

# **Operation of the Logistics Enterprise in Complex Emergencies**



**Joint Staff, J-4  
Logistics**

**Joint Staff, J-7  
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THE JOINT STAFF  
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MESSAGE TO LOGISTICIANS FROM THE DIRECTORS,  
J4 AND J7 JOINT STAFF

Complex emergencies are by their very nature logistics intense events that require the response of a myriad of actors in the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). No single entity can produce the results required at the necessary time and place by “going it alone.” These interactions between the various members of the JLEnt may be bound by an assortment of collaborative agreements, contracts, doctrine, policy, legislation, or treaties. However, fundamentally they are based on relationships. These relationships are not based on our traditional hierarchical chain of command but more on a social construct that values influence as much – perhaps more than – command authority. Consequently, we have developed this publication to help members of the JLEnt and joint force commanders and their staffs understand the scope and importance of the functioning of the JLEnt in complex emergencies.

The Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE) invested considerable effort into demonstrating the importance of the social network that exists within the JLEnt. Through the use of modeling and mathematical representation of relationships the experiment provided some empirical – or scientific – evidence regarding what we all generally accept based on our experience: relationships matter. This document offers strategies to improve and optimize working relationships among the many organizations that are part of a functioning JLEnt. It provides recommendations derived from this social network perspective to enable the logistician to configure relationships to optimize the performance of the enterprise as a whole through a greater awareness of others’ processes.

Experimentation will continue to refine the lessons learned contained within this document. While this document is descriptive, not prescriptive, our hope is it will stimulate the joint, interagency, and non-Department of Defense logistics community’s thinking about how to optimize the operation of the JLEnt in complex emergencies. JLEnt representatives from across the Department of Defense, Non-governmental Organizations, Multinational, Industry and International Organizations logistics communities provided a substantial amount of expertise and feedback during its development. Of special note the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the United States Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster (USAID/OFDA) significantly contributed, as did the UN’s World Food Program and the Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Project HOPE and the Southern Baptist Disaster Relief Committee. We encourage you to use the information in this publication and provide feedback to help us capture value-added ideas for incorporation in emerging joint doctrine, training, and professional military education.



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## PREFACE

This guide provides a set of principles for members of the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) to communicate and work more closely together and maximize opportunities for complementary, coherent, synchronized, or if desired, integrated action in complex emergencies. The JLEnt consists of a diverse range of civilian, military, governmental, and international organizations, including private sector stakeholders working in close partnership with one another when needed. This guide explains when and how cooperation between logisticians is most effective and the leadership, duties, responsibilities, relationships, processes, and perspectives that assist planners and operators across the broad logistics enterprise to effectively work together.

### 1. Purpose: Why this Guide is Necessary

a. Situations where human life is disrupted due to war, civil disturbance, natural disaster, or some combination of all three are known collectively as complex emergencies. The logistical demands in complex emergencies require an “enterprise” approach as they often transcend the ability of a single nation, government, or organization to address alone. Complex emergencies present a difficult mix of security, development, and humanitarian challenges that together stress even the largest and most capable logistics organizations.

b. The enterprise mindset and social network best practices found in this guide provide logistic planners and operators an understanding of how to best leverage existing logistics models and frameworks and how to better perceive, reinforce, and properly manage organizational relationships and operational connections in order to maximize the performance of the logistics community as a whole. It should be used by logisticians to encourage the development of an effective, mutually supporting JLEnt approach prior to and during complex emergencies through cooperation or coordination aimed at deconflicting activities in areas of common or overlapping interest and will result in better planning and more effective logistics response in complex emergencies.

c. The guide is also designed to provide U.S. military audiences with an understanding of how Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, *Joint Logistics*; JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*; and JP 3-28, *Civil Support* relate to other documents and formal integrating structures. These related materials include the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework in a domestic disaster, and the Logistics Cluster within the larger United Nations (UN) and humanitarian community’s Cluster Response framework as well as supporting the U.S. Embassy country team and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in a foreign humanitarian disaster. Many of the tenets found within the guide will form the basis for formal recommendations to implement the Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL) and JLEnt into Joint Doctrine.

### 2. Scope

a. The guide is written largely from a perspective focused on U.S. military and national security priorities, but applies to all organizations that provide logistics during complex emergencies including, but not limited to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), other U.S.

Government (USG) agencies, international, multinational, and non-DOD organizations, and the private sector. The intent of this document is to describe operations across the whole logistics community, to provide civilian partners with insight into how the DOD supports the efforts of other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector, and to develop a basic understanding of the motivations, goals, and objectives of the partner organizations that make up the JLEnt. It describes how to encourage the development of an effective, mutually supporting JLEnt prior to and during complex emergencies.

b. Each participating organization within the JLEnt has its own processes and procedures for providing logistics support as well as independent goals and metrics of success. This guide provides a perspective of the scope and scale of these processes – what they are, how they mutually support effective relationships, communication, goals, and shared perspectives across the JLEnt – and how they can improve the overall capacity of the JLEnt to respond to complex crises.

### 3. Background and Context

a. The notion of a JLEnt was first described within the U.S. military’s Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL) which defined it as a “multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively structured to achieve a common purpose.” This approach to logistics was developed due to the recognition that complex emergencies were an increasingly common feature of the 21st century security landscape and that the role of logistics was a central part in their successful resolution. The JCL was intended to leverage the unique capabilities of the broad logistics enterprise that has emerged in the humanitarian, government, military, and private sectors.

b. Concurrently, organizations such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the UN have likewise articulated cross-organizational enterprise approaches to logistics during a crisis. This guide builds upon these approaches and draws upon lessons learned in actual operations as well as social network theory that illustrate how organizational and individual dispositions and institutional “reflexes” can help or hinder logistics cooperation at the enterprise-level.<sup>1</sup>

c. This guide is a direct result of the research and development efforts of the Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE). The project was initiated within the DOD, but was conducted in partnership with a wide range of organizations across the logistics community of interest (COI). It focused on understanding how to effectively leverage the relationships among individuals and organizations – the social network – within the logistics community (see Chapter I section, Relationships and Social networks). The project found that understanding the characteristics of the social networks that underlay formal collaborative processes is essential for improving the speed and precision of logistics identification, sourcing, and delivery over the course of a complex emergency.

d. This document offers strategies to improve and optimize working relationships among the many organizations that are part of a functioning JLEnt. These strategies are derived from social network science, and they enable logisticians to foster and capitalize on relationships that

will tend to optimize the performance of the enterprise as a whole through a greater awareness of others' processes. Specifically, this guide provides:

(1) An overview of the JCL and the JLEnt, as well as the importance and relevance of an enterprise and social-network perspective to the practice of logistics (Chapter I).

(2) A description of key JLEnt members and their relevant attributes (Chapter II).

(3) A framework to effectively operate within the JLEnt, including a set of social network principles and enterprise best practices to maximize the effectiveness of the JLEnt as a whole (Chapter III).

(4) A description of the JLEnt optimized for foreign humanitarian disasters and a JLEnt optimized for domestic disaster response operations, including descriptions of key partners and established logistics frameworks within each type of operation. This chapter sets out what enterprise logisticians need to know about organizations and existing frameworks to be effective, including how to plan for, build, and operate a cross-organization JLEnt capable of efficiently and effectively supporting any operation. For the DOD this means at national, strategic, operational and tactical levels (Chapters IV & V).

(5) A description of the JLEnt optimized for combat operations and conditions and how social network principles and enterprise best practices can improve the performance of military logistics in joint planning efforts and when the use of military force is expected (Chapter VI).

e. It is important to keep in mind that the COI that constitutes a working JLEnt already exists and conducts many logistics activities together on a daily basis. This guide is intended to enhance the most effective of these working relationships and to build an enterprise perspective across all relevant stakeholders to enable greater capacity for a fiscally restrained logistics community faced with the enormous task of responding to a the array of difficult environments and crises they collectively face.

f. Research, experimentation, and interaction across the logistics community during the JCLE has strongly suggested that changing the density, persistence, and quality of relationships and ties among logisticians and their organizations can have an important effect on the ability to source and deliver logistics in a timely manner. This guide provides logisticians a better understanding about how the awareness and practice of social network principles and enterprise best practices builds more efficient and effective enterprise logistics capacity in both day-to-day operations and during the response to complex emergencies.

#### 4. Contact Information

Comments, suggestions, and other observations regarding this guide and the issues contained within it are welcome and encouraged. Points of contact for this document are the Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint Concepts Division, (757) 203-5268 and Joint Staff J4, Capabilities and Analysis Division, (703) 571-9854.

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## CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

*“Partnerships are critical for effective emergency response as no single individual or group is capable of sufficiently responding to any crisis.”*

**Logistics Cluster, Logistics Operational Guide**

*“In bitter, bloody fights in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it became clear to me and to many others that to defeat a networked enemy we had to become a network ourselves.”*

**General Stanley McChrystal, It Takes A Network**

### 1. Introduction

a. Today, a large and very diverse array of humanitarians, military forces, and other government and private entities operate in very troubled parts of the world. In volatile and chaotic environments, these groups work to relieve human strife in humanitarian and natural disasters, to limit the spread of disease or famine, to mitigate suffering due to armed conflict among and within states, and to respond to and support relief efforts during domestic disasters. For the U.S. and its Allies, this includes security scenarios involving the application of military power to secure national interests and to provide security for vulnerable populations. Although the activities needed to address these issues can be very different in form and character, they frequently overlap in space and/or time.

b. Natural disasters, conflict and war draw an array of organizations whose focus can be local, regional, national, or global in scope. The U.S. military’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) asserts that in the future “the operating environment will be characterized by increasing complexity, uncertainty, rapid change, and persistent conflict” and in such an environment, the Joint Force must be capable of performing several activities simultaneously. The JCL reinforces this notion, for the logistician, noting that, the logistics required to both support operations and to provide the supplies necessary to relieve suffering and/or rebuild after a disaster must be available in an environment in which combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction missions are conducted concurrently.

c. In a complex emergency, military power is only one part of national or multinational (MN) coalition responses. Military forces will typically operate in conjunction with or in the same physical space with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, partner governments, including those at the state, local, and municipal levels, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), or NGOs and private corporations during both domestic and overseas contingencies. The success of the response usually depends on the success of partnerships that are ideally developed before a crisis occurs and reinforced through constant attention to building and maintaining communications between heretofore “stovepiped” logistics systems. Depending on world circumstances, military forces may lead the national or multinational effort or may support other agencies. Typically, they create the security and infrastructure-related conditions that allow nonmilitary agencies to operate effectively. Every solution to a complex emergency requires

extensive logistics support. Military forces are often a part of the solution due to the scope, speed, and scale of logistics resources they are able to bring to bear.

### 2. The Joint Concept for Logistics

a. The JCL was signed on August 6, 2010 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Joint Staff Director for Logistics. The JCL establishes a common framework for the DOD to understand the conduct of future joint logistics operations. One of the main challenges identified in the JCL is the notion that joint force commanders (JFCs), the DOD, and other agencies that make up a government or coalition response have difficulty integrating, synchronizing, or otherwise optimizing logistics identification, sourcing, and delivery across the entirety of the global logistics community. The concept provides a basic approach to solving this set of problems cross-organizational problems that the logistics community may face, and is the foundation for the framework developed in more detail within this guide.

b. Within the JCL, the role of the JLEnt is to provide a mechanism with which JFCs can work to optimize logistics processes and capabilities and allocate military logistics resources according to national security needs in an environment featuring an array of partners. Concept experimentation efforts have led to a new understanding about how this JLEnt can be effectively put into practice. Logisticians across the enterprise can achieve greater capacity and more effective and efficient logistics support through a clear understanding of the critical role relationships play within the enterprise, and a greater understanding of the benefits of better networking. This consideration – important in the best of times – is absolutely vital in an era of declining resources available to both the government and humanitarian communities.

### 3. The Joint Logistics Enterprise

a. The JLEnt is a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers acting cooperatively to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing their own mission and goals. The first step in understanding how to work within the JLEnt is to understand which potential partners might benefit by taking part in it. Although the number of organizations providing logistics in a complex crisis can be very large, they all fall within six major communities. These are:

(1) The DOD and its Military Services, agencies, and combatant commands.


(2) The USG, including agencies involved in national security, international development, and foreign and domestic disaster relief.

(3) Multinational partners; nations hosting U.S. forces or otherwise requiring U.S. assistance, other state partners, allies, coalition forces, and disaster relief and development ministries.

(4) IGOs, including the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN and its subsidiary agencies (particularly the World Food Programme (WFP)).

(5) NGOs; any non-profit, voluntary citizens' group, legally constituted and organized on a local, national, or international level. NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies, and encourage political participation through the provision of information.

(6) Private Industry, which includes corporate, business, and professional entities and organizations, usually contracted to provide supplies or transportation assets, but sometimes acting in partnership, for example, by supplying very specific and detailed knowledge of crisis areas or by providing certain capabilities and capacities for relief on their own.



**Figure I-1. The Communities of the JLEnt**

b. At the strategic level, each of the communities that make up the JLEnt may have very different objectives, priorities, and logistics processes. However, each JLEnt partner will have overlapping interests or activities with other JLEnt partners to a greater or lesser degree during a complex emergency. Understanding those interest and activities, and developing and broadening areas of common interest is the first step in developing a standing JLEnt capable of communicating on a day to day basis in preparation for potential complex emergencies. This standing JLEnt assists each partner to develop a working understanding of roles, responsibilities, and authorities of others JLEnt members that they will encounter in logistics operations around the world to include knowing their basic organizational perspectives, attitudes and strategic objectives visualizing potential JLEnt partners and discovering the degree of common purpose defines the boundaries of the JLEnt and enables the standing JLEnt to transition to a more focused and effective JLEnt when the community moves to active operations as a crisis situation develops.

### Terminology

**The “Joint Logistics Enterprise” is a term developed within the U.S. military to describe an approach to working across organizational boundaries and generate improved levels of logistics support. Non-DOD organizations have adopted different names for the same idea, for example FEMA and the “Logistics Whole Community” and the Humanitarian Community’s “Logistics Cluster.” It is not the intention of this guide to rename or otherwise re-label ongoing efforts in other communities but to point out commonalities among them.**

c. Properly designed and executed logistics is an integral part of the success of any operation, from a major combat scenario to a disaster relief situation. It is clear that an organizational or process-centric view of logistics must expand to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and even synchronization of logistics services. A variety of techniques, principles, and best practices drawn from an understanding of social networks, can allow a global coalition of JLEnt partners to build a better understanding of the capabilities of other partners in the environment and how they can best be applied coherently in a crisis.

## 4. What is a Complex Emergency?

a. This guide is focused on assisting those organizations concerned with the collective provision of logistics to meet requirements in a wide array of international conflict, humanitarian, and domestic disaster relief scenarios. Together, these scenarios are known as complex emergencies. These complex emergency situations typically involve combinations of warfare, civil disturbance, and natural and man-made disasters coupled with vulnerabilities such as food insecurity, epidemics, social conflict, and displaced populations. Often, the scale and scope of these emergencies are beyond the capability of affected nation(s) and humanitarian actors, requiring the need to draw on military, national, and international response capabilities to provide assistance.

b. Although the humanitarian community defines complex emergencies as usually including a significant level of security or political concerns, this guide uses the term to denote an intersecting array of concerns that may or may not involve combat operations to ensure that the JLEnt concept is also inclusive of domestic disaster responses. Military and nonmilitary activities in complex emergencies will always confront difficult political, security, and physical environments and are often characterized by some combination of:

- (1) Physical displacement of people;
- (2) Widespread damage to societies, economies, and infrastructure;
- (3) Hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance due to political, security, or infrastructure constraints;
- (4) The threat or existence of extensive violence or loss of life;

(5) The need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance as local and national capacities are overwhelmed or prove inadequate to meet the needs of the affected population.

c. The U.S. military understands the operating environment in terms of increasing complexity and the need to establish and strengthen relationships among activities that have previously been viewed as distinct. For example, the CCJO states that most problems featuring high levels of uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change will require the application of military power across two or more concurrent activities. These four basic categories of military activity (combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction) are more difficult to plan and execute during complex crises because of this greater overlap in activities in both time and space.<sup>2</sup>

## 5. Guide Foundations

a. In 2011, the Joint Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Warfighting (JCW) conducted an experiment known as the Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment (JCLE) to explore the nature of the JLEnt and how it might be further developed for operational use. The JCLE approached the JLEnt by developing a perspective on the social relationships that link organizations together, rather than the specific logistics processes used by organizations. The experiment tested the hypothesis, that if the JLEnt has the ability to network and integrate or synchronize processes and capabilities, then the result will be the ability to deliver, position, and sustain the Joint Force in a more rapid and precise manner at the best value. It used emerging social network theory to explore how modifying relationships between organizations affected the movement of supplies in a set of simulated complex operations.

b. The project characterized the JLEnt by conducting extensive surveys across the spectrum of military, government, nongovernmental and private logistics providers during international and domestic crises. By conducting these interviews, the team developed a very detailed “social network map” of the relationships that make up the JLEnt. The project then linked this map with a logistics model of actual transportation units and commodities. These linked models allowed the project to examine how modifying the JLEnt’s social connections could improve the fulfillment of logistics requirements in a series of crisis scenarios. Later, in conjunction with representatives across the JLEnt, the team developed a number of practical ways to optimize the JLEnt social network.

c. The experiment found that social networks matter and furthermore, that relatively low-cost adjustments to social networks can yield significant improvements in logistics delivery. These low-cost adjustments however, require a shift in perspective that can be difficult. This mental and cultural shift is focused on moving from an organization and process-centered view of logistics and logistics cooperation to an enterprise-view that relies on relationships and the sustained application of a set of social network principles and enterprise best practices. Importantly, we must take into account the reality of the social network and the fact that optimizing the network is far beyond the capacity of any one organization to influence in its entirety. As such, the true potential benefit of the JLEnt can only be realized if a majority of individual and organizational actors involved in these complex scenarios understand and apply



these social network and enterprise principles. Achieving this well-known social network phenomena of a “tipping point” in which significant network wide changes in behavior occur is the foundational reason for creating and disseminating this guide.

d. This appreciation should drive military logisticians to think about crisis logistics more broadly than they would otherwise in their roles as a specific command, agency, or DOD representative. On the civilian side, this cultural shift requires deeper understanding of how the military operates and how its capabilities might be leveraged when interests and objectives coincide. This new focus will allow for the coordination of capabilities between organizations and reinforces those networks that are typically built out of necessity during ad hoc responses to complex emergencies. The JLEnt, therefore, elevates, broadens, and increases the options available to leaders when developing tailored and timely logistics solutions for complex emergencies.

