This is the Second Edition of The Joint Command Senior Enlisted Leader Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper. It was written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 and released by the J7 Deputy Director for Joint Training.

First Edition: January 2016
Second Edition: July 2017

Scope:
1st. Focuses on the Command Senior Enlisted Leaders (CSELs) at combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command, joint functional component, joint task force (JTF), NATO, and subordinate headquarters (HQs).
2nd. Addresses CSEL duties and responsibilities.
3rd. Emphasizes CSEL role in mission command, building relationships, support to the commander’s decision-making process, and JTF or multinational operations.

Table of Contents:
1.0 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................1
2.0 Mission Command .........................................................................................................2
3.0 Building Relationships .................................................................................................4
4.0 Key CSEL Tasks............................................................................................................6
5.0 Support to Commander’s Decision Making ...............................................................7
6.0 CSEL Support in JTF HQs .........................................................................................14
7.0 Suggested Reading List...............................................................................................17
GLOSSARY: Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL

Terminology and Acronyms: Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used in this paper. They are defined in the glossary to improve readability in the body of the paper for the intended readership.

POC: Mr. Mike Findlay, Email: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil
Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, Joint Training,
116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

Accessibility: This and other insights and best practices papers can be accessed online at the Joint Electronic Library site: http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers.aspx.

You may also download the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Mobile app free in your Apple or Android store to access DTD insight papers from your personal device. Requires completion of a short CAC-enabled JKO course titled "JKO Mobile" prior to first use.

Releasability: Approved for public release

Disclaimer: The insights in this paper are based on DTD observations and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Joint Staff, DOD, or the United States Government.
PREFACE

Since the First Edition of The Joint Command Senior Enlisted Leader Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper was published in January 2016, select members of the Deployable Training Division (DTD), Deputy Director for Joint Training, Joint Staff J7 continued collecting observations, insights, and best practices that bolster and stimulate the education of current and future joint Command Senior Enlisted Leaders (CSELS). The results of the collection effort are substantive and warrant publishing the second edition.

This edition builds on Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (SEJPME) and continues to focus primarily on joint CSEL roles, key tasks, and responsibilities as identified by flag officers, senior interagency professionals, and combatant command (CCMD) and joint task force (JTF) CSELS. While acknowledging that CSELS exist at the Service level and in other DOD enterprises such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), this paper is designed to reveal and illuminate the complexity associated with joint CSEL assignments. This document will be beneficial to Senior Enlisted Leaders assuming CCMD or JTF CSEL positions, as joint HQ staff personnel and to future joint force commanders (JFCs) as they consider how to employ and empower their CSELS. Furthermore, this paper serves as a good foundation for future Senior Enlisted Leaders to study, as they move forward along the professional military education continuum.

This paper continues to emphasize and reinforce the special bond between the JFC and the CSEL, as well as CSEL relationships with other key military and non-military leaders. We gained insights and perspectives from the current Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SEAC) as well as from current and former CSELS at both CCMD and JTF levels. The CSELS emphasize their roles in mission command, relationship building, support to the JFC’s decision-making process, and during JTF crisis response operations. Specific CSEL and selected commander perspectives are provided throughout the focus paper to support our observations, insights, and best practices at the strategic-theater and operational levels of war.

This paper adds to the existing body of work that may be found on the sites noted on the inside front cover. All of the focus papers are approved for public release. We would like to capture your thoughts and potential solutions as you think, plan, and work your way through these types of challenges. Please pass your comments to DTD’s POC, at js_dsc_j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil so that we can continue to improve this paper.

ANDREW N. HAMPTON
MGySgt, U.S. Marine Corps
Senior Enlisted Advisor
Joint Staff J7

STEPHEN M. NEARY
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Director, Joint Training
Joint Staff J7
This page intentionally left blank
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The senior NCO role takes on increased complexity in multi-service organizations, and expands even further when blended in a multinational/coalition force. Senior NCO leadership is an essential force multiplier in individual and unit training, quality of life issues, training events, exercises and mission rehearsals, real-world joint operations, and sustaining a warrior ethos through Service cultures. CSELs provide solution-centric leadership and must acknowledge, understand, and accept that their responsibilities and challenges have increased. CSELs must remain strategically, operationally, and organizationally fluent from the combatant commander (CCDR) level down to the deck-plate level.

Set against a backdrop of the exponentially increasing complexity of the operational environment and globally integrated operations, today’s joint CSELs must grasp the transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional (TMM) security challenges that their commanders face. Effective CSELs are joint and combined team builders who understand the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment; the effects of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—as well as the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) analytical framework. Joint CSELs must expect to look “up and out” habitually, while simultaneously remaining focused on the “down and in.” CSELs anticipate and adapt to surprise and uncertainty, recognize change and assist in transitions, and fully appreciate the core attributes of mission command—understanding, intent, and trust. CSELs make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms and think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations in support of their commanders’ decision cycles.

