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Personnel Recovery in Competition Insights and Considerations

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**Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
Personnel Recovery Education & Training Center**

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PREFACE

The United States places such a high value on the lives of those operating in service to our nation that it often risks personnel and significant treasure to return those personnel home through its personnel recovery capabilities. Until recently, Personnel Recovery has long been viewed as only applicable in conflict or our VEO problem set. This paradigm is a challenge for our Joint Force, a challenge this paper seeks to mitigate by threading our collective understanding of Personnel Recovery from Strategic National guidance through Joint Function relevance. Today, day-to-day global competition is the new reality and may put personnel at risk in new ways. As the U.S.G. leads international efforts to counter, marginalize, and deter hostage-taking and efforts to isolate personnel as a weapon against our U.S. interests it may require a different personnel recovery mindset. Comprehending this personnel recovery risk so that it can be aggregated, mitigated, and communicated through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) effects is our responsibility to the Presidential Policy that drives whole of government actions. This paper delivers the necessary perspective for commanders and staffs to plan, prepare for, and execute when an isolating event occurs in this context.

This paper may be beneficial to three main audiences:

- Operational level commanders and staffs to plan, prepare for, and conduct Personnel Recovery
- Service partners preparing for operations in the joint environment.
- The education, doctrine, and concept community.

Three key insights are continually reinforced throughout the paper:

- PR provides both support to, and mitigation for, the National Defense Strategy.
- PR must be addressed with WOG/DIME approaches and across the continuum of conflict to be effective in competition.
- The exploitation opportunity isolated personnel afford adversaries is a calculable risk. This risk is additive to the mission and able to be mitigated when Personnel Recovery is planned as cross-functional and enabling within Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Globally Integrated Base Plans (GIBPs), and other documented plans.

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency is a Chairman's Controlled Activity and the Office of Primary Responsibility for Personnel Recovery in the DoD. This paper is our executive level insights paper on Personnel Recovery. Please share your thoughts and best practices as you plan your way through operational challenges with js.belvoir.jptra.mbx.pretc-commandant@mail.mil, Personnel Recovery Education & Training Center.



Major General, U.S. Air Force
Vice Director for Joint Force Development
Joint Staff J7

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Executive Summary: The NDS defines the current global security environment as a field of great power competition; this requires the defense department to remain relevant across the continuum of conflict, particularly in the competitive space short of armed conflict/crisis. While much of the Joint Force has begun to orient around this new American way of war, Personnel Recovery (PR), as a Joint Function enabler, must also adapt. This paper calls out for that adaptation, closing planning gaps where PR delivers additive, unassessed but assumed risk against national strategies and DoD missions. Failure to address this risk undermines our ability to meet military objectives while allowing our adversaries to leverage daunting information campaigns that chip at the underpinnings of U.S. strength. Tackling this problem for the target audience establishes a trajectory for this paper from Strategic National to Operational, allowing the reader to connect Presidential Policy, National Defense Strategy, and their Joint Function expertise to PR. The desired end state is for Joint Staffs to appreciate PR's whole of government implications, its DIME compliment to existing plans, and the strategic importance of well integrated PR planning to support global campaigning.

1. Policy Links to Personnel Recovery:

1.1. Presidential Policy

1.1.1. Throughout our military history, the U.S. has placed a high value on the lives of those operating at risk in service to our nation. In many cases the U.S. has risked significant treasure and talent to return personnel home. Even today's shift of global competition as specified within the NSS and NDS does not diminish this drive.

1.1.2. The U.S. commitment to return isolated personnel begins with the President of the United States (POTUS) and the issuance of the U.S. government (USG) standard for PR found in Presidential Policy Directive-30 (PPD-30) *U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts*. Initiated under President Obama, presidential commitment to PR was re-affirmed by President Trump by stating, "one of the highest priorities of the President of the United States is to recover U.S. citizens isolated from friendly control and those held hostage abroad." PPD-30 mandates a whole of government approach and highlights the relevance of PR to America's national strategy and security.

"The 21st century has witnessed a significant shift in hostage-takings by rogue nations, terrorist organizations and criminal groups abroad. Hostage-takers frequently operate in unstable environments that challenge the ability of the United States Government and its partners and allies to operate effectively."... "Presidential Policy Directive-30 (PPD-30) directs a renewed, more agile United States Government response to hostage-takings of U.S. nationals and other specified individuals abroad. It establishes the need for"... "close interagency coordination in order to employ all appropriate means to recover U.S. hostages held abroad, and to significantly enhance engagement with hostages' families. It also reaffirms the United States Government's personnel recovery policy, which seeks to **prevent, prepare for, and respond to hostage-takings and other circumstances in which U.S. nationals are isolated from friendly support.**" (White House Press release June 24, 2015).

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1.2. Department of Defense Policy

1.2.1. Given their impact on national sentiments and strategies, the tenets of our commitment to isolated persons continues in Department policy...

“Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilians, and DoD contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces who are in danger of becoming, or already are, beleaguered, besieged, captured, detained, interned, or otherwise missing or evading capture (hereafter referred to as “isolated”) while participating in U.S.-sponsored activities or missions, is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense... The Department of Defense has an obligation to train, equip, and protect its personnel, prevent their capture and exploitation by adversaries, and reduce the potential for using isolated personnel as leverage against U.S. security objectives. Commanders at all levels must link force protection programs and personnel recovery as a means of preserving the force.” (DODD 3002.01, 24 May 2017).

1.2.2. What is clearly identified through this series of Presidential and Departmental policy excerpts is the linkage between a singular event involving an isolated person and its strategic impact on the NDS. Doctrinally, the “value” of PR has been articulated through four enduring purposes: 1) to maintain combat capability, 2) prevent enemy exploitation, 3) maintain morale, and 4) recover isolated personnel. Today, PR only exists as an enabling capability under the Joint Function of Protection, ensuring commanders have a Means by which to conserve the joint force’s fighting strength. Yet exploitation is regularly leveraged by U.S. adversaries as a Means to further their propaganda campaign and achieve strategic objectives through intelligence and information. This linkage must drive nested planning within a larger whole of government PR response that supports and protects greater U.S. strategies, not just individuals who become isolated.

2. Personnel Recovery and the National Defense Strategy

2.1. Current U.S. strategies ask the department to pivot toward peer adversaries in competition, rather than direct conflict. Preceding papers concede that to succeed in the emerging security environment, our nation and its Joint Force will have to out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate state, non-state, proxies, and other threat actors. Within this environment, our adversaries perceive our efforts to recover a single individual as a blue force vulnerability. As a result, we see multiple coherent adversary campaign plans objectively isolating personnel as a means for challenging our collective strategies. Such targets not only involve USG personnel, but include our allies and partners as well.

“Counter coercion and subversion. In competition short of armed conflict, revisionist powers and rogue regimes are using corruption, predatory economic practices, propaganda, political subversion, proxies, and the threat or use of military force to change facts on the ground.” (NDS of the United States of America, 2018 Summary).

2.2. These adversary plans deliberately and effectively create hostage taking, kidnapping for ransom, governmental detention, prisoner of war and other like events. In global operations

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with powers competing in the “gray zone,” we expect these isolating events to continue, forcing the U.S., our allies and our partners to reassess who and what are truly at risk. Currently, this risk is unassessed, assumed and far greater than doctrinal language would indicate.

Conventional thinking on PR has continued, unevolved into an environment of great power competition and in doing so fails to identify the risks of inadequate PR planning or coordination within competition. Further, failure to assess such risk within Global Campaign Planning affords adversaries opportunity to leverage isolated personnel in powerful influence campaigns, generating tactical pause, disengaging friendly forces and focus from lines of operation and effort (LOOs/LOEs), and empowering their own whole of government fusion of hard and soft powers.

2.3. In this context, sound PR execution demands a whole of government response backed by holistic and cross-functional planning to successfully counter an adversary’s efforts to exploit isolating events. Planning for PR through Joint Functions then allows for direct and proactive support to the NDS rather than the deleterious effects described above.

Insight: Failure to prepare for PR can create the perception that the U.S. is incapable of protecting its people or its allies. The resultant risk erodes political and public support while diminishing U.S. credibility, influence, and access. In an environment dominated by information, perceptions aggressively shape national will and subsequent political decisions.

2.4. Joint staffs begin to close this gap by understanding the specific linkages between PR and the NDS. The first piece of this puzzle is well described within the NDS as four broad LOEs supported by complementary Ways that allow for the U.S. to generate advantage while complicating adversary actions. More allusive is the understanding that a PR-savvy coalition of allies and partners brings the ability to “Expand in the Competitive Space” with risk understood, planned for, mitigated or assumed, and reduction in the scale, duration, and/or impact of isolating events.

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2.5. Support to the “Build a More Lethal Force” LOE is the most direct expression of PR’s necessity. Reflecting on doctrine’s enduring principles, a lethal force is one whose morale is sustained, whose fighting strength is maintained absent isolation, and whose lethality is not degraded by exploitation, loss, or counterintelligence.

2.6. The NDS highlights the need to expand and strengthen our partnerships in order to compete on a global scale with allies of like values and interests. Search and Rescue is a PR subset that presents a convenient Way to engage a nation in capability development especially when the capability has a dual civilian/military role, allowing for broader support by constituents. Understanding that no force is truly single-mission allows us to envision a nation’s PR capability as one that first supports coalition mitigation of risk, while second expanding the capabilities and capacities necessary for strategic placement and access.

2.7. It is the necessary interoperability underpinning our alliances and partnerships that additionally “Reforms the Department.” While only a single avenue of approach, PR interoperability through common terminology, process, and systems is truly reinforcing of broader interoperability with the U.S. Further, no function or capability is operating today at a level of efficiency and effectiveness that begets U.S. advantage in a globally competitive space. Like others, adaptation specific to PR tasks must also continue to occur as reinforcing of the Lethality LOE. Finally, in-line with current philosophies on the intent of exercise to evolve concepts and forces against dynamic problem sets, PR as an enabler compliments our DoD adaptation to improve efficiency and effectiveness of global operations.

