

# Joint Publication 3-16



## Multinational Operations



01 March 2019

Validated on 12 February 2021





## PREFACE

### 1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational (coalition or allied) force. It addresses operational considerations for the commander and staff to plan, execute, and assess multinational operations.

### 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

### 3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures

ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. J. O'Donohue". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent loop at the end.

DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Director, Joint Force Development

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES  
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16  
DATED 16 JULY 2013**

- **This publication was validated without change on 12 February 2021**
- **Removes and replaces Range of Military Options to a Competition Continuum.**
- **Updates and cleans up graphics throughout the joint publication (JP).**
- **Updates several of the quotes and examples throughout the JP.**
- **Terminology and acronyms updated to current lexicon.**
- **Utilizes “national” vice “political” will and decisions throughout.**
- **Updated out of date reference Internet links.**
- **‘Stability operations’ changed to ‘stability activities’.**
- **Emphasized Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.**
- **Enhanced the Multinational Logistic section.**
- **Enhanced the Transition to Multinational Operations section.**
- **Updates Appendix A, “Planning Considerations Checklist.”**
- **Updates Appendix B, “Multinational Planning Augmentation Team.”**
- **Updates Appendix C, “Multinational Strategy and Operations Group.”**
- **Adds Appendix D, “Multinational Logistics.”**
- **Adds Appendix E, “Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.”**
- **Includes “Counter Threat Networks” under “Other Multinational Operations.”**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Describes the strategic context for multinational operations**
  - **Discusses the nature and tenets of multinational operations**
  - **Describes how security cooperation provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives**
  - **Outlines command and coordination relationships within national and multinational chains of command**
  - **Discusses diplomatic and military considerations related to building and maintaining a multinational force**
  - **Describes how language, religion, culture, and sovereignty considerations effect planning for multinational operations**
  - **Outlines how land, maritime, air, space, information, and cyberspace operations are conducted in a multinational context**
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### Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

#### *Strategic Context*

Nations form regional and global geopolitical and economic relationships to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace operations, and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, **a nation's decision to**

**employ military capabilities is always a political decision.**

*Nature of Multinational Operations*

The tenets of multinational operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, team-building, trust, and confidence. While these tenets cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. National and organizational norms of culture, language, and communication affect multinational force (MNF) interoperability.

*Security Cooperation*

US national and Department of Defense strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies and partner nations (PNs) to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. Security cooperation (SC) activities are likely to be conducted in a combatant command's daily operations. SC advances progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum by strengthening and expanding the existing network of US allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations.

*Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability*

International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability with PNs is important for achieving practical cooperation; efficient use of research, development, procurement, support, and production resources; and effective multinational capability without sacrificing US capabilities.

**Command and Coordination Relationships**

*Command Authority*

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command.

**National Command.** As Commander in Chief, the President always retains and cannot relinquish

national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment of, and protecting military forces.

**Multinational Command.** Command authority for a multinational force commander (MNFC) is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. In making a decision regarding an appropriate command relationship for a multinational military operation, the President carefully considers such factors as mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement. Command authority will be specified in the implementing agreements that provide a clear and common understanding of what authorities are specified over which forces.

*Unified Action*

Unified action during multinational operations involves the synergistic application of all instruments of national power as provided by each participating nation; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.

*Multinational Force Commander*

MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. **The extent of the MNFC's command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements.**

*Overview of Multinational Command Structures*

No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command, but national considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure.

The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, lead nation (LN), or parallel command.

- **Integrated Command Structure.** A good example of this command structure is in NATO, where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of

subordinate commands are of multinational makeup.

- **LN Command Structure.** An LN structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The LN command structure can be distinguished by a dominant LN command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.
- **Parallel Command Structures.** Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The MNF leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to achieve unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided, if at all possible.

### *Interorganizational Cooperation*

In many operational environments, the MNF interacts with a variety of stakeholders requiring unified action by the MNFC, including nonmilitary governmental departments and agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Interorganizational cooperation includes the coordination between the Armed Forces of the United States; US Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector.

## **General Planning Considerations**

### *Diplomatic and Military Considerations*

The composition of an MNF may change as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives change or force contributions reach the limits of their nation's ability to sustain them. Some nations may even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another, so that a contribution may, for example, consist of an infantry company containing platoons from different countries. **The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every**

**case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance.** The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the multinational task force's (MNTF's) command structure.

Numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific operational limitations and capabilities of the forces of participating nations and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, host nation (HN) officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated.

***Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force***

Building an MNF starts with the national decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level.

***Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks***

The MNFC's staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised mission statement, commander's intent, and the MNFC's planning guidance. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training-level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from an alliance or likely coalition partners.

***Language, Religion, Culture, and Sovereignty***

**Differing languages within an MNF may present a significant challenge to command, control, and communications and potentially affect unity of effort if not mitigated.** US forces cannot assume the predominant language will automatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Therefore, US forces

should make every effort to overcome language barriers.

**Religion.** Each partner in multinational operations requires the capability to assess the impact of religion upon operations. Assigned religious affairs personnel serve as general planning considerations advisers to the command regarding religious factors among the local population, as well as assigned, attached, or authorized personnel.

**Culture.** Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of their physical environment, economic, political, and social outlook, as well as the values, beliefs, and symbols that comprise their culture. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious and cultural customs, holiday observances, and similar concerns of MNF members.

**Sovereignty Issues.** Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems the MNFC may be required to mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. National sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.

## **Operations**

### *Land Operations*

In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral and central part of the military effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment is largely a function of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment, and the forces available within the MNF.

National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the MNF. Nations with common tactics, techniques, and procedures will also experience far greater interoperability. Effective use of SC activities may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for countries with widely disparate weapons systems.

*Maritime Operations*

During multinational operations, maritime forces can exercise sea control or project power ashore, synchronize their operations with the other MNF components, and support the MNFC's intent and guidance in accomplishing the MNF mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies and coast guard; however, they may include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government departments and agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea.

*Air Operations*

Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive, agile, and flexible means of operational reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can be greatly extended in response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air operations are focused on supporting the MNFC's intent and guidance in accomplishing the MNTF mission and, at the same time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the other major MNF operational functions (land, maritime, and special operations forces).

*Space Operations*

MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities. Available space capabilities are normally limited to already deployed assets and established priorities for space system resources. Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. US Strategic Command, through the joint force component commander, enables commands to access various space capabilities and systems.

*Information*

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The joint force commander/MNFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of

military activities ultimately affects strategic objectives.

### *Cyberspace Operations*

**Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, space-based resources, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace uses electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to create, store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems. Cyberspace operations seek to ensure freedom of action throughout the operational environment for US forces and our allies, while denying the same to our adversaries. Cyberspace operations overcome the limitations of distance, time, and physical barriers present in the physical domains. Cyberspace links actions in the physical domains, enabling mutually dependent operations to achieve an operational advantage.

### **Other Multinational Operations**

#### *Stability Activities*

Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. Stability is needed when a state is under stress and cannot cope. MNFs supporting stabilization efforts should consider the use of fundamentals of stabilization and the principles of multinational operations to plan and execute military activities to facilitate long-term stability. The fundamentals are conflict transformation, HN ownership, unity of effort, and building HN capacity.

#### *Special Operations*

Special operations forces (SOF) can provide the MNTF with a wide range of specialized military capabilities and responses. SOF can provide specific assistance in the areas of assessment, liaison, and training of HN forces within the MNTF operational area.

*Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations*

To prevail in the next conflict, an MNF must win the fight for EMS superiority. Devices whose functions depend on the EMS are used by both civilian and military organizations and individuals for intelligence; communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; sensing; command and control; attack; ranging; and data transmission and information storage and processing.

*Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*

The President of the United States is the approval authority for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), which will be conducted under the lead of the chief of diplomatic mission, the President's personal representative to the HN. An NEO is conducted to relocate designated noncombatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. NEOs are principally conducted by US forces to evacuate US citizens but may be expanded to include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from other countries.

*Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations*

FHA operations, particularly in developing countries, often require the intervention and aid of various agencies, including the military, from all over the world, in a concerted and timely manner. As a result, operations involve dynamic information exchange, planning, and coordination.

*Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*

**Countering weapons of mass destruction** is a continuous campaign that requires a coordinated multinational and whole-of-government effort to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction related expertise, materials, and technologies.

**CONCLUSION**

This joint publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational (coalition or allied) force.

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## CHAPTER I

### FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

*“In the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security.”*

Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America

#### 1. Multinational Operations Overview

Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Commonly used terms under the multinational rubric include allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral. However, within this publication, the term multinational will be used to describe these actions. There are two primary forms of multinational partnership the joint force commander (JFC) will encounter:

a. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

b. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are typically ad hoc; formed by different nations, often with different objectives; usually for a single problem or issue, while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

#### 2. Strategic Context

a. Nations form regional and global geopolitical and economic relationships to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace operations (PO), and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, **a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision.**

b. Since Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the trend has been to conduct US military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). This could be under the auspices of a NATO operation, which may also include non-NATO nations (e.g., Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011) or an MNF consisting of a coalition of nations that is formed without NATO (e.g., Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, 2014-present).

Therefore, US commanders should be prepared to perform either supported or supporting roles in military operations as part of an MNF. These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, foreign military forces, local authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly in regard to counterinsurgency operations, other counter threat network activities, or stability activities, increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary entities.

*For more information on counterinsurgency operations and stability activities, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks; and JP 3-07, Stability.*

c. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs should account for differences in partners' laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, capacities, terminology, culture, politics, religion, language, and objectives. There is no "standard template," and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own protocols and operation plans (OPLANs) to guide multinational action. While NATO Allied doctrine provides guidance and authorities for US forces when operating as part of a larger authorized NATO force, US forces should comply with US joint doctrine if NATO doctrine is in conflict.

d. While most partner nations (PNs) recognize the range of military operations terminology, authorities, commitments, and imposed constraints and restraints may not mirror those of US forces who are now utilizing a 'competition continuum' (Figure I-1). Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, provides the NATO discussion comparable to JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. For instance, some frequent partners do not plan, execute, and assess their Services' operations from a joint perspective. Therefore, JFCs should establish early and continuous liaison that enhances mutual understanding of each MNFs' member's commitment. This enhanced understanding allows the JFC to consider the member's operational, legal, and logistical constraints and restraints (as prescribed by each partner's national law and policy) and facilitates operational planning that optimizes each contributing nation's military capabilities.

### **3. Nature of Multinational Operations**

After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that "mutual confidence" is the "one basic thing that will make allied commands work." The tenets of multinational operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, team-building, trust, and confidence. While these tenets cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. National and organizational norms of culture, language, and communication affect MNF interoperability. Each partner in unified action has a unique cultural identity. Military forces, civilian agencies, NGOs, and international organizations approach military conflict from different perspectives.




Figure I-1. Notional Competition Continuum

National and organizational values, societal and social norms, historic contexts, religious beliefs, and organizational discipline all affect the perspectives of multinational partners. Partners with similar cultures and a common language experience fewer obstacles to interoperability. Even minor differences, such as dietary restrictions or officer-enlisted relationships, may affect military operations significantly. Commanders may have to accommodate cultural sensitivities and overcome diverse or conflicting religious, social, societal, or traditional requirements, any of which can form bases for explicit or implicit caveats on partners' participation. In multinational operations, commanders rely upon the tenets to build teamwork and trust in a joint or multinational force in multiple ways. Commanders should establish relationships with their multinational counterparts based upon mutual respect. Team building is essential to successful MNF interoperability. It can be accomplished through training, exercises, and assigning missions that fit organizational capabilities. Building teamwork and trust takes time and requires the patience of all participants. The result is enhanced mutual confidence and unity of effort.

a. **Respect.** In assigning missions and tasks, the commander should consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment, organizational structure, and the operation assessment process. Understanding, discussing, and considering partner ideas are essential to building effective relationships, as are respect for each partner's culture, customs, history, and values. Junior officers or even senior enlisted personnel in command of small national

contingents may be the senior representatives of their government within the MNF and, as such, should be treated with the courtesy and respect afforded the commanders of other troop contributing nations. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist.

b. **Rapport.** US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from PNs, as well as the multinational force commander (MNFC). Establishing and maintaining rapport in a multinational environment through personal, direct relationships is an effective means of ensuring successful unity of effort with or among PNs. When interacting with non-English speakers, knowing at least a few phrases and greetings will help establish a relationship. It is important to remember eye contact and good listening skills are essential in building rapport. Therefore, when using an interpreter, the focus should be on the person to whom the message is being conveyed. Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort. The use of liaisons can facilitate the development of rapport by assisting in the staffing of issues to the correct group and in monitoring responses, while taking care not to relegate operational decision making to those liaisons.

c. **Knowledge of Partners.** In addition to learning about the threat, deployed US forces must demonstrate the capability to communicate and interact effectively with local nationals, government officials, and other multinational partners. Developing and demonstrating communication skills, regional knowledge, local customs, values, and cultural awareness serves as a force multiplier that enables effective MNF operations.

d. **Patience.** Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, evenhanded patience. This is more difficult to accomplish within coalitions than within alliances; however, it is just as necessary. It is therefore imperative that US commanders and their staffs apply appropriate resources, travel, staffing, and time not only to maintain, but also to expand and cultivate multinational relationships. Without patience and continued dialogue, established partnerships can rapidly degrade.

e. **Mission Focus.** When dealing with other nations, US forces should temper the need for respect, rapport, knowledge, and patience with the requirement to ensure the necessary tasks are accomplished by those with the capabilities, capacities, and authorities to accomplish those tasks. This is especially critical with force protection (FP) where failure could prove to have catastrophic results to personnel and mission. If operational necessity requires tasks being assigned to personnel who are not proficient in accomplishing those tasks, then the MNFC must recognize the risks and apply appropriate mitigating measures (e.g., a higher alert level to potential threats). The JFC may need to consider strategies to enable partners who may have capability shortfalls that would limit their ability to accomplish tasks.

f. **Trust and Confidence.** Commanders should build personal relationships and develop trust and confidence with other leaders of the MNF. Developing these relationships is a conscious collaborative act rather than something that just happens. Commanders build trust through words and actions. Trust and confidence are essential to

synergy and harmony, both within the joint force and with our multinational partners. Coordination and cooperation among organizations are based on trust. Trust is based on personal integrity (sincerity, honesty, and candor). Trust is hard to establish and easy to lose. There can be no unity of effort in the final analysis without mutual trust and confidence. Accordingly, the ability to inspire trust and confidence across national lines is a personal leadership quality to be cultivated. Saying what you mean and doing what you say are fundamental to establishing trust and confidence in an MNF.

#### 4. Security Cooperation

a. Security cooperation (SC) provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives. US national and Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies and PNs to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. SC activities are likely to be conducted in a combatant command's (CCMD's) daily operations. SC advances progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum by strengthening and expanding the existing network of US allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations. SC activities, many of which are shaping activities within the geographic combatant commander (GCC) campaign plans—the centerpiece of the planning construct from which OPLANs/concept plans (CONPLANs) are now branches—are deemed essential to achieving national security and foreign policy objectives. SC activities also build interoperability with NATO Allies and other partners in peacetime, thereby speeding the establishment of effective coalitions—a key factor in potential major combat operations with near-peer competitors.

b. The *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF) provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the President's *National Security Strategy*. With respect to SC, the GEF provides guidance on building partner capacity and capability, relationships, and facilitating access (under the premise that the primary entity of military engagement is the nation state and the means which GCCs influence nation states is through their defense establishments). The GEF outlines the following SC activities: defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchange, combined exercises and training, train and equip/provide defense articles, defense institution building, operational support, education, and international armaments cooperation.

c. GCC theater strategies, as reflected in their combatant command campaign plans (CCPs), typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities as daily operations. GCCs shape their areas of responsibility through SC activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The GCC's CCP provides a framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, SC activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires substantial US military intervention.

d. The CCP is the primary document that focuses on each command's activities designed to attain theater strategic end states. The GEF and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, *(U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)* (referred to as the JSCP), provide regional focus and SC priorities.

e. DOD components may develop supporting plans that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of the CCPs and on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the campaign end states and/or DOD component programs in support of broader Title 10, US Code, responsibilities. The Services conduct much of the detailed work to build interoperability and capacity with NATO Allies and mission partners.

*For additional information on SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation; the GEF; and the JSCP.*

f. The DOD State Partnership Program establishes enduring relationships between emerging PNs of strategic value and individual US states and territories. The DOD State Partnership Program is an important contribution to the DOD SC programs conducted by the GCCs in conjunction with the *National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy*, Department of State (DOS), campaign plans, and theater SC guidance to promote national and combatant commander (CCDR) objectives, stability, and partner capacity.

*For more detailed discussion on the DOD State Partnership Program, see Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, State Partnership Program (SPP), and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

### **5. Security Cooperation Considerations**

a. Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of US FID efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) internal defense and development, which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from security threats.

b. US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of instability. DOD employs a number of FID tools that interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, support civil administration, provide SC, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN. FID typically involves conventional and special operations forces from multiple Services. Special operations forces (SOF), military information support forces, and civil affairs (CA) units are particularly well suited to conduct or support FID.

c. Security force assistance (SFA) is DOD's activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. The US military conducts activities to improve the capabilities and capacities of a PN's (or regional security organization) executive, generating, and operating functions through the execution of one or more SFA tasks, that include organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding/building, or advising. While DOD primarily assists those FSF organized under the national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or paramilitary forces), the US military may support and coordinate with other USG departments and agencies that are leading USG efforts to develop or improve forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services.

d. Successful SFA operations require planning and execution consistent with the following imperatives:

(1) **Understand the Operational Environment (OE).** This includes an awareness of the relationships between the stakeholders within the unified action framework, the HN population, business environment information, and threats. Key to SFA success is an in-depth understanding of the size, organization, capabilities, disposition, roles, functions, and mission focus of the PN's security force.

(2) **Ensure Unity of Effort.** Unity of command is preferred but often impractical. Command relationships can range from the simple to complex and must be clearly delineated and understood. Within a multinational context, establishing coordinating boards or centers assists unity of effort among the stakeholders.

(3) **Provide Effective Leadership.** SFA seeks to provide and instill leadership at all appropriate levels of the FSF. Both MNF and HN leadership must fully comprehend the OE and be prepared and supportive for the SFA effort to succeed.

(4) **Build Legitimacy.** The ultimate objective of SFA is to develop security forces that are competent, capable, committed, and confident to contribute to the legitimate governance of the HN population.

(5) **Manage Information.** This encompasses the collection, preparation, analysis, management, application, and dissemination of information.

(6) **Sustainability.** This includes two major efforts: the ability of the US/MNF to sustain the SFA effort throughout the operation or campaign, and the ability of the PN security forces to ultimately sustain their operations independently.

(7) **Do No Harm.** SFA is often undertaken in support of complex operations and US/MNF actions can become part of the conflict dynamic that either increases or reduces tensions. SFA planners and practitioners must be sensitive to and maintain awareness for adverse impacts in the security sector and on the HN population.

*For additional discussion of SFA, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.*

## 6. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability

a. International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) with PNs is important for achieving practical cooperation; efficient use of research, development, procurement, support, and production resources; and effective multinational capability without sacrificing US capabilities.

b. RSI should be directed at providing capabilities for MNFs to:

(1) Conduct rapid pace operations effectively at by leveraging the capabilities of the entire MNF.

(2) Efficiently integrate and synchronize operations using common or compatible doctrine.

(3) Communicate and collaborate at anticipated levels of MNF operations, particularly to prevent friendly fire and protect the exchange of data, information, and intelligence via either printed or electronic media in accordance with (IAW) appropriate security guidelines.

(4) Share consumables consistent with relevant agreements and applicable law.

(5) Care for casualties consistent with relevant agreements and applicable law.

(6) Enhance military effectiveness by harmonizing capabilities of military equipment.

(7) Increase military efficiency through common or compatible Service support and logistics.

(8) Establish overflight and access to foreign territory through streamlined clearance procedures for diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel.

(9) Assure technical compatibility by developing standards for equipment design, employment, maintenance, and updating so those nations that are likely to participate are prepared. Extra equipment may be necessary so non-equipped nations are not excluded. Such compatibility should include secure and nonsecure communications equipment and should address other equipment areas, to include (but not limited to): ammunition specifications, truck components, supply parts, and data transmission streams.

*Detailed guidance on RSI may be found in CJCSI 2700.01, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Activities.*

c. **Rationalization.** In the RSI construct, rationalization refers to any action that increases the effectiveness of MNFs through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the MNF. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher multinational needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to

both weapons and materiel resources (the processes to loan and/or transfer equipment to another nation participating in an MNF operation) and non-weapons military matters.

d. **Standardization.** Unity of effort is greatly enhanced through standardization. The basic purpose of standardization programs is to achieve the closest practical cooperation among multinational partners through the efficient use of resources and the reduction of operational, logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational military operations.

(1) Standardization is a four-level process beginning with efforts for compatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with commonality. DOD is actively involved in several multinational standardization programs, including:

(a) NATO's main standardization fora; the five-nation (United States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) Five Eyes Air Force Interoperability Council (AFIC); the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCANZ) Armies' Program; and the thirteen-nation (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States) Multinational Strategy and Operations Group (MSOG).

(b) The US also participates in the five-nation (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) Combined Communications-Electronics Board (CCEB) that enables strategic and deployed force headquarters (HQ) information and data exchange and interoperability of communications-electronics systems above the tactical level of command, as well as the Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) Naval command, control, communications, and computers organization working to achieve standardization and interoperability in communications systems.

(2) Alliances provide a forum to work toward standardization of national equipment; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Standardization is not an end in itself, but it does provide a useful framework for commanders and their staffs. Coalitions, however, are, by definition, created for a single purpose and usually (but not always) for a finite length of time and, as such, are ad hoc arrangements. They may not provide commanders with the same commonality of aim or degree of organizational maturity as alliances.

(3) Alliances usually have developed a degree of standardization with regard to administrative, logistic, and operational procedures. The mechanisms for this standardization are international standardization agreements (ISAs). ISAs can be materiel or non-materiel in nature. Non-materiel-related ISAs should already be incorporated into US joint and Service doctrine and TTP. The five-paragraph operation order is one common example. Materiel ISAs are implemented into the equipment design, development, or adaptation processes to facilitate standardization. In NATO, ISAs are known as standardization agreements (STANAGs) and AJPs and are instruments that are used to

establish commonality in procedures and equipment. The ABCANZ Standards are another type of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean they will be automatically used during an alliance's multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the OPLAN or operation order. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles for obligating financial resources or transferring resources.

(4) Multinational publications (MPs) are a series of unclassified ISAs specifically developed by NATO. MPs provide signatory nations with common doctrine, TTP, and information for planning and conducting operations. These publications are available to all nations through a NATO sponsor.

(5) Standardization agreements like AJPs, MPs, STANAGs, and ABCANZ standards provide a baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world, these multilateral and other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential coalition members may be in place prior to the formation of the coalition. However, participants may not be immediately familiar with such agreements. The MNFC disseminates ISAs among the MNF or relies on existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs should identify where they can best standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the force. This is more difficult to accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been associated prior to the particular contingency. The same considerations apply when non-alliance members participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used where possible to standardize procedures and processes.

(6) MNF SOPs provide for standardization of processes and procedures for multinational operations. For example, the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program developed an MNF SOP with the 31 MPAT nations, has used it within real-world contingencies, and routinely uses it in exercises and training throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

e. **Interoperability.** Interoperability greatly enhances multinational operations through the ability to operate in the execution of assigned tasks. Nations whose forces are interoperable across materiel and nonmateriel capabilities can operate together effectively in numerous ways. For example, as part of developing PN security forces, the extent of interoperability can be used to gauge the effectiveness of SC/SFA activities. Although frequently identified with technology, important areas of interoperability may include doctrine, procedures, communications, and training.

(1) Factors that enhance interoperability start with understanding the nature of multinational operations as described in paragraph 3, "Nature of Multinational Operations." Additional factors include planning for interoperability and sharing information, the personalities of the commander and staff, visits to assess multinational capabilities, a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism and rewarding the sharing of information, liaison teams, multinational training exercises, and a constant effort to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation should be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such

standards should already be established for alliance members when the preponderance of NATO nations are representative of a particular alliance.

(2) Factors that inhibit interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary defense information; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting personalities.


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## CHAPTER II COMMAND AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

### 1. Command Authority

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command (see Figure II-1).

a. **National Command.** As Commander in Chief, the President always retains, and cannot relinquish, national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment of, and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time. All nations participating in a multinational operation will have their own form of national command. NATO and the European Union (EU) use the term “full command” to describe national command by their member states.



**Figure II-1. Notional Multinational Command Structure**

b. **Multinational Command.** Command authority for an MNFC is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. In making a decision regarding an appropriate command relationship for a multinational military operation, the President carefully considers such factors as mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). Command authority will be specified in the implementing agreements that provide a clear and common understanding of what authorities are specified over which forces.

*For further details concerning command authorities, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*


## 2. Unified Action

a. **Unified action during multinational operations involves the synergistic application of all instruments of national power as provided by each participating nation;** it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. This construct is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational environment, unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates multinational operations with the operations of other HN and national government agencies, international organizations (e.g., UN), NGOs, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort in the operational area (OA). When working with NATO forces, it can also be referred to as a comprehensive approach.

### MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

In 2002, the Combined Maritime Forces was formed to counter piracy and terrorism in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, a three million square mile area. In 2005, Somali pirates began raiding ships in the Indian Ocean, especially in the Gulf of Aden. On the average, each captured ship earned the pirates several million dollars and, in 2008, the pirates attacked 24 ships and seized 14 ships. In response to the increased piracy, the United Nations Security Council passed four resolutions condemning piracy and authorizing military forces to conduct anti-piracy operations in over one million square miles of territory. Under the Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, Counter-Piracy, was formed in January 2009 and is composed of forces from several nations and two multinational commands. For example, in 2010, CTF 151 was commanded by the following countries: Singapore, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and finally by Pakistan. CTF 151 consisted of multinational forces, CTF 508, the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] component commanded by a Portuguese, and then by a Dutch commodore, and CTF 465, European Union Naval Forces, was commanded by the Swedish, French, and finally by the Spanish. Twenty-five different nations patrolled the Indian Ocean and defeated the Somali pirates. CTF 151 also coordinated anti-piracy operations with naval forces from China, Russia, and India.

Various Sources



Somalian Piracy Threat Map (2005-2010)

b. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. This is one of the major characteristics of operating in the multinational environment. Commanders should be prepared to address issues related to legality, mission mandate, and prudence early in the planning process. In multinational operations, consensus often stems from compromise.

### COMBINED TASK FORCE 151

Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin, operates under a mission-based United Nations Security Council Resolution mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces area of operations to actively deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. Contributing nations have included ships from Australia, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and the US. In conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union Naval Force, ships from CTF 151 patrol in the Somali Basin and the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden. CTF 151 also coordinates anti-piracy operations with naval forces from China, Russia, and India.

Various Sources

### 3. Multinational Force Commander

a. MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. **The extent of the MNFC's command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements.** This authority can vary widely and may be limited by national caveats of those nations participating in the operation. **The MNFC's primary duty is to unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives.** An operation could have numerous MNFCs.

(1) MNFCs at the strategic level are analogous to GCC level.

