This is the Fifth Edition of the Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper on “Interorganizational Cooperation.” It is written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) Interorganizational Cooperation section of the Joint Staff J7 and released by the J7 Deputy Director for Joint Training.

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Scope. This focus paper addresses:
• USG interagency coordination.
• Multinational operations.
• Organization and process insights for Combatant Command (CCMD) Headquarters (HQ).
• Organization and process insights for Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ.
• This paper does not delve deeply into interorganizational cooperation with joint, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), or private organizations. The areas of authorities, specific cyberspace, intelligence, and sustainment as they relate to interagency and interorganizational coordination are also not discussed. These omitted topics are addressed in other focus papers - see URL below.

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Terminology and Acronyms: Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used in this paper. They are defined in the glossary to increase readability in the body of the paper for the intended readership. Further doctrinal discussions of Interorganizational Cooperation can be found in Joint Publication (JP) 3-08.

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You may also download Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Mobile free in your Apple or Android store to access these DTD insight papers from your personal device. This requires a short CAC-enabled JKO course titled "JKO Mobile" prior to first use.

Releasability: Approved for public release.
PREFACE

This paper discusses insights and best practices related to interorganizational cooperation to support, promote, and facilitate a comprehensive approach to achieve unified action. We derive these insights directly from our observations of joint forces in operations.

**This paper may be beneficial to three main audiences:**

- Senior leaders as they consider military interaction with external stakeholders.
- Directors and principals of joint staffs as they guide their staffs in working with other USG agencies, international organizations, and multinational partners.
- Other mission partners as they prepare to interact with a U.S. joint force.

**Four considerations:**

- **Support a broad comprehensive approach** that aligns the goals and efforts of military, governmental, and nongovernmental entities to achieve national and international objectives.
- **Be inclusive instead of exclusive** with military and non-military partners. Inclusivity leads to appreciation of different perspectives and assists with developing potential solutions. Inclusivity achieves cooperation and unity of effort, increasing the speed with which objectives are realized.
- **Develop trust and close relationships** with stakeholders across the interagency, international, multinational, and private sectors to enable the level of collaboration necessary to achieve common goals. Transparency and mutual trust remain central to the concept of interdependence.
- **Organize the HQ** to include mission partners and stakeholder perspectives, authorities, capabilities, and limitations in planning, execution, and assessment. Concurrently, reach out to partners and stakeholders to inform their planning, execution, and assessment.

This and other focus papers by the Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Division (DTD) summarize observations and insights on joint force HQs. DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with CCMD and operational level commanders and staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations and exercises. DTD incorporates these insights in functionally-based focus papers, refines them through senior flag officer feedback, and then shares them with the operational force joint lessons learned community and joint doctrine community. Five related focus papers to this paper are *JTF C2 and Organization, Chief of Staff (COS) Roles and Functions at the Joint Headquarters, Authorities, Design and Planning,* and *Joint Operations.* These papers are found on the site noted on the inside front cover.

Please share your thoughts, solutions, and best practices as you think, plan, and work your way through operational challenges with DTD’s POC, Mr. Mike Findlay. See the inside front cover for contact information.

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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. U.S. Joint Force Commanders coordinate with engaged United States Government (USG) agencies and cooperate with multinational partners to support, promote, and facilitate a comprehensive approach to achieve national and international objectives. The mission command attributes of trust and shared understanding extend beyond commanders and subordinates to interorganizational cooperation. Inclusion of mission partners’ viewpoints into the commander’s decision cycle facilitates appreciation of different perspectives, development of potential solutions, and achievement of unity of effort.

Key challenges:

- Coordination with the many interorganizational partners to retain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries.
- Developing trust, relationships, and unity of effort across a diverse group of organizations with differing cultures, policies, priorities, authorities, capabilities, and procedures. These challenges are magnified in ad hoc and short notice operations.
- Limited presence of engaged USG agency partners at the theater and operational level.
- Information sharing with mission partners.
- Readiness of U.S. forces to operate in a supporting role to allies, multinational forces, host nations, or U.S. civil authorities. The military is often not in the lead.
- Developing HQs organization and processes that promote coordination and collaboration with partners.

