encl to JCS 1800/104, 31 Jul 50; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 26. For the legal limits on Service strengths that were then in effect, see Ch. I, p. 21.

30. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 527–542.

31. *NY Times*, 25 Jul 50, p. 1.

32. *NY Times*, 23 Sep 50, p. 1, 28 Sep 50, p. 12. The relevant legislation was the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951 (PL 843, 81st Congress).

33. PL 655, 81st Congress (3 Aug 50).

34. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 21 Jul 50, w/Encls, Memos, SecDef to Svc Secs, 20 Jul 50, CCS 320.2 (5–1–45) sec 5. (U) Encl and Apps to JCS 1849/39, 24 Jul 50, same file, sec 6.

35. (U) JCS 2147/3, 31 Jul 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Increased Augmentation of the Army (Above 834,000)," 31 Jul 50; (S) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 10 Aug 50; CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1.

36. (U) JCS 2147/5, 11 Aug 50, CCS 320.2 (7–28–50), sec 1. Addition of the two squadrons would give each Marine air wing a full nine squadrons. The Marine Corps appears to have outstripped the other Services in the pace of its mobilization. See Ernest H. Giusti, *Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950–1951* (1951), passim, especially pp. 9–10.

37. (U) JCS 2147/7, 16 Aug 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Federalization of Certain Air National Guard Units," 18 Aug 50; (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 22 Aug 50, w/Encl; (U) Memo, SecDef to Pres, same date; CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1.

38. (U) Memo, Chm Munitions Bd to SecDef, "Recall Requirements of Reservists," 28 Aug 50, w/Encls, Tabs A, B, and C, giving detailed information for each Service; the Air Force figures are not given in the covering memo. Reproduced as Encl to JCS 1849/45, 29 Aug 50, but without the tabs. CCS 320.2 (5–1–45) sec 6.

39. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 31 Jul 50, and (S) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 10 Aug 50, CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1.

40. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 18 Aug 50, and (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 22 Aug 50, CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1.

41. (U) JCS 2147/8, 17 Aug 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Augmentation of Naval Forces," 21 Aug 50; (S) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 25 Aug 50; CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1. Approval by the President may be assumed but is not documented in available records.

42. (U) JCS 1800/110, 7 Sep 50, and JCS 1800/111, 11 Sep 50, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 26. (U) JCS 2147/9, 18 Aug 50, CCS 320.2 (7–28–50) sec 1. (U) JCS 2101/15, 28 Aug 50, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 5. The subsequent buildup of forces, using NSC 68 as a guide for program objectives, is described in Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, Ch. 2.

43. They left Washington on 10 July but stopped over in Hawaii, where GEN Collins consulted with local officers regarding the disposition of the 5th RCT. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 91, 105.

44. Appleman, *South of the Naktong*, pp. 101–145, 196. (TS) DA TT 3514, 13 Jul 50 (DTG 131045Z).

45. A detailed report of the Collins-Vandenberg trip to Tokyo is found in (TS) Memo, LTC D. D. Dickson, Far East and Pacific Br, G–3, to GEN Bolte, "Report of Trip to the Far East Command (10–15 July 1950)," 17 Jul 50, w/Encls, Army File, G–3 333 Pacific TS (1950), case 3. Additional information (notably about the Collins-MacArthur interview on 14 July, at which LTC Dickson was not present) is given in Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 81–85 (presumably based on the author's own recollections), and in a message sent by Collins while in Tokyo: (TS) Msg, CINCFE C 57814 to DA, 14 Jul 50, Army File, G–3 320.2 Pacific TS (1950), case 17.

46. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 85.

47. (S) Msg, DA G–3 WAR 86558 to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50. On 19 July the DA had given CINCFE permission to reorganize his field units at full war strength. (S) Msg, DA WAR 86450 to CINCFE, 19 Jul 50.

48. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX–58239 to DA for JCS, 19 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1776/46), CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 1.

49. (U) Msg, JCS 86511 to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50, (der from JCS 1776/46), same file.
50. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX-58327 to JCS, 21 Jul 50, CM IN 14303.
51. (U) Msgs, JCS 86778 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50; CSUSA WAR 86784 to CINCFE, same date; CINCFE C-58473 to DA for JCS 23 Jul 50, CM IN 14839.
52. The Marine RCT authorized for FECOM early in July had been combined with an air group to form a provisional brigade. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. I, p. 49.
53. (U) JCS 2147/1, 24 Jul 50, CCS 381 Far East (7-2-50) sec 2. Presumably GEN MacArthur was informed of this decision through Navy channels; no message on the subject has been found in JCS records. On this controversy, see Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. II, *The Inchon-Seoul Operation*, pp. 20–23.
54. Giusti, *Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve*, pp. 9–10.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 10; Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, p. 23.
56. (U) Msg, CINCFE C-58473 to DA for JCS, 23 Jul 50, CM IN 14839.
57. (U) Msg, CSUSA WAR 86784 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50.
58. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 169–171.
59. This trip and its background are discussed more fully in a later section of the chapter.
60. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 99. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 35–36.
61. (TS) Ltr, GEN Collins to GEN MacArthur, Army File, C/S 323.3 FEC TS (1950).
62. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 35–37. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 99. *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 540–544 (Memos by LTG Ridgway and Mr. Harriman).
63. Statements by GEN Ridgway to Army Policy Council, 9 Aug 50, (TS) Minutes of 28th Mtg, APC, 9 Aug 50, G-3 File, 334 APC (TS) case 7.
64. (TS) Handwritten memos (3), GEN Gruenther to GEN Bolte, Army File, G-3 320.2 Pacific (1950) TS, case 19/17. These memos were written between 1110 and 1150 hours, during the JCS meeting, to keep GEN Bolte abreast of JCS thinking (“so you don’t get crash-landed,” as one of them said). Two of them are dated 8 Aug, but this date was apparently written in later and is obviously erroneous. There was indeed a JCS meeting on the afternoon of 8 Aug 1950, according to the official record, but Generals Ridgway and Norstad did not attend. However, they were present (along with GEN Gruenther and the other Ops Deps) at a JCS meeting on 9 Aug 1950 that lasted from 1035 to 1155. (See record of attendance at JCS meetings, in JCS Files). GEN Collins told the Army Policy Council on 9 Aug that a special JCS meeting was planned for that day to hear the Ridgway-Norstad report (minutes of APC mtg cited in last note).
65. (U) JCS 2147/4, 10 Aug 50, CCS 381 Far East (7-2-50) sec 2.
66. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, pp. 25, 32–33. Giusti, *Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve*, pp. 13–14.
67. (U) JCS 2147/4, 10 Aug 50; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reinforcement of the Far East Command,” same date; CCS 381 Far East (7-2-50) sec 2.
68. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 121. (U) Sherman Memo.
69. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Reinforcement of the Far East Command,” 11 Aug 50, CCS 381 Far East (7-2-50) sec 2.
70. (TS) Msg, DA WAR 88594 to CINCFE, 12 Aug 50, Army Files, G-3 320.2 Pacific TS (1950), case 36/4.
71. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 214–215, 257–259, 389, 491.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 491.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 503, n. 44. The 187th had been shipped from California on 6 Sep 1950 and landed in Japan two weeks later. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 171.
74. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 739–740.
75. See Ch. 9.
76. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 139–140. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, pp. 4–9.
77. (U) JCS 1924/19, 12 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 24.
78. But a “last-ditch” line laid out by EUSAK for emergency purposes (known as the “Davidson Line,” from the officer who surveyed it) would apparently have coincided approximately with the “inner and final” line drawn by the Joint Intelligence Committee. See Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 391–392, and Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 247.
79. The evolution of the Pusan Perimeter can be followed in a series of situation maps beginning 15 July 1950, prepared as part of a series of daily “Highlights of the Korean Situation” for General Bradley (in OCJCS Files). A complete account is given in Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, Chs. VI–XXIV. Map III shows the perimeter at approximately its smallest extent.
80. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 58327 to JCS, 21 Jul 50, CM IN 14303.
81. Poats, *Decision in Korea*, p. 58.

82. A complete account of the disadvantages of Inch'on for an amphibious attack is given in Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, pp. 78–81. See also Poats, *Decision in Korea*, pp. 58–59; Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, pp. 43–44; COL Robert D. Heintz, USMC (Ret.), *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (1968), pp. 24–28; Walt Sheldon, *Hell or High Water: MacArthur's Landing at Inchon* (1968), pp. 115–116.

83. (TS) Tab C to Memo, LTC Dickson to GEN Bolte, 17 Jul 50, cited in note 45 above.

84. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 116.

85. (U) Msg, JCS 86778 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50; (U) Msg, CSUSA WAR 86784 to CINCFE, same date; (U) Msg, CINCFE C-58473 to DA for JCS, 23 Jul 50, CM IN 14839.

86. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 142–143.

87. Mr. Johnson's testimony in the MacArthur hearings seemed to imply some discussion of this matter before the Collins-Sherman visit to the Far East (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2618). This testimony is quoted in footnote 97.

88. (U) Sherman Memo.

89. As late as 7 Aug 50, a study drafted by G-3 to provide guidance to agencies responsible for supporting FECOM, based on the "best information currently available," assumed that an amphibious landing in the Seoul-Inch'on area would not take place before March 1951. The study commented on the fact that "a campaign plan for the Korean operation has not yet been received" from CINCFE, and cited an estimate by the Ops Depts that the conflict would require about twelve months. (TS) G-3 Study (Draft), "Interim Guidance for Support of Far East Command Campaign in Korea," 7 Aug 50, Army Files, G-3 091 Korea TS (1950), case 76.

90. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 121–123. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1295. (U) Sherman Memo.

91. One of the few concessions that General MacArthur had made to the principle of unified command within his headquarters, JSPOG consisted of three officers from the Army, three from the Navy, and two from the Air Force, who operated directly under BG Edwin K. Wright, USA, MacArthur's ACofS, G-3. JSPOG's original charter defined its mission as "to assist and advise the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on matters pertaining to the exercise of unified command over Army, Navy and Air Forces allocated to the Far East Command." When the United Nations Command was established, JSPOG's responsibilities were expanded to include it. All strategic plans for Korea either originated with JSPOG or were evaluated for MacArthur by it. See Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 47–49.

92. An account of this celebrated conference of 23 August 1950 is an obligatory part of every history of the Korean War. The following works make use of information furnished by one or more persons who were present at the meeting: Walter Karig, CDR Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, and LCDR Frank A. Manson, USN, *Battle Report: The War in Korea* (1952), pp. 166–169; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 149–150; Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, pp. 44–47; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, pp. 75–82; Heintz, *Victory at High Tide*, pp. 39–42; Sheldon, *Hell or High Water*, pp. 113–119; Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 493–494; Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 345–350. (Appleman twice gives the date as 23 July, perhaps through confusion with the earlier Collins-Vandenberg visit, which he does not mention.) There are two published accounts by participants: Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 123–126, and MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 347–350 (largely identical with Whitney except that it purports to give a verbatim text of his speech presumably written down from memory afterwards, from which Whitney gives excerpts). The Sherman Memo adds nothing and implies that the conference took place on 21 August. The amount of variation in the available accounts is no more than to be expected; all agree with the one given above, except that some omit reference to the JSPOG briefing, and General MacArthur's words are variously reported. The concluding paragraph quoted above is as given by MacArthur himself. Some attribute to him an even more stirring conclusion: "We shall land at Inch'on and I shall crush them!"

93. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 126.

94. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 150. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, pp. 47–48. Heintz, *Victory at High Tide*, pp. 42–43. The Sherman Memo mentions this conference but does not indicate that Posung-Myon was discussed; it quotes RADM Doyle as saying that there was "no better place than Inchon within twenty miles." The objection to Posung-Myon, as stated by GEN MacArthur's Chief of Staff, MGEN E. A. Almond, was that it was too far from Seoul, which was the "real objective" of the operation.

95. Karig, *Battle Report*, p. 169. (U) Sherman Memo. According to the latter source, there were two separate Sherman-MacArthur conferences, on 23 and 24 August. Karig mentions only one, on 24 August. The remark by Sherman is quoted by Karig, on the authority of Admiral Joy.

96. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 127.

97. As Secretary Johnson said later, during the MacArthur hearings: "... I had been carrying along with General MacArthur the responsibility for Inch'on. General Collins... did not favor Inch'on and

went over to try to argue General MacArthur out of it. General MacArthur stood pat. I backed MacArthur, and the President . . . backed me on it. He went ahead." *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2618.

98. (U) Msg, JCS 89960 to CINCFE, 28 Aug 50. (Drafted by ADM Sherman: see (U) SM-2008-50 to GEN Bradley, GEN Vandenberg, and GEN Collins, 25 Aug 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 29.

99. (U) GHQ, UNC, Op Order No. 1, 30 Aug 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) B1 pt 1 A.

100. According to General Collins (*War in Peacetime*, p. 127, footnote), copies were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the individual Service Chiefs but were not received until 8 September.

101. (U) Msg, JCS 90639 to CINCFE, 5 Sep 50.

102. (U) Msg, CINCFE C-62213 to DA for JCS, 6 Sep 50, CM IN 8572.

103. Appleman, *South of the Naktong*, pp. 397-487. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. I, pp. 209-225.

104. (U) Msg, JCS 90908 to CINCFE, 7 Sep 50. General MacArthur later declared that this message "chilled me to the marrow of my bones," with its implication that "the whole movement should be abandoned" (*Reminiscences*, p. 351).

105. (U) Msg, CINCFE C-62423 to DA for JCS, 8 Sep 50, CM IN 9304.

106. (U) Msg, JCS 90958 to CINCFE, 8 Sep 50. (U) Sherman Memo. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 129.

107. BG Lynn D. Smith, USA (Ret.), "A Nickel After a Dollar," *Army*, Sep 1970, pp. 25, 32-34.

108. (U) Msg, JCS WAR 91763 to CINCFE, 16 Sep 50.

Chapter 5. The Conflict Almost Won

1. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. II, pp. 73-280. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 488-606. Heintz, *Victory at High Tide*, pp. 65-251. Sheldon, *Hell or High Water*, pp. 163-329.

2. *NY Times*, 13 Sep 50, p. 1, 22 Sep 50, p. 22. The reasons for Sec Johnson's dismissal have never been officially revealed. The subject is discussed more fully in Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Policy, 1950-1952*, pp. 60-62.

3. Dean Acheson, *Sketches from Life* (1961), pp. 162-163. (reprinted in shorter form in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 371, 441). *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 379 (testimony of Secretary Marshall). Examples of the interdepartmental meetings referred to above are cited in Chs. 6-8 below. Mr. Acheson relates that, at one such meeting, he and GEN Bradley made a "treaty" that they would avoid references to a "purely military" or a "purely political" point of view. Acheson, *Sketches from Life*, p. 163.

4. *NY Times*, 14 Jun 50, p. 14, 19 Sep 50, pp. 20-21, 21 Sep 50, p. 23, 23 Sep 50, p. 8. Legislation for this purpose had been introduced before the Korean crisis by Representative Paul Shafer of Michigan.

5. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Future United States Policy with Respect to North Korea," 17 Jul 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, p. 410.

6. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 445.

7. Secretary Johnson made this clear in his testimony during the MacArthur hearings, when he was questioned on this point. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2585-2586.

8. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 341.

9. Dept. of State *Bulletin*, 10 Jul 50, p. 46.

10. On this debate in the administration, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 445, 450-451, and George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (1967), pp. 487-490. Kennan, who was then Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, firmly opposed unification, as apparently did Secretary Acheson, although he is less clear on the matter. Two draft memorandums prepared in the Department of Defense, dated 31 July and 7 August 1950, advocated that the UN Command "seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th Parallel": *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 502-510, 528-535. These studies were apparently drafted without formal participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since they have not been found in JCS files. Whether or not they were approved by Sec Johnson is not indicated. The earlier of these two drafts is evidently the document referred to by Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 451-452, and characterized by him as a "remarkable intellectual exercise."

11. LTC E. Lloyd Murphy, USA, *The U.S./UN Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel, October 1950: A Case Study of Changing Objectives in Limited War* (Air War College Research Report No. 3600, 1968), pp. 24-25, 29. (Hereafter: Murphy, *Decision to Cross the Parallel*). For GEN Eisenhower's statement, see *NY Times*, 21 Jul 50, p. 4.

12. (TS) Tab B to Memo, LTC Dickson to MG Bolte, "Report of Trip to the Far East Command (10-15 July 1950)," 17 Jul 50, G-3 File, 333 Pacific TS (Section I) Case 3.

13. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 144.
14. This conclusion is implied by the JCS memo of 7 Sep 50 to the SecDef, cited in footnote 20, below.
15. *NY Times*, 11 Aug 50, pp. 1, 10, 18 Aug 50, pp. 1, 8. Quotations from the Ambassador's speeches are given in Murphy, *Decision to Cross the Parallel*, p. 28.
16. *NY Times*, 18 Aug 50, p. 1.
17. (S) Memo, Svc Secs to SecDef, "U. S. Action in Korea with Respect to the 38th Parallel," 24 Aug 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea—38th Parallel) 1950.
18. NSC 81, 1 Sep 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 685–693.
19. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 145.
20. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Korea," 7 Sep 50 (der from JCS 1776/96), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 30.
21. Memorandum by Sec Acheson 7 Sep 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 705–707. (TS) NSC Action No. 354, 7 Sep 50.
22. (U) NSC 81/1, 9 Sep 50; (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea," 11 Sep 50, Encl A to JCS 1776/102, 13 Sep 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 31.
23. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, to which NSC 81 had been referred, had given it general approval but suggested a number of minor changes for "clarity, exactness, and completeness." (U) JCS 1776/96, 4 Sep 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 30. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as already noted, did not transmit the JSSC suggestions; instead, they recommended that NSC 81 be completely rewritten. But a comparison of NSC 81/1 with the recommendations of the JSSC (Encl A to JCS 1776/96) shows that many of the changes proposed by the Committee had been included. Probably the JCS Advisor to the Senior Staff took an active part in the drafting of NSC 81/1.
24. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 613.
25. Memo of Conversation by Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons), "Problems Relating to Korea," 8 Sep 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 709–711.
26. Murphy, *Decision to Cross the Parallel*, pp. 41–43, 85. Murphy stresses the "bellicose" nature of US pronouncements on the subject of Korea, while saying nothing about the administration's efforts to reassure Communist China; nevertheless his account is useful as a summary of debate leading up to the UN resolution of 7 October. A shorter account will be found in Martin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (1963), pp. 584–586.
27. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 644.
28. (TS) Msg, DA WAR 91650 to CINCFE, 15 Sep 50, Army File, G–3 091 Korea 1950 TS, case 14/16. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 16 Sep 50; (U) SM–2260–50 to JSSC, 18 Sep 50; (U) JCS 1776/108, 20 Sep 50, and Dec on, 22 Sep 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 32. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea," 25 Sep 50, same file, sec 34.
29. (U) Ltr, H. Freeman Matthews to MG James H. Burns, 18 Sep 50, Encl to Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 21 Sep 50 Encl and App to JCS 1776/110, 21 Sep 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 33. (U) Msg, JCS 92329 to CINCFE, 22 Sep 50.
30. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64159 to DA for JCS, 23 Sep 50, CM IN 14748.
31. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 26 Sep 50; (TS) Ltr, DepUSecState to SecDef, 27 Sep 50 Encl and App to JCS 1776/121, 3 Oct 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 34.
32. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 27 Sep 50; (U) Msg, JCS 92801 to CINCFE, 27 Sep 50.
33. (U) Msg, JCS 92801 to CINCFE, 27 Sep 50 (words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out).
34. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 536–537. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 662. (U) Msg, JCS 46085 to CINCFE, 29 Sep 50.
35. (U) Ltr, DepUSecState to MG Burns, 16 Sep 50, App to Encl to JCS 1776/105, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 32. (U) Ltr, DepUSecState to MG Burns, 22 Sep 50, App to Encl to JCS 1776/112, same file, sec 33. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Termination of Korean Hostilities," 27 Sep 50, same file, sec 34, (der from JCS 1776/114).
36. (TS) Ltr, DepUSecState to SecDef, 27 Sep 50, Encl to (TS) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS and Joint Secretaries, same date; (U) Msg, JCS 92762 to CINCFE, 27 Sep 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 34. The fact that the State Department letter was not disseminated as a JCS "green" and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took action the same day it was received (presumably after obtaining Presidential approval), indicates the urgency that was attached to the matter, probably because the question of pursuing enemy forces across the parallel was pressing.
37. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64730 to DA for JCS, 23 Sep 50, CM IN 16138.
38. (S) Memos, *Joint Secretaries to SecDef*, "U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Cessation of Hostilities in Korea" and "Proposed United Nations Surrender Message to North Korea," both dtd 27

Sep 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea-38th Parallel) 1950. The first of these memos expressly refers to a request for the Secretaries' opinion. In the second instance, such a request would appear to be a reasonable conjecture.

39. Statement by Secretary Johnson during MacArthur hearings, *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2622. The *United States Government Organization Manual, 1951–52* (giving information as of 1 July 1951) lists the Joint Secretaries as a part of the organization of the Dep of Defense, with their own designated Assistant (p. 118).

40. Copies of memoranda from the Joint Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense were not furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis. Only one such memo has been found in JCS files; it is dtd 24 Feb 1951, and gives comments on the problem of crossing the 38th Parallel, which was once more becoming an issue for UN forces and had been the subject of a memo by Sec Acheson (see Ch. 9). Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 264–65, in describing this episode, believes that it was the first time that a “question of major military significance” was referred to the Secretaries. However, proposed terms of surrender would seem to constitute such a question, and certainly the phrase could be applied to the consideration of the response to the large-scale Chinese attack in November 1950, on which their advice was sought (see Ch. 7). As Collins remarks, regular consultation of the Secretaries “would have tended to interpose them between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, which was not contemplated by the National Defense Act of 1947, as amended in 1949.”

41. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 64805 to DA for JCS, 28 Sep 50, CM IN 16170, and CM IN 16434, correcting an omission in the original. See Map 4 for the proposed limit of advance of non-ROK troops.

42. On these aspects of the plan, see Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 609–612; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 187–191 (which describes the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the plan); Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 155–163; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 54–57; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, pp. 114, 118–120.

43. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 158, 160.

44. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Future Korean Operations,” 29 Sep 50 (with photostatic copy bearing handwritten note by Secretary Marshall, recording approval of President and Sec State, same date); (U) Msg, JCS 92975 to CINCFE, 29 Sep 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 34. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 452–453.

45. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 9 Oct 50, p. 586.

46. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 155.

47. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 622–623.

48. (U) GHQ, UNC, Op Order No. 2, 2 Oct 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) BP pt 1.

49. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65252 to DA for JCS, 2 Oct 50, CM IN 17607.

50. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 615–616. (P'yonggang, some 30 miles north of the 38th parallel near the center of Korea, above Ch'orwon, must be distinguished from P'yongyang, the capital of North Korea, located on the west coast, 65 miles above the parallel. See Map 4.)

51. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 2 Oct 50, p. 559, 9 Oct 50, pp. 597–598.

52. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 25 Sep 50, pp. 518–519; 2 Oct 50, pp. 523–529, 558, 559. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 450. His proposals were eventually approved on 3 November (Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Nov 50, p. 791).

53. *NY Times*, 30 Sep 50, p. 4.

54. Murphy, “Decision to Cross the Parallel,” pp. 36–37. Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 343–344.

55. Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, p. 345.

56. Assistant Secretary Rusk told the British Amb on 3 October that the United States considered it “militarily necessary for General MacArthur to continue the fight in whatever way seems appropriate to him” and that the 38th parallel “would not itself impose a barrier.” Memo of Conversation by AsstSecState Rusk, “Korean Operations,” 4 Oct 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 859–862.

57. (U) Msg, JCS 92985 to CINCFE, 29 Sep 50. The typescript in CJCS File 091 Korea (1950) has attached a handwritten note, signed N and to Mr. Kearney, stating: “Note the original in Gen Marshall's handwriting.”

58. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65034 to JCS for SecDef, 30 Sep 50, CM IN 16966 (words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out).

59. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 65118 to DA for JCS, 1 Oct 50, CM IN 17229; (U) Msg, JCS 93079 to CINCFE, 1 Oct 50.

60. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 454. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 9 Oct 50, pp. 596–597. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 63–66. Lichterman, “To the Yalu and Back,” pp. 588–591. See also Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, pp. 344–345; Lie favored operations north of the parallel (as noted earlier), but was working on his own plan and was apparently not consulted in the preparation of the US resolution.

61. Text of resolution of 7 October 1950 in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. XII, January 1–December 31, 1950 (1951), pp. 459–460.

62. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, p. 2258. In his memoirs, Mr. Acheson later gave a clearer and more concise statement of the intent of the resolution, as follows: “No opposing military force remained in the North to frustrate UN efforts, and the chances were believed good that neither Russian nor Chinese troops would intervene if only Korean soldiery attempted to establish whatever degree of order was possible in the rugged country of the extreme north, If the Koreans encountered too heavy resistance, they could fall back to the strong position across the neck. . . .” Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 454.

Secretary Marshall’s interpretation, expounded during the MacArthur hearings, was that the resolution of 7 October *authorized* (in a “somewhat oblique fashion”) military operations north of the parallel, but did not require them, and that it set forth unification “as a political, rather than a military objective.” *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 361–362.

63. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*. p. 455.

64. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 19.

65. (TS) Memo, ActgExecSec, OSD to JCS, 6 Oct 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 35. (U) Msgs, JCS 47617 and 93555 to CINCFE, 6 Oct 50.

66. (U) Memo, Chief, BJSM to CJCS, 5 Oct 50, CJCS File 091 Korea (1950).

67. Handwritten notation by GEN Bradley on memo cited in last note.

68. (U) Msg, CINCFE Z 19681 to DA for JCS, 9 Oct 50, MC IN 79962; *NY Times*, 11 Oct 50, p. 1.

69. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 613–623.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 623–630, 642.

71. See above, Ch. 2, p. 44.

72. (U) NSC Record of Actions Nos. 308–c, 28 Jun 50, 323, 27 Jul 50. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “US Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities, 30 Jun 50, Encl to JCS 1776/10, 1 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 10 Jul 50, same file, sec 23, (derived from JCS 1776/13), same file, sec 22. (U) NSC 76, 21 Jul 50, same file, sec 25. The NSC Staff was directed to prepare recommendations for Council action regarding the JCS views, but apparently never did so. The subject was dropped either because it became evident that the USSR was not likely to intervene, or because the Council became engaged in a discussion of the wider question of possible Soviet action anywhere around the periphery of the Communist world (dealt with in the NSC 73 series of papers, launched by the Council on 28 June).

73. (U) Msg, JCS 84681 to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50.

74. (TS) Msg, CSGPO (unnumbered) to CINCFE, 2 Jul 50, Army File, G–3 091 Korea TS (1950), case 22.

75. (U) NSC Action No. 324, 27 Jul 50. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 2 Aug 50, Encl B to JCS 2150/5, 5 Aug 50; (U) Msg, JCS 88051 to CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, CCS 062 Far East (7–4–50) sec 1.

76. *NY Times*, 28 Aug 50, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Sep 50, p. 396.

77. (U) Msg, JCS 89970 to CINCFE, 28 Aug 50.

78. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 11 Sep 50, pp. 413, 439; 18 Sep 50, p. 477; 16 Oct 50, p. 610.

79. (U) Msgs, JCS to CINCFE, 87522, 31 Jul 50, and 88806, 15 Aug 50.

80. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, p. 183.

81. Memos by DepUSecState (Matthews), 12 and 14 Aug 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 566–567, 573–574. (C) Memo, Kenneth T. Young (OSD) to GEN Burns and CAPT Murdaugh, “State Department Opinion on 11 August Bombing of Rashin (Najin),” 12 Aug 50, with handwritten note by ADM Davis, D/JS, recording statement by GEN Bradley “that President said he thought the Najin attack was all right,” CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 28. (U) Ltrs, USecState to SecDef, 14 and 16 Aug 50, Encls to (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to Hon. Richard B. Russell, Chm, S Com on Armed Svcs, 27 Jun 51, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 6, 1 May–30 Jun 51. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2591. A draft letter from SecDef to SecState, setting forth the justification for the attack, is in OCJCS File, 091 Korea (1950), enclosed with a memo from GEN Bradley to SecDef, 21 Aug 50; however, there is no evidence that it was actually sent. Mr. Truman refers briefly to this incident but without mentioning that he was called upon to render a decision (*Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 394). Secretary Acheson’s memoirs say nothing about it.

A second strike at Rashin, launched on 22 August, was diverted by weather to a target farther south: (TS) DA TT 3681, 22 Aug 50. Ten days later, CG FEAF forbade further attacks on the city. Hq FEAF, *FEAF Operations History*, vol. I, p. 140. (Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, p. 183, erroneously ascribes this prohibition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

82. *NY Times*, 5 Sep 50, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 18 Sep 50, p. 454. (C) Msg, State 214 to USUN, 5 Sep 50, CM IN 8397; (U) Msg, JCS 90734 to CINCFE, 6 Sep 50; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Attack and Destruction of an Unidentified Aircraft in the Yellow Sea on 4 September 1950; Report on,” 13 Sep 50, Encl B to JCS 2161, 16 Sep 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Attack and Destruction of an Aircraft in the

Yellow Sea on 4 September 1950," 19 Sep 50 (der from JCS 2161); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 26 Sep 50; CCS 091.712 USSR (9–5–50).

83. Memo by SecState, 7 Sep 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 705–707.

84. (U) Msg, JCS 90943 to CINCFE, 8 Sep 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62718 to JCS, 10 Sep 50, CM IN 10035.

85. Memo, SecState to Pres, "Considerations Surrounding Proposed Bombing of Rashin (Najin)," 11 Sep 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 721–722.

86. *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, p. 722, footnote 1.

87. (U) Msg, JCS 92658 to CINCFE, 26 Sep 50. For a summary of the strategic bombing campaign in North Korea before the Chinese intervention, see Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, Ch. 6, pp. 174–186. The bombing of Rashin became an issue again in February 1951; see Ch. 9.

88. *NY Times*, 10 Oct 50, p. 1.

89. (U) Msg, JCS 93864 to CINCFE, 10 Oct 50.

90. (S) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 11 Oct 50, w/Encl, (S) Memo, DepUSecState (Matthews) to MG Burns, 10 Oct 50, Encl B to JCS 2161/2, 13 Oct 50; (U) Msg, JCS 93885 to CINCFE, 11 Oct 50, CCS 091.712 USSR (9–5–50).

91. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 66257 to DA for JCS, 12 Oct 50, CM IN 959; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Alleged Violation of Soviet-Korean Border," 17 Oct 50 (der from JCS 2161/3); (TS) Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 18 Oct 50; same file.

92. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Nov 50, p. 832. A brief summary of this episode is given in Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, p. 142, footnote.

93. (S) Memo, "Tom" (evidently Thomas K. Finletter, SecAF) to DepSecDef, 12 Oct 50, SecDef File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50). (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, 20 Oct 50, Encl to JCS 2150/8, 21 Oct 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Delimitation of Air Operations Along Northern Korean Border," 1 Nov 50 (der from JCS 2150/9); (TS) Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 4 Nov 50; CCS 062 Far East (7–4–50) sec 1.

94. (U) JCS 1924/17, 11 Jul 50, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 46. The 565,000 figure presumably included both regulars and militia.

95. (U) Memo, MIS, GHQ FECOM to C/S, ROK, "Chinese Communist Assistance to North Korea," 6 Jul 50 (copy in files of JCS Hist Div). This is apparently the document summarized in Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–1951* (1954), pp. 385–386, though the date is given there as 6 June.

96. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, pp. 47–115. (C) Dept of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "Chinese Communist Propaganda on the Korean Conflict, June–October 1950," OIR Rpt No. 5409, 29 Nov 50 (copy in G–2 Files).

97. The first of these figures is given in Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–1951*, p. 386; the source is not identified, but it is presumably one of the FECOM Daily Intelligence Summaries. The second is from Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 199 (taken from FECOM DIS for 21 Sep 50); it is given as the number of troops "massed in Manchuria," but presumably refers to regulars rather than militia. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, pp. 119–121, gives a convenient tabulation, illustrated with maps, of the location of major CCF forces between May and November 1950, which clearly brings out the shift to the Korean borders; the information is presented in terms of numbered CCF armies rather than manpower strength and represents a compilation from various secondary works.

98. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. VII, p. 13.

99. Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–1951*, p. 386; Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 758.

100. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, p. 1832 (testimony of Secretary Acheson).

101. (TS) Memo (unsigned, evidently originating in G–2, DA) to DCS, Plans, DA, "Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Korean Hostilities," 25 Sep 50, Army Files, C/S 000.1 (IS 50), Case 1. See also Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 452.

102. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 612.

103. This episode is described in full in Chapter 10 in connection with General MacArthur's dismissal, in which it played a part.

104. *NY Times*, 26 Aug 50, p. 1, 2 Sep 50, p. 1; *Time*, 11 Sep 50, p. 22. For comment on these statements, see Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, p. 96, and Murphy, *Decision to Cross the Parallel*, pp. 29–31. Both Secretary Matthews and MG Anderson were removed from office.

105. K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (1955), pp. 107–108. Presumably the Ambassador reported this conversation to his government, but no documentary evidence has been found that it reached US ears at the time.

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 109–111.

107. (U) Msg, London 1934 to State, 3 Oct 50, CM IN 17782, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 34. A time stamp on the back of this message indicates that it was received in the JCS Message Center at 030949Z, i.e., 0449 EST.

108. (S) Memo, ActgExecSec, OSD to JCS, 3 Oct 50, Encl to (S) SM–2444–50 to JCS Members, 5 Oct 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 35.

109. (TS) Hq FECOM, *GHQ Support and Participation*, Ch. VII, p. 13; Memo, DepAsstSecState to AsstSecState for FE Off, 3 Oct 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, p. 848.

110. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 362.

111. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 452.

112. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 201–202.

113. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Amplifying Directive to General MacArthur,” 6 Oct 50 (der from JCS 1776/130); (TS) Ltr, DepSecDef to Pres, 7 Oct 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 35. (U) Msg, JCS 93709 to CINCFE, 9 Oct 50. The President’s approval is attested by his signature on (S) Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 7 Oct 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50). The JCS message is reprinted in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 362, with an implication that the initiative came from the President.

114. (TS) Memo, Dir CIA to Pres, 12 Oct 50, w/encl, OCJCS File 381 (1950).

115. This DIS (No. 2957 of 14 October 1950) is quoted extensively in Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 759, and more briefly in Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur: 1941–1951*, p. 386. See also Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 200, which quotes this and several other summaries of early October for evidence of the continuing northward movement of Chinese forces.

116. (TS) Minutes of US-UK Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 23 Oct 50, CCS 337 (7–22–48) sec 2.

117. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 362–363.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 363. The date was chosen to coincide with the President’s plan to make an address in San Francisco in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter. The President had proposed Hawaii as the site but adopted Wake at the suggestion of Secretary Marshall: *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 433, 439–449, 589.

119. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 926. (U) Memo, GEN Bradley to Sec Marshall, 10 Oct 50, OCJCS File 091 Korea (1950).

120. Lists of the principal persons attending the conference are given in the memorandum record of conference proceedings (described in Appendix 2) and in the statement released after the meeting (*Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 672).

121. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 364–365. General MacArthur’s account of the Wake Island meeting (*Reminiscences*, pp. 361–363) does not mention this preliminary conversation with the President. When asked about it at the 1951 Senate hearings, he replied that he did not “feel at liberty to reveal what was discussed by the President with me” (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 41). Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 387, gives a short summary, based on what he was later told by General MacArthur; according to him, most of the conversation dealt with “the fiscal and economic problems of the Philippines.”

122. (U) “Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 1950,” compiled by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Notes Kept by the Conferees from Washington, n.d. Copies of this memorandum are to be found in CCS 337 (10–13–50); also in OCJCS File 091 Korea (1950), filed under date 15 Oct 1950, together with an earlier draft bearing corrections in ink, presumably by General Bradley. The account of the Wake Island conference presented here is drawn entirely from this source. See Appendix 2 for a discussion of the origin of this memorandum and of the controversy that surrounded it.

123. This passage, as written, clearly indicts General MacArthur for a lack of foresight. The General later characterized it as “an ingeniously fostered implication that I flatly and unequivocally predicted that under no circumstances would the Chinese Communist enter the Korean War.” According to his account, his conclusions were based on an assumption that the Far East Air Force would be free to strike at bases and supply lines on both sides of the Yalu; also on the fact that neither CIA nor the Department of State had indicated the probability of Chinese intervention with “major forces.” MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 362 (obviously based on the “staff notes” reproduced in Willoughby and Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941–1951*, pp. 382–383). See also his statements in *US News and World Report*, 17 Feb 56, p. 52, and the summary of his views in Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 760 (drawn from his comments made after reviewing Appleman’s manuscript). Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 392–394, argues the General’s case at some length.

124. According to General MacArthur, the “agreement” on Taiwan was “that both of us had dropped the question of discussing it there at Wake Island, [or] at any other time. The strategic situation of Formosa, its value, and its general relativity to security in the Far East was not discussed by me with the President.” *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 41. The President confirmed this

interpretation when he told a reporter on 19 October that there was “nothing about Formosa to be settled with General MacArthur” at Wake Island, because the subject had been disposed of earlier. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 679.

125. Memo by AsstSecState Rusk, “Addendum to Notes on Wake Conference, October 14,” n.d., *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 961–962.

126. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 672–673. See also Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 367.

127. (U) JCS 1776/124, 4 Oct 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 35.

128. (U) Msg, JCS 94651 to CINCFE, 20 Oct 50.

129. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67065 to DA for JCS, 21 Oct 50, CM IN 3797.

130. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 223–224.

131. (U) Msg, CSUSA WAR 95625 to CINCFE, 2 Nov 50.

132. (U) JCS 1776/144, 24 Oct 50, as amended by Dec On, 25 Oct 50, and by Corrigs, 25 and 27 Oct 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 36. (U) SM–2690–50 to CSA, 27 Oct 50; (U) Msg, G–3 WAR 95119 to CINCUNC, 26 Oct 50; same file, sec 37. Since the Greek and French troops were about to depart, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already taken action to have the former force reduced in size and the latter diverted to Indochina. (U) JCS 1776/143 and 1776/147, both 24 Oct 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 36; Ltrs, SecDef to SecState, 24 Oct 50, same file, and 25 Oct 50, same file, sec 37. The units already in Korea at that time were the Australian infantry battalion, the 27th British Brigade, the Turkish Brigade, and one Philippine battalion (see Encl A to JCS 1776/144).

133. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 2 Nov 50, same file. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState (“Personal”), 2 Nov 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50).

134. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 633–664.

135. Songjin is designated Kimch’aek on recent maps.

136. (U) Msg, CINCUNC CX 66705 to CG 8th Army et al., 17 Oct 50, CM IN 2355.

137. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 177. Collins says that he has no recollection that he and his colleagues noticed this “stretching.” Collins’ account is in error in implying that the JCS instructions of 27 Sep 50 had expressly prohibited use of non-Korean troops north of the Chongju-Hamhung line. In fact, this line was not mentioned in the JCS message, which, as already indicated, contained only general prohibitions against advancing too close to the border.

138. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 66839 to CG 8th Army et al., 19 Oct 50, CM IN 2991.

139. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 654–666.

140. (U) Msg, CINCUNC to CG 8th Army et al., 24 Oct 50, CM IN 4532.

141. (U) JCS 94933 to CINCFE, 24 Oct 50.

142. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67397 to DA for JCS, 25 Oct 50, CM IN 4890. General MacArthur’s concluding statement, as quoted above, is not substantiated by the memorandum record of the Wake Island conversations (although this record is admittedly incomplete).

143. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1300 (and a similar, though shorter, statement on p. 1216). See also Collins’ account of this episode in *War in Peacetime*, pp. 179–181.

144. (U) Ltr, DepUsecState to MG Burns, n.d. [ca. 21 Oct 50], CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 36. (U) Msg, JCS 94799 to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67154 to DA for JCS, 22 Oct 50, CM IN 4048. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 372.

145. (U) JCS 1776/150, 28 Oct 50; (S) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 28 Oct 50; (U) Msg, JCS 95328 to CINCFE, 29 Oct 50; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 37. (S) Ltr, DepSecDef to Pres, 28 Oct 50; Ltr (handwritten), Truman to Lovett, same date; OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50).

146. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 672–684.

147. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 617–618, 635–637, 684–686. On the landing of X Corps, see also Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, pp. 107–151, and Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol III, *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign* (1957), pp. 21–42.

148. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 686–687, 741–742.

149. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 673, 675–678. (S) FEC DIS 2975, 1 Nov 50.

150. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 686–687.

151. *Ibid.*, p. 677.

152. (U) FEC DIS 2972, 28–29 Oct 50.

153. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 67881 to DA for JCS, 31 Oct 50, CM IN 6644. (S) FEC DIS 2975, 1 Nov 50.

154. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3427.

155. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 761.

156. (S) Msgs, CIA PD 430 and PD 432 to CSUSA et al., 26 Oct 50, CM IN 5569, and 27 Oct 50, CM IN 5570. (Both messages bore “Routine” precedence.)

157. (TS) DA TT 3946, 27 Oct 50.

158. (TS) *Highlights of the Korean Situation*, 27–31 Oct 50, CJCS Files.

159. (TS) Memo, ACS, G–2, to CSA, “Intelligence and Information Available to FECOM Concerning Chinese Communist Intervention,” 6 May 51, Army File, C/S 350.09 TS (1951), case 2. (TS) Memo, DCI to DepSecDef, “Summary of Intelligence Estimates of Intervention of Chinese Communists in the Korean War (12 October–24 November 1950),” 4 May 51, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 6, 1 May–30 Jun 51.

160. (TS) “Chinese Communist Overt Operations,” n.d., Encl to (TS) Memo, AsstExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Politico-Military Conversations with the British Scheduled for 26 October,” 23 Oct 50, Encl and App to (TS) JCS 1924/41, 24 Oct 50, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 53. In October 1950 Communist China did in fact invade Tibet and overthrew the existing government, relying upon a claim to suzerainty over that country, and ignoring perfunctory protests by the United Nations. This development influenced subsequent US interpretation of Chinese Communist motives, since, followed as it was almost immediately by the massive invasion in Korea, it suggested a systematic pattern of aggression. (On the invasion of Tibet, see Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet, a Political History* (1967), pp. 299–315, and George N. Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt* (1960), pp. 62–68.)

161. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, pp. 2100–2101, pt 2, p. 759.

162. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, pp. 151–160.

Chapter 6. A Time of Uncertainty

1. Appleman, *South of the Naktong*, pp. 717–718, 750, 766–768. (S) Hq USAFFE (Adv), *Intelligence Digest*, vol. 1, no. 4, 1–15 Feb 53 (copy in OCMH Files). A Chinese Communist “army,” containing three divisions, was about the equivalent of a US corps.

2. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 689–715. For the MacArthur-Walker exchange, see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 235. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 186–188, has a very good brief account of the 8th Cavalry’s battle at Unsan.

3. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 729–745; Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. III, pp. 95–124.

4. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 205–207. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 715, dates the appearance of enemy jets as 31 October, possibly referring to Washington time.

5. (TS) Memo, C.V.R.S. [probably BG Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, G–3] to GEN Duff [unidentified], 31 Oct 50 (recording a conversation with ADM Davis, D/JS), Army Files, G–3 091 Korea (1950) TS, case 14/38.

6. (U) Msg, AC/S, G–3 WAR 95790 to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50. According to Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 373, he himself instigated this message.

7. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68285 to DA for JCS, 4 Nov 50, CM IN 8116; printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 373.

8. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 27 Nov 50, p. 858.

9. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Nov 50, p. 792.

10. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 241. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 209–210. Neither of these works indicates the exact time when the operation was to begin; this information is given in the reference by Acheson and Truman cited in note 12 below. This, according to Futrell, was a “far more severe air effort than General Stratemeyer had visualized.”

11. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, Ch XIII, p. 242 (citing DA TT 3976, 6 Nov 50, which has not been seen).

12. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 463–464. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 373–375. (S) Memo of Conversation between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lovett, 6 Nov 50, 10:20 A.M., signed by Mr. Lovett, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50). Record of attendance at JCS meeting, 6 Nov 50, 1050–1154 hours, at which DepSecDef Lovett and SecAF Finletter were present (filed with JCS meeting agendas). (U) Msg, JCS 95878 to CINCFE, 6 Nov 50 (DTG 061647Z, or 061147 EST; sent out at 1140 EST, according to Mr. Truman’s account).

13. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68396 to DA, 6 Nov 50, CM IN 8618 (DTG 062235Z; received in JCS Msg Center 061944, according to copy in OCJCS File). Reprinted in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 375.

14. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 375–376.

15. Record of attendance at JCS meeting, 6 Nov 50, 2120–2335. (U) Msg, JCS 95949 to CINCFE, 6 Nov 50, DTG 070457Z (partly quoted in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 464, with the remark that “the skepticism of the Chiefs shows through the correct language of their reply”). The conferees at the JCS meeting of 6 November discussed the Korean situation in general; there was a consensus in favor of a withdrawal to the “waist” of Korea followed by a search for a political solution, but no formal recommendations to this effect were made.

16. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68465 to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 50, CM IN 8731 (DTG 071125Z). In another message the following day, GEN MacArthur reported the sighting of a convoy of 500–750 vehicles heading south from the Yalu valley toward Chongju. “This could represent the major combat strength of a Chinese Corps of two divisions,” he said. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 68493 to DA for JCS, 8 Nov 50.

17. (TS) Msg, SecDef to CINCUNC, DEF 95961, 7 Nov 50, CJCS Message book, CINCFE Outgoing (Jun 50–Jul 51).

18. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 68506 to DA for SecDef, 8 Nov 50, CM IN 9061.

19. (U) Msg, SecDef to CINCUNC, DEF 96047, 8 Nov 50. Portions of this exchange of messages are printed in Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 409–411, and MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 367, 370.

20. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 245–246. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 211–216.

21. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 68411 to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 50, CM IN 8674.

22. (U) Msg, JCS 95978 to CINCFE, 7 Nov 50.

23. *NY Times*, 7 Nov 50, p. 1.

24. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, pp. 137, 160–162, speculates on these possibilities but reaches no conclusions.

25. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 466. According to Acheson, between 10 November and 4 December he and Secretary Marshall met three times with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five times with the President, while he himself consulted the President on five additional occasions.

26. (TS) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 6 Nov 50, w/Encl, (U) Memo, DepUSecState to MG Burns, same date (Encl A and App to JCS 1776/153, same date), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 38.

27. (U) Msg, JCS 96060 to CINCFE, 8 Nov 50 (and JCS 96069, correcting an error in the original), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 38 (DTG 081753Z).

28. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 68436 to JCS, 7 Nov 50, DA IN 8684.

29. (U) CINCFE C 68572 to DA for JCS, 9 Nov 50, CM IN 9417. The British proposal for a buffer zone is discussed further below.

30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50 (der from JCS 1776/156), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 38. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not at this time comment on the draft UN resolution, the history of which is described in the next section of this chapter.

31. (TS) Memo, Finletter to SecDef (Marshall), 8 Nov 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder 3.

32. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, “United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,” 10 Nov 50, w/Encls, summary of JCS conclusions from their memo to SecDef and Memo, Dir CI to NSC, 9 Nov 50; both presented at 9 Nov NSC meeting. CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 28. Following the meeting, Secretary Marshall indicated to Secretary Acheson that he concurred in the JCS views; (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 10 Nov 50, same file.

33. General Bradley gave a similar explanation several weeks later in a briefing given to President Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 4 December 1950. X Corps, he said (according to the summary of his remarks) “had been scattered in order to unify Korea as part of the program of holding elections throughout the country.” (U) [Minutes of] First Meeting of Pres and PM Attlee, 4 Dec 50, US–Min–1, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1361–1374. (This meeting is described in Ch. 8.)

34. This account of the 9 November NSC meeting is from Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 378–380; though he was unable to attend, he was given a report of it shortly thereafter. Secretary Acheson does not mention this meeting in his book. The official record states only that the Korean situation was discussed and that the NSC Staff was instructed to study the views of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency and suggest further measures to be recommended to the President; (U) NSC Action No. 378, 9 Nov 50.

35. (U) NSC 81/2, 14 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 39.

36. It was withdrawn from consideration on 30 November (by which time it was clearly out of date), after having been approved by the Secretary of Defense and several others. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, “United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,” 30 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

37. Memo of Conversation by the Political Advisor in Japan (Sebald), “General MacArthur’s Concept of the Korean Campaign,” 14 Nov 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1148–1149.

38. Memo of Conversation by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio), “North Korean Military Action,” 17 Nov 50, *Foreign Relations, Korea, 1950*, pp. 1175–1176.

39. (S) Memo, MG Burns to Sec Marshall, “Korea,” 14 Nov 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50).

40. (S) Memo, SecDef to MG Burns, 15 Nov 50; (S) Memo, MG Burns to Sec Marshall, 17 Nov 50; same file. Although Amb Jessup and Sec Rusk promised MG Burns that they would consider his suggestion further, there was apparently no further discussion of it.

41. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 13 Nov 50, p. 792.

42. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Resolution for Introduction to the Security Council of the United Nations," 6 Nov 50 (der from Encl B to JCS 1776/153), CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 38.
43. (C) Memos (2), ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 8 Nov 50, Encls A and B to JCS 1776/157, same date; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Resolutions in the United Nations to Provide Certain Assurances to the Chinese Communists," 9 Nov 50 (der from JCS 1776/157); CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 38.
44. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 10 Nov 50, same file.
45. (U) Msg, G-3 DA WAR 96655 to CINCUNC, 15 Nov 50, same file, sec 39. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Nov 50, p. 835, 27 Nov 50, p. 853. Leland M. Goodrich, *Korea: A Study of U.S. policy in the United Nations* (1956), pp. 151, 153–154. (Hereafter: Goodrich, *Korea*.)
46. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 265.
47. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 27 Nov 50, p. 855.
48. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 712.
49. See Ch. 5.
50. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 20 Nov 50, p. 835, 27 Nov 50, pp. 852–853, 874. *NY Times*, 18 Nov 50, p. 3 (article by James Reston). Goodrich, *Korea*, pp. 154–155. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 711–712.
51. (S) Msg, State to SCAP Tokyo (unnumbered), 17 Nov 50, CM IN 12347, summarizes the British proposal. It was intended to be enacted by the UN Security Council in place of the six-power resolution then on the Council's agenda. The Department of State believed the plan worthy of consideration but did not believe that it should delay enactment of the pending resolution. Another message from State to SCAP (CM IN 13123, 21 Nov 50) indicated that the French Government strongly supported the British in this matter.
52. Statement by Acheson at meeting of 21 Nov 50 (below, p. 142).
53. *NY Times*, 18 Nov 50, p. 1.
54. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 249–250 (citing testimony given by Secretary Marshall, General Vandenberg, and Secretary Acheson during MacArthur hearings).
55. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 21 Nov 50, App B to Encl to JCS 2150/10, 4 Dec 50, CCS 062 Far East (7-4-50) sec 1. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, pp. 1914–1915, 1927–1928.
56. (U) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 16 Nov 50, CCS 062 Far East (7-4-50) sec 1.
57. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 362 (Marshall testimony).
58. (U) Memo, DepSecDef to JCS, "Reduction in Forces to be Deployed to Korea," 4 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 37, Encl to JCS 1776/152, 6 Nov 50, same file, sec 38. See preceding chapter for the planned reduction.
59. (U) Memo by CSA, "Utilization of United Nations Ground Force Contingents," n.d. (memo of transmittal dtd 6 Nov 50); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Cutback of Forces to be Deployed in Korea," 6 Nov 50 (der from JCS 1776/152); same file.
60. (TS) Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 16 Nov 50, Encl to JCS 1776/162, 18 Nov 50; (U) Msg, G-3 DA WAR 96583 to CINCUNC, 14 Nov 50; same file, sec 39.
61. (U) Msg, CINCFC CX 68436 to JCS, 7 Nov 50, CM IN 8674.
62. (S) Memo, SecA to SecDef, "Release for Movement to FECOM, Beginning 1 December, of National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps Service Support Units," 8 Nov 50, bearing Sec Marshall's approval, Army File, G-3 320.2 Pacific 1950, Case 167. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 238–239. The message from CSA to CINCFC is quoted verbatim in the document cited in note 64 below.
63. This was the difference between the "Army of four divisions" requested by CINCFC on 9 July and the single division (3d Infantry) sent after that date. (See Ch. 4, where, however, it was pointed out that the *total* requirements expressed by MacArthur—8 to 8½ divisions—had been substantially fulfilled by the commitment of all the divisions from Japan, the filling out of the 1st Marine Division, and the sending of the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions and of several RCTs.)
64. (U) Memo [exact source unknown, but originating within the JCS organization], 27 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 39. This tabulation (which apparently does not reflect the actions documented in the SecA memo cited in note 62 above) was evidently prepared for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they realized that General MacArthur's final drive to the Yalu was running into trouble.
65. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, pp. 141–147.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 164. (U) Memo, SecA to Pres, "Logistical Support to the Army of the Republic of Korea," 1 Nov 50 (with note indicating President's approval, 4 Nov), Encl to (U) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD, to D/JS, 10 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 38 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/159), 13 Nov 50, same file, sec 39. Memos, MSC [COL Marshall S. Carter, OSD] to SecDef, 8 Nov 50 (S) and 9 Nov 50 (no classification indicated), OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 3 (8 Oct–24 Nov 50).
- There is strong evidence that Defense Department officials and the Joint Staff were disconcerted by Secretary of the Army Pace's action in going directly to President Truman on this matter. He did

not coordinate his recommendation with Secretary Marshall or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. COL Carter, in a note to his memorandum cited above, told General Marshall, "I believe as a result of my conversation, closer coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your office will result in the future."

67. (U) JCS 1776/56, 25 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 26; (U) JCS 1776/140, 18 Oct 50, same file, sec 36; (U) Memo by CSA, "Courses of Action in Korea," n.d. [ca. 25 Oct 50; not published as JCS "green"], same file, sec 37; (U) N/Hs of JCS 1776/56 and 1776/140, both dtd 27 Oct 50.

68. (U) JCS 1776/146, 25 Oct 50, same file, sec 37.

69. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 729–745, 772–773. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. III, pp. 121–124.

70. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, p. 771. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 257–258.

71. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 259–263. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. III, pp. 131–146. See Map 4, Ch. 5, p. 105.

72. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69211 to DA for JCS, 18 Nov 50, CM IN 12368.

73. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 211; *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 972–974; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 468. Regarding the disposition of the troops, General MacArthur later declared that this "could not have been improved upon" even if he had known the Chinese were going to attack, and that there was "complete coordination" between Eighth Army and X Corps (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 19, 246). As Appleman points out, the Chinese, in their successful attack on Eighth Army in late November, did not operate in the gap between the two UN forces; they opened the flank of Eighth Army by smashing the ROK divisions on its right wing (*South to the Naktong*, p. 746).

According to Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," p. 602, Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Acheson to urge the President to call off CINCFE's proposed advance but declined to make any such recommendation themselves. As sources for the paragraph containing this extraordinary statement, Lichterman cites a letter from Mr. Acheson and Under Secretary Rusk. For comments on this implausible allegation, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 468 and note on p. 754, and Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 202. Their refutation is convincing, and it is perhaps hardly necessary to remark that no evidence in support of the Lichterman statement has been found in JCS documents.

74. Memo, AsstSecState (Rusk) to COL Carter, Exec to SecDef, 21 Nov 50, w/Encl, "List of Points Prepared by the Secretary of State for Discussion with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *Foreign Relations, Korea, 1950*, pp. 1203–1204.

75. Memo of Conversation by Amb at Large Jessup, 21 Nov 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1204–1208. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 467, gives a brief summary of this meeting which, not unnaturally, focuses on his own remarks; however, it does not entirely agree with the Jessup memorandum. In fact, Acheson's account suggests that he may have confused this meeting with the NSC meeting of 28 November (and also, perhaps, with the State-Defense meeting of 3 December, since he speaks of an opening briefing by General Ridgway, who was present on 3 December but not on 21 or 28 November). Both of these meetings are described in the ensuing chapter.

76. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 268.

77. (U) Msg, CSUSA WAR 97287 to CINCUNC, 24 Nov 50. Two earlier drafts of this message, in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 39, show that the final text was the result of State-Defense discussion. The DTG was 240016Z, indicating that it was sent on the evening of 23 November, Washington time. The Sherman Memo records that the message was drafted on 22 November and sent the next day after being discussed with State. (The message referred to the State-Defense meeting of 21 November as having been held on "Thursday," which would have been 23 November; this is evidently a misprint for "Tuesday.")

78. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 372–373. It was on this trip to the front that General MacArthur made the casual remark, which later returned to haunt him, that he hoped to have the troops "home by Christmas" (*NY Times*, 24 Nov 50, p. 1). In his memoirs, General MacArthur later stated that he had directed General Walker to prepare plans for voluntary withdrawal if it turned out that Communist Chinese forces were entering Korea in "determined force"; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 372. However, there is no evidence that such plans were prepared; had they been in existence, the subsequent forced withdrawal of UN forces might have been more orderly.

79. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 373.

80. The parallel with his similar action on 29–30 June, after an earlier visit to the battlefield, is striking. See Ch. 2.

81. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 69808 to DA for JCS, 25 Nov 50, CM IN 14393. The DTG was 251111Z (252011 Far East time, 250711 EST). MacArthur referred to his reconnaissance of the battlefield "yesterday," leaving no doubt that the message was not drafted until 25 November.

82. Sherman Memo.

83. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 466.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 466, 468.

Chapter 7. The New War

1. *NY Times*, 24 Nov 50, p. 2.

2. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 24 Nov 50, CJCS Files. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, p. 64.

3. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 273.

4. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, pp. 751, 758. (S) Hq USAFFE (Adv), *Intelligence Digest*, vol. 1, no. 3, 16–31 Jan 53 (copy in OCMII). The IX Army Group consisted of the 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies, each of which had been temporarily increased to a strength of four divisions (instead of the normal three) by the assignment of troops from the Third Field Army, brought up from farther south in October. Appleman presents reasons for believing that the figure of 300,000 is approximately correct for the actual, as well as the nominal, strength of the Chinese force.

5. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 24–25 Nov 50, CJCS Files. Robert Leckie, *Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950–53* (1962), pp. 199–200. (Hereafter: Leckie, *Conflict*.)

6. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 25–28 Nov 50, CJCS Files. Poats, *Decision in Korea*, pp. 104–105. Leckie, *Conflict*, pp. 200–204.

7. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. III, pp. 151–190.

8. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 69953 to JCS, 28 Nov 50, CM IN 14957. (DTG 280745Z, or 280245 EST.) (Words abbreviated for message transmission have been spelled out.)

9. The JCS met from 1416 to 1745 on 27 November, according to the official record; the agenda listed twelve topics, none of which bore on Korea. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 385, quotes General Bradley as telling him on 28 November that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “had been in session all the day before, examining the situation, and they felt that while it was serious they were doubtful that it was as much a catastrophe as our newspapers were leading us to believe.” The *New York Times*, 27 Nov 50, p. 1, reported only that the Chinese had succeeded in stalling the UN advance. But the Sherman Memo records that press and radio reports and despatches from Admiral Joy indicated a deteriorating situation.

10. (TS) G–3 Daily Log, 28 Nov 50, records that this telecon (DA TT 4009) was received at 0056. It has not been found.

11. The copy of CINCFE C 69953 in the CJCS file of CINCFE incoming messages (Jun 50–Jun 51) bears a time stamp of 0446.

12. Eric F. Goldman, *The Crucial Decade: American 1945–1955* (1956), p. 178. Mr. Truman’s account refers to this telephone call, but does not use the above colorful phrase: Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 385.

13. *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, p. 1243.

14. (S) Memo, Svc Secs to SecDef, 28 Nov 50, with handwritten note indicating that the memo had been shown to General Bradley, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) 1950. (This is an unnumbered file, not making up part of the numbered sequence of CD 092 files that have been cited earlier.)

15. (U) Agenda for JCS Mtg, 28 Nov 50, and list of those attending (indicating that the meeting lasted from 1323 to 1421).

16. (U) SM–2931–50 to JSPC, 28 Nov 50, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 1. The Committee’s response to this directive (JCS 2118/4) was not received until 27 December, and is dealt with in Chapter 8.

17. See Ch. 6, note 78.

18. Ch. 6, pp. 142–144.

19. Memo of Conversation by Amb Jessup, 28 Nov 50, *Foreign Relation, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1242–1249. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 385–388. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 469–471. Sherman Memo. The official record of this meeting says only that the Council “discussed the current situation in Korea and possible courses of action with respect thereto”; (TS) NSC Action No. 389, 28 Nov 50.

20. *NY Times*, 29 Nov 50, p. 1. The text of the communique is reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3495.

21. Sherman Memo. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Situation in Northeastern Korea,” Ser 00215P03, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40; bears date 29 Nov 50 written in pencil, with a further handwritten note by RADM Lalor (Secy JCS) that it was circulated at the JCS meeting of that date and used in the preparation of JCS 97592 (cited in footnote 22).

22. (U) Msg, JCS 97592 to CINCFE, 29 Nov 50.

23. This fact is indicated by a note by RADM Lalor on a draft of the message in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

24. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Nov 50, CJCS File, 091 Korea (1950).
25. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 50021 to DA for JCS, 29 Nov 50, CM IN 15333.
26. (U) Msg, JCS 97594 to CINCFE, 29 Nov 50; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 384–385. The evolution of this message is made clear by successive drafts in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40. The phrase “have us isolated” in the second sentence was a typist’s error for “leave us isolated” in a hand-written State Department’s draft.
27. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 278–279.
28. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 50095 to DA for JCS, 30 Nov 50, CM IN 15673. The copy of this message in the CJCS CINCFE Incoming file (time stamped 300350) is the basis for the statements in the following paragraph of the text.
29. More than twenty years later, General Bradley, though he had inevitably forgotten many of the events of the Korean War, still remembered this message as “insulting” to himself and his colleagues, and remarked with some emotion that General MacArthur “treated us as if we were children.” Interview, Robert J. Watson with GEN Omar N. Bradley, 4 May 71.
30. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 50107 to DA for JCS, 30 Nov 50, CM IN 15689 (TOR JCS Message Center 300431).
31. The record of attendance shows that the meeting lasted from 1510 to 1655 and that General Bradley was not present. There was no formal agenda.
32. Sherman Memo. (U) Msg, JCS 97772 to CINCFE, 30 Nov 50, DTG 010407Z. (Copy in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40, with drafts that make it possible to trace its history, as with many other JCS messages sent during this period.)
33. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Dec 50, p. 915. (S) Msg, G–3 DA WAR 97819 to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50.
34. *NY Times*, 30 Nov 50, p. 1.
35. (S) Msg, G–3 DA WAR 97819 to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50, cited above.
36. Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (1955), p. 477. Leland M. Goodrich, “Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression,” *International Conciliation*, Oct 1953, pp. 167–168. Memo of Conversation by Dep Dir, Ofc of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Satterthwaite), “Situation in Korea,” 30 Nov 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1263–1265.
37. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 724, 726–727. Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (1973), pp. 495–498, gives an account of this press conference and includes some examples of press accounts that show how the President’s remarks about the atomic bomb were given an emphasis that he had not intended.
38. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 727. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 478–479. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 395–396.
39. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 29 Nov–5 Dec 50, CJCS Files. On the retreat of the Marines, see Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. III, pp. 177–275. The ordeal of the 2d Infantry Division is described in detail by S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (1953).
40. Memo of Conversation by Amb Jessup, 1 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1276–1282. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 472–473.
41. An exchange of informal memos between ADM Sherman and GEN Gruenther, undated but evidently prepared on 29 or 30 November, filed with drafts of JCS message 97772 to CINCFE cited in footnote 32, in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40, indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at least Sherman and Gruenther, had already discussed the possibility of sending someone to Korea and had briefly considered asking Secretary Marshall to undertake the trip. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 393, implies, whether intentionally or not, that the Collins trip was an outgrowth of the JCS–CINCFE exchange of messages on 3 December, described below.
42. (U) Memo, Bradley to Collins, 1 Dec 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.
43. Memo of Conversation, Lucius D. Battle and William J. Shepard, 2 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1301–1305. A draft resolution for presentation to the General Assembly, branding Chinese intervention in Korea “an act of aggression against the United Nations,” had been sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information on 1 December, even before it was formally approved by the Department of State: (S) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to DJS, 1 Dec 50, w/Encl (Encl and App to JCS 1776/166, same date), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.
44. Msg, State GADEL 153 to US UN Mission, 2 Dec 50; Memo by Lucius D. Battle, Special Asst to SecState, of a Meeting Held on 2 Dec 50 (with annex by Amb Jessup), 3 Dec 50; *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1307–1308, 1310–1313. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 473–474. For the subsequent acceleration of US rearmament, see (TS) Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, Ch. 2.
45. *NY Times*, 4 Dec 50, p. 1 (article by James Reston).
46. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 2 Dec 50, CJCS Files. US combat strength as of 1 December was estimated at 106,747 (82,690 for the six Army divisions and 24,057 for the 1st Marine

Division). Turkish strength was estimated at 4,000; no figures were given for the other UN units, or for the ROK Army. Casualty estimates were 9,083 for Army forces, 516 for the 1st Marine Division, and 1,000 for the Turkish Brigade.

47. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 50332 to DA for JCS, 3 Dec 50, CM IN 16668 (TOR in JCS 030609).

48. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 475.

49. The meeting of 3 December is described in Memo of Conversation by Amb Jessup, 3 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1323–1334, and in two personal messages sent to General Collins on 3 December by General Haislip (in CJCS outgoing message book, CINCFE, June 50–June 51). One of these messages bears a serial (WAR 97929) and was evidently sent through regular DA channels. The other, which summarizes the questions raised concerning a cease-fire, is unnumbered, with a notation that it was sent in one-time code. Very brief accounts are given in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 475, and Sherman Memo. All the quotations in the text above are taken from Jessup's memorandum.

50. Sherman Memo. Memo of Conversation by DepDir, Exec Secretariat, Dept of State (Sheppard), "Report of the Secretary's Meeting at the White House . . .," 3 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1336–1339.

51. (U) Msg, JCS 97917 to CINCFE, 3 Dec 50 (DTG 031841Z). The President's approval of this message is recorded in WAR 97929, cited in footnote 49.

52. Memo by Lucius D. Battle, SpecAsst to SecState, 4 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1345–1347. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 476–477. At the meeting, Secretary Rusk put forward, but did not pursue, the suggestion that General Collins assume command of the forces in Korea, leaving General MacArthur free to concentrate on his duties as occupation commander in Japan.

53. (S) Memo, Svc Secs to SecDef, 4 Dec 50, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder No. 4. At the meeting of 3 December, Secretary Marshall, after listening to Secretary Acheson and Mr. Rusk describe prevailing opinion in the United Nations, had remarked "that the attitude described in the UN was illogical, amounting almost to bad faith but that one had to recognize that such situations do arise in international relations." *Foreign Relation, 1950, Korea*, p. 1327.

54. See Ch. 10. The violation of this directive was the specific charge on which General MacArthur's dismissal was based a few months later.

55. (U) Msg, JCS 98172 to CINCEUR et al., 6 Dec 50.

Chapter 8. The UN Command in the Balance

1. Of GEN Collins' four trips to the Far East during the first year of the conflict, this was the only one on which he was not accompanied by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the other Services sent along officers of lower rank: MG Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, US Air Force, and VADM F. S. Low, Deputy CNO for Logistics. *NY Times*, 4 Dec 50, p. 1.

2. (U) Memo, D.O.H. [MG Doyle O. Hickey, USA, CS, FEC] to GEN Collins, 4 Dec 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

3. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50371 to DA for JCS (Collins to Haislip), 4 Dec 50, CM IN 16815.

4. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, "Report on Visit to FECOM and Korea, December 4–7, 1950," 8 Dec 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

5. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, 8 Dec 50, cited in preceding note. General Collins' published account of his trip and of his conversations with General MacArthur (*War in Peacetime*, pp. 229–232) is obviously based on this memo, but adds one fact not recorded therein, namely, his disagreement with General MacArthur's statement that UN forces could not hold out in Korea unless operational restrictions were removed.

6. *NY Times*, 9 Dec 50, p. 3.

7. (U) Agenda for JCS meeting, 8 Dec 50, and record of those present.

8. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, 8 Dec 50, cited in note 4.

9. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50635 to CG 8th Army et al., 7 Dec 50, CM IN 18111. Received in JCS Message Center at 070402 Dec. A pencil note on this message (apparently in GEN Bradley's handwriting) reads "The President & Sec of State have seen." The DTG was 070615Z, indicating that it was probably sent from Tokyo around 071515I.

10. (U) Msg, JCS 98400 to CINCFE, 8 Dec 50 (DTG 082224Z or 081724 EST). A draft of this message in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40 bears a notation that it had been approved by the DepSecDef and the President.

11. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 50801 to CG 8th Army et al., 8 Dec 50, CM IN 18836 (received in JCS Message Center 081931 Dec).

12. During his visit to FECOM, General Collins was given a map with the nine successive withdrawal lines plotted on it. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 234–235, 246–247, and (U) Msg, DA 80253 to CINCFE, 4 Jan 51. This map has not been found. It is partially reproduced in Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 212, where the first four of the lines are shown; however, they do not coincide with those given in the message. Whether the discrepancy results from error, or whether the map differed from the CINCFE message to 8th Army, cannot be determined. See Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 311–312.

13. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 478.

14. (U) Msg, CSUSA WAR 97929 to CINCFE (Haislip to Collins), 3 Dec 50.

15. (TS) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "President Truman-Prime Minister Attlee Conversations," 3 Dec 50 (Encl to JCS 2176, 4 Dec 50), CCS 337 (12–3–50). Besides Korea and China, the papers covered Taiwan, Japan, NATO, British rearmament, Soviet objectives and intentions, and raw materials problems.

16. (U) "Korea," Encl B to JCS 1776/167, 4 Dec 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

17. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Korea," 4 Dec 50 (der from Dec on JCS 1776/167), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40; *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1347–1349.

18. (TS) "China," Encl B to JCS 1776/168, 4 Dec 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "China," 4 Dec 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/168), as amended by Dec on, same date; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7, pt 12.

19. (U) Memo by CSA, "Possible Employment of Atomic Bombs in Korea," 20 Nov 50, Encl to JCS 2173, 21 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 39; (TS-RD) JCS 2173/1, 29 Nov 50, same file, sec 40.

20. (TS-RD) JCS 2173/2, 3 Dec 50, same file. This study was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 November 1950; (U) SM-2930–50 to JSPC, 28 Nov 50, same file, sec 39.

21. (TS) N/Hs of JCS 2173/1 and 2173/2, both dtd 18 Dec 50, same file, sec 40.

22. (U) JCS 2173/3, 4 Dec 50, w/Encl B, "Use of Atomic Bomb"; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 4 Dec 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 2173/3), as amended by Dec on, same date; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

23. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 4 Dec 50, CCS 337 (12–3–50), forwards JCS comments on the papers relating to China and to nuclear weapons (and several others as well), indicating Secretary Marshall's concurrence. The comments on the Korea paper were transmitted, without comment, by another letter bearing the same date, in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.

24. *NY Times*, 3 Dec 50, p. 1, 5 Dec 50, p. 12, 1 Dec 50, p. 9.

25. This overall summary of the Truman-Attlee conference is based principally on the US official record found in US MIN–1, US MIN–2, US MIN–5 and US MIN–6, recording US-UK Washington Conversations 4–8 Dec 50. These minutes are reprinted in *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea* as indicated: US MIN–1, pp. 1361–1374; US MIN–2, pp. 1392–1408; US MIN–5, pp. 1449–1461; and US MIN–6, pp. 1468–1479. The President and the Secretary of State have given their accounts in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 396–413, and Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 480–485. Mr. Attlee has described the conference much more briefly: C. R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (1954), pp. 220–283. The communique released after the meeting is printed in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 18 Dec 50, pp. 959–961. (TS) NSC 93, 12 Dec 50, Encl to JCS 2176/2, 15 Dec 50, CCS 337 (12–3–50), gives a summary of the conclusions reached, including some not mentioned in the official communique.

26. Memo for Record by Amb Jessup, "Excerpts from Meeting Between the President and Prime Minister in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Thursday, December 7, 1950," 7 Dec 50 (recording President Truman's oral summary of his private meeting with Attlee); Memo for Record, R. Gordon Arneson (SpecAsst to SecState), "Truman-Attlee Conversations of December 1950: Use of Atomic Weapons," 16 Jan 53 [sic]; *Foreign Relation, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1462–1465. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 484.

27. "Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting on December 6, 1950," 7 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1430–1432. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 483–484.

28. US MIN–6, Minutes of 6th Meeting of Pres Truman and Prime Min Attlee 8 Dec 50; Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 232–233.

29. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, p. 415.

30. US MIN–2, Minutes of 2d Meeting of Pres Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, 5 Dec 50.

31. *NY Times*, 6 Dec 50, p. 1. The countries joining in this plea were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

32. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 11 Dec 50, pp. 954–955, 18 Dec 50, p. 995.

33. *NY Times*, 8 Dec 50, p. 1.

34. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 6–12 Dec 50. Of the two ROK divisions in northeast Korea, the 3d had been embarked at Songjin, north of Hungnam, and was already en route to Pusan, while the Capital Division was aiding the defense of the perimeter.

35. *NY Times*, 12 Dec 50, p. 1. The Philippine Government withheld approval from the second proposed resolution because it did not include a condemnation of Chinese aggression.
36. Memo by AsstSecState Rusk, "Notes on Meeting of the National Security Council," 11 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1518–1520. Truman *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 417–419.
37. (TS) NSC Action No. 390, 11 Dec 50.
38. (U) Msg, JCS 98608 to CINCFE, 11 Dec 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 51052 to DA for JCS, 12 Dec 50, CM IN 19689.
39. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Position Regarding the Terms of any United Nations General Assembly Cease-Fire Resolution for the Korean War," 12 Dec 50 (der from Encl to JCS 1776/171); (U) Memo, SecDef to SecState, 12 Dec 50 (N/H of JCS 1776/161); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 41. The SecDef memo to SecState and the JCS memo to SecDef were both circulated to the National Security Council as NSC 95, 13 Dec 50.
40. (TS) Memo, MG Burns to DJS, 14 Dec 50, and reply by DJS (DM–514, same date), same file. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 15 Jan 51, p. 613.
41. *NY Times*, 13 Dec 50, p. 1, 14 Dec 50, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 18 Dec 50, pp. 994–995, 25 Dec 50, p. 1005. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 422–423. The text of the cease-fire resolution had been informally sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for information, on 12 Dec 50; (U) JCS 1776/172, 12 Dec 50 (with attached typewritten draft of the resolution and handwritten memo, GEN Bradley to ADM Davis, stating that it had been shown to SecDef), CCS 383.21 (3–19–45) sec 51. Sir Benegal Rau and Mr. Lester B. Pearson of Canada were chosen as the other members of the commission.
42. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 25 Dec 50, p. 1033, 15 Jan 51, pp. 113–114. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 423–424.
43. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 15 Jan 51, pp. 115–116. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, p. 424. *NY Times*, 23 Dec 50, p. 1.
44. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 12–31 Dec 50. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, *Korea—1950* (1952), pp. 232, 234–236. Futrell, *US Air Force in Korea*, pp. 237–246. Leckie, *Conflict*, pp. 215–228. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 301–302. Montross and Canzona, *Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. III, pp. 197–359. Cagle and Manson, *Sea War in Korea*, pp. 172–192. A dispatch from CG X Corps to CINCFE, announcing completion of the Hungnam evacuation, was relayed to Washington as (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52020 to DA for JCS, 25 Dec 50, CM IN 3838.
45. *NY Times*, 23 Dec 50, p. 1.
46. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 150, pt 2, pp. 1201–1202. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 236–237. The *NY Times* article announcing GEN Walker's death (cited in last note) also carried the news of GEN Ridgway's appointment. It is evident that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted, doubtless because time did not permit. For GEN Ridgway's account of how he received the news, see Ridgway, *Soldier*, pp. 195–196, and, more briefly, *The Korean War*, pp. 79–80. Wholly unaware that his appointment had been considered, he first learned of the matter when he received a telephone call on the evening of 22 December (in Washington) instructing him to "get your things together and get out there just as soon as you can."
47. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 80–83.
48. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 84–87, and *Soldier*, pp. 202–208.
49. This program is described more fully in Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, Ch. 2.
50. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 741–747.
51. *NY Times*, 17 Dec 50, p. 1.
52. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 294.
53. (U) Msg, CINUNC C 51559 to DA for JCS, 18 Dec 50, CM IN 1671.
54. Memo of Conversation by AsstSec Rusk, 19 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp. 1570–1573. Sherman Memo.
55. (U) Msg, JCS 99274 to CINCFE, 19 Dec 50.
56. (U) SM–3010–50 to JSSC, 8 Dec 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40.
57. (U) Fox, *Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations*, vol. I, passim.
58. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Colombian Offer of Military Assistance to Korea," 29 Nov 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 40 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/164), same file, sec 39. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Ethiopian Offer of Assistance in Korea," 6 Dec 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/165), same file, sec 40.
59. (U) Memo, ActgExecSec, OSD, to JCS, "Cuban Offer of Assistance for Korea," 8 Dec 50, Encl to JCS 1776/169, 9 Dec 50, same file. (U) JCS 1776/176, 15 Dec 50; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Cuban Offer of Assistance for Korea," 20 Dec 50 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/176); (U) N/H of JCS 1776/176, 29 Jan 51; same file, sec 41.

60. (S) Memo, ActgExecSec, OSD, to JCS, "Military Assistance for Korea," 12 Dec 50, w/encl, (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Dec 50 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/173, 14 Dec 50), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 41.

61. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 14 Dec 50, w/encl; (U) Ltr, DepUSecState to MG Burns, 12 Dec 50 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/175, 15 Dec 50); same file.

62. (U) JCS 1776/178, 29 Dec 50; (U) Msg, JCS 80254 to CINCUNC, 4 Jan 51; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52879 to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51, DA IN 7655; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Arming of the Korean Youth Corps," 17 Jan 51 (der from JCS 1776/182); (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Jan 51 (N/H of JCS 1776/182, same date); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 42.

63. Detailed plans for evacuating UN forces were prepared by JSPOG early in December 1950: Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 300–301. But General MacArthur told his political advisor on 12 December that there would be no evacuation; Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, p. 205. This statement is difficult to reconcile with what he had recently told GEN Collins.

64. (U) SM–3121–50 to JSSC, 22 Dec 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 41. (U) Msg, JCS 99616 to CINCFE, 22 Dec 50.

65. General MacArthur had asked for the 3d Division for duty in Japan. It was sent to him with the stipulation that it was to constitute a theater reserve and was not to be sent into combat until given extensive training, unless "compelling reasons" dictated otherwise. General MacArthur nevertheless committed the entire division to Korea between September and November 1950. See Ch. 4, pp. 82–84.

66. Memo of Conversation by Lucius D. Battle, SpecAsst to SecState, 27 Dec 50, *Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea*, pp.1600–1604. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 514.

67. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 27 Dec 50, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 1. A handwritten note on this memo, signed by ADM Davis, reads: "This served only as basis for final drafting of appropriate dispatch to General MacArthur." The meaning presumably is that the memo was not forwarded to SecDef in the normal fashion but was used as a basis for discussion at the State-Defense meeting of 28 December, described in the succeeding paragraph of the text. It may have been based on a draft prepared by the JSSC (in accord with the JCS instructions of 22 December), but there is no evidence of such origin in the files.

68. (U) Agenda for State-Defense Meeting, 28 Dec 50, and record of those present. (ADM Sherman was absent, being represented by the Vice CNO, VADM L. D. McCormick). Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 514, gives the date of this meeting as 27 December.

69. Details of the discussion at the 28 December meeting are not documented in available records, but the substance of the agreement reached is made clear by various revised versions of the draft filed in CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 1.

70. (U) JCS 99935 to CINCFE, 29 Dec 50. The above is reproduced from a smooth typed copy of this message in CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 1, initialled as approved by Secretary Marshall and President Truman, with a note by COL Ladue, JCS Secretariat, that there was to be no distribution. Another typed copy is in the CJCS outgoing message book, CINCFE (Jun 50–Jun 51), but the usual version, mechanically duplicated by the communications office, is absent, indicating the sensitivity with which the message was handled. A paraphrase (making no reference to the Kum River line) is printed in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, pp. 2179–2180. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 377–378, reproduces the text verbatim, except for some omissions, which are not indicated, although they do not alter the sense of the message.

71. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 378. See also Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 430–432, on MacArthur's reaction to this message.

72. Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 432.

73. The documents do not support GEN MacArthur's statement that this was what he had in mind when he first set forth a need for an "army of four divisions" for the Far East. See Ch. 2.

74. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52391 to DA for JCS, 30 Dec 50, CM IN 5452. This message and most of the others exchanged between Washington and Tokyo from late December 1950 to mid-January 1951 were later made available, in paraphrased or excerpted form, either in Whitney's book or in the MacArthur hearings. A full account of this exchange (strongly hostile to MacArthur) is given in Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (1958), pp. 303–314.

75. (U) Msgs, DA 80149 to CINCFE, 3 Jan 51, 80253, 4 Jan 51; (U) Msgs, CINCUNC C 52586 to DA for JCS, 3 Jan 51, DA IN 6268, and CINCFE C 52715 to DA (personal for GEN Collins), 4 Jan 51, DA IN 6746.

76. (U) Msg, JCS 99713 to CINCFE, 26 Dec 50 (original and earlier draft in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 41, indicating approval by SecDef); (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52125 to DA for JCS, 27 Dec 50, CM IN 4390.

77. See Ch. 7.

78. (U) JCS 2118/4, 27 Dec 50, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 1.
79. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea,” n.d. (JCS 2118/5, 3 Jan 51), CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 1. The original version of this memo also includes a recommendation that “hot pursuit” be initiated “*now*” (emphasis in original); however, this has been crossed out in pencil, presumably by ADM Sherman himself, and the statement was omitted when the paper was reproduced as JCS 2118/5. The Sherman Memo records that the Admiral drafted it at his home on 1 Jan 1951.
80. (TS) JCS 2118/7, 5 Jan 51, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2. Earlier, the Central Intelligence Agency had warned that the use of Nationalist troops would be strongly opposed by the nations of Western Europe and would alienate those of Asia (Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 319).
81. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “JCS 2118/7—Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces,” 8 Jan 51, Ser 00014P35 (JCS 2118/8, 9 Jan 51), CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2.
82. This position (referred to as “Line D”) coincided approximately with the sixth of the nine lines sketched by CINCFE in the message of 8 December.
83. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 31 Dec 50–10 Jan 51, CJCS Files. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 238–246. Poats, *Decision in Korea*, pp. 128–134. Leckie, *Conflict*, pp. 240–244. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 92–97, and *Soldier*, pp. 202–214. John Miller, Jr., MAJ Owen J. Carroll, and Margaret E. Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953* (Dept of the Army, OCMH, n.d.), pp. 5–8.
84. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 251–252, cites letters that GEN Ridgway wrote to him on 3 January and to GFN Haislip on 11 January, indicating ultimate success without underestimating the difficulties that lay ahead.
85. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1951* (1965), p. 2.
86. (U) Msg, JCS 80680 to CINCFE, 9 Jan 51. This message was based on a draft prepared by ADM Davis, intended, he said, “to crystallize what seem to be current views with regard to the Korean situation.” (U) DM–6–51 to JCS Members, 5 Jan 51, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2. Successive drafts in the same file indicate the changes that were made during the process of coordination with SecDef and SecState. ADM Davis had originally specified that withdrawal would commence if UN forces were driven back to the seventh of the nine withdrawal lines; this was changed so as to leave the matter to CINCFE’s judgment, as in the final quoted paragraph above. Also, with regard to a naval blockade, ADM Davis had written that UN concurrence “*might be considered necessary.*” The change to “is considered” doubtless resulted from State Department insistence.
87. Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 435, characterizes this message as a “booby trap.” He represents the Joint Chiefs of Staff as consistently refusing to give MacArthur clear-cut guidance (*ibid.*, p. 436).
88. (U) CINCUNC C 53167 to DA, 10 Jan 51, DA IN 8796. Reproduced in paraphrased form in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 906, and largely verbatim in Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 435–436.
89. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 434.
90. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 515. Secretary Marshall, reading the paragraph about the morale of the troops, “remarked to Dean Rusk that when a general complains of the morale of his troops, the time has come to look into his own” (*ibid.*).
91. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1600.
92. *Ibid.*, pt 1, p. 329. Whether he meant to imply that the message itself produced this low ebb is not entirely clear.
93. It was time-stamped in the JCS Message Center at 0929.
94. This meeting was held at Mr. Acheson’s home and, doubtless for that reason, was not recorded as a formal JCS meeting.
95. CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 42 contains a (U) typewritten document, obviously prepared in the State Department, headed “Outline for Discussion with JCS.” It argues at some length that it is of the “highest importance that resistance be continued in Korea and that if possible a line or position be stabilized at some point.” The document is dated 9 Jan 1951 (the day before GEN MacArthur’s message was received), and there is no proof that it was used at the State-JCS meeting of 10 January, but the point of view is one that was upheld by Secretary Acheson at that time, as well as on numerous other occasions.
96. (TS) Memo for Record, “Preparation of Instructions to FECOM Contained in JCS 80902,” unsigned and undated, filed with Msg, JCS 80902 to CINCFE (cited below), in CJCS outgoing message book, CINCFE (Jun 50–Jun 51). This memo was presumably prepared by GEN Bradley or by someone in his office. Originally it had attached both the original JCS draft message to CINCFE, mentioned above, and the revision approved on 12 January (see below). These, however are not found with this copy of the memo (which is a carbon). Since the original JCS draft cannot be found, it is impossible to know how much it was altered as a result of the discussions with State.

The Sherman Memo refers briefly to this meeting of 10 January, with a remark (implying disapproval) that there was “more talk of ‘negotiation’ and ‘cease-fire.’”

97. (TS) Memo for Record, "Preparation of Instructions to FECOM," cited in footnote 96. Sherman Memo. Memo of Telephone Conversation by Lucius D. Battle, Spec Asst to SecState, 11 Jan 51, recording Marshall-Acheson conversation, in which Marshall gave some particulars of his discussions of the JCS draft with General Bradley, (C) *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951*, vol. VII, Korea, pp. 57–60. Another memo by Battle, also dated 11 Jan 51, in *ibid.*, pp. 60–61, shows that General Bradley and Secretary Acheson briefly discussed that proposed State department draft before it reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a fact of some interest in illuminating the Bradley-Acheson relationship.

98. (TS) Memo for Record, "Preparation of Instructions to FECOM." Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 515.

99. (TS) Memo for Record, "Preparation of Instructions to FECOM." (TS) NSC Action No. 418, 12 Jan 51. (U) Sherman Memo. (C) Memorandum of NSC Meeting, 12 Jan 51, by Amb Jessup, *Foreign Relations, 1951*, pp. 68–70. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 343–435.

100. (U) Msg, JCS 80902 to CINCFE, 12 Jan 51 (DTG 121754Z, indicating transmission around 1254 EST).

101. Memo for Record, Secy JCS, "JCS 2118/4, /5, /7, /8 (Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces)," 12 Jan 51, filed with JCS Meeting agendas. The memo by GEN Collins was reproduced as (U) JCS 2118/9; that of Sherman was not circulated as a JCS "green" but was practically identical with (U) JCS 2118/10, the version approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both are in CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2. See also the Sherman Memo regarding this action.

102. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea," 12 Jan 51 (der from JCS 2118/10), CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2. The three courses of action omitted from the above list involved the strengthening of Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. Approval of this memo was regarded as constituting formal JCS action on JCS 2118/4, the JSPC report on courses of action in case of "open hostilities" between the United States and China; (U) N/H of JCS 2118/4, 13 Jan 51, same file, sec 1. For the later controversy over this memo, see Ch. 10.

103. (TS) NSC 101, 12 Jan 51 (JCS 2118/11), CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2.

104. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 516. (U) Sherman Memo.

105. (U) Msg, JCS 81050 to CINCFE, 13 Jan 51 (DTG 132328Z). Printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 435–436.

106. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 382. According to Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 437–439, GEN MacArthur made this statement to GENs Collins and Vandenberg, having received the President's message just after beginning his conference with them.

107. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 53400 to DA (for Pres), 14 Jan 51, DA IN 10186.

108. (TS) Msg, State Circular 334, 3 Jan 51 (Annex to JCS 1776/184, 15 Jan 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 42. A draft of this circular had been sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they had suggested some minor changes, most of which were adopted. (TS) Memo, ActgExecSec, OSD to JCS, 2 Jan 51, w/encl (Encl and App to JCS 1776/179, 2 Jan 51); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Action Regarding Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," 3 Jan 51 (der from Encl to JCS 1776/180), same date; (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, same date; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 42. For the ensuing approaches to other countries, see *NY Times*, 6 Jan 51, p. 1, 7 Jan 51, p. 1.

109. (U) Memo, A. C. Murdaugh to MG Burns, "Cease Fire Resolution in the United Nations," 11 Jan 51, w/encl (text of report to be submitted by Ceasefire Committee), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43. The text of the report as submitted is also given in Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jan 51, p. 164.

110. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 513. *NY Times*, 12 Jan 51, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 15 Jan 51, p. 117, 29 Jan 51, pp. 163–164. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 3, pp. 1967–1969 (Acheson testimony). Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1951 (1954)*, pp. 86–87.

111. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 513. *NY Times*, 14 Jan 51, p. 9; 16 Jan 51, p. 9; 17 Jan 51, p. 1.

112. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1951*, p. 87. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 22 Jan 51, p. 159, 29 Jan 51, p. 163.

113. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jan 51, pp. 164–166.

114. (S) Ltr, DepUsecState to MG Burns, 15 Jan 51, w/encls, Encl to (S) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 15 Jan 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/183, same date); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Action Regarding Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," 19 Jan 51 (der from Encl to JCS 1776/186), 16 Jan 51, as amended by Dec On, 19 Jan 51; (no classification indicated) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Jan 51; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 42.

115. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jan 51, p. 167.

116. See Ch. 9.

117. It was at this point, according to GEN Whitney's account, that GEN MacArthur made the statement quoted above on p. 191.

118. (U) Memo, GEN Collins and GEN Vandenberg to JCS, "Consultations with General MacArthur, January 15 and 18, 1951," 19 Jan 51, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2. *Military Situation in*

the Far East, pt 2, pp. 1227–1228 (Collins testimony), 1409, 1414–1415 (Vandenberg testimony). For a slightly different account of this conference, see Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 439.

119. (U) Memo, GEN Collins and GEN Vandenberg to JCS, 19 Jan 51, cited in footnote 118.

120. (U) *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid.* *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 1189, 1210–1211 (Collins testimony), 1408–1409 (Vandenberg testimony). Whitney, *MacArthur*, p. 462. This JCS memorandum of 12 January 1951 later became an important point at issue in the hearings over GEN MacArthur's removal. GEN MacArthur interpreted it as evidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted his recommendations and concluded that they had been overruled by civilian authority. See Ch. 10.

122. *NY Times*, 15 Jan 51, p. 1

123. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 326. Leckie, *Conflict*, pp. 255–257. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 8–9. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 14–17 Jan 51, CJCS Files.

124. On one occasion, General Vandenberg flew over the front in a helicopter, landed twelve miles in advance of the main UN line, and joined a ground patrol. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 329 (testimony of Secretary Marshall). For a comment on this incident, see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 327.

125. (U) Memo, CSA to SecDef, "Morale and Capabilities of the Eighth Army and ROK Forces in Korea," 19 Jan 51, CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2.

126. The date of 18 January is given in the title of the Collins-Vandenberg memo of 19 January to the other JCS members, cited in note 118 above. The text of the memo gives 19 January, but this is evidently wrong; GENs Collins and Vandenberg were back in Washington at 1730 on 18 January, or 190630 in Tokyo. It may in fact have been held on 17 January (Far East time), since GEN Collins, in the message to the JCS members bearing that date (see note 129 below), said that a meeting with MacArthur was planned for "this evening."

127. (U) Memo, GEN Collins and GEN Vandenberg to JCS, 19 Jan 51, cited footnote 119. The Navy evacuation study referred to in the text is found as Encl to (TS) Memo, VADM Joy to GEN Collins, 17 Jan 51, Army Files, C/S 091 Korea TS (1951–52).

128. (TS) NSC 101/1, 15 Jan 51 (JCS 2118/11, same date), CCS 381 Far East (11–28–50) sec 2.

129. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 53613 to DA for JCS (Collins to Bradley), 17 Jan 51, DA IN 11108; received in JCS Message Center 170354 Jan. Reprinted in full in Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 253–254, with a misprint ("English Army," instead of "Eighth Army"). Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 516, erroneously reports that GENs Collins and Vandenberg had returned to Washington before the 17 January NSC meeting.

130. A pencil note on a copy of this message in the CJCS file of incoming CINCFE messages, Jun 50–Jun 51, records the fact that the President had read it by 0940 on 17 January.

131. (TS) NSC Action No. 420, 17 Jan 51. The results of these studies are described in Ch. 9.

132. *NY Times*, 19 Jan 51, p. 1.

133. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 255. Memo by Spec Asst to SecState (Battle), 19 Jan 51, (C) *Foreign Relations 1951, Korea*, pp. 102–105, recording Secretary Acheson's summary of Cabinet briefing by GENs Collins and Vandenberg. (This summary is surprisingly detailed; evidently Sec Acheson took very full notes on the briefing).

134. (U) Memos, Collins and Vandenberg to JCS and CSA to SecDef, both dtd 19 Jan 51, cited in footnote 118 and footnote 125 respectively.

135. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 255.

136. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 437.

137. According to one careful study, "it seems not too much to say that with Collins' arrival in the Far East, MacArthur's influence was largely finished." Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, *Arms and the State*, p. 313.

138. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 1600–1601.

Chapter 9. The Conflict Stabilized

1. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 9–14. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 105–106. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 22 Jan–11 Feb 51, CJCS Files.

2. (U) "U.S. Intentions in Korea," Negotiating Paper for Truman-Pleven Talks, Pleven D-1/2, 24 Jan 51 (Encl to JCS 1776/186, 25 Jan 51); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Jan 51 (der from JCS 1776/187, as amended by Dec On, same date); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43. (TS) "General Examination of the Situation (in the Far East) Notably with Regard to China," Negotiating Paper for

Truman-Pleven Talks, Pleven D-1/3, 24 Jan 51 (Encl to JCS 2118/13, 25 Jan 51); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj (der from JCS 2118/14); CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 3.

3. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 437–438. *Public Papers, Truman, 1951*, pp. 128–130.

4. See Ch. 8.

5. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 29 Jan 51, pp. 166–169, 192–193, 5 Feb 51, pp. 235–236. Goodrich, *Korea*, pp. 162–168. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 513. As Acheson points out, the reluctance of some countries to support this resolution stemmed from a feeling that the United States had gotten “the best of both worlds” in the matter of the five-part resolution submitted earlier by the UN Cease-fire Commission (see Ch. 8); the State Department had officially supported it, but it had been rejected by a large element in Congress and the public.

6. See Ch. 8.

7. (U) JCS 1776/181, 15 Jan 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 42.

8. (U) Dec On JCS 1776/181, 24 Jan 51, same file. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Assistance for Korea,” same date, same file, sec 43.

9. See Ch. 8. The substance of the JCS memo of 12 January was sent to General MacArthur by dispatch on 22 January, with an assurance that the full text of the JCS paper (JCS 2118/10) was being forwarded by mail; (U) Msg, G-3 DA 81706 to CINCFE, 22 Jan 51.

10. (U) NSC Action No. 393-b, 14 Dec 50. For the origin of NSC 68/4 and its significance, see Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, Ch. 2.

11. Secretary Marshall had at first planned to set up a Departmental working group, including but not limited to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct the discussions: (TS) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 21 Dec 50 (JCS 2101/30, same date), CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 9. However, no civilian DOD representatives were present at any of the meetings for which records are available. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (and members of their organization) represented the Department, and the meetings took place in the JCS “tank room.” Assistant Secretary of State Rusk was present on some occasions.

12. The participants discussed a list of seven questions relating to politico-military strategy prepared by Mr. Nitze; these are enclosed with (TS) DM-19-51 to JCS Members, 22 Jan 51, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 9. There are two records of the proceedings of this meeting. The earlier and more complete version, prepared by the Secretary, JCS, gave at least the substance of the remarks attributed to each participant: (TS) Encl to SM-202-51 to JCS members, 24 Jan 51, CCS 337 (1-24-51) sec 1. This first draft was later circulated to State and a jointly agreed version was then prepared and circulated: (TS) Encl to SM-643-51 to JCS members, 12 Mar 51, same file. The second version was briefer, giving conclusions in summary form, but it reprinted verbatim the list of seven questions circulated by the Department of State. Both versions list those present at the meeting.

Similar double records exist for meetings of 30 January and 6 February. For those of 13 and 20 February, only the later (summary) version is available. (It was at the 13 February meeting that the conferees agreed to prepare a record of the previous meetings.) The records of the meetings of 30 January and of 6, 13, and 20 February, circulated as Enclosures to SMs, are found in CCS 337 (1-24-51) sec 1. Record of subsequent meetings, if any were held, has not been found.

13. This paper is probably to be identified with a document entitled “U.S. Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression,” headed “State Draft (Senior Staff),” dated 18 Jan 51 (copy in CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 2, bearing various pencil corrections indicative of extensive discussion). Unlike the earlier Senior Staff redraft of the JCS memorandum (NSC 101/1), it contains a section defining objectives, obviously inserted in compliance with the NSC decision of 17 January (for which see Ch. 8). As compared with the original JCS memorandum itself (NSC 101), the principal difference was in the inclusion of the following additional objective, placed at the beginning: “To prevent the extension of hostilities beyond Korea and the development of general war, particularly during the period in which the United States and its allies are in the process of achieving the requisite degree of military and industrial mobilization.”

14. In the light of later events, it is noteworthy that, according to the later and more condensed account of the meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “thought that the U.S. could not commit ground forces to Southeast Asia under any circumstances.” (The longer, initial account does not include this statement.)

15. See Ch. 8.

16. (U) JCS 2118/15, 27 Jan 51, and Dec On, 29 Jan 51, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) sec 3.

17. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “An Estimate of the Effects of a Naval Blockade . . .,” 5 Feb 51, Ser 000124P30 (Encl to JCS 2118/16, 6 Feb 51), same file. The Joint Chiefs of Staff “noted” the conclusions of the study on 16 Feb: (U) Dec On JCS 2118/16, 16 Feb 51, same file.

18. See Ch. 8.

19. The reference was evidently to the beginning of the process that produced NSC 48/5 (see below, pp. 216–218).

20. (TS) SM–368–51, 8 Feb 51, and SM–630–51, 9 Mar 51, both addressed to JCS members, CCS 337 (1–24–51) sec 1.
21. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 334–336. Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 460–461.
22. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 338.
23. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 55315 to DA, 11 Feb 51, DA IN 19819. GEN MacArthur asked that “no estimates of the situation be released in Washington,” because in the past, “jeopardy” had been caused by leakages of reports from FECOM or by “unjudicious speculation which has emanated from more or less authoritative sources.”
24. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–53*, pp. 14–16. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 106–107. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 12–17 Feb 51.
25. See Ch. 5.
26. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 55610 to DA for JCS, 15 Feb 51, DA IN 1115.
27. (U) Msg, JCS 83773 to CINCFE, 17 Feb 51.
28. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 55830 to DA for JCS, 18 Feb 51, DA IN 2317.
29. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 347.
30. Memo for Record, Secy JCS, “Draft Dispatch to CINCFE,” 21 Feb 51, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50) sec 4. (U) Msg, JCS 84026 to CINCFE, 21 Feb 51. Evidence of an intention to seek Presidential approval is found in (TS) Memo, SecDef to Pres (through SecState), “Proposed Action against Rashin by U.N. Forces,” 19 Feb 51, OSD Files, CD 092 (Korea) #6 (1 May–30 Jun 51). This is apparently a draft that was never sent. It reads, “I concur in the attached paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recommend your approval.” No “paper” is attached, but obviously it must have been a request to remove the restriction.
- The account of the JCS meeting of 20 February, given in the memo of 21 February cited above, implies that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have given approval if the decision were left to them. However, in testifying during the MacArthur hearings, Generals Bradley and Collins indicated agreement with the view expressed by Secretaries Marshall and Acheson that an attack on Rashin, besides risking a Soviet reprisal, would accomplish little militarily, because Rashin had no rail connections to the south and because the North Koreans could simply have moved their supply operations over the border to nearby Vladivostok. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 356, 431; pt 2, pp. 750, 1063–1064, 1330–1331; pt 3, pp. 2260–2261.
31. (U) Msg, JCS 99713 to CINCFE, 26 Dec 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 52125 to DA for JCS, 27 Dec 50, CM IN 4390.
32. (U) PM–2058 to JSPC members, 12 Jan 51, w/encl (Draft Rpt by JSPC to JCS), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 42.
33. (U) JSPC 853/81/D (JSPC Directive), 22 Jan 51, w/encls A and B, memos by Army and Navy Planners, dtd 17 and 16 Jan 51 respectively, same file.
34. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 56453 to DA for JCS, 26 Feb 51, DA IN 4778.
35. (U) Msg, JCS 84577 to CINCFE, 1 Mar 51. Drafts of this message in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43 make it clear that the decision to reject the request was arrived at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, in a meeting on 27 February; they drafted a message in this sense and then cleared it with Secretary Marshall and the President.
36. (U) JIC 557/1, 15 Feb 51, JIC 1557/2, 28 Feb 51, and Dec On JIC 557/1, 15 Mar 51; JSPC 853/84, 12 Mar 51, and Corrig, 27 Mar 51; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43.
37. Stebbins, *United States in World Affairs, 1950*, p. 91. For the earlier discussion of crossing the parallel, see Ch. 5, pp. 102–107.
38. (TS) Memo, DepUSecState (Matthews) to GEN Bradley, 13 Feb 51, w/encl, CJCS File 091 Korea (1951).
39. That General Bradley was here speaking for his JCS colleagues, and Mr. Matthews for the Department of State, is made clear by the summary of this meeting in (U) *Record of JCS Actions Relative to Korea*, p. 94. On this chicken-and-egg argument, whether political objectives or military capabilities should be determined first, see Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 248, and Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 517. Both imply that the question came up more than once. “Indeed,” says Acheson, “so insistent was each [department] upon having guidance from the other that it gave rise to some sharp expressions suggesting avoidance of responsibilities.” Acheson also points out that the mere fact of the argument disposes of “a commonly held view that the two departments were in a constant struggle for domination.”
40. (TS) SM–610–51 to JCS members, 8 Mar 51, CCS 337 (1–24–51) sec 1.
41. (TS) SM–624–51 to JCS members, 9 Mar 51, CCS 337 (1–24–51) sec 1. For further discussion of the possibility of Latin American troops, see pp. 226–228. It does not appear that further State-JCS conferences on the subject of Korea were ever held, and apparently the study of possible Soviet intervention, called for on 13 February, was never completed.

42. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 18–19. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 340.
43. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Feb 51, w/encl, Encl to (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to GEN Bradley et al., same date (Encl B, App, and Annex to JCS 1776/192, 24 Feb 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43. In this same file is a handwritten memo by ONB (GEN Bradley), observing that the draft memo had already been discussed with Messrs. Lovett, Rusk, and “in general terms” with the President, and adding that “State wants our comments so as to establish in writing our Gov’t policy.”
44. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to GEN Bradley et al., cited in footnote 43. It happened that 23 February was a Friday, and the wording of the memo seemed to call for a special week-end effort to reply. However, the Director of the Joint Staff, RADM Davis, consulted the Department of the Army and learned there was no immediate danger of a UN “violation” of the parallel; moreover, he recalled GEN MacArthur’s promise to consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff before crossing the parallel anew. He therefore satisfied Mr. Lovett and Mr. Rusk that a “middle-of-the-week-end fire drill” was unnecessary and undesirable. (TS) Informal memo, RADM Davis to GEN Bradley, 23 Feb 51, same file.
45. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Action to be Taken by United States Forces with Respect to the 38th Parallel,” 27 Feb 51 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/192, as amended by Dec On, 26 Feb 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43.
46. (TS) Memo, MG Burns to DepSecDef, “Draft Memorandum for the President on the 38th Parallel,” 26 Feb 51, Encl to JCS 1776/194, 27 Feb 51, same file.
47. (U) Memo, Svc Secs to SecDef, “State Department Draft Memorandum for the President: ‘The 38th Parallel,’” 24 Feb 51, Encl to Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD, to JCS, 26 Feb 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/193, 26 Feb 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43. GEN Collins (*War in Peacetime*, p. 265) thought this the first occasion on which a question of “major military significance” was referred to the Service Secretaries; for a comment on this statement, see Ch. 5, note 40.
48. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 1 Mar 51 (Encl to JCS 1776/196, 5 Mar 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43.
49. The Nash-Rusk conversation is recounted in (TS) Memo, K.T. Young (Office of Foreign Military Affairs, OSD) to DepSecDef, “State-Defense Views on the 38th Parallel,” 1 Mar 51, OSD File, CD 092 (Korea) Folder #5 (1 Feb–30 Apr 51). The source speaks merely of “Mr. Nash,” not otherwise identifying him except to observe that he was about to depart for New York. Evidently the reference is to Frank C. Nash, who was at that time Deputy US Representative in the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments (see 82d Congress, 1st sess, *Official Congressional Directory, 1951*, p. 355; hereafter: *Congressional Directory*). Why he was chosen to confer with Assistant Secretary Rusk is not clear. He later became Assistant to the SecDef for International Security Affairs, while continuing for a time to retain his UN position (*Congressional Directory, 1952*, pp. 362, 373). After the 1953 reorganization of the Department of Defense, he became Assistant Secretary for ISA.
50. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 354.
51. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–53*, pp. 20–22. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 112–114. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 7–16 Mar 51. Ridgway’s comment on the recapture of Seoul bears repeating: “By pointing a dagger at the enemy’s heart-line, actually at the brain of the enemy commander, [the operation] forced him to choose between attacking us at tremendous disadvantage to himself (inasmuch as we controlled the high ground) or abandoning the South Korean capital.”
52. *Public Papers, Truman, 1951*, p. 188.
53. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC Senior Staff, “United States National Objectives and Policy in Asia,” 15 Mar 51, w/encl (State Dept draft, same date), CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 11. For NSC 48/2, see Ch. 1.
54. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 517.
55. This episode is described in full in Ch. 10.
56. See Ch. 8.
57. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Position Regarding an Armistice in Korea,” 27 Mar 51 (der from Encl to JCS 1776/201, 26 Mar 51); CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44. See also Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 303, on the origin of this memorandum. According to the Sherman Memo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with State Department officials again on 28 March; General Collins argued in favor of an armistice, apparently along the approximate line of the 38th parallel, but Admiral Sherman “held that until we get to the line of 25 November, the Chinese would claim to have pushed us south.”
58. (U) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecDef, 31 Mar 51, (N/H of JCS 1776/201, 3 Apr 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44. This letter was read into the record during the MacArthur hearings: *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 497, 521. It became part of the evidence for General Whitney’s charge that General MacArthur’s statement of 24 March 1951 cut across a “plot” to buy off the Chinese Communists by giving them Taiwan and a UN membership (Whitney, *MacArthur*, pp. 467–468).
59. (U) JCS 1776/202, 30 Mar 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44.

60. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, "JCS 1776/202—Military Action in Korea," 4 Apr 51, Ser 000140P35; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Action in Korea," 5 Apr 51 (der from JCS 1776/202, as amended by Dec On, same date); same file. (U) Memo by CSA, "Military Action in Korea," n.d. [ca. 4 Apr 51], seen in same file, cannot now be located. (U) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, and (U) Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, both 9 Apr 51, same file, sec 45.
61. Goodrich, *Korea*, pp. 168–169.
62. (S) Msg, State 825 to USUN, 30 Mar 51, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44.
63. Goodrich, *Korea*, p. 171. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 21 May 51, pp. 838–839, 28 May 51, pp. 848–851.
64. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–53*, pp. 20–24. (TS) Highlights of the Korean Situation, 17–31 Mar 51.
65. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 20, 24–25. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, p. 116. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 361–363.
66. Miller, Carroll and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, p. 25. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 363. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59397 to DA for JCS, 5 Apr 51, DA IN 18415.
67. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 25–26. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 116–123. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 363–364.
68. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 379.
69. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 102–107. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 378–380, 387–389.
70. See above, pp. 211–212.
71. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC Senior Staff, "United States National Objectives and Policy in Asia," 25 Apr 51; (U) NSC 48/3, 26 Apr 51; CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 12. For the memo of 5 April 51, see above, pp. 188–191. (The memo of 12 Jan 51 was described in Ch. 8.)
72. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," 30 Apr 51 (der from JCS 1992/70), 27 Apr 51, as amended by Dec On, 30 Apr 51), CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 12. Circulated to NSC by (U) Memo from ExecSecy, NSC, 1 May 51, same file, sec 13.
73. (TS) NSC Action No. 466, 2 May 51.
74. (U) NSC 48/4, 4 May 51, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 13. A further change in this paragraph, proposed by the Department of State and transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff on 8 May, spoke of facilitating the withdrawal of "non-Korean armed forces," thereby remedying an oversight in the original, which had spoken only of withdrawing UN forces. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC Senior Staff, 8 May 51, same file.
75. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," 11 May 51, same file, sec 14 (der from JCS 1992/76, 7 May 51, as amended by Dec On, 9 May 51, and by N/H of JCS 1992/76, 14 May 51), same file, sec 13. This memo replaced one sent to SecDef on 10 May, the original of which, bearing GEN Bradley's signature, is filed with JCS 1992/76. In it the changes sought in NSC 48/4 were indicated by the laborious process of reproducing the entire original paragraph with the undesirable words lined out and others substituted. The 11 May version merely sets forth the wording desired by the JCS and is thus much easier to read. Presumably Secretary Marshall sent back the original version with a request to make it more readily comprehensible.
76. (TS) Memos, ActgExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," 14 May 51 and 15 May 51, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 14.
77. (U) Memo, GEN Collins to JCS, "National Security Council action on NSC 48/4," 16 May 51, same file.
78. (TS) NSC Action No. 471, 16 May 51. (TS) NSC 48/5, 17 May 51.
79. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, "JCS 1776/221—Proposed changes in directives to CINCFE," 28 May 51, Ser 000612P30, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 48.
80. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60388 to CG 8th Army, 19 Apr 51, DA IN 3460.
81. (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 60410 to CG 8th Army et al., 19 Apr 51, DA IN 3486.
82. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60965 to JCS, 25 Apr 51, DA IN 5595.
83. (U) Msgs, CINCFE C 61367 and C 61366 to JCS, 30 Apr 51, DA IN 7322, 7323.
84. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 121–122.
85. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60308 to DA for JCS, 17 Apr 51, DA IN 2646.
86. *NY Times*, 5 Apr 51, pp. 1, 3.
87. Sherman Memo. (U) Memo prepared by GEN Bradley, n.d., discussed and amended by JCS on 23 Apr 51, Encl to Memo for Record, Secy JCS, "Events in Connection with Change of Command in Far East," 24 Apr 51, CCS 013.36 (4–20–51) (hereafter: Bradley Memo). (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 307–309, 338–342. The draft order is printed in *ibid.*, p. 309. No copy of it has been found in JCS files, and it is evident that it was not drafted under normal JCS staff procedures.

88. “Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,” unsigned, prepared in Dept of State, 18 Apr 51, (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 353–362.

89. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 60308 to DA for JCS, 17 Apr 51, DA IM 2646; (U) Msg, JCS 88950 to CINCFE, 19 Apr 51. Successive drafts of the JCS message, in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 45 indicate approval of SecDef and the President.

90. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61157 to DA for JCS, 27 Apr 51, DA IN 6416. The line laid out in this message (designated RAIDER) was closer to Pusan than the old “Davidson Line,” which General Walker had designated as the last-ditch defense (see Ch. 4).

91. The order was intentionally withheld by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because they feared that GEN MacArthur might use it to justify precipitate action. See Ch. 10, p. 246.

92. (U) Msg, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 27 Apr 51, TSW 242, CM IN 250 (sent through G–2 channels). (U) Msg, JCS to GEN Ridgway, 28 Apr 51, unnumbered (copy in CJCS file of outgoing msgs to CINCFE, Jun 50–Jun 51: bears note, “This msg receipted for by General Ridgway 280700Z Apr 51”). Evidence that the JCS reply was cleared at higher levels is furnished by a Memo by Dep Asst SecState for FE Affairs (Merchant), 2 May 51, printed in (C) *Foreign Relations, 1951, Korea*, pp. 399–400.

93. (U) Memo by CSA, “Attack against FEC (DA IN 2646, 17 April 1951),” n.d. (filed under date 19 Apr 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 45. (U) JCS 1776/208, 24 Apr 51, and Dec On, 25 Apr 51; (U) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 30 Apr 51, w/encl, (U) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, “Directive to CINCFE for Operations in Korea,” 25 Apr 51; same file, sec 46. (U) Msg, JCS 90000 to CINCFE, 1 May 51.

94. The decision had been reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February to send them in April. See Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 345.

95. General Ridgway’s draft directive has not been seen, but is referred to in his message C 61932 of 7 May (see footnote 96). For the difference between it and the JCS directive (JCS 90000), see Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 300, and Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 385. General Ridgway’s reasons for seeking permission to send troops into Manchuria and the USSR are not known. Presumably he intended to use this authority only in reprisal for some escalation by the Communists. It is to be observed that he did not press this point in his subsequent discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

96. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61932 to DA for JCS, 7 May 51, DA IN 9679.

97. (U) Msg, JCS 90687 to CINCFE, 8 May 51.

98. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 62088 to DA for JCS, 9 May 51, DA IN 10599. Regarding GEN Ridgway’s third point, it will be recalled that the JCS on 27 April had authorized him to conduct reconnaissance of Manchuria and Shantung and to attack air bases there in case of an enemy air assault. The JCS directive of 1 May had merely authorized reconnaissance of Korea and the China coast. GEN Ridgway referred to another JCS message (WST 230) that apparently repeated the contingent authorization to attack enemy bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula but said nothing about reconnaissance, thereby creating ambiguity. This message has not been found.

99. (U) JCS 90999 to CINCFE, 11 May 51. The separate message dealing with reconnaissance over Shantung and Manchuria has not been found, but apparently the JCS granted the authority. (TS) Msg, CINCFE to ACS G–2, TIW–192, 29 May 51 (copy in CJCS file of incoming CINCFE msgs, Jun 50–Jun 51), indicates that reconnaissance missions had recently been flown over Anshan and nearby regions.

100. See Ch. 4.

101. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 300–301. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 395. (U) Memo by CSA, “Directives to CINCFE,” n.d. (JCS 1776/221, 23 May 51); (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “JCS 1776/221—Proposed Changes in Directives to CINCFE,” 28 May 51, Ser 000612P30; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 48. (U) SM–1354–51 to JCS members, 29 May 51, same file, sec 49 (along with various drafts of the message, including the final version as transmitted). (U) JCS 92831 to CINCFE, 31 May 51 (actually 1 Jun 51 GMT; the DTG was 010024Z).

102. See p. 224.

103. See Ch. 11.

104. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Assistance for Korea,” 24 Jan 51 (der from JCS 1776/181), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43. For the background of this memo, see Ch. 8, pp. 178–179.

105. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Feb 51, Encl to (TS) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Military Assistance for Korea,” 1 Mar 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/195, 2 Mar 51) CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43.

106. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 2 Mar 51, Encl to (TS) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, “Military Assistance for Korea,” 9 Mar 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/197, 10 Mar 51), same file. The additional Canadian troops reached Korea on 5 May 1951; (U) Fox, *Inter-Allied Co-operation*, vol. I, pp. 47–48, 237.

107. (C) Ltr, DepAsstSecState for FE Affairs (Livingston T. Merchant) to SecDef, 8 Feb 51, Encl to (C) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "Possible Offer by Argentina of Two Air Squadrons," 12 Feb 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/189, 13 Feb 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 43.
108. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Possible Offer by Argentina of Two Air Squadrons for Service in Korea," 23 Feb 51 (der from (S) JCS 1776/191, 20 Feb 51, as amended by Dec On, 22 Feb 51), same file.
109. (C) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecState, 9 Mar 51, same file.
110. (U) Memo, DepDir, ExecOfc of SecDef (Kreps) to JCS, "Norwegian Offer of Assistance for Korea," 13 Apr 51, w/encls (Encl to JCS 1776/206, same date), same file, sec 45. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 25 Apr 51, same file, sec 46 (der from Encl A to JCS 1776/207, 20 Apr 51, same file).
111. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 31 Mar 51 (Encl to JCS 1776/204, 2 Apr 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44. This letter was apparently written at the instigation of MG Taylor, the Army G–3; see Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 356. The Service Secretaries had also urged renewed efforts; their memo to SecDef on this subject (20 March 1951) has not been seen but is referred to in (TS) JCS 1776/218, 21 May 51, same file, sec 48.
112. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 26 Apr 51, Encl to Memo cited in next note.
113. (TS) Memo, DepDir, ExecOfc of SecDef, to Joint Secys and JCS, "Increasing the Strength of United Nations Contingents in Korea," 18 May 51 (Encl to JCS 1776/218, 21 May 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 48.
114. It was not until 19 June 1951 that the Joint Strategic Plans Committee drafted a reply to the SecDef memo: (U) JCS 1776/228, same file, sec 49.
115. (TS) Ltr, AsstSecState to SecDef, 2 May 51, Encl to (TS) Memo, OSD (COL Kreps) to JCS, "Increasing the Strength of United Nations Contingents in Korea," 18 May 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/219, 22 May 51), CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 48.
116. (S) Memo, ActgExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "Brief Study of Procedures Used in the Unified Command in Korea," 9 Mar 51, w/encl, (S) Ltr, ActgAsstSecState for UN Affairs to MG Burns, 2 Mar 51 (Encl and App to JCS 1776/198, 12 Mar 51), same file, sec 43. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Procedures Used in the Unified Command in Korea," 13 Apr 51, w/encls, same file, sec 45 (der from Encl to JCS 1776/203, 3 Apr 51, same file, sec 44).
117. Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*, pp. 105–110. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 387–389.
118. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63730 to DA for JCS, 30 May 51, DA IN 18375.
119. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 63744 to DA for JCS, 30 May 51, DA IN 18477.
120. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 365.

Chapter 10. The Relief of General MacArthur

1. Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession* (1966), pp. 344–345. (Hereafter: Phillips, *The Truman Presidency*.)
2. The decisions of June 1950 regarding the Seventh Fleet recounted in Ch. 2. For the discussion of military aid to the Nationalists, see Ch. 1.
3. (U) Aide-Memoire to Chinese Embassy, 1 Jul 50, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, "Chinese Offer of Forces to Assist in Korea," 1 Jul 50, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 21; reproduced as App C to Encl to JCS 1776/16, same file, sec 22, also in Dept of State, *US Policy in the Korean Crisis*, pp. 60–61.
4. (TS) "Summation of the Remarks of General MacArthur, 13 July 1950," Tab A to Memo, LTC Dickson to GEN Bolte, "Report of Trip to the Far East Command (10–15 July 1950)," 17 Jul 50, Army File, G–3 333 Pacific TS (1950), case 3.
5. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 14 Jul 50, and Encl, (S) Ltr, AsstSecState to GEN Burns, 7 Jul 50 (Encl and App to JCS 1966/33, 14 Jul 50), CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 4.
6. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "General Policy of the United States Concerning Formosa," 27 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1966/34), CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 4.
7. (U) NSC Action No. 325, 27 Jul 50.
8. (TS) NSC 37/10, 3 Aug 50. (U) Msg, JCS 87860 to CINCFE, 3 Aug 50 (der from JCS 1966/39), CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 5.
9. (TS) *History of the Formosan Situation*, p. 65. For a fuller account of the MDA program for Taiwan, and of other aspects of US relations with the Nationalists, see Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. IV, 1950–1952, Ch. 12.
10. (U) Msgs, JCS 87061 to CINCFE, 25 Jul 50, 87160, 26 Jul 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 58732 to DA for JCS, 26 Jul 50, CM IN 15682.

11. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Defense of Formosa," 28 Jul 50 (der from JCS 1966/35), 27 Jul 50; (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 29 Jul 50; (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 31 Jul 50; CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 4.

12. (U) Msg, JCS 87401 to CINCFE, 28 Jul 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 58994 to JCS, 29 Jul 50, CM IN 16830.

13. The reference was presumably to discussions in connection with the projected aid survey approved by the President and the NSC on 27 July. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that General MacArthur send someone else at that time and make his own trip later, but they left the decision to him, and he considered it advisable to go at once in view of the "many conflicting reports" emanating from Taiwan. (U) Msg, JCS 87492 to CINCFE, 29 Jul 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59032 to DA for JCS, 30 Jul 50, CM IN 17006.

14. Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1950*, pp. 237–238. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 522. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 354. *NY Times*, 10 Aug 50, p. 1. The account of this episode by William J. Sebald, General MacArthur's political advisor, is significant. At the request of the Department of State, he sought further information from General MacArthur about the visit, but was told that the talks were "purely military in nature" and had no bearing on policy. As a result of this incident, Mr. Sebald, according to his later recollection, "sensed a growing rift between the American authorities in Tokyo and Washington which, if not corrected, could only lead to disaster." Sebald and Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan*, pp. 122–124.

15. (U) Msg, CINCFE to DA, 311141Z Jul 50, CM IN 17316.

16. (U) Msg, JCS 87878 to CINCFE, 3 Aug 50; (U) Msg, CINCFE CX 59318 to DA, 4 Aug 50, CM IN 18476. Secretary Acheson later stated it as a fact that MacArthur "ordered three squadrons of jet fighters to Formosa without the knowledge of the Pentagon" (*Present at the Creation*, p. 422).

17. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, OSD to JCS, 3 Aug 50, Encl B to JCS 1966/38, same date; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Defense of Formosa," 3 Aug 50 (der from JCS 1966/38); CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 5.

18. (U) NSC Action No. 329, 3 Aug 50.

19. (U) Msg, SecDef WAR 88014 to CINCFE, 4 Aug 50. For the background of this message see (U) JCS 1966/51, 22 Nov 50, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 7.

20. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59418 to DA, 5 Aug 50, CM IN 18884.

21. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 59569 to JCS, 7 Aug 50, CM IN 19338.

22. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 349–353.

23. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 354.

24. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, p. 580.

25. (U) Msg, JCS 88681 to CINCFE, 14 Aug 50 (der from JCS 1966/44), same date, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 5. See also Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 354, on the origin of this message.

26. See Ch. 2.

27. The text of the MacArthur message to the VFW is printed in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3477–3480.

28. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 531–532.

29. *NY Times*, 28 Aug 50, p. 1. *U.S. News and World Report*, 1 Sep 50, pp. 32 ff.

30. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 423.

31. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 354–355. A very good analysis of the MacArthur message and of its political and diplomatic impact is given in John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (1959), pp. 73–77. (Hereafter: Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*.)

32. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 1217.

33. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Sep 50, p. 396, 11 Sep 50, pp. 411–412.

34. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 356; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 423; testimony of Secretary Johnson, *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 2586–2587, 2616. Sherman Memo.

35. (U) Msg, SecDef DEF 89880 to CINCFE, 26 Aug 50; reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3480. The message was actually dictated by the President after Secretary Johnson hesitated, in the light of General MacArthur's great prestige, to carry out the President's instruction. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 423–424; Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (1973), pp. 478–479. General Bradley later testified that the order was sent without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, p. 880).

36. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 61325 to DA for SecDef, 27 Aug 50, CM IN 5581. General MacArthur requested that, if the President's decision remained unchanged, the Secretary of Defense transmit a message to the VFW withdrawing his statement. Secretary Johnson's reply merely informed the General that such a message had been sent. (U) Msg, OSD DEF 89919 to CINCFE, 29 Aug 50.

37. (U) Msg, Pres DEF 90046 to CINCFE, 29 Aug 50 (also in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 356–358).

38. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 990–991.
39. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 355–356; *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, p. 2587. According to one account, evidence of dissatisfaction with MacArthur first appeared shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. John Foster Dulles, reporting to the President on his return from the Far East, had strongly criticized the General for his insulation from the public and from his own staff, members of which had at first been afraid to disturb him with the news of the crisis. Dulles felt that MacArthur should be “hauled back to the United States,” but the President had demurred because the General’s recall would create a “tremendous reaction.” Phillips, *The Truman Presidency*, p. 300, footnote (citing information from the “private diaries of a White House aide”).
40. See Ch. 5, pp. 117–119.
41. See Ch. 6, pp. 125–130.
42. See Ch. 6, p. 131.
43. Interview, General MacArthur with editors of *U.S. News and World Report*, 1 Dec 50; Msg, General MacArthur to Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press, 1 Dec 50; text of both reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3532–3535.
44. See Ch. 7, pp. 169–1710.
45. President Truman, speaking of these and similar examples of MacArthur’s public disagreement with his policy at this time, wrote in his memoirs: “I should have relieved General MacArthur then and there. The reason I did not was that I did not wish to have it appear as if he were being relieved because the offensive had failed. . . . Nor did I want to reprimand the general, but he had to be told that the kinds of public statements which he had been making were out of order.” Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 384.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 383.
47. (U) Msg, JCS 98134 to CINCEUR et al., 5 Dec 50.
48. (U) Msg, CINCFE C 50736 to JCS, 8 Dec 50, CM IN 18614; (U) Msg, JCS 98410 to CINCFE, 9 Dec 50.
49. Text of statements by GEN MacArthur, 13 Feb and 7 Mar 51, in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3539–3540; Ltr, SecDef Marshall to Hon Richard B. Russell, 17 Aug 51, *ibid.*, pp. 3665–3667.
50. (S) Memo, OSD (COL K. B. Kreps) to JCS, 20 Mar 51, with atchd draft Presidential statement, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44.
51. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 357–358. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 343.
52. (U) Msg, JCS 86276 to CINCFE, 20 Mar 51. A draft of this message in CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 44 records SecDef approval.
53. (U) Msg, CINCUNC C 58203 to DA for JCS, 21 Mar 51, CM IN 12977.
54. (U) *Record of JCS Actions Relative to Korea*, p. 101. (U) Record of attendance at JCS mtg, 21 Mar 51. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 518. The text approved by the President is printed in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 439–440.
55. Text, statement by General MacArthur, 24 Mar 51, reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3541–3542.
56. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 387–389. The two previous occasions to which General MacArthur referred were the broadcasts made by the UNC on 1 and 7 October, on the eve of the UN invasion of North Korea (see Ch. 5). Both of these broadcasts, however, had been made at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See the remarks by GEN Bradley on this point in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 1029–1030.)
57. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 441–442.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 442; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 519.
59. (U) Msg, JCS 86736 to CINCFE (Personal for MacArthur), 24 Mar 51. According to his later remarks, General MacArthur did not regard this message as a “rebuke” and in fact did not connect it with his statement of 24 March (*Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 71).
60. Letter, Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. to General MacArthur, 8 March 1951; Letter, General MacArthur to Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., 20 March 1951; both reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3543–3544.
61. *Ibid.*, pt 1, p. 113; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 445–447.
62. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3579–3580. General MacArthur was awarded seven Silver Stars, two Distinguished Service Crosses, two Purple Hearts, a Distinguished Service Medal, and a number of French decorations for his World War I Service. For an excellent treatment of General MacArthur’s career up to the outbreak of World War II see D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. I, 1880–1941 (1970).
63. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 520–521. Mr. Truman also refers briefly to two other occasions, in 1948 and 1949, when the General declined to return home (*Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 447); see below, p. 244.

64. James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt, The Soldier of Freedom 1940–1945* (1970), pp. 500–501. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. II, 1941–1945 (1975), pp. 403–440.

65. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 319. General MacArthur claimed that this episode brought down on his head “an avalanche of political abuse from the party in power” and that from that date it became only a matter of time “until retaliation would be visited upon me.”

66. For an authoritative account of the MacArthur/Marshall relationship before World War II see Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General 1880–1939* (1963), and *George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope 1939–1942*, (1966), passim. In this connection, it should be noted that General Marshall had been instrumental in 1941 in having General MacArthur recalled to active duty and named Commanding General, US Army Forces Far East. Their differences in World War II, stemming largely from General MacArthur’s calls for greater support in the Pacific, have been well publicized. There is certainly no indication that these were anything more than “official” differences.

67. On the relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, see Appendix 3. Examples of messages illustrating the relationship will be found in preceding chapters, notably Ch. 6, pp. 143–144, and Ch. 7, pp. 153–154.

68. Ridgway, *The Korean War*, pp. 121–122. *NY Times*, 5 Apr 51, p. 1 (citing statements made by Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn after a meeting of Congressional leaders at the White House).

69. (U) Bradley Memo, 23 Apr 51. See Ch. 9, pp. 220–222.

70. Unless otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section of the chapter and the ensuing section are based upon the following: Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 445–448; Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 271–287; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 521–524; Phillips, *The Truman Presidency*, pp. 340–347; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 364–377; Sherman Memo; Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51, cited p. 314, note 87. Besides this version of the Bradley Memo, there is another version, attached to a memo for the record by “ofgm” (LT Olive F. G. Marsh), dated 25 Apr 51, (copy in files of JCS Historical Division; obtained from Bradley Files, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA). The two do not entirely agree. The information given above regarding the discussion at the 6 Apr 51 meeting is from this second version. Otherwise, however, the version cited on p. 314, note 87, has been followed here, since it was the one approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

71. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 447. Mr. Truman’s account of this incident is as follows: “In the spring of 1949, as in 1948, MacArthur had pleaded that he could not come home because of the press of business in Tokyo, and it had been necessary for the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, to intervene urgently from Washington in order to get MacArthur to withhold his approval from a bill of the Japanese Diet which was completely contrary to the economic policy for the occupation as prescribed by the governmental authorities in Washington.” The nature of the policy violation is not indicated, and no further information on this incident has been found in the sources examined in connection with this volume.

72. This was General Bradley’s position as stated by him in his memorandum of 24 Apr 51. Mr. Truman, in a memorandum shortly after the event, stated that at the 6 April meeting General Bradley wanted General MacArthur “fired immediately.” Memo, “The MacArthur Dismissal,” 28 Apr 51, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s files, Harry S. Truman Library. In his memoirs, the President’s recollection was that General Bradley believed that “there was a clear case of insubordination and the general deserved to be relieved of command,” but that he wished to consult with his JCS colleagues before making a final recommendation. *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 447.

73. Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 447; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 520–521.

74. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 520–521; Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51.

75. Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51. According to Mr. Truman’s account, Secretary Marshall at this meeting said that he had read the file of messages between General MacArthur and the Pentagon for the last two years “and that he had now concluded that General MacArthur should have been fired two years ago” (*Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 448). Presumably he was referring to the 1949 incident cited by Mr. Harriman at the previous day’s meeting.

The statement by General MacArthur about ROK manpower, published originally in a now-defunct magazine (*The Freeman*), is reprinted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3544. The editor of the magazine had cited a news report that the ROK Government was releasing draftees for lack of equipment and had asked General MacArthur why the United States did not supply equipment; the General replied that the question “involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.” In fact, the situation reflected a decision based on General MacArthur’s own recommendation, not to supply weapons for the so-called “Korean Youth Corps” (Ch. 8, pp. 178–179). See President Truman’s comments on this incident in *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 450.

76. Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at their 8 April meeting agreed that if the President did not relieve General MacArthur, General Marshall should send General MacArthur a let-

ter as discussed above. The draft prepared by Generals Bradley and Marshall has not been found in official records, including General Marshall's personal files.

77. General Collins' view, as expressed at the JCS meeting of 8 April, is as given in *War in Peacetime*, p. 283. ADM Sherman's opinion is from the Sherman Memo. No account of GEN Vandenberg's views has been found, but it was doubtless similar to that of the others.

78. Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51. Phillips, *The Truman Presidency*, pp. 346–47, gives a short account of the JCS meeting of 8 April based on information furnished by COL Chester V. Clifton, USA, GEN Bradley's aide. According to this account, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "had become disenchanted with MacArthur a long way back—as far back as February or January in any event—and on military rather than on political grounds." The causes of their dissatisfaction were GEN MacArthur's conduct of operations in Korea (splitting his forces and launching the November offensive with inadequate intelligence); the feeling that he was losing confidence in himself and forfeiting the confidence of his troops; the "petulance and ill-tempered complaints" in his messages to Washington; and the evidence that he had become jealous of General Ridgway's success in stabilizing the military situation. COL Clifton was not present at the meeting, but he presumably got his information from GEN Bradley shortly afterwards, and it is likely that his account reflects the general tone of the meeting as remembered by GEN Bradley.

79. The three firsthand accounts of this meeting are Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 448; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 522; Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51. All agree in essentials, except in the matter of General Bradley's exact role. According to President Truman, General Bradley expressed his personal agreement with the Service Chiefs. This is probably erroneous; Bradley's memo contains no such statement, and in his testimony during the MacArthur hearings, Bradley said that he had indicated agreement only by not expressing disagreement. Secretary Acheson has Secretary Marshall, rather than General Bradley, announcing the verdict of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which seems unlikely) and stating that both he and General Bradley agreed.

80. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 284.

81. Bradley Memo, 24 Apr 51.

82. (U) Msg, JCS 88180 to CINCFE (Personal from GEN Bradley to GEN MacArthur), 11 Apr 51.

83. (U) Msg, JCS 88181 to CINCFE (Personal from GEN Bradley to GEN MacArthur), 11 Apr 51.

84. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 26. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 395.

85. *NY Times*, 16–21 Apr (front page stories). The text of the General's speech of 19 April 1951 is in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3553–3558, and MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 400–405.

86. On the aftermath of the MacArthur dismissal (including the Congressional hearings), see Phillips, *The Truman Presidency*, pp. 347–350; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 524–528; Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 287–293; Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, pp. 211–256; Trumbull Higgins; *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* (1960), pp. 133–176.

87. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, p. 3142.

88. (U) Memo, JSSC to JCS, "Preparations for Forthcoming Congressional Hearings," 26 Apr 51 (sgd by COL Cress as Secy JSSC), CCS 013.36 (4–20–51). The JSSC study was *Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Relative to the United Nations Operations in Korea from 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951*, cited in Ch. 2, note 35.

89. (U) Memo, JSSC to JCS, 26 Apr 51, cited in footnote 88.

90. In reporting on his action in deleting information from the transcripts, the Director, Joint Staff, stated that 1.4 percent of General MacArthur's testimony had been deleted while about 4 percent of General Marshall's had been deleted. The reason for the differences, according to the Director, was that "General Marshall speaks with authority. Hence his testimony tends to authenticate matters which, although publicly disclosed, are not points of positive public knowledge." (U) Memo, DJS to GEN Bradley et al., "Interim Report on Censorship in Connection with Current Congressional Hearings," 14 May 51, CCS 013.36 (4–20–51). A summary and analysis of the deleted portions, which have now been declassified, is given in John Edward Wiltz, "The MacArthur Hearings of 1951: The Secret Testimony, *Military Affairs*," Dec 1975, pp. 167–173.

91. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 69–71, 26–28.

92. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 5, pp. 3556–3557, pt 1, pp. 13–14. For the JCS memo of 12 Jan 51, see Ch. 8, pp. 188–190.

93. Ch. 9, p. 213. The JCS memorandum of 27 Mar 51 was addressed to the Secretary of Defense. How General MacArthur learned of it is not indicated in available records.

94. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 126.

95. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, p. 323.

96. *Ibid.*, pt 1, pp. 324, 329–341.

97. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 1, pp. 324–325.

98. *Ibid.*, pt 1, p. 325.
99. *Ibid.*, pt 2, pp. 730–731.
100. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 731–732.
101. *Ibid.*, pt 2, pp. 735–736, 738.
102. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 878–879.
103. *Ibid.*, pt 2, p. 751.
104. *Ibid.*, pt 2, pp. 763–872.
105. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 1087–1092, 1151–1179.
106. *Ibid.*, pt 2, pp. 1188, 1210–1217, 1230–1231, 1239–1241.
107. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 2, pp. 1378–1379, 1394–1395, 1401–1405, 1408–1409, 1441–1445 (Vandenberg); pp. 1526–1530, 1537, 1571–1579, 1599–1601, 1630 (Sherman).
108. The testimony of the above witnesses is found in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pts 3 and 4.
109. *Military Situation in the Far East*, pt 4, pp. 3119–3133, 3133, pt 5, pp. 3135–3164, 3561–3605. The quoted paragraph is from p. 3125.
110. Phillips, *The Truman Presidency*, p. 349. Secretary Acheson expressed a somewhat similar judgment: the hearings “exhausted both committees, bored the press and the public, publicized a considerable amount of classified material, and successfully defused the explosive ‘MacArthur issue.’” (*Present at the Creation*, p. 524).

Bibliographic Note

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the master records files of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records maintained in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by agencies of the Joint Staff. Research also extended to certain records of the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The volumes published by the Department of State in the *Foreign Relations* series have proved invaluable, especially in illuminating the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Department of State and the National Security Council.

During the period of this volume the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized under a case file system that had been in continuous use since 1942. This system is identified by the prefix CCS (for Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder title. Within each footnote, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are cited, all those contained in a single footnote "sentence," enclosed by a period, are to be found in the records file given at the end of the sentence. "Same file," rather than "Ibid.," is used for repeated, successive references to the same file.

Some documents are cited without a file reference. These include types that are widely distributed and that may be located without reference to the JCS files, such as Records of NSC Actions. Most messages can be readily found either in the regular JCS files or in a series of message books containing messages exchanged with CINCFE, maintained by General Bradley when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now making up part of the CJCS Files. Monthly Command Reports of FECOM/UNC are in the Army Files in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service.

Since the first draft of this volume was completed, a recheck of some of the JCS files used in its preparation has shown that some documents have been removed from the folders and can no longer be located. Instances of such missing documents that have come to the attention of the authors are pointed out in the footnotes.

Index

- Acheson, Dean G.: 14, 15, 26, 29-34, 35, 38-39, 40, 44, 58, 60, 94-95, 125-27, 138, 155, 167, 169, 177, 190, 233, 236, 246, 256
and cease-fire proposals: 212, 213, 214
and Chinese intervention: 112, 122, 130, 133, 137, 138, 151, 170-71
and Far East policy: 17-18, 109, 156, 160-62, 179-80, 188, 210
and MacArthur: 187, 236, 242, 246-47, 249
and Nationalist Chinese troop offers: 51, 152-53
and operations north of the 38th parallel: 46, 106, 108, 109, 208-09, 210
and strategy: 133-34, 141, 142-43, 146, 157, 160-62, 208-09, 210
and troop appeals/offers: 66, 68, 178, 226-28
and war objectives: 95, 97, 98, 106, 142
and war policy: 109-10, 151, 188, 220-21
and UN: 102, 105, 157-58, 170-71, 172, 191-93, 200
- Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM): 42
- Aerial surveillance: 108, 110, 145, 184, 190, 196, 203, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 235, 252-53
- Air Force, US: 77
Reserves: 77, 78
superiority of: 185
unit strength: 74
- Air Force, US (units)
5th Air Force: 20
13th Air Force: 20
20th Air Force: 20
- Air forces: 65
Argentine: 227
Australian: 60
Communist Chinese: 124, 129-30
ROK: 12, 13, 17
South African: 69
- Air National Guard: 78-79
- Air operations, Chinese: 124, 129-30, 150, 151, 156-57, 199-200, 204-06, 220
- Air operations, UN/US: 42, 43, 44, 45-46, 48, 153, 159, 175
"hot pursuit" into Manchuria: 138-39
north of the 38th parallel: 47, 50, 51, 108, 110
strategic bombing: 203-06
at the Yalu River: 125-30, 141, 183, 238
- Air transport services: 68, 75
- Aircraft
Australian: 60
North Korean: 27, 30, 37, 38
offers of: 69, 70
US: 20, 35, 38, 74, 75, 227, 234
- Aleutian Islands: 17
- Allison, John M.: 30
- Almond, Maj. Gen. Edward M., USA: 49, 86, 101, 121, 153, 165-66, 167
- Ammunition: 65
given to ROK Army by CINCFE: 29, 35, 40
shortages of: 19, 27
- Amphibious operations
North Korean: 30
UN Command: 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86-90, 92, 100-01
- Anderson, Maj. Gen. Orvil A., USAF: 111-12
- Anderson, Vernice: 261
- Appropriations: 13, 20-21, 70, 78
- Argentina: 208, 227
- Armed Forces Policy Council: 70, 150, 177
- Army, ROK: 5, 11, 12, 22, 25, 29, 30, 36, 48, 107, 114-16, 166, 185
capabilities of: 45, 47, 145, 148, 159, 179, 182, 195, 207, 211-12
expansion of: 140, 178-79, 181, 214
morale: 133-34, 195, 197
operations: 85, 117-18, 141, 143-44, 147-48, 175, 215
proposed evacuation of: 188, 189, 194, 195
role of: 148, 151, 216, 218, 225
strength: 12, 13, 19, 217
US assistance to: 40, 46, 178-79
US command of: 57
- Army, ROK (units)
corps
I: 102, 120, 121
II: 102, 120, 123, 141, 147-48, 149
III: 215-16
- divisions
1st: 36, 107, 120-21, 141, 147, 148
2d: 36
3d: 36, 102, 120, 121, 123, 156
5th: 36
6th: 36, 43, 102, 120-21, 147, 148
7th: 30, 36, 102, 120, 147, 148
8th: 36, 102, 120, 147, 148

- Capitol: 30, 102, 120, 123, 156, 175, 215
 Army, US. *See also* Army, US (units); Eighth US Army in Korea.
 Chief of Staff: 5, 11, 69. *See also* Bradley, General Omar N.
 General Staff: 49, 80
 General Reserve: 74, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83
 messages to CINCFE: 31-32, 34, 39-40, 143-44
 Army, US (units)
 armies
 Eighth: 20, 21, 57, 84, 181, 216. *See also* Eighth US Army in Korea.
 corps
 I: 120, 147, 194-95, 199, 215, 216
 IX: 147, 148, 199, 215, 216
 X: 87, 89, 90, 93, 100-01, 117-18, 120, 121, 123, 135, 141, 148, 150, 152-54, 156, 159, 160, 162, 165-67, 171, 173, 175, 177, 185, 195, 197, 199, 204, 215
 XXIV: 5
 divisions
 11th Airborne: 75, 80, 81, 82
 82d Airborne: 74, 81, 82, 176
 2d Armored: 82
 1st Cavalry: 20, 53, 74, 79, 85, 93, 107, 117, 120, 141, 147, 204
 2d Infantry: 74, 77, 80, 84, 114, 115, 116, 120, 141, 147, 148, 155-56, 178, 185, 204
 3d Infantry: 82-83, 84, 87, 114, 115, 116, 123, 141, 153, 158-59, 175, 180
 6th Infantry: 5
 7th Infantry: 5, 20, 82, 87, 93, 120, 123, 141, 156, 175
 24th Infantry: 20, 53, 74, 76, 79, 107, 117, 119-20, 141, 147, 148
 25th Infantry: 20, 53, 74, 79, 120, 141, 147
 40th Infantry (National Guard): 5, 222, 225
 45th Infantry (National Guard): 222, 225
 brigades
 2d Engineer Special: 74
 regiments. *See also* Regimental combat teams.
 17th: 141, 143-44
 29th: 20, 77, 80, 84
 33d: 82
 8th Cavalry: 123
 65th Infantry: 83, 84
 Army Organized Reserve: 78
 Atomic weapons: 155, 168-69, 170
 Attlee, Clement: 60, 155, 158, 161-62, 167, 168, 169-72, 239
 Austin, Warren R.: 26, 41, 59, 63, 96, 104, 110, 111, 125, 136, 154, 174, 192, 193, 237
 Australia: 63, 64, 138-39, 226, 227
 army units: 68, 71, 72, 116, 117
 forces offered: 60

 Barkley, Alben W.: 150
 Belgium: 69, 70, 71, 116
 Bevin, Ernest: 102-03, 214

 Bolivia: 71, 228
 Bolling, Maj. Gen. A. R., USA: 23-24
 Bolte, Maj. Gen. Charles L., USA: 27, 98, 116
 Bombing missions: 125-30, 134
 Bond, Neil W.: 49
 Bonesteel, Col. C. H., III, USA: 2, 4
 Bradley, General Omar N., USA: 11, 12, 18-19, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33-34, 38, 39, 62, 73, 74, 94, 97, 107, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 127, 169, 173, 200, 206, 245, 261
 and Chinese intervention: 113, 121-22, 124, 133, 149
 and diplomatic strategy: 156, 158, 170
 and Far East policy: 160-61, 177, 179-80, 207
 and MacArthur: 171, 237, 246-47, 248, 249, 250, 254-55
 and strategy: 133-34, 141, 142, 153, 156, 157, 160, 161-62, 208
 and war policy: 180, 202-03, 207-08, 220-21
 Brazil: 208, 226, 227, 228
 British Commonwealth: 60, 63, 72, 117, 119-20
 British Commonwealth Brigade, 27th: 117, 119-20
 British Commonwealth Division: 72
 British forces
 naval: 60, 68
 operations: 85, 120, 123
 troops: 68, 117, 227
 British Infantry Brigades
 27th: 72, 107, 116, 141, 147
 29th: 72, 116, 141
 British Joint Services Mission: 60
 Burma: 112, 136
 Burns, Maj. Gen. James H., USA (Ret.): 59, 70, 108, 130, 135, 210, 232

 Cairo Declaration: 1, 14
 Canada: 60, 62, 68, 71, 116, 138-39, 226, 227
 Casualties
 North Korean/Chinese: 229
 South Korean: 37
 UN troops: 158-59
 US: 158-59
 Cease-fire proposals: 37, 151, 156, 157, 158, 160-62, 167-68, 171-76, 188, 191-93, 197, 202, 206-07, 212-15, 240-41, 253
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 23, 29, 30, 112, 119, 121-22, 133, 137, 208
 Chae, General Byong Duk, ROKA: 36, 42
 Chang, John M.: 37, 178-79
 Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo: 1, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17-19, 51, 61, 152, 196, 232, 234
 Chiefs of Staff, British: 4, 107, 113, 220-19
 Chiefs of Staff, Soviet Union: 2
 Chile: 226, 228
 China, Communist: 10, 13-16, 189-90
 aerial surveillance of: 203, 225
 aid to North Korea: 108
 blockade of: 160, 162, 166, 168, 182, 184, 186, 190, 196, 202, 203, 216, 252-53

- desire of UN members to avoid conflict with: 142, 143-44
 and diplomatic efforts to restrict the advance of: 131, 134, 137-38
 entry into war: 124-25, 131-32, 135-36, 148-54, 159-62, 239, 240
 objectives in war: 149, 153, 158, 175, 191-92, 197, 213
 possibility of attacks on: 213, 216, 220-22, 224, 233, 234
 and possibility of entry into war: 108, 110-13, 114-16, 119, 145, 261
 recognition of: 17, 102, 200
 and seat at the United Nations: 13-14, 16, 61-62, 102, 160, 167, 168, 170, 175, 200, 213-14, 218, 253
 statements by: 46
 and Taiwan: 213-14, 232-35
 and UN cease-fire proposals: 174-75, 192-93, 207-08, 213-14, 253
 UN embargo of: 215
 and UNSC: 154
 and US strategy in the Far East: 182, 184-85
 and USSR: 13-14, 102, 159
 China, Nationalist. *See* Taiwan.
 China, People's Republic of. *See* China, Communist.
 Chinese Communist Forces (CCF): 120-22
 assessment of: 114, 131-32, 134-35, 148-49, 153, 159, 177, 180, 181-82, 185, 229
 morale: 195, 196, 229, 230
 operations: 130, 137, 148-49, 175-76, 185, 204, 216
 and potential crossing of 38th parallel: 167-68, 199
 resupply from Manchuria: 125-28, 129, 131, 133, 134, 141, 153, 159, 195, 196, 215
 retaliatory action against: 208, 228-30
 strength: 110-11, 113, 114, 123, 127-28, 133, 134-35, 148, 153, 158-59, 165, 179-80, 229
 Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), (units)
 army groups
 IX: 148
 XIII: 121
 armies
 Fourth Field: 111
 38th: 123
 39th: 123
 40th: 123
 42d: 121, 123
 50th: 123
 56th: 121
 66th: 123
 Chou En-Lai: 112, 175
 Ch'unch'on, Korea: 30, 35, 36, 43, 211
 Church, Brig. Gen. John H., USA: 42-43, 47
 Churchill, Winston S.: 1, 169
 Clark, General Mark, USA: 33
 Clifton, Lt. Col. C. V., USA: 27
 Collins, General J. Lawton, USA: 15, 26, 29, 31, 33-35, 38, 39, 55, 57, 59, 63, 77, 115, 150, 160, 168, 177, 204, 207, 222, 232, 245, 246
 and command relationships under CINCFE: 101, 175-76
 conferences with MacArthur: 49-50, 79, 82, 95-96, 157, 158, 165-67, 179, 193-198, 240
 and Far East policy: 194, 214
 and MacArthur: 117-18, 119, 188, 236, 237, 247, 249, 255-56, 259
 and mobilization: 77, 78, 81
 reinforcements for Korea: 79-84, 139-40, 226
 and strategy: 86, 88, 90, 92, 141, 142, 143-44, 150-51, 156-57, 165-67, 208
 trips to Korea: 79-80, 85-86, 87, 95-96, 165-67, 171, 188, 189, 190, 193-198
 and war objectives: 95, 96, 97, 165, 201-02, 217
 Colombia: 70-71, 117
 Combat replacements: 82-83, 139
 Combat reserve units: 83-84
 Command relationships in Korea: 101
 Commander, Navy Forces Far East (COMNAVFE): 35, 220
 Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE): 5, 13, 27, 216, 250. *See also* Far East Command; MacArthur, General Douglas; Ridgway, Lt. Gen. Matthew B.
 instructions from JCS: 35, 39-40, 43-44, 46-47, 50-51, 52, 61, 99-100, 101, 108, 110, 112, 130-31, 153-54, 188-91, 194, 205, 220-22, 224, 225, 233, 260
 instructions from US Army: 31-32, 34, 39-40, 143-44
 instructions regarding Soviet involvement: 43-44, 222, 224
 messages from JCS: 60, 64, 82, 83-84, 85, 88-89, 116, 143-44
 messages to JCS: 75, 76, 85, 86, 118, 153, 259-60
 messages to staff: 167
 missions: 130-31, 143-44, 194, 222, 238, 241
 orders from JCS: 161-62
 orders issued by: 89, 101-02, 117, 118, 219
 reinforcements for: 63, 73-77, 80, 81-84, 86-87, 139-40, 166, 194
 reports to JCS: 29, 36-37, 40, 46, 48-49, 50, 159
 responsibility for military activities in Korea: 32
 and strategy: 86, 103-04
 and Taiwan: 34, 233, 234
 visits from JCS: 79-80, 85-86, 87
 Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC): 20, 40. *See also* Radford, Admiral Arthur W.
 Commander in Chief, United Nations
 Command: 57, 59, 101, 132, 157, 217, 222, 224, 225-26, 250. *See also* MacArthur, General Douglas; United Nations Command.
 Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific: 4
 Commanding General, Far East Air Force: 108.
 See also Far East Air Force.
 Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East (CGUSAFFE): 5

- Commanding General, US Army Forces in Korea (CGUSAFIK): 5
 "Committee of Sixteen": 155
 Communism, containment of: 15, 16-19
 Communist insurgents
 in Indochina: 18
 in the Philippines: 39, 69
 in South Korea: 22
 Costa Rica: 71
 Coulter, Maj. Gen. John B., USA: 10
 Cress, Col. E. F., USA: 251-52
 Cuba: 178, 226
- Davis, Rear Adm. Arthur C., USN: 27, 43, 160, 173, 174, 252
 Dean, Maj. Gen. William F., USA: 76
 Demilitarized zone (proposed)
 at Manchurian border: 134, 137-38, 142, 143, 154-55
 at 38th parallel: 174
 Denmark: 61, 69
 Department of Defense
 and strategy: 208-12
 and Taiwan: 233
 and troop offers: 60, 62, 71, 227-28
 Department of State: 2, 6, 7, 32, 59, 260
 and cease-fire proposals: 169, 240-41
 and China: 134, 167-68
 clashes with MacArthur: 99, 119
 and Far East policy: 130-35, 188, 193, 201, 211-12, 216
 and invasion by North Korea: 27, 29, 31, 38
 and Korean political future: 99-100
 and naval blockade of North Korea: 58
 and nuclear weapons: 169
 and operations north of the 38th parallel: 109, 110
 policy statements: 43-45, 199-200
 relationship with JCS: 65, 94, 167-68, 241
 and strategy: 167-68, 206-07, 209-12
 and Taiwan: 61, 232-34
 and troop appeals/offers: 52, 60, 63, 65-67, 69, 71, 200-01, 226-28
 and UN resolutions: 56-57, 135-36
 and violations of Manchurian border: 138-39
 and withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea: 9, 10, 11
 Department of the Army: 59, 81
 and Army units for CINCFE: 140, 176
 and invasion by North Korea: 26-27
 and withdrawal of occupation troops from Korea: 9, 10-11
 Department of the Treasury: 70
 Diplomatic strategy: 131, 134, 137-38, 142, 144, 155, 156-58
 negotiations: 151
 problems created by MacArthur: 154
 in the UN: 172-76
 Doyle, Rear Adm. James H., USN: 86, 87
 Dulles, John Foster: 30
- Dunn, James C.: 4
- Economic aid
 to Korea: 11, 16-18
 to Taiwan: 14, 16
 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA): 15, 233
 Eddleman, Brig. Gen. C. D., USA: 205
 Edwards, Lt. Gen. Idwal H., USAF: 87
 Egypt: 41
 Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK): 57, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, 100-01, 103, 114, 115, 117, 135, 188, 189, 194-95, 196, 197-98, 200, 216
 mission: 216, 219
 morale: 195, 196, 197, 229
 operations: 120, 121-22, 123, 130, 141, 145, 147-50, 152, 153-54, 155-56, 158-59, 160, 165-67, 171, 172, 175-76, 177, 199, 208-09, 211, 212, 213, 229-30
 retreat: 185
 separation from X Corps: 117-18
 supply difficulties: 101, 103
 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., USA (Ret.): 95
 Entezam, Nasrollah: 174
 Equipment
 evacuation of: 175, 195
 for foreign troops: 66, 70-71, 208
 for NKPA: 19
 provided by UN members: 69
 for ROK Army: 19-20, 31-32, 35, 140
 Ethiopia: 70, 71, 72, 226
 Evacuation of US nationals from Korea: 29, 32, 34, 35, 37-38, 46
- Far East Air Force (FEAF): 20, 32, 35, 38-39, 40, 41-42, 46-47, 48-49, 108, 109, 110, 125, 134, 220
 Far East Command (FECOM): 7, 22, 23-24. *See also* Commander in Chief, Far East.
 authorized to defend Seoul: 35
 daily intelligence summaries: 121
 instructions regarding: 40, 46-47
 Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group: 87
 Military Intelligence Section: 110-11, 113
 reinforcement of: 74
 reports to US Army: 38, 149-50
 survey group to Korea: 32, 34-35
 troops sent to Korea: 51
 Finletter, Thomas K.: 26, 33, 35, 125, 133, 151, 210
 Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT): 80, 83
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC): 74
 Fleets
 Sixth: 44
 Seventh: 20, 29, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39-41, 44, 109, 160, 232, 233
 Formosa. *See* Taiwan.
 Forrestal, James V.: 6, 7
 Fox, Maj. Gen. Alonzo P., USA: 233
 France: 169, 199-200

- and Indochina: 18, 62
 and Manchuria: 138-39
 offers of ships: 65, 69
 troops: 69, 71, 72, 116, 185, 204
 and the UN: 136, 154
 Franks, Oliver: 169, 220
- Gardner, Rear Adm. M. B., USN: 4
 General Order No. 1: 2, 4-5
 Greece: 68, 69, 71, 72, 116, 139, 226, 227-28
 Gross, Ernest A.: 137
 Gruenther, Lt. Gen. A. M., USA: 49
 Guerrilla activity
 in China: 184-85, 190
 in North Korea: 175
 in South Korea: 22, 24, 174
- Hahn, Soon K.: 2
 Haislip, General Wade H., USA: 38, 160, 167, 177
 Hamblen, Col. A. L., USA: 261
 Hamhung, South Korea: 165
 Han River: 47, 48, 50, 75, 199, 203-04, 208, 215
 Harriman, W. Averell: 81, 113, 142, 150, 156, 160,
 210, 235, 246, 247, 249
 Hawaii: 77
 Hefelbower, Col. Roy C., USAF: 225
 Hickenlooper, Bourke B.: 255
 Hickerson, John D.: 39, 58
 Higgins, Marguerite: 73, 259
 Hillenkoetter, Rear Adm. Roscoe H., USN: 23
 Hobbs, Maj. Gen. Leland S., USA: 69
 Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R., USA: 5, 8-9, 10
 Hong Kong: 194, 197
 Hospitals: 69, 227
 Hydroelectric plants (North Korean): 119, 125,
 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 136, 144, 183, 205-06,
 220, 222, 225-26
- Imjin River: 215
 Inch'on, Korea: 4, 32, 35, 84, 85, 86-90, 93, 101,
 111, 160, 165, 177, 199, 238
 India: 41, 61-62, 69, 103, 104, 111, 112, 115, 116,
 154, 172, 228
 Indochina: 18, 39, 62, 115, 122, 189, 194, 200
 Iran: 44, 228
 "Iron Triangle": 102, 215
 Israel: 228
 Italy: 63, 64
- Japan: 2, 4-5, 7, 17
 as base for air operations in Korea: 46, 150
 defense of: 21-22, 52, 156, 170, 177, 180, 181,
 182, 184, 186-87, 188, 189-90, 191, 194, 195-
 196, 197, 221, 222, 224, 225
 forces from used in Korea: 49
 National Police Reserve: 179
 occupation forces, Australian: 68
 occupation forces, US: 20, 22, 82, 84
 occupation of: 5, 244, 245
 peace treaty with: 18, 24, 30, 41, 115, 160
 Security Forces: 186, 190, 195-196
 JCS 1736/8: 51, 52, 61, 74
 Jessup, Philip C.: 113, 135, 151, 161, 201, 203, 207,
 261
 Johnson, Louis: 15, 18, 26, 29, 31, 35, 39, 43-44, 45,
 58, 59, 62, 74, 75, 94, 98, 100, 109, 236, 237,
 256
 and commitment of ground troops: 45-46, 50-
 51, 53
 and military budgets: 21
 and mobilization: 77, 78-79
 and need for Far East policy: 16, 18-19
 and policy statements: 44-45
 and reinforcements for CINCFE: 83
 and strategy: 87, 88
 and Taiwan: 33, 34, 232, 233, 234-35
 and troop offers: 60, 65-66, 69, 70
 and UN resolutions: 56-57
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
 and cease-fire proposals: 167-68, 213-14, 216-
 17, 240-41
 and China: 108, 113-16, 131-33, 150, 153, 239
 failure to express concern over MacArthur's
 actions: 117-18, 143-46, 152, 238
 and Far East policy: 183-85, 186, 188-91, 209,
 210, 213-14, 216-17, 218
 guidance to the Department of State: 65, 209,
 241-42
 instructions to CINCFE: 35, 39-40, 43, 44-45,
 61, 98, 99, 101, 109, 110, 112, 116, 124, 125,
 126, 127, 130-31, 153-54, 181, 186, 188-91, 205,
 220-22, 224, 232, 260
 instructions to MacArthur: 57, 98, 108, 152,
 153-54, 181, 186, 209, 210, 243
 lack of trust in MacArthur: 246, 247-48, 255-56
 meetings with Truman: 34-35, 38-39, 245-50
 messages from CINCFE: 85, 89-90, 101-02, 118,
 126-27, 131, 148-49, 152, 159-60, 183, 204-05,
 241
 messages to CINCFE: 60, 74-75, 82, 88-89, 90,
 99-100, 106, 108, 126, 129-30, 152-53, 177, 179,
 186, 233-34, 235
 messages to MacArthur: 241, 242, 245
 and military aid to Korea: 12
 and military aid to Taiwan: 14, 15, 18, 232-34
 and military occupation of Korea: 6-9
 and mobilization: 39, 74, 77-79, 81, 89, 150
 and NSC 8/1: 12
 and NSC 81: 96-98
 and redeployment planning: 116
 and reinforcements for CINCFE: 63, 184, 186,
 226-28
 relationship with Department of State: 94
 and relief of MacArthur: 245, 246-50
 and reports to UNSC: 58-59
 and Senate hearings: 251-57

- and size of ROK Army: 140
- and strategy for war: 85-90, 92, 143, 150, 152, 153-54, 183-85
- and troop offers: 62, 63-66, 68-71
- and UN resolutions: 56-57
- and use of ground troops: 43-45, 50-51, 52
- and war objectives: 95, 97-98, 106, 196, 216-18, 254
- and withdrawal of occupation troops from Korea: 11, 12
- Joint Intelligence Committee: 23, 85, 110, 205-06
- Joint Military Advisory Group in the Philippine Islands: 69
- Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC): 75
- Joint Outline Emergency War Plan: 21-22
- Joint Staff Planners (JPS): 4
- Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC): 63, 116, 140, 150, 168-69, 178-79, 183-84, 189, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206
- Joint Strategic Plans Group: 206
- Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 2, 12, 43, 44-45, 51, 52, 58, 74, 98, 168-69, 178, 179, 184, 186, 189, 209, 213, 251-52
- Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner, USN: 20, 88, 195

- Kaesong, South Korea: 25, 26, 27
- Katzin, Col. Alfred G., South Africa : 103
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.: 24
- Kim Il Sung: 6, 24, 35, 107, 120
- Kimball, Dan: 210
- Kimpo airfield, Korea: 27, 32, 35, 38, 43, 86, 87
- Kirk, Admiral Alan G., USN (Ret.): 41
- Korea. *See also* Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of; Korea, Republic of; Korean War.
 - elections in: 7, 9
 - military aid to: 7-9
 - military government of: 5
 - occupation of: 1-2, 4, 6-13
 - partitioning of: 1-2, 4-6
 - plans for the political future of: 102, 114
 - proposed international trusteeship for: 1
 - proposed UN occupation of: 96, 97
 - role in prewar strategic planning: 21-22
 - surrender of Japanese troops in: 2, 45
 - unification. *See* Unification.
- Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of. *See also* North Korean Peoples Army.
 - established: 6-7, 9
 - government of: 99
 - invasion of by UN forces: 94-98
 - potential occupation of: 99-100, 151
- Korea, Republic of (ROK)
 - Air Force. *See* Air forces, ROK.
 - Army. *See* Army, ROK.
 - Communist guerrilla activity: 22
 - Constabulary: 5, 6, 7-9, 10, 11, 22
 - decision to send troops to: 34
 - established: 6-9
 - National Assembly: 10
 - Navy: 11
 - possibility of invasion from North Korea: 10, 11, 12
 - survey team to: 47
 - UN recognition of: 97
 - and withdrawal of occupation forces from: 11-12
- Korean National Civil Police: 5
- Korean War
 - cease-fire proposals: 37, 151, 156-58, 160-62, 167-68, 171-76, 202, 212-15, 240-41, 253
 - Chinese objectives: 149, 153, 158, 175, 191-92, 197, 213
 - decision to commit US troops: 45-53, 260
 - military objectives: 99, 103-04, 107, 117-19, 120, 132, 135, 145, 147, 151, 160-62, 184-85, 186-87, 188, 209, 215, 217, 222
 - political objectives: 207, 208, 210-12, 213-14, 242
 - possibility of US/UN withdrawal from: 160, 165-68, 177, 179-85, 186-87, 188-89, 190, 191, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 207, 220, 221, 224, 225, 226
 - restoration of 38th parallel as boundary: 32, 160-62, 171, 172, 173-74, 201, 225
 - UN objectives: 55, 94-97, 102-05, 115-16, 130-31, 132, 145, 165, 199, 209, 211, 222, 225, 230
 - unification as objective: 106, 119, 143-44, 145, 167-68, 171, 174, 197, 199, 209, 211, 214, 217-18, 241
 - US objectives: 32, 40, 45, 55, 94-98, 115-16, 130-31, 135, 142, 145, 157, 160-62, 179-80, 184, 188, 189, 191, 196, 199, 201-02, 207, 211-12, 216-18, 224
- Korean Youth Corps (KYC): 178-79

- Latin American troop offers: 62, 70-71, 116-17, 208, 226, 227, 228
- Leahy, Admiral William D., USN: 2
- Lebanon: 65
- Lemnitzer, Maj. Gen. L. L., USA: 23-24, 70
- Lie, Trygve: 24, 29, 61, 63-64, 67, 103, 237
- Lincoln, Brig. Gen. George A., USA: 4
- Lindsay, Maj. Gen. R. C., USAF: 205
- Logistic support
 - to Chinese forces: 153
 - to foreign ships: 65
 - to foreign troops: 70
 - to US troops: 153
- Lovett, Robert A.: 125-26, 127, 139, 142, 156, 180, 205, 213, 227, 242
- Low Countries: 62
- Luxembourg: 69, 71

- MacArthur, General Douglas: 2, 4. *See also* Commander in Chief, Far East; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.

- and acceptance of troops for UN Command: 64, 68, 69
- appointed UN commander: 57-59
- assessments of situation: 73-74, 75, 76, 79, 113-14, 124-25, 126-29, 134-35, 144-45, 148-49, 159-60, 165, 179, 181-82, 183, 197-98, 238
- career summary: 243-44
- and cease-fire proposals: 173-74, 212
- and Chinese intervention: 111-16, 124-29, 134-35, 165, 240
- and command relationships: 197
- conferences with the Pentagon: 49, 157
- distrust of: 118, 197, 238, 246, 247-48, 255-54
- and drive to the Yalu: 144-46
- estimates of requirements: 63, 68, 69, 74-75, 76-77, 79, 82, 81, 82, 84, 90, 165, 166, 177, 179
- and Far East policy: 17, 176, 181-83, 240-42
- and "hot pursuit" into Manchuria: 138
- and Inch'on: 84, 85-90
- instructions from JCS: 57, 112, 124, 125, 133-34, 180, 186, 234, 237-38, 240-43
- lack of confidence in: 154, 156, 170-71, 187
- meeting with Truman: 113-16, 261-62
- messages from: 65, 206, 215, 234-35, 241, 259
- messages to/from Truman: 190-91, 237
- and NSC: 151
- and occupation of Korea: 4, 5, 8-9, 10-12, 151
- and operations near Communist borders: 117-18, 125-30, 133-34, 141-46, 152, 238
- orders given by: 41-42, 47, 176
- preemptive actions by: 47, 117-18, 125, 238, 241-42
- public statements by: 103-04, 111, 151-52, 163, 212-13, 233-37, 238-40, 241-43, 247
- and redeployment planning: 116
- removed from command: 216, 230-57
- reports from: 46, 48-49, 53, 58-59, 68, 141, 148-49, 159-60, 211, 235
- and Ridgway: 203-04, 215, 219-20
- and ROK Government: 99
- Senate hearings on relief of: 251-57
- and Soviet intervention: 115, 182
- and strategic bombing: 204-06
- and strategy: 84-90, 100-02, 141-46, 152, 153, 159-60, 165-67, 204-06
- and Taiwan: 18-19, 81, 166, 233-38
- and use of ground troops in Korea: 48-52, 260
- and war aims: 95, 96, 97, 106, 131, 133-35, 145-46, 151, 183
- and war policy: 165, 183, 186-87
- Malaya: 62, 189
- Malik, Yakov A.: 16, 33, 102, 192
- Manchuria
- air reconnaissance of: 190, 203, 224
- as base for Chinese air operations: 129-30, 132-33, 134, 136, 150, 204-06
- avoidance of military operations near the border of: 47, 96-97, 98, 99, 108, 109, 110, 117-18, 219-20, 222, 224, 225-26, 238
- Chinese takeover of: 10, 156
- "hot pursuit" into: 138-39, 168, 171, 238-39
- operations near the border of: 117-18, 125-30, 238
- policy on air and naval action against: 132-33, 134, 136, 150, 151, 184, 186, 193, 220-22, 225
- possibility of demilitarized zone at the border of: 134, 137-38, 142, 143, 154-55
- prohibition on military activities violating the borders of: 101, 108, 128, 136, 138-39, 150, 156-57, 206, 219
- resupply from: 149
- troops in: 110, 113
- Mann, Thomas C.: 208
- Manpower strength
- in Korea: 75, 76
- need to increase: 139-40, 150-51
- NKPA: 6, 19
- UN: 150, 226-28
- US Air Force: 21, 75, 77, 78-79
- US Army: 21, 75, 77-79
- US Marine Corps: 21, 78
- US Navy: 21, 75, 77, 78-79
- Mao Tse-Tung: 10, 13, 24, 111, 130
- Marshall, George C.: 7, 67, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 112, 117, 133, 135, 138, 150, 169, 179-80, 190, 197, 200, 205, 210, 253
- and border issues: 125-26
- and cease-fire proposals: 173, 174, 212
- and diplomatic strategy: 156, 158, 170, 230
- and Far East policy: 161, 177, 179, 253
- and MacArthur: 103-04, 118, 127, 128, 129, 152, 162, 171, 180, 187, 244-47, 249, 251, 253-54
- and strategy: 142, 143, 150-51, 154, 157, 161, 214
- and troop commitments: 140, 178, 226-28
- and war policy: 220-21
- Martin, Joseph W., Jr.: 243, 245, 246
- Matthews, Francis: 111
- Matthews, H. Freeman: 71, 109, 130, 188, 201, 206, 207, 208, 221
- Matthews, Col. W. S., USA: 27, 33, 261
- Medical supplies: 61, 69, 72, 227
- Menzies, Robert: 68
- Mexico: 208, 226, 227, 228
- Military advisors (for Korea): 5, 8, 10, 12-13
- Military aid
- offered to the US: 55-56
- Soviet to North Korea: 19, 24
- US: 7-9, 11, 12-13, 20
- US to Indochina: 39, 201
- US to ROK Army: 16-17, 19-20, 22, 23, 31-32
- US to Taiwan: 14-16, 17-18, 201, 232-33
- Military budgets: 77-78
- Military intelligence
- on Chinese activities: 110-12, 124-25, 127-28, 131-32, 148, 197, 234, 235
- prewar: 22-23
- shared with UN forces countries: 155
- on Soviet activities: 44, 139, 220
- Military manpower. *See also* Manpower strength.

- draft: 78
- involuntary recall of: 77
- voluntary recruitment of: 77
- Military planning
 - lack of political guidance for: 96
 - political guidance for from the UN: 104
 - and threat of Chinese or Soviet entry in the war: 96-98, 99, 101
- Military readiness
 - and Truman administration: 20-21, 44, 73
 - of US divisions: 82-84
- Mobilization: 39, 41, 45, 52, 53, 62, 74, 77, 78-79, 140, 150, 151, 176-77, 201, 227
- Mountbatten, Admiral Louis, UK: 4
- Muccio, John J.: 9, 10, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 36, 37, 40, 42-43, 47, 99, 113, 114, 134-35, 166, 260
- Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: 14, 15, 18, 70, 140

- Nash, Frank C.: 210
- National Guard: 78-79, 81, 84, 89, 140, 150, 177-78, 179, 182, 186, 194, 195-196, 201-02, 222, 224, 225
- National Security Act Amendments of 1949: 94
- National Security Council: 8, 12, 108, 130
 - and cease-fire proposals: 173, 214, 217
 - and Chinese intervention: 133-34, 150, 196, 214
 - and Far East policy: 16-19, 190, 201-03, 210, 211-12, 216-18
 - and MacArthur: 187
 - meetings: 44, 45-47, 60, 97-98, 109, 110, 150
 - staff: 15, 96, 108, 133, 134, 210, 211-12
 - and strategy: 94, 210
 - and Taiwan: 14, 15, 16, 233, 234
 - and war objectives: 94-98, 202-03
 - and war policy: 179, 210
- Navy, ROK: 11
- Navy, US. *See also* Fleets.
 - superiority of: 185
 - Reserves: 78-79
- Navy Forces Far East (NAVFE): 20, 32, 35, 38-39, 40, 46-47, 48-49, 220
- Naval forces: 65
 - Australian: 60
 - British: 60
 - Canadian: 60
 - Netherlands: 69
 - New Zealand: 60
 - US. *See* Navy, US.
- Naval operations: 50, 110, 159, 175, 222, 233
- Nehru, Jawaharlal: 61-62
- Netherlands: 60, 69, 71, 116, 136-37, 138-39, 185
- New Zealand: 60, 63, 65, 68, 71, 116, 226, 227, 228
- Nieh, General Yen-Jung, China: 112
- Nitze, Paul: 201, 208, 220-21, 241
- Norstad, Lt. Gen. Lauris A., USAF: 81, 82, 235
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 63, 138-39, 189, 227
- North Korean People's Army (NKPA)
 - Chinese advisors to: 76
 - corps: 25
 - destruction of as war aim: 94-98, 99
 - divisions: 36, 42, 43
 - equipment: 25
 - operations: 175
 - rout of at Inch'on: 93-94, 97
 - Soviet advisors to: 24, 76
 - strength: 6, 19, 25, 29, 93-94, 101, 159, 165, 229
 - supplies for: 82, 89-90
 - US assessments of: 30, 31, 48, 73, 76, 79, 114, 229
- Norway: 69, 227
- NSC 8: 8
- NSC 8/1: 11-12
- NSC 8/2: 12, 13, 20
- NSC 48/1: 15
- NSC 48/2: 15, 16-19, 211, 216, 217
- NSC 48/3: 216, 217
- NSC 48/4: 217
- NSC 48/5: 212, 214, 216-18, 225
- NSC 68: 21
- NSC 68/4: 201
- NSC 81: 96-98
- NSC 81/1: 98, 99, 100, 102-03, 132-33
- NSC 81/2: 134
- NSC 101: 211, 217

- Occupation forces (Korea)
 - planning for: 119
 - Soviet: 2, 4-5, 9-10
 - UN: 114
 - US: 1-2, 7-8, 9-13, 116
- O'Donnell, Maj. Gen. Emmett, USAF: 256
- Office of the Secretary of Defense: 69, 70
- Okinawa: 18, 20, 21-22, 77
- Operations
 - KILLER: 208-09
 - RIPPER: 211, 215
 - ROUNDUP: 199, 204
 - RUGGED: 215
 - THUNDERBOLT: 199
 - WOLFHOUND: 194, 199
- ORE 18-50: 23
- O'Regan, Rear Adm. W. V., USN: 205

- Pace, Frank: 26, 33, 34, 35, 46, 50-51, 62, 64, 113, 117, 210, 249
- Pacific Command: 20
- Pakistan: 61, 63, 64, 115, 228
- Panama: 71, 83
- Panikkar, K. M.: 111, 112, 139
- Peace terms
 - explored by NSC: 97
 - explored with UN members: 100
- People's Republic of China (PRC). *See* China, Communist.
- Peru: 226, 228
- Pescadores Islands: 225, 234

- Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK): 72
- Philippine Islands: 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21-22, 39, 63, 64, 68, 69, 71, 72, 116, 170, 189-90, 228
- Pleven, Rene: 169, 199
- Potsdam Conference: 2, 5
- Prisoners of war
 Chinese: 120-22, 124-25, 195, 229
 North Korean: 166, 188
 planning for release of: 135, 145, 174
- Propaganda, North Korean: 25
- Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG), Korea: 10, 11
- Puerto Rican National Guard: 83
- Pusan, Korea: 4, 37-38, 40, 45, 47, 48, 49, 72, 76, 79, 82, 84, 85, 89, 101, 160, 161-62, 165, 167, 171, 175, 177, 183, 185, 189, 195, 260
- Pusan Perimeter: 85, 86, 89-90, 167
- P'yongyang, North Korea: 9, 100-01, 107, 108, 114, 118, 120, 159, 163, 215
- Quirino, Elpidio: 69
- Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN: 20, 76, 88, 113
- Rashin, North Korea: 109-10, 125, 204-05, 220, 222, 226
- Rau, Benegal N.: 172
- Redeployment planning: 116
- Refugees: 26-27, 42, 47, 48, 173, 175
- Regimental combat teams: 49-50, 51
 airborne: 75, 80, 81, 86
 187th: 81, 84, 117
 foreign: 68, 69
 Marine Corps: 74, 76, 81, 83, 84, 85
 5th: 77, 80, 84, 148
 7th: 148
- Reserve forces: 74, 77, 78, 140
- Reston, James: 154
- Rhee, Syngman: 9, 10, 11, 22, 30, 37, 47, 57, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 176
- Ridgway, Lt. Gen. Matthew B., USA: 38, 81, 82, 84, 106, 160, 175-76, 185, 194-95, 196, 197, 199, 203-04, 215-16, 217, 219-20, 221-22, 224, 225-26, 229-30, 231, 235, 240, 245, 249, 250, 251
- Roberts, Brig. Gen. William L., USA: 31
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 1
- Rusk, Dean: 27, 29, 31, 49, 98, 113, 115, 125, 135, 142, 143, 150, 155, 160, 161, 162, 173, 177, 180, 188, 201, 202, 207, 210, 232, 242
- Russell, Richard B.: 252, 253, 254, 255, 256
- Ryukyu Islands: 14, 17, 20, 35, 189
- Ryukyus Command: 20
- Scandinavia: 62
- Sebald, William J.: 134, 260
- Secretary of Defense: 6, 15, 53, 58, 70, 78, 100, 131-32, 237, 239, 251, 252, 253. *See also*
 Forrestal, James V.; Johnson, Louis.
- Secretary of State: 7, 53, 70, 234, 239. *See also*
 Acheson, Dean; Marshall, George C.
- Secretary of the Air Force: 108
- Selassie, Haile: 70
- Selective Service Act: 41
- Selective Service System: 78
- Seoul, Korea: 2, 4, 99, 100, 199
 defense of: 30, 32, 35, 36, 93-94, 176, 215-16
 evacuation of US dependents from: 29, 32, 34
 fall of: 37, 38, 42-43, 47, 185
 recapture of: 203-04, 208, 211
 retreat to: 159, 160, 167
- Service support units: 140
- Shepherd, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C., Jr., USMC: 88
- Sherman, Admiral Forrest P., USN: 33, 34, 35, 38, 44, 50, 51, 74, 77, 87, 220, 245
 and Far East policy: 161-62, 177, 184-85, 186, 189, 207, 218
 and forces for Korea: 80, 81-82
 and MacArthur: 187, 198, 237, 247-48, 255, 256
 and naval blockade of China: 202, 203
 and strategy: 87, 88, 90, 92, 143, 146, 151, 152, 153-54, 156-57, 214
 and war objectives: 95, 96, 97
- Ships: 19, 20
 aircraft carriers: 20, 83
 Australian: 60
 battleships: 83
 British: 60
 Canadian: 60
 Colombian: 70-71
 cruisers: 20
 destroyers: 20
 Dutch: 60-61
 French: 65, 69
 hospital: 69
 numbers of US: 78-79
 troop transport: 69
- Short, Joseph: 249
- Siberia: 110, 128, 141
- Slim, Field Marshal William, UK: 169
- Smith, Lt. Col. Charles B., USA: 53
- Smith, Lt. Col. Lynn D., USA: 90, 225
- Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P., USMC: 88
- Smith, General Walter B., USA: 133, 173
- Southeast Asia: 194, 201
- Stalin, Josef V.: 1, 5, 24
- State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC): 7, 8
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC): 1-2, 4-5, 6
- Strategic bombing: 108, 110, 203-06
- Strategy
 air offensive: 203-06
 for cease-fire: 160-62
- SANACC 176/35: 7, 8, 9
- SANACC 176/39: 8
- Saudi Arabia: 63, 64

- for destroying NKPA: 100-02
- diplomatic: 229-30
- for drive to Yalu River: 141-46
- JCS and: 85-90, 92, 152, 153-54, 156-58, 183-85
- NSC and: 150-51
- for retreat: 159-60, 165-67, 172
- UN and: 102-04, 171
- Stratemeyer, Lt. Gen. George E., USAF: 20, 74, 125, 206
- Struble, Vice Adm. Arthur D., USN: 20, 38, 232
- Suiho dam: 125, 127
- Supplies
 - for Chinese troops: 204-06
 - for Eighth Army: 101, 141, 153, 159
 - for foreign troops: 65-66, 70-71
 - shortages: 141
 - for UN troops: 215
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP): 2, 4, 5
- Suwon, South Korea: 47, 48, 50, 194
- Sweden: 69, 116, 136
- SWNCC 79: 2

- Taegu, Korea: 37-38
- Taejon, South Korea: 30, 37-38, 79, 180
- Taiwan: 6, 10, 13-19, 21-22, 115, 152-53, 184-85, 213
 - and Britain: 60
 - and Communist China: 39, 40-41, 47, 81-82, 167-68, 170, 175, 184, 190, 196, 232-34, 237, 253
 - defense of: 34, 39, 40, 47, 160, 189, 196, 201, 202, 222, 225, 232-37, 253
 - MacArthur and: 34, 232-35, 243, 252-53
 - military aid to: 190, 203, 232-33
 - survey party to: 31, 34
 - troop offers by: 51, 152-53, 166, 178, 182, 184-85, 186, 189, 202, 203, 216, 232, 243, 252-53
 - Truman policy statements on: 15-16, 19, 40-41, 236
 - and UN: 154, 167-68, 170
 - and UNSC: 102
- Taiwan, Strait of: 233
- Tanks: 25, 26, 29, 30, 36, 37
- "Task Force Smith": 53, 76
- Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D., USA: 204, 205
- Tedder, Air Marshal Arthur, RAF: 60, 107, 169, 220
- Thailand: 68, 71, 116, 189, 228
- 38th parallel
 - authorization of operations south of: 40
 - as basis for potential cease-fire: 158, 160-62, 167-68, 173-74, 175, 197, 216, 217, 218
 - crossing of by ROK forces: 96-98, 101, 103, 107, 112, 117, 215
 - crossing of by UN forces: 94-98, 99, 100-01, 102-03, 106, 107, 112, 115, 117, 206-07, 208-12, 215, 219
 - operations in the vicinity of: 215-16
 - as partition line after World War II: 2, 4-6
- potential crossing of by Chinese forces: 167-68, 172, 199
- prewar clashes along the: 22, 23-24
- prohibitions on action north of by US forces: 39, 97
- UK and crossing of: 106-07
- UN and crossing of: 102-04, 201
- UN naval actions north of: 209, 219
- US air operations north of: 43, 44, 46-47, 108, 209, 219
- Timberman, Brig. Gen. Thomas S., USA: 27, 31
- Training
 - for foreign troops: 66, 70-71, 72, 178, 226
 - of National Guard units: 177
 - of South Korean forces: 19-20
 - of US forces: 82, 83-84, 177
- Troop offers: 59-61, 178, 200-01, 208
 - Argentina: 208
 - Australia: 68, 116, 178, 226, 227
 - Belgium: 69, 116
 - Bolivia: 71, 228
 - Brazil: 208, 226, 227, 228
 - Canada: 60, 62, 68, 71, 116, 178, 226, 227
 - Chile: 226, 228
 - Colombia: 70, 178
 - Cuba: 178, 226
 - Ethiopia: 70, 178, 226
 - France: 69, 116, 178, 204
 - Greece: 69, 116, 178, 226-28
 - Latin America: 62, 70-71, 116-17, 178, 208, 226, 227, 228
 - Luxembourg: 69
 - Mexico: 208, 226, 227, 228
 - Netherlands: 60, 69, 71, 116, 178
 - New Zealand: 68, 116, 178, 226, 227, 228
 - Pakistan: 178, 228
 - Peru: 226, 228
 - Philippine Islands: 68, 69, 178, 228
 - South Africa: 69
 - Taiwan: 51, 61, 152-53, 166, 178, 232
 - Thailand: 68, 116, 178, 228
 - Turkey: 68, 116, 141, 147, 178, 226, 227
 - United Kingdom: 44, 52, 60, 61, 62, 68, 116, 178, 226, 227
 - Uruguay: 226, 228
- Truman, Harry S.: 1, 4-5, 6, 8, 9, 25-26, 29, 31, 39, 94, 140
 - and bombing of Manchurian border areas: 125-27, 128
 - and cease-fire proposals: 169-70, 173, 212-13
 - and Chinese intervention: 137, 149-54, 158
 - and declaration of national emergency: 158, 176
 - and Far East policy: 191, 194, 199-201, 210
 - and ground troops for Korea: 49-51, 53
 - and "hot pursuit" into Manchuria: 138
 - instructions on public statements: 239-40
 - instructions to MacArthur: 46, 152, 187, 188
 - and MacArthur: 57, 113-16, 150-51, 165, 187, 190-91, 194, 212-13, 216, 230-32, 233-49, 261-62
 - meeting with MacArthur: 113-16, 261-62

- meeting with Plevan: 199-200
 meetings with Attlee: 155, 158, 167-71, 172
 meetings with military advisors: 34-35, 38-39, 45-47, 150
 messages to Congress: 78, 236
 and military budgets: 21
 and military manpower: 78, 158, 176-77
 and mobilization: 78, 158, 176
 and naval blockade of North Korea: 52-53
 and operations north of the 38th parallel: 109, 210, 211, 215
 public statements: 40, 44, 51, 78, 98, 100, 111, 137, 155, 176, 186, 211, 212-13
 and reinforcements for CINCFE: 74, 83, 176
 and relations with British Commonwealth: 167-71, 239
 resolution to defend South Korea: 32, 34-35
 and solicitation of troops from UN members: 63, 64, 66
 and strategy: 150-51, 152
 and Taiwan: 14-16, 17-19, 61, 81, 233-35, 236
 and troop offers: 60, 61, 66-67, 68, 70
 and UN resolutions: 56, 137, 158
 and use of US forces in Korea: 34-35, 45
 and war objectives: 95, 98, 217
 and war policy: 110, 154, 161-62, 179-80, 188, 191, 210, 220-21
- Truman administration
 and allocation of appropriations: 13, 14-15
 and Far East policy: 212-15, 216, 243
 and military preparedness: 20-21, 73
 and relief of MacArthur: 251
 and Taiwan: 13-16, 17-18, 81, 236
 and war objectives: 95, 98
 and withdrawal of occupation troops from Korea: 9-10
- Truman Doctrine: 12
- Turkey: 63, 64, 68, 71, 72, 116, 141, 158-59, 226, 227
- Turkish Brigade: 72
- Twining, General Nathan F., USAF: 157
- Uijongbu, Korea: 25, 36, 42
- UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK): 136, 142, 144
- UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK): 8, 9
- Unification of Korea
 early negotiation: 5
 how to obtain: 103
 North Korean demands for: 22, 24
 as UN goal: 10, 95, 96, 97, 102-04, 106, 111, 135-36, 174, 192, 199, 209
 as US goal: 98, 106, 119, 142, 143-44, 167-68, 171, 197, 199, 211-12, 217-18, 241
- Union of South Africa: 69, 71, 103
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
 avoidance of military operations near the border of: 47, 96-97, 98, 99, 108, 109-10, 133-34, 219-20, 225-26
- calls on to mediate in Korea: 61-62
 and China: 13-14, 16, 18, 128, 129, 134, 202
 and Chinese intervention: 132, 133
 military aid to North Korea: 19, 24, 108
 occupation troops in Korea: 2, 4-5, 9, 10-11
 operations near the border of: 118, 142, 204-06, 219, 222, 224, 238
 possibility of intervention in Korea: 43-44, 46, 108, 111, 114-16, 131, 139, 144, 151, 152, 157, 168, 182, 184, 189, 208, 218, 220-21, 224, 226
 prohibition of military action against: 99, 108, 225
 support for Chinese forces: 159-60
 surrender of Japanese troops to: 2, 4-5
 and UN: 7, 12, 16, 104, 108
 and UN Security Council: 33, 41, 102, 154
 US communications with: 33, 41
- United Kingdom: 4, 6, 112, 155
 and cease-fire proposals: 169-70, 171-72
 and China: 125-26, 131, 136, 137-39, 142, 170, 171-72, 186, 214
 and crossing of the 38th parallel: 106-07, 206
 diplomatic initiatives: 61-62
 offers of aid: 44, 64
 and the Soviet Union: 24-25
 troop offers: 44, 52, 60, 61, 62, 68, 71
 and the UN: 104, 136, 154-55
 US relations with: 155, 167-71
 and use of atomic weapons: 168-69, 170
- United Nations. *See also* United Nations Command; United Nations Commission on Korea; United Nations forces; United Nations General Assembly; United Nations Security Council.
 Additional Measures Committee: 214-15
 cease-fire proposals: 171-76, 188, 191-93, 212, 214
 Charter: 12, 16, 17, 35, 40
 and China seat: 13-14, 16, 102, 160, 161, 167, 168, 170, 175
 and Chinese aggression: 150, 151, 157-58, 190, 191-93, 200
 and crossing of the 38th parallel: 102-04, 206
 Good Offices Committee: 200, 214
 need for the US to act through the: 150, 191, 210
 Secretary General: 22, 37, 63-69, 70, 71, 192, 227, 237
 and strategy: 143-44, 150, 154, 171, 206, 210
 and US role in the Far East: 152-53, 154, 156-58, 160-62, 167, 171-72, 191
- United Nations Command (UNC). *See also* Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; United Nations forces.
 formation of: 55-57
 mission of: 186-87. *See also* Korean War, UN objectives.
- United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK): 10, 11-12, 13, 24, 37, 103

- United Nations forces
 - acceptance of offered troops: 46, 65-69, 68, 152-53, 178, 227
 - appeals for troops: 63-67, 68, 178, 181, 200-01, 226-30
 - assessment of by MacArthur: 115, 159
 - command of: 52, 57-59, 61, 101, 171
 - constituent units. *See* Troop offers; particular countries.
 - morale: 187, 188, 189
 - need for reinforcements: 116-17, 139-40, 150, 176-79, 226-28
 - operations: 120, 141, 147-48, 151, 152, 155-56, 172, 175, 215-16
 - specifications for: 65, 150
 - strategies for: 165-6
- United Nations General Assembly: 6, 7, 9, 11, 96, 154
 - Collective Measures Committee: 192, 200, 228
 - meetings of: 102, 125
 - Political and Security (First) Committee: 172, 174, 192, 193
 - and political guidance for war: 104
 - ROK appeal to: 37
 - resolutions: 7, 96, 104, 106, 131, 136, 191-93, 200, 214-15
- United Nations Security Council: 12
 - call for assistance from members: 33, 41, 61
 - and China seat: 16, 62
 - and Chinese intervention: 125-26, 128, 130-31, 135-37, 154, 237
 - Communist response to resolutions: 61, 68
 - and invasion by North Korea: 29, 30-31, 32, 33, 35
 - meetings: 41, 96
 - and naval blockade of North Korea: 58
 - reports to: 56-57, 58-59, 68, 119, 124-25, 135-36, 154-55, 211
 - resolutions of the: 33, 38, 95, 106
 - response to resolutions of the: 40, 51-52, 60, 61-64
 - Soviet resolutions presented to: 102
 - US resolutions presented to: 32, 33, 39, 41, 56-57, 102, 130-31, 135-36, 154
 - USSR and: 33, 41, 61-62, 102, 108, 135, 136, 154
- US Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK): 5, 8-9, 10, 13
- US House of Representatives:
 - and military aid to Korea: 17-18
 - and military aid to Taiwan: 17
- US Marine Corps: 45, 74, 78
 - Commandant: 81, 83
 - operations: 156
 - request for division of: 86
- Reserves: 78, 80, 83
- units. *See also* Regimental combat teams, Marine Corps.
 - 1st Marine Division: 80, 81, 87, 88, 93, 107, 120, 123, 130, 141, 159, 172, 175
 - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade: 80, 84, 89
 - 7th Marine Regiment: 123
- US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG): 13, 19-20, 26, 27, 30, 31-32, 35
- US Senate
 - Appropriations Committee: 23
 - Armed Services Committee: 251
 - Committee on Foreign Relations: 251, 261
 - Committee on Military Affairs: 261
- Uruguay: 71, 226, 228

- Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A., USA: 69, 216, 219-20, 249
- Vance, Col. Reginald F. C., USAF: 23-24
- Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF: 33, 34, 35, 38, 75, 77, 87, 140, 142-43, 157, 189, 207, 232, 245, 255, 256
 - and Far East policy: 177
 - trips to Korea: 79, 85, 188, 190, 193-198
 - and Yalu River operations: 125
- Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW): 235-36, 237
- Vladivostok, USSR: 109-10, 128, 144, 152, 156-57, 205

- Wake Island Conference: 113-16, 238, 261-62
- Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H., USA: 20, 57, 79, 85, 89, 93, 103, 119-20, 123, 140, 141, 153, 159, 165-66, 167, 175
- War Department General Staff: 2, 4
- Wedemeyer, General A. C., USA: 6
- Whiting, Allen S.: 122
- Wiley, Alexander: 255
- Willoughby, Maj. Gen. C. A., USA: 29
- Wonju, Korea: 185
- Wonsan, North Korea: 100-01, 107, 117, 120, 123, 141, 153
- Wooldridge, Rear Adm. E. T., USN: 133
- Wright, Col. W. H. S., USA: 27, 36
- Wu Hsiu-chuan, General, PRC: 174

- Yalu River: 108, 114, 117-19, 121, 149
 - bombing near the: 125-30, 133, 134, 183, 205-06, 220, 225-26, 238
 - drive to the: 134, 136, 141, 142, 143-44, 145-46, 147-48
- Yugoslavia: 33, 41, 44, 104