Joint Publication 3-57

Civil-Military Operations

9 July 2018

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess civil-military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-57, 11 SEPTEMBER 2013

- **Deletes Chapter 3, "Civil Affairs and Civil Affairs Operations," and moves contents and discussion to Appendix A, "Service Civil Affairs Capabilities."**
- **Adds Civil-Military Operations assessment appendix.**
- **Adds an appendix on the discussion of Civil Information Management.**
- **Clarifies and updates text to ensure consistency with the newly revised Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* and JP 5-0, *Joint Planning.***
- **Updates figures and vignettes to reflect best practices.**
- **Updates terms and definitions.**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Discusses Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs Operations, and Unified Action**
- **Outlines Civil-Military Operations Function and Components**
- **Describes Civil-Military Operations planning**

Introduction

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). CMO are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). CMO support US objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability.

United States Government (USG) policy initiatives, national security directives, joint strategies, and military doctrine reflect a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary tools and representative elements of the instruments of national power such as interagency partners (e.g., Department of State) and private sector, in order to build a more effective and balanced strategy.

Civil Military Operations Operational Categories

Joint force commanders (JFCs) conduct CMO across the range of military operations in three primary categories:

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

Crisis response and limited contingency operations.

Large-scale combat operations.

Civil-Military Operations and Levels of Warfare

CMO may be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Specific actions at one level of warfare may affect all three levels

simultaneously with different effects at each level. CMO guidance should include higher headquarters objectives and end states synchronized with USG policy and guidance.

Civil-Military Operations Range of Activities

CMO include a range of activities that integrate civil and military actions. These activities are particularly suited to support the achievement of objectives that promote stability. CMO are necessitated by the requirement to achieve unified action and the inclusion of the civil component into the planning and execution to attain the desired stable end state.

Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs Operations, and Unified Action

In carrying out their CMO responsibilities, commanders use all CMO enablers at their disposal. One of the more prominent enablers is the conduct of CMO that bring together the activities of joint forces and multinational forces and nonmilitary organizations to achieve common objectives.

There are six civil affairs functional areas that are critical to support to civil administration: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public education and information, and public health and welfare.

Civil-Military Operations Function and Components

Civil-Military Operations Functions

CMO functions are those activities performed by military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and IPI by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. CMO are conducted to facilitate unified action in joint operations, the ultimate purpose of which is to establish, restore, or maintain a stable operational environment.

Civil-Military Operations Components

The components of CMO are broad categorizations consisting of the supporting actions required to achieve a designated role towards the achievement of CMO objectives. Each CMO component consists of CMO activities, which are Service capabilities that support the overall CMO goals

and objectives through the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Each Service has the responsibility to establish their own capabilities to support CMO. The three components of CMO include civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management.

Organizing for Civil-Military Operations

The JFC should establish formal CMO coordinating mechanisms to facilitate effective CMO. The JFC organizes its coordinating staff by creating a CMO directorate, typically found as part of the CMO directorate of a joint staff. If the coordinating requirements surpass the CMO directorate's capability to facilitate CMO at all echelons, the JFC may establish a CMO center or a joint civil-military operations task force.

Military Government

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to intervene militarily. For the joint force land component commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing joint land operations within an environment of political ambiguity. When a joint force performs a forcible entry (seize the initiative), defeating the enemy force, consequently deposing the indigenous government and subsequently performing a military occupation (dominate), the land component must establish civil control (stabilize) by implementing populace and resource control measures through the assertion of transitional military authority or establishment of military government until transition to a civil government (enabling civil authority).

When imposing military government, the military is in the lead as a whole-of-government effort to impose the nation's will. This collective effort is referred to as **stabilization** and **reconstruction** and includes stability tasks executed by all Service components, as well as other missions and tasks that preserve or restore essential civil services in the wake of combat.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by US Armed Forces, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, US Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.

Planning

The Adaptive Planning and Execution enterprise and joint planning process promote coherent CMO planning across all levels of warfare and command echelons.

CMO planners and CMO-related forces support the JFC with actions to:

- Coordinate military forces' use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies through and with IPI interagency partners.
- Plan for possible population displacements and work with civilian organizations (IPI and international organizations) to minimize local populace interference with friendly operations.
- Coordinate with civilian organizations to identify the local resources, facilities, and support available for US operations.
- Provide liaison and coordinate CMO support with local populations and international organizations, as applicable.
- Predict movement of civilians and establishing procedures and processes to minimize their interference with friendly operations.
- Estimate the availability of resources.
- Prepare area studies of the assigned area to support the mission, as required.

- Provide civil information and analysis to US and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the local populace.
- Recommend theater policy for CMO activities.
- Act as the focal point for civil considerations.
- Provide technical expertise in all civil functions.
- Provide timely civil information for the development of the supported commander's common operational picture.
- Distribute emergency food and water, clothing, shelter, and medical services supplies to civilians (depending on the effects of military operations to the HN).

Planning Considerations

CMO is planned to improve the US military's relationships with foreign civilians and facilitate operations by working with whole-of-government, HN national and regional governmental institutions, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to:

- Encourage human rights, freedom, and democracy with US national interests.
- Improve public education systems and institutions.
- Build rapport with cultural and religious leaders.
- Establish, support, or improve public health and sanitation.
- Encourage economic stability by advising labor, procurement, and contracting authorities.
- Provide foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Restore civilian supply, public safety, and transportation.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess CMO.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory."

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

1. General

a. **Civil-Military Operations (CMO).** CMO are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). CMO support US objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability. CMO may include activities and functions normally performed by the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions or operations. They may also occur in the absence of other military operations. CMO are conducted across the conflict continuum (see Figure I-1).

(1) CMO planners identify, evaluate, and incorporate civil considerations into courses of action (COAs) that support the commander's mission by synchronizing and building synergy between multiple military and civil entities, focusing on the stabilization of the operational environment (OE).

(2) CMO planners incorporate relevant messages and themes through the commander's communication synchronization (CCS) process while CMO enablers and other forces disseminate these messages and themes to local leaders and the HN population.



Figure I-1. Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

Both are done to support the commander's lines of effort (LOEs) and achievement of objectives.

(3) Feedback generated during CMO provides data to specific information-related activities as the assessments reveal sentiments of targeted HN populations or organizations.

b. **Strategic Aspects of CMO.** Frequently, the threat will use common culture, religion, generosity, and coercion to destabilize or depose legitimate governments and then exploit their success to advance political goals and objectives. These tactics can sometimes inspire support from local civilian populations. Effective efforts to separate the populace from the threat requires a joint force skilled in building relationships though cooperation to counter the influence of the threat. Otherwise, the joint force risks winning tactical and even operational victories but losing the war.

(1) CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They are the activities joint force commanders (JFCs) engage in to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. Ultimately, the JFC should understand transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats to the joint force and how CMO impacts a global perspective and responsiveness. As a part of unified action, JFCs are responsible for the organization of CMO in their operational area (OA) designed to reduce and/or prevent detrimental effects to the HN population to facilitate the seamless execution of military operations in support of strategic and military objectives. US forces conduct CMO to coordinate civil and military activities, minimize civil-military friction, reduce civil component threats, and maximize support for operations. CMO also meet the commander's legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian populations within the OA. Civil affairs (CA) conducts operations that nest within the overall mission and commander's intent.

(2) The JFC synchronizes capabilities of the joint force and coordinates with the other instruments of national power to achieve the national strategic objectives of the mission.

(3) Contending with the civil component of any society presents challenges. Foreign governments face challenges to security, stability, and peace, which may include ethnic and religious conflict, cultural and socioeconomic friction, and terrorism and insurgencies. Other civil vulnerabilities include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental security, infectious diseases, and increasing competition for or exploitation of dwindling natural resources. The joint force may also encounter these challenges when participating in foreign internal defense (FID) or support to governance while engaging in stability activities. US forces may be required to establish a military government in the absence of governing entities by providing support to civil administration or asserting transitional military authority.

(4) United States Government (USG) policy initiatives, national security directives, joint strategies, and military doctrine reflect a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary tools and representative elements of the instruments of national power, such

as interagency partners (e.g., Department of State [DOS]) and private sector, in order to build a more effective and balanced strategy.

(5) At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare, during all military operations, CMO facilitate unified action between military forces and nonmilitary entities within the OA. CMO facilitate this unified action, particularly in support of shaping, stability, counterinsurgency (COIN), and other activities that counter asymmetric and irregular threats. CMO may permeate other aspects of national security and military strategy for an operation or campaign.

c. **CMO Operational Categories.**

(1) JFCs conduct CMO across the range of military operations in three primary categories:

(a) Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence.

(b) Crisis response and limited contingency operations.

(c) Large-scale combat operations.

(2) US obligations to establish a military government in occupied territory are outlined in various international agreements (i.e., The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the law of war).

(3) Joint forces conduct CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO) to enable unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. In addition, the JFC should integrate CA with other military forces to work alongside HN agencies, military, and security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police) and to support unified action by interacting and consulting with other government agencies, IPI, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), HN, foreign nations (FNs), and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO.

For additional information on unified action, see Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, *and JP 3-0,* Joint Operations. *For additional policy guidance on civil affairs, see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2000.13,* Civil Affairs.

(4) Additional specific Department of Defense (DOD) activities that require interaction with the civil component of the OE are directed by DOD. They include, in the broader sense, DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation;* JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation;* and DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).* Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and defense support to SC can be characterized as the statutorily defined OEs under which DOD exercises different Title 10 and Title 32, United States Code (USC), authorities, including authorities and permissions to coordinate with the civil component (including civil authorities).

(5) Within the realm of SC and contingencies short of declared war, CMO support is rendered to foreign governments (in accordance with [IAW] support to the interagency in Title 22, USC, with DOD's limited Title 10, USC, authorities relating to foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA] and DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief [FDR],* and in keeping with DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*).

(6) Several statutory requirements and limitations of CMO are implemented in DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation;* DODD S-3321.1, *(U) Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War;* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, *Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory;* DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW);* CJCSI 3210.06, *Irregular Warfare;* CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support;* and DODD 3600.01, *Information Operations.* Additionally, restraints on CMO will exist during SC based upon bilateral agreements the US has with given countries. Most agreements prevent interference with HN internal affairs. CMO noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) restraints are covered in DODD 3025.14, *Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad.* Within the realm of DSCA, CMO is limited to the support rendered by DOD to domestic civilian authority:

(a) CMO is conducted domestically IAW DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA);* DODD 3025.13, *Employment of DOD Capabilities in Support of US Secret Services (USSS) Department of Homeland Security (DHS);* CJCSI 3125.01, *Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland;* and CJCSI 3710.01, *DOD Counterdrug Support.*

(b) The purpose of the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program is the operational readiness training of US military personnel. HCA may involve cooperation with HN military or paramilitary elements (including the participation of third-party organizations such as nongovernmental or private or voluntary groups) to establish trust and enhance relations with the entities. IAW Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities,* HCA activities:

1. Are conducted in conjunction with authorized operations and exercises of the Services in a foreign country (including deployments for training).

2. Are conducted with the approval of the HN's national and local civilian authorities.

3. Complement, and do not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance provided to the HN by DOS and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

(7) Stability activities is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide

essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

See JP 3-07, Stability, *for more information.*

d. USG stabilization efforts and DOD stability activities require the integration and synchronization of disparate capabilities in order to achieve unity of effort between military and nonmilitary entities (e.g., USG departments and agencies, DOD elements, partner nations [PNs], international organizations, IPI, and NGOs). Planning and executing CMO as part of stabilization is an intensive effort that requires the following:

(1) **Plan.** CMO foster cooperation between military forces, the HN, and interorganizational partners by building trust and mutual understanding. CMO facilitate transition to civilian governance by unifying military efforts with those of nonmilitary organizations, mitigating risks and threats to the civilian populace, and exploiting opportunities for success by separating the populace from threats. CMO synchronize the military effort with other instruments of national power to improve efficiency and improve the JFC's understanding of the impact of military operations on civilians and their environment in the joint operations area (JOA). To assist in achieving national and military objectives, the joint force will develop an approach that fosters an understanding and consideration of the OE. The joint force will identify the range of relevant actors and their associated social, cultural, political, economic, and organizational networks. With that understanding, the joint force will evaluate relevant actor behavior in context, anticipate relevant actor decision making, and endeavor to influence the will and decisions of relevant populations.

(2) **Analyze.** Detailed analyses of the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems is essential to plan CMO. Planners must understand the interaction of these systems to effectively engage and provide the JFC with actionable information concerning the civil component of the OE.

(3) **Assess.** CMO planners and operators constantly assess the impact of military operations on the IPI and provide updates to the JFC. Properly executed CMO will assist in achieving unified action and strengthen international resolve through the considerate treatment of civilians within the JOA.

(4) At all levels, CMO use negotiation, mediation, collaboration, consensus, and relationship building to create conditions for success.

Collectively, the terms interagency community, IPI, HNs, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector are often referred to as stakeholders. For more details on the interagency community, IPI, HNs, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector, refer to Chapter IV, "Interorganizational Cooperation," and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

e. **Liaison.** CMO require joint forces to liaise and coordinate with other US, multinational, and indigenous security forces and other USG departments and agencies, as well as NGOs, international organizations, IPI, and the private sector. Liaison officers commonly

provide joint forces with close, continuous, face-to-face communication between organizations.

f. **Unified Action and Unity of Effort.** Commanders synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort to promote unified action. Commanders exercise and conduct CMO to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate with elements of the civil component with which there is no command relationship in order to enhance unified action. Each organization may have separate purposes and goals. Organizations may also have varying degrees of local authority to direct or redirect resources toward shared goals. Unified action requires interagency coordination among all USG participants and interorganizational cooperation and collaboration among all participants. By its very nature, CMO require close and continuous coordination with interagency partners such as the US embassy country team. Close coordination among components, supporting forces, the country team, and HN is particularly important during complex operations. CMO should nest with joint operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to achieve unity of effort.

g. **Civil-Military Relationships**

(1) Joint forces may operate across a wide range of human habitation, from densely populated cities to sparsely populated rural areas. Every habitation poses a myriad of distinct and unique challenges. Civil-military relations should revolve around positive, often mutually-supportive, relationships with nonmilitary stakeholders.

(2) JFCs may be required to coordinate HN response to alleviate civilian suffering or support mitigation operations by the USG, HN, international organizations, or NGOs.

2. Civil-Military Operations and Levels of Warfare

a. The three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. CMO may be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Specific actions at one level of warfare may affect all three levels simultaneously with different effects at each level. CMO guidance should include higher headquarters objectives and end states synchronized with USG policy and guidance. Individuals and units conducting CMO must understand how tactical CMO actions may have strategic implications.

b. Civilian and military organizations often have differing perspectives. Some civilian leaders may object to specific CMO because the civilian populations might confuse the military with independent NGO or international organization efforts. Some international organizations or NGOs have filed objections with senior HN or USG officials when they feel CMO have compromised their neutrality. When these differing perspectives cause tactical or operational friction, they may escalate to strategic, time-consuming issues for the JFC. Prevention of such

friction may entail military leaders, ensuring non-military entities have the lead in nonmilitary related efforts as opposed to being seen as subordinated to military actions.

c. Recognizing that military and nonmilitary organizations use different decision-making processes and philosophies can help reduce friction among all stakeholders and set conditions for common understanding. Most civilian agencies do not organize themselves or make decisions based on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in regards to organizing or decision making. For example, civilian organizations may also organize activities around sectors of activity, such as health services or education, rather than geographically, such as by district or province. Most civilian agencies do not recognize the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in regards to organizing or decision making.

(1) **Strategic**

(a) At the strategic level, CMO focus on larger and long-term issues that may be part of USG shaping, stabilization, reconstruction, and economic development initiatives in failing, defeated, or recovering nations. CMO are an essential tool used to improve the HN in improving the capacity, capability, and willingness required to regain governance. Strategic CMO are part of a geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) SC guidance in the theater campaign plan (TCP).

(b) During certain contingency operations, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Secretary of State will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans and develop a general framework to coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations.

(2) **Operational**

(a) At the operational level, CMO synchronize stability activities with other activities and operations (offense and defense) within each phase of any joint operation. CMO also integrate the stabilization and reconstruction efforts of USG interagency, international organization, and NGO activities with joint force operations.

(b) Joint force planners and interagency partners should identify civil-military objectives early in the planning process. CMO are integrated into plans and operations through interagency coordination, multinational partnerships, and coordination with international organizations and NGOs. Coordination of CMO for current and future operations is conducted at the operational level. Information management (IM) enables CMO and facilitates interorganizational cooperation to efficiently distribute resources and measure success using nontraditional operational indicators.

(3) **Tactical.** A civil-military team or civil-military operations center (CMOC) may facilitate tactical CMO among the military, the local populace, NGOs, and international organizations. Commanders can coordinate, integrate, and synchronize with the civil component through military engagement, civil reconnaissance (CR), a civil-military support element, or through an established CMOC. Tactical CMO are normally focused on specific areas or groups of people and have more immediate effects.

d. Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) describes CAO and larger CMO in a plan or operation order (OPORD). CMO require coordination among CA, logistical support, maneuver, health service support, military police (MP), engineer, transportation, and special operations forces. CMO involve cross-cutting activities across staff sections and subordinate units. Annex G identifies, consolidates, and deconflicts the activities of the various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require significantly more details than discussed in annex G.

For more details concerning annex G (Civil-Military Operations), refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

e. Changes in the OE, such as changes in the military or strategic situation, natural or man-made disasters, or changes in the other operational variables, can divert the joint force's main effort from CMO. By continually analyzing the OE, the JFC can identify warnings of changes in the OE and allocate resources to monitor these changes in order to anticipate changes in force requirements and planning. Branch and sequel planning and preventive action may mitigate disruption of CMO. For example, a branch may call for the use of a show of force to deter aggressive action by a group while CMO are being conducted. The JFC can task a unit with a "be prepared to" mission in order to facilitate execution of branches or sequels. This can occur in the context of the commander on the ground tasking a subordinate element or in a larger context of a GCC tasking a Service component like the Navy with the be-prepared-to mission while the Army conducts the civil-military operation. Potential indicators are depicted in Figure I-2.

Possible Change Indicators

- Political activities and movements
- Food or water shortages
- Outbreaks of disease
- Military setbacks
- Natural disasters
- Crop failures
- Fuel shortages
- Onset of seasonal changes (winter may exacerbate fuel and food shortages, for example)
- Police force and corrections system deterioration
- Judicial system shortcomings
- Insurgent attacks
- Sharp rise in crime
- Terrorist attack
- Disruption of public utilities, e.g., water, power, sewage, and economic strife due to socioeconomic imbalance
- Increases in dislocated civilians

Figure I-2. Possible Change Indicators

Civil-military operations in the aftermath of the January 2012 Port-au-Prince earthquake. A civil affairs team helped set up a network connecting the clinic with various other nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and local government assets in St. Marc.

3. Civil-Military Operations Range of Activities

a. The joint force conducts CMO to facilitate military operations by establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relationships between military forces and the civilian populace. CMO usually include governmental organizations and NGOs and HN authorities in an OA. The environment may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile. All CMO should support USG objectives and end states.

b. CMO include a range of activities that integrate civil and military actions. These activities are particularly suited to support the achievement of objectives that promote stability. CMO are necessitated by the requirement to achieve unified action and the inclusion of the civil component into the planning and execution to attain the desired stable end state.

c. GCCs employ forces in their area of responsibility (AOR) to accomplish their missions. Promoting stability in support of national objectives is often a key responsibility. Stability activities include military missions conducted by GCCs and subordinate commanders, in coordination with other USG departments and agencies and their implementing partners. JFCs, in conjunction with the chief of mission (COM), may use components of CMO as a tool to mitigate suffering.

(1) **Military Government**

(a) Military government is established during military operations when replacement or sustainment of civil authority is required to maintain stability and governance in an area that has been legally occupied. Military government supports the US instruments of national power abroad through executing governance tasks mandated by US policy and international law. The objective of a military government is to establish law and order for

USG stabilization and reconstruction efforts, the end state of which is a reconstructed indigenous government that employs governing policies consistent with US interests.

(b) When force is necessary and a territory is occupied, the occupying force imposes military authority IAW the law of land warfare. Military authority is asserted through the imposition of military government. A military government in this context can be formed by a military, civil, or mixed administration. Once an interim civilian government is established, military authority is exerted to support civil administration, whether that civil administration is imposed by the occupying power or is inherently indigenous.

(2) **Support to civil administration (SCA)** is assistance given to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or interim civilian authority or supporting a reconstructed government. SCA occurs when military forces support DOS in the implementation of interim civil authority or US foreign policy in support of HN internal defense and development. SCA supports the US instruments of national power abroad through executing tasks affiliated with cooperative security, SC, and FID as a function of stability activities.

(a) During an interim civil authority or transitional military authority, the following terms apply:

1. **Military Governor.** A military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior.

2. **Military Government Ordinance.** A military government ordinance is an enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

3. **Governance.** Governance is a requirement for obtaining a stable, population-centric OE. Transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control and stability and enable civil security. DOS has the lead on foreign policy and controls the majority of the resources that can be used under Title 22, USC, Chapter 32 (Foreign Assistance Act). These resources are typically tied to achieving US objectives. Once an interim civilian government is established, military resources are exerted to support civil administration. JP 3-07, *Stability*, provides additional information on transitional military authority.

(b) **SCA Considerations.** SCA is tailored to the situation based on US law, HN law, international law (including the law of war), international treaties, agreements, and memoranda of understanding. To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government. Subject to the

OPERATION SAHAYOGI HAAT (NEPAL EARTHQUAKE) 2015

On 25 April 2015, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake devastated the Gorkha District, a central region of Nepal northwest of Kathmandu, followed by a 7.2-magnitude aftershock roughly 50 miles (80km [kilometers]) northeast of the Nepal capital in Kathmandu. Within 24 hours, the Department of State requested Department of Defense (DOD) humanitarian disaster assistance to airlift US Government and non-DOD relief supplies and personnel; conduct airfield assessment, management, and operations; and provide logistics support such as commodity repositioning to a third-party staging area. On 28 April, the Deputy Secretary of Defense formally approved the request to provide transportation support and provision of relief supplies. Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral Samuel Locklear, designated Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, as the lead Service component responsible for coordinating the combatant command's disaster response; activated Joint Task Force (JTF) 505; and designated Lieutenant General Wissler as the JTF commander. Five years of USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation initiatives with regional partners, US Government organizations, and international agencies facilitated an integrated, coordinated, and collaborative disaster response. The pre-disaster planning effort built situational awareness and established positive relationships. These relationships allowed the JTF to swiftly adapt as problems occurred. The success of the response is strong testimony to the value of Nepali, international, United States Agency for International Development, and USPACOM pre-disaster preparations.

SOURCE: USPACOM OPERATION SAHAYOGI HAAT JOINT AFTER ACTION REPORT 2016

military requirements, the JFC should avoid military activities likely to increase tensions in the occupied territory and conduct those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to a civil administration. This is especially important in multitribal, multiethnic, multiracial, or multicultural environments where one or more of the parties to a conflict will almost invariably see a chosen COA as biased against them.

(3) Populace and Resources Control (PRC)

(a) PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control.

1. **Populace control** provides security to people, mobilizes human resources, denies personnel to the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, and voluntary resettlement. Dislocated civilian (DC) operations involve populace control that requires extensive planning and coordination among various military and civilian organizations.

2. **Resources control** regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

(b) These controls are normally a responsibility of HN civilian governments. US forces may implement PRC when HN civilian authorities or agencies are unable or unwilling to. PRC are escalated during civilian or military emergencies. In a permissive environment, joint forces implement PRC measures with the consent of the local government. In a hostile environment, PRC measures are applied IAW international law and the law of war.

(c) Nonlethal weapons can reduce the probability of death or serious injury to the civilian populace while maintaining effective force protection (FP) measures. Commanders should evaluate the use of nonlethal weapons in operation plans (OPLANs).

