This focus paper is the Third Edition of the Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper on “Combatant Commander (CCMD) Command and Control Organizational Options.” It is written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 and released by the J7 Deputy Director for Joint Training.

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Expanded Scope:
   a) Extended to all CCMDs, not just GCCs (the earlier edition’s focus and title).
   b) Continues discussion on internal organizational options and considerations.
   c) Adds discussion on coordination between CCMDs.

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Terminology and Acronyms: Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used in this paper. They are defined in the glossary to increase readability for the intended audience. This document assumes the reader has an understanding of the joint command relationship terminology defined in Joint Publication 1.

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Accessibility: This and other insight and best practice papers can be accessed on the internet at the Joint Electronic Library site: http://www.jes.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers.aspx

Releasability: Approved for public release.
This focus paper addresses key challenges facing Combatant Commanders in anticipating, determining, and resourcing command and control organizational design. The paper communicates common C2 options and considerations that may assist in the formulation of suitable formations that accomplish the mission while retaining agility and adaptability to respond to the uncertainties and complexities that characterize today’s security environment. The paper also addresses coordination between CCMDs as an increasingly relevant topic to today’s operational environment.

This paper may be beneficial to four main audiences:

- CCMD leadership as they frame problems and consider options.
- CCMD J3s and J5s as they guide the staff in the development of options.
- CCMD planners tasked to generate courses of action in planning or in response to a crisis.
- Subordinate HQs and mission partners to gain a better appreciation of the options.

Four key insights underlie the paper:

- Spend time up front anticipating and determining the most viable and sustainable C2 options.
- Account for six key considerations in determining the appropriate organizational options and HQs: effectiveness, responsiveness, readiness, agility, simplicity, and efficiency.
- Organize to coordinate and collaborate with higher HQ, partners, and subordinates.
- Avoid the tendency to form large subordinate HQs.

This product and other focus papers summarize observations and insights developed by the Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Division (DTD). The DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant and operational-level commanders and staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations and exercises. The DTD observes and compares staff processes among the various joint force headquarters, drafts functionally-based focus papers, refines them through senior flag officer feedback, and then shares them with the operational force and the joint lessons learned and joint doctrine communities. Three related focus papers to this paper are, “Mission Command, Forming a JTF HQ, and JTF C2.” All of these unclassified papers are approved for public release and found on the site noted on the inside front cover.

We want to capture your thoughts, solutions, and best practices as you think, plan, and work your way through operational challenges. Please pass your comments to DTD’s POCs, Mr. Mike Findlay or Jim Derdall. Email: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil.

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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Senior leaders must rapidly respond to regional and transregional threats across a dynamic geopolitical landscape where the problem is continually evolving, alongside stakeholder interests, roles, and approaches. Within this complex landscape and under resource-constrained conditions, commanders and their staffs must anticipate and determine effective, sustainable C2 constructs that are value-added to the joint forces conducting the mission, leverage other mission partners, and remain agile and adaptable to broader AOR mission requirements.

The figure depicts several CCMD-level C2 organizational options and examples used to conduct operations. C2 and determination of the most suitable option remain “commander’s business.”

Key points.

• Spend time up front anticipating and determining viable and sustainable C2 options. Consider all options and their advantages and disadvantages; don’t immediately default to one option. Anticipate C2 needs up front to minimize unnecessary in-stride organizational changes that disrupt established, effective C2 arrangements. Still, change C2 if and when necessary. Adapting C2 with the least change permits more corporate-level focus on the enemy, problem, and mission. The staff can help here; think about C2 early on during planning and assessments.

• Apply six key considerations in C2 design: effectiveness, responsiveness, readiness, agility, simplicity, and efficiency.

• Organize to be able to coordinate and collaborate with higher, adjacent, and subordinates. Consider if and how an option will provide decision space for the CCDR to interact with national-level decision-makers and focus on the broader AOR.
  
  o Remember the global team and how effective command relationships (e.g., supported/supporting, TACON/OPCON) can leverage their capabilities in support of the CCDR and components.
  
  o Define the role, authorities, and responsibilities of the respective HQs relative to their higher, adjacent, and subordinate HQs. Include the CCMD HQ, other CCMDs, Allies and partners, relevant USEMBs, other USG agencies, and subordinate CCMD organizations (i.e., TSOC, Service and functional organizations, JTFs).