### 6. Relationships and Social Networks


a. Transitioning the current-day logistics COI into an “enterprise” model is the first strategic-level objective cited in the Joint Staff J4’s Joint Logistics Strategic Plan. An enterprise is both exchanging ideas and perspectives among interested partners and then acting on those ideas in a mutually beneficial way. Communications between organizations with vastly different backgrounds, mandates, and cultures is difficult enough. Between talking and doing – especially in a complex international crisis – lays a complex patchwork of agreements, formal and informal relationships, ad hoc arrangements, and field expedients. Currently, this constitutes the sum of the world’s logistics response capabilities. The JLEnt is the DOD’s approach to elevate less structured “communication” to cooperative “action.”

b. Improving the structure or quality of social relations among logistics providers and consumers can materially improve the rapid and precise delivery of logistics. It is not enough, however, to give each organization an internet connection, a telephone, and a directory and assume that logistics delivery will suddenly become more effective. Although social networks are central to the sharing of information within organizations or multi-organization enterprises, leaders across an enterprise often do not understand how individuals and organizations that make up the network connect to one another and what effect the strength and density of those connections might have on the work of their organization.

c. Logistics planners and operators must approach the network with knowledge that they can use to leverage these networks within the context of existing organizational and procedural frameworks. Even in the context of established processes and existing logistics frameworks, social network approaches to relationships can reinforce a common understanding of the logistics problem set and assist in more effective collaboration.

d. Social networks differ from organization charts in that they describe how information actually flows through an organization, both formally and informally, rather than what may be implied by the lines of authority that describe a typical corporate, government, or military organization chart. Understanding both these realities is necessary to truly understand how information is exchanged.

e. The two views of organizations paint a very different portrait of how information is exchanged. The left half of Figure I-2 depicts an organization chart showing a traditional representation of an organization, its administrative lines and command authorities across the corporate division. At right the figure provides a view of the same organization from a social network perspective. Note that in this network view, “Cole” is the most highly connected node in the organization, even though he occupies a relatively low position within the formal organizational structure. In contrast, “Jones” is at the head of the organization, but with only two strong network linkages, is among the least connected people within the network.<sup>3</sup>



**Figure I-2. Two Views - The Organization Chart and the Social Network**

f. As these two views of information exchange illustrate, simply overlaying an information system or concept of operations over an existing organization or collection of organizations may not capture the true essence of an enterprise’s method of operation. Information flows through networks in ways that may perhaps bear only a passing resemblance to the formal agreements, authorities, treaties, or doctrine that are supposed to govern them. From a social network perspective, where formal lines of authority and control are perceived to not add value or even impede the mission, the readiness of individuals to communicate, their propensity to share information, and their ability to generate trust about mutual competence are important factors in achieving success.

### **Social Network Principles and Enterprise Best Practices**

- **Work towards a common awareness of key enterprise partners and their goals and objectives.**
- **Account for different backgrounds, perspectives, and cultures of enterprise participants.**
- **Embrace emergent logistics networks and technologies to facilitate network building.**
- **Focus on building trust relationships across the enterprise.**
- **Build consensus on common objectives and goals while recognizing where objectives and goals may diverge.**
- **Leverage existing networks and coordinating mechanisms.**
- **Be aware of barriers that hinder information exchange across a social network.**
- **Develop appropriate strategies to include key organizations in the enterprise.**
- **Develop appropriate strategies to link key enterprise participants.**
- **Develop a culture among logisticians with a bias toward leveraging the enterprise.**

g. Enterprise logistics, with its highly diverse organizations across the DOD, interagency, MN, IGO, NGO, and private sectors, each with their own objectives, principles, and procedures is conducive to the rigorous application of social network principles and enterprise best practices uncovered during the JCLE.<sup>4</sup>

h. The application of social network principles and best practices increases the ability of JLEnt members to connect to one another and thus, to integrate or synchronize individual processes and capabilities into a more coherent whole. Benefits to this approach may include improved information flow and knowledge reuse; development of an ability to sense and respond to logistics requirements as they emerge; better connection of global requirements to drive planning and operations; and the early identification of areas of common, overlapping goals, along with the ability to act on those common interests.

### **Limitations of the JLEnt Social Network Approach**

**The social network best practices presented in this guide have the potential to significantly enhance the ability of JLEnt partners to work together in a wide array of circumstances. However, there remain a number of critical issues not addressed here that are important considerations for a fully functioning and operational JLEnt.**

- This guide's emphasis on a social network approach to building the enterprise does not provide guidance on how to transfer funds, assets, or resources, or reimburse other partner organizations. Although mutual understanding among partners is a critical first step in operationalizing the JLEnt, it is only a first step. A fully operationalized JLEnt will have a well-developed framework through which interested partners may share resources quickly and effectively. This constraint to the JLEnt as developed in the guide is being mitigated through constructs such as the National Response Framework and the embryonic International Response Framework and should be included in future versions of the guide.
- The guide's emphasis on a social network approach also did not focus on important processes that occur within JLEnt members' organizations, such as how to harmonize the prioritization of resources. This limits the relevance of the guide if communication about priorities does not result in actual change to these internal processes which are critical if a more coherent delivery of commodities across the JLEnt is to be achieved. This limitation can be mitigated by focusing standing JLEnt activities on sharing information about prioritization processes during Phase 1 efforts, and capturing major process-related issues in a future annex to this guide.
- The guide assumes at least some ability to communicate among members of the JLEnt at all levels. Although social network principles can and should be applied through whatever information sharing capabilities are available to partners (face-to-face, phone, e-mail, web, portal, etc.), the approach outlined in this guide is limited if partners have no way to communicate with one another. This limitation can be managed through an effort to integrate the JLEnt social network approach with commercial, government, and private information systems currently in use or in development within the military, humanitarian, and government logistics communities.
- The guide has focused on developing relations between the DOD and other JLEnt partners. This limitation may lead to a perception that the guide is overly focused on DOD issues and concerns relative to other partners in the JLEnt communities. This risk is not fully within the power of the DOD to address. However, it can be somewhat mitigated through DOD advocacy for social network principles in guides, handbook, manuals, and CONOPS developed by other JLEnt members where appropriate. For example this perspective could be included in training courses conducted by partners, or initiatives such as the UN/ICRC-sponsored MCDA working group.
- The emergence of a social network perspective within the JLEnt could have significant policy implications that are not specifically addressed in this guide. The ability of organizations to talk and to share information must not blunt or blur statutory authorities, regulatory responsibilities, or the "higher callings" that are the reasons these organizations exist in the first place. To mitigate the risk of social network approaches overwhelming established policies and missions or that policy barriers inhibit the operationalization of the JLEnt, JLEnt partners should work to better understand the implications

of the social network approach on specific policies, procedures, and standing agreements.

- The JLEnt could conceivably place DOD at greater risk in its capability to execute its combat, security, relief and reconstruction, and partnership building missions in a complex emergency by relying on the assistance of JLEnt partners that may not materialize.

## CHAPTER II

### STANDING JLENT PARTNERS

*“Every person counts in this business. And you’ve got to bring all the players together to make sure they understand the opportunities and capabilities...Trust and communication help us to better understand each other...Trusting relationships create environments where creative ideas and problem solving can flourish. Trust is really a must for those of us in our business as we confront the challenges of the years ahead.”*

**General Ann Dunwoody, Commanding General – Army Materiel Command<sup>5</sup>**

#### 1. Introduction

a. The JLEnt should be envisioned as a single, global entity, providing sustained logistics readiness for complex emergencies and encouraging the greatest degree of adaptability and freedom of action possible for each enterprise member. An adaptable JLEnt is predicated on logisticians across many different organizations having an enterprise-level perspective and some practical tools by which his or her organization may interact with others in both day-to-day situations and the transition to crisis mode. To develop this enterprise perspective, prospective JLEnt members must come to an understanding that they are indeed part of a wider community of organizations with similar functions and sometimes overlapping interests and objectives and visualize how these organizations might work together.

b. Leadership and participation in the JLEnt is fluid and may change as a complex crisis evolves, and moreover, the type of complex crisis will have a determining influence in how logistics planners should structure their relations across different JLEnt communities. For example, during homeland disaster relief scenarios the JLEnt will include vastly different JLEnt partners than in overseas combat operations, and different organizations will enter and leave the response as the focus of the effort shifts from immediate disaster relief to recovery efforts, to steady-state development and community resilience-building. JLEnt partnerships for particular operations change over time according to changing conditions on the ground, and as interests diverge or converge depending on the dynamics of the specific crisis. JLEnt partners must optimize relationships and connections to make the most of JLEnt-wide capabilities based on the type of complex crisis.

c. Distinct JLEnts do not exist separately for each type and phase of operation, but interested JLEnt partners converge based on the nature of the complex emergency. Various operations around the world draw from the “standing” or “warm” JLEnt as required. In several cases, standing structures such as the National Response Framework (NRF) are the core of this “standing” or “warm” JLEnt and set the context for social network relations among JLEnt partners. Understanding standing agreements, relationships, and frameworks will allow partnerships and interpersonal and interorganizational trust to flourish more quickly. The various phases of an operation bring different JLEnt members to the forefront or background depending on the context. JLEnt members must utilize those structures and maintain an enterprise-wide perspective as they construct and execute logistics operations.



d. The JCL identifies six broad communities that make up the JLEnt: the DOD, USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, multinational partners, and the private sector. The remainder of this chapter describes how a “warm,” or “standing” JLEnt forms, and what organizations constitute it. The descriptions of each logistics community includes how logistics is generally defined (see Figure II-1), the community’s general view of crisis response, what might prompt a JLEnt participant to respond in a crisis situation, and a participant’s general approach to engaging other logistics organizations across the enterprise.




Figure II-1. Logistics Definitions across Major JLEnt Communities

e. By increasing understanding among key partners, including how each logistician relates to other partner organizations within the JLEnt, each member will better understand one another’s roles in determining what must be done and when and how it should be done. Joint planning or coordination between organizations cannot occur unless a pre-crisis “warm” JLEnt is communicating before an actual crisis occurs. Chapter III of this guide explores the process of developing a standing JLEnt in more detail and provides recommendations on how to establish and reinforce relationships in a structured way within the context of typical operational planning processes by visualizing, optimizing, and utilizing the JLEnt during complex operations.



## 2. The Department of Defense

a. In the broadest terms, the DOD defines logistics as planning and executing the movement and support of forces.<sup>6</sup> Logistics includes the design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. Furthermore, logistics includes the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel, as well as installation support. Outside of force sustainment, military logistics can also be the movement as well as the acquisition of relief supplies and the furnishing of services in support of a humanitarian response.




Figure II-2. Evolving DOD Core Logistics Capabilities

b. For the purposes of employing U.S. military logistics capabilities during a complex emergency, the military uses the term Joint Logistics, which refers to the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more military departments' logistics resources to support the joint force. When a joint military logistician thinks of logistics, it is defined by a set of "core logistics capabilities" that help JFCs integrate logistics into their decision making processes.

c. A description of these core capabilities, depicted in Figure II-2, can be found in the *Joint Concept for Logistics*.<sup>7</sup> From the U.S. military's perspective, logistics can be thought of as the ability to project and sustain a logistically ready joint force through the sharing of DOD, interagency, and industrial resources. In today's operating environment this will include coordination and sharing resources with multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs. Borrowing from JP 4-0, "the value of joint logistics can be determined by how well three imperatives are attained." These include:

(1) **Unity of effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same organization – the product of unified action. For the joint logisticians within the JLEnt, this is the synchronization and integration of logistics capabilities focused on operational intent, and is the most critical of all joint outcomes.

(2) **Joint Logistics Environment (JLE)-wide visibility.** Having assured access to the logistic processes, resources, and requirements necessary to make effective decisions. Answering the questions, "where is it," and "when will it get there," JLE-wide visibility provides users within the JLEnt the means to optimize logistics capabilities in order to respond quickly and maximize outcomes while building confidence and cooperation with the JLEnt and enhancing response readiness.

(3) **Rapid and precise response.** The ability of the core logistics capabilities to meet constantly changing needs, the effectiveness of which can be measured by assessing:

(a) The speed at which everything moves according to priority, and which produces the most effective support response.

(b) The reliability of logistical support, reflected by the dependability of global providers to deliver required support when promised and the degree of predictability or time-definite delivery of support; the consistency by which requested logistics support is provided at the time and location required.

(c) The efficiency by which support is delivered, measured by the amount of resources required to provide support and deliver a specific outcome.<sup>8</sup>

### **Logistics for the Military Footprint vs. Logistics for Support to other Agencies**

**U.S. military logistics training, education, and processes are designed to support both the deployment and operation of military forces. As humanitarian operations have become more important to U.S. operations abroad, the need to provide humanitarian relief supplies has brought with it complex funding and prioritization mechanisms. In other government and nongovernment**

organizations (such as FEMA for example), major logistics elements such as projection and provision of commodities to an affected population are separate and usually handled by different entities or groups. For the DOD, this separation of sustainment of teams on the ground and the logistics associated with aid to affected populations can be confusing. Military logistics does not generally separate those parts which support military forces to operate and those commodities which are needed by the affected population, and the military is coming to grips with the requirement to supply both.

This subtle difference between military and nonmilitary logisticians becomes very apparent in Humanitarian Aid Operations. During these operations, the DOD is often tasked with providing logistics support to the initial response and early life sustainment mission for the affected population. Funding for supplies and the use of assets for response partner needs or for the affected population is different from typical Title 10 military logistics funds. These differences can strongly condition or shape a military logistician's response to requests for help and should be considered by other JLEnt members.

### 3. The U.S. Government

a. The U.S. interagency community responds to an emergency in two distinct ways depending on whether the complex emergency is at home or overseas. DHS coordinates federal response through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with international support coordinated through the Department of State (DOS), when needed. DOS coordinates the response to disasters through embassy country teams with support from USAID. During complex emergencies, both foreign and domestic, other USG agencies, including the DOD, support both FEMA and DOS in accordance with the NRF and various mutual aid, assistance, and international support agreements. Foreign and domestic disaster response configurations of the JLEnt will be described in greater detail in chapters IV and V.

b. For domestic emergencies, the NRF describes how the U.S. conducts all hazards response. It describes key response principles, participants, roles, and structures that guide U.S. response operations. FEMA coordinates the response support through fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that provide functional capabilities and resources from federal departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector and NGOs (see <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/> to access the NRF Resource Center online).

#### Emergency Support Functions

- ESF #1 – Transportation
- ESF #2 – Communications
- ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering
- ESF #4 – Firefighting
- ESF #5 – Emergency Management
- ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services
- ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support
- ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services
- ESF #9 – Search and Rescue

- **ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response**
- **ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources**
- **ESF #12 – Energy**
- **ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security**
- **ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery**
- **ESF #15 – External Affairs**

c. “Core capabilities” within the NRF describe a set of distinct elements necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment; and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred. They exist within each of five distinct mission areas, including Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery (see Figure II-3). To assess both the capacity and gaps to deal with crisis situation, each core capability includes capability target. The core capabilities and capability targets are not exclusive to any single level of government or organization, but rather require the combined efforts of the whole community.

d. As the primary and coordinating agencies for Logistics Management and Resource Support (ESF #7), DHS, FEMA and the General Services Administration (GSA) combine and optimize their responsibilities along functional lines, as described below:

(1) **Materiel management:** Planning and controlling the functions – identify, source, procure, schedule, move, store, issue, inventory, inspect, distribute, and disposal – supporting the complete cycle (flow) of materiel and associated information into and through an organization.

(2) **Transportation management:** Planning, programming, executing, and tracking the movement of people, materials, and associated assets, services, and systems from point of origin to point of destination to meet movement and delivery requirements, including rescue and emergency resupply efforts.

(3) **Facilities management:** Planning, programming, sourcing, locating, selecting, acquiring, managing, and maintaining storage, distribution, and operational facilities – shelters, responder camps, Joint Field Offices (JFO), etc. – and associate support systems and services.

PREVENT	PROTECT	MITIGATION	RESPOND	RECOVER
Planning	Planning	Planning	Planning	Planning
Public Information and Warning	Public Information and Warning	Public Information and Warning	Public Information and Warning	Public Information and Warning
Operational Coordination	Operational Coordination	Operational Coordination	Operational Coordination	Operational Coordination
Forensics and Attribution	Access Control and Identity Verification	Community Resilience	Critical Transportation	Economic Recovery
Intelligence and Information Sharing	Cybersecurity	Long-term Vulnerability Reduction	Environmental Response / Health and Safety	Health and Social Services
Interdiction and Disruption	Intelligence and Information Sharing	Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	Fatality Management Services	Housing
Screening, Search, and Detection	Interdiction and Disruption	Threats and Hazard Identification	Infrastructure Systems	Infrastructure Systems
	Physical Protective Measures		Mass Care Services	Natural and Cultural Resources
	Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities		Mass Search and Rescue Operations	
	Screening, Search, and Detection		On-Scene Security and Protection	
	Supply Chain Integrity and Security		Operational Communications	
			Public and Private Services and Resources	
			Public Health and Medical Services	
			Situational Assessment	

**Figure II-3. U.S. Domestic Response Core Capabilities**

e. As the lead federal coordinator for international disaster assistance, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) facilitates and coordinates the purchase and movement of emergency relief commodities worldwide. Support is limited to what the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Response Management Team (RMT) can legally provide, most of which is limited to developing, coordinating, funding, and monitoring response efforts of other response agencies, and the accountability of funds, materials, equipment, and supplies used during an emergency. DARTs do not typically purchase, hire, or contract for goods and services or make formal commitments to do so.<sup>9</sup>

#### OFDA Warehoused Commodities

- Water Containers
- Bladders
- Treatment Kits
- Blankets
- Hygiene kits
- Plastic Sheeting
- Field Packs
- Remote Location Kits

***\*Note: OFDA does not stock water, perishable items, or medical supplies.***

f. Washington, D.C.-based USAID/OFDA logistics officers can coordinate the delivery of relief supplies from regional warehouse hubs to affected areas via air, sea, or land. These



logisticians can also rapidly procure relief items that are not stockpiled in regional warehouses from numerous suppliers around the world. Most emergency responses require airlift, so USAID/OFDA works closely with USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance to use commercial aircraft to expedite the delivery of relief supplies. Field logistics staffs receive the commodities and ensure that supplies reach implementing partners for distribution to affected populations. USAID/OFDA may pre-position personnel and emergency relief supplies in the event of an impending disaster, such as a hurricane or volcanic eruption, so that immediate assistance is available to affected communities as humanitarian needs arise. It is important to remember, however, that from the USAID/OFDA perspective, sending commodities into theater to a disaster site is never the first option. USAID/OFDA will look to procure supplies locally or regionally where possible, as more local procurement can assist in jump-starting or revitalizing the local economy.

g. In addition, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has the unique capability of operating as part of the DHS (Title 14) or the DOD (Title 10). The USCG's primary missions are typically carried out under the direction of DHS. They will provide assistance to DHS/FEMA during domestic contingencies as per the NRF and can provide assistance to DOS via DHS for overseas humanitarian missions. They will use their existing logistics structure to support their units and can provide logistics liaison officers to the interagency community. USCG can also operate as part of DOD and typically will be assigned to the Naval Task Force supporting the Combatant Commander. When operating in a joint military environment, USCG will work within the DOD logistics structure for support and sustainment. Logistics liaison officers will be assigned to the N-4 staff as needed.