(2) MNFCs at the operational level may be referred to as subordinate MNFCs or a multinational task force (MNTF). This level of command is roughly equivalent to the US commander of a subordinate unified command or joint task force (JTF) and is the operational-level portion of the respective MNF. Integrated MNTFs, such as the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), will have embedded MNTF personnel throughout the HQ. A lead nation (LN) MNTF HQ, like Multinational Force-Iraq, will be staffed primarily by LN personnel and augmented by personnel from other MNTF countries. Some integration in staff functions is possible, but the bulk of the work will be handled within the LN structure. The LN provides the commander and the majority of staff with the MNF HQ. Moreover, it is likely to dictate the language and command and staff procedures utilized. Ultimately, the LN assumes responsibility for all aspects of planning; execution; assessment; command, control, communications, and information structure; doctrine; and logistic coordination that supports it. Other nations assign contributions to the force and fulfill some positions within the LN's staff. Figure II-2 illustrates an example of the various command levels.


b. MNFCs should integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the OA. All MNTF commanders plan, conduct, and assess the effectiveness of unified action IAW the guidance and direction received from the national commands, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior commanders.

c. The MNF will attempt to align its operations, actions, and activities with NGOs operating in a country or region. NGOs may be precluded from coordinating and integrating their activities with those of an MNF to maintain their neutrality.

d. Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission standards enhances unified action. The MNFC should establish common training modules or certification training for assigned forces. Such training and certification of forces should occur prior to entering the MNTF OA. Certification of forces should be accomplished by a team composed of subject matter experts from all nations providing military forces to the MNFC.

### 4. Overview of Multinational Command Structures

No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command, but national considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure.




**Figure II-2. Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure**

However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are fairly well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the US may operate in multinational operations.

a. **Organizational Structure.** The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, LN, or parallel command.


(1) **Integrated Command Structure.** A good example of this command structure (see Figure II-3) is in NATO, where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key factors in an integrated command are:

- (a) A designated single commander.
- (b) A staff composed of representatives from all member nations.
- (c) Subordinate commands and staffs integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.



**Figure II-3. Integrated Command Structure**

(2) **LN Command Structure.** An LN structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation (see Figure II-4). The LN command structure can be distinguished by a dominant LN command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the LN structure is Multinational Force-Iraq, wherein a US-led HQ provided overall command and control (C2) over US and multinational subordinate commands. US forces may encounter



**Figure II-4. Lead Nation Command Structure**

the term framework nation, which is defined in NATO, the EU, and UN documents to describe a LN for an operation.

(a) An LN command structure may also be characterized by an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff enables the commander to draw upon the expertise of multinational partners in areas where the LN may have less experience.

(b) Rotational command, a variation of LN command sometimes found in multinational commands, allows each participating nation to be the LN in turn. To be effective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that participating nations may alternate exercising the authority of the LN. An example of this type of command is the ISAF, which has 12- to 24-month command tours that rotate among the participants. Rotational command existed in ISAF from 2002 to February of 2007, after which time, the MNFC has been the US and continues to be under Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT and, therefore, was predominately a traditional LN construct.

(3) **Parallel Command Structures.** Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated (see Figure II-5). The MNF leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to achieve unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers (see paragraph 8.c., “Coordination Centers”). Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided, if at all possible.

b. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component, often called a national command




Figure II-5. Parallel Command Structure

element, to effectively administer its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is also referred to as the national support element (NSE). An NSE may provide common-user logistics (CUL) support to MNFs as well as national forces. It is also possible that in some operations, selected CUL would be arranged by the multinational joint logistics center (MJLC) (or equivalent), thereby reducing the role of the NSE in providing such logistics.

### **5. Multinational Command Structures**

a. In multinational commands, national objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Typically, alliance command structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree of stability and consensus, doctrine, and standardization. Established command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially during multinational operations that include non-allied members.

b. Multinational command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or an LN command structure. Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems, and standardized procedures. In combined operations, such structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Combined command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Subordinate commands are often led by senior military officers from member nations. Effective operations within an alliance require the senior national and military authorities be in agreement on the type of command relationships that will govern the operations of the forces. Notwithstanding peacetime command relationships, the national sensitivities associated with actual operations will impact command relationships and operating procedures.

c. Coalitions often form in response to crises that occur outside the area or scope of an established alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance can handle. Coalition command relationships, which evolve as a coalition develops, are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: LN or parallel. In coalition operations, member nations may initially desire to retain even more control of their own national forces than is generally associated with combined operations. At the outset of a coalition, nations are often reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one LN. Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the LN's interests.

d. One means of ensuring the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides

the coalition commander with representative leadership and a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the respective coalition members and facilitates the planning process.

e. During formation of the coalition, the early integration of the multinational national command elements into the coalition planning process can greatly accelerate building of unity of effort and reinforce the tenets of multinational operations. National command elements represent the national command channels from each individual nation within the multinational command. Meetings with the MNFC provide the setting for open, candid input from participating nations.


f. LN and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This situation occurs when two or more nations or organizations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. The command arrangement used by the Gulf War coalition (see Figure II-6) provides a good example of the intricate web of command structures possible. In that case, the US performed as the LN for a coalition of non-Arab countries while Saudi Arabia functioned as the LN for the Arab coalition members. A friendly forces coordinating council (since renamed to coalition coordination center [CCC]) provided the coordination conduit between the non-Arab (US-led) forces and the Arab/Islamic (Saudi-led) command structures. Terms in the figure reflect the terminology used in the operation.

g. Figures II-7 through II-10 show examples of coalition command structures from Afghanistan ISAF (Figure II-8), the NATO Balkans Stabilization Force (Figure II-9), and the Balkans European Force Command (Figure II-10). In the Balkans, when the EU assumed the mission from NATO, NATO continued to maintain a military HQ and a place in the command chain as well, with a continued US presence in the country. These diagrams highlight the evolution of multinational command structures, especially those involving international organizations such as NATO, the EU, or the UN. These organizations add a layer of complexity to the command structure as nations have to answer to both the international organization chain of command, as well as their national leadership.

## 6. Multinational Force Coordination

There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the coordination of MNFs—a liaison network and coordination centers.

a. **Liaison Network.** Effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building tool, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During multinational operations, US forces should establish liaison early with forces of each nation, by fostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating the ability to integrate and synchronize operations, assisting in the transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, gaining awareness and understanding of national caveats, and developing an increased level of teamwork.



**Figure II-6. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM (Land Forces)**

(1) Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams should be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, communication systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands. Liaison requirements for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually greater than anticipated or staffed. Personnel liaison requirements should be identified

early during the planning process and staffed accordingly. Team members should be language qualified or provided linguist support. Although professional knowledge and functional expertise are key factors to successful liaison operations, understanding language and culture are equally important and influential. Care should be taken to avoid liaisons becoming proxy decision makers; their purpose is to improve, rather than replace, coordination among commanders.

#### **OPERATION DESERT STORM: A STUDY OF US FORCES UNDER FRENCH OPERATIONAL CONTROL**

The nation of France, wanting to support Kuwait after Iraq's invasion on 02 August 1990, deployed a light armored division to Saudi Arabia, which remained under direct French national authority in coordination with Saudi Arabia during Operation DESERT SHIELD. For Operation DESERT STORM, France agreed to shift operational control (OPCON) of the Daguet Division to Lieutenant General (LTG) Gary Luck, commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, on 17 January 1991, the day the air campaign began.

The XVIII Airborne Corps' initial priority of effort was to seize As Salman, a town 90 miles inside Iraq with a 9,000 foot runway and adjacent to the north-south main supply route intersecting the paved east-west supply route. LTG Luck assigned this objective to the Daguet Division. This 10,000 man, 3,000 vehicle (500 of which were armored) division was comprised of three infantry regiments, two cavalry regiments, a headquarters regiment and one regiment each of tanks, artillery, engineers, logistics/supply, and medical. Additionally, the Daguet Division had two helicopter regiments consisting of 132 helicopters—60 of which were armed with anti-tank missiles. (See Figure II-7 – Order of Battle. Note: a French regiment was equivalent to a US battalion).

LTG Luck heavily reinforced the Daguet Division. On 23 January 1991, he passed OPCON of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, consisting of three battalions of infantry plus one artillery battalion, to Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Bernard Janvier, the commanding general of the Daguet Division. Additionally, LTG Luck transferred OPCON of one engineer battalion, one military police battalion, one civil affairs company, and two psychological operations vehicles with loudspeakers to Brig Gen Janvier. These forces were completely integrated into the Daguet Division. The US military police took charge of the prisoners of war whom the French captured, and the engineer battalion conducted mine clearing operations with the French engineer regiment. LTG Luck also gave operational control of one artillery brigade headquarters and five field artillery battalions to Brig Gen Janvier in support of operations in the eastern part of the campaign.

The French and the Americans units became a combined force. The commander of artillery brigade headquarters acted as the fires chief and reported directly to Brig Gen Janvier, and the brigade's fire control

system was integrated into the Daguet Division fires center, supporting a combined US and French offensive on 18 February, 1991, under French command. On 24 February, the Daguet Division crossed the line of departure into Iraq, and captured As Salman two days later. Shortly after the success of the Daguet Division, OPCON of the US units was transferred back to US commanders, except for one US civil affairs company that stayed under French OPCON until the Daguet Division redeployed to France.

This example of Allies working together in multinational operations had lasting benefits for both nations. Later, Brig Gen Bernard Janvier would write “4,200 Americans served under my orders and this is the first time in a longtime [since World War I] that a French general officer commanded (American) GIs....”

**Various Sources**

(2) The US Army’s digital liaison detachments (DLDs) have been in existence since Operation DESERT STORM and were used extensively during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. DLDs are specifically designed to provide US staffs with liaison teams composed of individuals with professional knowledge and functional expertise in associated Army battle command systems to enable interface with multinational units and are most effective when attached to the highest possible headquarters.

*For additional information on DLDs, see Army Techniques Publication 3-94.1, Digital Liaison Detachment.*

(3) SOF, in conjunction with conventional forces, have proven particularly effective in integrating MNFs. Their language capabilities, regional expertise, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries typically enable them to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding during MNF operations. Specifically, SOF can assist the MNFC to:

(a) Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the security assistance program to eligible foreign government military units conducting internal defense and development operations.

(b) Assess foreign military force capabilities and provide direction or recommendations toward improving HN special operations employment and sustainment methods.

(c) Educate foreign military force senior officers and civilians in how to appropriately employ SOF.

(d) Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous air/land/sea special operations resources and capabilities.




Figure II-7. Order of Battle

## International Security Assistance Force Coalition Command Relationships 2010 - 20xx





Figure II-8. International Security Assistance Force Coalition Command Relationships




**Figure II-9. Stabilization Force Coalition Command Relationships**

(e) Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ air/land/sea forces in specific operation situations.

(f) Facilitate force integration for multinational operations.

(g) Provide direct support to HNs by using air/land/sea resources to provide intelligence, communications capability, and air or aviation support.

**b. Coordination Centers.** Another means of increasing MNF coordination is the use of a multinational coordination center (MNCC). US commanders should routinely advocate creation of such a center in the early stages of any multinational effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of integrating the participating nations' military forces into the multinational planning, operations, and assessment processes, enhancing coordination and cooperation and supporting an open and full interaction within the MNF structure. Normally, the MNCC



**Figure II-10. European Forces Coalition Command Relationships**

is focused upon coordination of MNF operations, which will most likely involve classified information. The addition of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is recommended for coordination with the international humanitarian community indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) and interagency partners. Additional coordination centers may be established to coordinate multinational logistics (MNL), functional areas, and media affairs.

(1) Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, alert and warning, host-nation support (HNS), movement control, and training. However, as an MNF matures, the role of the coordination center can be expanded to include command activities.

(2) When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide a staff element to the center that is comprised of action officers who are familiar with support activities such as those listed above. MNF nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their

### 144TH ARMY LIAISON TEAM DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The 144th Army Liaison Team (ALT) was the third liaison team in this theater of operations. In this theater, the ALT provided liaison to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In accordance with the Bonn Accord, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) organized ISAF to support Afghanistan with security and stabilization operations. The 144th ALT arrived in theater and was assigned to Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan at ISAF headquarters. The ALT also provided liaison services primarily for the combined joint operations directorate and the combined joint intelligence directorate, but expanded mission requirements to provide service for all staff sections within the command as required. The 144th ALT provided “air gap” bridging capability for the US SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, ISAF Secret, the NATO SECRET Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating Systems, and the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) which was the coalition network solution. Information security standardization delayed CENTRIXS implementation, as nations were reluctant to share information.

Various Sources

parent HQ. Apart from a central MNCC, such as the CCC, a number of functional coordination centers may also be established within an overall combined logistics coordination or support command for a multinational operation. Activities centrally coordinated or controlled by such centers would include movement control, operational contract support (OCS), theater-level logistic support operations, overall medical support, and infrastructure engineering. One key to the success of such centers is the early establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel to exercise appropriate control of designated activities.

*For additional guidance on organizing and manning an MNCC, refer to the MPAT MNF SOP. The MNF SOP can be viewed and downloaded from: <https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat/p/sop.aspx>.*

## 7. Control of Multinational Operations

The degree of control exercised in an MNF is dictated by the degree of synchronization required, the MNF structure, and the command relationships between members of the MNF. In general, the more centralized the command structure, the greater the MNF’s ability to achieve unity of effort. Integrated command structures, operating within their alliance framework, afford the greatest degree of control. A parallel structure, with its separate lines of command, typically offers the least control and ability to achieve unity of effort. LN structures can exhibit a wide range of control depending on the mission set and the command relationships assigned.

## 8. Interorganizational Cooperation

a. In many OEs, the MNF interacts with a variety of stakeholders requiring unified action by the MNFC, including nonmilitary governmental departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Interorganizational cooperation includes the coordination between the Armed Forces of the United States; USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector. Interagency coordination is a subset of interorganizational cooperation. These groups play an important role in providing support to HNs. Additionally, the MNF should be aware of private-sector firms (e.g., businesses, contractors working for the military) operating in the OA. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. CA or NATO civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) forces enhance interorganizational coordination through the establishment of a CMOC.

b. **Relationships.** The MNFC's relationship with these organizations will vary depending on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved.

(1) Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and multinational partners) and international organizations should be clearly defined to coordinate required military support before commencement of operations, if possible. In some cases, other agencies may be lead agent for operations with military forces providing support. In other cases, the lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied and coalition forces and the agencies involved. The President, normally through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), should provide clear guidance regarding the relationships between US military commanders and USG departments and agencies.

(2) To achieve the greatest unity of effort, the roles, missions, efforts, and activities of the international humanitarian community within the MNF OA should be factored into the commander's mission analysis. Every effort should be made to formally include interorganizational coordination factors and requirements in MNF OPLANs.

(3) In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs and international organizations operating within the OA. A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing control to NGOs and international organizations. This must begin as early as possible in the planning cycle for such operations. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners should include international organization/NGO capabilities, limitations, and operations within the MNF's plan whenever possible.

c. **Coordination Centers.** One means of enhancing the working relationship between NGOs/international organizations when there is no command relationship is through their integration with existing coordination centers, as described in subparagraph 6.b., "Coordination Centers."

*For additional information, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*

d. **Agreements.** The US DOS leads USG negotiations with international organizations and other nations' agencies. Although Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of authority to negotiate and sign agreements with foreign nations, forces, and agencies to DOS, formal agreements between the US military and US civilian government agencies may be established. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or terms of reference. Concluding these negotiations prior to the commencement of operations offers the best chance for success. There are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints involving agreements between the Armed Forces of the United States and other US governmental departments and agencies. A staff judge advocate (SJA) should be consulted before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside DOD.

*For more detailed information on interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be involved, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

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## CHAPTER III GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

*“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them.”*

Sir Winston Churchill, 1 April 1945

### 1. Diplomatic and Military Considerations

a. Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response, from warfare to natural disasters. In responding to such situations, nations weigh their national interests and then determine if, when, and where they will commit their nation’s resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The composition of an MNF may change as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives change or force contributions reach the limits of their nation’s ability to sustain them. Some nations may even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another, so that a contribution may, for example, consist of an infantry company containing platoons from different countries. **The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance.** The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the MNTF’s command structure. In a parallel command structure, national forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines determined by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational influences. Under the integrated and LN command structures, more multinational involvement and interaction occurs. As such, this chapter will primarily focus on issues affecting the latter two structures.

b. **Capabilities.** As shown in Figure III-1, numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific operational limitations and capabilities of the forces of participating nations and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated. MNTF commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. Even within their own command, national and operational limitations on the employment of the forces can significantly influence daily operations.

c. **Integration.** The fundamental challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. This may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed by the MNFC. Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements (formal or informal) prior to the deployment of forces to the OA. This process relies heavily upon detailed coordination



**Figure III-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations**

between national leadership, prospective forces, and the MNFC. The degree of involvement of each participant is likely to be primarily a national decision and commanders at all levels must be cognizant of national mandates placed on individual units.

d. **Preparation.** In addition to planning and preparing for contingency operations in a multinational environment, CCDRs pursue national strategic end states as they develop their theater or functional strategies. This translates into an integrated set of shaping actions and activities by means of an operation or campaign plan.

(1) SC activities are designed to promote peace and security in a country or region and prevent or mitigate crises by facilitating cooperation and building relationships to enhance an HN or region’s security. A multinational operation can be designed to support a CCMD’s operation or campaign plan or a contingency operation.

(2) SC activities are undertaken well in advance of any crisis-precipitating event. The military contribution to these efforts focuses on enhancing cooperation and building and sustaining relationships to enhance regional security.

(3) A representative listing of SC activities might include:

(a) Provide training, education, and equipment to build the capacity, capability, and interoperability of PNs and organizations;

(b) Conduct activities with PNs to confront threats and challenges before they mature into a crisis;

- (c) Conduct military-to-military senior leader and staff talks and exchanges;
- (d) Promote regional cooperation to meet shared challenges, as well as decrease tension and rivalries;
- (e) Conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises; and
- (f) Conclude formal arrangements for the use of facilities, basing, or transit of military forces.

e. **Employment.** In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest result in varying levels of commitment by PNs. While some countries might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles. Some examples of PN contributions can be seen in Figure III-2. However, offers of national support should not be declined outright. Instead, every offer should be vetted through the MNFC and multinational partners and recognized as support to the operation or campaign. This process helps maintain the support of allies, friends, and partners and enhances the relationship. Additionally, multinational support will help increase the perceived legitimacy of operations domestically as well as internationally.


*For additional information regarding legitimacy, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For NATO operations, see AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.*

## 2. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force

a. Building an MNF starts with the national decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level. These senior-level discussions could include organizations like the African Union, UN, or NATO, existing coalitions or alliances, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should determine:

- (1) The nature and limits of the response.
- (2) The command structure of the response force.
- (3) The essential strategic guidance for the response force to include military objectives and the desired end states.

b. **Command Issues.** When the response force is resident within an alliance, the procedures and structure of the alliance will normally determine operational-level leadership for the response force. When the response force is based in a coalition (or an LN structure in an alliance), the designated LN will normally select the operational-level leadership. The Multinational Interoperability Council's *Coalition Building Guide*, describes the LN construct and could be used by an LN and potential partners as a starting point to address the coalition building process as it applies to multinational military operations, particularly at the strategic level.



**Figure III-2. Partner Nation Contributions**

c. These designated military leaders will coordinate military requirements and actions between participating nations. In an alliance such as NATO, this would normally be the alliance’s military commander. The MNFC promulgates essential guidance to all members that should contain the following information:

- (1) Purpose of the multinational operation.
- (2) Mission statement for the MNTF.
- (3) Strategic end state and military end state for the MNTF.
- (4) Strategic objectives and broad tasks for the MNTF with guidance for termination or transition.
- (5) Participating nations and expected initial contributions.

- (6) Designated LN and supporting guidance.
- (7) Common security interests.
- (8) Multinational communications strategy.
- (9) Specific diplomatic, economic, and informational guidance and national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.

d. When dealing with PNs, sensitivities and cultural differences must be recognized and acknowledged and procedures developed to mitigate or minimize additional conflict between nations. Some planning considerations for multinational operations may include language, culture and religion, diet, alcohol and tobacco consumption policies, male/female contact/cohabitation policies, openness to biometrics, work hours, leave, perspectives on ethics and corruption, working animals, ROE/rules for the use of force caveats, and other duty limitations.

e. Maintaining a cohesive MNF may require the MNFC's continual attention, as nearly every action or event may impact national and military interests and may compete for primacy with the MNF's objective and end state. In some cases, national restrictions may seem wholly out of line with national contributions. This tension between national elements is not new, and commanders at all levels should be prepared to deal with it. As discussed earlier, nations join multinational efforts for a variety of reasons, both known and unknown. National will, popular support, and the perceived achievement of stated objectives are just some of the factors that might influence continued national participation. However, thorough pre-mission preparation and planning can pay significant dividends later as the MNFC faces the challenge of maintaining a stable MNF.

### 3. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks

a. The MNFC's staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised mission statement, commander's intent, and the MNFC's planning guidance. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training-level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from an alliance or likely coalition partners.

b. Before the MNTF staff can develop proposed courses of action, the MNFC must conduct an estimate of the situation. This enables the MNFC to analyze, in an organized manner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s). This estimate should address the respective capabilities, national will, and national interests of the MNTF components. Additionally, expected interagency contributions and involvement of each nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation determines its contribution to the operation. **National force commitments, even in an established alliance, are not automatic.** For example, a NATO non-Article 5 crisis response operation is one such case where nations can opt in or out based on their national interests. Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks

necessary to achieve the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the MNFC should assign specific tasks to the elements of the MNTF most capable of completing those tasks. If there are several different national elements that can complete a particular task, the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner that allows each troop contributing nation to make meaningful contributions to the end state.

### 4. Language, Religion, Culture, and Sovereignty

a. **Language.** Differing languages within an MNF may present a significant challenge to command, control, and communications and potentially affect unity of effort if not mitigated. US forces cannot assume the predominant language will automatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Therefore, US forces should make every effort to overcome language barriers. Wherever and whenever possible, commanders should use exchange or liaison officers or nonmilitary translators to facilitate interaction and coordination with HN forces. Communication is conveyed through both verbal and nonverbal means, with information loss, miscommunications, and misunderstandings having a negative impact on operations. The additional time required to receive information, process it, develop plans from it, translate the plans, and distribute them to multinational partners can adversely impact the speed and tempo of operations. Commanders may lessen these difficulties by early identification of linguist support. They should assess the capabilities of US personnel to communicate with and to understand partners and use properly trained, multilingual personnel as appropriate. Capability gaps may be mitigated through the use of contracted support for interpreters and translators and should be addressed during the planning phase normally involving coordination with US Army Intelligence and Security Command. HN resources may serve an especially important role in this capacity, particularly if available during the initial stages of the deployment. In addition, the importance of staffing the HQ with qualified liaison personnel cannot be too highly emphasized. This will usually place additional demands upon US commanders for liaison personnel, but they are critical to the success of any multinational mission.

b. **Linguists and Area Experts.** To assist with cultural and language challenges, the MNTF employs linguists and area experts, often available within and through the Service components or from other governmental agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the OA, its cultures, and languages as a result of special training (e.g., foreign area officers), previous assignments, or heritage. The use of such abilities should be maximized to facilitate understanding and communications. Contract linguists should be screened for security purposes and vetted to verify their abilities.

c. **Religion.** Each partner in multinational operations requires the capability to assess the impact of religion upon operations. Assigned religious affairs personnel serve as advisers to the command regarding religious factors among the local population, as well as assigned, attached, or authorized personnel. Assigned religious affairs personnel also provide religious support through pastoral care, worship opportunities, and casualty incident responses. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious and cultural customs, holiday observances, and similar concerns of MNF members.

*For more information on religious affairs, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*

**d. Culture.** Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of their physical environment, economic, political, and social outlook, as well as the values, beliefs, and symbols that comprise their culture. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious and cultural customs, holiday observances, and similar concerns of MNF members.

(1) There are a number of tools that can aid commanders and joint forces in identifying and becoming familiar with troop contributing nations' cultural tendencies and provide insights into other cultures (HN, neighboring countries, adversaries, and supporters). This may enable commanders to be more effective when interacting with their other MNF leaders and the local populace. These tools can potentially assist commanders in making more timely assessments of potential cultural impacts and minimize any detrimental impact on operations and enable a more cohesive relationship with our multinational partners and friends.

(2) Some tools that provide analytical methodology for cultural evaluation include:

(a) Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center at <http://www.dliflc.edu/resources/>.

(b) US Air Force Culture and Language Center at <http://culture.af.mil/>.

(c) US Navy Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture.

(d) US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity at <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Units/MCIA/>.

(e) SOF global assessments conducted by US Special Operations Command.

(f) Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning at <https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/investing-education-and-training-our-marines/center-advanced-operational-culture-and>.

**e. Sovereignty Issues.** Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems the MNFC may be required to mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. National sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.

(1) The US commander, as part of the MNF, should coordinate with DOS, country teams, and the ambassador/chief of mission to the respective HN, if available, on any sovereignty issues that cannot be resolved at the MNFC level. Examples of sovereignty issues include basing, civil, or criminal jurisdiction over military and contractor personnel, immigration, customs and taxation, claims, ground movement,

overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, railheads, border crossings, frequency management, and operations in the territorial sea.

(a) Normally, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), status-of-mission agreements, or defense cooperation agreements (DCAs). These agreements, negotiated between the HN and the sponsoring organization on behalf of the participating countries, establish the detailed legal status of MNFs.

(b) Authority to negotiate a SOFA or DCA is held at the national level. For US forces, some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint Staff and CCDRs. Neither the MNFC nor the staff has such authority without specific approval or delegation from higher authority. Before any negotiations or agreement with another nation, the SJA or appropriate legal authorities should be consulted. US forces remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which will be administered by the appropriate US commander.

(2) The commander may also create structures such as committees to address sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary representatives of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. In many cases, SC organizations, NGOs, and international organizations present in the HN can help establish good will with the HN. In some cases, these organizations may also be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or in establishing a congenial relationship in the HN.

### 5. Legal

a. Commanders must ensure the MNTF complies with applicable national and international laws during the conduct of all military operations. Participating nations should provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of any national differences. In operations under the authority of NATO, relevant alliance documents will be applicable.

b. US forces will comply with the law of war (also referred to by other nations as the law of armed conflict) during all armed conflicts however characterized and in all other military operations. Additionally, US forces will be trained in the law of war IAW DODD 2311.01, *DOD Law of War Program*. US forces will report alleged violations of the law of war (for which there is credible information or conduct during military operations that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict) through command channels.

*Refer to DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program, and CJCSI 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.*

c. **International Agreements.** International agreements are the primary source of rules of international law applicable to US, multinational, and HN forces. SOFAs are one

type of international agreement. SOFAs are normally comprehensive; however, these may be modified or become inapplicable in time of armed conflict. They prescribe most of the reciprocal rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities of the US forces, to include DOD civilians and contractor personnel stationed abroad and of the governments of the HN and PNs and their respective armed forces. Other important types of international agreements concern security assistance and HNS agreements. For specific information on HNS agreements (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing agreements [ACSAs]) and international agreements (e.g., defense cooperation agreements), contact the US embassy military senior defense official or GCC's legal advisor.

**d. Treatment of Detainees.** During the conduct of military operations, MNF personnel must be prepared to detain a wide variety of individuals who fall into different categories under the law of war. Regardless of the category or status of a detainee, MNFs are required to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all detainees IAW applicable domestic law, international law, and policy. Additionally, US forces should be aware that other participating nations may categorize detainees differently. For this reason, and because the excessive use of force or the perceived mistreatment of detainees can also seriously undermine public confidence in MNF operations, it is imperative commanders provide clear guidance for detainee operations in a multinational environment.

