Insights and Best Practices
Focus Paper

Sustainment
Sixth Edition

Deployable Training Division
Joint Staff J7

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Approved for public release
This focus paper is the Sixth Edition of the Sustainment Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper. It is written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 and released by the J7 Deputy Director for Joint Training.

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**Scope:**
- Defines sustainment and the roles and responsibilities of key players in the planning and execution of sustainment functions at the theater-strategic and operational levels.
- Addresses developing a concept of support at the operational level to set the foundation for integrating various sustainment functions.
- Introduces the sustainment sub-functions and offers insights and best practices for achieving sustainment goals.

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**Terminology and Acronyms:** Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used in this paper. They are defined in the glossary (not in the body of the paper) to improve readability in the body of the paper.

**POC:** Mr. Mike Findlay, Email: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil
Deployable Training Division, Deputy Director Joint Staff J7, Joint Training
116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

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PREFACE

This paper shares insights and best practices on sustainment that enable mission accomplishment. We capture these from joint headquarters planning and conducting operations as they respond to the uncertainties of the dynamic world environment.

This paper focuses on three primary audiences:
• CCMD and JTF Chiefs of Staff as they integrate sustainment in HQ operations.
• CCMD and JTF sustainment senior staff officers as they synchronize the sustainment effort.
• CCMD and JTF-level operational planning team (OPT) members.

Five considerations:
• Inform the commander early on challenges and opportunities to gain guidance.
• Be able to “see yourself.” Identify critical information, manage data, and display information.
• Understand global resource limitations and theater time-distance requirements.
• Maintain an anticipatory and inclusive staff mindset to set the theater and achieve long-term force sustainment. Be inclusive across the entire Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt).
• Incorporate the ability to assess and communicate risk in sustainment planning.

This product and other focus papers share observations and insights on Joint Force HQs observed by the Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Division. The DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with Combatant Command and operational-level commanders and staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations and exercises. The DTD incorporates these insights in functionally based focus papers that are refined through senior flag officer feedback. The papers are then shared with the Joint Force and the joint lessons learned, joint doctrine, and future concepts communities. These papers are found on the site noted on the inside front cover.

Please send your thoughts, solutions, and best practices to DTD as you think, plan, and work your way through these challenges. See inside the front cover for contact information.

STEPHEN E. LISZEWSKI
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Director, Joint Training
Joint Staff J7
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Sustainment is one of seven joint functions common to joint operations. Sustaining operations is key to the ability to aggregate, operate, and disaggregate rapidly. It encompasses the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain and prolong operations, including mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment consists of all core logistics capabilities (including supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, health services, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support) and personnel support services such as human resources, financial management, and religious ministry.

This paper is based on observed insights and best practices. It is informed by the National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL), and Joint Concept for Contested Logistics (JCCL) as part of the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC).

Sustainment will be contested in today’s complex security environment with its array of current threats and adversaries. Critical access to the global commons, and air and seaports, once taken for granted, will be contested. Cyber vulnerabilities of a sustainment network operating largely unclassified with other government and commercial partners will challenge planning and execution. Additionally, conflicts and the demand for sustainment will not be limited to a single region but will extend globally. This environment requires transparency and real-time visibility of the full capacity of the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) to allow for timely adjudication of limited resources. These new challenges have highlighted the importance of effective data management and visualization to ensure near real-time logistics data is available to inform senior leader decisions.

Key Challenges for the Sustainment Team:
- Seeing ourselves - data management and visualization.
- Anticipating requirements - thinking out front.
- Leveraging global providers that are part of the JLEnt - bringing together all capabilities.
- Integrating sustainment capabilities - supporting the entire force and partner requirements.

Key Insights:
- Identify up front the necessary information requirements to inform data management activities. Visibility of force flow and logistics informs operational decisions on the concept of operation, risk mitigation, and force and resource allocation/reallocation.
- Leverage the commander’s instincts and the wider staff planning to anticipate requirements. Anticipation is crucial to setting theater conditions and successful long-term sustainment.
- Coordinate and prioritize critical resources across the JLEnt to set the theater. Time-distance requirements and the limited availability of global resources are critical factors in a crisis.
- Include the totality of sustainment functions (logistics, engineer activities, HS, and personnel support) in planning and execution.
2.0 SUSTAINMENT. Today’s complex joint operating environment places a significant burden on strategic and operational level sustainment partners to ensure the DOD’s ability to conduct multiple, simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) operations around the world. The Chairman’s priority challenges, coupled with the trans-regional, multifunctional, and all-domain aspects of the operating environment, require a solid understanding of global sustainment requirements and the ability to adjudicate the distribution of finite resources. The same applies at the Combatant Command and Operational levels.

Sustainment Defined (JP 4-0). Joint sustainment is more than logistics. The joint logistics capabilities, along with the personnel support capabilities in the diagram, are integral parts of sustainment and vital for support, operations and contingencies.

The responsibility for these capabilities is typically spread across multiple staff directorates and special staff sections (e.g., J1, J4, Engineer J8, Surgeon, and Chaplain). To further complicate matters, not all joint force commands are organized exactly alike. For example, the joint HQ Surgeon section could be organized under the J4 or be part of the commander’s special staff. The staff engineer may be organized under the J3, the J4, or as a special staff section. This variation can make the integration of capabilities more challenging, both vertically (HQ to components) and horizontally (HQ to HQ). Each functional area provides a unique view of supporting operations; success entails effective synchronization of these capabilities to support the mission.

Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL). In 2015, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the Joint Concept for Logistics. The central theme of this document is the concept of Globally Integrated Logistics (GIL) as a major underpinning of Globally Integrated Operations (GIO). The concept of GIL relies on an adequately resourced JLEnt, a robust transportation and communications/data network, and “leaner forces and operations.” The JCL outlines 24 required capabilities critical to enabling globally integrated logistics, from increased forward basing and prepositioning of materiel to an increased ability to conduct logistics-over-the-shore operations in a contested environment. Additionally, the JCL highlights seven significant risks to achieving GIL while providing notional mitigation strategies. While not a prescriptive document, the JCL is a must-read for all joint sustainers as the future operating environment will require adaptive, critical thinking to develop new and agile ways to support globally integrated operations.

