PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, assess, and support foreign internal defense.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine should be followed unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-22
DATED 12 JULY 2010

- This publication was validated without change on 02 February 2021.

- Updates the text to align with the new Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Security Cooperation.

- Synchronizes the use of foreign security force with JP 3-20.

- Clarifies the role of Air Force Special Operations Command combat aviation advisor in foreign internal defense (FID).

- Enhances the discussion of commander’s communication synchronization, public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations.

- Enhances the text to include discussions about the importance of threat networks in FID.

- Incorporates discussion about countering violent extremism association with FID, violent extremist organization, and the whole-of-government and international proactive actions.

- Incorporates discussion concerning Chief, National Guard Bureau, roles in accordance with (IAW) Title 10, United States Code, Section 342.

- Includes discussion of information as a joint function.

- Clarifies planning and execution of FID in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments.

- Enhances discussion of humanitarian and civic assistance coordination for supporting projects, IAW Department of Defense Instruction 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities.

- Adds text concerning the importance of multinational support and planning for multi-domain and transregional associations FID.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Discusses Foreign Internal Defense and the Instruments of National Power
• Describes Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations
• Identifies Foreign Internal Defense Categories
• Discusses internal defense and development strategies and programs
• Describes US Government organizations which conduct Foreign Internal Defense, and discusses their responsibilities
• Outlines Foreign Internal Defense Planning
• Discusses Foreign Internal Defense Training
• Describes Foreign Internal Defense Operations

Introduction

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a host nation (HN) government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The United States Government (USG) applies FID programs or operations within a whole-of-government approach to enhance an HN internal defense and development (IDAD) program by specifically focusing on an anticipated, growing, or existing internal threat. A FID program would typically be supported by the Department of Defense (DOD) through routine security cooperation (SC) activities as part of the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan.

FID may be planned and implemented as a program, an operation, or both. FID programs primarily entail
Executive Summary

SC activities (programs and authorities) integrated with interagency activities, as required, and under the coordinating authority of the US embassy country team as approved by the chief of mission (COM). A joint force commander (JFC) typically commands the FID operation, which may involve indirect support (training HN security forces), direct support (e.g., intelligence cooperation, logistic support, and civil-military operations [CMO]), and FID US combat operations, all in unified action with interagency and multinational partners as required.

**Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development**

IDAD encompasses the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, sabotage, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and other threats to its security. IDAD focuses on both internal security and building viable civic, social, and economic institutions that respond to the needs of the HN populace.

Based on US national security strategy, interests, and risk evaluation, a USG assessment can inform a policy decision to provide US foreign assistance to that IDAD program. US involvement may vary from simple military engagement and routine SC activities within a FID program up to a complex FID operation.

A FID program can also support other activities like counterterrorism (CT), counterdrug (CD), countering some other large or transregional extremist movement or criminal enterprise rather than counterinsurgency (COIN), or countering threat networks.

**Foreign Internal Defense and the Instruments of National Power**

One of the characteristics of FID is that it involves all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic).

**Security Cooperation**

SC involves all DOD interactions to develop foreign defense and security capabilities and build defense security relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and partner nation (PN) military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide
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Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations

US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and PNs.

Service and joint capabilities in military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities help the USG shape the operational environment (OE) and manage the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, while maintaining US global influence. These capabilities contribute to a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach to a transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threat by assuring US allies and partners to enhance the global network of relationships that enable effective operations. Foreign assistance can support or augment military engagements as routine SC activities or a FID program for an HN IDAD.

Foreign Internal Defense Categories

- **Indirect Support.** Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency, typically through SC activities.

- **Direct Support (Not Involving US Combat Operations).** These operations involve the use of US forces to provide direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle.

- **US Combat Operations.** The introduction of US combat forces during FID requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are capable of conducting independent combat operations. Based on the assessment of the threat, the US-HN combat operations will likely take the form of one or more of either COIN, CT, CD, or stabilization.

Internal Defense and Development

US FID programs align USG diplomacy, development, and security efforts with a designated HN that wishes to strengthen its own instruments of national power and improve its institutions, economy, and security conditions. The IDAD
Executive Summary

Program is advanced either through an HN request for support to the USG, a mutual USG and HN desired goal, or a USG proposition to an HN to improve its governance and security.

**Construct**

An IDAD program integrates security force and civilian actions into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may, in turn, promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

The Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and DOD provide the foundation to promote and protect US interests abroad.

**Functions**

An IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats:

- **Balanced development** attempts to achieve national objectives through diplomatic/political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus potentially alleviating frustration.
- **Security** includes all activities implemented to protect the populace from violence and to provide a safe environment for national development.
- **Neutralization** includes concepts that make a threat irrelevant to the political process.
- **Mobilization** provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support for the government.

**Tenets of Effective Foreign Internal Defense Operations**

Certain tenets guide efforts across the four IDAD functions:

- **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort is the product of successful unified action and is essential to prevent crisis and to defeat credible threats.
- **Optimized Use of Intelligence.** Optimized use of intelligence requires all operations be based on reliable, accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence.

- **Network Engagement and FID.** Network engagement activities are interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander’s objectives within an operational area.

- **Synchronized Use of CMO and Military Information Support Operations (MISO).** The effective use of CMO and MISO, fully coordinated with other operational activities, can enhance the legitimacy of HN forces and, ultimately, the stability of the HN.

- **Minimum Use of Force.** A threatened government must carefully examine all courses of action (COAs) in response to internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use of force to maintain order and incorporate economy of force.

- **A Responsive Government.** Positive measures are necessary to ensure a responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources, as well as to motivate the people, reflects its administrative and management capabilities.

- **Commander’s Communication Synchronization.** Effective communication synchronization is an important element of strategic direction during all FID operations.

**Organizational Guidance**

Organizations should follow the established political structure of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized planning and direction, facilitate decentralized execution of the plan, and be structured and chartered so it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies’ normal functions.
Organization and Responsibilities

Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the US will support through FID efforts. This decision is made by the President with advice from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other officials. Funding for these programs is appropriated by Congress.

The US considers FID support when the following three conditions exist:

- The existing or threatened internal disorder threatens US national strategic goals.
- The threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance.
- The threatened nation requests US assistance.

Ordinarily, when the decision limits FID support to minor levels of security assistance (SA) or CMO, there is no requirement to establish a special management program to facilitate interagency coordination. Larger FID efforts demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the combatant command (CCMD) and country team levels.

National-Level Organizations

The National Security Council (NSC) will generally provide the initial guidance of national-level decisions pertaining to FID. Specific guidance will also be provided to government agencies and departments. Key USG departments and agencies that normally take part in FID are:

- **DOS.** DOS is generally the lead for US FID (noncombat) operations.
- **Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).** The DNI and Director of the CIA support the FID mission in both a national-level advisory capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct support of FID activities.
- **DOD.** DOD national-level organizations involved in FID management include the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
### Combatant Commands

GCCs plan and execute military operations in support of FID within their area of responsibility (AOR). Other combatant commanders (CCDRs) play a supporting role by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the President or SecDef.

### Subordinate Unified Commands

A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. The responsibilities for FID support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the CCMDs. Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by the CCDR.

### The United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team

The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all USG departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and HN, except for employees under the command of a US military commander. However, this authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to an international agency. Close coordination with each COM and country team in the GCC’s AOR is essential to conduct effective, country-specific FID operations that support the HN’s IDAD program and US regional goals and objectives.

### Multinational Foreign Internal Defense Force

Each multinational operation in support of FID is different, and key considerations involved in planning and execution may vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members.

### Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities and capabilities are factors the JFC assesses when selecting a COA. The country team, USAID representatives, or civil affairs teams are the best sources of information on those NGOs. The joint force staff should develop an understanding of the
location of existing NGOs and areas where the NGOs are focusing their efforts.

**Planning**

**NSC Directives Promulgate US FID Policy.** Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents reflect the military responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance.

The responsibility for FID missions will rest with one of two USG departments—DOD or DOS.

The theater planning process incorporates the majority of DOD and DOS efforts and identifies activities intended to help shape the theater in which the activities will be conducted. Depending on whether the mission has originated through DOD or DOS, how, where, and at what level the planning, coordination, and resourcing takes place will vary.

**Planning Imperatives**

When integrating FID into strategies and plans, basic imperatives include the need to:

- Maintain HN sovereignty and build legitimacy.
- Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US assistance efforts before commencing FID.
- Tailor military support to FID to the OE and the specific needs of the supported HN.
- Incorporate unified action and unity of effort.
- Understand US foreign policy.
- Understand the information environment.
- Sustain the effort.
- Protect the effort.

**Department of Defense Guidance**

The majority of military planning for FID takes place at the CCMD level. GCCs base strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in the JSPS.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the Defense Strategy Review (DSR).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01, *(U)* 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (commonly referred to as the JSCP) implements the strategic policy direction provided in the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF) and initiates the planning process for the development of campaign, contingency, and posture plans. The GEF integrates DOD planning guidance into a single, overarching document. Through the guidance and resources provided in the JSCP, the GCCs develop their operation plans and concept plans to support FID.

**Theater Planning Requirements**

GCCs may develop theater strategies and campaign plans that support taskings by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level.

**Planning Procedures and Considerations**

The military plans and executes missions through Adaptive Planning and Execution, which provides the framework for operational activities and the planning and execution functions. The framework is a continuous process that synchronizes both the plans and their execution with a feedback loop informed by assessments.

**Planning for Force Protection**

JFCs and their subordinate commanders address force protection (FP) during all phases of FID operations, from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment.

**Foreign Internal Defense Assessment**

Those responsible for conducting FID operations assess what activities to conduct. DOS representatives work with foreign governments and DOD representatives work with foreign military personnel to develop IDAD programs that are consistent with US foreign policy objectives and useful to the country concerned. The SC planning process is used to assess currently implemented programs and exercises.
Military Resources. Special operations forces (SOF) are beneficial forces of choice for FID due to their extensive language capability, cultural training, advising skills, and regional expertise. However, FID requirements in theater and transregional conflicts can exceed available SOF capacity. Conventional forces, when designated, should be prepared to conduct FID operations.

Interagency Resources. JFCs consider capabilities and availabilities of interagency resources when planning for FID operations. During execution, the country team normally coordinates and synchronizes military operations with interagency initiatives and activities. This allows for the most capable and similar organizations to work together in developing effective and efficient HN resources.

Operational Contract Support (OCS). OCS is planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Contract support can be a valuable, enabling resource from logistics, training support, and contracted instructors for the various categories of FID indirect support, direct support, and US combat operations.

Training Joint Forces

Training, Knowledge, and Skills Needed for Success

Training needed for successful military operations in support of FID includes:

- Overall US and theater goals.
- Area and cultural orientation.
- Language training.
- Standards of conduct.
- Coordinating relationships with other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations.
- Legal parameters.
- Rules of engagement.
- Tactical FP training.

Foreign Internal Defense Training Strategy

Preparation for military operations to support FID requires training that covers a broad range of topics. The training must also be designed to support a mix of personnel, ranging from
language-trained and culturally focused SOF to those untrained in the specific area where the FID operation is being conducted. Some training, such as language qualification, requires an investment in time and money that will not be practical for all personnel. A combination of institutional and unit-conducted individual and collective training will be required.

Training Host Nation Forces

**Training Plan**

Developing a training plan for the HN is paramount for US support to FID and establishing the HN security forces capacity to support the IDAD strategy. The JFC develops a training plan based on thorough mission analysis and assessment of the IDAD strategy, HN capabilities and needs, and the OE. This plan should be developed in conjunction with both the country team and with commanders of HN forces to ensure comprehensive objectives are detailed.

**Training and Advising**

There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. In general, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions where joint force personnel are not likely to be forced to engage any armed threat. In equal generality, advisory assistance may entail some operational advice and assistance beyond training in less secure areas.

**Operations**

**Employment Considerations**

FID activities are part of the unified actions of the CCMD and emphasize interagency coordination. Even small, tactical operations will usually require interagency coordination, most likely through the security coordination operation (SCO).

**Employment Factors**

- **Information Impact.** During FID, plan integrated information activities early before the start of FID and often before the joint force has deployed to the operational area.
- **MISO Impact.** Regardless of where or when MISO are conducted, the FID and IDAD objectives should be kept in mind.
• **Intelligence Support.** A thorough intelligence analysis should focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic aspects of the area, as well as on an analysis of hostile elements.

• **The nature of FID missions and the high degree of dependence on human intelligence sources necessitate an active counterintelligence (CI) and operations security (OPSEC) program.**

• **Force Selection.** In general, US forces have some ability to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign forces. The degree to which they can be tasked to do so depends on their preparation in terms of language and other skills and the knowledge necessary to function within the OE.

• **Public Information Programs.** Public information is important during all phases of any FID mission. While it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to HN personnel through MISO, it is also important to employ an effective public affairs program to inform HN and US publics of current FID actions, goals, and objectives.

• **Logistic Support.** During FID, logistic operations support both US forces and primary operational missions (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities).

• **CD Operations in FID.** Narcotics production and trafficking can flourish in countries where subversion, sabotage, lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency exist. Accordingly, FID operations complement CD efforts by reducing those problems in HNs.

• **Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations in FID.** A JFC tasked for a FID operation must assess the potential of weapons of mass destruction being available and controlled or used by potential insurgents/terrorists and their external supporters.

• **CT and FID.** Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can all contribute to the growth of
Executive Summary

terrorism. FID can complement CT by reducing these contributing factors.

- **OPSEC.** A major problem in all FID activities is ensuring critical information and indicators about friendly intentions, capabilities, limitations, and activities are identified early in the planning process so appropriate measures and countermeasures are in place to protect them throughout the execution of the activities.

**Health Service Support**

US joint medical personnel and forces can be employed as indirect support or direct support during a FID operation. The predominant types of activities applied depend on the organization and capability of the HN military medical forces and the HN civilian health sector, as well as their respective roles in that nation’s IDAD program. For US joint medical forces, health activities will include varying degrees of military-military activities and medical civil-military operations.

**Indirect Support**

The three broad approaches to indirect support include SA, joint and multinational exercises, and exchange programs.

**Security Assistance**

In the SA arena, GCCs and subordinate JFCs do not have authority over the SA program but have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. GCCs are active in the SA process by advising ambassadors through the SCO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AOR. In addition, through coordination with the foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting SCOs, the GCC can assist in identifying and scoping requirements to support SA programs that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional FID operations.

**Joint and Multinational Exercises**

Joint and multinational exercises can enhance a FID operation. They offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering limited HN training opportunities. The participation of US forces in these exercises, primarily designed to enhance the training and readiness of US forces, is funded by operation and
Executive Summary

Exchange Programs
Exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other. Exchange programs are another building block that can help a commander round out the FID plan. These are not stand-alone programs; however, when commanders combine them with other FID tools, the result can be a comprehensive program that fully supports the HN IDAD program.

Direct Support (Not Involving United States Combat Operations)
This category of support involves US forces actually conducting operations in support of the HN. This is different from providing equipment or training support to enhance the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations. Direct support operations provide immediate assistance and are usually combined in a total FID effort with indirect operations.

Three types of direct support operations critical to supporting FID across all categories are CMO, MISO, and OPSEC.

Security Force Assistance
Security force assistance encompasses joint force activities conducted within unified action to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise, and assist FSF in support of an HN’s efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, HN, or regional security forces and their supporting institutions. This includes activities from the ministry level to the tactical units and the national security sector.

Logistic Support
Logistic support operations are limited by US law without an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA). Such support usually consists of transportation or limited maintenance support, although an ACSA can allow additional support in areas beyond those. However, ACSAs permit the reimbursable exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services with HN military. The existence, potential application, and limitations of
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an ACSA with the HN’s military forces should be considered when planning.

**Intelligence and Information Sharing**

Information cooperation is enabled by an information sharing environment that fully integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, country team, and CCDR’s intelligence staff, thus establishing the basis for any intelligence and communications sharing. CI elements can provide this support with HN military CI elements, security service, and police forces when deployed in support of FID operations. Other national-level baseline intelligence support (e.g., geospatial intelligence) may be provided via established or ad hoc memorandums of agreement or through national-level liaison teams as required.

**United States Combat Operations**

US participation in combat operations as part of a FID effort requires Presidential approval. The condition of the supported nation may descend into a failing state where coordination between DOD and DOS authorities occurs during planning or after assessing the FID impact. The COM has a series of security, defense, and development authorities that, when synchronized with DOD authorities, may have greater impact. This coordination should occur at the GCC and COM level or, in special cases, the USG special envoy/representative levels.

**Transition and Redeployment**

Redeployment of units conducting FID operations does not typically indicate the end of all FID operations in the HN. Rather, in long-term FID operations, as security and other conditions improve and internal threats become manageable for HN personnel, direct military-to-military activities by units will continue, but these activities may become more intermittent with gaps between regular exercises and exchanges. In ongoing FID operations, continuous coverage by US units generally involves mission handoff from one unit to its replacement. Redeployment, if conducted haphazardly or prematurely, can set FID operations back substantially.
Termination of Operations

The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the HN and regional countries. It is essential to understand that termination of operations is a vital link between NSS, DSR, NMS, and the desired national strategic end state(s).

Termination Approaches

There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military force. The first is to force an imposed settlement by the threat of or actual occupation of an enemy’s land, resources, or people. The second approach seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that, to yield will be less painful than to continue to resist. The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the irregular challenges posed by non-state actors is an indirect approach that erodes an adversary’s power, influence, and will; undermines the credibility and legitimacy of its political authority; and undermines an internal threat’s influence and control over and support by the indigenous population.

National Strategic End State

The first and primary strategic task regarding termination of intensive FID operations is to determine an attainable national strategic end state based on clear national strategic objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achieving these objectives is necessary to attain the national strategic end state and the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. In FID, this is determined with the HN civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually beneficial. The President or SecDef approves specified standards that must be met before a FID operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of support.

Mission Handoff Procedures

The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command lies with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining
the handoff process lies with the incoming commander since he will assume responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission will continue.

**Military Considerations**

Military strategic advice to USG and HN leadership regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility and acceptability, as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. An essential consideration is ensuring the longer-term stabilization and the enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continue upon the conclusion of sustained operations.

**Post Mission Debriefing Procedures**

The unit commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission and all relevant informational subsets. The debrief should begin with the updated area study and continue with other relevant issues. The range of topics can include military geography; political parties; military forces; insurgents; security forces; insurgent forces, targets, and target audiences; ongoing civil affairs operations; logistics; health service and supply issues; and ongoing joint, interagency, international, and multinational projects or operations.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, assess, and support FID.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“Although on the surface, FID [foreign internal defense] appears to be a relatively simple concept, that appearance is deceptive; FID is a much more nuanced and complicated operation than its definition at first implies. FID is often confused with or equated to training foreign forces, when in reality, there is much more to it.”

Lieutenant Colonel John Mulbury
ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces],
General [Conventional] Purpose Forces and FID
Special Warfare, January-February 2008

1. General

a. Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a host nation (HN) government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security. The United States Government (USG) and Department of Defense (DOD) face increasingly larger volume of threats; counter-influence activities against the US and allies; and more violent threats that operate transregionally, span activities across multi-domains, and organize to operate multi-functionally. One of the activities geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) can apply to counter these threats in multiple countries, but organized from an ideological credence, is FID, which supports each affected nation’s security. The USG applies FID programs or operations within a whole-of-government approach to enhance an HN internal defense and development (IDAD) program by specifically focusing on an anticipated, growing, or existing internal threat. A FID program would typically be supported by DOD through routine security cooperation (SC) activities as part of the GCC’s combatant command campaign plan (CCP).

b. Military engagement, SC, and deterrence encompass a wide range of activities where the US military is applied as an instrument of national power to build security relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and partner nation (PN) capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and deter adversaries. Within the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) theater strategy, SC and the associated programs, activities, and missions play a key role in understanding and shaping the operational environment (OE). Within the range of military operations, GCCs and functional combatant commanders (FCCs) routinely conduct military engagement and SC using global, theater, and functional campaign plans and as part of the USG international agreements mutually concluded between the US and those PNs. The Department of State (DOS) manages foreign assistance, which includes development assistance, security assistance (SA), and humanitarian assistance. DOD uses foreign assistance to support an HN’s IDAD strategy and program. The HN’s IDAD strategy and programs, supported by DOS foreign assistance, promotes security against threats and sustainable development of responsive civic, social, and economic institutions. The strategic goal is to promote local and regional stability.
c. The security cooperation organization (SCO) has a unique role as the primary interface between the GCC, US ambassador or chief of mission (COM), and HN on all SA and SC matters. The SCO performs its SA and cooperation management functions under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as well as other authorities. If the internal threat requires a significant military effort, the USG may require a FID operation as a contingency operation or in crisis response. In the context of this publication, internal threats include threats manifested within the internationally recognized boundaries of a nation, whether externally supported or not. These threats may include, but are not limited to, subversion, political violence, sabotage, insurgency (including support to insurgency), terrorism, violent extremism, and criminal activities. These activities are conducted by a multitude of groups that may seek to perpetuate insurgency during periods of instability by conducting criminal activities that can generate further instability, such as trafficking illicit drugs, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and human trafficking. While such threats present themselves internally, some may be supported from outside the country by a transregional or non-state organization, an international criminal organization, or another nation sponsoring instability through a surrogate or proxy.

*For more information on violent extremism, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency.*

2. **Foreign Internal Defense**

   a. Conducted through a whole-of-government approach (in unified action) to support a PN, FID may be planned and implemented as a program, an operation, or both. FID programs primarily entail SC activities (programs and authorities) integrated with interagency activities, as required, and under the coordinating authority of the US embassy country team as approved by the COM. FID programs entail limited direct support (e.g., intelligence cooperation) and FID indirect support and may include all aspects of SA and security force assistance (SFA) as the means for achieving FID program objectives. If a FID program cannot keep pace with the internal threats, or a friendly nation experiences an overwhelming internal threat, then a USG contingency or crisis response could necessitate a FID operation, likely conducted using special funding and authorities for a contingency/crisis. A joint force commander (JFC) typically commands the FID operation, which may involve indirect support (training HN security forces), direct support (e.g., intelligence cooperation, logistic support, and civil-military operations [CMO]), and FID US combat operations, all in unified action with interagency and multinational partners as required.

   b. While FID is one of the designated core special operations activities of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its subordinate commands, FID can be supported by the joint force, multinational forces (MNFs), and other USG departments and agencies. FID is not just a military operation; rather, it typically includes an interorganizational approach to assisting an HN’s security, stability, and development. FID requires a whole-of-government approach focused on achieving and leveraging unified action by all participants through facilitating practices such as interoperability, integration, and interdependence. Interoperability is the ability to act
together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates as a whole. Interdependence is the purposeful reliance by multiple departments and agencies, MNFs, or Services on the other’s capabilities to maximize any complementary and reinforcing effects, interdependence, and level of capabilities. Interdependence varies with the level of capability and in the degree of applicability and conduct among special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (CF), DOD and interagency partners, the USG, and multinational partners. JFCs leverage these practices by including such determinations during planning. Observations and insights gained through lessons learned continually reinforce the reality that interoperability and integration are fleeting; they are never completely achieved and must be continually pursued.

c. The JFC supporting a FID effort may employ capabilities provided by both SOF and CF. A large FID operation may be conducted through the command and control (C2) structure of a joint task force (JTF) or special operations joint task force (SOJTF). When SOF and CF are integrated, appropriate C2 or liaison elements should be exchanged or provided to the appropriate interoperability components of a joint force.

For additional detail on SOF and CF relationships, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations, and Field Manual (FM) 6-05/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)3-30.4/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-05.19/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence.

3. Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development

It is important to frame a FID effort within the context of US strategy and policy and to understand how the USG uses a FID program to support and enhance an HN IDAD program to create or improve security and stability.

a. IDAD encompasses the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, sabotage, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and other threats to its security. IDAD focuses on both internal security and building viable civic, social, and economic institutions that respond to the needs of the HN populace. A foreign nation that is anticipating or faced with internal security threats establishes an IDAD strategy to combine internal defense with other essential developmental efforts and then implements that strategy through an IDAD program. Based on US national security strategy, interests, and risk evaluation, a USG assessment can inform a policy decision to provide US foreign assistance to that IDAD program. US involvement may vary from simple military engagement and routine SC activities within a FID program up to a complex FID operation. An example of a FID program that develops into a FID operation is US forces supporting an HN counterinsurgency (COIN) operation to suppress an identified insurgency or rebellion that fails to achieve FID program objectives but escalates into a larger US military
commitment involving stability and combat support. Ultimately, the focus of a US FID program or operation is to support the HN IDAD program.

b. FID is the participation by other USG departments and agencies and the US military in any program or operation taken to support the security and stability of another government and to protect its society. FID also supports an HN IDAD strategy consistent with US national security objectives and policies. FID is functionally related to foreign assistance, which supports the HN not only through SA but also development assistance, by promoting sustainable development and growth of various indigenous institutions. These efforts support US goals to promote long-term HN and regional stability. A good example of FID supporting an HN IDAD strategy that aligned with US goals and objectives is Plan Colombia. The Colombian government developed Plan Colombia and was

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEFENSE AND
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT IN COLOMBIA

During the early years of the twenty-first century, Colombia was arguably the number one US security concern in the Western Hemisphere. The security concerns for Colombia included a stable government, the expansion of illicit narcotics production and distribution networks, and parts of Colombia dominated by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC). The US had been providing economic and security sector assistance to Colombia for decades, but in the late 1990s, Colombia eclipsed Peru and Bolivia as the single largest producer of coca used in the production of cocaine. The Colombian central government had limited institutional capacity of the state to extend governance and security, especially into remote areas dominated by paramilitary insurgents such as the FARC. As a result, the US determined that Colombia needed a larger Department of Defense and Department of Justice engagement plan to combat illicit narcotics distribution into the US and assist with stabilizing those Colombian regions challenged by the FARC. In 1999, the US Congress appropriated $165 million in aid to Colombia, making them the US Government’s third largest recipient of aid behind Israel and Egypt.

Thomas Pickering, the Under Secretary of State, a career ambassador, and an experienced diplomat in Latin American affairs, advocated for a long-term national plan for Colombia rather than a series of short-term incremental plans requiring yearly US Agency for International Development support. It was also imperative that the Colombian government become more proficient in linking their long-term security plan with counter-narcotics and counterterrorism operations. The Colombian security plan strategy included the synchronization for resources and personnel across the ministries, thereby engaging the creative talents of all Colombians in the rebuilding of their nation.
Jamie Ruiz, a Colombian, and the Chief of Staff for Colombian President Andres Pastrana, authored “Plan Colombia” linking economic development and security to the peace process. The “Plan Colombia” was an internal defense and development (IDAD) plan developed by the Colombian government that aligned with US goals to improve many areas of security, governance, economy, and criminal activities. In the words of Dr. Gabriel Marcella, an instructor of strategy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College and a former advisor to the Commander of United States Southern Command, “Plan Colombia endeavored to strengthen the state, reenergize an economy with deep unemployment, generate the conditions necessary for the pursuit of peace, control the expansion of illegal crops and drug trafficking, and restore civil society. In other words, Plan Colombia ...(was) nothing less than a grand strategy for the remaking of the nation into a secure democratic society freed of violence and corruption.” Similar to an IDAD, “Plan Colombia” was not exclusively a military or security strategy, but it was an inclusive plan that spanned the Colombian ministries efforts to stabilize the country.

The US initially committed to spend $7.5 billion in combined assistance over five years (to 2005) in the areas of human rights and judicial reform, expansion of counter-narcotics operations, alternative economic development, and increased interdiction and assistance to Colombian police forces. “Plan Colombia” extended until 2015, and the effort then became known as “Peace Colombia” until the Colombian Congress ratified a revised peace accord in November 2016 (following a failed popular referendum) that ended the conflict between FARC and the government of Colombia. “Plan Colombia” achieved mixed results for both the US and Colombia. While Colombia remains the world’s largest producer of cocaine and grower of coca and the US remains a huge consumer of cocaine, the plan is a US foreign policy success. Although the peace accord with FARC remains deeply unpopular with half of Colombian citizens, the plan helped bolster the social, political, and military lines of effort to modernize the government and stabilize the country.

Gabriel Marcella, Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives, Strategic Studies Institute, (US Army War College)

approved by the US Ambassador and supported by multiple USG departments and agencies. The US FID support by DOD included SOF supporting Colombian counter-narcotics and counterterrorism development to improve their capabilities against illicit narcotics networks and the emerging terrorist groups.

c. FID requires unified action through interagency coordination (i.e., a whole-of-government approach) and, when applicable, through interorganizational cooperation (i.e., a comprehensive approach). However, the HN, in coordination with the US country team, will likely determine the participants supporting the HN IDAD program. Also, not all
multinational partners will necessarily make a military contribution, as some, for example, may be more inclined to support development of social or economic institutions. US military support to FID helps the HN to anticipate, preclude, and counter internal threats while simultaneously addressing the drivers and root causes of instability. Emphasis on internal developmental programs, as well as internal defense programs and operations, is essential when organizing, planning, and executing military support to US FID activities. FID includes three categories: indirect support (training foreign security forces [FSF]), direct support (e.g., intelligence cooperation, logistic support, and CMO), and US combat operations, all of which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, “Operations.”

(1) In support of defense strategy and policy priorities, including combatant command (CCMD) campaign plans, defense institution building is conducted to promote principles vital to the establishment of defense institutions that are effective, accountable, transparent, and responsive to national political systems, especially regarding good governance, oversight of security forces, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.

(2) Success in providing internal security would allow for increasing development opportunities. Military engagement and SC activities used for routine shaping under a global campaign plan, CCDR’s CCPs, functional plans for competition below the threshold of armed conflict, or a contingency plan may coincide with HN development assistance in a FID program. These efforts may persist throughout the range of military operations but can have significant impact during early shaping of the OE in designated countries or the region. However, if an emerging internal threat presents increased instability and risk, it may require increased activities in the form of a more robust FID effort. This may trigger a transition to the deter phase of an operation.

(3) If that internal threat grows despite the ongoing US-HN FID effort, and significant escalation in size or complexity of the FID operation is required, it would likely be reflected in the transition to subsequent campaign phases of a limited contingency operation or a major operation. Such a transition could include not only more aggressive indirect support and direct support categories of FID but it may also necessitate the third category of FID, US combat operations. For example, that level of FID involvement could include US forces conducting COIN operations or other security operations for, or combined with, FSF. When conducting operations alongside a PN, this type of involvement transitions from FID to support to multinational operations. Support to multinational operations can take many forms and may include SFA (e.g., combat advising).

d. A FID program can also support other activities like counterterrorism (CT), counterdrug (CD), countering some other large or transregional extremist movement or criminal enterprise rather than COIN, or countering threat networks (CTN). Although most of the FID programs may remain focused on COIN, in a complex and rapidly changing security environment, US FID planners should anticipate threats to an HN’s internal stability. These threats may include civil disorder; criminal gangs; and activities, to include illicit drug, arms, or human trafficking; terrorism; radicalization; and resource competition among ethnic groups. While these threats may feed a growing insurgency, they may also become predominant as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic
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rivalries surface, or the economic incentives of criminal activities persist, all driven by globalization, diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts. Therefore, planning and preparation for US military response should increasingly account for transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional threats. These developmental aspects of IDAD fall outside the scope of FID but highlight the difficulty of progressing with development assistance while internal security remains tenuous. FID involves the support of an HN government and its military, FSF, or paramilitary forces. FID remains a US whole-of-government approach that supports an HN government’s IDAD plan to preserve the sovereignty of the HN.

For additional information on COIN, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency. For more information on CTN, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

e. US military operations supporting FID typically provide training, materiel, advice, assistance, or accompaniment to local forces executing an IDAD program. Such efforts occur through SFA rather than US forces independently conducting military missions for the HN. Military operations are, at least to some degree, intertwined with foreign assistance provided by non-DOD agencies in the form of SC, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), or SA described in legislation such as the FAA of 1961 (Title 22, United States Code [USC], Chapter 32), as amended; the AECA of 1976 (Title 22, USC, Chapter 39), as amended; and Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), USC. FID assistance should also take into consideration US law that prohibits providing funds to the enemy (see Title 10, USC, Section 2302).

See Chapter II, “Internal Defense and Development,” for a detailed discussion regarding IDAD.