Executive Summary – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:

• Expand knowledge of the TMM security challenges, JIIM environment, and the DIME and PMESII analytical frameworks. Refer to Section 6.0 for further TMM discussion.
  o Develop a working knowledge of the 4+1 security framework (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations [VEOs]). Expand understanding of globally integrated operations and how this will affect our future operations.
o Develop networks of willing and capable partners, including interagency, industry, and nongovernmental organizations.

- Expand understanding of combined and joint doctrine, command and control (C2) options, the value of building relationships, and combined and interagency capabilities and cultures.
  o Be strategically, operationally, and organizationally fluent. Be familiar with foundational documents such as the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 2016 National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) formerly Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Joint Publication 1 (JP 1) Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
  o Understand C2 constructs for establishing JTFs (Service or functional components, Service unit HQs, or use of the Theater Special Operations Command).

- Expand capacity and joint competency by focusing on personal and professional growth, i.e., studying, listening, and learning, as well as team building in a dynamic JIIM environment.
  o A Joint Force composed of agile and adaptive leaders and organizations who can innovate and critically think through dynamic problems in an increasingly TMM threat environment remains fundamental to the success of the Joint Force. The Joint Force’s aim must be to develop, educate, and train leaders to fully understand the TMM threat environment, anticipate and adapt to uncertainty, and operate with mutual trust in fellow leaders who are empowered through mission command. These strong joint leaders of character will need to think critically and strategically, and confidently address the toughest problems to assure future success.

- Assist the JFC by providing a grounding in the “down and in” perspective of the command while keenly aware of the “up and out” implications of the JFC’s decisions.

- Prepare to operate beyond your conventional comfort zone—this is vital to joint CSEL success.
  o We must place the highest value on developing leaders that prove adept at solving tough dynamic problems. Our methods must produce senior leaders who take the initiative, can operate globally, and can integrate joint and interagency capability across multiple domains—and do so in a state of dynamic complexity and great uncertainty.

2.0 MISSION COMMAND. Joint Publication 3.0 (Joint Operations) defines Mission Command as “The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.” Mission Command depends on three critical attributes: understanding, intent, and trust. These core attributes influence how we view and react to a world that has become more globalized, networked, and interconnected. The importance of understanding the problem, envisioning the end state, and visualizing the nature and design of the operation. The commander describes time, space, resources and purpose, as well as directs joint warfighting functions and constantly assesses the process. Critically, the JFC must understand the intent of the mission. In turn, the JFC clearly translates his/her guidance and intent to subordinates. The missions given to subordinates must be within their capabilities. The JFC sets conditions for subordinates’ success by sharing understanding and intent, gaining/delegating authorities, empowering subordinates, prioritizing efforts, allocating resources, and planning for and managing transitions. The JFC builds trust and transparency by being inclusive versus exclusive with partners. The JFC focuses on getting C2 (and required communications) correct up front and modifies C2 arrangements
only as necessary. By extension, the CSEL, as a valued and integral member of the command team, faces the same challenges and has the ability to affect every one of the aforementioned tasks. Today’s CSELs are products of the mission command philosophy; they intuitively understand what mission command is and rely on their instincts and experiences to ensure mission command is implemented. JFCs and their CSELs seek to obtain “situational understanding” (discussed further in Section 4.0) in a contested, disordered, and multi-polar world. Refer to the Joint Staff J7 focus paper on Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy for amplification.

An effective CSEL helps ensure a common understanding throughout the force by communicating with all staff members (i.e., officers, NCOs, junior enlisted, civilians, contractors, and coalition partners), as well as subordinate and supporting organizations. Specifically, the CSEL helps communicate the commander’s intent and guidance. The CSEL fosters trust by building enduring relationships and through his/her actions. Trust must be maintained through transitions and change. Building genuine trust takes time; it doesn’t come at H-Hour.

As a practitioner of operational art, the JFC translates strategy into action where ends, ways, and means are balanced and informed/acceptable risk is identified. The experienced CSEL contributes to this dialogue at all echelons—strategic, operational, and tactical—and assists with mission and coalition partner


“You cannot surge trust.”
Comment by Senior Flag Officer
inclusion. The CSEL helps articulate the JFC’s vision, i.e., guidance, intent, and operational approach, to subordinate and supporting units and organizations, focusing on the “Why” of the mission. Armed with the “Why,” subordinates can figure out the “How to” using their own abilities.

3.0 BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS. In today’s complex operational environment, JFCs strive to achieve a comprehensive approach with mission partners through continuous dialogue with their bosses, translation of this dialogue, development of desired conditions and favorable outcomes, and issuance of guidance and intent to subordinates to achieve unity of effort with mission partners. Their CSEL must possess the ability to establish, leverage, and foster relationships in order to grow and maintain trust. The objective is to achieve relative harmony among organizational leaders and organizational philosophies as they work together to achieve respective outcomes. Inclusive behaviors during design, planning, operations, and assessment with partners facilitate a common understanding and equip commanders with the insight to make holistic and informed decisions.