Understanding the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). Global operations require coordinating and partnering with multiple global logistics providers, both military and civilian. The sustainment and logistics demands resulting from complex emergencies (both kinetic and non-kinetic) require an “enterprise” approach since emergencies often transcend the ability of a single nation, government, or organization to address alone. The joint force’s ability to succeed requires this cross-matrixed, multi-tiered network of key global providers to work cooperatively to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing their mission and goals.
Effective situational awareness is gained by understanding stakeholder objectives, authorities, goals, and limitations in an operation. This situational awareness can enable sustainment planners to identify potential support opportunities and potential resource conflicts. Interagency and multinational partners may play key or lead roles in FHA/DR or DSCA missions while the Joint Force remains in support. A significant effort may be required in communicating joint force capabilities to involved stakeholders and partners due to system interoperability gaps.

Leveraging National Level Sustainment Providers. Sustaining operations with limited resources requires a robust and agile non-organic vendor base. Combat Support Agencies (CSA) such as DLA provide added capabilities to the Joint Force Commander through extensive commodity and services networks. Joint sustainers should include CSA inputs and commercial industry considerations into early planning efforts to identify gaps, seams, or shortfalls. The ability of the commercial industrial base to flex production to meet emergent demands remains a necessity. However, cost, production schedules, and transportation requirements are all variables that affect the ability of industries to meet emerging requirements. The Joint Staff J4, on behalf of the CCDRs, partners with OSD to influence commercial entities to meet mission needs (e.g., munitions, strategic lift).

Insights:
- The broader community of JLEnt stakeholders may have capabilities and resources that can be leveraged (e.g., local knowledge, established connections, etc.). Build relationships and trust with relevant JLEnt partners before a specific crisis. Understand JLEnt partner authorities, goals, and limitations.
- During a crisis, involve JLEnt partners early in the planning process; this may provide additional capabilities and capacities.
- Be prepared to support other USG agencies, IGOs, coalition members, NGOs, and PVOs.
3.0 SUPPORTING DECISION MAKING.

Informing the Commander’s Decision Cycle.
Synchronizing and integrating sustainment staff efforts are important to ensure unity of effort and economy of staff, and ultimately to better inform the commander’s decision cycle. The sustainment team provides advice and recommendations to the commander concerning prioritization and allocation of support. Therefore, the sustainment team must clearly understand the commander’s guidance and intent to anticipate the basic mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements of planning and operations.

The sustainment team best supports the commander’s decision-making process by integrating into the command’s battle rhythm across all three event horizons—CUOPs, FUOPs, and FUPLANs. The sustainment team integrates capabilities with operations and commander’s decision cycle activities (i.e., Design and Plan, Direct, Monitor, and Assess). Sustainment planners and functional SMEs help develop plans and planning products. The sustainment team establishes functional B2C2WGs and represents sustainment equities in other command battle rhythm events. The sustainment staff has representation in the JOC and other B2C2WGs to provide staff estimates and supportability analyses throughout planning and execution. The Sustainment Team also supports the command’s assessment process, informing future design and planning. Sustainment planners and functional SMEs determine measures of effectiveness based on the concept of support to monitor and assess progress and effectiveness.

The Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) and Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) are the fusion centers for logistics execution efforts on the staff and must stay closely connected to the JOC as plans transition to execution. The JLCB is the primary logistics board for overall theater logistics synchronization. Other supporting boards include the Joint Movement Board (JMB) for theater lift prioritization and allocation, the JCMEB for civil-military construction projects and resources, and the JRRB (for requirements) and CLPSB (for procurement) for theater contract support coordination.

Insight:
- Synchronize sustainment staff efforts across all event horizons to inform decision-making.

Best Practices:
- Include the correct sustainment SMEs inside appropriate command B2C2WGs (e.g., Joint Targeting Working Group/Board, Interagency Working Group, KLE Working Group, Joint Effects or Assessments Working Group/Board, etc.) to ensure staff products and analysis incorporate sustainment considerations from the beginning.
- Prepare back-brief charts/notes from command B2C2WGs to JLOC/JLCB for staff awareness.
- Establish Directorate Critical Information Requirements (DCIRs) to prioritize staff efforts supporting sustainment decision making.
Develop MOEs in coordination with the J3/5, components, and subordinates and participate in the assessment process to ensure support adaptation based on an assessment of LOOs/LOEs.

**The Joint Risk Analysis Methodology.** CJCSM 3105.01A Joint Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM) establishes the JRAM and provides guidance for appraising, managing, and communicating risk. It introduces and describes a common risk lexicon to facilitate consistency across Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint Force (JF) risk related processes.

Risk is the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued. Accurately appraising, managing, and communicating risk at the appropriate level of responsibility allows leaders and staffs to make informed decisions across disparate processes. The JRAM provides a consistent, standardized framework to appraise, manage, and communicate risk. Risk is specific to the time in which an event occurs, and the probability and consequence should be described within a time horizon.

The JF must consider risk globally to allocate resources, set priorities, and achieve national military objectives. This is done primarily through the JSPS processes and products and through Global Force Management (GFM). As each process tackles problem sets, commanders and staffs will use risk analysis to provide the best military advice possible in pursuit of executing an effective strategy. Appraising, managing, and communicating global risk lays the foundation and priorities to employ, manage, compare, and develop the JF to meet and prioritize national military objectives.

There are two categories of military risk: Risk-to-Mission (RM) and Risk-to-Force (RF). RM is the probability and consequence of current and contingency events causing harm to current or future military objectives, while RF is the probability and consequence of current and contingency events causing harm to the provision and sustainment of sufficient military resources. Both must be considered when calculating military risk. It involves balancing a CCMD’s ability to attain steady state, current operations, and contingency plan objectives against the Services’ and JF Provider’s ability to support CCMD missions.

**Sustainment Risk Considerations.** Sustainment capability and considerations are a lever that mitigates or escalates RM and RF. Therefore, sustainment cannot be separated from appraising, managing, and communicating risk. To ensure a commander is informed adequately over time and across CCMD and Service boundaries, it is critical to integrate sustainment within the operational COP to understand and communicate risk.
Insights:
• The sustainment team has significant input to both RM and RF.
• Proactively provide RF and RM input to planners, senior leaders, and in staff estimates.
• Consider the potential impacts of RM and RF during planning, leveraging, and operating within the JLEnt to include multinational partners.
• Sustainment considerations must be part of the risk analysis – cross-functional.

Best Practices:
• RM and RF should be accessed and communicated regularly in JLCBs and considered in courses of action development.

Visualization of the Sustainment Picture. A critical aspect of informing the commander’s decision cycle is the ability to help the commander and the staff understand the sustainment picture.
Visualization of the sustainment picture begins with identifying critical information requirements and developing a data reporting and management structure to gain the necessary information. Visualization of information can then be provided through various information technology tools such as PowerPoint, SharePoint portals, electronic dashboards, or a more sophisticated portal or web-based common operating picture (COP). A logistics COP (LogCOP) can contain integrated mapping and overlay features as well as an electronic library and can be used for both the staff’s situational awareness and commander briefings.

