

# Seabasing

## Joint Integrating Concept

*Version 1.0*



**01 August 2005**

# Table of Contents

1		
2	<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>4</b>
3		
4	<b>Section 1 – Purpose</b>	<b>10</b>
5		
6	<b>Section 2 – Scope</b>	<b>11</b>
7	<b>2.1 Strategic Guidance</b>	<b>11</b>
8	<b>2.2 Timeframe</b>	<b>11</b>
9	<b>2.3 Definition</b>	<b>11</b>
10	<b>2.4 Assumptions</b>	<b>11</b>
11	<b>2.5 Assessment of Risk</b>	<b>12</b>
12	<b>2.6 Future Joint Context Documents</b>	<b>13</b>
13	<b>2.7 Applicable Military Operations</b>	<b>13</b>
14	<b>2.8 Applicable Military Functions and Activities</b>	<b>13</b>
15	<b>2.9 Relationship to Joint Concepts</b>	<b>14</b>
16		
17	<b>Section 3 – Central and Supporting Ideas</b>	<b>16</b>
18	<b>3.1 Statement of Military Problem</b>	<b>16</b>
19	<b>3.2 Synopsis of the Central Idea</b>	<b>17</b>
20	<b>3.3 Principles of Seabasing</b>	<b>20</b>
21	<b>3.4 Application of Concept within a Campaign</b>	<b>22</b>
22	<b>3.5 Illustrative Concept of Operations</b>	<b>23</b>
23		
24	<b>Section 4 – Lines of Operation, Tasks, Attributes, and Standards and Conditions</b>	<b>35</b>
25	<b>4.1 Lines of Operation</b>	<b>35</b>
26	<b>4.2 Attributes</b>	<b>35</b>
27	<b>4.3 Conditions and Standards</b>	<b>35</b>
28		
29	<b>Section 5 – Implications</b>	<b>39</b>
30	<b>5.1 Implications for National Security</b>	<b>39</b>
31	<b>5.2 Implications for Development and Acquisition</b>	<b>39</b>
32	<b>5.2 Implications for Joint Experimentation</b>	<b>41</b>
33		
34	<b>Annex A – Reference Documents</b>	<b>43</b>
35		
36	<b>Annex B – Glossary and Acronyms</b>	<b>45</b>
37		
38	<b>Annex C – Lines of Operation, Associated Tasks, Attributes, Standards &amp; Conditions</b>	<b>62</b>
39		
40	<b>Annex D – Scenario, Intelligence, Illustrative CONOPS (Classified)</b>	<b>90</b>
41	<b>Appendix 1 Major Combat Operations (SDTE) CONOPS</b>	
42	<b>Appendix 2 Major Combat Operations (Pre-emptive) CONOPS</b>	
43	<b>Appendix 3 Humanitarian Assistance CONOPS</b>	
44	<b>Appendix 4 Counterinsurgency Operations CONOPS</b>	
45	<b>Appendix 5 Supporting Data</b>	

***This JIC contains titles or language similar to existing or future programs, solution sets, etc. which are intended to create a common understanding of future joint concepts and capabilities. In particular, Annex D contains detailed illustrative CONOPS. Programs, solution sets, etc. used in these CONOPS are not intended to justify future programs and solution sets or constrain the Capability Based Assessment (CBA) but to illustrate the concept.***

47 **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

48  
49 A joint concept is a visualization of future operations that describe how a commander, using  
50 military art and science, might employ capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. It  
51 need not be limited by current or programmed capabilities.<sup>1</sup> *Seabasing* is one of several  
52 evolving Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC) that describes, "...how a Joint Force Commander  
53 (JFC) 10-20 years in the future will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve an  
54 objective."<sup>2</sup> This document describes how Seabasing will complement, integrate and enable  
55 joint military capabilities throughout the littorals with minimal or no access to nearby land bases.  
56 It defines joint Seabasing, explains its relevance to strategic guidance and joint concepts, lays out  
57 assumptions and risks, identifies essential capabilities, defines attributes, and provides guidelines  
58 of how joint Seabasing can be executed to support national military objectives.

*U.S. forces must react promptly to theater needs from a posture that minimizes footprint. DOD is changing U.S. global basing policy, placing more emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe, and making U.S. forces more agile and expeditionary. The new challenge is to project joint power more rapidly to confront unexpected threats.*

*DOD Congressional Testimony, 2005*

*"Statement Of Secretary Of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld FY 2006 Department Of Defense Budget Senate Armed Services Committee", February 17, 2005, p. 3*

59  
60 This JIC outlines the concept for Seabasing. It describes closing, assembling, employing,  
61 sustaining and reconstituting joint forces from a sea base during a range of military operations in  
62 the 2015 to 2025 timeframe, including:

- 63
- 64 • Major Combat Operation (MCO)
  - 65 • Preemptive MCO with limited forward access
  - 66 • Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operation
  - 67 • Counterinsurgency Operation (COIN)

---

<sup>1</sup> Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan approved by CJCS July 2004

<sup>2</sup> IBID

Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.

68 These scenarios can be conducted as stand-alone operations or in a near-simultaneous  
69 scenario. Success in these operations requires a rapid global response with an integrated array of  
70 capabilities, from combat capabilities to defeat the forces that threaten stability and security, to  
71 capabilities integrated with DOD and non-DOD agencies for stability and security operations.

72 Seabasing enables early arrival and synchronization of joint force capabilities providing  
73 strategic speed, access, and persistence for military operations including presence, through  
74 combat against conventional as well as irregular threats. Capitalizing on the capabilities of  
75 forward deployed, pre-positioned and immediate/rapid response forces, Seabasing improves  
76 operational tempo while seizing the initiative without an operational pause. Seabasing also  
77 reduces force protection challenges ashore, especially during the early stages of a crisis, and  
78 increases joint force operational maneuver by allowing the JFC to fully exploit the sea as  
79 maneuver space to enhance capabilities and gain advantage over the adversary. Some  
80 operational capabilities attributed to Seabasing are not available today; however once realized,  
81 Seabasing will:

- 82 • Complement overseas presence and forward basing strategy as described in the IGPBS.
- 83 • Provide the ability to rapidly assemble forces at the sea base with minimal or no in-  
84 theater host and coalition nation support. This enables force closure and employment of  
85 joint force capabilities when forward access is denied.
- 86 • Enable joint force access, complement existing basing, and enhance power projection.  
87 Seabasing provides commanders with greater flexibility to rapidly and effectively build  
88 and integrate joint capabilities during the early stages of operations particularly when the  
89 political situation restricts basing, overflight or US presence. Seabasing supports setting  
90 the conditions for the immediate integration of follow-on sustainment of personnel,  
91 equipment, and supplies while minimizing footprint ashore.
- 92 • Support parallel and concurrent execution of all phases of forcible entry by enabling  
93 shorter response times and the simultaneous defeat of multi-dimensional threats.

- 94 • Provide a dynamic, mobile, networked set of platforms from which selected joint forces  
95 can operate in relative safety, while reducing risk to vulnerable facilities ashore. It can  
96 also diminish the political implications of host government support for US forces by  
97 reducing insurgent ability to exploit our presence as a propaganda tool.
- 98 • Provide an array of joint force options and sustained employment through the flexibility  
99 afforded by projecting and sustaining forces through the sea base (strike, forcible entry,  
100 security operations, special operations, freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance  
101 or disaster relief).
- 102 • Enhance the sustainment of future expeditionary joint force operations and minimize the  
103 operational pause associated with the build-up of large logistic stockpiles.
- 104 • Support high tempo, distributed joint operations and the capabilities for unit recovery,  
105 replenishment, reconstitution, re-positioning, and reemployment allowing rapid response  
106 to emerging asymmetrical and conventional threats within or outside the area of  
107 operations.
- 108 • Provide three force employment options that can be exploited by the Combatant  
109 Command (COCOM): 1) preemptive battlespace shaping through early joint integration  
110 of immediate response forces; 2) seizing the initiative through accelerated closure and  
111 sustainment of rapid response forces; and 3) seamless preparation for decisive  
112 operations<sup>3</sup> through rapid reinforcement by follow on forces.

113 These advantages are embodied in the principles of joint Seabasing:

114 **PRINCIPLES OF SEABASING**

- 115 **1) Use the sea as maneuver space.**
- 116 **2) Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence**
- 3) Protect joint force operations.**
- 4) Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.**
- 5) Sustain joint force operations from the sea.**
- 6) Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases.**
- 7) Create uncertainty for our adversaries.**

117 Through joint Seabasing, the President and/or the Secretary of Defense and military leaders  
118 have the capability to rapidly build and integrate credible joint combat power and command and

---

<sup>3</sup> The current 4 phases of a campaign is being revised to include 6 total phases: 1) Shape; 2) Deter; 3) Seize the Initiative; 4) Dominate; 5) Stabilize; and 6) Enable Civil Authority. This change will be reflected in the next revision of the Seabasing JIC.

119 control (C2) forward to deter escalation, enhance security, and provide assistance. In an MCO  
120 this includes seizing the initiative, and providing synchronized projection of joint force  
121 capability to achieve initial military objectives. This may include defeating anti-access  
122 challenges and setting conditions to enable the rapid build-up of joint combat power through the  
123 use of simultaneous force flows by air and sea across multiple entry points.

124 The Seabasing JIC integrates capabilities from Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), Joint  
125 Functional Concepts and Joint Integrating Concepts, and distills them into five lines of operation  
126 with associated tasks, attributes, conditions and standards. Specific tasks, conditions and  
127 standards are identified in Annex C.

### **LINES OF OPERATION**

**CLOSE** – rapid closure of joint force capability to an area of crisis.

**ASSEMBLE** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea-based assets.

**EMPLOY** – flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base.

**SUSTAIN** – persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to decisive combat operations ashore.

**RECONSTITUTE** – the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

128  
129 Lines of operation are discussed in greater detail throughout the document. In addition, the  
130 following attributes of Seabasing capabilities assist in qualifying metrics, conditions and  
131 standards:

132

133

134

135

136

137

**CAPABILITY ATTRIBUTES**

**CAPACITY** – the measure of how much joint force capability can be supported.

**RATE** – how fast things can be accomplished to support joint force capability over a given time under standard sets of conditions.

**INFRASTRUCTURE** – the measure of a family of systems and capabilities that provide essential services toward accomplishing the mission.

**INTEROPERABILITY** – the degree to which Seabasing can seamlessly integrate and support joint force capability.

**SURVIVABILITY** – the degree to which Seabasing can protect joint force capabilities.

**ACCESSIBILITY** – the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical constraints presented by terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and threat.

138

139 The Seabasing JIC, amplified by four detailed, illustrative Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

140 (Annex D), supports the following top-level measures of performance to assist Capabilities

141 Based Assessment (CBA), joint experimentation (e.g., Sea Viking, Nimble Viking, Unified

142 Course, Unified Quest, etc.), acquisition, and future concept development.

**TOP-LEVEL MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE (THRESHOLD)**

**CLOSE** joint sea-based capabilities, including elements of JC2, to a JOA to support major combat operations within 10-14 days of execution order.

**ASSEMBLE** and integrate joint capabilities from the sea base to support major combat operations within 24-72 hours of arrival within the JOA.

**EMPLOY** over-the-horizon from the sea base at least one (1) brigade for JFEO within a period of darkness (8-10 hrs).

**SUSTAIN** joint sea-based operations, including up to at least two (2) joint brigades operating ashore, for an indefinite period using secure advanced bases up to 2000 nm away; also support selected joint maintenance and provide level III medical within the sea base.

**RECONSTITUTE** one (1) brigade from ashore to the sea base and reemploy within 10-14 days of execution order.

143

Seabasing provides a new paradigm from which to examine and balance the strategic

144

mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning). Current strategic mobility cannot project and

145

sustain US forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments without reliance on land

146 bases within the Joint Operating Area in order to seize the initiative within minimal or moderate  
147 risk. A balanced strategic mobility triad that includes additional high-speed sealift and  
148 operationalized maritime pre-positioning capabilities is needed to improve future mobility and  
149 sustainment capabilities. This document illustrates interdependence between a balanced strategic  
150 mobility triad and a compressed timeline to rapidly close, assemble, employ, sustain and  
151 reconstitute joint forces.

152 Seabasing is a transformational joint concept that provides a means to achieve strategic  
153 military goals. Our national leaders will use Seabasing as a strategic enabler combining the  
154 aspects of forward presence and engagement with the capability to rapidly deploy and employ  
155 forces to meet the future security challenges presented by traditional, disruptive, catastrophic,  
156 and irregular threats within the range of military operations. As an operational enabler,  
157 Seabasing exploits the maneuver space and sovereignty of the sea to provide the COCOMs with  
158 greater operational independence. As a JIC, Seabasing is interdependent with emerging joint and  
159 service concepts and complements the IGPBS.  
160

161 **Section 1 – PURPOSE**

162

163 “We are developing joint sea bases that will allow our forces to strike from floating  
164 platforms close to the action, instead of being dependent on land bases far from the fight.”

165

166 *President George W. Bush*

167

*2005 USNA Commencement Address*

168

169 Future security environments will become increasingly complicated through changing  
170 international relationships, increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of non-state  
171 actors, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the United States’ security  
172 strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century continues to evolve, our nation remains committed to its global  
173 responsibilities to ensure national security through peace, prosperity, and freedom. However, US  
174 options to extend global influence through forward basing of military capability are diminishing  
175 or being adversely altered<sup>4</sup>. The implications of this are still being studied, but the challenge for  
176 our national and military leaders will be to maintain global presence and security in the face of  
177 uncertain access.

178

179 The Seabasing JIC describes how the presence, closure and assembly, employment,  
180 sustainment, reconstitution, and re-employment of operational capabilities at sea, through the  
181 sea, and from the sea will enhance stability through engagement, assure access to critical regions  
182 and expand maneuver options across the range of military operations (ROMO) in 2015-2025. A  
183 rigorous assessment and analysis of capability gaps and excesses based on this document will be  
184 conducted in order to reach appropriate materiel and non-materiel solutions. As the basis for  
185 performing this assessment, this concept defines lines of operation, tasks, attributes, conditions,  
186 and standards for conducting future sea-based operations.

186

187 This JIC will shape joint and service experimentation to address identified capability gaps  
188 and provide the framework for recommending potential solutions across the range of Doctrine,  
189 Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities  
190 (DOTMLPF) solutions.

190

191

---

<sup>4</sup> In the Overseas Basing Commission Report, the Commission expressed concern that the air and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet political contingencies.

192 **Section 2 – SCOPE**

193

194 *A sea base is not just a ship, not just pre-positioned materiel, not just helicopter assault*  
195 *– it represents a complex capability. One must think of a sea base as a hybrid system of*  
196 *systems consisting of concepts of operations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive*  
197 *weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics, all of which involve careful planning,*  
198 *coordination and exercising to operate smoothly.”*

199

200 *Defense Science Board*

201 *Task Force on Sea Basing, Aug 2003*

202

203 **2.1 Strategic Guidance.** The need for military access to retain global freedom of action is a  
204 consistent theme throughout the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the  
205 National Military Strategy. The Seabasing concept conforms to strategic guidance and is an  
206 extension of the reference documents found in Annex A. Specifically, Seabasing supports the  
207 goals of assuring allies and friends, deterring aggression, dissuading potential adversaries,  
208 rapidly responding to irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges, and if necessary, quickly  
209 defeating foes in combat.