4. Foreign Internal Defense and the Instruments of National Power

a. As shown in Figure I-1, one of the characteristics of FID is that it involves all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Examples of how these instruments are applied include SA and collaborative intelligence sharing. Although this publication centers on the military instrument’s contribution, it is also important to understand the overlying national strategy that directs FID activities and how all instruments of national power support these activities.

b. The goal of the USG use of the instruments of national power and FID is to assist foreign nations in the development and use of their own national power. The ability of the US to advance its national interests is dependent on its ability to employ the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The US does this throughout the range of military operations through SC, FID, or major operations. FID leverages the instruments of national power to focus on a foreign nation’s power to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, sabotage, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and other threats to security. The FID operational framework, shown in Figure I-2, is discussed in more detail throughout the remainder of this chapter.
Diplomatic Instrument. A dysfunctional political system in a nation can result in internal instability. This type of government can erode its legitimacy internationally and, more important, with the nation’s populace. The lack of governance results in lawlessness and internal instability. Diplomacy is the first instrument exercised by the US, and depending upon the decisions made by the President or the President’s designee, diplomacy may be the only practical instrument of national power that can influence the situation. Indirect and direct military support provided through training, logistics, or other specified support, however, all may make significant diplomatic contributions by demonstrating US commitment and resolve.

d. Informational Instrument

(1) FID requires strong trust and credibility between the US and HN-supported forces, as well as among all partners. This trust and credibility increases when words and actions are aligned and communication is consistent with USG strategic guidance. JFCs use the commander’s communication synchronization (CCS) process to implement strategic-level guidance to coordinate, synchronize, and ensure the integrity and consistency of strategic- to tactical-level narratives, themes, messages, images, and actions throughout joint operations. JFCs, their component commanders, and staffs coordinate and adjust CCS plans, programs, products, and actions with the other interorganizational participants employed throughout the operational area (OA), such as the various COMs relevant to the joint operation. Effective CCS focuses processes and efforts to understand and communicate with key audiences and create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance USG interests, policies, and objectives.
Synchronization of information-related capabilities, public affairs (PA), and other actions is essential for successful CCS. CCS effectively manages the rapid flow of information and resources across different national security instruments and elements.
information, which is enabled by the advancements in media distribution methods. CCS during FID, in particular, requires many factors, including communication means, theme context, and established patterns of communication within the culture where FID activities occur. Synchronized communication based on strategic guidance attempts to manage the positive and negative influences on the populace’s behavior. In accordance with (IAW) guidance as part of the CCS process, information operations (IO) integrates relevant information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation (LOOs) to influence the decision making of adversaries. PA are communication activities designed to inform external and internal audiences about military operations in a timely manner. Public information, in the context of PA, is information of a military nature, the dissemination of which is consistent with security and approved for public release. Synchronized communication planning is necessary to manage USG and local government information internationally and locally to affected populations. FID activities may lead to public misunderstanding of USG support to a region and may be exploited by elements hostile to the US and its allies. US foreign assistance (development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA) has often been met with skepticism by the American public and typically has been the target for propaganda against USG efforts. FID offers a mechanism to demonstrate US security and development support to the HN government and indigenous population in a positive light, but it should not be rendered at the expense of a supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid.

(3) Cultural and social sensitivities must be considered during FID negotiations and agreements. Accurate portrayal of US FID efforts through positive information programs can influence worldwide perceptions of the US FID efforts and the HN’s desire to embrace changes and improvements necessary to correct its problems, as well as deter those opposed to such changes. Additionally, some HNs may be willing to accept informational or intelligence support more readily than types of military support that are more visible to internal and external audiences.

e. **Military Instrument**

(1) With Presidential direction, FID involves the use of US combat units and advisors in roles intended to stabilize the nation with indigenous FSF and ensure the sovereignty of a PN and its vital institutions. The US military plays an important supporting role through FID activities that complement a PN’s IDAD strategy. In some cases, the role of the US military may become more important because military officials have greater access to, and credibility with, national regimes that are heavily influenced or dominated by their own military. In such cases, success may depend on US representatives being able to persuade the PN government and military authorities to lead or support reform efforts aimed at eliminating or reducing corruption and human rights abuse. FID supports Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, to strengthen the ability of the US to help allies and PNs build their own security capacity. US military support requires joint planning and execution to ensure the efforts of all participating CCMDs, subordinate joint force commands, and/or Service or functional components are mutually supportive and focused. **FID can only occur when an HN has asked for assistance.** See Figure I-3 for examples of indirect support, direct support, and US combat operations. These categories represent significantly different levels of US diplomatic and military
commitment and risk. It should be noted, however, that various activities and operations within these categories can occur simultaneously. As an example, indirect and direct support (not involving combat operations) may continue even when US forces are committed to a combat role. Additionally, when conducting FID support to combat operations, many levels of the US role are considered and applied. US policy informs US FID support to combat operations that can allow or prohibit US integration with the FSF during combat operations. The JFC can also place restrictions on US forces based on the FSF progression timeline and JFC intent to reduce FSF reliance on US assets or capability. Additionally, US forces can be allowed to conduct unilateral operations that are

![Diagram of Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities](image-url)

**Figure I-3. Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities**
coordinated with FSF and approved by the HN, or US forces can be relegated to only supporting FSF operations.

(2) Planning is crucial to determine what tasks the US forces must provide the FSF during HN combat operations and what US policy allows. As a result of US policy and planning for US FID support to combat operations, various roles can be assigned to US forces. The US roles are known as advise, assist, and accompany in relation to US force interaction with the FSF. The challenge for US trainers and advisors is the actual observation, assessing, and advising interaction with FSF performance during training, mission rehearsals, and, finally, FSF combat operations. FID support to combat operations may either allow US and FSF integration during combat operations or restrict US participation. The advise role is viewed as the least permissive and generally allows US forces to only train and advise at FSF training locations but not go with the FSF during operations. The advise role normally restricts US integration during FSF operations and involves training only, training and equipping, or training and advising. A US role for assist, which is more permissive, can allow US integration during FSF operations with caveats that may restrict US forces from physically going with the FSF through their final assault. The assist role can permit US forces and assets supporting FSF operations during enemy engagement and attempts to provide US capability support to the trained FSF (i.e., US intelligence support, air support, medical support). The accompany role is the most permissive and allows US integration with the FSF during all phases of their combat operations. A US accompany role where US advisors are authorized to accompany the trained FSF on operations normally includes advising and providing connectivity or US control with US supporting assets. The US commitment is determined by US policy; international commitment; and whether the threat is either exclusive to the nation where the US is supporting FID, a mutual threat to both the US and supported nation, or a transregional threat.

f. Economic Instrument. Economic factors influence every aspect of FID. Often, the internal strife a supported nation faces is brought on by unfavorable economic conditions within that nation, which lead to public anger against the government. These conditions weaken national institutions and infrastructures and contribute to instability, particularly when the government is perceived as not being able to meet the basic needs of the people. These instabilities may produce an environment ripe for increased subversion, sabotage, lawlessness, and insurgency. The US economic instrument is used in a variety of ways, ranging from direct financial assistance and favorable trade arrangements to the provision of the foreign military financing (FMF) programs under SA.

g. Selected Sources of Power Applied Through the Instruments of National Power

(1) Financial. The financial activities of the nation promote the conditions for prosperity and stability in the US and encourage prosperity and stability in the rest of the world. The Department of the Treasury is the primary USG department responsible for the economic and financial prosperity and security of the US. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other USG departments and agencies, governments of other nations, and international financial institutions to encourage economic growth;
raise standards of living; and predict and prevent, to the greatest extent possible, economic and financial crises. The activity of the Department of the Treasury abroad has a deterrence function implemented through the Treasury Office of Terrorism and Illicit Finance, which can support those nations where FID programs or operations are ongoing. Examples include levying financial sanctions, conducting asset forfeiture, combating money laundering, and tracking terrorist financial activities. The Department of the Treasury can implement these actions in the country where FID is conducted or against those external nations supporting the threat within the PN. JFCs will also work with the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in counter threat finance (CTF) activities. CTF seeks to rob insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organizations from funding streams that finance their illicit or offensive capabilities.

For more information on CTF, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

(2) **Intelligence.** The US intelligence community encompasses DOD and interagency intelligence organizations. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence promotes the integration of US intelligence community activities and coordinates prioritizing the utilization of intelligence resources to facilitate foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the US. US planners, in coordination with HN and PN planners, use all available intelligence to identify the adversary’s capabilities and centers of gravity (COGs), project probable courses of action (COAs), and assist in planning friendly force employment. Intelligence also provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human, diplomatic, or political risk. Intelligence support to USG FID may involve the identification of critical infrastructure, mapping of significant activities that may be threats, and products that support safety of navigation or provide increased situational awareness for strategic decision making.

(3) **Law Enforcement (LE)**

(a) US law enforcement, led by DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has distinct capabilities that can be leveraged to capitalize on the whole-of-government approach in support of an IDAD. Beyond providing information exchange with DOD, DOJ can assist law enforcement agencies (LEAs) of foreign governments. Resources such as customs agents, border patrol, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and DHS are all available for leveraging FID and support a PN’s legal, judicial, and policing functions. Other organizations that may provide related assistance are described in the following subparagraphs.

(b) Terrorism poses a grave threat to individuals’ lives and national security around the world. The International Criminal Police Organization-International Police (ICPO-INTERPOL) has made available various training opportunities and resources to support member countries in their efforts to protect citizens from terrorism, firearms and explosives, attacks against civil aviation, maritime piracy, and WMD. The US National Central Bureau of ICPO-INTERPOL operates in conjunction with DHS and within the guidelines prescribed by DOJ.
(c) The DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), while not an LEA, can be instrumental in the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. The DOJ’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives can also provide information about international crime and explosives trafficking.

(d) The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is a unique, multi-mission organization that is an LEA (Title 14, USC, Section 89), as well as a military Service and a branch of the US Armed Forces (Title 10, USC, Section 101; Title 14, USC, Sections 1 and 2). The ability to handle evolving scenarios as a federal LEA or an armed force is a unique characteristic of the USCG. Congress established the USCG as a maritime constabulary force of the US by specifically assigning it the duty to enforce or assist the enforcement of all applicable federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to US jurisdiction.

5. Security Cooperation

SC involves all DOD interactions to develop foreign defense and security capabilities and build defense security relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and PNs (see Department of Defense Directive [DODD] 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, and JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for a more detailed discussion). Under multiple authorities consolidated into a single, dedicated chapter (Title 10, USC, Chapter 16) by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, SC uses a combination of programs and activities by which DOD, in coordination with DOS, encourages and enables countries and organizations to partner with the US to achieve strategic objectives. SC involves an overarching functional relationship rather than a hierarchical relationship with its associated activities/programs. SC is critical to effective operations regarding disruption, degradation, and defeat of violent extremism, especially targeting the drivers and root causes of the extremism by setting theater conditions that shape and deter escalation and enabling effective operations, if necessary. The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) contains DOD guidance for SC. This guidance, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (commonly referred to as the JSCP), and global campaign plans, provides goals and activities for specific theaters and regions and provides the overarching framework for many FID-related activities. The GEF includes SC activities, some of which will be discussed (as they apply to FID) further in the chapter. Security sector assistance, as outlined in PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance, influences these functional relationships and directs USG assistance to a PN’s security sector, which comprises those government and international institutions, both civilian and military, responsible for protecting their state and citizens. SA is a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance national policies and objectives. Figure I-4 depicts the functional associations among foreign assistance, SC, SA, SFA, and FID as generally organized from larger to more specific programs.
For further information on SC and applicable tools supporting theater development, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.
a. **SA.** Those portions of SA authorized under Title 22, USC, and administered by DOD for DOS are considered a part of SC. DOD-administered SA is typically directed and administered through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and managed and executed by the Military Departments. SA is a principal element in a US FID effort, providing many of the resources in the form of funding, materiel, and training. Like unified action for FID, SA can include efforts of civilian agencies, as well as those of the military. While integral to FID, SA has a much broader application outside of FID under SC, such as providing defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. Note that only a portion of the overall SA effort fits into the FID area but that it is a large part of the overall FID indirect support effort. Also, it is important to note that the direct support (not involving US combat operations) category typically makes up the preponderance of the remaining military operations. DOD-administered SA is the military component of foreign assistance implemented by DOD IAW policies established by DOS and includes, but is not limited to, foreign military sales (FMS), FMF, international military education and training (IMET), peace operations (PO), and excess defense articles (EDA). DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations (PKO), a subset of PO, through a PKO fund. These components, combined with the Economic Support Fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, are SA tools the US can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort.

(1) **FMS.** FMS is a non-appropriated program through which foreign governments and international organizations can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the US. Eligible nations and international organizations can use this program to help build national security infrastructures. A limitation of this program is that the nations that require assistance are often unable to finance their needs.

(2) **FMF.** FMF falls inside the foreign assistance budget process of DOS. FMF provides funding to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through FMS or, for a limited number of countries, commercial channels. FMF can be an extremely effective FID tool, providing assistance to nations with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford US assistance.

(3) **IMET.** IMET, also part of the DOS foreign assistance budget process, contributes to internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian personnel on a grant aid basis. The program helps to strengthen foreign militaries through US military training (and exposure to culture and values) that are necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian-controlled, apolitical, and professional military. This program has long-term positive effects on US and HN bilateral relations. IMET serves as an influential foreign policy tool where the US shapes doctrine, promotes self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating US acquired defense equipment, encourages the rule of law, and occasionally has a marked effect on the policies of the recipient governments. Foreign students—many of whom occupy the middle and upper echelons of their country’s military and political establishments—are taught US defense doctrine and employment of US weapon systems, values, and management skills, resulting in greater cooperation and interoperability.
(4) **PO.** This program funds US PO, such as the MNF and observers in the Sinai and the US contribution to the United Nations (UN) Force in Cyprus. These operations are limited in scope and funding levels and, although related to FID operations, are generally considered separate activities with focused goals and objectives.

*For further information on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.*

(5) **EDA.** EDA are DOD- and USG-owned defense articles no longer needed and declared excess by the US Armed Forces. This excess equipment is offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an “as is, where is” basis. EDA are used for various purposes, including internal security (including antiterrorism [AT] and nonproliferation). The EDA program is most effective in assisting friendly nations and allies to augment current inventories of like items with a support structure already in place, as the friendly nation, upon receipt, gains responsibility for the articles’ movement to its country and their sustained operation and maintenance.


b. **Exchange Programs.** Military exchange programs also support the overall FID effort by fostering mutual understanding between forces; familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other; developing and strengthening interoperability between FSF; and enhancing cultural awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET program, are extremely valuable in improving HN and US relations and may also have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments. Exchanges typically originate with or are coordinated between Services and a foreign security force purposed to promote a specific interoperability or institutional requirement. It is important, however, that such exchange programs (funded with Title 10, USC, funds) do not themselves become vehicles for SA training or other services to the PN in contravention of the FAA and AECA.

c. **Joint and Multinational Exercises.** These programs strengthen US-HN relations and interoperability of forces. They are joint- and Service-funded and complement SA and CMO by validating HN needs and capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. There are very strict legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary limits of such support.


6. **Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations**

a. Service and joint capabilities in military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities help the USG shape the OE and manage the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, while maintaining US global influence. These capabilities contribute to a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach to a transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threat by assuring US allies and partners
to enhance the global network of relationships that enable effective operations. Foreign assistance can support or augment military engagements as routine SC activities or a FID program for an HN IDAD.

b. FID applies throughout the range of military operations, from enduring military engagements, to limited contingency operations involving indirect and direct military support, to US SOF and CF with a FID combat mission. A FID program can also counter transnational criminal enterprises. The type of operation that FID supports is also a factor. For instance, FID in one country may include training the HN to thwart criminal activity such as drug trafficking, while in another country, FID may include training the HN to conduct a major CT or COIN operations. As part of the overall support to an IDAD strategy, FID may include capacity and capability building across the HN, with the emphasis on combating internal threats and assisting the HN to operationalize their security capability in maintaining legitimacy, protection, and influence over the indigenous population. Designed and authorized to meet the needs of HN IDAD, FID programs will likely use scaled and tailored SFA activities, which could transition to the third category of FID (US combat operations), for a limited contingency or major operation/campaign—at the higher end of the range of military operations. If taken to this extent, indirect and direct support FID activities would likely continue support to the HN IDAD, while the overall USG participation expands to include US combat operations in the form of CT, CD, COIN, countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), SC, or stabilization efforts.

For additional detail on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

7. Foreign Internal Defense Categories

a. Indirect Support. These are FID programs, operations, or activities that emphasize the principle of PN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong, national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency, typically through SC activities. The US military contribution to this type of support is derived from SC guidance and provided primarily through SA, supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and selected joint exercises. Indirect support is the core of building partners through mutual security development, and where HN capabilities are improved, while the foundation of interoperability is built and strengthened between the HN and US forces. While they are not used solely for FID, the following SA programs and activities are typically used under indirect support: FMS, FMF, IMET, PO, and EDA. The US provides defense articles, military training, and defense-related services by grants, loans, credits, and sales to improve and advance national policies and objectives. These SA programs may be inherent to FID programs or operations or may complement them through separate US development initiatives with partners.

b. Direct Support (Not Involving US Combat Operations). These operations involve the use of US forces to provide direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually
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involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually (but may) include training
local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has
not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats
beyond its capability to handle. Assistance normally focuses on CMO (primarily, the
 provision of services to the local populace), military information support operations
(MISO), operations security (OPSEC), communications and intelligence cooperation,
mobility, and logistic support. In some cases, training of the military and the provision
of new equipment may be authorized.

1) **Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).** CVE is whole-of-government and
international proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit,
mobilize followers to violence and to counter individuals who may use violence to
justify particular actions. Violent extremist organization (VEO) is an overarching blanket
term that covers non-state terror, criminal, or insurgent groups that use violence in
pursuance of the group’s objectives.

2) **Cybersecurity assistance** is used when assisting an HN to secure and operate
computer networks, enhance OPSEC, and enable trusted communications within their
forces and between US and supported foreign forces.

3) **CMO.** Commanders execute CMO to achieve unified action by
synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating with governmental and nongovernmental
entities within the OA. CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain,
and influence relations between military forces and indigenous populations and
institutions, by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the
reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or foreign nation. CMO may
include military forces conducting activities and functions of the local, regional, or national
government. CMO can support both a COIN program and enhance all FID activities.
CMO may be used in a preventive or rehabilitative manner to address root causes of
instability; in a reconstructive manner after conflict; or in support of disaster relief,
consequence management, civil defense, CD, and AT activities.

a) **Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).** CAO are those military operations
conducted by civil affairs (CA) forces that enhance the relationship between military forces
and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; require coordination
with other interagency organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and
involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil
government to enhance the conduct of CMO. During FID activities, CAO can facilitate
the integration of US military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported
nation.

For further information on CMO support to FID, refer to Chapter VI, “Operations,” and

b) **FHA.** FHA operations relieve or reduce the impact of natural or man-
made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, or privation
in countries or regions outside the US. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration.

For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(c) **HCA.** HCA is provided to the local populace in conjunction with authorized military operations as specifically authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401. Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security interests of both the US and the HN and the specific operational readiness of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. These activities must also be IAW HN laws. GCCs integrate and coordinate HCA activities within their areas of responsibility (AORs) in the SC portion of their overall CCP or functional plan. In the context of FID, HCA may be an important part of helping to build relationships between the local populace and the joint force. When possible, HCA should give way to military civic action (MCA) and other HN/PN capabilities as the FID operation progresses. Before conducting HCA activities, IAW DOD policies, DOD should consult with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the HN to ensure the HCA activity is appropriate within the context of the USAID/HN country development cooperation strategy and cultural norms to avoid duplication of effort and/or unsustainable practices. For further information, see USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA, HCA generally encompasses planned activities and includes:

1. Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.

2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.


(d) **MCA.** MCA is the use of predominantly indigenous military personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and services useful to the local populace. These activities may involve US supervision and advice but are normally conducted by the local military. MCA is an essential part of military support to FID to assist the local government in developing capabilities to provide for the security and well-being of its own population.

(4) **MISO.** The focus of joint MISO objectives during FID operations or activities is to support US national security objectives, the GCC’s theater strategy objectives, and the objectives of the country team. These objectives are accomplished by MISO efforts to modify the behavior of selected target audiences (TAs). Additionally, MISO is used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against internally and externally based insurgencies and terrorism by encouraging the civilian populace to actively support the HN military and government.
For further information on MISO support to FID, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

(5) **OPSEC.** The focus of OPSEC objectives during FID operations or activities is to identify critical information and indicators associated with those operations and activities and to employ appropriate measures and countermeasures to protect FID critical information and indicators.

For further information on OPSEC support to FID, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. For more information on synchronization of OPSEC, MISO, and CMO/CAO, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(6) **Training FSF**

(a) **US Military Training of an HN’s FSF.** This training, under a FID program, is based on a military necessity, with considerations for the cultural and social aspects affecting the FSF and their relationships with indigenous populations. USG support normally requires the HN to have positive application of the rule of law, legitimate governance, and human rights vetting IAW US policy and law. Military training should focus on assisting HNs in anticipating and countering internal threats. Emphasis on the HN’s IDAD program when organizing, planning, and executing military training support helps the HN address the root causes of instability in a positive and preventive manner rather than just reacting to developing threats. There are significant statutory and regulatory restrictions in the areas of fiscal law and human rights vetting on US military training of HN forces. Commanders should consult with their legal advisors when planning and executing training of the FSF.

(b) **SFA.** A subset of SC, SFA is DOD’s contribution to a unified action effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions. SFA activities support developing the capabilities and capacities of a PN to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise (OTERA) those FSF, while other USG departments and agencies focus on those forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. SFA is designed to provide trainers who are not only subject matter experts but also have the cultural awareness, language skills, and seasoned maturity to more effectively relate to and train FSF. FID programs are developed based on the existing security capability of the PN. Often, developing a new capability for the PN is the preferred FID solution, and could be

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**ENABLING IRAQI FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES IN LIBERATING MOSUL**

**The History:** Following the collapse of the Iraqi government during 2003, after the US and coalition invasion of Iraq, both US conventional and special operations forces (SOF) began rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces. Security force assistance (SFA) was paramount during the development of the Iraqi army and police, along with US SOF development of the Iraqi
Special Operations Forces (ISOF) consisting of Iraqi counterterrorism (CT) forces and Commandos. The US SOF also developed the Iraqi Minister of Interior (MOI) Emergency Response Unit (ERU) a CT and counter insurgency element of the Iraqi Security Forces. Before operations in Mosul both ISOF and the ERU had matured and reorganized into the Iraqi CT Service (ICTS) and the MOI ERU had matured into an emergency response division (ERD). US SOF trained both elements into a fully capable urban-trained CT force with the goal to provide the Government of Iraq a future CT capability. The capability of both ICTS and ERU was key for the success of Iraqi security forces (ISF) during the liberation of Mosul.

The Challenge:
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), seized terrain in both Iraq and Syria and declared an Islamic caliphate under their leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi. Syria became an Unconventional Warfare effort for the coalition to remove an occupying power or the self-declared ISIS government of Syrian cities. US policy did not approve the removal of the Syrian government, but it supported degrading ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. In the Iraq case, ISIS declared governance over terrain through the occupation and control of Mosul, while US policy in Iraq was supportive of the government and their security forces. This vignette highlights how training the ISF (Army and Police) during the years following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003) contributed to follow-on success in the liberation of Mosul.

The Campaign:
After a brutal nine-month campaign to liberate Mosul ISIS, ISF retook Iraq’s second largest city. The battle was the largest conventional land battle since the capture of Baghdad by coalition forces in 2003, and a significant sustained urban operation involving ISF, US SOF and conventional forces, and Coalition SOF. The battle included all the organizations of the ISF (the Iraqi Army, Air Force, Special Operations Forces, Counterterrorism Forces, and Police) who both planned and led the fighting. The early successes in the Mosul campaign came from the ICTS and the MOI ERD elements who provided the critical capability to spearhead the campaign and gain initial momentum to degrade ISIS. As Iraqi SOF and MOI ERD units fought, secured, and liberated portions of the city, the Iraqi Army and Police Forces provided key security and control for those liberated sections of Mosul and surrounding towns. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Iraq (CJSOTF-I) security force assistance approach to the ICTS is an example of a comprehensive and long-term approach to building partner capacity and synchronization of US enabling support for ISF-led operations. Although the ISF had a robust capability, the US and Coalition forces aided ISF in the defeat of the Islamic State and the recapture of Mosul through providing critical enablers such as combined, joint, and supporting fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and logistics. Integrating US and coalition support occurred through SFA by a force generation effort to prepare, train, and equip ISF for sustained combat. All of this was necessary, as the Islamic
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State proved to be a capable and adaptable hybrid force capable of establishing a robust, layered urban defense with coordinated capabilities across multiple domains. However, Iraqi ground forces, operating with their advise, assist, accompany, and enable US conventional forces/SOF formations, further enabled by coalition capabilities in all domains, were able to conduct successful combined arms operations while simultaneously consolidating gains in order to defeat the Islamic State through multi-domain operations.

Achieving Success:
The success of the liberation of Mosul can be attributed to the US SOF model for partnering with Iraqi SOF beginning with the rebuilding of the Iraqi foreign security forces through to the liberation of Mosul. A unified Iraqi, US, and coalition force enabled by key US/coalition capabilities supporting the ISF elements enabled both unified efforts with responsive fires against ISIS. The US conventional, SOF, and coalition SOF aided the Iraqi forces by an integrated advise-and-assist network provided by the US and coalition forces that accompanied ICTS and ISF through sections of Mosul. The success in Mosul exemplified the US SOF and conventional force approach to SFA that helped build the foundation of ISF. The early development of ISOF that reorganized into ICTS enabled the Iraqi forces to use their SOF to spearhead contested areas of Mosul. US and coalition enablers allowed a unified approach to degrade ISIS and gave ISF key support during the liberation of the city.

Various Sources

their security forces, rather than US forces cadre training the FSF. FID and SFA are related but distinct approaches to develop the FSF. FID programs may be used to develop an existing capability, while SFA programs are often better suited to build a sustainable capability from the ground up. The vignette highlights how US partner building methodologies led to the successful liberation of Mosul in 2017 by Iraqi Security Forces. Since the end of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, US CF and SOF implemented SFA, which helped reorganize and develop the Iraqi FSF, including their police, military, SOF, CT force, and air force. The liberation of Mosul was successful based on the combined US CF, US SOF, and coalition SOF support through SFA.

(c) Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR is the comprehensive set of programs and activities a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. SSR is the reform or development of the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security under the rule of law in the HN. These include the military and LE, intelligence services, border guards, and services responsible for the security of ports of entry. The objective is to assist an HN government to provide effective, legitimate, and accountable security for its citizens IAW the rule of law. SSR assists a government in appropriately responding to threats within and outside its borders. DOD support to SSR occurs by way of SC. SSR can include a FID program supporting an HN IDAD, but an HN may conduct SSR to improve governance and legitimacy without a direct internal
threat (i.e., outside of FID). Normally, SFA activities and SA are part of any unified action for SSR, whether or not within a FID program.

For further information on SFA or SSR support to FID, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

(7) Logistic Support. US military capabilities may be used to provide deployment and distribution, maintenance, supply, and construction support to the HN military or civilians in operations that do not expose US personnel to hostile fire. The FAA does not generally authorize the transfer of equipment or supplies. Logistic support must be provided with consideration of the long-term effect on the capability of the local forces to become self-sufficient.

(8) Intelligence Cooperation. Intelligence cooperation is enabled by an information sharing environment that fully integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. US intelligence cooperation ranges from strategic analysis to current intelligence summaries and situation reporting for tactical operations. Intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities are often weak links in an HN military capability. US military communications hardware and operators may also be supplied in cases where HN infrastructure cannot support intelligence operations. The release of classified information to the HN is governed by national disclosure policy. Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of authority where appropriate.

c. US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces during FID requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are capable of conducting independent combat operations. Based on the assessment of the threat, the US-HN combat operations will likely take the form of one or more of either COIN, CT, CD, or stabilization. In most cases, indirect and direct FID support will continue during US combat operations in support of the HN IDAD program. While joint doctrine and Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide guidance for specific operations and activities, there are certain considerations that should guide employment of US forces conducting combat operations for internal defense of an HN. These considerations, and the specific C2 and employment considerations for joint and multinational tactical-level operations in FID, serve as the focus for discussions of tactical operations later in this publication.

(1) If possible, the primary role for US military forces in tactical operations is to support and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence, or other combat support and service support means and to advise in combat operations. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements. Due to the long lead time required to develop certain key capabilities such as aviation, explosive ordnance disposal, and SOF, US forces may need to provide these enablers to the HN for a considerable length of time.

(2) If the level of lawlessness, subversion, sabotage, or insurgency reaches a level that HN forces cannot control, US forces may be required to engage the hostile elements with
offensive operations to return the situation to a level controllable by HN security forces. In this case, the objective of US military operations is to help protect or stabilize the HN’s political, economic, and social institutions until the HN military can assume these responsibilities.

(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the HN government must bear this responsibility.

(4) Given the required interagency and possible multinational coordination required for conducting combat operations, JFCs can expect complex organizational and C2 relationships with the HN. More information on C2 relationships and issues is provided in Chapter III, “Organization and Responsibilities.”

(5) The nature of US tactical participation in HN internal conflicts requires judicious and prudent rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to US forces may easily reduce the perceived legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In addition, specific civilian casualty and collateral damage incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiment and assist the cause of the opposition, especially regarding US and international public opinions.

For more information on the US combat operations discussed above, refer to one or more of the following for detailed doctrine regarding US combat operations in COIN, CT, AT, CD, and stability activities: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-26, Counterterrorism; JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations; and JP 3-07, Stability.
CHAPTER II
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

“Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror[ism] is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 26 November 2007

1. General

US FID programs align USG diplomacy, development, and security efforts with a designated HN that wishes to strengthen its own instruments of national power and improve its institutions, economy, and security conditions. The IDAD program is advanced either through an HN request for support to the USG, a mutual USG and HN desired goal, or a USG proposition to an HN to improve its governance and security. Most often, the HN lays out its governance, economic, and security goals to the USG, which informs the development of a plan to meet those goals. Subsequently, the IDAD program is ideally preemptive; however, if an insurgency, illicit trafficking, criminal element or network, violent extremist or terrorist organization, or other threat develops, the IDAD program can evolve to counter that threat. Commanders and their staffs account for the HN’s IDAD program and its objectives to plan effectively to support it. The objective of FID will be to assist the HN in formulating an appropriate IDAD program, which often includes coalescing several separate strategic plans and programs into one broader strategy.

2. Construct

a. An IDAD program integrates security force and civilian actions into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may, in turn, promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

b. Often a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult.

c. The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Gaining support of the populace is vital to any IDAD strategy. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention to the political,
socioeconomic, human rights, cultural claims, grievances, or demands of the opposition is severely handicapped.

d. DOS, USAID, and DOD provide the foundation to promote and protect US interests abroad. Each represents a critical component of national security with unique roles and responsibilities. The functions performed by each provide greatest value to the nation when they are complementary and mutually reinforcing. As the USG assists an HN in developing its IDAD through a whole-of-government approach, the HN is the definitive component of the mutually supported strategy.

3. Functions

a. An IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats (see Figure II-1). These functions are balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.

(1) **Balanced development** attempts to achieve national objectives through diplomatic/political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus potentially alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions, drivers, and root causes of instability that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem requiring DOS, USAID, and DOD unity of effort.

(2) **Security** includes all activities implemented to protect the populace from violence and to provide a safe environment for national development. Securing the populace and government resources remains essential to countering the threat. Protection and control of the populace permits development and denies the adversary access to popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the HN can provide for its own security with limited US support.

(3) **Neutralization** includes concepts that:

(a) Make a threat (e.g., an insurgent, terrorist, violent extremist, or criminal element) irrelevant to the political process;

(b) Are the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the populace, which may also require the re-integration of people who were formerly in opposition to the government so they do not remain disaffected;

(c) Include all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the threat (i.e., insurgent, terrorist, or organizations, or criminal networks);

(d) Can involve public exposure and the discrediting of insurgent and criminal leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence;
Can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken; or

Can involve combat action when the adversary’s violent activities escalate.