For further guidance on nonlethal weapons, see DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Nonlethal Weapons (NLW) and NLW Policy.

(4) **FHA.** FHA consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. These activities are governed by various statutes and policies and range from steady-state engagements to limited contingency operations. FHA includes foreign disaster relief operations and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need and may also be conducted concurrently with other DOD support missions and activities such as DC support; security operations; and international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response (ICBRN-R). FHA operations (including foreign disaster relief operations) are normally conducted in support of USAID or DOS. Foreign disaster relief operations, when using foreign military assets, are usually conducted by observing best practices and guidelines for civil-military humanitarian coordination.

For further detail concerning FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, *and DODD 5100.46,* Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).

(5) **Foreign assistance.** Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by the USG within that nation's territory based on agreements mutually concluded between the US and that nation (e.g., Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama). Foreign assistance supports the HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. It is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the US and vital to US national security. The military may support foreign assistance through a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to promote US national interests. These activities often include security assistance (SA) programs; FID; and other Title 10, USC, programs and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by USG departments and agencies. The COM is the senior diplomatic representative in a HN. The combatant commander (CCDR) may conduct CMO to support the COM and enhance HN legitimacy. CMO may be performed as the main effort or a supporting effort. The HN, USG, international organizations, or NGOs

may see value in joint force logistic capabilities: vehicles and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to deliver supplies and services. The JFC should provide military support discreetly to maintain the neutrality of nonmilitary organizations. CMO missions generally benefit the HN government by ensuring local authorities receive public credit for helping the civilian populace. When the COM approves foreign assistance activities, CMO planners should integrate CMO with COM objectives. Common HCA projects include rudimentary engineering, medical, dental, or veterinary activity in the HN. HCA activity is distinct from development and not designed to drastically change the conditions found in local environments. HCA may also be used as a foreign assistance program and to support various CMO; however, it is always conducted under Title 10, USC, Section 401 authority. In the context of FID, HCA may be an important part of helping to build relationships between the local population and the joint force. When possible, HCA should give way to military civic action as the FID operation progresses.

For more information on HCA, refer to DODI 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, *and JP 3-22,* Foreign Internal Defense. *For further detail in regard to FID and SA, refer to JP 3-22,* Foreign Internal Defense.

(6) **Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Appropriation.** OHDACA funding is for DOD humanitarian programs to support achievement of a GCC's TCP objectives in support of larger US national security objectives. OHDACA is a common funding source for FHA activities. Each combatant command (CCMD) normally submits an annual FHA strategy and OHDACA budget request via the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System.

For more detailed discussion of OHDACA funds and FHA authorities in general, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

See DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), *for more information on OHDACA-funded FHA programs and activities.*

d. **CMO in Joint Operations**

(1) **CMO-Related Studies.** All CMO enablers gather and maintain information pertinent to their specific discipline in support of CMO. CMO planners should forecast and continuously reevaluate CMO requirements by analyzing the mission to determine specific tasks. This includes establishing guidance for the specific CMO tasks and developing estimates of the situation, to include area studies. In denied areas, CMO planners use intelligence products and open-source information to access, gather, and validate information for area or functional-oriented studies. Planners should consider their knowledge of CMO, geographic areas of specialization, language qualifications, civil sector functional technical expertise, and contacts with IPI. This will allow for timely and critical information on the civilian capabilities and resources in the OA. Civilian contacts may provide more extensive insight than information collected through intelligence channels, but CMO planners should validate all critical information and assumptions through intelligence capabilities. For example, CA area studies and area assessments provide operational analysis of the civil component of the OE.

(2) CMO tasks support a variety of military operations across the conflict continuum. The precise arrangement of CMO will depend on the objectives of the plan. These activities may be performed by CA, other military forces, or a combination and are described in the following discussion.

(a) **Shape.** During implementation of the CCDR's SC planning objectives, CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. CA support FID and contribute to planning. Before a crisis, CA working with HNs, regional partners, and IPI can shape the OE. Shaping operations can include regional conferences to bring together multiple stakeholders with competing concerns and goals, economic agreements designed to build interdependency, or regional aid packages and other capability/capacity building activities to enhance stability.

(b) **Deter.** CMO should be integrated with flexible deterrent options to generate maximum strategic or operational effect. CMO, in conjunction with deterrence activity, builds on shaping activities and can provide a stabilizing effect on the OE, reduce uncertainty, and influence the perception of joint force intentions.

(c) **Seize the Initiative.** In conjunction with other joint force activities to seize the initiative, CMO are conducted to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action in support of JFC operations. CMO are planned to minimize civil-military friction and support friendly political-military objectives. CMO conducted before the outbreak of conflict may also be used to create opportunities to aid in seizing the initiative, such as development of dual-use infrastructure and relationship building with IPI.

(d) **Dominate.** CMO also help minimize HN civilian interface with joint operations so that collateral damage to IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability activities is limited. Limiting collateral damage may reduce the duration and intensity of combat and stability activities. Stability activities are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to stabilization activities, relieve suffering, and set conditions for civil-military transition.

(e) **Stabilize.** Stabilize actions are required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority. This condition can be caused by a natural or man-made disaster, major combat operation, or regime collapse. The joint force may be required to occupy territory, perform limited local governance, or take on full governing responsibilities through a transitional military authority. It must then integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing multinational, international organization, NGO, or USG department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as the security environment stabilizes. Throughout these activities, the JFC continuously assesses whether current operations enable transfer of overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity.

(f) **Enable Civil Authority.** These activities are predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in the OA. This includes coordination of CMO with interagency, multinational, IPI, international organization, and NGO participants; establishing and assessing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs); and favorably influencing the attitude of the HN population regarding both the US

and the local civil authority's objectives. See Appendix D, "Assessing Civil-Military Operations," for more discussion on CMO, MOPs, and MOEs.

For more details concerning the notional phasing model, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(3) DC operations are planned to minimize civil-military friction, reduce civilian casualties, alleviate human suffering, and control DC movements.

(4) Forces executing CMO coordinate with civilian agencies to implement measures to locate and identify population centers. These forces also coordinate with civilian agencies to create, restore, and maintain public order; coordinate resources (e.g., labor, supplies, and facilities); coordinate immediate life sustaining services to civilians in the OA(s); and assist with planning for disease control measures to protect joint forces.

(5) CMO assets may designate routes and facilities for DCs to minimize their contact with forces engaged in combat.

(6) CMO may help contribute to logistics operations. CMO planners can help logistic planners identify available goods and services by using their contacts within the civilian sector.

(7) Civil-military implications for most operations depend on the mission scope, national strategic end state, and the characteristics of the civil sector in the OA. CMO in support of joint operations include:

(a) **COIN.** COIN operations are comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. CMO support to COIN operations includes using military capabilities to perform traditionally civilian activities to help the HN or FN deprive insurgents of popular support. CMO combine military-joint operations with diplomatic, political, economic, and informational initiatives of the HN and participating interorganizational partners to foster stability. The principle purpose of CMO in COIN operations or FID is to isolate the insurgents from the populace, thus depriving them of recruits, resources, intelligence, and credibility.

(b) **Peace Operations (PO).** PO are normally multiagency and multinational contingencies involving all instruments of national power and may include international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. CMO foster a cooperative relationship between the military forces, civilian organizations, and the governments and populations in the OA.

(c) **NEO.** CMO support to a NEO should limit local national interference with evacuation operations; maintain close liaison with embassy officials to facilitate effective interagency coordination; obtain civil or indigenous support for the NEO; help DOS identify US citizens and others to be evacuated; and help embassy personnel receive, screen, process, and debrief evacuees.

(8) **Countering Threat Networks (CTN).** To effectively counter threat networks, the joint force must apply a comprehensive network engagement approach by partnering with friendly networks and engaging neutral networks through the building of mutual trust and

cooperation. Network engagement is the interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander's objectives. Network engagement consists of three components: partnering with friendly networks, engaging neutral networks, and CTN to support the commander's desired end state. CMO may support CTN operations through obtaining information on and influencing of friendly and neutral networks.

For additional details regarding CTN, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

(9) **Stabilization.** Stabilization is defined in the 2018 DOS/USAID/DOD Stabilization Assistance Review as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict peacefully and prevent a resurgence of violence. Stabilization activities are necessary to consolidate military gains into lasting strategic success and may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution mechanisms, deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the voluntary return of displaced people. The joint force's core responsibilities during stabilization are security, basic public order, and the immediate needs of the population. These activities are separate from, but complementary to, humanitarian assistance.

For more information on stability and USG stabilization efforts, see JP 3-07, Stability.

(a) Plans should address stability activities in all operational phases. Planning for stability actions should begin when the joint planning process (JPP) is initiated. Even during combat operations, the joint force may be required to establish or restore security and provide humanitarian relief.

(b) Initial CMO will likely secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect and repair critical infrastructure, and restore public services. As authorized, US military forces should be prepared to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational, or international capacity cannot. If authorized, US military forces may also support the legitimate civil authority.

(c) US forces' robust logistic and command and control (C2) capabilities are often essential to stability activities. Normally, other agencies such as DOS or USAID are responsible for USG objectives but lack logistic and C2 capabilities. Because of the imbalance between capability and responsibility, stability activities will likely support, or transition support to, US diplomatic, international organization, or HN efforts. Military forces support the lead agency. US forces should be prepared to operate in integrated civilian-military teams that could include representatives from IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector.

For further detail concerning stability activities, refer to JP 3-07, Stability.

4. Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs Operations, and Unified Action

a. In carrying out their CMO responsibilities, commanders use all CMO enablers at their disposal. One of the more prominent enablers is the conduct of CMO that bring together the

activities of joint forces and multinational forces (MNFs) and nonmilitary organizations to achieve common objectives. This relationship is depicted in Figure I-3.

b. Under the six general functional areas, civil affairs functional specialists advise and assist the commander and can coordinate, with subordinates or civilian counterparts. These functional specialty areas support planning of interagency efforts or HN efforts. They can also support joint force components requiring such capabilities. There are six civil affairs functional areas that are critical to SCA: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public education and information, and public health and welfare (see Figure I-4).

c. GCCs can establish the civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) to plan, coordinate, conduct, and assess CMO. While CA can function as the primary coordinators and synchronizers of CMO, other joint forces also play major roles in supporting CMO. The CMO enablers include Special Forces; military information support (MIS); legal support; public affairs (PA); engineer, transportation, and health support personnel; MP; security forces; and maneuver units.

d. The J-9 develops CMO staff estimates and recommends JFC interorganizational cooperation.



Figure I-3. Unified Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs Operations



Figure I-4. Civil Affairs Functional Areas and Specialties

e. CA plan, execute, and assess CAO. Civil affairs functional specialists are often required during CAO due to the complexities and demands associated with activities normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities.

For more information on CAO, see Appendix A, "Service Civil Affairs Capabilities."

CHAPTER II
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS FUNCTION AND COMPONENTS

1. Civil-Military Operations Functions

CMO functions are those activities performed by military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and IPI by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. CMO are conducted in order to facilitate unified action in joint operations, the ultimate purpose of which is to establish, restore, or maintain a stable OE.

a. **Purpose.** Commanders conduct CMO in order to attain unified action between the military and civilian counterparts during the execution of joint operations. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations (e.g., the United Nations [UN]), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating all partner efforts with those of the JFC in a whole-of-government approach, is essential to obtaining a unified objective of stabilization**.**

b. **Unified Action.** Unified action is achieved when all partners are integrated into planning and all actions are coordinated and synchronized to achieve the commander's objectives. This applies especially to partners and activities that are not within the command authority of, or do not have command relationships with, the JFC. In some cases that may apply to military partners from other Services or multinational military partners but is nowhere more crucial than with the civil component within the OE.

For more information regarding unified action, see JP 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States.

c. **Joint Operations.** Joint forces conduct operations to defeat enemy forces, occupy enemy territory, and, if required, establish a temporary military government and transition to an interim civilian government as quickly as possible. When supporting a friendly government, US forces conduct support to civil administration. Joint operations consider CMO throughout all joint operations. The CMO staff plans for the interaction between military forces and interorganizational partners and the IPI. All joint force component commands consider CMO in the course of their operations. This includes functional component commands (land, maritime, air and special operations) as well as Service components (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard). The land component commander is usually designated as the lead component for stabilization during major operations. The Army or the Marine Corps is usually designated as the land component command depending on the operation. Short-term contingency operations composed of primarily stability tasks can, in some cases, focus exclusively on stability tasks.

For more information regarding joint operations, see JP 3.0, Joint Operations; *JP 3-07,* Stability; *JP 3-08,* Interorganizational Cooperation; *and JP 3-31,* Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

d. **Planning.** The JFC may have considerably more planning resources than other partners. The JFC should use planning resources to achieve unified action, even when DOD is not the lead USG agency. Civil-military relationships, fostered through CMO, can enhance economic, political, and social stability. Annex V (Interagency Coordination) identifies interagency support requirements for adaptive planning. Annex V should address interagency partners. JFCs utilize annex V to incorporate the efforts and resources of interagency, international organization, and NGO communities into military operations, and vice-versa. For details concerning annex V (Interagency Coordination), refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*

2. Civil-Military Operations Components

The components of CMO are broad categorizations consisting of the supporting actions required to achieve a designated role towards the achievement of CMO objectives (see Figure II-1). Each CMO component consists of CMO activities, which are Service capabilities that support the overall CMO goals and objectives through the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Each Service has the responsibility to establish their own capabilities to support CMO. The three components of CMO include civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management.

a. **Civil–military relations** are established, restored, or maintained by executing the CMO activities of interorganizational cooperation and IPI relationships**.**

(1) **Interorganizational cooperation.** Interorganizational cooperation includes the interaction between the USG, partner nations, the joint force, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector with the IPI. Other elements of the civil component are coordinated with in conjunction with the interagency and IPI. For more information regarding interorganizational coordination, see JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination*. JFCs conduct interagency coordination to promote cooperation and communication between departments and agencies of the USG, including DOD, to accomplish an objective. JFCs should consider and plan for potential requirements for interagency, international organization, and NGO coordination as a part of their activities within and outside of their OAs. Unity of effort is achieved through close, continuous, interagency, and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. JFCs should establish mechanisms at all echelons to perform interagency coordination. Additionally, interorganizational cooperation is an essential requirement for unified action. The JFC and staff should understand each interorganizational partner's roles, responsibilities, and operating procedures. The joint force, along with the country team, are instrumental in facilitating interorganizational cooperation. The JFC, in coordination with the COM, should



Figure II-1. Civil-Military Operations Components and Functions

determine whether the CMOC can serve as the USG's primary interface for other USG departments and agencies, IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and MNFs. This determination could be subject to change, based on the maturity of the conflict and progress of HN for example. For information regarding interorganizational and interagency coordination, see JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation,* and for information regarding operating with MNFs, refer to JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations.*

(2) **IPI cooperation.** JFCs execute CMO for the primary purpose of establishing relationships with IPI and obtain the cooperation of the IPI in achieving stability within a given region. Properly planned and monitored CMO synchronize military operations with those of IPIs to improve relationships with the IPI and enhance the JFC's understanding of the human factors affecting the OE. JFCs also establish mechanisms under which direct synchronization, coordination, and integration with the IPI can occur.

b. **Enabling operations** include CAO, medical civil-military operations (MCMO), military government, MP activities, engineer activities, military information support operations (MISO), PA activities, cyberspace operations, and sustainment activities. These enabling operations and activities are executed by Service or functional component commands supporting the JFC.

c. **Information Management.** Each of these enabling operations/activities produces information that promotes situational understanding of the OE, specifically as that information applies to the civil component. This information allows the JFC to obtain knowledge of the OE and the systems, links, and nodes that comprise the society that exists within the OE.

3. Organizing for Civil-Military Operations

a. The JFC should establish formal CMO coordinating mechanisms in order to facilitate effective CMO. The JFC organizes its coordinating staff by creating a CMO directorate, typically found as part of the J-9. If the coordinating requirements surpass the CMO directorate's capability to facilitate CMO at all echelons, the JFC may establish a CMOC or a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF).

b. CMO Directorate. The CMO directorate builds relations with military and civilian organizations that influence operations or campaigns. The CMO directorate coordinates with a variety of organizations that have their own agendas and objectives to enable collaborative planning. The CMO directorate provides a conduit for information sharing, coordinating support requests and activities, compiling and analyzing relevant information, and performing analysis that supports the commander's assessment.

c. CMO directorate staff functions may include:

(1) Serve as staff CMO proponent for the organization.

(2) Integrate attached CA.

(3) Provide liaison as needed to interagency partners, NGOs, international organizations, and other joint task forces (JTFs).

(4) Provide staff oversight and direction to the CMOC, if established by the JFC.

(5) Develop annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and assist in the development of annex V (Interagency Coordination) to OPLANs and OPORDs.

(6) Coordinate with the comptroller and staff judge advocate (SJA) to obtain advice on proposed expenditures of allocated funds dedicated to CMO. Facilitate movement, security, and control of funds to subordinate units, and coordinate with the funds controlling authority and financial manager to meet the commander's objectives.

(7) Support transition operations (terminated, transferred to follow-on forces, or transitioned to USG departments and agencies, IPI, or international organizations) as required.

(8) Provide expertise and support to the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) or joint interagency task force if either is part of the Joint Staff.

(9) Organize a civil information management (CIM) coordination capability to manage execution of the joint-CIM process in the supported commanders' OA.

For further details on joint staff directorates, see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

4. Civil-Military Operations Center

An effective solution to gaps in coordination, synchronization, and integration is the CMOC.

a. A CMOC (see Figure II-2) is an organization, normally comprising CA, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within IPI, the private sector, international organizations, NGOs, MNFs, and other governmental agencies in support of the JFC. The CMOC is employed whenever CMO planning, coordination, synchronization, and integration is necessitated to a higher degree than can be achieved by the organically assigned CMO staff. CMOCs can be established at every echelon tailored to specific operations and are often utilized from operational to tactical level.

b. CMOCs are tailored to the mission and augmented by engineer, medical, and transportation assets to the supported commander. The CMOC is the primary coordination interface for US forces and IPI, humanitarian organizations, international organizations, NGOs, MNFs, HN government agencies, and other USG departments and agencies. The CMOC facilitates coordination among the key participants. A CMOC is formed to:

(1) Execute JFC's CMO guidance.

(2) Lead JFC's CIM.

(3) Provide liaison with other departments, agencies, and organizations.

(4) Provide a forum for organizations that want to discuss CMO issues and raise concerns, yet maintain their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for stakeholder discussions but not a stakeholder decision-making forum.

(5) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

c. When joint operations are tailored specifically to FHA or foreign disaster relief, the HN may establish a humanitarian operations center (HOC) or the CCDR may establish a



Figure II-2. Notional Civil-Military Operations Center

humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC). The interagency can also provide representation to these centers through liaison or civil-military teams.

For more information regarding interorganizational coordination, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination.

d. A joint force public affairs officer (PAO) or PA representative and information operations (IO) representative should attend recurring CMOC meetings as the PAO is the only official spokesperson for the JFC, other than the JFC. As active members of the CMOC, those PA and IO representatives work with other CMOC representatives (as available) to help develop themes, messages, and specific news stories that adhere to strategic guidance. Additionally, a senior CMOC representative should attend the CCMD/JTF battle rhythm events that discuss IO and the CCS issues.

e. The CMOC officer in charge (OIC) typically reports to the CMO officer on the staff. The OIC might be assigned to the J-9; the chief of staff (COS); or the commander of the JCMOTF, if established. During certain operations, such as the conduct of FHA, the JFC might assign a deputy commander or the COS as the director of the CMOC, perhaps

with another officer assigned to provide detailed supervision of its operation. The CMOC officer requires access to the JFC, based on the situation and mission.

f. The USG may establish a crisis reaction center (CRC) as part of a response package prior to the arrival of a JTF. CMOC personnel may integrate with the established USG CRC to mitigate duplication of effort. USG departments and agencies, IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and MNFs coordinating with an established CRC may not interface with a CMOC. However, the JTF should be prepared to create a CMOC in the event the CRC is overwhelmed by the situation or in another location based on the JTF's mission. See Figure II-3 for a comparison between a HOC, HACC, and CMOC.

g. **HOC.** The HOC is a senior-level international and interagency coordinating body designed to achieve unity of effort in a large FHA operation. HOCs are horizontally structured with no C2 authority. All members are responsible to their own organizations or countries. The HOC normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN or possibly the USAID Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) during a US unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it should consist of senior representatives from the affected country,

Operations Center Comparisons

	Establishing Authority	Function	Composition
Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)	Designated individual of affected country, United Nations (UN), or United States Government (USG) department or agency	Coordinates overall relief strategy at the national (country) level.	Representatives from: • affected country • UN • US embassy or consulate • joint task force • other nonmilitary agencies • concerned parties (private sector)
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center	Combatant commander	Assists with interagency coordination and planning at the strategic level. Normally is disestablished once a HOC or CMOC is established.	Representatives from: • combatant command • nongovernmental organizations • international organizations • regional organizations • concerned parties (private sector)
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)	Joint task force or component commander	Assists in coordination of activities at the operational level and tactical level with military forces, USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental and international organizations, and regional organizations.	Representatives from: • joint task force • nongovernmental organizations • international organizations • regional organizations • USG departments and agencies • local government (host country) • multinational forces • other concerned parties (private sector)

The authority of all three centers is coordination only.

Figure II-3. Operations Center Comparisons

the US embassy, joint force, OFDA, NGOs, international organizations, and other major organizations in the operation.

h. **HACC.** During FHA operations, CCDRs may organize an HACC to assist with interagency partners, international organization, and NGO coordination and planning. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates in early planning and coordination stages. Once a CMOC or HOC is established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through normal CCDR's staff and crisis action organization.

i. **JCMOTF.** JFCs may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requirements and activities are beyond the JFC's organic capability.

(1) JCMOTFs are configured for specific CMO requirements such as stability operations. Figure II-4 highlights some of the typical JCMOTF functions.

(2) The composition of this organization should be representative of the forces comprising the JCMOTF. A JCMOTF may have both conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) assigned or attached. United States Army (USA) CA command and brigade organizational structure can provide the operational C2 structure to form a JCMOTF. A notional JCMOTF staff organization is depicted in Figure II-5.

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Functions

- Advise the commander, joint task force (CJTF), on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
- Provide command and control or direction of military host nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Assist in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Perform essential coordination or liaison with host nation agencies, country team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US multinational, host-nation military forces, and supporting logistic organizations.
- Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Plan and conduct joint and combined civil-military operations training exercises.
- Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitating transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other government agencies, international organizations, or host nation responsibility.
- Assess or identify host-nation support or relief capabilities and funding requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders, Services, or other responsible United States Government departments or agencies.

Figure II-4. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Functions

Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Organization



*CMOC is shown for illustrative purposes. The joint force commander determines the staff relationship

Legend

CMOC	civil-military operations center
COMJCMOTF	commander, joint civil-military operations task force
CSEL	command senior enlisted leader
DCJCMOTF	deputy commander, joint civil-military operations task force
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications systems directorate of a joint staff
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force

——— command authority
- - - - coordination

Figure II-5. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Organization

j. **JIACG**. Mechanisms established at the theater strategic and operational level could include a JIACG at the CCDR level; joint interagency task force at subordinate joint force

2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE: JOINT TASK FORCE-HAITI HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION CENTER

The joint task force (JTF)-Haiti commander organized boards, centers, cells, and working groups to facilitate collaboration and align JTF operations with the United Nations (UN) Stabilization Mission in Haiti and other partners. JTF-Haiti stood up a 30-person humanitarian assistance coordination cell (HACC) as a civil-military operations center like mechanism to integrate with the UN cluster system. The JTF Commander designated Brigadier General Matern, a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters, the responsibility to lead the HACC efforts. Primarily staffed by members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the HACC began the task of integrating US military support to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UN cluster system, and the Government of Haiti by coordinating, planning, and assisting the establishment of medical clinics and food and water distribution points. The JTF also provided key support to the staffs and working groups of USAID and the UN. Possibly the most important assistance provided was in the area of planning and planners. A UN strategic plans officer recently commented about Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, "the military's planning capability is not the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable." The international coordination structure would not have stood up as quickly if they were not tapped into the JTF planning capacity.