• Avoid forming large subordinate HQs; they are not sustainable. Recognize the CCMD’s role in reducing unnecessary burden on these HQs by using mission command effectively and clarifying reporting and battle rhythm requirements. Over-staffed and oversized HQs are often unable to share understanding and purpose, lack a bias for action, and have challenges in communications and delegation of authority. They can also develop extensive and often convoluted staffing by attempting to ensure all are included in the staffing processes. While guarding against the tendency to build large HQs, focus on output and a bias for action, and enable reach-back to the CCMD.
2.0 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

Key challenges:

- **Understanding**: As crises occur, CCMDs must gain an appreciation of the situation, track and inform dynamic political and policy decisions, provide a range of options to national leadership (best military advice or “BMA”), and share with subordinates their visualization and operational approach to the problem – all critical aspects of design. Understanding the situation refers to consideration of the perspectives, roles, interests, and interrelationships of the adversary and all stakeholders (see figures). Understanding has a temporal component and will evolve as a crisis continues and our view of the problem and feasible C2 options also evolves.

- **Strategic direction and interaction**: Senior leaders continually emphasize the pragmatic reality and importance of strategic demand signals from the President, NSC, SecDef, CJCS, and JS in real-world operations. This demand signal can consume a large part of a CCMD’s available bandwidth. Recognize this in the development of C2 constructs and empower subordinate commands to conduct operational level mission assignments so that the CCDR and staff retain the decision space to successfully inform and be informed by national leadership’s pursuit and implementation of viable strategic options.

- **Determining options**: CCMDs need to anticipate and determine a viable C2 structure that enables a specific mission while retaining the agility to plan and execute other emergent and ongoing AOR and functional missions. The C2 structure should be effective, responsive, agile, simple, efficient, and ready. While the CCMDs will develop the probable C2 structure in their campaign and contingency planning settings, they will remedy – or verify – the actual construct during a crisis, to include defining HQ roles, authorities, and responsibilities. The CCMD will plan for engagement with other CCMDs and agencies and delegation of authority to subordinate commanders, set command relationships, determine risk, and prioritize effort and support across their AOR or functional area. They also address other areas beyond the scope of this paper as a part of design and planning including operational approach, deploying required forces, designation of operational areas, HQ organization and processes (e.g., battle rhythm), and assessment measures.

- **Retaining a strategic focus**: In its early stages, an emerging crisis may draw much of a CCMD’s attention away from its broader responsibilities and national-level narratives. The CCMD HQ and its components should be able to accommodate an early focus on the crisis while continuing to engage political leadership and remain attentive to broader mission sets. Any C2 organizational option must both allow for a natural tendency to focus on the crisis while continuing to support the broader strategic and theater requirements.
**Overarching insights:**

- **C2:** The adage “Get your C2 right up front” remains valid; however, we find that C2 and COMRELs will evolve. A key consideration is getting the *initial* C2 right to allow flexibility and adaptability. In determining C2 understand the continually evolving nature of:
  - The USG role relative to international (and as appropriate, host nation) responses.
  - The US military (and CCMD) role relative to the USG whole-of-government approach.
  - The CCMD role relative to other DOD organizations (e.g., other CCMDs and CSAs)
  - Ongoing and anticipated missions and resources.

- **Global Integration.** Any C2 and HQ organizational option must account for the transregional and multi-domain nature of operations. Today’s “battlespace” is more extensive than any single AOR or domain. The concrete black lines that traditionally defined AORs are much more dotted than solid today – and superimposed by the cyber and space domains. Each CCMD must adapt its organization to operate with the other CCMDs. Anticipate multiple, shifting, and simultaneous supported and supporting relationships and increased command and staff level coordination with other CCMDs. We are seeing increased use of liaison and planning elements to facilitate this coordination.

- **The CCMD HQ role:** The CCMD continues to anticipate and set conditions for subordinates. At times it may retain necessary authorities and functions such as target development and validation authorities. Preservation of these responsibilities may be based on the mission and initial capability limitations of subordinate HQs due to manning or experience. This common practice is often overlooked in a crisis. Codify specifics of retained authorities in establishing directives.

- **Plan for C2 changes:** Anticipate transitions and changes to C2 constructs to retain agility and avoid “shooting behind the duck.” Consider all C2 options as part of COA development, analysis, and recommendation. Ensure planners address this in both deliberate and crisis action planning. Review effectiveness of the construct periodically during execution.

- **Command Relationships:** Time spent up front determining the most appropriate COMRELs that delineate the roles and authorities of the various subordinate HQs will pay dividends during execution and transitions. Establishing clear command relationships at successive echelons helps ensure synergy and achieve unity of effort. Establishing directives should delineate specific authorities and limitations of OPCON, TACON, and support relationships. [See Mission Command and JTF C2 focus paper]

- **Interagency and Multinational implications:** We’ve observed the value and challenges of a whole-of-government(s) approach in advancing national interests as the military works by, with, and through many mission partners and stakeholders. (Note that not all stakeholders may be mission partners.) Our joint force routinely operates in support of U.S. Ambassadors and lead federal agencies. We recognize the power of multinational operations. However, we have also seen the challenges of coordination, synchronization, and information sharing with our interagency and multinational partners. Any C2 option needs to be able to operate within this paradigm. Direct, resource, and enforce a coalition network.