Note: All neutralization efforts must be legal. Forces involved in neutralization efforts must scrupulously conform to HN laws and policy provisions regarding rights and responsibilities and, to the degree sanctioned and substantially supported by the USG, they must be consistent with US laws and ethical expectations. Security forces must act lawfully.
and ethically to reinforce government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. If government agents abuse these powers, they could lose the popular support they need. Denying the adversary an opportunity to exploit legitimate issues against the government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda. Care should be taken not to assume common understanding of, and appreciation for, ethics, values, and appearances among partnered organizations and personnel of dissimilar cultures.

(4) Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support for the government. This support is essential to a successful IDAD program. Effective mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while minimizing those available to the insurgent group. Mobilization allows the government to strengthen existing institutions and develop new ones to respond to demands and to promote the government’s legitimacy.

b. The HN continuously analyzes the results of its IDAD program and establishes measures of effectiveness (MOEs). It should also have a methodology to provide feedback for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation of strategic national policy.

4. Tenets of Effective Foreign Internal Defense Operations

a. Although each situation is unique, certain tenets guide efforts across the four IDAD functions to mitigate insurgency growth, prevent lawlessness progression, or defeat an internal threat. Planners must incorporate the IDAD strategy and apply the tenets described below to each specific situation. Planners should answer three main questions when considering the tenets: What is the necessary consensus among the political leadership and, more broadly, among civil society for the country to contribute forces to FID operations or to conduct operations to deter threats? What operational capacity and capabilities does the HN require for it to perform these and other desired roles? What institutional capacity is needed to sustain the required operational and capacity and capabilities?

b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is the product of successful unified action and is essential to prevent crisis and to defeat credible threats. Unity of effort requires cooperation and collaboration among all forces and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the command or coordination structures of the participants.

c. Optimized Use of Intelligence. Optimized use of intelligence requires all operations be based on reliable, accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence. Successful implementation of operations necessitates extensive OPSEC, counterintelligence (CI), and human intelligence (HUMINT) programs to protect friendly FID operations and to counter and penetrate opposing force intelligence collection operations. Intelligence and CI activities should be designed to accurately assess the opposing force’s capabilities, to provide timely intelligence to HN and US forces, and to penetrate and be prepared to
compromise hostile operations on order. If the HN is not capable of performing these missions effectively, then US intelligence and CI elements must be deployed upon the commitment of US forces to accomplish these missions. In these cases, FID operations may need to focus on supporting HN efforts to develop internal intelligence and security forces to perform these missions effectively. US elements may assist the HN in developing an intelligence capability IAW USG directives and as deemed appropriate by the supported GCC in coordination with the US country team to the HN.

d. **Network Engagement and FID.** Network engagement activities are interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander’s objectives within an OA. Network engagement has three components: partner with friendly networks, engage with neutral networks, and counter threat networks. Network engagement leverages all capabilities to achieve FID objectives. Partnering with friendly networks includes all three types of FID support and also includes partnering and messaging with HN security forces, HN government, NGOs, and HN private and public institutions that are key to SC, SA, SFA, and FID. Engaging with neutral networks uses CCS and other information-related capabilities to win support for the HN, or at least ensure the HN population does not support insurgent, criminal or terrorist organizations. In a FID program or operation, utilizing network engagement can greatly enhance the JFCs ability to shape the OE to help achieve objectives.

*For more information on network engagement, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.*

e. **Synchronized Use of CMO and MISO.** The effective use of CMO and MISO, fully coordinated with other operational activities, can enhance the legitimacy of HN forces and, ultimately, the stability of the HN. Stability activities, enabled by CMO, are the “deeds” US and HN forces use to demonstrate and reinforce the “words,” delivered through dedicated MISO and a broad-based CCS effort. Use of CMO can mitigate grievances exploited (or potentially exploited) by insurgents, as well as other internal threats to HN stability, by actively demonstrating an HN force’s commitment to the wellbeing of the population. It can also reinforce to key elements of the populace their importance as the COG and as an essential factor in the government’s legitimacy. CMO is an initial step to reinforce and enhance the HN’s image as a responsive government, both internally and internationally. The application of CMO integrated with MISO helps generate active and tacit popular support of the HN government and can generate time for the HN civil authorities and government to eliminate or mitigate valid popular grievances. CMO is executed by all forces and can be better enabled and facilitated by the application of CA to train, advise, and assist other forces, as well as plan and execute specific and targeted CAO to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Examples of coordinated CMO and MISO objectives in FID/IDAD include:

1. Mitigate the grievances exploited by insurgents/threats to stability that generate popular support for resistance elements.

2. Reduce the impact of military operations on the civil populace.
(3) Reduce civil interference with military operations.

(4) Facilitate civil order.

(5) Increase the effectiveness of, respect for, and cooperation with HN LE and security forces.

(6) Set conditions and prepare the populace for elections.

f. Minimum Use of Force. A threatened government must carefully examine all COAs in response to internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use of force to maintain order and incorporate economy of force. At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force; however, the use of force should normally be appropriate (and proportional) to the incident at hand. In all cases where force is to be applied, clear rules on its use should be established; broadcast to the civilian populace; and understood by all members of the police, military, or paramilitary force being employed by the government.

g. A Responsive Government. Positive measures are necessary to ensure a responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources, as well as to motivate the people, reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many cases, the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and follow-up.

h. CCS. Effective communication synchronization is an important element of strategic direction during all FID operations. Defense support to public diplomacy, PA, and specific messages should be coordinated early during the planning process and continually throughout the operation as a part of the CCS effort. In FID operations, the use of CCS and MISO are closely related. Effectiveness and efficiency require the continual sharing of information. Although the messages may be different, they are derived from harmonized themes and must not contradict one another or the credibility of some of the agencies involved in the FID effort, particularly the HN’s, could be compromised or lost.

5. Organizational Guidance

a. The following discussion depicts a notional HN organization the JFC may see when planning and conducting FID. Actual organizations may vary from country to country to adapt to existing conditions. Organizations should follow the established political structure of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized planning and direction, facilitate decentralized execution of the plan, and be structured and chartered so it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies’ normal functions. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to effect unified action at each level.

b. National-Level Organization. The national-level organization plans and coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with internal threats such as insurgency, illicit
trafficking, violent extremism, and terrorist threats. Figure II-2 depicts notional planning and coordination organization at the national level that is specific to COIN.

(1) The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or defeat the threat. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources.

(2) The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs and plans, and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. The intelligence office also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. This office is staffed by representatives from intelligence agencies, LE, and military intelligence.

(3) The populace and resource control office develops economic policies and plans and provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field.
Representatives of government branches concerned with commerce, as well as LE and justice, staff this office.

(4) The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the mobilization and distribution of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces. Representatives from all major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff this office.

(5) Six separate offices covering MISO, information, economic affairs, cultural affairs, CA, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or agencies and develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.

(6) The OPSEC office ensures the protection of information and indicators associated with the organization, its operations and activities, and its intentions and capabilities.

(7) An administrative office, if constituted, frees the other offices to concentrate on their duties without being mired in administrative duties.

For more information on COIN organization, see JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

c. Subnational-Level Organization. Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as multinational civil-military headquarters (HQ) at subnational, state, and local levels. Staffed with commanders who exercise operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) over military forces made available, ACCs control civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. ACCs do not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the OA.

(1) ACCs perform a twofold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they facilitate an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. ACCs are headed by senior government officials who supervise and coordinate the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense plans and operations in their areas of interest. The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the ACC’s area of interest. Each ACC includes members from the:

(a) Area military command.

(b) Area police agency.

(c) Local and national intelligence organizations.

(d) Public information and information-related agencies supported by military information support (MIS) elements.

(e) Paramilitary forces.
(f) Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

(2) There are two types of subnational ACCs that a government may form—regional and urban—depending upon the environment in which the ACC operates.

(a) **Regional ACCs** normally locate with the nation’s first subnational political subdivision with a fully developed governmental apparatus (state, province, or other). These government subdivisions are usually well established, having exercised government functions in their areas before the onset of insurgency. They are often the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all COIN programs. A full range of developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those on-call elements or government subdivisions that are not part of the normal government organization should be added when the ACC activates. These additional capabilities enable the ACC to coordinate its activities better by using the existing structure.

(b) Urban areas usually require more complex ACCs than rural areas. **Urban ACCs** are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas lacking a higher level coordination center. Urban ACCs are organized like the ACCs previously described and perform the same functions. However, urban ACCs include representatives from local public service agencies, such as police, fire, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation.

(c) When a regional ACC includes an urban area, economy of force and unity of effort may dictate that urban resources locate in that center where planners can coordinate and direct urban operations. The decision to establish an urban ACC or to use some other ACC for these purposes rests with the head of the government of the urban area and should be based on, among other things, available resources.

(d) If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary for proper planning and coordination. The ACC should seek to support and rely as much as possible on local governance structures to exercise that control.

d. **Civilian Advisory Committees.** Committees composed of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, government programs and social mobilization objectives.

(1) The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs; changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chairman of the committee should be a prominent figure either appointed by the government or elected by the membership. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations and other community groups who have influence with the target population. These leaders may include:
(a) Education officials (distinguished professors and teachers).
(b) Religious leaders.
(c) Legal advisors.
(d) Health directors.
(e) Minority group representatives.
(f) Labor officials.
(g) Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, and editors.
(h) Business and commercial leaders.
(i) Former political leaders or retired government officials.
(j) Tribal or family leaders.
(k) Agricultural leaders, farmers, and stakeholders.

(2) The success of a civilian advisory committee hinges on including leading participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

“I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

President Harry S. Truman,
Message to Congress, 1947

1. General

a. Integrated Effort

(1) When it is in the interest of national security, the US may employ all the instruments of national power to assist friendly nations in conducting IDAD programs.

(2) For FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, the USG must integrate the efforts of multiple US and multinational government agencies, thus interorganizational, and in many cases international, coordination and cooperation becomes extremely important. Effective integration is difficult and requires a consistent, focused effort that adjusts and evolves as the situation changes and different organizations and groups become involved.

(3) Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization and horizontal between USG departments and agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to allied nations and multinational partners participating with the US in FID efforts. As Figure III-1 illustrates, the lines of organization and coordination during FID operations are complex. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a daunting challenge.

b. Organizing for FID

(1) Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the US will support through FID efforts. This decision is made by the President with advice from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other officials. Funding for these programs is appropriated by Congress. The US considers FID support when the following three conditions exist:

(a) The existing or threatened internal disorder threatens US national strategic goals.

(b) The threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance.

(c) The threatened nation requests US assistance.
(2) The level and type of assistance required is determined and a country-specific plan is developed. No two FID programs or operations are alike.

(3) The GEF describes SecDef’s priorities for creating new partnerships and building the capacity of existing partnerships.

(4) Ordinarily, when the decision limits FID support to minor levels of SA or CMO, there is no requirement to establish a special management program to facilitate interagency coordination. Larger FID efforts (i.e., those in support of nations important to
US national interests) demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the CCMD and country team levels.

2. National-Level Organizations

The National Security Council (NSC) will generally provide the initial guidance of national-level decisions pertaining to FID. Specific guidance will also be provided to government agencies and departments. Key USG departments and agencies that normally take part in FID are:

a. **DOS.** DOS is generally the lead for US FID (noncombat) operations. Major DOS responsibilities related to the planning and execution of FID include:

   (1) The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy and has other major specific responsibilities key to the overall planning and execution of the national FID effort.

   (2) DOS assists the NSC in building national FID policies and priorities and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies in the interagency arena. DOS involvement extends from policy formulation at the highest level to mission execution at the HN and country team levels. The Office of Plans and Initiatives, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization are the elements of DOS most involved with interagency planning for FID. The Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services provides financial and operational support services to all of the department’s program areas.

   (3) The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DOS. Control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. These lines of supervision and administration interface with DOD at the individual country teams and SCOs in the HNs (see Figure III-1). DOS directs the overall US SA program and DOD executes the program.

   (4) At the national level, PM is the principal channel of liaison between DOS and DOD. This bureau has primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in executing the responsibilities of managing the military portion of SA. PM is also the focal point within DOS for providing policy direction in international security, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.

   (5) INL is especially important in FID programs as a coordinating link in US support of HN CD programs.

   (6) The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) supports US foreign policy objectives by informing the public in other nations about US programs and policies and administering overseas cultural and exchange programs. These activities enhance US military operations in support of HN IDAD programs through public diplomacy to the supported government and its populace. DOD and IIP efforts should
be mutually supportive. Close coordination among embassy public affairs officers (PAOs) and cultural attachés, military PA offices, and MIS elements is essential.

(7) USAID. The activities of USAID, which reports to the Secretary of State, have a significant impact on military activities in support of FID. USAID carries out nonmilitary assistance programs designed to assist certain less-developed nations to increase their productive capacities and improve their quality of life. It also promotes economic and political stability in friendly nations. The mission of USAID and the parallel DOD developmental activities supporting FID underscore the importance of employing an integrated interagency effort.

b. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The DNI and Director of the CIA support the FID mission in both a national-level advisory capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct support of FID activities. The DNI advises the NSC in matters concerning the coordination and implementation of intelligence activities in support of national-level FID efforts. On the regional level, the CIA provides intelligence in support of FID threat analysis and needs assessments and supports the COM with intelligence at the country team level. This intelligence support is extremely important in determining the level and degree of required resources and in determining the effectiveness of these committed resources. Military intelligence activities are linked with CIA activities, either directly or through the country team, to ensure the exchange of information necessary to support FID.

c. DOD. DOD national-level organizations involved in FID management include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff (JS).

(1) OSD. In most FID matters, OSD acts as a policy-making organization. Numerous activities at the OSD level affect FID efforts. The five activities listed below are directly involved in the areas of SA and in the general areas of low-intensity conflict and FID-related issues.

(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) provides policy for SA for OSD through the various assistant secretaries of defense.

(b) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence provides policy for defense and military intelligence, to include oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency and respective Service contributions.

(c) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]) oversees DOD special operations and has far-reaching policy responsibilities that can impact FID policy and programs.

(d) DSCA is the principal DOD organization through which SecDef carries out responsibilities for SA. DSCA leads the SC community for the development and execution of security solutions that support mutual US and partner interests. DSCA administers and supervises SA planning, selects and trains US personnel to support SA, identifies requirements, and executes SA efforts in coordination with other government programs. DSCA also conducts international logistics and sales negotiations with
representatives of foreign nations and serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry regarding SA. Finally, DSCA develops and promulgates SA procedures, maintains the database for the programs, and makes determinations with respect to the distribution of FMS administrative funds.

(e) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the principal advisor to USD(P) and SecDef on international security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, Africa, and their governments and defense establishments and for oversight of SC programs and FMS programs in these regions.

(f) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs supervises and establishes policy for PA programs with DOD. PA is an integral part of military support to FID.

(2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS and JS play an important role in providing strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of military operations in support of FID. This guidance is provided primarily through the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the JSCP, the key components of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This guidance is provided after, and often modified as a result of, the interagency coordination and policy development process described earlier in this chapter. Because of their familiarity with the needs of the friendly nations in their regions, the GCCs are given great latitude in managing and coordinating their military activities in support of FID.

d. USCG, within DHS. The USCG is specifically authorized to assist other USG departments and agencies in the performance of any activity for which the USCG is especially qualified, including SA activities for DOS and DOD. The Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the inclusion of the US Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense Missions identifies certain national defense capabilities of the USCG, including SC, and improves the process by which the USCG serves as a force provider for DOD missions.

3. Combatant Commands

a. GCCs plan and execute military operations in support of FID within their AOR. Other CCDRs play a supporting role by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the President or SecDef.

b. The GCC coordinates and monitors all the military activities in the AOR in support of FID. GCCs develop CCPs that include SC programs and activities IAW the GEF. Organizing for military operations in FID will vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations. For example:

(1) Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the GCC’s AOR. These plans reflect national security priorities and guidance.
(2) GCCs may request to expand the military presence in the country team. In most instances, the application of US military resources in support of an HN’s IDAD programs will occur through the framework of SCOs. However, should it become necessary to expand US assistance, this may be accomplished by introducing selected US military forces, such as a JTF or the appropriate-level SOF C2 structure to coordinate this effort. Examples of appropriate SOF C2 nodes are a small theater special operations command (TSOC)-supplied C2 node or an O-5-level special operations command-forward, a medium to large O-6-level C2 node or special operations task force from one Service or multiple Service joint special operations task force (JSOTF), and a general officer-level C2 node or SOJTF.

c. **Staff Organization.** The general purpose and functions of the CCDR’s staff are provided in JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. The purpose of this discussion is to outline general organizational requirements for FID oversight and management at the CCMD level.

(1) **Plans Directorate.** The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), as the staff planner, incorporates military support to FID into theater strategy and plans. The J-5 has three ways to accomplish this: the plans division prepares the GCC’s vision and strategy, looking out 5 to 10 years and providing long-term and mid-term objectives for military support to FID; the political-military affairs division links the CCMD to the SCOs; and the SA section provides oversight of military SA efforts and coordinates integration of regional SA activities into theater-wide activities. The SA section may be organized within another directorate of the CCMD staff, depending on the desires of the GCC.

(2) **Operations Directorate.** The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) monitors the execution of military operations in support of current FID. Additionally, the J-3 may use the CMO, MISO, and OPSEC sections to orchestrate specifically designed programs to maximize the positive effects of military activities in support of FID. The J-3 also employs a special operations staff element that assists in the planning and employment considerations for SOF in support of FID. GCCs may elect to assign the above programs and planning for SOF in support of FID to the theater subunified special operations commander (SOC) or designated element.

(3) **Intelligence Directorate.** The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) produces intelligence that often supplements estimates produced by the US intelligence community. The J-2 leads the staff’s effort to conduct joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). Intelligence requirements (IRs) in support of FID include assessment of economic, political, and social conditions, as well as the accurate detection of internal instability. Through the command counterintelligence coordinating authority (CCICA), the J-2 plans CI support to the military portion of the FID operation. CI support is critical to the execution of FID operations and can provide commanders with valuable tools for force protection (FP) planning, as well as maintain the integrity and OPSEC of FID operations. Additionally, in those instances where a force protection detachment (FPD) is stationed in the HN, the CCICA or designated CI coordinating authority coordinates CI support for FID activities. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the US and the HN are vital to information sharing; however, disclosure of
classified information to HN or other multinational FID forces must be authorized. CI support needs to be included and executed from the initiation of the FID operation. Due to the nature of CI, it cannot be relied upon to be fully effective or productive if included as an afterthought or brought into action after FID operations are underway.

(4) **Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD).** DOS may assign a POLAD to a GCC. The POLAD serves as a link between DOS and the GCC’s staff and should have a solid understanding of the complementary and concurrent roles and authorities of DOS and DOD. An effective use of the POLAD’s skill in FID-intensive theaters may be for the GCC to establish a **FID interagency working group** (see Figure III-2) consisting of interagency representatives and military staff from country teams and the GCC’s staff. This group acts as a focal point for the coordination and integration of military and nonmilitary support to FID.

(5) **Legal Advisor.** The legal advisor should evaluate all military operations in support of FID because of the legal restrictions and complex funding sources. See Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” for additional considerations when supporting FID.

(6) **PA.** Integral to successful military operations in support of FID is public awareness and support. The PAO should be an early and active participant in military planning to support FID.

(7) When formed, a **joint interagency coordination group (JIACG)** can provide the GCC with an increased capability to collaborate FID operations with other USG departments and agencies.

*For more information on JIACGs, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

(8) **Other Staff Elements.** All staff elements of the GCC contribute to the overall support of the FID operation. Some, such as the logistics directorate of a joint staff and the communications system directorate of a joint staff, may be given primary responsibility for specific military technical support missions. These staff elements will usually focus on the direct support (not involving US combat operations) category of military support to FID.

### 4. Subordinate Unified Commands

a. When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis IAW the criteria set forth for unified commands.

b. A subordinate unified command (e.g., US Forces Korea) may be established on a geographical area or functional basis (e.g., TSOC). The responsibilities for FID support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the CCMDs. Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by the CCDR. However, basic principles and staff organization remain consistent.
c. Functional subordinate unified commands control a specific functional capability. USSOCOM subordinate unified commands are established in each theater, and these TSOCs contribute to FID planning and execution by managing aspects of FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise.

d. **TSOCs are of particular importance because of the significant role of SOF in FID operations.** The theater SOC normally has OPCON of SOF in the theater and has primary responsibility to plan and execute SOF operations in support of FID. SecDef attaches SOF to a theater and specifies OPCON of attached SOF to the GCC. The GCC normally exercises this authority through the commander of the TSOC. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and task forces, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/task
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force special operations requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, will normally establish support or TACON command relationships between JSOTF commanders and JTF/task force commanders. Coordination between the joint force special operations component commander (who is also normally the TSOC commander, SOJTF commander, or JSOTF commander) and the other component commanders within the CCMD is essential for unified action of military operations in support of FID, including joint and multinational exercises, mobile training teams (MTTs), integration of SOF with CF, and other operations.

For further information on JSOTFs, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

5. Joint Task Forces

GCCs may form JTFs to execute complex missions. For example, US Northern Command’s Joint Task Force-North provides US military assistance to US civil LEAs to combat transnational threats to the homeland. Another example, Joint Task Force-BRAVO, which is subordinate to US Southern Command, was formed by the CCDR for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting US military training exercises in Honduras during a time when a US forward presence in Central America was deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and related HCA projects was a primary factor in the decision to form the JTF. Other JTFs may be organized to accomplish specific functional missions such as road construction and support for transportation and communications efforts. Much of the training, CAO, and MISO conducted by a JTF may warrant the creation of a subordinate JSOTF, a joint CMO task force, or a joint MIS task force. In some instances, a JSOTF may be the initial or follow-on task force structure when conducting FID operations. As seen in recent experience during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines, the JSOTF structure may include a subordinate CF element.

For further information on JTFs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

6. The United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team

a. The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all USG departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and HN, except for employees under the command of a US military commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927). However, this authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to an international agency. Close coordination with each COM and country team in the GCC’s AOR is essential to conduct effective, country-specific FID operations that support the HN’s IDAD program and US regional goals and objectives.

b. Organization. The country team structure (see Figure III-3) denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. The composition of a country team varies, depending on the desires of the COM,
the in-country situation, and the number and levels of USG departments and agencies present. The principal military member of the country team is the senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT). In addition to being the diplomatically accredited DATT, the SDO is the chief of the SCO. In some instances, the COM may use the term SA organization/officer for the organization of his or her staff members. Although the US area military commander (the GCC or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, the commander may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the country team. The following discussion provides an outline of typical country team representatives and explains the military elements important to the FID mission.

(1) The COM coordinates much of the FID effort in the assigned country and accomplishes this task either through the assigned SCO or through the country team.
(2) The SCO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the ambassador. The specific title of the SCO may vary; however, these differences reflect nothing more than the political climate within the HN. As examples, an SCO may be referred to as a military assistance advisory group, military advisory group, defense liaison office, office of security cooperation, office of military cooperation, or office of defense cooperation. SCOs may have up to six members of the Armed Forces before congressional approval is required. Usually, a US military officer serves as the chief. When programs involve more than one Service, the SCO organization will be joint. The organization (departmental and functional alignments) of a typical SCO are indicated in Figures III-4 and III-5.

(a) Funded by DSCA, the chief, SCO (sometimes referred to as the SA officer), operates under the direction of the US ambassador or COM and reports administratively to the GCC.

(b) SCOs manage equipment and service cases; manage training; monitor programs; evaluate and plan HN military capabilities and requirements; provide administrative support; promote rationalization, standardization, and interoperability; and perform liaison exclusive of advisory and training assistance.
For more information on the roles and responsibilities of the SCO, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

7. Multinational Foreign Internal Defense Force

    a. Multinational operations require clear C2 and coordination procedures for FID planning and execution to achieve unity of effort.

    b. Each multinational operation in support of FID is different, and key considerations involved in planning and execution may vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members.

    c. **Multinational Resources.** Multinational partners can assist materially in training HN security forces. Some nations are more willing to train HN forces, especially police forces, than provide troops for combat operations. Likewise, some MNFs entail significant employment restrictions. Each international contribution is considered on its own merits, but such assistance is rarely declined by the US unless, for example, the FSF undergoes and fails vetting IAW US policy and law.

8. Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

    NGOs may be present in the OE to alleviate human suffering; promote education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encourage the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or international organization
hierarchies; however, they often occupy the same operational space, and efforts must be made for coordination. While NGOs may have similar goals as DOD, they may choose not to cooperate with DOD or USG efforts to maintain their neutrality. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, NGOs can lessen the civil-military resources a JFC would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although NGOs may have philosophical differences and divergent agendas from military forces, short-term objectives are frequently similar. Identifying common ground with NGOs can be mutually beneficial, although NGOs often object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian or development nature and in very few cases related to assisting the military. For US forces, there are legal restrictions on the provision of support to NGOs. NGO activities and capabilities are factors the JFC assesses when selecting a COA. The country team, USAID representatives, or CA teams are the best sources of information on those NGOs. The joint force staff should develop an understanding of the location of existing NGOs and areas where the NGOs are focusing their efforts. Protection of NGOs from threats in the OA and from FSF operations is critical and requires efforts from the joint force staff to monitor and deconflict.

For additional information on NGOs, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.
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CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

"As we look to the future, the US military and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security cooperation activities, and military-to-military engagement. Such activities increase the capabilities and capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression and defeat extremists."

National Military Strategy, June 2015

1. General

   a. FID is designed to bolster the internal stability and security of the supported nation. Only a comprehensive planning process at both the national and theater levels can provide the means to reach this goal.

   b. **NSC Directives Promulgate US FID Policy.** JSPS documents reflect the military responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance.

   c. The entire focus of US assistance under FID is to assist an HN, if possible, in anticipating, precluding, and, as a last resort, countering an internal threat. The type of planning necessary is dictated by the type or types of support being provided. **Support in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of indirect support and direct support (not involving US combat operations).** An existing threat is likely to require responses that span all categories of FID support, to include US combat operations. A detailed discussion of employment considerations is included in Chapter VI, “Operations.”

   d. Prior to a training team or JTF conducting a FID mission in a foreign country, many levels of policy development and operation planning will take place. The specific mission to be conducted can range from participating in a multinational exercise to training an HN force on basic infantry skills. The responsibility for FID missions will rest with one of two USG departments—DOD or DOS. To a training team in the HN, this distinction may seem irrelevant; however, the activity or program a training team has been deployed to participate in is governed by specific rules, funding, and conditions, depending on whether the program falls under DOD or DOS oversight. The theater planning process incorporates the majority of DOD and DOS efforts and identifies activities intended to help shape the theater in which the activities will be conducted. Depending on whether the mission has originated through DOD or DOS, how, where, and at what level the planning, coordination, and resourcing takes place will vary. For example, Title 22, USC, governs DOS programs and indicates participants in these programs are noncombatants, whereas Title 10, USC, the authority for DOD FID programs, does not restrict participants from being combatants.
2. Planning Imperatives

FID involves certain aspects that make planning for it complex. When integrating FID into strategies and plans, basic imperatives include the need to:

a. **Maintain HN Sovereignty and Build Legitimacy.** If US military efforts in support of FID do anything to undermine the real or perceived sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government, they will have effectively sabotaged the FID efforts. Ultimately, **FID operations are only as successful as the HN’s IDAD program.**

b. **Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US assistance efforts** before commencing FID. This is especially important in building HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel. Comprehensive understanding and planning will include assessing the following:

   (1) The end state for development.

   (2) US and HN sustainability of development programs and defense improvements.

   (3) Acceptability of development models across the range of HN society, and the impact of development programs on the distribution of resources within the HN.

   (4) Second-order and third-order effects of socioeconomic change.

   (5) The relationship between improved military forces and existing regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages in society.

   (6) The impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power.

   (7) Personnel life-cycle management of military personnel who receive additional training.

   (8) The impact of military development and operations on civil-military relations in the HN.

   (9) The willingness and ability of the HN to absorb and sustain capabilities implemented by FID development efforts.

c. **Tailor military support to FID to the OE and the specific needs of the supported HN.** Choices in equipment and training conducted during FID operations may affect future interoperability capabilities. It is important to consider the threat, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors, when developing the military plans to support FID. Overcoming the tendency to use a US frame of reference is important because this potentially damaging viewpoint can result in equipment, training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving US assistance.
d. **Unified Action and Unity of Effort.** As a tool of US foreign policy, FID is a national-level program effort that involves numerous USG departments and agencies that may play a dominant role in providing the content of FID plans. Planning considers and, where appropriate, integrates all instruments of national power and international organizations, NGOs, and HN capabilities to reduce inefficiencies and enhance strategy in support of FID and HN IDAD efforts. An interagency plan that provides a means for achieving unity of effort among USG departments and agencies is described in Appendix C, “Illustrative Interagency Plan for Foreign Internal Defense.”

e. **Understand US Foreign Policy.** NSC directives, plans, or policies are the guiding documents. If those plans are absent, the GCC and the JFC, and their respective staffs, must find other means to understand US foreign policy objectives for an HN and its relation to other foreign policy objectives. They should also bear in mind these relations are dynamic, and US policy may change as a result of developments in the HN or broader political changes in either country. DOD planners should seek guidance from the COM and country team in interpreting foreign policy and guiding US efforts in a particular country.

f. **Understand the Information Environment**

(1) With the advent of instant or nearly instant communications and media access in even the most remote regions, US FID efforts in any HN may be scrutinized more closely within the region, surrounding regions, or globally. In addition, FID operations may affect countries throughout the region or even cause international debate and opposition. In some theaters, traditional rivalries and hostility toward the US will be a factor. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing adversaries in the area may be perceived by those adversaries as upsetting the regional balance of power. Although it is increasingly an untenable position, some nations may consider the HN to be within its “sphere of influence.” The ethnic rivalries in the Balkans and the quasi-religious dogmas of the jihadists promoting terrorism show that historical animosities, even a millennium old, can still foster fanatic resistance to US FID efforts. These examples highlight the propensity of some internal threats to use revisionist history in their propaganda.

(2) Proactive PA programs that accurately depict US efforts, integrated with IO, support efforts to defeat or mitigate the adversary propaganda program. Effective employment and synchronization of information-related capabilities is also essential to gaining a decisive advantage in the information environment. For example, JFCs should pursue a proactive MISO effort in the HN and neighboring or other stakeholder countries to prepare key TAs for US FID operations. In addition, MISO can exploit early successes in the HN. US commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN region and envision how they will perceive US support. Additionally, it may be prudent and most beneficial to emphasize HN actions over US contributions so the message is viewed as being owned by the HN rather than originating from the US. IO and PA, through CCS, must be coordinated to address regional, transregional, and, if applicable, global audiences that may have, or perceive they have, a stake in any US FID operations.
(3) Planners should be mindful that all FID operations have the potential to move quickly from obscurity to the center stage of global media. Forces properly trained and knowledgeable about the OE’s culture, politics, and social dynamics are necessary for successful mission accomplishment.

   g. **Sustain the Effort.** This includes planning for both the US sustainment effort and also the efforts necessary for the HN to sustain its operations after the US or MNFs depart.

   h. **Protect the Effort.** OPSEC planning should be integrated into the operations planning process to ensure the essential secrecy of the effort. OPSEC must not only protect essential elements of the operations being planned, but of the planning effort itself.

3. **Department of Defense Guidance**

   a. The majority of military planning for FID takes place at the CCMD level. GCCs base strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in the JSPS. This section will briefly discuss the major JSPS guidance documents and their relation to the CCDR’s FID planning process. Only those documents most relevant to the FID planning process will be discussed.

   For further information on joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System.

   b. The NMS supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the Defense Strategy Review (DSR). The NMS conveys the CJCS’s message to the joint force on the strategic direction the US Armed Forces should follow to support the NSS and DSR. It describes the ways and means to realize the NMS, NSS, and DSR through a legislatively mandated review of DOD strategy and priorities.

   c. **CJCSI 3110.01, 2015 (U) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).** The JSCP implements the strategic policy direction provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the development of campaign, contingency, and posture plans. The GEF integrates DOD planning guidance into a single, overarching document. Through the guidance and resources provided in the JSCP, the GCCs develop their operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans to support FID. Generally, the JSCP provides guidance important to FID in the following areas:

   (1) The JSCP provides general tasking planning guidance for SC activities to the CCMDs from which CCDRs may deduce military missions to support FID.