210

211 **2.2 Timeframe.** This concept focuses on the 2015-2025 timeframe.

212

213 **2.3 Definition.** Seabasing is the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection,  
214 reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing  
215 continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without  
216 reliance on land bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options,  
217 and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.

218

219 **2.4 Assumptions.** The following assumptions were used in the development of this JIC:

- 220
- 221 • Reduced access to forward operations bases (FOBs) (insight taken from Overseas Basing  
Commission Report<sup>5</sup>).
  - 222 • US joint forces will be required to conduct operations in anti-access environments.

---

<sup>5</sup> In the Overseas Basing Commission Report, the Commission expressed concern that the air and sea ports, inter-nodal connectivities and other mobility enabling systems are not adequate to meet political contingencies.

- 223 • CONOPS and force structure based on Baseline Security Posture (BSP), Defense  
224 Planning Scenario(s) (DPS) and Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) campaigns  
225 with the following deviations:
- 226 ➤ Seabasing will complement existing OPLANS, CONPLANS, and FUNCPLANS by  
227 reducing footprint at land bases, denying the adversary Essential Elements of Friendly  
228 Information (EEFI), reducing transloads and minimizing enroute stops, and  
229 compressing reception, staging, onward movement and integration of joint forces.
  - 230 ➤ Future Seabasing systems, platforms, and capabilities will be employed (e.g., high-  
231 speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface), selective off-load, etc.).
  - 232 ➤ Key Seabasing elements will continue to be forward deployed or pre-positioned in  
233 accordance with current and future defense strategies.

234 In addition, to support the scope of the effort, CONOPS development was bounded by the  
235 following considerations:

- 236 • Examining an operational force capable of supporting four scenarios, including Major  
237 Combat Operations (MCO)(SDTE and Preemptive), Counterinsurgency Operations  
238 (COIN), and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations.
- 239 • No specific force size has been established for these operations, however to support  
240 capabilities and CONOPS development, the JIC referred to the 2003 Defense Science  
241 Board (DSB) Task Force on Seabasing that examined Seabasing in support of brigade-  
242 sized or larger combat operations.

243

244 **2.5 Assessment of Risk.** In any operation, a variety of factors can pose risks to execution. The  
245 JFC can mitigate these risks by accounting for and addressing these factors in advance. Many of  
246 these factors are common across most, if not all, operations. Some factors have a greater impact  
247 on Seabasing operations and are detailed below:

- 248 • Enemy anti-access capability – mines, missiles, aircraft, submarines, ships, and  
249 surveillance assets – threaten or delay the sea base’s ability to achieve maritime and  
250 air/space superiority.
- 251 • Force protection assets supporting the sea base must provide sufficient protection for the  
252 sea base and employed forces.
- 253 • Adverse weather conditions and sea state impact sea-based operations and affect the rapid  
254 build-up of combat power and timely sustainment of employed forces.

- 255 • Capacity, rate, and survivability of high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors  
256 (air/surface) must be sufficient to provide for the timely closure, assembly and  
257 sustainment of the sea base.
- 258 • Capacity, rate, and survivability of prime movers and connectors (air/surface) must be  
259 sufficient to provide for the timely projection and sustainment of necessary combat power  
260 ashore.
- 261 • Range of operations can be affected by need for self-protection and the size, distance, and  
262 distribution of joint forces that need to be sustained.
- 263 • Sea-based joint C2 is dependent on a secure, reliable, net-centric environment that  
264 supports distributed, on-the-move (OTM), over-the-horizon (OTH) operations.
- 265 • Future treaties and international laws may impact Seabasing operations.
- 266 • CONUS-based and forward land-based platforms/points of embarkation are vulnerable to  
267 terrorist attack.
- 268 • Surface vessels have unique decontamination requirements when subjected to  
269 chemical/biological attack.

270

271 **2.6 Future Joint Context Documents.** The Seabasing concept supports future joint context  
272 documents.

273

274 **2.7 Applicable Military Operations.** Seabasing supports a wide range of military operations,  
275 from presence and deterrence missions to contributing to the conduct of an MCO.

276

277 **2.8 Applicable Military Functions and Activities.** The following military functions and  
278 activities apply to Seabasing:

- 279 • **Force Application (FA).** The FA capabilities of maneuver and engagement are key  
280 capabilities in the Seabasing concept, with the specific application that these joint  
281 capabilities are projected from the sea.
- 282 • **Joint Command and Control (Joint C2).** Seabasing supports applicable Joint C2,  
283 including elements of JFC, component, and multinational staffs. Specific application  
284 includes: monitoring/collecting data, developing situational awareness, developing  
285 courses of action/plan, executing and monitoring the plan; and using collaborative C2  
286 capabilities for preparation, planning, virtual rehearsal, and simulation in support of  
287 employment.

- 288 • **Force Protection (FP).** A key application is the integrated protection of joint forces  
289 afloat and ashore within the JOA through the use of core FP capabilities (detect, assess,  
290 warn, defend, and recover).
- 291 • **Battlespace Awareness (BA).** The application of BA in Seabasing includes all domains  
292 (air/space, cyber, maritime, and land). The actions necessary to support Seabasing  
293 operations include monitoring, tasking and integration of intelligence, as well as  
294 predictive analysis of adversary intentions, goals, and objectives. These capabilities  
295 require persistent observation and reconnaissance. ISR assets must conduct surveillance  
296 over large areas and also concentrate on specific areas and items of interest in order to  
297 find, identify, focus, and continuously track specific contacts of interest.
- 298 • **Focused Logistics (FL).** Key applications include joint at-sea arrival and assembly,  
299 selective on-load/off-load, medical, maintenance, total asset/in-transit visibility,  
300 flexible/tailored sustainment, and reconstitution.
- 301 • **Net Centric (NC).** Seabasing requires the networking of all joint force elements to  
302 support information discovery, sharing, and management; collaboration; adaptive  
303 organizations; exploitation of force interdependencies; and a greater unity of effort via  
304 synchronization of the force at the tactical and operational levels. NC includes  
305 distributed OTH/OTM communications.
- 306 • **Force Management (FM).** The sea base provides the JFC with additional options for  
307 conducting the full range of military operations within the integrated global basing  
308 posture.

309

310 **2.9 Relationship to Joint Concepts.** Seabasing is fundamentally about conducting operations  
311 from the sea. It serves as an at-sea enabler for numerous other joint concepts, including:

- 312 • **Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) JIC.** Seabasing and JFEO are  
313 complementary concepts, as Seabasing provides additional options for operational  
314 maneuver and forcible entry. This is particularly relevant considering the risks cited  
315 within the JFEO JIC for limited future basing options.
- 316 • **Global Strike JIC.** Seabasing complements global strike by providing sea-based strike  
317 assets, forward positioned C2 capabilities, and other joint force capabilities.
- 318 • **Joint Undersea Superiority (JUSS) JIC.** Seabasing both enables and is enabled by  
319 Undersea Superiority – this includes providing assets from the sea base to achieve

- 320 Undersea Superiority and the required capability to protect the sea base from undersea  
321 threats such as mines and submarines.
- 322 • **Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) JIC.** Seabasing forces complement  
323 IAMD with unique capabilities from the sea base, to include air and missile defense of  
324 both the sea base and designated inland areas.
  - 325 • **Command and Control (C2) JIC.** The key relationship between Seabasing and Joint  
326 C2 is the flexibility of the sea base to support Joint C2 through capabilities afloat and net-  
327 centric reach back to shore-based HQs.
  - 328 • **Joint Logistics (Distribution) JIC.** Seabasing and joint logistics are closely aligned.  
329 Sustaining joint forces is one of the major Seabasing lines of operation, and several key  
330 capabilities are shared by both concepts, including C2, total asset/in-transit visibility,  
331 selective off-load/on-load, and medical and tailored logistics packages. Seabasing  
332 provides a viable means...from the sea...to support logistics for joint forces ashore.  
333

334 **Section 3 – CENTRAL AND SUPPORTING IDEAS**

335

336 *"From the beginning, America has sought international support for our operations in*  
337 *Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much support. There is a difference, however,*  
338 *between leading a coalition of many nations, and submitting to the objections of a few.*  
339 *America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country."*

340

341 *President George W. Bush*

342 *State of the Union Address, 20 Jan 04*

343

344 **3.1 Statement of Military Problem.** Future security environments will become increasingly  
345 complicated through international political relationships, increased acts of terrorism, the  
346 expanded influence of non-state actors, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  
347 (WMD). Potential enemies are more likely to attack US forces abroad with increasingly lethal  
348 weapons, including WMD, either developed by indigenous industries or purchased abroad.  
349 Many nations may find it politically untenable to host US bases or allow access through their  
350 territory (as illustrated in Figure 3.1). Recent Congressional testimony emphasizes that US  
351 forces must react promptly to theater needs from a posture that minimizes footprint, partly due to  
352 increasingly low regional tolerance for long-term foreign military presence no matter how well  
353 intentioned, and partly because of the regions' dynamic nature requiring maximum flexibility.  
354 Furthermore, changes to DOD global basing will emphasize forward presence and engagement  
355 as well as the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots. This requires forces that are more agile  
356 and expeditionary. *The new challenge is to project concentrated joint power more quickly to*  
357 *confront unexpected threats.*<sup>6</sup>

358 As indicated in strategic guidance, the US still requires secure strategic access and the  
359 freedom to act globally.

---

<sup>6</sup> "Statement Of Secretary Of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld FY 2006 Department Of Defense Budget Senate Armed Services Committee", February 17, 2005, p. 3

360 However, during periods  
 361 of crisis, COCOMs will  
 362 need the capability to  
 363 contain the crisis by  
 364 deterring potential  
 365 adversaries or seizing  
 366 the initiative to swiftly  
 367 defeat enemy actions.  
 368 Given the likely  
 369 operational environment,  
 370 the JFC must be able to




Figure 3-1 Reduced Overseas Basing

371 project power when forward basing may not be available. Even where FOBs are otherwise  
 372 available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use, and  
 373 the JFC may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the joint force. In addition, US  
 374 presence at FOBs may be a source of friction in some coalition situations and present security  
 375 challenges that threaten operational objectives. Lastly, where potential air, sea, and land entry  
 376 points are available, their predictability allows the enemy to focus his anti-access capabilities  
 377 against our forces. As a result, Seabasing will be a critical capability for joint forces in 2015-  
 378 2025 that increases options while decreasing liabilities both politically and militarily.

379 Projecting and sustaining joint combat power from the seas, Seabasing assures joint access  
 380 by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces  
 381 operating globally. Seabasing capitalizes on the maritime dominance gained by our nation's  
 382 forces, and uses the maneuver space and freedom of action afforded by the sea to stage, project  
 383 and sustain joint combat power from an inherently mobile aggregation of distributed and  
 384 networked platforms.

385 The US cannot predict with any certainty the political agreements that will be required to  
 386 conduct operations in support of its security interests. Nevertheless, our military will be required  
 387 to maintain a significant presence in critical regions outside its homeland in order to pursue  
 388 national interests. Presence capitalizes on opportunities to engage with government, military,  
 389 and other representatives from other countries. Seabasing forces complement the presence  
 390 provided by forces based on land near or within an objective area. Forces at sea and present in  
 391 the critical regions can close to objective areas and facilitate the at-sea closure of other forces  
 392 from distant bases outside those objective areas.

393

394 **3.2 Synopsis of the Central Idea.** Seabasing provides commanders with greater flexibility to  
395 rapidly and effectively build and integrate joint capabilities during the early stages of operations  
396 with minimal or no access to nearby land bases. When the political situation restricts or denies  
397 basing, overflight or US presence, Seabasing leverages flexible forward presence to provide  
398 early availability of joint combat power to exploit unpredictable points of entry, even in austere  
399 environments. It enables joint force access and enhances power projection by complementing  
400 existing basing. Seabasing offers the COCOM and JFC additional options to close, assemble,  
401 employ and sustain a joint force. It also complements, integrates and enables joint military  
402 capabilities throughout the littorals. Exploiting opportunities created by maritime superiority and  
403 the sovereign freedom of forces operating from international waters, Seabasing allows JFCs to  
404 expand the joint operations' maneuver space into the sea. Through the protection provided by  
405 maneuvering platforms under a defensive power projection shield, Seabasing provides the  
406 opportunity to retain a myriad of support functions (sustainment, fire support, medical, and  
407 maintenance, etc.) at sea and reduces the need for the build-up of a large vulnerable support  
408 infrastructure ashore, particularly during the early stages of combat operations. Seabasing also  
409 restricts the adversary's intelligence collection efforts by closing and assembling portions of the  
410 joint force at sea.

411 The foundation of Seabasing is the sea base, an inherently maneuverable, scalable  
412 aggregation of distributed, networked platforms and organizations, capable of receiving  
413 deploying forces and supporting the employment of those forces. Depending on the capabilities  
414 of assigned sea base platforms, this support could include the full range of C2, combat support  
415 and combat service support functions. The capacity and capability of the sea base could increase  
416 over time as more platforms arrive in the operating area. The sea base is organized as a  
417 networked entity with interdependent capabilities.

418 Joint forces rapidly deploy and close by a combination of means to the sea base, or points in  
419 the objective area, where they organize for operations and from which they receive protection,  
420 C2, combat support, and combat service support. These forces then project combat power ashore  
421 from the sea base, exploiting the operational freedom of action that maritime superiority  
422 provides. The sea base continues to support those forces during operations ashore.

423 Joint forces deploy directly from Continental United States (CONUS)/Outside CONUS  
424 (OCONUS) or through secure advanced bases to the sea base using high-speed inter and intra-  
425 theater connectors (air/surface) where they join forward deployed and pre-positioned assets.

426 Some aviation forces may self-deploy. The platforms of the sea base might already be in place  
427 or might be closing on the designated location simultaneously with deploying forces. Some  
428 deploying forces could link up with sea base platforms while enroute to the objective area. The  
429 joint forces assemble and organize at the sea base. Combinations of surface and air connector  
430 systems transfer assets among the platforms of the sea base as the force organizes for its mission.  
431 These connector assets could be forward deployed or deployed to the theater.

432 Sea-based and global assets perform integrated force protection. The sea-based portion of  
433 that protection is provided by assets organic to the sea base. These forces include surface  
434 combatants, submarines, aircraft, and air and missile defenses as well as assets organic to forces  
435 assembling at the sea base.

436 The sea base provides C2 capabilities for the JFC, designated component and multinational  
437 staffs. This capability includes seamless C2 of forces throughout the battlespace.

438 Selected combat support for operations ashore originate from the sea base; examples include  
439 Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Special  
440 Operations, Naval Fire Support (NFS), and Offensive Air Support (OAS).