- **Training and Exercise Implications:** This all reinforces the need for exercise programs that:
  - Replicate the complexity and ambiguity of the trans regional, all-domain environment.
  - Stress realistic interaction with CJCS, SecDef, JCS, JS, OSD staff, and other CCMDs.
  - Operate within resource constraints.

Observation:
USCENTCOM reassessed its C2 construct in 2014 based on the ISIS threat and established CJTF-OIR.
o Demand agility, adaptability, and coordination with mission partners.
o Provide feedback on the efficiency and effectiveness of potential C2 options.
o Exercise and assess the readiness of the prospective headquarters to perform missions.
3.0 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. The examples noted in the executive summary highlight the need to develop considerations to anticipate and understand C2 challenges. These reflections inform course of action development, mission analysis, and guide decisions regarding C2 options and degree of empowerment to the respective HQs. CCMDs and their staff note the need for a structure that anticipates and considers other relationships and transitions between phases, military HQs, USG lead federal agency mission partners, and US or international HQs and host nations. We’ve observed confusion in understanding the roles and responsibilities of the various HQs when an anticipatory mindset focused on transitions and C2 is absent. Commander involvement coupled with component input pays off.

CCMDs all share the observation that the determination of the C2 construct is not a singular activity but rather just one of several key design and planning decisions. These include (in our words): understanding the environment, framing the problem, providing a range of options to national leadership, developing a strategy to support the plan of action desired by the National Command Authority, determining an operational approach, defining the mission, gaining the necessary forces, assessing the C4I implications, and then determining the optimal C2 option through which to employ the forces.

Joint Publication 1 addresses joint command and control principles stating: “Component and supporting commands’ organizations and capabilities must be integrated into a joint organization that enables effective and efficient joint C2. The C2 structure is centered on the JFC’s mission and CONOPS; available forces and capabilities; and joint force staff composition, capabilities, location, and facilities. The JFC should be guided in this effort by the following principles - simplicity, span of control, unit integrity, and interoperability.” These C2 principles provide a rational set of guiding thoughts that many CCMDs incorporate into their planning.

In addition to the principles JP-1 has offered, we’ve observed several considerations used by CCMDs as they determine a viable C2 approach in response to a crisis. These are based on their responsibility to provide national leadership with a range of viable military options, their theater-strategic role, and multiple ongoing mission requirements in the AOR. In addition to the traditional COA validity screening criteria, applicable considerations have proven to be effectiveness, responsiveness, readiness, agility, simplicity, and efficiency of the relevant HQs (see figure). These considerations are not independent of each other. Satisfying one concern may require a tradeoff with another consideration. However, we believe they collectively portray important considerations that may be used to analyze and decide on the most appropriate and resilient option.

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<th>Considerations</th>
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<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong>: Does the option enable accomplishment of the mission? Can it set conditions and provide value to subordinates?</td>
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<td><strong>Efficiency</strong>: Does the option allow for efficiency in terms of force structure and HQ manning in today’s resource-constrained world?</td>
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• **Effectiveness:** Does the option enable the accomplishment of the mission? Will it provide value to subordinates? Options may favor standing HQs with mature intelligence, planning, targeting, and operations staff.

• **Responsiveness:** Can the option be executed within mission time constraints? This consideration also favors use of standing organizations – such as the Service and functional component HQs, individual Service forces, or the TSOC options that can rapidly assume command and control of response forces.

• **Readiness:** Does the option account for the readiness, capability, and capacity of the designated HQ to conduct the mission? The designated HQ must be ready to assume the responsibilities organic to the level of C2 they are assigned: readiness includes organizing, manning, training, and equipping requirements. Capacity is a function of experience, capability, endurance of the HQ, span of control, and an understanding of supporting enablers such as special operations, space, and cyber mission forces. These all have implications for the HQ’s ability to execute the mission set.

• **Agility:** Does the option enable flexibility and agility for the Combatant Command, for potential mission changes, and for the joint force? This consideration includes supporting the CCMD’s theater-strategic stance and flexibility to meet current and emergent functional or AOR requirements and operational-level flexibility for current and future operations (i.e., branch and sequels) in the operational area.

• **Simplicity:** Does the option allow for ease in understanding the roles of HQs and relationships among mission partners? This is a significant consideration in today’s complex and uncertain environment. CCMDs recognize the benefit of a simple C2 construct coupled with clear support command relationships and theater-wide priorities. Several commands note the value of contingency planning, tabletop exercises, and rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills before a crisis to think through potential options and increase understanding of roles and responsibilities.

• **Efficiency:** Does the option allow an efficient force structure and HQ manning in a resource-constrained world? This reflection is increasingly more important as we posture globally across all domains to defend national interests.