Various Sources

commands; or CMO working groups, boards, centers, and bureaus established in order to ensure synchronization, coordination, and integration. JFCs may also establish civil-military teams necessary to achieve specific objectives. CMO is accomplished at every echelon, starting at the National Security Council down to the smallest military unit, where civilian interagency partners are coordinating in civil-military teams with the IPI. For more information on the CMOC, see JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation.*

k. **Civil-Military Teams.** A civil-military team helps stabilize the OE in a province, district, state, or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic development and enforcing the rule of law. Examples of civil-military teaming include the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), which were used in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW DAWN in Iraq and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. It combines representatives from interagency (and perhaps multinational) partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently conducting operations to stabilize a part of the OE by enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government. A civil-military team can focus on combined military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict, while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, providing basic services.

CIVIL-MILITARY TEAM

The first several hours after a major natural disaster, such as the Haiti earthquake in 2010, constitute a period of "incomplete situational awareness." During this time, the situation is changing rapidly, communications are disrupted, access is limited, and most on-the-ground assessments have not yet been conducted. Because of its proximity to Haiti, the US was quickly able to dispatch a USAID [United States Agency for International Development] disaster assistance response team (DART) and USSOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] personnel set up US Joint Task Force Haiti to manage and coordinate logistics and to support other USG [United States Government] humanitarian response activities.

Coordination centers were established at USSOUTHCOM in Miami and at USAID and the State Department in Washington to gather information that was useful for strategic and programmatic decision-making. One lesson learned/best practice that was followed was the assigning of DOD [Department of Defense], DOS [Department of State], and USAID personnel in each other's coordination centers to serve as liaisons and advisors in an effort to develop and implement a "whole-of-government" approach to the response. Representatives from UN [United Nations] agencies and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] also served as liaisons in some of these coordination centers, as well as with some USG teams in Haiti. This helped to establish personal relationships, facilitate interorganizational information sharing, and provide greater understanding of cross-community cultures.

US Department of State
Humanitarian Information Unit
White Paper, July 2010

5. Military Government

Military government is the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and IPIs of domestic, allied, or enemy territory, therefore, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government.

a. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to intervene militarily. For the joint force land component commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing joint land operations within an environment of political ambiguity. When a joint force performs a forcible entry (seize the initiative), defeating the enemy force, consequently deposing the indigenous government and subsequently performing a military occupation (dominate), the land component must establish civil control (stabilize) by implementing PRC measures through the assertion of transitional military authority or establishment of military government until transition to a civil government (enabling civil authority). This progression is in synch with the joint phasing model and consistent with the achieving of

unified action. The indigenous population must acknowledge the legitimacy of the US mission and the emergent government, thus the governed consent to be governed. US forces in support of the USG stabilization effort support an election process in order to confirm the legitimacy of the government before all sovereign responsibilities are restored to the new government and US political will is enforced. As a result, the potentially slow development process of government reconstruction and stabilization policy may frustrate flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of land combat operations. Thus, integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in a stability operation is essential to long-term peace and stability.

b. Integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in a stability operation is essential to long-term peace and stability. Military intervention could involve the conduct of a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. Intervention could necessitate military occupation and the initial establishment of a military government within the assigned AOR when occupying enemy territory (normally delegated to a subordinate or specified unified command, subordinate JTF, or the land component command) (see DODD 5100.01, *Functions of DOD and Its Major Components,* and DODD 2311.01E, *Law of War Program*). In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the US and its partners. The immediate requirement when occupying territory is ensuring stability by asserting transitional military authority within the occupied territory, providing the local populace with security, restoring essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs. The long-term goal may be to develop the following: indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

For more information regarding stability and transitional military authority, see JP 3-07, Stability.

c. When imposing military government, the military is in the lead as a whole-of-government effort to impose the nation's will. This collective effort is referred to as **stabilization** and **reconstruction** and includes stability tasks executed by all Service components, as well as other missions and tasks that preserve or restore essential civil services in the wake of combat. US forces perform stability tasks throughout its operations but establish temporary military government in order to initiate stabilization and reconstruction. Once implemented, initial military government is transitioned to another authority as soon as possible.

d. That transition can include transition to a US interim authority, an indigenous authority, or an international organization. When transition to a US interim authority, the military provides support to DOS to assist its stabilization and reconstruction efforts after temporary military government has transitioned military authority to the interim authority and a US diplomatic mission has resumed. Stabilization and reconstruction assistance may be required in a wide range of situations such as military occupation, COIN, and humanitarian crises. Once a military government has transitioned authority to an interim authority, the military remains in support to civil administration.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT VIGNETTE

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2013, coalition forces did not completely occupy the territory of Iraq; thus coalition forces were unable to completely dominate the operational environment. Civilian factions resorted to violence in order to assert political dominance; chaos ensued. As a matter of US policy, the US was not "occupying" Iraq … it was "liberating" Iraq. US diplomat Paul Bremer was appointed as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Director for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, subsequently renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). As Director of the CPA, Mr. Bremer ruled by decree. Amongst his most notable actions was CPA Order #1, which outlawed the Baath part in all its forms, essentially eliminating Iraqi government institutions from the National to local level. The absence of a military government produced a political/security vacuum in the time between military victory (March 2003) and the establishment of an interim authority under Special Envoy Bremer (May 2003). The inability to enforce local laws in accordance with the law of land warfare allowed sectarian rivals to vie for political and civil control. This rivalry promoted sectarian civil strife between the former ruling Baathists and the majority Shite population; civil war ensued. The CPA created the Iraqi Interim Governing Council in March 2004 coinciding with the drafting of an interim Constitution and Status of Forces agreement. Sectarian civil war continued as the majority Shite government gained and assumed the reins of government. The CPA along with the Interim Governing Council transitioned authority to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004. Although the newly elected Iraqi government drafted a new constitution, the fractured government failed to adequately remedy the sectarian/political division amongst the populace. The Iraqi civil war continued later with Sunni-based ISIS occupying territory formerly part of Iraq, an Iraqi government seemingly content with maintaining its hold on Shite dominated southeastern Iraq, and the Kurdish Regional Government continuing to function essentially as an autonomous region in northern Iraq. Even with changes in Iraqi government leadership, Sunni resistance continued and the country remained fractured.

Various Sources

For more information regarding military government, see Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Law of Land Warfare.

6. Defense Support of Civil Authorities

DSCA is support provided by US Armed Forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events.

a. Per the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD regulations, the US is generally prohibited from employing Title 10, USC, DOD forces to provide direct military involvement to enforce the law of the US unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Congress. For example, the President, as Commander in Chief under the Insurrection Act, may use the military in cases of civil disturbance and to protect USG functions and property. It is important to note that use of military forces in the defense of the US is not support to civilian law enforcement and is not subject to the prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act. DSCA is provided within the national response framework assuring the preservation of civil authority. Maintaining military command relationships and assignment of DOD capabilities in a support role preserve the primacy of civil authorities in their spheres of responsibility while facilitating the full utilization of military forces as permitted by the Constitution, law, and directives of the President. Military commands provide assistance in consonance with these directives for activities conducted under the control of civil authorities.

b. SecDef retains the authority to approve use of DOD resources for assistance to civil authorities. For DSCA within the US, the Joint Staff Joint Director of Military Support validates requests for assistance, determines what DOD capabilities are available to fulfill the request, and coordinates SecDef approval to use DOD forces. The Joint Director of Military Support will normally allocate Title 10, USC, forces to US Northern Command for operations approved by SecDef. The National Guard has unique roles in domestic operations. The National Guard, in either state active duty or Title 32, USC, status (not in federal service), is likely to be the first military force to provide support for an incident.

c. CMO is conducted while providing DSCA by designated DOD and state entities. CMO will occur in local, state, or regional coordination offices between civil authorities and defense representatives of a defense coordinating element, as well as emergency preparedness liaison officers or assigned defense coordination officers within various civilian-emergency management enterprises.

For more information regarding DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authority.

CHAPTER III
PLANNING

"…the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks. Ideally, planning begins with specified national strategic objectives and military end states to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused."

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*

1. General

a. **Planning.** Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future. Planning must be responsive to strategic guidance established in the *Unified Command Plan;* the *Global Employment of the Force;* and CJCSM 3110.01, *(U) 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).* The resulting global and regional or theater regional campaign plans will describe goals, supporting objectives, and end states that will involve CMO contributions.

(1) **Deployment, Employment, Sustainment, and Redeployment Planning.** Joint planners must clearly articulate CMO requirements to support joint operations. This enables commanders to select appropriate forces to support the operation. The Adaptive Planning and Execution enterprise and the JPP promote coherent CMO planning across all levels of warfare and command echelons, as depicted in Figure III-1.

For further detail concerning planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(2) **Large-Scale Operations.** CMO planning for large-scale operations includes multiple supporting actions conducted simultaneously throughout the JOA. CMO planners and CMO-related forces support the JFC with actions to:

(a) Coordinate military forces' use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance, or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies through and with IPI interagency partners.

(b) Plan for possible population displacements and work with civilian organizations (IPI and international organizations) to minimize local populace interference with friendly operations.

(c) Coordinate with civilian organizations to identify the local resources, facilities, and support available for US operations.

(d) Provide liaison and coordinate CMO support with local populations and international organizations, as applicable.

(e) Predict movement of civilians and establishing procedures and processes to minimize their interference with friendly operations.



Figure III-1. The Conflict Continuum

(f) Estimate the availability of resources.

(g) Prepare area studies of the assigned area to support the mission, as required.

(h) Provide civil information and analysis to US and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the local populace.

(i) Recommend theater policy for CMO activities.

(j) Act as the focal point for civil considerations.

(k) Provide technical expertise in all civil functions.

(l) Provide timely civil information for the development of the supported commander's common operational picture (COP).

(m) Distribute emergency food and water, clothing, shelter, and medical services supplies to civilians (depending on the effects of military operations to the HN).

(3) **Stability.** CMO are essential to integrate the military with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability activates. CMO stability-related planning considerations include:

(a) The post conflict mission objectives.

(b) Integrated military-civilian organizational and oversight elements or agencies.

(c) The extent of devastation.

(d) Local violence and IPI capacity.

(e) The availability of indigenous leaders and civil servants.

(f) The desires and objectives of other governments.

(g) US military in support to failed states.

(4) **Shaping Operations.** CMO shaping operations occur both as a precursor to large-scale combat operations, as well as when conducting military engagement, SC, deterrence, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. CMO planners and forces support the commander's shaping operations by:

(a) Coordinating for military use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies through and with IPI and interagency partners.

(b) Planning for possible population displacements and working with civilian organizations (IPI and interagency partners) to minimize local populace interference with US decisive operations.

(c) Providing liaison and coordinating CAO in support of CMO with local IPI and interagency partners as applicable to maintain stability during military operations.

(d) Predicting movement of civilians and establishing procedures and processes to minimize their interference with decisive operations.

(e) Preparing area studies of the assigned area to support the mission, as required.

(f) Providing civil information and analysis to US and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the local populace.

(g) Recommending theater policy for FHA, civil assistance, and support to civil administration operations.

(h) Acting as the focal point for cultural considerations.

(i) Providing technical expertise in all civil functions.

(j) Providing timely civil information for the development of the supported commander's COP.

(k) Assessing local governance, essential infrastructure, and rule of law.

(5) **Joint Lessons Learned Program.** Commanders and their staffs should review CMO observations, lessons, issues, and best practices from previous operations and exercises located in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), the DOD lessons learned system of record. In turn, upon completion of operations, it is the responsibility of the command to record observations (best practices or capability shortfalls), validate those observations, and ultimately resolve identified issues at the lowest level possible. Resolved issues become lessons learned and are institutionalized to improve military capabilities. Observations can be entered at the appropriate unclassified or classified JLLIS Website, https://www.jllis.mil or http://jllis.smil.mil, respectively. Lessons learned may also be gleaned from each of the Service component's lessons learned program. For more information on lessons learned, see Appendix F, "Administrative Instructions."

b. **Post-Conflict Operations.** Sustained hostilities can devastate the HN and even regional facilities, services, and personnel. US forces and MNFs may be required to distribute emergency food and water, clothing, shelter, and health services supplies to civilians.

c. **Conflict Termination or Consolidation Considerations.** Conflict termination and consolidation planning considerations for CMO include:

(1) The post-conflict governance structure for the HN and required US resources for military support to governance.

(2) Integrated military-civilian organizational and oversight elements or agencies.

(3) The extent of devastation.

(4) Local violence and IPI capacity.

(5) The availability of indigenous leaders and civil servants.

(6) The desires and objectives of other governments.

(7) US military in support to failed states.

2. Planning Considerations

Planners must understand national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. They must also have a clear understanding whether DOD is the lead or supporting USG department and agency during planned operations. Figure III-2 identifies general planning considerations for CMO. CMO is planned to improve the US

Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations

- Administrative, logistic, and communications support requirements of civil-military operations (CMO) forces
- The need for early deployment and employment of CMO forces
- The coordination between CMO requirements and plans and strategies
- The coordination of CMO requirements with other appropriate staff functions, the interagency partners, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, host nation, and private sector
- Additional lead time normally necessary for Reserve Component forces availability
- The early identification of CMO resources and task organization to support the plan and maximize use of external organizations
- Thorough inclusion and coverage of CMO in each phase of the plan requires proactive CMO staff work
- The need to work closely with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff to both provide and obtain civil environment intelligence used in planning
- CMO input to the targeting process will help reduce destruction of essential civilian capabilities needed in stabilize and enable civil authorities phases.
- The tactical, operational, and strategic objectives achievable via CMO
- Religious, cultural, and social customs for the operational area
- The need to work closely with the joint force staff in the collecting and fusing of civil information to provide the commander with an analysis of the civil component for use in the planning process

Figure III-2. Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations

military's relationships with foreign civilians and facilitate operations by working with whole-of-government, HN national and regional governmental institutions, international organizations, and NGOs to:

a. Encourage human rights, freedom, and democracy with US national interests.

b. Improve public education systems and institutions.

c. Build rapport with cultural and religious leaders.

d. Establish, support, or improve public health and sanitation.

e. Encourage economic stability by advising labor, procurement, and contracting authorities.

f. Provide FHA.

g. Restore civilian supply, public safety, and transportation.

h. Support USG and HN government efforts to combat criminal activity and its impact on the civilian populace and economy.

3. Other Planning Considerations

a. **Strategic Guidance.** The adherence to strategic guidance and consistent messaging should be reflected in the CCS process and considered when planning information-related activities and similar activities of the country team and may influence and inform the various organizations and partner countries that may be involved in the given operation. The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs should ensure messages are not contradictory and that they do not damage the credibility of the joint force or compromise the essential elements of friendly information. USAID missions are required to share with their geographic CCMD counterparts' drafts of their country development cooperation strategy early on in the drafting process for feedback to enhance joint planning. Conversely, the CCMDs are encouraged to share early drafts of their TCP through the USAID senior development advisor embedded at the CCMD, who, in turn, will share with the respective USAID missions in the GCC's AOR.

b. IO

(1) CMO are designed to shape HN personnel, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI opinions and subsequent behavior. IO is the integration of information-related capabilities (IRCs) with other lines of operation (LOOs) to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversaries and potential adversaries' decision-making processes, while protecting those of the US.

(2) CMO is supported by:

(a) Key Leader Engagement (KLE). By establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with key HN personnel, NGOs, and international organizations, CMO can potentially secure a more expedient and credible means of disseminating information and influencing behavior.

(b) Informing populace of CMO activities and support.

(c) Correcting misinformation and countering adversarial information directed against HN civilian authorities by adversaries.

(d) Promoting civilian HN legitimacy to the indigenous population.

(e) Providing information and participating in the CMO assessment activity (e.g., civilian polling data).

(3) **IO Cell.** The JFC normally **assigns responsibility for IO** to the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). The J-3 has primary staff responsibility to plan, coordinate, integrate, and assess IO as part of the overall operation or campaign. **The J-3 may designate an IO cell chief.** JFC guidance establishes the IO cell's organization and relations with the Joint Staff, components, and other organizations. **The IO cell should have CMO or civil affairs representation.** To support the overall CCS process, the cell conducts early and

2015 NEPAL EARTHQUAKE STRATEGIC MESSAGING

Strategic messaging to the international public from Unites States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its components during the Nepal earthquake response included appropriate language and an accurate visual representation of the US military response. USPACOM products supported the broader United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and US Embassy Kathmandu messages. At the outset of the Joint Task Force (JTF) 505 response, the public affairs officer for JTF 505 (Forward) initiated contact with the director for public affairs at USAID headquarters in Washington, DC, to ensure all parties were communicating similar themes and messages and using the same social media tools, thus conveying US objectives accurately and in a timely manner. This process encouraged a positive, trusting, and mutually beneficial partnership between all parties, to include the Nepalese Army Public Affairs staff.

Various Sources

continuous coordination with and integration of all IRCs, including PA, CA, MISO, along with all other activities and operations, so messages do not contradict, or damage, the JFC or compromise critical information. The IO cell chief typically chairs an IO working group.

For more details concerning IO, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, *and JP 3-13,* Information Operations.

c. **PA**

(1) The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, synchronize, execute, and evaluate US military public information, command information, and community engagement activities. PA convey facts about joint force activities to help the JFC build public support.

(2) Media coverage of CMO impacts perceptions of success or failure and may influence the commanders' decisions.

(3) PA, coordinated with other military (e.g., MNFs) and nonmilitary (e.g., DOS) communication, can shape the OE, prevent misinformation and disinformation from inciting protest or hostilities, and help establish or maintain diplomatic/political and public support to achieve the commander's objectives.

(a) Proper staff coordination is required to ensure information released by one staff element does not conflict with or complicate the work of another. For example, PA, CMO, and MISO messages may be different and may even be aimed at different audiences, but they must not contradict one another or the credibility of one or all three may be lost or compromised. This coordination should take place during the planning process.

(b) PA support to CMO may include the following activities:

1. Coordinate releases to the media with all appropriate agencies to facilitate consistent and accurate information flow to the local population.

2. Develop and disseminate media releases about CMO efforts to local, national, and international media, as well as to command information outlets.

3. Help media cover CMO or CAO. Highlighting HN government, military, civilian group, or organization contributions to joint operations may prove most beneficial to US interests.

4. In cooperation with civil affairs, publish and broadcast information to protect DCs.

5. Clearly state US objectives and US intent to transition operations to HN agencies or NGOs (in the case of FHA operations) as soon as conditions permit. Highlighting US intent to assist until the HN government or NGOs can lead operations supports transition and termination.

6. The JFC and PAO are the primary official military spokespersons.

(4) The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE), a joint subordinate command of the United States Transportation Command's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, provides ready, rapidly deployable, joint PA capability to CCDRs to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force headquarters (HQ), bridge joint PA requirements, and conduct PA training to meet theater challenges. The criticality of PA during CMO places considerable strain on existing PA staffs, which JPASE can augment during the planning and initial execution of CMO.

For further details concerning PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

d. **Legal**

(1) Legal advisors should work with both the J-3 and plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) to review plans, orders, and agreements between US forces and HN or nonmilitary organizations. Some CMO staffs have a civil affairs legal team. The SJA provides legal expertise as the senior legal advisor to the JFC, whether or not a civil affairs legal team is available.

(2) Civil affairs legal teams or SJAs advise and assist during preparation and review of CMO plans for consistency with US law; SecDef guidance; and the rules and principles of international law, including treaties and other international agreements; and local and HN laws. If there is both a civil affairs legal team and an SJA, the SJA will take the lead concerning any legal issues. The CMO staff element provides input for the development of rules of engagement (ROE). CMO may warrant supplemental ROE.

(3) Civil affairs legal teams and SJAs provide predeployment training to personnel and units preparing to conduct CMO. This training may include:

(a) **Law of War.** Understanding the legal aspects of war and implications on military operations.

(b) **Reporting Requirements.** Personnel should be trained in the law of war to recognize and report violations to their chain of command.

(c) **ROE.** All military and civilian participants must understand the applicable ROE for the operation.

(d) **Status of Forces.** The status of forces is an important concern for CMO planners. Numerous legal issues should be resolved prior to deployment, including, but not limited to, the following: HN criminal and civil jurisdiction, authority to conduct law enforcement (LE) activities, claims against the US or US personnel, authority for US forces to carry arms and use force, FP, entry and exit requirements, customs and tax liability, contracting authority, authority to provide health care without a local medical license, vehicle registration and licensing, communications support, facilities for US forces, contractor status (local, US, or other nationals), and authority to detain or arrest, as well as identify vetting and provisions for transferring custody. The SJA provides legal advice concerning status-of-forces issues, to include the provisions of current agreements, the need for additional agreements, and the procedures for obtaining agreements.

(e) **Environmental Law Issues.** All applicable environmental laws should be addressed in training.

(4) During combat operations, civil affairs legal teams may provide the JFC analysis and recommendations concerning population control measures; minimizing collateral damage or injury to the civilian population; treatment of DCs, civilian internees, and detainees; acquisition of private and public property for military purposes; IRCs; and other operational law matters.

(5) During the stabilization phase, civil affairs legal teams may provide legal services concerning claims submitted by local civilians and FHA issues.

(6) The JFC's SJA and the civil affairs SJA may advise and assist on matters related to civil administration. SJAs may also provide counsel regarding the creation and supervision of military tribunals and other activities for administration of civil law and order. The JFC may require legal services with respect to HN jurisdiction over US military personnel and activities. Figure III-3 highlights the types of legal issues that may influence joint force operations.

For more details concerning legal matters, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

e. **Mortuary Affairs**

(1) In CMO, the death of civilians requires specific political and cultural sensitivities. Civil affairs can help the JFC avoid diplomatic or political and cultural complications.

Legal Issues

Military Justice

- Uniformity versus efficiency
- Courts-martial asset sharing
- Divergent command philosophies
- Chain of command

Claims

- Foreign claims
- Single-service claims authority

Legal Assistance

- Asset utilization and interoperability

Environmental Law

- Applicability of US law abroad
- Environmental treaties and agreements

Fiscal Law/Contracts

- Fiscal authority to supply logistic support
- Contingency contracting and host-nation support

International Law

- Treaties and customary international law
- Law of war
- National policy issues
- Executive orders
- Status-of-forces agreement/status of mission agreements

Operations Law Issues

- Overflight of national airspace
- Freedom of navigation
- Basing rights (intermediate staging bases and forward operations bases)
- Dislocated civilians
- Humanitarian assistance
- Use of deadly force

Rules of Engagement (ROE)/Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

- An operations responsibility
- Legal advisor may be the most experienced and educated in ROE/RUF development

Figure III-3. Legal Issues

(2) Civil affairs can act as intermediaries between the affected organization and the families to ensure the command honors cultural traditions and complies with local and HN regulations.

(3) Civil affairs can assist local agencies interface with military assets providing support to remove the remains. This can include handling customs, location of storage facilities, burial sites, transportation options, and providing linguists.

(4) Civil affairs advise the command on cultural traditions relating to the handling and removing of remains.

For further guidance on mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

f. **Intelligence.** Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment's (JIPOE's) continuous process defines the total OE. It also describes the impact of the OE (to include the civil and cultural environment), evaluates the threat, and determines and describes threat potential COAs (particularly the threat's most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment). Available biometric and forensic collections should be included in the analysis process. The JIPOE process assists JFCs and their staffs by identifying threat centers of gravity (COGs); focusing intelligence collection, including identity activities, at the right time and place; and analyzing the impact of the OE on military operations.