441 Forces maneuver from the sea base to operational depths ashore using a combination of air  
442 and surface means in austere environments. These could include the same means originally used  
443 to deploy those forces to the sea base or by means specifically intended for employment of forces  
444 from the sea base. Depending on the situation, forces may continue to operate from the sea base,  
445 operating ashore only long enough to perform specific missions before returning to the sea base.  
446 As forces flow ashore, additional forces may deploy to the sea base as part of a continuous build-  
447 up of combat power. Seabasing operations may open additional early entry points for rapid  
448 continued build-up of forces ashore directly from CONUS/OCONUS locations, advanced bases,  
449 or intermediate staging bases. Theater access enablers<sup>7</sup> may provide entry forces with the means  
450 to mitigate the limitations brought about by the environment, weather, infrastructure, terrain, and  
451 enemy occupation.

452 From the initiation of operations, Seabasing provides persistent joint logistics integrated with  
453 operations to ensure the continuous sustainment of select forces afloat and ashore. Seabasing  
454 capabilities that support projection and sustainment of joint combat power can also be used to  
455 recover, reconstitute and redeploy select joint forces for further employment.

---


<sup>7</sup> Theater Access Enablers include US Army Theater Opening Packages, US Air Force Contingency Response Groups and US Navy NMCB and NAVELSF.

456 From the period prior to the onset of a crisis through the completion of stabilization  
457 operations, Seabasing provides scalable power projection options to the JFC through the  
458 sequential and concurrent integration of the five primary Seabasing lines of operation outlined  
459 below. These lines of operation provide a framework for the range of capabilities available to  
460 the JFC through Seabasing and are described as:

- 461 • **Close** – rapid closure of joint force capabilities to an area of crisis.
- 462 • **Assemble** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around  
463 secure sea-based assets.
- 464 • **Employ** – flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives  
465 supported from the sea base.
- 466 • **Sustain** – persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through  
467 transition to decisive combat operations ashore.
- 468 • **Reconstitute** – the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat  
469 capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

470 Figure 3-2 depicts an overarching Operational View of these joint Seabasing lines of operation.

471



**Figure 3-2 Seabasing Overarching View**

472

473 **3.3 Principles of Seabasing.** Seabasing presents options to the JFC that complement the use of  
 474 land bases in the JOA, and maximize advantages to exploit adversary weaknesses. This includes  
 475 the rapid employment of joint forces across the spectrum of conflict to deter or disrupt an  
 476 adversary's hostile course of action and seize the initiative from the adversary before he can fully  
 477 integrate an anti-access strategy. Furthermore, Seabasing supports the transition to decisive  
 478 operations by establishing conditions for an early favorable conclusion and closing the gap  
 479 between early entry and follow-on forces.

480 There are seven overarching Seabasing principles that apply across a wide range of  
 481 scenarios:

- 482 • **Use the sea as maneuver space.** Seabasing exploits the freedom of the high seas to  
 483 conduct operational maneuver in the maritime (to include littoral) environment relatively  
 484 unconstrained by political and diplomatic restrictions, for rapid deployment and

485 immediate employment. Sea-based operations provide JFCs with an operational  
486 flexibility to support the immediate deployment/employment/sustainment of forces across  
487 the extended depth and breadth of the battlespace.

488 • **Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence.** Joint forces operating from  
489 the sea base, in conjunction with other globally based joint forces; provide the JFC an on-  
490 scene, credible offensive and defensive capability during the early stages of a crisis.

491 Combined with other elements of this joint interdependent force, forward deployed joint  
492 forces can help to deter or preclude a crisis or enable the subsequent introduction of  
493 additional forces, equipment, and sustainment.

494 • **Protect joint force operations.** Seabasing provides a large measure of inherent force  
495 protection derived from its freedom of operational maneuver in a maritime environment.

496 The combined capabilities of joint platforms in multiple mediums (surface, sub-surface,  
497 and air) provide the joint forces a defensive shield both at sea and ashore. The

498 integration of these capabilities and freedom of maneuver effectively degrades the  
499 enemy's ability to successfully target and engage friendly forces while facilitating joint  
500 force deployment, employment, and sustainment.

501 • **Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.** Forces rapidly closing the sea  
502 base by multi-dimensional means (air, surface, and subsurface) give the JFC the ability to  
503 rapidly scale and tailor forces/capabilities to the mission. Seabasing provides an option  
504 to the JFC to mass, disperse, or project joint combat power throughout the battlespace at  
505 the desired time to influence, deter, contain, or defeat an adversary.

506 • **Sustain joint force operations from the sea.** Sea-based logistics entails sustaining  
507 forces through an increasingly anticipatory and responsive logistics system to support

508 forces afloat and select joint/multinational forces operating ashore. The sea base is  
509 sustained through the interface with support bases and strategic logistics pipelines

510 enabling joint forces to remain on station, where needed, for extended periods of time.

511 Seabasing uses selective off-load to assemble and deliver tailored sustainment packages  
512 directly to joint forces operating ashore.

513 • **Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases.** Seabasing integrates  
514 global and sea-based power projection capabilities to provide the JFC with multiple  
515 access options to complement forward basing in the JOA, and reduces reliance on

516 forward basing when the security environment dictates. This includes theater access  
517 capabilities at improved and unimproved ports and airfields.

- 518 • **Create uncertainty for adversaries.** Seabasing places an adversary in a dilemma  
519 through the conduct of dispersed and distributed operations. The options of multiple  
520 points and means of entry require an adversary to either disperse or concentrate his  
521 forces, creating opportunities to exploit seams and gaps in defenses.

522

523 **3.4 Application of Concept within a Campaign.** Seabasing is a flexible and scalable concept  
524 that supports a wide range of military operations, including an MCO. The scalable and  
525 distributed nature of Seabasing provides the JFC with a means to escalate or deescalate a  
526 conflict, through the application of military pressure when and where required, independent of  
527 coalition basing. Employing Seabasing, joint forces can assemble and integrate combat  
528 capabilities in-theater without necessarily exacerbating or prematurely escalating a crisis. The  
529 JFC will use Seabasing to rapidly build, integrate, and project combat power from over-the-  
530 horizon with distributed and net-centric forces to seize the initiative. These actions, when  
531 coupled with joint forcible entry, enable a rapid transition to decisive operations. This sets the  
532 conditions for the joint force to achieve deployment momentum and the projection of joint  
533 combat power to operational depths within the JOA. In this context, Seabasing provides the JFC  
534 options to conduct JFEO (seize multiple entry points – e.g., improved and unimproved Aerial  
535 Port of Debarkation (APOD)/Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD), objectives, etc.) for faster  
536 transition to decisive operations. This overall capability will be made possible by high-speed  
537 inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface)<sup>8</sup> that are able to operate over-the-shore or through  
538 unimproved, shallow water or austere ports for near simultaneous reinforcement of immediate  
539 response forces to enable the JFC to apply expanded maneuver options throughout the JOA. The  
540 JFC will leverage these capabilities to close the gap between immediate response and rapid  
541 response forces in order to move as quickly as possible from efforts to seize the initiative to  
542 decisive operations, without an operational pause.

543 Concurrently, air/space assets provide unique capabilities to complement and enable  
544 maritime-based operations. Global Strike forces may project power within minutes or hours, and  
545 can provide air, space, sea, and limited ground operations to achieve initial effects while the sea

---

<sup>8</sup> Examples of high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) include, but are not limited to, Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLs), Austere Access High Speed Sealift (AAHSS), and Joint Heavy Lift Aircraft (JHLA).

546 base is being established. Global air/space assets, in conjunction with sea-based assets, will  
547 conduct integrated operations to defeat anti-access threats, assisting in assuring access and  
548 setting the conditions for follow-on operations. Long-range combat air forces/tankers/C4ISR  
549 systems will conduct operations in conjunction with ground and maritime forces to achieve  
550 desired effects and meet JFC objectives.

551 At the conclusion of a campaign, Seabasing will serve the JFC with the means to provide  
552 secure staging and redeployment of forces back to CONUS/OCONUS bases and other  
553 designated areas. Inter and intra-theater lift (air/surface) will be used to interface with the sea  
554 base and other points ashore to recover and transport personnel and equipment. The sea base can  
555 be scaled to provide continued support during the latter phases of the campaign, including  
556 security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

557 The same Seabasing benefits inherent in conducting an MCO also apply to a wide range of  
558 contingency operations (Annex D examines Seabasing applications in an MCO (SDTE and Pre-  
559 emptive), HA and COIN). The JFC has the option to use Seabasing to complement land-based  
560 operations or conduct the majority of operations from the sea.

561

562 **3.5 Operational Context.** The following describes Seabasing within the operational context of  
563 the functional capability of Joint C2, the phases of an MCO and the Seabasing Lines of  
564 Operation (LOO). This section provides a broad, overarching discussion on the operational  
565 application of Seabasing. Specific operational descriptions are described in the detailed  
566 illustrative CONOPS in Annex D.

567

568 **3.5.1 Joint C2.** The sea base provides the capability for the JFC to exercise command and  
569 control of joint and multinational forces. C2 can be conducted afloat, enroute, or ashore, as the  
570 commander deems appropriate. The command element operating afloat reduces support and  
571 force protection requirements ashore, thereby making more resources available to those elements  
572 conducting, or directly supporting operations. Should the commander desire to do so, he will  
573 have the capability to command from a small, highly mobile forward command post while the  
574 major portion of the staff remains afloat. If sustained operations ashore develop, the commander  
575 will have the capability to fully transition C2 capabilities and functions from the sea base.

576           Regardless of whether C2 is conducted from afloat, ashore, or various collective locations, it  
577 is supported by a common net-centric C2 system. The system is inherently joint and  
578 interoperable with select multinational systems. It is secure, scalable to meet mission  
579 requirements, easily deployable, and capable of supporting commander collaboration  
580 requirements.

581           Joint Seabasing C2 structure may leverage existing Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ),  
582 potentially embarking part of a core element to conduct effects based planning, and rapidly  
583 prepare for an operation by using tools such as the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)  
584 and Operational Net Assessment (ONA).

585           The JFC may designate functional component commanders (Joint Force Land Component  
586 Commander (JFLCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Force Air  
587 Component Commander (JFACC), and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)), or service  
588 component commanders, or a combination of the two to plan, coordinate and execute operations  
589 under their cognizance. The location and size of the JFC's headquarters element, the  
590 components and their staffs during Seabasing operations are important because they potentially  
591 influence key capabilities in the sea base (e.g., C2, berthing, etc.). Assuming functional  
592 component is utilized and given the requirements for a seamless transition between immediate  
593 and rapid response forces, this JIC envisions that the JFC (to include selected portions of his  
594 staff), JFMCC, JFLCC, JSOTF, and other designated component/multinational staff elements  
595 may be embarked in the sea base in accordance with the JFC's intent. JFACC may embark an  
596 Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) as his direct representative in the sea base to  
597 liaison with the JFC, and component/multinational staffs.

598

599 **3.5.2 Deter/Engage.** By taking advantage of rapid closure and assembly of immediate and rapid  
600 response forces, Seabasing provides the JFC multiple methods to deter an adversary, or conduct  
601 selected operations, to include demonstrations, Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), and Non-  
602 Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). During these operations, high-speed inter and intra-  
603 theater connectors (air/surface) provide the required capacity, rate and accessibility, which  
604 includes the use of improved and unimproved APODs/SPODs.

605

606 **3.5.2.1 Close.** Strategic Planning Guidance outlines the overall military strategy for the future,  
607 including specified response timelines. Seabasing follows this guidance by providing and  
608 supporting immediate response, rapid response and follow-on forces in the required timelines.

609 This concept provides the JFC with several options to conduct operations that range from  
610 deterrence with immediate response forces to decisive operations with rapid response and  
611 follow-on forces.

612 Immediate response forces (generally forward deployed, presence, or alert forces) are  
613 envisioned to include forward deployed naval assets (e.g., Carrier Strike Groups (CSG),  
614 SSGNs/SOF, and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG)), specified Army Brigade Combat Teams  
615 (BCT) (e.g., Airborne, and when forward deployed/based, Air Assault (AASLT), Stryker, etc.),  
616 Air Force Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) elements (including ISR, Global  
617 Strike, Airlift, Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR), CSAR, and space assets), and special  
618 operations/multinational/interagency forces. These forces will be able to immediately respond to  
619 conflicts by rapidly closing the JOA, deterring the enemy, and if necessary, seizing the initiative  
620 through the use of joint combat power. Immediate response forces will self-deploy or use high-  
621 speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to close the JOA and the sea base.

622 Rapid response forces (generally, tailored joint forces configured to respond shortly after the  
623 employment of immediate forces) are envisioned to include designated and pre-positioned assets  
624 in theater, OCONUS, and CONUS. Examples include Marine Expeditionary Brigade(s) (MEB),  
625 Maritime Pre-positioning Ship (MPS) Squadron(s)/Groups (MPS/MPG)(MPG to include  
626 Combat Logistics Fleet (CLF)), Army Strategic Flotilla (ASF), additional Army BCTs/Unit(s) of  
627 Employment (UEX) and additional CSG/ESGs, special operations capable forces, follow-on  
628 AETF elements, and selected multinational/interagency forces. Rapid response forces will either  
629 self-deploy or use high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to advanced bases,  
630 and in some cases, directly close to the sea base. On arrival at advanced bases, selected forces  
631 will use high-speed intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to close to the JOA and/or sea base.

632 The importance of high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) cannot be  
633 overemphasized – these assets must provide rapid, long endurance, high capacity means of  
634 movement of joint personnel and equipment from advanced bases to distributed, unpredictable,  
635 austere locations within the JOA.

636 High-speed intra-theater connectors (air/surface) may also ferry forces and equipment from  
637 advanced bases to sea base prime movers enroute to the JOA. These same intra-theater  
638 connectors also provide critical transportation between sea base assets within the JOA –  
639 transportation is required to assemble, integrate, and sustain at-sea joint forces.

640 Closure must not be limited to sequential force flow – increased responsiveness for follow-on  
641 forces will be gained by enabling force projection through multiple, parallel force flows. This

642 will generate increased throughput and balanced deployment momentum that further enables  
643 rapid transition to decisive operations. As follow-on forces are introduced, they may:

- 644 • Deploy from CONUS/OCONUS for employment directly to objectives ashore
- 645 • Deploy through the sea base for employment to objectives ashore
- 646 • Deploy to advanced bases or intermediate staging bases (ISBs), then employ to objectives  
647 ashore
- 648 • Deploy to the sea base for subsequent operations

649 The sea base may also act as an afloat ISB providing logistics support and force protection to  
650 forces employing on or from the sea base.

651 While closing to the JOA, the JFC, along with subordinate commanders, will conduct  
652 collaborative preparation and planning to include course of action development, virtual or live  
653 rehearsals, and simulations<sup>9</sup>. Through the net-centric environment, the JFC will receive  
654 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) updates and use ONA to develop situational  
655 awareness. This process requires a layered and survivable ISR plan that includes air/space,  
656 maritime and reconnaissance forces from the various services. In addition, the JFC may initiate  
657 an aggressive Information Operations (IO) campaign throughout the battlespace. This IO  
658 campaign should address the impact of the sea base, including its presence and capabilities, on  
659 the adversary's decision-making and actions. Robust Joint Battle Management Command and  
660 Control (JBMC2) capabilities, facilitated by the net-centric environment, are essential to this  
661 process to provide the Common Operational Tactical Picture (COTP) and Situational Awareness  
662 (SA).