   (2) The JSCP supplemental instructions (CJCSI 3110 series) provide additional planning guidance and amplification of tasking for certain specified capabilities. These supplemental instructions impact the military planning and execution of FID through various functional associations, such as those described in Figure IV-1.

   d. **GEF.** The GEF provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the President’s NSS. With respect to SC, this guidance provides direction on irregular warfare; building partner capability and capacity;
and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction. SC tools are discussed in Chapter I, “Introduction.”

e. **DOD Guidance for SC.** SC guidance comes from many sources and informs DOD SC planning, implementation, and oversight to achieve defense strategy objectives and complements policy and guidance promulgated in the GEF; the Defense Planning Guidance; and PPD-23, *Security Sector Assistance*. The geographic CCMD staffs plan their theater plans with COM integrated country strategy input that helps prioritize those nations in theater for resource allocation and development. This guidance informs a standardized SC prioritization framework to assist GCCs and other stakeholders in prioritizing SC resources and activities in alignment with the DOD defense strategy. This framework also assists in accounting for risk and other considerations related to the likelihood of successful outcomes.
4. Theater Planning Requirements

a. GCCs may develop theater strategies and campaign plans that support taskings by the CJCS in the JSCP. Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level.

b. Theater and functional strategies are broad statements of the GCCs’ long-term vision for the AOR and the FCCs’ long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities guided by and prepared in the context of the SecDef’s priorities. The NMS, GEF, and JSCP guide the development of theater and functional strategies that incorporate campaign plan objectives and contingency plan end states that reflect national and DOD policy and guidance. Campaign plan goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. FID is an integral part of these strategies. The determination of the desired end state for the AOR or functional capability is an important element in the strategy process. This determination establishes the strategic direction on which commanders and their staffs base campaign plans as well as other plans. In general, the theater and functional strategies will normally include an analysis of US national policy and interests, a strategic assessment of the AOR or global functional capability, a threat analysis, the commander’s vision, and a statement of theater missions and objectives.

c. Theater and functional campaign plans are extensions of the theater or functional strategies. They provide the commander’s vision and intent through broad operational concepts and provide the framework for OPLANs, which are branch plans.

For further information on campaign plans, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

d. SC Planning. SC is the way in which DOD interacts with the PN security establishment to build relationships that promote specific US security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense, contingency operations, and multinational operations; and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN. The theater and functional campaign plans are the primary documents that focus on the command’s shaping activities, which include operations, SC, and other activities designed to achieve theater or functional objectives. Direction for the GCC and FCC is provided through the GEF, the JSCP, and other DOD planning guidance. This guidance provides regional and global functional SC priorities and CCP content requirements for SC. At the discretion of the Service chiefs, Services develop campaign support plans that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of CCPs; on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the campaign end states and/or DOD component programs; and/or institutional priorities and end states in support of broader Title 10, USC, programs with SA programs and Service component command activities to support CCMD
campaigns and Service institutional objectives. If developed, Services should ensure campaign support plans are synchronized with CCMD campaign plans through their respective component commands.

*For additional information on SC planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning; JP 3-20, Security Cooperation; the GEF; and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joints Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).*

e. The Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise provides a framework for iterative dialogue and collaborative planning to assess the merits and risks of various military options in use by joint forces. APEX is applicable across the range of military operations to plan and execute military activities to achieve the policy objectives outlined in the NSS and NMS.

5. **Planning Procedures and Considerations**

a. The military plans and executes missions through APEX, which provides the framework for operational activities and the planning and execution functions. Figure IV-2 depicts the joint process to develop these products. The framework is a continuous process that synchronizes both the plans and their execution with a feedback loop informed by assessments. This framework is fully described in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, and CJCS Guide 3130, *Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework*. FID planning follows these guidelines and is further described below.

b. **Strategic Guidance.** The purpose of this planning function is to develop a shared understanding of the environment, objectives, and framework for subsequent concept development. This function is characterized by a sustained civilian-military dialogue to ensure the alignment of military planning with strategic direction and policy. There are three methods by which the CCDRs identify requirements for military activities to support FID. Plans for these specific military operations in support of FID become part of the overall campaign and contingency planning.

1. **Top down through the JSPS.**

2. **Bottom up from an HN or country team in the GCC’s AOR.** These include both SA and other SC requests. SA requests are forwarded by the SC officer on the country team directly to the implementing agency. The GCC is informed of such requests but execution is outside the JSPS. For other SC requests the GCC may forward those requests to SecDef for authorization. The GCC may authorize these support missions whenever they are IAW US law and directed through the JSPS.

3. **GCC Initiated.** Military support to FID efforts that is not directed under an existing specified or implied mission may be identified. The GCC endorses these requirements and obtains authorization from SecDef. Also, routine civilian-military dialogue during the four operational activities (situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment) provides updated strategic direction that could identify requirements for military activities to support FID.
c. Concept Development. Concept development follows a series of stages to develop a plan that meets the commander’s intent or intermediate strategic goals. A FID plan for developing a designated nation’s security capability should follow the steps below during concept development. FID considerations include the following:

(1) Mission Analysis. Before beginning FID planning, the commander’s staff will conduct a thorough mission analysis of the OE and threat. This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for FID concept development and planning. The following areas are considered when developing the concept:

(a) Threats to HN IDAD. Threats may be specific, such as illicit drugs or terrorism, or they may be more general, as in social unrest and instability. Identification of the root cause is key so military activities in the FID plans may target long-term causes rather than short-term symptoms. Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” provides detailed guidance for conducting intelligence preparation of the OE necessary for effective FID planning. For additional information, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

(b) The HN Social, Economic, and Political Environment. FID efforts are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN’s cultural and political realities. The capability of the HN government and leadership, as well as existing treaties and social infrastructure, are all factors that planners consider for a development plan. This may result in the conclusion that the best solution from the US perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. This proposed solution may be outside the realm of FID and may be better accomplished through other means. This situation must be resolved in diplomatic channels between the USG and the HN. For example, a treaty may meet US goals and objectives independent of the HN IDAD program and interests.

(c) Mission analysis for military operations in support of FID will normally be conducted in conjunction with normal operation planning. During this phase, commanders and their staffs analyze the assigned tasks, develop a mission statement, formulate subordinate tasks, and prepare guidance for the commander’s approval. The first two of these efforts are discussed below.

1. Analyze Assigned Tasks. Tasks to support FID will be specified and implied and may range from supporting SA efforts to providing forces to conduct FHA efforts.

2. Develop a Mission Statement. The mission statement guides much of the remaining planning process. The mission statement will provide the who, what, when, where, and possibly why. The theater mission established by the GCC may be general but could also identify FID-related tasks. The mission statement focuses on the priority threats to the security and stability of the HN.
Planning Guidance. During planning guidance, the commander outlines tentative COAs, additional assumptions, and a planning directive to the staff and subordinate commanders. Several important FID guidelines must be considered to ensure future planning results in the most efficient employment of the commander’s resources.

(a) Legal Authorizations and Restrictions. The legal restrictions governing US military activities in support of FID are complex and subject to changing US legislation and applicable international law. The staff legal advisor has an active role in the FID planning process. The basic funding authorizations for military activities in support of FID come through either the FAA, AECA, or through DOD operation and maintenance (O&M) funding sources. While GCCs may use O&M funding for specified and limited FID activities such as HCA, they may not use O&M funds for SA or exceed strict dollar limits on military construction projects. Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” provides a look at the legal aspects of FID.

(b) Third-Country Interests. US FID activities may impact conditions and perceptions throughout the region, particularly in neighboring countries. These factors will not dictate US policy but require careful evaluation and consideration and may impact the design of specific operations. Commanders should use active information programs to accurately depict US efforts to influence perceptions and to defeat adversary propaganda efforts.

(c) Restrictive Use of Force. US combat operations in FID will generally require a judicious selection and employment of forces including approved ROE. The purpose of such selection and employment is to ensure the HN military and other civilian security forces rapidly accept the responsibility for its security and to minimize HN civilian casualties. Nonlethal weapons and other capabilities that create nonlethal effects provide US and HN forces an escalation of force option to determine intent during operations and assist in reducing civilian casualties, helping to gain the trust of the population. Employment of nonlethal weapons and other capabilities that create nonlethal effects significantly expands options for force application and provides a means to achieve scalable levels of force.

For more information on nonlethal weapons, refer to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-22.40/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.

1. Specific ROE are developed and approved to support FID operations. They will normally differ from country to country, may differ within regions of the same country, and are likely to be more restrictive in FID than in other operations. However, ROE will not restrict the inherent right to use proportional force in self-defense when responding to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. In these situations, nonlethal weapons and other capabilities that create nonlethal effects offer a wider range of responses when considering an increase or decrease of force, and their employment should be clearly addressed in ROE.
2. Standing rules of engagement (SROE) are provided for US forces as stand-alone guidance that, with appropriate authorization, can be tailored to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in the absence of specific ROE from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures; these supplemental measures may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular mission. GCCs may also augment the SROE to support missions and respond to threats in their AOR. SROE do not apply to defense support of civil authorities missions; routine Military Department functions, including FP duties, within US territory and territorial seas; LE and security duties on DOD installations (and off-installation, while conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside US territory; USCG units (and other units under their OPCON) conducting LE operations; and US forces assigned to the OPCON or TACON of an MNF (the ROE of the MNF will be followed, if authorized by SecDef).

For additional information on SROE, refer to CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

(3) **Staff Estimates.** The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the staff estimate process of concept development. These detailed options serve as the foundation for the commander’s decision to select a COA. Military options to support FID under consideration can involve any of the categories of indirect support, direct support (not involving US combat operations), or US combat operations. The following three estimates have specific implications for the development of an effective FID plan.

(a) **The intelligence estimate is essential to accurately identify the threat upon which to base FID efforts.** The intelligence estimate supporting FID operations will have an orientation quite different from that of a conventional estimate. A comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the OE is essential in building this estimate. The intelligence estimate concentrates on adversary situation; adversary capabilities, to include their capacity to procure or produce chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and the location of CBRN materials, including toxic industrial materials, that could be used to produce such weapons or makeshift devices; an analysis of those capabilities; and finally, conclusions drawn from that analysis. In FID, however, analysis must focus more on the local populace and its probable reactions to potential US or opposition actions. This requires knowledge of the ethnic, racial, economic, scientific, technical, religious, and linguistic groups in the HN, as well as their locations and an understanding of how they may perceive future operations. Understanding the OE and the HN’s social, economic, and political systems is essential to effectively and efficiently support the HN’s IDAD program. Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” discusses the FID-specific aspects of intelligence preparation that must be considered to successfully plan and execute FID operations. Additionally, there are certain planning factors associated with network engagement, such as social network analysis and link analysis. These and other tools can assist in FID planning and engaging friendly, neutral, and threat networks.

For more information of planning considerations, social network analysis, and link analysis, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.
(b) **The CMO estimate examines each military COA and how CMO may best influence the various COAs the commander is considering.** The CMO estimate focuses on situation assessment rather than COA development. The purpose is to assemble information underlying a CMO concept of support that can be modified to support the overall concept of operations (CONOPS). CA should complete area studies where operations are likely. During military operations that support FID, these assessments focus on social, economic, and political factors that relate to existing or potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. They may include overlays that show local demographics, civil supply support, public utilities, and population displacement. The CMO estimate shows how CMO can best be integrated into the overall operation and supports decision making throughout an operation. CA support, like MISO, should be incorporated into all FID operations.

(c) **The MISO staff estimate process examines the potential impact of proposed US military operations.** Internal stability is closely connected to the HN populace’s perceptions; thus their perceptions should be continually assessed and MISO adjusted accordingly. More specific guidance is included in the MISO annex to the appropriate plan. **At the CCMD level, MISO concepts and plans are coordinated through the country team.** This coordination is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI, “Operations.”

(d) In addition to the planning imperatives previously discussed, there are **several important FID guidelines** to consider when developing possible COAs. These guidelines are:

1. **Leverage Intelligence Capabilities.** Identify political, economic, scientific, technical, and social threats, in addition to the conventional hostile military factions. This is a complex task, especially when working in an unfamiliar culture in which US personnel may have little or no experience and in which high-technology collection and processing equipment may be of little use. Despite this challenge, commanders and their staffs must integrate all available assets and use culturally trained specialists to define these threats and to appropriately tailor the COAs.

2. **Reconcile FP Measures.** Commanders and staffs must evaluate operations closely to determine the increased risks of large deployments of US personnel in the area. In a high-threat condition, it may be prudent to delay the FID mission or commit a smaller element, rather than to commit a larger force that has a higher profile and is more difficult to protect. Depending on the mission, the JFC may consider seabasing some of the force as an alternative to reduce the footprint ashore.

3. **Account for Sustainment.** Commanders and staff must be cognizant of HN culture and their appreciation for sustainment, maintenance, and budgeting. IDAD programs are frequently at risk in the out years because they may not receive adequate HN investment. This applies both to physical infrastructure and programs to improve human capital, good governance, and other intangibles.
4. Define MOEs. The success of US FID activities can be measured only in terms of the success of the HN’s IDAD program. MOEs should focus on long-term, attainable objectives rather than short-term targets, limited objectives, or over-ambitious development goals. In addition, clearly established transition points should define when the supported HN will, incrementally, assume responsibility for the total IDAD effort.

d. Plan Development. Plan development (Figure IV-2) begins after the GCC’s strategic concept is fully developed. This phase matches mission requirements against available resources. This action is particularly important because a large portion of the force needed to conduct FID is in the Reserve Component (RC). In major military operations in support of a FID operation, the commander must consider availability of forces (both Active Component [AC] and RC) to support the mission requirements. Use of RC forces, including USCG Reserve, may alleviate shortfalls and assist organizing and tailoring resources to carry out the military support to FID as efficiently as possible. Similarly, leveraging the mutually supporting capabilities of the United States Navy (USN) and USCG can serve as a force multiplier. Coordination among the HN, third-party nations, and USG interagency partners (country team) remains paramount during plan development. This is an extension of the coordination that began during the plan initiation phase.

e. Plan Assessment. Commanders and their staffs should consider many FID objectives will involve a long-term effort, and MOEs may be difficult to evaluate in the short term.

f. Supporting Plans. Supporting FID plans may come from a variety of units such as Service or functional component commanders; subordinate unified commanders; JTF commanders; supporting CCDRs; or subordinate CA, MIS, engineer, medical, transportation, SOF, or other combat units.

g. Other Planning Considerations

(1) For personnel recovery operations that may occur during FID, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(2) A key component of developing the training plan is established through an agreement (memorandum of agreement [MOA] or letter of agreement) between the HN and the joint force conducting the training. These are, in effect, signed contracts detailing the specifics of what is being provided by each party and should be carefully reviewed by the legal advisor for any instrument that is potentially an international agreement. Training plans at the operational level will vary based on HN needs and unit training capabilities. An assessment for the training to be conducted should begin with a pre-mission site survey by all joint force units deploying in the HN.

6. Planning for Force Protection

a. JFCs and their subordinate commanders address FP during all phases of FID operations, from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment. All
aspects of FP are considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders implement FP measures appropriate to all anticipated threats. The JFC must provide guidance to the force on the employment of all capabilities including nonlethal weapons in the conduct of operations.
b. Supported and supporting commanders ensure deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the OA.

c. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation within the HN.

d. JFCs also plan for CI support to the FID operation and should incorporate umbrella concepts for CI FP source operations in the planning process.

e. For the foreseeable future, the threat of terrorism is a constant factor, even in those nations with advanced domestic security infrastructures. FID operations require proactive FP measures and consideration of the following:

1. Street or organized crime.
2. VEOs.
3. Foreign intelligence services.
4. Local populace animosity or demonstrations.
5. Dislocated civilians.
6. HN regional transportation systems.
7. HN biometric systems utilized to identify and track personnel.
8. HN military equipment, training, and procedural deficiencies.
9. Activities to safeguard the force from CBRN hazards and measures to control, defeat, disable, and/or dispose of WMD and related materials.
10. Weather, terrain, and environment.
12. Health threats and HN health care capabilities.
14. Political groups, parties, or individuals.
15. Regional cross-border threats.
For further information on FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. For further information on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments. For further information on CBRN response, refer to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.

For further information on improvised explosive devices, refer to JP 3-15.1, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices.

For further information on mines and unexploded ordnance, refer to JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.

7. Foreign Internal Defense Assessment

a. Commanders and staffs must realize that planning for joint FID operations is an integrated process. It is totally integrated into theater planning and is reflected in planning documents extending from the JSCP and the GCC’s strategy down to subordinate joint force and Service component supporting plans. During the concept development of FID planning, a broad approach to JIPOE must be considered. In addition, MISO and CMO estimates are included in the decision-making process to formulate adequate and feasible COAs from the FID standpoint; in other words, how can CMO best influence the operational concept. Finally, the staff reviews FID plans for adequacy, acceptability, and feasibility before ensuring the creation of appropriate supporting plans to support theater-level operations.

b. Those responsible for conducting FID operations assess what activities to conduct. DOS representatives work with foreign governments and DOD representatives work with foreign military personnel to develop IDAD programs that are consistent with US foreign policy objectives and useful to the country concerned. The SC planning process is used to assess currently implemented programs and exercises. Representatives assess the previous programs for relevancy and success in relation to country-specific objectives and to the overall goals within the region. Programs are assessed on the basis of key trends, shortfalls, future opportunities, and challenges.

8. United States Foreign Internal Defense Capabilities

a. Military Resources. SOF are beneficial forces of choice for FID due to their extensive language capability, cultural training, advising skills, and regional expertise. However, FID requirements in theater and transregional conflicts can exceed available SOF capacity. CF, when designated, should be prepared to conduct FID operations. In fact, CF have a distinct advantage in certain FID operations where their HN counterparts have a similar conventional mission. Conventional commanders must assign the best qualified Service members to training and advisory missions. Both SOF and CF participating in FID operations outside of their normal area of expertise may require augmentation from linguists fluent in the HN language and culture.

(1) United States Army (USA)
(a) USA FID operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving HN ground force capabilities through ground force advisor operations in coordination with SA programs. A principal US activity for conducting FID is the transfer of major items (weapon systems and related support items) to selected HNs, primarily through SA. The USG often facilitates such transfers through operational and strategic assessments, ground force studies, SA-funded equipment refurbishment, training on specific weapon systems and support items through SA-funded MTTs, and SA case management and oversight. Delivery of FMS items can be performed in conjunction with multinational operations and contingencies and with other training programs conducted by the GCCs and USG departments and agencies. FID operations can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. Commanders can employ a greater range of capabilities and resources through the provision of direct support and US combat operations for FID, when HN ground units are inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their own defense effort. Principal initiatives to accomplish FID objectives include the following:

1. Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the SA program to eligible foreign government aviation units conducting IDAD operations.

2. Assess foreign military ground force capabilities and provide direction or recommendations toward improving HN landpower employment and sustainment methods.

3. Educate foreign military force senior officers and civilians in how to appropriately use military power.

4. Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous ground resources and capabilities.

5. Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ ground forces.

6. Assist foreign ground forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms but generally includes hands-on assistance in enabling capabilities such as intelligence operations, military police/detainee operations, CA/civil-military cooperation, sustainment/logistic support, and health service support (HSS).

7. Facilitate force reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for joint and multinational operations.

8. Provide direct support to the HN with USA resources to provide intelligence, communications capability, mobility, logistical, medical, and USA aviation support.

9. Secure basing and land use agreements for US military requirements.
10. Provide support to civil administration in under-governed areas.

11. Provide operational contract support.

12. Establish the force generating capability for HN forces.

13. Provide C2 for joint and combined military forces as a land component command, joint security area coordinator, or JTF.

For further guidance and detail on USA FID capabilities, refer to FM 3-07, Stability, and FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation.

(b) US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). ARSOF may support FID operations in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of CF. The ARSOF core task of FID is only one component of an HN’s IDAD policy and programs. The strategic end state of FID is an HN capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to address internal threats. From a SOF perspective, one measure of successful FID efforts is when the need to deploy large numbers of US military personnel and equipment is precluded. FID, as part of SC, takes place in an arena that may include support to COIN, countering VEOs, CT, MISO, DOD support to CD operations, and FHA. These activities may include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against internal threats. Small teams may conduct FID training in remote areas in HNs where the US force commitment is small. ARSOF has capabilities for MISO that support FID capabilities and activities, are important for influencing and enabling HN legitimacy with the populace, and also support a broader range of US and HN information-related activities and the overarching USG strategic guidance. When this is the case, ARSOF units may be the primary or sole trainers of HN military or paramilitary personnel. In other cases, large numbers of forces and units may be involved in direct support (not involving US combat operations). Training of HN military may continue while US forces are providing direct support and, to some degree, even during US combat operations. A commander must balance the need to operationally employ ARSOF against their unique abilities (possibly unparalleled by the CF available) to train critical capabilities in the HN military.

For further guidance and detail on ARSOF FID capabilities, refer to ATP 3-05.2, Foreign Internal Defense.

(2) United States Marine Corps (USMC)

(a) The Marine Corps uses CF task-organized and enabled with SC skills to enable FSFs to operate alongside Marine forces, to provide access, build relationships that support strategic objectives, and contribute to Service operational capabilities. The Marine Corps employs forward-deployed, crisis response-capable Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) and special purpose Marine air-ground task forces (SPMAGTFs) and smaller task-organized teams enabled with varied skills to conduct SC. These forces are trained to advise partner FSF and deployed to conduct combined exercises, key leader engagements, and other SC activities with FSF.
(b) Forward-deployed MEUs embarked aboard amphibious ready groups provide flexible, scalable, and maneuverable options for CCDRs to conduct SC and support daily operations while prepared for crisis response and contingencies.

(c) Although SPMAGTFs and MEUs account for the majority of USMC SC activities for GCCs, other task-organized and enabled units, MTTs, detachments, and task forces routinely support the GCC’s requirements. The Marine Corps provides GCCs with trained advisors capable of operating across the range of military operations in task-organized or purpose-built task forces.

(d) For FID operations in complex security environments, intelligence support will be vital, and USMC intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets can provide tailored intelligence to USMC or other joint forces. USMC forward-deployed and forward operating forces provide flexible, protected, and self-sustained sourcing solutions to a wide range of SC activities.

(e) **Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARFORSOC).** MARFORSOC is the USMC SOF component to USSOCOM. MARFORSOC supports FID operations through teams that train, advise, and assist friendly HN forces—including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them to support their governments’ internal security and stability, to counter subversion, and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats.

(f) The USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning serves as the central Marine Corps organization for operational culture and language familiarization training programs, ensuring Marines are regionally focused, globally prepared, and effective at navigating and influencing the culturally complex modern OE.

(3) **USN**

(a) While SC support can be sourced from units across the USN, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command provides most of the USN’s CF contribution and is composed of several subordinate commands that are able to provide unique capabilities in support of FID. Expeditionary training units deliver focused maritime capabilities training to HN personnel across a wide array of maritime competencies that include the following:

1. Construction capabilities in support of operating forces; civic projects for other nations, to include building roads, bunkers, airfields, and bridges; and responsive support for disaster recovery operations.

2. Expeditionary support capable of conducting port and air cargo handling missions, customs inspections, fuels distribution, freight terminal and warehouse operations, postal services, and ordnance reporting and handling.

3. Expeditionary diving support capable of conducting salvage; search and recovery; harbor clearance; underwater cutting and welding; construction; inspection; and repair of ocean facilities, including wharves, piers, underwater pipelines, moorings, boat ramps, and limited repairs on ships.
4. Coastal Riverine forces operate in harbors, rivers, bays, across the littorals and ashore. The primary mission is to conduct maritime security operations by defending high-value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors, and both inland and on coastal waterways and, when directed, conduct offensive combat operations.

5. Adaptive force packages embarked in naval shipping, to include ships operated by Military Sealift Command, can conduct missions in support of FID. Sea basing joint and interagency forces can help facilitate sustainment, C2, and FP while reducing footprint ashore.

(b) Naval Special Warfare Command provides SEAL teams trained to conduct FID as a core mission for USN SOF, which provides USSOCOM with a maritime component for advise-and-assist programs, building partner maritime and land SOF capability. Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School provides a robust FID and SFA capability to FSF on riverine operations of small craft strategy, operations, communication, weapons, maintenance, and foreign partner instructor development.

(4) United States Air Force (USAF)

(a) USAF FID operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving HN airpower capabilities through air advisor operations in coordination with SA programs. A principal US instrument for conducting FID is the transfer of major items (weapon systems and related support items) to selected HNs, primarily through SA. The USAF often facilitates such transfers through operational and strategic assessments, airpower studies, SA-funded aircraft refurbishment, airlift of SA-funded defense articles, training on specific weapon systems and support items through SA-funded air advisory and technical MTTs, and SA case management and oversight. Delivery of FMS items can be performed in conjunction with multinational operations and contingencies and with other training programs conducted by the GCC and USG departments and agencies. USAF FID operations can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. If necessary, commanders can employ an even greater range of capabilities and resources in the direct support and US combat operations categories of FID support when HN aviation units are inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their own defense effort. Principal USAF initiatives to accomplish FID objectives include efforts to:

1. Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the SA program to eligible foreign government aviation units.

2. Assess foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction or recommendations toward improving HN airpower employment and sustainment methods.

3. Train foreign military air forces to plan and execute effective and efficient intelligence collection, as well as to produce, disseminate, and distribute raw data.

4. Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous airpower resources and capabilities.
5. Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ airpower in specific operational situations.

6. Assist foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms, but generally includes hands-on assistance in combat support capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, fuels, HSS, and aviation medicine.

7. Facilitate force integration for multinational operations.

8. Provide direct support to HNs by using USAF resources to provide intelligence, communications capability, mobility, logistic support, and airpower.

For further guidance and detail on USAF FID capabilities, refer to Air Force Doctrine Annex (AFDA) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

(b) US Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF). AFSOF conduct FID operations by working by, with, and through foreign aviation forces. While FID operations are typically conducted in environments ranging from permissive to hostile, AFSOF must also be prepared to conduct partnered operations in contested and denied environments. When required, AFSOF can provide assets for persistent ISR, air mobility, and precision strike. AFSOF maintain specially trained combat aviation advisors (CAAs). CAAs are operational aviation detachments with HN language skills. They are organized, trained, and equipped to assess, train, advise, assist, accompany, and integrate HN aviation forces into joint, SOF, or other USG activities, operations, and campaigns. Additionally, AFSOF special tactics teams enhance the air-to-ground interface, helping coordinate air support for CF and SOF when advising foreign security force operations during COIN operations. AFSOF has capabilities to disseminate MISO products that support FID, which can influence and enable HN legitimacy with the populace but also as part of a broader range of USG strategic guidance and communication synchronization efforts.

(5) USCG. The USCG possesses broad authorities across the spectrum of military, LE, regulatory, and intelligence activities in support of FID.

(a) Many of the world’s navies and coast guards have a mix of military, LE, resource protection, and humanitarian functions very similar to those of the USCG. A common constabulary and multi-mission nature promotes instant understanding and interoperability and makes USCG a valued partner for many naval and maritime forces. The USCG has a long history of providing training and support to maritime forces around the world.

(b) Building effective maritime governance requires coordination beyond navies and coast guards. It requires integrated efforts across agencies and ministries, as well as private sector commitment. The USCG can provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country organize and establish a coast guard. The USCG has this expertise by virtue of its broad statutory missions, authorities, and civil responsibilities; membership in the intelligence community; and strong partnerships with industry. The USCG routinely conducts military engagement with other
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nations through multiple ministries and can offer a model maritime code that countries can use to improve their laws and regulations.

(c) The USCG is the lead agency for maritime counter illicit trafficking operations and is the principal maritime LEA of the US. In addition, subject to international agreements, the USCG may patrol or conduct pursuit, entry, and boarding operations in the territorial waters of other countries.

(6) **State Partnership Program (SPP).** The SPP is a joint DOD SC program, per Title 10, USC, Section 341; overseen by USD(P); managed and administered by the Chief, National Guard Bureau; executed by the GCCs; and sourced by the National Guard of the states and territories. The SPP supports the SC objectives of the US, achieves the GCCs’ CCPs objectives, and supports the objectives of the relevant COM to promote national objectives, stability, partner capacity, better understanding, and trust.

b. **Interagency Resources.** JFCs consider capabilities and availabilities of interagency resources when planning for FID operations. During execution, the country team normally coordinates and synchronizes military operations with interagency initiatives and activities. This allows for the most capable and similar organizations to work together in developing effective and efficient HN resources. For example, DOJ and DOS can send LE specialists overseas to train and advise HN police forces; police are best trained by other police. The nature of the OE and legal considerations are also important. USCG SC activities reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to a broader HN maritime audience, including, but not limited to, LEAs, maritime administrations, and transport ministries. The USCG is uniquely positioned to conduct military engagement through traditional and non-traditional defense, LE, and maritime safety operations.

c. **Operational Contract Support (OCS).** OCS is planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Contract support can be a valuable enabling resource from logistics, training support, and contracted instructors for the various categories of FID indirect support, direct support, and US combat operations. The demand throughout the world for US SOF/CF advisors and trainers for civil and military forces is greater than what DOD can provide. Contractors are hired both internal (theater support contracts) and external (external support contracts) to support FID operations in the HNs to fill roles of expertise outside that of DOS and DOD ranks and augment deficiencies, especially for general tasks and training events (i.e., basic military and law enforcement). In some cases, additional training support from contractors enables commanders to use joint forces more efficiently. For example, contracted police development capabilities through the INL can provide expertise not resident in the uniformed military. Contractor support can provide HN training and education, including the following:

(1) Establish or develop institutional training programs.

(2) Support development of security ministries and HQs.

(3) Establish administrative and logistic systems.
(4) Advise and train military forces and civil authorities.

For further guidance and detail on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.
CHAPTER V
TRAINING

“A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle.”

Major General Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee III, 1756-1818

SECTION A. TRAINING JOINT FORCES

1. General

a. A tenet of the NMS is to assist allies, multinational partners, and the governments of threatened states in resisting aggression. This strategic imperative demands that joint forces strengthen their abilities to assist, train, and advise foreign military and security forces for their own self-defense and to enable those forces to apply their capacity in support of US strategic interests.

b. FID may be conducted by a single individual in remote isolated areas, small groups, or large units involved in direct support (not involving US combat operations) or US combat operations. In many of these situations, US CF will be operating in unfamiliar circumstances and cultural surroundings.

c. FID operations occur in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. However, due to the ambiguity and instability often found within or along the operating area, US FID forces may be required to conduct operations or transit through contested, and/or denied environments. Combined with the stresses of operating in a foreign culture, this possibility may warrant training that is not routinely offered to CF.

d. **Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM),** is charged by law with training assigned SOF to meet mission requirements (including FID) and to ensure their interoperability with CF as well as other SOF. Continuing individual education and professional training peculiar to special operations are the responsibility of CDRUSSOCOM.

For further information on CDRUSSOCOM training and education responsibilities, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations, and JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations.

2. Training, Knowledge, and Skills Needed for Success

The following subparagraphs highlight some of the training needed for successful military operations in support of FID.

a. **Overall US and Theater Goals.** Personnel conducting FID operations must understand the overall goals and objectives of the supported GCC. This knowledge is similar to understanding the commander’s intent in conventional operations. An understanding of
these goals provides a foundation upon which to determine if an individual’s actions and operations support overall theater objectives.

b. **Area and Cultural Orientation.** Knowledge of the OA is required to maximize the effectiveness of military operations in support of IDAD programs. It is challenging and potentially counterproductive to successfully interact with the HN if individuals conducting FID do not have an understanding of the background of the nation, the culture, and the customs and the impact of those factors on partner values, ethics, critical thought, and perceptions.

c. **Language Training.** It is very important for all personnel conducting FID operations to be able to communicate with HN personnel in their native language. Language capabilities can significantly aid trainers and others who have daily contact with HN military personnel and the local populace. Personnel can function much more effectively if they receive language training in the target language prior to deployment. Even if they do not have extensive familiarity with the language, their use of basic expressions can help establish rapport with HN counterparts. Although language training is important, it is equally important for personnel conducting FID operations to conduct training on working with and speaking through interpreters.

d. **Standards of Conduct.** US military personnel understand the importance of the image they project to the HN population, from rapport building to active FP. This impression may have a significant impact on the ability of the US to gain support for FID operations or the HN to gain long-term support for its IDAD program. US standards of conduct are, to a great extent, an example of the professionalism and respect inherent in the US military—a respect and professionalism that can be passed by example to the HN military and police forces and populace. Refresher briefings in standards of conduct, which complement cultural awareness training, should be mandatory for all personnel involved in FID operations.

e. **Coordinating Relationships with Other USG Departments and Agencies, NGOs, and International Organizations.** FID programs and operations are likely to interact at all levels with other USG departments and agencies, in addition to NGOs and international organizations. For example, special forces (SF), MIS, and CA elements will likely coordinate with the embassy PAO or cultural attaché, and CA may work closely with USAID. This type of coordination may be new to some military personnel; therefore, specific training or procedures may be required.

f. **Legal Parameters.** To function effectively, personnel supporting FID activities must be aware of the legal parameters. These parameters include provisions of applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), as well as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. Because many military activities take place within the HN, applicable legal guidelines should include laws of the HN government addressing the status of US personnel while in country (for example, existing SOFAs). Accordingly, a country law briefing, cultural orientation, and review of any pertinent international agreements should be included in training.

*Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” provides a look at the legal aspects of FID.*
g. ROE. A thorough understanding of the ROE is very important to units involved in combat operations and for individuals involved in any military activities in support of FID.

h. Tactical FP Training. FID activities often require small US elements to deploy in isolated areas to support threatened HN governments. This requirement makes for a potentially dangerous situation for US personnel. US forces must be prepared for these situations through proper training in self-protection programs and measures. The required or designated training should include identified individual and collective tasks.

3. Foreign Internal Defense Training Strategy

a. Preparation for military operations to support FID requires training that covers a broad range of topics. The training must also be designed to support a mix of personnel, ranging from language-trained and culturally focused SOF to those untrained in the specific area where the FID operation is being conducted. Some training, such as language qualification, requires an investment in time and money that will not be practical for all personnel. A combination of institutional and unit-conducted individual and collective training will be required.

b. Institutional Training. SOF receive extensive institutional training in language, cultural considerations, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic specialty. When available and in sufficient numbers, these personnel should be extensively used to train HN forces and facilitate liaison with the HN. CF that are tasked to provide training and serve as advisors and MTTs and to conduct joint and multinational operations with HN forces require language, cultural, and other training to prepare them for these missions. Some institutional courses are available that can be used by commanders to train personnel for FID missions. Listed below are some of the types of institutional training that is provided by one or more of the Services. Consult appropriate training catalogs for DOD course listings.

(1) Language training.
(2) Cultural awareness and interpersonal communications training.
(3) General FID and IDAD principles training.
(4) FP and AT awareness training.
(5) Site exploitation training.
(6) SA team orientation training.
(7) SA technical training.

c. Unit Training. Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support FID activities may be conducted within the unit. This training can be individually focused or, in the case of unit-size participation, may involve large-scale collective training. Training resources may be drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are particularly valuable
because of their area orientation and FID focus. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of the FID mission. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may encounter during a FID mission.

SECTION B. TRAINING HOST NATION FORCES

4. Training Plan

a. Developing a training plan for the HN is paramount for US support to FID and establishing the HN security forces capacity to support the IDAD strategy. The JFC develops a training plan based on thorough mission analysis and assessment of the IDAD strategy, HN capabilities and needs, and the OE. This plan should be developed in conjunction with both the country team and with commanders of HN forces to ensure comprehensive objectives are detailed.

b. Baseline Assessment and Site Survey. The first step in developing the HN training plan is the conduct of a site survey. In addition to identifying logistics requirements for trainers, the site survey must include a baseline assessment of HN capabilities, drawing conclusions about gaps between capabilities and needs as identified in the IDAD strategy. The training assessment should, as a minimum, consider:

(1) HN doctrine and training literature, including differences from US doctrine;

(2) Constraints in HN resources and funding;

(3) Societal and military culture;

(4) Language barriers;

(5) Current level of HN proficiency;

(6) HN’s ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment;

(7) Airfield suitability survey to assess runway capability for US tactical airlift support;

(8) Potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (e.g., ranges, urban terrain training sites);

(9) Proficiency of HN trainers;

(10) Equipment availability (e.g., radios, weapons, vehicles);

(11) C2 systems and procedures;

(12) Logistics systems and procedures; review theater logistics analysis developed for the HN;
(13) Cooperation level with US and HN intelligence agencies during operations and training exercises;

(14) Constraints on US and past HN information miscues and history (include a review of observations and insights contained in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System [JLLIS]);

(15) Background and analysis of the main interagency partners in the region (especially JIPOE and intelligence preparation of the battlespace if available);

(16) HN schedule that considers and includes local holidays, traditional days off, and any cultural training time constraints; and

(17) FP assessment.

c. Training Plans

(1) Upon completion of the baseline assessment and site survey, and in conjunction with the HN leadership, the JFC or leader of the US element develops a training plan for FSF. Because training all echelons of forces helps to synchronize execution of mission-essential tasks throughout the FSF, agreed-upon training strategies must include multi-echelon training whenever possible. It is imperative to build flexibility for contingencies into the training plan. Often, the reality of a HN’s capabilities differs, both positively and negatively, from the initial assessment. Training plans must be able to accommodate this inconsistency to maximize training and preserve relationships. As a minimum, the training plan should:

   (a) List mutually agreed-upon training objectives at each echelon of HN forces;

   (b) Identify units, commands, and leadership personnel requiring training across each echelon;

   (c) Identify required FID resources and how they will be provided; and

   (d) Identify what will be provided by each party, through an instrument (such as a MOA or letter of agreement) between the HN and the JFC.

(2) Individual units will develop plans for execution of the JFC’s training plan.

5. Training and Advising

a. There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. In general, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions where joint force personnel are not likely to be forced to engage any armed threat. In equal generality, advisory assistance may entail some operational advice and assistance beyond training in less secure areas. Joint force personnel render advisory assistance in relatively low-risk situations. However, in the current OE, every member of a joint force is, to some
degree, in harm’s way. Advisory assistance (and to a lesser degree, training assistance) may involve situations that require personnel to defend themselves, which necessitates that the commander and the US embassy accept greater risk. The difficulty in putting exact and unqualified definitions on either type of assistance is that both may take place through the entire range from indirect support to direct support (not involving US combat operations) during the same FID operation. As long as risk is clearly defined, planned for, mitigated where possible, and, most importantly, deemed worth the potential cost, this lack of definition causes no inherent problems. Mitigation can be accomplished through accurately assessing the OE in which a FID operation is conducted and carefully matching the appropriately trained advisory force required to reduce threats and meet objectives within that environment.

b. Joint force elements typically develop, establish, and operate centralized training programs for the supported HN force. The joint force can also conduct individual, leader, and collective training programs for specific HN units. Training topics span the gamut of military tasks, and training methods range from individual instruction through leader development to specialized collective training. The joint force can provide both training and advisory assistance in two ways. In either case, assistance may be provided under the SCO chief in the role as the SDO in-country, other designated embassy official, the TSOC, or JTF, depending on the C2 arrangement.

(1) Small teams may provide training or give operational advice and assistance to HN civilian, military, or paramilitary organizations.

(2) Individual personnel may be assigned or attached to the SCO to perform training and advisory assistance duties on a temporary or permanent basis.

c. Training Assistance. The agreement negotiated between US and HN officials provides the framework for the who, what, when, where, how, and why of military training assistance. Often, application of US doctrine, as prescribed in applicable publications, must be modified to fit the unique requirements and constraints of the HN forces being trained. Procedures may vary, but the fundamental techniques and thought processes still apply. Training assistance should reflect on the materiel, fiscal, and logistical realities of the HN.

d. In general, those skills, concepts, and procedures for FID taught to US forces are also applicable to HN forces for IDAD. Training emphasis varies according to the HN requirements, force composition, and US and HN agreements. The training to be conducted depends on the situation and varies considerably. Existing military personnel, new military personnel, or paramilitary forces may receive training assistance.

e. US trainers must be present with FSF counterparts. Ultimately, US trainers use the train-the-trainer method for developing FSF. The goal is for the FSF to eventually conduct all instruction and training without guidance from US personnel. Initially, US personnel may present all or most of the instruction with as much HN assistance as is feasible.

f. Training assistance consists of all formal training conducted by joint force units. However, all personnel conducting training assistance must be cognizant of the potential
for the intense (and sometimes magnified) scrutiny of HN government personnel, military, media, and ordinary citizens. Part of preparing personnel for providing training assistance is making them aware of the less tangible elements of training assistance that can have a deep impact. Their words and actions should, at all times, serve as examples of professionalism. Joint force personnel should know, that in many HNs, their mere presence alongside their counterparts often bolsters that counterpart’s prestige within their organization and among the populace. Those providing training assistance should be aware that many HNs have a domestic information capability and exploiting the presence of highly skilled US trainers may be part of their agenda.

g. Advisory Assistance. Within DOD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance is the SCO. The SCO includes all DOD elements, regardless of actual title, assigned in foreign countries to manage SA programs administered by DOD. The US advisor may often work and coordinate with civilians of other country team agencies. When this occurs, they must know their functions, responsibilities, and capabilities, because many activities cross jurisdictional borders. Together, the advisor and their counterpart must resolve problems by means appropriate to the HN without violating US laws and policies in the process. Advisors operate under very specific ROE to ensure advisors remain advisors.

h. The joint force advisor must understand the scope of SCO activities. The advisor should be familiar with the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of other USG departments and agencies in the HN. Because many joint force (notably SOF) activities cross the jurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of other country team members, the advisor seeks other country team members to coordinate that portion of the overall FID effort.

i. Site Survey/Trainer/Advisor Checklists. The predeployment site survey (PDSS) leader—along with any subordinates specified—should establish initial rapport with the FSF commander. The following checklist is dependent on the type of FID activities being planned and the number of US personnel on the PDSS. The PDSS leader:

(1) Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner, preferably using the HN language, if capable or through an interpreter.

(2) Briefs the HN commander on the joint force advisors’ PDSS mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the unit by the higher US commander. The PDSS leader should use the HN language if possible and, if required, visual aids translated into the HN language.

(3) Assures the HN commander that all PDSS team members are fully supportive of the HN’s position and that they firmly believe a combined US and HN-unit effort will be successful.

(4) Assures the HN commander that assistance is needed to develop the tentative objectives for advisory assistance to include advisory team agreements with the HN commander on training objectives.
(5) Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s actual estimate of the unit’s capabilities and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements.

(6) Explains the PDSS team’s initial plan for establishing counterpart relationships, obtains approval from the HN commander for the plan, and requests to conduct the counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the PDSS leader and the HN commander.

(7) Supervises the linkup between PDSS team members and their HN counterparts to determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart relationship and their responsibilities within it.

(8) Identifies support requirements from the parent unit or US based entities.

(9) Endeavors not to make any promises or statements that could be construed as promises to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the advisory assistance or fulfill material requirements.

j. The PDSS team members analyze the HN unit’s status according to their area of expertise for the purpose of determining the HN requirements for advisory assistance. The PDSS team members:

(1) Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts.

(2) Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, and the briefing of the analysis to the advisory team and HN unit commanders.

(3) Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and tentative advisory assistance COAs selected prior to deployment.

(4) Collect and analyze all information relating to FP.

(5) Prepare written, prioritized estimates for advisory assistance COAs.

(6) Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the PDSS team and HN unit commander.

(7) Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the assistance mission.

(8) Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs.

(9) Prepare written or verbal estimates of COAs that will correct the deficiencies or negate their effects on the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs.

(10) Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the JFC of the status of the preparations compared to the plans for them.
k. Once received, the PDSS leader supervises the processing of the survey results. The PDSS leader then:

(1) Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs emphasizing how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory assistance objectives. Effort should be made to shape the selection as mutually advantageous in view of shared interests.

(2) Ensures their counterpart understands the desired COAs are still tentative contingent on the tasking US commander’s decision.

(3) Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on joint units, after obtaining input from the HN unit commander.

(4) Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant findings in the team survey for HN assistance.

l. The PDSS team plans its security IAW the anticipated threat. Adjustments are made as required by the situation on the ground. The PDSS team members:

(1) Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) IAW the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility.

(2) Maintain a team internal guard system, aware of the locations of all other joint force advisors and ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions.

(3) Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an emergency.

(4) Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside of the immediate area controlled by the team.

(5) Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction.

(6) Discuss visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their understanding and to maintain effective rapport.

(7) Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status and the inspection of its facilities.

(8) Establish mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack.

(9) Rehearse team alert and defensive plans.
(10) Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force rehearsals of defensive plans.

m. Executing the Mission. The senior joint force advisor assists the HN unit commander in providing C2 during the execution of the operation. Accompanying an HN commander on missions will afford the advisor visibility on the interactions between the HN forces and the populace. The senior advisor:

(1) Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA to gainfully exploit changes in the situation.

(2) Monitors the location of the HN commander and recommends changes so he can provide leadership at critical points and not deprive himself of the ability to maneuver his force in response to tactical changes.

(3) Monitors the information flow to the HN commander and recommends improvements needed to:

   (a) Make continuous use of intelligence collection assets.

   (b) Keep subordinates reporting combat information.

   (c) Screen the information given to the HN commander to prevent information overload.

   (d) Keep the command communications channels open for critical information.

(4) Monitors the HN commander’s control of the execution and recommends improvements to:

   (a) Focus combat power on the objective.

   (b) Keep movement supported by direct and indirect fire.

   (c) Maintain mutual support between subordinate elements.

   (d) Maintain fire control and discipline.

   (e) Consolidate and reorganize during lulls in the battle or after seizing the objective.

   (f) Conduct network engagement to increase partner capability, influence neutral networks to support HN or at least not support VEOs, and counter threat networks by nonlethal, and if authorized, lethal means.

   (g) Conduct effective stability activities to gain popular support.
(h) Support progress in such areas as governance, infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, and economic development.

(i) Support activities with effective CCS efforts.

(j) Collect and submit observations, insights, lessons, and best practices to the higher HQ’s lesson manager for entry and validation in JLLIS.

(5) Monitors any command succession and assists the new HN unit commander to smoothly and rapidly take control of the execution of the operation.

n. The joint force advisory team members also assist their counterparts during the execution of the operation. The advisory team members:

(1) Monitor staff functions and recommend improvements or corrections, as needed.

(2) Monitor the technical or tactical execution of individual tasks and recommend improvements or corrections, as needed.

(3) Remain continuously aware of the tactical situation.

(4) Execute joint force unilateral contingency plans, as required by the situation.

(5) Document recurring or significant problems or events for reference during end-of-mission debriefings and reports.

o. The advisory team presents the instruction. Trainers/advisors:

(1) Adhere to the lesson outlines consistent with the cooperation from the HN forces and changes in the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.

(2) State clearly the task, conditions, and standards to be achieved during each lesson at the beginning of the training (to include training exercises) and ensure the HN students understand them. (Human rights should be emphasized in the appropriate period of instruction.)

(3) Demonstrate the execution or show the desired end result to clearly illustrate the task.

(4) Stress the execution of the task as a step-by-step process, when possible.

(5) Monitor the HN students’ progress during practice and correct mistakes as they are observed.

(6) State (at a minimum) all applicable warning and safety instructions in the HN language.
(7) Monitor, periodically, instructions given through HN interpreters to ensure accurate translations using HN-language-qualified joint force personnel.

p. The joint force ensures the security of the training sites. Advisors or designated security personnel:

   (1) Analyze the threat to determine any capabilities to attack or collect intelligence on the HN unit’s training at each site.

   (2) Prepare estimates of COAs that would deny the training sites to the insurgents or terrorists.

   (3) Recommend to the HN unit commander that they order the adoption of the most desirable COA, stressing how it best satisfies the identified need.

   (4) Ensure, before each training session (using, as a minimum, brief back rehearsal), all personnel—both US and HN—understand the defensive actions to be taken in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack and any OPSEC measures to be executed.

q. Designated advisory/training team members maintain written administrative training records. These members:

   (1) Encourage HN counterparts to assist.

   (2) Record all HN personnel and units who receive training and identify the type of training they receive.

   (3) Organize records to identify training deficiencies and overall level of HN proficiency.

   (4) Identify specific HN personnel or units who demonstrate noteworthy (good or bad) performance.

   (5) Identify to the joint force and HN unit commanders the noted training deficiencies, noteworthy performances, and required additional or remedial training.
SECTION A. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

   a. Thus far, describing the functions and tenets of FID has centered on the strategic and operational levels. This chapter transitions to a more focused examination of the tactical principles, tools, and techniques used in conducting FID.

   b. **FID activities are part of the unified actions of the CCMD and emphasize interagency coordination.** Even small, tactical operations will usually require interagency coordination, most likely through the SCO.

2. Employment Factors

   As in planning, several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in FID operations (see Figure VI-1).

   a. **Information Impact.** During FID, plan integrated information activities early before the start of FID and often before the joint force has deployed to the OA. IO involve actions taken to have a negative effect upon adversary information and information systems decision making, as well as counteract local support for the adversary. Specific information-related capabilities, such as MISO, CMO, CAO, and key leader engagements, are employed to affect the perceptions and attitudes of adversaries and a populace or group in the OA. During FID, disciplined use of information must be closely integrated in all aspects of planning and execution.

   b. **MISO Impact.** Regardless of where or when MISO are conducted, the FID and IDAD objectives should be kept in mind. The impact of these efforts may occur incidentally, as a result of another unrelated operation, or may be the result of an operation specifically executed for its psychological effect. Globalization has increased the responsibility for MIS forces to consider the tertiary effects of MISO transnationally and on populations that may be outside the OE.

   c. **Intelligence Support.** A thorough intelligence analysis should focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic aspects of the area, as well as on an analysis of hostile elements. Active intelligence support will be needed through to
the end of the employment of military forces. This continuous intelligence effort gauges the reaction of the local populace and determine the effects on the infrastructure of US efforts, as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area.
(1) Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” provides intelligence considerations and a format for intelligence preparation of the FID OA. Although the considerations must be modified for the specific FID operation, generally the OA must be surveyed for an operational area evaluation (OAE); a geographic, population, and climatology analysis; and a threat evaluation. These factors will dictate the employment techniques and FID tools to use.

*For further information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.*

(2) **HN intelligence and HUMINT are important types of intelligence support to FID.** Intelligence support requires a HUMINT effort to understand the HN threat the HN is countering. Small units and teams deployed in the OA conducting FID are in a good position to evaluate or validate the social, economic, and military situation in the HN but may require HN assistance to better understand the threat. The best information may come from sources in the local populace, the HN intelligence resources, and HN military forces. The sharing and collaboration with HN HUMINT provides key intelligence and threat insight within the area designated for FID activities. The US and HN leaders should agree on intelligence collaboration protocols and the threshold for sharing HUMINT. The US support to FID can be significantly more successful through a shared US and HN understanding of the threat, which can be informed by HN intelligence resources.

(3) **Information sharing across USG and national boundaries is an important concept in FID.** Often, there can be several USG departments and agencies working in an HN, all exposed to information valuable to FID and the success of the IDAD program. FID operations focus on developing an effective process for interagency information exchange and coordination. In addition, the nature of FID denotes sharing of information between the supported HN and the US joint force HQ controlling the FID effort.

*For further information on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

(4) **The nature of FID missions and the high degree of dependence on HUMINT sources necessitate an active CI and OPSEC program.** At a minimum, US forces should be able to:

(a) Accomplish liaison with HN CI and security forces. Pre-established relationships with the country team are necessary and should be regularly maintained in advance of FID operations, wherever practical, as they will maximize efficiency and effectiveness.

(b) Provide a conduit to country team CI and security elements.

(c) Conduct analysis of opposing force intelligence collection, security, CI, and deception capabilities, and propaganda.
(d) Conduct the full range of CI activities.

(e) Conduct CI vulnerability assessments of US forces.

(f) Provide CI input to US FID plans.

(5) US force deployments for FID missions should be structured to provide adequate CI capabilities and plan for reachback to the national strategic CI community to accomplish these missions.

d. **Force Selection.** In general, US forces have some ability to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign forces. The degree to which they can be tasked to do so depends on their preparation in terms of language and other skills and the knowledge necessary to function within the OE. Success can be achieved through the employment of operational designs that provide a combination of CF, while leveraging the unique capabilities of SOF and aligning those forces to the mission. The selection of the appropriate ratio of SOF, CF, and civilian personnel from other agencies should be a deliberate decision based on thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. The most important factor informing this decision is the required level of capability and expertise rather than the size of the force. Additional factors include the political sensitivity of the mission and requirements for cultural and language experts or other specialties. JFCs must be aware that operations may change rapidly in character and their force structures may need to adapt as well. Both the integration of SOF with CF, and vice versa, are increasingly the norm.

(1) **SOF.** SOF may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of CF.

(a) SOF units possess specialized capabilities for FID, including support for COIN and, when applicable, for unconventional warfare. Other support includes CAO, MISO support, and training in specific areas, typically with HN SOF. In addition, SOF may support combat operations by conducting highly specialized missions. However, the typical SOF role in FID is to screen, train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces.

(b) In addition to the specific capability requirements that may call for selection of SOF, the nature of the FID mission itself may dictate the use of SOF. SOF’s unique capabilities for language, cultural awareness, and regional focus may be required when the environment involves particular political sensitivities. Additionally, SOF’s ability to conduct short-notice missions, with only modest support, makes them adept at initiating programs for hand-over to CF.

(c) USSOCOM provides SOF in support of GCCs. SOF contribute to the FID effort normally under OPCON of the TSOC, which has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of FID. SOF also provide dedicated theater forces. When planning for use of SOF, command, control, communications, and computers requirements among the CCMD, the country team, and
SOF must be assessed. Communications requirements for C2, administration, logistics, and emergencies must be clarified.

(2) **CF.** When the FID effort requires broader action to support HN IDAD efforts, the JFC may predominantly employ CF in the FID mission. CF contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct FID indirect support, direct support, and US combat operations. This may include providing intelligence and logistic support to HN units, serving as military advisors, conducting MTTs, embedding US units into HN units, conducting joint/multinational operations with HN units, and serving as a quick reaction force in support of HN units. Unit commanders must be given clear guidance on unit mission requirements that include the need to prepare their forces to conduct FID. USCG training teams, personnel, and platforms are well suited to support the development of stable, multi-mission maritime regimes to respond to many transnational threats. USCG FID activities reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to a broader HN maritime audience, including, but not limited to, LEAs, maritime administrations, and transport ministries.

e. **Public Information Programs.** Public information is important during all phases of any FID mission. While it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to HN personnel through MISO, it is also important to employ an effective PA program to inform HN and US publics of current FID actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown, that without popular support, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID operation. At the US national level, public diplomacy programs should accurately depict US efforts. These national programs are supported through the CCDR’s (or subordinate JFC’s) information programs designed to disclose the maximum amount of information possible within applicable security restrictions and the guidelines established by the President or SecDef. Coordination is essential between the PA staff and the media, the country team, a MIS element, and other information agencies within the HN and region.

*For more discussion, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.*

f. **Logistic Support.** During FID, logistic operations **support both US forces and primary operational missions** (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities). General guidelines for logistic issues in support of US forces conducting FID operations include:

(1) There may be a ceiling imposed on the number of US military personnel authorized to be in the HN to conduct FID operations. Commanders should determine how contracted support or seaborning forces impacts this decision. Maximum use should be made of host-nation support (HNS) capabilities. FID and its support may include contractor personnel, which could complicate legal, diplomatic, administrative, budgetary, and logistic issues. Efficient throughput of supplies (an average quantity that can pass through a port on a daily basis), airlift resupply, and inter-Service support agreements should also be considered.

(2) Commanders must carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with the danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources.
(3) Logistic operations are tailored to the type of mission. Service logistic support elements will be integrated into the overall joint force. Logistic support for the deployed forces, however, will remain a Service responsibility.

(4) HNs often require support beyond their organic capabilities. Accordingly, **when conducting FID with multinational partners, there becomes a need to establish multinational logistic support agreements**. The need for such non-organic support must be identified during the planning phase of FID support and arranged for prior to participation in the operation. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) negotiated with multinational partners are beneficial to the FID effort in that they allow US forces to exchange most common types of support. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the GCC by SecDef. Authority to execute these agreements lies with SecDef and may or may not be delegated.

*For further information on international logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.*

g. **CD Operations in FID.** Narcotics production and trafficking can flourish in countries where subversion, sabotage, lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency exist. Accordingly, **FID operations complement CD efforts by reducing those problems in HNs.** CD-focused programs are integrated into theater strategies as a coordinated effort to support HN governments’ IDAD strategies.

(1) DOD resources may be used in connection with CD activities in nations receiving military assistance in support of an IDAD program. This military assistance is often centered on source operations but can be involved with in-transit CD operations.

(a) DOD is the lead agency of the USG for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US. This mission is performed with O&M funds, notwithstanding the possibility of incidental benefit to the HN. Such activities may include nonconfrontational intercepts for intelligence or communication purposes and gathering and processing of tactical intelligence from a variety of sources, including fixed and mobile surveillance assets and certain intelligence sharing.

(b) In a CD support role (subject to national policy and legislative guidance), DOD may offer certain direct support to HN CD personnel, and certain enhanced support to US civilian LEAs that may be operating in the HN, and to INL.

(2) Absent direction from SecDef, DOD forces conducting CD activities are prohibited from direct LE activity. They may not directly participate in an arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not authorized to accompany HN forces on actual CD field operations or participate in any activities where hostilities are likely to occur. USN ships contribute significantly to the detection and monitoring phase of CD operations, as they are frequently in a position to intercept and apprehend maritime drug smugglers. Because DOD does not directly participate in search, seizure, arrest, and other similar activities, USCG LE detachments, who are authorized to perform LE activities, are frequently embarked on USN and allied ships to act in this capacity, as
prescribed in Title 10, USC, Section 279. The types of support DOD may provide civilian LE and foreign LEAs is provided in Title 10, USC, Section 284.

3. As directed by SecDef through the CJCS, GCCs plan and execute HN programs using a combination of SA, training and advisory assistance (non-SA-funded), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, and FHA. These efforts are designed to bolster the HN’s capability to operate against the infrastructure of the drug-producing criminal enterprises.

4. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs coordinate closely with the country team drug enforcement agency and DOS international narcotics matters representatives. Liaison with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is also vital. ONDCP is legislatively charged with the responsibility of establishing the national drug control strategy and with coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the consolidated National Drug Control Program budget. This coordination is crucial to an efficient national CD program to combat illicit drug trafficking in source regions.

For further information on joint CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

h. CWMD Operations in FID. It is unlikely, in most FID situations, that a spontaneous WMD threat could materialize, because the supported GCC and USSOCOM should have a reasonable understanding of who in the AOR may possess WMD. However, a JFC tasked for a FID operation must assess the potential of WMD being available and controlled or used by potential insurgents/terrorists and their external supporters. CWMD could be one of the greatest challenges facing the US-HN FID effort if WMD are anticipated. FID operations can build capacity to support the global CT campaign in conjunction with CWMD.

For further information on CWMD operations, refer to JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

i. CT and FID. Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can all contribute to the growth of terrorism. FID can complement CT by reducing these contributing factors. Specific AT and CT efforts can be conducted during FID operations in support of an HN’s IDAD program.

1. Enhancing the will of other states to fight global terrorism is primarily the responsibility of DOS. Effective FID, however, can improve public perceptions of the HN and USG and facilitate more active HN policies to combat terrorism. More directly, military-to-military contacts can help make HN officials advocates of potential operations against terrorist capabilities.

2. In many cases, measures increasing the capacity of a state to fight terrorism also strengthens its overall IDAD program. These measures may include the following:
(a) Developing the fidelity of HN financial transactions, breaking funding streams for criminal and insurgent groups, and prosecuting members of those groups. This may involve greater US-HN cooperation in developing regulated financial institutions.

(b) Ensuring HN security personnel have access to appropriate equipment and training to conduct all phases of combating terrorism operations.

(c) Training personnel at entry and exit points (including airports, seaports, and border crossings) to identify and apprehend individuals and materials being used by international terrorist groups.

(d) Advocating for HN security and intelligence agencies to be included into international networks that can share information on terrorist activities.

(e) Developing effective judicial systems, and minimizing corruption and intimidation of HN officials.

For further information on CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

j. OPSEC. A major problem in all FID activities is ensuring critical information and indicators about friendly intentions, capabilities, limitations, and activities are identified early in the planning process so appropriate measures and countermeasures are in place to protect them throughout the execution of the activities. The nature of FID implies that many HN officials and much of the populace will know of certain US activities as they occur. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or sympathizers within HN institutions that could be informants. US and foreign personnel involved in FID and IDAD programs should be provided extensive OPSEC training to ensure effectiveness of their operations.

k. Lessons Learned. As FID operations are conducted, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify future operations and activities to fit the special circumstances and environment. Comprehensive after action reviews and reports focusing on the specifics of FID operations should be conducted to gather this information as soon as possible after mission execution. The JS Joint Lessons Learned Division, the Services, and USSOCOM lessons learned programs provide readily available sources of information to FID planners and operators. JLLIS is the automated shared repository supporting the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program. In addition, USSOCOM’s Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System, an internal USSOCOM-only program, also can provide additional information on peacetime FID missions.

For further information for specific reporting procedures, refer to CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program, or the following JLLIS links: https://www.jllis.mil/ and http://jllis.smil.mil/.

3. Health Service Support

a. US joint medical personnel and forces can be employed as indirect support or direct support during a FID operation. The predominant types of activities applied depend on the
organization and capability of the HN military medical forces and the HN civilian health sector, as well as their respective roles in that nation’s IDAD program. For US joint medical forces, health activities will include varying degrees of military-military activities and medical civil-military operations (MCMO). In some countries, the military and civilian health systems may be completely separate, while in other nations, the two systems may be integrated, necessitating a unified approach. Medical input and involvement in indirect support to FID such as SA, exchange programs, and multinational exercises must be provided at the onset of planning and address the health problems facing the HN military and, in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies, civilian health initiatives through CAO and FHA. Possible MCMO activities during FID operations include providing public health activities, such as preventive medicine and veterinary care, disaster response, worker/occupational health, water sanitation and hygiene, food hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures.

b. Military forces should be employed in MCMO missions that are affordable and sustainable by the HN. This includes pursuing realistic training and acquisition programs. In addition to training HN personnel during FID operations, medical education opportunities for HN personnel through IMET may be pursued. Following a course of realistic HSS measures and programs may also entail mitigating unrealistic expectations among the HN populace. Other second-order effects can emerge from HSS as well, such as a real or perceived imbalance in health care development. Resources should be shifted to areas where imbalances exist.

c. FID units typically can provide only a small portion of the HN’s HSS needs; therefore, close cooperation with interagency partners, international organizations, and NGOs can enhance the support provided by the military. Commanders should seek to increase the effectiveness of other USG department and agency programs such as USAID whenever possible. Working with or near international organizations and NGOs may be untenable due to their desire to preserve the perception of neutrality. Military units may have to settle for awareness of international organization and NGO activities and employ themselves so as not to duplicate efforts in HSS.

For further information on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

For information on MCMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

SECTION B. INDIRECT SUPPORT

4. General

a. This category of support provides equipment or training support through SC to enhance the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations.

b. The three broad approaches to indirect support include SA, joint and multinational exercises, and exchange programs (see Figure VI-2).
5. Security Assistance

   a. This section will discuss specific SA activities and how the GCC may use this tool to further support FID activities. The military will primarily provide equipment, training, and services to the supported PN forces. In the SA arena, GCCs and subordinate JFCs do not have authority over the SA program but have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. GCCs are active in the SA process by advising ambassadors through the SCO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AOR. In addition, through coordination with the FSF and supporting SCOs, the GCC can assist in identifying and scoping requirements to support SA programs that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional FID operations. Military Departments, as the implementing agency for security assistance, typically manage and execute SA based on national, theater, and Service chief guidance.

   b. **Equipment.** The FID planning used to tailor support to HN needs is also important in determining equipment support. Environmental factors, level of HN training, ability to maintain equipment, HN infrastructure, and a myriad of other factors will determine what equipment is appropriate to the HN’s needs. If equipment in the US inventory is not appropriate for use by the HN, the commander may recommend a nonstandard item to fill the requirement. Sustainability of nonstandard equipment and interoperability with existing equipment must be considered.

   c. **Services.** Services include any service, test, inspection, repair, training publication (e.g., end user/operator), technical or other assistance, or defense information used for the purpose of furnishing military assistance but does not include military education and training activities. Services support is usually integrated with equipment support. The CCDR has the responsibility for oversight to ensure the equipment is suitable for HN needs and the

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Figure VI-2. Indirect Support of Foreign Internal Defense

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HN is capable of maintaining it. These types of services will almost always be required to ensure an effective logistic plan for the acquired equipment. There are two common types of service teams: quality assurance teams (QATs) and technical assistance teams (TATs). QATs are short term and are used to ensure equipment is in usable condition. TATs are used when the HN experiences difficulty with US-supplied equipment.