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

g. **Engineering.** CMO will likely rely on engineering for construction, repair, operations, and maintenance of national, regional, and local infrastructure and essential services, to include facilities, water, sanitation, transportation, electricity, and fuel distribution. The engineering staff should be integrated into CMO planning throughout the entire process to synchronize engineer planning with CMO objectives and provide engineering technical expertise. The staff engineers can provide initial technical estimates of critical infrastructure and basic services necessary to sustain the population. They can also plan and coordinate follow-on infrastructure surveys as part of the overall CR plan to provide detailed descriptions on the condition of major services. These estimates and surveys will generally follow the model of sewage, water, electricity, trash, medical, security, and other considerations. The engineer plan may include developing and managing construction projects, using military or contract means, to improve infrastructure and services. Engineer planning may include the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), USAID, HN government agencies, and other NGOs and international organizations. The joint civil-military engineering board, CMOC, and JIACG can facilitate coordination between stakeholders to improve planning and execution of engineering.

For more information on military engineer capabilities, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

h. **Logistics**

(1) Logistic planners should identify CMO logistic requirements and HN and theater support capabilities. Logistic planners should also identify risks, risk mitigation strategies, opportunities, and logistic objectives. Emphasize locating logistic bases as close

as possible to the recipients. Logistic planners should avoid locating distribution points too close to major population centers to preclude displacement of civilians. Consider all potential supply sources, including HN, commercial, multinational, and pre-positioned supplies. Logistics and support infrastructure to sustain CMO are frequently underestimated. CMO are often logistics and engineering intensive. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the overall plan and be mutually supporting. This includes actions to:

(a) Identify time-phased material requirements, facilities, and other resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks.

(b) Identify support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and sea lines of communications. This will also require plans to deconflict civil and military transportation systems.

(c) Establish procedures to coordinate and control material movements to and within the OA. Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, providing the commander flexibility to reinforce priority efforts with additional assets.

(2) Planning should include logistic support normally outside military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and the elderly). CMO often provide support to these categories of individuals, and joint force planners should ensure proper aid is administered.

(3) Joint force planners should consider potential requirements to support nonmilitary personnel (e.g., NGOs, international organizations, IPI, and the private sector).

(4) Cultural considerations for logistic planners supporting CMO include:

(a) Inappropriate foods, materials, and methods may have a detrimental impact on CMO or the local populace's perception on the legitimacy and professionalism of US forces. Procurement of culturally appropriate foods and materials may require additional planning and coordination or use of contractors.

(b) Cultural heritage sites and property (world heritage monuments, archaeological sites, artifacts, and sites of local significance) should be protected from construction and heavy machinery operations.

i. **Medical.** MCMO will be performed by medical units directly and in conjunction with CA and in coordination with other USG department or agencies or multinational agencies. These activities must always be in line with the overall JFC's CMO objectives. Close coordination between the joint force surgeon (JFS) and civil affairs elements is essential to the success of MCMO.

For more detail concerning MCMO, refer to Annex C, "Medical Civil-Military Operations," to Appendix A, "Service Capabilities in Support of Civil-Military Operations," and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

j. **HCA Project Management.** A project is a temporary endeavor constrained by time, funding, and scope. When properly managed, projects can improve conditions in the OE through increased employment, improved infrastructure, and greater HN legitimacy and promote the specific operational readiness skills of US forces participating in the HCA activity. Project management includes planning, organizing, securing, and managing resources to complete project goals. Project managers are responsible for overall project supervision and oversight. They set priorities of work and individual project goals. They establish the management process to ensure material, equipment, and manpower resource distribution is commensurate with the project plan. They make decisions on resource allocation to deconflict schedules and competing requirements. Projects conducted under HCA are specifically addressed in DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities,* which also has pertinent information on project management, detailing the requirements for assessments and reporting associated with HCA projects. The functions of the project manager are planning, scheduling, and monitoring/controlling. To implement these functions, the manager must understand the commander's intent and the policies and regulations governing the project.

(1) **Plan.** This function includes organizing and staffing. The project manager breaks down the project into workable subtasks and determines the order in which to perform them. The product of this step is a logic diagram, or network, which is the initial graphic representation of a plan's tasks and order of accomplishment.

(2) **Schedule.** This function adds a time element to the logic diagram as the project manager determines individual construction activity durations and then calculates the entire project's duration. The product of this step is a critical path model, typically presented as a project schedule or Gantt chart.

(3) **Monitor and Control.** This function requires the project manager to direct the project, measure the progress of the project, compare the actual progress against the initial schedule, and take corrective action if the actual progress deviates significantly from the schedule.

For further information, see Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 4-04.2.5, Construction Project Management.

k. **Operational Contract Support (OCS).** OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Integrating innovative OCS solutions across the joint functions will increase joint capabilities resulting in greater freedom of action. Incorporating OCS into planning and operations will provide military forces with rapid and seamlessly integrated contracted support. This will enable commanders and staffs to synchronize contract support with the overlapping timeframes of current operations, future operations, and future planning for continuity throughout all phases of an operation. Most theater support contracts are awarded to local vendors and provide employment opportunities to local national personnel, promote goodwill with the local populace, and improve the local economic base. Unemployment can lead to unrest and contribute to local support to an insurgency. Maximizing local hires through theater support contracting or civil augmentation programs can alleviate this

situation. Expertise and equipment may have to be outsourced. In these instances, social, political, and economic factors must be analyzed before selecting a foreign contractor. One of the ways to mitigate the impact of a foreign contractor is to require they fill a specified percentage of their unskilled labor jobs with local population. In areas where security is an issue, intelligence-based vendor threat mitigation is a process of vetting that helps ensure funds are not inadvertently provided to the enemy. Furthermore, a properly vetted, local security contractor with a vested interest in the success of the project can satisfy the need to address social or cultural mission considerations.

(1) An OPLAN's annex W (Operational Contract Support) may need to include specific CMO-related guidance, such as directives, to maximize theater support contracts or local hires.

(2) **Integrating OCS Efforts to the Civil-Military Aspects of the Campaign Plan.** Integrating OCS into the civil-military aspects of the GCCs' campaign plan or OPLAN requires close coordination between the joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC), lead Service for contracting (LSC), or lead Service for contracting coordination (LSCC) and the GCCs' plans and operations staff. Reconstruction and transition to civil authorities' related OCS effort is normally in support of the COM or NGOs.

(a) **Management Challenges.** Joint staff directorates and supporting organizations can be quickly overwhelmed in their dual mission to coordinate forces support and support to civil authorities. OCS planning and coordination boards, cells, and working groups, in close coordination with project managers, can alleviate some of the challenges of managing OCS responsibilities.

(b) **Balancing Risk to Contracting Forces Support.** Another major challenge in planning for and executing contracted support of CMO is identifying both the potential risk CMO may cause to overall force support and any potential positive results toward achieving the civil-military objectives. What may be good for forces support may not meet the needs of the civil-military aspects of the overall plan. In all cases, both the increased security risks and contract management requirements must be closely analyzed prior to making any formal decisions.

(c) **Balancing Contracting Business Practices with Operational Needs.** The JFC's planners should work closely with JTSCC, LSC, or LSCC to balance OCS business practices and operational requirements.

For additional information on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; *CJCSM 4301.01,* Planning Operational Contract Support; *and DODI 3020.41,* Operational Contract Support.

l. **Financial Management**

(1) Financial management supports the JFC through resource management (RM) and finance support. The joint force director, acting as the comptroller, integrates RM and finance support. Financial management objectives:

(a) Provide mission-essential funding using the proper source and authority.

(b) Reduce the negative impact of insufficient funding on readiness.

(c) Implement internal controls to assure fiscal year integrity and to prevent antideficiency violations.

(d) Ensure financial management is coordinated between Services and CCMDs to provide and sustain resources.

(2) Financial managers should be colocated with the joint force SJA and logistic officer to obtain legal opinions and consolidate efforts in the use of JFC's fiscal resources.

(3) Resource managers develop command resource requirements, identify sources of funding; determine costs; acquire funds; distribute and control funds; track costs and obligations; capture costs; conduct reimbursement procedures; establish an internal control process; and coordinate finance support, which may include banking and currency support, financial analysis and recommendations, and funding.

(4) CCDRs have numerous sources of funding to be used to promote regional security and other US national security goals and can impact CMO. These include, but are not limited to, traditional CCDR activity funding; CCDR initiative funds; HCA provided in conjunction with military operations, Title 10, USC, Section 401; emergency and extraordinary expenses, Title 10, USC, Section 127; and OHDACA-funded activities, to include humanitarian assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 2561; transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries, Title 10, USC, Section 402; foreign disaster assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 404; and humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance Title 10, USC, Section 407; excess nonlethal supplies: availability for humanitarian relief purposes, domestic emergency assistance, and homeless veterans assistance, Title 10, USC, Section 2557.

For further detail pertaining to financial management, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

m. **IM.** Information is shared to build common understanding of challenges and potential solutions. This is accomplished through proper management of the information and people, processes, and technology. Information sharing in CMO allows the exchange of information with the interagency and MNF partners and with other organizations (international organizations, NGOs, the private sector). Planning for information sharing should include an understanding of what information can be shared to facilitate partner support of common objectives. Accordingly, that information sharing requires not only close coordination with the foreign disclosure officer and strict adherence to foreign disclosure guidelines but also knowledge of security classification guides and information security policy and procedures to ensure classified and controlled unclassified information is safeguarded. The IM plan must provide explicit guidance for all forms of information and sharing. Sharing and receiving intelligence information is one of the most difficult aspects of information sharing and requires careful review and handling.

For more details on IM, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, *and JP 3-33,* Joint Task Force Headquarters. *Guidance regarding disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments is contained in DODD 5230.11,* Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. *Guidance regarding safeguarding, marking, and handling of DOD information (classified, controlled unclassified, and unclassified) is contained in Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 5200.01, Volumes 1-4,* DOD Information Security Program.

n. **Communications**

(1) Communication with USG departments and agencies, MNFs, HN and FN agencies, NGOs, international organizations, IPI, the private sector, and other organizations is essential to successful CMO. Communication with stakeholders can include secure and nonsecure modes using voice, data, and video teleconferencing through a combination of military and commercial systems.

(2) Communications systems are vital to plan, execute, and sustain CMO. Operations, logistic, and intelligence functions depend on communications. Communications is the central system that ties together all aspects of joint operations and allows commanders to maintain C2 of their forces. Communications architecture supporting CMO should provide for interoperable and compatible systems to support the exchange of information among all participants. Direct communications between commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, international organizations, HNs, and the private sector facilitates coordination and decision making. While IM should optimize information sharing among participants, it also requires information protection for secure and nonsecure communications. Additionally, communications planning must consider the transition or termination of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to an international organization or the HN.

(3) **Spectrum Management.** HNs maintain strict control of spectrum management within their borders, and access by US forces is not guaranteed. CMO require communications and network planners to collaborate with spectrum managers to coordinate frequency allocation to military, government, nongovernmental, and private-sector users. Aircraft and weapon systems, especially sensors, consume significant frequency resources in an already congested electromagnetic environment.

(4) **Interoperability.** Nonmilitary agencies may have their own communications networks, and the degree of sophistication will vary. These may include commercial leased circuits and satellite services and high frequency (HF) radio equipment. Commercial satellite services can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communications. This system can provide an excellent communications link between both military and nonmilitary organizations. CMOCs should be equipped with communication equipment that facilitates coordination with all participants. CMOC communications requirements should be identified early. Deployment planners should use commercial off-the-shelf equipment to meet end-user requirements. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in CMO may also necessitate using unclassified communications means during the operation. However, this can create information sharing

challenges due to the lack of secure communications. The key to success is evaluating the use of all available means of communicating (military, commercial, HN, and FN) to put together a network that supports CMO. Every situation is unique.

For further details on communications support and spectrum management, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System; *JP 6-01,* Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations; *and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-16,* Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

o. **Information Security.** Information security is the protection of information and information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Communications may be secured against monitoring through encryption. Physical hardening and redundancy reduce system failures stemming from sabotage and elements of nature. Coordination with other agencies (e.g., interagency partners and non-US organizations) and MNFs also complicates communications security.

p. **Religious Advisement**

(1) Chaplains

(a) Advise on impact of religion on joint operations.

(b) Advise on impact of military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics in the OA.

(c) Advise on worship, rituals, customs, and practices of US military personnel, international forces, and the indigenous population.

(d) Liaise with officials of interagency, nongovernmental and international entities, MNFs, and local religious leaders (when directed).

(2) **By recognizing the significance of religion, cultural sensitivities, and ideology held by allies, multinational partners, and adversaries,** JFCs may avoid unintentionally alienating friendly military forces or civilian populations that could hamper military operations. Commanders and their staffs should also consider religion, other cultural issues, and ideology while planning CMO. Chaplains do not participate in activities that might compromise their noncombatant status under the Geneva Conventions, nor will they function as intelligence collectors. However, the joint force chaplain (JFCH), as a staff officer, will provide religious advisement to the commander and participate, as appropriate, in planning for the impact of religion on current and future operations.

(3) As directed by the JFC, in coordination with the CMOC, and in consultation with the CCMD chaplain, a JFCH may also conduct liaison with key civilian religious leaders and faith-based organizations, with the objective of fostering understanding and reconciliation.

(4) Chaplains also advise JFCs and other staff on moral and ethical issues, to include ethical dimensions of operational decision making in operational planning and execution consistent with their noncombatant status.

For more details concerning religious advisement, refer to Joint Guide 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

q. **Linguist Support.** CMO planners should determine linguist support requirements by phase. If needs in this area exceed organic capabilities, services can be provided by other USG departments and agencies, as well as through contracts.

r. **Civil Affairs Planning Considerations**

(1) Successful accomplishment of CAO in large part depends on adequate plans and policy determinations, adequate staff capability, and availability of dedicated CA to assist the commander in the execution of CMO. CA provide military commanders the knowledge and analytical/operational capabilities for CA-related decisions and actions that promote achievement of military objectives and facilitate transition to civilian authority.

(2) During the JPP, CA should:

(a) Identify CMO administrative, logistic, and communications support requirements.

(b) Recommend CMO force deployment schedules.

(c) Coordinate CMO with other staff functions and outside agencies.

(d) Provide COAs for JCMOTF development.

For further details on civil affairs planning, refer to Appendix B, "Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations."

APPENDIX A
SERVICE CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Annex	A	Service Civil Affairs Organizations
	B	Engineering
	C	Medical Civil-Military Operations
	D	Military Police or Security Forces
	E	Military Information Support Operations

The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of some of the Service capabilities that would most likely support CMO. Each annex to this appendix will discuss a different Service capability.

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

1. United States Army

a. The intent of CAO is to enhance stability, set conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society, and assist in establishing local government capability or enhancing its capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats.

b. USA CA, both Active Component (AC) and United States Army Reserve (USAR), conduct CAO in support of the JFC's CMO intent and synchronize their efforts with the supported commander's operational concept.

c. USA CA provide the majority of this CAO capability and are DOD's primary force to engage and influence the civil component of the OE, conduct military government operations, and provide civil considerations expertise. USA CA interact with unified action partners, IPI, other civil entities, and the interagency, through the planning and execution of CAO, to set the conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society. USA CA provide unique competencies and functions that enhance the military mission and advance US interests throughout the world.

d. CAO are designed to work with friendly networks and engage neutral networks to help achieve commander's objectives. Engaging with IPI, interagency partners, NGOs, and international organizations creates a better shared understanding of the OE, informs USG decision makers, and influences informal networks towards US national interests. Properly executed CAO can assist in:

(1) Shaping the joint OE.

(2) Mitigating friction between military forces and the civil component.

(3) Setting the conditions for stability.

(4) Improving relations between joint forces and civilian authorities.

(5) Providing civil considerations to the COP.

(6) Planning and conducting civil component-oriented, indirect approaches to joint and USG operations.

(7) Integrating civil-military teams to support military engagement and SC activities in support of USG operations and objectives.

(8) Improving USG partnerships with HN governments and their populations.

e. CAO is an umbrella term consisting of three core competencies, with nested functions, that focus on the civil component. These core competencies are essential and

enduring capabilities provided in support of CMO. For detailed information on USA civil affairs and CAO, see FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations.*

2. United States Marine Corps

a. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has the capability to plan and conduct CMO across the range of military operations. A dedicated CA structure is maintained within the Reserve Component (RC) and AC, consisting of four RC civil affairs groups (CAGs), each commanded by an O-6 AC CA Marine and CMO planners organic to each Marine expeditionary force (MEF). Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commanders may request additional support from a CAG via their USMC component commander.

b. USMC CMO are typically centrally planned by the MAGTF staff for decentralized execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF has organic air, ground, C2, and logistic capabilities that provide immediate and integrated CMO options to the JFC. Operational maneuver from the sea, implementing ship-to-objective maneuver and sea- based logistics, enables rapid execution of USMC CMO, without the need to establish extensive infrastructure ashore. Qualified Marines from each MEF's aligned CAG are prepared to deploy within days of a validated request, even if no Presidential Reserve Call-up is authorized. Additional volunteers may provide further support, by Presidential Reserve Call-up of CAG elements for contingencies or by mobilization of entire CAGs. Regardless of size, USMC CA elements will require support from the MAGTF in such areas as transportation, health support, supply, and messing.

3. United States Navy

While the United States Navy (USN) does not maintain formal CA organizations, it possesses important CMO-related capabilities (i.e., legal, transportation, health support, security forces, engineering [infrastructure], and communications).

4. United States Air Force

While neither the United States Air Force (USAF), nor the Air National Guard (ANG), maintain formal CA organizations, the USAF can identify ANG and Air Force Reserve officers with civil government or legal experience and leverage that expertise for judge advocate missions, PRTs for example. The Air National Guard Readiness Center normally assists USAF judge advocates in CA-related matters but does not routinely support other CA requirements. The ANG, together with the Army National Guard, may also be deployed to support CMO through DOD's State Partnership Program that is coordinated with CCMDs and DOS.

5. United States Coast Guard

While the United States Coast Guard (USCG) does not maintain formal CA organizations, the USCG can provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country organize and establish a coast guard or prepare for large-scale incident response. USCG forces conduct 11 statutory missions: marine safety; search and rescue; aids to navigation; living marine resources (fisheries LE); marine environmental

protection; ice operations; ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other LE (economic exclusive zone) and incident-response protocols useful to the GCC in conducting CMO.

6. Core Competencies and Functions

a. CA core competencies and functions are executed within the scope of CAO. The three CA core competencies nested within CAO describe the comprehensive, or overarching, capabilities the civil affairs branch provides. Civil affairs functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities that frame the mission and purpose of the assigned CA to achieve the desired effects. They may be executed prior to, simultaneously with, or in the absence of other military operations, across the range of military operations, and all levels of war.

b. Each of these core competencies support the overall CMO goals and objectives as outlined in the JFC's CMO strategy, but rarely do they do so independently. Instead, the core competencies are mutually supporting. The functions, which are nested under the core competencies, are those capabilities that must be executed to accomplish the designated role of the branch. CAO consist of the following core competencies and their nested functions:

c. CA activities.

(1) CIM.

(2) CMOC.

(3) Civil engagement.

(4) Civil reconnaissance.

(5) CAO staff support.

d. Military government operations.

(1) Transitional military authority.

(2) SCA.

e. CA-supported activities.

(1) Foreign assistance.

(2) FHA.

(3) PRC.

(4) Civil-military engagement.

7. Civil Affairs Operations and the Range of Military Operations.

CA support military operations and vary in size, purpose, and intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. The nature of the security environment may require CA to conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. Whether the prevailing context for the operation is one of traditional warfare or irregular warfare (IW), or even if the operation takes place outside of war, combat and stabilization are not sequential or alternative operations. The CA planner and CMO staff plan, integrate, and synchronize with other operations to facilitate unity of effort and effective use of developmental resources. Figure A-A-1 displays the CA joint responsibilities supporting CMO.

8. Civil Affairs Joint Responsibilities

a. CA can support both SOF and CF. CA supporting CF and SOF units execute the same core competencies and functions.

b. Civil affairs teams (CATs) are trained to conduct CR and civil engagement, engage HN and interagency counterparts, create country or region-specific supporting plans, develop activities to foster unity of effort, and conduct transition activities with the ultimate goal of identifying critical civil strengths and vulnerabilities in order to support JFC objectives. Civil affairs can serve as primary CMO advisors and joint force representatives to the HN government and interorganizational partners.



Figure A-A-1. Civil Affairs Joint Responsibilities

c. CAO, in support of CMO, enhances the JFC's ability to execute stability activities, IW, and transitional military authority. The civil affairs functional specialist capability can advise on, assist with, restore, implement, or enable basic government functions and coordinate with USG interagency partners to enable a whole-of-government approach to stabilizing the civil environment

d. CA provide the JFC an analysis of the local populace's perceptions, their willingness to support US and friendly forces, and other information related to CMO. CA promote military objectives and transition to civil authorities.

e. CAO planners should consider CMO in all phases and balance offensive, defensive, and stability activities. Overemphasis on offensive and defensive activities in earlier phases, to the exclusion of stability operations activities, may limit development of basic transition planning. Even during sustained combat operations, civil security and humanitarian relief must be established or restored as areas are occupied, bypassed, or returned to a transitional authority or HN control.

f. Initial CAO should advise the JFC and develop plans to establish civil security to protect both the joint force and the civilian population, while meeting the humanitarian needs of HN civilians affected by armed conflict. Simultaneously, the JFC should work with partners to support the restoration of essential services and to repair and protect critical infrastructure. CAO may best serve JFC objectives when conducted in areas where the USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs cannot operate.

g. Robust joint force C2 and logistics capabilities may make the JFC the only viable USG entity to execute operations in uncertain or hostile environments. CAO should plan and support transition of civil activities to interagency partners, HN, or IPI. The lead agency may not have the capacity to execute civil administrative and other stability functions. CA should support the HN government through SCA or execute government functions through a transitional military authority. The joint force may be the only USG entity capable of civil administration, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts until after combat objectives are accomplished.

h. During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the combination of stability, offensive, and defensive activities varies with the circumstances. Many crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as FHA, may not require combat. Others, such as strikes and raids, may not require stability activities. Still others, such as COIN, will require a delicate balance of stability, offensive, and defensive activities. CAO may be executed by theater civil affairs planning teams (CAPTs) or functional specialty teams at the strategic and operational level or via the execution of direct support by tactical CATs in the JOA. The JFC may determine that the operating environment for a crisis response supports the creation of a JCMOTF. In this case, the senior civil affairs officer and the civil affairs officer's staff may form the nucleus of the task force C2 and be augmented by supporting units to respond to the crisis.

9. Civil Affairs Considerations in Support of Joint Operations.

a. Civil affairs staff provide input and support to the JIPOE process by providing analysis and synthesis of the civil environment to the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2). This input complements the military intelligence efforts in analyzing the enemy threat and the OE. Rigorous staff efforts for developing civil understanding early in the planning process are important, and coordination with the J-2 responsible for the JIPOE is critical. CA work to provide continued analysis and communication with key leaders, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and various population segments. CA strive to be the cultural experts for the OA and enhance JIPOE with key civil and cultural considerations. The analysis of civil considerations should follow the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) framework.

