PREFACE

1. Scope

This joint doctrine note (JDN) describes national strategy, defense strategy, and military strategy. It focuses on the development of military strategy within and for the Joint Force, rather than national or “grand” strategy, which is outside the purview of military doctrine. It emphasizes the description, preparation, production, and implementation of military strategy necessary for the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands to fulfill their responsibilities in developing military strategies that support the national strategy as developed by the administration.

2. Purpose

A JDN facilitates information sharing on problems and potential solutions to support formal joint doctrine development and revision. This note discusses the implications of strategy on the use of the military as an instrument of national power. It also examines the evolution of strategy from a general concept to the broad application of capabilities required to pursue national policy objectives. This JDN supplements current joint doctrine and provides context and guidance for members of the joint force who have been put in position to develop military strategy.

3. Application

The guidance in this JDN is not authoritative. If conflicts arise between the contents of a JDN and a joint publication (JP), the JP will take precedence for the activities of joint forces, unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Outlines national strategy, national defense strategy, and the strategic use of military force.
• Discusses types of military strategy.
• Describes military strategy in joint campaigning.
• Outlines military strategy in force development and force design.
• Distinguishes strategic assessment from campaign and contingency assessments.

Strategy Overview

The objective of strategy, in the modern sense, is to serve policy—the positions of governments and others cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex environment. The ultimate goal of strategy is to achieve policy objectives by maintaining or modifying elements of the strategic environment to serve those interests.

National Strategy

National strategy secures and advances a nation’s long-term, enduring, core interests over time. The most common expression of national strategy for military strategists are the president’s national security strategy and policy guidance issued through the National Security Council.

National Defense Strategy

The National Defense Strategy is the Secretary of Defense’s framework to prioritize Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance and activities, and it structures DOD strategy assessments and deliberations.

Military Strategy

Military strategy is the creation, employment, and articulation of the
military instrument of national power to achieve policy objectives.

The ends in military strategy are a subset of the defense strategy’s objectives, while the ways and means represent how the joint force will execute the defense strategy. The frameworks in a military strategy provide a lens for subsequent campaign planning and contingency planning.

The Logic of Military Strategy

While military strategy is principally a function of creative art, the logic, or science, behind every strategy must be rigorous and founded upon the evidence of history; the arithmetic of available resources; a clear acknowledgment of time horizons and distances; and astute analysis of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy interests and will. Developing military strategy requires an understanding of facts and assumptions to inform strategic decision making. Its logic is both inductive and deductive, guiding purposeful action towards its end.

Strategic Uses of Military Force

The United States leverages all instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, DOD provides military options to ensure the president and our diplomats negotiate from positions of strength. The DOD is in a supporting role when the military instrument of national power is not the predominant instrument for the strategy. When directed or if the other instruments of national power prove insufficient, the military becomes the nation’s primary instrument. In either case, the military facilitates and supports the application of the other instruments.
Types of Military Strategies

**National Military Strategy**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submits a national military strategy biennially to Congress. It describes how the Armed Forces of the United States will support the objectives of the United States. The broad scope of the Chairman’s responsibilities suggests a continuum of strategic direction spanning three overlapping time horizons corresponding to how the joint force employs, adapts, and innovates the force to meet the requirements of law, policy, and defense strategy. This provides the final piece of the ends, ways, and means construct—the means.

**Combatant Command Strategy**

Combatant command strategies are geographic or functional and are strategies of force employment. They articulate the pursuit of global, regional, or functional objectives within the context of a national strategy to achieve national policy objectives specific to the region or the function.

**Service or Institutional Strategy**

Unlike a strategy of force employment, strategies for the military Services and other institutions tend to look internally for their implementation. Such strategies translate a senior leader’s vision for their organization into direction for the future force while meeting today’s commitments, consistent with their responsibilities and authorities.

**Military Strategy in Joint Campaigning**

**Operational Art from Strategy**

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

**Global Campaigning**

Implementing national strategic guidance
through operational art with a global perspective has multiple aspects. The first aspect is global campaigns, which direct day-to-day operations and are the purview of global campaign planning that occurs at the Joint Staff and combatant command levels. Day-to-day campaigns span the range from competition through armed conflict.

**Contingency Campaigning**

The second aspect of implementing strategic guidance is contingency campaigning, operations executed in response to changes in the strategic environment that require a branch from the global, functional, regional, or combatant command campaign plans. National and defense strategies, through the presidentially approved contingency planning guidance, direct contingency plans to address designated threats, potential catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that warrant military response options.

**Global Force Management and Posture**

The global force management process aligns force apportionment, assignment, allocation, and readiness methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy.

**Institutional Strategy**

**Implementing Institutional Strategies**

Institutional strategies translate military strategy to an organization’s internal tasks to shape investments for the future force and ensure force resilience. Those investments are adaptive in the case of force development or innovative in the case of force design.

**Military Strategy in Force Development**

Implementing military strategy in force development occurs within the years of the Future Years Defense Program. It assesses and identifies required capabilities for the future joint force. Those capabilities may
come from strategy, campaign plans, and contingency plans at multiple levels. Collectively, readiness reporting for contingency planning and assessments of strategy and campaign planning inform the Joint Military Net Assessment, which is the joint force’s capstone assessment product.