Insights:
• First, identify the relevant information and knowledge required by decision-makers.
• Second, determine the data reporting and management necessary for synthesizing into the relevant information and knowledge.
• Third, translate sustainment data into operational information and knowledge that informs staff planning and assessments, and commander decision-making.
• Fourth, develop an effective visualization or picture of the sustainment data, information, and knowledge.
  – Leverage technology to compile and display the relevant sustainment picture.
  – Avoid legacy visualization means such as manually constructed PowerPoint slides which are laborious and difficult to remain current.

Best Practices:
• Incorporate information feeds from the system(s) of record.
• Provide effective visualization of the sustainment picture using a dedicated portal, electronic dashboard, or an integrated COP that can be used for situational awareness.
• Avoid creating separate functional COPs in the same command. Instead, integrate the sustainment picture with the operational COP.
Sustainment Team Concept. The Sustainment Team Concept is a coordination philosophy more than an organizational construct. It is seen more often at the JTF level to promote simplicity, enhance integration, and reduce span of control due to the inherently lean nature of a JTF staff.

The Sustainment Team Concept is employed through deliberate internal staff coordination meetings between the various directorates. Whether formal or informal, there are clear benefits in a Sustainment Team. It:

- Better synchronizes and coordinates overlapping sustainment functions.
- Provides consistent cross-functional inputs supporting operational planning and execution.
- Facilitates information sharing while minimizing stove-piped efforts.
- Develops a comprehensive picture of sustainment issues.

At a JTF level, we have observed that the COS may formally delegate coordinating staff responsibility to the J4 for the J1 and the other noted functions in the above figure. While the J1 and J4 are always separate staff directorates, they often coordinate closely within this team construct. Likewise, while the Chaplain, Surgeon, and in some cases, the Engineer are designated as special staff, the COS may delegate coordinating staff responsibility to the J4 or J1 for select functions. For example, the Surgeon and Chaplain may fall under J1 overarching coordination responsibility, and the Engineer may operate under J4 coordinating responsibility. (More on the Engineer later – such as the J3 linkages).

Fostering a Sustainment Team mindset on the staff regardless of the level of HQ or organizational construct can enhance planning and coordination across the Sustainment staff sections (e.g., J1, J4, J8, Engineer, Surgeon, and Chaplain). While the staff organization may change, the staff sections can routinely coordinate within this team construct at all levels, from the action officer to senior staff leader level, to better integrate and provide coherent recommendations and actions.

Insights:
- Operating as a Sustainment Team can promote comprehensive planning and concept of support development.
- During a contingency, a Sustainment Team approach can help synchronize cross-functional/directorate requirements such as personnel rotation, resourcing, mortuary affairs, casualty tracking and patient evacuation, transportation and lift, and KLE requirements.
- Sustainment support, particularly when operating in remote or austere locations, often requires significant lead time. Including the Sustainment Team up front and early in the design and planning phase enables them to anticipate requirements and help set conditions for mission success.

Best Practices:
- Include representatives from the J1, J8, Engineer, Chaplain, and Surgeon staff sections in sustainment battle rhythm events to facilitate senior-level synchronization of sustainment efforts.
• Include other J-code directorate representatives in the JLCB, for example: J2 briefs status of lines of communication (LOC); Cyberspace representative briefs vulnerabilities of logistics systems; J3 representative ensures operational priorities are communicated and understood by the Sustainment Team; and an interagency representative provides situational awareness on civil-military operations, especially during humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.
4.0 SUSTAINING OPERATIONS.

Logistics. Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more military departments’ logistics resources to support the joint force. The JLEnt projects and sustains a logistically ready joint force by leveraging DOD, interagency, nongovernmental agencies, multinational, and industrial resources. Identifying established coordination frameworks, agreements, and other connections creates an efficient and effective logistics network to support the mission.

Over the last four decades, few adversaries have been capable of contesting our logistics network. Logistics and our strategic agility were our comparative/competitive advantages. However, today’s peer or near-peer adversaries can contest our logistics, deployment and distribution, engineering, health services, and personnel support. This fact introduces new challenges and emerging vulnerabilities that we will need to protect. These vulnerabilities must be more fully considered in today’s plans.

Setting the Theater. Coordination across component and subordinate commands is crucial to set the theater and ensure long-term sustainment at the theater level. Subordinates and components work with the CCMD staff to assess capabilities, limitations, and resources early in the planning process.

- Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL). In its simplest form, authority can be defined as the power to perform some act or take some action. “Authority” is not a doctrinal term and is often characterized as “permission”. There are many challenges and complications concerning authorities that impact logistical support.

CCDRs exercise DAFL as part of CCMD authority to organize logistics within the theater according to operational needs. DAFL includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure effective execution of OPLANs, effectiveness and economy of operation, and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and functions overlapping among Service component commands. DAFL does not alleviate Service responsibility for logistics support, discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, disrupt effective procedures, or prevent efficient use of facilities or organizations. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the military departments and Services continue to have responsibility for logistics support of assigned forces attached to joint commands. The CCDR may delegate DAFL for common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the assigned mission. When delegated to a subordinate commander, the CCDR formally delineates this delegated authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC.

- Agreements. Agreements reduce the logistical and financial burden on the force. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA) are two of the many agreements that directly impact logistics efforts. ACSAs allow the United States allies and coalition partners to exchange food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and
equipment with U.S. forces and do not commit any participating country to military action. An ISSA allows support between DOD agencies.

- **Enablers.** Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) and USTRANSCOM’s JTF-Port Opening (JTF-PO) support logistics efforts by providing the ability to move materiel with or without a fixed port of debarkation (POD). JLOTS gives JTFs the ability in contested or denied environments to load and unload ships in unimproved areas where ports are damaged, unavailable, or without fixed facilities. Similarly, JTF-PO can rapidly establish and initially operate an aerial or seaport of debarkation in support of operations.

- **Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI).** Our current and future joint operating environment requires the ability to deploy and aggregate rapidly. RSOI is the transitioning of deploying personnel and equipment into forces postured to support operations. Conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries increase vulnerabilities during RSOI.

- **Distribution.** Access, basing, and overflight authorization significantly impact the distribution of support. Redundancy in logistics support minimizes the impact and should be presented early in the planning process. Additionally, having global visibility of the sustainment picture limits interruption to logistics support.