See Appendix B, "Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations," for more information on ASCOPE analysis.

b. CA provide civil environment considerations and analysis into the joint targeting coordination board and targeting process. CA planners using CIM products and analysis can provide nonlethal targeting options to support the commander's end state when appropriate and support lethal targeting with analysis of second and third order effects and mitigate the effects of lethal targeting on the civil environment and local population. Specifically, CA analysis supports target development by participating in target system analysis, development of electronic target folders, and target list development processes, which are the responsibility of joint fires. Nonlethal targeting can include technologies to separate civilians from combatants (e.g., ocular interruption devices, warning munitions), as well as those intended to influence the attitudes of the population as a whole.

c. Civil affairs staff provide input and support the commander's OCS working groups coordinating requirements from interagency, HN, multinational, and NGO partners. Civil affairs staff, in coordination with interagency working groups, develop estimated numbers of contractors authorized to accompany the force; contractors not authorized to accompany the force estimates; and contracted support requirements by function and location from interagency, HN, multinational, and NGO partners during shaping and follow-on phases of operations. These estimates are used to enhance whole-of-government efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, civil affairs staff planning, through the OCS working groups, is critically important during transition planning between phase IV (stabilize) and phase V (transition to civil authorities). For more information on OCS planning, see JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support.*

For additional information on joint civil affairs and CAO, see JP 3-28, Defense Support to Civil Authorities; *JP 3-07,* Stability; *and JP 3-29,* Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A
ENGINEERING

1. United States Army

a. The USA has a wide variety of engineer units at division, corps, and theater level that provide particular technical capabilities required to accomplish essential, diversified tasks throughout the depth of the theater. The engineer architecture forms these units into an organization that is responsive to commanders at all echelons.

b. USA operational engineer HQ, assigned to USA and joint organizations, include two theater engineer commands (TECs), engineer brigades, and engineer battalions and one prime power engineer battalion. The TEC develops plans, procedures, and programs for engineer support for the theater USA. The TEC commander exercises command over those engineer or other units (USA and joint) task-organized to the TEC, to include commercial contract construction capability such as the USACE, NAVFAC, Air Force Civil Engineer Center, multinational units, HN assets, or others as assigned. The TEC may also support joint and multinational commands and other elements according to lead Service responsibilities, as directed by the supported JFC. The engineer brigade, one of the USA's functional brigades, can control up to five mission-tailored engineer battalions having capabilities from any of the three engineer disciplines (combat, general, and geospatial). The engineer brigade can support a JTF or a Service or functional component command (land, air, or maritime) and provide C2 of all Service engineers and oversight of contracted engineering within an OA. The engineer battalion can conduct engineer missions and control up to five mission-tailored engineer companies. The engineer battalion is typically found in the engineer brigade, in the maneuver enhancement brigade, or supporting a brigade combat team. Engineer companies include a variety of combat engineer units to support the mobility, countermobility, and survivability of maneuver forces, geospatial units, and vertical and horizontal construction companies for general engineering (GE). Engineer teams include specialized units for diving, mine dog detection, facilities management, construction management, geospatial planning, explosive hazards coordination, route clearance operations, water well drilling, real estate management, quarrying, asphalt, and firefighting.

c. USACE is the USA's direct reporting unit assigned responsibility to execute USA and DOD military construction, real estate acquisition, and development of the nation's infrastructure through the civil works program. Other services include wetlands and waterway management and disaster relief support operations. With its subordinate divisions, districts, laboratories, and centers, USACE provides a broad range of engineering service support to the Military Departments, USG departments and agencies, state governments, and local authorities. The USACE also provides technical assistance and contract support to joint forces deployed worldwide.

d. USA engineers are capable of providing the senior engineer command HQ in the OA or integrating into a joint force and supporting other Services, as well as multinational and civilian organizations.

For additional information on the employment of USA engineers, refer to FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, *and JP 3-34,* Joint Engineer Operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. The USMC provides operating forces to conduct expeditionary operations, and its organic engineering expertise rests in expeditionary engineering. Expeditionary engineering is the organic engineering capabilities conducted to meet the maneuver, FP, and basic logistic requirements of the MAGTF. Expeditionary engineering ensures the MAGTF can operate in austere environments with organic capabilities typically for zero to six months with limited external support to maintain operations. Expeditionary engineering provides freedom of maneuver through the application of capabilities to emplace and breach obstacles/barriers, as well as build and maintain combat roads/trails, assault gap crossing, and landing zones (formerly mobility and countermobility). FP requirements are supported by mitigating the effects of adversary weapons through position hardening and emplacing barriers that support stand-off (formerly survivability). Expeditionary engineering support to enabling basic logistic requirements of the MAGTF includes limited horizontal/vertical construction, power generation and distribution, bulk liquids storage, and a working understanding of infrastructure systems to adapt them for MAGTF use (formerly GE). An MEF is comprised of an organic headquarters group, a division, a logistics group, and an air wing.

b. The MEF is supported by an engineer support battalion (ESB) that is organic to the Marine logistics group (MLG) contained within the MEF. The ESB is structured to facilitate task organization and provide expeditionary engineering to the MEF. The ESB is organized to plan, coordinate, and supervise expeditionary engineering support functions. The expeditionary engineering support includes enhancing the MEF's maneuver, FP, and basic logistics. Additionally, the ESB provides explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations to the MEF.

(1) The ESB provides vertical and horizontal construction, gap crossing, water purification, and mobile electric power.

(2) The ESB can conduct limited counter obstacle missions.

(3) The ESB is the primary USMC engineering unit to support CMO.

c. The USMC division is supported by one combat engineer battalion (CEB) which provides expeditionary engineering support through task-organized combat engineer elements. The mission of the CEB is to enhance the maneuver, FP, and basic logistic capability of the USMC division. The division contains three infantry regiments, and a combat engineer company from the CEB normally supports each regiment. The CEB enhances the movement of the division's operational forces in much the same manner as the ESB.

d. The Marine aircraft wing has expeditionary engineer capabilities embedded in the Marine wing support squadrons (MWSSs). These support squadrons possess an engineer company with capabilities for the construction and maintenance of expeditionary

airfields, fuel handling, materials handling, and limited vertical and horizontal construction. They can also provide mobile electric power and can purify water to potable standards. Each MWSS provides EOD support to expeditionary airfield operations. Expeditionary engineer requirements exceeding MWSS capabilities are augmented by the ESB.

e. The Marine division, wing, and MLG structure outlined here is identical for I and II MEF. The organizational structure for engineering support for III MEF is similar but slightly reduced due to smaller end strength. GE support to augment the organic MAGTF expeditionary engineering capability is provided by naval construction force (NCF).

For additional information on naval construction augmentation to the USMC, see Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-10.1M/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-34D (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 4-11.5), Seabee Operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

3. United States Navy

a. USN civil engineering forces are organized and equipped to meet the requirements of diverse CMO engineering tasks. They are versatile, flexible, expandable, rapidly deployable, sustainable, and able to reconstitute for expeditionary operations. USN civil engineering forces combine the complementary but distinct capabilities of the construction and engineering operating forces of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) and naval amphibious construction battalions (PHIBCBs) of the naval beach groups (NBGs), the business enterprise of NAVFAC, and CCMD staff engineer positions.

(1) Because of integral working relationships, naval civil engineering forces are able to leverage a wide range and scope of engineering and construction capabilities to support the warfighter. Mission support areas include construction of advanced bases; horizontal and vertical construction; battle damage repair; the full range of facility planning, design, construction, contracting, operation and maintenance; and environmental compliance.

(2) Their expertise includes amphibious and underwater construction, construction contracting, facilities management, real estate acquisition, environmental compliance, ship-to-shore support, pier construction and repair, well drilling, fleet hospital erection, construction of standard and nonstandard bridges, water and fuel storage and distribution, electrical power generation systems, and utilities systems. They also provide technical engineering and contract support.

b. The NCF provides the JFC with flexible expeditionary engineering forces capable of supporting a wide range of missions. The NCF primarily supports the MAGTF and USN ashore forces as directed by existing plans and orders. The NCF also supports component missions specified by the CCDRs. NCF capabilities enable the JFC to optimize the effectiveness of dedicated Armed Forces across the range of military operations.

For more information on the missions, capabilities, and organization of the NCF, refer to NTRP 4-04.2.1, Doctrinal Reference for the Naval Construction Force.

c. NECC provides forces to fulfill operational requirements of a CCDR exercising C2 over subordinate naval construction groups. A naval construction group may deploy when two or more subordinate naval construction regiment (NCR) units (e.g., five or more naval mobile construction battalions [NMCBs]) deploy to a theater. NECC is comprised of two active and two reserve NCRs, six active and five reserve NMCBs, two active construction battalion maintenance units (CBMUs) with reserve augment support, and two active underwater construction teams (UCTs). NCF units include the following:

(1) NMCBs provide responsive military engineering and construction support to USN, USMC, and other forces in military operations. It is a modular task organization of air transportable, ground, and logistics elements. NMCBs can deploy rapidly as part of amphibious ready forces or maritime pre-positioning forces. It constructs advanced base facilities in support of the USN, USMC, and other Armed Forces and provides repair, maintenance, and construction support during contingency, emergency, or recovery operations.

(2) The CBMU provides follow-on public works operations, maintenance, and repair at existing advanced base shore facilities or facilities constructed by NMCBs in contingency operations. It also provides public works support for various USN expeditionary medical treatment facility configurations during military operations. Designated personnel are assigned IAW NTTP 4-02.4, *Expeditionary Medical Facilities*. In peacetime, CBMUs provide repair and maintenance support to US shore installations and have a secondary mission to conduct disaster recovery missions.

(3) The UCT provides underwater engineering, construction, repair, and inspection support and performs complex inshore and deep ocean underwater construction tasks, including ocean bottom surveys for potential underwater facilities.

(4) The NCR exercises C2 over subordinate NCF or other attached expeditionary units, providing planning, coordination, and oversight. It deploys when two or more subordinate NCF units deploy to a theater.

For additional information on the employment of the NCF, refer to Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 4-04, Navy Civil Engineering Operations, and NTTP 3-10.1M/MCTP 3-34D (MCWP 4-11.5), Seabee Operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

d. NAVFAC is the USN's global shore facilities manager. This command's primary mission is to provide facilities engineering, acquisition, and technical support to the operating forces of the USN and USMC. It provides construction supplemental and contingency contracting capability for planning, designing, and executing construction in theater including architectural/engineering services, real estate, environmental compliance, and base operation support/facility services. It also provides technical support across a broad spectrum of engineering and scientific disciplines during planning and solves challenging problems related to engineering, infrastructure, and environmental compliance during contingency operations using reachback capabilities. NAVFAC also maintains standing contingency contracts with large international and continental US civil

construction, engineering, and facility support service firms for contingency response missions.

For additional information on the employment of NAVFAC, refer to NWP 4-04, Navy Civil Engineering Operations.

e. PHIBCBs are an integral part of USN civil engineering operating forces organized under the NBG. They provide over-the-shore logistic movement and construction support to amphibious forces.

For information on the employment of the PHIBCBs, refer to NTTP 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, Ship to Shore Movement, *and NTTP 3-02.14,* Naval Beach Group Operations.

4. United States Air Force

a. The USAF engineering mission is to provide the necessary assets and skilled personnel to prepare and sustain global installations as stationary platforms for projecting air and space power across the range of military operations. Air operations are highly dependent on operating bases; consequently, engineering planners must participate in all stages of operational planning for bases to be available when they are needed. USAF engineering units can deploy either as a part of an expeditionary force or as detached units operating in support of specific missions and operational taskings. The USAF civil engineering mission in support of a typical plan or order includes airfield damage repair (ADR); emergency war damage repair to other essential facilities; force beddown; operations and maintenance; crash rescue and fire suppression; EOD; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and toxic industrial materials (TIMs) and improvised explosive devices; and construction management of emergency repair of war damage and force beddown that are necessary for employing USAF forces and weapons systems. These engineering forces are organized either as prime base engineer emergency force (Prime BEEF) or Red Horse units. During any type of military operation, engineer requirements will be numerous, and military engineers may be stretched beyond their capability. A force multiplier for USAF engineering is the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP) that allows civil engineers to focus on the most critical missions.

b. Prime BEEF is the primary organizational structure for supporting both mobility and in-place contingency requirements. The principal objective of deploying Prime BEEF teams is to beddown and support an air and space expeditionary task force. Force beddown generally divides into three categories—aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure support. Aircraft support provides the maintenance shops, hangars, squadron operations centers, munitions storage, fuel storage, and other facilities directly supporting the flying mission. Personnel support provides the housing, feeding facilities, latrines, showers, administrative offices, and other indirect support facilities. Infrastructure support provides the utility systems, solid and hazardous waste disposal, roads, and communications that serve the beddown site. Beddown locations range from main operating bases with adequate existing facilities to bare bases with no facilities other than runways, taxiways, and aircraft parking aprons. Tasks accomplished by Prime BEEF units include airfield support, fire protection, fuel systems setup and support, EOD functions,

construction of FP infrastructure, base defense, base denial, ADR, facility repair, and utility repair.

c. The AFCAP provides commanders with another option to relieve military engineers, particularly for critical high-threat or critical missions. AFCAP has installation support capabilities that mirror the USAF engineering and force support sustainment services functional capabilities. AFCAP can provide all the installation support services and operations inherent in the Air Force engineering and force support sustainment services functional areas, except EOD, CBRN operations, field operations, and mortuary affairs. AFCAP may be used after an initial military beddown response, for facility erection and construction requirements, or to support recovery operations at existing locations across the range of military operations.

d. Red Horse squadrons and their associated unit type code configurations provide highly mobile, largely self-sufficient, rapidly deployable echelons to support major construction requirements and to repair heavy war damage. Red Horse units are stand-alone squadrons not tied to peacetime base support. They provide USAF component commanders a dedicated and flexible airfield with base heavy construction and repair capability. This capability allows the GCCs to react, initiate movement, and support missions as the air order of battle dictates. Red Horse units often accomplish major construction in forward locations, in advance of the main deploying force. They provide heavy horizontal (earth moving and pavements) and vertical (facility and utility skills such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants; structural, mechanical, and power generation) engineer capability, and possess special capabilities such as quarry operation (blasting and rock crushing), well drilling, concrete or asphalt batch plant operations, specialized building construction (K-Spans), and constructive explosive operations. Red Horse units are also required to be current in a variety of other capabilities across the range of military operations.

For more details on engineering, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A
MEDICAL CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Overview

An assessment of total health support requirements for CMO comes from careful mission analysis, resource application, and an adequate survey of existing medical care infrastructure. This assessment should then be coordinated within the theater health support community. MCMO will be performed by health support units directly and in conjunction with CA. These activities must always be in line with the overall JFC's CMO objectives. DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities,* lists medical and other health interventions as primary tools to promote the security interests of the USG and the HN, enhance operational readiness skills of US military units, and promote USG foreign policy interests. There is significant DOD policy on HCA and FHA based on legal authority within Title 10, USC. Additionally, there are several funding sources for CA and medical forces to perform MCMO missions legally and effectively.

2. Civil Affairs and the Health Sector

a. It is important for public health/medical personnel to be involved directly with the assessments, planning, and execution of CMO that directly and indirectly affect the health sector. The health sector is a term used internationally to include all aspects within a country or area that affects the population's health. It is critical to consider all the aspects of that particular country to develop positive relationships and acquire information to maximize the health of the largest number of people. A viable health sector that can lead to better overall health is thus very important to a population and the HN government in supporting the stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

b. The term "health" is considered in the broadest sense as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." Thus, health includes direct care, disease surveillance and prevention, sanitation, nutrition, potable water, hazardous waste and material management, and consideration of physical and psychological impact of conflict and hardship. All of these components of health are typically disrupted, and often destroyed, in nations in which military operations are conducted or other natural or man-made crises have occurred. Many times these services were already in disrepair and a new emergency or conflict makes them even worse.

c. Other sectors of a society that overlap with and impact the health sector include governance, administration, logistics, economics, and security. The amount of HN governmental control over health infrastructure, policy, and personnel, or lack thereof, will determine how the health assets will be employed and if they can be reconstructed. A country's processes and alternative processes for acquiring medical materiel will be affected by its other logistic needs and capabilities. Finally, if the environment is insecure, the risk to health sector workers may prevent them from delivering services to the population.

3. Medical Civil-Military Operations

a. MCMO are accomplished by health support personnel and typically affect the health sector of the involved nation and where other civil sectors integrate with the health sector. Cooperation and coordination with joint military assets, interagency partners, HN, FN, IPI, NGOs, international organizations, private sector, and other entities will facilitate better long-term effects and outcomes.

b. **MCMO can be employed across the range of military operations.** MCMO include peacetime medical military engagement activities; FHA; and disease outbreak response in a permissive environment; pre-conflict, health-related CMO; and health-related activities during major campaigns and operations and post-conflict stability activities. Although the primary mission of health support is to enable force health protection (FHP), health support personnel may be tasked to conduct or support MCMO in activities that build HN or FN capacity in the public health sector. These operations are often conducted in areas where social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, inadequate and unsafe food and water (as well as distribution problems), civil disturbances, general civil unrest, diseases, uncontrolled distribution of hazardous wastes and hazardous materials, and environmental extremes. In this environment, there are several health support activities that may be appropriate for MCMO that include public health activities, to include preventive medicine initiatives, personal sanitation and hygiene training, safe food and water preparation and handling, infant and childcare, preventive dental hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, veterinary care, and behavioral health surveillance and support. Additional efforts can include the development of logistic programs, continuing medical support education programs and medical intelligence and threat analysis, and assistance in upgrading and devising methods for supplying and sustaining existing HN medical infrastructure and facilities.

4. Planning for Medical Civil-Military Operations

a. Medical planners must consider FHP and direct care needs of US forces, as well as the assets and resources needed to support CMO for the indigenous population. For example, the medical planners may have to adjust typical personnel and logistic packages to care for women and children affected even in operations not originally of a humanitarian nature.

b. Medical planning should account for the appropriate MCMO that will enhance each type of operation and at each operational phase. The medical planner, in conjunction with other experts within the JFS's office, must liaise with the CMO staff, the HN or FN ministry of health, the country team, USAID and other USG departments and agencies, and international agencies that address the health sector to define requirements and capabilities; establish roles and responsibilities; identify the people, process, and technology necessary to conduct effective CIM; and provide functional area analysis to the commander. An understanding of the capabilities, intentions, and efforts of these organizations will allow the JFS and the medical planners to include, or exclude, joint US military health assets as appropriate.

c. Needs assessment should be conducted in conjunction with the HN or FN ministry of health or governance leadership in the health sector, when possible. Civilian health partners such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), WHO, USAID, and any NGOs/international organizations familiar with the OA can help with this process. The objective is to identify the health sector priorities of the HN or FN and the most threatening issues to the local population. In doing so, the medical health service can then target resources and health assets to projects that will help build indigenous health system capacity and capabilities, save lives, meet the commander's CMO objectives, and be sustainable by the HN or FN upon transition. Care should be taken not to initiate projects that are not viewed as necessary by the served population, that do not have transition plans and target organizations and agreements in place, or that exceed the HN's anticipated capability or capacity to sustain long-term.

d. CMO planners need to be aware of aeromedical evacuation (AE) requirements in regard to highly contagious diseases. Patients with suspected or confirmed highly contagious diseases that pose a threat to US national security, require special public health action, or have the potential to cause public panic and social disruption will be treated in place and not transported with the AE system. In extreme cases, there may be a requirement to move one or two index cases for medical evaluation or critical medical care. Immediate contact should be made with the supporting patient medical requirements center for the affected AOR to coordinate decisions for transport. If patient movement is required, prior approval must be given by the involved GCC; Commander, US Transportation Command; and SecDef in consultation with medical authorities.

e. Medical logistics play a significant role in the delivery of health care during stability activities. Prior to a deployment, the JFS determines if there are any special medical supplies or equipment requirements for the operation—with the focus of providing only those supplies and medications available to the HN on a regular basis. Due to the variety of operations, there will be different priorities to meet MCMO needs. The medical planner must include plans on how logistics experts will obtain and coordinate transportation, and transport, receive, sort, store, and distribute Class VIII materiel. Further, medical logistic personnel can collaborate with international organizations, NGOs, and the HN or FN in assisting the military or civilian medical supply infrastructure and industry. See Figure A-C-1 for CMO medical planning considerations.

5. Caring for Non-United States Patients

Past lessons in stability activities indicate, that although providing care and medical resources to non-US patients has not been specifically planned for except in pure humanitarian missions, it is done in almost every operation. Populations that must be cared for include DCs, enemy wounded, and detainees. While under US control, enemy wounded and detainees are to receive medical treatment equivalent to that provided to US Armed Forces personnel within the AOR. Consequently, during planning, careful consideration should be given to what level of care could be sustainable by the HN health sector when treating local populations affected by US military actions. Often times, health care experts treat people in need regardless of the person's affiliation or combatant

Medical Planning Considerations in Medical Civil-Military Operations

- Enhance host nation legitimacy
- Account and prepare for local cultural and religious norms
- Share information and validation of ideas with civil affairs, foreign area officers, and local and international health experts
- Recognize local and international standards of care and avoid raising expectations above what is sustainable by the host nation
- Account for potential negative effects of medical civil-military operations on local health care system and the economy
- Legal issues

Figure A-C-1. Medical Planning Considerations in Medical Civil-Military Operations

status. Planning considerations must also include the necessary security and detention measures required during health care support to detention operations.

6. Health Sector Capacity Building

a. Health-sector capacity building includes interventions with intent to rebuild indigenous capability and ownership in the health sector. The objective is to equip, or re-equip, the HN or FN to take care of their own people instead of the US military providing care and services of a different kind, quality, scope, and logistic package than what will be present upon transition. Basically, capacity building should avoid providing parallel medical support that fosters different expectations or standards than the HN or FN can sustain in the future.

b. Health-sector capacity building should focus on public health and preventive medicine, which are the basis of a strong health sector. The most common causes of morbidity and mortality are addressed mainly with sanitation, potable water availability, and nutritious food availability. Direct medical care and ancillary health services have a role as well, and the US military medical forces can partner with other agencies to do so. Capacity building includes planning for the transition of health services totally to HN or FN control with other long-term health sector entities in support, such as USAID, the Red Cross, NGOs, or international organizations.

c. The focus of medical support initiatives during MCMO is to improve HN or FN capacity to provide public medical services to its population, thereby enhancing legitimacy of the HN or FN, enhancing FP, and accomplishing the JFC's objectives. Capacity-building initiatives during MCMO should emphasize long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN or FN.

7. Teams

Multiple teams and cells can be established to bring military and civilian minds together, both indigenous and multinational, to coordinate and cooperate on CMO. Health/medical personnel can be members on these teams and function in advisory and planning capacities to help achieve objectives in the health sector that supports USG objectives. The health care experts on these teams may come from different USG departments and agencies, including DOD, USAID, the US embassy in the HN, Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, and the CDC or NGO/international organization experts in MCMO and public health. Additionally, WHO and other regional or international health organizations may provide invaluable collaboration.

8. Joint Medical Assets for Civil-Military Operations

The five overarching joint medical capabilities for health support are: first responder care, forward resuscitative care, theater hospitalization, definitive care, and en route care. These capabilities are considered throughout the continuum of the health care system by the command surgeons and medical planners. MCMO is not one of these five listed capabilities, and there are no stand-alone medical units from any Service primarily designated to accomplish MCMO. Theater medical assets must be designated to accomplish MCMO as an additional mission. However, capabilities are present within each Service that can adapt to providing civic assistance. There are a limited number of medical personnel within each Service who have acquired training and experience in CMO-related activities and are well suited for leading, planning, and executing MCMO.

a. **USA.** CATs have medical personnel assigned with the duties of providing evaluation and advice on health sector issues pertinent to the CAO. Particular emphasis of the medical CAT member is placed upon preventive medicine sanitation and disease prevention, veterinary medicine and prevention of zoonotic diseases. CA health personnel are not intended to provide joint FHP, casualty care, or patient movement capabilities to the CA, nor deliver medical supplies to the populations to achieve CA objectives. Consequently, CA are dependent on theater health support assets for the care of the CA and dependent upon theater health support assets in conjunction with HN and NGO assets to execute MCMO. USA battalion and brigade-size units and higher contain attached or assigned Professional Filler System doctors, assigned physician's assistants and organic medical platoons and companies that can provide medical expertise to maneuver units conducting CMO.

b. **USN.** The USN does not have any medical personnel or units primarily dedicated to MCMO or CA support. Forward-deployable, preventive medicine units are ideally suited to assume a civic assistance role and accomplish collaborative MCMO with HN or FN and international assets. USN hospital ships are capable of providing medical assets to a region for a defined period and in a visible fashion. Adaptive force packages can deploy on alternative platforms. These and other organic medical assets can be employed to provide civic assistance in various operations but again should be employed with the

OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE

Department of Defense support to the USG response to the Ebola crisis in Liberia in 2014-2015.