For detailed information on teams available for initial and follow-on equipment support, see DODD 5105.65, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual.

d. Training. The training portion of SA can make a significant impact on the HN’s IDAD program. The GCC is actively involved in coordinating, planning, and approving training support through the SCO and HN. The Services, through their SA training organizations, are the coordinators for SA-funded training.

(1) The following are the general objectives of training programs under SA.

(a) Professional military education.

(b) O&M skills.

(c) Effective management.

(d) Development of training self-sufficiency.

(e) Rapport and understanding.

(f) Increased awareness.

(2) The following force structure, training plan, and training activities considerations should be understood before implementing an SA training program.

(a) Training force structure.

(b) Training plan.

(c) Training activities.

1. MTTs.

2. Extended training Service specialists.

3. Technical assistance field teams.

4. International education and training.

5. Contractors.

6. The Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program
(3) **MCMO in Indirect Support.** MCMO indirect support to FID operations is generally accomplished by medical training teams and advisors. The focus is on identification of health threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the HN military forces and designing programs to train and equip those forces. Typically, the main effort of such training has been conducted by SF with support from other SOF units. MCMO and CA have historically supported and advised HN counterparts in public health programs and series as part of indirect support missions. Wellness and instructional public health messaging can seek to simply increase participation in medical or veterinary programs that some TAs may be reluctant to use due to cultural bias or can pursue introduction of new behaviors such as sanitary food or water practices. This type of support can cross boundaries into the realm of direct support, as well, and may involve simultaneously conducting both indirect and direct support.

6. **Joint and Multinational Exercises**

Joint and multinational exercises can enhance a FID operation. **They offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering limited HN training opportunities.** The participation of US forces in these exercises, primarily designed to enhance the training and readiness of US forces, is funded by O&M funds of the providing Service or USSOCOM if SOF are involved. Airlift and sealift may be provided by the CCMD from its airlift and sealift budget. Certain expenses of HN forces participation may be funded by the developing country multinational exercise program as arranged by the conducting CCMD. **These expenses differ from SA funding because SA is designed to train HN forces, whereas multinational and selected joint exercises are designed to train US forces in combination with HN forces.** Legal restrictions on what FID activities can be conducted in conjunction with these exercises are complex. Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” provides general guidelines on these restrictions. Prior legal guidance is important to the concept of the exercise and related FID operations. Exercises should be planned as part of the overall training program for the theater, and other FID activities should be integrated into the framework of these exercises. Examples of this integration are found in the conduct of HCA missions. The implementation of HCA programs into exercises will be examined in detail later in this chapter. Multinational and selected joint exercises can yield important benefits for US interests and the overall theater FID operation. The most significant of these benefits:

a. Enhance relationships and interoperability with HN forces,

b. Demonstrate resolve and commitment to the HN, and

c. Familiarize US forces and commanders with HN employment procedures and potential combat areas.

7. **Exchange Programs**

a. These programs allow the commander to use O&M money for the exchange of units or individuals and may be used to expand the efforts of the SA programs funded under
IMET that allow HN personnel to train in the US. **These exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other.** Exchange programs are another building block that can help a commander round out the FID plan. These are not stand-alone programs; however, when commanders combine them with other FID tools, the result can be a comprehensive program that fully supports the HN IDAD program. The general types of exchange programs commanders should consider are described below. Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” provides a more detailed explanation of the legal aspects of these types of training.

b. **Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program.** This program is for squad-to-battalion-size elements. Each nation’s forces provides TTP training to the other. This program is a good vehicle for US commanders to sensitize their forces to the cultural and social aspects of the HN while simultaneously increasing the training readiness of HN forces. The proficiency of both units must be comparable to preclude exchanging fully trained US forces for untrained HN forces.

c. **Personnel Exchange Program (PEP).** The PEP is a reciprocal exchange of military personnel, in similar duties, between the US and the PN where the overall benefit to each participant is essentially equal. The PEP work assignments provide work experience and knowledge of the organization and management of the host participant activities by performing duties under the director of a host participant supervisor, as defined in the position descriptions for their respective positions. Importantly, the PEP is not to be used as a mechanism for the exchange of information between the US and PN. PEP personnel will not liaise or otherwise act as representatives of the parent participant or the parent government while assigned to exchange positions, nor will they act as official representatives of the host participant or the host government to which they are assigned.

d. **Individual Exchange Program.** This program is similar to the PEP but involves a temporary duty assignment in theater. This program gives the commander flexibility, since personnel will not be lost for extended periods and the commander is able to expose a larger portion of the force to the program.

e. **Combination Programs.** Commanders should consider combining SA efforts with joint or multinational exercises to obtain maximum benefit for all concerned. For example, exchange of key personnel during exercises will gain more in terms of interoperability than exchanges during normal operational periods. Also, the exchange of units with similar equipment, especially if the HN is unfamiliar with the equipment, may be very beneficial.

**SECTION C. DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING UNITED STATES COMBAT OPERATIONS)**

8. **General**

a. **This category of support involves US forces actually conducting operations in support of the HN** (see Figure VI-3). This is different from providing equipment or training support to enhance the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations. Direct support
operations provide immediate assistance and are usually combined in a total FID effort with indirect operations.

b. Three types of direct support operations critical to supporting FID across all categories are CMO, MISO, and OPSEC. Because these operations involve US forces in a direct operational role, they are discussed under direct support (not involving US combat operations). Also included in this direct support discussion are military training to HN forces, logistic support, and intelligence and information sharing activities.

9. Civil-Military Operations

CMO span a very broad area in FID and include activities across the range of military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a FID operation can enhance preventive measures, reconstructive efforts, and combat operations in support of an HN’s IDAD program. This discussion is limited to those portions of CMO that most directly contribute to a commander’s support of a FID operation.

For further information on CMO relationships to CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
a. **CAO.** CAO enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present. CAO, usually planned, directed, and conducted by CA personnel, enhance the conduct of CMO because of the often complex and demanding requirements for functional specialty skills in work that is normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities. **CAO are vital to theater FID operations in areas from planning to execution.** They are a valuable resource in planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect support, direct support (not involving US combat operations), and US combat operations in support of the overall FID effort. CAO also support the reconstitution of a viable and competent civil service and social infrastructures in areas of the HN that were previously ungoverned or under-governed or in the direct control of threat forces or shadow governments. CAO can also assist the HN civilian government by providing civil administration assistance within its governmental structure.

(1) **Force Structure.** Each GCC is aligned with both an AC USA CA element and with a USA CA command that is found only in the USA Reserve and staffed with functional experts possessing a wide range of functional specialty areas.

   (a) **CA Liaison.** CA liaison personnel may be assigned or attached to a CCMD to augment the CA staff planning element. These personnel can be instrumental in assisting in the planning of military operations to support FID and incorporating FID operations into the overall theater strategy.

   (b) **CA Commands, Brigades, and Battalions**

   1. USA CA deploy as teams, detachments, or larger units in support of a JFC. USA RC CA typically support CF requirements, while USA AC CA are SOF and support SOF requirements. Accordingly, USA RC CA are sourced through the JS through US Army Reserve Command, whereas USA AC CA are sourced through US SOCOM. US SOCOM CAO planners are at 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and US SOCOM has the ability to determine the proper doctrinal structure or task organization to meet requirements.

   2. USMC CA deploy as teams, detachments, companies, or groups integral to a Marine air-ground task force or, when made available, in support of a JFC.

(2) **CA Capabilities.** Regionally oriented CA possess varying levels of language capability and country expertise. Only the RC have all six CA functional specialty areas: **governance** (public administration, public safety, environmental management), **rule of law** (judicial administration, corrections, public safety, LE), **infrastructure** (public transportation, public works and utilities, public communications), **economic stability** (food and agriculture, economic development, civilian supply), **public health and welfare** (public health and cultural relations), and **public education and information** (public education, civil information services). Commanders should consider using their CA assets in the following roles to support the overall FID effort.

   (a) Planning, supporting, and controlling other military operations in FID such as training assistance, FHA, MCA, HCA, and logistic support.
(b) Providing liaison to civilian authorities, international organizations, and NGOs.

(c) Facilitating the identification and procurement of civilian resources to support the mission.

(d) Supporting and conducting civil administration.

(3) **CA Employment Considerations in FID.** The following are areas commanders should consider when employing CA assets in planning, supporting, and executing FID operations.

(a) CA expertise should be incorporated in the planning, as well as into the execution of military activities in support of FID operations.

(b) Successful FID operations hinge upon HN public support. Integrating CAO and MISO with FID operations can enhance that support. For specific humanitarian and indigenous religious leader liaison missions, chaplain support may offer mission credibility.

(c) The sovereignty of the HN must be maintained at all times. The perception the US is running a puppet government is counter to the basic principles of FID. This is important to remember when providing civil administration assistance.

(d) HN self-sufficiency is a goal of all CAO.

b. **FHA.** FHA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing the relief effort. FHA may be planned into the GCC’s military strategy to support FID as a component of the overall program to bolster the HN’s IDAD capability. Often, however, FHA efforts are in response to unforeseen disaster situations. When requested by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Relief, DOD will support foreign disaster relief (FDR) operations. FHA efforts may also extend outside the FID umbrella. When FHA is provided to a nation experiencing lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency, these efforts should be considered as part of the FID effort. As such, all of the MISO and CMO/CAO considerations discussed earlier should be considered as the FHA programs are planned and executed.

(1) **FHA Missions and Assistance.** A single FHA operation may contain one or more FHA missions. Common missions include: relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions, technical assistance and support functions, and consequence management operations. Common examples of FHA that commanders may provide are temporary shelter, food and water, medical assistance, transportation assistance, or other activities that provide or restore basic services to the local populace. These services are often in response to a natural disaster such as an earthquake, a volcanic
eruption, or a flood. In addition, FHA support may include assistance to the populace of a nation ravaged by war, disease, or environmental catastrophes.

(2) FHA Coordination and Control

(a) DOS. The US ambassador or the COM to the affected nation is responsible for declaring the occurrence of a disaster or emergency in a foreign country to request US FHA support. This declaration is sent to the Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOS to begin possible USG assistance. USAID, which is under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, acts as the lead federal agency for US FHA. USAID administers the President’s authority to provide emergency relief and rehabilitation through OFDA. Should OFDA request that DOD conduct certain FHA operations, DOS would reimburse DOD for those operations. Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” covers the legal authorizations and restrictions for these operations.

(b) DOD. The USD(P) has the overall responsibility for developing military policy for FHA operations. The ASD(SO/LIC) administers policy and statutory programs. Policy oversight is executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. Program management and funding of these programs is the responsibility of DSCA.

(c) CJCS. The CJCS is responsible for recommending supported and supporting commands for FHA operations. The Joint Staff J-5 [Plans Directorate] has the primary responsibility for concept review of OPLANs in support of FHA; the Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Directorate] oversees Service logistic support; and the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] will be involved when a military force is inserted into a foreign country as part of a US humanitarian response.

(d) GCC. The GCC considers FHA when formulating and establishing theater strategic objectives. Planning is conducted IAW APEX. The supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain FHA operations. In certain circumstances where coordination and approval lead times are not adequate, the GCC is authorized to commit the command’s resources to provide immediate assistance.

(3) FHA Employment Considerations. There are certain major points CCDRs and other JFCs should consider when planning or executing FHA operations. Many GCC theaters reside in regions where natural disasters are current or future threats and are optimal areas to plan, prepare, and exercise for FHA. FHA planning and employment considerations require coordination and synchronization within the USG, the country team, and affected HN governments.

(a) When appropriate and approved, incorporate MISO and CA into FHA operations or programs. Plan to coordinate and seek approval with HN government officials, as well as with the US ambassador or COM, to provide positive themes that support FHA objectives, while supporting HN government credibility and trust in the populace.
(b) Coordinate all FHA activities with the country team to obtain input from all actors and planning participants. Concurrence by USAID regional or bi-lateral mission director is required prior to conducting FHA. FDR support requires an executive secretary request for assistance from USAID OFDA.

For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

c. HCA. These HCA programs can be very valuable to the GCC’s support of FID operations, while at the same time offering valuable training to US forces. It is important to understand the difference between HCA and FHA programs. FHA programs, as discussed above, focus on the use of DOD excess property, emergency transportation support, disaster relief, or other support as necessary to alleviate urgent needs in an HN caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. HCA programs are specific programs authorized under Title 10, USC, Section 401 funding. These programs provide operational readiness training for US military personnel wartime skills, providing incidental assistance to the HN civilian populace in conjunction with military operations, exercises, or deployment for training. These are usually planned well in advance and are usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed following disasters. Assistance fulfills unit training requirements that create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

(1) HCA Coordination and Control. The coordination requirements for HCA projects are specified in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities, and based on Title 10, USC, Section 401. HCA activities conducted in a foreign country require the specific approval of the Secretary of State, typically coordinated through the US ambassador, the COM, or deputy COM. Within DOD, the USD(P) oversees HCA, and ASD(SO/LIC) acts as the program policy lead. JSJ-5 Global Policy and Partnerships provides global program management. HCA projects are funded using GCC fenced O&M funding. GCCs develop a proposed annual execution plan for HCA activities within their AORs and execute HCA activities in conjunction with other military operations. Coordination with USAID is also required for efficient/effective HCA operations. The HCA program is a more decentralized program than FHA. This allows the GCC to have greater influence and to plan for a larger role in this area. Congress controls all HCA funding authorizations through a review and approval process. Funds are included in the GCC’s budgets, and distribution is based on national security priorities and guidance from SecDef.

(2) HCA Employment Considerations. The nature of HCA operations makes the employment considerations for this type of operation quite different than for FHA. The following are the key employment considerations for HCA.

(a) Plan for use of RC as well as AC forces. The medical, surgical, veterinary, and dental care, as well as construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems and well drilling activities of HCA, are well suited to skills found in the RC forces. Typical HCA missions allow these forces to get the realistic training they may not receive at their home stations or at other US training sites.
(b) Incorporate network engagement, MCMO, and CA into HCA just as in FHA operations.

(c) Subject all HCA plans to close legal scrutiny. Like FHA operations, the legal aspects of all HCA operations must be understood.

(d) Plan adequate deployed FP measures. HCA operations are sometimes conducted in areas that are subject to unrest and internal instability. US forces may become targets of opposition forces’ terrorist attacks. Security measures must be included in each operation.

(e) Establish the primary purpose of HCA missions as training for US forces. Incidental to this purpose are the benefits received by the civilian populace.

(f) Conduct all HCA operations in support of the HN civilian populace. No HCA projects/programs may be provided to HN military or paramilitary forces.

For further information on HCA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

d. MCA. MCA programs offer the JFC a CMO opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills and by enhancing
the legitimacy of the HN government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the populace’s basic needs. MCA programs can also be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in HN military treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool GCCs and subordinate JFCs should use, whenever possible, to bolster the overall FID plan.

For further information on MCA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(1) **MCA Examples.** US forces may advise or assist the HN military in conducting the MCA mission. This assistance may occur in conjunction with SA training or as a GCC’s separate initiative. In all cases, the actual mission must be performed by the HN military. Some of the most common MCA projects occur in construction and infrastructure improvement.

(2) **MCA Coordination and Control.** Coordination for MCA missions is slightly less involved than for FHA and HCA missions. First, the US level of involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. As with all FID operations, however, the US ambassador and country team should be aware of all operations in their assigned country. If the US military support to MCA is provided through SA, normal coordination procedures apply, but if it is provided through a separate GCC’s initiative using O&M funds, most of the coordination will be internal to the command.

(3) **MCA Employment Considerations.** Many of the same considerations apply when employing US military personnel in support of MCA as in supporting FHA and HCA. The essential difference is that in MCA, US personnel are limited to training and advisory roles. In addition to this general point, commanders should also consider the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs.

(a) Select projects that are simple and can be accomplished and maintained by the HN. If the FSF is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local government and military may be significantly damaged.

(b) HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission.

(c) Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders will normally include CA, MISO, other SOF trainers, and combat support and combat service support elements to support MCA missions.

(d) Coordinate projects with the country team. The USAID representative should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should be informed of all MCA efforts.

10. **Military Information Support Operations**

   a. **MISO support the achievement of national objectives by influencing behaviors in select target foreign audiences.** The objectives of MISO are based in authorities and
refined during the TA analysis process. These objectives may have great variance among TAs. MISO units design activities that may include both MISO products and actions to achieve these objectives. The following are examples of potential groups and broad goals.

(1) **Target Groups and MISO Goals Within FID.**

(a) **Insurgents.** To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces by utilizing the identify, separate, influence, and renunciation technique.

*See JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, for more information.*

(b) **Civilian Populace.** To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its IDAD program.

(c) **Military Forces.** To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of HN forces.

(d) **Neutral Elements.** To gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the HN or get the populace to not support criminal organizations or violent extremism.

(e) **External Hostile Powers.** To convince hostiles that the insurgency will fail.

(2) **MISO Activities**

(a) Improving popular support for the HN government.

(b) Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents themselves.

(c) Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the US.

(d) Supporting defector programs.

(e) Providing close and continuous support to CMO.

(f) Supporting HN programs that protect the populace from insurgent activities.

(g) Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities.

(h) Informing the international community of US and HN intent and goodwill.

(i) Passing instructions to the HN populace.

(j) Developing HN information capabilities.
Chapter VI

(3) **MISO Capabilities.** The JFC should use the extensive capabilities of MISO assets to complement the FID plan in the following roles. The MISO planner identifies certain themes and narratives that are most likely to resonate with the TA and further identifies channels of communication the TA deems credible. Once the commander chooses a theme and narrative, the tone and general parameters for much of the MISO to support the FID operation have been established, and all military operations should be evaluated against these parameters. Objectives, supporting objectives, and themes frame the program that will be delivered through various communication channels to foreign TAs and reflect national and theater policy and strategy.

(a) Providing planning assistance for military support to FID. Planning tasks include identification of those military operations conducted primarily for their psychological effects and review of other military operations that have a psychological impact.

(b) Working with the military PAO and DOS PA personnel to build an extensive information effort to inform the local populace of US intentions in the FID effort and to strengthen the credibility of the HN government.

(c) Gathering information through MISO assessments of the local area that assist in determining FID requirements and MOEs.

(4) **MISO Employment Considerations in FID.** Commanders must consider the following when employing MISO assets in support of FID operations.

(a) Accurate intelligence is imperative to successful MISO and FID. An inadequate analysis of the TA could result in the use of improper themes or symbols and damage the entire FID effort.

(b) Early integration of MISO to FID planning is imperative at all levels. MISO planning for FID requires an extensive knowledge of the TA vulnerabilities, social and cultural dynamics, and languages. Late integration of MISO to the FID operation may degrade USG efforts to strengthen the HN credibility to the populace.

(c) MISO programs are audience driven; an analysis is required for each new TA and must be updated as attitudes and vulnerabilities change.

(d) MISO are a combat multiplier and should be used as any other capability. This use includes evaluation of targets through joint targeting procedures.

(e) MISO programs should be coordinated and synchronized with other USG information efforts.

b. **Peacetime MISO Programs.** GCCs may develop such programs, in coordination with the chiefs of US diplomatic missions, that plan, support, and provide for the conduct of MISO in support of US regional objectives, policies, interests, and theater military missions.
For further information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

11. Operations Security

The HN government requesting FID assistance may wish to reduce the US signature for force protection, political, or other reasons. OPSEC protects the essential details of all FID operations and activities. The continual application of the OPSEC process to identify and protect FID critical information and indicators, beginning in the initial planning stages and continuing through FID termination, is a must.


12. Security Force Assistance

a. The HN FID situation may intensify and increase the need for military training beyond that of indirect support. Direct support operations should provide more immediate benefit to the HN and may be used in conjunction with various types of SA indirect support training.

b. Increased emphasis on IDAD becomes important and training may focus on specific subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency problems encountered by the HN that may be beyond its capabilities to control.

c. SFA

(1) The current strategic environment is seen as one of persistent conflict in which US national strategic objectives require unified action to achieve unity of effort. These synchronization, coordination, and integration activities of both governmental organizations and NGOs with military operations also require close relationships with US PNs, key friends, and allies. A key to achieving unity of effort is strengthening interagency coordination, working with international allies and partners, and reliance on communication synchronization by the US and its international partners.

(a) The USG, including DOD, conducts a range of activities to enhance the capacity and capability of FSF. See Figure VI-4. This is known as SFA.

(b) SFA support unity of effort in FID by enabling allies and PNs to improve the way they provide safety, security, sustainment, and justice.

(2) SFA encompasses joint force activities conducted within unified action to OTERA and assist FSF in support of an HN’s efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, HN, or regional security forces and their supporting institutions. This includes activities from the ministry level to the tactical units and the national security sector.

(a) SFA spans the range of military operations. It can include combat advisory and support activity but does not include unilateral direct combat by US forces,
as these activities do not build the capability or capacity of the FSF. However, US units can be partnered with FSF and have the dual mission of conducting unilateral combat operations and activities, while simultaneously developing the FSF. Subsequently, SFA may be conducted in both permissive and uncertain security environments.

(b) Joint forces can conduct SFA unilaterally when necessary; however, when conducted within unified action, joint forces collaborate closely with interagency and multinational partners.

(3) **Relationships Between FID and SFA.**

(a) SFA activities are conducted primarily, but not exclusively, to assist PNs in developing capability and/or capacity to defend against internal and transregional threats that contribute to operations of mutual US-PN interest either unilaterally or as part of a multinational operation, develop interoperability with similar FSF or enable access for US forces. Although SFA is a subset of SC, it is not a subset of FID nor is FID a subset of SFA, because SFA activities serve other purposes beyond internal defense. SFA, SC, and FID have functional, not hierarchical, relationships. SFA provides many, but not necessarily all, of the means for successful FID. FID programs, with objectives established in support of the HN IDAD, provide the ways, while SFA activities, which may include SA, provide the means through SFA-qualified personnel, material and equipment—for training and advisory assistance to FSF from the tactical unit up to the ministerial level. Also, if a PN has an SSR requirement inherent with IDAD, SFA activities could support SSR as part of FID. Other SC initiatives dedicated to the non-security sector that may support FID, such as bilateral meetings, exchanges, combined exercises, or CA activities, fall outside the scope of SFA. However, DOD policy requires SFA activities to be conducted by and with FSF. As such, FID capability or capacity-building operations that are not conducted with FSF are not SFA.

(b) SFA addresses many of the security objectives through which FID can be accomplished but is still dependent upon the contribution of interagency and
multinational partners in other developmental sectors. Subsequently, SFA activities may also support the development of nonmilitary security forces and their supporting institutions, to the extent authorized by law.

(c) In addition to providing basic security, a major joint force role in FID or stability activities may be to support a PN’s SSR, the broad set of policies, plans, programs, and activities a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice to the indigenous population. SFA activities, at the ministerial level and down to the tactical unit level, if necessary, can provide the means for a PN to attain and sustain the transformational objectives of SSR. However, in the absence of a FID requirement in an HN IDAD, but for positive governance and legitimacy, PN SSR objectives may be accomplished as part of security sector assistance through SC activities (SFA and SA).

*For more details regarding SSR, see JP 3-07, Stability.*

(4) CF and SOF conducting SFA will find that baseline and continuous assessment of the PN security forces is essential for successful advisory efforts. Particular attention is required when assessing the tasks of OTERA related to FSF development. Continuous assessment is essential throughout all OTERA tasks and a comprehensive assessment will help advisors develop program objectives and milestones and a baseline to measure FSF progress and success. SFA includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, sustaining, advising, and assisting FSF.

(5) **Sustain the Effort.** This includes two major efforts: the ability of the US and PNs to sustain the SFA effort throughout the campaign and the ability of the HN security forces to ultimately sustain their operations independently.

*For additional information on SFA and SC assessment, monitoring, and evaluation, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.*

(6) **Plan and Resource.** The planning and resourcing for SFA activity begins as CCMDs and associated country teams understand the OE and determine the requirements of FSF for SFA activities. Baseline and continuous assessment by each GCC is an important part of the process for establishing and validating SC requirements and, in turn, the need for SFA activities. It also ensures the US provides SFA that achieves the objectives and attains end states desired by both the PN and US. The PN and US should then analyze the resource requirements and efforts to ensure developing FSF have sufficient and appropriate resources. Training FSF and building supporting institutions in the midst of insurgency or major combat operations has proven to be a difficult challenge even through the unified action of the joint force with interagency and multinational partners. While SFA activities are not always conducted in a threat environment, the inherent cultural, political, leadership, and other complexities associated with any SFA activities still demand careful, timely, and deliberate attention from SFA planners.

13. **Logistic Support**

a. Logistic support as discussed here does not include activities authorized under SA. **Logistic support operations are limited by US law without an ACSA.** Such support
usually consists of transportation or limited maintenance support, although an ACSA can allow additional support in areas beyond those. However, ACSAs permit the reimbursable exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services with HN military. The existence, potential application, and limitations of an ACSA with the HN’s military forces should be considered when planning.

b. In some cases, the President or SecDef may direct a show of force exercise to demonstrate support for the HN and to provide the vehicle for provision of logistic support.

c. Logistic support is integrated into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict.

d. When providing logistic support as part of the theater FID effort, the following should be considered.

(1) Develop definitive ROE and FP measures.

(2) Educate all members of the command on permissible activities in providing the logistic support mission.

(3) Gather and analyze OCS aspects of the OE data for the country. Build a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in country. This database should include political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems with focus on information of local supply availability, warehousing and maintenance facilities, transportation assets, line of communications (LOC), and labor force availability. OCS can influence diplomatic relations, a nation’s economy, and the enemy. It is imperative that a detailed analysis of the OCS aspects of the OE be prepared to help shape COA development and determine the possible intended and unintended outcomes of OCS.

(4) Tailor the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability packages to the needs of the HN.

(5) Consider utilizing a sea base to provide logistics support, if naval assets are available and if geographically supportable.

14. Intelligence and Information Sharing

a. Information cooperation is enabled by an information sharing environment that fully integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, country team, and CCDR’s intelligence staff, thus establishing the basis for any intelligence and communications sharing. CI elements can provide this support with HN military CI elements, security service, and police forces when deployed in support of FID operations. Other national-level baseline intelligence support (e.g., geospatial intelligence [GEOINT]) may be provided via established or ad hoc MOAs or through national-level liaison teams as required. During the GCC’s assessment of the OA, the HN intelligence and communications capabilities should be evaluated. Based on this evaluation, the GCC can more effectively provide or recommend approval of intelligence or communications
The sharing of US intelligence is a sensitive area that must be evaluated based on the circumstances of each situation. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the US and HN are vital; however, disclosure of classified information to the HN or other multinational FID forces must be authorized. Generally, assistance may be provided in terms of evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support.

b. Any intelligence assistance is coordinated with the country team intelligence assets to benefit from operational and tactical capabilities.

c. The initial focus of assistance in this area will be to evaluate HN intelligence and communications architecture. Based on this evaluation, the GCC will be able to determine the HN’s requirements.

d. The intelligence process should be examined in the context of the current situation. The needs of the HN, as well as their technical expertise and equipment, should be considered when evaluating their systems. The HN intelligence and communications systems must reflect the HN’s environment and threat.

e. Following the evaluation, a determination is made as to how the US FID operation may assist. Any intelligence sharing is evaluated against US national security interests and be both coordinated and approved at the national level.

f. Equipment deficiencies should be identified in the assessment process. US assistance in equipment normally will be provided through the SA process.

g. Training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect support, will also normally be conducted under SA. Some limited informal training benefits may also be provided during exchange programs and daily interface with HN military intelligence and communications assets.

h. Employment Considerations. The following items summarize the major considerations that commanders and planners must be aware of as they conduct intelligence cooperation activities in support of the FID operation.

(1) Deploy US intelligence and CI elements. The effectiveness of CI assets is significantly increased with early introduction. Additionally, requesting existing CI capabilities through an FPD and a foreign area officer should be considered in the planning stages to maximize CI asset employment.

(2) Direct most intelligence and information efforts toward creating a self-sufficient HN capability. US assistance that creates a long-term reliance on US capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system.

(3) Scrutinize any training assistance to ensure it is provided within legal authorizations and ensure information or processes are not revealed without authorization.

(4) Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within the HN.
(5) Balance initial and limited use of US intelligence collection technology, which may benefit the HN, with the more lasting solution of realistically upgrading the HN’s intelligence collection capability in a manner it can sustain. HN intelligence professionals must understand the temporary nature of such US support.

(6) Give special attention to the development of releasable intelligence products, available bandwidth, and other potential interoperability challenges inherent to working extensively with HN personnel.

SECTION D. UNITED STATES COMBAT OPERATIONS

15. General

a. US participation in combat operations as part of a FID effort requires Presidential approval. The condition of the supported nation may descend into a failing state where coordination between DOD and DOS authorities occurs during planning or after assessing the FID impact. The COM has a series of security, defense, and development authorities that, when synchronized with DOD authorities, may have greater impact. This coordination should occur at the GCC and COM level or, in special cases, the USG special envoy/representative levels.

b. In some cases, US forces may be required to conduct COIN, CT, CD, CWMD, or other sustained combat operations directly in the place of HN forces, particularly if HN security force capacity is still being developed. In other cases, US forces may conduct such combat operations directly in concert with HN forces.

16. Considerations for United States Combat Operations

a. This section discusses areas at the operational and strategic levels of warfare that should be considered when conducting combat operations in support of an HN’s IDAD program. Many of the considerations discussed in the other two categories of FID remain important in tactical operations. The most notable of these involve the coordinated use of CCS, CMO, and MISO and the early application of OPSEC to planning, as well as coordination with other USG departments and agencies operating within the HN. The JFC should also consider the following areas when employing combat forces in support of FID.

b. HN IDAD Organization. Maintain close coordination with the elements of the government responsible for HN IDAD efforts. If a nation has reached a point in its internal affairs that it requires combat support from the US, it should have already developed a comprehensive IDAD strategy. The organization to effect this strategy will vary among nations. It may simply be the normal organization of the executive branch of the HN government. The important point is that an organization should exist to pull together all instruments of power to defeat the source of internal instability. JFCs must be involved in this coordination and control process. Chapter II, “Internal Defense and Development,” provides a detailed explanation of an IDAD strategy, as well as a sample IDAD organization. US commanders supporting an IDAD program must be integrated into the organizational structure that controls the program.
c. **Tiers of Forces.** Tailor force selection and sequence employment. Historically, SOF (principally SF, MISO, CA, and CAAs) lead COIN and stability efforts; if HN capabilities are not sufficiently improved or MOEs do not reveal acceptable progress, CF may be required. This is particularly true if the HN has one or more porous borders that internal threats operate across and even more likely if a bordering nation-state is providing support to the internal threat.

d. **Transition Points.** Establish transition points at which combat operations are to be returned to the HN forces. This process establishes fixed milestones (not time dependent) that provide indicators of the progression of the HN IDAD program.

e. **Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Focus.** Expect combat operations supporting FID to be joint and to potentially include multinational operations involving the HN, the US, and other MNFs. Interagency coordination should also be anticipated, given the inherent nature of FID operations.

f. **US Combat Operations.** Prioritize identification and integration of logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means. When tactically feasible, HN forces should conduct and support actual combat operations, thus increasing the legitimacy of the HN government and reducing the dependency on US forces. US forces will conduct combat operations only when directed by legal authority to stabilize the situation and to give the local government and HN military forces time to regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of US operations will be FP rather than destruction of adversary forces. Gaining the strategic initiative is the responsibility of the HN. Commanders must evaluate all operations to ensure they do not create the impression the US is executing a war for a nation that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat internal threats.

g. **Human Rights Considerations.** Maintain strict adherence to respect for human rights. Repression and abuses of the local populace by the legitimate government will reduce the credibility and popular support for the HN government, may violate the Leahy amendment, and may also cause the President to consider withdrawing US support; therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights policies to US forces, as well as forces from the HN and other participating MNFs. In many FID combat situations, the moral high ground may be just as important as the tactical high ground. Before the US military conducts training with any foreign military, FSF, or paramilitary group, the unit and associated foreign personnel must be vetted for human rights abuses.

h. **ROE.** Apply judicious and prudent ROE during combat operations in FID. A balance between FP and danger to innocent civilians, as well as damage to nonmilitary areas, must be reached. Each individual must be trained to prevent unnecessary destruction or loss of civilian life. Commanders must closely monitor this situation and provide subordinate commanders with clear and enforceable ROE, as well as the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes.

i. **Indiscriminate Use of Force.** Employ force only IAW US law, policy, and applicable ROE. Indiscriminate use of force is not authorized.
j. **Intelligence.** Tie the US joint intelligence network into the country team, the local HN military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation. Deployed military CI elements can provide this liaison with local HN military CI and security and police services in their areas of operations (AOs). In this manner, social, economic, and political information can be kept current to allow the commander to become aware of changes in the OE that might require a change in tactics. Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” provides detail on the type of information necessary for a thorough evaluation of the AO. The nature of the required information places a greater emphasis on HUMINT efforts than on technical collection capabilities.

k. **FID Integration With Other Activities.** The initiation of hostilities does not mean other FID operations will be suspended. In fact, MISO, CMO, SA, FHA, intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically. The FID planning imperatives to take the long-term approach, tailor support to HN needs, and ensure the HN bears the responsibility for IDAD remain important throughout both combat and noncombat operations.