2.8. Joint force planning for PR based upon this understanding of direct support to the NDS requires to principle adaptations. First, planners and staffs must comprehend the WOG/DIME nature inherent in PR by policy, guidance, definition, and practicality. Second, these same

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planners and staffs must understand the duality of PR as a cross-functional enabler, both supporting and supported by the family of Joint Functions.

3. WOG/DIME Approach to PR:

3.1. One must first understand the definitions and supporting structures PR rest upon before specific applications across joint planning and execution coordination can be made. While the enterprise is wrapped in a host of national and department level policies intending to define criterion upon which we can understand where a PR requirement should trigger staff action, the USG as a whole lacks a common list of PR terminology. Therefore, this paper uses definitions and situational context contained in DoDD 3002.01 *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*, DoDI 2310.05 *Accounting for Missing Persons*, DoDI 3020.41 *Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF)*, Joint Publication 3-50 *Personnel Recovery* and Joint Publication 1-02 *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* to create PR terms of reference. At the forefront of this list is the term “Isolated Person” where inclusion of the corresponding conditions, legal disposition or status, and operating environment context sets the stage for determination of appropriate DIME effects necessary to mitigate the event’s risk.

3.2. Isolated Person (IP).

3.2.1. DoDD 3002.01 describes the DoD employee types and conditions surrounding an IP as **“U.S. military, DoD civilians and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a U.S. sponsored military activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.”** At no point does DoDD 3002.01 specify or imply that PR only applies in time of declared war. In fact, the policy remains intentionally broad so that the most senior of leaders throughout the DoD can capitalize on PR’s value against risk at any level, including risk to the NDS, regardless of the operating environment (permissive, uncertain, hostile, and denied).


3.2.2. DoDI 2310.05 states that military commanders and ultimately service Secretaries are legally bound to fully account for all assigned U.S. military and DoD civilian personnel who are declared missing. It also defines all potential missing personnel categories as Missing in Action, Interned or Detained (in a foreign country), Captured, Beleaguered, and Besieged against one’s will. These categories lay the foundation for why an IP can range in scale from one person to an entire organized unit. These categories also bring in other relative crisis management situations like hostage and kidnapped.

3.2.3. DoDI 3020.41 provides the guidance necessary to apply PR when addressing DoD contractor personnel per DoDD 3002.01. This unique population exhibits calculable operational risk and adversary exploitation value in the global environment not much different than U.S. military and DoD civilians should they become isolated.

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3.2.4. Contrary to legacy belief, the scope of persons for whom the USG will undertake PR is not limited to situations involving hostile action, circumstances suggestive of hostile action, or only DoD personnel. DoDD 3002.01 specifically calls out "...and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense," which remains DoD's link to PPD-30 where a whole of government approach to PR is mandated given its relevance to America's national strategy and security. Based on this national policy level determination, PR may be initiated through any combination of authorities-based military, diplomatic, and civil/private response option in support of any U.S., allied, or coalition individual or group who become isolated.



Insight: While PR is WOG, inconsistencies and complexities are barriers to mission success. DoD policy must be streamlined to ensure a timely effective response is enabled.

3.3. Personnel Recovery (PR).

3.3.1. Within the context of this paper it is then important to correlate the definition of PR as a WOG approach to the recovery of an IP. Doctrinally PR is **“the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.”** More accurately stated this would be the use of all instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) as planned for consistent with JSCP guidance specific to PR tasks. The unified application of DIME demands strategic level synchronization and management of all plans to include global campaign plans, globally integrated base plans, integrated contingency plans and combatant command campaign plans

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(GCPs/GIBPs/ICPs/CCPs) to integrate the execution of strategies and synchronization of authorities to mitigate risk.

Insight: PR is a cross-functional, enabling capability requiring supported and supporting planning in order to provide an effective WOG response. The definition of PR as “the sum of diplomatic, military, and civil efforts” uniquely places it within the CJCS’s purview for Joint Staff integration and synchronization of effects.

3.3.2. To a military mind, the role military capabilities play in support of a PR response tends to remain straight forward. Where innovation and national power remains largely untapped is the civil and diplomatic dimensions even though collaborative structures and authorities exist to do so. The logical root cause behind such untapped capability is a lack in understanding, failure to incorporate these means into planning, and ineffective exercise design that uses or truly emulates real-world players.

3.3.3. Regardless as to what US department an isolated person represents, the USG has a responsibility to recover these individuals consistent with WOG policy where the DoD plays a key role. Accounting for DoD personnel within a PR plan, while very complex, is remarkably humbled when compared to the scope of DoD resource and support planning involving non-DoD and private entities also at risk. Application of the DIME approach was clearly evident with the recent return of Pastor Brunson following his unlawful detention in Turkey (2018). There the U.S. levied economic sanctions, political pressure, and sent a Senator to negotiate the release of the pastor following President Trump’s guidance that “we will use all means available to recover and return our citizens.” The DoD’s part to play in this event was through intelligence, medical, and transportation support. The tactics of negotiations, armistice, strategic messaging, raids, and sanctions are not new to the U.S. in its strategies to return IPs.