663

664 **3.5.2.2 Assemble.** Regardless of the mode of deployment to the JOA and sea base, an essential  
665 capability is the seamless integration of joint maritime, air and land capabilities to support joint  
666 power projection. The sea base must provide facilities to conduct at-sea arrival, reception, and  
667 assembly of arriving joint forces through sea state 4. It is envisioned that forces and equipment  
668 arriving at the sea base via high speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) will be  
669 transferred to prime movers, which will have the capability to handle a full range of cargo,  
670 equipment, supplies, and personnel. Interfaces between prime movers and high-speed inter and  
671 intra-theater connectors (air/surface) must support the transfer of joint forces and equipment

---

<sup>9</sup> Live rehearsals are always the preferred method for preparing for tactical employment of forces from the sea base. Virtual rehearsal at the tactical level is an alternative method when the commander deems sufficient time is not available for a live force rehearsal. At a minimum, systems checks must be accomplished prior to employment.

672 through sea state 4. At a minimum, this future capability will require materiel handling systems,  
673 platform interface capability for trans-loading, and sea state mitigation capabilities.

674 In order to provide sea base mobility and persistence, the following focus areas must be  
675 addressed: external payload transfer; joint modular intermodal packaging; internal payload  
676 transfer; and broken stow.

677 External payload transfer can be further broken down into large and small vessel interfaces  
678 (lift-on / lift-off and roll-on / roll-off). Large vessel interfaces will provide the ability to rapidly  
679 and safely transfer and secure materiel and vehicles by stabilized cranes, standard tensioned  
680 replenishment alongside methods, or by transferring rolling stock between sealift, sustainment  
681 and/or sea base prime movers. Small to large vessel at-sea transfer technologies will be  
682 developed to enable the transfer of materiel and equipment from or to the sea base prime movers  
683 to or from small vessels such as the high speed connectors for intra-theater transfer. These  
684 technologies will allow ships to approach and safely remain connected while at sea in the sea  
685 base.

686 Advanced joint intermodal modular packaging techniques will improve handling and reduce  
687 retrograde, waste, and storage requirements. Efforts such as the Joint Modular Intermodal  
688 Container (JMIC) are looking to develop a pallet-sized intermodal ISO<sup>10</sup> module or container  
689 that is compatible with multiple distribution platforms. The size of the modules is a critical  
690 feature but will be difficult to determine until the attributes and features of the modules are  
691 decided.

692 Shipboard internal payload movement systems must incorporate seamless transitions and be  
693 “throughput-matched.” Vertical and horizontal cargo movement rate must match to make it  
694 possible for stowage at the rate of receipt during underway replenishment. Internal payload  
695 transfer capabilities to eliminate bottlenecks inherent in elevator platform loading and unloading  
696 during conventional strike-up/strike-down operations will be needed. Another internal payload  
697 and transfer capability is the automated warehouse system that maximizes cargo throughput,  
698 selectivity, packing density, availability, and reliability, while minimizing cost, weight, and  
699 maintenance. Finally, to achieve increased Seabasing throughput rates, advancements in  
700 shipboard internal materiel handling must occur that will enable very large loads (cargo and  
701 weapons) to be moved more quickly and safely by fewer personnel in higher sea states.

---

<sup>10</sup> ISO is an acronym for the International Organization for Standardization and is derived from the Greek “Isos”, meaning, “equal.”

702 The broken stow factor<sup>11</sup> will fluctuate depending on the type and size of vehicles, type and  
703 size of general cargo, experience of loading personnel, type of loading, method of stowage, and  
704 configuration of the compartment. To support selective offload capability, broken stow must be  
705 taken into account when designing and employing platforms that support the at-sea arrival and  
706 assembly of combat cargo, equipment and personnel. Broken stow factor must account for both  
707 the turning radius of combat vehicles and the tailored packaging of Class I (food) and V  
708 (explosives) materiel.

709

710 **3.5.3 Seize the Initiative.** The JFC seizes the initiative through the integrated application of  
711 joint force capabilities to gain, expand, and maintain access. The very presence of the sea base  
712 in the JOA provides a measure of access, particularly when basing or host nation support is not  
713 available. The sea base provides the infrastructure to conduct anti-denial operations, including  
714 maritime, aviation, and special operations. These operations include Global Strike with land-  
715 based air, space, maritime, and multinational assets employed from CONUS/OCONUS and the  
716 sea base. JUSS will provide freedom of maritime maneuver through Mine Countermeasures  
717 (MCM) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations. Joint IAMD operations counter  
718 adversary air and missile threats.

719 The JFC will continue to conduct ISR, IPB and IO, increasing battlespace awareness,  
720 supporting combat operations, and achieving desired effects. To set the conditions for forcible  
721 entry, the JFC will conduct Joint Advance Force Operations (JAFO), which may include  
722 reconnaissance of objective areas/assault lanes/high value targets, raids, direct action operations,  
723 etc.

724 Conducting forcible entry operations, the JFC uses maneuver from the sea to create multiple  
725 dilemmas for the adversary, compelling the adversary to concentrate or disperse forces. For  
726 example, one of the primary Seabasing missions within an MCO may be to seize multiple entry  
727 points (e.g., improved and unimproved APODs and SPODs) for use by follow-on forces for  
728 faster transition to decisive operations. To accomplish this, the JFC will use Seabasing  
729 operations to integrate and synchronize immediate, rapid response and follow-on forces,  
730 configured to conduct a combination vertical and surface maneuver. As the introduction of  
731 advanced lift improves depth of operations, future forces can be used to either strike directly at  
732 the enemy or to secure air and sea entry points for follow-on forces. Once entry is achieved, the

---

<sup>11</sup> Broken stow factor is a percentage of space that is invariably lost between boxes, vehicles, around stanchions and

733 JFC will seek to maintain deployment momentum by means of simultaneous and sequential force  
734 flows through these multiple entry points, thus enabling more rapid build-up of combat  
735 formations within the JOA. These actions enable the JFC to extend joint combat power of  
736 maneuver forces to operational depths.

737

738 **3.5.3.1 Employ.** Leveraging the scalability of the sea base, small units (joint, combined, SOF  
739 and/or interagency) may be employed early to conduct sensitive, initial operations. This may  
740 occur concurrently with the closure and assembly of additional joint forces, and expansion of the  
741 sea base. In addition, SOF planning and C2 elements (Joint Special Operations Task Force) may  
742 embark in sea base platforms.

743 The JFC conducts operations to establish maritime superiority and expand maritime access  
744 thereby increasing freedom of maneuver unimpeded by the maritime threat. Maritime  
745 superiority requires the defense of the sea base from attacks, including defense against  
746 submarines as well as multiple small boats and asymmetric terrorist or suicide attacks. It also  
747 requires the detection, identification, neutralization and potential clearing of mines to ensure  
748 maneuver access in key littoral approaches to be used for follow-on surface assault.

749 Air and space superiority is required through all lines of operation and provides joint forces  
750 the freedom to maneuver unimpeded by the air threat. During the employ line of operation, this  
751 includes the freedom to maneuver vertically to objectives within the JOA. Air/space superiority  
752 includes defending joint Seabasing forces from enemy air and missile attack, including theater  
753 ballistic missiles, and the intercept and engagement of enemy aircraft and cruise missiles  
754 throughout the JOA. Initially supported by Global Strike (kinetic and non-kinetic), IAMD, and  
755 sea-based forces providing tactical air and missile capability against air/space threats, this  
756 mission will be expanded to include ground based point and area defense assets to rapidly  
757 expand the theater IAMD umbrella.

758 By exploiting the maneuverability of the sea base, the JFC can mitigate anti-access threats,  
759 and capitalize on operations in and from the commons without interference (i.e., control of the  
760 relevant international sea, air, and cyberspace) to conduct operations at the time and place of his  
761 choosing. Localized anti-access threats may effect but not preclude the JFC from conducting  
762 offensive operations ashore. Seabasing provides a unique advantage to the JFC by extending the  
763 breadth and depth of the battlespace.

764 Seabasing allows the JFC to conduct integrated power projection concurrent with expansion  
765 of the sea base and assuring access. This includes the employment of a scalable range of lethal  
766 and non-lethal joint force capabilities to support JFC mission objectives. The JFC selects the  
767 appropriate interdependent joint force mission packages to achieve desired effects. These  
768 packages require access to the net-centric environment at the unit level, while on the move.

769 Integrated power projection includes not only the use of all-weather precision strike  
770 throughout the JOA, but also the insertion of ground forces at key objectives selected by the JFC.  
771 Seabasing provides freedom of maneuver for these joint forces by using the sea base's mobility  
772 and maneuverability to conduct flexible sea-to-objective maneuver and by providing mobile  
773 land, air, and sea-based fires. Sea-based fires include strikes on strategic, operational and tactical  
774 targets to shape the battlespace, close supporting fires for maneuver forces during the initial  
775 entry and during subsequent operations ashore, counter-fire to protect maneuver forces ashore,  
776 and suppression of enemy air defenses. Joint fires assets are an integral part of Seabasing, and  
777 include OAS from sea-based and theater/global aviation assets, and NFS from ships. Future joint  
778 fires must provide the reach, precision, volume, and responsiveness required to support  
779 maneuver forces ashore.

780 During integrated combat power projection, the JFC and his components must have the  
781 capability to plan, coordinate, execute, and synchronize distributed operations across the  
782 battlespace. This includes timely battlespace awareness and actionable intelligence, available to  
783 networked and distributed operational and tactical units (including those on the move) – the net-  
784 centric environment must support user requirements for secure data and information transfer and  
785 provide access to applicable enterprise services to all nodes.

786 Seabasing will also use operations from the sea to create dilemmas for the adversary by  
787 exploiting multiple means to seize the initiative and set the conditions for decisive operations.  
788 These avenues include the capability to provide tactical connectors (air/surface) to project forces  
789 ashore and maneuver forces within the JOA, and then use these tactical lift assets to continually  
790 sustain joint ground forces. Joint ground forces, supported by sea-based fires, are more mobile  
791 and agile; consequently these joint ground forces have greater freedom to maneuver.

792 Vertical maneuver is a critical Seabasing capability to support operations and sustainment.  
793 Vertical maneuver of a mounted force substantially expands the options for the joint force  
794 commander to execute distributed operations into austere environments with increased lethality,  
795 mobility, and survivability of these forces compared to dismounted troops. By employing  
796 vertical maneuver from the sea base, joint mounted forces are able to rapidly expand entry

797 lodgments, respond more effectively to a greater array of enemy threats, move to subsequent  
798 objective areas faster and operate to greater depths. Overall, vertical maneuver of joint mounted  
799 forces can enable tactical operations to quickly achieve desired effects. Reliance on vertical  
800 maneuver, especially low altitude transit of uncontrolled territory separating the sea base and  
801 forces distributed throughout the JOA, may require a high degree of persistence and survivability  
802 for the ISR and strike forces tasked with suppressing air defenses.

803 For forcible entry operations from the sea, the sea base must be able to project and sustain  
804 forces to objectives by simultaneous air and surface means. Seabasing forcible entry includes  
805 both projecting brigade sized forces<sup>12</sup> from the sea base via air and surface lift within one period  
806 of darkness from OTH to inland objectives and the projection of non-sea-based forces from  
807 CONUS, advanced bases or non-theater locations.

808

809 **3.5.3.2 Sustain.** Guided by the COCOM's intent and the complexity of the operation, a scalable  
810 set of logistics support capabilities can enable the JFC to synchronize and integrate logistics to  
811 sustain Seabasing forces and other support activities across the JOA. The solution set in one  
812 COCOM will not necessarily be the same for another. Each has its own unique requirements.  
813 While simple enhancements to existing processes and procedures may bring efficiencies in one  
814 area, a more robust logistics command and control entity may be required in another. The  
815 logistics command and control construct must be flexible to the needs within each COCOM in  
816 this complex operating environment that now asks the JTF Commander to receive, stage,  
817 integrate and move as well as sustain multiple services and agencies.

818 In a combat operation, the joint logistics distribution pipeline must be established rapidly and  
819 concurrent with force closure. Forward deployed and pre-positioned immediate response forces  
820 will have established strategic and theater sustainment capabilities. The joint deployment and  
821 distribution enterprise will expand existing regional peacetime distribution capabilities to support  
822 closure, assembly, sustainment, and reconstitution of rapid response and follow-on forces.

823 The distribution network will employ inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) to  
824 sustain the sea base. The distribution enterprise should focus on the sea base early in the  
825 operation as it is likely that, during seize the initiative, SPODs/APODs will be limited. Once lift  
826 assets arrive at the sea base, the joint force must expeditiously receive, reconfigure, store, load,  
827 transport, and distribute supplies, and materiel throughout the sea base. Decision support tools

---

<sup>12</sup> See Section 2.4, Assumptions.

828 and total asset visibility will provide the capability to coordinate and control the distribution of  
829 joint logistics.

830 Seabasing enables persistent combat operations by sustaining selected joint forces ashore  
831 through multiple entry points. Tactical distribution directly from the sea base reduces the need  
832 for the build-up of large supply bases ashore. Once joint ground forces have been projected  
833 ashore they will be continually sustained by a combination of intra-theater and tactical  
834 connectors from the sea base. Seabasing will provide continual sustainment for up to two  
835 brigades during initial phases of an operation and support throughput for select follow-on forces.  
836 Sustainment ashore includes scalable selective offload, transfer and distribution of personnel,  
837 materiel, and all classes of supply from the sea base. Tactical heavy/medium lift (air/surface)  
838 from the sea base to forces ashore will ensure the timely distribution of designated classes of  
839 supply. In particular, tactical vertical lift can be used to distribute supplies to joint forces without  
840 reliance on overland sustainment to reduce joint forces' vulnerability to both conventional and  
841 asymmetric threats.

842 Seabasing must support a number of logistics functions to include: designated maintenance  
843 of joint force equipment on the sea base, selected maintenance and equipment recovery support  
844 ashore, medical evacuation of casualties to the sea base, level III medical services on the sea  
845 base, and the evacuation of patients and casualties from the sea base to facilities outside the JOA.  
846

847 **3.5.4 Decisive Operations.** Execution of a large-scale operation would likely require the  
848 seizure of early entry points and land bases to facilitate the rapid entry of additional joint forces.  
849 Seabasing provides a means for the seamless transition to decisive operations by establishing  
850 conditions that allow a closing of the gap between initial entry and follow-on forces,  
851 transitioning combat power ashore, and withdrawing and repositioning combat power. As entry  
852 points are established, the JFC has options of flowing forces through the sea base, flowing  
853 directly to available APODs/SPODs from CONUS or advanced bases, or using capabilities  
854 provided by both the sea base and by facilities ashore seized by the joint force. During decisive  
855 operations, Seabasing offers the option of commanding assigned forces from a secure sea base  
856 until choosing to move C2 capabilities and functions ashore.