**Military Strategy in Force Design**

The joint force’s primary document for force design is the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030*. Vetted through war games and experimentation, the capstone concept and the other documents in the family of joint concepts provide the intellectual basis for Service concepts that describe each of the Services’ contributions to the future joint force. The required capabilities articulated in those concepts also bridge force design to force development by highlighting capability gaps that will require long lead times to mitigate.

**Risk and Strategic Assessment**

Assessing risk, the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued, is a key element of decision making. Accurately appraising risk enables commanders and staffs to manage and communicate risk, inform decisions, and provide information across disparate processes. A formal methodology to assess strategic risk to national interests, as well as military risks to missions and to forces, appears in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*.

**Types of Assessments**

Strategy and its related products are assessed differently, depending on the instrument being assessed and its temporal horizons. Strategy assessments often address the entire continuum of strategic direction spanning force employment,
force development, and force design, and are often more focused on identifying longer-term trends. In contrast, campaign and contingency assessments and readiness reporting focus principally on near-term force employment using the current force structure and posture.

Conclusion

This joint doctrine note describes national strategy, defense strategy, and military strategy.
CHAPTER I
STRATEGY OVERVIEW

“Strategy—A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1. Overview

a. Military strategy has evolved from its narrow conception as the martial skills of military genius to a contemporary understanding involving a broader set of abilities required to employ the instruments of national power across a broad spectrum of competition and conflict in pursuit of objectives, in a transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional environment.

b. The objective of strategy, in the modern sense, is to serve policy—the positions of governments and others cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex environment. National policy articulates national objectives. National policy is broad guidance statements adopted by national governments in pursuit of national objectives. The ultimate goal of strategy is to achieve policy objectives by maintaining or modifying elements of the strategic environment to serve those interests.

c. Strategy formulation must consider the strategic environment (e.g., geography, character, and relationship of political entities and their interests, and resources) subject to norms and constants present. These factors present themselves differently in each strategic interaction and exert considerable influence on a particular strategic situation. Additionally, these factors may change during execution, necessitating revision of the strategy.

d. In its simplest expression, strategy determines what needs to be accomplished, the methods to accomplish it, and the resources required by those methods. A comprehensive and effective strategy answers four basic questions:

(1) What are the desired ends?

(2) What are the ways to get there?

(3) What means or resources are available?

(4) What are the risks associated with the strategy?

e. This ends, ways, means model is the basic construct of modern strategy, but it alone is inadequate to turn ideas into action. Strategy is both an iterative process and a product—the reflective synergy of art and science creating a coherent bridge from the present to the future, enabling the translation of ideas into action to get what you want while addressing potential risks to the nation.
f. This doctrine note addresses the military strategy process and national, defense, and military strategy products. Its emphasis is on military strategy and its preparation and production.

2. **National Strategy**

   a. National strategy articulates broadly developed interests and identifies threats, resources, and policies. National strategy usually does not address particular operational and tactical ends, and does not consider military power in isolation from other sources of national power. It defines the direction for the entire country and includes all the instruments of national power. In brief, a national strategy is a country’s overarching “strategy of strategies.”

   b. National strategy secures and advances a nation’s long-term, enduring, core interests over time. The most common expression of national strategy for US military strategists are the president’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and policy guidance issued through the National Security Council. These provide a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. In the ends, ways, and means construct, the NSS provides the ends. This national strategy is anchored in the national interests that support a strategic vision of the role of the United States. National strategy also reflects societal dynamics and their underlying enduring values and beliefs.

   c. Emerging challenges in the security environment that require the joint force to operate in all domains and across multiple regions simultaneously have placed a new importance on national strategy. While the dictates of national policy translate into different strategic objectives for different theaters, that policy guidance requires the determination of strategic objectives at the national level.

   d. National security strategy can apply broadly or to a specific situation. Conceptually, national security frequently entails the search for advantage over a foreign nation, groups of nations, or non-state actors; building a favorable foreign relations and deterring hostile action. This concept must also allow for armed response and defeating adversaries if deterrence fails. In the United States, this is defined by the administration in power and can vary based on elected officials’ interpretation of the national interests, ends, allowed means, and allocated resources.

3. **National Defense Strategy**

   a. Congress directs in law (Title 10, United States Code [USC], Section 113) that the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) develop a national defense strategy (NDS) every four years to describe how the Department of Defense (DOD) will contribute to the execution of the president’s NSS. The NDS translates the national interests and objectives in the NSS into prioritized defense objectives for DOD and articulates DOD’s approach for developing and employing military forces and Departmental resources to protect and promote US national security interests.

   b. The NDS is a classified strategy with an unclassified summary, and includes:
(1) Assumed strategic environment, including critical and enduring threats.

(2) Strategies to counter threats and provide for national defense.

(3) Priority missions of DOD.

(4) The roles and missions of the Armed Forces assumed force planning scenarios and constructs.