*For additional information, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.*

e. The DOD Detainee Program establishes overarching DOD detainee policy. The directive requires humane treatment of all detainees, however characterized, during all armed conflicts and in all other military operations. The standards of treatment set forth in the directive apply to all DOD components and contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), when assigned to or supporting the DOD components conducting, participating in, or supporting detainee operations. These standards also apply to all non-DOD personnel as a condition of permitting access to internment facilities or to detainees under DOD control.

*For additional information, see DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program.*

**f. Military Justice**

(1) Jurisdiction over US forces suspected of committing a criminal offense will be decided on a case-by-case basis, IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil authorities. It is US policy to retain jurisdiction in all criminal cases to the fullest extent possible. Foreign military commanders exercising operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) over US forces will not administer discipline.

(2) Jurisdiction over non-US members of the MNTF in such circumstances will also be decided IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil authorities. Since national procedures with regard to jurisdiction will determine how each case will be handled, US commanders should defer such matters to the participating nation's authorities.

g. Commanders should coordinate with the joint force SJA to assist in resolving potential legal conflicts that arise during multinational operations, such as jurisdictional issues related to HN law and military justice, questions regarding compliance with international law, and issues related to the treatment of detainees. However, this does not relieve the commander of the responsibility to understand and apply pertinent directives related to the law of war and ROE.

### 6. Doctrine and Training

a. **Doctrine.** Some nations, and international organizations, possess doctrine and training programs with a full treatment of strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs smaller in both scope and capability to match their national goals and objectives. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the US. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy, and guidance. An example is the MNF SOP developed by 31 nations within the MPAT in the Asia-Pacific region. It seeks to identify common starting points for the rapid activation and forming of an MNTF for crisis response situations (see Appendix B, "Multinational Planning Augmentation Team").

b. **Training and Resources.** When the situation permits, MNFCs at all levels should seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and resource sharing consistent with agreements between MNF members. This could include development of interoperable C2 and joint fires capabilities and procedures; the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP; and participation in multinational exercises, including training at US national training centers when appropriate. GCCs should include this information in the SC portion of their campaign plan.

### 7. Funding and Resources

Financial and resource considerations may vary greatly with each multinational operation. Responsible parties need to become familiar with the added legal complexities and ramifications when operating with MNFs. Reimbursement and other funding issues are often complex. Many arrangements will be similar to those for UN operations while other financial arrangements will be based on specific coalition agreements, MOUs, or technical agreements. It is important to begin coordination of financial arrangements with prospective multinational partners as early in the planning process as possible. Often, financial arrangements may be supported by special US logistic and funding authorities (the US's Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid provisions, for example). Examples of unique authorities include the provision of supplies, services, transportation, and logistic support to coalition forces supporting military and stability activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and authorities to use ACSAs to lend certain military equipment to foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for personnel protection and survivability. Additional examples of authorities are: establish an OCS coordination framework to preclude MNF

contracting conflicts; preserve and support local economy and wage rates; and preclude monopolization of HN vendors, services, and goods (ensure HN populace access to needed resources).

*In addition to the specific agreements governing each operation, important references on multinational funding issues are contained in DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR), Volume 15, Security Cooperation Policy.*

## **8. Protection of Personnel, Information, and Critical Assets**

a. The protection function focuses on preserving the joint forces fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications (LOCs) from an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Equally important is the application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire. Finally, emergency management and response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. As the MNFC's mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond FP to encompass protection of noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and interorganizational partners.

*See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional information on the protection function.*

b. Commanders must understand that other nations do not necessarily execute FP in the same way as the United States Armed Forces. Some nations' armed forces may or may not be willing or able to assume the same risk as US forces. US commanders, whether under US control or under a command relationship to an MNF, must continuously assess threats and vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate FP countermeasures IAW published GCC directives. Special consideration must be given to personnel with duties that require interaction with local populations.

c. Throughout multinational operations, risk management techniques and methodologies should be used to reduce or offset risk by systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk.

d. Another significant problem facing the MNF is the potential for friendly fire. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference can increase this risk. MNF support or liaison teams can greatly assist in assessing and reducing the friendly fire risk to the MNF by recommending operational coordination measures and technological solutions.

e. Finally, commanders must understand US forces, as part of an MNF, can potentially be the greater target. Enemies may view attacks against US Service members as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted multinational or HN forces to conduct these attacks against unsuspecting US forces. While these types of so-called "insider" or "green-on-blue" attacks may be context-specific to a particular theater, JFCs should, nevertheless, ensure their protection plans at least take into account the potential

for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures as the situation dictates. **US forces operating at tactical levels may be especially vulnerable to unintended and adverse exploitative use of information to gain advantage. Commanders should implement clear measures to ensure tactical information is accurate, timely, and adequately protected at all times.**

f. Nontraditional threats, such as insider attacks, undermine an MNF's ability in establishing a secure and stable environment, as well as the cohesion of the MNFs. Strategically, these types of threats provide a propaganda platform from which adversaries can not only threaten the MNF's objectives and termination criteria but also undermine the overall efforts of the international community. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation between HNs and MNFs affects military capability. Eliminating or minimizing nontraditional threats, especially by proper preparation and training of coalition forces, is critical to mission success. However, tougher FP standards and measures that are overtly heavy handed must be well balanced yet culturally sensitive enough to not send the wrong message to the very people and organizations the coalition is trying to protect.

g. Commanders must recognize that FP may have a higher priority than achievement of specific tactical objectives as the information gained by an enemy's successful attack against US forces can have an operational or even strategic impact. This does not imply that what is called for is a reduction of risk by isolation of US forces.

### 9. Rules of Engagement

a. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities may be time-consuming but is essential and should begin early in the planning process. Though the participants may have similar national mandates, ROE may differ among the represented PNs. In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought but may not be achievable. The MNFC should reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies and law.

b. It is essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces understand each others' ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in an identical fashion to a given situation. Without this understanding, events could result in misperceptions, confusion, and even friendly fire.

c. US forces assigned OPCON or TACON to an MNFC will follow the ROE of the MNF for mission accomplishment, if authorized by SecDef. US forces retain the right of self-defense. Apparent inconsistencies between the right of self-defense contained in US standing rules of engagement and the MNF ROE will be submitted through the US chain of command for resolution. While the final resolution is pending, US forces will continue to operate under US ROE. In the case of NATO operations, attention should be directed to applicable alliance documents, such as, Military Committee 362/1, *NATO Rules of Engagement*.

*For additional information on standing rules of engagement, see CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.*

## **10. Combat Identification and Friendly Fire Prevention**

Tragically, “fog-of-war” situations can lead to friendly fire incidents. Rapid, reliable identification of friends, foes, and neutrals, also known as combat identification (CID) is a key survivability enabler that mitigates friendly fire incidents.

a. Effective CID enhances joint force capabilities by providing confidence in the accuracy of engagement decisions throughout the force. The MNFC’s CID procedures should serve to optimize mission effectiveness by maximizing enemy engagements while minimizing friendly fire and collateral damage. These measures are particularly important in PO and traditional noncombat operations. Therefore, CID measures should be established early in the planning cycle.

b. CID considerations play an important role in FP. The MNFC’s CID procedures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere with a unit’s or an individual’s ability to engage enemy forces and conduct actions appropriate for self-defense. CID characterizations, when applied with ROE, enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of weapons and capabilities that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects. When developing the MNF CID procedures, important considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants.

*For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.*

c. MNFCs must make every effort to reduce the potential for the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel (to include civilians) by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, the fluid nature of the nonlinear OA, the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces, and the presence of civilians in the OA, increase the potential for friendly fire.

*For additional information on protection of civilians, refer to Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide (Second Edition) at [http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/PoC\\_MilRefGd\\_2nd\\_ed\\_Web\\_reduced.pdf](http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/PoC_MilRefGd_2nd_ed_Web_reduced.pdf).*

d. Commanders must identify and assess situations that increase the risk of friendly fire in the OE and institute appropriate preventive measures. The primary preventive measures for limiting and reducing friendly fire are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners, exercises, reliable and timely CID, effective SOPs, technology solutions (e.g., identification, friend or foe; friendly force tracking), and enhanced situational awareness (SA) of the OE. Commanders should seek to minimize friendly fire while not limiting boldness and initiative.

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## CHAPTER IV OPERATIONS

### 1. Land Operations

In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral and central part of the military effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment is largely a function of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment, and the forces available within the MNF.

a. National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the MNF. Nations with common TTP will also experience far greater interoperability. Effective use of SC activities may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for countries with widely disparate weapons systems.

b. The MNFC may assign the responsibility for land operations to an overall multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) or a task force (TF) within the MNF command structure (for example: TF South, TF North). Such TFs may include elements from a single nation or multiple nations, depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved. In addition, the MNFC may also assign an area of operations (AO) to the MNFLCC or TF based upon the concept of operations (CONOPS). Figure IV-1 contains a representative sample of MNFLCC responsibilities.

c. The MNFC will also establish supported and supporting relationships between the land component command or TF and other MNTF components (maritime, air, and special operations), based upon mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions; establishing the main effort; and establishing formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation, mission, or phase.

d. A fundamental consideration for planning and executing land operations is sustainability. The following factors impact the sustainability of land operations:

- (1) Personnel staffing requirements.
- (2) Medical requirements and capabilities.
- (3) Maintenance.
- (4) Supply.
- (5) Storage facilities.
- (6) Transportation.
- (7) Technical support and requirements.
- (8) Common sourcing of support.

(9) OCS.

### Multinational Force Land Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

- Advise the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper employment of forces made available for tasking.
- Develop the joint land operation plan/operation order in support of the MNFC's concept of operations and optimizing the operations of task-organized land forces. The multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) issues planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposed courses of action. The intent is to concentrate combat power at critical times and places to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical goals.
- Direct the execution of land operations as specified by the MNFC, which includes making timely adjustments to the tasking of forces and capabilities made available. The MNFLCC coordinates changes with affected component commanders as appropriate.
- Coordinate the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other components and supporting agencies.
- Evaluate the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of interdiction operations and forwarding these results to the MNFC to support the combat assessment effort.
- Synchronize and integrate movement and maneuver, fires, and interdiction in support of land operations.
- Designate the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.
- Establish a personnel recovery coordination cell, and be prepared to implement a personnel recovery plan and conduct personnel recovery of assigned forces.
- Provide mutual support to other components by conducting operations such as suppression of enemy air defenses and suppression of threats to maritime operations.
- Coordinate with other nations' functional and Service components in support of accomplishment of MNFC objectives.
- Provide an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations and coordination as determined by the MNFC.
- Support the MNFC's operations in the information environment by developing the information requirements that support land operations and synchronizing land force information assets when directed, to include cyberspace requirements.
- Establish standing operating procedures and other directives based on MNFC guidance.
- Provide inputs into the MNFC-approved joint operational area air defense plan and the airspace control plan.
- Integrate the MNFLCC's communications systems and resources into the theater's networked communications system architecture or common operational picture to synchronize MNFLCC's critical voice and data requirements. These communications systems requirements, coordination issues, and capabilities should be considered in the joint planning and execution process.

**Figure IV-1. Multinational Force Land Component Commander Notional Responsibilities**

See JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations, for more detail. AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, provides further information on doctrine for planning, preparing, and executing NATO land component operations.

## 2. Maritime Operations

During multinational operations, maritime forces can exercise sea control or project power ashore, synchronize their operations with the other MNF components, and support the MNFC's intent and guidance in accomplishing the MNF mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies and coast guard; however, they may include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government departments and agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea.

a. Maritime operational responsibility may be assigned to a multinational force maritime component commander (MNF MCC) or a designated TF. Figure IV-2 contains a representative sample of MNF MCC responsibilities.

b. The MNFC can also assign a maritime AO to the MNF MCC or naval TF within the MNF OA, based upon the CONOPS. The MNFC will also establish support relationships between the MNF MCC (or TF) and other MNF components (land, air, SOF), based upon mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions, establishing the main effort, and establishing formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.

c. A fundamental consideration of maritime operations is sustainability. The following factors impact the sustainability of maritime operations:

- (1) Number of surface ships (combatant and noncombatant).
- (2) Number of submarine assets.
- (3) Maintenance.
- (4) Storage facilities.
- (5) Weather and sea state conditions.
- (6) Sea LOCs.

d. Properly planned, resourced, and employed maritime forces may conduct operations that provide the MNFC with an MNF that can use the maneuver space of the sea to provide a broad range of options, generally unfettered by the requirement to obtain HN permissions and access. Maritime forces can provide power projection, afloat HQ, logistics, area surveillance, and denial platforms and facilities for joint forces offering advantages in flexibility and sustainability. Use of maritime forces may reduce the MNF footprint ashore and enable support and sustainment to be landed in sufficient quantities, as required, without necessarily placing it all in a vulnerable and essentially immobile location. Seabasing of MNFs also reduces the possible negative impact on limited

### Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

- Recommend to the multinational force commander (MNFC) the apportionment of the joint maritime effort (after consultation with other component commanders).
- Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with MNFC apportionment decisions.
- Control the execution of joint maritime operations, as specified by the MNFC, to include adjusting targets and tasks for available joint capabilities/forces. The MNFC and affected component commanders will be notified, as appropriate, if the multinational force maritime component commander changes the planned joint maritime operations during execution.
- Assign and coordinate target priorities within the maritime area of operations (AO) and integrate maneuver and movement, fires, and interdiction. The multinational force maritime component commander nominates targets located within the maritime AO to the joint targeting process that may potentially require action by another component commander's assigned forces.
- Contribute to maritime domain awareness. In order to allow decision makers to understand complex security environments, maritime components must:
  - Persistently monitor the maritime domain to identify potential and actual maritime threats;
  - Fuse and analyze intelligence and information when possible; and
  - Disseminate intelligence and information in near real-time to the MNFC and other component commanders.
- Function as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.
- Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities made available.
- Establish a personnel recovery coordination center in the same manner as the land component commander.

**Figure IV-2. Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander  
Notional Responsibilities**

infrastructure ashore and facilitates the protection of supplies and logistics support. Maritime forces expand access options, reduce dependence on land bases, and create uncertainty for adversaries.

e. Maritime transport vessels provide the bulk of heavy lift in support of multinational operations.

*See JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, for details on maritime operations*

### 3. Air Operations

a. Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive, agile, and flexible means of operational reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can be greatly extended in response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air operations are focused on supporting the MNFC's intent and guidance in accomplishing the

MNTF mission and, at the same time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the other major MNF operational functions (land, maritime, and special operations forces).

b. Overall MNF air operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force air component commander (MNFACC) (the designation will be based on the type of multinational configuration used in the operation). MNFACC plans, coordinates, allocates, and tasks air capabilities/force made available based on the MNFC's air apportionment decision (see Figure IV-3). The MNFC will also establish support relationships between the MNFACC or TF and other MNF components based on MNF mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions and establish formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.

c. **Air Operations Planning.** An integral part of the MNFC's planning efforts is the concept of air operations. The MNFACC conducts air operations planning and develops the concept for air operations, describing how the multinational assets made available are envisioned to be employed in support of the MNFC's overall objectives. Both US component commanders and MNFCs should provide highly trained liaison staffs to facilitate integration, coordination, and synchronization of their operations. Air planning should also include the use of logistic air assets and airfields. This is especially important for the coordination of tactical air operations with logistic operations, especially the air movement of supplies, their unloading, and rapid clearance from aerial ports. In the event that no established multinational guidance is available, planning considerations for multinational air operations should resemble those for joint air operations.

### Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

- Develop a multinational air operations plan to support the multinational force commander's (MNFC's) objectives.
- Recommend to the MNFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders.
- Allocate and task air capabilities/forces made available based on the MNFC's air apportionment decision.
- Provide oversight and guidance during execution of multinational air operations.
- Coordinate multinational air operations with other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC.
- Assess the results of multinational air operations.
- Support MNFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed.
- Function as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.
- Perform the duties of the airspace control authority, the area air defense commander, and/or the space coordinating authority as designated.
- Implement a personnel recovery plan for their own forces.

**Figure IV-3. Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional Responsibilities**

See JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for details on the air planning process.

d. **Airspace Control.** The primary purpose of airspace control is to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, effective, and flexible use of airspace with minimal restraint imposed on the users. International agreements; enemy and friendly force structures; deployments and resupply operations; commanders' concepts and operations; and operating environments such as foreign countries, the high seas, and amphibious objective areas will necessitate different specific arrangements for airspace control. Since participating nations' policies and doctrines may vary in this regard, the MNFC should ensure early, common understanding of the boundaries and limits of all operational areas.

(1) **Responsibility.** The responsibility for airspace control rests with the MNFC, who normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate the airspace control activities for multinational operations. In broad terms, the ACA establishes, coordinates, and integrates the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority and approval of the MNFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among nations' forces.

(2) When operating outside of a combat environment and within the borders of another sovereign nation, the ACA may perform coordination rather than control over the airspace. In those situations, the ACA needs to establish an effective relationship with the HN airspace authority. In addition to increasing effectiveness, the HN interests are likely to include safe domestic civil aviation, efficient commercial aviation, and international overflight rights. Integrating airspace control efforts will have a positive impact on the overall relationship between the HN and the MNF.

(3) The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the MNFC, integrates the MNF airspace control system with that of the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply command authority over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement are referred to the MNFC for resolution. The responsibilities of ACA and MNFACC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. If this is not possible, the ACA staff should be collocated with the MNFACC staff.

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for specific information on US joint operations and AJP-3.3.5, Airspace Control, for specific information on NATO operations.

e. **Air Defense.** Air and missile defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The MNFC normally designates an area air defense commander (AADC) to integrate the MNF's defensive effort. The responsibilities of the MNFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual. When the situation dictates, the MNFC may designate a separate AADC and/or ACA. In those joint operations where separate commanders are required and designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire, and deconflicting joint air operations.

See JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for details on air and missile defense operations.

f. **Sustainment.** The following factors significantly influence sustainability during air operations:

- (1) Available aircraft.
- (2) Landing fields/air base support infrastructure.
- (3) Weather.
- (4) Maintenance.
- (5) Supply.
- (6) Storage facilities.
- (7) Transportation.
- (8) Technical support and requirements.
- (9) Common sourcing of support.
- (10) Secure LOCs.
- (11) Medical support requirements and capabilities.
- (12) OCS.

#### 4. Space Operations

a. MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities. Available space capabilities are normally limited to already-deployed assets and established priorities for space system resources. Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), through the joint force component commander, enables commands to access various space capabilities and systems. As situations develop, priorities for space support may change to aid the MNFC in assessing the changing environment. Most important, MNFCs and their components need to anticipate “surge” space-based capabilities needed for future phases due to the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire additional capability.

b. **Space Integration into MNF Operations.** MNFs will have many of the same requirements for space support as do US forces. Sharing of intelligence products is controlled according to security guidelines. Unannotated commercial imagery may facilitate information sharing with other MNFs. Weather data is also readily available to share, as is Global Positioning System navigation support. Providing warning of and defense against attack from all classes of ballistic missiles is important because it helps

build trust among MNFs. USSTRATCOM assists in development of missile warning architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called “shared early warning.”

c. **Space Coordinating Authority (SCA).** The SCA gathers operational requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use of established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations. The SCA coordinates with each MNF component and ally to reduce redundancy among, and interference between, space operations, as well as conflicting support requests reaching USSTRATCOM. The MNFC should consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities; and the C2 (including reachback) in designating the SCA. MNF coordinating authority is normally retained at the MNF level but may be delegated to a component. The SCA may require additional liaison with MNFs.

*For additional information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.*

### 5. Information

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC/MNFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic objectives.

a. Multinational operations in the information environment should be based on a systemic understanding of the information environment. Themes and messages must be agreed upon by all MNF participants and integrated into operations. The information environment is dynamic and subject to rapid change requiring flexibility and adaptability to mission and situation requirements. The development of capabilities, plans, assessments, intelligence, and communications support applicable to operations in the information environment must begin early so information activities can be integrated into the overall operation or campaign plan. This development also requires coordination with the responsible DOD components and PNs. Coordination with allies above the JFC/MNFC level is normally accomplished within existing defense arrangements, including bilateral arrangements. Operations in the information environment should be coordinated with all stakeholders especially the appropriate GCC and DOS country team.

#### b. **The Multinational Information Operations Cell**

(1) When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by planners and subject matter experts from the MNF. All MNF member nations should be represented in the information operations (IO) cell in positions to integrate information throughout the communications. Planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of the MNF with the objective of using all the available resources. Direct representation enables multinational information assets to be used efficiently and ensures the

multinational plan for operations in the information environment is coordinated with all other aspects of the multinational operation. Toward that end, it is essential that from the initiation of planning those activities, and the structures, systems, and facilities that support them, be classified at the lowest level possible.

(a) Each nation has various resources to provide both classified and unclassified information to a particular information activity. To maximize the benefits of information activities, all nations must be willing to share appropriate information to accomplish the assigned mission. However, all MNF members should understand each nation is obliged to protect information that it cannot share with other MNF nations.

(b) Information sharing arrangements in formal alliances, to include US participation in UN missions, are worked out as part of alliance protocols. Information sharing arrangements in ad hoc multinational operations where coalitions are working together on a short-notice mission must be created during the establishment of the coalition.

*For more information, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-13, Information Operations. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.*

(2) When the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to brief the MNFC and staff on the advantages of operations in the information environment to achieve US and MNF objectives. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO cell. If this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using operations in the information environment to support US and MNF objectives.

**c. Multinational Planning for Operations in the Information Environment.** Planning operations in the information environment to support multinational operations is more difficult because of complex approval and security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers.

(1) How to plan multinational operations is the prerogative of the MNFC. The size, composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level, with detailed planning at the individual element level, would give multinational planning for operations in the information environment the most consistency with US planning procedures.

(2) The use of information should directly and demonstrably support the objectives of the MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners are attempting to acquaint a non-US MNFC with the advantages of operations in the information environment.

(3) The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent operations in the information environment in support of multinational objectives.

*See CJCSI 6510.01, Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND).*

d. Military information support operations (MISO) provide the commander with the ability to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups' attitudes and behaviors. MISO can also degrade the enemy's combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and increase the population's support for operations. MISO provide JFCs with ways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the OE that may be as critical to operational success as actions against enemy and adversary military capabilities. Target audiences are individuals or groups selected for influence and may include enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral groups or populations. MISO should be incorporated into all multinational operations.

(1) The MNFC should ensure all MISO, regardless of national origin, are coordinated. MISO planning must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of MNFs and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of the operation. A detailed analysis of a country's culture, political climate, and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively apply MISO to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. US MISO require US granted authorities/permissions and are approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the MNF chain of command.

(2) Many NATO and Partnership for Peace nations still use the term psychological operations in place of MISO. In the US, military information support forces are trained personnel who primarily conduct MISO. It is important not to confuse the psychological impact of other military operations with MISO. Many actions of the joint force, such as air strikes, have psychological impact, but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the attitudes, rules, norms, beliefs, and subsequent behavior of a target audience. However, the psychological impact of such events can significantly enhance or undermine program effectiveness and is considered during planning, execution, and assessment. Regardless of the circumstances, all MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities. MISO officers advise the commander and operations officer on the possible psychological impacts of all actions and ongoing operations.

*See JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, and CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, for additional information.*

## 6. Cyberspace Operations

a. **Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, space-based resources, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace uses electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to create, store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems. Cyberspace operations seek to ensure freedom of action throughout the OE for US forces and our allies, while denying the same to our adversaries. Cyberspace operations

overcome the limitations of distance, time, and physical barriers present in the physical domains. Cyberspace links actions in the physical domains, enabling mutually dependent operations to achieve an operational advantage.

b. Nations' understanding of the role of cyberspace in military operations continues to evolve. Operating capabilities, philosophies, and national limitations on cyberspace activities in support of military operations are changing at a tempo that affects ongoing MNF operations, as well as the planning of potential future ones. Mutually beneficial national interests usually govern a contributing nation's involvement in MNF cyberspace operations. Cyberspace operations planning, coordination, and execution items that must be considered when an MNF campaign plan or OPLAN is developed can include the national agendas for each country of the MNF, which may differ significantly from those of the US, creating potential difficulties in determining cyberspace operations objectives. The level of multinational network and other cyberspace operations integration is directly influenced by differing national standards and laws, which may affect employment of PN cyberspace capabilities or willingness to participate in certain cyberspace operations.

c. Multinational operations are becoming the norm for military operations, making intelligence and information sharing with PNs increasingly important. Cyberspace connectivity, security, and assurance are essential for the multinational and HN forces' effective mutual support during operations. Cyberspace interoperability issues should also be considered in light of cybersecurity policy requirements. Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of individual cyberspace operations plans and orders with multinational partners; this may severely hamper cyberspace synchronization efforts. While it may not be possible to share specific cyberspace plans, resources, and techniques with all partners due to restrictions, appropriate information on the broader intent, objectives, and messaging should be provided, enabling PNs to conduct effective, if unsynchronized, independent activities.

d. The threat may use cyberspace operations to penetrate US, MNF, and HN networks to collect data on forces and systems or to create denial or manipulation effects. States are the principal actors on the global stage, but non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, cyberspace hackers, and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Our partners and allies in cyberspace go beyond just nation-states; multilateral organizations, NGOs, corporations, and other strategic influencers all provide opportunities for collaboration and partnership.

*For further information, read JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.*

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## CHAPTER V OTHER MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

### 1. Stability Activities

a. Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. Stability is needed when a state is under stress and cannot cope. MNF supporting stabilization efforts should consider the use of fundamentals of stabilization and the principles of multinational operations to plan and execute military activities to facilitate long-term stability. The fundamentals are conflict transformation, HN ownership, unity of effort, and building HN capacity.

b. MNF provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the HN is normally responsible. These actions generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with stabilization:

(1) Tasks for which MNF retain primary responsibility.

(2) Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain responsibility but MNFs execute or are prepared to execute.

(3) Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

c. Joint or MNF planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for later stability and enabled civil authority activities. JFCs/MNFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to stability activities and shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority. Considerations are to:

(1) Limit the damage to key infrastructure and services.

(2) Establish the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilize military and paramilitary forces.

(3) Provide for the availability of local currency.

(4) Identify and manage potential stabilize phase enemies.

(5) Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer, medical, multinational) and balance of capabilities that can produce lethal and/or nonlethal effects for mission accomplishment and FP.

(6) Determine availability of HN law enforcement, health service support, and force health protection (FHP) resources.

(7) Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and first responder services.

(8) Develop and disseminate multinational communication-related themes to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

(9) Coordinate OCS to preclude destabilization of market wage and vendor rates; monopolization of vendor capability, goods, and services; and competition among individual MNF members for resources.

*For specific details on stability activities, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-07, Stability; DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations; JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction.*

### **2. Special Operations**

a. SOF can provide the MNTF with a wide range of specialized military capabilities and responses. SOF can provide specific assistance in the areas of assessment, liaison, and training of HN forces within the MNTF OA. Special operations responsibility will normally be assigned to a multinational force special operations component commander (MNFSOCC) or to a TF within the MNF command structure. The TF may be made up of SOF from one nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved. Figure V-1 contains a representative sample of MNFSOCC responsibilities.

b. SOF may deploy ahead of the multinational operations to evaluate capability of foreign units and identify training necessary to integrate them into the overall plan. This capability is enhanced by routine interaction of SOF with foreign military units including, for example, combat aviation advisory support. SOF can make use of their language and cultural capabilities to liaise with multinational units as needed. SOF can train, advise, assist, and, in some cases, accompany HN or multinational forces to overcome existing shortfalls identified during the assessment.