3.3.4. Further, two clear examples where the DoD military dimension clearly connects with diplomatic and civil instruments is addressed in DoDI 3003.01 *Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue* and DoD MANUAL 3025.01 *Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)*. Geographic Combatant Commands are tasked to support civil SAR in accordance with multiple International Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) arrangements. In addition, DoD provides military capability for U.S. territories and OCONUS when requested through the Department of State, which regularly occurs in the form of Foreign/Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (F/HADR) under USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Application of DoD military capabilities in these two areas already have well defined authorities and collaborative frameworks backed with countless success stories. Additive to a commander’s risk calculation is the dual task placed on limited PR capabilities to support DoD needs and civil SAR requirements. While an extreme example, supporting a Hurricane Katrina civil SAR relief effort while also providing Homeland Defense rescue coverage north of the Arctic Circle and kinetic operations in USCENTCOM requires ruthless prioritization.

3.3.5. From a teaming approach, DoD support to civil SAR remains a strong avenue of support to our allies and partners around the globe. DoD support to civil SAR in conjunction with F/HADR operations provides an opportunity to gain, expand, and maintain access in the

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competitive space through both the Diplomatic and Economic instruments. For example, effects from our 2004 OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (tsunami relief within Indonesia) stands as a prominent example. In 2004, the DoD initially was the lead federal agency (LFA) based on the totality of the speed and capabilities the Department could provide. In a Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) study conducted afterward provided evidence U.S. civil/military authorities involved in the tsunami relief gained significant trust and prominent placement and access for follow-on operations in Indonesia.

Insight: Leveraging authorities specific to DSCA and Defense Support to Civil SAR can afford the DoD flexibility in access and influence that delivers the strategic opportunities necessary for reductions in risk across strategies.

4. Joint Functional Approach to Personnel Recovery.

4.1. To ensure PR's efficacy to address the competition problem described in the NDS, utilizing all instruments of national power, DoD must also shift its view of PR from its tactical response stove-pipe within Protection to one of operational compliment across all seven joint functions. Symptomatic of this historical DoD view, the PR community within DoD remains heavily focused on full-scale conflict, denied A2AD environments, or the need to address High Risk of Isolation (HRI) within a VEO construct. Meanwhile the challenge and corresponding risk have grown as a result of great power competition below armed conflict, thus elevating the risk of isolation for strategic gains by competing powers within the gray zone. As the U.S. and its allies engage in a broad spectrum of partnership building, peace keeping, and humanitarian activities, how does the Joint Force properly plan for PR where DoD may lack the authority but has a responsibility under presidential and/or departmental policy?

4.1.1. Power competition creates risk. The rise of competitors and the challenges within the gray zone inherently creates opportunities for isolating events. Having calculated the risk, how do strategies inclusive of PR prepare decision-makers to plan, predict, and provide Military response options coincident with DIImE and aligned to whole of government effects?

4.1.2. **Hypothetical Vignette #1:** To provide context we will use a vignette to analyze the complexity of a peer challenge against allied nations and a fictitious CONPLAN XXXX having incomplete authorities for PR operations in Phase 0 to Phase 1 transition.

A peer adversary deploys surrogate forces along the border with multiple allied nations. Surrogates take advantage of the porous borders to conduct unconventional warfare to destabilize each country and the region. This includes Information Operations (IO) claiming the right to protect similar ethnic minorities within U.S. allied nations. Through Dynamic Force Employment (DFE), U.S. forces are deployed from the Immediate Response Force (IRF) to conduct Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) in an attempt to de-escalate tension within the region. Decision point criteria is met and the CDR transitions from Phase 0 to Phase 1 of CONPLAN XXXX. The adversary escalates again by conducting counter-deterrence operations

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with cross-border surrogate forces. As a result, a small contingent of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and allied partner SOF become isolated. Per CONPLAN XXXX, the planned PR response forces are available in a neighboring country. But prior to Phase 2, these forces lack the authority and permissions to conduct unilateral cross-border PR operations without the basing host nation's approval. Additionally, a case-by-case permission from the allied country where U.S. SOF are now isolated exists for a PR response force to enter and conduct operations. The time delay while seeking permissions and approvals affords the adversary opportunity to detain the U.S. SOF element; and then control the optic, location, and timing of release. The adversary executes additional steps within its own IO campaign focused on the inability of the USG and its allied partner to protect their ethnic brothers and sisters. They do so by holding a press conference to exploit the situation and gain a marked advantage in the competitive space through its influence over the constituent populations.

Insight: A globally dispersed force feels combat capability loss proportionately greater than a concentrated one, furthering the notion of PR's strategic significance. Given the adversaries current advantage in decision speed, especially in the information environment, the U.S. can expect to lose influence compounding this strategic significance.

4.2. The vignette highlights the strategic influence an adversary is able to obtain through exploitation of an isolating event. Further, in the current reality of insufficient force structure, this event highlights the impact from losing even routine forces has on our lethal force sustainment. The commander in this case must then ask, what would happen or how would this be impacted by the lack of Low Density/High Demand DFE Enablers being committed to a higher priority? Planners must ask, is the Joint Force appropriately prepared to support the military objectives and our national strategies should an isolating event occur?