**Insights:**
- Synchronize the sustainment staff efforts to enable unity of effort and economy of staff.
- Leverage the JLEnt in the CCDR’s Theater Logistics Concept.
- Scale sustainment capabilities across the phases of an operation and ensure each phase achieves a fully collaborative information sharing (vertically and horizontally) environment.
- JLEnt partners will not always share information due to incompatibility with DOD networks.
- Time Phased Force Deployment and Distribution (TPFDD) planning is critical in balancing and prioritizing combat and service support forces.

**Best Practices:**
- Sequence critical enablers such as theater opening and force protection capabilities appropriately in the force flow.
- Recognize and tailor logistics posture activities to send coherent messages and prevent an inadvertent escalatory message through what may be perceived as an aggressive logistics stance.
- Develop running sustainment estimates to quantify requirements.
- If a legitimate government exists and there is sufficient time to negotiate an agreement, implement host nation support (HNS) under an umbrella MOU.
- In cases where an HNS agreement is not practical, resources may still be obtained locally. Local contracts can be made between the joint or multinational force and individual civilian providers rather than the national government level.

**Operational Contract Support (OCS).** Commercial support is a critical joint force enabler that provides Joint Force Commanders with the flexibility to optimize force mix and address shortfalls. The joint force relies on commercial capability and capacity for many services, especially logistics, communications, construction, and language translation. Commercial support has comprised 50% or more of the total force in recent operations.
Planning that considers commercial capabilities can result in faster combat power build-up, access to unique services or expertise, augmentation for shortfalls in organic capability or capacity, and support to non-lethal applications of power. The following are considerations when planning for commercial support:

- What is the optimal mix (organic, multi-national, host nation, commercial) to accomplish the mission?
- What commercial capabilities are available in the market to support operations?
- What are the benefits and risks associated with using commercial support?
- How will contracting actions impact the operation or be perceived by the host nation? Are there second or third-order effects that should be considered?

OCS is DOD’s capability to effectively plan for, procure, and manage commercial support to provide commanders with options beyond the uniformed force. OCS comprises three functional areas: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. The actions associated with each function are depicted in the chart below:

OCS planners and Operational Contract Support Integration Cells (OCSIC) work with joint force and Service component command staff and theater support contracting activities to develop a requirements flow process, manage expectations for commercial support, convey joint force commander priorities, de-conflict OCS issues, and identify existing contracts or task orders that could be used to support operations.

Insights:

- OCS planning, integration, and management are primarily an operational, not contracting, function. All primary and special staff members play specific roles in OCS matters. While the preponderance of contracted support is for logistical services and planned by the J4, all of the other staff members are still responsible for planning and coordinating OCS actions related to their staff functions. For example, the J3 is responsible for establishing the requirements for the arming of contractors and force protection.
There are potentially three levels of OCSIC (CCMD, JTF, and Service component). Depending on the operation, there may be multiple JTFs, each with its own OCSIC. Each level of OCSIC has a unique role to play. The graphic below is a visual representation.

**Effective OCSICs:**
- Integrate into existing staff cross-functional teams to address OCS-related considerations.
- Participate in or support operational planning teams, contributing commercial support information, and sharing planning products with OCS and contracting elements in AOR.
- Establish an OCSIC portal as the singular information management (IM) hub to post the OCS Concept of Support, the current status, OCS analysis of operational environment information, and a view of the geographic laydown of OCS and contracting capabilities.

**Service component and JTF staffs** may not have permanent, full-time OCS personnel. Units may request augmentation from the Services or use the request for forces process to establish an OCSIC.

An OCS Working Group (OCSWG) may be established to coordinate and collaborate with supporting components and contracting activities to communicate commander’s intent, priorities, and anticipated changes in the mission that will impact the use of commercial support.
- Outputs from an OCS WG can inform the Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB) at the component level and lower, Joint Logistics Board (JLB), Joint Logistics Coordination Board (JLCB), Combatant Commander’s Logistics Procurement Support Board (CLPSB), Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB), and others.
Each Service is responsible for its own contracting and contract administration. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of theater support contracting, the CCMD has the authority to designate a lead service for contracting coordination (LSCC) or a lead service for contracting (LSC). These theater contracting support organizational constructs establish a requirement for coordination between contracting activities operating across the CCMD’s AOR or within a specific JOA. The LSC construct creates efficiency in contracting for common theater support as appropriate.

**Best Practices:**

- Establish and exercise OCSICs and OCSWG to integrate OCS functions across the staff and with supporting components and contracting activities.
- CCMDs designate LSCC and LSC in their respective AORs. The Senior Contracting Officials (SCOs) conduct routine JCSBs with stakeholders to exercise the processes and facilitate a transition to operations.
- ANNEX W integrates OCS considerations addressed in other functional ANNEXES (B, C, D, E, G, K, P, Q) into the OCS Concept of Support. ANNEX W includes clear tasking for theater contract support construct(s), specifies priorities and requirements flow for contracted support, and incorporates guidance for contractor management.
- The OCSIC should coordinate with financial/resource management to understand the types of funds supporting the operation and limitations that may impact the use of commercial support.
- Integration of OCS into planning, training, exercises, and operations is critical to leverage commercial support into military operations effectively. Training and resource information can be found in OCS connect at [https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ocs/](https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ocs/)
5.0 SUSTAINMENT FUNCTIONS.

Engineering. Engineers facilitate the freedom of action necessary for the JFC to meet mission objectives by enhancing strategic and operational maneuver, providing infrastructure for force projection, and enhancing quality of life. Engineers also support sustainment operations, develop operational intelligence, construct protective fortifications, and help set conditions for an operation to transition to civil authorities. Engineer functions include combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering. A logical organizational structure and coherent C2 relationships ensure integration of the engineer functions and unity of effort. Responsibilities for engineer functions may be spread across the staff to include the J3, J4, or special staff to achieve unity of effort. When deciding where to place the Engineer or engineering staff function oversight in the joint force staff, there are four available options to consider based on the focus of engineer efforts:

1. When focused on maneuver support, the engineering staff function may be placed under the J3. This practice is observed in most U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps commands.
2. When directed towards facilities and basing, the best choice may be to place the engineering staff function under the J4. This organizational approach is in most CCMD staffs.
3. When the engineer effort cuts across several staff sections, the best option may be to designate the engineering staff function as a separate staff section, normally the J7 or simply the JENG, as seen in coalition HQs during past operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
4. When the engineering effort is a significant focus or a key element of the joint operation, and many theater engineer requirements can only be accomplished with high-demand engineer assets, consider establishing a separate engineer command known as a Joint Force Engineer Command (JFEC). This JFEC can report directly to the JFC; its commander may be dual-hatted as the joint force’s staff engineer. This option provides maximum flexibility in synchronizing diverse engineer operations but will require Combatant Commander approval based on the JFC’s command relationship with the other Service forces.