*For specific details on special operations, see JP 3-05, Special Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.*

### **3. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations**

a. The MNF is critically dependent on the EMS. To prevail in the next conflict, an MNF must win the fight for EMS superiority. Devices whose functions depend on the EMS are used by both civilian and military organizations and individuals for intelligence; communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; sensing; C2; attack; ranging; and data transmission and information storage and processing. The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, EMS is a key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as a focus of operations themselves.

### Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

- Advise the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper employment of special operations forces (SOF) and assets.
- Plan and coordinate special operations and employ designated SOF in support of the MNFC's concept of operations.
- Issue planning guidance.
- Analyze various courses of action.
- Coordinate the conduct of special operations with other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC.
- Evaluate the results of special operations.
- Synchronize sustainment for SOF.
- Establish a combat identification standing operating procedure and other directives based on MNFC guidance.
- Function as a supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.
- Focus operational-level functions and their span of control.
- Develop and support selected information operations efforts.
- Responsible for a personnel recovery plan covering their forces and should establish a personnel recovery coordination center.

**Figure V-1. Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander Notional Responsibilities**

b. JEMSO are military actions undertaken by two or more Services operating in concert to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). These actions include all joint force transmissions and receptions of electromagnetic (EM) energy. The EMS is the range of all frequencies of EM radiation. EMS superiority is that degree of dominance in the EMS that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting an adversary's ability to do the same.

c. JEMSO actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the EMOE rely on personnel and systems from the legacy EMS-related mission areas (e.g., signals intelligence, EMS management, electronic warfare [EW]). Instead of these mission areas being planned and executed in a minimally coordinated, stove-piped fashion, JEMSO guidance and processes prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and deconflict all joint force actions in the EMOE, enhancing unity of effort.

d. Operations within the air, maritime, and land domains are similar in their EMS dependence through the execution of the joint functions. Since the EMS overlaps all the physical domains and the information environment simultaneously, JEMSO provides the processes to effectively prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and deconflict the EMS aspects of operations throughout the OE. Many space and cyberspace operations occur through

the EMS, especially at the tactical level, and require close coordination with other JEMSO through EM battle management processes.

e. Effective EMS management is essential to integrate and deconflict MNF use of the EMS for communications, C2, sensor operations, information activities, EW, directed energy capabilities, signals intelligence, and FP. The number, sophistication, and variety of systems operated by PNs make EMS management far more demanding in multinational operations than in joint operations.

f. The MNFC provides guidance for planning and JEMSO to the MNF through the operations directorate of a joint staff's combined electronic warfare coordination cell (CEWCC). Note: NATO/multinational terminology still references the CEWCC. Therefore, the CEWCC, not joint EMS operations cell, will be used when discussing NATO/multinational operations.

*For more information on spectrum management, refer to JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations; JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.*

#### **4. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**

a. The President of the United States is the approval authority for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), which will be conducted under the lead of the chief of diplomatic mission, the President's personal representative to the HN. A NEO is conducted to relocate designated noncombatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. NEOs are principally conducted by US forces to evacuate US citizens but may be expanded to include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from other countries.

b. NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty. They may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country's government, reoriented diplomatic or military relations with the US, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster.

c. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances, there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

d. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of physical objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces operating in foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment, the security of the force, and the extraction and protection of evacuees.

e. In planning for a NEO, the chief of mission, GCC, and JFC may consider the possibility of operating with MNFs. When the NEO is to evacuate US citizens and

nationals, and designated other persons abroad, the Secretary of State may recommend to the President to approve the use of an MNF. Approval for US participation in, or use of, an MNF NEO will come only from the President. Under an emergency situation involving the safety of human life or the protection of property, offers of voluntary service from other countries may be accepted by the chief of mission prior to approval.

f. Multinational evacuations involve multiple nation diplomatic initiatives—with MNFs conducting a NEO in a supporting role. A national decision from each of the participating nations is required to conduct a NEO with an MNF. Should the national powers decide on a requirement for a multinational NEO, an initiating directive should be issued to enable detailed operational planning to commence.

*For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Specific guidance on conducting NEOs within NATO is provided in AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.*

## **5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations**

a. FHA operations, particularly in developing countries, often require the intervention and aid of various agencies, including the military, from all over the world, in a concerted and timely manner. As a result, operations involve dynamic information exchange, planning, and coordination.

*For more information, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

b. An MNCC may be established by the senior commander in support of all JTFs, as an option for multinational coordination of FHA operations. In such contingencies, the MNCC also acts as a CMOC and/or CIMIC coordination center, in addition to providing coordination of military support operations.

c. When military forces are involved in FHA operations, their assets are provided primarily to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the affected country's civil authorities and/or of the humanitarian relief community. This support may include, but is not limited to, logistics, transportation, airfield management, communications, medical support, distribution of relief commodities, and security.

d. Although it is the primary responsibility of national civilian aid agencies, governmental departments and agencies, civil facility authorities, and international agencies to conduct disaster needs assessments, they may not have the ability to do so or capability to respond fast enough depending on the complexity, size, and nature of the emergency/crisis. In such cases, along with multilateral and bilateral agreements, military forces may be requested to provide and/or assist in disaster needs assessments.

*For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance, and AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.*

## RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE IN HAITI

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, killing 85,000, injuring many more, displacing 900,000, and flattening much of the capital of Port-au-Prince, where approximately half of the population of Haiti live. The earthquake killed many civil servants and destroyed the National Palace, the Supreme Court, the Palais de Justice, the Parliament, 14 of the 16 Haitian government ministry buildings, and the emergency operations center. One report stated “At the time of the earthquake, Haiti’s government was barely functioning; it was rated as one of the most corrupt in the world... as a result, the government lacked the financial resources, management, and leadership infrastructure to respond effectively.” Shortly after the earthquake, Haitian president, Rene Preval, sent several of his ministers on motorbikes to the US embassy requesting aid. The first request was for the US to open and run the Toussaint Louverture Airport as the control tower was out of commission.

Instability in Port-au-Prince has been a long-term concern. The United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. MINUSTAH, in its French acronym, in 2004, comprised of over 8,000 soldiers and policemen to keep order in Haiti. Additionally, the earthquake destroyed the main prison, enabling the escape of more than 4,000. Doctors without Borders treated 264 people in Port-au-Prince in the five months following the earthquake for gunshot wounds and another 2,147 patients for violence-related trauma.

The response to the earthquake was the largest humanitarian response ever in Haiti. In addition to the UN, 140 countries sent personnel, including 26 countries which sent military contingents, and 17 other countries sent some military personnel as augmentees and liaison officers. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and over 2,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also sent personnel. The Haitian Minister of Tourism, the UN Principal Deputy, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, and the Deputy Head of MINUSTAH, chaired the coordination support committee which managed the overall response at the operational level. Members of the committee were UN agencies, multinational officers commanding deployed forces, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and donors (e.g., World Bank, Canadian International Development).

The US agreed to take responsibility for the ports, airports, and roads for distribution of humanitarian assistance, and the UN (supported by multinational forces and Haitian authorities) was given the responsibility for law and order. US forces and MINUSTAH jointly provided security at food distribution points.

The UN and the ICRC, as well as other NGOs, utilized the cluster coordination mechanism and organized the response in 11 thematic areas. The UN established a joint operations and tasking center at the tactical level which prioritized requests for all the military forces.

President Barack Obama designated USAID as the lead federal agency, with the Department of Defense and 10 other departments and agencies supporting it. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the supported combatant commander, established Joint Task Force (JTF)-Haiti, which dwarfed USAID. USAID sent hundreds of people, while JTF-Haiti was in charge of over 22,000 servicemen. One USAID worker asked “How do we lead with such a small agency? We are smaller than a military band.”

JTF-Haiti exchanged liaison officers with MINUSTAH and received liaison officers from Canada, France, and South Korea. The JTF commander appointed a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps to lead the JTF’s Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell, which was the focal point between US efforts and the cluster groups. The 2,000 person Canadian contingent JTF-Haiti collaborated with many other agencies, organizations, and nations. The relationship between the various militaries and the NGOs worked very well because it was based on commitment to the objectives, transparency between the participants, and open communication and coordination. USSOUTHCOM established the All Partners Access Network (APAN), an unclassified, nonmilitary computer network for use by all US Government agencies, international organizations, the UN, and NGOs. Through APAN, which JTF-Haiti treated as a core rather than adjunct tool to operationalize the “born unclassified” principle, US Government organizations posted imagery (satellite, unmanned aerial vehicles, and over 4,000 photographs from helicopter overflights) to better assist in identifying needs and also received imagery requests. Additionally, a UN civil-military coordination officer temporarily relocated to USSOUTHCOM headquarters where the higher-level military-civilian coordination was conducted. The United States Naval Ship *Comfort* allowed NGO medical staff on board and use of their facilities. The UN relied heavily on joint task force’s planning capabilities, and JTF-Haiti provided much logistic support, especially transportation, to the NGOs for distribution of supplies. With roads blocked by debris, the military transported NGOs and other military contingents and their supplies to isolated regions by aircraft and amphibious landing craft.

Various Sources

## 6. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or causing mass casualties.

b. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning includes the development of global and regional multinational campaign plans to shape the environment to prevent the US and multinational partners from being attacked or coerced with WMD. The existence of CBRN materials, significant quantities of toxic industrial material, or the presence of pandemic influenza or infectious disease and the potential for use precipitates the need to plan, prepare for, and counter their use.

c. CWMD is a continuous campaign that requires a coordinated multinational and whole-of-government effort to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-related expertise, materials, and technologies.

*See JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for CWMD planning considerations; JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, for CBRN planning considerations; and, for NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence.*

### 7. Counterdrug Operations

a. Counterdrug (CD) operations are inherently interagency and/or multinational in nature. DOD supports the USG lead agencies for both domestic and international CD operations, so military planning requires coordination and collaboration with relevant agencies and multinational partners. This helps ensure the effective integration of supporting military forces and equipment. Military planners must understand some of the agencies and multinational organizations that lead or might become involved in CD operations will have different goals, capabilities, limitations (such as policy and resource constraints), standards, and operational philosophies.

b. Coordination and collaboration can be accomplished by integrating the efforts of military, civilian agency, and multinational planners early in the planning process. Military commanders who support CD operations must ensure interagency and multinational planners clearly understand military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations and military planners understand the nature of the relationship and the types of support they can provide. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

*See JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, for more information. Also, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for interagency and multinational considerations.*

### 8. Countering Threat Networks

Countering threat networks through network engagement involves developing and partnering with friendly networks, which frequently, if not practically always, involve allied, coalition, or HN military forces. Under network engagement, the MNF would be a key element of the friendly network. The MNFC needs to understand the MNFs' role in the friendly network and how to best enable other friendly partners to reach mission objectives, as well how to leverage PN authorities and capabilities. As with friendly partners in general, individual members of the MNF may have differing authorities and

capabilities that can affect how and in what ways they can partner with friendly, engage neutral, and counter threat networks.

*For more information on network engagement and countering threat networks, refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.*

## 9. Personnel Recovery

a. Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. IAW DODD 3002.01, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*, PR is applicable to all DOD personnel, including the military, DOD civilians, and CAAF. PR may occur through three options (diplomatic, civil, or military) or through any combination of these options. In multinational operations, PR may be a secondary task during NEOs and salvage operations. In addition, planning for peacetime search and rescue (SAR) operations must be considered.

b. The MNFC must make a careful assessment of each MNF nation's PR capability, restrictions, and procedures. Normally, each nation and/or component is responsible for conducting its own PR missions. However, participants may possess a variety of PR methods ranging from civil SAR to dedicated combat SAR. Therefore, the MNFC may designate an individual or establish an organization and procedures to coordinate this mission among all participants.

c. **Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC).** The MNFC should create a PRCC to act as the MNF focal point for all personnel and equipment ready to perform PR within the AO. The actual name of the PRCC will be based on the arrangement of the participating nations and could be joint or multinational. PRCCs coordinate with all component PR activities, including coordination with the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC), if one has been established, and other component PRCCs. The MNFC should be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. Further, the PRCC should be prepared to implement a PR plan and conduct PR for assigned forces. Functions of the PRCC include:

(1) Coordinate PR operations, both within the MNF and with external organizations.

(2) Advise the MNFC or designated component commander on PR incidents and requests.

(3) Coordinate requests for augmentation to support recovery operations as required.

d. PR operations may extend across national lines of responsibility. Operational flexibility, interoperability, and multisystem redundancy are the primary factors in successful PR operations. Commanders should know the PR capabilities available to maximize unified action, achieve economy of force, and enhance SA to enable those most

capable of executing the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate.

*See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, for additional information on PR. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment.*

## CHAPTER VI OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

### 1. Assessment

a. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint/multinational force capabilities during military operations. There are a wide range of assessment tools and methods to gauge the ability of the military instrument of national power to prepare for and respond to national security challenges across the levels of warfare and in all joint/multinational functions. It involves monitoring and evaluating the current situation and progress toward mission completion. Assessments can help determine whether a particular activity contributes to progress with respect to a set of standards or desired objective or end state. Assessments also help identify the current status of dynamic systems (e.g., weather, the economy, the political and security climate) and can help anticipate the future status.

*Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, for more information on Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) assessments. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on staff estimates, integration of assessment during planning, and conducting operation assessment during execution.*

b. Theater strategic and operational-level assessments provide a methodology for JFC/MNFCs and Services to adjust planning and execution to be more effective, match the dynamic OE, and better identify their risks and opportunities. At the strategic level, the CJCS conducts deliberate and continuous assessments, such as the **Annual Joint Assessment** and the **CJCS's Readiness System**, respectively. **Operation assessment** refers specifically to the process the JFC/MNFCs and staff use during planning and execution to measure progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions or effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it. There is no uniform method by which joint/multinational forces assign management responsibilities for the assessment. Assessment is an entire staff effort, requiring expertise and inputs across the staff. Formalizing assessment roles and responsibilities in each command is essential to an effective and efficient process.

c. To the maximum extent permitted by information-sharing policy constraints, it is imperative in multinational operations that the design, effort, and product of operation assessment be shared by all contributing nations.

*Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on operation assessment (e.g., integration of assessment design during the planning effort, roles and responsibilities, tenets of an effective assessment, the assessment process, and development and use of assessment indicators). Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on combat assessment.*

### 2. Intelligence

a. In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to issue intelligence collection requirements to share intelligence with and coordinate receiving intelligence

from foreign military forces whenever possible within security guidelines. In some circumstances, the JFC will need to seek authority to go outside the usual political-military channels to provide information to NGOs. Unique intelligence policy and dissemination criteria may have to be tailored to each multinational operation.

b. A multinational intelligence center is necessary for merging and prioritizing the intelligence requirements from each participating nation and for acquiring and fusing all the nations' intelligence contributions. Likewise, the center should coordinate the intelligence collection planning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations of each nation. Designating a single director of intelligence for the multinational command may assist in resolving potential disagreements among the multinational members.

c. Every interrelated intelligence operation of the intelligence process—planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback—is substantively affected in multinational operations. In some international operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use ISAs (e.g., NATO STANAG) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation will be unique, such agreements may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. The following general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures (see Figure VI-1).

(1) **Maintain Unity of Effort.** Each nation's intelligence personnel need to view the threat from multinational, as well as national, perspectives. A threat to one element of an MNF must be considered a threat to all MNF elements.

(2) **Make Adjustments.** There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among the coalition partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence is the willingness to make the adjustments required to resolve significant differences such as:

(a) How intelligence is provided to the commander, the commander's staff, and forces.

(b) Procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.

### Multinational Intelligence Principles

- Maintain unity of effort.
- Make adjustments.
- Plan early and plan concurrently.
- Share all necessary information.
- Conduct complementary operations.

Figure VI-1. Multinational Intelligence Principles

(c) The degree of security afforded by different communications systems and procedures.

(d) Administrative requirements.

(3) **Plan Early and Plan Concurrently.** National command channels determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. NATO and the Republic of Korea, via the Combined Forces Command, have developed and exercised intelligence policies and procedures with the US that provide examples of how multinational planning can be done in advance.

(4) **Share All Necessary Information**

(a) MNF members should share all relevant and pertinent information and intelligence about the situation and threat without violating national disclosure policy (NDP). They should also write and/or classify material for release to as many of our multinational partners as possible. However, avoid sharing information about intelligence sources and methods with multinational members unless approved by the appropriate authority.

(b) FP is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence support to that mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could impact the commander's FP mission.

(c) The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) should establish procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. To the greatest extent possible, this information should be disseminated using a tear line to keep information above the tear line (compartmented data) and disseminate the intelligence below to facilitate intelligence sharing. Such considerations warrant increased emphasis for forces operating at the tactical level, where timely information is especially critical to mission success, as well as prevention of friendly fire and undesired collateral damage. When feasible, intelligence production organizations operating in a multinational environment should use the principle of "write for release" to facilitate timely dissemination of information to interagency, international, nongovernmental, or multinational partners.

(d) The joint force J-2 should obtain the necessary authorizations from the foreign disclosure officers (FDOs) and designated intelligence disclosure officials from the CCMD J-2 or FDO as soon as possible.

(5) **Conduct Complementary Operations**

(a) Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary. HN security services' capabilities, for example, may contribute significantly to FP. Regional partners will likely have unique cultural adeptness that make them more effective in disciplines, such as human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and counterintelligence, and some military partners may have more open intelligence exchanges with their respective law-enforcement counterparts. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls, especially linguist requirements, may help overcome such limitations.

(b) All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational collection management element is essential for planning and coordinating multinational collection operations.

*See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for further details.*

**d. Geospatial Intelligence Geodetic Datums.** Multinational operations require interoperable geodetic data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to work on standard vertical and horizontal datums that allow products to have common datum reference points. A multinational geodetic reference plan should be developed and used to coordinate all products for use by member forces, including access approval procedures and blending assets into a cohesive production program.

*See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, for further details.*

**e. Biometrics.** Biometrics—the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics—is an enabling technology used across multiple joint functions; applicable in movement and maneuver,

**UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
COALITION INTELLIGENCE CENTER**

**“We were established in 2001 at the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Under J-2 [intelligence directorate of a joint staff], we were established for the purpose of facilitating and sharing of intelligence. In the beginning, there was some operational tactical intelligence that we shared with our coalition members and that information was limited to just Afghanistan. But as the mission expanded into Iraq, we also had to expand our purpose of sharing and discussing information while establishing analytical teams to address specific questions from both the Coalition and the US. Our Center is the forum where most of those discussions take place.**

**The Coalition countries are all invited to have membership in the Intelligence Center. We put in perspective the nation’s involvement with operations. Not every country has an intelligence interest and not every country has an intelligence officer assigned to United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). Those that do have an intelligence officer assigned at USCENTCOM will participate with us on a daily basis. Those that do not have an intelligence officer, but do have intelligence interests, usually go through their country’s senior national representative or through the operations officer to consult with us and discuss with us issues of common interest.”**

**Colonel Evilio Otero, Jr.  
Chief, Coalition Intelligence Center  
US Central Command Coalition Village**

sustainment, and protection; and applicable to other joint functions such as crosscutting many intelligence-related mission sets and functions. MNFs are employing biometrics in operations with increasing frequency and improving results to identify known threats, disrupt adversary freedom of movement within the populace, link people to events, and verify local and third-country nationals accessing MNF bases and facilities. PN and HN laws and social sensitivities must be considered in establishment of coalition biometric objectives and standards; staff legal and religious advisement can be especially useful in this particular area.

f. **Other Considerations.** It is important to consider the ramifications of labeling information about an OA as intelligence, especially when interacting with nonmilitary organizations. Therefore, unclassified facts and/or data should be referred to as information to facilitate its dissemination among members of the MNF for the purpose of fostering mutual interests in resolving or deterring conflict or providing support.

### 3. Information Sharing

a. **NDP.** The release of classified information to multinational partners is governed by NDP. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander by the chain of command IAW National Security Decision Memorandum 119, *Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, and NDP-1, *National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*. Detailed, written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure authority where appropriate (e.g., combined/joint FP purposes). However, the senior US officer needs to become personally concerned with the issues of intelligence sharing and releasing of information early in the process and clearly state the commander's requirements. Commanders should promote information sharing and inclusion of liaison officers (LNOs) in secured systems as much as possible. Commanders should establish

*“Coalition forces continue to play a vital role in current, and likely all future operations in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The information sharing challenge is extremely complicated with multiple coalitions, international organizations, and alliances participating in different operations. Many nations participate in multiple communities. These include the 66-nation Global Counterterrorism Forces, the 51-nation Multinational Coalition Forces-Iraq, the 11-nation Combined Naval Forces Central Command, the 33-nation International Security Assistance Forces for Afghanistan, the 26-member nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the traditional 6 Gulf Cooperation Council member states and our 25 regional AOR countries. USCENTCOM needs to be able to electronically share information with these various communities of interests quickly and efficiently to successfully conduct coalition operations.”*

**Jill L. Boardman/Donald W. Shuey  
Combined Enterprise Network Theater Information System;  
Supporting Coalition Warfare World-Wide  
April 2004**

and promulgate clear NDP-compliant guidance to subordinate elements that not only permit but promote, as appropriate, flexibility to share information where and when it is needed. A commander-led culture focused toward sharing as appropriate will go a long way toward developing mutual trust and operational effectiveness.

b. The NDP is implemented within DOD by DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, and CJCSI 5221.01, *Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.

*JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, contains a detailed discussion of sanitization and foreign disclosure procedures.*

c. Military information and intelligence should be derived and crafted to maximize recipient eligibility. Such principles as accessibility, timely electronic dissemination, and scalable classification levels (e.g., tear lines) are just a few of the multiple techniques to enhance sharing. Intelligence and information should be written for release at the lowest possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination restrictions within foreign disclosure guidelines. This is important to maintain the integrity of a common holistic understanding of the OE. Other nations are also likely to have access to their own national intelligence and should be encouraged to share across MNFs.

d. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation, coupled with the potential for rapid change, requires operations security (OPSEC) be an integral part of any operation. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility that coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

*See DODD 5205.02, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program, for more information.*

e. The success of joint and multinational operations and interagency coordination hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. Information sharing, cooperation, collaboration, and coordination are enabled by an intelligence and information sharing environment that fully integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. The JFC participating in the coalition or alliance tailors the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance. A JFC participating in a coalition or alliance should tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on theater guidance and national policy as contained in NDP-1, *National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*. NDP-1 provides policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance.

f. Information sharing, including intelligence information, plays a critical role in the success of any multinational endeavor. Analysis of recent operational lessons learned emphasizes that multinational operations are much more effective, efficient, and safe when

information is shared by all the forces involved. The ability to exchange tactical information is especially critical for forces during execution. Information must flow quickly from sensors to fusion processes to analysts and decision makers and ultimately to those who execute actions. Some specific insights and recommendations from these operational lessons learned include:

(1) Develop categories/groups in which information can be released or disclosed. Release is the physical transfer to another nation. With disclosure, the owning or originating nation maintains control, but the information may be visually or orally displayed to another nation.

(2) Address information disclosure restrictions before major planning efforts and especially before execution.

(3) Identify, delegate, and announce release authority early and to all concerned.

(4) Identify and pre-stage classified documents (e.g., Adaptive Planning and Execution System plans and orders) to be made releasable and distributed to multinational partners at the right time.

**g. Communications and Processing Architectures.** Due to the perishable nature of pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is imperative that a system be devised for and by the MNF members that is capable of transmitting the most important intelligence rapidly to units. Frequently, this system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by one country's forces to ensure commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition LNOs at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant intelligence communications channels to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation's mission in time to exploit it.

(1) Several nations maintain and utilize separate classified Internet and communications systems. For US forces, the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is the primary classified architecture solely for US-specific communication and tasks not suitable for execution in a multination information-sharing environment. The same can be expected of US partners and allies utilizing their respective national classified systems for internal use.

(2) Unclassified networks are an operational imperative. In addition to classified networks, an unclassified network using the Internet (commercially encrypted if available) is a communications backbone for multinational operations. To enable timely and efficient information sharing with nonmilitary organizations, the MNF should provide these organizations with access to current information on unclassified networks. MNFs should be aware that many NGOs/international organizations are hesitant to use DOD-sponsored information exchange Websites to avoid the appearance of close association with USG entities. In such situations, MNFs should first coordinate regarding these concerns and then be prepared to "push" information to specified organizational Websites.

(3) MNF networks such as the BICES [battlefield information collection and exploitation system], if established, are able to provide responsive information sharing

between the MNFs, but care must be taken to avoid the inadvertent sharing of classified information that has not been sanitized for release to other nations. Detailed planning for information sharing should be accomplished well in advance of operations with MNFs. This may be very complicated based on the multiple classification levels allowed and by the nature of PNs involved in the operation. Some PN countries have established intelligence-sharing agreements with the US STONEGHOST network. It is an encrypted communications network designed to support collaboration and intelligence sharing between the US defense intelligence community and its Commonwealth allies during combat operations. Other MNFs have long-standing relationships with US Services and intelligence agencies, but release of US-produced intelligence is subject to review by the FDO. The United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (US BICES) and United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System Extended (US BICES-X) are capabilities that provide the US intelligence community a mechanism for sharing intelligence with PNs who have the appropriate agreements with the US. By mutual agreement, US BICES also allows nations to use the system for bilateral or multilateral intelligence sharing by implementing additional security measures. US BICES-X services in support of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) are known as the Asia-Pacific Intelligence Information Network. Within United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM's) area of responsibility, the system is referred to as the USCENTCOM Partner Network. US BICES-X is implemented with PNs or a grouping of nations in alignment with CCMD requirements and the appropriate policy, security, and technical agreements with the PN(s). The use of cross-network information security solutions should be used whenever possible to avoid the inadvertent sharing of information with networks external to those accessible by the collective membership of a specific MNF. Often, LNOs can bridge the culture gap between what multinational commanders/staffs say and what they mean.

(4) The MNF networks will provide responsive information sharing between the MNF at both the unclassified level and the classified level. Mission partner information sharing provides an operational framework for planning, preparation, and execution of operations with mission partners supported by effective information sharing and data exchange. The mission partner information sharing framework integrates varied partner doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities and policy approaches to enable mission partners to rapidly establish an information sharing and data exchange network at an agreed security classification level and in a common language.

*For more information on mission partner information sharing, see DODI 8110.01, Mission Partner Environment (MPE) Information Sharing Capability Implementation for the DOD.*

**h. Coordination.** Within alliances, it is common for intelligence procedures, practices, and standardized agreements to be established and tested prior to actual use. Coalitions, however, are frequently created and disbanded relatively quickly. Coalition participants typically compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination between national leadership and prospective forces. As mentioned above, coordinating the elements of communications architectures is essential. Additional areas requiring extensive coordination include the friendly use of the EMS, use of space and/or space

assets, geographical location of intelligence collection assets, and targets of intelligence collection. Intelligence processing centers should be multinational in character, serving the MNFC but also recognizing intelligence that has value in support of national missions. However, establishment of these multinational processing centers, particularly in the case of ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal involvement and support from the MNFC and the corresponding nation to make this a functioning reality. The MNFC priority intelligence requirements should serve as the milestones to fully focus the intelligence effort. The answers can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.

i. Additional national and DOD-level references on information sharing useful to enhancing the information environment in support of joint and/or multinational operations include the *National Strategy for Information Sharing*, *United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy*, *DOD Information Sharing Strategy*, and *DOD Information Sharing Implementation Plan*. Additionally, the Defense Information Systems Agency has a Multinational Information Sharing Program Office with a mission to manage current multinational information sharing efforts, provide the standard multinational information sharing services and applications for future DOD information networks, and facilitate information sharing among DOD components and eligible foreign nations in support of planning and execution of military operations.

#### **4. Communications**

a. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planning considerations include frequency management; equipment compatibility; procedural compatibility; cryptographic and information security; identification, friend or foe; and data-link protocols. MNFCs should anticipate that some forces from MNF will have direct and near-immediate communications capability from the OA to their respective national leadership. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration, as leaders external to the OA may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. When exchanging equipment, special consideration must be paid to the release of communications security (COMSEC) devices, as well as the level and nature of classified information (material) released to individual countries per NDP and any applicable exceptions. The ability of the MNF to exchange information at all levels (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical) should be a consideration during planning and throughout execution. As difficult as communications are among all partners in the force during the operation, the problem is compounded when communications are degraded or denied and limited compatible resources are stretched even further.

b. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the MNF. It is critical that operations and communications planners begin the coordination process early to ensure both US and MNF communication requirements are identified and sourced prior to operations. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically capable participant. Effective communications support enables control over diverse, widely dispersed air, maritime, land, and space elements. Access to both military and commercial satellites should be an early planning

requirement to support widely dispersed elements. The MNFC should address the need for integrated communications among all participating forces early in the planning phase of the operation. MNF planning and technical communications systems control centers should be established as soon as possible to coordinate all communications.

*For more information regarding frequency management, refer to JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.*

c. In all multinational operations, a broadband, unclassified network will be a critical requirement for multinational coordination within the MNF OA. The international humanitarian community and affected nations' governments and militaries will normally use unclassified, commercially encrypted networks (such as the All Partners Access Network [APAN]) as their primary collaboration and coordination tool. US forces should be able to integrate with MNFs to support collaboration needed to conduct multinational operations. US forces should expect to use SIPRNET solely for US-specific communication and tasks not suitable for execution in a multinational information-sharing environment. US forces in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility should expect to use SIPRNET Release to United States of America, Five Eyes (or REL TO USA, FVEY) when execution involves the Five Eyes nations. Satellite access to broadband Internet capability should be planned as an operational necessity, if not currently available within the MNF OA.

d. LNO teams should be sent to other MNF HQ to facilitate integration of operations. These LNO teams should deploy with sufficient communications equipment to conduct operations with their respective HQ. Consideration should also be given to possible degradation of communications due to the extended distances over which the MNF may operate and the impact of enemy exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Urban operations present other difficulties due to interference from physical structures or frequency overlaps. Planning for communications support also includes provisions that enable execution of required communications under adverse conditions. Additionally, US law requires prior international and implementing agreements defining quid pro quo payments for allied use of the Defense Information Systems Network and military satellite communications assets.

e. Secure C2 systems are vital to the execution of MNF operations to avoid conflict and increase mutual understanding. The objective of secure C2 interoperability within an MNF is to develop greater cooperation through improved technical capability, system interdependence, and SA in the OA.

f. **Communications Security Release to Foreign Nations Policy.** Disclosing, releasing, and transferring products or associated COMSEC information to foreign governments is governed by DODI 8523.01, *Communications Security (COMSEC)*. Detailed guidance outlining criteria for release of information security products, services, and information to foreign governments is provided in CJCSI 6510.06, *Communication Security Releases to Foreign Nations*.

g. Under CJCSI 6510.06, *Communication Security Releases to Foreign Nations*, the CJCS validates CCMD interoperability requirements to release COMSEC products or associated COMSEC information to any foreign government. These secure C2 interoperability requirements originate from the theater Service components.

h. Release of COMSEC to foreign governments is permitted when there is a validated interoperability requirement. Specifically, the GCC and the MNFC should have or develop agreements on cryptographic, communications, and/or automated data processing security issues among all multinational components and understand where capability gaps exist, along with the implication of those gaps.

## 5. Joint Fires

a. Integrating and synchronizing planning, execution, and assessment is pivotal to the success of effective joint fires. Understanding the objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all joint, interagency, and multinational partners in the OE may enable the means to accomplish tasks and create effects.

b. Effective fire support coordination in multinational operations may require additional efforts due to differing national priorities and the risk of friendly fire, civilian casualties, and collateral damage. To maximize the fires of the MNF and to minimize the possibility of friendly fire, the MNFC should ensure fire support coordination throughout the MNF is developed. These special arrangements may include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. Standard operating procedures should be established for fire support to synchronize forces and optimize mission partner capabilities.

*See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for more details. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.*

## 6. Host-Nation Support

a. **HNS will often be critical to the success of a multinational operation.** In general, centralized coordination of HNS planning and execution will help ensure HNS resources are allocated most effectively to support the MNF's priorities. The more limited HNS resources are in the OA, the greater the requirement for centralized management.

b. NATO doctrine recognizes the importance of centralized HNS coordination and gives NATO commanders the authority to:

- (1) Prioritize HNS requirements.
- (2) Negotiate HNS agreements, on behalf of nations, with an HN.
- (3) Coordinate HNS allocation with troop contributing nations and an HN.

c. In US-led multinational operations, nations typically negotiate their own HNS agreements. Nevertheless, participating nations should coordinate their HNS arrangements

with the MNFC, who in turn should coordinate HNS allocation with the HN. The MNFC should involve participating nations in the negotiation of either commonly worded separate bilateral agreements for target audiences or a single agreement applicable to the entire MNTF.

**d. Host-Nation Support Coordination Cell (HNSCC).** To assist the MNFC in HNS coordination activities, an HNSCC may be established. One of the most important functions of the HNSCC is to assist the MNFC and legal counsel in developing technical arrangements (TAs) that involve sustainment matters such as infrastructure, financial management, purchasing and OCS, engineering, environment, hazardous material storage, landing and port fees, medical operations and support, border customs, tariffs, and real estate.

(1) **Staffing.** The HNSCC should be staffed with specialists familiar with developing and executing HNS agreements. In addition, consideration should be given to including representatives of the HN within the HNSCC to:

(a) Facilitate coordination and identification of resources for potential use by the MNTF.

(b) Provide interpretation and translation services to the HNSCC staff.

(2) **Information Requirements.** To effectively plan and coordinate HNS allocation, the HNSCC needs up-to-date information on HNS logistic capabilities and ongoing HNS allocation to MNTF contingents throughout the operation. To ensure it receives such information, the HNSCC must maintain close contact with the HN and with MNTF contingents.

(3) **Coordinating Activities.** In conducting its operations, the HNSCC coordinates closely with appropriate CMOC organizations, the MJLC (if established), and the HN's representatives.

e. HNS is generally furnished IAW an agreement negotiated prior to the start of an operation. HNS agreements are commonly established through diplomatic channels in bilateral and multilateral agreements with the HN. These are normally umbrella-type agreements that are augmented to support contingencies by TAs detailing the specific support to be provided and the type/amount of reimbursement.

f. During crises, it may be necessary for the GCC to request authority to negotiate bilateral HNS agreements for the purpose of providing logistic assistance to other nations. Such negotiations are conducted in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and DOS and in compliance with applicable US law and policy. Alternatively, the MNFC may be authorized to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of force contributing nations, with their prior concurrence. This approach, which NATO doctrine endorses, simplifies and streamlines the process and reduces the amount of time required to put such agreements into place.

g. **Available HNS Infrastructure.** Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN is critical to understanding force sustainability. MNTF logistic planners should evaluate

what facilities and services (such as government, law enforcement, sanitation, power, fuel, and medical support) exist as viable support for local consumption and support of coalition forces.

(1) First, assess the ability of the HN to receive MNTF personnel and equipment (e.g., ports and airfields).

(2) Second, determine the HN's transportation capabilities and systems to move forces once they arrive in theater.

(3) Third, evaluate availability of HN logistic support capabilities.

(4) The impact of obtaining HNS on the HN's national economy must also be considered, along with possible environmental impacts upon HNs. These must be recognized and addressed during the planning process.

(5) In addition, specific TAs in many areas (e.g., environmental cleanup, levying of customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and/or waste storage, transit, and disposal) may need to be developed to augment SOFAs that may have been concluded with HNs.

*For more information on NATO HNS procedures, see AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures.*

## **7. Civil Affairs Operations**

CA provide the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the OE. The commander uses CA core competencies to analyze, evaluate, and influence the local populace. As part of the commander's CMO, CA conduct civil affairs operations (CAO) that are nested within the overall mission and intent. CAO contribute significantly to ensuring the legitimacy and credibility of the mission. The key to understanding the roles of CAO and CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organization in the OE to create a desired effect and achieve the overall objectives. CA units can provide support to non-US units in multinational operations. Planners coordinating CA support must realize the majority of US CA units are in the Reserve Component and consider the mobilization timelines and requirements to access these forces to support multinational operations.

a. Incorporating liaison and coordination procedures into CCPs, CONPLANs, and OPLANs (especially in a CMO annex) will facilitate proper education, training, and exercising between military and civilian personnel and assist the commander in transitioning responsibility, when directed, to the appropriate organizations upon mission completion. One method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for CMO is to establish a CMOC. The CMOC serves as the primary coordination interface for US forces, humanitarian organizations, international organizations, NGOs, MNFs, and other USG departments or agencies. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO and CAO. The CMOC serves as one of the primary coordination interfaces for US forces with IPI and mission partners. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the

mission and augmented by assets (e.g., engineer, medical, transportation) available to the supported commander and mission partners. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CAO and in support of the commander's CMO plan to manage civil information, analyze civil considerations, and develop civil inputs to the common operational picture. This occurs from tactical levels to strategic levels within a given OA, depending on the level of the CMOC. With the exception of the 95th CA Brigade Headquarters and its subordinate battalion headquarters, Army CA units are still organized to provide the supported commander the manpower and equipment to form the nucleus of the CMOC. The CMOC function requires over-the-horizon and nontraditional communications capabilities to most effectively conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination, integrate nonmilitary stakeholders to synchronize operations, and coordinate plans and operations with the civil component of the OE.

b. CIMIC doctrine involves aspects of both CMO and interorganizational cooperation as described in joint doctrine. Additionally, CIMIC teams are comprised of a mixture of military and civilian members, much like a provincial reconstruction team.

*See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, for additional information.*

### **8. Health Services**

The medical assets committed supporting multinational operations consist of health service support and FHP capabilities that span the OE from point of injury/illness to the appropriate role of care. It also includes health services with HN civil and military authorities in support of stability activities and building partner capacity, to reestablish or strengthen the HN infrastructure and governmental legitimacy. Components within these capabilities are essential in the execution of multinational operations.

*See JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for further details.*

### **9. Personnel Support**

Military operations include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and other actions that involve managing complex crises and contingency operations. To accomplish these missions, the Services must be prepared to operate in a multinational environment. Personnel support for multinational operations remains a national responsibility; however, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs operating as part of an MNF should establish a SOFA, memorandum of agreement (MOA), and/or MOU regarding personnel support between members of any alliance and/or coalition prior to the onset of operations that clearly define JFC command authority over MNF personnel, command relationships, and reporting channels.

*For additional guidance on personnel support to joint operations, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.*

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) concept allows NATO members to operate independently in the field while pursuing the common goals of investing in reconstruction of the most critical areas of education, health, agriculture, small infrastructure, security, and governance, while limiting or eliminating duplication of effort and increasing cooperation between organizations. During a 12-month period:**

**In the town of Ala Chapan outside Mazar-e Sharif, German International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) CIMIC members working with the German charity organization “German Forces helping children of the developing world” completed construction and opened a high school capable of serving 1,600 Afghan students.**

**In Logar Province, the Czech provincial reconstruction team (PRT) continued to assist Afghan National Security Forces by training members of the Afghan National Police in basic policing skills and knowledge.**

**At Shamail Daria village, Spanish ISAF doctors held a medical clinic arranged by the Spanish CIMIC unit in a building constructed by the Spanish Cooperation for Development Agency.**

**Greek authorities provided significant funding for the Hungarian PRT implementing CIMIC civilian development projects in Afghanistan’s Baghlan Province aimed at training, education, and health with specific focus on improving the situation of Afghan women and creating job opportunities.**

**Various Sources**

## **10. Public Affairs**

a. US public affairs (PA) planners should work closely with operational planners from other countries to ensure appropriate levels of synchronization and consideration of each nation’s the objectives.

b. Commanders at all levels should proactively plan to both anticipate, and to the maximum extent possible given OPSEC constraints, support media coverage for multinational operations. Such support will typically be IAW the PA guidance established in the OPLAN and potentially amended by DOD and CCMD direction based on emergent conditions, as well as consideration of multinational sensitivities. Accurate media coverage of US operations is generally a key component of the commander’s overall plan to influence the behavior of relevant actors to achieve operational objectives and is a DOD obligation under the DOD’s principles of information. PA advises the MNFC on the implications of command decisions, actions, and operations on stakeholder and key public perceptions.

(1) The speed and methods with which individuals and organizations can collect and broadly disseminate information means that information about multinational activities and/or operations quickly reach a global audience, creating an often difficult-to-counter first impression about those activities/operations. Internet sites, social media and networks, text messages, and cellular/satellite telephones are some of the means through which threat targets and relevant actors can communicate with audiences globally in the information environment, creating effects in the overall operational and security environments. This instantaneous transmission of unfiltered, often incomplete, inaccurate, or intentionally biased information makes the protection and leveraging of information a key consideration in all operational planning, particularly with respect to PA operation.

(2) PA plans should leverage all aspects of public communication to achieve MNF operational objectives. IAW the DOD principles of information, these plans should provide for maximum disclosure of information, with minimum delay, consistent with OPSEC and help ensure an atmosphere of trust between the MNF and legitimate reporters that encourages accurate coverage of operations. Additionally, PA should have a basic understanding of several specific subjects, such as weapons and capabilities that can create nonlethal effects and CBRN effects, to answer questions appropriately and minimize reactions.

(3) In most multinational operations, one or more centers will be established to support the media. Although the title may vary by operation depending on the command structure, these centers are established to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during operations.

(4) Responsibilities for establishing media ground rules and credentialing media are developed and implemented through appropriate multinational command and staff channels. Media outlets owned entirely or in part by governments or citizens of rival states might not receive the same considerations as those working for outlets owned by governments or citizens of friendly nations. Additionally, noncredentialed journalists may not be given the same access to a combat zone as those who have credentials. They should be encouraged to register at the appropriate information center.

(5) Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists and providing them with information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the OA. Additionally, media must be credentialed to ensure they have official status under the Geneva Conventions in the event of capture. Others covering military operations without such credentials should be encouraged to register at the appropriate facility.

*For US-specific doctrine, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional details. For NATO-specific doctrine, see NATO Military Public Affairs Policy, available at [www.nato.int/ims/docu/mil-pol-pub-affairs-en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mil-pol-pub-affairs-en.pdf).*

### **11. Multinational Logistics**

a. The effective use of military logistics capabilities in conflict, post-conflict, or humanitarian crisis situations demands cooperation and collaboration with international

*“Fewer than 30 reporters accompanied the entire invasion force to Normandy, France, on 6 June 1944. In contrast, more than 500 journalists appeared within hours to cover combat operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. At the beginning of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, more than 1,600 news media and support personnel were present, and some 1,500 reported on hurricane relief operations in Florida in 1992. Reporters provided live television and radio coverage of the night amphibious landing that marked the beginning of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992 and the end of the United Nations operation during Operation UNITED SHIELD in 1995. More than 1,700 media representatives covered the initial phases of peacekeeping operations in the American sector of Bosnia in 1996.”*

**Major Barry Venable, US Army, *Military Review*, January-February 2002**

organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. As such, military commanders and their logisticians tasked to support these complex support activities should consider the impact of these additional agencies during their mission planning and while in the theater of operations fulfilling their missions.

b. Successful multinational logistic operations are governed by several unique principles. First, multinational logistic operations are a collective responsibility of participating nations and the MNFC, although nations are inherently responsible for supporting their forces. Nations are highly reluctant to give MNFCs complete authority for logistics. Nevertheless, a second principle is that MNFCs should be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to ensure the force is supported in the most efficient and effective manner. Third, cooperation and coordination are necessary among participating nations and forces, which should make use of multinational logistic support arrangements to reduce the logistic footprint in the OA. Finally, synergy results from the use of multinational integrated logistic support; to ensure this, the MNFC must have visibility of the logistic activity during the operation.

c. Multinational operations have diplomatic and political factors. Generally, nations are reluctant to commit forces early. In some MNFs, formal advance planning is considered too sensitive for sharing. Thus, US logistics planners must work closely with PNs to the extent possible in coordinating plans to support national decisions. Obtaining early knowledge of the organic logistics support capabilities of forces provided by participating nations and identifying the means to support their needs will be critical to effectively supporting the total force. When the US is the LN, logistics planning must consider unique logistic requirements of military forces from other nations. Some nations may require the US to provide some logistics support to permit their forces to operate in an expeditionary manner.

d. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations.

(1) OCS can be a significant force multiplier, but it is only one of numerous sources of support to the joint force. The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs should

judiciously consider the proper mix of different sources of support to include organic US military support and nonorganic support sources, to include multinational military support, HNS, and contracted support. Each of these sources of support has advantages and disadvantages that should be carefully weighed by the JFC and subordinate Service component commanders in order to determine the most appropriate source of support.

(2) The JFC and the US military lead contracting activity must be cognizant of challenges and potential pitfalls on planning and executing OCS actions in a multinational environment. Every effort must be made to arrange common contracting support, or at a minimum, to share vendor information. Planning for and executing common contracted support in an MNF is complicated by the lack of a commonly accepted contracting policy and procedures. In any case, US military planners need to advocate for some sort of contract support deconfliction, such as through a coordination mechanism similar to the joint contract support board in major multinational operations where appropriate. Commanders should consider establishing a requirement review board process to review, approve, and prioritize major common contracted services.

### **e. Planning Considerations**

(1) For any successful operation, it is necessary to understand the essential concepts of military logistics. The following outlines the critical needs for close CIMIC, and identifies the areas of potential logistical support, which could be provided by the military logistics systems across the competition continuum. Some of the major friction points are identified, as well as those areas that require improvement and/or areas for further development to achieve a greater degree of national and multinational logistics support.

(2) It is essential that the major contributing agencies, both military and civilian, work together to create standing logistical policies and an agreed upon/shared logistical doctrine that will allow for the development and continued enhancement of their communications and collaborative partnership networks as an ongoing, day-to-day business practice. These pre-existing logistical agreements and relationships are imperative in order to have well-established LOCs and known procedural practices, based upon a common collaborative doctrine, which brings their agencies and respective resources and procedures together to meet the challenges, well in advance of a particular crisis or mission.

(3) Though MNL capabilities can and will vary in scope and magnitude from nation to nation, the fundamental provision of logistical support will, in general, be composed of the provision of the following logistics functions that can be deployed/utilized on both a national or international basis in varying degrees of magnitude:

- (a) Inland surface, sea, air, and pipeline transportation networks and assets.
- (b) Supply, distribution and storage facilities, and services.
- (c) Life support services (food, water, and shelter).

- (d) Engineering assets and services.
- (e) Communications assets and services.
- (f) Medical assets and services.
- (g) Vehicle and aircraft maintenance.
- (h) Management of OCS.

(4) Information exchange, not only between multinational military forces but also with civilian counterparts, remains a significant impediment to overcome in conducting interagency and MNL support missions.

(5) Some of the fundamental and key principles which need to be considered in the planning and implementation of military logistics support are as follows:

(a) Noncombat-related/crisis resolution/FHA operations or missions will likely be civilian-led with logistics support from the military (most likely transportation assets initially) in high demand.

(b) There will be a requirement for early and high-level involvement by the national and multinational civilian and military logistics organizations involved in the mission.

(c) The required collaborative logistical process, which should be established and institutionalized in advance of any mission, should include an active dialogue and information sharing with national and international organizations and with NGOs.

(d) HN logistical needs, capabilities, and concerns should be considered and reflected in the planning and dialogue along with the use of HN power and related infrastructure.

(e) The security and protection of logistics forces to provide assured sustainment.

(6) Establishing an NSE

(a) An NSE provides logistic support to MNFs, as well as to national forces. NSEs are located geographically to best support the force and sited to take advantage of air, rail, and/or sea LOCs. In cases where the MJLC (or equivalent) has real estate management responsibility, nations desiring to locate NSEs in the MNFC's OA must coordinate with both the MJLC and the HN for final site approval. This is critical in those areas with limited air and seaports of debarkation in which several nations may be competing for limited available space or facilities. NSEs from several nations may be collocated to achieve economies and efficiencies. Some nations may find it especially advantageous to form a combined NSE.

(b) NSEs are national activities that remain under control of national authorities—not the MNFC. US NSEs will normally be under direct command of their respective Service component commander. In exceptional cases, the US NSE may be a logistically focused JTF under OPCON to the senior JTF commander. Both scenarios are consistent with the practice of most nations participating in a multinational operation to designate a national commander in-theater to which the NSE normally reports. In such cases, the national commander retains national control over all national units and other elements not transferred under OPCON or TACON of the MNFC.

(c) Regardless of the national command relationship that may exist, US NSEs are expected to coordinate and cooperate fully with the appropriate MNF logistic C2 organization and with the HN. It is incumbent upon the NSEs to provide liaison personnel to logistic organizations, such as the MJLC, LN, role specialist nation (RSN), multinational integrated logistic unit, joint logistics support group, or third-party logistic support services, in order to establish and maintain the appropriate relationships.

f. The joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) is a multitiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively structured through an assortment of collaborative agreements, contracts, policy, legislation, or treaties utilized to provide the best possible support to the JFC or other supported organization. The JLEnt may also include multinational partners and international organizations. Participants operate across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and many are affiliated with either supported or supporting commands and operate under a variety of command relationships. The JLEnt is interconnected among global logistics providers, supporting and supported organizations and units, and other entities. Knowing the roles, responsibilities, relationships, and authorities of JLEnt partners is essential to planning, executing, controlling, and assessing logistics operations. JLEnt partners must collaborate to ensure the coordinated employment and sharing of capabilities and resources. Global logistics providers manage end-to-end processes that provide capabilities to the supported CCDR to fulfill requirements.

*Additional guidance on the JLEnt can be found in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.*

*Additional guidance on multinational logistics can be found in Appendix D, “Multinational Logistics;” Appendix E, “Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Logistics;” JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; JP 4-09, Distribution Operations; and JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. For specific NATO doctrine, see AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, and other AJP’s in the 4 series. For a detailed discussion on JLEnt visibility, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.*

## 12. Meteorology and Oceanography

The ability of commanders to anticipate and exploit meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) effects on multinational and adversary military capabilities in the OE is a cornerstone of successful multinational operations. It is essential to address differences in language, techniques, and data formats of multinational partners as soon as possible to achieve interoperability and best use of METOC capabilities for the MNF. The MNFC should designate a lead multinational METOC officer to coordinate all METOC activities

and interoperability issues in the theater. The lead METOC officer must also ensure the integration of accurate, timely, and relevant predictive assessments of METOC effects throughout planning and execution. This enables MNFC's situational understanding, risk management, and decision making to achieve a decisive advantage over the adversary. Knowledge of the comparative differences between predictive METOC effects on multinational and adversary capabilities enables MNFCs to achieve information superiority, exploit favorable METOC windows of opportunity more rapidly than the adversary, and employ capabilities that enhance probability of mission success.

*See JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, for additional details.*

### **13. Environmental**

a. Environmental considerations should be integrated in multinational operations. To the extent practicable and consistent with mission accomplishment, commanders should take environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and conclusion of a multinational operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may be different from the normal practices of the member nations and obtain agreement from participating nations. Besides agreeing on common objectives for the operation, the MNF's national component commanders should reach some understanding on environmental protection measures during the operation, with particular emphasis at points of transition. Failure to accomplish this may result in misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a failure to develop and implement a successful environmental annex and plan for the operation. Additionally, the failure to consider environmental impacts on the HN could result in an erosion of acceptance for the MNF within the HN.

b. Environmental considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (1) Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery.
- (2) Cleanup of contingency locations and other occupied areas to an appropriate level.
- (3) Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the OA.
- (4) Environmental safety and health.
- (5) Hazardous material management.
- (6) Hazardous waste disposal.
- (7) Medical and infectious waste management and disposal.
- (8) Natural and cultural resource protection.
- (9) Noise abatement, including noise from aircraft operations.

(10) Pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide management to control non-point pollution.

(11) Resource and energy conservation through pollution prevention practices.

(12) Solid waste management and disposal.

(13) Oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls.

(14) Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations.

*For a further discussion of environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, and AJP-3.12, Allied Doctrine for Engineer Support to Joint Operations.*

## 14. Transitions

Transitions are critical to multinational operations. In general, transition could be the transition from one type of operation to another, the transition between the various phases of an operation, the transition of a specific function or service from one organization to another (i.e., logistics), or the transition of authority for the effort from one organization to another (i.e., JTF to MNF or MNF to international organization/HN).

### a. Transitioning to Multinational Operations

#### (1) Transitioning from a US Joint Operation to a Multinational Operation.

The US may find it necessary to initiate military action before an international consensus develops (such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). Following the development of international support, a multinational operation, conducted by an alliance or a coalition, possibly under UN or NATO management, may be authorized.

#### (2) Transitioning from a UN Operation to a Multinational Operation.

In transitioning from a UN operation to another multinational operation, as in the transition from the United Nations protection force (UNPROFOR) to NATO's Implementation Force in Bosnia, the UN may remain the lead agency for humanitarian assistance within the OA. In this case, the MNFC should be prepared to consider requests for assistance from international organizations and NGOs in accomplishing their humanitarian mission. A UN representative HQ organization should remain in the area and serve as the coordinating point of contact for possible assistance requests.

(a) The incoming MNFC should use the intratheater UN infrastructure and organizations to facilitate early development and establishment of the new MNF.

(b) Essential to the successful transition is the development of a cooperative environment between the UN and the new MNF. If a UN force or HQ is withdrawing from the OA, the new MNF should negotiate the transfer of materiel and infrastructure/facilities with the UN commander as appropriate. This procedure would apply in reverse should a UN force relieve another MNF. In addition, agreements between the UN and the MNF are

necessary to coordinate the shared use of specified resources. Claims relating to incidents occurring prior to the MNF assuming command of operations are the responsibility of the UN.

(c) To effect a smooth transition, working groups should be established at the appropriate levels to coordinate administrative, financial, and logistic matters.

(d) A critical component of the transition is the reorganization, certification, and reflagging of possible UN units, including logistic forces, to the MNFC.

(e) In the past, the US, as a member of an alliance or coalition, has been called upon to plan for extracting UN peacekeeping forces from threatening situations, as was the case with UNPROFOR in the Balkans. In this kind of operation, normal logistic support for threatened UN forces would likely be disrupted and the US might be required to support UN contingents during extraction operations.

#### **b. Transition Between Phases**

(1) A phase can be characterized by the focus that is placed on it. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the operation. Each phase should have a set of starting conditions (that define the start of the phase) and ending conditions (that define the end of the phase). The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase.

(2) Working within the phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the multinational operation and be determined by the MNFC. During planning, the MNFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases are planned to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The MNFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions. A multinational operation may be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the OA has widely varying conditions. For instance, the commander may transition to the stabilize phase in some areas while remaining in the dominate phase in those areas where the enemy has not yet capitulated. Occasionally, operations may revert to a previous phase in an area where a resurgent or new enemy re-engages friendly forces.

(3) Transitions between phases are to be distinct shifts in focus by the MNF, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives is achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the MNF and is, therefore, usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander's objectives, desired effects, measures of effectiveness, priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or factors in the OA. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat

operations in the dominate phase to a preponderance of stability activities in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the MNF begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government and deters adversaries from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community take steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This challenge demands an agile shift in MNF skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, mental outlooks, and interorganizational coordination, with a wider range of interagency and multinational partners and other participants to provide the capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

*For more information on phasing alternatives and details on individual phases, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*


### **c. Transition of Multinational Logistics**

(1) Since the US may have an extensive logistic structure already in place in the OA, it may be asked to assume the lead role in the MNL organization—at least for a transition period. The senior US logistic commander may be designated as the senior logistics commander for the MNF and be given specified authorities and responsibilities by the MNFC. Additionally, US contracts and HNS agreements may become the vehicles for multinational agreements. The US may also be asked to assume LN and RSN roles. LN and RSN roles may require the use of a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, construction capabilities contract program contractors, Naval Facilities Engineering Command contingency construction, and service contracts for supporting the MNF. These assets are generally used for the creation and support of contingency bases. Therefore, it is important to consider the plan, design, establishment, operation, management, and transition or closing of contingency bases early in MNF planning.

(2) The extent to which the US accepts logistic responsibilities for the MNF is decided by SecDef. However, two conditions are critical for a smooth transition to multinational support: the US should have the proper legal arrangements (e.g., ACSAs) in place to provide logistic support to members of the deploying MNF; PNs should be prepared to reimburse the US for logistic services rendered, unless other arrangements have been made.

(3) GCCs are better positioned to support PNs in their own areas of responsibility and have habitual relationships with those nations that enhance interoperability.

**d. Transition of Authority.** Military operations may include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the HN as its capacity increases (see Figure VI-2). Each transition involves inherent risk. The risk is amplified when multiple transitions must be managed simultaneously or when the force must quickly conduct a series of transitions. Planning anticipates these transitions, and careful preparation and diligent execution ensure they occur without incident. Transitions are identified as decisive points on lines of effort; they typically mark a significant shift in effort and signify the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of the HN. Because of these risks and complexities, lower-priority development projects may not be resourced.



**Figure VI-2. Notional Transitions of Authority**


For more information on transitions of authority, see JP 3-07, Stability.

## 15. Multinational Communications Integration

a. Multinational communications integration (MCI) is the MNFs' coordination and employment of actions, images, and words to support the achievement of participating nations' overall strategic objectives and attaining the end state. The commander of the MNF receives multinational communication strategy guidance for MCI and integrates this guidance into all plans, operations, and actions of the MNF.

(1) MCI consists of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power in an MNF at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. MCI focuses on creating, strengthening, or preserving conditions favorable to accomplish the MNF's mission. In an MNF, the key is coordinated communication integration among participating nations.

(2) The MCI should integrate all information activities into planning activities relevant to the mission, addressing both current and future operations (see Figure VI-3).



**Figure VI-3. Multinational Communication Integration**

This plan should minimize adverse effects on multinational operations from inaccurate media reporting/analysis, violations of OPSEC, adversary propaganda, and promulgation of disinformation and misinformation. Well-planned information activities support is important in every phase of operations.

b. The MNFs' predominant military activities that support MCI are IO, PA, and defense support to public diplomacy. All multinational operations (executed or not executed) should be viewed through the MCI perspectives and framework to facilitate support of strategic objectives and end state. Communication planning and synchronization guidance should be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in OPLANs, and coordinated and synchronized with USG departments and agencies and multinational partners.

c. In addition to addressing MCI with partners during the mission analysis, careful and thorough planning and coordination with multinational partners is critical to ensure the messages are consistent and account for regional, cultural, and language interpretations and perceptions. However, it is also important to recognize that interagency and multinational partners may have their own goals and objectives, not all of which will be revealed to the MNF, which may result in considerable challenges to the MCI effort.

*Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-13, Information Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Planning; and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for more information on strategic guidance; commander's communication synchronization; and the informational instrument of national power, IO, and PA.*

d. The nature of each nation's decision to participate in a multinational operation will influence what they communicate to their population about their involvement. The communication activities of each nation in the operation will reach audiences in the other countries and serve to either support or undermine the objectives of the MNF and those of the individual participating nations.

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## APPENDIX A PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS CHECKLIST

Multinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. The checklist below provides an MNFC with a planning tool for multinational operations directed through either an integrated or LN scenario. Operations conducted in a parallel command relationship will normally follow national planning guidance and doctrine. **Where possible, this checklist will attempt to highlight only those items unique to multinational operations.**

*Detailed planning checklists for JTF directorates can be found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. Most material contained in those checklists is applicable to MNTF directorates as well.*

### Strategic-Level Considerations

- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the political-military estimate been completed and coordinated with PNs?  
Have the PNs reached agreement on the appropriate response?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have strategic assessments been shared within the constraints of national and organizational information sharing regulations?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the LN, in coordination with other PNs, developed the strategic military guidance for the operation? Does this strategic guidance contain:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ A clear description of objectives?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ A broad outline of any military activity envisioned?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ The desired end state?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Key planning assumptions?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Constraints or restraints on military operations and actions?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a mission analysis been accomplished?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has the commander's mission statement been provided?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has an analysis of the situation, opposition forces, friendly forces, and restrictions been conducted?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have courses of action (COAs) been developed?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has a preferred COA been selected?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has the commander's intent been developed/provided?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Have ROE been agreed upon by military commanders and national policy makers?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a CONOPS been developed and approved by the national and interagency partners?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a confirmation of capabilities and/or forces to be contributed been obtained from our national and interagency partners, to include government capabilities/forces and likely international organization, NGO, and/or private sector contributors?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has an OPLAN been developed based on the approved CONOPS/campaign plan?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have annexes to OPLANs/CONPLANs/CCPs been developed to effectively support multinational and/or interagency coordination and operations?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the OPLAN been approved by national and interagency partners?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the operational-level commander been appointed?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has communication synchronization guidance been included in the OPLAN?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the appropriate coordination been conducted with the DOS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, their associated local humanitarian reconstruction and stabilization teams, US Agency for International Development, and/or the US embassy country team(s) in the specific OA?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has CCSWG, PA, and information guidance been included in every phase of the OPLAN?

### **Operational-Level Considerations**

- \_\_\_\_\_ Have command relationships been established between the MNFC and national forces?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has an MNTF HQ been established?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have critical billet requirements been identified?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a theater foreign disclosure authority been identified? Has a policy and a plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information been promulgated?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training levels, and language? Have historical national sensitivities been considered?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Are there sufficient linguists available for both planning and execution?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications, logistic, and office support capabilities in place?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a more horizontal organization?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have 24-hour command centers been established if required?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have C2 arrangements been made to include appropriate international organization and NGO officials in coordinating functions?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been provided appropriate liaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary), operators, and maintainers to enable interaction with the commander and other multinational members?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication among same nation staff members?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the strategic and military end states been identified? Are the conditions tangible in military terms? Are they contained in the mission statement?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the end state and termination criteria been articulated as part of the commander's vision for subordinates?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ What is the termination criteria?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ What constitutes mission success?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a mission analysis been conducted?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has planning guidance been developed and issued?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Does it contain the commander's intent?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Are the ROE established? Do they require adjustment?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have COAs been developed?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has a preferred COA been selected?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has the commander's intent been provided/developed?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) been developed in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System and requirements validated by the appropriate CCMD(s)?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Have requirements for non-US forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and/or redeployment been included in the TPFDD and validated?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has the deployment plan been deconflicted with HN, NGO, and contractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are there mechanisms in place to track the cost?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have SOFAs been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Who has been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission balance with the potential ramifications of failure to protect the force?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the OA been fused with the traditional study of geographic and military considerations to form an intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high-value and high-payoff targets? Does the plan consider these issues in a way that facilitates operations and end state?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs, to increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminate redundancy in operations?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Are nonlethal weapons available for use?
- \_\_\_\_\_ To what extent are riot control agents authorized for use?
- \_\_\_\_\_ To what extent are nonlethal weapons authorized for use?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Are forces, communication system capabilities, and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members regarding communication equipment capability?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What are the Information/data exchange requirements for the mission?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the communication system network?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have common databases been provided for?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable communication system network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational communication system infrastructure?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP security issues, and other planning factors been reached among all multinational components? Are compatible materials available?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contractor multinational foreign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposure to ADP and classified information used in daily operations?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products to that datum?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a multinational geospatial intelligence plan been produced and disseminated which designates all products for use?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign disclosure procedures been established?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have special, adequate, and supportable geospatial sharing and foreign disclosure procedures been established?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have special, adequate, and supportable biometrics sharing and foreign disclosure procedures been established?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the adversary's use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under the control of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks IAW the MNFC's intelligence requirements and according to the capability of the multinational equipment under MNF control?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers? Have disclosure and release procedures been identified, with respect to each PN?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Can authorized targeting materials be disseminated rapidly?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the MNFC's authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been defined and agreed to?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a coordinating mechanism been establish to coordination and execute OCS (contracting for goods and services) been established?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ What, if any, ACSAs exist between participating nations to enable the provision of supplies, services, transportation, and logistic support?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an overall officer in charge or main point of contact for C2 of contractor personnel?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Do other legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to participating nations?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have reimbursement or replacement in kind procedures been developed and agreed to?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the multinational commander designated a lead nation and/or role specialist nation to provide CUL support to the MNF?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic support of goods and services between the MNTF countries and accounts for the amounts received?
  
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a logistics determination been made (i.e., what countries will provide what piece of the logistics system, health services to include ground and air evacuation, and medical logistics)?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the force?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Do transition plans include the accountability process for the return of US equipment loaned to another nation in an MNF operation?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Can the HN provide support, and if so, have negotiations to secure support been established or completed?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known and being complied with by all nations, Services, and units?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine the logistic requirements?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has an assessment of HN medical capabilities and a determination of availability to support MNF health services requirements been accomplished?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have coordinating centers been established for personnel movement, medical support, ground and air evacuation, OCS, infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? Are evacuation plans, both intra- and inter-theater, in place?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Are CBRN threats known, and are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational casualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing with casualties?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Have information activities been planned to support the operation?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Have assets been requested to support the information portion of the plan?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of information activities?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Have military information support personnel been integrated into analysis, targeting, and planning?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have information-related activities been integrated and tailored to the specific environment/mission assigned?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander's authority to impose them been included in the MNF plan?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute unconventional military options for the commander?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has a PA plan been promulgated that:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the MNF and its mission?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) make the initial public release concerning the MNF and its mission?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the MNF and its national components?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is predeployment media training complete?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations and future strategic decisions understood by all commanders?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have requirements for combat camera support been arranged?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons learned?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for MNFs? Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other peaceful operations?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ What forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind? Has disposal of equipment and supplies been properly planned?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Who will support forces that remain behind?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Has the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNF presence been identified?

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## APPENDIX B

### MULTINATIONAL PLANNING AUGMENTATION TEAM

#### 1. Overview

a. The MPAT program was established by the Commander, USINDOPACOM, in consultation with the chiefs of defense of various nations in the Asia-Pacific region in early 2000. The impetus for the program is to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of MNTF HQ.

b. MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor in program success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the program. Without MOAs, terms of reference, or other more formal arrangements, the program has been able to share information, and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts and procedures without the normal formal policy constraints—a key inhibitor to multinational interoperability when working with other nations.

#### 2. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Composition

a. MPAT is an international cadre of military planners from 31 nations with interests in the Asia-Pacific region that is capable of augmenting an MNF HQ established to plan and execute coalition operations in response to military engagement, SC, and deterrence operations and small-scale contingencies. Planners learn from each other the common procedures for activating, forming, and employing a coalition TF HQ and associated planning processes. This is done through a series of multinational workshops called MPAT TEMPEST EXPRESS staff planning workshops. The MPAT cadre also participates in USINDOPACOM and other nations' multinational exercises.

b. Participation also includes representation from UN organizations, international organizations, and NGOs.

c. The MPAT Secretariat resides with the Pacific Command Exercises Directorate.

#### 3. Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures

a. MPAT planners are credited with developing an SOP for an MNTF HQ. This SOP recognizes the existence of shared national interests in the region and seeks to standardize some basic concepts and processes that will promote habits of cooperation, increase dialogue, and provide for baseline MNTF operational concepts. Further, this SOP serves as a centerpiece for the MPAT workshops and exercises aimed at improving interoperability and MNTF operational readiness within the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of the SOP is straightforward:

- (1) Increase the speed of an MNF initial response.
- (2) Improve interoperability among the participating forces.
- (3) Enhance overall mission effectiveness.

(4) Support unity of effort.


b. The MNF SOP is not a USINDOPACOM document, nor is it signed by any of the participants. It has been developed by the combined efforts of all the MPAT nations as a multinational document to provide the foundation of multinational crisis response. The SOP is also unclassified and available for use by any nation in combined/joint or coalition operations.

c. The procedures contained in the MNF SOP are primarily focused for use by an MNTF HQ for use at the mid to lower end of the “competition continuum.” These include numerous campaign operations activities such as limited contingency operations, stability activities, PO (which includes peace building, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking), FHA, NEO, SAR/PR, combating terrorism, and FID.

#### 4. Organization

The MPAT is not a standing, billeted organization or TF. It is a cadre or pool of trained planners with MNF operations planning expertise that has developed relationships from participation in MPAT events. Figure B-1 contains a list of potential key MNTF staff billets or functional areas that can be filled with MPAT personnel from the various MNF participating nations.

*For additional information on the MPAT concept and MNF SOP, refer to the unclassified MPAT Website at <https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat/p/sop.aspx>. This Website acts as the portal for the MPAT program and MNF SOP. The updated MNF SOP can be obtained via this portal, and the latest MPAT information can be found through this site.*



**Figure B-1. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Augmentation Roles**

## APPENDIX C MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS GROUP

### 1. Overview

a. The MSOG is a joint, multinational forum for identifying operational and interoperability issues and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MSOG member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

b. The MSOG is a senior operator-led body for coordinating, deliberating, and facilitating resolution of contemporary operational and interoperability issues. The MSOG's work focuses on resolving information interoperability problems, strategic and operational issues, and interagency aspects considered as key to coalition operations.

c. The MSOG focuses on resolving information sharing and LN contemporary operational and interoperability issues across all lines of development (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities). The MSOG also addresses interagency/comprehensive approach activities that are key in establishing and executing coalitions, as well as policy issues for supporting and monitoring multinational operations. These activities are targeted to positively impact coalition interoperability policy, doctrine, and collaborative planning and execution.

### 2. Purpose

Since inception, the MSOG has evolved to keep pace with changes in the strategic environment, transforming from strictly a tactical and operational forum to a strategic platform focused on harmonizing collective efforts and resources. The MSOG provides a unique senior operator/planner-led multinational forum to understand and address strategic and operational challenges and risks to influence the development of operational practices to enable more effective and aligned coalition operations and strategic approaches. The MSOG's objectives are to:

a. Build relationships to enhance mutual trust and understanding of national perspectives and operational challenges and risks, as well as identify where future strategic opportunities and national interests align in order to better integrate efforts, capitalize on activities, and magnify resources across multiple problem sets.

b. Influence and shape the development of operational practices for more effective coalition operations in a constrained resource environment.

### 3. Composition

a. The creation of the Military Framework Chiefs of Defense (also referred to as the "Framework") forum in 2016 was the key factor in the MSOG expanding in 2019 from the eight member nations to the current thirteen like-minded nations, mirroring those represented in the Framework meeting. The MSOG is a forum that provides a multinational venue to understand and address contemporary strategic and operational

challenges, and is composed of countries that are most likely to form and lead a coalition operation. The MSOG member nations are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The member nations are equal participants in the MSOG. While membership is not meant to be exclusionary, the criteria for membership is based upon a nation's demonstrated capacity and national will to lead international coalitions.

b. The MSOG is led by the MSOG Principals, who are the senior national representatives for MSOG member nations and are flag officers/general officers from their nation's national defense HQ. The MSOG Principals define and articulate the strategic direction of the MSOG and provide guidance for the MSOG activities. Invaluable levels of trust and camaraderie are cultivated in the MSOG, which further encourage and promote national efforts in coalition and multinational operations.

c. The following groups manage and/or implement/perform the work of the MSOG according to the guidance of the MSOG Principals:

(1) The Framework Steering Committee is composed of O-7/NATO OF-6 representatives and provides management oversight of tasks approved by the MSOG Principals. It is the senior O-7-/NATO OF-6-level group that provides day-to-day guidance, oversight, and direction to any directed working group, national secretaries, or national officers as required.

(2) The Framework secretariat staff is the only full-time MSOG staff and works in the US Joint Staff J-5 [Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Deputy Director Global Integration]. The secretariat staff is responsible for managing and coordinating the day-to-day business activities for the MSOG, while serving as the central point of contact for the MSOG Principals, the Framework Steering Committee, and national secretaries. In addition to permanently assigned US personnel, twelve foreign liaison officers from other Framework member nations are assigned full-time to the Secretariat staff. The Framework secretariat staff conducts all external coordination, correspondence, and communication.

#### **4. Products**

MSOG-developed documents represent a nonbinding consensus view among MSOG nations. These documents are reviewed and updated on a regular basis. The following are representative examples of MSOG-developed documents. Refer to the MSOG community on the APAN Website for the most current version of all MSOG documents.

##### **a. Coalition Building Guide (CBG)**

(1) One of the MSOG's early actions was the development of the CBG. The purpose of the CBG is to facilitate LNs, troop-contributing nations, and participants in the establishment and effective operation of a coalition anywhere on the globe. Specifically, the CBG concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of multinational joint operations and identifies some of the essential factors associated with the process of coalition building. Additionally, it attempts to provide a common framework of reference for contributing nations. The CBG is designed to assist the JFC and his staff, as well as

highlight national factors. The CBG does not constitute official policy or doctrine, nor does it represent a definitive staff planning or military decision-making guide. It is offered to assist MSOG member nations and their potential partners in serving together in future coalitions and to assist other working groups in their exploration of related interoperability issues. The CBG is based upon the LN concept. For the purposes of the CBG, the LN is described as: That nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of national consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the LN, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as functional lead agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.

(2) The MSOG agreed that NATO Allied joint doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed, is default doctrine for planning and conducting multinational operations. The CBG uses established NATO Allied joint doctrine as a basis. NATO doctrine is the default doctrine for a MSOG member-led coalition unless the LN specifies the military doctrine to be used. If an LN chooses to use other than NATO doctrine, then it must ensure all participating partners have access to the doctrine in use. Operating procedures, as well as TTP, will be prescribed by the LN.

*For additional guidance on the CBG, refer to the Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide, Volume I-III, 3rd Edition, [https://community.apan.org/wg/mic/p/coalition\\_building\\_guide](https://community.apan.org/wg/mic/p/coalition_building_guide).*

#### **b. Comprehensive Approach Framework—A Military Perspective**

(1) Recent experiences of coalition operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and other operations confirm the complexity of contemporary crises. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today's challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination, and deconfliction of coalitions' military instrument with the other instruments of national power.

(2) The comprehensive approach framework is primarily designed for use by prospective coalition commanders and their staffs, but it also informs potential civilian partners on the vision and views of the militaries organized within the MSOG concerning the framework for the application of a comprehensive approach as both a mindset and a method to crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict activities. The central idea is to demonstrate the possibilities but also the limitations of forming civil-military partnerships both at home and in a region or a country by creating and operationalizing the spirit of a true team effort. The document, therefore, aims at establishing a certain commonality in comprehensive approach understanding and terminology to support further work between military and civilian partners in the context of coalition operations.

(3) To promote the synergies of a civil-military team effort, the national militaries of the MSOG nations have to specify their roles and possible contributions throughout all phases of involvement in a crisis abroad. These phases of conflict have been categorized as crisis prevention, stabilization, and finally transition—when the military involvement winds down to be handed over to other, better-suited agencies and organizations. This expeditionary focus excludes all questions of how the individual MSOG nations handle natural or man-made crises within their own respective boundaries, possibly also in a comprehensive manner. Likewise, possible considerations for a civil-military interface in situations of combat operations are not subject to the framework at hand.

(4) The document points out the products and services needed from civilian partners, which may range from an early exchange of cultural views to very precise demands for specific liaison arrangements. Acknowledging the existing overlap with civilian organizations and actors, the areas of military logistics, and military medical services have been given special attention.

(5) The underlying core theme throughout the document applies the following triple concept to make the envisaged civil-military team effort a reality:

(a) Establishing a common understanding of the problem at hand (which includes information sharing and SA),

(b) Defining a mutually acceptable vision for the problem solution (which includes a set of outcomes or objectives that shall not contradict one another), and

(c) Aiming at harmonizing the corresponding activities (which includes the will to adjust in light of emerging insights).

**c. The Military Contribution to Stabilization Operations (Stabilization Handbook)**

(1) Stabilization is a multidimensional concept involving reconstruction and normalization activities and tasks that involves attributes of other programs such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform (SSR) that must be considered in defining common approaches to a campaign.

(2) The *Stabilization Handbook* addresses the tasks normally performed by military forces in supporting stabilization operations when an HN is unable to govern and/or to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Military forces perform myriad functions in supporting broad coalition reconstruction, SSR, and stabilization efforts in order to establish a safe and secure environment in a fragile state. The stabilization tasks accomplished by military forces during a wide range of activities help set the conditions or framework for:

(a) Facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries;

(b) Establishing political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and

(c) Setting the environment for transitioning responsibility to legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law.

(3) Accordingly, the document also addresses the need to consider a comprehensive approach in planning for and conducting stabilization operations, in order to build strong relationships through cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with the various governmental, nongovernmental, private, and international organizations and agencies, as well as other military forces involved in stabilization operations.

*For additional information on the MSOG and ongoing multinational interoperability efforts, refer to the MSOG community on the APAN Website at <https://community.apan.org/wg/mic/>.*

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## APPENDIX D MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

### 1. Introduction

a. The purpose of this appendix is to provide detailed guidance to US forces who provide or receive logistic support during multinational operations. The term “multinational” encompasses operations that may also be referred to as “allied,” “alliance,” “bilateral,” “combined,” “multilateral,” or “coalition.” The overall logistics doctrine for supporting US joint operations has been established in JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

b. MNL is any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a MNF under the auspices of an alliance or coalition. This includes operations conducted under a UN mandate. MNL includes activities involving both logistic units provided by participating nations designated for use by the MNFC, as well as a variety of MNL support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces.

c. Multinational operations of even modest complexity require some centralized coordination of logistics and the use of mutual support arrangements to facilitate smooth, timely, responsive, and effective deployment and force sustainment. This may include negotiation of HNS and agreements relating to border crossings; customs and duty fees; medical support; engineering; OCS; supplemental security forces; movement control; and provision of CUL supplies, such as bulk petroleum.

*See JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, for additional information on CUL.*

d. The principles of logistics for US joint operations also apply to the logistics of multinational operations. However, because participating forces represent sovereign nations, there are several unique principles for MNL operations. Figure D-1 lists the principles of MNL as contained in NATO’s logistic publication Military Committee 319/3, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*, and expanded upon in AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Logistics*. Although first formulated in NATO documents, these principles are adaptable to all multinational operations.

### 2. Special Considerations in Organizing and Conducting Multinational Logistic Operations

a. **The Impact of National Sovereignty.** The planning and conduct of logistics in operations involving multiple sovereign nations characteristically differs from that in unilateral operations.

(1) MNFCs typically do not have the same degree of directive authority over MNF logistics as commanders of national operations. Nations give MNFCs only as much authority over their national logistic resources as they are willing to concede to achieve national objectives in the operation. These authorities are generally quite limited and often involve only coordinating authority. As a result, effective logistic operations in a multinational operation depend on personal relationships between multinational and



**Figure D-1. Logistics Principles of Multinational Operations**

national force commanders. MNFCs and the logistic staff use persuasion and diplomacy to encourage national contingents to support MNF operational priorities. In order to ensure better understanding between commanders, LNOs should be dispatched to all relevant organizations throughout the multinational C2 structure.

(2) US and other forces participating in multinational operations operate under limitations imposed by applicable international agreements, including SOFAs, DCAs, national laws, and regulations. The US has negotiated a number of bilateral SOFAs that govern US forces operating within another nation’s territory. SOFAs may also be multilateral and should be negotiated to apply to all participants in the MNF. Detailed SOFA provisions are usually contained in supporting TAs. Many of the areas addressed in the TAs relate directly to logistic issues: medical support, environmental obligations, customs and duties, movement control, landing rights and/or port utilization fees, and rights and protection of MNF contractors. Accordingly, the MNFC’s logistic and legal staffs may become closely involved with negotiation, implementation, and application of the SOFA and TAs to ensure such documents facilitate rather than hinder logistic support of the operation.

(3) Differences in national ROE, FP, and security requirements constitute potential areas of friction in a multinational operation and could affect the security of operating bases and logistic assets on which US forces and MNFs rely on. MNFC FP and

security requirements should be identified early in the planning process and addressed during TA negotiations.

(4) National laws guide the exchange of logistic support among nations. There are a number of legal provisions that stipulate the manner in which US forces can exchange logistic support with other force contingents and/or participate in MNL arrangements.

*For more information on national laws guiding logistics support, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.*

**b. The US as Provider and Recipient of Logistic Support.** The US may provide logistic support as part of its national contribution to a multinational operation, as it did in Operations UNITED ASSISTANCE (West Africa) and ATLANTIC RESOLVE (Europe). The US, in turn, could require extensive foreign logistic assistance (as in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, INHERENT RESOLVE, FREEDOM'S SENTINEL, and RESOLUTE SUPPORT). The US, therefore, is likely to be both a consumer and provider of CUL in multinational operations. MNL may provide US commanders and logistic planners with a means to effectively and efficiently support US forces.

### 3. Core Logistics Capabilities

The core MNL functions are supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, joint health services, engineering, logistic services, and OCS. The MNL capabilities delivered by these functions, when combined with multinational personnel service support, provide the ability to globally project and sustain US forces operating as part of an MNF. Personnel involved in MNL should work to integrate and make effective use of Service, joint, commercial, interagency, and MNL assets. Understanding these capabilities will enable MNFCs and their subordinate commanders to obtain, provide, and sustain effective logistics support. Additionally, logistic planners should identify areas where international agreements would facilitate supply and maintenance support of multinational operations. Developing mutually supportive relationships to enhance coordination is an important enabler for MNL operations. ACSAs are examples of international agreements that allow for the provision of cooperative logistics support. Upon identifying a need, the MNFC should determine the feasibility of such agreements and, where applicable, pursue their development in coordination with the appropriate higher command level.

#### a. Supply

(1) Multinational support agreements and arrangements can usually be considered for the provision of food, water (bulk and bottled), bulk petroleum, some ammunition types, and medical supplies. The supplies and services to be provided by MNL will be determined in concert with nations prior to commencement of the operation and will depend on the degree of standardization and interoperability within the force. This should be determined during the logistic and HNS planning conferences. Possible methods of multinational provision are given in NATO publication AJP-4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistic Support*.

(2) Supply transactions between nations or national forces may take the form of pre-planned logistic assistance, emergency logistic assistance in crisis and conflict,

multinational support, or redistribution. The compensation for delivered or redistributed supplies should be executed IAW procedures agreed upon by the PN. Nations should implement the provisions of these agreements in their national doctrine and procedures to enhance the efficient execution of mutual support.

**b. Maintenance**

(1) Maintenance operations facilitate systems readiness for the MNFC. Each member nation executes maintenance as a core logistic function to maintain the fleet readiness of units and capabilities.

(2) In crisis or conflict, an efficient maintenance organization, composed of MNF and national repair facilities, is an essential component of MNF's capability. Therefore, nations should be encouraged to make bilateral and multilateral agreements in peace to cover use of national repair facilities in both peacetime and wartime. This facilitates the transfer of repair loads from one nation's facilities to another and will exercise cross-servicing facilities and procedures. Whenever weapon systems are used by more than one nation, a coordinated approach to logistics is recommended. Not only can logistic resources be shared but, also by consolidating supply and maintenance requirements, unique opportunities are created to reduce investment and operating costs.

**c. Deployment and Distribution**

(1) The global dispersion of the threats, combined with the necessity to rapidly deploy, execute, and sustain operations worldwide, makes the deployment and distribution function the cornerstone of MNL. This global distribution-based system requires the end-to-end synchronization of all elements of distribution. The deployment and distribution function supports the movement of forces and unit equipment during the deployment and redeployment processes and supports materiel movement during the sustainment of operations. Asset and in-transit visibility provides the CCDR the capability to see and redirect strategic and operational commodity and force flow in support of current and projected priorities.

See JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, and JP 4-09, *Distribution Operations*, for additional information.

(2) **Move the Force.** The Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], as the joint deployment process owner, serves as the DOD focal point to improve the deployment process supporting multinational operations and interagency coordination. Force providers are supported by United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) during the planning and execution of the deployment and redeployment process. USTRANSCOM, as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator, supports the deployment process by providing the strategic distribution capability to move forces and materiel in support of MNFC operational requirements and to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to home and/or demobilization stations.

(3) **Movement Control.** A variety of organizations may be established to manage, control, and coordinate strategic and operational movement for multinational operations.

(a) In US-led multinational operations, the movement control concept is usually an extension of US joint doctrine, as discussed in JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, and JP 4-09, *Distribution Operations*.

(b) The organization and planning tools to synchronize and coordinate movement control during multinational operations and in other kinds of multinational operations are similar and will usually include:

1. A planning center (at the strategic or geographic command level) to construct a detailed multinational deployment plan.

2. A joint movement coordination center at the MNF HQ level.

3. An air component center for controlling air movements.

4. Organizational elements for managing/coordinating reception, staging, onward movement, and integration activities to coordinate MNF movements with the HN's national movement coordination center, if established and allocating any common-user transportation resources.

(c) In a NATO operation, for example, strategic movement is managed by the allied movement coordination center (AMCC), which combines and deconflicts separate, national, detailed, deployment plans into a single, multinational, deployment plan to ensure smooth flow of forces IAW the MNFC's deployment priorities. The AMCC, in cooperation with NATO's civil transportation planning boards and committees, also assists nations in resolving strategic lift shortfalls through arrangements with other allied nations and/or commercial transportation firms. See AJP-3.13, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces*.

(d) At the operational level, a joint theater movement staff (JTMS) develops movement and transportation directives and plans and recommends priorities for theater movement requirements. A joint transportation coordination center (JTCC) may also be established. The JTCC focuses primarily on managing intratheater movements and tasking any transportation assets provided by nations for support of the entire MNF.

(e) NATO's JTMS and JTCC perform similar functions to a US joint movement center (JMC). If the US establishes a separate, national JMC for managing movement of US forces in a multinational operation, the JMC must coordinate closely with the multinational movement control centers to ensure synchronized deployment and intratheater movement.

(f) In non-US-led coalitions, the US may be requested to function as LN for deployment planning and movement control because of its expertise in these areas.

(4) **Sustain the Force.** Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. Sustainment is conducted for the duration of the joint mission. A logistic concept of support must complement the overall CONOPS. Logistic planners accomplish this by tailoring the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE), including incoming stock, theater excess stock, and disposal requirements, or devising new distribution capabilities. The JDDE is that complex system of equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations, facilities, training, and materiel that facilitates the successful conduct of multinational distribution operations.

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, for additional information.

#### d. Joint Health Services

(1) Nations are ultimately responsible for providing medical care for their forces. Because of national sensitivities, the US strives to rely on national resources for providing joint health services to its forces to the maximum extent. Opportunities exist to rationalize medical care within a multinational operation. For example, medical care roles could be provided by an LN or RSN. However, differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful consideration in planning multinational medical support. The exchange of blood and blood products between nations is an especially sensitive issue. Because of its robust, high-quality medical capabilities, the US may be able to provide medical support to multinational partners, including Class VIII medical supplies, veterinary services, medical laboratory services, optical fabrication, medical equipment maintenance and repair, preventive medicine, and patient movement (ground and aerial evacuation).

(2) US laws and policies, however, place restrictions on the provision of medical support to other nations and the use of foreign medical support by US forces. US commanders must be aware of such restrictions in non-US-led multinational operations and inform the MNFC of these restrictions. Due to such restrictions, US commanders should consult with the SJA.

See JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for more detailed guidance on joint health services in multinational operations.

#### e. Engineering

(1) Engineering lends itself to multinational coordination and management arrangements. Nations participating in a multinational operation may place assigned engineer units under the OPCON or the TACON of the engineer TF commander. As an alternative, engineer units may simply coordinate engineer activities with the MNFC and the force engineer. Ultimately, all engineer operations should be coordinated with the theater engineer to achieve a synchronized approach to engineer operations. The theater engineer will typically be the supported US CCMD engineer.

(2) To assist the force engineer, an engineer coordination element may be established. In a US-led multinational operation, this coordination element will normally comprise a staff element within the logistics directorate of a joint staff and may involve a number of functionally specific joint engineer boards—for example, the joint facilities utilization board (JFUB), joint civil-military engineering board (JCMEB), and joint environmental management board. These joint boards would be expanded with personnel from coalition partners to form combined organizational elements with multinational engineer coordination functions. In NATO doctrine, the central coordinating organization for engineering is called an engineer coordination cell (ECC) and may directly support the force engineer, who is a special staff officer under the MNFC. If joint engineer boards have been established in support of US forces in a NATO operation, they should coordinate closely with the ECC. The theater engineer may also establish regional/component subordinate offices to assist the ECC in coordinating multinational engineering activities.

*For details on US engineering doctrine, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. For NATO doctrine, see AJP-3.12, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering.*

f. **Logistic Services.** In addition to MNL coordination centers at the MNF HQ level, nations participating in a multinational operation may determine the need for operational-level support organizations to provide common support for the MNF. Such organizations include naval advanced logistic support sites (NALSSs) and naval forward logistic sites (NFLSs) for supporting multinational maritime forces and intermediate staging bases (ISBs) for supporting ground and air units. MNL support elements serve as critical transshipment nodes, supply storage and distribution points, refueling stations, staging bases for onward movement into tactical operational zones, medical support centers, and providers of other CUL support. MNL sites may be organized as elements within the MNF C2 structure under the command of the MNFC. Within a NATO maritime operation, for example, NALSSs and NFLSs are elements of the multinational maritime force shore support organization and may report either to a MNL maritime command or directly to a maritime element embedded in the MJLC. In such an organizational structure, NALSSs and NFLSs are multinational organizations with NATO commanders and integrated multinational staff. Multinational support organizations, however, could also be LN-operated organizations that provide support to multinational partners, as requested. For example, the US could establish a national ISB outside the tactical operational area that is used for both staging and supporting US forces and providing logistic services to other nations. In this case, the logistic site providing MNL support is under command of the operating nation (the US), and the site commander coordinates with the MNFC.

g. **OCS.** Theater support contracts and CUL-related external support contracts make use of regionally available supplies, services, and construction capability in immediate support of deployed units, at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. The use of local contractor services can also play a very important role in the economic health within the countries where the operation is being conducted. In multinational operations, commanders of US contracting entities are responsible for contracting operations to support US forces, and contracting officers are guided by US laws and the Federal Acquisition Regulation in obtaining contractor services. The contracting coordination center prioritizes and coordinates national contracting of goods and services

that are in limited supply within the OA or are commonly needed by the entire force (or by more than one component). These commonly needed goods and services may include food, fuel, lodging, labor, construction materials, facilities, and transportation. To effectively coordinate MNF contracting activities, the MNFC may publish a restricted items list that identifies critical, limited supplies and services within the OA, the procurement of which must be coordinated with the contracting coordination center.

#### **4. Multinational Logistics Planning Considerations**

a. Logistic planning of multinational operations poses considerable challenges. Realistically, only a few nations can logistically support themselves in every operational phase: deployment, sustainment, and redeployment/termination.

b. MNL planning is complicated by several factors:

(1) Advance planning for multinational operations is usually confined only to close allies that are highly likely to join with the US in the planned operation. Even among close allies, some PNs may be reluctant to support advance planning of operations in which the US is involved. As a result, most planning for multinational operations, therefore, tends to be ad hoc.

(2) Nations are generally reluctant in the early planning process to commit forces to the MNF. This is especially true regarding logistic contributions to MNF support. Logistic planning for multinational operations, therefore, can be a lengthy, iterative process, during which nations come to agreement on the logistic C2 organization and support arrangements only after extensive deliberation.

(3) Given these factors, planning for multinational operations usually commences only after the crisis has developed. Since logistics often is a limiting factor in operations, logistic planning needs to be initiated as soon as possible and occur concurrently with operational planning.

(4) Within a multinational operation, it is imperative that participating nations have confidence in the way partners are supporting their forces. Nations are often reluctant to, and sometimes prohibited from, sharing national OPLANs with potential partners because of national security. Nonetheless, efforts should be made to share operation and logistic support plans during the plan development stage. While selected details may not be shared, general logistic support concepts, possible force/resource contributions, logistic support requirements, capabilities, logistics security and protection requirements, and possible support arrangements should be discussed.

(5) An information database regarding the logistic capabilities of potential multinational partners is crucial for effective MNL planning. During peacetime, US and multinational planners may be able to use such information to identify—in advance—possible MNL contributions to an operation and to implement programs, including multinational exercises and planning seminars, to enhance interoperability. USINDOPACOM's MPAT program is a good example that enhances MNL planning and provides planners with the requisite planning tools.

c. To integrate partners in contingency logistics planning effectively, the MNFC should consider the following measures:

(1) Seek early assignment of logistic planners from participating nations to the MNFC logistic planning staff.

(2) Produce MNL planning templates using US/LN data and planning factors. Templates would be filled out by participating nation logistic planners.

(3) Arrange temporary assignment of US/LN logistic LNOs to the national HQ of participating nations.

(4) Provide access to US/LN logistic information management systems or arrange electronic interface between compatible national systems where feasible.

(5) Seek early briefings on participating nation logistic capabilities and shortfalls and obtain commitments to cooperative logistic arrangements.

(6) Seek early staffing for MJLC (or equivalent) functional coordination bodies.

(7) Seek early agreement on an MNF basing strategy that may include establishing efficient contingency bases to support mission requirements.

d. National operational preferences influence the degree to which nations are willing to rely on MNL during the early phase(s) of an operation. Nevertheless, early MNL planning increases the options available to national commanders for employing MNL for mutual benefit during the critical first stages of an operation.

e. **Perspective of US MNFC.** When functioning as the MNFC, US commanders have the responsibility to develop a CONOPS and initial concept of support, in coordination with participating nations. Upon approval of participating nations, US and other MNL planners iteratively develop the support plan during a series of planning conferences, as time allows. US MNFCs should address the following critical logistic issues in planning for multinational operations.

(1) Logistic C2 relationships and organizational structure. Given differences in national terminology, it is essential that participating nations operate with the same understanding of C2 relationships.

(2) Structure, staffing, and equipment of MNL organizations. Personnel from participating nations need to be integrated into MNF logistic HQ organizations to make them truly multinational.

(3) Logistic authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and participating nations.

(4) Logistic reporting requirements and reporting capabilities of participating nations.

(5) Interoperability of logistic C2, communications, and information systems within the force. Achieving interoperable logistic C2, communications, and information systems is difficult, even with long-time allies. To facilitate interoperability, the US commander serving as an MNFC may need to provide requisite systems to multinational partners.

(6) Logistic requirements for national contingents (e.g., level of medical support, amount of supplies to be maintained in the OA).

(7) Logistic capabilities of participating national contingents. The MNFC needs to know to what extent national contingents may require support from nonorganic resources in order to develop a logistic plan for the operation. NATO doctrine currently requires certification of the logistic capabilities of non-NATO contingents before they participate in non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Similar “certifications” may not be relevant or required for US-led coalitions and, in any case, may be beyond the resources of the US MNFC and staff to conduct. However, even in the case of less formal logistic assessments, the US commander serving as an MNFC should be aware that such assessments of multinational partner capabilities may be diplomatically or politically sensitive and require multinational cooperation.

(8) Requirements for force-wide mutual support arrangements and implementing mechanisms.

(9) Requirements for multinational support, including requirements for theater- and operational-level logistic forces.

(10) Requirements for enduring and contingency bases, which may benefit from the use of virtual base design technologies, best practices and lessons learned, and alternative energy technologies to reduce the base’s logistics footprint and sustainment requirements.

(11) Concepts for logistic functions and use of MNL support arrangements, such as RSN and LN, to implement such concepts.

(12) Prioritized requirements for HNS and available resources.

(13) Authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and nations in arranging support from host and transited nations. Centralized coordination of intratheater resource allocation is essential for operationally efficient support of multinational operations.

(14) Availability of logistic planning tools, including logistic information databases in the OA, and responsibilities for developing and maintaining such databases.

(15) Differences in classes of supply; see Figure D-2.

(16) Mechanisms to protect logistic technical databases and logistic information systems.

### United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Classes of Supply

Class of Supply	United States	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
I	<b>Subsistence:</b> Food.	Items of subsistence (e.g. food and forage) which are consumed by personnel or animals at an approximate uniform rate, irrespective of local changes in combat or terrain conditions.
II	<b>General Support Items:</b> Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and tool kits, hand tools, material, administrative, and housekeeping supplies.	Supplies for which allowances are established by tables of organization and equipment (e.g., clothing, weapons, tools, spare parts, vehicles).
III	<b>Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants:</b> Petroleum (including packaged items), fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and compressed gasses, coolants, deicing, and antifreeze compounds, plus components and additives of such products, including coal.	Petroleum, oil, and lubricants for all purposes, except for operating aircraft or for use in weapons such as flame-throwers (e.g., gasoline, fuel oil, coal, and coke).
IIIa		Aviation fuel and lubricants.
IV	<b>Construction/Barrier:</b> Materials that support fortification, obstacle and barrier construction, and construction material for base development and general engineering.	Supplies for which initial issue allowances are not prescribed by approved issue tables. Normally includes fortification and construction materials, as well as additional quantities of items identical to those authorized for initial issue (Class II) such as additional vehicles.
V	<b>Ammunition:</b> Ammunition of all types (including chemical, radiological, and special weapons), bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items.	Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents of all types.
VI	<b>Personal Demand Items:</b> Nonmilitary sales items.	
VII	<b>Major End-Items:</b> A final combination of end products ready for intended use (e.g., launchers, tanks, racks, adapters, pylons, mobile machine shops, and administrative and tracked vehicles).	
VIII	<b>Medical Material/Medical Repair</b>	
IX	<b>Repair Parts (less medical special repair parts):</b> All repair parts and components, including kits, assemblies, material power generators subassemblies (repairable and non-repairable) required for all equipment; dry batteries.	
X	<b>(code as zero '0'):</b> Material to support military programs, not included in Classes I through IX.	

**Figure D-2. United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Classes of Supply**

(17) Relationships with and support to international organizations, NGOs, and other nonmilitary organizations.

(18) Coordination with US non-DOD departments and agencies on logistic matters affecting the mission/operation. In addition to normal USG interagency coordination efforts and procedures, CCDRs can use their joint interagency coordination group and the associated or attached USG department or agency representatives and command LNOs to facilitate and foster logistics planning and coordination.

(19) Applicability of existing NATO or ABCANZ STANAGs to serve as a basis for quick development of standardized coalition logistic procedures.

(20) Requirements for infrastructure improvements within the OA and funding arrangements for such improvements, to include HN power resources and infrastructure.

(21) Requirements for operational energy and their associated risks, including those risks related to the assured supply of bulk petroleum and electricity, if applicable.

(22) Logistic-related items, such as landing rights, customs, taxes, and environmental issues, to be addressed in SOFAs and supporting TAs.

(23) Environmental considerations and hazardous material/waste treatment and removal.

(24) Up-front common funding authority and availability of funds.

(25) FP measures for logistic sites and activities.

(26) In addressing these issues, US MNFCs should keep in mind cultural aspects of multinational partners that could affect the operation (e.g., dietary preferences, physical characteristics, and religious practices and taboos). Appendix E provides a “Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.”

**f. US Commander’s Perspective.** The US commander should be an early and active participant in the planning process, anticipate support requests, identify US support requirements, and be prepared to respond appropriately. Close and continuous coordination with the Joint Staff may also be necessary, especially when SecDef approval is required for US participation in a specific MNL support arrangement—for example, acceptance of RSN or LN responsibility. In cases where the US force commander is not “dual-hatted” as the MNFC, the following critical planning tasks should be addressed:

(1) Incorporate MNFC logistic guidance into US support plans.

(2) Coordinate US logistic planning with MNFC logistic planning and maintain continuous liaison.

(3) Determine sources of support from the HN and available commercial sources and consult with other participating nations and the MNFC in identifying potential multinational support arrangements. (The US must clearly identify the extent to which it can participate in multinational support arrangements.)

(4) Notify the MNFC as to the logistic supplies and services that the US will make available to support other participants in the MNF and what limits there are on such support. (US logistic contributions to the MNF are approved by SecDef and communicated to MNFC planning staffs.)

(5) If additional ACSAs are required, coordinate with designated negotiating authorities (generally the cognizant GCC) and ensure Service components identify points of contact and implementation procedures for this authority.

(6) Notify the MNFC regarding what logistic assets are available for possible redistribution.

(7) Notify the MNFC of relevant aspects of the US support plan in order to assist the MNFC in harmonizing support for the entire MNF.

(8) Coordinate with nations contributing forces to US units (divisions, brigades, air wings, maritime task forces) regarding support available from the framework unit and on what terms.

(9) Promulgate MNFC logistics policy, plans, and procedures to participating US units.

(10) Assemble databases from all available sources on logistic capabilities of non-US units operating within US framework units and with nations, including HNs, located in the OA.

(11) Determine FP requirements for US logistic forces; coordinate measures with the MNFC and HNs; and obtain clear specification of responsibilities of US forces, HNs, and other multinational participants.

(12) Review US legal authorities and notify the MNFC regarding any legal constraints that might have an impact on US participation in MNL activities.

(13) Reference lessons learned information systems during the planning process. Appendix E, "Commander's Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations" is provided to assist US commanders and logistic staffs prepare to participate in multinational operations.

g. **NSE.** An NSE is any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are part of an MNF. NSEs serve as the intermediary between national logistical support at the strategic level to tactical-level forces. NSEs also coordinate and consolidate CUL functions. Routinely, the US Service component of the MNF that has the preponderance of the lead Service CUL responsibilities is designated the US NSE responsible to provide CUL support to US forces. If the US force is geographically dispersed, separate component NSEs may be required. NSEs include nationally commanded NALSSs, NFLSs, ISBs, or other organizations within the OA that support national forces assigned to the MNF.

(1) An NSE provides logistic support, including supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, customs and border clearance, engineering, environmental, and OCS. As noted above, an NSE may provide CUL support to MNFs, as well as to national forces. It is also possible that, in some operations, selected CUL would be arranged by the MJLC (or equivalent), thereby reducing the role of the NSE in providing such logistics.

(2) In both linear and nonlinear operations, NSEs are located geographically to best support the force and sited to take advantage of air, rail, and/or sea LOCs. In cases where the MJLC (or equivalent) has real estate management responsibility, nations desiring to locate NSEs in the MNFC's OA must coordinate with both the MJLC and the HN for final site approval. This is critical in those areas with limited air and sea ports of debarkation in which several nations may be competing for limited available space or facilities. NSEs from several nations may be colocated to achieve economies and efficiencies. Some nations may find it especially advantageous to form a combined NSE.

(3) **Command Relationships.** NSEs are national activities that remain under control of national authorities—not the MNFC. There are two basic options for US command relationship of NSEs.

(a) US NSEs will normally be under direct command of their respective Service component commander.

(b) In exceptional cases, the US NSE may be a logistically focused JTF under OPCON to the senior JTF commander.

## 5. Control and Coordination Models

### a. Logistic C2 Organizations

(1) The logistic C2 organization of a multinational operation encompasses both the internal logistic staff elements of the MNF HQ and the overall logistic organization, as integrated into the total MNF C2 structure.

(2) If the operation is relatively small or involves only a few multinational partners, the MNFC may rely on the combined-joint logistics office (CJ-4) staff, augmented (if necessary) with functional experts, to plan and coordinate MNF logistic activities.

(3) In the case of larger, more complex operations requiring more coordination and common support, the MNFC may establish a separate organization to assist the CJ-4 in developing and executing the operation's logistic support plan. NATO designates an organization, such as an MJLC, for coordinating and managing MNF logistics.

(4) For a US-led multinational operation, the JFC may establish an organization functionally similar to the MJLC that is tailored in size and specific functions to the particular operation. This organization may be designated combined/joint logistics center, MNL coordination center, or the like.

(5) The MJLC (or its equivalent), if established, may be established as:


(a) An augmentation to the CJ-4's staff, especially during initial planning or for smaller operations of limited duration.

(b) A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization.

(c) A separate organization integrated in or colocated with the multinational HQ or other supporting HQ.

(d) A module placed within a component command.

(6) As shown in Figure D-3, the MJLC may consist of various functional coordination centers (or other equivalent bodies) that provide centralized coordination of common support services, such as engineering, movement control, medical activities, OCS, and HNS, and the provision of common supplies, such as bulk petroleum and rations. The terminology used to designate such organizations and their specific functions varies depending on the command organization for the operation (e.g., NATO, US-led coalition, ABCANZ-member nation coalition).



**Figure D-3. Illustrative Multinational Joint Logistic Center Structure**

(7) In a US-led multinational operation, for example, the MJLC could comprise a number of joint logistic centers, offices, and boards that would be expanded to include coordination of MNL matters. These bodies could include combined versions of a joint logistics readiness center or joint logistics operations center, JMC, joint petroleum office, JCMEB, JFUB, CCDR logistics procurement support board, theater patient movement requirements center, joint blood program office, joint medical surveillance team, joint materiel priorities and allocation board, and/or joint transportation board. See JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, for details on the functions of these centers, offices, and boards.

(8) NATO has developed detailed doctrine regarding the structure of an MJLC, referred to in NATO joint doctrine as the joint logistic support group (JLSG), including the functions and staffing of various coordinating centers. See AJP-4.6, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group*, for information on the organization and structure of the JLSG.

(9) Depending on the command structure of the operation, some functions, such as movement control, engineering (general, combat, and geospatial), and medical support, may not fall under the staff cognizance of the CJ-4. The MNFC may determine that these functions will be organized under other staff sections, such as the combined-joint operations officer, staff engineer, or staff medical officer. Nonetheless, the CJ-4/MJLC will be involved in coordinating various aspects of these functions—for example, contracting for local supplies and services in support of engineer and health services activities.

(10) Another important function of the CJ-4/MJLC is to maintain close coordination on logistic matters with NGOs and international organizations through the MNFC's CMOC, if established. The US and other nations participating in an MNF may establish separate CMOCs to best execute civil-military operations and objectives at the national level. Nations need to closely coordinate their activities with the MNFC.


(11) In addition to functional coordination tasks, the MJLC may be assigned the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of logistic units provided by nations to serve at the theater/operational level for support of the entire MNF. NATO doctrine considers that there may also be a need to establish tailored, component-level, subordinate multinational logistic centers (MNLCS) to conduct component-level coordination.

(12) Regardless of the specific logistic C2 and/or management structure developed for a multinational operation, execution of the MNFC's logistic responsibilities should be clearly delineated between the CJ-4 and the MJLC or equivalent.

(13) The CJ-4 is responsible for developing the initial logistic guidance, planning for the logistic support of the operation, and promulgating logistic policies on behalf of the MNFC. The MJLC (or equivalent) is primarily concerned with implementing the guidance, policies, and plans developed by the CJ-4 and approved by the MNFC. Essentially, the MJLC performs the execution role for the CJ-4, serving as an extension of the CJ-4 staff.

(14) Regarding the overall logistic C2 organization, several options exist consistent with the various multinational C2 structures. Figures D-4 through D-6 depict three possible logistic C2 organizational structures modeled after past multinational operations.

(15) The structure represented in Figure D-4 can scale across any multinational operations but is most applicable to larger multinational operations with many participants. The key logistic organizational elements of this model are an MJLC, an MNLC for the maritime component, and NSEs supporting respective national contingents. (Depending on the size and complexity of MNF air and land forces, MNLCs may also be established for the air and land component commands.)



**Figure D-4. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: Alliance-Led**

(16) In the operation represented, US contingents assigned to the MNF operate under OPCON of the relevant component commander, as has occurred in NATO Balkan operations. Alternatively, US forces could participate in the operation as a JTF and be supported through a combination of Service-specific logistic organizations and a joint logistic organization responsible for providing CUL to US JTF units.


(17) In the structure depicted in Figure D-5 for a US-led multinational operation, the relevant lead Service for CUL support of US forces also provides such support to PNs. An MJLC, directed by the MNFC's CJ-4, coordinates selected logistic activities (e.g., fuel supply and distribution and medical support) with multinational partners through various cells and boards. A JMC is also established. This structure is suited to operations where only a few multinational partners contribute to a predominantly US MNF. The logistic structure for the operation consists of US staff elements that are augmented with multinational personnel to form an integrated joint structure.

(18) The logistics C2 structure for a non-US-led coalition operation may diverge from the US or alliance models in various aspects. US logistic planners seek to influence the MNL structure of a non-US-led coalition to be consistent with approved US joint doctrine. However, US commanders and logistic staff should be prepared to operate within C2 organizations that differ from those discussed within this publication.

(19) Figure D-6 represents a key feature of UN operations: responsibility for logistic support may be shared between a force commander and a chief administrative officer. This dual structure was developed to manage peace support operations involving relatively few military forces (e.g., small peacekeeping contingents and observer teams) that could be most efficiently supported through a single logistic organization. In several larger, more recent operations, participating nations have been encouraged to provide their own logistic support for their national contingents. (This support can be provided organically or through bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other participating nations.) Another option is that the US may be requested to serve as LN for the provision of selected logistic support to the entire MNF, as the US did in UN operations in Somalia II. In this case, the chief administrative officer exercised overall logistic coordination for the entire UN mission—including the provision of support for other UN activities (such as election monitoring and military observers)—but the US logistic group operated under the control of the force commander.


(20) Other logistic C2 structures are possible. The key is that, in multinational operations, there will almost always be a requirement for some centralized coordination or management of common logistic support for the MNF. US commands and Services (and their staffs) must be prepared to support US forces in a variety of multinational organizational structures and, in the case of US-led operations, to establish logistic organizations for coordinating logistic support for the entire MNF.

### **b. Incorporation of US Theater Logistics Management Considerations in Multinational Operations**



**Figure D-5. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: United States-Led Multinational Operation**

(1) In alliance operations, US forces are guided by previously agreed on processes and procedures. For coalition operations, STANAGs may also have been previously concluded that determine the organization arrangements for an operation. For example, within the ABCANZ Standardization Program, the participants have agreed to an Army component logistic organization structure for multinational operations that comprise two or more ABCANZ nations.



**Figure D-6. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: United Nations-Commanded Multinational Operation**

(2) In the case of US-led multinational operations, the US JFC is expected to expand upon the tools available for managing joint logistic operations and adapt them to

the multinational environment. Current US doctrine for the logistic support of joint operations identifies the need to capitalize on the assets and capabilities available in theater to facilitate support to the warfighter. Joint theater logistics management (JTLM) is one way to help achieve a unified focus within the theater by integrating information, product delivery, flexible response, and effective C2. JTLM ensures the right product is delivered to the right place at the right time.

