A Guide to Strengthened Civil-Military Cooperation in the Combatant Command’s Area of Responsibility

27 January 2010
MESSAGE TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTER

This pamphlet is not a ‘stand-alone’ publication. It provides an overview of the unified action (UA) series of handbooks developed to assist the joint force commander (JFC) design, plan, and execute a whole-of-government approach. The UA Handbooks are not a comprehensive planning guide. Instead, they complement operational design and the joint operation planning process to enable the JFC and his staff to better integrate with all elements of national power in complex overseas contingency operations, or in support of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. This pamphlet describes the handbook series, suggests how the handbooks should be used, and identifies significant interrelationships among the handbooks. The handbooks are guides, not templates. It is important to understand the dynamic nature of interagency coordination and not use these handbooks as a step-by-step “how-to” manuals.

NOTICE TO USERS

All approved and current Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Pamphlets, Handbooks, and White Papers are posted on the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Web page at https://jdeis.mil/jdeis/jel/template.jsp?title=jwfcpam&filename=jwfc_pam.htm. If a JWFC product is not posted there; it is either in development or rescinded.
PREFACE

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms, defines Unified Action (UA) as the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. To this end United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) embarked on a multi-year project to carry forward the principles of UA through concept development and experimentation. The project, called Unified Action, intersected with and supported the development of this overview pamphlet and a series of five other handbooks (listed on page iv). This was completed through the concept development and experimentation capabilities residing within USJFCOM as a part of a command initiative, directed from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to build partnership capacity and assist with the implementation of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44).

The UA project focused on two lines of operations (LOO) to achieve its objectives. The first line included limited objective experiments contributing to the implementation of the DOD work plan to support NSPD-44. Products of this included the military component to revisions of the United States Government (USG) Draft Planning Framework, the Implementation Planning Annex, and the Interagency Management System (IMS) Operations Guide. The second line of operation included spiral events to produce the series of handbooks and overview. The products of both LOO were developed and validated through a rigorous process of experimentation that was conducted with military and civilian partners across the USG.

The authors of the IMS Handbook as well as of the functional handbooks developed them in close coordination with, and significant input from both civilian and military experts in the respective fields that the handbooks cover. The authors also regularly vetted the content with these experts to assure currency and accuracy of both theory and practice. As a result, both the IMS Handbooks as well as the functional handbooks represent the current state of best practices in the both functional areas for reconstruction and stabilization operations, and the conduct of the IMS.

In conventional warfare one objective is to destroy the infrastructure that the adversary uses to support its combat effort. In today’s conflict a principal objective is to win the confidence of the population and convert the adversary to become a partner to contribute to stability. The preservation and development of the critical infrastructure to function effectively to serve the needs of its population is an important component in winning the confidence and support of the population. Thus the judgment on how to limit the destruction of infrastructure is important to support rapid post-conflict recovery.

Once the combat mission is achieved, recent experience (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)) has demonstrated that the same military units conducting the combat will likely remain to initiate the post-conflict reconstruction program. It is this initial post-conflict period with less than permissive security conditions for civilians that the military may bear significant responsibility for reconstruction efforts. The purpose of these handbooks is to provide guidance for
military planners during the reconstruction period. The military will also continue to contribute to reconstruction of critical infrastructure and support the provision of essential services to the population throughout the stability operations period.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Unified Action Handbook Series** .................................................... iv

**Section I - The Changing Approach to Global Security** ........ 1
- Overview .................................................................................................. 1
- Global Perspective and a Changing Defense Approach ...................... 2
- Purpose and Scope .................................................................................. 2
- A Synopsis of the Unified Action Handbooks ........................................ 2
- Putting it all together ............................................................................. 3
- How to use the Unified Action Handbook Series .................................. 4

**Section II - Significant Interrelationships Among Handbooks** 6
- Governance ............................................................................................. 6
- Conflict Transformation .......................................................................... 6
- Transfer of Authority .............................................................................. 7
- Building Host Nation Governance Capacity .......................................... 7
- Population and Leader Security (Human Security) .................................. 8
- Civil-Military Interdependencies ............................................................. 8
- Corruption ............................................................................................... 8
- Budgeting and Resource Allocation ....................................................... 9
- Integrated Operational Design and Planning ......................................... 9
- Prioritizing and Sequencing ................................................................. 10
- Future Operations and Transition Planning ......................................... 10
- Strategic Communication ...................................................................... 11

**Section III - Principles for Mission Success** .............................. 12
- Additional Principles when Crisis Response is Anticipated .................. 15
- Achieving Operational and Strategic Objectives .................................. 15

**Section IV - Gaps - Seeking Opportunities** ................................. 17
- Role of Religion and Ideological Factors Driving Conflict .................... 17
- Determining Force Size Based on Comprehensive Assessments .......... 18
- Host Nation Policy Reform Requirements ............................................. 19
- Occupational Governance Authorities .................................................. 22
- Enforcing Peace Agreements; United Nations Security Council Resolutions ......................................................... 23
- Transfer of Authority as Central Planning Focus .................................. 23
- Use of Polling ........................................................................................ 24
- Managing Demonstrations, Protests, and Strikes .................................. 24
- Planning Dynamics – Building Reach-Back Capacity .......................... 25
- Regional Security Officer Effect on Implementation Efforts ................. 25
- DOD Contracting Officer Expeditionary Capacity for Reconstruction & Stabilization Operations ......................................................... 26
- The Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework ...................... 27
- Value and Role of Host Nation Entertainment Media .......................... 27
- The Case of Safe Havens ...................................................................... 27

**Section V - Looking Ahead** ............................................................. 29

**Endnotes** .......................................................................................... 30
UNIFIED ACTION HANDBOOK SERIES

Book One: Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The handbook outlines joint force roles and responsibilities in the Interagency Management System (IMS) and existing interagency coordination authorities and mechanisms. It aligns with the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation. It will also align with the IMS Guide under development at the Department of States’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Book Two: Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure

This handbook defines services essential to sustain human life during stability operations (water, sanitation, transportation, medical, etc.), the infrastructure needed to deliver such services, and potential joint force responsibilities.

Book Three: Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media

The last comprehensive guide to military governance was written in 1943. Combatant commanders have directed joint forces to rebuild media, support election preparations, and provide advisors to embryonic executive ministries and legislative committees in recent and current operations. This handbook provides pre-doctrinal guidance for joint force support to good governance, political competition, and support to media.

Book Four: Military Support to Economic Stabilization

This handbook outlines joint force support to economic development. It addresses conducting a comprehensive economic assessment, employment and business generation, trade, agriculture, financial sector development and regulation, and legal transformation.

Book Five: Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform

This handbook defines the “Rule of Law;” explains the interrelationship between rule of law, governance, and security; and provides a template to analyze the rule of law foundation essential to successful stability operations.
Section I - The Changing Approach to Global Security

“One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.”