Overarching insights:

- Interorganizational cooperation is essential to achieving unified action.
- A comprehensive approach expands a military-centric perspective to a whole of government and governments approach that is integrated with external partners and stakeholders.
- Focus collective efforts on common goals to gain unity of effort.
- Understand the DOD’s complementary role in supporting the USG’s other instruments of power.
- Understand mission partners’ perspectives, goals, authorities, capabilities, capacities, and limitations.
- Extend the mission command principle of inclusion to mission partners. Build personal relationships and trust with mission partners through transparency, appropriate information sharing, and access to capabilities.
- Develop HQ structures, processes, and procedures to facilitate inclusion and unity of effort.

Interorganizational cooperation: The interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. Source: JP 3-08

Unified Action: The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

Unity of Effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. Source: JP 1-02

“The value we have derived by having interagency or interministerial...baked in at the ground floor is almost immeasurable.” - Senior Joint Commander

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2.0 STRATEGIC CONTEXT.
The 2016 National Military Strategy (NMS) characterizes the strategic environment as unpredictable and marked by an increase in global disorder as the U.S. faces multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and non-traditional, transregional sub-state groups, both taking advantage of rapid technological change. Other challenges in the strategic environment include “seam” issues—foreign fighter flow, terrorist threat networks, cyberspace, illicit trafficking, pandemics, transnational criminal organizations, etc., that cut across multiple geographic boundaries, necessitating close coordination across many entities to address these challenges.

Success in this environment will increasingly depend on the Joint Force’s ability to support, promote, and facilitate a comprehensive approach in the pursuit of national security objectives.

- Interorganizational cooperation is an element of unity of effort; it is the connective tissue which allows the commander to develop a comprehensive approach to achieve unified action. Interorganizational cooperation is defined as the interaction that occurs among: elements of the DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.

- Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the DOD and the other instruments of US national power.

Supporting a Comprehensive Approach. The figure below illustrates the coordination necessary to develop and implement a comprehensive approach in concert with our joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners to achieve favorable outcomes. The coordination and processes are far more complex in actuality than that depicted.

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- The National Military Strategy outlines a vision of a global Joint Force optimized for a dynamic and ever-changing security environment. It recognizes the challenges posed by an evolving security environment and seeks to address them through a comprehensive and globally integrated approach to planning, operations, and capability development that retains a competitive advantage over potential adversaries.

- The evolving nature of transregional, multi-domain, multi-functional challenges will continue to produce challenges and interrelated risks at greater speed, necessitating an integrated approach in addressing them.

- Regardless of crisis or contingency, the Joint Force will prefer to operate in concert with joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners.

- Excerpt from the 2016 National Military Strategy
are much broader than friendly versus enemy military warfare (military on military thinking). The military is just one of the many instruments of national power operating to achieve shared objectives. Commanders are developing and using end states, objectives, and conditions that address the broader environment by using some form of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) construct as a means to provide common visualization and better achieve unity of effort with our partners. Combatant commanders, in conjunction with Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other USG agencies, determine how to coordinate operations, actions, and activities at the theater strategic and operational level to achieve strategic objectives.

**Four key insights (see the illustration on the previous page):**

1) **Dialogue:** Persistent dialogue with national and international leadership is required to ascertain the “real” problem and to clarify/develop national objectives, desired end states, risks, and feasible policy direction. Furthermore, commanders and staff must translate what they see, hear, and feel into solid, clear Combatant Command level objectives. Recognizing that national and international positions and objectives continually change, theater-strategic headquarters expend significant effort maintaining open dialogue to ensure objectives remain appropriately nested. (The Ends)

2) **Analysis:** We recognize the complex, interconnected, and largely unpredictable nature of the environment. Inclusion of mission partners in analyzing this environment facilitates common understanding, shared visualization, and unity of effort bridging the gap between elements of national and international power. (The Ways)

3) **Actions:** We strive to harmonize military actions with those of our stakeholders. The use of mission-type orders, coupled with guidance and intent, empower decentralized military operations that are synergized with those of our partners. We continually see the importance of establishing a command climate and an organizational capability that facilitates inclusion by all members of the joint, interagency, and multinational team. (The Means)

4) **Accountability:** We repeatedly see the combatant and JTF commander ultimately held accountable for success regardless of higher direction, lack of resources, or absence of support.

“Operational art promotes unified action by encouraging JFCs and staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interorganizational partners, while determining objectives, establishing priorities, and assigning tasks to subordinate forces...[operational art] facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, integration of military operations with those of interorganizational partners, thereby promoting unity of effort.”

