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CIVIL ORDER AND GOVERNANCE
AS A MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

by

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mueller entered the Marine Corps in 1996 as a graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He is an EA-6B Prowler Pilot with over 2000 mishap free flight hours in platform. On his initial tour with Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron One (VMAQ-1), he deployed to combat in Operations NORTHERN WATCH, SOUTHERN WATCH, and participated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He returned to Iraq in 2006 as a member of Joint CREW Composite Squadron One where he served on the First Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) staff and as the Electronic Warfare Officer to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. LtCol Mueller attended the Australian Command and Staff College and has a Masters degree from the University of New South Wales, Australia. He served as the Operations Officer and Executive Officer of VMAQ-3 and deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan and Al Udeid, Qatar respectively. Both deployments were in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. LtCol Mueller Commanded VMAQ-4 from September 2013 until April 2015 and deployed to Al Udeid where he participated in the initial support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, flying sorties in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State. He is currently a student at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Abstract

Despite the fact the uniformed military has historically been the responsible agency for civil order and post conflict governance, the lack of appreciation for this fact by modern U.S. commanders contributed to the 2003 security struggles in postwar Iraq. During the planning of the Iraqi invasion and its immediate aftermath, the U.S. military maintained a laser focus on destroying the Iraqi Army while virtually ignoring postwar stability planning. U.S. forces were not just slow to recognize the military significance of civil disorder, but gladly ceded authority to civilian agencies to handle the governing duties of the occupation. Examination of the British capture of Damascus in 1918 demonstrates the fundamentally different mindset of British and Australian Generals who appreciated maintaining civil order is a distinct military responsibility and an implied task in any offensive. Further examination of U.S. Army occupation government policies in World War II shows the historical model for postwar occupation governance is military government. In contrast to the World War II policy, the makeshift civilian occupation government established in Iraq in 2003 was without precedent for the United States. Furthermore, it prevented unity of command between the occupation leaders and the military forces required to provide security. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, not only have the doctrinal deficiencies which led to the occupation's difficulties remained unresolved, they are routinely ignored.

Civil Order and Governance as a Military Responsibility

In April of 2003, as U.S. forces closed on Baghdad, chaos and disorder began to break out in the city of over six million residents. As civil order broke down, the lack of guidance and forethought U.S. leadership put into the responsibility of U.S. forces for maintaining civil order in their newly conquered territory became apparent. Because there was no planning or guidance on how to handle looting, commanders in Baghdad decided to focus on defeating the last remnants of the Iraqi military, and did little to maintain order in the capital.¹

Eighty five years earlier, another western military force advanced on another Middle Eastern city and was faced with a similar situation. General Allenby, the British commander in the Middle East, had dispatched a force, under Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel of Australia, to take the Ottoman City of Damascus. Chauvel was given specific orders on how Damascus was to be taken and administered in order to strengthen the British position for the postwar settlement. When unpredicted events caused civil disorder to break out in Damascus, however, Chauvel prioritized maintaining civil stability above his orders from Allenby. His decisions greatly complicated the postwar situation and arguably violated his orders, but there is no question he viewed the maintenance of civil order as an implied task of the utmost military importance, and Allenby supported his decisions.²

The starkly different way in which American commanders viewed their responsibility to maintain civil order in Iraq from their British and Australian counterparts in World War I speaks to the way each of those groups viewed the roles and responsibilities of a military force. The American military's willingness to cede postwar stability operations to civilian authority, even an authority within the Department of Defense, would have been foreign to Allenby and his Lieutenants in 1918. This truth goes beyond the fact travel and communication is much easier

today, or even the formative experiences of Allenby³ and Chauvel⁴ (both were Boer War veterans) compared to their American counterparts, and speaks to an evolution of thinking amongst American military professionals.