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

Overview

The US approach to global security, focusing on peer competitor state entities is changing. Weak and failing states were largely ignored for years, but they have become a priority in ongoing efforts to transform our national security architecture. The challenge today is to develop multi-decade, integrated approaches that focus on conflict prevention. New strategic imperatives require building sustainable capacity with overseas partners to help establish good governance and security, promote economic prosperity and social well-being, and more effectively promote community-level development.

The JFC must maintain current crisis response capabilities while building new integrated, “steady state” approaches. “Steady state” is utilized by the US Department of State (DOS) to describe the full range of engagement with Host Nations (HN) in a permissive environment. Integrating support to governance and security, economic prosperity, social well-being, and community development into crisis response efforts is a significant challenge. The purpose of the UA Handbook Series is to improve civil-military cooperation in operational campaign design, planning, and execution to meet this challenge.

Efforts by the USG to strengthen the civilian instruments of national power to better address current and future national security challenges is an extremely dynamic and complex endeavor, made more complex by a rapidly changing environment. The JFC must rapidly expand the capacity of the joint force to support a whole-of-government approach.

The joint force will not infringe upon activities associated with civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, when civilian agencies and NGOs cannot perform their functions in crisis response operations, the joint force will. As a part of the function the JFC should integrate civilian personnel to enable civilian agency action as early as possible.

The DOS, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other civilian agencies are developing capacity to deploy in support of overseas contingency operations. Until the “deployable” sections of DOS and USAID are
operational, it may be necessary to embed selected civilian personnel in combatant command and subordinate joint force staffs to provide immediate guidance and reach-back to initiate governance and security, economic prosperity, social well-being, and community development programs. Wide scale implementation of whole-of-government approaches will pay exponential dividends. For the foreseeable future, however, joint forces must maintain the capability to conduct governance and security, economic prosperity, social well-being, and community development programs unilaterally in the initial phases of overseas contingency operations.

**Global Perspective and a Changing Defense Approach**

The United States developed the whole-of-government approach to build global stability. DOD and the JFC will implement UA through the whole-of-government approach using operational campaign design and the JOPP during overseas contingency operations in close partnership with DOS, USAID, and other USG civilian agencies.

DOD is aligning to holistically support USG strategic objectives in unstable regions. DOS, USAID, and DOD will present one USG voice concerning diplomacy and development, with an increased focus on conflict prevention and maintenance or restoration of stability.

**Purpose and Scope**

The UA Handbook series is a pre-doctrinal joint force guide for planning, implementing and managing complex overseas contingency operations within the whole-of-government framework. The handbooks are “guides,” not “templates”. They introduce joint planners to sectors in which they may have little or no functional knowledge. They may also be beneficial to DOS, USAID, and other USG civilian personnel with overseas contingency planning and operational responsibility. They do not replace current policy or specific agency instructions, but rather inform the transformation process to accelerate the capacity of the joint force to support a whole-of-government approach. The handbooks are a bridge between the best practices in the field and their migration to doctrine.

**A Synopsis of the Unified Action Handbooks**

The USG is closely examining how it collectively responds in the initial period of a crisis intervention. Critical gaps may exist while the joint force establishes security, and before DOS, USAID, and other civilian agencies can deploy in sufficient numbers to initiate stability and reconstruction operations. The UA Handbooks provide joint forces guidance through the six phases of joint operations or campaigns. The handbooks also provide DOS, USAID, international organizations, and NGOs insights about joint force perspectives, planning, and operations concerning persistent security requirements during reconstruction operations. The following is a short summary of each UA Handbook:
Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The handbook outlines joint force roles and responsibilities in the Interagency Management System (IMS) and existing interagency coordination authorities and mechanisms. It aligns with the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation. It will also align with the IMS Guide under development at the DOS’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure

This handbook defines services essential to sustain human life during stabilization operations (water, sanitation, transportation, medical, etc.), the infrastructure needed to deliver such services, and potential joint force responsibilities.

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The last comprehensive guide to military governance was written in 1943. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) have directed joint forces to rebuild media, support election preparations, and provide advisors to embryonic executive ministries and legislative committees in recent and current operations. This handbook provides pre-doctrinal guidance for joint force support to good governance, political competition, and support to media.

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This handbook outlines joint force support to economic development. It addresses conducting a comprehensive economic assessment, employment and business generation, trade, agriculture, financial sector development and regulation, and legal transformation.

Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform

This handbook defines the “Rule of Law;” explains the interrelationship between rule of law, governance, and security; and provides a template to analyze the rule of law foundation essential to successful stabilization operations.

Putting it all Together

Figure 1 presents key components of a notional whole-of-government planning initiative that requires synchronization of USG departments and agencies to achieve US policy objectives:
How to Use the UA Handbook Series

These handbooks will assist the JFC in establishing early and effective collaboration with appropriate USG agencies to design, plan, and implement stability operations in support of USG strategic objectives and regional policy goals. The handbooks are applicable to all CCDRs. They are applicable to every phase of joint operations and campaigns, whether USG civilian agencies have forward deployed, or are still embedded with combatant command staffs outside of theater.

Each handbook covers specific but interconnected topics. The range of topics covers known challenges to HN stabilization. Overlap exists, because all topics relate to rule-of-law and governance, and the IMS covers all aspects of operational campaign design and HN stabilization. Cross-cutting issues also are covered in this overview. These handbooks all cover operational campaign design. Most cover the immediate seize the initiative phase and the beginning of the stabilize phase. Two handbooks cover all operational phases, including the shape and enable civil authority phases of operations (Phases 0 and 5). The chart below shows which phases of operations are covered by each handbook.

Figure 1. Notional Whole-of-Government Planning Initiative
The UA Handbooks address challenges identified in “lessons observed” in current operations and recent exercises. The six phases of joint operations normally apply to the range of overseas contingency operations. However, each handbook focuses on specific phases of a joint operation or campaign, as indicated in Table 1 and provides detailed guidance accordingly.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unified Action Handbook</th>
<th>Phase I “Deter”</th>
<th>Phase II “Seize the Initiative”</th>
<th>Phase IV “Stabilize”</th>
<th>Phase V “Enable Civil Authority”</th>
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Table 1. Unified Action Handbook – Joint Operation Phase Alignment
Section II - Significant Relations Among Handbooks

Governance

Helping HN governments, populations, and leaders build responsible and effective governance processes is an essential element of both crisis response and ongoing Phase 0, “Shape,” and Phase V, “Enable Civil Authorities,” activities. Failure of governance leads to crises. All of the UA Handbooks address aspects of governance. Major milestones in the governance area include forming new HN interim governments, creating new constitutions and gaining popular approval, enabling provincial and national elections to establish permanent governments, and transfers of authority to HN institutions. These milestones are best developed as elements of operational design within the whole-of-government approach. They define the main lines of effort and demark transitions between phases. The DOS and USAID, working closely with international authorities, carry the lead responsibility for HN governance development. Forward deployed personnel have generally directed operations to build local governance capacity. Building effective links between national and local government organizations for all reconstruction activities is vital.