#### 4. Intergovernmental Organizations

a. The UN is the most prominent IGO in many global humanitarian response operations. It defines logistics as the range of operational activities concerned with supply, handling, transportation and distribution of materials, and is also applicable to the transportation of people. Furthermore, the UN conceives logistics as being a diverse and dynamic function that is flexible and changes according to the various constraints and demands imposed upon it.<sup>10</sup>

b. For the humanitarian sector, logistics is best summarized as Supply + Materials Management + Distribution.<sup>11</sup> For IGOs, logistics covers the range of actions from physical materiel and information flow from raw material to the distribution of the finished product. Major emphasis is now placed on the importance of information as well as physical flows. Additionally, the flow of products and packaging back through the system – “reverse logistics” – is a very relevant planning and management consideration.




Figure II-4. Cluster Approach<sup>12</sup>

c. The humanitarian community, including the United Nations usually organizes its humanitarian response to complex emergencies around several “clusters” focused on issues such as health, camp management, and logistics (see Figure II-4). These clusters are activated when it has been determined, based on an initial evaluation or on the recommendation of the Humanitarian Coordinator, that there is a specific need for coordination or a need for additional capacity in relation to certain issue. In the case of the logistics cluster, when there is a need for coordination or to fill a logistics gap. The cluster approach is meant to influence humanitarian capacity, leadership, accountability, and coordination.

d. Within the Logistics Cluster, logistics is defined as “the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials as well as related information, from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of meeting the end beneficiary’s requirements.”<sup>13</sup> During complex emergencies, these requirements frequently include:

- (1) Provision of common transport services where necessary (surface and air)
- (2) Warehousing/storage facilities



(3) Intervention with local authorities and/or government counterparts on behalf of the cluster participants regarding facilitation measures (i.e. customs and duty procedures)

(4) Provision of information management and Geographic Information System (GIS) services to the humanitarian community

(5) Advocacy and resource mobilization

e. The cluster approach operates at two levels: at the global level and at the country level. Each global cluster is led by a specific IGO which coordinates common responses and provides information management capabilities. These cluster leads have three essential responsibilities; the development of standards and policy, building response capacity, and providing operational support for other humanitarian actors.<sup>14</sup> The WFP is the designated global lead of the Logistics Cluster at the global level and manages a website ([www.logcluster.org](http://www.logcluster.org)) that assists in the coordination of humanitarian response. The global leads are, in turn, accountable to the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) who leads the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The USG/ERC and OCHA provide policy guidance, coordination mechanisms (including information management), and consolidated funding.




Figure II-5. Accountability of the Clusters at Country and Global Levels<sup>15</sup>

f. At the country level, the cluster approach is designed “to ensure a more coherent and effective response by mobilizing groups of agencies, organizations and NGOs to respond in a strategic manner across all key sectors or areas of activity, each sector having a clearly designated lead, as agreed by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team.”<sup>16</sup> Guidance provided by a Humanitarian Coordinator is combined with the Humanitarian Country Team’s influence and connections acquired from being located in proximity to the disaster, to enable country clusters to organize coordination meetings that establish common awareness.

g. The Logistics Cluster is the key node that links the UN, NGO, international and national level humanitarian response communities together. While the cluster system offers an entry point for coordination, it is important to understand that IGOs have their own internal processes, logistical capabilities, and relationships. Indeed, the term “humanitarian community” suggests a semblance of unity and even control. However, this is not the case. Common standards, policies, and accountability mostly exist insofar as autonomous actors agree to submit to them. Donors and UN agencies offer a center of gravity for humanitarian organizations, but varied agendas, preferences, and funding streams can inhibit broad cohesion.

h. IGOs such as the UN can fulfill several different roles during complex emergencies related to the JLEnt. First, they offer a venue for nations to pool donations (mostly cash) with which IGOs fund specific agencies and programs for a specific crisis. Second, the UN and other IGOs influence the broad goals and priorities for humanitarian aid. Third, IGOs offer the broader logistics community an experienced hub where relationships may be forged without infringing on the operational independence of organizations found on the ground through the cluster approach.

**For further information on coordinating DOD and IGO efforts, see JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* and JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.**

## 5. Nongovernmental Organizations

a. NGOs and their diverse range of capabilities have a unique role in both domestic and overseas disaster relief efforts and vary greatly in size, organizational structure, mission, and capability. NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering, promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution, and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.<sup>17</sup> Typically, most programs run by established NGOs are focused on specific areas and compliment government efforts. They bring to bear knowledge and skills about specific areas or locations that are not available elsewhere and compliment or support the existing response frameworks of the HN government.

b. NGOs may assess needs on the ground at a humanitarian or disaster site. Since they are often already in-country or arrive immediately after the first responders, NGOs will first apply what resources they have immediately and locally. They later look to their higher headquarters or to partner organizations for additional support if demands exceed their local capacity to address them. NGOs may initiate appeals campaigns to fill gaps and some will respond to government agency or private foundation grant programs to find money with which to address a particular gap. NGOs are typically reliant on donations to enable their response which creates a high level of competitiveness for grant and donation money.

c. NGOs do not seek to supplant the governmental relief agencies but to act as interested parties for an affected populace. In the case of a disaster, they are able to quickly assemble their volunteer manpower for relief work. NGOs have the flexibility to react quickly at the local level.

In addition, due to their essentially localized scope of operation they may have the ability to reach out to underserved and possibly marginalized sections of society other partners may have trouble accessing. Because NGOs can respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that military forces might otherwise have to devote to relief operations.<sup>18</sup>

d. NGOs tend to specialize in the type(s) of aid they provide and coordinate heavily with other NGOs and response entities to minimize duplication and compliment response efforts. While the NGO community is usually decentralized, they are conscious of their image and negative perceptions which might impact their operations and ability to raise funds and, therefore, focus on making good on the trust and money afforded to them. Individual NGOs will have certain priorities and relationships with those they serve as well as those who enable them to do their work such as financial donors and partner agencies.

e. NGOs will often work cooperatively with government entities like the UN or the HN government entities (local, state or federal), both within the United States and overseas. One advantage to working with NGOs overseas is their experience as implementing partners both in the region and in their area(s) of expertise. Implementing partners are organizations to which other organizations – the UN, USAID, or the European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) – provide funds and/or materials in support of programs deemed beneficial to the interest of the funding organization through established agreements and may include grants to carry out programs of the funding organization. For example, the WFP will grant money to an NGO to distribute aid the “last mile” – bridging the gap between warehouses and disrupted transportation networks to the point of need. Indeed, many partners within the JLEnt “have come to rely heavily on NGOs and their vast network of local and international connections.”<sup>19</sup>

f. This means that NGOs are not just implementing partners but are also relied upon for reporting further requirements not identified through other channels whether overseas or in the United States. They will use their own processes to quickly seek assistance through the solicitation of cash donations, in-kind donations from businesses, and support from partner organizations. Subsequently, they ensure that needed items are delivered as expeditiously as possible since they are usually providing life-saving and life-sustaining support.

g. NGO support is a critical element in ensuring that survivors’ needs are met. They have logistical capabilities and challenges which are often unknown to others but their inclusion in a response can often spell the difference between life and death and should be actively sought as partners by the DOD as they will be present at every disaster scene. An awareness of their differences and the capabilities they possess is essential to building better relationships on the ground. Given the diversity of NGOs, there are some additional factors that should be considered and are helpful to building better relationships on the ground.

h. First, many NGOs are faith based organizations (FBOs) which ascribe to certain moral creeds. However, they assist and offer aid regardless of the beneficiary’s race, creed or religion. However, the donations that they receive may come from different donor bases. These different donor perspectives can affect the overall logistics network. Furthermore, NGOs and FBOs may

be sensitive to security concerns/restraints imposed overseas since dealing with security issues is almost never a factor in their US-based day-to-day response activities. This situation can challenge and have a negative impact on information sharing and collaboration activities.

i. Second, some NGOs arise from perceived service gaps during response efforts and only exist as ad hoc or spontaneous NGOs. While their capacity to provide relevant support may not be initially understood, their activities in the crisis will impact overall humanitarian requirements. Persons ramping up a spontaneous NGO to address specific humanitarian needs are often unaware of ongoing planning and coordination between partners within the JLEnt. Understanding where to direct such NGOs to receive guidance and logistical support within existing frameworks is a key step in building a good relationship.

j. Third, there are certain NGOs that focus on providing transportation services overseas. Air transportation capability is one example which provides scarce and much-sought-after capacities and can further enhance the overall performance and reach of the JLEnt if properly connected. Examples of these include Air Serve International or Wings Worldwide.

#### **Unsolicited Donations**

**The human impulse to do something when a disaster strikes can create challenges for logisticians. When disaster strikes overseas, people who want to help may begin collecting items intended for use in relief operations. It is not unusual for community and civic groups to have collected thousands of pounds of material – typically used clothing, canned food and bottled water - realizing only afterward that they do not know to whom to send the collection, what their transportation options are or whether the items are actually needed. Reasons why these donations are frequently counterproductive are given below. The good news is that the simplest and easiest way to support response efforts is also the most economical and efficient – through cash donations to relief agencies.**

**Financial contributions allow professional relief organizations to purchase exactly what is most urgently needed by disaster survivors, when it is needed. Cash donations allow relief supplies to be purchased near the disaster site, avoiding the delays and steep transportation and logistical costs that can encumber material donations. Some commodities, particularly food, can almost always be purchased locally - even after devastating emergencies and in famine situations.**

**Cash purchases also convey benefits beyond the items procured. They support local merchants and local economies, ensure that commodities are fresh and familiar to survivors, that supplies arrive expeditiously and that goods are culturally, nutritionally and environmentally appropriate. In contrast, unsolicited household donations can clog supply chains, take space required to stage life-saving relief supplies for distribution, and divert relief workers' time. Collections of household goods serve no useful function in the acute phase of an emergency operation. Managing piles of unsolicited items may actually add to the cost of relief work through forcing changes to logistics and distribution plans and creating more tasks for relief workers. Cash contributions to established,**

**legitimate relief agencies are always more beneficial to survivors and to relief operations than are unsolicited donations of commodities.**

k. Being cognizant of possible tensions between NGOs and the military will also be helpful. The Sphere Handbook acknowledges the “increased involvement of the military in humanitarian response, a set of actors not primarily driven by the humanitarian imperative.”<sup>20</sup> Many NGOs define their objectives in terms of three fundamental humanitarian principles: Humanity, Impartiality, and Neutrality. A basic understanding of these principles is required to establish and maintain a successful working relationship.<sup>21</sup>

*“[The military’s] activities can blur the important distinction between humanitarian objectives and military or political agendas and create future security risks.... Some agencies will maintain a minimum dialogue to ensure operational efficiency (e.g. basic program information-sharing) while others may establish stronger links (e.g. use of military assets).”<sup>22</sup>*

**For a further source of information on NGOs, see JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, Appendix C.**

### 6. Multinational Partners

a. **Host Nation.** A host nation (HN) is a nation that receives commodities or people from nations, coalitions, IGOs, and NGOs and which may be located in, operate within, or transit through its territory. In most cases the HN, as a sovereign entity, establishes the limits and authorities for international groups operating within its borders. Its relationship with the other communities within the JLEnt will define the logistical response. For example, Burma’s reluctance to accept aid after Cyclone Nargis hit in 2008 created unique challenges wholly different from the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti which, in turn, was wholly different from the response to the 2011 earthquake in Japan. A HN’s relationship with other nations can be understood by studying the relationship of the foreign ministries. The humanitarian community will have a broad range of relationships in the HN’s government, private sector, and general population based on their specific focus; so an NGO promoting adult literacy will likely have relationships with a HN’s ministry of education, universities, etc. Thus, the history, culture, and politics of the HN will shape the relationship hubs and centers of gravity that logistics planners and operators must take into account during a complex emergency.

#### **Encouraging a Multinational JLEnt.**

**Coalition operations are important, but the JLEnt is not only about preparing for complex crisis contingencies. Multinational treaty organizations such as NATO or the United Nations may serve as important future logistic enablers. Logisticians across the JLEnt should use the various forums that these organizations can provide where possible to work collectively toward common lexicon, doctrine, policy, processes, and standardization issues.**

b. **Partner Nations.** Partner Nations are structured for humanitarian response in ways similar to the United States. Like the United States, other nations have laws and procedures which dictate who leads, coordinates, and supports the nation’s response. These agencies behave



in much the same way that the U.S. agencies do, albeit with slight cultural and political differences. Their relationships with different parts of the world will be driven by national interest, historical connections, regional proximity, and bilateral/multinational agreements. Consequently, these nation's capabilities and response have been scaled and tailored to meet their regional and National security strategies. The primary agencies that JLEnt participants should consider are:

(1) Aid/development agencies – typically, the primary conduits of aid from outside/non-government sources to communities in need. Includes NGOs and IGOs, but may include government or government supported agencies (i.e., USAID, Red Cross, etc.) in support of both international and in-country/HN response efforts.

(2) Government/HN response agencies – often the primary source of first responders and emergency aid during both national and international response. Includes both government (local, state, and federal) and non-government entities.

(3) Militaries – capable of providing both lift capability and security forces to transport and secure equipment, commodities, survivors, and, at times, responders. Relationships between military entities and other response agencies may vary depending upon HN laws, mutual aid and international agreements, treaties, and funding restrictions.

(4) Foreign departments of state/affairs – typically, the main connection to a HN for other nations, IGOs, and NGOs providing support during response efforts, and the agencies responsible for coordinating support requests among partner nations and the international community.

c. In addition, nations may not be directly involved on the ground responding to a crisis, yet their importance in understanding relationships across the logistics enterprise should not be dismissed. Regional nations may serve as transit nations whereby recovery assistance and disaster relief will pass through their territory to the affected state. Moreover, many nations work through IGOs which offer a venue to pool donations to fund specific agencies and programs for a given crisis, influence humanitarian aid goals and priorities, and to forge better relationships.

## **7. Private Sector**

a. The private sector is the most diverse community within the JLEnt, involving thousands of companies, multi-national corporations (MNC), academia, professional organizations, and other private entities. Many even come with their own logistics management capabilities and resources, though oftentimes focused on specific needs or specialized capabilities. However, their resources are also limited, and rarely concentrated or available in sufficient quantities such that any one organization could support the needs of a significant response effort. Moreover, during an emergency response, many of these same organizations will be incapable of providing any measurable support; possibly because they will be impacted by the event, possibly because they are reliant upon the same businesses and systems that are now overwhelmed, or fully engaged with the JLEnt and unable to support them. JLEnt planning must take into account both the limitations and the availability of the services and commodities private sector organizations

can offer, particularly those within the stricken area, or when multiple players in the JLEnt (DOD, FEMA, NGOs, etc.) rely upon the same organization(s) for commodities and specialized services (i.e., medical support, food and water, and lift capability). Depending upon the circumstances, JLEnt responders may need to be self-sufficient for some period of time after being deployed to avoid overstressing the already impacted support systems.

b. Many companies will be impacted by the complex emergency itself and their primary concern is returning to pre-crisis normalcy to the extent possible. Industry may coordinate with government agencies to stabilize supply chains to pre-crisis levels. Other, less dramatically affected companies will look inward first to take care of their business and the needs of employed personnel. Private companies also assist in broader response and recovery efforts. Industry typically takes part in the JLEnt through donation or contracting services and supplies to other JLEnt members. To provide these services, private industry will generally connect to the JLEnt in three distinct ways, coordination, corporate social responsibility, and contracting.

c. **Coordination.** The private sector will reach out to local government agencies to plan for expected demand, share information during a crisis, and anticipate when normalcy will return. Trade associations offer a hub where potential common interests are readily evident. At the same time, it must be understood that associations are ultimately part of each company's business strategy. Coordination during response can take many forms. Companies affected by the disaster will want to understand the disaster response plan and its impact on the company's recovery. Companies interested in keeping their stocks filled for their consumers will want to work with officials to understand available routes, permissions, etc.

d. **Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).** CSR (also referred to as "corporate citizenship") is a term that describes how private companies understand and address social or environmental problems that go beyond what is required by government regulators. CSR implies short-term costs to the company that do not provide an immediate financial benefit, but may promote future goodwill towards the company or profitability by shaping the environment in a favorable way (a soft drink company promoting clean water, for example). In exercising CSR during a complex crisis, private industry may donate cash or in-kind commodities, services, or personnel to NGOs. Organizations formed from corporations with a humanitarian focus (like DHL Disaster Response Teams) offer their logistic expertise or commodity resources pro bono as part of their CSR objectives. When providing resources in this way, private industry will often have priorities complementary to their business interests and have relationships aligned with the goods or services the parent company typically provides.

e. **Contracting.** Private industry will also serve in a contracted role, working for each type of partner within the JLEnt. Contractors will provide specific commodities or services depending on the requirements of the response. Contracting, with a few exceptions, is highly segmented between layers because of funding streams and internal, compartmentalized contract managing protocols and processes. A company's relationship to other layers relies mostly on their capabilities and marketing. Government agencies tend to have standing contingency contracts while other layers of the enterprise do not always have the management capabilities to maintain such large-scale contract vehicles. The DOD also has the capacity to contract support, at many levels, however most relevant to the JLEnt will be a Joint Contracting Support Board



(JCSB) which is established at a combatant command and chaired by the contracting organization with responsibility of focusing on how a JFC/JTF might procure support within a specific operation or area. More information about the DOD's perspective on contracting can be found in JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.

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## CHAPTER III

### FRAMEWORK TO OPTIMIZE LOGISTICS RELATIONS ACROSS THE JLENT

*“The dynamics of each particular scenario may be different, but the application of social network principles applies throughout.”*

**Dr. Catherine Miller, Southern Baptist Disaster Relief**

#### 1. Introduction

a. This guide suggests a step-by-step, social network-based framework focused on developing and achieving the greatest possible unity of effort across the organizations that make up the JLEnt. This framework (depicted in Figure III-1) is a structured process by which logisticians can discover or develop a sense of common purpose across their respective organizations during complex crises to maximize the potential for cooperation among groups, and to plan responses that mutually optimize the delivery of logistics. The framework assists JLEnt logisticians by defining organizations that will normally respond to each of the complex crises described in this guide. It provides ways to encourage information sharing about organizational capabilities that can be brought to bear during a complex crisis. Finally, it provides a means to establish contact with other JLEnt actors and plan, coordinate/facilitate, and sustain – on a daily basis – the effective delivery of logistics support/assets/services using existing structures well before a crisis occurs.