4.3. Specified and implied PR tasks exists through DoD policy, CJCS guidance, and plans. These tasks are assigned across joint staff and special staff areas. Too often PR is viewed as being centralized amongst the four to five personnel sitting in the JPRC and not the holistic system of Joint Function capabilities. Specified tasks exist in policy for all CCMDs and Services to have a PR OPR. JSCP guidance exist directing that all CCDRs must plan for PR, and yet the operationalization of these tasks could stand improvement. In execution, how is PR supported by Information, Intelligence, Sustainment, and Fires? Planning, as well as coordination in execution, requires Joint Function leads to see the valued duplicity in PR as a supporting and supported enabling capability.

4.3.1. **Protection.** Doctrinally, PR is aligned under the Protection Joint Function where emergency management and response processes reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to isolating events, accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. This traditional paradigm engenders a more "reactive" posture. PR in this light is the branch or sequel to Force Protection gone awry. Commanders must leverage PR's enduring principles to create a proactive posture to mitigate the effects of exploitation vis-à-vis people, information, technology

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and missions. This directly supports Protection's principle, where "...[preserving] the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission."

4.3.2. **Command and Control.** Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups (B2C2WG) constructs should include PR where PR is both the supporting and supported capability/mission. While providing unity of effort and clarity of decision across staff echelons, it also allows for discussions and decisions on authorities, priorities, consequence management, and the allocation of resources informed by risk. Operating on a global scale, through a vision of whole-of-government PR under PPD-30, further demands synchronicity in effort driven as much from the Joint Staff for a global response as a CCMD for theater effects.

4.3.3. **Information.** Information related capabilities (IRCs) deliver necessary effects to support PR through the information environment and dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Examples of relevance include setting the conditions that shape the local and global view of U.S. presence to mitigate the likelihood of an isolating event, shaping the local conditions to delay contact to improve the likelihood of a friendly recovery, and then, should capture occur, owning the message to ensure adversary exploitation campaigns are either mitigated or occur on U.S. terms. Additionally, PR's civil and military flexibility often supports positive diplomatic messaging behind U.S. efforts.

4.3.4. **Intelligence.** Using doctrinal PR execution tasks Report, Locate, Support, Recover, and Reintegrate demands an Intel Function that is proactively planned and exercised in its ability to leverage all available technical and non-technical means to find, fix, and recover. Staffs cannot forget the importance of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) as the driver of commander's decisions. More nascent is the Intel support to commander's decisions that reflect enemy designs to isolate, capture, and exploit U.S. and Allied partner personnel. Then, should exploitation occur what are the impacts of counter-intelligence and influence to our mission and our strategies. Finally, when recovery is successful, isolated persons are questioned/debriefed to reveal elements of information that improve our understanding of the adversary, operating environment, as well as Joint Force Development and Design efforts.

4.3.5. **Fires.** Staffs easily understand the efficacy of the Joint Fires Function when conducting PR at the tactical level. Too often neglected is the PR plan in support of Joint Fires employment. Gaining necessary authorities and permissions, and identifying triggers to employ kinetically and non-kinetically early in planning improves probabilities for a speedy response within a mission where time to recover is critical. Joint Fires within a globally integrated PPD-30 context involves the integration and synchronization of military effects as well as diplomatic, informational and economic effects (DIME strategies) of the interagency and coalition/alliance to achieve recovery, release, or at worst mitigation during an IP-driven crisis.

4.3.6. **Movement and Maneuver.** In a competitive space with dispersed forces, Maneuver forces must account for the ability to conduct PR across a range of complex diplomatic and threat environments. In our current environment, an entire Maneuver element may find itself Movement constrained as much through physical isolation as through a loss of positive and procedural control within an EMS contested space. Proportionately large impacts to smaller, disaggregated forces hinder their ability to obtain objectives on behalf of the theater commander's mission. Finally, once isolated, personnel should be trained to survive and evade while engaging opportunistically in complement of Maneuver elements.

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4.3.7. **Sustainment.** In a competitive space our adversaries will use economics, diplomatic relationships, and surrogates to frustrate, isolate, detain and/or cripple the ability to move logistics around the globe. In these circumstances, the DoD relies on few, desperate resources to support the whole of USG requirements for security, transportation, and medical support. Those at risk of isolation under this Joint Function must be planned for and prepared to mitigate both the Information and Intelligence benefits gained by our adversaries in the advent of their capture. To complicate matters, it is not uncommon for the DoD to leverage contracted personnel to accomplish large scale logistical movements across vast and less than permissive environments that are regularly uncertain and at times even hostile. Our adversaries will exploit this population regardless of their source of employment and still achieve desired strategic affect.

4.4. PR planning across Joint Functions supports accurate and full assessments of risk surrounding the potential for isolating events culminating in capture. Planning for isolating events ensures that a fully burdened risk is properly communicated. Allocation of resources to mitigate such risk is a complicated decision with limited resources and high strategic relevance. Strategic relevance or value of a captured U.S. person goes beyond a simple combat loss, and must be viewed through historical lenses to understand possible strategic impact. Recent historical examples include the EP-3 crew detention in Hainan China (2001), the 10 USN riverine sailors detained in Iran (2016), the ambush of a SOCAFRICA convoy in Nigeria (2017), and the three American citizens detained in North Korea (2018).