Source: JP 3-0, Joint Operations

JFCs promote unified action through supporting a comprehensive approach. The joint force may also provide assistance to external organizations, such as a Lead Federal Agency (LFA), in support of its efforts to achieve an overarching mission. An example that illustrates the benefit
of an LFA synchronizing USG efforts was the designation of the USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) as the lead for the USG response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, with the Joint force in a supporting role.

The joint commander seeks to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate the activities of the military (M) instrument with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic) as part of the D-I-M-E construct to promote unified action. Supporting a comprehensive approach applies to both foreign and domestic operations in which DOD participates. Additional discussion of the comprehensive approach is available in the overarching “Insights and Best Practices Paper on Joint Operations.”

**Insights and Best Practices:**

- The operational environment is dynamic, requiring iterative dialogue and interaction between the Joint Force, interorganizational mission partners, and national and international leadership.
- Commander’s guidance and intent will evolve to adapt to changing conditions.
- Developing a shared understanding of the operational environment requires early interaction with mission partners in supporting a comprehensive approach.
- Strong personal relationships and defined roles, responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, and processes with interorganizational mission partners will promote unity of effort, and overcome organizational and cultural differences.
- Include mission partners in design, planning, execution, and assessment. External stakeholders have unique perspectives and expertise that build a broader assessment and understanding of the operational environment.
- In foreign operations, incorporate liaison officers with all involved embassy country teams and include country team representatives from each country team in-person or via video teleconference (VTC) during design, planning, execution, and assessment.
- In domestic operations, provide liaison and be engaged with the involved agencies and entities (e.g., Federal Coordinating Officer, Defense Coordinating Officer, Joint Field Office) to assist their planning and awareness.
3.0 FRAMING THE COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION CHALLENGES.

Challenges in coordination and collaboration have the potential to hinder support to a comprehensive approach. This section addresses two major overarching challenges of coordination and collaboration within the broader challenge noted in the text box:

- A void of organizational structure and linkages at the theater and operational level.
- Unclear organization and processes to effectively coordinate and collaborate.

**Operational Void:** As depicted in the illustration, while structures exist at the strategic and tactical levels to facilitate interorganizational cooperation, a “void” often exists at the theater and operational level where CCDRs and JTF Commanders operate. This operational void is caused by differences in organizational structures, coordination permissions, capacities, capabilities, and budget authorities between DOD and other interorganizational partners.

A contributing factor to the operational void is the disparity of resources among the various agencies. Resources drive how an agency can respond to, and support, a crisis. This disparity is particularly evident in foreign operations that involve multiple nations. When carrying out a regional operation that involves more than one foreign country, inclusion of all the relevant embassy country teams, and coordination among them as well as with the DOD and other elements is extremely important, but not always easy. Country teams are often focused on the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the host country, and each country team reports back to Washington without a coordinating entity within the region. When confronted with an operational void that adversely impacts mission coordination, the JFC can take initiative to assist in a broader coordination among governmental and nongovernmental entities, while recognizing their respective lines of authority.

**Organizational and process challenges:**
The graphic depicts the coordination lines between various echelons of command and potential partners. These are often complex and overlapping due to the many requirements for coordination and collaboration. Information fratricide can
occur absent continuous communication and clear lines of responsibilities.

A related challenge is deciding:
1. Who should we coordinate with?
2. How are we coordinating with them?
3. How is this information getting into our staff processes?
4. How are we supporting our partners?

These questions are valid whether the joint force is supported or supporting another force or agency. The graphic to the right depicts a framework that lays out the above questions when the joint force is the supported organization. One can see how it could also be applied when the joint force is supporting an organization on the left side. It depicts the first step to identify engaged partners and stakeholders, which can be overlooked – often due to the complexity of the situation and lack of knowledge on who is working the problem. Second is to determine a method (or methods) of coordination. Sometimes methods may pre-exist, other times they may need to be created. Additionally, there may be restrictions in direct liaison or a lack of trusted relationships hindering coordination or collaboration. The final step is to develop the means to gain partner/stakeholder perspectives while providing joint force perspectives in return. We find this last step is often the most challenging step of the process and is best addressed by clear terms of reference and staff integration processes. We have seen JFCs continually re-address these basic questions as the environment or situation changes.
4.0 INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.
Interagency coordination, as a subset of interorganizational cooperation, is defined as coordinating across U.S. federal government agencies. As such, the type of operation – foreign or domestic support – will determine agency partners for DOD entities. The primary partner for foreign operations is DOS, normally through the appropriate U.S. Embassy. During domestic operations, the most likely partner is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as embodied by the United Coordination Group defined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF).