**Insights:**

• C2 is a critical upfront decision made by CCMDs to set conditions for success while retaining agility. Consider all options within an interagency, multinational, and DOD aspects.

• C2 should be one of the key distinguishing components in the courses of action developed by planners. This element applies to both deliberate and crisis action planning and to branch and sequel planning during execution.

• Anticipate C2 constructs and associated transitions to avoid “shooting behind the duck.”

• C2 is commander’s business. Consider assigning the duty for anticipating challenges to a specific individual; some commanders focus a flag officer on it.

• Modify doctrinal command relationships where necessary. Suppose a subordinate commander requires the authority to reorganize forces, but cannot execute the full range of OPCON responsibilities. In that case, an option could be to assign that commander TACON of subordinate forces plus the selective authority to reorganize them [See JTF C2 Focus Paper].

• Consider specifying command relationships with supporting combat support agencies at the CCMD and subordinate command levels.

• Codify COMRELs in instructions, orders, or establishing directives.
4.0 SERVICE AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT OPTIONS.

CCMDs may conduct operations through their Service component commanders and functional component commanders if and when established.

Theater Service components are permanent organizations responsible for Service-specific functions including administration, personnel support, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations. Service component commanders normally retain their Service component responsibilities and authorities, concurrent with additional responsibilities and authorities they may assume due to CCMD C2 requirements. Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, including clear and simple command lines. This arrangement is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organization of Service components.

Functional components are normally established to gain unity of effort within a domain. Not all CCMDs have standing functional components. CCDRs may establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Per Joint Publication 5-0, “The commander has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional components, and subordinate joint commands... Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. These staffs should be organized and trained prior to employment to be efficient and effective, which will require advanced planning.” These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command is a primary consideration. An established functional component commander will normally retain that commander’s Service Component Title 10 responsibilities. This system can be a significant challenge if not planned for and exercised.

Some CCMDs leverage the functional component C2 construct for execution (see the rationale in the text box). Key advantages of the functional component model are simplicity and responsiveness due to their existing organizational structures, developed AOR understanding and relationships, and relationships with the CCDR, staff, and regional partners. Additionally, this model enables the CCMD to retain a high degree of agility to rapidly shift focus and supporting capabilities from one mission set to another. However, most Service components are minimally manned to address Service Title 10 activities; they can rapidly become stretched if also tasked with functional component responsibilities.

Examples

- Service component: USMARFORPAC (2013) Empowered as a supported commander for FHA supporting the Philippines after typhoon Haiyan.
- Functional component: USCENTCOM CFLCC (OIF 2003). Supported the attack north into Iraq. Was challenged with maintaining service component AOR-wide Title 10 responsibilities across the AOR.
- Theater JFACCs and USCYBERCOM’s components.

A GCC Senior Leader’s Perspective

- One needs “to be able to command and control multiple concurrent contingencies throughout the AOR in peace, crisis, and war with a reduction in CCMD and Component HQ strength, small number of available mission ready JTF HQs, and limited force structure.
- Need to be able to rapidly transition from peace to crisis to war without reliance on moving bodies or relying on individual augmentation or forming of HQ.
- This may drive a move away from discrete JTF HQ-centered C2 solution sets toward a permanent Functional Componency C2 construct driven by limited resources and necessary efficiencies.” [Note – this is one perspective]
When using this option, we find the CCMD must ensure three key actions:

**Ensuring synergy at lower echelons** is an essential requirement within the functional model (see figure). Absent attachment of forces and delegation of OPCON or TACON (such as with a JTF), some may argue that the functional component construct doesn’t encourage synergy of tactical level actions. Conversely, many believe this approach can achieve this level of synergy given:

- CCDR assurance / direction to ensure the various supported functional commanders (and their subordinates) can count on secure access to allocated supporting capabilities.
- Delineation of subordinate operational and tactical level “supported commanders” by the respective subordinate commanders.
- Direction that operational and tactical “supporting commanders” will interact with their counterparts at the operational and tactical level in a “direct support-like” relationship.
- Increased awareness by operational and tactical HQ on potential enabling joint capabilities that can help with mission accomplishment. This enhancement requires joint training, not just Service-level training.
- Horizontal integration at all levels to increase synergy (requires liaison at echelon).

**Priorities of effort.** The sharing of understanding, intent, risk, and priorities of effort across mission sets can assist the components to best internally prioritize and allocate their unique capabilities to support the CCDR’s Intent. The key here is the recognition that a subordinate’s priorities of effort may not be identical to the higher commander’s. For example, a SOF component may better focus on specific tasks based on its capabilities, while the maritime component may prioritize differently and allocate its forces against other, more maritime-relevant priorities, all within higher’s intent. An observed best practice among component commands is horizontal collaboration to best develop respective prioritization of effort and force allocation. This approach facilitates commands to meet each other’s initial requirements rather than waiting for detailed direction and approval from the higher commander. This internal “self-regulation” (as one GCC termed it) promotes bias for action and harmony among components, thereby enabling units to operate at the speed of the problem.