Operation Iraqi Freedom marked the first time the United States military conducted offensive operations without a partner force to handle occupation duties since World War II. In that previous experience, the largest stability operation ever conducted by the United States, and one of the most successful in world history was conducted by the U.S. Army. At the peak of its authority, the U.S. Army occupied four nations, and over three hundred million people were under some form of Army authority.⁵ The need to prepare for military occupation was recognized and prepared for beginning in 1940,⁶ and created a standard which would be lost on U.S. forces over fifty years later. Therefore, despite the fact the uniformed military has historically been the responsible agency for civil order and post conflict governance, the lack of appreciation for this fact by modern U.S. commanders contributed to the 2003 security struggles in postwar Iraq. By comparing the Iraqi invasion with the British capture of Damascus in 1918 and the U.S. Army's occupation authority post World War II we will see how these long standing historical facts were lost on U.S. forces in 2003.

The 2003 Invasion – You pay attention to the day *after*, I'll pay attention to the day *of*.

The breakdown of order in Iraq immediately after the U.S. military defeated Iraqi forces in 2003 was not the result of a single oversight or bad decision, but rather the result of a massive gap in the planning and preparation for the U.S. offensive. Stability operations, known as Phase IV in the U.S. Joint Planning Process, represent the transition from direct combat against enemy forces to the maintenance of civil order until “legitimate local entities are functioning.”⁷ Phase

IV planning is doctrinally considered a responsibility of the Joint Combatant Commander during operational planning, which in 2003 was General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

2003 was not the first time the CENTCOM staff had considered how to invade the nation the United States had previously invaded in 1991 and had a policy of regime change against since 1998. Previous CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni's plan 1003, developed in 1998, was designed for the invasion and occupation of Iraq and called for 380,000 U.S. troops to stabilize the nation of 24 million.⁸ Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, however, rejected the large troop requirement of the 1003 plan, insisting force levels were too high, but the study conducted by the joint staff to prove the force levels could be lower failed to take stability operations into consideration.⁹ As planning continued, General Franks told subordinates in August of 2002 the post-war planning effort would be led by the State Department, but by mid-October Secretary Rumsfeld had secured DoD as the lead agency. Rumsfeld then decided to divide the responsibilities in post-war Iraq between a civil administrator and a military commander, each of whom would report to the CENTCOM commander.¹⁰

The CENTCOM commander, however, seemed to have little interest in the Phase IV (stability operations) plan. As Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor put it, "Franks appointed a tiny cell of planners working on ways to get humanitarian assistance to the Iraqis. But he seemed content to leave the lion's share of the Phase IV planning to others in the government."¹¹ The one military staff to put any effort into the Phase IV plan was Lieutenant General David McKiernan's Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). McKiernan, who assumed he might have to lead the post-war reconstruction, was assembling a Phase IV plan.

However, as it matured, the lack of U.S. forces required the plan to assume the availability and effectiveness of Iraqi forces to perform many of the tasks.¹²

The civil administrator who was to lead the civilian side of Rumsfeld's two sided approach to Iraqi occupation was retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner. Garner was contacted on 9 January 2003, agreed to a four month commitment, and his position was ratified on 20 January 2003 with a presidential directive.¹³ The choice of Garner made sense; he had run relief operations to the Kurds in Northern Iraq after the '91 Gulf War,¹⁴ so he had experience with humanitarian operations, was familiar with Iraq, and, as a retired general, should integrate well with his military counterpart. CENTCOM, however, had been planning the invasion, and mostly ignoring Phase IV, for over a year. Now, two months before the invasion, Garner was just putting his team together. When Garner's team arrived in Kuwait, they were told there was no room to quarter them on base with the CFLCC staff, so they continued their planning from the isolation of a beachfront hotel, still using Iraqis, foreign forces not yet committed, and contractors to meet the plan's force structure requirements.¹⁵

A gap is a weakness in a military force. Physical gaps are usually found at the boundaries between adjacent units who don't coordinate properly.¹⁶ Franks' plan was creating a gap between Phase III (dominate – breaking the enemy's will to resist) and Phase IV.¹⁷ More importantly, Franks was the commander who should have been responsible for both phases and the transition, but instead “Franks focused most strongly on phase three” while Phase IV was little more than a “skeleton” until “very late.”¹⁸ In Franks' own memoir he recounts telling the “bureaucracy beneath” Secretary Rumsfeld, “You pay attention to the day *after* and I'll pay attention to the day *of*.”¹⁹ He was essentially taking ownership of what he saw as the military

responsibilities – warfighting, while pushing off what he perceived as non-military tasks to the civilians – postwar governance.