Conflict Transformation

NGOs began using the term “transformational development” in the 1990s to define a process to help third world people implement community development practices that addressed child mortality, food production inadequacies, illiteracy and education limitations, poor public health capacities, slow technology transfer, human rights abuses, and other constraints. DOD uses “transformation” in a different context, emphasizing accelerated processes of using the best technology to transform the art of warfare.

The US Institute of Peace published the Quest for Viable Peace to address significant lessons identified during security sector reform (SSR) operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and bring common understanding to the term “conflict transformation.” Each UA Handbook addresses aspects of conflict transformation that move nations from practices that create conditions which cause conflict to practices that lead to sustainable peace. They include the establishment of effective rule of law, security sector management, transparent financial management practices to include regulatory institutions for infrastructure construction, and competent economic planning to achieve effective and prosperous production systems.

Quest for a Viable Peace describes how reconstruction efforts fail in the absence of transformation of governance systems. Former Secretary of State Rice used the term “transformational diplomacy” which reflected a general acceptance of this requirement.
Transfer of Authority

Perhaps the most important set of decisions in crisis response efforts is setting the criteria and the time schedule for transferring authority between controlling or governing entities. This can be a transfer of authority (TOA) from bilateral to multilateral institutions; as accomplished in the Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo operations; where the authority to manage reconstruction efforts was passed to the United Nations (UN). The UN, however, might not have the mandate or the capacity to conduct crisis response operations during conflict. In the absence of a UN mandate or capacity, TOA may be to regional international organizations, such as the European or African Union or HN institutions. The USG has primarily funded conflict transformation efforts for Afghanistan and Iraq, with the strategic objective of transferring authority to the HNs.

Neither Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) nor Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were designed to include a TOA schedule based on the development of a criteria and comprehensive planning to build HN capacity. Like the outcomes in Haiti, Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo and other previous (and smaller scale) operations, TOA scheduling decisions were largely based on political criteria with the assumption that all other factors would adjust to accommodate that schedule. This practice is has been problematic in theater. The most daunting challenge has been the requirement to build HN security sector management capacity as part of building effective governance. The USG is developing more effective civil-military planning procedures, which focus on TOA. The UA Handbooks are part of that process.

Building Host Nation Governance Capacity

The ultimate responsibility for building effective governance rests with HN officials, civil society leaders and people. The USG and the international community, to include the UN, are still building tools to assess and measure competent governance. Because straightforward engineering problems like restoring essential services and reconstructing critical infrastructure generally have associated metrics; determining the qualitative metrics to assess national and local governance has received less attention. The education and training programs to build effective human resources have been considered long-term and less urgent. But these programs are critical to building effective government and private sector performance.

Most nations have civil service training institutions. During operational design, and especially within the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), the USG should prioritize training requirements and fund training programs. These institutions can provide public management training for officials in all sectors essential to developing effective HN governance to include: Ministries of Defense, Justice, Public Works, Agriculture, Finance, Interior, and others. Vocational training for reconstruction is also important, but rarely considered in operational design or the JOPP. Specialized training programs oriented
toward crisis recovery can be employed, such as the macroeconomic simulation developed by the Institute of Defense Analyses (SENSE4) and currently used by United States Institute for Peace.

**Population and Leader Security (Human Security)**

Provision of security for government officials, civil society leaders, and traditional population leadership to enable implementation of changed practices to transform conditions from those that lead to conflict to those that lead to sustainable stability is an essential task. Leadership in conflict transformation processes must confront entrenched traditional practices, interest groups, insurgency groups, and criminal activities. There is no standard for human security and resources are also constrained. Building competent HN human security institutions is the key to the solution. But it is impossible to provide total protection, and triage analysis will determine allocation of resources.

**Civil–Military Interdependencies**

Economic development is closely tied to human security. Both must occur simultaneously. USG civil-military institutional boundaries cover important gaps. Joint forces have evolved from avoidance of “mission creep,” “no nation building,” and “stay in our lane” constraints to embracing SSR operations to the extent that civilian USG agencies, international organizations, and NGOs often complain that they have gone too far. USG civilian agencies are developing SSR capabilities to address constraints in fielding staff for overseas contingency operations.

Operational design and the JOPP involve DOS, USAID, and military planners from the outset and throughout operations to detect interdependencies among USG agencies. Civilians need to identify the security required for the most significant reconstruction projects. The JFC must identify security concerns and potential “no-go” areas. Prioritizing and sequencing project activities must include identification of resource availability and funding sources, prioritizing activities competing for funds, and evaluation of how projects contribute to strategic objectives. An activity designed to address one objective, such as building a clinic to address significant community health problems, can in fact be counterproductive to higher operational or strategic objectives, such as reducing support to a corrupt leader who would otherwise get the credit for the clinic.

**Corruption**

A common and pervasive obstacle to achieving national strategic objectives is HN corruption that blocks the establishment of good governance and limits the effectiveness of the resources authorized for reconstruction. All the handbooks provide guidance on countering corrupt practices. But knowing what is needed and actually achieving it have proven exceptionally elusive. Corrupt practices will almost always be denied and methods to hide them are well-refined. The use of public resources for personal gain is commonly accepted. A Sierra Leone governor captured this sentiment by openly saying, “The cow grazes where it stands!” HN institutions need to be built and civil society groups
strengthened to hold officials accountable for transparent financial management in all sectors of government management.

**Budgeting and Resource Allocation**

The DOD, DOS, USAID and other USG civilian agencies each follow different planning processes with respect to funding and resource allocation. The planning process for stability operations is evolving for the entire USG. For the DOD, resource constraints are becoming more significant. For DOS, USAID, and other USG civilian agencies; significantly increased requirements for overseas contingency operations have increased available resources for these operations.

UA requires that DOD develop common assumptions with other USG civilian agencies and stakeholders outside the USG, as appropriate. The central assumption of the UA Handbooks is that DOD will not conduct overseas contingency operations without including the DOS, USAID, and other USG civilian agencies in operational design and the JOPP, except in national emergencies. Joint planners must therefore engage civilian agencies at the outset of joint operation design and planning. The accompanying assumption is that funding will be provided to civilian agencies in the traditional manner for the bulk of joint operation phases IV and V reconstruction management. Therefore DOD, even if initially the lead USG agency, must design and plan overseas contingency operations to facilitate the eventual TOA to USG civilian agencies or an appropriate international organization, such as the UN. USG funding at the start of the “Stabilize” phase to both joint forces and USG civilian agencies will constrain future joint operation planning and execution.