**Figure III-1. JLEnt Engagement Framework**

b. The framework is a cyclical process consisting of five distinct phases. Each phase is connected to the next by several supporting social network principles and enterprise best practices. The five phases are:

- (1) Establish and Maintain Base JLEnt Understanding
- (2) Develop and Maintain Mutual Appreciation of the Environment
- (3) Orient Leadership and Fix Responsibility for Coordination
- (4) Inform Internal Logistics Processes
- (5) Execute and Assess Logistics Operations

c. The JLEnt engagement framework is intended to augment and compliment planning frameworks of JLEnt members. For example, across the U.S. military, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) is described in JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning as a framework to formally integrate the planning activities across all facets of joint military operations and spans many organizational levels.<sup>23</sup> The JLEnt engagement framework provides a structured way to apply social network principles and enterprise best practices in the context of the broad operational activities and planning functions that constitute APEX. Figure III-2 depicts when each of the JLEnt engagement framework phases are most relevant to these operational activities and planning functions. It is important to note that JLEnt engagement phases are continuous and may take place in any phase, however, they are likely to be most relevant or urgent as arranged in the figure.




Figure III-2. JLEnt Engagement Framework and Related APEX Activities and Functions

d. Similarly, the humanitarian community, represented by the Logistics Cluster develops its own logistics assessments and plans. Within the global humanitarian community, the assessment process allows logisticians to understand the impact of a disaster and the planning framework develops concepts for how logistics services might be provided JLEnt-wide. The JLEnt engagement framework can also augment the humanitarian logistics assessment process by providing social network principles and enterprise best practices that relate to each of its various phases as well. Figure III-3 illustrates the relationship between the humanitarian assessment process and the JLEnt engagement framework.<sup>24</sup>





Figure III-3. JLEnt Engagement Framework and the Logistics Cluster Assessment Cycle

e. Within each of the five phases of the JLEnt engagement framework are three “JLEnt Activities” Derived from JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations, JLEnt activities are a series of basic steps that support an orderly and systemic approach to building and maintaining relationships. Linking each phase of the framework is a set of supporting social network principles and enterprise best practices. Applying these principles and best practices encourage more developed and mature relations among JLEnt partners and allow JLEnt members to conduct the more complex activities found within the phase of the framework that immediately follows. The remainder of this section of the guide will describe each of these phases in further detail.

## 2. Phase 1: Establish and Maintain Base JLEnt Understanding

a. There are a wide range of organizations with drastically different logistics capabilities, perspectives and roles. Organizations have statutory authorities, guidelines and governance directives that frame their role and responsibilities and the character of their participation in different classes of complex emergencies. During phase 1 of the engagement framework, the logistician will define who may potentially be part of a “day-to-day” or standing JLEnt. Beginning with the broad outline of different JLEnt communities described in chapter 2, the logistician will begin to understand and engage potential partners. Phase 1 activities allow the logistician to develop a detailed understanding of the general interests, objectives, and equities of potential JLEnt partners. This basic understanding will allow the JLEnt as a whole to identify opportunities for cooperation and to avoid triggering unnecessary conflict or confrontation between various members. Especially relevant social network principles and enterprise best practices in this phase encourage the logistician to reach outside of his or her particular organization and make relevant connections with others.



**Figure III-4. JLEnt Engagement Framework Phase 1**

b. Phase 1 JLEnt activities ensure that each JLEnt member has a basic understanding of the organizational roles of each member organization as well as a basic grasp of institutional relationships among participating JLEnt members. Figure 3-4 depicts phase 1 activities in detail, as well as the set of supporting best practices that together set the conditions for JLEnt partnerships to transition to effective phase 2 activities.



c. *JLEnt Activities*

(1) JLEnt activities in phase 1 are intended to develop in the minds of logisticians a basic understanding of the standing JLEnt including key attributes of each organization that may be part of a logistics response, their overall motivations, procedures, and general factors that shape their response to varying international and domestic situations. For the humanitarian community, a partnership is defined as the establishment of alliances between two or more entities for the purpose of achieving common goals. To better understand which partners should be part of a standing JLEnt network, the logistician should identify and catalog the broad objectives, end state, and transition criteria for each JLEnt participant. For military forces, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed, while an end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives.

(2) Beginning with the broad categories of JLEnt members outlined in Chapter II, the logistician should develop a list, register, or link diagram of the specific organizations and individuals with logistics capabilities that may be active within the particular area of responsibility. This JLEnt register is a useful aid to see the various partners that will have an impact on a particular logistics operation.

(3) Each organization has different perspectives on what logistics means. Chapter II in this guide describes these differences at the most basic level. In addition, each organization views important terms such as “operation,” “coordination,” or “command and control” differently. It is critical that logisticians across each community understand these differences, particularly when engaging with one another in planning or during operations. In day-to-day activities, logistics planners should construct and maintain a detailed understanding of important differences in terms that may impact the optimal delivery of logistics across the JLEnt.

d. *Supporting Social Network Principles and Enterprise Best Practices*

(1) Once a basic understanding of the JLEnt from a logistician’s particular perspective is constructed, focus should shift to engaging in active outreach across the organizations entered and characterized in the JLEnt register. Although phase 1 activities will provide a rough understanding of the JLEnt, it will not be refined enough for use in actual operations. This “first cut” should be shared with assumed primary relationships so that a more collective, set understanding can be built. JLEnt members will wish to refine this base understanding, providing context for imputed objectives, end states, and transition criteria. The following supporting social network principles and enterprise best practices ensure that the JLEnt has established a set of relations capable of working toward a set of common purposes across the remainder of the framework activities.

**Phase 1 Supporting Best Practices**

- **Work toward a shared awareness of key JLEnt partners and their goals and objectives.**



- **Account for different backgrounds, perspectives, and cultures of JLEnt participants.**
- **Embrace emergent logistics networks and technologies to facilitate network building.**

(2) There are significant differences in perspective that JLEnt members will have to account for when participating in logistics plans and operations. Some key sources of friction between military, interagency, NGOs, and others that logisticians across the JLEnt should be aware of include:

(a) **Long versus Short-term View.** Conflict can exist between partners with similar cultural perspectives (humanitarian and development organizations) due to differences between short and long-term goals. For example, humanitarian relief workers may desire to deliver free food aid to a needy village. This is a short-term goal which may hinder longer-term development work focused on increasing local capacity to provide for itself.

(b) **Requirements for Media Coverage.** Humanitarian and development organizations survive primarily on “donor” funds. Media coverage of both the crisis and their participation in that crisis will assist them in getting more funds. In contrast, diplomats and the military often seek to get the crisis off of the front pages of newspapers due to political and security concerns. In most cases (the Pakistan floods and earthquake, or Indian Ocean tsunami), the United States will want its efforts to be positively viewed by the local population as well to support larger strategic messages.

(c) **Competition.** Competition can also be a source of friction between partners. NGO representatives have claimed during responses that they can at times be more comfortable sharing information with the military than with other humanitarians they are competing with for “donor” funds. The military and private security forces also have a conflicting relationship even though they share a common culture and background, partly because the military prefers to maintain a monopoly on the use of force.<sup>25</sup>

(d) **Local versus Global.** Members of the JLEnt may be so locally focused that they are unable to see the big picture in a complex crisis. A private industry partner may be more interested in acquiring forces to secure their needed supply line to resume their corporate operations and be frustrated by efforts to secure shelter operations that divert security resources. An NGO may seek to influence supply chains to stockpile food for an orphanage they operate to the detriment of other adversely affected populations during a complex emergency. The JLEnt’s function may break down when locally focused members attempt to influence JLEnt operations to support their localized operations rather than support the broader JLEnt initiatives in complex emergencies.

e. Communicating cultural assumptions of military logisticians to other JLEnt members may allow each partner to better understand areas of common interest, provide sharper focus on those common logistics endeavors needed to solve or address the crisis, and spend less time and attention on parochial or otherwise non-value added issues that may divide them or on issues not readily addressable based on more enduring principles. Just as important is developing an

understanding about how to identify and agree when organizational purposes diverge in a crisis situation, while maintaining relations or connections between organizations.

f. The individual logistician cannot account for all possible providers prior to a crisis. FEMA's ESF #7 notes that planning and coordinating with other supply chain partners in the private sector is critical, and in a domestic response situation, private industry can bring to bear materials in quantities that often dwarf what is available in U.S. GSA, FEMA, or American Red Cross (ARC) prepositioned stocks. Logisticians across the JLEnt should understand and account for this, while simultaneously preparing to augment emergent networks, particularly in the private sector, wherever possible with engineering and movement assets.

g. In a particularly devastating humanitarian disaster, the capacity to move information from planning and headquarters to the field and back can be muddled and inconsistent. Rather than viewing them as a nuisance or aberration, emergent activity should be viewed in terms of its potential to fill voids that may not be filled or addressed by more traditional, centralized command and control approaches.<sup>26</sup> Logisticians should also be ready to identify specialized communications capabilities to link emergent networks to the JLEnt as a whole to take advantage of their detailed knowledge and information about a crisis situation.

h. Social network relationships in this environment may be fluid and fleeting with dispersed leadership. Additionally, mission objectives are transient as environmental conditions continually change.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the development of the JLEnt register should be an ongoing endeavor. New logistics organizations will emerge in each community, but especially at the local NGO level. These small scale, but responsive organizations can be critical sources of logistics requirements, so logisticians should develop a detailed appreciation for these groups and their information gathering, local distribution and commodity-provision capacities. JLEnt logisticians should be open to emergent logistics networks and communications capabilities, such as open-source, web based information sharing platforms that facilitate personal connections that can be leveraged in a crisis.

i. Phase 1 allows the logistician to identify, prioritize and then reinforce day-to-day relationships that are critical for effective JLEnt activities during a crisis. After conducting phase 1 activities in accordance with the associated social network principles and enterprise best practices, the logistician will have sufficient understanding of important partners and where interests and objectives may overlap to transition to phase 2 of the framework. Social networks will often organize around informal planning processes and JLEnt nodes should have sustained, everyday contact with possible partners so that partnership becomes reflexive and normal when a crisis begins. As General William Ward, Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) noted "Where there is a reluctance to engage with the military, it's often because of a lack of understanding. So you establish a relationship, you establish a dialogue, you find where there are common lines of operation, if you will, supporting lines of operation, and we fill those in."<sup>28</sup>

### 3. Phase 2: Develop and Maintain Mutual Appreciation of the Environment

a. Partners should not jump immediately to attempt structured collective joint planning upon their development of an initial understanding of who will likely be part of a standing or working JLEnt. Prior to collective planning activities, it is critically important that emerging JLEnt members discuss what they believe the end state should be when any joint or collective operation is complete and to outline the basic steps each believes is required to achieve this end state.

b. During phase 2 of the engagement framework, logisticians will build on the emerging JLEnt and begin to think through the conditions that might require a common approach to logistics, as well as more specific problems at both the individual JLEnt member and enterprise levels. Phase 2 activities allow the JLEnt to collectively uncover and correctly formulate logistics-related problems expected to occur in the international and domestic crisis environments and to understand key assumptions and differences among members' objectives and goals. Relevant social network principles and enterprise best practices in this phase are critical for uncovering basic boundaries or policy restraints and for developing a realistic understanding about the capacities and scope of common effort that can be applied to the evolving situation.




Figure III-5. JLEnt Engagement Framework Phase 2

c. Phase 2 initiates the process of developing and maintaining key links that will build a "standing" JLEnt capable of quickly transitioning to a "working" JLEnt when a complex crisis emerges and multiple logistics organizations need to work together. At the conclusion of phase 2, JLEnt logisticians will have developed a mutual appreciation of the environment. This picture can then be used to build a more refined picture of the scope of potential joint action as well as

possible synergies among JLEnt member capabilities and capacities. Figure III-5 depicts detailed phase 2 activities and the supporting set of best practices that reinforce phase 2 activities and set the conditions for JLEnt partnerships to transition to effective phase 3 activities.

d. *JLEnt Activities*

(1) In phase 2, the logistician begins with the phase 1-developed JLEnt register and works with potential partners to shape individual and JLEnt-level “problem statements.” These JLEnt-level problem statements are an important tool for logisticians to develop that individual organizations or the JLEnt as a whole will face as they think through the implications of different organizations operating together or independently within overlapping operational space. These problem statements are the starting point to more rapidly develop a collective understanding about the scope for common action, and focus the JLEnt on an understanding of the affected population and what the priorities of the JLEnt should be.

(2) A JLEnt problem statement should be written from an individual organization’s perspective, but with the entire JLEnt in mind. This statement serves as the foundation for discussions with other JLEnt members about the nature of the logistics problem and vision for a potential solution. This statement should be written as a clear concise statement of what the organization believes is the state of the situation with a particular emphasis on the fundamental logistics issue that bringing the JLEnt together may solve. It should describe the role of your organization in solving the logistics problem as well as how it might relate to other JLEnt partners within the environment. Finally, the JLEnt problem statement should provide a short description of what would constitute success, both for the individual organization, and for the broader JLEnt engagement.

**Key JLEnt Problem Statement Considerations**

- **Size and scope of affected population.**
- **Geographic features of affected area**
- **Materials or commodities needed.**
- **Electric power available**
- **Water/Sewage conditions**
- **Civil aviation, airports**
- **Seaports**
- **Railways**
- **Road and bridge conditions**
- **Local transport capacity**
- **Transfer and warehousing capacity**

(3) As each partner develops its JLEnt problem statement, it uses this narrative as a starting point for discussions with other JLEnt members. As discussions among the partners evolve, these problem statements can merge to form broader JLEnt-level statements that are used collectively by ever-larger portions of the JLEnt. Furthermore, they may allow areas of disagreement to be surfaced quickly, increasing understanding about each member’s perspective on the evolving situation.



(4) The complexity of developing a common purpose is highlighted in Figure III-6, which illustrates how a seemingly simple phrase “devastating earthquake” can have a very different meaning depending on one’s background, training, and role in the situation.<sup>29</sup> People sharing organizational membership often have similar experiences and have planned together prior to a crisis situation, leading to a common conceptual frame of reference. This results in the swift development of common approaches to the situation. There are often hundreds of distinct organizations or entities working within the same crisis area, each with different—and often competing—agendas. Thus, the JLEnt must provide a means through which groups can understand the true nature of the crisis and one another’s conceptual framework for dealing with it.




“Devastating Earthquake”			
	Observation	Prior Knowledge	Comprehension
 Government Official	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Read reports from emergency services.</li> <li>• Contacted family in affected region.</li> <li>• Toured damage and developed government response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law Degree</li> <li>• Interior Ministry Official</li> <li>• Raised in Affected Region</li> <li>• Understands terrain and cultural context</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic view</li> <li>• Emergency services responding well</li> <li>• Family and friends are safe</li> <li>• Government mobilizing resources to handle problem</li> </ul>
 Helicopter Pilot	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performed relief and rescue flights</li> <li>• Observed widespread damage from altitude</li> <li>• Received hostile response from some in localized area</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military Academy graduate</li> <li>• Working on masters degree</li> <li>• Combat veteran in region</li> <li>• Relief reconstruction, combat, aviation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational view</li> <li>• Resources stretched but able to cope</li> <li>• Local insurgents may hamper ability to provide relief.</li> </ul>
 Aid Worker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aiding internally displaced persons in temporary camps.</li> <li>• Observes near total lack of government response</li> <li>• Personally observed casualties.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social work degree</li> <li>• Years of on-site field experience with humanitarian disasters</li> <li>• IDP/Refugee expert</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tactical view</li> <li>• People suffering because government unable to cope with problems</li> <li>• Need immediate outside support.</li> <li>• Tied to local networks</li> </ul>

Figure III-6. Differing Perspectives among Potential JLEnt Members

e. *Supporting Social Network Principles and Enterprise Best Practices*

(1) One of the most important elements of a social network is that it provides access to the institutional memory and personal experience of both organizations and individuals across the enterprise. No one person or organization within the JLEnt has access to all the knowledge relevant to emerging or evolving complex operations. Leveraging the social network provides an important means to access knowledge that may not be otherwise available. In order to build effective social structures for sharing knowledge, three conditions must be met.

(2) **Trust in expertise specialization.** Each member of the JLEnt must be confident that required information will be accessible when it is needed. Effective social networks tend to feature groups that are able to delegate responsibility and to specialize in different aspects of a task.

(3) **Credibility of expertise.** Members of the JLEnt must believe that each participating element knows its specific business area and can trust that opinions or recommendations are based on the reliability of members' expertise. This can be difficult in a civil military context (or even within the military in a joint context) as one party may view the other as an "amateur" or insufficiently professional to render credible information about a situation.

#### **Phase 2 Supporting Best Practices**

- **Focus on building trust relationships across the JLEnt.**
- **Leverage existing networks and coordinating mechanisms.**

(4) **Ability to coordinate tasks or expertise.** Enterprise members must be able and willing to coordinate their work efficiently based on their knowledge of who knows what in the group.

f. The text box below provides a set of questions to assist the logistician to clarify the necessary level of trust across the JLEnt's working relationships.

#### **Establishing Trust in JLEnt Relationships**

##### **Specialization**

- **Do JLEnt members have specialized knowledge of some aspect of crisis response?**
- **Does my organization have knowledge about an aspect of crisis response that no other JLEnt member has?**
- **Are different JLEnt members responsible for expertise in different areas?**
- **Is the specialized knowledge of different JLEnt members needed to deliver rapid and precise logistics?**
- **Do I personally know which JLEnt members have expertise in specific areas, or know how to quickly get this information?**

##### **Credibility**

- **Is my organization comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from other JLEnt members?**
- **Does my organization trust that other members' knowledge about logistics delivery in this crisis is credible?**
- **Am I confident relying on the information that other JLEnt members bring to the discussion?**
- **When other members give information, does my organization double-check it to ensure its validity?**
- **Is my organization willing to rely on other members' level of expertise?**



#### Coordination

- Do the JLEnt members with whom I interact have clear understanding about what to do?
- Is there much confusion about how the JLEnt should accomplish the task?

g. Having conducted phase 2 activities and associated social network principles and enterprise best practices, JLEnt members will have collectively focused on developing relationships capable of carrying the weight of shared interests and responsibilities and can begin more in-depth discussions about shared leadership and responsibility.