Working with multinational and coalition partners presents unique opportunities and challenges. Whether a mature HQ like International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or a short-term, no-notice crisis response to a disaster like the Haiti earthquake, we will always work with and alongside multinational military, governmental, and nongovernmental stakeholders. Personal relationships and understanding between commanders and staffs of multinational and coalition partners are critical to the effective integration of forces and capabilities. Like any relationship, trust is a critical component. It must be embedded throughout your organization and be an integral part of the command culture. Understanding and taking into
consideration our partners’ national caveats, restrictions, and capabilities are critical to planning and mission success. Similarly, partner nations need to understand the US has caveats and restrictions, which may affect parallel planning efforts. Finally, we must give due consideration to the depth and breadth of information sharing. Technical challenges aside, commanders and leaders must determine what mission-essential information we can and will share. Are there policies which prevent information sharing? What level of risk are we willing to assume by sharing information with our multinational partners and stakeholders? Can we efficiently and effectively write for release to avoid information sharing challenges? Do we have an overreliance on the use of foreign disclosure officers (FDOs)? Often, political considerations, directed authorities, and national caveats will influence the coalition command structure and operations. Maintaining unity of effort and reaching an adequate level of interoperability and resourcing will always be challenging. Developing and employing an information sharing process early are essential. Refer to Section 5.4 for further discussion on information sharing.

**Building Relationships – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

The CSEL should:

- Be versed in emotional intelligence (i.e., the ability to know and manage our own emotions, and recognize, appreciate, and influence other individuals’ emotions) and understand how it affects group member dynamics within the human domain. Do not allow emotions and ego to affect developing and maintaining relationships.
- Recognize that many nations do not imbue the same level of trust in their senior NCO corps as in the United States.
- Build and cultivate relationships with deputy commander(s) and HQ Chief of Staff (COS), as well as with higher, subordinate, and supporting commands/organizations—be approachable, be an active listener, keep private matters private, remain open-minded, and display a positive attitude.
- Expand knowledge of mission stakeholders and operational environment to develop and sustain traditional and nontraditional partnerships.
- Make time for the J-Directors (J-Dirs) and HQ Special Staff (e.g., Staff Judge Advocate, Political Advisor [POLAD], Surgeon General, etc.) to build favorable relationships; seek them out; do not rely on them coming to you; be relevant. Include HHQ and interorganizational representatives, as well as liaison officers (LNOs).
- Value people who think differently and offer diverse perspectives.
- Understand that building relationships often requires humility and patience.
- Build and use a wide-ranging network of multi-discipline experts to bolster your value as a joint CSEL—it’s not only what you know, but who you know that knows.
- Recognize and respect the role and authorities of the US Ambassador and Country Team.
• Recognize the Country Team is a gateway to in-country agencies and organizations; recognize the unique organization/capacity within each Country Team; building and nurturing personal relationships are key.
• Ensure the staff understands and respects the sovereignty of the Host Nation and its leadership prerogatives.
• Ensure the staff leverages the unique skill sets and capabilities of each nation’s force within the alliance or coalition.

Maintain a C5 mindset: Command, Control, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coordination.
• Understand cultural distinctions of your coalition/mission partners. Cultural considerations may provide a sound framework for gaining insights into leader personalities.
• Recognize the deputy commander, COS, and CSEL are crucial in ensuring dual-hatted US and coalition commanders accomplish national and coalition responsibilities and maintain relationships with traditional and nontraditional (unanticipated/atypical) partners.
• Recognize that building a command team mindset may require additional effort by the JFC and CSEL if both leaders are not from the same Service with common professional backgrounds.
• Unless the JFC and CSEL have previously served together, the initial CSEL interview with the commander begins the relationship building process.

4.0 KEY CSEL TASKS. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/, identifies key tasks of the joint CSEL; however, whether at JTF or CCMD level, we find CSEL tasks are much more extensive and complex than those listed in JP 3-33. Below are some CSEL-related observations, insights, and best practices identified by DTD members:

**Key CSEL Tasks – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

CSELs should:
• Be accustomed to being the commanders’ “honest brokers” and have proven their value within their respective Services.
• Constantly seek situational understanding—the ability to make sound and timely decisions based on situational understanding. Situational understanding is fleeting and will change as new conditions or circumstances appear in dynamic decision-making situations.
• Know what decisions the JFC is contemplating; provide advice, especially regarding risks.
• Be total force leaders (including active duty, Guard, and Reserve forces), not just for the enlisted ranks.
• Read what their commanders read; be conversant on topics important to the JFC. Have the requisite security clearance. Read and study applicable orders, plans, and annexes, as well as the joint HQ SOP.
• Understand what constitutes unlawful command influence and how to prevent its occurrence.
• Be involved in talent management. Position the right talent in the right joint billets; stay engaged in multi-service enlisted personnel career management.
• Identify interorganizational partners, and advise the commander about both potential opportunities and challenges—focus on achieving unity of effort.
• Understand national limitations, caveats, and mission partner authorities.
• Represent their commanders in professionally developing partner and ally militaries.
• Participate routinely in key leader engagements (KLEs); at times, JFCs and their CSELs may become unintended diplomats.
• Expand understanding of authorities and associated funding implications (e.g., Title 10, Title 32, Title 22, Title 50, etc.), Department of State (DOS) organization and regional alignments, and General Purpose Forces-Special Operations Forces (SOF) integration.
• Gain an understanding of cyber-related activity that affects their commands.
• Accustom the force to operating with degraded communications/automation—assured communications and network accessibility are not guaranteed. Ensure a Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) plan exists.

5.0 SUPPORT TO COMMANDER’S DECISION MAKING. This section amplifies how the joint CSEL supports the JFC’s decision-making process. The following terms—design and planning, battlefield circulation and KLE, battle rhythm, information sharing, command messaging, and decision-making styles—all have substantial CSEL role implications. With this knowledge, a CSEL will contribute more effectively to the JFC’s decision-making process.

5.1 Design and Planning.
Design is a commander-centric effort. During design, senior leaders invest their time, experience, intellect, education, creativity, intuition, and

**Thoughts for CSELs**

• Focus on framing the problem before attempting to solve it
• Maintain a broad perspective on the environment; it’s more than a mil-on-mil conflict; think through a comprehensive approach
  – Understand the power of DIME on PMESII
• Commander’s vision / guidance and intent provide clarity in today’s dynamic environment
  – Mission-type orders remain key to success
  – Commanders who work with their staffs, giving guidance, and then staying with the staff and helping them, get better solutions in a fraction of the time
• Rely on your instinct and intuition
  – Anticipate and seize opportunity
  – Guard against the staff tendency to “over-control” the fight
  – Work with and through your subordinate commanders
• Be inclusive versus exclusive with your JILM partners in how you assess, plan, and make decisions

judgment up front in problem-setting, i.e., identifying and framing the correct problem. Problem-
setting then proceeds to problem-solving where more detailed planning occurs. Planning seeks to solve a problem within an accepted framework and generally follows the procedural steps within the Joint Planning Process (JPP). Throughout the JPP, initial facts and assumptions derived during design need to be revisited to ensure the correct problem(s) is being addressed. The importance of commander-led design, to include understanding the problem, cannot be overemphasized. If design efforts fail, all that follows will likely be flawed.

**Design and Planning – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

- While design, operational art, and planning have largely been the exclusive realm of senior commanders and their staff officers, a CSEL’s access, sound perspectives, and valued relationships have the potential to contribute substantially to JFC-led problem-framing (design) and developing solutions.
- Spend time up front with the JFC to determine the correct problem; this requires understanding and dialogue. The CSEL’s unique perspective can assist the JFC and staff with clearly defining the problem. Attend JFC “touch points” with the staff to stay informed.
- Help the JFC articulate the implications of decisions made by HHQ or senior national leaders during the design and planning process. Assist the JFC by encouraging and facilitating vertical and horizontal dialogue. Such dialogue can help identify potential mission creep, and also help reduce risks to mission and force by clarifying ambiguities in senior echelon guidance.
- Advise leaders on risk. CSELS are positioned and networked to sense when risks have been assumed by multiple command echelons, and when the accumulated risk could jeopardize the mission. Understand that problem prevention is as important as problem solving.
- Understand that the staff will use the JPP to make well-coordinated and timely recommendations to the JFC. On occasion, circumstances will not allow for the desired coordination, detailed mission analysis, and thorough course of action analysis and war gaming; thus, accelerated JFC-led crisis planning occurs using the JPP.
- Enable crisis planning and decision-making process by: helping the JFC and staff to frame the problem at hand; encouraging divergent thinking and close scrutiny of initial facts and assumptions; and articulating the JFC’s thinking, intent, and guidance to the staff, subordinate commands, and supporting organizations. This is important because the CSEL
can bridge gaps caused by different echelons of command operating at different speeds. This allows the CSEL to provide unvarnished assessments to the JFC and staff.

5.2 Battlefield Circulation and KLEs. Battlefield circulation and KLEs are not limited to the commander. The JFC empowers those who can transmit the command’s messages, and the CSEL is a primary messenger for the JFC and command. CSELs are force multipliers and have critical roles in battlefield circulation and KLEs. Some battlefield circulation and KLE observations, insights, and best practices are provided below.