While the military has dealt with force health protection in the past (e.g., 1918 Spanish flu pandemic), Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE was the first US military operation to support a disease-driven foreign humanitarian assistance mission. The international community's lack of preparedness to respond to the scale and severity of the Ebola outbreak and delayed decision making allowed the disease to spread, complicating the subsequent Department of Defense and international response. The unique aspects of the mission, the evolving Department of Defense roles, the lack of understanding of the operational environment, and force projection shortfalls presented challenges in establishing an expeditionary base in an austere environment. Although limited in capability, the use of a Service component headquarters, coupled with key enablers, allowed immediate operations and time to prepare for a tailored headquarters and response force. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) executed a disciplined operation that supported the United States Agency for International Development (the lead federal agency), avoided mission creep, and enabled a timely and ordered redeployment that included a 21-day controlled monitoring regimen. Despite the success of the operation, shortfalls were revealed in planning, policies, and preparedness across the Department of Defense, which need to be addressed for future, possibly more dangerous, global infectious disease outbreaks.

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planning principles noted previously into primarily capacity-building activities with long-term sustainability and effects for the allies being supported.

For more information on hospital ships, see NTTP 4-02.6, Hospital Ships.

c. **USMC.** The USMC CA do not normally have a medical expert assigned on its table of organization, though the MAGTF normally deploys with its own organic medical capability which can be used in CMO. RC CAG structure includes limited medical capability with each CA detachment and in the CAG CMO branch.

d. **USAF.** The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) deploys modular, expandable field health service units and equipment packages to accomplish care in expeditionary force operations. The AFMS provides an infrastructure designed to field and sustain a medically ready force throughout the entire range of military operations. This postures the AFMS to respond in FHA, as well as health care operations. Due to the modularity and rapid deployment capability, AFMS assets may be used to support a primarily humanitarian, civic, or other multinational stability activities. AFMS personnel participate at the start of force employment planning and expeditionary force operations.

Health service surveillance teams are critical assets in this process and can report on health threats at deployment locations. The USAF international health specialist (IHS) program serves CCMD and component command surgeons by providing medics with proficiency in a second language, regional and cultural expertise, medical planning, medical diplomacy, CMO, knowledge of international organizations and NGOs, knowledge of FHA, and other medical stability activities. IHS personnel assigned to CCMDs or to a JTF surgeon's staff work at the strategic and operational levels with CA to monitor and guide MCMO. IHS personnel from the AC and RC can lead or augment other health assets in tactical execution of MCMO.

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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A
MILITARY POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES

1. United States Army Military Police

a. MP demonstrate their competencies (soldiering, policing, corrections, and investigations) through the performance of their unique technical capabilities and tactical tasks. These technical capabilities and tactical tasks combine to form the MP disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support) (see Figure A-D-1), which enable the elements of combat power support the generating force and the operational USA across the range of military operations.

b. The USA provides the JFC a complete range of MP organizations from theater-level MP commands, headed by a major general, through MP brigades task-organized with two to five MP or MP detention battalions, to a variety of companies and teams. The MP battalion is the most versatile of the battalion HQ, conducting all three MP disciplines, and is the only MP battalion-level element optimized to conduct those MP tasks that comprise the security and mobility support discipline. The MP detention battalion is designed with a focus on the MP tasks that comprise the detention operations discipline. When fully operational, the MP detention battalion may operate a theater detention facility capable of detaining 4,000 detainees. Specialized MP teams include military working dogs and MP LE detachments. Each USA MP brigade is equipped with a nonlethal capability set to support each of its assigned missions providing an escalation of force capability.

c. The JFC is able to draw from a force pool of MP units available for integration into joint forces at various echelons. The theater army normally receives one MP command when more than one MP brigade is required. The MP force supporting a corps is not set by rules of allocation. Rather, the force is tailored to meet anticipated requirements based on an analysis of the situation. The MP brigade HQ focuses on support to corps and echelon-above-corps operations. The MP brigade is capable of providing effective mission command of MP operations for contingencies in which a corps HQ is required and is the most likely MP HQ to be tailored for a corps echelon. The tailored MP force supporting a division is not set by rules of allocation. Rather, the force is tailored to meet anticipated requirements based on an analysis of the situation. The divisional MP force may be organized under a multifunctional HQ, such as the maneuver enhancement brigade, or under a functional MP HQ.

d. **United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).** USACIDC operations support the GCC, JFC, or the senior mission commanders in maintaining discipline and order by preventing or investigating felony crimes which reduce a unit's ability to train and fight. During investigations, USACIDC concentrates efforts on serious crimes, such as wrongful deaths, controlled substance offenses, theft (based on the amount limit identified in Army Regulation 195-2, *Criminal Investigation Activities*), fraud, public corruption, sexual misconduct, assaults, cyberspace crimes, and other national security offenses. USACIDC also conducts sensitive and special investigations involving senior USA officials and those associated with classified

Army Military Police Disciplines, Technical Capabilities and Tactical Tasks

Technical Capabilities and Tactical Tasks	Police Operations	Detention Operations	Security and Mobility Support
	Perform law enforcement.	Confine United States military prisoners.	Provide support to mobility. • Support breaching • Support clearing • Support gap crossing • Develop a traffic plan • Conduct main/alternate supply route regulation and enforcement • Support passage of lines • Straggler movement control
	Employ forensic analysis or biometric identification capabilities support.	Conduct detainee operations.	
	Conduct criminal investigations.	Conduct host nation corrections training and support.	Conduct area security. • Base/base camp defense • Critical asset security • Protective services • Response force operations • Lines of communications security • Checkpoints • Port area and pier security • Area damage control
	Provide customs support.		
	Provide support to civil security and civil control. • Restore and maintain order • Support border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement • Establish an interim criminal justice system • Host nation police training support		
	Conduct traffic management and enforcement.		Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
	Perform civil disturbance control.		Apply antiterrorism measures.
	Conduct police engagement.		Implement physical security procedures.
	Provide support to civil law enforcement.		Provide military working dog support.
	Provide evidence response team support.		Provide support to populace and resource control. • Dislocated civilian operations • Noncombatant evacuation operations • Logistics security

Figure A-D-1. Army Military Police Disciplines, Technical Capabilities and Tactical Tasks

programs. USACIDC's Defense Forensic Science Center's Forensic Exploitation Directorate provides technical investigative support, integrating forensic capabilities

with those of other federal investigative agencies, joint and combined police activities, USA MP activities, and other sources of MP-related reachback support.

For more information on USA MP, see FM 3-39, Military Police Operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. Each MEF has an LE battalion assigned under the MEF command element. The LE battalion provides task-organized, functionally specialized police units capable of conducting LE operations; policing operations; police advising, training, and partnering; and detainee/corrections operations tailored to support the operational requirements of the MAGTF commander.

b. The LE battalion provides the MAGTF commander the capabilities shown in Figure A-D-2.

3. United States Air Force

a. USAF security forces provide LE, security, and base defense in the following areas in support of USAF, joint, and multinational operations:

(1) **Law and Order Operations.** Entry control and traffic control points, LE, crime prevention, traffic control, resource protection, and limited accident/incident investigation.

(2) **Base Security Operations.** Countering enemy ground attacks on air bases is a common task for all security forces.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Military Police Capabilities		
Policing Operations	Detention Operations	Support to Security and Mobility Operations
Police patrol operations	Detainee processing	Route regulation
Police intelligence	Detainee collection point operations	Physical security support
Support to identity operations	Detainee reporting	Protective services operations
Criminal investigations		Civil disturbance control
Law enforcement operations		Dislocated civilian support operations
Police advising and training		Support to mission assurance
Military working fog operations		
Customs and border clearance operations		

Figure A-D-2. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Military Police Capabilities

(3) **Military Working Dogs.** The USAF trains DOD military working dogs in support of its requirements as well as other DOD or USG taskings.

(4) **Combat Arms.** Conduct small arms training and weapons maintenance.

(5) **Nuclear Security.** Provide security for nuclear munitions from stockpile to deployment.

(6) **Area Security Operations.** Security forces can conduct operations beyond the air base to provide protection against attacks.

b. Security forces conduct these missions throughout the USAF, continental US, and outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Security forces conduct these missions fully armed and prepared to confront any threat against US national security.

c. In OCONUS operations, the air base defense mission may include a base boundary that extends beyond the base perimeter to conduct tactical maneuver to defend against the threat of attacks using standoff weapons. Security forces conduct combat patrols outside the perimeter fence within the base boundary. Security forces coordinate these operations with local LE or in a theater of war with HN, FN, or MP assets. Security forces ensure the area of security for the base is understood and procedures to respond and reinforce the security forces are coordinated.

d. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is a field-operating agency that is the USAF's felony-level investigative service. It reports to the Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The AFOSI provides professional investigative service to commanders of all Air Force activities. It further identifies, investigates, and neutralizes criminal, terrorist, and espionage threats to the USAF and DOD personnel and resources. AFOSI focuses on four priorities: detect and provide early warning on worldwide threats to the USAF, identify and resolve crime impacting USAF readiness or good order and discipline, combat threats to USAF information systems and technologies, and detect and defeat fraud impacting USAF acquisitions and base level capabilities.

4. United States Navy

The coastal riverine force (CRF) operates in harbors, rivers, and bays; across the littorals; and ashore. The primary mission of CRF is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases of military operations by defending high-value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors both inland and on coastal waterways against enemies, and when commanded to conduct offensive combat operations. CRF is composed of units manned, trained, and equipped to conduct port and harbor security, high-value unit security and escort, surveillance and reconnaissance, insertion and extraction of small units, and C2 for supporting assigned units. CRF is capable of conducting 24-hour operations in all weather conditions and climates. CRF operations:

a. Conduct security for designated assets.

b. Provide layered defense in the integrated coastal and landward portion of the maritime domain.

c. Provide maritime expeditionary C2 integration with the Navy component commander; joint force maritime component commander; commander, JTF; and multinational operations commander when directed.

d. Provide mobile and fixed defensive positions.

e. Support to visit, board, search, and seizure operations.

f. Conduce port security and harbor defense and harbor approach defense.

g. Coordinate fire support.

h. Insert and extract small units.

i. Escort and protect high-value assets.

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. United States Army

a. Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), exercises combatant command (command authority) of all active USA psychological operations forces USAR psychological operations forces are assigned to United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and further assigned to the USAR command. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM and Commander, FORSCOM, provide psychological operations units and personnel to CCDRs and COMs. Coordination of MISO is typically conducted through a joint military information support task force (JMISTF) operating directly under the JFC. The USA MISO capability consists of two active and two USAR psychological operations groups.

b. **Psychological Operations Group (POG).** The military information support group (MISG) plans, coordinates, and executes MISO at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A POG is structured to support CF and SOF deployed worldwide. It can operate up to two MIS task forces at the CCMD or the JTF level. A POG may contain the following organizations:

(1) **Psychological Operations Battalion.** Psychological operations battalions are regionally aligned affording them continuity within a GCC's AOR and the opportunity to develop collective cultural expertise. Psychological operations Soldiers are trained in foreign languages and maintain proficiency in order to stay qualified in their career field. Both cultural and linguistic expertise lend themselves to the ability to plan, develop, produce, and execute all expects of MISO.

(2) **Tactical Psychological Operations Battalion.** Tactical psychological operations battalions provide MISO capability to corps and below and select special operations and conventional task forces. The battalion develops, produces, and disseminates messages within the MISO program guidance (themes, objectives, and target audiences) and as authorized by the series approval authority (CCDR or subordinate JFC). The primary capability of the battalion is the development and dissemination of MISO messages and coordination for the execution of MIS actions. All USAR psychological operations battalions are configured as tactical psychological operations battalions.

c. **Special Operations Media Operations Battalion.** The special operations media operations battalion is a unique organization and as the sole battalion of its kind is subordinate to a single POG. The battalion provides audio, visual, and audiovisual production, signal support, and broadcast capabilities to the MISG, military information support task force, and tactical psychological operations units. The battalion can simultaneously support two separate OAs at the CCMD level. Additionally, the Strategic Dissemination Company in the USAR provides tactical-level media support to conventional MIS forces.

2. United States Marine Corps

The USMC maintains an organic capability to conduct tactical and limited MISO. The MIS capability resides principally with the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) and is organized as a tactical MISO company with three deployable expeditionary military information support detachments (EMDs). Each EMD contains three expeditionary military information support teams (EMTs). USMC EMTs are routinely deployed in support of USMC components; MAGTFs, particularly Marine expeditionary units embarked aboard amphibious warfare ships; and various USA MIS organizations such as MIS teams or JMISTFs. EMTs can plan and execute MISO through face-to-face communication, loudspeaker operations, radio broadcasts using radio-in-a-box, and disseminating various print and novelty products to selected target audiences in support of a commander's objectives. Additionally, MV-22 Ospreys, KC-130 Hercules, and various helicopter assault support assets organic to a deployed MAGTF can conduct leaflet dissemination. The MCIOC can execute both audible and visible actions designed to convey specific impressions to the enemy (e.g., broadcasts from man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and airborne loudspeaker systems, as well as radio-in-a-box frequency modulation and amplitude modulation band systems).

3. United States Navy

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual products are available from Navy Expeditionary Combat Camera; Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific; and from all aircraft carriers and most large deck amphibious warfare ships. F/A-18 aircraft can be configured to drop PDU-5B leaflet canisters. Shipborne helicopters can provide leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. C-2A Greyhound transport aircraft can disperse a large volume of leaflets by static-line airdrops from the aft cargo ramp. The EA-18G Growler can jam adversary broadcasts and also transmit MISO messages on a wide range of frequencies. Ships also have voice broadcast capabilities including HF, very high frequency, and ultrahigh frequency.

b. While product development is carried out almost exclusively by USA MISO planners, USN personnel have the capability to produce documents, posters, articles, broadcast messages, and other material for MISO. Language capabilities exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most Asian, Middle Eastern, and European languages.

4. United States Air Force

a. The USAF has a variety of assets used to execute missions in support of MISO objectives. EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft are equipped to broadcast MISO radio and television products. Transport aircraft perform static line leaflet airdrop missions. USAF aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping leaflet canisters.

b. USAF MISO capabilities extend beyond the typical dissemination roles of airborne broadcasts and leaflet drops. Behavioral influences analysis (BIA) provides an analytical framework to facilitate understanding and exploitation of the perceptual and behavioral

context of the OE. BIA directly supports MISO target audience analysis, providing a more robust assessment of target audiences.

c. MIS officers coordinate and liaise between the USAF air operations center (or joint air operations center if designated) and the IO or CCS staff to utilize all-source analysis of an adversary's sociological, cultural, and demographic information to recommend effective MISO. USAF MIS forces fill individual billets on joint manning documents and are capable of providing direct support and general support roles to units conducting MISO.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

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APPENDIX B
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

1. General

The JFC's CMO staff provides staff support of USA and USMC CA deployed in theater. They ensure CA capabilities are employed and that CAO are synchronized with conventional military operations. CMO staffs also ensure CA participate in planning and theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with CA capabilities, in addition to operational and support requirements. Theater special operations commands (TSOCs) provide C2 of SOF deployed in theater. They ensure SOF capabilities are employed and SOF are synchronized with conventional military operations. TSOCs also ensure SOF personnel participate in theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF capabilities in addition to operational and support requirements.

2. Planning Considerations

a. **CA Inclusion.** Inclusion of CA in support of a plan or order should be based on a clear concept of CA mission requirements. Once requirements are developed, the CMO staff element should determine appropriate augmentation requirements based on CA functional expertise.

b. **Understanding the Civil Dimension.** Understanding the civil dimension of the OE is paramount for planners to be able to begin to formulate plans to leverage or change situations to the benefit of the commander's objectives. For some planners, analyzing the civil dimension requires a departure from the threat analysis paradigm and shift to a more holistic paradigm that looks at the civil environment as a whole, at least to start with. COG analysis can be a useful tool to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing the sources of strength, weakness, and vulnerabilities of the civil dimension.

(1) Analysis of the civil environment is necessary for CMO planning to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in civil infrastructure, economy, governance, and other IPI that can be leveraged to advance the joint mission and USG objectives.

(2) Commanders and CMO planners must look beyond the traditional military construct in considering the impact of the civil dimension on operations. While the civil dimension applies to adversary, friendly, and environmental COGs, in some operations, it can dominate the focus of analysis. In such situations, the interactions between humans and the environment can result in recursive or unanticipated consequences. Additionally, analysis of the civil dimension is a continuous process throughout an operation and looks at the following six interrelated civil ASCOPE considerations:

(a) **Areas.** Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's OE, which are not normally thought of as militarily significant. The commander must analyze key civilian areas in terms of how these areas affect the military's

mission, as well as how military operations impact these areas. Examples of key civilian areas a commander should analyze are areas defined by political boundaries (e.g., districts within a city and municipalities within a region); areas that have historical or cultural significance (e.g., ancestral lands, burial grounds, archeological sites and settlements, and hunting, gathering, or grazing areas of settled or nomadic people); locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; economic and industrial zones; ethnic fault lines; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions. Failure to consider key civilian areas can seriously affect the success of any military mission.

(b) **Structures.** Existing structures take on many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams are often considered high-value targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and archeological structures, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Hospitals are given special protection under international law. Other facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television and radio stations, and print plants, may be useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, application, and consequences of supporting military operations. Using a structure for military purposes often competes with civilian requirements for the same structure and requires careful consideration. Additionally, if exigent military operations require decisions whether or not to destroy specific structures, consideration must balance the short- and long-term effects of such actions and be in accordance with the law of war.

(c) **Capabilities.** Capabilities can be analyzed from different perspectives. The analyst views capabilities in priority from the perspective of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities—be they HNs or FNs, aggressor nations, or some other bodies—to provide key functions or services to a populace (e.g., public administration, public safety, emergency services, food, water, agriculture, and environmental security). Capabilities include those areas with which the populace needs assistance in revitalizing after combat operations (e.g., public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce). Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission (e.g., interpreters, laundry services, and construction materials and equipment). The HN or other nations may provide these resources and services.

(d) **Organizations.** These organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions that influence and interact within the OA. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be indigenous to the area, such as church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups. Other organizations may be introduced to the area from external sources, such as multinational corporations, interagency partners, international organizations, and NGOs.

1. The commander should be familiar with the organizations operating within the OA (e.g., their activities, capabilities, and limitations). Additionally, the

commander should understand how the operations of different organizations impact the command's mission, how military operations impact organizational activities, and how organizations and military forces can work together towards common objectives, as necessary.

2. The commander uses the CMOC to keep advised of all these issues.

(e) **People.** This general term is used to describe the nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces during operations. The term includes all the civilians within an OA, as well as those outside this area whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. Individually or collectively, people impact military operations in positive, negative, or neutral manners.

1. There may be many different groups of people living and working within a given OA. Like the discussion of organizations above, people may be indigenous to the area or introduced from external sources. An analysis of demographics should identify various capabilities, needs, and intentions of a specific population.

2. It is useful to study the historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors of a target population to understand the civil environment. It is critical to identify key communicators, as well as the formal and informal communication processes used to influence a given population.

(f) **Events.** Events include routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly impact both civilian lives and military operations. Some civil events that affect organizations, people, and military operations are national and religious holidays, agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Other events are disasters from natural, man-made, or technological sources that create civil hardship and require emergency response. Examples of events precipitated by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays. Once the analyst determines which events are occurring, it is important to template the events and to analyze them for political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

c. **Predeployment Planning**

(1) The early deployment of CA in the OA can be a great force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population.

(2) The functional composition of CA varies with mission, availability, qualifications of CA, plus the supported commander's preferences.

(3) Mobilization of RC CA must be a consideration during predeployment planning.

(a) The USA and USMC both have authorizations for CA specialists. The majority of these CA authorizations are in the RC.

(b) USAR CA normally arrive in theater 130 days after Presidential Reserve Call-up for contingencies or upon mobilization.

(4) Ensure bilateral agreements and support arrangements are in place with the HN. Planners must coordinate with the US embassy for these, as well as ensuring aircraft diplomatic clearances are approved if required.

d. **Post-Conflict Operations.** Post-conflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement and then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. US forces will frequently be in transition from one mission to another. The transitions may cause the US military to conduct several types of joint operations across the range of operations. Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation require significant preparation, planning, and coordination between the interagency community, NGOs, international organizations, and the HN/FN government. US military forces, at the conclusion of hostilities, may be required to support long-term US interests and strategic objectives including the establishment of security and stability in the region.

(1) Transition or termination occurs either upon accomplishment of the mission or as the President or SecDef so directs. CMO planners play a major role in transition and

CIVILIAN-MILITARY CO-DEPLOYMENT IN SYRIA

In August 2016, US Special Operations Forces accompanied Syrian Democratic Forces as they liberated residents in Manbij, Syria, from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Following the liberation, US Civil Affairs personnel requested humanitarian assistance for the residents. When the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reviewed the request, they disagreed on the requirement but did not have any personnel on the ground to substantiate their view. An interagency disagreement ensued, and Department of Defense (DOD) spent $1.5M in Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid funds to provide cooking oil and other necessities to the residents of Manbij. Determined to prevent a repeat of the Manbij disconnect, interagency planners developed the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team - Forward (START-FWD). In June 2017, this small team of US civilian experts from Department of State (DOS) and USAID co-deployed to Syria with the US military. This whole-of-government approach allowed each agency to work to their comparative advantage. DOD provided access and security while civilian agencies provided expertise and programming. With support from the Special Operations Joint Task Force in Syria, START-FWD guided civilian humanitarian assistance and stabilization efforts, engaged in diplomatic outreach to local authorities and non-governmental civilian counterparts, supported the civilian aspects of the Defeat-ISIS campaign, and oversaw DOS and USAID foreign assistance programs.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy

termination not only in the planning process (by establishing a transition mechanism) but also with assisting civilian organizations in clarifying their respective roles and responsibilities after US military forces leave the area. The need for reserve CA should be identified early to allow for mobilization and deployment.

(2) Predetermined achievement of objectives along LOOs, such as availability of resources, or a specific date, is the basis for transition or termination criteria. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of DCs returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity is statistical criteria that may prompt the end of US military forces' involvement. Fulfilling transition criteria is accomplished by evaluating performance through MOEs to track progress along LOEs. Progress along LOEs under a LOO can be uneven, or the initial conditions can vary significantly, so the weight of each LOE in defining transition criteria for the LOO they fall under should reflect operational conditions and requirements.

(3) When other organizations (such as the UN, NGOs, HN, FN, and international organizations) have marshaled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan.

(4) Transition may occur between the US joint force, another military force (e.g., US, multinational, and affected country), regional organization, the UN, or civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. A major aspect during transition is the movement of large numbers of military forces and civilians out of or within the OA.

(a) An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms particularly is required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhances the transition.

(b) The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure planning assumptions are still valid and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

(5) Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces. Orders and termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to an order.

(6) **Transition Planning.** CMO planners play a major role in transition planning and should be fully integrated in the JFC's HQ staff planning process because of their expertise. A clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation should be developed. Transition groups are formed early in the planning process

of the operation with regular meetings to update the transition plan input as to the current OE. Transition planning begins with the end state in mind and results in a sustainable, durable structure/system. Transition to another organization occurs because a specific deadline, milestone, or end state has been met.

(a) Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and mission analysis.

(b) Transferring control of an operation or project from US military to a nonmilitary organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis (analysis of mission statement), an identifiable end state, USG strategic plan for reconstruction, stabilization, or conflict transformation and the national policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situation dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements.

(c) Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical area—plan for transition when planning for intervention.

(d) As the redeployment phase for US military forces approaches, it is important to continue emphasizing FP. The redeployment phase can be the most hazardous because the tactical focus shifts toward redeployment and away from FP. (Note: Although all facets of the transition planning process are important, it is critical that personnel protection is a priority in planning through implementation of the plan. Protection of the force is easy to overlook, but doing so could have serious consequences.)