**Resourcing** the functional components with joint/other component expertise. One Combatant Command has directed other components to assist in manning of critical functional components to enable that component to think jointly to retain coherence of actions. Resourcing in crisis and conflict can be anticipated through thought-out and approved joint manning documents.

**Insights:**

- Consider the Service or functional component C2 options, in conjunction with traditional supported-supporting command relationships with other components, due to their potential for efficiency, simplicity, and responsiveness, especially in today’s environment of limited resources.
- Provide clear CCMD-level intent and priorities of effort to empower decentralized action. One CCMD empowered its main effort to use a daily Supported Commander Action Message
(SCAM) that outlined specific requirements and deliverables for the supporting players within the CCDR’s higher level direction and priorities.

- Service component HQs may face capacity challenges to perform functional component C2 roles while fulfilling their Title 10 responsibilities simultaneously. Think through resourcing. Leverage other units’ capabilities and expertise to stay lean.
- Assess and mitigate the risk of selecting a Service or Functional component for C2 of one specific mission based on the likelihood of disrupting Service-specific and operational responsibilities.
A subordinate unified command (also called a sub-unified command) provides an established joint organization subordinate to the CCMD to employ forces. CCMDs may establish sub-unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis when authorized by SecDef through the CJCS. A sub-unified command may be established for a geographical area (e.g., United States Forces Korea – USFK and United States Forces Japan - USFJ) or a functional basis (e.g., the Theater Special Operations Commands – TSOCs). Commanders of sub-unified commands exercise OPCON of assigned forces, and normally also of attached forces. [See JP 3-0]

Established sub-unified commands provide effective options for the exercise of C2. They have established roles and relationships, and understand their respective establishment terms (e.g., ROK, Japan, and special operations using the examples above). They are relatively permanent organizations. However, their C2 capability may be limited to a defined mission set (for example – USFJ is not structured or manned to conduct C2 full spectrum operations.)

We have not observed sub-unified commands established in response to a crisis (recalling the earlier description “established to conduct operations on a continuing basis”). However, while not officially designated as such, many would note that USF-I and USFOR-A were very similar to sub-unified commands. Taking years to mature, both commands were established to conduct operations on a continuous basis in a geographic area. In each case, CENTCOM had to clearly delineate authorities, particularly regarding Service-specific matters. For example, delineating Service component Title 10 responsibilities relative to an entity such as USFOR-A in Afghanistan could have potentially been an area of confusion for the Service components.

A TSOC is a functional sub-unified command under COCOM of SOCOM and OPCON to a CCMD. It is a proven organizational option through which a CCMD can employ forces. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization capable of conducting broad continuous full spectrum special operations. It is the primary mechanism for a CCMD to exercise C2 over SOF. SOF are rapidly deployable, have operational reach, and do not constitute irreversible policy commitments. They often have a presence throughout the AOR, have well-established relationships with the CCMD, US military and interagency mission partners, and the various regional military forces in the AOR. However, the TSOC HQ has a relatively limited capacity to direct large-scale conventional operations.

**Insights:**
- Sub-unified commands exemplify the considerations of simplicity and responsiveness to conduct operations within their assigned and relatively permanent mission sets.
- Consider the potential significant capacity shortfalls in directing a non-warfighting focused sub-unified command to respond to a crisis.
- Recognize and leverage the proven capability of the TSOC as a viable C2 option.
**6.0 SINGLE-SERVICE FORCE AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL FORCES OPTIONS.**

Many small to medium crises can be resolved by directly employing a Single-Service force HQ (or specific operational force) that is directly subordinate to the CCDR, normally in an OPCON command relationship.

The CCDR may choose to designate command authority to the commander(s) of a Single-Service force (e.g., task force, task group, or MAGTF) or specific operational force (e.g., SOF for a special operations mission), which, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, may be the most responsive option for the CCDR. In addition, the commander will normally assign missions requiring a Single-Service force to a Service Component Commander, however the CCDR may choose this option to directly command and control these forces due to potential urgency of the situation.

We have observed merit in both of these options. Subordinate HQs organized under these options are normally designated as a Supported Command and therefore can leverage the capabilities of the broader set of mission partners without the need to be designated a joint headquarters with its associated forming challenges. Supporting commanders can mitigate the potential lack of joint expertise in the designated Service or operational force HQ by deploying liaison elements to assist the Service or SOF HQ to better understand and access their respective capabilities. The CCMD HQ may likely augment the HQ with subject matter expertise and capabilities (e.g., planners, public affairs, logistics, communications, and intelligence).