Command climate is defined as “the culture of a unit. It is the way a unit ‘conducts business.’ The leader of the organization is solely responsible for the organization’s command climate. Commanders at all levels establish this climate by what they say and what they do.”²⁰ Franks’ lack of interest in the Phase IV plan was creating a command climate that viewed stability operations as someone else’s problem – not a military responsibility. Franks was not alone in creating this perception, and it was not limited to the Central Command.

Shortly after retiring in late 1998, Air Force General Howell Estes gave an interview to PBS’ *Frontline* regarding the military mission in Bosnia. Referring to the many roles the military was being asked to perform in order to stabilize Bosnia, Estes said, “there is a civilian component that needs to do the nation building. And what the military needs to do is go in and set the conditions in which the nation building teams can come in and carry out their operations.”²¹ Estes didn’t clarify who the civilian component was, or where it would come from, just that it wasn’t the military’s role. Later he claimed the overall view of the “military” with regard to those additional tasks was: “this is not what the nation's military is for, we're not trained to do this, you need to get the people who are supposed to do this to do it.”²² While he may not have been speaking for the entire “military,” Estes was certainly not alone in these views, and the aversion to using U.S. forces for such tasks was a routine emphasis of Secretary Rumsfeld leading up to the invasion. In a speech on 14 February 2003, Rumsfeld assured listeners the U.S. could conquer and leave Iraq quickly without lengthy “peacekeeping” or “nation-building” operation.²³

The lack of planning and guidance with regard to civil order came to a head as U.S. troops entered Baghdad and Iraqi civil authorities abandoned their positions. As American Marines toppled the statue of Saddam Husein in Firdaus Square on 9 April 2003, looting was already beginning in the city.²⁴ In the days that followed, maintaining civil order was dismissed as outside the responsibility of U.S. forces in Iraq. “U.S. forces have neither the troops nor the inclination to police neighborhoods or deter looters in the next few days, according to Bush administration officials,” reported *The Washington Post* on 10 April 2003 in an article titled, “U.S. Military Spurns Postwar Police Role.”²⁵ Two days later, *The Post* updated the status of the direction; “Troops are to intervene directly only if Iraqis appear to be stealing weapons from any of the many arsenals found throughout the city.”²⁶ While *The Los Angeles Times* was reporting some troops had been given orders to stop the looting as early as 11 April, it pointed out the U.S. military’s “hands-off policy had encouraged the looters to commit more and more thefts.”²⁷

From Kuwait, Jay Garner and his team could only watch the looting and wonder what would be left by the time they arrived in Baghdad. They had prepared a prioritized list of buildings that needed to be safeguarded for post-war stability, placing the National Bank and Baghdad Museum as the highest priorities, while the Oil Ministry was the lowest. In the immediate turmoil after the invasion, the Republican Palace and the Oil Ministry were well protected,²⁸ while the looting of the Baghdad Museum in view of U.S. forces became the symbol of post war chaos and U.S. indifference to civil order.²⁹ The disconnect between the people responsible for the post-war plan and the military forces required to implement that plan was astounding. While U.S. forces did begin dedicated efforts to restore civil order, they didn’t have the forces to do the job, and the Iraqis weren’t being organized quickly enough to provide the

forces necessary. As late as May 27th, *The New York Times* was still reporting looting throughout Iraq.³⁰