(e) Areas that will significantly impact the development of a transition plan are:

1. Identification of issues.

2. Key events (past and present).

3. Work required to accomplish the transition.

4. A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

(f) The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between US forces and international organizations, NGOs, other interagency organizations, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process. There is no standard format for a transition plan. However, several significant areas must be addressed. The best way to cover all the areas is by using the OPORD format. The CMOC can support joint, combined, or single-Service operations from the strategic to the tactical level. In

general, the CMOC is a structured coordination center in which transition planning is an essential activity.

(g) All CMO assets, identified by their interaction with the civil environment and involved in a mission, must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most complex portion of this process. It is imperative all teams or sections conduct effective CIM to aid in the transition process. The transition process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission. CA play a major role in this planning process because of their functional expertise, regional focus, and ability to operate and facilitate activities with a variety of organizations. Figure B-1 depicts a sample checklist for transition planning.

(h) The transitional plan must be synchronized with the strategic guidance. All entities involved in the transition must share support and understanding of the themes and discussion points to be relayed to the IPI, international organizations, NGOs, HN government, and any other major stakeholders. It is critical to ensure the population is

Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

- Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
- Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?
- Who will fund the transition?
- What is the new mission?
- What US forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?
- What will be the command relationship for US forces that remain behind?
- What will be the communications requirements for US forces that remain behind?
- Who will support US forces that remain behind?
- Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?
- Will new rules of engagement be established?
- Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?
- Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or organization?
- Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the joint force?
- What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?
- Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?
- How will the turnover be accomplished?
- Who will handle public affairs for the transition?
- Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the United States Transportation Command?
- Will we transfer facilities, equipment or other assets to follow on forces, host nation, international organizations, or nongovernmental organizations?
- Are there disposal requirements for excess equipment?

Figure B-1. Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

informed of the transition and provided understanding of the rationale behind it. This will aid in the prevention of destabilization of the HN once the transition element begins to depart and turn operations over to HN governmental agencies.

e. **FP**

(1) FP includes preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. FP does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Elements of FP include but are not limited to the following:

(a) **CBRN Defense.** Operations in a CBRN environment will require the employment of tactical capabilities that counter the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards. CBRN threats include the capability to employ, intent to employ, and intentional employment of weapons or improvised devices to produce CBRN hazards. The employment or threat of CBRN weapons including TIMs pose serious challenges to US military operations worldwide. Together with USG interagency partners and PNs, the military will continue to invest in capabilities to prevent the acquisition and reduce the threat of CBRN weapons and respond to crises if they are used. The reduction of CBRN threats and hazards through building partnership capacity with PNs and preventing the proliferation of WMD are essential in the global environment.

For additional guidance on CBRN, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

(b) **Antiterrorism (AT).** AT programs support FP by establishing defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian force. They also consist of defensive measures to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment.

For further guidance on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

(c) **Security.** Security of forces and means enhances FP by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks and rear areas in the OA. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats from foreign intelligence assets, terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and biometric access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

For further guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(d) **Operations Security (OPSEC).** Effective OPSEC prevents threats from gaining critical information concerning friendly operations and enable the successful execution of all IRCs. The most effective OPSEC measures manifest themselves at the lowest level. Varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set, but unpredictable, pattern discourage terrorist activity.

For further guidance concerning OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(e) **LE.** LE aids in FP through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime. A cooperative police program involving military and civilian or HN or FN LE agencies directly contributes to overall FP.

(f) **Personal Security.** Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include use of individual protective equipment, use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms.

(2) **Planning for FP**

(a) JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address FP during all phases of planning. All aspects of FP must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement FP measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists.

(b) Supported and supporting commanders should ensure deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to, and upon arrival in, the OA.

(c) In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders should evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation.

(d) Because CA operates primarily in a civilian environment, there are unique FP conditions for CA of which the JFC and staff should be aware. For example, it may be inappropriate and counterproductive for CA in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. These types of concerns, and the impact of FP on CAO, should be addressed early in the planning process.

(e) Intelligence support to FP consists of actions to monitor, report, and analyze the activities, intentions, and capabilities of threats to determine their possible COAs. Detecting the threat's methods in today's OE requires a higher level of situational understanding, informed by current and precise intelligence. This type of threat drives the

need for predictive intelligence based on analysis of focused information from intelligence, LE, and security activities.

For more detailed discussion of FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

f. **Joint Urban Operations (JUOs)**

(1) In any OA, most of the civil authority and the greater part of the population are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of the numbers and density of civilians, any urban operation will require a significant CMO (CAO) effort on the part of the joint force.

(2) CMO conducted as parts of urban operations strive to achieve the same objectives as in other types of operations. These are:

(a) Enhance military effectiveness.

(b) Support national objectives.

(c) Reduce the negative impact of military operations or other destructive force on civilians.

(3) **CMO and Urban Operations**

(a) As with other activities, the complex, physical aspects of urban terrain can hamper CMO. The urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly FHA. It will be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC operations. Urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other forms of support, but the damage to those structures from military operations or natural or man-made disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the support difficulties.

(b) The civilian population is a primary concern of CMO, and urban areas may contain huge numbers of civilians. These numbers may range from the thousands to the millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will be displaced and in need of basic support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and support the civilian population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. Effective urban CMO requires knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and attitudinal characteristics of the populace. Civilian populations in urban areas are rarely homogenous; therefore, effective CMO will require the understanding of neighborhoods, tribal relations, and the basic allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants.

(c) Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of effectiveness, in which case CMO must work through and with local authorities and services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such as power plants or water stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not

only basic subsistence and shelter but the full gamut of support personnel such as police, legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, and transportation.

(d) The proximity of noncombatants to legitimate military targets necessitates careful weaponeering to avoid excessive collateral damage. The proximity to civilians increases the risks that diseases and other public health hazards will pose health risks to military personnel.

(4) **CMO Considerations in JUOs.** Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the main focus of operations but are in any case the responsibility of the CCDR to plan and conduct.

(5) **Planning Considerations.** Planning for CMO support of urban operations is generally the same as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban area. The JFC and staff should consider the impact of military operations on civilians, to include their culture, values, and infrastructure; thereby, viewing the urban area as a dynamic and complex system—not solely as terrain. General planning considerations were addressed earlier in this chapter. Additional planning considerations are below:

(a) CMO planners should carefully consider these aspects of the urban area—terrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure.

(b) Some other factors to consider include legal implications, communications, culture, education, economics, religion, labor, health, and administrative infrastructure.

(c) NGOs, international organizations, the interagency community, and IPI also play a major part in all CMO but may be of more importance in urban operations.

(6) **Synchronization.** CMO must be synchronized both internally and with other operations. The relation of CMO to the overall operation can vary a great deal depending on the situation. JUOs could require the full extent of CMO in one portion of an urban area while another is still being heavily contested. Most likely, regardless of the situation, civilians in the OA will have a great impact on operations. Planning must be synchronized to ensure CMO and other operations (e.g., combat operations) support the USG overall objectives.

(7) **Support.** CMO may require support in a number of key areas from other forces (e.g., health support, engineer, and MP/security forces).

(8) **Other Operational Considerations.** The most important urban operation consideration is that CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, other operations—including combat. The JFC must, therefore, identify sufficient forces and synchronize the planning and execution of these operations, as well as the support required. The relation of CMO to other operations in JUOs will vary, but CMO will be a significant part of any operation.

For further guidance concerning urban operations, refer to JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.

g. **ICBRN-R**

(1) ICBRN-R consists of USG activities that assist foreign governments in responding to the effects from an intentional or accidental CBRN incident on foreign territory in order to save and sustain lives, stabilize the situation, protect property and the environment, and/or meet basic human needs. These operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works, firefighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential or routine health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials mitigation, food, and energy.

(2) Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of an incident resides with the HN government. DOD normally supports DOS as the lead agency in USG ICBRN-R efforts. A CBRN response that takes place in a permissive international OE requires a request for ICBRN-R to originate from an affected nation through DOS. In cases where the HN lacks the capability to request assistance or DOS lacks an established diplomatic presence, the President may direct DOD to lead an ICBRN-R mission.

For further detail concerning ICBRN-R, refer to CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory; *JP 3-29,* Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; *JP 3-40,* Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; *and JP 3-41,* Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

h. **Negotiation and Mediation.** Although, historically, formal negotiating has not been a primary responsibility for CA, current experience has shown commanders come to depend on CA to execute this important task. CA have increasingly mediated and arbitrated disputes during military operations. Each role requires different attributes but there are many common ones and the following focuses on those common attributes and techniques. The COM is the lead USG representative in country and must authorize JFC personnel to coordinate with HNs, international organizations, and NGOs.

(1) Negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. It is important to understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature.

(a) In many operations, it is essential to maintain dialogue with all parties, groups, and organizations, not only the government if one exists but also the opposition or various factions or militias.

(b) It is also important not to allow any one incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied); needlessly fostering an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to a resolution.

(2) Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. It is a way to advance the command's interests by mutually decided action. Cooperation of the other parties is generally necessary; consider them partners in solving problems.

(3) Careful thought should be given to both the full range of mission objectives and the full range of other parties' interests. What are the underlying interests behind a particular position that a party has taken on a particular issue? People negotiate for different reasons such as:

(a) Tasks (e.g., the lease of a compound),

(b) Relationships (e.g., to get to know the other party and find out more information about whom that person is), and

(c) Status (e.g., legitimacy as a participant in the eyes of others).

(4) Alternatives in negotiating an agreement should be given through consideration. How can the negotiator be most persuasive in educating others to see a negotiated settlement as being in their best interests?

(5) Be attuned to cultural differences. Actions can have different connotations. The use of language can be different; "yes" may mean "no." How people reason and what constitutes facts and what principles apply are shaped by culture. Solutions often are best when they come from the factions themselves. Nonverbal behavior such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting also is important. It is particularly important to look at opportunities for small interim agreements that can be seen as "trust building" steps that are necessary when it will take time to reach agreement on larger issues.

(6) Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: negotiations among USG departments and agencies, between the multinational partners, between the joint force and UN agencies, and between the joint force and local leaders, any of which rising to the level of an international agreement require prior GCC and DOS Circular 175 approval (Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 181.3) prior to commencing negotiation. This complex web of negotiations requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open-mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

(7) **Procedures for Negotiation.** Successful negotiations should be based on the following steps:

(a) Establish communications. The first step is to establish an effective means of communicating with the political or faction leader(s). Do not assume that certain leaders or elements are opposed to your efforts without careful investigation. Insist on fact finding before forming any opinions.

(b) Carefully develop a plan and diagram the results of your analysis. Useful questions to answer in this analysis are:

1. What are the main issues?

2. Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?

3. What are these parties' publicly stated positions? Privately stated positions?

4. What are the underlying interests behind these positions?

5. What are the bottom-line needs of each party?

6. What are their concerns? Fears? To what degree does "historical baggage" affect them?

(c) There will be a negotiation on the conduct of negotiations (examples: physical location/seating arrangements [round table, U-shaped, etc.]/agenda/security requirements). This process must be addressed in the initial planning sessions.

(d) Set clear objectives. Know what the joint force is trying to accomplish, as well as the limits of its authority. Think carefully about how the joint force wants to approach the issues. Settle the easy issues first. Settle issue by issue in some order. Look to create linkages or to separate nonrelated issues. For example, security issues might be separated from logistic issues. Consider having details worked out at later sessions with the right people. Understand these sessions also will be negotiations.

(e) Work with the parties to identify common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue. Expect to spend considerable time determining the exact problem(s). At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented.

1. If a party perceives more benefits from an alternative to negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce, do not expect that party to negotiate to reach an agreement. You need to educate and persuade them that negotiations will in fact produce the most benefits.

2. Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.

3. Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking.

4. When necessary, assume the role of convener, facilitator, or mediator. Be patient.

(f) Composition of negotiating forum and decision-making mechanisms. In some cases, a committee or council can be formed with appropriate representation from the various interested parties. It is critical to identify the right participants in advance. For example, will it include COM and JFC-level, mid-level, or working-level personnel?

1. In deciding what constitutes the appropriate construct for a meeting, consider the culture. For example, what role do women play in the society? How is status defined in the culture?

2. Composition of the committee or council may also include legal advisors, political representatives (e.g., DOS, UN agencies, or others), military representatives, and other civilian representatives from the joint force, NGOs, or international organizations.

3. Members should possess the status and ability to deal with the leadership representing all involved parties.

4. For those members seen as part of the joint force, it is important that they understand the issues and speak with one voice. This will require a prior coordination within the joint force's delegation. They must understand policy and direction from higher authority.

5. Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frustrating. As the head negotiator, be attentive to whether you have the people negotiating who can effectively recommend that their superiors ratify an agreement reached. Are all the decision makers who will determine whether the agreement reached is implemented represented in the committee or council?

6. A supportive climate needs to be developed for the decision makers to complete an agreement. In that vein, it is useful to talk to those who are not decision makers but from whom the decision makers will need support. In this way, they may assist you in helping their decision makers reach agreement.

7. In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, it is frequently difficult to determine the legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement must be made.

8. The JFC ensures all of his or her negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their authority. Their requirement to obtain the JFC's prior approval will empower them in their role as negotiator or mediator.

(g) Establish the venue. What is the manner in which meetings can be called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should US representatives go to the factional leader's location, or will this improperly affect the negotiations? What about the details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings traditionally used in the culture?

1. Selection of a negotiating venue should also be based on security for all involved parties, accessibility, availability of communications facilities, and comfort.

2. Ensure appropriate information arising from, or relevant to, the negotiations is shared with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances.

3. Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generated from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision

will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publicity may help create support and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive. Flexibility is needed here rather than a hard and fast rule.

(h) Cultural Considerations

1. There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and departments of the USG that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are national cultural differences.

2. It is imperative that experienced interpreters be part of the negotiating team. What is critical is their understanding of the cultural context of terms used. The team needs more than literal translators.

3. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. It is worthwhile to consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting an approach. Adapting your techniques to indigenous ones (degradation of US objectives is not acceptable) may improve the prospects for a settlement.

4. There are differences in styles of reasoning, manner in which an individual negotiates, who carries authority, and behavior in such dimensions as protocol and time. For example, in our culture, it is accepted that one may offer concessions early in a negotiation to reach an agreement. That approach may not have the same connotation in other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a positive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cultures.

5. Western cultures tend to take a more direct approach to negotiations, with a give-and-take style. Other cultures are more indirect; they tend to be more concerned with the establishment of long-term relationships and view issues in an historical context. Issues of symbolism, status, and face may be important considerations. For example, answers may not be direct, forcing the negotiator to look for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand the other party's intent. In turn, careful wording and gestures are required so unintended meanings are not sent. The other party may not say "no" directly to a proposal, but that is what is meant. If agreement cannot be reached, it is still important to keep the dialogue going. The negotiator should, at a minimum, seek agreement on when the parties will meet again; anything to keep the momentum alive. It is often helpful to go back to earlier discussions on common ground and seek to keep trust alive in the process.

6. Within the negotiating team, one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues should look at the process of the negotiations and advise the rest of the team. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, they may be able to coach the joint force negotiators in more effective techniques.

(i) Social Considerations

1. Social identity can be described through national, tribal, clan, religious, language, or other factors such as geographical territory; political authority cultural expectations; and psychological ideals, beliefs, and convictions. The leading social identity may be in conflict with the prescribed law of the current governing power (i.e., HN government).

2. Underlying causes of conflict among the civilian populace are important factors to consider (social, economic, geographical, ethnic, religious, political). Determining the security of the populace should consider these factors, as well as perceived normal security levels within the HN.

3. It is worthwhile to consider essential needs (water, food, shelter, etc.) as a driving factor in stability activities. If necessities are unavailable, all good intentions will still lead to fear and resentment on the part of the locals.

4. Degree of religious freedom.

5. Presence of terrorist groups that could and do have an impact on the social fabric of the population (fear, compassion toward said group[s]).

6. Consider the overall quality of life (pros and cons).

(j) Implementation

1. At the conclusion of negotiations, a report should be prepared to ensure all accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use.

2. Consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to all participants what has taken place. This can build trust in the process if it is viewed as an honest effort to understand each side's position.

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APPENDIX C
CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

"Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major -- perhaps the major -- stake in the worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control over access to and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor."

Jean François Lyotard, 1984
French Philosopher
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge

1. Introduction

a. The CIM process is continuous, occurs across the range of military operations, and develops timely and accurate civil component information critical to the commander's understanding and planning. This information serves to augment and enhance the JIPOE process. Normally, CA provide the JFC with expertise on the civil component of the OE and conduct CIM.

b. Civil information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the joint force and other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of raw and analyzed civil information to military, interagency partners, and PN forces throughout the OE.

c. CIM enhances situational awareness and facilitates understanding for all forces in the OE. CIM is conducted in six steps that generate situational understanding through collection, collation, processing, and analysis of information that leads to the production and dissemination of civil information products that are fused with other intelligence and planning products.

2. Concept

a. **The information environment.** JP 3-13, *Information Operations,* defines the information environment as "the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions continuously interacting with individuals, organizations, and systems."

b. **CIM is a six-step process.** CIM provides decision makers with accessible information on the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements influencing actors in the OE. All levels of the military force should conduct CIM using an IM organization to support the IM plan. CIM coordinators are an important part of the organization. They monitor the information environment for civil information. The CIM process changes raw data into information to enhance understanding of the impact of military operations on the civilian population in the area. Civil information may be found

in many sources, including CMO reports, situation reports, civil assessment and survey reports, village assessments, reports on KLE and other military engagement, civil system assessments, and reports on civil projects. Success requires participation by the entire joint force, including the staff, maneuver forces, supporting elements, and military or nonmilitary organizations in episodic or persistent contact with the population. Through unity of effort, the CIM process provides structure to gather, consolidate, and analyze information moving through organizations to produce and share with decision makers and staffs.

c. **Intent.** The joint force should identify, understand, and evaluate the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements in order to shape human decision making and associated behavior. When military personnel need to develop area-specific knowledge on how these elements shape the perspectives of actors in the environment, they draw on experts to obtain advanced insights and predictive analysis. Situational awareness enhanced by CIM provides detailed examination of human decision making and behavior enabling commanders to identify desired effects on relevant actors in the environment.

(1) **Method.** Understanding these dynamics may enable joint force and partner abilities to plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations to produce desired effects on individuals, groups, and populations in the OA. CIM is the process of gathering, storing, and analyzing civil information to fuse with other data sources in the information environment. CIM improves joint force situational awareness and decision making by providing the JFC with timely, accurate information. CIM ensures the widest possible dissemination of civil information to other military and select nonmilitary partners throughout the JOA at the discretion of the JFC.

(2) **End state.** Through persistent contact with the local population, military personnel have the ability to record metrics, observations, and insights on the civilian condition in an OA. They record data using formatted reports in a common database. When fused with information from multiple sources, the products paint a larger picture, enabling commanders to better understand the OE. Joint planners may fuse data with information from multiple sources to develop approaches to shape the environment through relationships with the local population.

(3) **Notional example.** As depicted in Figure C-1, understanding who local leaders are; how they relate to others; and the populace's needs, strengths, weaknesses, and limitations are critical tools in security and stability. IAW conventional wisdom, the JFC might choose to conduct KLE with the town mayor to influence public attitudes toward the local insurgency. When JTF planners fuse CIM with information from other sources, they discover the local religious leader not only influences more of the town populace than the mayor but is also related to the local insurgent leader by marriage. Additionally, the religious leader's family ties enable him to indirectly communicate with the insurgent commander through a common brother-in-law. The religious leader appears friendly to goals of the MNF. Which way might the brother-in-law lean? Is he willing to help in negotiations? In this circumstance, fusing CIM with intelligence shows JFC KLE with the religious leader might be more effective than the town mayor.



Figure C-1. Notional Civil Information Management Connects-the-Dots between People in the Operational Environment

3. Civil Affairs

CIM is a core task of CA, the primary responsibility of the civil affairs officer or noncommissioned officer in the CIM cell, and an essential task for all CA in coordination with the J-2. The JFC should task supported units' intelligence and maneuver elements with CIM to support JFC decision making though enhancing the COP and supporting the JIPOE process.

a. **Civil Affairs CIM Database.** Various organizations at all levels use different databases and applications for CIM. The Services and CCMDs, including United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), conduct ongoing efforts to identify and develop systems and processes to conduct CIM using common doctrine and technical standards.



Figure C-2. Civil Information Management Process

b. **The CIM Process.** There are six steps of the CIM process, as depicted in Figure C-2:

(1) **Plan.** Mission planning should consider more than staff analysis of DOD-sourced information. It should include as many information sources as possible from intelligence organizations, interagency partners, the HN, IPI, international organizations, and NGOs to develop better understanding of OE. Depicted in Figure C-2, the civil affairs staff uses the CIM process to build a comprehensive understanding of the OE and to enable operations aimed at mitigating sources of instability, civil vulnerabilities, and duplication of effort.

(a) JTF staff participation in interagency and multinational forums with the command, senior USAID representatives, and other senior agency representatives are important to coordinate activities. This is especially true in hostile or uncertain environments where there may be no imbedded USAID personnel. CA can provide real-time assessments in governance and FHA issues.

(b) When appropriate, the JTF staff should participate in national-level formal and informal discussions among HN, UN, other government and nongovernment participants to share perspectives and develop a common understanding.

(c) The JTF should collaborate and share information with all USG, international organization, and NGO entities to develop a comprehensive understanding of CMO in the OE. Potential partners are shown in Figure C-3.

Potential Partners in Civil Information Management

United States Government (USG), International Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) Interorganizational Coordination

USG Departments and Agencies

- Department of Agriculture
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Justice
- Department of Labor
- Department of State
- Department of Transportation
- Department of the Treasury
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Environmental Protection Agency
- General Services Administration
- National Security Council
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Peace Corps
- United States Agency for International Development

International Organizations

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- United Nations
- United Nations Children's Fund
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- United Nations World Food Programme
- United Nations World Health Organization
- United Nations Development Programme
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- European Union
- Organization of American States

NGOs

- International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
- American Red Cross

Figure C-3. Potential Partners in Civil Information Management

(d) CIM requires planners assess conditions in the JOA. The assessment process serves two important purposes. First, to gain clarity of the situation, and second, to enable the supported government to monitor progress. The international community and national actors should discuss the scope and objectives of the assessments to ensure they are suitable. A number of factors, including the attitudes of key HN leaders, shape MOPs

and MOEs. Assessments provide an important opportunity to build trust between international and local organizations and develop local ownership of USG-sponsored programs. The development of MOPs and MOEs are shown in Figure C-4.

For more details concerning MOE and MOP, refer to the Joint Civil Information Management Users Manual *available at: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-270815.*

(2) **Gather.** Information gathering occurs at all levels through civil assessment and survey operations and data mining with the information environment to satisfy the JFC's requirements.

(a) CIM should be kept unclassified to share information with non-USG partners. Daily interaction among US forces and the myriad of civilians in the supported commander's OA is the most valued resource of information gathering. Record these contacts and data points. Initial assessments may be short and superficial due to pressure to quickly design and implement programs and activities. Political priorities or immediate threats posed by natural disasters, and real or potential violent conflict may obstruct in-depth planning and preparation. When conditions prevent comprehensive assessments from being performed, planners should include required assessments as a specified task in the plan.



Figure C-4. Assessment Levels and Measures

(b) CR are targeted, planned, and coordinated observations and evaluations of specific civil aspects of the environment. CR focuses on the civil component. The elements are area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. CR also focuses on gathering civil information to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision making. CAO and CMO planners (J-3, J-5, and J-9) and supporting CAPTs, in coordination with the CMOC, integrate CR analysis into the overall OPLAN. A coordinated CR plan considers multiple sources. Examples include:

1. Ongoing assessments of the JOA that identify MOE trends.

2. Identified unknowns in civil information.

3. Gaps identified during collation and analysis.

4. Gaps remaining in the area study, assessment, and staff estimate.

5. CA interaction with IPI or civilian constructs of an OA, including, but not limited to, the following:

a. HN government officials.

b. Religious leaders.

c. Tribal, commercial, and private organizations.

d. All categories of DCs.

e. Legal and illegal immigrants.

f. Infrastructure managers and workers.

g. Local industry personnel.

h. Medical and educational personnel.