857  
858 **3.5.5 Transition.** During transition, the JFC focuses on coordinating joint force activities to  
859 bring operations to a successful conclusion. This includes the assessment of Seabasing  
860 operations and the potential transition of selected sea-based joint forces to other missions.

861  
862  
863  
864  
865  
866  
867  
868  
869  
870  
871  
872  
873  
874  
875  
876  
877  
878  
879  
880  
881  
882  
883  
884  
885  
886  
887

**3.5.5.1 Reconstitute.** As follow-on forces enter the JOA, or as the operational situation dictates (e.g., transition to stabilization operations or need to project power elsewhere), the JFC may rapidly transition joint sea-based forces to sequential or follow-on operations through at-sea reconstitution. Rapid reconstitution eliminates the need to wait for additional forces or equipment from CONUS to support additional operations in a different location.

Once the decision is made to reconstitute, selected forces ashore will recover personnel and equipment to the sea base using tactical connectors (air/surface). Upon recovery to the sea base, joint forces begin the process of restoring selected combat capability. This process is facilitated by the logistics and maintenance capability inherent to the sea base, including sustainment through access to distribution pipelines, intra-ship transfer, and selective on-load/off-load capability.

Once selected joint forces have been recovered to the sea base, the JFC has the option of maneuvering and repositioning within the JOA. This repositioning can be done concurrently with the at-sea restoration of joint force combat capability. Once the joint force capability has been reconstituted (i.e., the forces and their equipment have been fully restored), the JFC then has further options to reemploy sea-based forces, including projecting power ashore in the same JOA on another axis of entry, or in another role altogether (e.g., stabilization, peacekeeping, etc.).

The JFC has the additional option of rapidly deploying sea-based forces to another JOA. This is advantageous to support responsiveness required by future defense guidance for immediate and rapid response forces. Redeploying the sea-based force allows the COCOM the ability to rapidly reposition and employ a proven joint combat force, i.e., immediate and rapid response forces that have already closed, assembled and integrated. Seabasing provides the responsiveness as directed in defense guidance, to redeploy from one JOA and seize the initiative in another JOA.

888 **Section 4 – LINES OF OPERATION, TASKS, ATTRIBUTES, AND STANDARDS AND**  
889 **CONDITIONS**

890

891 *“We’ve got to include more of a Joint force in everything we do. We have to become*  
892 *fully integrated into Joint warfighting. Our exercises have to be done in a Joint context.*  
893 *Our doctrines have to be developed keeping in mind that we’re going to fight as a member*  
894 *of a Joint team. We should have in mind that we’re developing the force to contribute to*  
895 *the Joint force commander. Our commitment to a capabilities-based Joint force will give*  
896 *combatant commanders the right options in the right place at the right time.”*

897

898

*General Kevin P. Byrnes*

899

*Army Training and Doctrine Command*

900

901 **4.1 Lines of Operation.** The five lines of operation used to organize joint Seabasing are:

902

- **Close** – rapid closure of joint force capabilities to an area of crisis.
- **Assemble** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea-based assets.
- **Employ** – flexible employment of joint force capability to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base.
- **Sustain** – persistent sustainment of joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to decisive combat operations ashore.
- **Reconstitute** – capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capability within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations.

911

912 **4.2 Attributes.** Attributes provide the framework to establish measures of effectiveness for tasks  
913 identified in Annex C. They support the CBA and serve as a common foundation for follow-on  
914 assessment.

915

- **Infrastructure** – the measure of a family of systems and capabilities that provide essential services toward accomplishing the mission. It describes the physical plant, facilities, systems, services, manpower, and skill sets required to support Seabasing operations (i.e., receive, assemble, store, integrate, project, transfer, support, and sustain a designated quantity of the joint force). Infrastructure is a critical cornerstone of

919

920 Seabasing operations. It supports the functional requirements of joint force operations,  
921 e.g., the movement of selected forces and equipment (by air and sea), berthing,  
922 equipment storage, net-centric environment, C2 capabilities, logistics (supply,  
923 sustainment and maintenance), rehabilitation, medical care, etc. The components of  
924 infrastructure are generally fixed sets of systems and capabilities that provide essential  
925 services, but can be configured to adapt to various mission packages.

926 • **Capacity** – describes the maximum degree to which Seabasing operations are able to  
927 receive, store, organize, integrate, project, support, and sustain a designated quantity of  
928 the joint force. It is a key attribute as it determines to some extent the size and the ability  
929 of the JFC to conduct Seabasing operations. Capacity describes the limits of joint force  
930 capabilities that can be supported from the sea base and is driven in large part by the  
931 functional limitations of the Seabasing infrastructure (i.e., volume, weight, radio  
932 frequency spectrum and associated bandwidth, workstations, skill sets, maintenance  
933 capability, etc.). Seabasing operations are scalable; the infrastructure can be configured  
934 to fit the force. Therefore capacity need not be a limiting factor, but must be planned for  
935 when employing a joint force from a sea base.

936 • **Rate** – describes the degree to which Seabasing operations are able to receive, store,  
937 organize, integrate, project, support, and sustain a designated quantity of the joint force  
938 over a period of time under a standard set of conditions. Since speed and responsiveness  
939 are essential elements of successful joint operations, maximizing the rate of Seabasing  
940 capabilities for closure, assembly, employment, sustainment, and reconstitution must be  
941 addressed. The rate of the joint force that flows during Seabasing operations will be  
942 driven in large part by the functional limitations of Seabasing capacity and infrastructure  
943 (e.g., aircraft sortie generation rate and surface throughput rate as driven by  
944 embarkation/debarkation points (air and surface), speed of off-load/on-  
945 load/staging/integration/rehabilitation, etc.). The maximum rate that can be supported by  
946 a given infrastructure is normally fixed. To increase rate, infrastructure must be changed.

947 • **Interoperability** – describes the degree to which Seabasing operations are able to  
948 provide and accept assets and services from other units, systems, and forces, and to  
949 operate these exchanged assets and services together in an effective manner. Joint  
950 Seabasing forces must be able to seamlessly operate with joint and multinational forces.  
951 Seabasing infrastructure should be designed to accommodate US and other forces and

952 still operate effectively at a sustained rate. Future joint standards may need to be  
953 developed to address key interfaces to ensure interoperability.

- 954 • **Survivability** – describes the degree to which Seabasing operations can mitigate effects  
955 of actions that threaten the sea base and designated forces ashore. Survivability depends  
956 on several factors, including the specific numbers and type of threat, acceptable level of  
957 risk determined by the commander, protective measures, training, inherent defensive  
958 capabilities of the sea base and joint force infrastructure vulnerability to damage or  
959 susceptibility to attack. It also includes the capability of Seabasing operations to conduct  
960 protection, including the functions of detect, assess, warn, defend, and recover.
- 961 • **Accessibility** – characterizes the ability of Seabasing operations to project joint force  
962 capabilities throughout a range of changing environmental conditions. The flexibility to  
963 bypass or operate within the physical constraints presented by terrain, hydrography,  
964 weather, depth of operations, and threat is an important attribute of Seabasing operations.  
965 Seabasing must be supportable both day and night, during fair weather or poor.  
966 Furthermore, Seabasing maneuver elements must be capable of conducting operations  
967 across different types of terrain and coastal boundaries in austere conditions to safely  
968 deliver combat forces, supplies and materiel to achieve objectives at varying ranges of  
969 operations. A variety of both surface and air maneuver capabilities supporting Seabasing  
970 operations across the spectrum of operational environments may be needed to provide the  
971 necessary accessibility.

972

973 **4.3 Conditions and Standards<sup>13</sup>**. The overarching conditions and standards for conducting  
974 Seabasing operations are:

- 975 • Project joint combat power from OTH to inland objectives.
- 976 • Conduct operations in all weather, 24/7, through sea state 4.
- 977 • Provide facilities to effect recovery, decontamination, and reconstitution of Chemical,  
978 Biological, and Radiation (CBR) contaminated equipment and personnel.
- 979 • Provide multi-dimensional defense of the sea base.
- 980 • Provide C2 of distributed joint and multinational and coordinate with interagency forces.
- 981 • Provide scalability to enable the JFC to achieve deployment momentum and joint  
982 objectives across a range of military operations.

---

<sup>13</sup> Specific tasks, conditions and standards are identified in Annex C.

- 983 • Provide Joint Logistics Enterprise to sustain joint, multinational and interagency forces.
- 984 • Contribute to joint logistics management.
- 985 • Contribute to joint total asset and in-transit visibility.
- 986 • Employ standardized intermodal packaging across the services.
- 987 • Employ standardized trans-modal interfaces to/at/from the sea base.
- 988 • Integrate relevant intelligence activities (including adversary capabilities, disposition and
- 989 intention) in support of the sea base.
- 990

991 **Section 5 – IMPLICATIONS**

992

993 *"We need to think about Seabasing in a very joint construct and what it does for*  
994 *the entire military structure, and we need to figure out how to invest properly, focus our*  
995 *investment stream so we maximize that advantage."*

996

997 *Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations*

998 *Air Force Magazine, July 2004*

999

1000 **5.1 Implications for National Security.** Our nation's security and continued prosperity is  
1001 highly dependent on international cooperation and trade. However, it has become more difficult  
1002 to precisely predict the worldwide political, social, and security environments in which our  
1003 nation's interests must be preserved. We have traditionally provided forward deployed US  
1004 military force presence to influence regional security, to promote democracy, to respond to  
1005 crises, and to safeguard US interests. However, the changing character of the threats to  
1006 international security and peace are more frequently requiring that US military forces conduct  
1007 operations in areas where host nation support and international cooperation cannot be  
1008 guaranteed. Our inability to accurately predict future security risks and the uncertainty of  
1009 continued global partnerships highlights the need for flexible, agile, and sovereign forces that  
1010 can operate independently, if necessary, to secure US interests. Future Seabasing capabilities  
1011 have great potential to support the successful synchronization, projection and sustainment of a  
1012 full range of joint force capabilities in non-permissive environments where host nation  
1013 cooperation is uncertain or unattainable. Seabasing provides the President and/or the Secretary  
1014 of Defense with feasible, sustainable options for projecting joint military capabilities in many  
1015 parts of the world without having to rely on forward land bases or assurance of international  
1016 cooperation. Joint Seabasing when sufficiently implemented will fulfill an increasingly vital role  
1017 for joint military operations well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

1018

1019 **5.2 Implications for JCIDS and Acquisition.** The ultimate objective of joint concepts is to  
1020 guide the transformation of the joint force so that it is prepared to operate successfully in the next  
1021 10-20 years. JICs such as Seabasing have been developed to describe future joint force  
1022 capabilities to support Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs) that will ultimately impact future  
1023 joint force employment and development. Joint CBAs will shape near-term programming

1024 decisions and science and technology investment, and support the development of far-term  
1025 capability roadmaps.<sup>14</sup> The following capability requirements are highlighted to help focus  
1026 assessments and guide development:

- 1027 • C2 of joint, multinational and multi-agency Seabasing operations requires net-centric  
1028 systems to be interoperable, use common data standards and formats, and support  
1029 connectivity between widely dispersed units operating OTH beyond line of sight.
- 1030 • Seabasing operations call for the development of specific concepts of employment for  
1031 pre-positioning and amphibious ship hulls, high-speed strategic shipping, and joint high-  
1032 speed vessels in Seabasing scenarios, with particular attention as to how hull forms will  
1033 interact and operate to accomplish required operations.
- 1034 • Force Protection and survivability of the sea base and sea-based systems is necessary to  
1035 support the concept. In particular, efforts should focus on the ability to counter threats  
1036 related to ASUW, MIW, IAMD, and ASW.
- 1037 • The distributed nature of Seabasing operations and the desire to synchronize the effects  
1038 of dispersed, highly maneuverable forces increases the requirement for persistent, reliable  
1039 situational awareness down to the unit level, including the need to identify and track  
1040 friendly, enemy, neutral, and unknown contacts.
- 1041 • Seabasing operations call for the capability to provide on-demand, timely, tailored, user-  
1042 defined intelligence to widely dispersed, moving forces airborne, afloat and ashore.
- 1043 • A family of connector platforms supporting high-speed inter and intra-theater/tactical  
1044 connectors (air/surface) will facilitate Seabasing operations to project and sustain joint  
1045 forces operating within and from the sea base. This means potential future development  
1046 of maritime and air vehicles that can operate in austere conditions in other than fixed  
1047 ports and airfields, and can support the capacity, accessibility, and rates required to  
1048 rapidly deploy and sustain joint force capabilities in forward operating areas where secure  
1049 support bases may not be in close proximity to the JOA.
- 1050 • Seabasing operations are highly dependent on the close coordination and synchronization  
1051 of joint and multinational capabilities to provide supporting fires. Fire support  
1052 coordination must be able to support converging, distributed joint/multinational force  
1053 employment over extended operational and strategic distances. Fires supporting  
1054 Seabasing operations must provide sufficient effects, precision, range and quantity to

---

<sup>14</sup> Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan, July 2004

1055 support maneuver of widely dispersed forces operating over extended distances. Joint C2  
1056 must support the coordination and deconfliction of joint and multinational fires  
1057 throughout the JOA.

- 1058 • One of the primary advantages of Seabasing operations is the maneuverability provided  
1059 the JFC. To take full advantage of joint Seabasing capabilities, the JFC must be able to  
1060 conduct joint shaping operations and synchronize effects. Establishment of net-centric  
1061 enabled, sea-based C2 and ISR among joint and multinational forces is essential to  
1062 shaping operations and will allow the JFC to successfully employ globally distributed  
1063 (forward based and CONUS) combat power to neutralize enemy activities and to achieve  
1064 desired effects.
- 1065 • Distributed operations from the sea base call for a joint logistics system that is more  
1066 interoperable and provides for greater connectivity, integration, and centralization.  
1067 Added commonality of parts and materiel will facilitate joint logistics support.
- 1068 • Seabasing operations will be highly dependent upon total asset visibility during transit  
1069 to/from the sea base, within the sea base, and when transferring and supporting selected  
1070 joint forces ashore. Total asset and in-transit visibility will allow the JFC to more  
1071 effectively tailor joint force packages and provide necessary sustainment and logistics  
1072 support within the sea base and to joint/multinational forces operating ashore.
- 1073 • Seabasing projection and sustainment will be highly dependent on at-sea transfer systems  
1074 that facilitate the movement and distributions of personnel, equipment, and supplies  
1075 between platforms and from ship-to-shore. Additionally, systems that provide for added  
1076 maneuverability and storage within the sea base will be crucial to supporting joint force  
1077 assembly and staging.

1078

1079 **5.3 Implications for Joint Experimentation.** “Joint experimentation explores concepts to  
1080 identify joint and component DOTMLPF change recommendations and capabilities needs.  
1081 Experimentation provides insight and understanding of the concepts and capabilities that are  
1082 possible given the maturity of specific technologies and capabilities that need additional research  
1083 and development emphasis.”<sup>15</sup> Experimentation includes: seminars, war games, exercises,  
1084 prototype development, and analysis (e.g., CBA). The following areas are recommended for

---

<sup>15</sup> CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 11 May 2005

1085 future Joint and Service exercises and experimentation: Unified Quest, Unified Course, Sea  
1086 Viking, Sea Trial, Unified Engagement, etc.