#### 4. Phase 3: Orient Leadership and Fix Responsibility for Coordination

a. After developing shared understanding of the problem and the possible scope of common action across different parts of the JLEnt, the logistician must develop the productive relationships and meaningful levels of trust that are necessary to support a coherent response to a complex crisis. The JLEnt relies heavily on established frameworks and processes among the individual organizations within the JLEnt, but it is the relationships among JLEnt members that allow these frameworks and processes to work together effectively.




Figure III-7. JLEnt Engagement Framework Phase 3

b. During phase 3 of the engagement framework, the logistician is focused on developing relationships capable of finding and developing common solutions to mutual logistics problems

and assisting in orienting his or her own organization to support wider JLEnt-level common purposes. Phase 3 activities develop and reinforce key links that transition the “standing” or “warm” JLEnt to a “working” or “operational” JLEnt by actively developing sound logistics requirements and coordinating response capacities. Relevant social network principles and enterprise best practices in phase 3 support the development of a higher level of consensus among JLEnt members about what parts of the JLEnt are most relevant to the logistics problem and encourage a shared understanding of competencies among the multiple logistics organizations.

c. *JLEnt Activities*

(1) Establishing responsibility for various logistics activities is critical in phase 3. For example, the UN humanitarian reform initiative noted that sectoral or thematic groups cutting across current organizational boundaries would significantly improve the performance of global humanitarian response.

**Coordination: Who’s Responsible?**

**Understand who leads, who coordinates, and how best to plug into a response in the different complex emergency systems.**

**Sovereign lead**

- **Host Nation (HN or WFP Coordination)**
- **U.S. State/Governor, initial responsible government responder.**
- **Domestic All Hazards Lead – Bring federal assets to bear in domestic crisis. (FEMA Coordination).**

**International Organization Lead / Failed State**

- **Logistics Cluster Leads Coordination**

**U.S. National Command Authority Lead**

- **Joint Force Coordination**

(2) These sectoral and thematic groups are organized around eleven “clusters” focused on issues such as water distribution, camp management, and logistics. During humanitarian operations where the Logistics Cluster has been activated, the WFP acts as the cluster lead. A focus on building relationships has influenced both the DOD’s JLEnt conceptual approach as well as the UN cluster system. Synchronizing DOD logistics processes with the cluster system is the critical first step in operationalizing a JLEnt across military, interagency, IGO, NGO, multinational, and private sector communities in foreign humanitarian assistance-type crises.

(3) Figure III-7 depicts detailed phase 3 activities and the supporting set of best practices that reinforce phase 3 activities. Phase 3 activities are focused on orienting willing JLEnt partners on bringing logistics capabilities to bear based on the mutual understanding of the environment and problem set uncovered during phase 2 efforts. These activities, principles and

best practices set the conditions for JLEnt partnerships to transition to effective phase 4 activities.

(4) One of the fundamental roles of an organization taking a lead role in the JLEnt is to encourage common purpose across the prospective membership. Leadership within the JLEnt will not be about exercising command and control in a formal sense, but will place a premium on the involvement of stakeholders, of the development of a JLEnt identity and “story” or “narrative” that defines the collective identity.

(5) In order to develop this identity, leadership should be based on knowledge, capabilities, and authority, not status, or rank. When agreeing on who should take the lead role within a working JLEnt, partners should consider issues such as which organization has sufficient capacity established and maintained in all the main sectors/AORs. The JLEnt should consider which organizations can provide predictable and sustained leadership across all facets of the logistics problems and can facilitate collaboration with the wide range of partners in accordance with JLEnt agreed standards and guidelines. Finally, JLEnt members should consider accountability among the potential leaders of the logistics response. They should determine which organizations can be held accountable for the monetary and resource decisions, and who can answer for the broader JLEnt when things go wrong or when logistics requirements are not being met.



Figure III-8. JLEnt Lead Responsibilities

(6) When working through issues of leadership and responsibility, JLEnt activities should focus on developing and sharing the answers to the following questions in phase 3 activities.

(a) What is my organization's role in different complex emergencies, and how do I communicate this to other organizations?

(b) What type of complex crisis am I addressing, and who typically leads in this scenario?

(c) What logistics capacities, capabilities, and operating framework does this organization have, and what are the general perspectives and assumptions of its members?

(d) Do I have a point of contact or standing relationship with the lead organization?

(d) How do I best engage, plan, and execute logistics operations with this lead organization, and how do I share its goals and priorities with my own organization?

(f) How are my organization's goals and objectives compatible or contradictory with those of the lead organization?

(g) How can I communicate these differing objectives and goals with the lead organization?

d. *Supporting Social Network Principles and Enterprise Best Practices*

(1) Further building and reinforcing high levels of trust across a network like the JLEnt requires intentional efforts to overcome or mitigate barriers to information sharing. There are many barriers to information sharing between military and civil partners that must be brought down in order to operationalize the JLEnt. This can be very difficult in a civil/military context as it is often difficult to provide information generated within military systems to civilian or multinational partners, while information generated outside of formal military channels may not be properly integrated into military information systems or the military decision-making process. The free revealing of information about logistics requirements and capabilities in a chaotic, crisis environment is more effective than that practiced by the tightly coupled organizational structures that define governmental, military, and business organizations. However, information barriers are often embedded in the processes used by these organizations as well as the policies that govern them. Thus, they can be very difficult to transcend.

*"Relinquishing control over content is perceived by many to endanger U.S. interests and personnel, undermine orders from superiors and the wisdom of experts, diminish the power that comes from holding on to knowledge, and open institutions to criticism as the limits of their knowledge are revealed."<sup>30</sup>*



**Phase 3 Supporting Best Practices**

- **Work to build consensus on common objectives and goals while recognizing where objectives and goals may diverge.**
- **Be aware of barriers that hinder information exchange across a social network.**
- **Develop appropriate strategies to include key organizations in the JLEnt.**

(2) Specific obstacles to information sharing that may impede the development of an operational JLEnt include cultural differences between the military and others. These differences may cause friction as some military members view members of IGO/NGOs as undisciplined, and perhaps not very effective or particularly trustworthy. In contrast, some IGO/NGO members view members of the military as aggressive and inflexible. Therefore, military members can often view working with IGOs/NGOs as potentially too troublesome, while members of the IGO/NGO communities may resent the military's seeming propensity to take charge of the situation when they arrive, overwhelming ongoing work and assuming that others are not capable of decisive action.

(3) In addition, the military's "need to know" mentality and strict classification and information release policies complicate information flows required for a JLEnt. This mentality greatly hinders civil-military cooperation, especially in an environment awash with information where even military intelligence personnel may gather significant data from open sources. Civilian organizations frequently have little problem sharing information with the military, but the perception is that military does not reciprocate. Current information security regulations and classification policies have the potential to severely limit the quality of information shared with needed JLEnt entities. This lack of reciprocity in levels of information is likely a significant potential source of distrust among JLEnt members, hindering the rapidity and precision of logistics delivery across the network as a whole.

(4) As a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report goes on to note "because traditional ways of managing information flows are becoming counter-productive, free revealing must find a way to work within the context of institutional realities."<sup>31</sup> Decades of field practice and lab experimentation have not yet solved the problem of multi-level security information sharing. Therefore, it is critical that all members of the JLEnt identify in advance those information-sharing barriers that exist. Rather than attempting to breach a wall that heretofore has been impervious to attempts to defeat it, the JLEnt should seek to make all participants aware of these barriers and seek to build trusting relationships in an environment where full exchange of all information remains beyond the realm of the possible.

e. Moreover, the underlying purpose for these institutional barriers ought to be readdressed. Information must never be shared if it threatens national security, yet not all information jeopardizes national security, nor is more information always more useful. Too much information can drown out good information. The onslaught of information needs no help from institutions who adopt a "fire hose" approach—social media and other outlets are already overloading development and response efforts; rather, a thoughtful awareness of circumstances on the ground is needed, with particular emphasis on who may need what information when.

f. By focusing on several key ideas, such as the development of trust between organizations, the number of network members and how they are connected, the level of consensus among members, JLEnt members can better orient other partners.

## 5. Phase 4: Inform Internal Logistics Processes

a. After the JLEnt has developed a collective sense of how the JLEnt should be oriented, including agreement among JLEnt partnership on leadership (if required) and what organizations will be active participants in the logistics response, each logistician is required to inject this perspective and orientation into the specific logistics activities of his or her organization while keeping JLEnt partners informed about relevant ongoing activities. During phase 4 of the engagement framework, the logisticians provide a collective vision of JLEnt operations across their respective organizations that serve to link the individual strategic objectives of JLEnt members to the multitude of operational logistics activities across the JLEnt. Phase 4 activities are focused on relating individual logistics activities to broader goals and constructing mechanisms or networks required to support crisis response logistics. Relevant social network principles and enterprise best practices in phase 4 ensure that the JLEnt and associated partner processes and activities remain oriented on JLEnt-wide goals.




Figure III-9. JLEnt Engagement Framework Phase 4



b. Figure III-9 depicts phase 4 and the supporting best practices that reinforce phase 4 activities which set the conditions for JLEnt partnerships to transition to effective phase 5 activities.

c. *JLEnt Activities*

(1) A comprehensive approach to a complex crisis implies the application of political, civilian and military instruments. Military and government partners must work with other groups to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and sometimes military crisis management (or security instruments as a last resort) to fill a gap that cannot be addressed by other means. A comprehensive approach means that all partners seek to contribute to collective efforts where possible based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness, and determination, and taking into account their respective strengths, mandates, and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.

(2) Prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military commanders to civilian authorities. This process must begin at the national level. When interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector transition planning does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted. As campaign plans, operational plans, and orders are developed, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration.

(3) Commanders and their staffs should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations. Transitions should be carefully planned in detail with a clear articulation of responsibilities (who, what, where, when, and how), be they military- or civilian-led. As the lead transitions from the military to the civil authorities, significant military resources may be reprioritized in order to properly support civil operations, and there may be a requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian headquarters.<sup>32</sup>

d. *Supporting Social Network Principles and Enterprise Best Practices*

**Phase 4 Supporting Principles and Best Practices**

- **Develop appropriate strategies to link key JLEnt participants.**
- **Develop a culture among logisticians with a bias toward leveraging the enterprise.**

(1) Social networks allow partners within the JLEnt to move beyond a typical focus on “coordinating” efforts through formal military command and control arrangements, memoranda of understanding (MOU) or other traditional coordination mechanisms. A social network perspective on the JLEnt takes into account the complexity of different organizational relationships, goals, and perspectives and does not attempt to force the entirety of the enterprise into more formal, hierarchical command relationships.

(2) In combat situations, military forces will insist on leadership, with the JFC and staff at the center of coordinating activities. During a domestic incident, FEMA is the statutory lead federal agency and the DOD will contribute as a supporting element of its coordinating NRF.

During foreign humanitarian disaster relief efforts, the Joint Force as part of the U.S. response through DOS, may be asked to connect to the Logistics Cluster and should do so through a DOS liaison.

**Is My Social Network Appropriately Connected?**

- **As logistics operations are being executed, logisticians should ask themselves the following questions:**
- **Are the right voices influencing JLEnt activities?**
- **Is the JLEnt appropriately connected for the task at hand?**
- **Has the JLEnt cultivated important external relationships?**
- **Are value added collaborations occurring across the JLEnt?**
- **Do underlying relationship qualities yield effective collaboration?**
- **Does the organizational context support effective collaboration?**
- **By simply asking these questions during each step in a formal planning process, the JLEnt logistician can encourage an enterprise mindset personally and within his or her own organization.**

(3) Ultimately, each JLEnt member must think through the balance between what social network connections through the JLEnt can provide versus relying solely on organic or "within-community" processes provide. Although the bias should be toward leveraging the enterprise wherever possible, each member must also understand key tradeoffs. In developing a JLEnt with appropriate membership to the problem at hand, JLEnt leaders will be required to balance a number of important areas that are in tension including:

(a) The effectiveness of the network as a whole to address immediate crisis needs versus longer term efficiency of more enduring solutions. Efficient solutions may require a smaller number of tightly-controlled JLEnt units, while effective solutions may require inclusiveness of a wider array of partners.

(b) Internal versus external legitimacy. The JLEnt must be seen as responsive to common goals across participating organizations, as well as to the needs of logistics recipients that the JLEnt is intended to serve. Overemphasis on external legitimacy means that network members are highly disconnected and the JLEnt is a network only nominally – i.e., it does not provide a common, coordinated response. However, focusing too much on coordination within the network may mean that key constituencies on the outside may view the JLEnt as illegitimate. For example, when humanitarian and combat related principles come into conflict, the JFC will be hard-pressed to balance the two.

(c) Flexibility versus Stability. Flexibility may make the JLEnt more responsive by rapidly reconfiguring to the crisis at hand; however, stability means that long term relationships among the participants can be built, enhancing overall trust within the system.

(d) Diversity of opinion versus aggregation. Social networks must be large and diverse enough to allow new sources of information to influence planning. Each organization should maintain their own private assessment of information – even if it is seen across the network as an eccentric interpretation of the “known” facts. Diverse opinions must not prevent

unified or complementary action if the JLEnt is to be effective, so social networks must attempt to balance the ability of turning private judgments into a collective decision. However, increasing the diversity of opinion must not come at the expense of action, especially when lives and health may be affected. Some diverse opinions may be misinformed, and must in some ways be filtered as not to negatively impact JLEnt Activities

e. These tensions have significant practical implications for the leadership and participation of the JLEnt as a whole. Each member of the JLEnt as well as those organizations taking a leadership role should consider the proper balance of these criteria when selecting or advocating a particular level of participation in the JLEnt.

f. Most military logisticians (except perhaps civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)/Civil Affairs personnel) do not normally interact with civilian partners, and are limited in their ability to support civilian response efforts without first being granted additional authorities to do so. Logisticians typically train on developing logistics functional expertise, which does not always include civil-military operations. Training on why and how to work with civil and MN partners should be an essential part of any military logistics training program.

g. The encouragement of a culture biased towards leveraging the enterprise is an ongoing activity. In fact, the successful application of social network principles encourages an enterprise mindset across all phases of the JLEnt framework. However, as part of a broader comprehensive approach, logisticians (as well as other operators and planning specialists) should become familiar with social network ideas, principles and approaches and look for opportunities to cross-train between different JLEnt members as a matter of course. Because the JLEnt cannot be effective if logisticians do not understand how social networks operate, and what issues may encourage their effective operation, the development of JLEnt-wide training will reinforce and disseminate these ideas.

### **6. Phase 5: Execute and Assess Logistics Operations**

a. Phase 5 of the engagement framework encompasses the actual execution and assessment of logistics operations by organizations within the JLEnt both individually and in partnership with others. During phase 5 of the engagement framework, the JLEnt will conduct and integrate differing combinations of logistics operations and capabilities to support individual organization and enterprise-wide activities according to collective and individual logistics concepts of operations designed to meet the particular circumstances of the situation. Action within the framework does not end at phase 5, and JLEnt relationships, participants, and activities should be subject to continuous, shared assessments of results in relation to the common expectations developed. As the situation within a complex crisis changes, JLEnt members must work together to modify both the understanding of the situation and subsequent shared activities and operations accordingly.




Figure III-10. JLEnt Engagement Framework Phase 5

Furthermore, the DOD may at times have special responsibilities to provide logistics support across the JLEnt partners, as the text box below illustrates.<sup>33</sup>

#### Special DOD Responsibilities for other U.S. Government Agencies

U.S. Government agencies are responsible to provide for their own logistic support. However, US military logistic capabilities are occasionally requested and provided to these organizations. Pursuant to the Economy Act, a Joint Task Force (JTF) may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for U.S. Federal Government Agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational forces. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, and management of air, land, or sea transportation nodes. In situations where there is limited or denied access and civilian transportation infrastructure is degraded or otherwise limited, DOD-provided transportation may be the only viable mode. Identifying USG agency intertheater and intratheater movement requests to a geographic combatant commander's (GCC) responsible organization and deconfliction of all movement executions are vital to ensure the needs of all operational partners are met. A memorandum of agreement (MOA) should be crafted between DOD and interagency JLEnt partners whenever resources are changing hands.



b. Based on phases 1-4 of this framework, each logistician within the JLEnt will have a more coherent understanding of the JLEnt social network, what enterprise-wide capacities and capabilities can be leveraged, and how to use this information to inform and shape individual organizational logistics concepts of operations during phase 5. The systematic application of these activities and social network principles will encourage a greater degree of trust among JLEnt partners, contributing to a greater degree of unity of effort across the JLEnt as a whole.




Figure III-11. Operationalizing the Joint Logistics Enterprise

## CHAPTER IV

### THE JLENT AND FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS

*"We need to forge new and lasting relationships, based on trust and mutual respect, so that we can prepare more effectively, and so that when emergencies happen, we know who to talk to, and what we should do."*

**UN USG Emergency Response Coordinator Valerie Amos,  
Speech at Regional Partnership Meeting, 12 Oct, 2011**

#### 1. Leadership and Responsibility for Coordination during a Crisis

a. If a disaster strikes and a nation requests humanitarian assistance, the international community will work with HNs to help affected populations. The role of the HN is central to humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR) efforts and may take many forms depending on the circumstances. Effective communication with HN representatives and HN agencies is essential to delivering logistics requirements where and when needed. Figure IV-1 offers a simplified depiction of the key partners during HA and DR operations.




Figure IV-1. Key Actors in Foreign Humanitarian Disasters



b. The international community typically focuses its support through the cluster system. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this cluster system provides accountability and predictability through specific clusters, based on functional and sectoral expertise and an established division of labor and responsibilities -- one of which is logistics and led by the WFP. This system is used in many areas of the world to respond to humanitarian concerns, and has a working mechanism to gather and disseminate logistics requirements to responders. Cluster leads help strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies.

c. The U.S. is one of many nations who may respond to a complex emergency both through the UN approach and through bilateral arrangements with the HN. USG responses to foreign disasters are coordinated through U.S. Embassy country teams, which may include USAID representatives. USAID/OFDA is the principal U.S. federal agency for overseas disasters outside of the United States. Before a crisis occurs, the USG will likely be involved with the HN as part of its diplomatic and/or development efforts. “One of the great assets and comparative advantages of our Foreign Service personnel is the deep knowledge of the culture, language, and political landscape in a foreign country.”<sup>34</sup> Leveraging this expertise during disaster response will help logisticians maintain and develop important relationships.

d. On occasion, the U.S. military may be called to support USG and international efforts in responding to a disaster.<sup>35</sup> USG and military involvement is governed by political direction from the highest levels of the USG. DOD command of military forces resolves itself into on-the-ground activities through a chain of command that stretches from the GCCs, through a JTF to local, tactical logistics organizations. At the same time, ongoing U.S. commitments to international guidelines like the Oslo Guidelines for the use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA)<sup>36</sup> shape the U.S. military response in working with the humanitarian community’s broader efforts in a country and/or region during a complex emergency. For further discussion on DOD activities in support of FHA, see JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.