**Battlefield Circulation and KLEs – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

- Commander’s priorities and intent should drive the joint CSEL’s focus, battlefield circulation, and KLEs. Review battlefield circulation and KLE opportunities frequently and participate, where appropriate. This is important because some events will require interaction at very senior levels. Additionally, identifying appropriate engagement targets within the interorganizational construct may prove challenging based on differing organizational structures, mission sets, and authorities.
- Battlefield circulation is not about the person who is circulating, but about the person being visited. The joint CSEL should foster a climate of inclusion and try to create a favorable outcome every time he/she travels. Battlefield circulation is central to the CSEL’s personal battle rhythm.
- A CSEL does not always have to accompany the commander. The CSEL’s access to people or units not typically visited by the JFC allows the JFC and staff to receive valuable input and unvarnished assessments from sources that only the CSEL can reach.
- Many leaders now communicate decisions and direction via e-mail and other collaborative means. We find that the most effective leaders communicate face-to-face with subordinates whenever possible. Trust is difficult to build through e-mail.
- Gain improved visualization of operational, intelligence, sustainment, and interagency activities by circulating through the Joint Operations Center (JOC), Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC), and Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Visit night shifts routinely to assess the HQ staff’s 24-hour workload.

“Don’t be a tourist; have a task and purpose when circulating.”

Comment by a KEYSTONE Fellow

“Where do I need to be…where will I have the biggest impact?”

Comment by JTF CSEL

“I often liken our positions to that of IG [Inspector General], we can go anywhere, can be a part of anything with the flexibility of movement.”

Comment by CCMD CSEL
5.3 Battle Rhythm. An effective and disciplined battle rhythm supports the commander’s decision-making cycle, whether in steady-state operations or in a crisis. Although battle rhythm management usually falls under the purview of the COS, the CSEL can coordinate with the COS to ensure that there is “white space” built into the battle rhythm that allows the JFC time to reflect, think, and conduct battlefield circulation. Protect the commander’s time and decision space. Additionally, white space can provide flexibility in the schedule to accommodate emerging requirements. The CSEL can help preserve white space by ensuring the staff understands how the JFC receives and digests information. While the JFC’s “touch points” with the staff are somewhat dependent on the commander’s leadership style and personality, the CSEL can help identify battle rhythm events that can be “shed” from the schedule.

**Battle Rhythm – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

**CSELS:**

- Concentrate on the outcomes/outputs of key battle rhythm events such as commanders’ update briefs and decision briefs. CSELS should not focus their efforts too much on internal HQs staff processes that are mainly conducted by action officers.
- Follow a personal battle rhythm that includes rest and thinking time. Stay healthy. Keep a sustainable and productive schedule. Stay at the top of your game intellectually.
- Understand and participate in the command’s battle rhythm. Understand the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) and operational planning teams (OPTs) that comprise the command’s internal battle rhythm. Know what anchor points form the cornerstone of the command’s battle rhythm, e.g., a Secretary of Defense (SecDef) secure VTC or a JFC’s conference call with subordinate commanders. Understand and selectively participate in the HQ battle rhythm’s critical path, i.e., the logical and sequenced arrangement of B2C2WGs that best supports the commander’s decision-making cycle.
- Ensure the HQ battle rhythm is flexible and built to accommodate changes in mission requirements and HHQ demands. Furthermore, ensure the battle rhythm promotes staff and unit-level interaction and planning.
- Ensure low-density, high-demand subject matter experts are used effectively.
- Remember – A decision board provides an opportunity to combine multiple requirements for JFC or Deputy JFC guidance and/or decisions into one venue.
- When the JFC departs HQ battle rhythm events, stay behind for a few minutes because attendees may ask you questions seeking further clarity on the JFC’s guidance and intent.
• Know the battle rhythms of your subordinate commands as well as HHQ, and how they nest. Look “down and in,” as well as “up and out.” A former ISAF CSEL spent about one-third of his time working “up and out” issues, one-third working “down and in” issues, and one-third with the JFC. Synchronize your schedule with the JFC’s schedule to expand coverage.
• Encourage integrating the command’s NCOs into B2C2WGs and OPTs and leverage enlisted leaders at higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting commands to attain and maintain situational awareness as well as to expand situational understanding.

5.4 Information Sharing. As a senior leader, the joint CSEL informs, instructs, inquires, inspires, interprets, enables, and empowers. Technically, the CSEL is an information node, information filter, information synchronizer, and information conduit. Each function mentioned is important; however, the CSEL has a larger information-sharing role in the HQ. The CSEL should understand and have an appreciation for how the command identifies, receives, retrieves, prioritizes, analyzes, stores, displays, acts upon, safeguards, shares/distributes, and discards both unclassified and classified information. The CSEL has opportunities to find information-sharing gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities within the command. Subsequently, mitigating solutions can be identified and applied in conjunction with the COS, Information Management Officer (IMO), Knowledge Management Officer (KMO), FDO, and J6 Directorate.