**Insights:**
- The subordinate HQ may not be experienced in leveraging the capabilities of the full array of mission partners. This deficit may require significant augmentation or focused support by the CCDR.
- Augment the HQ with subject matter expertise and liaison elements to enhance capabilities.
- Balance benefit of exercising command authority directly through these types of HQs with the associated burden and limiting of flexibility for the CCDR HQ.
- Think through the degree of authority and control the CCDR will retain over a specific crisis response versus how much to delegate to these subordinate HQ.
- Service-specific Title 10 functions remain Theater Service Component responsibilities.

**Example**

- As a Single-Service Force, 3d MEB (2013) while supporting USAID/OFDA, assisted the Government of the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan. 3d MEB was subordinate to III MEF and USMARFORPAC and later transitioned to JTF 505 with III MEF as the core HQ.
7.0 JTF OPTION.
A major benefit of the JTF option is its likely single mission focus and ability to closely integrate forces in the objective area. A JTF is typically delegated significant authority to execute the mission, often within a dynamic and challenging political environment. The JTF Commander is normally designated as the supported commander within an assigned JOA. The JTF option provides the CCMD freedom to maintain an AOR-wide focus through deliberate delegation of authority to the JTF commander while emphasizing a common understanding of the situation and problem.

A JTF – often a coalition HQ – may be established on a geographical or functional basis. When DOD Title 10 forces and National Guard operating under Title 32 or State Active Duty are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities within the United States, a dual-status commander is the usual C2 arrangement.

When direct participation by departments other than DOD is significant, the establishing authority may designate the JTF as a joint interagency task force (JIATF). This designation might typically occur when the other interagency partners have primacy and legal authority, while the joint interagency task force provides supporting capabilities, such as for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. This designation does not infer any form of DOD authority over those other departments but rather emphasizes the military role as part of a whole-of-government approach. Some long-standing JIATFs such as JIATF-South have MOAs or other documents agreed upon by the relevant agencies that define their member’s roles, responsibilities, and relationships. These JIATFs normally take years to develop and have clearly defined authorities and interagency staffing.

There are several sourcing options for a JTF HQ. A CCMD Service Component, Service HQ (e.g., Army corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet, Marine Expeditionary Force), and designated SOF HQs including a TSOC can form the core of a JTF HQ. CCDRs and force providers may also staff the HQ through joint individual augments. CCDRs are responsible for designating and verifying the readiness of designated HQs to establish, organize, and operate as a JTF HQ.

Many commands opt to stand up a JTF from either in-theater forces or CONUS in response to a crisis. JTF HQs may have significant forming challenges, especially in a no-notice crisis response scenario. A newly formed JTF HQ may not possess the same degree of AOR understanding and developed relationships as the Theater Service and Functional Component Commands, especially if they are sourced from outside the AOR. Some may be further challenged with understanding the dynamic strategic environment as they form, plan, and conduct operations. They may also have manning, equipping, and training challenges, delaying their forming and C2 capability. New JTF HQs will also likely be challenged with receiving and commanding subordinate forces, and understanding and leveraging supporting force capabilities – all while forming.

**Insights:**
- Consider using the JTF / CJTF option due to its single mission focus and ability to closely integrate forces to accomplish the mission.
- Balance the benefits of the JTF option against four potential challenges:

**Examples**
- JTF-South in Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama 1989) Core of JTF HQ was XVIII Airborne Corps operating directly under USSOUTHCOM. Success of mission was facilitated by carefully defined objectives, meticulous planning, and focused training.
- JTF-Leeward Islands. Disaster assistance.
- Availability of personnel and other resources to form an additional HQ.
- Time and resources required to form, receive personnel, and achieve operational capacity.
- Limits to CCDR agility to rapidly shift forces to other emergent challenges in the AOR.
- Potential new seams in command and control (across components), and battlespace geometry (for example between a theater of operations and a joint operations area).

- Treat the JTF as a new entity in terms of authorities, responsibilities, requirements, and capabilities. It is not the HQ from which its commander and core staff were derived.