## 2. How the JLEnt Changes Over Time

a. Relationships are shaped by circumstances, so it is important for logisticians to take into account how relationships on the ground existed before a crisis (informed by history, culture, etc), how relationships are impacted by the crisis (including what new relationships form), how relationships can impact efforts to transition out of a crisis, and how relationships can impact longer-term goals. Figure IV-2, depicts the relative extent of military, international civilian, and local/national capacities used over time illustrating when MCDA might be more likely to be called upon to meet core capability needs. Over time, the need for and appropriateness of MCDA will diminish, and the humanitarian community will begin to focus on recovery, long-term development, and a “new” normal.




Figure IV-2. MCDA use throughout a Complex Emergency

b. Relationships in this area can be developed using phase 1 best practices, and should occur prior to an actual crisis and can posture the JLEnt for more effective response. An existing relationship may assist responders to develop a more comprehensive picture of needs, find a more efficient or beneficial avenue for delivery, or discover redundancies. When a relationship lies fallow or is non-existent, the efficient delivery of resources in a complex emergency may be negatively affected.

c. UN agencies and NGOs may be working -- sometimes independent of one another, sometimes collaboratively -- on several projects within a country before a crisis arises. Their connections with the general population, the HN's ministries, and each other will vary widely based on many factors. It may be helpful to study the region or country's Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) if one has been produced. While NGOs may pursue programs and relationships independent from this plan, the CHAP provides:

- (1) Analysis of the context in which humanitarian assistance takes place;
- (2) Best, worst, and most likely scenarios;
- (3) Analysis of need and a statement of priorities;
- (4) Roles and responsibilities, i.e. who does what and where;
- (5) A clear link to longer-term objectives and goals; and
- (6) A framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary.<sup>37</sup>

d. Studying the CHAP will offer the logistician a picture of the country or region's background and a better understanding of the general, long term objectives of the humanitarian community.

e. The USG as well as other nations may also be engaged in a number of relationships before a crisis arises. Each U.S. embassy has a Mission Disaster Relief Officer (MDRO) responsible for planning assistance to the HN in the event of a major accident or disaster as part of the Embassy's overall Emergency Action Plan.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy will be engaged in day-to-day discussions with the HN on a range of issues. USAID may be engaging in development or disaster risk reduction programs with host nations and have existing relationships with the local population and NGOs on the ground. Other U.S. agencies may also be engaged with the HN relating to that agency's focus (agriculture, energy, etc.). Military-to-military (Mil-Mil) relationships may also influence logistics during a crisis; the GCC's Theater Campaign Plan for the country/region is a useful starting point for understanding ongoing security cooperation programs that may prove useful during a crisis.

f. When a complex emergency arises, the impact to the nation or region's population may be significant. The HN will be focusing most of its efforts on immediate response. If the emergency is of such a scale that stresses the capacity of the HN, they may call upon the international community to aid in the response. In addition, humanitarian organizations may also be impacted by the disaster. Many NGOs will be working to ensure their safety and provide what relief they can. As partners from the international community organize themselves for response existing and emerging relationships will be influential as most will be working to define their initial roles and assessing immediate needs. Divergent understanding of the environment and nature of the crisis may complicate communication among organizations and ultimately may harm ongoing and planned logistics operations.

g. If the UN is part of the response in a humanitarian event, it will activate the logistics cluster in response to a specific need for coordination or additional capacity to fill a logistics gap. Understanding the work of the logistics cluster is helpful in understanding the focus of the broad humanitarian community from a strategic and operational viewpoint and insight into the cluster activation process should be an important focus to assist logisticians to understand each other's objectives during the response so that appropriate relationships can be built and leadership can be oriented to the environment.

h. The UN uses a pool of money from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs), and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). These fund programs are implemented by UN agencies, often in support of other international organizations and NGOs to respond to humanitarian needs. Access to these UN programmed funds is not provided to Non-UN sponsored or controlled IGOs and NGOs without the UN's authorization. The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) is "used by aid organizations to plan, implement and monitor their activities together. Working together in the world's crisis regions, they produce appeals, which they present to the international community and donors."<sup>39</sup> The CAP and flash appeals (which match funds to more immediate need) summarize relief needs and response plans for different humanitarian sectors (including logistics). While NGOs and other groups act

independently and focus on their interest in humanitarian response, the CAP and flash appeals show the primary focus of the international community.

i. The UN will have several means to provide general situational awareness of their operations in a given response. Relevant websites include:

(1) **Relief Web** which offers an overview of humanitarian operations around the world. Information includes press releases from NGOs and concept of operations (CONOPs) for some operations. [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

(2) **Logistics Cluster** offers a logistics situational awareness of ongoing humanitarian responses where it has been activated. [www.logcluster.org](http://www.logcluster.org)

(3) **Virtual On-Site Operation Coordination Center (VOSOCC)** provides near real-time alerts about natural disasters around the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, including media monitoring, and map catalogues.<sup>40</sup> Access to this website requires approval from UN OCHA administration, and anyone may apply for this access <http://vosocc.unocha.org>.

j. The U.S. response will likely be part of the international community's response and may leverage bilateral relationships with the HN to provide support and complement the international community's effort. As part of this response, the USG will turn to USAID/OFDA's expertise in disaster response.

k. USAID/OFDA's mandate is to facilitate and coordinate USG response efforts to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide. OFDA responds when the U.S. Chief of Mission declares a disaster to be beyond the affected country's capacity to respond or is willing to accept USG assistance, and it is in the USG's interest to provide assistance. When the U.S. Embassy releases a disaster cable \$50,000 is released to USAID for immediate disaster relief. Should the need arise, USAID may send an Assessment Team and/or a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to augment the Embassy Team's response. USAID/OFDA may provide relief commodities from its warehouses – blankets, hygiene kits, water containers, bladders, and treatment units – and/or issue funding to NGOs and IGO to implement specific relief programs.<sup>41</sup> USAID's RMT is a good touch point for USG, private sector, and US humanitarian community to communicate in regards to the disaster response.




Figure IV-3. Interagency Coordination

l. The U.S. military has specific processes in place to provide assistance to the USG activities beyond immediate threats to the life, limb, and eyesight of disaster survivors.<sup>42</sup> The flowchart found in Figure IV-3 represents approval of a U.S. military response to an overseas disaster and the associated following interagency coordination.<sup>43</sup> This distinction between immediate crisis response and longer-term recovery is an important distinction for non-military logisticians within the JLEnt to understand about military disaster recovery and relief operations.

m. As disaster relief is provided and the HN begins long-term recovery, the JLEnt will change. Interests, laws, and funds will necessarily change the character of relationships as the focus of the effort transitions from disaster relief

#### USAID's Field Operations Guide (FOG)

The FOG is an important resource for JLEnt partners. It contains information on general responsibilities for disaster responders, formats and reference materials for assessing and reporting on populations at risk, general information related to disaster activities, and working with the military in the field. It can be downloaded at [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov).





to recovery and development programs. The HN will begin working towards returning to a new normal and reviewing their permission of international operations in their borders. From the outset, transitioning from emergency relief to a “new normal” will be the goal of the international community. At some point, the humanitarian community will start to transition from disaster relief to recovery and long-term development. The U.S. Government will have its own transition plans of withdrawing its support in a sustainable fashion. This transition period offers an opportunity to institutionalize relationships created during the crisis to improve the cohesion of the JLEnt in the future.

### 3. Relations with Non-DOD Partners

a. Every foreign humanitarian assistance operation poses unique opportunities, challenges, and hazards, so it is imperative to consider the relationships described here in a complex emergency’s particular context. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations should be a tailored response once the capabilities and desires of the HN are considered. Beyond planned troop sustainment, relief commodities coordinated with USAID as part of the international effort ought to be defined by needs based assessment; developing a mutual appreciation of the environment is key for humanitarian aid.

*“The question always arises among the military ... **“Who’s in charge?”** My answer was the countries affected by the disaster are always in charge. However, I also advised the JTF staff that among the humanitarian relief organizations and agencies responding to the disaster there is a certain **“fog of relief.”** This fog and the **independence** of these organizations and agencies **do not lend itself to a strong centralized command and control structure** among responders.”*

**USAID-OFDA DART Leader to Operation Unified Assistance Joint Task Force/Combined Support Force – 536 For Earthquake/Tsunami Relief Efforts Utopao, Thailand, 29 December, 2004 – 2 February, 2005**

b. The humanitarian community’s logistics support is highly decentralized. Save for a few UN services available to the broader humanitarian community,<sup>44</sup> every humanitarian organization is responsible for its own logistics with their own systems and means of operation. The humanitarian community purchases most supplies it needs locally. Many NGOs do not have their own movement assets, so they often rely on the private sector, the UN, and the military as logistical service providers. Moreover, the humanitarian community does not have the manpower that militaries often have. This difference means different organizational structures, processes, and priorities when compared to militaries.

c. Relations between DOD logistics providers and others will not be governed by the strict command and control relationships to which military forces are accustomed. In addition, there may be actors with large roles in a complex emergency that may wish to remain at arm’s-length from military forces or are opposed to civil-military coordination altogether. However, when MCDA are used in a natural, technological or environmental emergency in times of peace, IGO and NGOs’ relations with the Department of Defense and other military forces are governed by a set of guidelines collectively known as the “Oslo Guidelines.”



d. The Oslo Guidelines set the conditions and goals of the humanitarian community when working with MCDA. The Oslo Guidelines identify a set of key humanitarian principles when MCDA and humanitarian assets work in the same operational space:

(1) **Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

(2) **Neutrality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

(3) **Impartiality:** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.<sup>45</sup>

e. Beyond these humanitarian principles, the Oslo Guidelines are designed to enable responders from all communities across the JLEnt to work together, while providing a clear and visible distinction between humanitarian response workers and MCDA providers. This distinction is necessary to allow humanitarian aid workers access to affected populations who might not accept aid from anyone associated with government or military forces. This necessary distinction emphasizes the importance of USAID's JLEnt relationships, as well as those with affected populations, for both smooth communication and the effective use of assets during emergency response efforts. This is particularly true when engaging with IGOs and NGOs, or invited to participate in UN planning and coordination meetings.

#### 4. Engaging DOD in Logistics Planning and Operations

a. Hierarchy and command and control define DOD operations. The military's chain of command works across the different services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard). The services typically conduct operations together within one of six geographic and three functional combatant commands.<sup>46</sup> Combatant commanders organize subsidiary component commands that are drawn from each of the Services' personnel and designate those components with certain responsibilities.

Locale	HN & International Community	USG	DOD
Country	Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center	Country Team	Joint Task Force
Global	UN OCHA WFP	Response Management Team	Geographic Combatant Command Joint Staff J-4

Figure IV-4. Key Requirements Points of Contact

b. The DOD's logistics operations place a significant emphasis on planning. For non-DOD logisticians, communication with the DOD, then, should begin well before a crisis happens to provide input for the DOD's planning and execution of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. The DOD views operations in phases whereby resources are supplied according to which phase the operation is in. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, suggests the following phase framework for DOD foreign humanitarian assistance planning and operations. It is important for the humanitarian community to understand these general phases of operation and how the JTF views the operation at a given time.



Figure IV-5. Phases in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance – Different Views

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## CHAPTER V

### THE JLENT AND DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE OPERATIONS

*“State plans vary enormously from a Department of Defense perspective. We want to know in advance what each state might ask for. I don’t want to have ‘pickup games’ in reacting to a disaster.”*

**Dr. Paul Stockton**  
**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs**  
**February 2010**

#### 1. Introduction

a. Planners and operators need to balance the desire expressed by Dr. Stockton with the practical reality that under the federal system of governance states, local jurisdictions, and tribal entities have sovereign rights and responsibilities that create a unique mosaic of capabilities, risks, and in the event of a disaster – operational requirements. The Department of Homeland Security’s FEMA is empowered by law to lead efforts for planning, preparedness and coordination of operational support necessary to meet state, local, and tribal efforts to provide for disaster response and recovery. To accomplish these tasks, FEMA has developed doctrine that encompasses the ‘Whole Community.’<sup>47</sup> This approach includes the federal interagency (including DOD elements), state, local, tribal, private sector, non-governmental organizations, citizen groups and individual citizens.

b. In as much as all disasters are local, a tiered system of response from the local to the state to the federal level exists. Being able to comprehend and visualize this response effort as it relates to your individual organization will allow for greater operational flexibility both in planning and execution. Understanding relationships amongst partners prior to an all hazards event will help understanding the Logistics Whole Community of support which is vital to a successful response.

*When operating in a domestic disaster response, the JLEnt is referred to as the “Logistics Whole Community.”*

c. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act identifies FEMA as the lead federal agency for preparedness and response activities in support of state and local governments. Additionally, the National Response Framework (NRF) establishes the Federal Government’s framework for all hazards response with FEMA in the lead in planning for and responding to disasters across the nation. The NRF is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation, linking all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector.

d. The NRF also established 15 ESFs which coordinate functional capabilities and resources from federal departments and agencies, along with certain private sector and NGOs during domestic disaster response. FEMA and the GSA share co-lead agency responsibilities for the ESF responsible for logistical support, ESF #7 Logistics Management and Resource Support (LMRS).

e. There are additional ESFs which have a major impact on requirements or support capabilities which will be discussed below. Additionally, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) support figures prominently in domestic disaster response operations. JP 3-28, Civil Support, provides for the DOD overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting joint civil support operations. The role of DOD is funneled through the prism of requirements going to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) in each of the 10 FEMA Regions across the United States with support being provided via the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) which will also be addressed in this chapter. However, it is important to note that DOD works at the direction of FEMA as the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating logistical support during domestic disaster response operations.

## 2. Leadership and Responsibility for Coordination in Crises

a. FEMA's Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) and GSA serve as the Primary Agencies responsible for ESF #7 as mentioned above. They ensure that planning and response activities are synchronized to the maximum extent possible across the Logistics Whole Community of support to include partners at all levels of government, the private sector and NGO community.

b. Additionally, in accordance with the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) FEMA's Assistant Administrator for Logistics, on behalf of the FEMA Administrator, serves as the National Logistics Coordinator (NLC). The NLC coordinates, synchronizes, and implements the National Logistics System (NLS) during all phases of an incident cycle, whether the incident is anticipated (a "notice event") or is unanticipated (a "no-notice event"). The NLC leverages Interagency Agreements (IAAs) and tiers of logistical support from other federal agencies (OFAs), the private sector and in coordination with state, local and NGO partners. The NLC also works closely with FEMA Logistics Chiefs assigned to each of the 10 FEMA Regions whose primary focus is on logistical planning and response and recovery activities for their Region.

c. GSA is one of the three central management agencies of the Federal Government and sets federal policy in such areas as federal procurement and real property management among others. Major component organizations of GSA active during a disaster include the Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) which provides contracting services, relief supplies, and transportation support and the Public Buildings Service (PBS) which provides facility space from its owned / leased federal property inventory.

d. The ESF #7 Logistics Management and Resource Support (LMRS) Annex within the NRF describes what equities partners bring to bear in planning for and responding to disasters. In addition to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM, there are other important DOD partners integral to a successful response to include USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

e. Key ESF #7 Partners



(1) In addition to FEMA and GSA spearheading activities for ESF #7, there are other critical players within the Logistics Whole Community who will have a direct bearing on the success of the response. For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) is the Primary Agency responsible for ESF #1, Transportation, to include regulation of transportation, management of the Nation's airspace, and ensuring the safety and security of the national transportation system. ESF #1 has a significant impact on logistics in large disasters where it is a key coordinator of domestic airspace. ESF #1 is also an important infrastructure assessment element that plays a role in providing updates on restoration and recovery of transportation infrastructure and in shaping the capabilities needed for a successful Whole Community.

(2) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Primary Agency responsible for ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering, and provides infrastructure protection and emergency repair, infrastructure restoration, engineering services and construction management, and emergency contracting support for lifesaving and life-sustaining services such as emergency power generation, bottled water, ice, and Planning Resource Teams (PRTs). FEMA assigns, as required, the aforementioned USACE lifesaving and life-sustaining resources in support of an all-hazards event.

(3) The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for food safety during disaster relief operations, and, through the US Forest Service, is responsible for leading firefighting efforts, protection of watershed lands and forests from fire. USDA is also responsible for providing infant and toddler food requirements after the first 72 hours as part of an ESF #7 response.

(4) The Private Sector provides invaluable logistical support through a vast array of contracts with FEMA and other federal agencies. Waivers of certain components of the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) may be obtained during a declared Stafford Act response thereby increasing the number of vendors available worldwide to provide support. Additionally, during a catastrophic response, the Defense Production Act (DPA) may be invoked by the President to facilitate the immediate support of logistics requirements from the private sector.

(5) The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is responsible for providing medical supplies and services as the lead agency for ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services. They are supported by a number of agencies, including DHS, DOD and 13 other agencies with some supporting role in ESF #8 to ensure they have needed medical logistical support through patient evacuation, transportation coordination, and ensure that resources are provided quickly.

(6) FEMA's Recovery Directorate and the American Red Cross (ARC) serve as the Primary Agencies responsible for ESF #6, Mass Care. When directed by the President, ESF #6 services and programs are implemented to assist individuals and households impacted by potential or actual disaster incidents. Mass Care support requirements are a key driver in what logistical support is provided to the affected state. ESF #7 works closely with FEMA's Recovery Directorate and the ARC prior to and during a response to ensure that needed items are identified and obtained quickly for survivors.

d. ESF #6 is organized into four primary functions described below:

(1) Mass Care: Includes sheltering, feeding operations, emergency first aid, bulk distribution of emergency items, and collecting and providing information on survivors in shelters to family members.

(2) Emergency Assistance: Assistance required by individuals, families, and their communities to ensure that immediate needs beyond the scope of the traditional “mass care” services provided at the local level are addressed. These services include: support to evacuations (including registration and tracking of evacuees); reunification of families; provision of aid and services to special needs populations; evacuation, sheltering, and other emergency services for household pets and services animals; support to specialized shelters; support to medical shelters; nonconventional shelter management; coordination of donated goods and services; and coordination of voluntary agency assistance.

(3) Housing: Includes housing options such as rental assistance, repair, loan assistance, replacement, factory-built housing, semi-permanent and permanent construction, referrals, identification and provision of accessible housing, and access to other sources of housing assistance. The National Disaster Housing Strategy is used to guide this assistance.

(4) Human Services: Includes the implementation of disaster assistance programs to help disaster survivors recover their non-housing losses, including programs to replace destroyed personal property, and help to obtain disaster loans, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), crisis counseling, disaster unemployment, disaster legal services, support and services for special needs populations, and other federal and state benefits.




Figure V-1. The Role of ESF #7 in Domestic Disaster Response Operations

e. Method for Delivery of Goods and Services

(1) Local governments rely on first responders (such as police, fire and emergency medical services) as well as NGOs such as the ARC and Salvation Army to provide initial support to local disasters. Once a local government realizes that the response to a disaster has exhausted their resources they will seek assistance from the state.

(2) The state will use its own commodities, contracts and outside resources to provide support to the local government. They will also utilize EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact) agreements established with other states to provide support. They may also turn to the Federal Government for support.

(3) Once the state determines that they are in need of specific logistical support from the Federal Government they will prepare and submit an Action Request Form (ARF) to FEMA via the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or the Joint Field Office (JFO) when established. Once FEMA has validated and approved the request they will send an electronic tasker or a Mission Assignment (MA) to a particular federal agency for fulfillment within clearly specified time frames. DOD may receive a MA which will need to be fulfilled as quickly as possible.




Figure V-2. The Logistics Whole Community in Domestic Disaster Response

## f. Presidential Policy Directive 8 National Preparedness

(1) With the release of Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8 on National Preparedness in March 2011 additional components for preparedness and response have been introduced to supplement existing domestic disaster response activities. While the National Response Framework will be maintained, with the ESF structure intact, there will be more emphasis on functional area planning and response activities in groupings called “Core Capabilities.” The Core Capability (CC) entitled “Public and Private Services and Resources” deals specifically with the Logistics Whole Community and FEMA Logistics and GSA have taken a lead role in development of this CC.

(2) There will also be national level Frameworks developed in the areas of Prevention, Protection and Mitigation (note that the National Disaster Recovery Framework was released in December 2011) as indicated in Figure V-3.

Prevention	Protection	Mitigation	Response	Recovery
<b>Planning</b>				
<b>Public Information and Warning</b>				
<b>Operational Coordination</b>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Forensics and Attribution</li> <li>Intelligence and Information Sharing</li> <li>Interdiction and Disruption</li> <li>Screening, Search, and Detection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Access Control and Identity</li> <li>Verification</li> <li>Cybersecurity</li> <li>Intelligence and Information Sharing</li> <li>Interdiction and Disruption</li> <li>Physical Protective Measures</li> <li>Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities</li> <li>Screening, Search, and Detection</li> <li>Supply Chain Integrity and Security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Resilience</li> <li>Long-term Vulnerability Reduction</li> <li>Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment</li> <li>Threats and Hazard Identification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Critical Transportation</li> <li>Environmental Response/Health and Safety</li> <li>Fatality Management Services</li> <li>Infrastructure Systems</li> <li>Mass Care Services</li> <li>Mass Search and Rescue Operations</li> <li>On-scene Security and Protection</li> <li>Operational Communications</li> <li>Public and Private Services and Resources</li> <li>Public Health and Medical Services</li> <li>Situational Assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Economic Recovery</li> <li>Health and Social Services</li> <li>Housing</li> <li>Infrastructure Systems</li> <li>Natural and Cultural Resources</li> </ul>

**Figure V-3. U.S. Domestic Core Capabilities per the National Preparedness Goal**

## g. State and Local Governments

(1) As mentioned above, local governments are the first responders in any domestic crisis situation. They have layered local support networks and play a key role in determining the extent of damage and critical logistics requirements.

(2) The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) acts as the coordinating body within the state to support local responders. They coordinate requests when their state resource



requirements are beyond their capabilities to support local responders. As mentioned previously, states can request assistance from other states through EMAC as well as request federal assistance from FEMA and its partners through prescribed procedures at the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) JFO, or Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) once deployed.

(3) The National Guard of each state is a key partner in the state's successful response to a disaster. Working at the direction of the Governor, the National Guard provides both manpower and resources that can enable logistics. National Guard assets become increasingly important when dealing with a degraded infrastructure. Their personnel with air and ground assets enhance and provide flexibility when civilian responders are constrained by geographic accessibility issues. The National Guard can also be augmented by federal active duty Soldiers, within the constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, under a Dual Status Commander to provide the necessary capabilities for a more effective state response.

(4) It is important to note that the state is the sovereign lead during a disaster response. They are the chief logistics facilitator and coordinator within the state's boundaries and direct disaster response operations which the Federal Government and its partners support.


h. Federal Civilian Partners. FEMA partners with a wide variety of federal civilian partners described above. Additionally it works with other players such as the American Logistics Aid Network (ALAN) or Business Executives in National Security (BENS) who bring additional expertise and resources to bear during a response.

i. Department of Defense Providers

(1) USNORTHCOM is the gateway to DOD support during domestic disaster response operations in the continental United States while USPACOM is responsible for DSCA operations in Hawaii, American Samoa, and Guam. Both work with federal partners at the regional and national levels in planning and response activities and provide the initial coordination and support of DOD assets in response to formal requests from the Federal Government. FEMA has Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) in place with DOD for example: Incident Support Base (ISB)/Staging Area (SA) support, water purification support, and Point of Distribution (POD) support.

(2) USNORTHCOM has developed a Theater Concept of Support designed to organize the DOD response to a domestic disaster under FEMA as coordinated by the National Logistics coordinator. From a logistics perspective, the concept of support provides guidance as to the funding and prioritization of DOD assets. From a USNORTHCOM perspective, during a DSCA scenario, some DOD stocks are transferred from DLA directly to FEMA while other DOD stocks are used to support DOD and its operations. The Theater Concept of Support is essential to understanding how military funding streams and prioritization of resources will fit within the Whole Community approach. Figure V-4 depicts some of the major elements, including key organizations and basic commodity flows in the Whole Community approach from the USNORTHCOM Concept of Support Perspective.





**Figure V-4. NORTHCOM Perspective of Whole Community Logistics**

(3) In addition to USNORTHCOM, other major DOD actors will be part of any military response in support of a Whole Community, FEMA-led response. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides transportation support across the spectrum of those needing assistance for both ESF #7 and ESF #8 partners through USNORTHCOM and USPACOM. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistical support to ESF #7 through an Interagency Agreement (IAA) focusing mainly although not exclusively on fuel and meals support. The USACE provides support to ESF #7 primarily through mission assignments to provide generators and other support items. The National Guard Bureau is the channel of communication on all matters pertaining to the National Guard between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the several States. The use of National Guard units personnel and resources in support of State(s) emergency is critical to responding to the affected communities.


j. Nongovernmental Organizations. The ARC operates under a Congressional Charter and is the premier NGO providing mass care (primarily sheltering and feeding) services in the nation. The ARC serves as the co-Primary agency along with FEMA's Recovery Directorate for Mass Care under ESF #6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services. Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) exist at the local, state and national level bringing together NGOs who assist with disaster relief operations. Each NGO has a specific response area but all provide valuable expertise and resources to assist with response and recovery efforts. Finally, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) may be part of a response, and are religious organizations/churches which provide assistance in the community during disaster relief and may or may not be a part of a local, state or national VOAD. Their assistance may

vary but understanding their ability to contribute and their close linkages with the affected area can be an important part of an effective response.

k. **International Partnerships.** The OFDA within USAID coordinates donations from other countries to the United States in a domestic disaster under the International Assistance System (IAS) Gift/Donations Program. Items must meet basic specifications prior to acceptance by FEMA. OFDA is then responsible for having the items transported to specified locations within the United States for use by FEMA.

### 3. How the Logistics Whole Community Changes Over Time

a. ESF #7 response and recovery efforts are delineated by phases shown in Figure V-5. In many incidents, no clear transition may exist from one phase to the next, and phases may run concurrently or be overlapping. During incidents that affect multiple states and/or FEMA Regions, different jurisdictions may transition through the phases at various paces depending on the impact to the affected geographical area as indicated in the diagram and explanation which follows:



**Figure V-5. Domestic Disaster Response Phasing**

(1) **Phase 1a Normal Operations.** “Normal operations” are the “steady state” in the absence of a specific threat. During this sub-phase, deliberate plans are reviewed and refined based on new or changed facts, assumptions, lessons learned and best practices as part of their normal planning cycle. This phase focuses on pre-incident logistical readiness and preparedness operations. Pre-incident activities also involve the development of plans and procedures that integrate survivor requirements as well as the conduct of training and exercises that validate the planning for a response.

(2) **Phase 1b Elevated Threat**

(a) During this phase, selected teams are alerted and begin to deploy when FEMA's National Watch Center (NWC) has issued a watch or otherwise identified that an area may expect the possibility of an impact. This sub-phase involves heightened situational awareness, including collecting, analyzing, and disseminating pertinent information to anticipate requirements and ensure a prompt response.

(b) The NWC will elevate the need for an increased activation level. Actions are taken to heighten situational awareness triggered by actionable data or knowledge of a precursor event meeting senior level decision makers' Critical Information Requirements (CIR) criteria. In addition, FEMA commences preparatory actions, such as verification of communications systems, alerting/mobilizing key personnel, and issuing advisories. These actions may actually commence or continue in ensuing phases. During this phase, FEMA's partner agencies may be deployed or deploying and conducting response operations under their own statutes and authorities.

(3) Phase 1c Credible Threat. During the credible threat phase, the threat is identified. Resources that are not already pre-staged in anticipation of support needed by the State(s) and region(s) will begin deployment. FEMA begins to alert and/or deploy resources in coordination with state authorities. The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) evaluates the need to increase its activation level in accordance with the situation and its standard operating procedures (SOP). Select ESFs are activated by FEMA under the Stafford Act. FEMA also deploys national and/or regional teams [e.g., Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs), Urban Search and Rescue (US&R)] during this phase. FEMA Regions send liaisons to the State Emergency Operations Centers or to other locations to work directly with the state to obtain information on the impact of the event and discuss and assist with requests for federal assistance. FEMA will determine the location of an interim operating facility (IOF) and/or a JFO and activities to establish it may commence when deemed necessary.

(4) Phase 2a Response.

(a) This phase and its inclusive sub-phases focus on a rapid, coordinated, and effective federal response to save lives and reduce casualties during an incident in support of survivors, communities, and affected governments.

(b) FEMA coordinates ESF support through the NRCC, Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs), and/or JFO per the NRF. To address the magnitude of the incident, procedures for certain ESFs may be expedited or streamlined by mobilizing and deploying assets based on verbal authorizations and /or independent of a request by state authorities.

(5) Phase 2b Deployment. During this phase, the deployment of additional federal resources to Incident Staging Bases (ISBs) and employment at incident sites occur. Federal actions focus on supporting resource requests and implementing decisions made during the initial response. The sub-phases continue until there are sufficient resources to stabilize the impacted area. At the outset, IOFs operate at the field level to coordinate federal support to each affected state through the RRCC until a JFO is stood up.

(6) Phase 2c Sustained Response. As response operations mature, each IOF evolves into a JFO (if not already established). The JFOs coordinate directly with the NRCC. The NRCC coordinates with the JFO with regard to the specific incident and continues providing coordination for other disasters across the nation. The Regional Administrators/RRCCs maintain situational awareness and support the JFOs as required. Regional Administrators are in constant contact with the FCOs in their respective region. An increasing number of short-term and intermediate recovery and mitigation activities characterize this sub-phase.

(7) Phase 3 Recovery. Recovery and mitigation activities begin in the early stages of response operations, with efforts focusing on stabilizing the immediate impacts of an event on the community and identifying and initiating mitigation actions, both of which may last for years. Stabilization and short-term recovery actions commence almost immediately following an incident and increase as time elapses. The various elements of a community system stabilize on different time frames leading to a situation in which response, stabilization, restoration, and mitigation activities can occur concurrently.

b. Response operations and other emergent activities that immediately precede or follow a disaster—such as lifesaving, life-sustaining, and property-protection actions—create an environment where recovery and mitigation activities can begin; however, they can be resource intensive and limit the ability to transition to long-term recovery efforts. The timing of the transition from response to recovery operations varies based on the scope and complexity of the incident. As the incident begins to shift to recovery, specialized federal teams (US&R, USACE, IMAT) will begin to demobilize.

#### **4. Relations with Non-DOD Partners**

Relationships within the Logistics Whole Community are optimized based upon the expansion and contraction of the various partners contingent upon the requirements of a notice or no-notice incident. Relationships are also conditioned upon whether the incident is singular or multi-regional. Non-DOD elements of the Logistics Whole Community should understand the principles that govern the National Response Framework<sup>48</sup>, PPD-8, the National Preparedness Goal<sup>49</sup>, and FEMA's Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action<sup>50</sup> architecture.

#### **5. Engaging DOD in Domestic Disaster Response Operations**

DOD is a critical partner in the Logistics Whole Community enterprise supporting a successful domestic disaster response operation. However, it is important to note that DOD always acts in support to FEMA in a domestic disaster response, never as the lead agency. Awareness of the complexity of domestic disaster response operations and that the role of DOD is significantly different than in a foreign humanitarian disaster response or during combat operations will enhance the successful logistician's ability to provide needed assistance most effectively.

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## CHAPTER VI

### THE JLENT AND COMBAT OPERATIONS

The application of social network principles and enterprise best practices can elevate the outcome of efforts between military and nonmilitary logisticians in support of humanitarian and domestic disasters, but these are not the only scenarios in which the social network perspective is relevant. Social networking principles and enterprise best practices are also relevant within the more tightly controlled and doctrinally bound environment across the DOD portion of the JLEnt. This is readily apparent during security and nation building operations like Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition has to work in conjunction with governmental and nongovernmental civilian efforts in the nation to provide the sort of unified effort necessary to defeat a networked insurgency deeply embedded within the society and culture.

#### **Social Network Implications for Joint Forces**

- **Combat operations, engagement, and stability and reconstruction operations will take place at the strategic direction of political leaders. Joint logisticians must have an understanding about how to construct, leverage, and maintain their own portion of the JLEnt to bring the whole of national logistics capacities to bear in military operations of importance to the nation.**
- **Use of social network principles to encourage better logistics management in coalition with other nations' military forces.**
- **Use of social network principles to encourage better coordination/collaboration of logistics in coalition with other nations / military forces, DOD and organizations outside of government, or military command and control.**
- **Use social network principles to facilitate DOD end to end logistics integration within the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE).**
- **Use of social network-related measures to link the Joint Operations, Logistics, and Operational Planning processes to better optimize and synchronize the delivery of logistics.**

#### **1. Leadership and Responsibility for Coordination in Crises**

a. Combatant commanders typically establish a JTF to accomplish a specific mission drawn from the component commands. The JTF is the primary actor with which NGOs and IGOs will have the most contact. In multinational operations, a JTF may combine with a variety of forces from a number of nations. In such cases, the JTF becomes a combined joint task force (CJTF). The JTF is divided into the following six main command staff designations that correspond to those at the GCC headquarters and the Joint Staff:

- (1) J1 Administration; deals with internal personnel issues.

(2) J2 Intelligence; gathers, analyzes, and reports on information, including classified information.

(3) J3 Operations; mainly focuses on current operations.

(4) J4 Logistics; provides internal support for the JTF and may include support to disaster victims.

(5) J5 Plans and Policies; normal location of Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC).

(6) J6 Communications.

b. The JTF will likely stand up a body designed to work with civilian partners working in the field when appropriate. A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) may be established for tactical coordination. A Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) may be established by the supported commander to assist in coordination at the strategic level. Circumstances will dictate the name, function, and scope of the body, but the DOD will establish a center for the humanitarian community as an avenue for volitional coordination.

## 2. How the JLEnt Changes Over Time

a. It is important to understand that the military plans and executes complex contingency operations in terms of phasing. Oftentimes, members of a military organization will refer to these operational transitions as the “phases” of military activities, referring to a standard way of viewing military activities sequentially. The phases are: Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and Enable Civil Authority, and Figure VI-1 depicts how phasing may be used to plan and visualize the sequential execution of a military response.




Figure VI-1. Phases of a Military Response

b. For the military, a phase refers to a stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces or capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. The purpose of phasing is to help the JFC integrate and synchronize all subordinate operations toward the same goal. Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government, and deters adversaries from resuming hostile actions while the U.S. and international community take steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary to achieve their strategic objectives.

c. These transitions between phases demand quick shifts in skills, actions, organizational behaviors and mental outlooks for the joint force and require coordination with a wider range of organization, interagency, multinational, IGO, NGO and private sector partners to provide the capabilities necessary to address the mission

d. *Phase 0 (Shape)*

(1) Joint and multinational operations, as well as various interagency activities, are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries, and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. The operations are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. All enabling forces are conducting normal operations as well as building relationships with new partners.

(2) Phase 0 is characteristic of routine peacetime operations. Those operations encompass various interagency activities being performed within an operations area, a country or a theater of operations. (Note: A theater of operations is a subarea of significant size within a theater of war or AOR defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific (combat) operations over extended periods of time. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. For example, the Korean theater of operations falls within the USPACOM's AOR while both Iraq and Afghanistan are considered separate theaters of operations within the U. S. Central Command's larger theaters of operations / AOR). Phase 0 shaping operations are characterized by security cooperation efforts, training, exercises and planning for potential future operations.

e. *Phase 1 (Deter)*. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. Once the crisis is defined, actions affecting logistics in this phase may include mobilization; initial overflight permissions and/or deployment into a theater; and development of mission-tailored logistic requirements to support the JFC's contingency operation plans. Combatant Commanders continue to engage multinational partners while liaison teams coordinate with the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs and assist to set the conditions for the execution of subsequent phases of the campaign.

f. *Phase 2 (Seize Initiative)*. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy into a position where they can be

defeated. Rapid and sustained application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy's initial aggression. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities.

g. *Phase 3 (Dominate)*. The dominate phase focuses on breaking the adversary's will to fight in combat operations or to gain control of the operational environment in noncombat operations. This is a military operation at full speed with all anticipated capabilities on-hand and dealing with the situation. Stability operations may occur simultaneously blurring the phasing within a theater of operations. The intent of stability operations during phase 3 is to relieve suffering. Success in this phase depends on having a stronger force than the enemy in the right place, at the right time. In this phase, all of the capabilities needed to defeat the enemy are available in some quantity, and the remaining forces are moving into the area as quickly as possible and in the order that they are needed.

h. *Phase 4 (Stabilize)*.

(1) Stabilization operations may begin during the previous phase. Stabilization is characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations, however, that change may not occur throughout the entire theater of operations simultaneously. This phase is required when there is limited or no functioning legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, interagency, IGO, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase.

(2) Stability operations are often logistics and engineering intensive. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. Planning also should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel (e.g., USG civilian agencies, NGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector).

i. *Phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority)*. This phase is characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting multinational, interagency, IGO, NGO, and private sector participants. The joint force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during this phase. Redeployment of military forces and cessation of combat operations, or the occupation of territory and transfer of lead from DOD to DOS are characteristics of this phase. Combatant command involvement with other nations and interagency partners may be required to achieve the national strategic end state beyond the termination of the joint operation and the beginning of a new phase 0.

### 3. Relations with Non-DOD Partners

a. For the humanitarian community, complex emergencies involving combat can often mean that access to the affected areas and effective delivery of relief supplies may be limited by political or security concerns or by the lack of key infrastructure. Military logisticians are keenly focused on providing logistics in support of their own forces. However, the logistics structure put in place may only provide for self-sustainment, requiring a concerted effort to shift process and procedures to support the movement of relief supplies for the humanitarian community. Many of these challenges can be overcome or at the very least mitigated through the application of social networking principles in the development of relationships with MN entities within the JLEnt before, during and after combat.

b. Multinational partnerships are an important component of logistics in combat-focused environments. Because MN partners are sovereign states with their own military establishments, equipment, doctrine, procedures, national cultures, and military capabilities, the logistic support for these operations presents often difficult challenges for U.S. GCCs, subordinate joint force commanders, the services, and defense agencies. JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations describes many of the unique logistical aspects associated with multinational operations, including planning, coordination, execution, command and control, and deconflicting of logistic requirements. It provides guidance and principles for the U.S. military in conducting logistic activities when operating as part of a MN force.

### 4. Engaging DOD in Logistics Planning and Operations

a. A central “sub-enterprise” within the DOD that others within the JLEnt should be aware of is the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, provides military guidance for combatant commanders and other JFCs to exercise authority along with the doctrinal framework within which logistics can be optimized for operations, education, and training. The document acknowledges the existence of sub-enterprises within the joint logistics community, but cites the need to build a single unified enterprise capable of rapidly delivering and positioning joint forces and sustainment from any origin or supply source to any JFC designated point of need and back again.

b. The JDDE is the construct of equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution operations. The JDDE directly supports the three over-arching distribution imperatives; 1) build the right capacity into the joint distribution pipeline, 2) exercise sufficient control over the pipeline, and 3) provide a high degree of assurance that right forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive when and where needed. The central idea of the JDDE is that it must be capable of providing future JFCs with the ability to rapidly and effectively move and sustain selected joint forces in support of major combat operations or other joint operations. The JDDE must be capable of operating across the strategic, operational, and tactical continuum with a set of integrated, robust, and responsive physical, information, communication, and financial networks. Applying social network principles can help to build trust across the JLEnt which directly affects the function of the JDDE.



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## CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION

*“The practice of logistics is a bridge, a common language that we can use to speak across cultural boundaries...”*

~ JCLE Interview with USAFRICOM Logistics Expert

### 1. The Social Network Matters

a. This guide applied a social network perspective to encourage the establishment and effective operation of a JLEnt. To fully operationalize the JLEnt as it is envisioned in the Joint Concept for Logistics will take a profound cultural shift that extends far beyond the direct reach of the DOD. As equal partners, each prospective member of this emerging JLEnt — the DOD, Interagency, multinational, private, and nongovernmental communities — all have an interest in making such a cultural shift. Many already realize the benefits of a social network perspective and are actively engaged in making this shift real. This guide is one small part of a broader effort to encourage an enterprise approach to logistics provision in a complex crisis.

b. As fiscal constraints limit the availability of resources and assets within single organizations there is an ever greater need for coordination and sharing between organizations. By leveraging the capabilities of multiple organizations, logisticians broaden possible options. Applying social network principles and enterprise best practices enables effective and efficient cross-organizational communication. This interaction between partners within the JLEnt directly impacts logistics support to complex emergencies, and is enabled when the capabilities of the JLEnt are known by all and focused collectively on a common mission.

#### **Social Network Principles and Enterprise Best Practices**

- **Work towards a common awareness of key enterprise partners and their goals and objectives.**
- **Account for different backgrounds, perspectives, and cultures of enterprise participants.**
- **Embrace emergent logistics networks and technologies to facilitate network building.**
- **Focus on building trust relationships across the enterprise.**
- **Build consensus on common objectives and goals while recognizing where objectives and goals may diverge.**
- **Leverage existing networks and coordinating mechanisms.**
- **Be aware of barriers that hinder information exchange across a social network.**

- **Develop appropriate strategies to include key organizations in the enterprise.**
- **Develop appropriate strategies to link key enterprise participants.**
- **Develop a culture among logisticians with a bias toward leveraging the enterprise.**

c. Currently, a complex patchwork of agreements, formal and informal relationships, ad hoc arrangements, and field expedients constitute the mechanism by which the world's logistics response capabilities operate. Without dismissing the fact that each community in the JLEnt has varying objectives, priorities, and processes with regard to their roles, responsibilities, and capabilities in a crisis, cooperation between organizations with a common general purpose is imperative. By understanding basic social network characteristics across the three distinct complex operations and the JLEnt operating framework, and a set of overarching principles for communication before, during, and after an operation, logisticians can share perspectives on the crisis and determine the best ways to approach the problem. Even more fundamentally they can develop the level of trust necessary to share capabilities in a mutually beneficial way and build a global enterprise-mindset for logistics support in an array of complex crises.

d. Logisticians understand connections perhaps more than any other community. Connections are what make the delivery of goods possible. Resources and routes, pallets and ports—the vocabulary of logistics is about connecting resources to demands. Logistics is also about connecting people, so logisticians must also have an understanding of the social networks that link people and organizations together. A single logistics provider will not have the full set of capabilities or resources that are required to support all logistics needs in today's complex crises. Taking advantage of the JLEnt will allow for a better collective ability to develop, understand, and then achieve common logistics goals and objectives. Leveraging the approaches, principles, and best practices found in this guide will allow access to the broader community of logisticians that make up the enterprise and should be a critical part of every logistics plan and operation.

## APPENDIX A

### SELECTED REFERENCES

The perspective on enterprise and social network best practices as well as the specifics of humanitarian operations in complex emergencies contained in the guide were derived from the JCLE project's Baseline Assessment Report, which distilled research from over 180 distinct reference documents. General social network theory principles were derived from leading academic network theorists such as Robert Cross (*Driving the Results Through Networks*), Nicholas Christakis (*Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks*) and Julia Kotlarsky (writing numerous academic pieces focused on transactive memory systems).

The framework found in Chapter III was developed through the use of Joint Publication 5, Joint Operational Planning Process, and the World Food Program's (WFP) Logistics Operational Guide. The different steps within the framework are embedded within steps of the operational planning process and the Logistics Operational Guide planning processes in an effort to orient the reader as to when the principles might be best be used within the two illustrative planning processes. The framework was further developed using after-action reports, such as the Haiti Hotwash Report which described how to better pursue unity of effort across organizations and PACOM's "How-to Handbook on Multilateral Information Preparation for the Operational Environment for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief." describing a four-step process of similar scope and scale.

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## APPENDIX B

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Social network theory focuses on how relationships and connections among individuals or organizations affect their behavior.

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<sup>4</sup> Social network principles and best practices from *Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment, Baseline Assessment Report* (21 July 2011), United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Concept Development and Experiment Directorate.

<sup>5</sup> Dennis Steele, “AMC Paving the Way with a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Construct and a Factory to Foxhole Logistic Connection,” *Army Magazine* (March 2012), p. 33.

<sup>6</sup> JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

<sup>7</sup> *Joint Concept for Logistics*; Joint Logistics Imperatives, p. I-7.

<sup>8</sup> JP 4-0 *Joint Logistics*; Joint Logistics Imperatives, p. I-7.

<sup>9</sup> USAID Field Operations Guide, Version 4.0, p. I-9

<sup>10</sup> Logistics Cluster, Logistics Operational Guide.

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<sup>12</sup> “Logistics Cluster and Humanitarian Reform.” July 2010, p. 4.

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<sup>16</sup> “Generic Terms of Reference for Sector/Cluster Leads at the Country Level.”  
<http://log.logcluster.org/operational-environment/cluster-approach/index.html>

<sup>17</sup> Joint Publication 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*.

<sup>18</sup> JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, p. II-6.

- <sup>19</sup> Lynn Lawry (ed.), *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*, p. 21.
- <sup>20</sup> The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response* (2011), p. 11.
- <sup>21</sup> These are drawn from the UN Charter, International Law, and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and NGOs in Disaster Relief.
- <sup>22</sup> The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response* (2011), p. 60.
- <sup>23</sup> JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, p. x.
- <sup>24</sup> The Logistics Operational Guide provides a detailed list of factors that affect the humanitarian logistics community. See Logistics Operational Guide, Assessment and Planning, located at <http://log.logcluster.org/response/assessment/index.html#planning-cycle>
- <sup>25</sup> Tony Icayan, NATO CIMIC Fusion Center, *Civil Military Overview Guide*, p. 17.
- <sup>26</sup> Tierney, Lindell, Perry, “Facing the unexpected: Disaster preparedness and response in the United States.” Joseph Henry Press.
- <sup>27</sup> Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead, “Coordinating Expertise among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters,” *Organization Science*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January-February 2007) pp. 147-161.
- <sup>28</sup> “Interview with William E. Ward” *PRISM*, Vol. 2 No. 2 (March 2011), p. 179.
- <sup>29</sup> Tony Icayan, “Information and Knowledge Management: A Content-Based Solution” NATO CIMIC Fusion Center, (February 2011), p. 6.
- <sup>30</sup> Rebecca Linder, *Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings*, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2006), p. 17
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>32</sup> JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, p. II-14.
- <sup>33</sup> JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, p. II-22.
- <sup>34</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power*, (2011), p. 63.
- <sup>35</sup> As part of a whole of USG response, other U.S. agencies may have existing relationships before a crisis. For more information about the possible agencies that may be involved in U.S. efforts, see JP 3-08 *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, Appendix A-1.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets, *Oslo Guidelines*,” Revision 1.1 (November 2007).  
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8706B7B69BD77E00C1257233004F0570-OCHA-Nov2006.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> UN Interagency Standing Committee, “Consolidated Appeals Process,”  
[http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-subsidi-swg\\_cap-cap](http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-subsidi-swg_cap-cap)

<sup>38</sup> USAID/OFDA OFDA, “Guidance for Disaster Planning and Response, FY2011.”

<sup>39</sup> UN OCHA, “What is CERF”  
<http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf/WhatistheCERF/CERFandtheCAP/tabid/1829/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

<sup>40</sup> See Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System at: <http://www.gdacs.org/>

<sup>41</sup> USAID, *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response*, p. xix.

<sup>42</sup> In case of threats to life, limb, and eyesight, U.S. forces are authorized to immediately intervene to prevent undue suffering.

<sup>43</sup> To understand the process more fully, please see JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 2009. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_29.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> These services include the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), the WFP’s Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD), and any common service provided through the Logistics Cluster (Warehousing, Transport, Fuel Provision, etc.) based on established needs.

<sup>45</sup> “Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets, *Oslo Guidelines*,” Revision 1.1 (November 2007). p 8.  
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8706B7B69BD77E00C1257233004F0570-OCHA-Nov2006.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> For more detail on the organization of the DOD, consult the following website:  
<http://www.defense.gov/orgchart/>

<sup>47</sup> FEMA, *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles Themes, and Pathways for Action* (December 2011). p. 3.  
<http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=4941>.

<sup>48</sup> National Response Framework, January 2008,  
<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/aboutNRF.htm>.

<sup>49</sup> Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 National Preparedness Goal, First Edition September 2011.

<sup>50</sup> FEMA, *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles Themes, and Pathways for Action* (December 2011).

## GLOSSARY

### Part I – Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOR	Area of Responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
ARC	American Red Cross
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
COI	Community of Interest
CONOPs	Concept of Operations
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOS	Department of State
DR	Disaster Relief
ECHO	European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FAS	Federal Acquisition Service
FBO	Faith-Based Organization
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPO	Field Program Officer
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GSA	General Services Administration
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters
IAA	Interagency Agreement
IMAT	Incident Management Assistance Team



IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IOF	Interim Operating Facility
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCL	Joint Concept for Logistics
JCLE	Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment
JDDE	Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFO	Joint Field Office
JLEnt	Joint Logistics Enterprise
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
LMRS	Logistics Management and Resource Support
LOG	Logistics
MCDA	Military and Civil Defense Assets
MDRO	Mission Disaster Relief Officer
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRF	National Disaster Recovery Framework
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIFC	National Interagency Fire Center
NLC	National Logistics Coordinator
NLS	National Logistics System
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center
NRF	National Response Framework
NVOAD	National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
NWC	National Watch Center
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGA	Other Government Agency
PBS	Public Buildings Service
PHS	Public Health Service
PKEMRA	Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PRT	Planning Resource Teams
RMT	Response Management Team
RRCC	Regional Response Coordination Center
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure

UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
U.S.	United States
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/OFDA	United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USGS	United States Geological Survey
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
US&R	Urban Search and Rescue
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VOAD	Volunteer Organization Active in Disasters
VOSOCC	Virtual On-Site Operation Coordination Center
WFP	World Food Programme

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## Part II – Terms and Definitions

**Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO):** A U.S. DOD document intended to guide force development and experimentation by: establishing a common framework for military professionals for thinking about future joint operations, visualizing future joint operations for policymakers and others with an interest in the employment of military force, establishing a conceptual foundation for subordinate joint and Service concepts, and motivating and guiding the study, experimentation and evaluation of joint concepts and capabilities.

**Complex emergencies:** A humanitarian crisis due to war, civil disturbance, natural and man-made disasters, or any combination which exceeds a country's, region's, or society's ability to recover.

**Corporate Social Responsibility:** a term that describes how private companies understand and address social or environmental problems that go beyond what is required by government regulators. CSR may imply short term costs to the company that do not provide an immediate financial benefit, but may promote future goodwill towards the company or profitability by shaping the environment in a favorable way (a soft drink company promoting clean water, for example). In exercising CSR during a complex crisis, private industry may donate cash or in-kind donations (commodities, services, or personnel) to NGOs.

**Emergency Operations Center:** The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., federal, state, regional, tribal, city, county), or some combination thereof.

**Faith-Based Organizations:** A class of NGO which ascribe to certain moral creeds but will offer aid regardless of the beneficiary's race, creed or religion.

**Framework to Optimize Logistics Relations across the JLEnt:** a step-by-step, social network-based framework focused on developing and achieving the greatest possible unity of effort across the organizations that make up the JLEnt. It consists of five steps:

- (1) Establish and Maintain Base JLEnt Understanding
- (2) Develop Mutual Appreciation of the Environment
- (3) Orient Leadership and Fix Responsibility for Coordination
- (4) Inform Internal Logistics Processes

### (5) Execute and Assess Logistics Operations

**Global Logistics Cluster Support Cell:** For humanitarian logistics operations where the Logistics Cluster has been activated, the GLCSC in WFP HQ, Rome acts as a liaison between the humanitarian community and Military/Civil Defense Agencies.

**Joint Concept for Logistics:** The JCL was signed on August 6, 2010 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Joint Staff Director for Logistics. It establishes a common framework for thinking about future joint logistics operations. More specifically, the concept notes that joint force commanders, the Department of Defense, and other agencies that make up a government or coalition response have difficulty integrating, synchronizing, or otherwise optimizing logistics delivery.

**Joint Concept for Logistics Experiment:** A 2011 experiment focused on exploring the nature of the JLEnt and how it might be further developed for operational use. The JCLE approached the JLEnt by developing a perspective on the social relationships that link organizations together, rather than the specific logistics processes used by organizations. It used emerging social network theory to explore how modifying relationships between organizations affected the movement of supplies in a set of simulated crisis operations

**Joint Logistics Enterprise:** A multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively engaged or structured to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing the integrity of their own organizational missions and goals.

**Logistics:** Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. Those aspects of an operation that deal with the design and development, acquisition, storage, control, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel and forces (personnel). During complex response operations, logistics includes; the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; the acquisition or furnishing of services, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and the acquisition or furnishing of services.

**Logistics Cluster:** A group of organizations working together on specific topics to improve humanitarian response. Typically, a “sectoral group” (or in some cases, “working group,” thematic group,” or “task force”) comprised of various functional areas of expertise/effort lead by a UN designated organization, and in which responsibilities and divisions or labor have been established to improve the effective use of assets without the duplication of effort. Key responsibilities include developing standards and policies, building response capacity, and providing operational support to other humanitarian actors.

**National Response Coordination Center:** As a component of the National Operations Center, serves as the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency primary operations center responsible for national incident response and recovery as well as national resource coordination. As a 24/7 operations center, the NRCC monitors potential or developing incidents and supports the efforts of regional and field components.

**National Response Framework:** For domestic emergencies, the NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all hazards response. The NRF describes key response principles, participants, roles and structures that guide the Nation's response operations. FEMA coordinates the response support through 15 Emergency Support Functions that provide functional capabilities and resources from federal departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector and nongovernmental organizations.

**Nongovernmental Organizations:** An extremely diverse set of organizations which have numerous organizational structures, constituencies, goals, means, and ideologies and are important logistics providers during a complex emergency.

**Office for Disaster Assistance (OFDA):** The lead U.S. federal agency for coordinating and facilitating USG responses to foreign complex crises.

**Oslo Guidelines:** A set of guidelines which govern the use of military and civil defense assets following natural, technological and environmental emergencies in times of peace. Core principles include the notions of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. The Oslo Guidelines were originally prepared over a period of two years beginning in 1992. They were the result of a collaborative effort that culminated in an international conference in Oslo, Norway, in January 1994 and were released in May 1994.

**Social Network:** Social networks are human organizational structures comprised of individuals and/or organizations connected by one or more relationships. They are composed of "nodes" and "links," with nodes being the actual organizations or individuals within the structure under observation and links describing the connections which tie individual nodes together.

**Sphere Handbook:** Describes a set of guidelines set out in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. These guidelines offer a common framework for ensuring that human rights are upheld during Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response Operations.

**Spontaneous Nongovernmental Organizations.** NGOs which form ad hoc during a crisis. They tend to form quickly in response to a perceived gap in service provision to survivors.

**USAID's Office for Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA):** The lead federal U.S. agency for coordinating the response to complex emergencies and natural disasters.

**Virtual On-Site Operation Coordination Center:** A web-based system that provides near real-time alerts about natural disasters around the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, including media monitoring, and map catalogues.

**World Food Programme:** A voluntarily funded agency within the United Nations system and the largest humanitarian agency devoted to fighting world hunger. During emergency responses, the WFP serves as the lead agency for logistics in the UN's Cluster Approach/System.



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