Information Sharing – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:
The CSEL should:
• Encourage information sharing, both physically and virtually.
• Encourage the staff to write for release and use the FDO to approve release of select documents and briefing packets to traditional and nontraditional mission partners.
• Help the JFC identify gaps in information requirements; encourage information fusion.
• Confirm that there is a Request for Information (RFI) process that includes all stakeholders.
• Help identify and reduce impediments to effective staff work and information sharing.
• Confirm changes to JFC guidance and intent are distributed widely and effectively.
• Confirm that HQ unclassified and classified portals are identified, leveraged, user-friendly and navigated easily; this includes collaborative tools.
• Confirm Knowledge Management Representatives (KMRs) are distributed within the HQ.
• Confirm adequate foreign disclosure personnel are assigned to the HQ.
• Confirm detailed and deliberate shift change procedures are followed in 24-hour operations.
• Understand the JFC’s information requirements, and know how to get important information back into the staff planning and analysis processes.
• Understand that there are differences between information, knowledge, and shared understanding. All too often, we see staffs present JFCs with raw, unanalyzed data, forcing the JFCs to accomplish the analysis, fusion, and assessment functions. Ensure staff briefings contribute to shared understanding and contain the “So what?” to better enable the commander to make informed decisions.
• Assessment within the HQ is a staff-wide effort, not simply the product of an assessment cell.
• Help the JFC and staff better understand and differentiate between commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and the commander’s “wake-up” criteria. For example, a service member who is badly injured in a traffic accident may meet a commander’s wake-up criteria, but this is not an operationally-related CCIR.
• Confirm the J3-managed common operational picture (COP) and supporting COPs (e.g., logistics COP, medical COP, etc.) are shared real-time among commands, support planning efforts, and build situational awareness and understanding.

5.5 Command Messaging and the Information Environment (IE). In the 21st Century, our leaders are forced to operate in, and navigate through, an unforgiving IE. The continuous shift in information delivery causes us to be adaptive and proactive in operating in the IE. A 24-hour news cycle compels us to evaluate our messaging and our audiences continuously. Veracity in TV, radio, and print media is being challenged by “fake news” and “crowd sourcing” on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in real time. Furthermore, capable and talented adversaries (such as ISIS) are able to communicate in near-real time to a broad audience from remote locations. With this
knowledge, effective CSELs convey the command’s messages, both internally and externally, and possess the ability to tailor and deliver those messages according to the audience.

**Command Messaging and the IE – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

- CSELs, as principal messengers for their JFCs and commands, need to understand the latitude to which they can speak for their commanders and their commands. Establish these parameters early with JFC.

- Be cognizant that people listen to what you say and watch what you do.

- Know your social media persona. Expand knowledge of social media and the implications.

- Effective CSELs apply their experiences to conduct messaging “credibility checks” within their HQs to ensure the alignment of words and actions—all to accomplish the mission and to minimize the “Say-Do” gap.

- Use the Public Affairs Office (PAO) to prepare for media interviews, to include rehearsals.

- Confirm there are clear approval processes for the command’s narratives, themes, and messages. Confirm the HQ staff lead for communication strategy and venues for decision.

- Understanding the adversary and threat narrative helps inform our narrative and strategy.

- Anticipate likely adversary actions and gain response-and-release authorities to respond rapidly in the “battle of the narrative.”

- Assessment is critical to refine the communication narrative and strategy.

- Guard against the tendency to trumpet success immediately.

- A communication synchronization-related working group that is integrated with the targeting process and linked to a decision board enables effective synchronization.

**The Narrative:**

**- Message Filters for the Operational Commander and CSEL -**

**How will what is done or said:**

- Be understood, perceived, or manipulated by my adversary?
- Be understood or perceived by my coalition partners?
- Mesh with President’s schedule and what he is saying?
- Mesh with SecState, SecDef, and CJCS schedules and messages?
- Mesh with my boss’s (or bosses’) schedule and policies?
- Be perceived in National Security Council Deputies / Principals Committees?
- Play in our allies’ capitals?
- Read on the front page of The New York Times?
- Read on the front page of the newspaper in my region?

**The Commander and CSEL are the most sensitive filters in the headquarters.**

5.6 Decision-making Styles. A joint CSEL engages in the JFC’s decision-making process by virtue of his/her advisory role to the JFC. The CSEL needs to know the JFC’s preferred decision-making style and help the staff to work within the JFC’s preferences.

**Decision-making Styles – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:**

- Understand differences in commanders’ decision-making styles and be flexible enough to adapt and complement them. Some JFCs use small groups. Other JFCs prefer using larger, inclusive groups to receive, deliberate on, and make decisions. Use of either style has
information sharing and battle rhythm implications. The effective CSEL does not have to adopt the JFC’s style but rather adapt to his/her JFC’s style.

