ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN: Thank you. A lot has changed in my life since I was last here to speak to that specific issue. Thank you for that kind introduction and for the opportunity to spend an hour or so with you today. I’ll go over just a few thoughts with respect to this and then open it up to questions and answers.
And hopefully those will induce me to get out on the edge on some of these leading kinds of issues. As you talk specifically about change, one of the thoughts was, I actually attended a graduation this weekend. And the theme for that – there were two themes that came out of that graduation, one of which was, the only constant in our lives is change. And, secondly, it was an institution, an American institution that was graduating students from only 50 countries.
And the diversity that was represented in that graduation was pretty remarkable and it speaks to the generation that is on the rise and that will, in fact, as I indicated in my last time here, that will lead this country and actually lead this world in the very near future.
I’d like to talk briefly about just three priorities that I’m focused on right now. One is security and stability in the broader Middle East. And that really, for me, goes from Lebanon to Tehran and extends into South Asia. Many of you know that in my travels, I have spent an extraordinary amount of time in Afghanistan and Pakistan and certainly our president and the new administration has put together a comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
And I felt this was vital to focus on the region, not just focus on one country or the other, but, in fact, have a comprehensive strategy for the entire region. And that strategy, in fact, reaches far beyond what the military does. Many of you have seen me before talk to the military contribution here as a necessary contribution, but not a sufficient contribution.
And, in fact, when I was here in 2007 as the CNO, I said, we should look at better resourcing the State Department, better resourcing the entirety of our government to focus on the world that we’re living in, which, in my vision, is much – a much more expeditionary government. So you have a government that recruits and retains and develops career paths and educates young people for a career that would move them around the world, including in and out of conflict zones like we have right now. And certainly that has – I still believe that today.
I think it’s an absolute priority that we resource our State Department and other agencies to do this, not just for the near term – and we clearly need those resources in Afghanistan – but also for the long term, as this world changes, not knowing where it’s going to go, except I think it’s going to be a much more integrated effort, and it’s going to – it needs to be much more comprehensive across all of the things that we do with respect to engagement in various countries around the world, engagement with various countries around the world.
So security and stability in the broader Middle East is something I’ve – again, I’ve spent an awful lot of time on. We are at a point now where we are drawing down in Iraq, and that will continue. When I say that, though, I certainly shouldn’t – I don’t want to miss the fact that we still have an awful lot to do there. It’s fragile and we’ve got 140,000 troops that are still there. And so over the next 18 to 24 months, we’ll see a – obviously a significant drawdown there, tied to the strategic framework and also the president’s goal of August of 2010.
And at the same time we see the strategic growth of required forces in Afghanistan and, again, a focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it’s not just the military focus. It’s – yes, we’re going to add some 21,000-plus troops here this year, 4,000 of which are directly focused on training, directly focused on the Afghan army and the Afghan police development, without which it won’t make any difference how many combat troops we add, because the future really in Afghanistan is tied to its own forces providing for its own security. As it is in Iraq, so it must be in Afghanistan.
I also believe that this is a much more complex environment because of the Afghanistan-Pakistan linkage. I think the comprehensive strategy, which includes economic development – and at the heart of economic development is agriculture and at the heart of developing agriculture in Afghanistan is going to be displacing the opium crop, which I think strategically is something we absolutely have to do.
The strategy also looks at a very comprehensive long-term approach for Pakistan. Not too long ago, actually about three or four weeks ago, I visited Egypt. And I was struck that we have a relationship with Egypt that we have invested people and time and energy and resources in Egypt for – since the late ’70s. And it is in that investment, when I visit Egypt and others from our government visit Egypt, that we have discussions based on that foundation. And we may not agree on every issue, but it’s anchored in an incredibly strong foundation over a long period of time.
And when you think about that as a model and then look at where we – where I believe we need to go with Afghanistan, where I believe we need to go with Pakistan, where I believe we need to go, actually, with Iraq, it’s going to take us a while to get there, for these three countries in many ways we’re just beginning that relationship.
The question I get when I go to Afghanistan and Pakistan routinely is, are you sticking around this time? And I think it’s a valid question. And until that question is answered and that those countries know and the citizens know that we’re going to – that our intent is to have a long-term relationship with them, not just a military relationship. I think that question will continue to be out there, and then that will drive strategies in those countries that oftentimes hedge against the possibility that we might leave. And so it’s going to take us some time and some patience to answer those particular questions.
There’s an awful lot more going on. In the Middle East, obviously, the steps taken to look at a two-party solution – two- state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian challenge; the engagement that the administration is taking on with Iran, and all that means – and I am a supporter of that. I think it’s important we keep all options on the table with respect to that. But engaging with a country – and I’ll use the Egypt example.
The opposite of that is, we’ve had no engagement with Iran for 30-plus years, and look where we are. So I think it’s really important that those efforts – not are just initiated as had – as they had been, but that we see them through. And I’m cautiously optimistic in that regard.