(5) Force size and shape, posture, defense capabilities, readiness, infrastructure, organization, personnel, and technological innovation, including major investments for the budget.

c. In addition to these statutory requirements, the defense strategy often covers other institutional aspects such as the defense industrial base, national-level logistics, basing, agreements, and organizational reform.

d. The NDS is the Secretary’s preeminent strategic document for DOD providing guidance on force employment, force planning, force design, posture, programming, and other activities. It provides the framework and prioritization for all subordinate DOD strategic guidance and activities, and serves as the launch point for structured DOD strategy assessments and deliberations to ensure its implementation and adjustment as the environment evolves.
CHAPTER II
MILITARY STRATEGY

“The role of the strategist is to exercise influence over the volatility, manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, and resolve the ambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and in compliance with policy guidance.”

Dr. Harry Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy

1. Military Strategy

a. Military strategy is the creation, employment, and articulation of the military instrument of national power to achieve policy objectives. Coherent and effective military strategy is essential to achieve specific objectives or sets of objectives that protect the national interests as conveyed by national policy and national strategy. Military strategy by inferring a rational order on reality, makes action by the joint force purposeful; without it, military activities could be ad hoc, incoherent, and potentially counterproductive.

b. Unlike national strategy, the scope of a military strategy is limited to the military instrument of national power. To be effective it still must be integrated with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. Only a comprehensive approach to strategy will result in effective outcomes. The ends in military strategy are a subset of the defense strategy’s objectives, while the ways and means represent how the joint force will execute the defense strategy. The frameworks in a military strategy provide a lens for subsequent campaign planning and contingency planning. Risk in a military strategy is localized to the ends, ways, and means of the military strategy and, while related, may differ from risk in a defense strategy.

c. Military strategy is both practical and purposeful. It entails a coherent design for employing military power to achieve objectives that implement the directives and desires of national leaders. All strategies include a fundamental logic of ends, ways, means, and risk. A strategy’s form depends on the organization it serves. Military strategies generally incorporate a variety of military ways and resources. Each strategy’s context, applicability, capability, and purpose determine the specific factors that are considered in its development.

d. While the cognitive processes to develop, implement, and assess a military strategy may be consistent, the actual elements of a strategy are unique to the circumstances at hand. The wide variance of those circumstances and the potential solutions required to address them preclude a purely doctrinal or “playbook” approach to military strategy.

e. Leaders develop strategies through the exercise of strategic art and science. The essence of strategic art is inductive—organizing and articulating in clean terms the complex interrelationship between national interests, policy, strategic ends, and practice in clear terms. The conduct of strategic art occurs at the strategic level of military activity, spanning national strategy, defense strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy. The
exercise of strategic art requires practitioners to think conceptually to integrate competing interests and objectives in the security environment, and the organizational considerations inherent to implementation.

f. Strategies articulate a story that operates in a competitive space to bridge the present to the future within the duration of the strategy. Audiences of the strategic story include friendly forces, enemies, adversaries, allies, partners, and of special significance, a variety of other relevant actors, in both public and classified venues. The “plot” provides the conceptual basis for supporting military campaigns. To be effective, a military strategy should be clear, concise, and easily understood. This enables the strategy to be successfully translated into campaign plans. The design of the operations that form those campaigns shapes the perceptions, and ultimately behaviors, of relevant actors toward strategic success. The ability to visualize and conceptualize how strategic success can be achieved or supported by military means is a fundamental to the application of operational art and operational design.

2. The Logic of Military Strategy

While military strategy is principally a function of creative art, the logic, or science, behind every strategy must be rigorous and founded upon the evidence of history; the arithmetic of available resources; a clear acknowledgment of time horizons and distances; and astute analysis of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy interests and will. Developing military strategy requires an understanding of facts and assumptions to inform strategic decision making. Its logic is both inductive and deductive, guiding purposeful action toward its end.

a. Military strategy is fundamentally about choices. It bridges from present facts to a desired future state or condition, providing options how best to arrive there expressed in coherent and clear terms. In doing so, strategy addresses enemies, adversaries, allies, and other actors; identifies resource, risk, and organizational issues to give rigor to policy choices; and provides rationale to joint planning. Strategies should be resource-informed, which requires tradeoffs between competing priorities. Conversely, a well-defined strategy can inform resource requirements and enable policy decisions and trade-offs.

b. Military strategy serves national policy. Policy should provide strategists the limits of actions and resources available to pursue policy ends. Military strategists may have to make inferences or assumptions to implement strategy when policy is not clear. When policy is absent or faulty, strategy cannot rescue it. However, strategy can inform policy by identifying costs and risks associated with proposed policy objectives.

c. Military strategies are comprehensive. They consider the other elements of national power and how the military element contributes to a whole of government approach to achieve defense objectives. Consequently, military strategies should never be developed piecemeal or in isolation. For the same reasons, strategy is also cumulative. Strategic activities should be designed to patiently shape the security environment to attain strategic ends, often in ways that operational and tactical activities cannot.
d. Military strategies operate across multiple time horizons. They can address short-term issues (such as a wartime strategy to defeat an enemy) or to achieve long-term objectives (such as improving military power relative to a competitor). Strategists need to integrate these, as short-term goals affect long-term options and long-term objectives should not be shortchanged by quick-fixes.

e. Military strategies are competitive in nature; they are developed and implemented to shape a security environment in tension with the strategy of others simultaneously trying to influence the environment for their own purposes. Degrees of opposition created by others can range in intensity from cooperative to adversarial, which will influence the character of the strategy. All military strategies seek to create or preserve friendly advantages, if necessary at the expense of the competitor or adversary.

f. A military strategy, like all strategies, seeks to impose order on the environment. As a result, a strategy mismatched to the environment or the role of the organization it serves will likely fail. The ends, ways, means, and risk for an organization are unique to that organization; for that reason, using another organization’s strategy is unlikely to succeed.

g. Military strategies are perishable and must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate variables in the environment. They are dependent on the policy guidance, strategic choices made prior to that strategy, and the desired objectives within a given period. Strategies should include the expected time or event bounding of the strategy. Similarly, strategists should have a sense of when a strategy will reach the end of its useful life so they can anticipate when to initiate development of or transition to a new strategy.

h. A military strategy answers the question “Why.” The scope, uncertainty, and ambiguity inherent in activity at the strategic level preclude a strategy that can deterministically presuppose cause and effect.

i. Policy is not strategy. Policies are the stated positions of government, usually communicated in the form of ends, that policymakers direct to be attained. Policy also includes stated assumptions, available resources, and permissions that are allowed to the military strategist. A military strategist must identify the conditions in the strategic environment that generate those policy goals. In much the same way that tactics must support operations, military strategy necessarily serves national policy, while providing insights to the costs incurred in attaining those policy goals. Policy may require a strategy which reduces strategic risk, but may incur greater tactical risk. Good tactical execution serves strategy, but it cannot substitute for sound strategy and policy.

j. Military strategy is the art and science of achieving a political objective through the military instrument of national power. Military strategy is not planning. Similarly, a strategy is not a campaign plan. It guides and directs but is distinct from the products and activities of a campaign plan. A campaign plan organizes day-to-day operations of the joint force to achieve national objectives. It is also distinct from the products and activities that military organizations use to organize, resource, and shape their future capabilities.
3. Strategic Uses of Military Force

The United States leverages all instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, DOD provides military options to ensure the president and our diplomats negotiate from positions of strength. DOD is in a supporting role when the military instrument of national power is not the predominant instrument for the strategy. When directed or if the other instruments of national power prove insufficient, the military becomes the nation’s primary instrument. In either case, the military facilitates and supports the application of the other instruments. Whether in a primary or supporting role, the military has the ability to use its strengths, assets, and capabilities in a range of strategic ways in order to achieve national aims.

a. Assurance is using the military instrument to demonstrate commitment and support to US allies and partners. Assurance often takes the form of security cooperation, combined exercises and forward stationing of US forces. It can also take the form of stabilization missions to provide security and meet the basic human needs of populations in a conflict-affected area and include foreign humanitarian assistance missions as a demonstration of commitment to the international order and support to those in need.

b. Coercion uses threats of force to shape the behavior of another actor. The word “coercion” is an umbrella term that encompasses two distinct forms: deterrence and compellence. Deterrence seeks to prevent an enemy from taking an action he has not yet taken; compellence seeks to persuade an enemy to do something he would rather not do—or to cease an action he has begun. In both cases the coercer threatens to use force if the target state (or actor) does not comply. With coercion, it is the threat of pain not yet inflicted that matters most. These threats may be severe, and the coercer may demonstrate commitment to the contested stake by taking an action designed to signal serious intent. For instance a coercer may use an air strike to signal commitment and to threaten further escalation. In the case of both deterrence and compellence, the decision to comply is in the hands of the target state. Successful coercion thus requires a detailed understanding of the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses, and his will and determination. It is highly dependent on intelligence, and the ability of the coercer to structure the enemy’s incentives.

(1) Deterrence may be accomplished by threat of punishment or threat of denial. In the case of the former, the coercer threatens to inflict pain on the target if it takes an action proscribed by the coercer. In the case of the latter, the coercer threatens to deny (through the use of military force) the enemy’s ability to achieve its objective. For instance, during the Cold War the United States sought to deter a Russian attack on Western Europe by threatening pain in the form of nuclear retaliation. But it also sought to deter such an attack by relying on North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces (including a large US contingent) to deny Russia victory in such a circumstance. Threats of punishment and denial are not exclusive and often reinforce each other. The joint force deters by maintaining and supporting capable, highly skilled and trained military forces, by sustaining the ability to strike targets worldwide and to deploy globally, by stationing forces forward, and by conducting exercises and multinational security cooperation and training.
(2) **Compellence** is the more complicated form of coercion since it requires precise signaling and communication through threats and acts, and since it is even more dependent than deterrence on an accurate assessment of enemy will. Compellence is often employed when ends are perceived (by the coercer) as limited, or achievable without regime change. But compellence is neither a short cut nor a “silver bullet.” A coercer seeking to compel must make clear what it wants the target state to do, including “how much?” and “for how long?” And compellence is active in ways that deterrence is not: the target state must perform an action (not just refrain from one), thus the act of complying is obvious—and often humiliating. Therefore, targets of compellence often attempt to resist the coercer’s threats and acts. By absorbing high levels of pain, by fighting longer than the coercer anticipates, or by taking control of the tempo of an asymmetric fight, a target state can resist—and thus force the coercer to pay a higher price than he had anticipated. In particular, the coercer must be prepared to climb the ladder of escalation if the target state resists the coercer’s demands. For the coercer, this requires a strong sense of what the stake is worth to the nation and the people. The joint force has many powerful tools to employ for the purpose of compellence, including air, sea, and land power. Compellence campaigns must be planned carefully however (based on sophisticated intelligence), and must rest upon high levels of communication between military leaders and civilian decision-makers if success is to be achieved. Compellence is often combined with diplomacy, and these instances are usually referred to as “coercive diplomacy.” An example is the naval quarantine imposed by the Kennedy Administration in 1962 to compel the Soviets to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cuba. This effort combined vigorous but judicious military action with equally vigorous diplomacy.

c. **Forcible Action** does not depend on the enemy’s compliance—indeed, non-reliance on the enemy’s ultimate cooperation is what distinguishes it, crucially, from coercion. It removes the enemy’s ability to hold the initiative. This uses pure strength to subdue the enemy and impose our will. This use of military power is more straightforward since it pits strength against strength, but it requires a substantial commitment of resources reflecting a stake that is very highly valued by the national population undertaking that commitment. Consolidating the gains of forcible action and translating them into long term political goals usually requires planning for and resourcing a postwar reconstruction/stabilization period that can last for years.
CHAPTER III
TYPES OF MILITARY STRATEGIES

1. Types of Military Strategies

   a. Military leaders develop strategies varying in purpose and scope according to their
duties and responsibilities, as well as the roles and missions of the organizations they lead.
US law, national security policy, and national-level strategy govern these obligations that
in turn shape military strategies focused either externally on force management and
employment or internally on force development and force design. Military strategy at the
national level can incorporate both an internal and external focus according to the functions
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

   b. Regardless of their orientation, all military strategies exist in an environment
shaped by outside factors and conditions necessitating the clear articulation of the art and
science of creating and employing the military instrument of national power to achieve
policy objectives.

2. National Military Strategy

   a. Title 10, USC, Section 153, requires the CJCS to submit a national military strategy
biennially to Congress describing how the Armed Forces of the United States will support
the objectives of the United States. The broad scope of the Chairman’s responsibilities
suggests a continuum of strategic direction spanning three overlapping time horizons
corresponding to how the joint force employs, adapts, and innovates the force to meet the
requirements of law, policy, and defense strategy. This provides the final piece of the ends,
ways, and means construct—the means.

   b. Force employment contains the CJCS’s recommendations on prioritization and
management of joint forces to achieve policy goals and strategic objectives in pursuit of
one or more strategies against a competitor or adversary. Force employment includes both
activities in in day-to-day operations as well as in contingencies, generally just beyond the
years of budget execution, looking 0-3 years ahead.

   c. Force development identifies and documents capability requirements and the
Chairman’s recommendations to adapt current forces and improve performance against
near-term to mid-term challenges in the strategic environment. The horizon for force
development is continuous, starting with requirements determination based on current and
forecast capabilities desired of a military force, translating these capabilities into programs
and structure starting at the end of the current year’s budget execution and ending just
beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), spanning roughly two to seven years
ahead.

   d. Force design contains the Chairman’s recommendations for innovation required to
address mid-term to long-term challenges in the strategic environment. Much like force
development, force design spans both force development and capability development
activities, with an emphasis on long-term solutions to retain a competitive advantage, fill
capability gaps, and address long-term risk over anticipated adversaries and competitors beyond the FYDP. The temporal window for force design is roughly a decade, starting near the end of the FYDP, looking approximately 5-15 years ahead.

3. Combatant Command Strategy

Combatant command strategies are either geographic or functional and are strategies of force employment. They articulate the pursuit of global, regional, or functional objectives within the context of a national strategy to achieve national policy objectives specific to the region or the function. A combatant command strategy is generally a subset of a national-level strategy and is also expressed in a similar form of ends, ways, means, and risk. Given their regional or functional focus, combatant command strategies must nest within national-level strategies, requiring either adjustments to the national strategy or assumption of greater risk.

4. Service or Institutional Strategy

a. Unlike a strategy of force employment, strategies for the military Services and other institutions tend to look internally for their implementation. Such strategies translate a senior leader’s vision for their organization into direction for the future force while meeting today’s commitments, consistent with their responsibilities and authorities.

b. Institutional strategy is anchored by the principal’s interpretation of higher strategies and vision. It describes broadly what the organization does, which may be phrased as roles and missions, foundational qualities, or other enduring aspects of the organization.

c. An institutional strategy translates higher-level policy, strategy, and the strategic approach into a set of desired ends for that organization to attain by a given time period. Attainment of those ends occurs through ways in the strategy, which often correspond to lines of effort in a plan but could also be construed as key tasks within the duration of the strategy. The means to an institutional strategy can take the form of resources or authorities for implementation of the ways, required capabilities to attain the ends, and guidance to activities of the organization to bound subordinate objectives in planning. An institutional strategy should include risk guidance to shape analysis and guide tradeoffs and strategic choices between competing priorities.
CHAPTER IV
MILITARY STRATEGY IN JOINT CAMPAIGNING

“Campaign—a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning

1. Operational Art from Strategy

   a. Operational art is the mechanism the joint force uses to implement military strategy. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

   For more information, see Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning.

   b. Military options composed of singular tactical actions or isolated operations alone rarely achieve all strategic objectives. Achieving objectives or attaining broader strategy ends increasingly requires the joint force to adopt a global perspective and integrate all joint functions across regional boundaries in all domains. In this complex environment, strategy is the conceptual basis for operational art, and joint campaigning is the method by which the joint force integrates balances multiple time periods, multiple spaces, and forces to achieve the objectives of military strategy within acceptable risk.

2. Global Campaigning

   a. Implementing national strategic guidance through operational art with a global perspective has multiple aspects. The first aspect is global campaigns, which direct day-to-day operations and are the purview of global campaign planning that occurs at the Joint Staff and combatant command levels. Day-to-day campaigns span the range from competition through armed conflict.

   b. Global campaigns for the joint force are directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). This overarching plan provides CJCS direction on how to execute the military strategy and identifies global, functional, and regional campaigns required to support national strategy objectives. Global campaign plans address adversaries and competitors identified in national strategy by integrating joint force actions across geographic boundaries and form the base of CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

   c. The Chairman also addresses specific functional and regional challenges that span domains and geographic boundaries. Functional campaign plans and regional campaign plans address threats and challenges requiring coordination across multiple combatant commands.
d. Combatant command campaign plans implement a combatant commander’s strategy and seek to shape the operational environment by integrating posture, resources, and activities to achieve objectives and complement other government efforts related to a geographic region or functional area. Combatant command campaign plans also consolidate operational objectives and tasks identified by the CJCS in the global, functional, and regional campaign plans as they pertain to the commander’s specific authorities and responsibilities.

3. Contingency Campaigning

a. The second aspect of implementing strategic guidance is contingency campaigning, operations executed in response to changes in the strategic environment that require a branch from the global, functional, regional, or combatant command campaign plans. National and defense strategies, through the presidentially approved contingency planning guidance, direct contingency plans to address designated threats, potential catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that warrant military response options. This guidance provides the basis for combatant command contingency plans and global war planning.

b. Global war plans are detailed descriptions of military actions that can be taken in response to contingencies which threaten national security. Since many contingencies are branches from day-to-day campaign plans, an integrated contingency plan should capture modifications to day-to-day campaign objectives, resources, and forces so that SecDef, CJCS, and the combatant commanders can coordinate joint force contingency response activities across all combatant commands.

c. During a contingency response and activation of an integrated contingency plan, day-to-day campaigns continue in modified form to account for changes in the operational environment, resource allocation, and to balance risk. The Joint Staff develops globally integrated base plans that examine global implications of conflict with a state-based threat and provide initial recommendations on reallocation of resources to respond to the contingency.

d. Contingency campaigns conclude upon achievement of identified military objectives, and military operations return to day-to-day campaign plan execution, often under new or re-characterized conditions. Post-contingency conditions may require re-evaluation of existing strategies and campaigns to sustain new strategic conditions and objectives.


a. A key operational art resource for force employment is the global force management (GFM) process. GFM is a process that aligns force apportionment, assignment, allocation, and readiness methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy and Joint Force availability requirements which assigns and allocates forces globally against requirements in campaigning, including requirements identified in contingency planning to support the execution of the defense and military strategies. The
GFM processes provide insight into the strategic posture of forces and global availability of forces and capabilities for plans and operations and provide senior decision makers with a construct to assess impacts and risks associated with proposed changes to the force and how the force is used. Additionally, GFM balances current demands with readiness recovery to enable the force to successfully execute contingency campaigns and improve performance through force development. Combatant commands execute their theater strategies and corresponding campaign plans based on the forces allocated through GFM.

b. Global and contingency campaigns must use current posture and force levels due to the long timeline required to make posture adjustments. Posture strategy incorporates expected future risk, campaign requirements, and force design. Posture strategies require incorporating appropriate future scenario development that accounts for shifts in friendly, partner, and adversary capabilities.
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CHAPTER V
INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY

1. Implementing Institutional Strategies

   a. Institutional strategies translate military strategy to an organization’s internal tasks to shape investments for the future force and ensure force resilience. Those investments are adaptive in the case of force development, or innovative in the case of force design.

   b. Institutional strategy is implemented at a number of levels. At the national level, the ultimate expression of institutional strategy is the FYDP and its allocation of budgeting resources to programming. Force development occurs primarily within the time horizons of the FYDP, while force design looks beyond those time horizons. The scope of investments in the future force requires a view to the entire duration required to bring strategic choices and capabilities into fruition, which often exceeds the horizon of the FYDP. Force design provides the long-term basis to inform strategic choices and capabilities.

   c. The return on investments in the future force is improvement to joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Some of those improvements are possible in the near term, while others will require deliberate, mid-term investments in the FYDP or even long-term investments beyond the budget years. Institutional strategies should unify all of those changes in a coherent framework to attain the principal’s vision.

2. Military Strategy in Force Development

   a. Implementing military strategy in force development occurs within the years of the FYDP. It assesses and identifies required capabilities for the future joint force. Those capabilities may come from strategy, campaign plans, and contingency plans at multiple levels. Collectively, readiness reporting for contingency planning and assessments of strategy and campaign planning inform the Joint Military Net Assessment, which is the joint force’s capstone assessment product. The CJCS’s military advice to SecDef on capability investments appears in the CJCS’s program recommendation, which provides a wide range of recommendations to inform the defense planning guidance, which provides the Secretary’s force planning, analytic, and investment direction for implementing the strategy in the budget cycle for the Services and combatant commands with service-like responsibilities.

   b. SecDef’s defense planning guidance guides the development of institutional and Service strategies, as well as changes to DOTMLPF-P in accordance with the defense strategy. The ends, ways, means, and risk in those Service strategies implement the defense strategy’s objectives within the years of the FYDP for readiness recovery, modernization, and near-term acquisitions and provide the basis for long-term Service concept development, which is the springboard for force design.
3. Military Strategy in Force Design

a. Military strategy in force design focuses on the years after the FYDP. The principal focus of force design is concept development, which addresses required capabilities of the joint force beyond the budgetary timelines. Joint concepts address current or envisioned challenges and describe how a joint force commander might employ new or existing capabilities to meet those challenges. Those concepts also build on the foundations laid in military strategy.

b. The joint force’s primary document for force design is the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030, which describes the CJCS’s long-range vision beyond the FYDP for how the future joint force will operate and overcome operational challenges in the anticipated security environment. Vetted through war games and experimentation, the capstone concept and the other documents in the family of joint concepts provide the intellectual basis for Service concepts that describe each of the Services’ contributions to the future joint force. The required capabilities articulated in those concepts also bridge force design to force development by highlighting capability gaps that will require long lead times to mitigate.

c. Joint concepts can inform Service and institutional strategies but serve a different purpose. In general, joint concepts articulate how the joint force might fight in the future and identify capabilities required to meet future challenges, but also provide a basis for experimentation to vet those concepts for more focused investments. Those investments, however, are the responsibility of Service and institutional strategies, which contain more detailed prioritization to guide the strategic choices that must be made inside the FYDP.
CHAPTER VI
RISK AND STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

1. Purpose

   a. Implicit to the implementation of a strategy is the identification of its associated costs and risks. Given the fundamental uncertainty in the strategic environment and the likelihood that requirements for the joint force will exceed available resources, strategic assessment is a vital component of strategy implementation. Further, because levels of risk are dynamic over time, such assessments must examine trends in risk across time and must be periodically updated to reflect a changing strategic environment.

   b. Assessing risk, the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued, is a key element of decision making. Accurately appraising risk enables commanders and staffs to manage and communicate risk, inform decisions, and provide information across disparate processes. A formal methodology to assess strategic risk to national interests, as well as military risks to missions and to forces, appears in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.

   c. When trying to distinguish between costs and risks, it is useful to think of the two in terms of the level of certainty. Costs are the losses you expect to incur if the strategy goes as planned. Risks are the losses you expect to avoid, but may not if the strategy does not go as planned.

2. Types of Assessments

   a. Strategy and its related products are assessed differently, depending on the instrument being assessed and its temporal horizons. Strategy assessments often address the entire continuum of strategic direction spanning force employment, force development, and force design, and are often more focused on identifying longer-term trends. In contrast, campaign and contingency assessments and readiness reporting focus principally on near-term force employment using the current force structure and posture.

   b. Strategy assessments evaluate the ability of the joint force to meet the challenges defined in a strategy, focused on attainment of its ends and ways, and based on trends in force employment, force development, and force design. Most assessments of strategies focus on risk, and joint force assessments of military strategy often utilize the joint risk analysis methods in CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Assessment. Those assessments inform changes to the strategy, whether in force employment or program advice, that affect force development and force design.

   c. Campaign assessments evaluate the ability of the joint force to achieve the objectives articulated in a global or combatant command campaign plan. The results of a campaign assessment inform decisions on resource allocation or force management to implement of a strategy. They can also inform changes to the campaign plan itself. While campaign assessments have a relationship to strategy assessments, that relationship is indirect.
d. Readiness reporting measures the ability of the joint force to meet contingency planning requirements. In comparison to campaign assessments of daily operations and activities, readiness reporting focuses on wartime requirements and tasks.
APPENDIX A
STRATEGY DOCUMENTS

1. National Security Strategy

   a. Signature authority: President.

   b. Timeframe: Not more than 150 days after the President takes office.

   c. Statutory requirement: Title 50, USC, Section 3043 directs the transmission of a national security strategy to Congress from the President. Under that statute, each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States.

   d. Required composition:

      (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

      (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

      (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph d.(1).