- Commanders have different preferences when interacting with the staff and subordinates, e.g., one-on-one, through the COS, by secure VTC, or in person. Determine your commander’s preference and how to accommodate his/her preferred means.
- Understand how your JFC views the use of the CSEL, deputies, COS, J-Dirs, and Special Staff. Understand and leverage the command’s Terms of Reference (TOR).
- Differentiate information requirements and preferred ways to receive information (e.g., CCIR, reporting, and briefing implications). Many commanders prefer graphics while others prefer words to support their decision making.

6.0 CSEL SUPPORT IN JTF HQs. Often a crisis has occurred and is deteriorating when a HHQ (i.e., establishing authority) activates a JTF HQ. In this crisis response situation, the JTF leadership is placed in a reactive mode. Seventy-five percent of JTFs formed during the last 15 years had less than 42 days from notification to operational employment. Accordingly, time-sensitive challenges ensue when forming, staffing, organizing, training, deploying, sustaining, and operating a JTF HQ. Furthermore, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) activities are challenging, especially if an enemy contests JTF entry with asymmetric, unconventional, and hybrid anti-access/area denial
CSEL Support in JTF HQs – Key Observations, Insights, and Best Practices:

- Prepare early for eventual JTF CSEL role; help prepare your HQ for a future JTF HQ role.
- Develop and maintain a list of critical tasks that the CSEL should do/can do when the HQ is notified it will assume a JTF HQ role. De-conflict and synchronize this list with the commander’s and other senior leaders’ lists of critical tasks. The tasks can be developed and documented during periodic tabletop exercises (TTXs) with other senior leaders, and by producing a JTF HQ TOR. Reinforce an expeditionary mindset within the HQ.
- Spend time understanding the political and policy aspects of the mission, and the CCDR’s mission, intent, end state, and processes to better define the JTF role and mission. Participate actively in the commander-led operational design effort.
- Along with the commander and planners, read and study all establishing authority’s (e.g., SecDef, CCMD, etc.) orders, directives, and guidance for the JTF. If further clarity is required, encourage the staff to forward unambiguous RFIs to the establishing authority.
- Based on experience, CSELs can play a key role in developing and translating authorities (e.g., rules of engagement [ROE]) into something that subordinate units can understand. JTF CSELs can also play a key role in reminding their commanders to seek necessary authorities.
- A well-understood JTF HQ SOP assists greatly. The Joint Staff J7 Common JTF HQ SOP can be used as a model—https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop_index.htm
- Confirm that JTF HQ SOP, JTF HQ TOR, Joint Training Plan, Joint Manning Plan, draft Joint Manning Document (JMD), draft Joint Mission-Essential Equipment List (JMEEL), and personnel reception plan are developed and updated to improve JTF HQ preparedness.
- The JTF commander must seek to fill as many requirements as possible from his/her immediately available personnel assets.
- Review the JTF Manning Plan and JMD and determine where NCOs can help fill requirements in the various staff directorates. Consider the use of a JMD working group to manage the JMD development process. Ensure the JMD defines the overall personnel requirements necessary to complete the mission.
- Consider that the individual augment sourcing process is typically designed for sourcing within 90-120 days of completion of the SECDEF Orders Book (SDOB).
- Spend time up front developing training plans.
and continuity/turover procedures designed to integrate incoming personnel quickly.

• Ensure the HQ establishes responsibility for JTF staff training, e.g., pre-deployment, reception, and continuous sustainment training.

• Participate actively in the JTF Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPPOE) process. Develop comprehensive understanding of the joint operations area (JOA) to include transregional security threats (e.g., VEOs, drug trafficking, and North Korea), multidomain threats (e.g., air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace), and multifunctional threats (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; information operations; and cruise and ballistic missile defense).

• Understand supported and supporting command relationships and associated authorities. DOD may not be the Lead Federal Agency, i.e., the JTF may be in supporting role.

• Help the commander identify and prioritize critical resources and forces, as well as identify 2nd- and 3rd-order effects, i.e., unintended consequences, of pending decisions.

• Know all JTF subordinate and supporting organizations and their capabilities in order to identify potential shortfalls (e.g., low-density, high-demand assets) or excess capabilities.

• Ensure the JTF HQ maintains a “bias for action” by developing a lean organization. Small, well-organized JTF HQs are more efficient and sustainable than large bureaucratic HQs. The CSEL should recommend exchanging trained LNO teams immediately and requesting augmentation from USTRANSCOM Joint Enabling Capabilities Command’s (JECC’s) Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE), Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE); USTRANSCOM’s JTF-Port Opening (JTF-PO); DLA-Energy; and DLA’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). These organizations provide tailored and functional capabilities and expertise to JTF HQs.