The JFC must determine whether the joint force has initial responsibility for all reconstruction activities. Joint force planners can then analyze funding among all expected participating USG agencies to create viable interagency agreements that cover funding and TOA. Transferring funds between DOD and other USG agencies is complicated and will require early and detailed financial planning alongside operational planning.

**Integrated Operational Design and Planning**

The DOS’s S/CRS has led a range of interagency activities to coordinate civilian and military actions to facilitate UA in overseas contingency operations. These efforts to operationalize “smart power” through the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and interagency planners reflect the USG’s new approach to planning and conducting stability operations; i.e., a civilian-led, whole-of-government plan designed to provide sufficient civilian capabilities so that joint forces can assume a supporting role.

At the same time, resources and systems available to the JFC are generally greater than those available to USG civilian agencies. In OEF and OIF, as well as operations in the Balkans, Africa, and elsewhere; DOS, USAID, and even the UN have relied upon joint forces to provide resources to sustain whole-of-government efforts. USG civilian agencies will equally appreciate DOD recognition of their increased capabilities to design, plan, and assess overseas contingency operations in support of national strategic objectives.
Prioritizing and Sequencing

Orchestrating UA to achieve operational objectives in support of national strategic objectives is the greatest challenge for USG overseas contingency planners. The efforts cross all the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and governance elements.

For example, country X earns most of its foreign revenue from exporting electric power from hydroelectric plants, at the same time depending on hydroelectric power to support essential services. If the hydroelectric power facilities were sabotaged during a conflict and if significant casualties required good health care facilities, which depend on electrical production, it is essential to restore power generation as quickly as possible. However, if the cause of the conflict was a repressive, corrupt government; installation of a reformed or new government acceptable to the HN population may be necessary.

Such a response effort runs through several LOO, i.e., governance, essential services, and security. Operational design and the JOPP must identify common strategic objectives, then allocate staff and resources to assure that the focus of joint forces and USG civilian response agencies supports the achievement of those objectives. Building an effective security system is also critical in all stability operations. It is possible in this scenario that building an effective community police force and other security institutions in support of an effective national security institution would be the critical path. The joint force and USG civilian agency planners, both in designing operations and in reframing assessments throughout operations, will make critical judgments on what constitutes the critical path.

Note: DOD has aggressively developed modeling and simulation tools for crisis response operations. USG civilian agencies have not been able to devote the resources to do this, and will use joint force resources to address crisis response challenges.

Future Operations and Transition Planning

The JFC must simultaneously design and plan current and near-, intermediate-, and long-term operations. While the joint force conducts current operations, activities critical to long-term stability must also be initiated as soon as possible. The fluidity of overseas contingency operations will cause the joint force and its USG civilian partners to frequently reframe and re-examine USG funding sources.

It is essential to determine national strategic objectives and intermediate operational objectives. Common OEF and OIF operational objectives such as “Free Market Democracy” are desirable, but impractical as near or even intermediate objectives. Objectives such as “Establishing Security Conditions” must be achieved to enable other objectives. SSR objectives are both long-term and primarily the responsibility of the HN. Achieving national strategic objectives may take several years, or even generations, so overseas contingency planners must establish intermediate operational objectives.

Intermediate operational objectives must be clearly articulated in both the JFC’s intent and parallel USG planning documents developed through the whole-of-government
approach. Funding for intermediate operational objectives also must be identified across USG Title 10 and Title 22 funding sources.

**Strategic Communication**

Conducting public affairs, information operations, psychological operations, and defense support to public diplomacy activities are key components of the JFC’s communication strategy is support of national strategic communication (SC) efforts. Synchronizing SC-related themes, messages, images, and actions across the joint force as well as with other USG agencies is critical to achieving national strategic and intermediate operational objectives. It also is important for SC planners to use intermediate operational objectives to plan communication activities that help manage expectations of progress in reconstruction and stabilization.

SC will play an increasingly important role in UA. DOD and DOS continue to work side-by-side to speak with one USG voice. This is a challenge for the entire USG. Additionally, DOD published an SC concept of operations and a set of SC principles to develop SC fundamentals.
Section III - Principles for Mission Success

Initiatives to address poverty and insecurity in the world’s most fragile states are best lead by the people and the leadership of the affected country. External influences effect fragile states in unintended positive and negative ways. Although the international community cannot by itself put an end to state fragility, it has identified and accepted certain principles to maximize international community engagement and minimize unintentional harm:

• **Take context as the starting point.** International organizations must understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared strategic response. It is particularly important to recognize the variations in capacity, political will, and legitimacy in: (i) post-conflict and crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound political analysis is essential to adapt international responses to country and regional context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance, or institutional strength. International organizations should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blue-print approaches.

• **Do no harm.** International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonized and graduated responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures, and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and companies, often based in Organisation for European Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority.

• **Focus on state-building as the central objective.** States are fragile when state’s structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. First, support the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement, and stability. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfill their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice, mobilizing revenue, establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance, and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens’ confidence, trust and engagement.
with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.

• **Prioritize prevention.** Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International organizations must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention also will include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the stability-building capabilities of regional organizations; and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.

• **Recognize the links between political, security, and development objectives.** The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic, and social spheres are interdependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on stability-building in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the “Millennium Development Goals” in the longer-term. This underlines the need for The international community to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a whole-of-government approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. They should aim for policy coherence and coordinated strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality, and impartiality of humanitarian aid organizations. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

• **Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.** Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion, and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities, and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

• **Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.** Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, the international community should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments — such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds — can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, International organizations should consult with a range of national
stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, International organizations should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.

• **Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international organizations.** This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis, joint assessments, shared strategies, and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labor among donors, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international organizations should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.

• **Act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.** Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions normally will require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilizing for fragile states, international organizations must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.

• **Avoid pockets of exclusion.** International organizations need to address the problem of “aid orphans” – states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international organizations are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international organizations make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, coordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity, and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries are therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem of aid orphans.
Additional Principles when Crisis Response is Anticipated

Additional principles to guide the planner when addressing crisis response include:

• The assessment as the critical start point.

• Embedded civilians at every echelon (the geographic combatant command down to deployed joint task forces).

• Early integration of civilians in the geographic combatant command planning staff’s battle rhythm.

• Planning begins from a common set of assumptions.

• Understand the legitimacy of the stability operation - the degree to which the local population accepts and supports the mission or the government and its mandate.

• Learn and adapt - analysis and action must be calibrated to particular country circumstances and continually updated throughout the crisis response period.

• Host-nation ownership and capacity.

• Conflict transformation is the principle that guides the strategy to transform conflict from violent to peaceful means of political and economic competition.