17. **Command and Control**

The C2 relationships established during FID US combat operations can change based on the political, social, and military environment of the area. In general, the following C2 recommendations should be considered.

a. **The HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront.** If not already the case, the HN security forces should be encouraged to establish strategic policy and objectives, and a single multinational HQ should be established to control combat operations.

b. **The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate.** The President retains command authority over US forces. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making that determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE.

*For further information on C2, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

18. **Sustainment**

As with any operation, sustainment of US forces is essential to success. Sustainment of combat operations in FID is similar to sustainment for other types of operations. The political sensitivities and concern for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence do, however, change the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. The general principles that should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat operations in FID are:
a. **Maximum Use of HN Capabilities.** This includes routine services, supplies, facilities, and transportation. This approach reduces US overhead and the number of US personnel required in the HN. When utilizing OCS in the HN, consider the cost, performance, schedule, and contract oversight requirements, as well as many other contract support-related matters (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform, civil-military impact, OPSEC) across the joint force, to include USG departments and agencies and key multinational partners.

b. **Maximum use of existing facilities such as ports, airfields, and communications sites.**

c. **Minimum Handling of Supplies.** For short-duration operations (90 days or less), support is provided through existing organic support packages; through air, ground, or both LOCs; or through the use of logistics flowing through a sea base.

d. **Medical Self-Sufficiency.** Many areas of the world where the US is likely to conduct FID do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders cannot rely on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient HSS for combat operations in FID. At a minimum, adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, patient movement, and preventive medicine must be established to support these operations.

e. **Optimum use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far forward as possible.** Equipment evacuation for repair should be kept to a minimum.

f. **Routine use of both intertheater and intratheater airlift and sealift to deliver supplies.**

**SECTION E. TRANSITION AND REDEPLOYMENT**

19. **General**

a. Redeployment of units conducting FID operations does not typically indicate the end of all FID operations in the HN. Rather, in long-term FID operations, as security and other conditions improve and internal threats become manageable for HN personnel, direct military-to-military activities by units will continue, but these activities may become more intermittent with gaps between regular exercises and exchanges. In ongoing FID operations, continuous coverage by US units generally involves mission handoff from one unit to its replacement. Redeployment, if conducted haphazardly or prematurely, can set FID operations back substantially.

b. Commonalities exist between redeployments that involve direct handoff and redeployments that involve intermittent deployments. In the latter case, the possibility always exists that situations during routine activities and military-to-military contact will arise causing handoff to a relieving force. Typically, this will involve the original unit or select members of it extending their presence in-country to provide continuity or to stay in place as part of a more robust force. Redeployment may also involve a transition from DOD execution of programs to DOS or other interagency partner execution. In both immediate mission handoff and intermittent FID operations,
capturing lessons learned in thorough post-mission debriefings is essential to continue to build institutional FID knowledge and refine FID doctrine and training.

20. Termination of Operations

The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the HN and regional countries. It is essential to understand that termination of operations is a vital link between NSS, DSR, NMS, and the desired national strategic end state(s). A poorly conducted termination of FID operations can have a long-term impact on USG relations with the HN, the region, and, potentially, other regions. Some level of operations will normally continue well after intensive FID support has ended. The possibility of an extended presence by US military forces to assist FID operations should be considered during the initial planning and COA development.

21. Termination Approaches

a. There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military force. The first is to force an imposed settlement by the threat of or actual occupation of an enemy’s land, resources, or people. Supporting the threat of actual occupation may be accomplished by the selective destruction of critical functions or assets, such as C2, infrastructure, or making the adversary unable to resist the imposition of US will. In FID, this approach is typically only taken with intransigent internal threats, and the approach differs from other operations in that it still involves a preponderance of HN effort in any imposed settlement.

b. The second approach seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to yield will be less painful than to continue to resist. In FID, military power alone will rarely compel an internal threat to consider a negotiated conclusion. Rather, military success in providing security to the HN populace, coupled with the other functions of the HN IDAD program, may induce an internal threat to negotiate under terms acceptable to the HN government. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to use both. However, some internal threats, by their nature, may not be viable candidates for negotiation. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it provides a way to gain time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. The efficacy of an armistice or truce must be weighed against the potential damage done by legitimizing an internal threat.

c. The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the irregular challenges posed by non-state actors is an indirect approach that erodes an adversary’s power, influence, and will; undermines the credibility and legitimacy of its political authority; and undermines an internal threat’s influence and control over and support by the indigenous population. This approach is necessary with an internal threat unwilling to enter into discussion.
22. National Strategic End State

a. The first and primary strategic task regarding termination of intensive FID operations is to determine an attainable national strategic end state based on clear national strategic objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achieving these objectives is necessary to attain the national strategic end state and the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. In FID, this is determined with the HN civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually beneficial. The President or SecDef approves specified standards that must be met before a FID operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of support.

b. Commanders clarify their desired end state for training programs early. The characteristics of effective HN security forces include flexible, proficient, self-sustained, well-led, professional forces which are integrated into society. The well-trained HN security forces should:

(1) Provide reasonable levels of security from external threats while not threatening regional security.

(2) Provide reasonable levels of internal security without infringing upon the populace’s civil liberties or posing a coup threat.

(3) Be founded upon the rule of law.

(4) Be sustainable by the HN after US and MNFs depart.

23. Mission Handoff Procedures

a. During long-term, continuous FID operations, commanders may elect to replace teams for a variety of reasons. Time is not the only governing factor. Changes in the HN OE may require reshaping force packages as situations change for better or worse. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units; for example, new equipment may be fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of reason, mission handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

b. The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command lies with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies with the incoming commander since he or she will assume responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission will continue.

c. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this advice conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander’s desires and the
conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

d. As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the outgoing unit under the incoming unit’s control during the changeover process. Although this procedure would present a clear and easily defined solution to establishing the incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most effective control for US forces should hostile contact occur during the process.

e. If the incoming US unit or the HN unit it advises is in direct-fire contact with insurgents or another internal threat during the handoff, the unit immediately notifies the higher HQ ordering the exchange. If the incoming unit commander has not assumed responsibility, the unit immediately comes under control of the outgoing unit and is absorbed into that unit position. The outgoing unit commander and his or her HN counterpart will control the battle. If the outgoing unit commander has passed responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the OPCON of the incoming unit, and the HN unit coordinates its movements with the new unit. Units in advisory or combat support roles should follow these same procedures.

24. Military Considerations

In its strategic context, military success is measured in the attainment of military objectives supporting the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly from those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to USG and HN leadership regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility and acceptability, as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. An essential consideration is ensuring the longer-term stabilization and the enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continue upon the conclusion of sustained operations. Premature reduction of FID support can trigger a rapid and dramatic upsurge in internal threat activity, strength, and political viability. Proper use of the informational instrument of national power mitigates the possibility of any vestigial internal threat elements characterizing a reduction in military commitment to a US or HN strategic or tactical reversal.

25. Post Mission Debriefing Procedures

a. The unit commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission and all relevant informational subsets. The debrief should begin with the updated area study and continue with other relevant issues. The range of topics can include military geography; political parties; military forces; insurgents; security forces; insurgent forces, targets, and TAs; ongoing CAO; logistics; health service and supply issues; and ongoing joint, interagency, international, and multinational projects or operations. See Appendix D, “Foreign Internal Defense Post Mission Debriefing Guide,” for more information.

b. **Documentation.** As FID operations are executed and the joint force rotates, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the FID operation
to fit the special circumstances and environment. Debriefs by individual units of the joint force ensure internal continuity. Relevant portions of these debriefs are consolidated into a single joint force after action report. Therefore, comprehensive after action reviews and reports focusing on the specifics of the FID operations should be conducted to gather this information as soon as possible after mission execution.

For further information on documenting lessons learned, refer to CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program, or the following JLLIS links: https://www.jllis.mil/ and http://www.jllis.smil.mil/.

26. Considerations

Although the considerations in the following paragraphs are intended primarily for a direct handoff between units, they also apply when handoff is made to an interagency partner. In addition, the considerations should be taken into account in a mature FID operation where there may be lag time between deployments. In this latter case, preparing an analysis of the considerations listed below will aid the incoming commander on the next iteration. The incoming and outgoing commanders or interagency partner lead representative should consider the following:

a. **Mission.** The incoming commander must make a detailed study of the unit’s mission statement and understand the present mission tasks and the implied mission tasks. The mission may also require a unit with additional skill sets, such as specialized intelligence capabilities, near real time connectivity, CA functional specialists, or complex media production ability. Knowing the mission, commander’s concept of the mission, commander’s critical information requirements, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and IRs will help him or her understand the mission. After a complete, in-depth study of the OA, the incoming unit commander should complete the handoff in a manner that allows for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow any adversary to gain operational advantages.

b. **OE.** The in-country unit provides continuous information updates to the incoming commander. PIRs and IRs were established for the original mission along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The incoming unit must become familiar with the ongoing PIRs and IRs and the upcoming mission PIRs and IRs.

c. **Adversary Composition.** The incoming unit commander should be provided the latest available intelligence on all internal threats that affect the mission. This intelligence includes comprehensive data on terrorist identities, to include the current DOD Biometric-Enabled Watchlist of persons of interest in the OE and terrorist-related incidents, criminal activity, and specific environmental threats over the previous several months. In addition to the normal intelligence provided to the incoming unit commander on a regular basis, the situation may call for a liaison from the outgoing unit. OPSEC is critical to prevent the enemy from discovering the impending relief and then exploiting the fluidity of the change and the concentration of US forces.
d. **Friendly US/MNFs.** For the incoming unit, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The unit needs to be familiar with the C2 structure it will deal with on a daily basis. The incoming unit needs to know all friendly units in adjacent OEs and be aware of the capabilities of their mission support base in addition to other operations, units, and their capabilities. If US combat support units are to be relieved, their relief should occur after the relief of the units they support.

e. **HN Forces.** The incoming unit plans and prepares for a quick and frictionless transition in counterpart relations. However, potential or anticipated friction between the HN unit and the incoming unit may cause the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing units need a period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission handoff. If possible, the incoming unit members should receive biographical data on their counterparts, to include photographs prior to deployment. This information allows unit members to become familiar with their counterparts and may aid to determine which advisor techniques need more emphasis. Mission execution should be able to continue within the capabilities of the incoming unit, the HN unit, and the available supporting assets.

f. **Civilian Populace.** All incoming units should conduct an in-depth area study, giving close attention to local problems. General demographic data may be available from sister units that can be expanded upon for unit-specific needs. Popular support for US activities taking place within the OE may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing unit provides this critical information and describes in detail all completed civic action projects and those that are underway. The incoming unit should understand the functioning of the HN government and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved in or influencing the situation in its OE.

g. **Terrain and Weather.** Some handoff operations may require select SOF units, such as SF detachments, CA teams, or tactical MIS teams, to move by foot or by animal mounts into and out of the AO. In such instances, the outgoing unit plans and reconnoiters the routes used for infiltrating the incoming unit and those used for its exfiltration. These routes should provide the best possible cover and concealment. If possible, the units make this exchange during darkness or inclement weather. SOF units need to consider significant terrain or weather features that may impede movement. Limitations of media coverage or difficulties to civic action projects because of these features are two common examples. In addition, weather conditions and significant elevations can greatly affect air operations. These factors can critically affect resupply and health service and supply (notably medical evacuation procedures) as well.

h. **Time.** The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted will determine the time required to exchange units. Ideally, there is an overlap period to allow the incoming unit to become familiar with the OE and to establish rapport between the incoming unit personnel and their HN counterparts. However, the handoff operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more personnel in the OE become vulnerable and lucrative targets. A quickly executed relief will reduce the time available to the enemy to strike before the incoming unit has time to consolidate.
its position. The incoming unit should not sacrifice continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming unit needs to have enough time to observe training techniques and procedures and to receive a debriefing from the outgoing unit on lessons learned.

i. Other Interagency Partners. When the US military and interagency partners operate within the same OE, the capacity of the military often exceeds the interagency partner. This can become an important factor when the environment has challenges with security, logistics, and US collaborative effort. When a military unit is relieved of a function by another military unit operating in the OE with an interagency partner, or transferring to interagency partner responsibility, the handoff procedures will typically take more time and entail more complex interagency coordination. However, the other areas of consideration still apply and, in fact, may pose greater challenges for the interagency partner if the US military force is downsizing. Outgoing units that have past, present, or future projects already planned must provide for the transfer of these projects to new responsible agents in the incoming unit or interagency partner. As outgoing unit personnel develop a relief in place, they should allow sufficient time to coordinate with incoming unit personnel and their applicable interagency counterparts. In addition, the outgoing unit should brief the incoming unit on any interagency programs affecting FID operations.

j. Continued Involvement of Joint Forces. The constant and unbroken presence of SOF or CF in FID operations is not a foregone conclusion. In FID operations, gaps in deployments of SOF, CF, or both types of units may be unavoidable. In addition, limited CF or SOF units or advisors may be present on an ongoing basis. In these instances, the SOF or CF with a constant presence must maintain continuity and brief sister-SOF units or conventional units on aspects of the OE. Various operational concerns can affect what sort of unit relieves another; for instance, a CF, after completing the basic training of an elite but previously untrained HN unit, might handoff to a SOF unit to complete the HN unit’s advanced training.
APPENDIX A
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Overview

Unless otherwise stated, the conditions stated in this appendix apply to FID and SFA. Law and policy govern the actions of the US forces in all military operations, including FID and SFA. For US forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of the operation. It affects the ROE, how US forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the HN, and the authority of US forces to detain and interrogate. Orders issued by the President or SecDef to a CCDR provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, as well as treaties to which the US is party. Policies include executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by government officials. No summary provided here can replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting staff judge advocate (SJA). This appendix summarizes some of the laws and policies that bear upon US military operations in support of SFA and FID.

2. Legal Authority for Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense

Without a deployment or execution order from the President or SecDef, US forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve FID. If the Secretary of State requests and SecDef approves, US forces can participate in FID. The request and approval may go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22, USC. Among other programs, Title 22, USC, contains the FAA and the AECA. Programs under Title 22, USC, authorize SA, developmental assistance, and other forms of aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in Title 10, USC. Title 10, USC, authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of HCA in coordination with the US ambassador to the HN. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance to police by US forces is permitted but not with DOD as the lead government department.

a. Distinguishing Sentiment, Policy, and Law. The underlying international sentiment as to what is acceptable behavior in conflict and war often rapidly outpaces formal treaty adoption and ratification. Customary international law is based on the consistent practice of nations that is followed out of a sense of legal obligation. While customary international law is generally binding upon all nations, persistent objectors to a rule of customary international law may not be bound by that rule. In the fight against terrorism, contemporary OE, international policy, and sentiment have been greatly debated among the legitimate nation-states of the world, and non-state armed groups and sympathizers have attempted to shape and exploit that debate to their advantage. Joint forces conducting FID operations face similar conditions. Even as codes, laws, and conventions emerge, joint forces conducting FID operations will likely always face disinformation and propaganda that vilifies legitimate military, reconstruction, and LE efforts as violations of what the adversary will refer to as international law.
b. **Planning Concerns**

(1) Those planning and conducting FID operations often need a detailed knowledge of international law, such as the Geneva Conventions, for two principal reasons. The first is to educate HN military staffs and forces on internationally accepted standards of conduct. The second is to counter very specific points of adversary disinformation and propaganda. Advisors and trainers may have to help the HN to either build a knowledge base of international law among HN military personnel or promote an adherence to that part of international law the HN military has routinely ignored in the past. In addition, this past behavior may have carried over to transgressions of its own laws; therefore, advisors and trainers may have to assist HN forces in building acceptance of new HN laws safeguarding civil liberties (e.g., the right of free speech, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press). HN soldiers must uphold these rights in FID operations for many reasons that influence public trust in the FSF. US personnel who notice suspected violations of basic human rights must report the facts to their chain of command. Under US law, SA may not be provided to any country of the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, except under limited circumstances.

(2) Internal threat propagandists increasingly use factual, partially factual, or entirely fictitious violations of international law, policy, or even sentiment to discredit HN governments. These attempts are frequently graphic to have the maximum incendiary effect. They often address third countries or international agencies and may cite specific provisions of the law of war. Citing specific portions of the law of war accomplishes two goals for them. If successful, they appear to have legitimate status as a state actor, and they make the HN look like a nation that ignores civil rights and the law of war. FID forces must infuse an acceptance of the basic tenets of international law among the HN personnel they work with, advise, and train.

3. **International Law and Treaties**

a. The UN Charter came into force on 24 October 1945 after being ratified by the US and a majority of other signatories. The UN Charter mandates that all member states resolve their international disputes peacefully and requires that they refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. The UN Charter also provides that all nations have the right to use self-defense to combat acts of aggression against them, and in collective self-defense, until such time as the Security Council shall take action.

b. The UN Charter provides the treaty framework for states’ authority for the use of force and outlines the limits of modern *jus ad bellum* (the law that regulates the conditions under which a state may resort to force). Certain *jus ad bellum* criteria have, at their philosophical roots, drawn from principles that have been developed as part of the just war tradition. These principles include:

(1) A competent authority to order the war for a public purpose,

(2) A just cause (such as self-defense),

(3) The means must be proportionate to the just cause,
(4) All peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted, and

(5) A right intention on the part of the just belligerent.

c. US forces obey the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations. The law of war is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding upon the US, including treaties and international agreements and applicable customary international law. The law of war principles of military necessity and proportionality are slightly different than discussed in paragraph b. Military necessity is the use of armed force to attain legitimate military objectives are lawful versus proportionality of the principles that justifies the use of all measures need to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war. The principle of proportionality generally requires that combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.

For additional information on the principles of the law of war, refer to the Department of Defense Law of War Manual.

For additional information on the legality of nonlethal weapons, refer to DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Nonlethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.

d. During SFA or FID operations, commanders must be aware of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the status of insurgents under the laws of the HN. Common Article 3 is contained in all four of the Geneva Conventions and is specifically intended to apply to internal armed conflicts. It provides that, at a minimum, all persons taking no direct part in hostilities and those placed hors de combat must be treated humanely.

4. Application of Criminal Laws of the Host Nation

The final sentence of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions makes clear that armed conflict with an insurgent group neither confers nor removes the insurgent group’s status under international law. They are not, when captured, prisoners of war. Insurgents may be prosecuted as criminals for bearing arms against the government and for other offenses, so long as they are accorded the minimum protections described in Common Article 3. US forces conducting SFA should remember the insurgents are, as a legal matter, criminal suspects within the legal system of the HN. Counterinsurgents must carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at the scene. This evidence will be used to process the insurgents into the legal system and thus hold them accountable for their crimes while still promoting the rule of law.

5. Host Nation Law and Status-of-Forces Agreements

a. The military leader must be aware of and consider the impact of other bodies of law that impact the planning and execution phases, including HN law and any applicable SOFAs.
b. SJAs and planners must be familiar with any SOFAs or other similar agreements that may be applicable. In any given mission, there may be agreements short of SOFAs, such as diplomatic notes, on point. Relevant international documents affecting military operations may be difficult to locate. Several sources are available in which to locate applicable international agreements governing the status of US forces or affecting military operations. DOS publications, such as *Treaties in Force*, contain unclassified international agreements. Both the relevant CCMD’s legal office and the DATT or military assistance group at the embassy should also have access to international agreements impacting the military operation.

c. SOFAs and other international agreements establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. Topics that are usually covered in a SOFA include criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the HN, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to HN laws. It is essential that all personnel understand status of US forces in the AO and are trained accordingly.


US law, regulations, and policy play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct SFA and FID missions. These factors tend to constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in combat situations to the ability to spend government funds for a training or support mission.

7. General Prohibition on Assistance to Police

Usually, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is the lead when US forces provide SA, military training, equipment, and defense articles and services to HN military forces. The FAA specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive. When providing assistance to training, the DOS’s INL provides the lead role in police assistance. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies.

8. Training and Equipping Foreign Forces

All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. US laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. US law also requires DOS to verify that the HN receiving the assistance does not commit gross violations of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man hours and materiel requested by DOS under the FAA. The President may authorize deployed US forces to train or advise HN security forces as part of the mission. In this case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, and logistic support (including supplies, and services) provided to foreign forces by DOD are paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Moreover, the President gives
specific authority to DOD for its role in such “train and equip” efforts. Absent such a directive, DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting an HN in training and equipping its security forces.

For additional information, see DODI 5111.19, Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority.

9. Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Often these directives are specific to the operation. If there are no operation-specific ROE, US forces apply SROE. When working with an MNF, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly.

10. Fiscal Law Considerations

a. While conducting SFA or FID missions, like all operations, commanders require specific authority to expend funds. This authority is normally found in the DOD Appropriations Act. As a general rule, O&M funds may not be used for SFA or FID missions. Congress may appropriate additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of conducting more complex stability activities that are not typically covered by O&M. Examples include the commander’s emergency response program, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.

b. The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the FAA, Title 22, USC, Section 2151.
c. There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring the use of Title 22, USC, funds for foreign assistance:

   (1) **Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization Training.** DOD may fund the training (as opposed to goods and services) of foreign militaries with O&M dollars when the purpose of the training is to enhance the interoperability, familiarization, and safety of the training. This is a very limited exception that requires careful analysis. Units contemplating using this exception should consult with the SJA to ensure O&M funds may not be used for SA training.

   (2) **Congressional Appropriation and Authorization to Conduct Foreign Assistance.** DOD may fund foreign assistance operations if Congress has provided a specific appropriation and authorization to execute the mission.

d. The FAA contains additional constraints on government funding of SFA/FID missions. The specific law, first enacted in 1974, prohibits the USG from providing funds to the security forces of a foreign country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Funding can be authorized if the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice. Similar provisions, referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,” are found in annual national defense authorization acts.

e. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. USAID expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22, USC. In addition, provisions of Title 10, USC, authorize small amounts of funds to be appropriated annually for commanders to provide humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. These standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally require significant advance coordination within DOD and DOS.

f. The USCG is specifically authorized to assist other USG departments and agencies in the performance of any activity for which they are especially qualified. As a Service, the USCG has very limited, organic legislative authority to unilaterally provide training and technical assistance to foreign countries. With few exceptions, the USCG is generally a service provider to other USG funding departments and agencies whose international authorities convey to the USCG with the transfer of funding, for the specific mission. IAW the Economy Act of 1932, Title 31, USC, Section 1535, the costs incurred by the USCG while delivering international training and technical assistance are reimbursable whenever the training/assistance is funded by or through another USG or foreign government agency.
### KEY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDING PROGRAMS

The following programs have funds appropriated by Congress to allow the Department of State (DOS) to conduct its foreign assistance mission:

- Foreign Military Financing Program
- International Military Education and Training Program
- Economic Support Fund
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Antiterrorism Assistance
- Humanitarian Mine Action
- Refugee Assistance
- Personnel Details

The following programs are administered by DOS, but do not have funds appropriated to sustain them:

- Foreign Military Sales Program
- Foreign Military Lease Program
- Economy Act Security Assistance
- United States Government Commodities and Services Program
- Direct Commercial Sales Program

There are additional special programs created by law to assist in the foreign assistance mission. These programs include:

- Excess Defense Articles
- Presidential Drawdowns

DOS directly, or indirectly through the United States Agency for International Development, finances numerous development assistance programs to address the following needs:

- Democracy
- Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
- Global Health (including maternal/child health, infectious diseases, water and sanitation, and voluntary family planning)
- Agriculture
- Nutrition and Resilience
- Education
- Environment and Economic Development

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP is an example of a targeted humanitarian assistance fund program. CERP’s primary purpose is “[to enable] military commanders in Iraq [and Afghanistan] to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility by carrying out programs that will..."
immediately assist the Iraqi [and Afghan] people.” CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, but Congress later appropriated US funds for the purpose. CERP is a program established to assist in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not applicable to missions outside of those countries. Future missions, though, may have similar funding sources established to facilitate a humanitarian assistance mission. Consult with the servicing judge advocate to determine the availability of funding.

Various Sources
1. Introduction

   a. JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decision-making process.

   b. JIPOE is a four-step process that defines the total OE; describes the impact of the OE; evaluates the adversary and other relevant actors; and determines the COAs for adversary and other relevant actors, particularly the most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.

   For further information on the four-step process for JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

   c. JIPOE for FID, like any operation, is accomplished through a mix of analysis utilizing all the intelligence disciplines. JIPOE utilizes seven intelligence disciplines: GEOINT, HUMINT, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), technical intelligence, and CI. The primary purpose of JIPOE is to support joint planning, execution, and assessment by identifying, analyzing, and assessing the adversary’s COGs, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, decisive points, limitations, intentions, COAs, and reactions to friendly operations based on a holistic view of the OE. The goal is to gain a solid understanding of internal factors as well as regional factors. Accordingly, JIPOE for FID is divided into five categories: OAE, geographic analysis, population analysis, climatology analysis, and threat evaluation.

2. Operational Area Evaluation

   a. The JIPOE to support FID begins with a broad OAE, which covers the JFC’s OA. During this phase, data is collected to satisfy basic IRs in the following areas: political; military; economic; religious; social; endemic diseases and health status of the populace; geographic; psychological; cultural; friendly forces; threat forces; and nonbelligerent, third-party forces. Data is collected with respect to the specific OA and mission and considers all instruments of national power from a strategic perspective. Of particular interest during this stage is the evaluation of the MISO and CMO estimate.

   b. The MISO OAE is initially composed of special MISO studies and special MISO assessments. These studies identify psychological vulnerabilities, characteristics, insights, and opportunities that exist in the OA. Analysts doing MISO OAE also focus on, but do not limit themselves to, identifying:

      (1) The ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the area and their locations and densities.
(2) Key leaders and communicators in the area, both formal (such as politicians and government officials) and informal (such as businessmen, clergy, or tribal leaders).

(3) Cohesive and divisive issues within a community; as examples, what makes it a community, what would split the community, and what are the attitudes toward the HN.

(4) Literacy rates and levels of education.

(5) Types of media consumed by the community and the level of credibility each is perceived to carry within the community and/or segments within society.

(6) Any concentrations of third-country nationals in the OA and their purposes and functions.

(7) Scientific and technical developments; production; and trade, including significant trade agreements, restrictions, and sanctions, or lack thereof.

(8) The use of natural resources, industry, and agriculture, and destruction or exploitation of the environment.

(9) Location, type, and quantity of toxic industrial material.

c. In the course of OAE, the MISO planners coordinate with the military PA office, the cultural officer, and PA staff within the country team to prepare a matrix identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that should be developed. Target groups are identified. The locations of mass media facilities in the area that can be used for the dissemination of MISO products, and the identification of their operational characteristics, are also important in the selection of the proper outlet for these products. In particular, the MISO planner should evaluate:

(1) Studios and transmitters for radio and television and their operational characteristics (wattage, frequency, and programming).

(2) Heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities of equipment that can supplement the capabilities of MIS units.

(3) Accessibility of such facilities to MIS forces; as examples, who controls them and whether they will cooperate with the US.

d. CMO OAE in FID is composed of an evaluation of HN civic action programs, populace and resource control, civilian labor, and materiel procurement. Operational concerns may expand the evaluation to a CMO estimate. The CMO planner also evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken in the OA by the HN unilaterally or with US support through CMO. In making this evaluation, the planner often relies primarily on the local and regional assets of the HN and the supported command to get an accurate feel for the lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, or other related FID threats that may exist in the area.
3. Geographic Analysis

a. The geographic analysis considers a wide range of factors that include the political, military, economic, religious, social, psychological, and cultural significance of the area. Although not relying exclusively on the two disciplines of GEOINT and OSINT, the geographic analysis accomplished during the JIPOE for a FID operation relies heavily on these two disciplines. The three components of GEOINT, namely imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information, provide the whole of data (or nearly so) on some of the six overlays for FID geographic analysis, such as the cover and concealment overlay, and portions of data for other overlays, such as the logistics sustainment overlay. Similarly, the incident overlay may rely heavily on OSINT data.

b. Normally, the six map overlays described below are a result of the geographic analysis.

(1) **Population Status Overlay.** The generic population status overlay graphically represents the sectors of the population that are pro-government, anti-government, pro-threat, anti-threat, and uncommitted or neutral. This overlay is important because the populace can provide support and security to friendly or threat forces. This graphic may also display educational, religious, ethnic, or economic aspects of the population. A more refined product in an urban environment displays the home and work places of key friendly and threat military or civilian personnel and their relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps and imagery are used to conveniently plot information by marking rooftops of buildings, although care must be taken to derive coordinates only from non-displaced ground footprints of buildings. Biometric-focused area studies provide fidelity on known actors operating in the area, as derived from identity intelligence analysis. Such refined products should be cross-referenced to order of battle (OB) files that are analogous to the represented data such as personality files and/or faction and organization files.

(2) **Cover and Concealment Overlay.** The cover and concealment overlay graphically depicts the availability, density, type, and location of cover and concealment from the ground as well as from the air. In areas of significant threat of aerial attack or observation, overhead cover and concealment may be important considerations for threat selection of base camps, mission support sites, drug laboratories, or other adversary areas. Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and man-made features such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions. Vegetation is the primary feature that provides concealment. The canopy closure overlay is critical for the determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in tropical rain forests, and is incorporated into the cover and concealment overlay for rural and other forested areas. In built-up areas, man-made structures are also assessed for the cover and concealment they offer. When used with the population status overlay, the cover and concealment overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe houses, routes of movement, and meeting places.

(3) **Logistics Sustainability Overlay.** Logistics is essential to friendly and threat operations. The detection and location of supply lines and bases are critical to finding and
defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, and materiel supply. In rural areas, the logistics sustainability overlay depicts potable water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, and other relevant items. In built-up areas, this overlay depicts supermarkets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel. Key to preparing this overlay is knowledge of threat and friendly forces, their logistic requirements, and the availability and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements.

(4) **Target Overlay.** The target overlay graphically portrays the location of possible threat targets within the area. In FID environments, this overlay depicts banks, bridges, electric power installations, bulk petroleum and chemical facilities, military and government facilities, the residences and work places of key friendly personnel, and other specific points most susceptible to attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. Hazard estimates are prepared for those targets with collateral damage potential. For example, the threat to a large airbase may focus on airframes; crew billeting; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage as opposed to runways, aprons, or the control tower. The target overlay is significant to the friendly commander’s defensive planning because it shows where defenses need to be concentrated and, conversely, where defenses can be diffused. It also provides CI personnel with a focus for indicators of threat preparation to attack; for example, to discover an indigenous worker pacing off the distances between perimeter fences and critical nodes. The target overlay is useful in disaster relief operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, looting, or areas of potential collateral damage.

(5) **LOC Overlay.** The LOC overlay highlights transportation systems and nodes within the area such as railways, roads, trails, navigable waterways, ports, airfields, drop zones (DZs), and landing zones (LZs). In urban environments, mass public transit routes and schedules, as well as underground sewage, drainage and utility tunnels, ditches and culverts, and large open areas that could be used for DZs and LZs, are also shown. Where applicable, this overlay will also show seasonal variations. Care is taken to compare recent imagery and geospatial information to ensure new LOCs are added to the final product. In many situations, LOC products will be readily available from the HN or other local sources.