• Unless close CSEL-to-CSEL relationships already exist, the JTF CSEL must establish relationships with the higher, subordinate, and supporting HQs CSELs at earliest opportunity.

• Be well-versed in the policies and instructions for other Services.

• The CSEL, in conjunction with the J2, J3, J4, and J6 Senior Enlisted Leaders, should be familiar with the JMEEL and help determine if the suite of communications- and intelligence-related equipment is adequate for the JTF HQ.

• Confirm that communications and network interoperability exists among JTF organizations.

• Understand HQ’s role in building time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).

• Confirm Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)-trained experts are in HQ.

• Be aware of every capability that the command has access to, and endeavor to establish relationships that will ensure things are done. Be resolute in support of the JTF commander and command. Never take “No” from a person who does not have the authority to say “Yes.”

• JTF access to capabilities may be more important than actual JTF ownership of assets.

• The JTF CSEL can help the commander by providing advice about both potential missteps and opportunities pertaining to interorganizational stakeholders.

• A JTF HQ normally works with at least one US embassy during a crisis; expand and leverage relationships with the embassy’s Country Team, e.g., the Senior Defense Official (SDO), Defense Attaché (DATT), etc. The JTF CSEL could actually represent the commander, at least initially, as an LNO team chief at a specific US embassy.

• Force protection is always a JTF consideration; work with the US embassy’s Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Marine Security Guard Detachment to address protection issues.

• Confirm a viable personnel recovery (PR) system exists and that certified PR experts are assigned to the HQ; request Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) support if necessary.
Multinational partners have different authorities, ROE, Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), national caveats, and restrictions. JTF CSELs can play an important role in sorting them out.

Leverage the authorities and capabilities of mission partners to improve effectiveness, e.g., US Title 22 and 50 authorities and those of the individual coalition countries. Thoughtful delegation of authorities supports disciplined initiative.

Spend more time with JTF elements that you have least familiarity, e.g., other Services, SOF, interorganizational elements, joint augmentation elements, etc.

Participate in JRSOI/mission rehearsals to expand understanding of pending operations.

Anticipate an austere JTF environment, at least initially; manage personnel expectations.

Establish a Senior Enlisted Council comprised of CSELs/SELs from the staff, subordinate HQs, as well as NCO peers from other nations’ militaries.

CSELs with recent JTF experience should mentor future and newly assigned JTF CSELs.

7.0 SUGGESTED READING LIST. The documents identified on the slide below are recommended reading. This list amplifies much of what CSELs already know, and continues to build on the education necessary for effective CSELs. This list is not comprehensive and several of the identified documents reside only on the SIPRNET due to their classified nature.

**Suggested Reading List**

- 2016 National Military Strategy (Classified)
- 2017 Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA) (Classified)
- Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) 2015-2017 (Classified)
- CJSI 3110.01J, 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 25 Sep 2016 (Classified)
- CAPSTONE Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) 2020
- Chief of Staff Roles and Functions at Joint Headquarters (JS J7 DTD Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, April 2010)
- CJCS Notice 3500.01 – 2017-2020 Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance, 12 January 2017
- Joint Forces Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter, January 2017) From the Chairman: The Pace of Change
- JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 30 July 2012 (Currently in revision)
- Unity of Effort Framework – Solution Guide, 31 August 2013
- JLLD/JCOA – Decade of War Video Series. Requires CAC access
- Joint Electronic Library (JEL and JEL+).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-access/Area Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2C2WG</td>
<td>Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirement(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operational Picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATT</td>
<td>Defense Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (analytical construct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD/DOS</td>
<td>Department of Defense/State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDO</td>
<td>Foreign Disclosure Office(r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHQ/HQ</td>
<td>Higher Headquarters/Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>Information Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>Information Management Office(r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACSO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSE</td>
<td>Joint Communications Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-Dir</td>
<td>Joint Staff Director (e.g., J3, J4, and J6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JECC</td>
<td>Joint Enabling Capabilities Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIIM</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIOC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMD</td>
<td>Joint Manning Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMEEL</td>
<td>Joint Mission-Essential Equipment List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPASE</td>
<td>Joint Public Affairs Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPP</td>
<td>Joint Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPRA</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPSE</td>
<td>Joint Planning Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRSOI</td>
<td>Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Campaign/Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-PO</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-Port Opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMO</td>
<td>Knowledge Management Office(r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMR</td>
<td>Knowledge Management Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Operational Planning Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Primary, Alternate, Contingency, &amp; Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Office(r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (analytical construct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Request for Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Office(r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Rules for the Use of Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDOB</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Orders Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAC</td>
<td>Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEJPME</td>
<td>Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMM</td>
<td>Transregional, Multi-domain, and Multifunctional (security threats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTX</td>
<td>Tabletop Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>Violent Extremist Organization(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>