      (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

      (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

2. National Defense Strategy

   a. Signature authority: Secretary of Defense.

   b. Timeframe: Every four years or sooner, as SecDef deems appropriate.

   c. Statutory requirement:

      (1) Title 10, USC, Section 113(g), directs SecDef to provide a defense strategy to the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United States; the commanders of the combatant commands; and the heads of all defense agencies and field activities of DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and to the congressional defense committees.
(2) The national defense strategy shall support the most recent national security strategy report of the President under Section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Title 50, USC, Section 3043).

d. Required composition:

(1) The priority missions of DOD, and the assumed force planning scenarios and constructs.

(2) The assumed strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies posed by state or non-state actors, and the strategies that DOD will employ to counter such threats and provide for the national defense.

(3) A strategic framework prescribed by the Secretary that guides how DOD will prioritize among the threats described in paragraph 2 and the missions specified pursuant to paragraph 1, how DOD will allocate and mitigate the resulting risks, and how DOD will make resource investments.

(4) The roles and missions of the armed forces to carry out the missions described in paragraph 1, and the assumed roles and capabilities provided by other US Government departments and agencies and by allies and international partners.

(5) The force size and shape, force posture, defense capabilities, force readiness, infrastructure, organization, personnel, technological innovation, and other elements of the defense program necessary to support such strategy.

(6) The major investments in defense capabilities, force structure, force readiness, force posture, and technological innovation that DOD will make over the following five-year period in accordance with the strategic framework described in paragraph 3.

3. Contingency Planning Guidance

a. Signature authority: President.

b. Timeframe: Every two years or more frequently as needed.

c. Statutory requirement: Title 10, Section 113, directs the Secretary, with approval of the President and the advice of the CJCS, shall provide written guidance (to be known as “Contingency Planning Guidance” or “Guidance for Employment of the Force”) on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans, including plans for providing support to civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident, for homeland defense, and for military support to civil authorities. This guidance is to be the primary source document used by the CJCS in executing global integration responsibilities and developing implementation guidance for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders of the combatant commands.
d. Required composition. The guidance shall include:

1. A description of the manner in which limited existing forces and resources shall be prioritized and apportioned to achieve the objectives described in the national defense strategy.

2. A description of the relative priority of contingency and campaign plans, specific force levels, and supporting resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective.

3. Prioritized global, regional, and functional policy objectives that the armed forces should plan to achieve, including plans for deliberate and contingency scenarios.

4. Policy and strategic assumptions that should guide military planning, including the role of foreign partners.

5. Guidance on global posture and GFM.


7. Specific guidance on United States and department nuclear policy.

4. National Military Strategy

a. Signature authority: CJCS.

b. Timeframe: Each even-numbered year, whether to prepare a new strategy or to update a previously prepared strategy.

c. Statutory requirement: Title 10, USC, Section 153(b), directs the CJCS to prepare a national military strategy (or update) that describes how the military will support the objectives of the United States as articulated in:

1. The most recent national security strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to Section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Title 50, USC, Section 3043).

2. The most recent annual report of SecDef submitted to the President and Congress pursuant to Title 19, USC, Section 113.

3. The most recent national defense strategy presented by SecDef pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 113.

4. The most recent policy guidance provided by SecDef pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 113(g).

5. Any other national security or defense strategic guidance issued by the President or SecDef.
Appendix A

d. Required Composition: At a minimum, each national military strategy (or update) submitted under this paragraph shall:

   (1) Assess the strategic environment, threats, opportunities, and challenges that affect the national security of the United States.

   (2) Assess military ends, ways, and means to support the objectives referred to in statutory requirement.

   (3) Provide the framework for the assessment by the Chairman of military risk and for the development of risk mitigation options.

   (4) Develop military options to address threats and opportunities.

   (5) Assess joint force capabilities, capacities, and resources.

   (6) Establish military guidance for the development of the joint force and the total force building on guidance by the President and SecDef as referred to in statutory requirement.

5. Combatant Command Strategies

   a. Signature authority: Unified or Specified Combatant Commander.

   b. Timeframe: Generally two years, paralleling a combatant command campaign plan.

   c. Statutory requirement: None.

   d. Suggested composition: Identification of the ends, ways, means, and risk guidance to the combatant command for activities in its area of responsibility, or function, based on national-level policy and strategy for the joint force, refined through global, regional, or functional policy guidance. Although there is no prescribed format for a strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission, challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources.
APPENDIX B
REFERENCES

d. FYDP.
e. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.
f. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
g. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
h. CJCSI 3110.01, *(U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*.
i. Joint Military Net Assessment.
k. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.
l. CJCSM 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*.
m. Title 10, USC.
n. Title 50, USC.
## Glossary
### Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Future Years Defense Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFM</td>
<td>Global Force Management</td>
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<td>JDN</td>
<td>joint doctrine note</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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