The failure to prioritize civil order in the immediate aftermath of the invasion was one symptom of the dysfunctional approach the U.S. took to the postwar stability, but it was hardly the last. Jay Garner, understaffed, and never sufficiently part of the planning effort, arrived in Baghdad on 21 April 2003.³¹ The following day Garner was informed by Secretary Rumsfeld he would be replaced and his entire organization would be dissolved to make room for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer.³² Bremer “possessed full executive, legislative, and judicial authority” in Iraq, but while he reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld, his chain of command as a Presidential envoy was unclear.³³ What was clear is Bremer reported to no one in Iraq, or wearing a uniform. However, General Sanchez, who was now the senior military commander in Iraq, did not report to Bremer either. While he had been directed to support Bremer and the CPA by Secretary Rumsfeld, his chain of command still ran through CFLCC, CENTCOM, and then to the Secretary.³⁴ In short, there was no single person in Iraq in charge of the entire U.S. effort, much less the coalition and Iraqi efforts.

As if to emphasize how little anyone cared about the postwar effort, the immediate aftermath of the invasion was defined by a rush of senior leadership to leave theater. By the end of the summer, McKiernan and Franks had left Iraq, Garner was replaced by Bremer, and Lieutenant General Wallace had turned V Corps over to newly promoted Lieutenant General Sanchez.³⁵ This left the newest Corps commander in the Army and a civilian administrator who learned he’d be going to Iraq in April to run the occupation, and neither of them was in charge. The lack of clarity, focus, and a coherent plan for post-war Iraq, as well as the many failures of the CPA are well documented by authors like Ravjiv Chandrasekaran, Michael Gordon, and

Bernard Trainor.³⁶ But the underlying mistake was a failure to recognize the military necessity of civil order and postwar governance. The U.S. military, which hadn't been responsible for an occupation in over fifty years, missed the fact those things are both historically military responsibilities.

Taking Damascus – The Army of Empire prioritizes civil order

In late September 1918, British General Edmund Allenby was preparing to continue his Middle Eastern offensive against the Ottoman Turks. Allenby had already conquered Sinai, Jerusalem, and was advancing in Transjordan, but his next conquest had the potential to create a political firestorm. Damascus was the first city in Allenby's path earmarked to fall under French control by the terms of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. Sykes-Picot was a secret plan whereby the British and French committed to a post-war partition of the Middle East amongst themselves, and was to become effective in any area either ally conquered. Thus far, Allenby and the British Government had total control of the decisions concerning their conquered territories. The French, however, would demand post-war control of any territories Allenby conquered in Syria and had representatives with Allenby's army to ensure their interests were safeguarded.³⁷

The British were hoping to avoid implementation of Sykes-Picot in Damascus because they preferred to grant its post-war governance to Prince Feisal, who (accompanied by the most famous liaison officer in history, T.E. Lawrence) was leading an Arab army against the Ottoman Turks in the name of Arab nationalism. After a volley of telegrams and two-faced diplomacy between London, Paris, and the Middle East, Allenby gave his subordinates specific orders regarding the movement on Damascus designed to avoid implementation of the Sykes-Picot agreement. He dispatched General Harry Chauvel, the leader of the Australia New Zealand

Army Corps (ANZAC) Cavalry, and fellow Boer war veteran, to lead the politically fraught mission on Damascus.³⁸

The important elements of Allenby's orders came down to two key provisions designed to avoid the implementation of the Sykes-Picot agreement: First, Chauvel was to allow Faisal's Arab army to liberate the city. Allenby's order, expressing concerns very familiar today, directed that none of Chauvel's troops should enter Damascus. According to David Fromkin, this was "presumably to forestall resistance by a possibly hostile Moslem [sic] metropolis to a Christian occupation."³⁹ Furthermore, if Feisal's army, and not the British force, were to capture Damascus, Feisal might not be subject to an agreement to which he played no part. In fact, Allenby's chief political officer had already written Sykes saying, "If Feisal makes good in a military sense he may well carry Syria with him," but otherwise, he would have no influence.⁴⁰

The second important element to Allenby's orders was to retain the Ottoman civil government in Damascus. Chauvel recognized he did not have the forces to place a military governor in charge of the city of 300,000, and the foreign office believed Sykes-Picot would not go into effect until the British exerted control over the civil authority.⁴¹ It is not clear what Chauvel was supposed to do if Feisal insisted on his own Arab government once he took the city, although Allenby instructed Chauvel to "deal with him through Lawrence" if there was any trouble.⁴²