Achieving Operational and Strategic Objectives

The DOS office of S/CRS leadership of whole-of-government policy formulation, strategic planning, and civilian deployment management institutional capability for the USG provides structure for the civilian agencies to design, plan, and execute overseas contingency operations with DOD. The strategic planning template developed by S/CRS includes the major mission element (MME) which equates to LOO. The UA Handbooks conform to the S/CRS strategic planning template.

The over-arching requirement for the USG, as well as coalition allies, is to establish a HN capacity to govern itself effectively and become a responsible member of the international community. All LOO/MME are established to contribute to that goal. Past interventions demonstrate that this is a significant, multi-year effort. Often, when new HN leaders assume authority; pre-crisis governance systems have to be transformed from authoritarian to free market and participatory systems, counterproductive societal structures must be changed or abolished, and people must learn their new roles.
The DOD, which in recent times, traditionally has not played a substantial role in phases IV and V reconstruction, is now an exceptionally important partner in HN transformation. Crises are frequently incited by militant groups and often the HN military is a contributor to the crisis. SSR of the HN security forces (e.g., military, police, and gendarmerie militias) to conform to a responsible governance system is a crucial LOO/MME. The military will not likely be able to leave the operational area until this operational objective is accomplished, alongside the civilian MME and USG strategic objective of establishing effective governance.
Section IV - Gaps – Seeking Opportunities

Experiences in the Post-Cold War period have encompassed a wide range of conflicts in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The challenge has shifted to containing ideological extremists over the last decade. The learning requirement has been steep and responses often have not provided positive lessons. Solutions have come slowly and with great pain. OEF and OIF best practices are still under development. Consequently, gaps exist in these handbooks. Much work remains in learning how best to respond to today’s crises.

All DOD, DOS, USAID, and other USG civilian agency overseas contingency planners and operators are encouraged to record their experiences to contribute to the stabilization operations knowledge base. Opportunities exist to improve our performance. The following is a partial list of gaps that are either not covered or limited in detail in these handbooks:

Role of Religion and Ideological Factors Driving Conflict

The Cold War was a result of major ideological differences between communism and capitalism, and in particular, the deterministic views of the leaders of communist countries that their form of government was destined to go global. Today’s major conflicts are rooted in religious and ideological differences, e.g., the desire by radical Islamists to establish a global Caliphate. The exploitation of these differences to gain power or authority by leaders of population groups leads to conflict. Identification with and adherence to a given religion by these population groups provides the grounds that can be and has been exploited by these leaders.

The prevalence of religious factors in conflict was particularly evident in the following crises:

- Yugoslavia – historical Catholic/Orthodox/Muslim animosities sprung prominently to the fore in the post-Cold War vacuum. The Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo conflicts were based on religious differences.

- East Timor – the decades-long festering differences between the Catholic enclave and the Muslim Indonesian government finally resulted in conflict.

- Iraq-Iran – the Iranian Shiite and Iraqi Sunni differences were one factor in that destructive conflict.

- Somalia – the continuing conflict has evolved to be between extremist and more traditional Muslim groups.

Establishing governance legitimacy has been covered in the handbooks. The role of religion in government legitimacy has not been addressed, partly because it is a highly
sensitive topic and partly because external parties can do little to influence the manner in which religious factors can bear on conflict resolution and building effective governments.

A significant number of studies in this subject area have been conducted and need to be consulted in work where knowledge of this subject is essential. Joint publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, and Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides basic descriptions for these military operations. Although a civilian “Counterinsurgency Guide” has been developed for interagency use, whole-of-government practices on addressing religious factors in situations of civil war, stabilization, and counterinsurgency have not been extensively planned and executed.

USAID has extensive experience in technology transfer to developing countries where the only laboratory is the practice on-the-ground. At times experimentation is required, and USAID uses the term “applied research” for this. Army FM 3-24 describes the equivalent military practice like this:

“Initially, situational awareness will probably be relatively low and the design will, by necessity, require a number of assumptions, especially with respect to the populace and the force’s ability to positively influence their perception of events. The design can be viewed as an experiment that tests the operational logic, with the expectation of a less-than-perfect solution. As the experiment unfolds, interaction with the populace and insurgents reveals the validity of those assumptions, revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the design.”

It is likely that much of the work in determining the role of religion in stabilization will fall in the on-ground applied research or experimentation category.

**Determining Force Size Based on Comprehensive Assessments**

Recent experiences in determining the appropriate force to address a crisis have demonstrated the extent of the challenge this presents. The general idea behind “troops to task” is that a set of rules of thumb are used to say that: We need X battalions for Y square kilometers, Z staff officers for N districts, and so on. Our experiences for mixed missions like Afghanistan are that it is still very much an art form, not a science. Recent US Army doctrine calls for one counterinsurgent for every 50 people. But in actual practice, this rule of thumb is only one of a number of factors that are applied. Domestic US politics is also another important factor, and planning methodologies that can be used to influence these political considerations have not been developed.

The military has traditionally determined its force size through a military planning process and, although “civil considerations” are a critical factor, joint planning with civilians from other agencies is not standard procedure. The assessed requirements focus on the military performing the military role and not the military requirements to support civilian activities.
The Strategic Assessment conducted for Afghanistan in 2009 by a team including civilians may be the first experience that includes civilians to perform an assessment of requirements, including force size requirements. This effort is still not a joint planning effort. The IMS Handbook provides the methodology for joint civil-military planning, to include force development, but it has not yet been tested for a major operation. Thus standard methodology that has been used in actual practice to determine force size to support both military and civilian requirements has not been fully developed and detailed explanations are not included in these handbooks.

Host Nation Policy Reform Requirements

The term “transformation” has received significant attention over the past several years, mostly related to how the USG performs its work. It was discussed in the “Conflict Transformation” topic above with respect to transformation requirements in the HN to successfully accomplish the mission. The basic responsibility for stabilization resting with the HN was discussed in the “Achieving Mission Success” section. However, the importance of HN policy reform in the transformation process was not addressed as a central topic in the handbooks. Various aspects of policy reform were included in parts of the different handbooks, and combined they provide a good sense of the requirements, but the relative priority of policy reform in stabilization operations has not been well studied, thus difficult to handle in these handbooks.

Increasing the effectiveness of stability operations, and reducing the time security forces have to be deployed, may very well rest on how rapidly HN governments establish and execute their transformational policy reform requirements. The topics below may help the commander and his staff take the handbook information forward into new, innovative practices to improve operational results.

• Transforming Host Nation Security Forces

It is frequently the case that the HN security forces have contributed to creating a crisis. This places a special requirement on the creation of HN security forces that support the HN government as it works toward establishing and maintaining the conditions of sustainable stability. The Rule of Law Handbook covers significant aspects of this transformation requirement. The handbook specifically states that “reform” is part of the military problem, and includes guidance to address military procurement fraud, vetting, and financial management actions.