- Mitigate forming challenges through preparations across the man, train, and equip spectrum.
  - Develop JTF battle staff SOPs with specified billets, roles, responsibilities, and procedures to fall in on if established. These SOPs will assist and shorten the HQ stand up time if established.
  - Tailor mission-focused training and exercise programs.
  - Leverage the JS J7 training and coaching capability, specifically the Deployable Training Division (authors of this paper). See also the “Forming a JTF HQ” focus paper by DTD.
  - Leverage functional and regional subject matter expertise augmentation, e.g., JECC or CCDR personnel (for example INDOPACOM’s Deployable JTF HQ Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) of HQ-sourced battle-rostered personnel).
8.0 PHASING OF OPTIONS.
At times the best C2 option may not be immediately apparent or feasible for a variety of factors. Thus we frequently see a phasing of options. CCMDs often use an existing HQ to direct initial operations as a "first response," combining a concurrent alert and stand-up of a follow-on replacement HQ (e.g., JTF, component HQ, or CCMD Forward HQ) in the event that the required scope of response grows over time. This approach is a typical scenario for no-warning, natural, or man-made disasters. Phasing allows the follow-on HQ time to form while leveraging the initial HQ’s immediate response capabilities, understanding of the AOR, and developed relationships. The stand-up and preparation of the follow-on HQ can also be deliberately shaped by feedback from the ongoing operation and continuing CCMD design and planning results. This “phased” approach to C2 options allows the initial crisis response HQ to focus on near-term actions while the follow-on HQ focuses on sequel or follow-on phase requirements and planning.

Insights:
- Consider if the initial speed of response is important, and whether or not you expect an extended mission posture.
- Delineate planning focus of the different HQs. Anticipate and plan for transition.
- Consider tasking initially selected HQs to provide key personnel augmentation to subsequent HQs. This order could include the deployment of a CCMD Forward HQ where necessary.

9.0 MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY CONSIDERATIONS.
Any organizational option must be able to readily plug into the broader interagency and multinational approach. As noted in PDD-1, the National Security Council (NSC) is the principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies to develop and implement national security policy. In many cases, a lead federal agency may be designated (e.g., DOS, USAID/BHA, DHS/FEMA, DOJ/FBI); in other cases, POTUS may elect to locate de facto coordination responsibilities at the National Security Staff and National Security Council level due to the complexity or dynamic nature of the situation.

The CCDR is responsible for setting the conditions for success for their component and subordinate commands in gaining unity of effort at the operational level. This includes leveraging the CCMD’s established networks and relationships on behalf of CCMD components and subordinates. CCMDs ensure vertical synchronization of interorganizational coordination between HQ and subordinate elements, as well as horizontal synchronization among components and subordinates. This collaboration often warrants increased attention.

The designated operational-level commander is responsible for coordination and cooperation with the relevant interagency and multinational mission partners. This approach requires expertise and relationship-building, coupled with developed procedures for inclusion in partners’ operational-level decision-making.

Insights:
- Understand CCMD, JS, and OSD respective roles and interests for NSS/NSC interaction.
- Be prepared to take the initiative to gain unity of effort at theater strategic and operational levels.
- Clarify authorities and responsibilities for coordination with interorganizational partners.
- Ensure respective HQs have the authority, expertise, capability, and capacity to interact at the appropriate levels with DOD, interagency, and multinational partners.
10.0 COORDINATION BETWEEN COMBATANT COMMANDS.

Today’s transregional and all-domain challenges require significant coordination across CCMDs. This coordination goes both ways, from supported to supporting in terms of identifying required support, and from supporting to supported in terms of how they can support. Each CCMD must consider how it coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes operations. Each FCC (GCC in USSPACECOM’s case) coordinates directly with other CCMDs and have physical liaisons to help coordinate, plan, and even synchronize operations. CCDRs rely on the FCC elements for coordination. There are few liaisons established at the FCC HQ by other CCMDs. For example:

- USSOCCOM has Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) assigned at the GCCs.
- USSTRATCOM and USTRANSCOM have liaison teams at the GCCs.
- USCYBERCOM has Cyber Operations Integrated Planning Elements (CO-IPEs) to GCCs.
- USSPACECOM has developed a Joint Integrated Space Team (JIST) as its liaison element.
- Both USCYBERCOM and USSPACEFORC are considering establishment of Components at the GCCs.

Challenges:

- **Adapting to the increased importance of actions in the cyber and space domain.** No longer is conflict restricted to a single geographic or functional domain. Today we see a likelihood for early competition and conflict in the space, cyber, and the information environment. These domains have implications for how CCMDs internally plan and execute, and how they incorporate the expertise, recommendations, and capabilities of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM. One key area is in ensuring clarity in who is responsible for gaining additional cyber and space authorities and decisions (for example – is it the regional GCC or USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM) Related is the appropriate vetting of the requirement with the battlespace owner (the regional GCC).

- **Direct coordination.** The amount of necessary internal CCMD planning and coordination coupled with coordination with the NCR may reduce the inclination to reach out to supported and supporting CCMDs. We find CCDRs and their senior staff directors counter this by scheduling regular sessions directly between CCMDs and by participating in JCS/JS venues, using both virtual coordination and physical liaisons at other HQs.