- 1087
- 1088 • To support sea-based C2 and joint shaping operations, sea-based C2 and ISR  
1089 experimentation should focus on providing a net-centric environment to facilitate  
1090 interoperability and situational awareness enabling joint and multinational collaborative  
1091 planning, rehearsal, execution, and assessment among widely dispersed, on-the-move,  
1092 units. Emphasis should be placed on supporting real-time situational awareness down to  
1093 a specified tactical unit/platform level to include providing friendly force tracking.
  - 1094 • To enable the rapid deployment and assembly, and persistent sustainment of joint force  
1095 capabilities within the sea base and JOA, sea base connector experimentation should  
1096 focus on developing inter-theater, intra-theater, and tactical connectors that can  
1097 effectively interface with platforms comprising the sea base.
  - 1098 • C2 experimentation supporting joint and multinational fires should focus on the timely  
1099 coordination, integration, synchronization, and deconfliction of fires and strikes.  
1100 Emphasis should be placed on determining the capabilities of the sea base to support  
1101 pertinent planning and operations.
  - 1102 • Fires experimentation should concentrate on the effective synchronization of joint and  
1103 multinational fires to achieve effects and to provide needed volume, range, and precision  
1104 to support a range of combat operations ashore. Emphasis should be placed on  
1105 determining the capabilities of the sea base to support a variety of supporting fires for  
1106 units operating ashore at different distances from the sea base.
  - 1107 • Experimentation for joint logistics should focus on a goal of interoperable, distribution-  
1108 based logistics. This includes systems that support total asset and in-transit visibility of  
1109 joint and multinational forces, equipment and supplies; at-sea delivery and transfer  
1110 systems that facilitate the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to, within,  
1111 and from sea base platforms; selective on-load/off-load of personnel, equipment and  
1112 supplies; and integrated logistics planning and execution.

1113

- 1114 **ANNEX A – Reference Documents**  
1115  
1116 **A. National Security Strategy, September 2002**
- 1117 **B. National Defense Strategy, March 2005**
- 1118 **C. National Military Strategy, 2004**  
1119  
1120 **D. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 30 September 2001**  
1121  
1122 **E. CJCSINST 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)**  
1123  
1124 **F. Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS)**  
1125  
1126 **G. Baseline Security Posture (BSP)**  
1127  
1128 **H. Multi-Scenario Force Deployment (MSFD)**  
1129  
1130 **I. Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan, July 2004**  
1131  
1132 **J. Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC), November 2003**  
1133  
1134 **K. Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC), 24 March 2004**  
1135  
1136 **L. Force Application Functional Concept, February 2003**  
1137  
1138 **M. Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, December 2003**  
1139  
1140 **N. Joint Command and Control Functional Concept, February 2004**  
1141  
1142 **O. Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept, April 2005**  
1143  
1144 **P. Protection Joint Functional Concept, 31 December 2003**  
1145  
1146 **Q. Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 31 December 2003**  
1147  
1148 **R. Force Management Joint Functional Concept (draft)**  
1149  
1150 **S. Joint Force Entry Operations (JFEO) Joint Integrating Concept, 15 September 2004**  
1151  
1152 **T. Joint Undersea Superiority (JUSS) Joint Integrating Concept**  
1153  
1154 **U. Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, 10 January 2005**  
1155  
1156 **V. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Joint Integrating Concept, January 2005**  
1157  
1158 **W. Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept (draft)**  
1159  
1160 **X. Command and Control Joint Integrating Concept (draft)**

1161  
1162 **Y. Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Seabasing, August 2003**  
1163  
1164 **Z. NWDC/MCCDC Enhanced Networked Seabasing (ENS) Concept Paper, August 2003**  
1165  
1166 **AA. JFCOM Joint Seabasing Concept of Operations (draft), July 2004**  
1167  
1168 **BB. Chief of Naval Operations (N703) Seabasing CONOPS (draft), March 2004**  
1169  
1170 **CC. High Speed Connectors Enabling Concept, October 2004**  
1171  
1172 **DD. CJSM 3500.04C Universal Joint Task List, July 2002**  
1173  
1174 **EE. The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept, 07 April 2005**  
1175  
1176 **FF. Nimble Viking 04 War game Outbrief, November 2004**  
1177  
1178 **GG. Oversea Basing Commission Report, 09 May 2005**  
1179  
1180 **HH. JP-1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, November 2000**  
1181  
1182 **II. JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, July 2001**  
1183  
1184 **JJ. JP 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, March 2000**  
1185  
1186 **KK. JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Amended 09 May 2005**  
1187

1188 **ANNEX B – Glossary and Acronyms**

1189

1190 **Accessibility** – the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical constraints presented by  
1191 terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and threat is an important attribute of  
1192 Seabasing operations. Seabasing must be supportable both day and night, during fair weather or  
1193 poor, and maneuver elements must be capable of conducting operations across different types of  
1194 terrain and coastal boundaries in austere conditions to safely deliver combat forces, supplies, and  
1195 materiel to achieve objectives at varying ranges of operations. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1196

1197 **Advanced base** – base located in or near an operational area whose primary mission is to  
1198 support military operations. (Ref: JP 1-02). Advanced bases can include main operating bases  
1199 (MOB), forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security locations (CSL). (Ref: National  
1200 Defense Strategy 2005)

1201

1202 **Air Assault** – movement of friendly assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service  
1203 support) by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key  
1204 terrain. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1205

1206 **Airborne** – troops especially trained to effect, following transport by air, an assault debarkation,  
1207 either by parachuting or touchdown. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1208

1209 **Amphibious Force** – amphibious task force and a landing force together with other forces that  
1210 are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1211

1212 **Austere Environment** – an operational environment with the following characteristics: little or  
1213 no host-nation support; limited pre-existing infrastructure and facilities; immature ports of  
1214 debarkation; inadequate transportation and communications networks; unsophisticated medical,  
1215 supply and other services. It is a particularly difficult environment for conducting operations of  
1216 expeditionary joint forces. Derived to support Seabasing JIC Concept of Operations where little  
1217 or no host nation infrastructure is available to support joint military operations. (Ref: Seabasing  
1218 JIC)

1219

1220 **Austere Port** – an austere port includes characteristics of degraded and minor ports and has one  
1221 or more of the following limitations: loading/discharge capability; cargo handling; pier, quay or  
1222 berth facilities (length and/or water depth); and access. Derived to support Seabasing JIC  
1223 Concept of Operations where seaport of debarkation has limited capabilities. (Ref: Seabasing  
1224 JIC)

1225  
1226 **Battlespace Awareness** – the knowledge and understanding of the operational area's  
1227 environment, factors, and conditions, to include the status of friendly and adversary forces,  
1228 neutrals and noncombatants, weather and terrain, that enables timely, relevant, comprehensive,  
1229 and accurate assessments, in order to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and/or  
1230 complete the mission. (Ref: JP 1-02). The ability to develop shared situational awareness and to  
1231 produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. It is  
1232 knowledge and understanding of all domains. It is the knowledge and understanding of the  
1233 operational environment's characteristics and conditions, friendly, adversary and non-combatant  
1234 disposition and other natural and man-made effects that enable timely, relevant, comprehensive,  
1235 and accurate assessments in support of national and military objectives. (Modified from JP 2-01  
1236 dated Oct 2004)

1237  
1238 **Capability Based Assessment (CBA)** – the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development  
1239 System analysis process that includes the functional area, needs and solution analyses and post  
1240 independent analysis. The results of the CBA are used to develop a joint or initial capabilities  
1241 document. (CJCSI 3170.01E)

1242  
1243 **Capacity** – the sea base's maximum capability to receive, store, organize, integrate, forward,  
1244 support, and sustain a designated quantity of the joint force. The joint force includes personnel,  
1245 their equipment, organic lift (air and surface), organic strike, force protection, intelligence,  
1246 information exchange, command and control, and required logistics (supply, sustainment, and  
1247 maintenance). The sea base's maximum capacity to handle a joint force that flows into and from  
1248 the sea base will be driven in large part by the functional limitations of the sea base infrastructure  
1249 (i.e., volume, weight, bandwidth, workstations, skill sets, maintenance capability, etc.). As the  
1250 sea base will be scalable – that is to say that the infrastructure can be modified to fit the force –  
1251 capacity should not be considered a limiting factor, but used as a planning guideline for a

1252 notional sea base in support joint operations. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes,  
1253 measures and effectiveness. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1254  
1255 **Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)** – a specified information environment that  
1256 enables collaborative processes at will between a select group of individuals or organizations.  
1257 The CIE is a subset of the emerging global information environment. The information backbone  
1258 that provides warfighters the ability to enhance organizational effectiveness, and reduce  
1259 hierarchical, serial planning timelines through information and idea sharing and parallel  
1260 planning. (Ref: Joint Command and Control Joint Functional Concept dated Feb 2004)

1261  
1262 **Connector** – a system, usually surface or vertical, that provides a means of movement for joint  
1263 forces, equipment, materiel, supplies and parts, between two or more distributed units of the sea  
1264 base (in this case units of the sea base may include fixed or unimproved points ashore, including  
1265 pier, beach, landing zone, etc.) An inherent characteristic is an interoperable connection (e.g.,  
1266 interface) between the units that it connects. Derived to support development of Seabasing JIC  
1267 (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1268  
1269 **Counterinsurgency** – Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic  
1270 actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1271  
1272 **Deployment Momentum** – a characteristic of a military campaign that seeks to close gaps  
1273 between arrival of deployed forces, and eliminate operational pauses caused by the need to  
1274 secure lodgments/points of debarkation for follow-on forces. When these gaps are closed,  
1275 deployment momentum is achieved, improving the capability of the force to expand initial  
1276 operations and build combat power sufficiently to assume the offensive throughout the JOA.  
1277 (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1278  
1279 **Distributed Operations** – the conduct of simultaneous non-contiguous operations, distributed  
1280 across a JOA in a synchronized manner. (Modified from JOpsC dated November 2003)

1281  
1282 **Effects Based Planning (EBP)** – an operational planning process to conduct Effects Based  
1283 Operations within RDO. EBP is results-based vice attrition based. EBP closely mirrors the  
1284 current joint planning process, yet focuses upon the linkage of actions to effects to objectives.

1285 EBP changes the way we view the enemy, ourselves, and what is included and emphasized in the  
1286 planning process. EBP uses a flexibly structured battle rhythm that leverages a collaborative  
1287 information environment and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint boards. It employs  
1288 virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of command. (Ref: JFCOM Online Glossary  
1289 July 2005)

1290

1291 **Expeditionary Force** –An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign  
1292 country. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1293

1294 **Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO)** – a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision by  
1295 laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options  
1296 carefully tailored to send the right signal. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the  
1297 various deterrent options available to a commander (such as economic, diplomatic, political, and  
1298 military measures) are implemented into the planning process. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1299

1300 **Focused Logistics** – building sufficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline,  
1301 exercising sufficient control over the pipeline from end-to-end, and providing a high degree of  
1302 certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and  
1303 support will arrive where needed and on time. (Ref: Focused Logistics JFC dated December  
1304 2004)

1305

1306 **Force Application** – the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create the effects  
1307 necessary to achieve assigned mission objectives. (Force Application JFC dated March 2004)

1308

1309 **Forward Operating Base (FOB)** – a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is  
1310 established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training  
1311 and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations  
1312 and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. (Modified from JP  
1313 1-02 to capture air and maritime aspects of a forward operating base)

1314

1315 **Global Strike** – responsive joint operations that strike enemy high value/payoff targets, as an  
1316 integral part of joint force operations conducted to gain and maintain battlespace access, achieve

1317 other desired effects and set conditions for follow-on decisive operations to achieve strategic and  
1318 operational objectives. (Global Strike JIC dated January 2005)

1319

1320 **Humanitarian Assistance (HA)** – operations conducted to relieve or reduce the results of  
1321 natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger,  
1322 or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss  
1323 of property. Assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host  
1324 nation civil authorities or agencies. (Modified from JP 1-02)

1325

1326 **Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)** – a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting  
1327 the forces into the host nation. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1328

1329 **Infrastructure** – the physical plant, facilities, systems, services, manpower, and skill sets  
1330 inherent to the sea base, necessary to receive, assemble, store, integrate, forward, support, and  
1331 sustain a designated quantity of the joint force. The joint force includes personnel, their  
1332 equipment, organic lift (air and surface), organic strike, force protection, intelligence,  
1333 information exchange, command and control capabilities, and required logistics (supply,  
1334 sustainment, and maintenance). In general, infrastructure includes facilities, equipment and  
1335 personnel to support the functional requirements of the sea base: movement of selected forces  
1336 and equipment (including by air and sea), berthing, equipment storage, command and control,  
1337 logistics (supply, sustainment and maintenance), rehabilitation, medical care, etc. The  
1338 infrastructure is generally a fixed set of systems and capabilities, but can be modularized to adapt  
1339 to various mission packages. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes, measures and  
1340 effectiveness. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1341

1342 **Interoperability** – the capability of the sea base infrastructure and joint force to provide and  
1343 accept assets and services from other units, systems, and forces, and to operate these exchanged  
1344 assets and services together in an effective manner. Specifically, interoperability is the sea base  
1345 capability to seamlessly operate with joint and a multinational force, i.e., the sea base  
1346 infrastructure is designed to accommodate different forces, equipment, services, and still operate  
1347 effectively. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes, measures and effectiveness. (Modified  
1348 from JP 1-02)

1349

1350 **Joint Advance Force Operations (JAFO)** – military operations conducted within the Joint  
1351 Operations Area (JOA) by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in order to prepare the objective  
1352 area for the main assault by forcible entry forces. JAFO may include operations to gain and  
1353 maintain local domain dominance. (Ref: JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations  
1354 dated Jul 2001)

1355  
1356 **Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise** – the collective set of common and fully  
1357 integrated joint processes, standards, systems, platforms, C2, people, organizations, shared-  
1358 knowledge, and communication networks established to globally distribute joint personnel,  
1359 equipment, materiel, supplies, repair parts and other joint requirements. (Ref: Draft Joint  
1360 Logistics (Distribution) JIC)

1361  
1362 **Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO)** – Seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face  
1363 of armed opposition. (Ref: JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations dated Jul 2001)

1364  
1365 **Joint Interdependence** – the services’ purposeful reliance on each others capabilities to  
1366 maximize complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities in  
1367 order to achieve the mission requirements of the JFC. (Ref: Draft Capstone Concept for Joint  
1368 Operations (CCJO))

1369  
1370 **Joint Integrating Concept (JIC)** – a description of how the Joint Force Commander 10-20  
1371 years in the future will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve an objective. A JIC  
1372 includes an illustrative CONOPS for a specific scenario and a set of distinguishing principles  
1373 applicable to a range of scenarios. (Ref: CJCSI 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and  
1374 Development System (JCIDS))