The gap in the handbooks is how the military works with the civilian community on building that effective HN governance process to establish and maintain security. USAID’s Africa Bureau officers in particular have written a concept paper on the desire to work with the military in conflict vulnerability assessments in Africa to determine the role of HN security forces on contributing to or resolving a crisis. We are striving to build our own whole-of-government capabilities in the USG, as covered in the IMS Handbook, so clearly such procedures are under development. Transferring the results of our work to
improve USG interagency effectiveness to HN civil-military transformation efforts may be critical to increasing effectiveness in stabilization programs. These results should be tailored to fit the context of the HN civil-military transformation effort as the system of government adopted by the HN will more than likely not be identical to the USG.

- **The Golden Hour – Opportunities for Greater Effectiveness**

  The “Golden Hour” concept is briefly mentioned in the handbooks, but not addressed as an integral, specific challenge. The origin of the concept was from experiences in Vietnam. It basically describes the opportunities that arise early in an operation that can hasten achievement of mission objectives. Our inability to be effective during the initial period in Iraq was the subject of USAID/Iraq Mission Director Spike Stevenson’s book, *Losing the Golden Hour.* By contrast, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991 succeeded in accomplishing its mission and redeploying in less than three months by seizing early opportunities that arose, led by a USAID humanitarian assistance team. The opportunity was presented by *Peshmerga* leaders offering to help overcome traditional Kurd leaders in mountain camps taking political postures, refusing to return home while Saddam was in power. If that opportunity had not been seized, and instructions from Washington NOT to interact with the *Peshmerga* ignored, US forces might have had to stay in Northern Iraq indefinitely and high-cost, long-term facilities constructed for the Kurds in the mountains next to Turkey.

  Few studies exist on recent experiences that provide information on how to most effectively be alert for opportunities and how to use them to hasten stabilization activities toward completion. However, that should not deter commanders and their civilian counterparts from seeking these opportunities.

- **Civil Servant and Civil Society Human Resources Development**

  Opportunities to hasten progress will more likely come from the HN human resources and institutions (e.g., new leaders, civil service training centers, vocational training, universities, chambers of commerce) that exist on-the-ground. Good vetting processes to determine which personalities and institutions will contribute to the mission objectives will be needed – only the Rule of Law Handbook addresses the vetting process on the military side. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction work identified building ministry capacity as one of the important efforts for reconstruction, referring to the November 2005 *U.S. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* and the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan. These documents identified Iraqi national capacity development as a key component of US strategic, political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq.

  HN capacity-building is frequently cited as fundamental to ultimate mission success and is a key theme in the handbooks. The Governance, Elections, and Media Handbook specifically warns about neglecting the long-term, capacity-building requirements given the pressures of performing short-term restoration of essential services. Little is included on how to develop training programs, determine resource requirements, how to prioritize capacity-building relative to other activities, and how to use training as an incentive with important HN personalities to hasten program achievement.
It is also critical to support the development of HN civil society institutions (e.g., professional associations, local NGOs, student groups) which may not have existed or have been suppressed prior to intervention. It is these institutions that hold new governments accountable to the population. One common example is the importance of building “community policing” into police training programs and operations (police accountable to the community). The handbooks describe the role of civil society organizations but include little detail on how to support their growth as effective representatives of their communities.

- **Building Transparent Host Nation Budgeting; Payment of Civil Servants**

One immediate requirement when intervention results in regime change is that HN government officials need to be paid, but the top responsible leadership authorizing payments has been removed. The use of the existing financial transaction capabilities is far better than creating a new system. This has to be learned, the treasury accounts studied, the money to make the payments found, and the process to deliver payments to government employees planned. In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority civilians worked very closely with the military to plan and make payments. The military logistical planning processes worked exceptionally well in support of the delivery of payments throughout the country. The handbooks do not include guidance on this complex operation.

Related to this and to building HN capacity is the creation of a transparent budgeting process for HN government authorities. This is generally alien to authoritarian governments. Transparent budgeting and reporting how the government uses public funds is perhaps the most visible and immediate financial management process that can be established as part of governance transformation. It could be one of the most effective tools to help civil society keep the government accountable to the population and to control corruption. This is unfortunately not considered a priority project and not included in the handbooks.

- **Economic Policy Reform**

The Economic Stabilization Handbook is written to focus on pre-deployment planning and it doesn’t address the issues that arise on management of the economy during the reconstruction period. Economic policy reform issues are sensitive and will arise frequently, e.g., privatization; role of state-owned enterprises; and subsidies for services; regulatory practices, and decentralization. The complex factors that make up the economy of a nation can’t be treated lightly and support for economic planning and management should be sought from organizations with the appropriate expertise.

One important resource that State, Treasury, and USAID will engage immediately is the World Bank and perhaps the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank’s original mandate when it was established following World War II was as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, i.e., reconstruction. It evolved away from that until the needs in Bosnia caused it to restore that institutional capability. Economic policy reform is one component of reconstruction that doesn’t have to be done within a conflict
zone, except for visits and meetings with HN officials. The World Bank is credited with stressing economic policy reform in Africa beginning in the 1980s, which led to many African countries improving their economies. Direct decision making in this area by the military should be avoided.

**Occupational Governance Authorities**

Interventions have been conducted under a variety of conditions and different authorities have been used. Given the lack of a consistent approach, these handbooks have not specifically addressed authority structures. Among the range of authorities that cover interventions are the following:

- UN Charter, Chapters 6 and 7
- Trusteeships
- UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)
- Protectorates
- Declarations of War
- Peace Agreements
- Occupational Authorities

During the decade of the 1990s the reluctance to use full Chapter 7 authorities led to the informal characterization of interventions as Chapter 6 ½. This less assertive process restored authorities quickly to HN governments, but left issues unresolved leading to long post-conflict recovery periods. Although Trusteeships are covered in the UN Charter, they are considered by most members of the UN as a vestige of past times and not valid for today’s world. Some use the term Protectorate as needed to more assertively correct the governance incapacities in crisis countries. Bosnia is the longest-lasting reconstruction effort. Recently concerns have been voiced that conflict can resume in Bosnia because the Dayton Accords weren’t sufficiently assertive. One district in Bosnia is an exception, however:

“Areas such as the self-governing Brcko District, in the country’s northeast, have become success stories. Brcko was the site of some of the worst violence during the war, but today the Muslim, Croat, and Serb communities there live in relative harmony. The international community established a strong protectorate structure in Brcko, under which the United States led a coordinated effort involving international organizations and domestic Bosnian institutions. … Just a decade after Dayton, Brcko was able to demonstrate the possibility of ethnic cooperation. Unfortunately, it has remained an exception.”13
As much as it is against USG nature to call any intervention an “Occupation,” the only international law that applied for establishing governance in Iraq was occupational authority. A series of decrees and directives was used to establish governance for Iraq. This experience is not registered in the handbooks.