When Chauvel and the ANZACs arrived at the outskirts of Damascus on 29 September 1918, Feisal's Arab army was still at least three days away. With orders to avoid the city, the ANZACs continued to pursue the fleeing Turkish Army. The Ottoman government within Damascus, however, decided on 30 September to abandon the city and join their retreating army which caused civil disorder to break out.⁴³ Like his American counterparts in 2003, Chauvel was

unable to retain the civil apparatus he had planned to use to maintain order in the city. Furthermore, in pursuit of the Turks, one of Chauvel's units had violated orders and ridden through Damascus on 1 October where local Syrian Arab notables gave them an official welcome. Meanwhile, Chauvel, trying to solve his civil governance problem, worked with Lawrence (who had arrived in Damascus ahead of Feisal), and appointed a pro-Feisal Arab as the new governor.⁴⁴

On 2 October, with Feisal's forces one day away from Damascus, civil disorder was still rampant and possibly exacerbated by the appointment of the governor. Chauvel decided to march his entire force through Damascus to quell the unrest. According to Fromkin, "this was exactly what Allenby and Clayton [the political officer] had hoped to avoid: the population aroused [and] Christian troops defiling through the streets of a great Moslem [sic] city to restore order."⁴⁵ It was also the final action in a series of events which completely undermined Allenby's intent to avoid the implementation of Sykes-Picot and the subsequent political complications. Most notably, however, Allenby, who arrived the same day as Feisal, understood the situation Chauvel had been placed in and did not blame him.⁴⁶

In comparing Chauvel's decisions to those of American commanders in 2003, the timeline is telling. Three days is the longest Chauvel would have needed to tolerate civil unrest to comply with Allenby's orders, but he deemed the delay unacceptable. In the case of marching his troops through the town, it would have been a one day delay to wait for Feisal's Arabs to do the same thing, but one day was too long for Chauvel. By contrast, three days into the Baghdad unrest, American commanders still weren't sure providing civil order was their responsibility, even if they had the forces to secure it. Allenby's support for Chauvel in the aftermath of

Damascus, however, is evidence the distinguished British General understood the maintenance of civil order was an implied task when he gave the order to conquer the city.

World War II – The U.S. Army and Military Government

The U.S. Army ran one of the most successful post-war stabilization efforts in history following World War II. The Army established military governments in Japan, Korea, Austria, and Germany, and Army generals were appointed to command them.⁴⁷ Command authority was at the heart of what made the military governments so effective. *FM 27-5 Military Government and Civil Affairs*, first published in 1940, established military government as a “command responsibility,” and gave the commanding general “full legislative, executive, and legal authority” over his assigned territory.⁴⁸ These are the same authorities given to Paul Bremer in 2003, except unlike the military commanders, Bremer had no authority over the forces he relied on for his security. While control of postwar policy was debated throughout the war, the Army was the most prepared agency to institute postwar governance and had the doctrine to support its position.

It is important to note the U.S. Army’s occupation experiences leading up to World War II. The most recent, and the one which drove most research and thought at the Army War College during the interwar period, was the Rhineland occupation after World War I. The most influential study of the period was the Hunt report, by Col Irvin L. Hunt who “spent the interwar period seeking to ensure that the army was prepared for its next occupation.”⁴⁹ Hunt’s report identified two major lessons from the Rhineland occupation. First, the military civil administrator, who reported directly to the overall theater commander, was separate and distinct from the tactical commander, thus dividing the legislative and executive authorities among two

commanders. The report said all authorities should be consolidated under one commander. Second, Hunt criticized the use of the same military units for tactical and governance duty simultaneously, where separate units would have been preferable.⁵⁰