(3) **Consolidate.** The two elements of consolidate are collation and processing.

(a) Collation is storing and meta-tagging data to organize and standardize it into relevant groups for identification or further processing. A civil information database is capable of cataloging vast amounts of data with attached files and photos and rapidly retrieving this data for follow-on processing, analysis, production, and sharing. Within these database structures, civil information is normally collated by date, type, location, organization, activity, and meta-tagged by supported objectives.

(b) Processing is reducing and converting collated data into specific formats. Processing reduces data size by removing obsolete, irrelevant, inaccurate, or incomplete data, then, collapsing overlapping (similar or repetitious) data according to meta-tags and analysis needs. The final step converts data into formats used for assessment and sense-making (sensible, reasonable, and practicable).

(4) **Analysis.** Analysis is the process of evaluating and integrating collected information to produce intelligence products. Analysts and civil information managers fuse civil information into products to recognize current and future impacts of the threat and/or environment on operations. CIM supervisors direct the analytical efforts to close gaps in the commanders' awareness and understanding. Analysis of civil information focuses on the following:

(a) Identifying mission variables.

(b) Identifying operational variables.

(c) Identifying COGs.

(d) Identifying trends.

(e) Conducting predictive analysis.

(f) Identifying civil vulnerabilities.

(g) Assessment of MOPs and MOEs.

(h) Prioritization and apportionment of resources to:

1. Address civil vulnerabilities.

2. Influence populations.

3. Legitimize governments.

(5) **Produce.** This is the packaging of civil information products into easily disseminated reports, presentations, and updates. The production phase of the CIM process ensures CIM products and services are accurate, timely, and useable for commanders and other senior leaders. Products include:

(a) Layered geospatial information.

(b) Civil layers (ASCOPE) for the COP.

(c) COGs.

(d) Civil considerations products.

(e) Answers to requests for information.

(f) Reported priority civil information requirements.

(g) Updates to ongoing assessments, estimates, and area studies.

(6) **Information Sharing**

(a) Information sharing is integral for CMO to establish and maintain perceptions of legitimacy. Without effective information sharing between all involved parties, unity of effort may not be achieved. Information sharing assists disparate partner agencies and organization in coordinating actions, and presents a unified, legitimate face to the target audience. Information sharing involves more than an active pushing of products to specific consumers and the passive posting of products on web portals. Information sharing is a dedicated, cyclic process, integrated into the military decision making process, to ensure all parties involved in establishing an agreed-upon end state are working from a shared understanding of the operational variables.

(b) The CMO partners may not realize what information they need; therefore, forces assigned to CAO or CMO must anticipate the information needs of the partner or supported unit or agency. Thorough dissemination of civil information reduces redundancy and ensures the maximum effects are created by using limited resources to their fullest potential to fulfill information gaps or apply assets to create an effect. Mechanisms for sharing may vary by situation and echelon, but the goal to share a common understanding of the OE remains constant. The J-9 or CMO staff, supported by the J-2, normally serve as the JFC's primary manager for the integration of civil information products into one central database. Examples of information sharing include:

1. Integration of partners with the COP.

2. Establishment of civil information repositories and granting access to online databases that include reports, assessments, and area studies.

3. Pushing and posting of reports, update briefs, and other civil information products.

4. Integration with the joint targeting process (nonlethal).

5. Integration with the TCP.

6. Integration with TCP cycles.

(c) Civil information sharing is critical for pursuing common objectives. Collaborative environments encourage information sharing between many different groups and authorities working in parallel. Technology enables the creation of unclassified collaboration, but social, institutional, cultural, and organizational attitudes may delay or prevent sharing. Access barriers, such as lack of access to computer networks or communications challenges, can also limit information sharing.

(d) To overcome communication barriers, joint planners should determine information sharing requirements and provide appropriate disclosure guidance, classifications, and caveats required throughout the civil information lifecycle. This allows the staff to share data to the maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. The JFC should recognize civil information share could be crucial to success. The JTF staff should balance the OPSEC analytic process to protect critical information with CIM to enable civil information sharing.

For more details concerning OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

APPENDIX D
ASSESSING CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. General

a. **Introduction to CMO Assessment.** CMO assessment provides the critical and necessary requirement for mission examination and analysis. Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders, should continually monitor the OE and assess the progress of the operation toward the desired end state. Based on assessment results and recommendations, commanders direct adjustments, thus ensuring the operation remains focused on accomplishing the mission. A continuous discourse among those involved with CMO at all echelons provides the feedback the senior leadership needs to adapt operations to the current situation. Assessment informs CMO decision making.

b. **Assessment Basics.** Determining how to assess CMO is an integral part of the operational design and planning for a campaign or operation. The purpose of the assessment is to make operations more effective by mitigating risks, acting on opportunities, and addressing any necessary changes to improve progress of objectives towards attainment of the end state. Commanders use assessment to help decide whether to continue the current course, execute branch plans or sequels, and otherwise reprioritize missions or tasks. As a result, they may provide additional guidance and intent to subordinates in the form of fragmentary orders; request additional support; or provide recommendations to key stakeholders or external partners.

For details on the assessment process, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning; *JDN 1-15,* Operation Assessment; *and Joint Staff J-7 Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper,* Assessment.

c. Assessment helps:

(1) Deepen understanding of the OE.

(2) Depict progress toward accomplishing the mission.

(3) Inform commander's intent, guidance for planning, prioritization, and execution.

(4) Answer the questions "what happened," "why and so what," and "what needs to be done" across three areas:

(a) Task assessment is focused on "are we doing things right" by assessing performance of our tasks. Task assessment, much like after action reports and hot washes, helps review and improve our techniques and procedures in how we perform our tasks.

(b) OE assessment is focused on "are we doing the right things" by assessing how we are changing the OE, for better or worse. OE assessment, probably the one in which most effort is expended, assesses how the OE is changing and allows us to gauge if

we are doing the right things to change the environment. It directly influences prioritization, amending the current plan if off course, and future planning.

(c) Campaign assessment is focused on "are we accomplishing the mission" by assessing progress in achieving our objectives. Campaign assessments occur at higher commands. They focus on whether the operation is on plan in terms of timelines or success criteria and make recommendations for changes to address shortfalls or new challenges.

2. The Operation Assessment in Civil-Military Operations

a. Operation assessment is an integral part of planning for and execution of CMO, fulfilling the necessary requirement to analyze changes in the OE and determining progress of the operation (see Figure D-1). Operation assessment involves the entire staff and other sources, such as higher and subordinate HQ, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. It offers perspective and insight and provides the opportunity for correction; adaptation; and thoughtful, results-oriented learning, which in turn, makes



Figure D-1. Planning, Execution, and Assessment Cycle

operations most effective. Operation assessment occurs at all levels of warfare and across the range of military operations. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is conducted should be the level at which such activity is assessed.

b. During planning, the commander and staff describe the current conditions of the OE, the desired conditions at the end state of an operation, and identify the barriers that prevent the establishment of the desired conditions. The commander and staff develop an assessment plan to focus and integrate information from various sources to reduce the uncertainty of their observations and conclusions about the OE. This information may be derived from interagency partners, multinational partners, the HN government, subordinate commands, NGOs, and various intelligence sources (e.g., JIPOE).

c. In CMO, it is sometimes difficult to see the effects of specific actions, especially long-term developmental efforts such as education enhancement.

d. The outputs of CMO assessment communicate the effectiveness of the OPLAN toward desired end states, describe risks involved in the accomplishment of the plan, and recommend necessary changes to the plan in order to attain a desired end state. Additionally, CMO assessments help the commander to report observations and conclusions about the impacts of CMO efforts and make recommendations to senior commanders or policy makers. Figure D-2 portrays the relationship between time, goals, resources, and risk when conducting a CMO assessment.

3. Civil-Military Operations Trends

Assessment usually needs to establish a trend to be useful. Typically, a single boots-on-ground assessment only captures what's happening at the present time. Planners should ascertain the status prior to the event to establish a trend line. Conducting repeated assessments by various forces of the same location may not be redundant if collected data helps establish a trend. For example, CIM collected by CA, assessments by engineers, medical personnel, and other enablers collectively might provide planners useful trend data over time. NGOs, international organizations, and other participants in CIM may have experienced long-term access to locations denied to USG and military entities. CIM can be crucial in preserving past assessments, reports, and observations.

4. Civil-Military Operations Solutions

CMO planners should not identify problems without recommending solutions with achievable objectives. They should be prepared to recommend resources to solve the problem. When problems exceed resources, planners must be willing to identify the problems and estimate the risks to the mission. Do not limit analysis to military solutions. Consider all resources available including HN, international organization, NGO, and USG.



Figure D-2. Notional Assessment Relationships

5. Assessment Complexities in Civil-Military Operations

a. Operation assessment tends to involve a calculation of the current state of the OE, MOPs, and MOEs with regard to primarily military objectives and the military end state (see Figure D-3 and Figure D-4).

b. Operation assessments in CMO differ from assessments of many other operations because success of the operation often relies on nonmilitary factors and factors outside of the joint force's direct control. This increases the focus on diplomatic, informational, and economic objectives. As with other operations, the operation assessments will link the performance of the joint force to the conditions of the current OE. Because the LOEs and LOOs within CMO are interdependent, the impact of military actions can be difficult to isolate in the OE. Often, this requires that the joint force determine progress toward these objectives to understand the relationships that exist between nonmilitary and military objectives.

c. CMO often involve complex political and societal issues that may not lend themselves to quantifiable MOEs; therefore, assessment staffs in CMO require skill sets in

WATER

A local commander decides that providing the civilian population with potable water is a key to stability in sector. He tasks the staff to develop a potential measure of effectiveness (MOE) for potable water. The local water purification plant is damaged and can only provide limited production. Local authorities and a nongovernmental organization are delivering drinkable water using a variety of methods, including:

- **Tanker Truck**
- **Bottled Water Distribution**
- **Onsite Treatment (bottled chlorine)**

Numerous ad hoc means of water delivery make conventional meter measurements at the water plant impracticable. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners look at measurable second- and third-order effects for MOEs and measures of performance. They recommend tracking the number of patients treated with waterborne illnesses at the local hospital as a good number for establishing a trend. Rationale: The fewer the number of patients, the more sanitary the water.

CMO staff planners recommend the commander provide the following assessment guidance to the task force: "Find out how many patients the local hospital treated with waterborne illnesses pre-conflict (Goal). I want to improve stability by reducing the number of patients treated with waterborne illnesses to a pre-conflict level (Before). I am willing to accept risk by keeping the weekly illness rate at 10 percent of the population (Now). I am not willing to accept an increase above 10 percent (Risk). I will provide water/chlorine trucks with security in semi-permissive neighborhoods to ensure those civilians receive potable water (Resources). Provide me with a weekly snapshot on waterborne illness rates in sector (MOE). Show me whether rates are improving, not changing, or getting worse (Trend). Notify me immediately if illness rates spike more than five percent."

Various Sources

operationally relevant qualitative research analysis. This includes a degree of area knowledge specific to social science skill sets and an understanding of CMO and/or operational relevance in CMO analysis. Interagency partners, particularly USAID, may have expertise or experience that can be useful in assessing complex issues.

d. The JFC and staff must establish which assessment factors within the OE are important and ascertain the status of these factors with regard to the CMO intermediate objectives and end state. The complexity of CMO usually does not allow for uniform or quantifiable MOEs. Because no two operations and no two locations within an OA are the same, all CMO must be assessed on their own merits. The JFC and staff must continually

Possible Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness for Civil-Military Operations

Measures of Performance

- Shape: foreign humanitarian assistance supplied, quick impact projects.
- Deter: levels of violent/disruptive events.
- Seize the Initiative: integration with host nation civil-military authorities, host nation government, integration with local populace.
- Dominate: decrease in hostilities, decrease in collateral damage/deaths, injuries.
- Stabilize: foreign humanitarian assistance, restoration of services, repair/rebuilding projects.
- Enable Civil Authority: train/equip law enforcement and military, political elections, mentoring of government officials.

Measures of Effectiveness

- Shape: perception by host nation government and host nation populace, reduction of turmoil, return to pre-event levels.
- Deter: restoration of pre-event civil activities.
- Seize the Initiative: perception that host nation government and civil-military authorities are legitimate/ credible and that United States Government (USG) intervention is welcome.
- Dominate: host nation government lead and legitimacy, USG supporting role is unhindered and unchallenged.
- Stabilize: self-sufficiency/stability at pre-event levels or better.
- Enable Civil Authority: self-sufficient/legitimate military and law enforcement, legitimate/unquestioned political elections, legitimate government.

Figure D-3. Possible Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness for Civil-Military Operations

develop and enhance their understanding of the OE to identify the key factors particular to their operation.

e. Outputs of CMO assessment communicate the effectiveness of the CMO plan toward desired end states, describe risks involved in the success of the plan, and recommend necessary changes to the plan in order to attain a desired end state. CMO involves complex political and societal issues that may not lend themselves to easily quantifiable MOEs and MOPs; therefore, assessment staffs in CMO require skill in operationally relevant, qualitative research analysis. This includes a degree of area knowledge specific to social science, economics, public administration, and governance. CMO assessments must have supporting data and analysis (context) to justify ratings used in assessment products like stoplight charts (see Figure D-5).

(1) A stoplight chart is only one method for graphically depicting CMO assessments. Others include thermographs, spider-charts, and geospatial charts. Stoplight charts are useful because they are easily understood, and such charts clearly draw the commander's attention to items requiring it.

Quantitative versus Qualitative Assessment

	Measures of Performance	Measures of Effectiveness
Quantitative	• Number of wells drilled • Number of schools built • Inoculations given • Number of police stations manned	• Cases of water-borne illness • Literacy rate (per/1000) • Malaria rate (per/1000) • Crime rate (%)
Qualitative	• Integration with other government/nongovernment organization programs • Host nation perception of quality of work	• Sentiments of the host nation population as to health and safety • Police morale

Figure D-4. Quantitative versus Qualitative Assessment

(2) Often, stoplight charts are a shorthand method of providing judgments about the implications of information that may be quantifiable, such as the amount of ammunition on hand or the graduation rate of a PN's basic officer course.

(3) Sometimes stoplight charts present simple information that is not easily quantifiable, yet has a clear order. For example, a unit leader's judgment of the unit's ability to accomplish a tactical task as "untrained," "needs practice," or "trained" or the status of a civil affairs project as "stalled," "on track," or "complete."

(Notional) Civil-Military Operations Stop-Light Chart

Function	Sub-Function	Value Measure	2017	2018	2019	2020
Governance and Policies	Military & Government Corruption	Minimize corruption index (%)				
	Country Health Status	Minimize infant mortality rate (deaths/1000 births)				
	Political Unrest	Minimize citizens killed/detained by the government				
	Parallel Beliefs, Goals, Morals	Maximize education spending (% of government budget)				
Economy	Strong Economy	Minimize percent unemployment (%)				
		Maximize average annual income				
		Optimize inflation rate (%)				
		Maximize investment climate ranking (#)				
	Private Sector Development	Maximize tourism revenue ($ millions)				
Social Well Being	Poverty	Minimize % of population below poverty line (%)				
	Ethnic Conflict	Maximize labor participation rate (%)				
	Disease	Minimize disease death rates (deaths per year)				
	Life Expectancy	Maximize life expectancy (years)				
	Education	Maximize literacy rate (%)				
Security	Terrorism	Minimize terrorist attacks (# of attacks per year)				
	Military Size	Maximize size of the military (% military per labor force)				
	Defense Budget	Maximize defense spending (% of gross domestic product)				
	Internet Security	Cyber security activity (yes/no)				
	Force Protection	Existence of government antiterrorism/force protection agency (yes/no)				
	Piracy	Minimize acts of piracy (# of attempts per year)				
	Drug Trafficking	Minimize number of drugs crossing the border (1000K per year)				

Adapted from *Evaluation of Assessment Methodology to Support Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,* Center for National Reconstruction and Capacity Development, July 2012.

Description	Frequency by Year			
= Value between 66 - 100	8	7	5	8
= Value between 33 - 66	6	6	8	7
= Value between 0 - 33	7	8	8	6

Figure D-5. (Notional) Civil-Military Operations Stop-Light Chart

APPENDIX E
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J7/Joint Doctrine Division
Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
Phone number: 1-703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-5
Commercial: 1-703-695-4623 (DSN 225)

Lead Agent/USSOCOM/J7-CDI-D
Commercial: 813-826-6829
DSN: 299-6829

TRA/USSOCOM/J7-CDI-J
Joint CA Proponent: Phone: 813-826-2319
DSN: 299-2319

TRA/United States Army Special Operations Command
Commercial: 1-910-432-1654/8253/1548

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APPENDIX F
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-57 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General

a. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination's *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook.*

b. Title 10, USC, *Armed Forces.*

c. Title 22, USC, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse.*

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. *Unified Command Plan.*

b. DOD *Foreign Clearance Guide.*

c. DOD *Foreign Clearance Manual.*

d. DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs.*

e. DODD 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program.*

f. DODD 3000.03E, *DOD Executive Agent for Nonlethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.*

g. DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW).*

h. DODD 3210.06, *Defense Grant and Agreement Regulatory System (DGARS).*

i. DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.*

j. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).*

k. DODD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.*

l. DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.*

m. DODI 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC).*

n. DODI 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities.*

o. DODI 3000.05, *Stability Operations.*

p. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS).*

q. DODM 5200.01, Volumes 1-4, *DOD Information Security Program.*

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3207.01C, *Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action.*

b. CJCSI 3214.01E, *Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.*

c. CJCSI 5810.01D, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*

d. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*

e. CJCSM 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support.*

f. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

g. JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations.*

h. JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support to Joint Operations.*

i. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

j. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.*

k. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations.*

l. JP 3-05, *Special Operations.*

m. JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations.*

n. JP 3-07, *Stability.*

o. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism.*

p. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations.*

q. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation.*

r. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater.*

s. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.*

t. JP 3-13, *Information Operations.*

w. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations.*

v. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security.*

w. JP 3-15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.*

x. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations.*

y. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation.*

z. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense.*

aa. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency.*

bb. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

cc. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

dd. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations.*

ee. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*

ff. JP 3-40, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

gg. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.*

hh. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs.*

ii. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.*

jj. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics.*

kk. JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System.*

ll. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services.*

mm. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning.*

nn. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs.*

oo. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support.*

pp. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning.*

qq. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System.*

rr. JP 6-01, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.*

ss. JDN 3-16, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.*

tt. Joint Guide 1-05, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.*

4. Allied Joint Publication

Allied Joint Publication-3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.*

5. United States Army Publications

a. Army Regulation 195-2, *Criminal Investigation Activities.*

b. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency.*

c. FM 3-34, *Engineer Operations.*

d. FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations.*

e. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations.*

6. United States Marine Corps Publication

MCTP 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations.*

7. United States Navy Publications

a. NTTP 3-02.14 (Rev A), *Naval Beach Group.*

b. NTTP 4-02.4, *Expeditionary Medical Facilities.*

c. NTTP 4-02.6, *Hospital Ships.*

d. NTRP 4-04.2.1, *Doctrinal Reference for the Naval Construction Force.*

e. NWP 3-29, *Disaster Response Operations.*

f. NWP 4-04, *Navy Civil Engineering Operations.*

8. United States Special Operations Command Publications

a. USSOCOM Publication 1, *Doctrine for Special Operations.*

b. USSOCOM Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement.*

c. *Joint Civil Information Management Tactical Handbook.*

9. Multi-Service Publications

a. Army Techniques Publication 3-22.40 [FM 3-22.40]/MCTP 10-10A [MCWP 3-15.8]/NTTP 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.45/Coast Guard

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.*

b. NTTP 3-10.1M/MCTP 3-34D (MCWP 4-11.5), *Seabee Operations in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).*

c. NTTP 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, *Ship to Shore Movement.*

d. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-02 (MCWP 3-33.5), *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

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APPENDIX G
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made valuable contributions to the revision of this joint publication: lead agents, Mr. John Campbell and Mr. Stephen Goto, US Special Operations Command; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Marshall Mantiply, Joint Staff J-5; Mr. Craig Corey and Mr. Alan Armistead, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Mr. Lloyd Brown, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* 11 September 2013.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification,* and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.*

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/ (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AC	Active Component
ADR	airfield damage repair
AE	aeromedical evacuation
AFCAP	Air Force contract augmentation program
AFMS	Air Force Medical Service
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	area of responsibility
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
AT	antiterrorism
BIA	behavioral influences analysis
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAG	civil affairs group
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAPT	civil affairs planning team
CAT	civil affairs team
CBMU	construction battalion maintenance unit
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CCS	commander's communication synchronization
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CEB	combat engineer battalion
CF	conventional forces
CIM	civil information management
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
COP	common operational picture
COS	chief of staff
CR	civil reconnaissance
CRC	crisis reaction center
CRF	coastal riverine force

CTN	countering threat networks
DC	dislocated civilian
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODM	Department of Defense manual
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EMD	expeditionary military information support detachment
EMT	expeditionary military information support team
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ESB	engineer support battalion
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual (Army)
FN	foreign nation
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
FP	force protection
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GE	general engineering
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HF	high frequency
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOC	humanitarian operations center
HQ	headquarters
IAW	in accordance with
ICBRN-R	international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response
IHS	international health specialist
IM	information management
IO	information operations
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
IRC	information-related capability
IW	irregular warfare
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JDN	joint doctrine note
JFC	joint force commander
JFCH	joint force chaplain
JFS	joint force surgeon
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JMISTF	joint military information support task force
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JPP	joint planning process
JTF	joint task force
JTSCC	joint theater support contracting command
JUO	joint urban operation
KLE	key leader engagement
LE	law enforcement
LOE	line of effort
LOO	line of operation
LSC	lead Service for contracting
LSCC	lead Service for contracting coordination
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCIOC	Marine Corps Information Operations Center
MCMO	medical civil-military operations
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MIS	military information support
MISG	military information support group
MISO	military information support operations
MLG	Marine logistics group
MNF	multinational force
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MP	military police (USA and USMC)
MWSS	Marine wing support squadron
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NBG	naval beach group

NCF	naval construction force
NCR	naval construction regiment
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMCB	naval mobile construction battalion
NTRP	Navy tactical reference publication
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWP	Navy warfare publication
OA	operational area
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OCS	operational contract support
OE	operational environment
OFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (DSCA)
OIC	officer in charge
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PHIBCB	amphibious construction battalion
PN	partner nation
PO	peace operations
POG	psychological operations group
PRC	populace and resources control
Prime BEEF	prime base engineer emergency force
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
RC	Reserve Component
RM	resource management
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	security assistance
SC	security cooperation
SCA	support to civil administration
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
TCP	theater campaign plan
TEC	theater engineer command
TIM	toxic industrial material

TSOC	theater special operations command
UCT	underwater construction team
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USACIDC	United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
WHO	World Health Organization (UN)
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

civil affairs. Designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

civil affairs operations. Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

civil information. Relevant data relating to the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the operational environment used to support the situational awareness of the supported commander. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

civil information management. Process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated. Also called **CIM.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

civil-military operations. Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

civil-military operations center. An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. Also called **CMOC.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

civil-military team. A temporary organization of civilian and military personnel task-organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific operational and planning tasks. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

civil reconnaissance. A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called **CR.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

host nation. A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

indigenous populations and institutions. The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens; legal and illegal immigrants; dislocated civilians; and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called **IPI.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint civil-military operations task force. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. Also called **JCMOTF.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

military civic action. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

military government. The supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory, therefore, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

private sector. An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

provincial reconstruction team. A civil-military team designated to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called **PRT.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-57)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-57** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:



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