**Enforcing Peace Agreements; United Nations Security Council Resolutions**

Peace agreements and UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are mentioned in the handbooks, but specific guidance on evaluation of progress and enforcement is not included beyond how to support elections in the Governance, Elections, and Media Handbook. Two of the most important in recent times are the Dayton Accords and the Bonn Agreement. Given the example of current problems in Bosnia, which can be traced back to the Dayton Accords, and in Afghanistan, which began with the Bonn Agreement, more attention is probably needed.

“As successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state’s authority. . . . The political order established by Dayton seems to be careening dangerously off course. . . . If the international community does not reverse these trends, the result may well be the re-division of Bosnia and a return to war.”

Dayton has been debated frequently, including its limited assertiveness, and many have called for a Dayton II. The lessons learned in Bosnia were applied more effectively in Kosovo, with the intervention based on a UNSCR, more akin to managing it as a Protectorate, and the results seem to be better. A UNSCR is much less detailed, leaving greater flexibility to the intervening community. However, UNSCRs are politically volatile and extraordinarily difficult to achieve in a number of international contexts due to the divergent priorities of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

A few peace agreements build in “Civil Society” monitoring mechanisms, such as the Guatemala peace agreement in 1996 and the Sierra Leone agreement in 1999. The peace in both countries has endured, thus an institutional process to hold governments accountable through civil society groups may have some validity.

**Transfer of Authority as Central Planning Focus**

Guidance on planning permeates the handbooks, and the need to plan a TOA is discussed above as well as mentioned in the handbooks. Planners hesitate to develop end state plans because, as discussed in the planning section, achieving them is elusive and often impractical. On-site planners; however, are very well acquainted with the prevailing desire to complete the mission and redeploy. A frequently heard expression is “you guys are our ticket out of here,” often addressed to civilians deployed to work on the long-term programs and sometimes to rotational replacements. This is basically a
TOA, one of the most specific, tangible and desirable events to achieve. In one sense, TOA planning is an informal central planning focus in practice, but not tied into the generally more ambiguous mission plans.

The handbooks do not address the relationship between TOA planning and mission plans.

**Use of Polling**

The most important pieces of information are those which assess and analyze public opinion. Public views of their government, the intervening forces, economic factors, the political factions, the insurgents, the sectarian groups, and many other matters are important to know. Many polling institutions are employed to obtain this information, and they use professional HN organizations when available. The information they collect is also important to balance the anecdotal reports by news reporters, who sometimes present points of view from limited information sources as generally representative of the situation on the ground. Reports in the media often drive reactions from headquarters.

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research has a capacity to manage polling activities for civilian purposes during crisis responses. They can also contract with professional US polling institutions, which work with indigenous resources to conduct polls.

The handbooks do not include guidance on polling.

**Managing Demonstrations, Protests, and Strikes**

Special interest groups either exist or form quickly and advocate various solutions to problems facing them. Although demonstrations and protests do not occur frequently under crisis conditions, they occur. For example, even when the engagements are limited like Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, the displaced persons demonstrated against the coalition forces about turning the management of their camp over to the UN. Most demonstrations, protests, and strikes are directed toward interim HN government entities and not the intervening forces, but if governance has not been turned over to HN leaders they could be against the intervening force management.

Also, in most countries, workers are not permitted to form unions, but informal worker interest groups form when authority structures break down, and they occasionally become animated enough to strike. Some groups know that intervening authorities respect group action and become emboldened to demonstrate or protest over concerns.

The handbooks do not include guidance on demonstrations, protests and strikes.
Planning Dynamics – Building a Reach-Back Capacity

S/CRS is executing an important effort to building a strategic planning framework (a practitioner’s handbook) as covered in the IMS Handbook. It will bridge the considerable gap in how planning is conducted, both in preparing for and during field operations. The most critical planning, as experiences have demonstrated, is the planning on-the-ground during operations to adapt to changing conditions and take advantage of opportunities, which inevitably arise to shorten the deployment period. The complexities of today’s operations; however, frequently present challenges which are difficult to address by the deployed personnel.

The concept of building a reach-back capacity has been discussed but little effort has been devoted to achieve it. Coalition Provisional Authority leadership refused to even consider it during their tenure in Baghdad. This could possibly represent the most significant new processes to improve the effectiveness of joint planning in crisis operations.

Regional Security Officer Effect on Implementation Efforts

Much has been written about the capacity of USG civilian agencies to provide expert personnel for stability operations when compared to the amount of resources available for DOD. The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) has been established under S/CRS to create an expeditionary workforce of highly qualified civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations utilizing the whole-of-government approach. While not fully funded, this represents an initial step to address the capacity gap. The CRC and the capacity gap have been addressed in the IMS Handbook. However, the handbooks have not addressed how the existing capacities of personnel from USG civilian agencies are being utilized in the field during stability operations. Specifically, the role the regional security officer (RSO) plays in determining the areas the USG civilians, under chief of mission’s (COM) authority, may operate is an issue that can limit the ability of USG civilians to conduct operations and implement programs in many reconstruction and stabilization environments.

The RSO is the COM’s senior security officer and is charged with managing and implementing programs to ensure the security of all US embassies and consulates in a given country. The COM relies on the RSO to conduct risk assessments and set the security levels based on the threat conditions faced in the environment where the US mission is located. In many reconstruction and stabilization operations, the operating environment is likely to be at best uncertain or in civilian terms, semi-permissive. However,
when a military commander assesses an operating environment to be uncertain, an RSO may arrive at the conclusion that the same environment is non-permissive or in military terms, hostile. This often leads to situations where USG civilian personnel, under COM authority, are restricted from large areas in which the US military may be operating. This has left the military as the only instrument in which to implement a reconstruction and stabilization strategy and country-level plan in what should be a whole-of-government approach and no doubt has contributed to what has been called “losing the golden hour.”

**DOD Contracting Officer Expeditionary Capacity for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations**

DOD’s capacity gap in its contingency contracting capability has been linked to the development of an expeditionary corps of contingency contracting officers (CCOs). No where has the need been more evident for these CCOs then during the conduct of reconstruction and stabilization operations. The IMS Handbook discusses the role of CCOs in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Increasingly, DOD CCOs have been called upon to manage contracts related to projects under the implementation of reconstruction and stabilization programs for a HN. This is especially true in the initial periods of the “Stabilize” phase when the capacities of a HN to take on reconstruction and stabilization programs have yet to be developed. Also, many areas of a HN are likely to be deemed non-permissive, i.e., hostile, by an RSO. This may significantly restrict travel for USG civilians under COM authority to many areas in need of reconstruction and stabilization assistance. These issues coupled with the addition of DOD program funds (e.g., Commander’s Emergency Response Program) for reconstruction and stabilization purposes has added exponentially to the workload of the CCOs due to the increase of reconstruction and stabilization projects managed by DOD and the contracts that support them.