The Rhineland experience and the Hunt report inspired study and debate on military governance throughout the interwar period, including the update of existing U.S. war plans.⁵¹ With the outbreak of war in Europe, it was only natural for the Army to update its military governance doctrine, and *FM 27-5* was published in 1940. *27-5* gave all authority to a single unified commander, the military governor, and emphasized “military necessity” as the driving principle in military governance.⁵² While the Army’s embrace of military governance may appear strange in 2016, the Army of 1940 could refer to a consistent stream of precedents where U.S. occupations required military governments. From Vera Cruz to World War II, the list includes Reconstruction, the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Rhineland, numerous Marine Corps interventions in the Caribbean; over 120 years of consistent, though periodic, need for military governments.⁵³ By contrast, the Iraqi invasion of 2003 was 51 years after the military government in Japan ended in 1952.⁵⁴

The idea of placing conquered and liberated nations under U.S. Army rule was not without opponents in the early 1940s. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall had misgivings about the Army taking on such a monumental governance task because of how it would be perceived. He “worried that presiding over the governance of people throughout the world could send the wrong signal to the American People.”⁵⁵ Most of Roosevelt’s cabinet had strong reservations towards granting the Army such a large role in postwar policy, and even Roosevelt himself was lukewarm at best to military governance in Europe.⁵⁶ In the end, however, no other agency had the resources and structure to accomplish the task. This did not mean some civilian

agencies didn't have critical skills and personnel needed in the postwar governments, they did, but the Army had doctrine and precedent, and could easily incorporate those civilians into the military governments where applicable.⁵⁷ Military governance was the logical, if imperfect choice.

The success of the World War II occupations is undeniable, and was often cited by the administration in 2003, but the model of military government was always overlooked. Even without military government, if the principles of a unified command and emphasis on military necessity had been emphasized, the Iraqi occupation may have looked more like that of World War II. In the end, results from Europe show the choice of military government in postwar situations may be much like Churchill's opinion of democracy, "the worst form of government, except for all the others."⁵⁸

Are we learning the wrong lessons?

The lessons drawn in the aftermath of any war are always critical to the way future operations will be conducted. Retired Army Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger claims to identify lessons from the U.S. failure during the Iraqi occupation in his 2015 book, *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars*. Bolger argues "short, decisive, conventional conflicts waged for limited ends" emphasize the advantages of America's swift and agile military.⁵⁹ He claims if the U.S. effort in Iraq had ended after the initial campaign in 2003, "admiring war colleges would have studied the brilliant opening rounds as models of lightning war."⁶⁰ Bolger does not speculate what postwar Iraq would have looked like if U.S. forces had departed in May of 2003, but he implies it wasn't the United States' problem, or the military's responsibility.⁶¹

Bolger criticizes the doctrine captured in the 2006 release of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, as “the shiny objects of counterinsurgency theory.”⁶² He degrades counterinsurgency doctrine as a distraction from a focus on “core strength, rapid, decisive conventional operations.”⁶³ However, Bolger ignores the fact the insurgency in Iraq was not an inevitable byproduct of the invasion, but was the result of mismanaging the postwar situation. Specifically, it resulted from the failure to treat civil order and competent postwar governance as military responsibilities and *FM 3-24* was a critical milestone in correcting not just doctrine, but the culture within the military. After the 2006 release of *3-24*, the Army revised *FM 3-0 Operations* with a renewed emphasis on stability operations, civil order, and support to civil government.⁶⁴ Both documents reflect the U.S. military’s evolved understanding of civil order and good governance as a distinct military priority in ways which would have been familiar to the U.S. Army of World War II or Chauvel’s ANZACs.

The new-found emphasis on civil order and stability operations found in *3-24* and *3-0* is a strong and important step toward ensuring the military importance of civil order is not lost on future generations. However, while those manuals emphasize support for existing civil governments and the importance of good governance, only *3-24* makes mention of military government, and then only one time.⁶⁵ Given the climate they were writing in, I applaud the authors of the 2006 counterinsurgency manual for even mentioning military government, but was anyone ready to advocate for it or implement it? Instead, the 2014 version of the document eliminated the reference to military government.⁶⁶ Both versions of *FM 3-24* revisit many of the themes found in the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* of 1940, but the 1940 manual has entire chapters on military government and how to conduct elections – essentially nation building from the ground up.⁶⁷ To truly close the doctrinal loop the next update of *FM 3-24* should include

sections on military government and elections or a modern version of *FM 27-5 Military Government* should be created.