**U.S. Embassy:** The interagency process continues to be the most efficient and effective means for the U.S. Government to leverage resources for securing America’s interests abroad. In foreign operations, a key partner for the joint force is the U.S. Embassy. JFCs conduct coordination with the country team and the various agencies represented on it. The country team has established relationships with the host nation, multinational partners, and non-governmental and private entities. Working through the country team allows the joint command to engage appropriately without negatively impacting existing U.S. relationships. For a JTF (when given DIRLAUTH), the primary point of entry for the joint command into the country team will be the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) as the senior military officer in the embassy. The Joint Force Commander will normally have a regular and close relationship with the country team Chief of Mission.

**Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD):** POLADs provide invaluable foreign policy expertise and advice to senior, strategic level military leaders serving at various commands throughout the world. POLADs work alongside conventional and special operations commanders and communicate with foreign governments, militaries, and other government agencies. The POLAD is often a senior Foreign Service officer with substantial diplomatic expertise. The POLAD is an advisor to the commander and not an LNO from the State Department. As such, he or she provides the commander with insights and perspectives of a foreign policy expert. The POLAD can be expected to leverage contacts with DOS or other agencies to open a dialog, but does not speak on behalf of DOS.

**Unified Coordination Group:** For domestic operations, DOD conducts two types of missions, Homeland Defense and Civil Support. These missions are characterized by different partners, authorities, and structures than that of foreign operations. DOD’s principal mission partner in each of these missions is DHS and, for Civil Support, FEMA. Authorities for operating domestically differ greatly from foreign operations, partly because fewer U.S. laws apply to foreign operations whereas all U.S. laws apply for domestic operations (e.g., Posse Comitatus).

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**US Embassy: Authority and Country Team Members**

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<th>Chief of Mission</th>
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<td>- Ambassador or Chargé</td>
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<td>- Personal representative of President to host nation</td>
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<td>- Lead for US foreign policy in country</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Has authority over all US Government personnel in-country</td>
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<td>- Except those assigned to a combatant commander or international organization</td>
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“The Combatant Commander’s team on the ground must be adept, flexible in coordinating not only with the Ambassador and country team, especially the DATT and Station (Chief), and especially all elements on the ground... to understand mission, ops in the entire region, AOR, and keep Washington interagency informed and also asking the right questions.”

- Senior State Department Official and Former U.S. Ambassador
Coordinating structures with federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local agencies are guided by NIMS and the NRF. The Unified Coordination Group (UCG) serves as the focal point for Unified Action and is located at a Joint Field Office (JFO). The primary DOD linkage in the JFO is the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).

Cyberspace Operations:
Cyberspace operations is another example of necessary interagency coordination. DOD has an interdependent relationship with national cyberspace infrastructure partners (see the graphic on the right). The U.S. private sector and international/host nations provide support for DOD networks requiring coordination to ensure the integrity of key nodes. The cybersecurity operations team in the graphic demonstrates a necessary whole-of-government solution to defend the nation due to the scale of the interdependent cyberspace infrastructure and the diversity of partner relationships. For example, DHS complies with the NRF and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to plan for and respond to crises. Authorities for the conduct of cyberspace operations reside at high levels across different USG agencies (e.g., DOD, DHS, and Department of Justice (DOJ)). The diverse placement, employment, and timeliness of authorities complicates mission planning and can delay capability execution without transparent interagency coordination.

Insights and Best Practices:
- Develop and nurture relationships with interagency partners. Be inclusive.
- Understand the interagency process for both domestic and foreign operations.
- Leverage the POLAD as an advisor; they are not liaison officers from DOS or Embassies.
- Leverage key interagency coordination groups to achieve unity of effort.
- Understand the key interagency partners in cyberspace operations. Leverage their expertise and capabilities for cyberspace situational awareness, timely threat identification, global and regional analysis and assessment, the development of tailored threat responses, and/or the execution of branch plans that account for stakeholder equities.
5.0 MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS. The U.S. will normally operate as part of a multinational force to share capability, capacity, and authorities and to lend broader international legitimacy to a given mission. Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces.