Due to this increased workload, CCOs have had to increase their reliance on the contracting officer representative (COR), or in the specific cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, the project purchasing officer (PPO). In almost all cases, CORs or PPOs are assigned as an additional duty to individuals already operating under a full workload. These individuals may not have a background in acquisitions and contracting and their training generally has ranged from a few hours to one week. The large increase in the numbers of CORs and PPOs has transferred the workload from CCOs, but has come at a cost. The ratio of CCOs to CORs/PPOs has made the oversight of COR and PPO activities difficult. This oversight is needed due to their relative inexperience at managing contracts. This inexperience also has contributed to the less than desired outcomes of many reconstruction projects. As a result the USG has been put in positions of over promising and under delivering to populations whom we are competing with insurgent forces to protect and influence.
The Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework

USAID has developed a localized version of the ICAF, the Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework (TCAPF). The use of the ICAF is described in both the IMS and the Governance, Elections and Media Handbooks. The TCAPF is designed as a complement of ICAF to be used at local levels (the ICAF is a national-level assessment) and was designed by USAID specifically for use by the military. It is included alongside ICAF as Annex D of FM 3-07, Stability Operations. The TCAPF is not mentioned in any of the handbooks, but it will likely be more useful to military units operating at the tactical level than the ICAF.

Value and Role of Host Nation Entertainment Media

During periods of prolonged conflict the HN population often finds ways to relieve the stresses of the conflict through various forms of spontaneous or organized entertainment. A protected theater in downtown Sarajevo was the center of plays, movies, music events, and amateur programs. Bosnians even held dog shows during the daytime. Sports events such as soccer and basketball are held when possible. Radio and television programs – talk shows, comedies, music, movies – are prized when available. Some international NGOs use this media to air programs that address the key issues in a popular manner. The search for common ground designs results in putting regular soap operas on the air that, in both comic and dramatic ways, use inter-ethnic issues as the themes (Burundi, Angola, Israel/Palestine and elsewhere).

The handbooks provide no guidance on how to be helpful in this area.

The Case of Safe Havens

On rare occasions segments of territory rather than a whole country will be established as a mission objective. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq in 1991 established a designated secure zone for the Kurds after Operation DESERT STORM to permit them to return home. It was subsequently declared a “no fly zone” to prohibit the Iraq government to launch airstrikes against the Kurds, which successfully protected the Kurds and permitted them to establish autonomous government in their territory. Kosovo was a province of Yugoslavia, and intervention there was to protect the Albanian population, not to create a new country. The annual Army Exercise UNIFIED QUEST was designed one year around the objective of establishing a secure zone as the mission objective.
On such occasions, it will be important to carefully study the boundaries for the safe haven. The Operation PROVIDE COMFORT secure zone erroneously did not include Dahuk, the city from which most of the Kurds fled. It will also be important to determine the nature of governance in that zone, taking into account the existing government.

The handbooks do not provide guidance for the establishment of safe havens, although much of the content of the handbooks also applies to safe havens. One important difference is that the end state objective is not likely to be the establishment of a new government for the territory in place of the national government, as was the case for Kosovo, so the nature of the interim governance has to be very carefully designed.
Section V - Looking Ahead

Two major factors may shape the content of these handbooks:

- **These handbooks are based on current policy directives** issued by the President, the National Security Council, DOD, DOS, USAID, and other USG agencies. New policy and programmatic directives may change current directives. For example, USAID may be expanded to play a larger role in crisis responses, given the importance of development assistance and its link to reconstruction in restoring stability in crisis countries. The importance of improving whole-of-government efforts likely will lead to important new approaches to interagency cooperation and new operational systems. It is essential to stay abreast of changes that could potentially change the role of the joint force in support of stability operations.

- **Each crisis is different.** For example, the US has yet to face the exceptionally challenging requirements of a significant catastrophe in one or more major urban areas, where huge populations will suddenly require immediate humanitarian assistance. The USG has not rapidly provided humanitarian assistance to populations exceeding two million. If a city of 10 million requires total support, requirements would exceed capacities of both multilateral and bilateral donors.

At the same time, commonalities exist among crisis responses, and past experiences can validate design and response to new crises. For example, HN officials are generally overwhelmed and they welcome assistance to prioritize and sequence HN response management processes. Also, care must be taken not to re-establish the conditions which caused the crisis in the first place.

These factors will require the application of effective judgment and innovation in the design, planning, and execution of overseas contingency operations. The UA Handbooks, at best, provide the basic information needed to start. They will not provide a template for new operations.

Institutional and management structures are likely to evolve. Improving a civil-military crisis response design and planning capability is still embryonic. The current whole-of-government planning process, as described in the IMS Handbook, is centered in Washington, DC, requiring the combatant command to deploy planners there at the same time civilian planners are deployed to the combatant command. This process is untested in a major crisis. Also, as a crisis response evolves from design to initial planning to in-country operational planning, significant on-the-ground leadership is required from civilian agencies in the same manner as the JFC delegates its responsibilities to subordinate commanders. Experience gained from the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq can lead to a more effective civilian field management structure in future operations. The UA Handbooks are living documents designed to improve and unify USG efforts in future overseas contingency operations. Since crises and USG institutional preparedness constantly evolve, planners and operators are asked to provide additional research as new operations are launched to assure the handbooks are current.
Endnotes


2 Although not precisely defined, The Interagency Assessment Framework states, “Steady-State Engagement / Conflict Prevention Planning: May include, but is not limited to: Embassy preparation for National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1207 funding; request by an Embassy or Combatant Command for interagency assistance in understanding and planning for leveraging US interests in fragile or at-risk countries; development of Department of Defense (DoD) Theater Security Cooperation Plans; development of Country Assistance Strategies or Mission Strategic Plans; designing interagency prevention efforts for countries listed on State Failure Watchlists and Early Warning Systems. In a steady-state or conflict prevention effort, there normally will be sufficient time and a sufficiently permissive environment to allow a full-scale assessment such as a three-day Washington, DC-based Application Workshop and several weeks of an in-country verification assessment.” http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=CJ22

3Quest for a Viable Peace; United States Institute for Peace, 2008

4SENSE - Synthetic Estimates for the National Security Environment, a highly sophisticated simulation for recovery from conflict designed in the late 1990’s by the Institute for Defense Analyses at the instigation of General Wesley Clark. It was designed for Bosnia and used in Bosnia and the Republic of Georgia. The most effective use of this simulation would be to transfer its technology to host nation institutions for continued and pervasive use. USIP has made this effort for Iraq.

5The term “state” here refers to a broad definition of the concept which includes the executive branch of the central and local governments within a state but also the legislative and the judiciary arms of government.


7Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 15, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 4-6.

8”Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation”, FM 3-24, p. 1-13.

9FM 3-24, p. 3-2.


14Ibid, pp. 70, 83.