Conclusion

There is a distinct difference between the responsibility to maintain civil order in the transition from combat operations to post-war governance, and the running of the occupation government itself. It is logically consistent to believe the military should do all it can to maintain civil order through combat operations, while believing the occupation government should be run by some other entity, be it the State Department or some other arm of government. What is clear, however, is maintaining civil order through the transition is critical, and the military must be prepared to provide postwar security forces. Therefore, if we are to keep unity of command and view the running of an interim stability government as a command function, a military government under a uniformed commander is the most logical option. If, however, another entity is going to run stabilization operations, the military commander should involve that entity in planning for the transition and ensure the responsibility for civil order, as well as the command relationship, is codified in a robust Phase IV plan.

There will always be military professionals who see their role as fighting the enemy, destroying their equipment, and defeating their armies, while all the civil order and policing duties should be left to someone who's "trained to do it." The problem is, that group of "trained to do it" individuals does not exist in a deployable form in the United States, nor has it ever. The State Department's Civilian Response Corps was established in 2004 to be that capability, but never reached its planned size and currently exists in a reduced capacity with questionable capabilities.⁶⁸ As such, the military remains the only large organization the nation can turn to

and say “you’re leaving next week to go half way around the world for the next year” and not have half the personnel resign.

We’ve seen from the above examples, civil order and governance is historically the responsibility of the military which conquers a territory. Nevertheless, today, instead of a Col Hunt (author of the 1920 report on the military occupation government of the Rhineland) attempting to prepare the United States for its next occupation, voices such as Daniel Bolger’s are arrayed to advocate the U.S. should never engage in another occupation, so why would we prepare for it. But we don’t always get to choose the war we want to fight, the enemy gets a vote, and occupation duties are the inevitable result of most offensive operations. We need to recognize a military unprepared for occupation is unprepared for offensive operations – the decision to conquer comes with the responsibility to govern, and it is always easier to destroy than create. Even if we don’t resource units for civil affairs and occupation duties, we need mature doctrine and a military culture that refuses to rely on General Estes’ mythical “civilian component that needs to do the nation building” as the foundation for Phase IV plans.⁶⁹

Finally, a closing point regarding the adamant public debate regarding the threat of the Islamic State and the increased calls for its destruction: While the threat is undeniable, and the calls for its destruction are becoming more and more compelling, those who advocate that end must also provide the answer to post-conflict governance in the area it controls. Furthermore, any military commander executing a plan aimed at destroying the Islamic State should see the maintenance of civil order and post-conflict governance as a military responsibility. A mature plan should be required before what little order still exists in the region is destroyed by American action.

Notes

¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006) p. 428.

² David Fromkin. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co, 1989) pp. 334-8

³ British National Army Museum website “Britain’s Greatest General” biographies. Last updated 11 January 2016. Viewed 14 January 2016. <http://www.nam.ac.uk/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/britains-greatest-general/edmund-allenby>

⁴ A. J. Hill, 'Chauvel, Sir Henry George (Harry) (1865–1945)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/chauvel-sir-henry-george-harry-5569/text9497>, published first in hardcopy 1979, viewed online 14 January 2016.

⁵ Walter M. Hudson. *Army Diplomacy: American Military Occupation and Foreign Policy After World War II* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015) p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid*, 63.

⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. *Joint Operational Planning*. 11 Aug 2011. p. xxiv

⁸ Gordon and Trainor, 53.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 138 and 141.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 139.

¹² *Ibid*, 138 and 148.

¹³ *Ibid*, 149-50.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 149.

¹⁵ Hotel reference in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006) p. 38. Reference for force structure assumptions in Gordon and Trainor, 152-60.

¹⁶ MCDP-1 *Warfighting* (New York, NY: Cosimo Books, 2007) p. 92

¹⁷ Joint definitions found in JP 5.0, p. xxiv.

¹⁸ Daniel Bolger. *Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co, 2014) pp. 117-8.

¹⁹ Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2004) p. 441 emphasis his; Quote originally found in Hudson, 270.

²⁰ Lt. Col. Joseph Doty and Maj. Gelineau. “Command Climate” *Army Magazine*, July 2008. pp. 22 and 24. Viewed online 16 January 2016.

http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2008/7/documents/fc_doty_0708.pdf

²¹ Howell Estes. Quoted in PBS documentary *Frontline, episode: “Give War a Chance”* published May 1999, viewed online on 17 January 2006 at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/estes.html>.

²² *Ibid*.

²³ Gordon and Trainor, 152.

²⁴ Chandrasekaran, 46 and Anthony Chadid, “Hussein’s Baghdad Falls; U.S. Forces Move Triumphantly Through Capital Streets, Cheered by Crowds Jubilant at the End of Repressive Regime” *Washington Post*, 10 Apr. 2003, A1.

²⁵ Peter Slevin and Bradley Graham, “U.S. Military Spurns Postwar Police Role; Pressure Builds to Provide Order, Protection” *The Washington Post*, 10 April 2003, A39.

²⁶ William Branigin and Rick Atkinson, “Anything, and Everything Goes; With No Authority to Stop Them, Iraqis Plunder Capital of Goods” *Washington Post* 12 Apr. 2003, A1.

²⁷ John Daniszewski and Geoffrey Mohan, “A Scene of Lawlessness; Looters Bring Baghdad New Havoc; Marines are told to stop thieves, who have hit offices, homes, even hospitals. Few shops dare open” *Los Angeles Times*, 11 Apr. 2003, A.1.

²⁸ Chandrasekaran, 45-6.

²⁹ Frank Rich, “Operation Iraqi Loting” *The New York Times*, 27 April 2003, pp A1, A22.

³⁰ Edmund Andrews, “Iraqi Officials Say Looting of Ancient Sites Continues Despite Pleas to U.S. Troops to Help” *The New York Times*, 27 May 2003, p. A14.

³¹ Monte Reel, “Garner Arrives in Iraq To Begin Reconstruction; Retired General Upbeat Despite Skepticism, Damage” *Washington Post*, 22 April 2003. p. A1.

³² James Dobbins, Seth Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas. *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Santa Monica, CA; Rand Corporation, 2009) p. xv. Viewed online on 17 January 2015 at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf.

³³ *Ibid*, xiii, xvii.

³⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁵ Gordon and Trainor, 488.

³⁶ Chandrasekaran, entire book; Gordon and Trainor, entire book, also *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York, NY, Random House, 2012).

³⁷ Fromkin, 305-335.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 332-5.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 336.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 334.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 333-335.

⁴² Allenby as quoted in Fromkin, 335.

⁴³ Fromkin, 336.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 337-8.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 338.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷ Hudson, 1.

⁴⁸ Hudson, 64-5, quotes from FM 27-5 (1940) as quoted in Hudson.

⁴⁹ Hudson, 37-43, quote from Hunt on p. 42.

⁵⁰ Hudson, 40-1.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 48-9.

⁵² *Ibid*, 64-5.

⁵³ Ibid, 35, 39, 44.

⁵⁴ PBS website: “Japan’s About Face: Japanese Military History” updated July 2008, viewed 2 February 2016 at: <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/japans-about-face/timeline-japanese-military-history/?p=1168>.

⁵⁵ Hudson, 2.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 94-119.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 147-56.

⁵⁸ Winston Churchill, *Goodreads* website. Viewed on 4 February 2015 at <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/267224-democracy-is-the-worst-form-of-government-except-for-all>.

⁵⁹ Bolger, 429.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid, 429-30

⁶² Ibid, 429.

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⁶⁸ Nina Serafino, *In Brief: State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations* (Congressional Research Service, 10 October 2012) Viewed online on 6 February 2016 at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42775.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Estes quote in from endnote 21.

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