This, I think, speaks to – and just to this region, this speaks to the kind of, I think, strategic engagement – and it’s not just about the United States. It’s about many countries. It’s about international organizations. It’s about governments and non- governments that speak to, I think, the leading edge of where we not just are, but where we’re going to be going, here, for the next 20, 30 and 40 years, without being specific – or too specific about where that might apply. Because oftentimes we’re surprised about where that engagement must take place or where the crises occur.
And I overlay that discussion right now with the economic and financial crisis that we’re all facing, and the impacts of that and where that goes with respect to security, what kind of national elections take place in countries around the world, what happens to countries whose – who have recently turned to capitalism and yet their financial system isn’t as strong as it could be or as it should be, given the stress that the financial crisis now brings.
And what does that mean, based on – what does the financial crisis mean, in terms of it sustaining itself and looking at the kinds of demographics that are ongoing throughout the world? And so in addition to answering some questions today, I hope I can generate some questions, because there aren’t clear answers to those issues – except I think they do have, potentially, some significant security implications.
So heavy focus, obviously, in my life and with my staff, in engagement on the broader Middle East. But a lot of what’s going on there also applies to other parts of the world.
Secondly, a lot of my time on the health of our force. We’re in our eighth year of war right now; multiple deployments. We’ve got individuals and we’ve got a military and particularly a ground force – but I don’t want to limit it to the ground force, because it’s been a military – but a ground force that has been extraordinarily pressed, has put us on a path to succeed in Iraq where not very long ago not very many people thought that was possible. And there’s a resilience in that force, a skip in their step, a capability that is truly extraordinary in its evolution, and really revolution, to become what I believe is the best counterinsurgency force in the world, and in doing so has set a standard about how quickly we can change, given the strategy is put in the right place.
That said, they have been pressed, and the tragic incident that occurred literally a week ago in Baghdad, where we lost five of our young people, of our most precious resource, our most precious asset, to that tragedy – and speaking to that, I don’t have all the details on that, but certainly I can’t believe that that isn’t tied to multiple deployments and the overall stress.
The increased number of suicides we have, particularly in the Army; the stress that my – I see and that – I travel an awful lot with my wife, Deborah – and that we see on families for these repeated deployments; and the numbers that we get right now are sort of three and four, but we’ve talked to families that are on their fifth and sixth deployment, so – and particularly as we shift our main effort – and we’re doing that – the main effort right now is in Afghanistan. And as we shift that effort, come down in Iraq, increase force levels in Afghanistan, as I talked about earlier; increase the growth of the Army and the Marine Corps, both forces of which are at their new end strength, but now those forces have to be put together in units that can actually rotate to the theater – over the next 18 to 24 months that stress is going to continue. And then after that, I can start to see a time where dwell time will increase, and we can start to bring the pressure down, based on what I understand right now.
So the whole issue of helping the force – we’re still working hard on making sure we take care of those who are wounded, those families of the fallen, their families, what that means. And when I say “take care of them,” I really mean take care of them for the rest of their lives. These are young people who have gone out, done what our country has asked them to do, and they should be well taken care of, not just by the Department of Defense or the VA, but by America, communities throughout the land, reaching out to these young people, whose dreams haven’t changed. They still want an education. They want their kids to go to school. They’d like to go to school. And they’d like to own a piece of the rock. It’s just the path has been – has altered. And as far as I’m concerned, we owe them that debt.
So we’re still at the beginning stages. Even in our eighth year of war, we’re in the beginning stages of getting at what I’d consider to be a debt that needs to be repaid for those sacrifices.
And it’s for injuries seen, but it’s also for injuries unseen, the whole issue of traumatic brain injury, the issue of combat stress. We see that extending now to families. The issue of a shortfall – significant shortfall in mental healthcare providers, and yet there are organizations who ask for pro bono mental health care providers, and they have healthcare providers lining up 10 deep to help our people.
So I think the resources are out there. It’s, how do we make that connection? So that’s where I spend an awful lot of my time with the service chiefs.
And I want to commend both the commandant of the Marine Corps – all the service chiefs, but particularly the commandant of the Marine Corps – General Conway and the chief of staff of the Army, General Casey, for also bringing great focus in this area.
For it’s not just about these wars we’re in. It’s also about the future. And that involves making sure we take care of those who sacrifice so much. Our future, I believe, is guaranteed, from a national-security standpoint, if we take care of our people.
And we’re going through a – you know, a big debate right now about systems, major acquisition programs, what we should buy for the future. What we should buy for the future is to make sure we get it right for our people. That’s health care; that’s housing; that’s benefits; that’s the compensation package; that’s bonuses – all those kinds of things.
Third priority for me really has been the rest of the world. It’s not a small globe. There are challenges that exist throughout the world – and making sure right now, with so many of my forces focused in the Central Command area, that I have enough forces that are engaged in other parts of the world.
It doesn’t take large numbers, but it does take the constancy of engagement. And that engagement would then be preventative, for I would much rather prevent and deter a war than have one. So how do we make sure that we have small teams?
And this isn’t just about military. I mean, this is my responsibility, obviously, in the military. But how are we engaging other parts of the world to make sure we can sustain a long-term relationship with them? Whether it’s the challenges we see in the continent of Africa, we focus on the economic engine that exists particularly in Brazil but also in South America, and that we ensure – we continue an increased level of stability in the Pacific, on the Pacific Rim, and all that is tied to that.
If it was ever – if it ever – if there was ever any doubt about the global connection and how interwoven and interleaven (ph) we all are, I think that was left aside when this financial – global financial crisis hit us. So we are very dependent on each other. Stability is a key for the future in that regard. And along those lines, that stability – again, not unlike Iraq and not unlike Afghanistan – that stability is going to be a necessary condition but not sufficient, because we need education development, we need economic development, we need good governance. Those are also key to progress not in the current conflicts, but progress in the future as well.
So those are the three priorities that I spend an awful lot of my time on, a lot of issues that come in under those priorities that – stability and security in the Middle East, making sure we get it right for our force, so that we can fight and win now, but also do the same thing in the future; and then making sure we’re engaged globally, as best we can be right now, given the resources that are focused on Central Command, in a way that ensures a more stable world in the future.
Thank you.
(Applause.)
I always enjoy doing this on-camera.
(Laughter.)
MICHAEL O’HANLON: Well, thank you, Chairman. Wonderful speech.
I’m Mike O’Hanlon here at Brookings, with Carlos Pascual and Peter Singer and Strobe Talbott, just delighted to have the admiral here today. And thank you for your speech. I’m just going to ask one question, if I could, to kick things off, and I know there’s going to be a lot of interest, with other questions.
I want to hone in on Afghanistan, and I know some people will probably hone in on Pakistan as well, and you’ve reminded us of how many problems you have to think about. But let me ask this about Afghanistan. Let me remind people that with the surge in Iraq, of course, things happened pretty fast once they got going. We got all five brigades in Iraq within about five months of the president’s speech. We already had a lot of resources in-country, and we started to see results within six to eight months. I think a concern of yours, if I’ve interpreted your comments correctly, is, it may take a little longer to really see success, or even the beginning of success, in Afghanistan.
So my question is, if the current strategy works, how long will it take for us to know that it’s working? And I don’t mean how long until we leave; I just mean how long until we know that we’re really starting to succeed, or, to put it the other way, if it’s failing, how soon might we know that?
ADM. MULLEN: It’s a big year in Afghanistan. We’re heavily focused on the elections, which are set for the 20th of August, as one major event. We’re clearly adding these troops. I was there about three weeks ago, and I went out in the east. And in the east now, we actually have enough troops, and I was taken by couple things. I was with the 3rd of the 10th and the 4th of the 25th ID, and the 3rd of – the 3rd of the 10th Mountain Division. And I was struck by the absorption of the counterinsurgency approach by all of our people, down to a level of specialists and sergeants that I hadn’t seen before, living it, breathing it, and it was in everything that they were doing. And I was encouraged by that, and the reason I was encouraged by that is to – the 3rd of the 10th had been there about 60 days, the 4th of the 25th actually about the same, maybe a little less. But both of them had had a big impact very quickly.
And the other thing that was really important, which goes to an approach that I think we must take with Afghanistan, is about 30 percent of the 3rd Brigade from the 10th Mountain Division had been there before, so their ramp-up speed was pretty close to zero. And I think – and I have a sense of urgency about this, that we must move as rapidly as possible.
I think, to your point, Michael, about how quickly this will happen, I think we need to make it happen pretty quickly. I think these 21,000 troops will certainly do that, their getting there this year. Having free and fair elections this year in Afghanistan is absolutely critical.
And back to the 3rd of the 10th, why that was so important is I think we know what to do now, because of what we have learned in Iraq. And I think we can move more quickly than we did there, because in Iraq we had to revolutionize all of our thinking. Our military forces now get that, get the requirements, so again, our ramp speed is going to be, I think, pretty quickly.
And I would look to 2009 and 2010 to be incredibly important years in Afghanistan. The violence level is up, the Taliban is much better organized than they were before. And so we have to address that. I would not expect – what my goal would be over the next year to two is really start to turn it, and have it be very evident.
We’ve had no troops in the South – virtually no troops in the South; not none, because we’ve had some there. But the 10,000 Marines that are going in there starting now will have a big impact on security there as well. And again, it’s important – that’s the counterinsurgency approach; it’s not just a kinetic approach. And I know that’s the approach of the Marines, as they’re thinking as they go in as well.
So I’m hopeful that we can in the next 12 to 24 months really stem the trends which have been going very badly in Afghanistan in the last three years. It’s going to be a more violent year in 2009 and 2010, because of the troops, because – the troops addition, and actually an awful lot of the bad guys are in the south.
So, again, I’m hopeful that we’ll see trends start to turn over the next two years. And that then sets the conditions for economic development, rule of law, governance.
MR. O’HANLON: Excellent. Thank you.
As you ask a question, please, if you don’t mind, state your name. And also, wait for the microphone, if we could. I will begin up here. Yes, please.
Q: Good morning, Admiral. Colin Clark, with DODBuzz.
Kilcullen appears to have tilted against drone attacks as a basic tactic. And I’m wondering if you think that we have, broadly speaking, devoted too much resources to the kinetic approach and not enough to COIN in Afghanistan, and if you really think that, over the next six to 12 months, that will start to change. And I guess also, should we stop the drone attacks?
ADM. MULLEN: We’re going through a review and a very difficult situation which occurred a couple weeks ago where there were Afghan civilians killed. And I believe that each time we do that, we put – we put our strategy in jeopardy, in terms of backing up. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan – or anywhere else, but let’s talk specifically about Afghanistan – by killing Afghan civilians.
The center of gravity in Afghanistan are the people of Afghanistan. And so we – and General McKiernan has worked hard in recent months, as we all have, to change our procedures, to be more deliberate and more precise about this. And yet clearly we had an incident the other day, and that investigation is both not through and – and I worry a little bit about the clarity of it, even in the end.
That said, we can’t keep going through incidents like this and expect the strategy to work. At the same time, we can’t tie our troops’ hands behind their backs. So we’ve got to – we’ve got to be very, very focused on making sure that we proceed deliberately, that we know who the enemy is. And in fact, the enemy uses this very effectively against us. We need to be more rapid in our information campaign with respect to this. And yet, as always, we’ve got to be truthful. So we still – we’ve got to – we’ve got a significant amount of work to do with respect to that.
As far as drone attacks themselves are concerned, the – we have – I have found them to be, and the commanders in the field have found them to be, very effective. I think they speak to not only effectiveness in these – in these kinds of campaigns, but also they speak to our future with respect to where we should go in the unmanned world. But they have to be done in a way that moves the strategy forward and doesn’t back us up.
MR. O’HANLON: Yes, sir. Here, about five rows back – (inaudible, off mike).
Q: Good morning, Admiral. I think in Iraq we’ve seen the –
MR. O’HANLON: Your name, please?
Q: Oh, my name is Carlos Alvarez (sp).
I think in Iraq we’ve seen that this has been – the new counterinsurgency has been a learning process. In many ways, the commanders on the field have developed new techniques that have been useful, and those have been distributed across the battlefield. My question is, in Afghanistan, to what extent is that important? It would seem it would be more important. And what steps has the military taken to make sure that that kind of information transfer happens so that, when one commander finds something that works, it can be applied more broadly?
ADM. MULLEN: The lessons that – I think, naturally, a significant amount of our force that will be in Afghanistan will have learned those lessons in Iraq.
So there is a transference that’s going on.
As I indicated when I was with the troops on the ground, three weeks ago, I was just struck with how much they understood, at a very junior level, this quickly into their deployment, less than a couple months. And so there is a tremendous effort to spread these lessons. And there will be a learning.
Afghanistan is not Iraq. There are those things that are very similar. And yet there are those things that are not similar. And it is an extraordinarily complex environment. I extend it to the region.
The strategy talks about Afghanistan and Pakistan. There’s a linkage there. There’s a history there that we also have to recognize. And there are many more tribes, many more villages, many more relationships that go back, through the ages, that we have to understand as we engage.
And yet when I go to Afghanistan, I talk to young sergeants and first lieutenants who are engaged with the leadership in the villages. And one of the principles is to make sure that their security is going to be okay.
Clearly we learned that in Iraq. And it is in that security that the people start to turn the insurgents out. And we’re not there right now in Afghanistan. It’s where we need to go.
MR. O’HANLON: In the far back, please.
Yes, sir.
And then you, right.
Q: Malcolm Lovell, George Washington University.
Admiral, what do you think about the importance of winning the hearts and minds of all the people; in other words, with a Marshall Plan concept, in addition to the military effort?
ADM. MULLEN: I think that we must win the hearts and minds of all the people. And that’s why I speak to, it’s not just providing security. There’s got to be a significant economic development. There’s got to be a significant economic investment. Afghanistan is a very, very poor country. There’s got to be a significant educational investment, because of the level of illiteracy. And while things have, in some ways have, improved in terms of education, in Afghanistan, we still have a long way to go.
When I’m out there and I talk to the people of Afghanistan, it is a government that is not delivering services to the people. I talk to the governors. And the governors, when I ask them about assistance that they get, from Kabul, and oftentimes those resources are not showing up in any kind of significant number.
So and it’s the people who are looking for good governance, not just out of Kabul. They’re looking for it in the provinces and in the districts. And leaders at every level have got to deliver that.
They’re not going to be able to do that if the people are not secure.
Some of what – we’ve come up short sometimes in terms of what NATO has provided militarily. What I would hope some countries in NATO could do would help a great deal on the resource side – so along the lines of a – Marshall Plan kinds of contributions. That would be significant across a whole host of requirements, some of which I’ve mentioned.
MR. O’HANLON: We’ve got one more in the back, and then we’ll move up front. Behind you, sir. Yeah, right back there. Thank you.
Q: (Inaudible) – Foreign Policy Association.
Admiral, your articulation of this analysis of the complete defense in regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan and the various others – factors affecting it, you talked of elections. And recently, election in India has taken place, returning the previous government with a strong mandate. And Talibans are a common enemy for Pakistan and India in a long term of – defense terms for America. Is there a move of making a joint defense between India and Pakistan to face the Talibans who are creeping inside this subcontinent?
ADM. MULLEN: I’m – I spoke to the regional approach, and I think India’s – India is not just positioned in the theater, but India is – security is also tied to improved stability in the region, particularly with Pakistan and Afghanistan. And I recognize that there is still great focus on the border in between Pakistan and India.
I was struck when India and Pakistan a few years ago actually de-tensioned that border, and that some commerce and tourism started to move across the border in a very positive way. That also, then, allowed some of the security measures to be – in terms of numbers of forces and readiness levels – to be reduced. And I’m hopeful that the political leadership in these countries will take steps to continue to reduce this.
I think all three of these countries, from a security standpoint, are very much linked. And, in fact, the focus on the Taliban that we have inside Pakistan, working both sides, both Afghanistan and India, has to be addressed by everybody out there, politically and militarily.
MR. O’HANLON: Go to Gary and then Carlos, please.
Q: Thank you. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. General Mullen, I want to ask if you could do a little parsing for us.
We – in the policy community and elsewhere now, the term is AF-PAK – joined at the hip, from a policy perspective. But I think we understand that the nature of the challenge in Afghanistan and Pakistan is significantly different, from a military and from the sort of civil perspective.
A, is it your belief that Afghanistan and Pakistan are in fact two highly distinct, different challenges? And second, if so, could you characterize in some way or another a sort of shorthand version of – to someone who hasn’t spent much time thinking about it – here’s the challenge in Afghanistan, and here’s the challenge in Pakistan, and these are the differences, and particularly from a military perspective?
ADM. MULLEN: They are very distinct countries, and yet they are very much linked. And from a – if I were to approach Pakistan first from the standpoint – obviously, a sovereign country, and our assistance there is assistance that we are invited in to provide, from the standpoint of any kind of military assistance; a very proud military, and a military that we are looking to assist where they ask in areas, some intelligence areas, training – to assist in training, to assist in some equipment – helicopters would be an example, the ability to provide night-vision goggles – and help them, train them in that kind of requirement, as their counterinsurgency requirement grows.
They’re a military with two threats, one conventional threat and the other in the west, which is a counterinsurgency threat. When I was in Pakistan three weeks ago, I looked at two divisions that were going through what I consider to be pretty good counterinsurgency training, which General Kayani has put in place throughout his country. They’ve got a functioning economy. Obviously, they’ve got, you know, a rule of law. And they are not – despite some characterization, I don’t believe they are a country near failure.
Yet they have this – this insurgent, terrorist threat, which is marching – my view, marching closer, getting closer and closer to Islamabad. And it’s one that they, the leadership, are increasingly aware of and are addressing it, as has been evident in operations in Buner and Dir, and in Swat as we speak. And I’m – and I’m pleased with the progress that they’ve made there in recent weeks.
In Afghanistan, you’ve got a – I consider, you know, a much – you’ve got institutions that are nascent. You’ve got an economy which is – which is very, very weak, and an economic development, a GDP, which is on the bottom of the world.
You’ve obviously got a growing insurgency, very focused, being fed by the insurgents who cross from Pakistan. And in Pakistan, you also have the leadership of al Qaeda. And so the key in the strategy is to defeat al Qaeda. And they’re living in Pakistan and being protected by the Pakistanis and people who – the Taliban in particular. And so we must do that.
I think the long-range piece, with Pakistan, is to continue to put pressure on the FATA, Northwest Frontier in a way that eventually puts us in a position to be able to defeat al Qaeda. And at the same time, pressure coming from the other border – the other side of the border, sorry, from Afghanistan, which stops the insurgents from flowing there as well and allows us to get Afghanistan headed in the right direction.
So again they’re very different countries but they’re very much linked. Some of those linkages are, they are what we must recognize in our strategy. And similarities for instance would be a long-term relationship with both countries, which I think is important.
Our strategy in Pakistan just can’t be focused on the fight. It’s got to be economic. It’s got to be educational. It’s got to be the kinds of things in the relationship we have with other countries, throughout the world, over an extended period of time.
MR. O’HANLON: Carlos.
Q: Carlos Pascual from Brookings.
Admiral, very good to have you again at Brookings.
ADM. MULLEN: Hi, Carlos.
Q: Thank you for coming back.
You and Secretary Gates have been very much at the forefront of pushing and pressing this point that there has to be a civilian capacity, to be able to be integrated with the military capabilities on the ground. And that has really done a phenomenal job actually, to even changing the debate on many of these issues. And I stick with this theme, because it’s become a really critical factor in Afghanistan and what the future is of that mission.
In your comments, you mention that there are going to be 4,000 troops dedicated specifically to the task of training police and Afghan national army. As you know, 4,000 troops are about two-thirds the size of the entire Foreign Service. There may be about a few hundred civilians that are going to be added to the Afghan mission, I think, probably radically inadequate.
If you go back to the point that you made, that this has to be an effort that has to be enjoined at the provincial and the district level, in order to make a difference, when you look at the numbers of civilians that are there, the capacity that the U.S. government has to put in place, in any given district or provincial level, might be 3-4- 5.
And so this is a point in time when a supplemental is going through Congress. Funding isn’t really adequate yet, at that time, to really radically increase the deployment of civilians. There isn’t adequate funding for joint training.
At this point, there isn’t joint planning, on how to conduct counterinsurgency activities, that really builds in the civilian component into it.
So it could be a real moment of opportunity. I wonder if you could comment on that and what the plans are and whether something can, in fact, be done to actually use this as a point to use the Afghan mission, and the critical need to integrate the civilian capacity with the military capacity to really push that piece of the agenda.
ADM. MULLEN: Back to what I said before, 2009, 2010 are really critical years. We took far too long to get this right in Iraq. It took us a long time to generate the civilian capacity. That’s a lesson we learned, and we must do better now.
Key to that, you have to have resources, and that’s why passing the supplemental – the ’09 supplemental is so critical, because that then gives Secretary Clinton an opportunity to go higher and respond.
She is also putting tens of civilians in within the next month or two. This is a – this is a focus of both Secretary Clinton as well as Ambassador Holbrooke to generate this capacity. And we haven’t quite settled on what the number is. There’s analysis out there that says 500; there’s analysis that says out there that it might need – we might need upwards of 2000.
I’m less concerned about that right now than generating as much as we can as quickly as we can. I was taken aback the other day when I was in the southern part of Afghanistan to find out we only had 13 civilians in the entirety of southern Afghanistan, where the toughest fight is right now.
That said, we speak in – in the military we speak in terms of thousands, and we always do. On the civilian side – and we saw this in Iraq – it’s a much smaller number. One civilian with the right expertise makes a huge difference in terms of moving these other entities forward, whether it’s economic development or governmental development, whatever the case might be, at every single level of government in Afghanistan or as it has been in Iraq.
So I’m actually hopeful we can generate some of this capacity as rapidly as possible. We clearly are going to need more. And we also are in a time, because of these – what we’ve learned is it’s going to take a while to do this over – it’s going to take, I don’t know, a decade or so to really generate the kind of career paths, recruiting environment, that brings people in to do this for the long haul. So the military’s going to continue to bear some of this for the near term as well.
MR. O’HANLON: Here in the second row, please.
Q: Thank you. My name is Sara Hussein. I’m a reporter with the Saudi Press Agency. I wanted to ask you about Somalia. What is your assessment of the situation there currently? And what policy options do you think the United States has if the government, such as it is, collapses entirely?
ADM. MULLEN: I know that I – I spoke earlier about the safe haven for al Qaeda in Pakistan. And it is the top priority in the strategy that we have for Afghanistan and Pakistan, defeating them. I am very worried about growing safe havens in both Somalia and Yemen, specifically, because we’ve seen al Qaeda leadership – some leaders start to flow to Yemen.
And we’ve seen two organizations in Somalia who are affiliating more and more with al Qaeda. And so the larger concern I have with respect to Somalia is specifically: Does it become a safe haven? And it’s a policy question that we’ve looked at. We don’t have all the answers yet. There are – when you look at something like this, there are always lots of options that get created.
You know, from where I sit, the plate’s pretty full right now. And so I think it’s important to engage here, both politically, diplomatically. But I am extremely concerned with what I’ve seen just lately, specifically with what’s going on in Mogadishu. And then, what does that mean for southern Somalia, and what does it mean for Kenya, what does it mean for the region?
So it’s an area we’re very focused on. And I’m hopeful that we can figure out a way – not just the United States, because none of these problems can be solved just by the United States – but the international community can recognize this growing threat, and we can figure out a way to, again, be preventative, as opposed to have to respond to another safe haven.
MR. O’HANLON: Here in the third row, please.
Q: Hi. Rachel Streitfeld from CNN.