Insight: The exploitation opportunity isolated personnel afford adversaries of the U.S. and partners on a global stage is a calculable risk. This risk is additive, and yet able to be mitigated when PR is integrated as cross-functional and enabling within GCPs, GIBPs, ICPs and CCPs.

5. **Multinational Support to Personnel Recovery.**

5.1. Harkening back to our NDS LOEs, partner and ally PR capabilities must be a component of our U.S. planning efforts. The U.S. has traditionally maintained a force of sufficient capability and capacity to operate independently. Arguably since Graham-Rudman (1987), the U.S. military has been reduced to a point where the DoD no longer has the luxury of unconstrained Means. This revelation is most evident on a Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) stage and has resulted in a shift in the U.S. planning construct. From a PR perspective examples include:

5.1.1. A U.S.-led coalition conducted manned airstrikes against Syria with limited U.S. military PR response forces, thus created reliance upon a civil/multinational SAR architecture to cover gaps and seams.

5.1.2. USAFRICOM possesses limited assigned or allocated forces capable of addressing its extensive PR commitment. USAFRICOM closed the gap by creating bilateral agreements with allied and host nation partners and acquiring a contract MEDEVAC-CASEVAC-SAR capability to mitigate some of its PR risk.

5.2. Thematic to U.S. strategies is the need to expand access, capabilities, and capacity through partnerships. PR is as much a Way as it is a Means within this theme. PR is a Way by

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which to garner allied partner support to a broader military effort. As described earlier, the diplomatic vehicle that rides on our common humanity to save lives allows for access and partnerships where they previously have not occurred. USSOUTHCOM's engagement across South and Central America through diplomatic channels on behalf of PR is an often cited model for combatant command theater security cooperation. As a Means, the scope of PR requirements cannot be met without the DIME support of our allies. The PR enabling capabilities, as expressed here through Joint Functions, are necessary compliments to joint forces while generating convincing dilemmas for U.S. adversaries who would attempt to operate indirectly or through others absent such sustained CCMD engagement.

5.3. The capture and killing of Jordanian pilot Moaz-Al-Kasasbeh in Syria placed tremendous strain on coalition support within Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. The associated impact to coalition commitment persisted until adequate PR capacity existed in theater and retained the capability for responding to similar isolating events in the future. The preservation of human life tends to be universal across U.S.-led coalitions, and so too is the coalition requirement to plan for it through PR. The impacts of a single isolating event, unplanned for, will continue to have operational and ultimately strategic impacts.

6. Hypothetical Vignette #2

6.1. To fully absorb PR from a WOG perspective, one must understand who the key stakeholders are along with the situational complexities behind necessary collaboration and coordination. To provide necessary context, the following vignette steps through what each key stakeholder would do based on authorities and/or responsibility.

Vignette #2 Situation: Two (2) U.S. Navy tactical vessels were transiting from BlueLand to Orangeland within international waters when the lead vessel experiences compounding mechanical issues that render it immobile. While working on the vessel to regain mobility, both vessels drift just outside a territorial sea boundary of an adversarial Redland with whom the U.S. has had a decade or more of geopolitical tension. Status reports are passed regularly by the element's senior ranking officer to a Duty Officer in the assigned Navy Component Headquarters. Those communications stop and shortly thereafter world news agencies are airing photos of U.S. Navy sailors being detained by Redland personnel while Redland's government officials are messaging that they have successfully rescued these U.S. Navy sailors. Absent any immediate communications or response from the USG, the Government of Redland begins making accusations over why these U.S. Navy tactical vessels penetrated their territorial waters. The situation rapidly becomes contentious and Redland is now directly challenging the U.S. by unlawfully detaining the U.S. Navy sailors.

6.2. Taking a pause in scenario to think with this situation in mind, and recalling how an IP can come from just about any walk of life, what if the IPs in this scenario were replaced by a political leader and appointed staff, a religious leader, a Military Liaison Element, or a U.S. civilian nuclear physicist. How about a Contractor Owned – Contractor Operated ship under USTRANSCOM's MSC or a similar ship under U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime

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Security Program Fleet? What if it were one or more astronauts on a manned space flight mission who entered this situation following a catastrophic event while ascending into or descending from space? None of these are implausible given today's operating and security environments.

6.3. One must also revisit the real risk of exploitation and how an adversary plans for such conditions within their own Information Campaign Plan to target a critical vulnerability. In this scenario, the adversarial Government of Redland is using IP exploitation by design to target U.S. (western) personnel as a COG to create the following effects:

6.3.1. Immediately force the U.S. into unplanned negotiations.

6.3.2. Appear strong militarily by challenging U.S. Military credibility (NDS).

6.3.3. Weaken U.S. Strategic credibility (NSS).

6.3.4. Reduce regional access by raising waterway security concerns.

6.4. WOG Stakeholder Roles, Responsibilities and Actions:

6.4.1. With a CCIR tripped and event details reported to key leaders and staff, an OPREP-3P is transmitted IAW CJCSM 3150.03D. Coordination within the JS commences according to the DJS's B2C2WG construct.

6.4.2. The Intelligence Community applies National Technical Means support to find-fix-recover the IPs. Select IO partners from across that community posture IAW predetermined authorities and actions.