1375  
1376 **Joint Operations Area (JOA)** – area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic  
1377 COCOM or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander conducts military  
1378 operations to accomplish a specific mission. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1379  
1380 **Joint Operating Concept (JOC)** – an operational-level description of how the Joint Force  
1381 Commander 10-20 years in the future will accomplish a strategic objective through the conduct  
1382 of operations within a military campaign. The concept identifies broad principles and essential

1383 capabilities and provides operational context for JFC and JIC development and experimentation.  
1384 (Ref: CJCSI 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS))

1385

1386 **Joint Total Asset Visibility** – capability designed to consolidate source data from a variety of  
1387 joint and Service automated information systems to provide joint force commanders with  
1388 visibility over assets in-storage, in process, and in-transit. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1389

1390 **Lines of Operation** – lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space  
1391 in relationship to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its  
1392 objectives. (Ref: JP 1-02)

1393

1394 **Major Combat Operations (MCO)** – large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s)  
1395 that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities,  
1396 and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US National  
1397 Security. (Ref: Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept (MCO JOC) dated September  
1398 2004)

1399

1400 **Net-Centric (NC)** – a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability  
1401 that allows all DOD users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they  
1402 need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from  
1403 those who should not have it. (Net-Centric Environment JFC dated April 2005)

1404

1405 **Operational Net Assessment (ONA)** – a continuously updated operational support tool that  
1406 provides a JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system-of-systems"  
1407 analysis of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and  
1408 information (PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs decision-makers from  
1409 strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks  
1410 that can be considered when applying the full range of diplomatic, information, military, and  
1411 economic (DIME) actions to achieve specific effects on an adversary's will and capability in  
1412 support of national objectives. (Ref: JFCOM Online Glossary July 2005)

1413

1414 **Prime Mover** – the units of the sea base that provide the primary means of movement to/from  
1415 and in the JOA, for joint forces, equipment, supplies and parts. Prime movers also provide

1416 infrastructure to support joint forces and their equipment for a designated period of time. Derived  
1417 to support description of Seabasing CONOPS. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1418  
1419 **Rate** – the sea base's maximum capability to receive, store, organize, integrate, forward, support  
1420 and sustain, a designated quantity of the joint force over a period of time under a standard set of  
1421 conditions. The joint force includes personnel, their equipment, organic lift (air and surface),  
1422 organic strike, force protection, intelligence, information exchange, command and control, and  
1423 the required logistics (supply, sustainment, and maintenance). The rate of the joint force that  
1424 flow into and from the sea base will be driven in large part by the functional limitations of the  
1425 sea base capacity and infrastructure (i.e., aircraft sortie generation rate and surface throughput  
1426 rate as driven by embarkation/debarkation points (air, surface), speed of offload / on load /  
1427 staging / integration / rehabilitation, baud rate, information processing speed, etc.). Rate is not  
1428 normally scalable – that is to say physical infrastructure cannot be modified to support an  
1429 increase in rate. Derived to support Seabasing JIC attributes, measures and effectiveness. (Ref:  
1430 Seabasing JIC)

1431  
1432 **Reconstitute** – those actions that the JFC plans and implements to restore units to a desired level  
1433 of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources.  
1434 Reconstitution operations include retrograde and regeneration. Derived to support development  
1435 of Seabasing Lines of Operation. (Modified from JP 3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment  
1436 Operations)

1437  
1438 **Reduced Operational Status** – Applies to the Military Sealift Command ships withdrawn from  
1439 full operational status (FOS) because of decreased operational requirements. A ship in reduced  
1440 operational status is crewed in accordance with shipboard maintenance and possible future  
1441 operational requirements, with crew size predetermined contractually. The condition of readiness  
1442 in terms of calendar days required to attain FOS is designated by the numeral following the  
1443 acronym ROS (i.e., ROS-5). (Ref: JP 1-02)

1444  
1445 **Sea Base** – the sea base of the future will be an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of  
1446 distributed, networked platforms that enable the global power projection of offensive and  
1447 defensive forces from the sea, and includes the ability to assemble, equip, project, support, and

1448 sustain those forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area. Derived to  
 1449 support synopsis of central idea and CONOPS. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1450  
 1451 **Sea State** – a scale that categorizes the force of progressively higher seas by wave height. In  
 1452 accordance with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and Joint Meteorology and  
 1453 Oceanography (METOC) Conceptual Data Model (JMCDM), sea state is the code that denotes  
 1454 the roughness of the surface of the sea in terms of average wave height. (Ref: Joint Metrology  
 1455 and Oceanography Conceptual Data Model)

1456		
1457	0 – CALM, GLASSY	WAVE HEIGHT = 0 METERS
1458	1 – CALM, RIPPLED	WAVE HEIGHT = 0 – 0.1 METERS
1459	2 – SMOOTH, WAVELETS	WAVE HEIGHT = 0.1 – 0.5 METERS
1460	3 – SLIGHT	WAVE HEIGHT = 0.5 – 1.25 METERS
1461	4 – MODERATE	WAVE HEIGHT = 1.25 – 2.5 METERS
1462	5 – ROUGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 2.5 – 4.0 METERS
1463	6 – VERY ROUGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 4.0 METERS – 6.0 METERS
1464	7 – HIGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 6.0 METERS – 9.0 METERS
1465	8 – VERY HIGH	WAVE HEIGHT = 9.0 – 14.0 METERS
1466	9 – PHENOMENAL	WAVE HEIGHT = OVER 14.0 METERS

1467  
 1468 **Seabasing** – the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-  
 1469 employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support,  
 1470 sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land  
 1471 bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate  
 1472 assured access and entry from the sea. (Ref: Approved at JCS Tank June 2004)

1473  
 1474 **Self-synchronization** – the ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchronize  
 1475 complex warfare activities from the bottom up. The organizing principles are unity of effort,  
 1476 clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement. Self-  
 1477 synchronization is enabled by a high level of knowledge of one's own forces, enemy forces, and  
 1478 all appropriate elements of the operating environment. It overcomes the loss of combat power  
 1479 inherent in top-down command directed synchronization characteristic of more conventional  
 1480 doctrine and converts combat from a step function to a high-speed continuum. (Ref: Network-  
 1481 Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future, VADM Arthur Cebrowski, Proceedings, January 1998)

1482  
 1483 **Seize the Initiative** – assuming offensive actions to confuse, demoralize, disrupt and defeat the  
 1484 enemy. Using knowledge superiority to achieve military advantage over the enemy. (Ref: Joint  
 1485 Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (JP-1) dated November 2000)

1486

1487 **Survivability** – the sea base's capabilities to protect the joint force embarked in the sea base (and  
1488 designated Area of Responsibility (AOR)), and continue accomplishment of the mission, under a  
1489 standard set of conditions and against a designated threat. The joint force includes personnel,  
1490 their equipment, organic lift (air and surface), organic strike, force protection, intelligence,  
1491 information exchange, command and control, and required logistics (supply, sustainment, and  
1492 maintenance). The degree of survivability depends on several factors, including the specific  
1493 numbers and type of threat, level of risk determined by the Commander, protective measures,  
1494 training, and the inherent defensive capabilities of the sea base. Derived to support Seabasing  
1495 JIC attributes, measures and effectiveness. (Ref: Seabasing JIC)

1496

1497 **Unit of Employment (UEX)** – is the primary higher tactical echelon of Army forces. The UEX  
1498 will be a completely modular command and control entity designed to exercise command and  
1499 control over assigned brigades and battalions. The UEX will not have any organic forces beyond  
1500 the elements that make up the headquarters. The UEX may be inserted above another UEX or  
1501 current force division headquarters as a land component headquarters. This capability allows the  
1502 Army to provide the Geographic Combatant Commander (RCC) with the necessary land  
1503 command and control to direct major combat operations involving Army, Marine, and  
1504 multinational formations. (Ref: Draft Army White Paper on UE operations)

1505

1506  
1507**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>AAHSS</b>	Austere Access High Speed Ship
<b>AAR</b>	Air-to-Air Refueling
<b>AASLT</b>	Air Assault
<b>ABL</b>	Airborne Laser
<b>Abn</b>	Airborne
<b>ACA</b>	Airspace Control Authority
<b>ACCE</b>	Air Component Coordination Element
<b>ACE</b>	Aviation Combat Element
<b>AD</b>	Air Defense
<b>AETF</b>	Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force
<b>AF</b>	Amphibious Force
<b>AFFOR</b>	US Air Forces
<b>AFSB</b>	Afloat Forward Staging Base
<b>ALOC</b>	Air Line of Communication
<b>AMEMBASSY</b>	American Embassy
<b>AO</b>	Area of Operation
<b>AOR</b>	Area of Responsibility
<b>APOD</b>	Aerial Port of Debarkation
<b>APOE</b>	Aerial Port of Embarkation
<b>APS</b>	Army Pre-Positioned Stocks
<b>ARFOR</b>	US Army Forces
<b>ARPAC</b>	US Army Forces, Pacific
<b>ASDS</b>	Advanced SEAL Delivery System
<b>ASF</b>	Army Strategic Flotilla
<b>ASW</b>	Anti-Sub. Warfare
<b>ATF</b>	Amphibious Task Force
<b>Atk Avn</b>	Attack Aviation
<b>AWACS</b>	Airborne Warning and Control System
<b>BA</b>	Battlespace Awareness
<b>BCT</b>	Brigade Combat Team
<b>BDA</b>	Battle Damage Assessment
<b>Bde</b>	Brigade
<b>BE</b>	Bomber Element
<b>BLT</b>	Battalion Landing Team
<b>Bn</b>	Battalion
<b>BSP</b>	Baseline Security Posture
<b>C2</b>	Command and Control
<b>C4I</b>	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

<b>C4ISR</b>	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<b>CBA</b>	Capability Based Assessment
<b>CBR</b>	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
<b>CBRNE</b>	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives
<b>CCIR</b>	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
<b>CCOI</b>	Critical Contacts of Interest
<b>CDCM</b>	Coastal Defense Cruise Missile
<b>CE</b>	Command Element
<b>CFACC</b>	Combined Forces Air Component Commander
<b>CFLCC</b>	Combined Force Land Component Commander
<b>CFMCC</b>	Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander
<b>CG</b>	Commanding General
<b>CHAPGRU</b>	Cargo Handling and Port Group
<b>CIE</b>	Collaborative Information Environment
<b>CJFACC</b>	Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander
<b>CJFC</b>	Combined Joint Force Commander
<b>CJFLCC</b>	Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander
<b>CJFMCC</b>	Combined Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
<b>CJIATF</b>	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
<b>CJIOCC</b>	Combined Joint Information Operations Component Commander
<b>CLF</b>	Combat Logistics Fleet
<b>CMOC</b>	Civil Military Operations Center
<b>COA</b>	Course of Action
<b>COCOM</b>	Combatant Command
<b>COIN</b>	Counterinsurgency Operations
<b>COMINT</b>	Communications Intelligence
<b>COMSOF</b>	Commander, Special Operations Forces
<b>CONOPS</b>	Concept of Operations
<b>CONUS</b>	Continental United States
<b>COTP</b>	Common Operational Tactical Picture
<b>CP</b>	Command Post
<b>CRAF</b>	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
<b>CRG</b>	Contingency Response Group
<b>CSAR</b>	Combat Search and Rescue
<b>CSG</b>	Carrier Strike Group
<b>CSOCC</b>	Combined Special Operations Component Commander
<b>CSSE</b>	Combat Service Support Element
<b>CTF</b>	Combined Task Force
<b>CVOA</b>	Carrier Operating Area
<b>DCA</b>	Defensive Counter Air

<b>D-E-S</b>	Deployment – Employment – Sustainment
<b>DLA</b>	Defense Logistics Agency
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DOS</b>	Days of Supply
<b>DOTMLPF</b>	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
<b>DPG</b>	Defense Planning Guidance
<b>DPS</b>	Defense Planning Scenario
<b>DRAT</b>	Disaster Relief Assessment Teams
<b>DSB</b>	Defense Science Board
<b>EEFI</b>	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
<b>EMP</b>	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
<b>EO/IR</b>	Electro-Optic/Infrared
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
<b>ESF</b>	Expeditionary Strike Force
<b>ESG</b>	Expeditionary Strike Group
<b>EUCOM</b>	US European Command
<b>EW</b>	Electronic Warfare
<b>FA</b>	Force Application
<b>FARP</b>	Forward Arming and Refueling Point
<b>FCS</b>	Future Combat System
<b>FDO</b>	Flexible Deterrent Option
<b>FEU</b>	Forty-Foot Equivalent Unit
<b>FIE</b>	Flow-In-Echelon
<b>FIOP</b>	Family of Integrated Operational Pictures
<b>FL</b>	Focused Logistics
<b>FM</b>	Force Management
<b>FOB</b>	Forward Operating Base
<b>FON</b>	Freedom of Navigation
<b>FP</b>	Force Protection
<b>FS</b>	Fighter Squadron
<b>FW</b>	Fixed Wing
<b>GCE</b>	Ground Combat Element
<b>GS</b>	Global Strike
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terrorism
<b>HA</b>	Humanitarian Assistance
<b>HA/DR</b>	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
<b>HALO</b>	High Altitude Low Opening
<b>HNS</b>	Host Nation Support
<b>HPT</b>	High Payoff Target
<b>HQ</b>	Headquarters

<b>HRO</b>	Humanitarian Relief Organizations
<b>HSS</b>	High Speed Sealift
<b>HSV</b>	High Speed Vessel
<b>HUMINT</b>	Human Intelligence
<b>HVT</b>	High Value Target
<b>I&amp;W</b>	Indications and Warning
<b>IAMD</b>	Integrated Air and Missile Defense
<b>IAW</b>	In accordance with
<b>ICD</b>	Initial Capabilities Document
<b>ID</b>	Identification
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>IHA</b>	In-extremis Hostage Rescue
<b>ILP</b>	Integrated Landing Platform
<b>IMA</b>	Intermediate Maintenance Activity
<b>IO</b>	Information Operations
<b>IO/ISR</b>	Information Operations/Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<b>IPB</b>	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
<b>ISB</b>	Intermediate Staging Base
<b>ISO</b>	International Organization for Standardization
<b>ISR</b>	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
<b>JAFO</b>	Joint Advance Force Operations
<b>JBMC2</b>	Joint Battle Management Command and Control
<b>JCDRP</b>	Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan
<b>JCIDS</b>	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
<b>JFACC</b>	Joint Force Air Component Commander
<b>JFC</b>	Joint Force Commander
<b>JFCOM</b>	US Joint Forces Command
<b>JFEO</b>	Joint Forcible Entry Operations
<b>JFLCC</b>	Joint Force Land Component Commander
<b>JFMCC</b>	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
<b>JHLA</b>	Joint Heavy Lift Aircraft
<b>JHSV</b>	Joint High Speed Vessel
<b>JIC</b>	Joint Integrating Concept
<b>JIL</b>	Joint Integrated Logistics
<b>JL</b>	Joint Logistics
<b>JLD</b>	Joint Logistics Distribution
<b>JMCC</b>	Joint Movement Control Center
<b>JMCDM</b>	Joint METOC Conceptual Data Model
<b>JMIC</b>	Joint Modular Intermodal Container
<b>JOA</b>	Joint Operations Area