- **Terms of Reference for planning and liaison elements.** As with other liaison elements, a gaining CCMD may assume a degree of ownership over planning and liaison elements from other CCMDs. The sending CCMD (e.g., USCYBERCOM) is responsible for defining the relationship. Clarity is paramount. For example, contemplate if whether the CO-IPE would be considered a forward representative (i.e., a personal representative of the CCDR who can speak for the CCMD) or an extension (i.e., they are part of a CCMD HQ staff and perform inherent HQ functions such as planning)? This relationship can be further exacerbated when the liaison element comes from a sending CCMD’s subordinate Service HQ or CCFHQ. We have seen confusion whether the liaison and planning element represents the FCC or one its components, and whether they support the CCDR’s planning or are simply a conduit to the planning base inside the FCC. This situation could also apply to the SPACE JISTs.

- **Reporting.** Responsibilities for liaison elements can be blurred. Liaison elements can assist and highlight reporting, but reporting responsibilities remain commander and staff responsibilities. Commanders should continue to exchange dialogue, while the JOCs and staff sections retain direct reporting and coordination responsibilities. Recommend discipline in the use of liaison elements.
**Insights:**
- Ensure two-way communications between CCMDs.
- Direct staff directors to coordinate with their counterparts in other CCMDs.
- Use, but do not insert, liaison elements between commanders and staffs.
- Clarify routes for gaining additional cyber and space authorities.
- Codify duties of liaison elements – foremost as representatives of sending commanders.
- Codify ownership of liaison elements within the sending command. Clarify if they speak on behalf of the CCDR or a component.
11.0 CONCLUSION.

**Summary:** C2 is clearly a vital upfront focus area of CCDRs to set conditions for successful operations. We continually see the importance of critical analysis and decisions on C2 organizational options and subsequent assessment for ensuring continued effectiveness. The C2 organizational options introduced in joint doctrine and discussed here should be one of the primary distinguishing elements of the courses of action developed by CCMD planners for decision.

The considerations introduced in this paper are intended to help a CCMD staff to analyze the many different C2 organizational options that a CCDR may employ, as the command supports broader USG and DOD efforts. These are not the only considerations, but may help identify the option that best enables mission success.

**Insights:**
- Spend time up front anticipating and determining the most viable and sustainable C2 options.
- Apply six key considerations – effectiveness, responsiveness, readiness, agility, simplicity, and efficiency to determine the appropriate organizational design and HQ option.
- Define roles and authorities of relevant HQs relative to higher HQs and mission partners.
- Anticipate transitions and associated C2 constructs to avoid “shooting behind the duck” in the development of C2.

**Training and Exercise Implications:** A superior training and exercise program will provide quality feedback on CCMD OPLANs and CONPLANs, and can help increase both readiness and capacity of the relevant joint and Service HQs for the C2 options noted in this paper. Exercise objectives should directly support both plan requirements and specific HQ readiness requirements. They should also stress the NCR-driven dialog demands on the CCMD.

**Considerations:**
- Ensure your exercise division works with other J-Directors to craft exercises that directly correlate to plans and readiness requirements. Directly link exercise and training objectives to real-world readiness, both of US forces and regional partners (e.g., the building partner capacity aspect).
- Analyze cost/benefit to derive a recommended exercise program that achieves the greatest operational and strategic risk reduction within budget considerations.
- Use exercises to assess and validate planned C2 organizational options, challenge planning assumptions, and identify potential required transitions to other C2 constructs. Consider global integration and all-domain aspects in exercises.
- Use exercises to increase readiness and assess capabilities of the relevant operational headquarters, both joint and Service HQs, to execute or support the mission.
- Leverage senior leader seminars and tabletop exercises to enrich understanding and identify challenges for subsequent analysis in exercises and incorporation into plan revisions.
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### Glossary
#### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>BHA</td>
<td>Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>CO-IPE</td>
<td>Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning Element</td>
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<td>COMREL</td>
<td>Command Relationship</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept of Operation Plan</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Combat Support Activity</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DJTFAC</td>
<td>Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authority</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Functional Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>FDR</td>
<td>Foreign Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>GCP</td>
<td>Global Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>GIBP</td>
<td>Globally Integrated Base Plan</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Interagency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJC</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>J-Dir</td>
<td>Joint Staff Directorate</td>
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<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Force Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>JFCC</td>
<td>Joint Functional Component Command</td>
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<td>JIST</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Space Team</td>
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<td>JLLIS</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Learned Information System</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>GL-1</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>LFA</td>
<td>Lead Federal Agency</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air Ground Task Force</td>
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<td>MARFORPAC</td>
<td>Marine Corps Forces Pacific</td>
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<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>MN</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
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<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Corps – Iraq</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
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<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Capitol Region</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Staff</td>
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<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
<td>Operational Planning Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>RSM</td>
<td>Resolute Support mission</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Central</td>
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<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOJTF</td>
<td>Special Operations JTF</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSO</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution(s)</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USF-I</td>
<td>United States Forces – Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>United States Forces Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces Afghanistan</td>
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