Insights:
- The omission of engineer considerations in any phase of an operation may adversely impact the entire plan.
- During stability operations and TSC activities, engineers provide valuable capabilities the JFC can use to achieve civil-military objectives.
- Include engineers in staff B2C2WG’s to ensure inclusion of engineer equities.

Best Practices:
- Use a Joint Civil-Military Engineer Board (JCMEB) to facilitate unity of effort among JLEnt partners in the JOA.
- Integrate the JCMEB into campaign assessments and nonlethal integration processes to allocate resources to achieve operational objectives.
• Leverage engineering efforts (e.g., humanitarian construction projects) to support JFC efforts and effectively deliver themes and messages that support the Commander’s communication strategy.

• In coordination with J4 staff, develop mechanisms to manage critical class IV commodities.

**Basing and Infrastructure.** The Engineers play a critical role in sustainment operations through development, closure, and transition of basing and infrastructure. In base support operations, the JFC Engineer establishes policy for base development, construction standards, real estate actions, operation and maintenance, and closure of facilities. The Engineer recommends to the commander the overall AOR facility policy and reconciles discrepancies with the military Service components or CCMD staff. Environmental planning and policy formulation is important to consider early in the operational planning process. Key tasks include developing policy in accordance with U.S. and HN laws and agreements, providing advice on applicable laws and regulations, mitigating actions for mishaps, and coordinating for completion of all Environmental Baselines Surveys (EBSs). Neglecting early environmental planning can result in impacts to force protection issues (health and safety) and the disposal of real estate or the closure of operating bases. These functions normally require specialized skill sets not usually available on the engineering staff. Some Service engineers may have the experience required, but fuller expertise resides in the U.S. Army Public Health Command, U.S. Army Environmental Command, USACE, and NAVFAC.

**Insights:**
• Consider infrastructure and basing requirements in the early stages of campaign development, particularly for new construction or extensive renovations.
• The Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) is the primary tool to manage real estate/facilities use, base construction, and basing program oversight.
• Execute the JTF environmental management program. Develop the environmental considerations Annex L to the JTF OPORD, manage the JEMB, and ensure JTF compliance with environmental policies developed by the JTF.
• Contingency basing using predesigned modules (e.g., FORCE PROVIDER and HARVEST FALCON) maximizes operational flexibility and support efficiency. Contingency construction and MILCON provide more enduring solutions but require extended lead times for planning, funding, and construction.

**Best Practices:**
• Incorporate basing and infrastructure considerations in the JFC’s concept of support.
• Incorporate environmental factors during planning to reduce later challenges in the disposal of real estate or the closure of operating bases.
• Understand and apply the appropriate basing standards to achieve the mission.
• Use a JFUB to establish policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for engineer support to troop bed-down and mission requirements. Evaluate and reconcile component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, and construction to ensure compliance with priorities established by the JFC. Integrate coalition and interagency facility use. Develop
MILCON priority submission. Recommend approval for non-appropriated funded construction programs and repair. Provide technical and fiscal oversight for construction and base development.

- Understand and articulate funding authorization and constraints.
- Develop working relationships with contract construction agents (i.e., USACE and NAVFAC).

**Health Services.** HS supports the operational mission by fostering, protecting, sustaining, and restoring the behavioral and physical health of the joint force. HS responsibility is under the staff purview of the Joint Force Surgeon. Including HS requirements into operational planning is vitally important to sustain operations. The Joint Force Surgeon and staff develop the HS plan based on the operational situation, mission requirements, and the joint force’s medical capabilities.

Allocation of surgical and hospitalization assets is best done using the Joint Staff approved Joint Medical Planning Tool (JMPT). JMPT is used to develop an estimate to demonstrate patient flow from the point of injury through definitive care while implementing planning and logistics strategies for operational missions. The Joint Staff-endorsed Automated Information Discovery Environment Medical Common Operating Picture (AIDE MedCOP) tool provides strategic, operational, and tactical level mission command environment to support the medical community of interest. Functional areas include Medical Command & Control (MedC2) and Medical Surveillance (MedSA).

**Insights:**
- A clear picture of the medical footprint enhances operational planning efforts and ensures responsive support. The picture should incorporate the joint medical functions to include: all medical capabilities, equipment, airlift/MEDEVAC support; personnel and specialties available in the operational area; and availability of multinational and HN facilities and services.
- At the CCMD, leverage Defense Health Boards to communicate operational medical requirements for sourcing to the Joint Staff and OSD.
- Allocation of surgical and hospitalization assets is best done using the JMPT.
- Understanding supported and supporting command relationships enhances medical support during NEO and RSOI.

**Best Practices:**
- During crisis operations, establish a Joint Medical Operations Cell (JMOC). Organize the JMOC with essential staff to plan, coordinate, and harmonize the joint force’s HS and Force Health Protection operations.
- Monitor medical capabilities using the Joint Staff endorsed AIDE MedCOP.
- JTFs should review the CCMD’s Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) to understand transition points that enable anticipation and planning to allocate critical medical capabilities and resources.
- Active participation in Force Flow Working Groups to adjust or right-size equities in the TPFDD allows an opportunity to mitigate early medical gaps.
CCMD Surgeons should set communication guidelines and staff processes for the theater during steady-state operations enabling effective JTF integration during crisis. Procedures for transition to a crisis posture should be documented within TCP Annexes or separate SOPs.

**Mortuary Affairs (MA).** GCCs normally establish a Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO) within their commands to provide policy to their assigned Service components and support the joint force. The JMAO develops MA-specific directives and geographic-specific operation orders for the GCC while providing oversight of Service component MA operations and programs. The Services are responsible for tentative ID and disposition of human remains and personal effects unless given other guidance by the JMAO. Commanders and MA-support planners at all levels should consider the following during planning and execution: review or establish multinational agreements; anticipate the number of expected fatalities; determine the level of infrastructure development (e.g., port mortuary location, intra-theater lines of communications, airfields, and other facilities).

**Insights:**
- MA capabilities within DOD are minimal; DOD provides:
  - Advisory support
  - Search, recovery, receiving
  - Decontamination
  - Identification
  - Processing, storage, and transportation assistance of remains.
- Religious beliefs and practices will influence the handling of human remains and may impact joint and multinational operations. Religious Support Teams (RST) can advise on specific religious practices associated with the handling of the deceased and internment operations.
- Be responsive and provide support across the full range of DSCA operations.
- Health and Human Services (HHS) is the primary agency for MA in a federal emergency or disaster response.