<b>JOC</b>	Joint Operating Concept
<b>JOpsC</b>	Joint Operations Concept
<b>JRCC</b>	Joint Reception Coordination Center
<b>JSF</b>	Joint Strike Fighter
<b>JSOA</b>	Joint Special Operations Area
<b>JSOAC</b>	Joint Special Operations Air Component
<b>JSOTF</b>	Joint Special Operations Task Force
<b>JSTARS</b>	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
<b>JTF</b>	Joint Task Force
<b>JTF-HA</b>	Joint Task Force – Humanitarian Assistance
<b>JUSS</b>	Joint Undersea Superiority
<b>LCAC</b>	Landing Craft Air Cushion
<b>LCS</b>	Littoral Combat Ship
<b>LOC</b>	Line of Communication
<b>MAGTF</b>	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
<b>MANPADS</b>	Man Portable Air Defense System
<b>MARCENT</b>	US Marine Corps Forces, Central Command
<b>MARFOR</b>	US Marine Corps Forces
<b>MARFORPAC</b>	US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific Command
<b>MCCDC</b>	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
<b>MCM</b>	Mine Countermeasures
<b>MCO</b>	Major Combat Operations
<b>MDSU</b>	Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit
<b>ME</b>	Maneuver Enhancement
<b>MEB</b>	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
<b>MEDEVAC</b>	Medical Evacuation
<b>MEF</b>	Marine Expeditionary Force
<b>METOC</b>	Meteorology and Oceanography
<b>METT-T</b>	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available – Time Available
<b>MEU</b>	Marine Expeditionary Unit
<b>MHE</b>	Materiel Handling Equipment
<b>MIO</b>	Maritime Interdiction Operations
<b>MMA</b>	Maritime Multi-Mission Aircraft
<b>MOG</b>	Maximum on the Ground
<b>MP</b>	Military Police
<b>MPA</b>	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
<b>MPF(F)</b>	Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)
<b>MPG</b>	Maritime Pre-positioning Group
<b>mph</b>	miles per hour
<b>MPS</b>	Maritime Pre-positioning Ships

<b>MSC</b>	Military Sealift Command
<b>MSFD</b>	Multi-Service Force Deployment
<b>NAVCENT</b>	US Navy Forces, Central Command
<b>NAVELSF</b>	Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force
<b>NAVFOR</b>	US Navy Forces
<b>NAVPAC</b>	US Navy Forces, Pacific Command
<b>NC</b>	Net-centric
<b>NEHC</b>	Navy Environmental Health Center
<b>NEO</b>	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
<b>NFS</b>	Naval Fire Support
<b>NGO</b>	Non Government Organizations
<b>NGFS</b>	Naval Gunfire Support
<b>NIPRNET</b>	Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network
<b>nm</b>	nautical mile
<b>NMCB</b>	Navy Military Construction Battalion
<b>NMT</b>	No more than
<b>NOC</b>	Naval Operating Concept
<b>NSE</b>	Naval Support Element
<b>NSFS</b>	Naval Surface Fire Support
<b>NSWTG</b>	Navy Special Warfare Task Group
<b>NTA</b>	Naval Tactical Task
<b>NWDC</b>	Naval Warfare Development Command
<b>OA 04</b>	Operational Availability 2004
<b>OAS</b>	Offensive Air Support
<b>OCONUS</b>	Outside Continental United States
<b>ONA</b>	Operational Net Assessment
<b>OP</b>	Operational Task
<b>OPCON</b>	Operational Control
<b>OPDS(F)</b>	Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (Future)
<b>OPSEC</b>	Operational Security
<b>OTH</b>	Over-the-Horizon
<b>OTM</b>	On-the-Move
<b>PACAF</b>	Pacific Air Force
<b>POD</b>	Point of Debarkation
<b>POL</b>	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
<b>PSYOP</b>	Psychological Operations
<b>PVO</b>	Private Volunteer Organizations
<b>QDR</b>	Quadrennial Defense Review
<b>RCC</b>	Regional Combatant Commander
<b>RGR</b>	Ranger

<b>RHIB</b>	Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
<b>ROS</b>	Reduced Operational Status
<b>RPG</b>	Rocket Propelled Grenade
<b>RSOI</b>	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
<b>RSTA</b>	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
<b>RW</b>	Rotary Wing
<b>SA</b>	Situational Awareness
<b>SAG</b>	Surface Action Group
<b>SAM</b>	Surface to Air Missile
<b>SAR</b>	Search and Rescue
<b>SBCT</b>	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
<b>SCIF</b>	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
<b>SDTE</b>	Swiftly Defeat the Effort
<b>SF</b>	Special Forces
<b>SFOD A</b>	Special Forces Operational Detachment A
<b>SIAP</b>	Single Integrated Air Picture
<b>SIGINT</b>	Signal Intelligence
<b>SIPRNET</b>	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
<b>SLOC</b>	Sea Line of Communication
<b>SOA</b>	Southern Operating Area
<b>SOCOM</b>	US Special Operations Command
<b>SOC PAC</b>	Special Operations Command, Pacific
<b>SOF</b>	Special Operations Force
<b>SOFA</b>	Standard Operating Force Agreement
<b>SP MAGTF</b>	Special Purpose Marine Aviation Ground Task Force
<b>SPG</b>	Strategic Planning Guidance
<b>SPOD</b>	Sea Port of Debarkation
<b>SPOE</b>	Sea Port of Embarkation
<b>SS</b>	Sea State
<b>SSBM</b>	Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
<b>SSN</b>	Nuclear Attack Submarine
<b>STANAG</b>	Standing NATO Agreement
<b>STK</b>	Stryker
<b>STRATAIR</b>	Strategic Airlift
<b>STRATCOM</b>	US Strategic Command
<b>SUW</b>	Surface Warfare
<b>TA</b>	Tactical Task
<b>TAC CP</b>	Tactical Command Post
<b>T-ARS</b>	Auxiliary Rescue and Salvage Ship
<b>TATF</b>	Technical Assistance Task Force

<b>TBMD</b>	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
<b>TCA</b>	Transformational Communication Architecture
<b>TEU</b>	Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
<b>TF</b>	Task Force
<b>TLAM</b>	Tactical Land Attack Missile
<b>TMD</b>	Theater Missile Defense
<b>TR</b>	Tilt Rotor
<b>TRANSCOM</b>	US Transportation Command
<b>TRAP</b>	Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and/or Personnel
<b>TTP</b>	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
<b>UA</b>	Unit of Action
<b>UAV</b>	Unmanned Air Vehicle
<b>UEx</b>	Unit of Employment (Division)
<b>UEy</b>	Unit of Employment (Corps)
<b>UJTL</b>	Universal Joint Task List
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>USAID</b>	US Agency for International Development
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	US Central Command
<b>USPACOM</b>	US Pacific Command
<b>USW</b>	Undersea Warfare
<b>VISA</b>	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
<b>VTC</b>	Video Teleconferencing
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction
<b>WMO</b>	World Meteorological Organization
<b>ZMI</b>	Zone of Military Isolation

**ANNEX C**  
**LINES OF OPERATION, ASSOCIATED TASKS, ATTRIBUTES,**  
**STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS**

**C.1 INTRODUCTION.**

Seabasing capabilities and associated tasks are based on information contained in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the Naval Operational Concept, the Joint Logistics (Distribution) JIC, the C2 JIC, the IAMD JIC, the JFEO JIC, the Joint Undersea Superiority JIC, and the Global Strike JIC, and have been organized into tables<sup>16</sup> using the five overarching lines of operation.

- **CLOSE** – the rapid closure of joint force capability to an area of crisis
- **ASSEMBLE** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea-based assets
- **EMPLOY** – flexible employment of joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base
- **SUSTAIN** – persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore, through transition to decisive combat operations ashore
- **RECONSTITUTE** – the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable sea base for subsequent operations

To assist in identifying general standards, conditions, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance that could be used in assessing Seabasing capabilities and tasks, the following attributes have been defined and used in the tables of this Annex:

- **INFRASTRUCTURE** – the physical requirements and facilities needed to support and sustain joint force capability
- **CAPACITY** – the measure of how much joint force capability can be supported
- **RATE** – how fast things can be accomplished to support joint force capability over a given time under standard sets of conditions
- **INTEROPERABILITY** – the degree to which Seabasing can seamlessly integrate and support joint force capability

- 1541       • **SURVIVABILITY** – the degree to which Seabasing can protect joint force capabilities
- 1542       • **ACCESSIBILITY** – the flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical constraints
- 1543               presented by terrain, hydrography, weather, depth of operations, and threat
- 1544

*Note: Metrics used in defining Standards and Conditions were taken from other documents (e.g. ICDs, JICs, etc), or were derived from the development of the Illustrative CONOP – Annex D. Identified metrics are not intended to be definitive or binding, but are intended only as guides to give a range of values to assist in future capabilities based assessments.*

- 1545
- 1546
- 1547
- 1548       The following general definitions are applicable:
- 1549

### DEFINITIONS

<b>LINES OF OPERATION</b>	Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They <b>connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives</b> .
<b>CAPABILITY</b>	The ability to achieve an <b>effect</b> to a standard under specified <b>conditions</b> through multiple combinations of means and ways to perform a set of <b>tasks</b> .
<b>ATTRIBUTE</b>	A testable or measurable characteristic that describes an aspect of a system or <b>capability</b>
<b>METRIC</b>	A quantitative <b>measure</b> associated with an <b>attribute</b> .
<b>TASK</b>	An <b>action</b> or <b>activity</b> based upon doctrine, standard procedures, mission analysis or concepts that may be assigned to an individual or organization.
<b>CONDITION</b>	A variable of the environment that affects performance of a <b>task</b> .
<b>STANDARD</b>	The minimum proficiency required in the performance of a <b>task</b> . For mission-essential tasks of joint forces, each task standard is defined by the joint force commander and consists of a <b>measure</b> and <b>criterion</b> .
<b>MEASURE</b>	Quantitative or qualitative basis for describing the quality of <b>task</b> performance.
<b>MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE</b>	<b>Measures</b> designed to quantify the degree of perfection in accomplishing functions or <b>tasks</b> .
<b>MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS</b>	<b>Measures</b> designed to correspond to accomplishment of mission objectives and achievement of <b>desired effects</b> .

- 1550
- 1551
- 1552
- 1553

---

<sup>16</sup> Seabasing lines of operation, associated tasks, attributes, standards and conditions for Annex C are located in an associated Excel spreadsheet named Seabasing JIC Annex C Rev 15.xls. This spreadsheet is best viewed when printed on 11 X 17 paper.

1554 **ANNEX D. Illustrative CONOPS**

1555

1556 **Executive Summary.** The requirement for the United States to maintain global freedom of  
1557 action is a consistent theme throughout the National Security Strategy, National Defense  
1558 Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Seabasing consists of a flexible and scalable set of  
1559 capabilities required to support a full range of future military operations, ranging from presence  
1560 and deterrence through stability operations.

1561

1562 A notional Seabasing CONOPS is outlined in the unclassified main body of the JIC, with the  
1563 primary purpose of identifying critical Seabasing capabilities and tasks in an unclassified  
1564 medium, outside of the context of an operational scenario. This annex illustrates detailed  
1565 Seabasing CONOPS<sup>17</sup> for the following scenarios<sup>18</sup>:

1566

- 1567 • **Appendix 1:** MCO-1 SDTE 2012<sup>19</sup>.
- 1568 • **Appendix 2:** MCO-1 Preemptive 2012
- 1569 • **Appendix 3:** Defense Planning Scenarios Illustrative Baseline Security Postures (BSP  
1570 #12) for 2012 Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Operations.
- 1571 • **Appendix 4:** Defense Planning Scenarios Illustrative Baseline Security Postures (BSP  
1572 #18) for 2012 Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN).
- 1573 • **Appendix 5:** Supporting Data and Assumptions.

1574

1575 These CONOPS are addressed in separate classified appendices, with the intent that CONOPS  
1576 for additional scenarios can be added later to expand the portfolio. Future CONOPS should be  
1577 based on approved Defense Planning Scenarios.

1578

1579 CONOPS and capabilities that are specific to a complementary JIC (IAMD, JUSS, JFEO, Global  
1580 Strike, C2 and Joint Logistics (Distribution)) are not discussed in detail within this Annex;  
1581 however, where necessary, these CONOPS discuss the relationship of these JICs to Seabasing.

1582

---

<sup>17</sup> The scope of these CONOPS will be limited to Seabasing. It is understood that the actual COCOM's CONPLAN for each scenario will be much larger in scope and extend beyond Seabasing operations.

<sup>18</sup> HA and COIN scenarios are conducted near-simultaneously with either MCO-1 SDTE or MCO-1 Preemptive.

<sup>19</sup> Incorporating insights from joint Seabasing wargame Nimble Viking 04

1583 Each CONOPS develops Commander's Intent and Planning Guidance, shapes a baseline Course  
1584 of Action (COA), and then traces the five Seabasing lines of operation (Close, Assemble,  
1585 Employ, Sustain and Reconstitute) and supporting tasks through the applicable phases of the  
1586 campaign. Where applicable, branches will be identified to fully explore Seabasing capabilities.  
1587 At the end of each CONOPS, preliminary findings and insights are presented.

1588

1589 The following overarching assumptions are common to all CONOPS discussed in this Annex<sup>20</sup>:

1590

1591 • US Army Unit of Action/Employment Forces will be operationally capable and deployable

1592 • US Air Force AETF forces will be operationally capable and deployable.

1593 • USMC Baseline 2015 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) will be operationally capable  
1594 and deployable.

1595 • By 2015, use of globally sourced forces, along with evolving Flexible Deterrent Options  
1596 (FDO), will affect deployment timelines and permit the COCOM(s) more flexibility.

1597 • Capability to support Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) from forward  
1598 deployed sea-based platforms will be operationally capable and deployable.

1599 • Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Support Concepts will be operationally capable and  
1600 deployable.

1601 • The following future Seabasing systems, platforms and capabilities are available<sup>21</sup>:

1602 ○ Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)

1603 ○ Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)

1604 ○ High-Speed Inter-Theater Connector (Air/Surface)

1605 ○ High-Speed Intra-Theater Connector (Air/Surface)

1606 ○ Selective Onload/Offload

1607 ○ Inter-Ship Trans-load through sea state 4

1608 ○ Total Asset Visibility/In-transit Visibility

1609 ○ Intermodal Packaging

1610 ○ Net-Centric Operational Environment (OTM/OTH) communications,

1611 Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and Enroute Collaborative  
1612 Planning)

---

<sup>20</sup> Unique assumptions for a specific CONOPS are discussed in the applicable appendix.

<sup>21</sup> Programs are listed for illustrative purposes only. Notional capabilities are listed in Appendix 5.

1613

1614 Annex D Appendix 5 includes background information (e.g., forces, force flow, platforms, etc.)

1615 that can support follow-on analyses, assessment, wargaming, and experimentation.

1616