(3) Options for expanding JTLM organizational structures to manage MNL include using a predominant Service organization as the nucleus operational logistic activity to manage common requirements; expanding the logistic readiness center; and using the lead Service, as directed by the CCDR, to provide CUL support (e.g., fresh water) to multinational partners.

(4) Regardless of the approach, US staff conducting JTLM functions will need to be augmented by personnel from participating nations to give the JTLM organization the capability to manage MNL activities. The nucleus for the organization may be available through US personnel currently staffing logistic readiness centers and/or from other logistic commands not anticipated to participate in the operation as a unit. GCCs can facilitate establishment of multinational JTLM organizations by conducting logistic staff augmentation planning exercises with prospective regional multinational partners.

(5) The challenge for JTLM organizations in multinational operations is to gain visibility of the logistic requirements and status of the total MNF. To the extent feasible, JTLM organizations should strive to use improved communications and modern technology to integrate the logistic reporting and information systems of participating nations. Enhanced logistic connectivity may be difficult to achieve, however, because of the differences in technological sophistication among participants and national requirements for information security.

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**APPENDIX E**  
**COMMANDER'S CHECKLIST FOR LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF**  
**MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

**1. General**

Logistic operations as described in this publication cover a wide variety of subjects. The checklist provided below offers the MNFC, the US JFC, and logisticians participating in multinational operations a tool for use in planning logistic support.

**2. Planning**

**a. Overall Mission-Force Organization-C2**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the nature of the operation—its specific mission, the size of the force, national composition, and expected duration?

\_\_\_\_\_ Under what authority is the operation being conducted? UN? NATO? National governments only?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will a combined joint task force (CJTF) be formed? What forces will be under OPCON of the CJTF commander or MNFC? How is “OPCON” understood by participating nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the overall C2 structure of the force?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the forces be organized along component or national lines?

\_\_\_\_\_ Does the OPLAN provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and concept of multinational operations that logistic planning must support?

**b. Overall Logistics Planning**

\_\_\_\_\_ Is the planning for the multinational operation under way concurrently by operation and logistic planners?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has a JFC been designated to provide US input and interface with the multinational planning element, especially for logistics?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the US planning element represent both the operation and logistic communities?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have the force logistical concepts and requirements been determined and concisely stated?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have logistic policies, processes, and reporting procedures been coordinated, established, and promulgated throughout the force, and with key USG interagency partners, international organization, or NGO partners as appropriate?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is a listing available of national doctrinal, policy, and procedural publications appropriate to the level at which the plan is prepared? Are multinational and joint Service references included where applicable?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have logistics-related assumptions been stated and are they realistic?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the MNFC identified financial responsibilities of all of the participants and developed reimbursement procedures for CUL support?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has logistics support been planned for all phases of the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ Does the US have any logistic agreements with any of the participating nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ How deep into the US held stocks are we willing to reach in support of PNs?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have the logisticians looked at the GCC's theater distribution plans (TDPs) on multinational movement support?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there a requirement to build one or more contingency bases to support MNF operations for US and PN forces?

### **c. Logistic C2 Relationships and Organization**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the logistic C2 organization for the operation? Will an MJLC or equivalent organization be established, or will the CJ-4 (and staff) manage and coordinate MNF logistics? If established, where will the MJLC be located in the C2 structure?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the multinational command structure been designed to eliminate unnecessary duplication of logistic functions?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the US structure been similarly aligned?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are the responsibilities for support clearly stated for the following? Are they aligned with the correct authority?

- (1) Supporting command(s)
- (2) Supported command(s)
- (3) HNS
- (4) Other Services
- (5) Multinational partners
- (6) NSE

\_\_\_\_\_ What directive authority, if any, will the MNFC have over logistic support for the MNF? Will the MNFC have OPCON over any logistic units or resources?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the MNFC have “redistribution” authority over national logistic assets, and to what extent has the US accepted such authority? What limits has the US imposed on MNFC redistribution of US logistic assets?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have coordinating centers been established for movement control, medical support, OCS, engineering, and logistic operations?

(1) Where will they be assigned?

(2) What authority will such centers have?

\_\_\_\_\_ For non-US-led operations, what (if any) US logistic elements will be attached to multinational HQ?

\_\_\_\_\_ For US-led operations, what plans exist for incorporating PN staff into US logistic C2 and operational organizations? What arrangements have been made to facilitate integrating PN personnel into US logistic organizations (e.g., introduction to US systems and procedures)?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have logistic supported and supporting command relationships been established or referred to higher HQ for resolution?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the US establish an NSE?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the mission of the US NSE be to support all US components, or will there be separate NSEs for each US component of the MNF?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will US NSE(s) have any responsibilities for providing support to non-US contingents?

\_\_\_\_\_ Where will NSE(s) be located?

\_\_\_\_\_ What US liaison elements are needed?

\_\_\_\_\_ Does the US have a process to ensure US liaison elements on multinational command staffs possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both US and multinational objectives?

\_\_\_\_\_ What multinational liaison elements are needed, who will provide them, what qualifications should they have, and where will they go?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are all the JDDOCs logistical C2 relationships and organizations specified in the GCC's TDP?

#### **d. Logistic Communications and Information Systems**

\_\_\_\_\_ Have the communications and intelligence systems been established to rapidly disseminate time-sensitive, logistic-related information to all participants?

\_\_\_\_\_ What automated logistic information planning tools are available to support COA analysis and to assist the MNFC logistic staff in ensuring operational priorities are fully supported? Is a coalition logistic database available to support logistic planning? Are participating nations being encouraged to populate the database with up-to-date information that is usable by coalition logistic planners?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are national logistic information systems interoperable, and are workarounds or contingency measures being implemented to facilitate exchange of critical logistic information?

\_\_\_\_\_ What mechanisms are in place to protect logistic information databases and communications systems to ensure continuous logistic support in case of a cyberspace attack?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are all logistical information planning tools located in the GCC's TDP?

**e. MNL Support Arrangements**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the concept for using RSN, LN, and multinational integrated logistic unit (MILU) arrangements for providing CUL support to the MNF? Have requirements for such arrangements been identified and particular nations, with the requisite capabilities, assigned the relevant responsibilities?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the US offered to assume RSN, LN, or MILU responsibilities? For what specific logistic functions and geographic area?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent can the US use theater support contracts to provide logistic support to MNF contingents? What arrangements (legal and otherwise) need to be implemented to allow for such use of US external support contract capabilities?

\_\_\_\_\_ If multinational theater support contract programs have been previously established, can such capabilities be used to provide CUL in the planned operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are the logistic capabilities of all participating nations—large and small—being fully leveraged through use of MNL arrangements to ensure the most operationally effective and efficient support of the MNF with the smallest logistics footprint?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are smaller participating nations that have compatible equipment encouraged to link together to enhance mutual support?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the implications of planned MNL arrangements for the size and structure of US logistic forces assigned to the operation and the time-phased deployment of specific units?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there a requirement for an MNF-wide mutual support agreement to facilitate mutual support among all participating nations? Is the US able to participate in such an agreement?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there a requirement for waivers to US legal authorities to conduct mutual logistic support with other nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What action is being taken to obtain waivers (if required) to US legal authorities to conduct mutual logistic support with other nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What US element is charged to ensure the necessary ACSAs and related implementing agreements are in place with participants?

\_\_\_\_\_ Does the US have an ACSA with each participating nation? If not, what will be the legal mechanism for exchanging logistic support?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the opportunity for the US to develop or use existing bilateral and multilateral agreements with PN involved in the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent do participating nations have open foreign military sales cases with the US to facilitate participating in US logistic support?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are all MNL support arrangements located in the GCC's TDP?

**f. Logistic Capabilities/Certification**

\_\_\_\_\_ What level of sustainment stocks is mandated by the MNFC to maintain in the OA? What level should US forces maintain?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are forces—MNF and US—sufficiently robust “logistically” to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have standards regarding logistic capabilities been established and what organization will inspect and ascertain compliance with logistic-related standards prior to deployment?

\_\_\_\_\_ Does the MNF logistic staff possess the requisite information regarding participant logistic capabilities in order to properly coordinate MNF logistics? Are there measures the MNF staff can take to assist nations in ameliorating any logistic deficiencies?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there a requirement for a formal logistic certification process, and, if so, how can it be conducted with maximum cooperation and understanding among participating nations?

**g. Managing Allocation of HNS**

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the MNF requirements for logistic support provided from sources in the OA?

\_\_\_\_\_ What infrastructure and other HN logistic resources are available in the OA to meet MNF requirements?

\_\_\_\_\_ What defense articles and services is the HN willing to provide and under what reimbursement conditions, and what resources must be procured through contracts with local providers?

\_\_\_\_\_ How is HNS provision and allocation to be managed and coordinated? Is the MNFC authorized by nations to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of nations and to prioritize allocation?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have the appropriate coordination channels been established with the HN to ensure timely provision of HNS where it is most needed? Have the US and other MNF nations established liaison teams in the MNF HQ and at key HNS locations to coordinate the provision of HNS to national contingents?

\_\_\_\_\_ What HNS agreements do the US and other MNF nations already have in place with HNs? How are pre-existing bilateral HNS arrangements to be integrated into a total MNF HNS structure?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have MNF nations agreed on a policy for reconciling conflicts in HNS allocation among nations?

**h. Contracting**

\_\_\_\_\_ Is the MNFC authorized to coordinate multinational contracting efforts in the OA in order to ensure priorities are efficiently supported?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the MNF HQ organization that will manage this process been identified?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are the MNF contracting policies and processes available?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is a “restricted items list” required to manage contracting for scarce resources in the OA?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the MJLC or equivalent organization be required to negotiate contracts for the entire MNF? If so, have participating nations assigned requisite personnel to the MNF contracting center?

\_\_\_\_\_ Does the US plan to use external support contracts during the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ Who will manage this process?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will there be a single MNF manager for external support contracts to include HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP, and other contracted support?

\_\_\_\_\_ Who will be the US manager to interface into this process?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the US identified the main point of contact of contractor personnel, including both theater and external support contractors?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are all OCS requirements located in the GCC's TDP?

**i. Common Funding**

\_\_\_\_\_ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the US identified funding to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?

**j. SOFAs/TAs**

\_\_\_\_\_ Who is responsible for negotiating a SOFA with the HN(s), including transited nations? What is the status of SOFA negotiations?

\_\_\_\_\_ Who is responsible for negotiating the TAs to supplement the SOFA?

\_\_\_\_\_ What logistics-related issues/items need to be addressed in the SOFA and TA(s)? For example, are US and other national contractors properly included as part of the MNF for purposes of SOFA rights and obligations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What US elements are participating in these negotiations?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the appropriate authority been delegated to the MNFC to negotiate and conclude with multinational partners agreements deemed necessary to conduct the planned operation?

**k. Relations with NGOs, International Organizations, and Local Populations**

\_\_\_\_\_ How will MNF logistic HQ coordinate with NGOs and international organizations? Will a CMOC be established for this purpose? If NATO is participating, will country cluster coordination meetings be held?

\_\_\_\_\_ What MNF logistic organizational element is authorized as the main point of contact with international organizations and NGOs?

\_\_\_\_\_ What efforts have been made to obtain logistics-related information from international organizations and NGOs operating in the area and to take advantage of their knowledge and contacts in the OA?

\_\_\_\_\_ What efforts have been made to coordinate activities with such organizations to reduce competition for local resources, enhance operational efficiency, and eliminate redundancy in operations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF concept for providing logistic support for the restoration of local government and other civil-military activities? What are the MNF and US logistic requirements to support local populations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF concept for assisting local governments and populations through acquisition of local goods and services?

**l. Engineering**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF concept for general engineering, combat engineering, geospatial support? How will MNF engineering activities be coordinated? Through what organizations?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have required projects been identified that benefit the entire MNF (e.g., bridge and main supply route construction)?

\_\_\_\_\_ What resources will be used to execute these projects? Who will provide the resources?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent are HNS and commercial resources available for such projects? What governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations provide engineer logistical support in the OA? How can MNFs leverage or be supplemented by those assets?

**m. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF EOD plan? How will EOD activities be coordinated? Through what organizations? What resources will be used to execute EOD operations? Who will provide the resources?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the logistic support requirements for that plan?

\_\_\_\_\_ If humanitarian demining operations are to be conducted, are US forces trained in the restrictions of demining placed on US forces?

**n. Joint Health Services**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF concept for medical support? What level of capability are nations required to provide their forces in the OA? What medical policy and guidance has been issued to participating nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What organizational element will coordinate medical support for the MNF during the operation? Have nations identified skilled personnel to staff the multinational medical coordination center?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are there any existing medical support agreements among participating nations or with the HN? What opportunities exist for multinational arrangements to consolidate and rationalize medical support in the OA? Have LN and RSN health service responsibilities been assigned to nations? Is there a role for multinational integrated medical units?

\_\_\_\_\_ What medical materiel (supplies and equipment) can the US offer to provide MNF contingents? Has the US JFC notified the MNF chief medical officer of all US legal restrictions that pertain to providing medical support to other nations' personnel and the terms and conditions of such support?

\_\_\_\_\_ What restrictions apply to US acceptance of medical support from other countries?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the quality of the medical capability in the OA?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent does US intend to contribute to and use an MNF blood bank?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there any plan for the US forces to develop an initial preplanned supply support package?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the approved commercial sources of medical products?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are medical treatment facilities identified to support the operation? What is the status of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) (intratheater) and aeromedical evacuation (intratheater and intertheater) plans?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent will US strategic aeromedical evacuation or battlefield MEDEVAC (air and ground) capabilities be required to support the MNF?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF and US theater (aeromedical evacuation and MEDEVAC) (air and ground) policy?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the process of reimbursement between US and multinational partners regarding the provision and receipt of medical assistance, including (aeromedical evacuation and MEDEVAC) (air and ground)?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have necessary provisions been made to allow rendering of such health services to foreign forces?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are all medical services accounted for in GCC's TDP?

**o. Health Services**

\_\_\_\_\_ What diseases exist in country?

**p. CBRN Threats**

\_\_\_\_\_ Are CBRN threats known and are US and MNF medical facilities prepared to cope with them (including prophylaxis and pretreatment)?

\_\_\_\_\_ What diseases exist in country?

\_\_\_\_\_ What plans do the US and the MNF have to decontaminate personnel and materiel and provide contamination mitigation and consequence management support?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent will the MNF and the US need to provide such support to the local civilian population?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will multinational laboratory support provide for the identification and confirmation of biological and chemical warfare agents and support selected biomonitoring requirements?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are alternate sites and capabilities identified in the event that key logistics nodes and infrastructure are subjected to CBRN hazards?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are essential contractors and key civilian workers included in CBRN FP planning?

**q. Mortuary Affairs**

\_\_\_\_\_ Are mortuary affairs procedures in place to process multinational decedents, to include recognition of culture differences and timely return to national authorities?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are all mortuary affairs activities accounted for in GCC's TDP?

**r. Detainee Management**

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF plan to handle and care for detainees? What are the US plan, role, and responsibilities?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be detainee turn-over procedures and to what nation?

**s. FP**

\_\_\_\_\_ What guidance has the MNFC issued regarding FP?

\_\_\_\_\_ What arrangements have been made with HNs and PNs for FP, especially in rear areas?

\_\_\_\_\_ What FP, if any, will be provided by HN and/or multinational partners to US forces, and what FP will the US be required to provide other national contingents of the MNF?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will there be a lead rear area security coordinator? What are the responsibilities of logistic units to provide local security and to coordinate with the lead rear area security organization?

\_\_\_\_\_ What element is responsible for FP planning?

\_\_\_\_\_ What element will be responsible to identify FP threats?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has munitions site planning been conducted?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have munitions control/security procedures been established?

**t. Operational Energy**

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the staff requested contingents provide estimated power requirements?

**u. Environmental Hazardous Waste**

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the staff legal office been consulted regarding applicable HN and other environmental law?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the higher authority guidance regarding environmental law and policy issues?

\_\_\_\_\_ What legal restrictions apply, if any, including the restrictions on the use of appropriated funds or the requirement to notify the CJCS, the Office of the Secretary Defense, or Congress?

\_\_\_\_\_ What, if any, MNFC guidance should be promulgated?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has an environmental checklist been prepared for use by contingents in assuming responsibility for intratheater facilities?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the applicable HN and other laws and policies relative to the handling, movement, storage, and disposal of hazardous material?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the staff requested contingents provide estimated power requirements?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the staff estimated base camp power requirements and developed an efficient power production and distribution plan?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has an energy surety checklist been prepared to assist contingent in identifying and prioritizing critical infrastructure and systems?

**3. Deployment**

\_\_\_\_\_ What automated system will be used to establish and execute the TPFDD?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be the US contribution to strategic lift of forces other than US?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO/international organization and contractor transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?

\_\_\_\_\_ What LOCs are to be established?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be the responsibilities assigned relative the LOCs from reception to intratheater destinations?

\_\_\_\_\_ What en route support will national elements require?

\_\_\_\_\_ What role will the multinational HQ play with regard to contributing nations and en route support?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF requirements determination process for flowing the forces into the theater?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has an MNF TPFDD/TPFDL been established? What is the method of insertion of forces into the theater?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there a need for a logistics over-the-shore operation? If so, is that identified in a separate plan?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF plan to manage the flow of force into the OA for the MNFC?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be the US management and operational responsibilities to support deployment?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF plan to use US strategic lift capability to support deployment?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be the reception ports of entry (to include border crossing points) into the OA?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are MNF security arrangements for the POEs/PODs?

\_\_\_\_\_ What LOCs will be used?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the plan to manage use of the LOCs?

\_\_\_\_\_ What LOC will the US use?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be the US responsibilities for that LOC?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is MNF reception, staging, and onward movement plan to include en route support for US forces?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the MNFC selected and allocated staging areas and tactical unit assembly areas?

\_\_\_\_\_ What staging areas and tactical assembly areas have been allocated by the MNFC for US use?

\_\_\_\_\_ What MNF agreements have been made for en route support of deploying forces, to include the US?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is the MNFC obtaining clearances for MNF elements transiting en routenations?

- \_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF security plan for reception points in objective area?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF plan for coordinating international organization and NGO movement into the OA?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What is the process to manage road and rail movement into and out of the theater?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Who has that management responsibility?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Who will be the US manager of that flow?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What are the reception requirements for the force moving by these modes?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Who has highway regulation and control responsibility?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have custom and border clearances been planned for? Obtained? By whom?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What HNS will be available, if any, to support US forces deploying into the OA?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What MNF and US logistic capabilities need to be deployed very early?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What initial assets has the MNFC identified as requiring visibility during deployment?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Does the US agree to provide such visibility to MNFC? To what extent will this information be shared with other MNF participants?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What is the mechanism and frequency of reporting such information?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Is there an FP plan covering force deployment?

#### **4. Termination/Redeployment**

The checklist for deployment also applies in large measure to the redeployment process. The following represent some additional issues associated with termination and redeployment.

- \_\_\_\_\_ Has the end state, exit strategy, and redeployment plan been developed by the MNFC?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What is the status of the US redeployment plan?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Have the redeployment TPFDD and TPFDL been developed and validated?
- \_\_\_\_\_ What are the HN and US customs/agriculture requirements?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have the US Customs and Border Clearance agencies, particularly the US Department of Agriculture, been contacted to determine requirements for returning cargo and passengers?

\_\_\_\_\_ If articles are left in theater, what are the procedures for transferring or disposing of those articles?

\_\_\_\_\_ What US forces, equipment, and materiel will remain in theater?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the support requirements for this force?

\_\_\_\_\_ What MNF forces and materiel will remain in place?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF plan to dispose of excess or unusable or equipment where transportation costs exceed new purchase costs?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF plan for disposal of hazardous items?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF FP plan for withdrawing forces?

\_\_\_\_\_ What logistic support will be required for withdrawal?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the MNF close-out plan for facilities? Does it include a checklist for environmental issues?

\_\_\_\_\_ What will be the role of LOGCAP, AFCAP, and NAVFAC contingency construction and service contracts during US withdrawal?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the estimated cost for facility restoration?

\_\_\_\_\_ Who will pay for the restoration? US or common funding?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the plan to dispose of equipment procured through MNF resources?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the destination for US equipment?

\_\_\_\_\_ What are the equipment readiness standards to be met before being redeployed?

\_\_\_\_\_ Where will withdrawing equipment be brought to standards? Are facilities adequate for the task?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have standards been established for equipment being relocated?

\_\_\_\_\_ Are there applicable accounting procedures for reporting financial expenditures and have reimbursement procedures been initiated?

\_\_\_\_\_ What is the plan to transition or close contingency bases as US forces draw down and redeploy?

## 5. Transition Considerations

\_\_\_\_\_ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the US be asked to provide additional logistic resources or units to support the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent can other participating nations provide logistic resources that will reduce the US logistic contribution to the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent have the additional logistic requirements of the operation been rationalized given the increased scope of the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent has the logistic structure been identified to meet logistic requirements above the maneuver unit level (e.g., corps or theater-level logistic units).

\_\_\_\_\_ How will the US JTF C2 structure be affected? Will the US assume command of the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ If the US is to lead the operation, to what extent will its C2 organization be augmented by personnel from other participating nations?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will an MNFC be established to coordinate logistic support for the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ What degree of authority for logistics will be given for the operation?

\_\_\_\_\_ How will costs of the operation be apportioned among participating members?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what degree will up-front common funding be made available and for what uses?

\_\_\_\_\_ Is there a need to develop MOAs to formalize relations among the participating nations? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements? Have appropriate MOAs been developed?

\_\_\_\_\_ What modifications are necessary to existing SOFAs and TAs to accommodate forces from the additional countries? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements?

\_\_\_\_\_ What agreements are necessary to permit the redistribution of logistic resources during emergency conditions? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements? Have all participating nations agreed to those provisions?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent will US logistic policies and procedures be changed to satisfy either UN or regional alliance policies and procedures?

\_\_\_\_\_ Have logistic policies, procedures, processes, and reporting requirements been identified and promulgated?

\_\_\_\_\_ Has the ability of transferred units to support themselves and/or logistic deficiencies been identified?

\_\_\_\_\_ If a NATO operation, to what extent and in what areas will NATO STANAGs be used?

\_\_\_\_\_ Will the participating nations provide logistically robust units that are self-sufficient?

\_\_\_\_\_ To what extent can existing contracts supporting US forces be amended to support the additional forces?

**APPENDIX F  
POINTS OF CONTACT**

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**United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)**

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**United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)**

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DSN: 567-1049

**United States Coast Guard (USCG)**

Phone: 202-372-1096

## APPENDIX G REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references.

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- b. AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*.
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## APPENDIX H ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

### 1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: [https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp\\_feedback\\_form.pdf](https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf) and e-mail it to: [js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil](mailto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil). These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

### 2. Authorship

a. The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Charles C. Pattillo Jr., Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)/Deputy Director Transregional Threats Coordination Cell (DDT2C2)/Multinational Operations Division (MOD); Mr. Glenn P. Palmer and Mr. Craig R. Corey, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch; and Mr. Peter L. Croteau, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

### 3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, 16 July 2013.

### 4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: [https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp\\_feedback\\_form.pdf](https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf) and e-mail it to: [js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil](mailto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil).

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

### 5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

### **6. Distribution of Publications**

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

### **7. Distribution of Electronic Publications**

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

## GLOSSARY

### PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AADC	area air defense commander
ABCANZ	American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
ACA	airspace control authority
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AFIC	Five Eyes Air Force Interoperability Council
AJP	Allied joint publication
AMCC	allied movement coordination center
AO	area of operations
APAN	All Partners Access Network
AUSCANNZUKUS	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAAF	contractors authorized to accompany the force
CAO	civil affairs operations
CBG	coalition building guide
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCC	coalition coordination center
CCDR	combatant commander
CCEB	Combined Communications-Electronics Board
CCMD	combatant command
CCP	combatant command campaign plan
CD	counterdrug
CEWCC	combined electronic warfare coordination cell
CID	combat identification
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CJ-4	combined-joint logistic office
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJTF	combined joint task force (NATO)
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
CUL	common-user logistics
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DCA	defense cooperation agreement
DLD	digital liaison detachment

DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
ECC	engineer coordination cell
EM	electromagnetic
EMOE	electromagnetic operational environment
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EU	European Union
EW	electronic warfare
FDO	foreign disclosure officer
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FID	foreign internal defense
FP	force protection
FSF	foreign security forces
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HNSCC	host-nation support coordination cell
HQ	headquarters
IAW	in accordance with
IO	information operations
IPi	indigenous populations and institutions
ISA	international standardization agreement
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISB	intermediate staging base
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
JCMEB	joint civil-military engineering board
JDDE	joint deployment and distribution enterprise
JDN	joint doctrine note
JEMSO	joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JFC	joint force commander
JFUB	joint facilities utilization board
JLEnt	joint logistics enterprise
JLSG	joint logistic support group
JMC	joint movement center
JP	joint publication

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JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JTCC	joint transportation coordination center
JTF	joint task force
JTLM	joint theater logistics management
JTMS	joint theater movement staff
LN	lead nation
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
MCI	multinational communications integration
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MILU	multinational integrated logistic unit
MISO	military information support operations
MJLC	multinational joint logistics center
MNCC	multinational coordination center
MNF	multinational force
MNFACC	multinational force air component commander
MNFC	multinational force commander
MNFLCC	multinational force land component commander
MNFMCC	multinational force maritime component commander
MNFSOCC	multinational force special operations component commander
MNL	multinational logistics
MNLC	multinational logistic center
MNTF	multinational task force
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MP	multinational publication
MPAT	Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
MSOG	Multinational Strategy and Operations Group
NALSS	naval advanced logistic support site
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	national disclosure policy
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NFLS	naval forward logistic site
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSE	national support element
OA	operational area
OCS	operational contract support
OE	operational environment
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan

OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PN	partner nation
PO	peace operations
PR	personnel recovery
PRCC	personnel recovery coordination center
ROE	rules of engagement
RSI	rationalization, standardization, and interoperability
RSN	role specialist nation
SA	situational awareness
SAR	search and rescue
SC	security cooperation
SCA	space coordinating authority
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA	staff judge advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	standard operating procedure
SSR	security sector reform
STANAG	standardization agreement (NATO)
TA	technical arrangement
TACON	tactical control
TDP	theater distribution plan
TF	task force
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations protection force
US BICES	United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System
US BICES-X	United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System Extended
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USG	United States Government
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

## PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.** Agreement, negotiated on a bilateral basis with countries or international organizations, that allow United States forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Also called **ACSA**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)

**combined.** A term identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**cross-servicing.** A subset of common-user logistics in which a function is performed by one Service in support of another Service and for which reimbursement is required from the Service receiving support. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)

**integrated staff.** A staff in which one officer only is appointed to each post on the establishment of the headquarters, irrespective of nationality and Service. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**lead nation.** The nation with the will, capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a multinational operation. Also called **LN**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**multinational doctrine.** The agreed-upon fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**multinational force commander.** A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. Also called **MNFC**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**multinational integrated logistic unit.** An organization resulting when two or more nations agree to provide logistics assets to a multinational logistic force under the operational control of a multinational commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. Also called **MILU**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)

**multinational logistics.** Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. Also called **MNL**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**multinational staff.** A staff composed of personnel of two or more nations within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)


**rationalization.** Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**role specialist nation.** A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Also called **RSN**. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)

**specialization.** An arrangement within an alliance wherein a member or group of members most suited by virtue of technical skills, location, or other qualifications assume(s) greater responsibility for a specific task or significant portion thereof for one or more other members. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

**status-of-forces agreement.** A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Also called **SOFA**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-16** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