6.4.3. The SecDef and Chairman build time-sensitive awareness to enable the correct framing of conversations with the President and his advisors on strategy and policy. Their staffs review assumptions, think through regional risk to mission, risk to strategy, and develop options that gain decision space, deter adversaries, and if deterrence fails, manage escalation to end the situation on terms favorable to the U.S.

6.4.4. JS J2 provides a perspective of the adversary's normative reasoning for ongoing actions and aspirations. J5, based on their being the central JS linkage to OSD and their continuing GCP-X, GIBP-X and Readiness Review responsibilities, provides key insights to initial assessments and recommendations to modify adversary behaviors, re-establish deterrence, control escalation, and inform the associated messaging. As the situation develops, the JS J3 increases capacity for situation monitoring and interacts with the directly affected CCMD J3, the other CCMDs J3s and Services to further ascertain the situation, mature risk and mitigation options, and frame necessary prioritization and allocation decisions for the DJS, Chairman and SecDef. Products: WARNORDs, ALERTORDs, responses to RFIs

6.4.5. The directly affected CCMD assesses the situation, reaches out to regional foreign and interagency partners, and plans with subordinates, all while collaborating with the JS, Chairman, and SecDef. The CCMD staff begins building an estimate for the JS addressing both traditional military options and non-kinetic cyber and space options to support the "M" or "m" in a DIME approach to PR.

6.4.6. OSD, informed by top-down guidance and through participation in JS B2C2WG events, assesses policy, WOG, and alliance implications. Meanwhile the Services assess the situation and risk associated with force readiness and generation for senior leaders and the JS. Products: Estimates, WARNORDs, responses to RFIs.

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6.4.7. The directly affected CCDR's initial estimate is disseminated, JS provides strategic risk assessment, and OSD reaches across the rest of the interagency for all to understand the Political, Military, Economic, Intelligence, Information (PMESII) implications of this event and associated risks to a DIME approach.

6.4.8. CJCS and SecDef are informed, so they reach out to stakeholders while increasing dialogue with the POTUS and information exchange with the National Security Council (NSC) Staff (Hostage Recovery Group (HRG) and Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC)). The HRG supports the NSC Deputies and Principals Committees, develops and implements USG policy and strategy with respect to PPD-30. The HRFC supports the HRG, and oversees a USG DIME response IAW PPD-30. DoD principles on the HRG are from OSD-SOLIC, OSD(I), and JS J37 (DDSO). Collaboration and coordination occurs with the following State Department sections: Diplomatic Security, Consular Affairs, Medical, Counter Terrorism, Management, and Legal.

6.4.9. POTUS is reaching out to allies and international organizations (UN/NATO) and the media while engaging internally within the USG. SecState and Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA) begin coordinating with international partners. SecState enables POTUS's senior diplomats and diplomats from key allies to engage with the Government of Redland and negotiate a diplomatic solution. Of note, coordination from the SPEHA, HRG, and HRFC is very short and moves information to the principal's level rapidly.

Vignette #2 Conclusion: Ultimately, the U.S. Navy sailors are turned over by the Government of Redland to the embassy of a U.S. Allied partner within Redland upon conclusion of a diplomatically negotiated release.

7. Challenges for PR in Today's Global Environment.

7.1. PR is challenged with building a systemic approach to enable the Joint Strategic Planning System. Execution of the specified task for all CCDRs to plan for PR within the JSCP is often absent in support of mission objectives.

7.2. Access and Authorities: A DIME-centered PR response regularly requires specified authorities to act in both Title 10 (Military) and Title 22 (Diplomatic) environments.

7.2.1. Title 22 - Chief of Mission (CoM): DoD may have no or limited authority to conduct PR operations in a sovereign nation (e.g. Germany). This is based on a sovereign nation's established authority and responsibility within its own territorial boundaries. With appropriate planning, coordination, and authorities a host nation would more likely grant permission to conduct PR operations when those operations align to the host nation government's security responsibilities.

7.2.2. Title 10 – DoD Campaigning vs. Phasing: A typical contingency plan for armed conflict is written to include the authority (Title 10) to conduct unilateral PR at the transition into Phase 1. However, some plans don't allow for this prior to Phase 2. PR must be planned for across all phases, especially those early shaping phases where isolation events are more likely to be destructive to our national objectives, through the influence of others, in environments short of conflict.

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7.3. Identifying and mitigating IP risk to NDS/NSS in GCPs/GIBPs/ICPs for unplanned non-traditional personnel groups. Institutionalized paradigms restrict the relevance of PR to armed conflict or VEO operating environments. The nature of the competitive space forces us to rethink risk of isolation, capture, resultant exploitation, and associated propaganda. It is possible leaders will perceive PR as either inconsequential or organically supported resulting in unassessed and unmitigated risk across a broad spectrum of personnel and material resources. The alignment of PR OPRs to joint HQ staff J-3s may only reinforce this perspective as valued impact to future plans, adherence to JSCP guidance, and integration across interagency bodies is limited.

8. **Conclusion:** In competition below armed conflict, pre-approved and delegated authorities are required to set the conditions for adaptive and responsive DIME strategies for PR. Given PR's Presidential policy origins, WOG characteristics, NDS implications, and enabling capabilities to Joint Functions; planning for PR within great power competition and synchronized across global campaigns with DIME instruments of power is the only way to truly buy down the risk isolating events pose to strategies and missions. Failure to plan and coordinate in this integrated fashion is to neglect the additive risk PR poses, which in turn compromises U.S. objectives and the Chairman's best military advice.

8.1. Current 2+3 adversaries are engaging absent legal restraints. As a weapon of influence, IPs will place the U.S. into a reactive posture until strategic campaign planning and staff integration can set the conditions to increase the speed of decision cycles.

8.2. Adaptability and flexibility: The USG will work in a coordinated effort to leverage all instruments of national power and use every appropriate resource to prevent, prepare for, and recover IPs consistent with PPD-30.

8.3. Strengthen Allies and Partners: A methodology for creating access through interoperability resides within shared terminology and processes riding on the back of "Releasable" classification and compatible C4I systems.

8.3.1. Nearly all countries conduct Search and Rescue operations. Interoperability training can create capability and capacity to extend U.S. reach and expand our access across the competitive space. Shared task standards go one step further toward effective multilateral operations.

8.3.2. Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue (DODI 3003.01): This policy supports an overarching International Diplomatic agreement (IAMSAR/ICAO). The outcome creates a symbiotic relationship synchronizing the Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) of an integrated campaign. Whether through partnership or direct interagency support, the result is a WOG mitigation response providing capability, capacity, and enhanced access.

9. Insights:

9.1. Failure to prepare for PR can create the perception that the U.S. is incapable of protecting its people or its allies. The resultant risk erodes political and public support while diminishing U.S. credibility, influence, and access. In an environment dominated by information, perceptions aggressively shape national will and subsequent political decisions.

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9.2. While PR is WOG, inconsistencies and complexities are barriers to mission success. DoD policy must be streamlined to ensure timely effective response is enabled.

9.3. PR is a cross-functional, enabling capability requiring supported and supporting planning in order to provide an effective WOG response. The definition of PR as “the sum of diplomatic, military, and civil efforts” uniquely places it within the CJCS’s purview for Joint Staff integration and synchronization of effects.

9.4. Leveraging authorities specific to DSCA and Defense Support to Civil SAR can afford the DoD flexibility in access and influence that delivers the strategic opportunities necessary for reductions in risk across strategies.

9.5. A globally dispersed force feels combat capability loss proportionately greater than a concentrated one, furthering the notion of PR’s strategic significance. Given the adversaries current advantage in decision speed, especially in the information environment, the U.S. can expect to lose influence compounding this strategic significance.

9.6. The exploitation opportunity isolated personnel afford adversaries of the U.S. and partners on a global stage is a calculable risk. This risk is additive, and yet able to be mitigated when PR is integrated as cross-functional and enabling within GCPs, GIBPs, ICPs and CCPs.

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10. Acronyms.

ALERTORD: Alert Order
B2C2WG: Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups
CAAF: Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force
CCDR: Combatant Commander
CCIR: Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCMD: Combatant Command
CCP: Combatant Command Campaign Plan
CJCS: Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM: CJCS Manual
COG: Center of Gravity
COM: Chief of Mission
CONPLAN: Concept of Operation Plan
DDSO: Deputy Director Special Operations
DFE: Dynamic Force Employment
DJS: Director of the Joint Staff
DIME: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
DoD: Department of Defense
DODD: Department of Defense Directive
DODI: Department of Defense Instruction
DOS: Department of State
DSCA: Defense Support to Civil Authorities
EMS: Electromagnetic Spectrum
FDO: Flexible Deterrent Option
F/HADR: foreign Humanitarian/Disaster Relief
FRAGO: Fragmentary Order
GCP: Global Campaign Plan
GIBP: Globally Integrated Base Plan
GIO: Globally Integrated Operations
HQ: Headquarters
HRFC: Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell
HRG: Hostage Recovery Group
HRI: High Risk of Isolation
IA: Interagency
IAMSAR: International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
IC: Intelligence Community
ICP: Integrated Contingency Plan
IO: International Organizations
IRF: Immediate Response Force
JS: Joint Staff
JSCP: Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
LOEs: Lines of Effort
LOOs: Lines of Operation
MEDIVAC: Medical evacuation
MSC: Military Sealift Command
ND: National Defense Strategy
NSC: National Security Council
NSS: National Security Strategy
USAID OFDA: USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPR: Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP: Operations Report
OSD: Office of Secretary of Defense
OSD(I): Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
OSD-SOLIC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
PMESII: Political, Military, Economic, Intelligence, Information
POTUS: President of the United States
PPD-30: Presidential Directive Policy 30
PR: Personnel Recovery
RFI: Request for Information
SAR: Search and Rescue
SecDef: Secretary of Defense
SecState: Secretary of State
SERE: Survive, Evade, Resist, and Escape
USAFRICOM: United States Africa Command
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
USG: United States Government
USSOUTCOM: United States Southern Command
USTRANSCOM: United States Transportation Command
VEO: Violent Extremist Organization
WARNORD: Warning Order
WG: Working Group
WOG: Whole of Government

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