**Best Practices:**
- Conduct country survey for mortuary affairs assets and facilities and update current plans accordingly (e.g., refrigeration support, morgues, and embalming capabilities).
- When applicable, draft approval documentation for temporary internments and use of Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) commissary cold storage prior to the start of combat operations. The approval authority for temporary internments is the Combatant Commander.
- Within a mortuary affairs estimate, evaluate J-1 casualty estimates, equipment stockpiles, and expected recycle times of mortuary affairs equipment (e.g., transfer cases) to ensure the industrial base has the necessary lead-time to refill supply expenditures.
- Review and become familiar with MA support to DSCA operations; quickly establish rapport with key civilian personnel (e.g., medical examiners, foreigners).

**Personnel Support.** Human resources, financial management, and religious affairs are functional areas within joint personnel support. These functions are executed by the J1, J8, and HQ chaplain, respectively.
Joint Manning Document (JMD). Once a mission is delineated via a SecDef order, the unit tasked to form the core of the JTF HQ is required to identify its personnel requirements. One of the keys to effectively transitioning a Service component organization from its routine Title 10-related missions to that of a JTF HQ is the creation of a JMD that defines the JTF HQ’s overall manpower requirements needed to complete its mission. The J1 and other staff elements support the J3-led mission analysis to identify requirements, JMETs, and corresponding manpower requirements. These requirements ensure adequate manning levels and the proper mix of skilled military and civilian personnel.

The JMD is the primary tool to identify the core staff and request JIAs. JMD billets can be filled using multiple sourcing options to include existing staff personnel, Service units, and other DOD entities. With proper coordination, it is possible to leverage coalition, other government agencies, and contractors to fill capability gaps. A formalized, structured JMD working group (JMDWG) is the prescribed venue for JMD development. It is used to confirm/validate JMD positions by skill, grade, and component. The draft JMD is submitted to the establishing CCDR for validation and approval. The CCMD J1 will attempt to fill any remaining vacancies in the JMD from within the CCMD prior to requesting JS J1 for JIA support. The JMD is not a static document. Once approved and sourced, the JMD can be used as a tool to track by-name arrivals and departures for each position; determine and refine current and future manning requirements; and submit requests to HHQ for changes based on approved additions, deletions, and modifications identified by the JMDWG.

Insights:
- JMD development and management is an iterative process that warrants constant command attention.
- JMDs should be capabilities-based to allow the staff to meet operational requirements effectively.
- Accurately reflect the actual needs of the commander in the JMD construct; inflated requirements call into question the veracity of the entire document.
- An evolving mission mandates an adaptive manning construct.
- LNO/interagency partners, internal and external to the organization, are a critical component of a staff. Provide the most qualified personnel as liaisons to external organizations.
- Additional manning requests should be documented in the Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System (FMTS), the official system of record for JMDs; this ensures the proper sourcing of the requirement has been vetted.

Best Practices:
- The JMDWG is most effective when chaired by the COS. Identify the J1 and J3 as JMDWG co-facilitators.
• Engage the entire staff to identify required capabilities during JMD development to establish a credible/supportable document.
• Engage the Service components early and frequently during the JMD validation process to improve fill rates.
• Include theater Service component manpower representatives in the JMDWG.
• Establish an iterative process through the JMDWG, ensuring the staff remains tailored and capable of adapting evolving mission phases, branches and sequels.

Personnel Accountability. The J1 has primary staff responsibility for personnel accountability and strength reporting. Accountability begins with force arrival in the theater. Accurate accountability enables leaders at all echelons to support the Commander’s overall concept of operations. Timely reporting allows the commander to make optimal force allocation and employment decisions.

The Joint Personnel Status and Casualty Report (JPERSTAT) is the prescribed method used to satisfy the Commander’s information needs and authenticate the number of total force personnel physically present in a geographic CCDR’s AOR. The JPERSTAT is divided into three sections: Personnel Strength, Casualty, and the Narrative. The Personnel strength number includes all U.S. forces physically present within a CCMD’s AOR; the Casualty section is a report of all categories of personnel identified in the Personnel Strength Section who have become casualties since the last JPERSTAT report; and the Narrative section is used to amplify data, raise personnel issues, and explain changes or discrepancies. The completed JPERSTAT will be classified consistent with the classification of the operation or as directed by the CJCS or the authoritative CCDR.

A mechanism to account for personnel arrivals (to include civilians and U.S. contractors) is establishing a Joint Personnel Processing Center (JPPC). The JPPC is the central entry point for in-processing and should be established as early as possible in an operation. In addition to accountability, the JPPC is an excellent venue to provide briefings regarding rules of engagement, cultural concerns, general orders, and information regarding billeting, training, and onward movement. Additionally, the JPPC is used to out-process personnel upon departure from the theater or the operational area.

As the number of contractors on the battlefield increases, accurately accounting for these contractors (both U.S. and foreign national) presents a significant challenge. Processing personnel in and out of the AOR through the JPPC, or other personnel centers designated by the CCDR, can alleviate this issue. The Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) is the sole federal government database for tracking and accountability of contractor personnel; its use is mandatory. SPOT delivers a standardized and collaborative method for the managing, tracking, and visibility of contractor personnel.

Insights:
• Personnel accountability (to include RSOI) should be included in a JFC’s concept of operations.
• Anticipate there will be several casualty reporting sources.

Best Practices:
• During crisis operations, establish a Joint Personnel Operations Cell (JPOC) to act as a “hub” for key personnel actions (e.g., JPERSTAT, casualty tracking, etc.).
Establish reporting instructions that identify mandatory entry points (ideally at a JPPC) and theater-specific personnel requirements (medical records, orders, etc.).

Identify the staff responsible for the oversight and monitoring of SPOT (JP 4-10 states that the J1 is responsible for contractor accountability through the Contracting Representatives); know the SPOT use requirements and system functionality.

**Casualty Reporting.** Casualty reporting requirements are based on CCDR guidance to make the chain of command aware of the status of forces and events under their purview. Casualty operations are a Title 10, USC responsibility of the respective Services. Service casualty procedures remain relatively consistent across the range of military operations. The DOD’s casualty reporting system is the Defense Casualty Information Processing system (DCIPS). The lowest level unit with DCIPS capability creates the casualty report. Timely and accurate reporting is critical since reporting facilitates time-sensitive family notification. Typically, the Services perform the next of kin notification, and the J1 maintains accountability.

**Insights:**
- Properly maintaining accurate personnel accountability facilitates timely casualty reporting.
- Plan for redundant casualty reporting capabilities.

**Best Practices:**
- Link casualty reporting to significant events for commander update briefs.
- Ensure the most current casualty information is presented at all commander update forums by the J1 (regardless of established reporting criteria).
- Reconcile casualty numbers between the J1, J3, J4, and the Joint Force Surgeon’s office to eliminate confusion.

**Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.** Joint Force Chaplains (JFCH) provide two fundamental tasks regardless of the level of command they serve; religious-based advice to commanders and staff, and religious support to service members. JFCH advise commanders on a multitude of topics ranging from the influence of religion on joint operations to perspectives on how military operations may affect religious and humanitarian dynamics in an area of operations. Chaplains function as religious leaders and staff officers who reports directly to the JFC.

The JFCH role as staff officer requires them to be knowledgeable in the JOPP, produce written products that inform and analyze the joint force (e.g., Religious Support Annex, Religious Estimate), and build strategic relationships with key stakeholders.

JFCH joint staff officer functions include:
- Advising on the religious impact of COAs.
- Liaison with NGOs, IGOs, and religious leaders.
- Informing relevant battle rhythm events.
- Briefing on cultural awareness/sensitivity.
- Coordinating religious support for civil-military operations.
Insights:
- Consider religion, ideology, and other cultural issues when developing concept of operations, rules of engagement, planning civil-military operations, psychological operations, information operations, and public affairs activities.
- Tailor religious estimates to the mission plan, the operating environment, and the religious affairs assets. Religious estimates should consider tangible and intangible factors such as: location and movement of Religious Support Teams (RSTs); logistical and communication support required for specific missions; RST replacements; religious, moral, and morale issues that affect the service members and the unit; and impact of indigenous religions in the military operation.
- JFCHs and subordinate chaplains can engage with regional religious leaders in the area of operations on behalf of commanders to promote mission accomplishment. Engagement themes and messages must be nested in the overall commander’s narrative and within legal parameters.

Best Practices:
- Task the JFCH to provide staff estimates to support planning and inform decision-making.
- JFCHs should attend B2C2WGs like the JLOC, the JLCB, and the Interagency Coordination WG.
- Establish a Chaplain Synchronization WG via collaborative means (e.g., DCS, VTC, Teleconference) to ensure synergy of operations.
- Participate in KLEs and related B2C2WGs within the roles and legal constraints of the chaplain.
6.0 DISCRETE OPERATIONS: NEO AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) Considerations.** A NEO is conducted to support the DOS in evacuating U.S. citizens and designated persons from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. The USG will consider evacuating Host Nation (HN) and Other Country Nationals (OCNs) on a case-by-case and space available/reimbursable basis when it serves U.S. interests. The affected nation may not have the logistical means or structure to support a NEO and may heavily rely on the joint or multinational force. Multiple or simultaneous NEOs will require the establishment of priorities to de-conflict support efforts. Consider the following when NEO planning:

**Logistics:**
- Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)/Sea Base requirement and location to include facilities and support equipment availability.
- Logistics enablers and equipment requirements to include personnel and sourcing.
- Logistics requirements for a safe haven for evacuees.
- Risk assessment for food and water requirements.
- Translator requirements.

**Medical:**
- Reception center medical support plan.
- HN medical capabilities and availability.
- Physical condition of evacuees (e.g., special needs, pregnancy, infectious disease, geriatric, pediatric, wounded, etc.).
- MEDEVAC procedures.
- Veterinary requirements.

**Insights:**
- The operational environment can quickly change instantaneously as dictated by the threat environment and each operational environment demands a different force package, footprint, response time, transportation cost.
- Risk can increase as a NEO continues. Adversaries have more time to identify vulnerable evacuation areas and can target operations. Consider rapidity of action.
- Ensure sustainment personnel are embedded in the NEO Cell and forward deployed to the embassy with the LNO team.

**Best Practice:**
- Use NEO Tracking Systems (NTS) to register and track noncombatants.

Refer to JP 3-68 *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* for further information.

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR).** FHA/DR are DOD operations normally supporting USAID or DOS and conducted outside the U.S., its territories, and
possessions. These operations seek to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation due to natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. FHA/DR provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing assistance. Oversight and requirements are communicated by the HN to interagency intermediaries such as USAID and then to DOD.

The U.S. military has supported numerous FHA operations and will continue to do so in the future. There are several examples, particularly during the 2014 Ebola response (Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE), the 2015 Nepal earthquake relief (Operation Sahayogi Haat), and the Mozambique Humanitarian Relief in response to Cyclone Idai in 2019. An analysis of C2 and sustainment (logistics, HS, and engineering) operational functions during the response/relief effort shows that prior operational planning is essential to achieve unity of effort. The following two figures address key considerations in FHA/DR:

### FHA / DR Considerations

#### Needs Assessment: People
- Types of Major Injuries / Diseases
- IN Capabilities to Handle
- External Expertise / Specialties Required
- Other Sources (NGOs, IGOs, etc.)
- Existing Health Facilities
- Production / Purification Capability
- Municipal
- Other Water Treatment Systems
- Requirements
- Availability / Requirements
- Types And Quantities Required
- Host Nation
- Accommadations (Availability / Required)
- Tent City Sites (If Required)
- Locations (Ports, Fields, Airways, Etc.)
- Military
- How can military capabilities be best utilized?
- What military assets are in need?
- Emergency Facilities
- Equipment
- Available (Functional or Repairs Required)
- Needed (Type And Quantity)
- Available Potable Water Resources (Wells, Surface / Subsurface)
- Distribution Capability
- Storage / Warehousing
- Distribution (Capacity / Requirements)
- PKH / DR Personnel
- Accommodations
- Transportation
- Communication
- Security
- What military assets are redundant?
- Are there limitations to use of military assets?
- (e.g., no landing zone (UZ) for helicopters)

### FHA / DR Considerations

#### Situational Assessment: Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airfields</th>
<th>Location / Capacity (Primary / Alternate)</th>
<th>Fueling (Type and Availability)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location / Capacity / Alternates</td>
<td>Ability to Conduct VIP / IFR</td>
<td>Support Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Emergency Vehicles</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Equipment</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>Motor Gasoline (RFGAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Equipment Requirements</td>
<td>(Available / Required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Fueling (Type and Availability)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Ports</th>
<th>Host Nation Vehicle Availability</th>
<th>Other Sources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location / Capacity / Alternates</td>
<td>Emergency Vehicles</td>
<td>Roads, Bridges, Railroads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Equipment</td>
<td>Equipment Requirements</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Translator and Transcriber Requirements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Additional sustainment considerations include:

- Location of logistics bases (as close to relief recipients as possible).
- Identifying all potential AOR supply sources within the AOR.
- Planning for limited contingency operations (e.g., peacekeeping and humanitarian operations offer numerous opportunities for multinational logistics) to control costs.
- Close coordination with IGOs and NGOs operating within the same area. The multinational force commander is likely to be responsible for coordinating operations of the multinational force with these organizations and for coordinating selected sustainment activities of the force (e.g., contracting, movement control, distribution, and engineering).
- Review legal authorities related to specific use of DOD resources by NGOs and IGOs.
- Identify HS capabilities and requirements to include medical assessment and services. Synchronized HS can incorporate the appropriate strategic messages and themes during the initial phases of the operation to prepare the local population and other providers for the eventual departure of military forces.
• Determine engineering capabilities and requirements. Consider energy distribution, water supply, sanitation, and sewer.

Insights:
• A critical first step is identifying the lead government agency for the response.
• Understand the sustainment role in the broader response effort. The host nation and/or UN will coordinate the international response, of which the U.S. military will be just one player.
• Sustainment support can only be provided when requested via the military tasking matrix (MITAM)
• Clarify command and control during FHA/DR due to the larger number of supporting forces.
• In FHA missions/operations, broad multilateral participation is often solicited.
• Other JLEnt sustainment stakeholders may support the relief operations, often competing with the JFC for access and resources.
• Medical support is often the priority of effort for the JFC and may be a LOO/LOE.
• During planning, account for mission, scope, and duration.

Best Practices:
• Ensure appropriate sustainment planner representation on battle rhythm events supporting FHA/DR operations.
• Clearly define Medical Rules of Eligibility (MRoE) and HS transition criteria; leveraging international and nongovernmental organizations’ expertise for medical transitions.
• Use theater security cooperation plan as a starting point to understand end-states.
• Leverage FHA/DR sustainment efforts to effectively deliver themes and messages that support the Commander’s communication strategy.
### Glossary
#### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCEE</td>
<td>Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment</td>
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<td>AIDE MedCop</td>
<td>Automated Information Discovery Environment Medical Common Operational Picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>B2C2WGs</td>
<td>Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Combatant Command Campaign Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLPSB</td>
<td>Commander’s Logistics Procurement Support Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPs</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operational Picture</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Combat Support Agency</td>
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<td>CUOPS</td>
<td>Current Operations</td>
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<td>DAFL</td>
<td>Directive Authority for Logistics Processing System</td>
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<td>DCIPS</td>
<td>Defense Casualty Information Processing System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCIR</td>
<td>Director’s Critical Information Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Defense Collaboration System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support to Civil Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>Deployable Training Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBS</td>
<td>Environmental Baseline Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>e-JMAPS</td>
<td>Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FML</td>
<td>Force Manning Level</td>
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<td>FMTS</td>
<td>Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System</td>
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<td>FUOPS</td>
<td>Future Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FuPLANS</td>
<td>Future Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>GIBP</td>
<td>Globally Integrated Base Plan</td>
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<td>GIL</td>
<td>Globally Integrated Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIO</td>
<td>Globally Integrated Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHQ</td>
<td>Higher Headquarters</td>
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<td>HHS</td>
<td>Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>Health Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Health Services Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intermediate Staging Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSA</td>
<td>Inter-Service Support Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>J1</td>
<td>Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff</td>
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<td>J3</td>
<td>Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff</td>
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<td>J4</td>
<td>Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff</td>
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<td>J8</td>
<td>Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate of a Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCL</td>
<td>Joint Concept for Logistics</td>
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<td>JCCB</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Contracting Board</td>
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<td>JCCL</td>
<td>Joint Concept for Contested Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMEB</td>
<td>Joint Civil-Military Engineer Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDDOC</td>
<td>Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDEIS</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System</td>
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<td>JENG</td>
<td>Joint Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCH</td>
<td>Joint Force Chaplain</td>
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<td>JFEC</td>
<td>Joint Force Engineer Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>Joint Facilities Utilization Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIA</td>
<td>Joint Individual Augment</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLCB</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Coordination Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLEnt</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLOTS</td>
<td>Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shore</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAO</td>
<td>Joint Mortuary Affairs Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>Joint Movement Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMD</td>
<td>Joint Manning Document</td>
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<td>JMDWG</td>
<td>JMD Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMET</td>
<td>Joint Mission Essential Task</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMOC</td>
<td>Joint Medical Operations Cell</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

JMPT – Joint Medical Planning Tool
JOA – Joint Operations Area
JOC – Joint Operations Center
JOPEC – Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course
JPP – Joint Planning Process
JPERSTAT – Joint Personnel Status and Casualty Report
JOPP – Joint Operating Planning Process
JPG – Joint Planning Group
JPOC – Joint Personnel Operations Cell
JPPC – Joint Personnel Processing Center
JRRB – Joint Requirements Review Board
JRROI – Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration
JTF – Joint Task Force
JTF-PO – JTF - Port Opening
JWC – Joint Warfighting Concept
KLE – Key Leader Engagement
LSCC – Lead Service for Contracting Coordination
LSC – Lead Service for Contracting
LNO – Liaison Officer
LOE – Line of Effort
LOGCOP – Logistics Common Operational Picture
LOO – Line of Operation
MedC2 – Medical Command & Control
MEDEVAC – Medical Evacuation
MedSA – Medical Surveillance
MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit
MILCON – Military Construction
MITAM – Military Tasking Matrix
MOE – Measure of Effectiveness
MNF – Multi-National Force
MRoE – Medical Rules of Eligibility
NAVFAC – Naval Facilities Engineer Command
NEO – Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
NTS – NEO Tracking System
NMS (National Military Strategy)
OCN – Other Country National
OCS – Operational Contract Support
OCSIC – OCS Integration Cell
OCSWG – OCS Working Group
OFDA – Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGO – Other Government Organization
OPLAN – Operations Plan
OPORD – Operations Order
PVO – Private Volunteer Organization
RST – Religious Support Team
RSOI – Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
SCO – Senior Contracting Official
SME – Subject Matter Expert
SPOT – Synchronized Pre-Deployment Operational Tracker
TCP – Theater Campaign Plan
TPFDD – Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TPMRC – Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center
TSC – Theater Security Cooperation
USACE – U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID – U. S. Agency for International Development
USG – U. S. Government
USTRANSCOM – U. S. Transportation Command
VTC – Video Teleconference
The Joint Staff J7
116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA  23435-2697

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