Admiral, I’m wondering, how can you say that Pakistan is making progress towards understanding this new threat, when apparently they’re spending billions on nuclear arms? And is there a concern that U.S. military aid might be diverted towards that purpose?
ADM. MULLEN: The – I am not aware of any U.S. aid that’s gone towards nuclear weapons, save that which is very focused in the last several years – last three years, three or four years, on improving their security, which is exactly what we’d like, and they’ve done that.
The reason I can speak to it is because I’ve met with the leaders. I’ve been to Pakistan nine or 10 times over the last 15, 16 months. And I see in them, you know, an increasing concern. And I see in these operations – I was very concerned about the Swat deal that was made a couple of months ago, that obviously didn’t work. And I’ve seen the Pakistani civilian leadership as well as the military leadership now address the insurgents in Dir, Buner – and now in Swat. And it is that – so I’m encouraged by what I’ve seen lately. Where this has not worked before is in the ability to sustain that. And so when I get asked questions right two or three days after an operation starts in Pakistan, what do you think long term? I don’t know the answer to that yet. They need to sustain it, and they need to provide sustained security for their people, for all the reasons that we talked about that are tied to counterinsurgency thinking here, so that other developments can take place there as well.
MR. O’HANLON: Here in the front row, and then we’ll go back to the middle.
Q: Admiral, Air Vice Marshal Mike Harwood, U.K. defense attaché. I’ve got in front of me your Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and I want somewhat to explore strategic guidance. In your opening paragraph here, you talk about future joint commanders will combine and subsequently adapt some combination of four basic categories of military activity: combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.
Then you say the concept is informed by current strategic guidance, but because it looks to the future, it is intended to be adaptable, as it must be, to changes in that guidance. This was published on the 15th of January, not the 21st. Are there any changes that we should know about?
ADM. MULLEN: No. (Laughter.)
No, no. I mean, we worked long and hard on that concept. So – and it focuses in the areas that – and you mentioned a couple of them – that look to the kind of adaptability and flexibility and change and learning that must take place, leaders must grasp, for the future. And I think a great deal of what we’re going through right now informs that. And what we’ve learned just in the last (three ?) years informs that as well.
I’d also say that, you know, we can’t predict very well, so getting it exactly right can be difficult, which is why I argue for a balanced approach and a balanced force, as opposed to trying to put all our eggs in one basket.
MR. O’HANLON: Here about – in the fifth row. Yes, please, sir. And then two rows behind for the follow-up.
Q: Admiral, John Doyle with Aviation Week magazine. You talked about drawing down in Iraq and increasing the presence of the troops in Afghanistan at the same time you’re increasing the end strength of the ground forces in the Army and the Marines. As you know, there are critics who say you’re taking your eye off the ball of the future and potential peer threats from places like China and Russia, especially if you cut back on research and development. How do you achieve the balance that Secretary Gates is always talking about, fighting a war in the here and now, and keeping your eye on the horizon for future adversaries?
ADM. MULLEN: I’ve been in and out of the Pentagon since 1989. I basically believe the Pentagon – the Pentagon is incapable of not focusing on the future. It’s what we do. It’s – you know, I’ve grown up looking five to 10 years out. I mean, tomorrow, for me, is five years out. That’s how I was trained, and that’s what the Pentagon does.
And we must continue to do that. And the current budget does that. I’m very comfortable with it. I was intimately involved with Secretary Gates in the development of this budget. It’s the best budget work I’ve seen since 1995, when I first started doing budgets. Very hard decisions – they routinely don’t get made – that it is – endeavored – it’s focused, as I said, on our people, and it’s focused on moving the pendulum a little bit. We can’t swing it all the way across. It just – nor should we, in the Pentagon.
So it is – it is a budget which does both, focuses on the times that we’re in right now, the fights that we’re in right now, which, to my previous point, informs the future – and I really believe that – as well as focuses on conventional and in fact, you know, nuclear threats in the future that are out there, in combination with this budget, tied to the Nuclear Posture Review, which is ongoing, and the QDR, which is ongoing, and the ‘11 budget. It’s those – it’s the totality of those four pieces, I think, that will set the tone and set the direction for the future.
Q: Admiral, Chris Castelli, with Inside the Pentagon.
When you briefly mentioned the big debate on weapons systems earlier, you quickly segued to the importance of investing in health care, compensation and bonuses, to make things right for the military’s people. Do you see a need during the QDR to shift a significant amount of money from procurement toward those personnel costs in the coming years?
ADM. MULLEN: We’re not far enough into the QDR to be able to say that, whether that’s an answer, Chris. Sixty to 70 percent of our overall costs, resources in the Pentagon, go to the people account. Now, that’s far beyond just salaries and far beyond just military, because we’ve got hundreds of thousands of civilians who are key contributors to what we do that also we must pay attention to.
The ’10 budget starts to shift us away from contractors to buy back some of our acquisition force, which is vital for the future. So I think that, as in everything else, the balance has to be there. We’ve got to figure out a way to get our arms around health care costs. They’ve almost doubled since 2001: somewhere around 6 percent in 2001, and they are – or, sorry, or they will double, I think, in another 10 years to over 12 percent of the budget. That’s not sustainable over time. And it’s a microcosm of the problem that we have in America.
But as we make this – as we focus on our people – and as someone with a budget background, what I worry about is additional pressure on the budget, then those things which sustain our people – it’s housing, it’s bonuses, it’s commissaries, it is health care, it’s education, it’s support for families – great family programs that have been put in place over the last several years. And oftentimes, those are the first things that come out of the budget. Leaders – myself included – need to hold those in, as the pressure increases on the budget. So the QDR will certainly be informed by this requirement. Whether we’ll be trading for additional expenses or additional costs with respect to our people, we’ll see.
MR. O’HANLON: We have time for two last questions I’m going to take together, Admiral, and then ask you to respond, if you don’t mind.
At the very back – yeah, right next to you – to your right there. And then Adriana, if you could, also the gentleman over here in the fifth row, for the last one.
Q: Admiral, Kris Osborn, Defense News. I was interested in your general thoughts on the procurement equation with respect to Afghanistan and how it differs from Iraq, given the terrain differences and so forth. We’ve heard of the MATV as a step up in ISR, more UAVs, things of that sort. As more troops arrive, what might that mean by way of additional procurement, in just a general sense, even?
ADM. MULLEN: I think – I’m sorry. Go ahead.
MR. O’HANLON: Either way. I mean, if you want to –
ADM. MULLEN: Go ahead.
MR. O’HANLON: Okay, and then we’ll the last question here, and then we can wrap up, please.
Q: Mike Lavallee from TBS. I guess this would be from the rest of the world category. On North Korea, North Korea has become increasingly belligerent over the past couple of months, and they have threatened to do a nuclear test. There have been reports out of South Korea that there has been brisk activity at their nuclear test site. I was just wondering if you have seen any signs that they may be preparing for a nuclear test. And are you concerned that they’re again returning to this crisis sense of how they can achieve their goals?
ADM. MULLEN: Let me answer the North Korea question first. Then I’ll go to the Afghanistan question.
North Korea is all alone, and the leadership there continues to make decisions with – which further isolates North Korea from the rest of the world. It’s not a new strategy, because it’s something that he’s done over time.
Certainly the – you know, it’s worrisome because he has nuclear weapons. There are reports that he’s considering nuclear tests, and I wouldn’t, you know, confirm or deny those one way or the other.
But all that speaks to the constancy of how he approaches the world, which is one that further and further isolates him.
This is not about the – my view – the relationship between the United States and North Korea. It’s about the relationship between North Korea and the rest of the world. And the international community is obviously focused on this. And the international community in particular, I think, needs to continue to deal with this.
Having a stable Western Pacific is vital not just to the region but the entirety of the world. And there are countries, obviously, who live there that are incredibly concerned and focused as well. And I would hope that we could engage with him in a way, whoever “we” would be – the United States, six-party talks, whatever the right – you know, the totality of the engagement would be – to move him off his more and more belligerent stance, because it can be very, very dangerous, and that’s what I worry about.
With respect to Afghanistan, a great deal of what we’ve learned in Iraq is going to Afghanistan. Equipment, an increased level of ISR, an increased number of unmanned vehicles as well as, you know, very focused on changing equipment that we’ve had for some time, let’s say, in aviation and upgrading that, to support what we’ve learned there.
So that’s – so there’s a lot of commonality in one way. Another way the – you know, one young soldier told me, in 2007, my first trip to Afghanistan, you know, the terrain here can be the enemy as well. And that speaks to your question about the M-ATV, which is a lighter MRAP, which provides the same kind of protection.
I don’t think there’s any question that the investment, the $26 billion, that America has provided in MRAPs – to protect our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines on the ground – has been more than worth the investment, because when you talk to them, that’s what they say. And they say get them more.
Now, we’d like a lighter one, because the terrain is tougher. And we have to achieve that balance between weight and protection. And we look to do that and start generating that lighter one, into Afghanistan, later this year. Another one that comes immediately to mind is helicopters. It’s a lot higher. You need – you need helicopters with heavier engines, to get you to heights that was not required in Iraq.
So focusing there is important. I mean, those are two kinds of things. And then making sure the winter is going to be – you know, the winter is a tough time in Afghanistan, as well, making sure our troops are equipped to not just handle the winter but fight in the winter, which the Taliban did this year, this last winter, more than previously.
So those are kind of three areas that immediately come to mind.
MR. O’HANLON: Chairman, what a tour de force. And thank you very much for being here.
ADM. MULLEN: Thanks, Mike.
MR. O’HANLON: Please join me in thanking him.
(Applause.)
ADM. MULLEN: Thank you.