The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command. A good example of an integrated command structure is found in Afghanistan (Resolute Support HQ) where Commander, RS is designated from a member nation, but the HQ staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. A Lead Nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation (CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve is a U.S. Lead Nation construct). Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated and the staffs are separate. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This is normally accomplished through the use of coordination centers. (An example of a parallel command structure was the response to a disaster relief operation in the Philippines. Supporting nations operated under bilateral relationships directly with the Government of the Philippines. GOP established a coordination center).

Forces participating in multinational operations will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. The degree of command authority (e.g., OPCON, TACON, etc) delegated to a multinational force commander (MNFC) is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. In a multinational or coalition environment, each nation will likely have a National Command Element (NCE) providing command and control support and guidance to the nation’s forces and a National Support Element to provide administrative, logistics (what United States would refer to as ‘Title 10’ support). Normally the senior assigned officer is designated the Senior National Representative (SNR). These elements can be the commander’s point of coordination for many of the issues involved in coalition and multinational operations; examples of such issues are rules of engagement, national caveats, and interoperability.

Although personal relationships between the commander and his or her counterpart and the associated staff relationships are critical, two structural enhancements can improve the coordination within MNFs: a liaison network and coordination centers.

During multinational operations, U.S. forces establish liaison early with forces of each nation to:
- foster better understanding of caveats, capabilities, and limitations
- facilitate the ability to integrate and synchronize operations
- assist in sharing information
- Developing trust and an increased level of teamwork.

Another means of enhancing MNF coordination is the use of a multinational coordination center (MNCC). We often see some form of MNCC at the combatant command when the US has been designated a lead nation in an MN operation or between national forces in a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of integrating the participating nations’ military forces into
multinational planning and operations processes, enhancing coordination and cooperation, and supporting an open and full interaction within the MNF structure. A MNCC may be established as a response to a crisis or maintained permanently to facilitate continuity.

We can expect to see more scenarios where a JTF may be largely working by, with, and through the host nation or indigenous forces. This “by, with, and through” construct has unique implications for the JTF. This construct requires the JTF to understand its role, authorities, and how its partner force operates as well as the specific mechanisms allowing the JTF to work “by, with, and through” its partner. In this situation we will often operate within a parallel command structure with HN forces.

Interoperability within a coalition construct is two-faceted: a human dimension based on trust, transparency, and inclusion; and a technical aspect. Coalition operations are by nature human-based. JFCs can not allow technical limitations of information sharing networks, tools, and databases to fracture the coalition. Language differences can pose formidable challenges. Even in the same language, words have different meanings to different people in different cultures. Select words carefully, avoid acronyms, and confirm understanding early rather than risk confusion later. Ensure information-exchange technical platforms are in-place, necessary disclosure and information sharing training is accomplished, and establish a strong “write for release” policy to enable collaboration both within and external to the HQ.

**Insights and Best Practices:**
- Personal relationships and building mutual trust are often more important than formal command relationships.
- Political considerations, directed authorities, and national caveats will heavily influence the coalition command structure and operations. Understand the domestic politics of participating nations to gain awareness of factors influencing national objectives, capabilities, and limitations.
- Understand the speed at which your partners can plan and operate.
- Leverage relationships to overcome potential technical interoperability challenges.
- Include and empower coalition partners by not over-classifying information and effectively sharing with them. Include Foreign Disclosure Officers.
- Understand and incorporate National Command and National Support Elements, and Senior National Representatives.
6.0 HQ ORGANIZATIONAL INSIGHTS. Interorganizational cooperation is a cross functional staff effort. This type of cooperation occurs across the staff and is not limited to a particular section or directorate; it entails interaction by multiple functional areas with various organizations outside of the JFC. The following list provides a sample of some initial questions for functional staff consideration:

- **Planning**: Are your partners included in planning? Are you included in theirs? Are they assisting in design (understanding the operating environment and problem)?
- **Assessment**: How are you including your partners’ perspectives?
- **Operations**: Are your operations synchronized with your partners? Is your battle rhythm in sync with the supported agency’s battle rhythm?
- **Fires**: How are you integrating your nonlethal fires?
- **Communication Strategy**: Are all partners presenting a unified message?
- **Legal**: Does everyone understand their proper authorities?
- **Intel**: Is information from all mission partners included in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPPOE)?

The efforts toward gaining and maintaining interorganizational cooperation constitute a multifaceted staff process that requires ownership and assigned responsibilities in some form of terms of reference (TOR) document. Absent clear responsibilities, the HQs will either overlook potential engagements or be confusing in their engagement with these external partners and stakeholders.

We see numerous options for engagement and interface with these players. Many HQ have civilian or multinational deputy commanders. These deputies can greatly assist in the interaction with civilian and coalition partners. Some HQs use a separate directorate, often designating a J9 for this function, particularly in combatant commands and other JFCs where dealing with agencies and other external stakeholders is a significant portion of the command’s focus. Others assign this responsibility to the J3 or J5, or form a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), a Partnership Directorate, or Civil-Military Coordination Section. Regardless of the name or mechanism, we see the importance of designating responsibility for primary interface with each of the various players and ensuring their inclusion within the HQs.

A HQ’s structure and processes for coordination may evolve as the mission progresses and the requirements for coordination and synchronization change. Early on much of the coordination may occur in the J5, while in execution the J3 may take on increased responsibilities. In addition to structure and process changes, the placement and use of partner representatives or liaison may

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<th>Example of Responsibility Matrix</th>
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<td><strong>USG Agencies</strong></td>
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evolve. For example, interagency representatives and LNOs may be consolidated in one location, or be spread by function across the entire staff in a hub-and-spoke arrangement.

A key requirement for interorganizational coordination within a joint command is to establish the initial staff linkages to external partners. As part of the initial mission analysis, the command conducts an evaluation to determine what stakeholders may influence or affect the mission. The illustration to the right depicts the complexity of cross-functional command group and staff interaction with partners. The arrows are not all-inclusive; the relationships shown here are part of a large, complex web. This complexity underscores the need for Terms of Reference (TOR) within the command to delineate roles and responsibilities for engagement and coordination. Listed below are questions to consider when determining whether to establish a separate internal coordinating entity within the joint force command structure:

- What is the current requirement for interorganizational cooperation? Who are we currently coordinating with? Are there other organizations we should be coordinating with? Is the current coordination sufficient? How is it affecting the mission? What would be the benefits of improved coordination?
- Are the current coordination processes for Phase 0 operations sufficient and effective when transitioning and operating in subsequent Phases?
- Are the coordination processes for supporting another organization effective?
- Are the coordination processes when the JFC is the supported command effective?
- Is the solution a new organizational entity or process, or just a refinement of current staff processes?

**Insights and Best Practices:**

- Develop Terms of Reference to define roles and responsibilities across directorates.
- Develop and maintain a close relationship with the POLAD (if assigned) to ensure that DOS perspectives and diplomatic considerations are represented in key Battle Rhythm events.
- Ensure external perspectives are included in appropriate staff processes (e.g., OPTs, assessments, daily Commander Briefs, the Operations Center).
- Develop and maintain relationships with the higher HQ to leverage their interagency contacts, relationships, and capabilities that can inform your command’s operations.
- Understand your subordinates’ capabilities to coordinate with relevant partners. Some subordinates may be better able and equipped to directly coordinate with relevant partners, while others may require your support.
- Develop and maintain relationships with pertinent private or commercial entities that may impact your mission.
7.0 COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION TECHNIQUES.

**Information Sharing:** As stated in the National Security Strategy signed December 2017, “relationships develop over time, create trust and shared understanding that the United States calls upon when confronting security threats, responding to crises, and encouraging others to share the burden from tackling the world’s challenges.” Sharing information with our mission partners is inherently linked to building the trust necessary to operate together to achieve unified action. DOD’s culture encourages the safeguarding of information to ensure operational security. Thus, sharing information with our partners is often limited by policy and regulation, but just as often we restrict information flow simply out of convenience or habit. For example, much unclassified work is conducted on classified networks without consideration of the ability to share information with our partners. Understand the opportunities and implications of sharing information not only with USG interagency partners, but also with potential alliance and coalition members. Effectively sharing information will require up-front, command-level decisions within a properly balanced need-to-share and need-to-know construct. Sharing of information may require a mission partner environment network together with well-defined information management decisions to create shared understanding.

**Insights and Best Practices:**
- Balance “need-to-share” with “need-to-know” thinking within a culture of inclusion. Always consider “writing for release.”
- Integrate Foreign Disclosure Officers into the staff to help mitigate risk while encouraging the maximum amount of information sharing.
- Address information sharing and collaboration requirements with mission partners. Develop processes to share information with all stakeholders who are not on your communications network. Interoperability is more human-based than technical.
- Identify and promulgate the primary communications network to be used by the command. Alert users when critical information must be passed on another network.

**Liaison Officers:** Liaison Officers are the most common method to coordinate with external mission partners. They can be deployed individually or in small teams, but the rule of thumb is to send quality personnel with the maturity and skill to operate independently. Understand and codify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of LNOs or Agency Representatives. Understand at what level the representative can speak for their parent organization and at what point the JFC will have to reach to higher authority. The staff as a whole, and decision-makers in particular, must understand if the assigned LNOs are able to speak on behalf of their parent organization or if they can only provide reach back, viewpoints, and perspectives. The joint force command can fill a vital role by gathering, understanding, and sharing the specific authority held by individual LNOs and representatives.

**Coordination Centers:** We have seen coordination centers work as an effective means of coordinating with interorganizational partners, particularly at the tactical level where they can link the JTF with partners on the ground. Doctrinal solutions include Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACC), and the previously mentioned MNCC. CMOCs and MNCCs are normally extensions of the JFC staff. Locating a CMOC away from the JFC headquarters may help to encourage and facilitate participation by external organizations. The HACC is normally established by an external entity such as the
United Nations. JFCs will likely provide some form of liaison to HACCs to ensure synergy with other missions such as NEO or combat operations.

**Working Groups and Meetings:** Sitting down for face-to-face meetings with interorganizational partners is often the most effective way to coordinate, but can also be the most difficult. We have observed greater access within less formal setting in the case of external forums located off site, and internal battle rhythm events, such as an Interagency Working Group or a Combined Interagency Coordination Group (CIACG). Relevant stakeholders must be included to allow for maximum information sharing.

**Engagements:** Individual discussions between senior leaders are often the precursor to establishing the above mentioned meetings. These one-on-one engagements establish relationships and build trust that create common understanding between organizations.

**Information Networks/Websites:** Multiple networks and web portals exist for sharing of information and gaining situational awareness. We see successful JFCs utilizing or monitoring these networks, ensuring their staffs have access to and are aware of the information available on them. Examples include the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), ReliefWeb, and the All Partners Access Network (APAN).

**Contact Groups:** In some instances, we have observed a move toward less structured approaches to coordinating disparate groups toward a common goal. These loosely formed organizations, sometimes called Contact Groups, are bound by a shared problem set (e.g., piracy, Ebola pandemic) and membership is open to anyone who can contribute. These ad-hoc groups are then disbanded once the problem is solved or reduced to a manageable level.

**Stakeholder Coordination Efforts:** Interorganizational partners have established methods to improve coordination with DOD counterparts, many with the goal of educating and establishing relationships prior to operations or crisis. Notable examples are USAID’s Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) and the Development in Vulnerable Environments (DiVE) course. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has personnel and programs that educate military units on their unique role. The U.S. Institute of Peace hosts an Interagency Tabletop Exercise that brings together the military, other USG agencies, and NGOs for an event that promotes interaction and education in real-world scenarios. These programs educate the military staff member of interorganizational capabilities and participation by military staff members increase the likelihood of improved coordination during real-world events.
Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOR – Area of Responsibility
APAN – All Partners Access Network
C2 – Command and Control
CCDR – Combatant Commander
CCMD - Combatant Command (organization)
CIACG – Combined Interagency Coordination Group
CJTF – Combined Joint Task Force
CMOC – Civil-Military Operations Center
COS – Chief of Staff
DATT – Defense Attaché
dCO – Defense Coordinating Officer
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DIME – Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
DIRLAUTH – Direct Liaison Authorized
DiVE – Development in Vulnerable Environments
DOJ – Department of Justice
DOS – Department of State
DTD – Deployable Training Division
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPA – Foreign Policy Advisor
GCC – Geographic Combatant Command
HACC – Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HQ – Headquarters
HSIN – Homeland Security Information Network
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
JFC - Joint Force Commander
JFO – Joint Field Office
JHOC – Joint Humanitarian Operations Course
JIACG – Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIPOE – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment
JKO – Joint Knowledge Online

JP – Joint Publication
JTF – Joint Task Force
LFA – Lead Federal Agency
LNO – Liaison Officer
MNCC – Multinational Coordination Center
MNFC – Multinational Force Commander
NCE – National Command Element
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NIMS – National Incident Management System
NIPPC – National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NMS – National Military Strategy
NRF – National Response Framework
NSE – National Support Element
OFDA – Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPT – Operational Planning Team
PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure
POLAD – Foreign Policy Advisor
SDO – Senior Defense Officer
TOR – Terms of Reference
UCG – Unified Coordination Group
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USG – United States Government