(6) **Incident Overlay.** The incident overlay plots security-related incidents by type and location. Clusters of similar incidents represent a geographic pattern of activity. These incidents can then be further analyzed for time patterns, proximity to population grouping, LOCs, targets, and areas of cover and concealment. This analysis assists in the day-to-day application of security resources.

c. MISO and CMO considerations also impact the geographic analysis as described below.

(1) MISO considerations in a geographic analysis focus on how geography affects the population of the area and the dissemination of MISO products. This step may include, for example, preparation of a radio line of sight (LOS) overlay for radio and television stations derived from an obstacle overlay depicting elevations and LOS
information. MISO terrain analysis will, for example, focus on determining the respective ranges and audibility of signals from the most significant broadcast stations identified during OAE and locations for cellular communication towers/stations.

(2) CMO considerations in geographic analysis include the identification of critical government, insurgent, and terrorist threats and other threats to food and water storage facilities, toxic industrial material sites, resupply routes, and base locations. In addition, a primary consideration in FID is how terrain affects the ability of US and HN forces to conduct CMO. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may be unsuited to some CMO projects because of inaccessibility to the necessary manpower and equipment needed to initiate such projects.

4. Population Analysis

a. When conducting FID, the local populace is a key factor to successful operations. The CMO planner, in conjunction with assigned, attached, or supporting CA, is a critical contributor to this element of JIPOE. Elements of the CMO OAE provide the basis for this analysis, as well as CA area study and assessments previously created or created in support of the mission. During this analysis, the planner identifies, evaluates, and makes overlays and other products as appropriate for the following factors: social organization; economic organization and dynamics; political organization and dynamics; history of the society; nature of the insurgency (if applicable); nature of the government; effects on nonbelligerents; and COAs of the insurgents, the HN government, and nonbelligerents.

b. In evaluating social organization, planners look at:

(1) Density and distribution of population by groups; balance between urban and rural groups; sparsely populated areas; and concentrations of primary racial, linguistic, religious, or cultural groups.

(2) Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party and affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, and age of the populace.

(3) Overlaps among classes and splits within them, such as the number and types of religious and racial groups to which union members belong and ideological divisions within a profession.

(4) Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and composite strengths of each; that is, those who actively or passively support the government or the threat and those who are neutral.

(5) Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each group and subgroup.

(6) Population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups.
(7) Finally, planners perform a factor analysis to determine which activities and programs accommodate the goals of most of the politically and socially active groups. Then they determine which groups and composite groups support, are inclined to support, or remain neutral toward the government.

c. In evaluating economic organization and performance, planners specifically look at:

(1) The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations in the OA.

(2) The economic infrastructure such as resource locations, scientific and technical capabilities, electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.

(3) Economic performance such as gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.

(4) Major industries and their sustainability, including the depth and soundness of the economic base, maximum peak production levels and duration, and storage capacity.

(5) Performance of productive segments, such as public and private ownership patterns, concentration and dispersal, and distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, mining, and transportation.

(6) Public health factors that include, but are not limited to, birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, endemic diseases, health of farm animals, and availability of veterinary services.

(7) Foreign trade patterns, such as domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private) and resource dependencies.

(8) Availability of education, including access by individuals and groups; sufficiency for individual needs; groupings by scientific technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training; and surpluses and shortages of skills.

(9) Unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups, as well as horizontal and vertical career mobility.

(10) Taxation authorities, rates, and rate determination.

(11) Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.

(12) Population shifts and their causes and effects; as examples, rural to urban, agriculture to manufacturing, and manufacturing to service.

(13) Finally, planners identify economic program values and resources that might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups.
d. In evaluating political organization and dynamics, planners specifically look at:

   (1) The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power; that is, pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters or strong man rule supported by the military.

   (2) The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with the formal structure; that is, is the government nominally a democracy but in reality a political dictatorship?

   (3) Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success. Also, the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the parties.

   (4) Nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or programs they support such as political action groups.

   (5) Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlation of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations such as churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions.

   (6) The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, roles of the populace and those in power, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocs, and patron-client determinants of voting.

   (7) Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. That is, does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights?

   (8) Independence or control of the press and other mass media and the alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.

   (9) Centralization or diffusion of essential decision making and patterns of inclusion, or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process.

   (10) Administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats egalitarian in practice or in words only? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy?

   (11) Finally, planners correlate data concerning political, economic, and social groups and then identify political programs to neutralize opposing groups, as well as provide programs favorable to friendly groups.

e. In evaluating the history of the society, planners specifically look at:

   (1) The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership. Was it elected? Does it have a long history? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?
(2) The history of political violence. Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, *coup d’etat*, assassination, or terrorism? Does the country have a history of consensus-building? Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

(3) Finally, the analysts determine the legitimacy of the government, acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace, the type and level of violence to be used by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups that will support or oppose the use of violence.

f. In evaluating the nature of the insurgency, planners specifically look at:

(1) Desired end state of the insurgency, clarity of its formulation, openness of its articulation, commonality of point of view among the elements of the insurgency, and differences between this end view and the end view of the government.

(2) Groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the insurgency.

(3) Divisions, minority views, and dissension within the insurgency.

(4) Groups that may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired end state of the insurgency.

(5) Organizational and operational patterns used by the insurgency, variations and combinations of such, and shifts and trends.

(6) Finally, analysts determine the stage and phase of the insurgency, as well as how far and how long it has progressed and/or regressed over time. They identify unity and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine, training, morale, discipline, operational capabilities, and materiel resources. They evaluate external support, to include political, financial, and logistic assistance or the provision of safe havens or sanctuaries in neighboring nations or regions. This should include not only the sources of support but also specific means by which support is provided and critical points through which the HN could slow, reduce, negate, or stop this support. The planners determine whether rigid commitment to a method or ideological tenet or other factor constitutes an exploitable vulnerability and/or a weakness on which the government can build strength.

g. When studying hostile groups, planners examine from hostile perspectives:

(1) The leadership and staff structure and its psychological characteristics, skills, and C2 resources.

(2) Patterns of lawless activities (for example, illicit drug trafficking, extortion, piracy, and smuggling) or insurgent operations, base areas, LOCs, and supporters outside of the country concerned.

(3) The intelligence, OPSEC, deception, and information capabilities of the hostile groups.
(4) The appeal of the hostile groups to those who support them.

h. In evaluating the nature of the government response, planners specifically examine:

(1) General planning, or lack of planning, for countering the insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion being encountered, as well as planning comprehensiveness and correctness of definitions and conclusions.

(2) Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and execution of plans such as resource requirements, constraints, and realistic priorities.

(3) Use of populace and resources and the effects on each group.

(4) Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces; for example, how the government protects its economic and political infrastructure.

(5) Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.

(6) Population and resource control measures.

(7) Economic development programs.

(8) Finally, planners correlate government and insurgent strengths and weaknesses and identify necessary changes in friendly programs, plans, organization, and doctrine.

i. In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerents, planners specifically examine:

(1) Mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses.

(2) Common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the insurgency.

(3) Effects on the populace of government military, political, economic, and social operations and programs. That is, does the government often kill civilians in its counterthreat operations? Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?

(4) Orientation of the populace. To whom is the populace inclined to provide intelligence?

(5) Strengths and weaknesses of the nonbelligerents, the depth of their commitment to remain neutral, and the requirements to make them remain neutral or to support friendly or threat programs or forces.

j. In evaluating COAs for threat forces, the government, and nonbelligerents, analysts balance the foregoing factors and determine likely COAs, as well as the probable outcomes for each element.
5. Climatology Analysis

Relevant weather factors extend beyond short-term weather analysis to consideration of the broader and longer term climatological factors. The area’s climate, weather, and light conditions are analyzed to determine their effects on friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party operations. Planners consider climate types by area and season and their effects on military, political, social, and economic activities. Historic weather data and weather effects overlays are developed during this step. The effects of weather and climate are integrated with terrain analysis. Special considerations are made for the effects of weather and climate on CMO projects, MISO media and dissemination, amounts of accessible food, storage of explosives, and population patterns such as seasonal employment. Examples of potential effects are periods of drought that force farmers to become bandits or insurgents and flooding that causes isolation and interference with the distribution of food and medicine.

6. Threat Evaluation

a. In conducting the threat evaluation in FID, particular attention is paid to the HN government’s military and paramilitary police forces and the insurgent forces and infrastructure (guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground). Correlation of force evaluation in such environments includes a detailed analysis of the following factors for friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces: composition, strength (include number of active members, amount of popular support, funding method, and origin), training, equipment, electronics technical data, disposition (location), tactics and methods, operational effectiveness, weaknesses and vulnerabilities, personalities, and miscellaneous data.

b. FID planners determine how the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces can use geography, offensive actions, security, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop locally superior application of one or more of the instruments of national power. FID planners identify the strengths and weaknesses of friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces, and determine the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of each side’s COAs, tactics, and countertactics. Finally, planners develop COAs that will optimize the application of the elements of national power by the friendly side.

c. The MISO threat evaluation serves two purposes. First, it provides the commander with an understanding of the existing and potential opposing propaganda in the area. It is a safe assumption that if US forces are conducting MISO in an area, some other organization is also conducting information activities in the area. US forces in the area must anticipate and be able to counter, if not prevent, threat information directed at US forces, allied forces, and the local populace. Second, the MISO threat evaluation provides the supported commander with a forecast of likely effects of US operations and also provides alternative measures within each COA. To conduct an effective threat evaluation, the planner must determine the capabilities of threat organizations to conduct adversary information activities and to counteract US and allied influence efforts. (The demographics of any military or paramilitary threat should be evaluated at this step if they were not considered during OAE.) Specific capabilities to be evaluated include threat abilities to:
(1) Conduct offensive information activities targeting US or allied forces or the local populace.

(2) Indoctrinate personnel against US MISO efforts (defensive counterpropaganda).

(3) Counteract US MISO efforts by exploiting weaknesses in US MISO operations (offensive counterpropaganda).

(4) Conduct active measures.

(5) Conduct electronic attack against US or allied broadcasts.

(6) Conduct electronic protection to safeguard organic information capabilities.

d. The CMO threat evaluation focuses on determining the adversaries in the HN populace. This determination is especially critical when the opponent is not a standing military force or when the opposing force is not equipped with standard uniforms and weapons such as guerrillas or terrorists. These forces often blend into, or intermingle with, the civilian community. CMO threat evaluation identifies the threat, OB, and modus operandi. Social, religious, and other types of forums through which threat forces employ the instruments of national power, as well as methods of countering such applications, are also identified.

e. The OPSEC threat analysis provides insight into foreign intelligence service or other intelligence-related entities with the capability, capacity, and intent to observe, collect against, analyze, and develop potential COAs to counter or impede friendly operations. An accurate threat analysis allows OPSEC planners to determine friendly critical information and indicator vulnerabilities to the threat, assess their risk to friendly operations, identify measures and countermeasures to protect them, and then assess the overall effectiveness of the OPSEC program.
APPENDIX C

ILLUSTRATIVE INTERAGENCY PLAN FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. Purpose

   Illustrative interagency plans for FID accomplish the following.

   a. Employ all instruments of US national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic) and other sources of power (financial, intelligence, law enforcement) in support of an HN IDAD effort.

   b. Identify and sequence a checklist of tasks for each USG department and agency over time.

   c. Provide a mechanism for USG programs to be mutually supporting.

   d. Include clear MOEs and measures of performance (MOPs) working toward clearly defined goals.

   e. Integrate USG activities with those of HN and other interested parties.

   f. Justify future budget requirements.

   g. Establish clear criteria for transition of phases.

   h. Inform and guide agency future strategies and plans.

   i. Provide a final deconfliction of disparate or contradictory actions by individual agencies.

   j. Ensure all USG departments and agencies communicate the same policies and strategic guidance for consistent themes and messages.

2. Content

   Because there is no set format for an illustrative interagency plan, the commander or lead agent for FID operations should set the form to use. The illustrative interagency plan should include the following components:

   a. Policy Planning Guidance. This section summarizes guidance provided by the President or other national security decisions pertaining to this situation. This section may include the guidance of the US ambassador. Limiting treaties or further policy guidance from HN policy makers or multinational partners (as endorsed by the President or the President’s designee) should be included in this section as well.

   b. US Interests at Stake. This section states the US interests at stake that warrant US FID assistance. Clearly stated, transparent motives devoid of any unstated or hidden agendas greatly facilitate the application of the informational and diplomatic instruments
of national power. Examples include securing significant economic interests, reducing international criminal activities affecting US interests, and promoting the spread of human rights and democracy.

c. **US Strategic Purpose.** This section describes the overall purpose of conducting FID operations in the HN. Increasingly, the strategic purpose of FID transcends the borders of the HN to encompass a regional, transregional, or global strategic purpose. Examples include stabilizing a country for the sake of regional stability; countering narcoterrorism; reducing the potential for proliferation of WMD and the materiel, technology, and expertise necessary to create and sustain a WMD program; and stabilizing a country so it does not become a haven for terrorists.

d. **Mission Statement.** This section states the who, what, where, when, and why of a USG FID operation. Although not necessarily providing an exhaustive list of the who (that is, the USG departments and agencies involved), this mission statement should be in sufficient detail to encompass generalities on how the instruments of national power are going to be brought to bear so each USG department and agency involved in FID operations can infer its level of participation. A comprehensive overview is given with significant operations or known hard dates. For instance, the mission statement may include, that during the FID operation, national elections will occur on a specified date. The why of the mission statement should be one of the most complete and least general portions of the mission statement and should comply with, and encapsulate, US policy, interests, and strategic purpose in the context of the HN IDAD needs.

e. **Desired End State.** This section describes the desired outcome of all FID assistance. The preparer should describe the end state in measurable and quantifiable terms rather than generalities. An example might be a situation where a HN is stabilized to the point that an insurgency is reduced from a national security threat to a minor LE problem. In this case, the level of insurgents might be quantified by a specific number (expressed in an acceptable plus or minus range) coupled with an objectively verifiable metric, such as the actual number of insurgent attacks.

f. **Operational Concept.** This section describes, in broad terms, how the USG will employ the instruments of national power in the FID operation. The operational concept is not the equivalent of a military CONOPS. The level of detail within an illustrative interagency plan operational concept will typically be less than in a CONOPS. It will instead focus on a holistic description of the interaction of the USG departments and agencies involved in the FID operation to leverage all instruments of national power to effect political-military conditions in the HN.

g. **Phases.** This section describes phases of USG assistance to an HN. Examples might be support to an HN’s transition to a new strategy, support to an HN’s operations to regain the initiative, support to HN offensive operations, support to HN consolidation of COIN gains, and rehabilitation. Each phase includes triggers or transition points for movement to the next phase. An alternative type of phasing could be geographical; for instance, pacifying the eastern three regions of a country, then the center, then the west.
h. **LOOs and Political-Military Objectives.** A LOO is a logical line that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective or a physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and space to objectives. This section describes the broad categories of FID activities the USG will conduct and the objectives within each. An example of a LOO is support to HN security forces to enhance their capacity to deal with insurgency. Political-military objectives within that LOO could include training and equipping a counterguerrilla brigade, supplying 100 helicopters to an HN army, conducting intelligence cooperation, and training the HN police to defend their stations against guerrilla attacks.

i. **Agency Responsibilities.** This section outlines the primary responsibilities of each USG department and agency involved in this FID operation. In the case of multiple agencies having areas of commonality, limiting or delineating points may be established. In addition, this section can include information on which is the lead and coordinating agency for a line of action that involves multiple USG departments and agencies.

j. **Implementation Matrix.** This section displays the political-military objectives for each phase in matrix form. Although there is no set format for the implementation matrix, all matrices must show objectives in chronological order. This is true whether the matrix displays hard dates or not. If not, the matrix shows items in the order they will take place.

k. **LOOs Annexes.** Annexes contain key tasks, each with its MOEs, MOPs, costs, and issues for each LOO. Annexes may be broken down into consolidated multiagency annexes by LOO or by individual agency listing all relevant LOOs for that agency.
The unit commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission and all relevant informational subsets. Figure D-1 depicts a post mission FID debriefing guide.

### Post Mission Debriefing Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Execution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brief statement of mission by joint force commander.</td>
<td>Brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement of method of operation accomplished during the operation, to include deployment, routes, activity in host nation areas, and redeployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uniforms and equipment used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications and media equipment used and results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Host nation force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties (friendly and enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friendly contacts established, to include descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military Geography

| Geographic name, Universal Transverse Mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations. |
| Boundaries (north, south, east, and west). |
| Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature. |
| Terrain. |
| • What type of terrain is dominant in this area? |
| • What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area? |
| • What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation? |
| • What is the approximate degree of slope? |
| What natural obstacles to movement were observed, and what are their locations? |
| What natural or man-made obstacles to media or humanitarian distribution are there? |
| What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area? |
| • Direction of flow. |
| • Speed. |
| • Depth. |
| • Type of bed. |
| What is the physical layout of rural and urban settlements? |
| What is the layout of various houses within the area? |
| What is the description of any potential landing zones or drop zones? |
| What is the description of any beach landing sites, if applicable? |
| What are the descriptions of any areas suitable for cache sites, and what are their locations? |
| People. |
| • What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area? |
| • What was (or is) their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area? |
| • What are the principal religion(s) of the area, and how are they practiced? |
| o Main, secondary, etc. status. |
| o Influence on people. |
| o Influence or control on political or judicial processes. |
| o Religious prayer times, regular observed days, and holidays. |
| o Constraints, laws, and taboos. |
| o Conflicts in or between religions, denominations, or sects. |
| o Religious themes, symbology, and allegory or folklore. |
| o View on conflict and martyrdom. |
| • What is the description of the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, characteristics)? |
| o Is there a physically differentiated minority? |
| o Is there a minority differentiated by other visual cues such as dress or hairstyle? |
| • What type clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear? |
| • Is symbolism or status attached to certain items of jewelry or ornaments? |
Appendix D

- What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?
  - Between males and females?
  - Between young and old?
    - Toward marriage, birth, and death?
    - Between the populace and local officials?
- What is the ordinary diet of the people?
  - Self-imposed restrictions.
  - Chronic dietary deficiencies.
  - Cyclic, seasonal, or localized deficiencies.
- What was the attitude of the populace toward US and host nation forces?
  - Friendly target groups or specific target audiences (TAs).
  - Neutral or uncommitted target groups or specific TAs.
  - Hostile target groups or specific TAs.
  - Specific behavioral changes noted.
  - Anecdotal occurrences or spontaneous events during current deployment.
- What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the host nation troops toward the government and leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?
- How did the populace cooperate with United States Government (USG) elements?
- What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen?
  - What formal and informal educational practices were observed?
    - Internal threat interference.
    - Internal threat sponsorship.
- What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area?
- Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so, how?
- What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages?
- Did any member of the populace approach or ask questions about US presence or the mission? If so, describe in detail. Give names, if possible.

Political Parties (Major, Minor, or Illegal Parties)

- Targeted by host nation or US:
  - For internal defense and development (IDAD) support or as foreign internal defense target.
  - Lethal, nonlethal, or both.
- Fundamental ideology.
  - Authoritarian or elitist. Populist or democratic.
  - Secular, theocratic, or mixed.
  - Attitude toward government.
  - Attitude toward USG.
- Leaders.
  - Key communicators.
  - Willing or unwilling to support military information support operations (MISO) program.
  - Effectiveness as spoiler or antigovernment/anti-US firebrand.
- Policies.
  - Influence on government.
  - Influence on the people.
  - Peaceful/cooperative or militant/front group.
  - Cooperative with MISO program.
  - Used in MISO series targeting another TA(s).
- Overall effectiveness.
  - Percentage of electorate: claimed vs. actual turnout.
  - Money, real influence, covert influence, spoiler, etc.
- Foreign influence.
  - Ethnic and/or ideological.
  - Regional or international.
  - Stability, strength, and weaknesses.
### Military

- Friendly forces.
- Disposition.
- Composition, identification, and strength.
- Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Degree of training and combat effectiveness.
- Morale: general and specific:
  - General psychological strengths and weaknesses.
  - Degree of stratification—number of TAs.
  - Psychological vulnerabilities/susceptibilities.
  - Targeted by host nation and/or US MISO—effectiveness.
  - Targeted by internal threat/foreign propaganda—effectiveness.
- Mission.
- Leadership and capabilities of officers and noncommissioned officers compared with those of the US.
- Logistics.
- Health capability.
- Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
- Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.
- General relationship between host nation military forces, the populace, and other forces (paramilitary, police, etc.).
- Influence on local populace.
  - Credibility.
  - Lingering effects of past bad acts/incompetence.
  - Anecdotal or empirical evidence of improvement(s).
  - Leaders or rank and file as used as key communicators/disseminators.
  - Significant operations and/or MISO actions with outcomes.
- Recommendation for these forces (military and/or paramilitary) for unconventional warfare contact.

### Insurgent or Other Internal Defense Threat Forces*

- Disposition.
- Composition, identification, and strength.
- Organization, armament, and equipment including weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Location and descriptions of WMD programs (stockpiles and proliferation networks.)
- Effects of any WMD used.
- Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
- Mission.
- Leadership capabilities.
- Logistics.
- Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
- Method of resupply and its effectiveness.
- Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- Relationship between insurgent forces, joint force units, and the populace.
- Influence on local populace.

### Police and Security Forces (Friendly and Adversary)*

- Disposition, strengths, and location.
- Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Logistics.
- Motivation, reliability, and degree of training.
- Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- Relationship with the government and local populace.
### Auxiliary and Underground (Friendly and Adversary) *

- Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
- Morale and general effectiveness.
- Motivation and reliability.
- Support.
  - Logistics.
  - Intelligence.

* Combined in example for brevity. Should be covered separately.

#### Infrastructure

Describe the area:

- **Rail system.**
  - General route.
  - Importance to the local and general area.
  - Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
  - Bypass possibilities.
  - Key junctions, switching points, and power sources.
  - Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale interdiction.
  - Security.

- **Telecommunications system.**
  - Location and description of routes, lines, and cables.
  - Location of power sources.
  - Location and capacity of switchboards.
  - Critical points.
  - Importance to the local general area.
  - Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating at a minimum.
  - Security.

- **Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage and processing facilities.**
  - Location.
  - Capacity of storage facilities.
  - Equipment used for the production of POL.
  - Power source.
  - Types and quantities of POL manufactured.
  - Methods of transportation and distribution.
    - Rail.
    - Truck.
    - Ship.
    - Air.
  - Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities.
  - Security.

- **Electrical power system.**
  - Location and description of power stations.
  - Principal power lines and transformers.
  - Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
  - Critical points.
  - Capacity (kilowatts).
  - Principal users.
  - Security.

- **Military installations and depots.**
  - Size.
  - Activity.
  - Location.
  - Units.
  - Equipment.
### Targets

#### Describe the area:

- **Reaction time.**
- **Security.**
- **WMD programs and storage facilities.**
  - Locations.
  - Security.
  - Types of WMD present and means of delivery.
  - Proliferation networks (who was supporting the insurgent access to WMD).
- **Highway and road system.**
  - Name and number.
  - Type of surface, width, and condition.
  - Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
  - Bypass possibilities.
  - Traffic density.
  - Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
  - Security.
- **Inland waterways and canals.**
  - Name and number.
  - Width, depth, and type of bed.
  - Direction and speed of flow.
  - Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions.
  - Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance crew, facilities, and reaction crew.
  - Location and description of navigational aids.
- **Natural and synthetic gas system.**
  - Location and capacity of wells and pipelines.
  - Storage facilities and capacity.
  - Critical points.
  - Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
  - Principal users.
  - Security.
- **Industrial facilities.**
  - Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities in wartime to the production of essential military materials.
  - Type of facilities.
  - Power sources.
  - Locations.
  - Sources of raw materials.
  - Number of employees.
  - Disposition of products.
  - General working conditions.
  - Critical points.
  - Security.
  - MISO actions.
- **Restricted targets for cultural, infrastructural, or psychological value.**
- **Targets requiring nonlethal action.**

### Health and Sanitation

- To what degree does hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet?
- What cash crops are raised in the area?
- What domestic and wild animals are present?
- What animal diseases are present?
- What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas?
- What systems are used for sewage disposal?
- What sanitation practices were observed in the populated and unpopulated areas?
- What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?
• What basic health services are available in populated and unpopulated areas?
• What occupations or practices could lead to illness or disease?
• What pesticides are used and how are they applied?

Evasion and Recovery
• From which element of the populace is assistance most likely?
• What, if any, safe houses or areas for evasion and resistance purposes can be recommended?
• What type shelters were used?
• Were fires small and smokeless?
• Were shelters adequate?
• Was food properly prepared?
• Were campsites well chosen?
• Were campsites and trails sterilized after movement to a new one?
• Host nation/US MISO support to evasion and resistance?

Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)
• Has the end state been attained for CAO supporting civil-military operations?
  ▪ Host nation transition plan.
  ▪ Has coordination for handoff been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
  ▪ If no, remaining benchmarks.
• Have the underlying causes of the conflict been ameliorated?
  ▪ To what degree?
  ▪ If still existing, how do they influence future planning?
• What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish remaining civil affairs (CA) activities?
• New humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements during current deployment.
• Will any ongoing operations (for example, engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?
• CA functional specialists that remain behind and residual requirements for each:
  ▪ Rule of law.
  ▪ Economic stability.
  ▪ Infrastructure.
  ▪ Governance.
  ▪ Public education and information.
  ▪ Public health and welfare.
• Who will support CA forces that remain behind?

Miscellaneous
• Weather.
  ▪ Wind speed and direction.
  ▪ Temperature.
  ▪ Effect on personnel, equipment, and operations.

Figure D-1. Post Mission Debriefing Guide
APPENDIX E
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Doctrine Division
Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone number: 1-703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J37 DDSO/CT
Strategy, Policy, Plans Division
Comm: 1-703-695-8103 (DSN 224)
E-mail: js.pentagon.j3.list.j37-dd-so-plans-policy-exercises-all@mail.mil

United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)/J-7/Lead Agent
USSOCOM Doctrine, J-7 CDI-D
Comm: 1-813-826-6728 (DSN 299)
E-mail: ussocomdoctrine.ctr@socom.mil

Air Force Special Operations Command
Mailing Address: HQ AFSOC/A8X
100 Bartley St.
Suite 209W
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544
Website: http://www.afsoc.af.mil/
E-mail: AFSOC.A8X.SP@us.af.mil
Phone Number: 1-850-884-3878

United States of Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USAJFKSWCS)
Mailing Address: Joint and Army Doctrine Integration Division
3004 Ardennes Street Stop A
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610
Website: http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/
E-mail: doctrine@socom.mil
Phone Number: 1-910-432-6035

Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARFORSOC)
Mailing Address: US Marine Forces Special Operations Command
(MARFORSOC)
G7 Doctrine
PSC Box 20116
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 28542-0116
Website: http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/
Phone Number: 1-910-440-0255 (DSN 758)
Appendix D

Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC)

Mailing Address: Naval Special Warfare Command, Attention N51
2000 Trident Way Building 624 (Attention N51),
San Diego, Ca 92155-5599
Website: https://navsoc.sof.socom.mil/default.aspx
Phone Number: 1-619-537-1245
APPENDIX F
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-22 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General
   a. Title 10, USC, Armed Forces.
   b. Title 22, USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
   c. Title 50, USC, War and National Defense.
   e. PPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.
   f. PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance.

2. Department of Defense Publications
   c. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW).
   d. DODD 5105.65, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
   e. DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.
   f. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
   g. DODD 5240.02, Counterintelligence (CI).
   h. DODD 8521.01E, DOD Biometrics.
   i. DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.
   j. DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.
   k. DODI 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities.
Appendix F

1. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.
   
2. DODI O-3300.04, Defense Biometric Enabled Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic Enabled Intelligence (FEI).
   
   
4. DODI C-5105.81, (U) Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies.
   
5. DODI 5111.20, State Partnership Program (SPP).
   
6. DODI 5132.13, Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel.
   
   
   

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
   
   
   b. CJCSI 3110.01J, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).
   
   c. CJCSI 3110.05F, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.
   
   
   e. CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
   
   f. CJCJSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedure).
   
   g. CJCJSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.
   
   h. CJCJSM 3150.25A, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
   
   i. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
k. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
m. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations*.
n. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.
o. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
q. JP 3-07, *Stability*.
r. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.
s. JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*.
t. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.
u. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*.
x. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.
y. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
z. JP 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*.
aa. JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*.
bb. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
cc. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
ff. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
8. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
hh. JP 4-08, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*.
ii. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
jj. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
kk. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.
ll. *(U)* *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*.
mm. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

4. **Multi-Service Publications**


   c. FM 6-05/MCRP 3-30.4/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*.

   d. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-02, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.


5. **United States Army Publications**

   a. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.

   b. ADP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

   c. ADP 3-07, *Stability*.

   d. ATP 3-05.2, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

   e. ATP 3-05.40, *Special Operations Sustainment*.


   g. ATP 3-57.30, *Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance*.
h. ATP 4-02.42, *Army Health System Support to Stability and Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks*.

i. FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*.


k. FM 3-61, *Public Affairs Operations*.

6. **United States Navy Publications**


   b. NWP 3-05, *Naval Special Warfare*.

   c. NWP 5-01, *Navy Planning*.

   d. NTTP 3-05.7 *Naval Special Warfare Foreign Internal Defense*.

   e. NTTP 3-06.1, *Riverine Operations*.

   f. NTTP 3-54M/MCWP 3-40.9, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*.

7. **United States Marine Corps Publications**


   b. MCWP 3-03, *Stability Operations*.


8. **United States Air Force Publications**

   a. AFDA 3-2, *Irregular Warfare*.

   b. AFDA 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
APPENDIX G
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Ricky Peterson, USSOCOM; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, LTC Todd Van Orsdel, Joint Staff J-3; LtCol Brian Mullery, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch; and Mr. Lloyd Brown and LtCol Mark Newell, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
## Glossary

**Part I—Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>area coordination center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
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<td>AFDA</td>
<td>Air Force doctrine annex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOF</td>
<td>Air Force special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEX</td>
<td>Adaptive Planning and Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>antiterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>combat aviation advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>civil affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCICA</td>
<td>command counterintelligence coordinating authority</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>combatant command campaign plan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>commander’s communication synchronization</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>counterdrug</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRUSSOCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
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<td>conventional forces</td>
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<td>CGTTP</td>
<td>Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>CI</td>
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<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CJCSM</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
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<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>CT</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>counter threat finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTN</td>
<td>countering threat networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>countering violent extremism</td>
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<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATT</td>
<td>defense attaché</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>DSR</td>
<td>defense strategy review</td>
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<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>field manual (USA)</td>
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<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
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<td>ICPO-INTERPOL</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>IIP</td>
<td>Bureau of International Information Programs (DOS)</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
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<td>Intelligence requirement</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>J-2</td>
<td>Intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-3</td>
<td>Operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>Plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>Joint Lessons Learned Information System</td>
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<td>Joint publication</td>
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<td>Joint special operations task force</td>
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<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<td>Joint task force</td>
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<td>Military civic action</td>
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<td>MCMO</td>
<td>Medical civil-military operations</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
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<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
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<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
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<td>Military information support operations</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Measure of performance</td>
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<td>Mobile training team</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>national security strategy</td>
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<td>NTTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>NWP</td>
<td>Navy warfare publication</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operation and maintenance</td>
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<td>OA</td>
<td>operational area</td>
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<td>OAE</td>
<td>operational area evaluation</td>
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<td>OB</td>
<td>order of battle</td>
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<td>operational contract support</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
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<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office of National Drug Control Policy</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>operations security</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>open-source intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTERA</td>
<td>organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDSS</td>
<td>predeployment site survey</td>
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<td>PEP</td>
<td>personnel exchange program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>partner nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
<td>Presidential policy directive</td>
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<td>QAT</td>
<td>quality assurance team</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>security cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>security cooperation organization</td>
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<td>SDO</td>
<td>senior defense official</td>
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<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>special forces</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations commander</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<td>SOJTF</td>
<td>special operations joint task force</td>
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<td>SPMAGTF</td>
<td>special purpose Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<td>SPP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>target audience</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<td>technical assistance team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>violent extremist organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-22)

military assistance advisory group. A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the United States military assistance planning and programming in the host nation. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

Military Assistance Program. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-22)

technical assistance. The providing of advice, assistance, and training pertaining to the installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-22)
**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-22 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: