PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters to command and control joint operations. It provides guidance for the JTF headquarters to plan, prepare, execute, and assess JTF operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-33
DATED 30 JULY 2012

• Adds a characterization of threats that are increasingly transregional, multidomain, and multi-functional in nature; adds three characterizations of the operational status of a joint task force (JTF): operational, contingency, and standing; adds a paragraph on the combined JTF headquarters (HQ); and clarifies the role of joint task force-state in Chapter I, “Introduction.”

• Updates the roles of various organizations that support the JTF (such as Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, and the US Transportation Command’s Joint Enabling Capabilities Command); updates explanation of joint individual augmentation; and adds three optional J-Code directorates of a joint staff: training and education directorate (J-7), resource management and financial support directorate (J-8), and civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate (J-9) to Chapter II, “Forming and Organizing.”

• Adds paragraphs on special operations task force and joint special operations task force as examples of functional component commands to Chapter III, “Subordinate Commands.”

• Revises the explanation of information management and expands the explanation of battle rhythm management in Chapter IV, “Command and Control.”

• Significantly revises the explanation of the joint manpower development process for more logical information flow in Chapter V, “Manpower and Personnel Directorate.”

• Clarifies the role of the joint intelligence support element with respect to the JTF J-2 in Chapter VI, “Intelligence Directorate.”

• Adds an explanation of commander’s communication synchronization (CCS); the J-3’s role in facilitating CCS; and the use of information-related capabilities to create effects, accomplish tasks, or achieve objectives and adds a description of the counter threat finance cell and an explanation of the role of the request for forces (RFF) (RFF manager) to Chapter VII, “Operations Directorate.”

• Updates information on contract support, contracting, and operational contract support and adds a paragraph on the operational contract support integration cell to Chapter VIII, “Logistics Directorate.”

• Revises the explanation of operational art to be consistent with the Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017, in Chapter IX, “Plans and Policy Directorate.”
Summary of Changes

• Revises the description of the JTF J-6 role and responsibilities to be consistent with the JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*, 10 June 2015, in Chapter X, “Communications System Directorate.”

• Adds a new Chapter XI, “Training and Education Directorate,” as an optional directorate for a JTF HQ.

• Adds a new Chapter XII, “Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate,” as an optional directorate for a JTF HQ.

• Adds a new Chapter XIII, “Civil-Military Operations Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate,” as an optional directorate for a JTF HQ.

• Adds a new Chapter XIV, “Special and Personal Staff,” in place of the previous Appendix C, “Commander, Joint Task Force Personal, and Special Staffs,” and subordinate annexes.

• Adds a new Annex A, “Checklist for the Chief of Staff,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

• Updates and moves the “Checklist for Liaison Personnel” to its own Appendix C, “Liaison Officers.”

• Reorganizes content as required for more logical flow of related information.

• Reduces redundancies and simplifies explanations where appropriate.

• Updates references, terms, and definitions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

- General .......................................................................................................................... I-1
- Joint Functions ............................................................................................................. I-5
- Interorganizational Cooperation Considerations ....................................................... I-5
- Types of Joint Task Forces ........................................................................................ I-8
- Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters ................................................................ I-9
- Joint Task Force-State ............................................................................................... I-9

CHAPTER II
FORMING AND ORGANIZING

- General ....................................................................................................................... II-1
- Authorities .................................................................................................................. II-1

Section A. Forming .......................................................................................................... II-2
- Forming Options ........................................................................................................ II-2
- Options for Augmenting the Headquarters ............................................................... II-3

Section B. Organizing .................................................................................................... II-8
- Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities ..................................................... II-8
- Staff Organization .................................................................................................... II-12
- Staff Integration ....................................................................................................... II-24
- Liaison Personnel ..................................................................................................... II-24

CHAPTER III
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

- Task Organization and Common Responsibilities .................................................... III-1
- Service Component Commands ............................................................................. III-2
- Functional Component Commands ......................................................................... III-3
- Subordinate Joint Forces ........................................................................................ III-6

CHAPTER IV
COMMAND AND CONTROL

- General ....................................................................................................................... IV-1
- Command and Control Factors .............................................................................. IV-1
- Management Processes ............................................................................................ IV-14
CHAPTER V
MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

- General ...................................................................................................................... V-1
- Organization ............................................................................................................. V-2
- Responsibilities ....................................................................................................... V-2
- Personnel Planning ............................................................................................... V-14

CHAPTER VI
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

- General ..................................................................................................................... VI-1
- Organization ............................................................................................................. VI-2
- Responsibilities ....................................................................................................... VI-4
- Intelligence Disciplines and Sources ....................................................................... VI-7
- Collection Management ........................................................................................ VI-7
- Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center ............ VI-7
- Joint Intelligence Support Element .......................................................................... VI-8
- Intelligence Centers and Other Support ................................................................ VI-9
- Multinational Intelligence Sharing Agreements .................................................... VI-12

CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

- General .................................................................................................................... VII-1
- Organization ............................................................................................................ VII-1
- Responsibilities ..................................................................................................... VII-11
- Joint Operations Center ......................................................................................... VII-14
- Current Operations ................................................................................................ VII-16
- Future Operations .................................................................................................. VII-16
- Cyberspace Considerations ................................................................................... VII-17

CHAPTER VIII
LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE

- General .................................................................................................................. VIII-1
- Organization .......................................................................................................... VIII-2
- Responsibilities ...................................................................................................... VIII-4
- Authority ............................................................................................................... VIII-7
- Planning Considerations ........................................................................................ VIII-8
- Multinational Logistic Considerations .................................................................... VIII-11
- United Nations Logistics ....................................................................................... VIII-12
- Other Logistic Considerations .............................................................................. VIII-13
- Operational Contract Support Considerations .................................................... VIII-13
- Host-Nation Support Considerations ..................................................................... VIII-14
- Logistic Supporting Agencies and Organizations ................................................ VIII-16
- Logistics Staff Organizations ................................................................................ VIII-17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Title</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IX</td>
<td>PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adaptive Planning and Execution System</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational Art, Operational Design, and Joint Planning Process</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Planning Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td>IX-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER X</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM DIRECTORATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cyberspace Considerations</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Network and Information Technology Support</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Global Command and Control System</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td>X-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER XI</td>
<td>TRAINING AND EDUCATION DIRECTORATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General</td>
<td></td>
<td>XI-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>XI-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>XI-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training the Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td>XI-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lessons Learned</td>
<td></td>
<td>XI-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER XII</td>
<td>RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT DIRECTORATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General</td>
<td></td>
<td>XII-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>XII-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>XII-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tasks, Functions, and Procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td>XII-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER XIII</td>
<td>CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE/INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIII-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIII-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>XIII-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CHAPTER XIV  
SPECIAL AND PERSONAL STAFF

- Public Affairs ........................................................................................... XIV-1  
- Staff Judge Advocate ................................................................................... XIV-4  
- Chaplain ........................................................................................................ XIV-9  
- Surgeon ............................................................................................................ XIV-11  
- Inspector General .......................................................................................... XIV-13  
- Provost Marshal .............................................................................................. XIV-16  
- Comptroller ..................................................................................................... XIV-18  
- Headquarters Commandant ........................................................................... XIV-20  
- Historian .......................................................................................................... XIV-21  
- Safety Officer .................................................................................................. XIV-22

## APPENDIX

| A | Checklists .......................................................................................... A-1  |
| B | Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters ........................................... B-1  |
| C | Liaison Officers .................................................................................. C-1  |
| D | Shared Understanding and Information Management ........................ D-1  |
| E | Joint Task Force-State .......................................................................... E-1  |
| F | Joint Task Force Headquarters Enabling Capabilities – Points of Contact | F-1 |
| G | References ............................................................................................ G-1  |
| H | Administrative Instructions .................................................................... H-1  |

## GLOSSARY

| Part I | Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms ........................................ GL-1  |
| Part II | Terms and Definitions ........................................................................... GL-9  |

## FIGURE

| I-1 | Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities .................. I-3  |
| I-2 | Joint Task Force Organizational Options ........................................... I-4  |
| II-1 | Building Upon the Core Staff ............................................................. II-5  |
| II-2 | Headquarters Organization Options .................................................... II-14  |
| II-3 | Cross-Functional Organizations and Staff Integration ........................ II-18  |
| II-4 | Basic Working Group Model .............................................................. II-20  |
| II-5 | Operational Planning Teams ............................................................... II-21  |
| II-6 | Notional Joint Task Force Staff Organization ..................................... II-22  |
| II-7 | Staff Interaction Supporting Decision Making ..................................... II-23  |
| II-8 | Liaison Officer Guidelines ................................................................. II-25  |
| III-1 | Possible Joint Task Force Components ............................................... III-2  |
| IV-1 | Typical Joint Task Force Operational Areas ......................................... IV-6  |
| IV-2 | Commander’s Decision Cycle .............................................................. IV-16  |
| IV-3 | Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm ........................ IV-18  |
IV-4 Seven-Minute Drill Example: Civil-Military Operations
Working Group ...................................................................................... IV-20
V-1 Notional Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel Directorate
Organization ............................................................................................. V-2
VI-1 Notional Joint Task Force Intelligence Directorate Organization.......... VI-2
VI-2 Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities............... VI-3
VI-3 Notional Joint Intelligence Support Element ...................................... VI-8
VII-1 Notional Joint Task Force Operations Directorate Organization ........ VII-2
VIII-1 Notional Joint Task Force Logistics Directorate Organization ........ VIII-3
VIII-2 Host Nation Areas of Support ...................................................... VIII-15
IX-1 Notional Joint Task Force Plans Directorate Organization............... IX-3
IX-2 The Joint Planning Process ............................................................ IX-6
IX-3 Joint Task Force Plans and Operations Synchronization ................ IX-8
IX-4 Notional Joint Planning Group Composition ................................ IX-10
IX-5 Forming and Informing the Planning Groups and Teams ................ IX-11
X-1 Information Quality Criteria........................................................... X-2
X-2 Notional Joint Task Force Communications System Directorate
Organization ............................................................................................. X-4
XI-1 Notional Joint Task Force Training and Education
Directorate Organization ........................................................................ XI-2
XIII-1 Interorganizational Cooperation................................................ XIII-2
XIII-2 Notional Joint Task Force Civil-Military Operations Directorate or
Interagency Operations Directorate Organization ................................ XIII-3
XIV-1 Notional Joint Task Force Special and Personal Staff Organization .. XIV-1
XIV-2 Notional Inspector General Organization ....................................... XIV-15
XIV-3 Notional Joint Task Force Comptroller Organization .................... XIV-19
XIV-4 Notional Headquarters Commandant Element ......................... XIV-21
B-1 Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness ............................ B-2
E-1 Command Structure Using a Dual-Status Commander .................... E-4
E-2 Parallel Chains of Command.......................................................... E-5
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Discusses joint task force (JTF) establishing authority responsibilities.

• Presents JTF organizational options.

• Outlines options to form the JTF headquarters and organize the staff.

• Discusses Service and functional component commander responsibilities.

• Describes JTF command and control factors and management processes.

• Outlines each JTF directorates’ responsibilities.

• Discusses the commander, joint task force special and personal staff.

Introduction

A joint task force (JTF) is one of several command and control (C2) options for conducting joint operations. A JTF may be established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the operation require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC). The JTF establishing authority designates the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assigns the mission, designates forces from currently assigned or allocated forces, or, in the case of combatant commands (CCMDs) without or with not enough assigned or allocated forces, submits a request for initial or additional forces through the global force management (GFM) process to stand up a JTF.

The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment (OE), such as the threat, the geography of the joint operations area (JOA), the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission. CJTFs typically function at the operational level and employ their capabilities throughout the JOA.

The establishing authority typically establishes a JTF for a focused and temporary purpose and disestablishes it when the JTF achieves its purpose and is not required for other operations.
**Types of Joint Task Forces (JTF)**

**Operational JTFs** are the most common type of JTF and is established in response to a Secretary of Defense (SecDef)-approved military operation or crisis.

**Contingency JTFs** are identified and designated to support operation plan execution or specific on-call missions, such as national special security events, on a contingency basis.

**Standing JTF** is a JTF originally established as an operational JTF, but that has an enduring mission that is projected to continue indefinitely.

**Combined JTF Headquarters (HQ)**

A combined JTF is a multinational JTF the commander commands from a multinational and joint headquarters (HQ). The purpose of creating a combined JTF is to provide flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable combined JTFs with dedicated C2 capability and to facilitate operations in concert with partners.

**Joint Task Force-State**

A National Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State) liaison officer (LNO) provides C2 of all NG forces in the state for the governor and can act as a joint HQ for national-level response efforts during contingency operations. The NG JFHQ-State is comprised of Army National Guard and Air National Guard members of that state and is also staffed with LNOs from the Services.

**Forming and Organizing**

**Authorities**

JTFs are established by SecDef, a combatant commander (CCDR), subordinate unified commander, existing JTF commander, or a state governor (for joint task force-state) in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, Title 10, United States Code (USC), and Title 32, USC.

**Forming Options**

**Building Upon an Existing Service HQ.** The Department of Defense (DOD) relies primarily on Service component HQs to adapt with little or no notice into a JTF HQ, often under crisis planning conditions. However, the newly designated JTF HQ typically requires additional resources that are not organic to the core Service HQ.

**Tasking an Existing JTF HQ.** In some situations, the establishing authority could task an existing JTF with the mission rather than establish a new joint force.
**Executive Summary**

**Build a New JTF HQ.** The optimal sourcing method for a new joint manning document (JMD) is the identification of a core unit around which to build the JTF HQ, submitting request for forces as necessary for skills/capabilities resident in the core unit (or units), and finally augmenting the JTF HQ with joint individual augmentees for subject matter expertise or unique experience not inherently resident in the core unit or the enabling units contributing to the JTF HQ’s JMD. This option would require an extended period of time to resource, stand-up, and train.

**Staff Organization**

**HQ Organization Options.** Mission requirements drive organization and manning since each joint force’s mission is different.

- **J-Code Organization.** These primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the joint functions: manpower and personnel directorate (J-1), intelligence directorate (J-2), operations directorate (J-3), logistics directorate (J-4), plans directorate (J-5), and communications system directorate (J-6).

- **Functional/Mission-Oriented HQ Organization.** Alternative HQ organization structures may be useful in some circumstances, such as security cooperation, and to achieve unit of effort with other partner organizations.

**Cross-Functional Organizations that Support the JTF Staff**

A **center** is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within JFC’s HQ.

A **group** is an enduring functional organization formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC’s HQ.

A **cell** is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC’s HQ.

An **office** is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a JFC’s HQ to coordinate and manage support requirements.

An **element** is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JFC’s HQ.
A **board** is an organized group of individuals within a JFC’s HQ, appointed by the commander (or other authority), that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision.

A **working group (WG)** is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a JFC’s HQ formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users.

**Operational planning teams (OPTs)** are established to solve a single problem related to a specific task or requirement on a single event horizon. In most cases, OPTs are not enduring and will dissolve upon completion of the assigned task.

**Subordinate Commands**

**Task Organization and Common Responsibilities**

The subordinate Service components’ HQ and their forces provide the basic building blocks for the JTF’s component structure. The CJTF can organize the JTF with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the OE. All joint forces include Service component commands, because those commands provide administrative and logistic support for their forces. Typical JTFs have a combination of Service and functional components.

**Service Component Commands**

A JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces assigned or attached to the JTF. In general, a Service component commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the next higher commander.

**Functional Component Commands**

CJTFs normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more Military Departments established to perform designated missions.

**Subordinate Joint Forces**

A CJTF is authorized to establish subordinate JTFs as circumstances require. For example, a CJTF assigned a large JOA, characterized by difficult terrain that restricts movement and maneuver, might determine that C2 could be more effective with a subordinate JTF responsible for operations in a remote portion of the JOA.

**Command and Control**

**Role of the CJTF in C2.** The CJTF leverages the full range of skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to guide the
command through the fog and friction of operations toward mission accomplishment.

**Commander’s Role in Planning Operations**

The commander provides guidance that drives the joint planning process and supervises execution of the products.

- The **commander’s intent** is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation, the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission, and the desired military end state.

- The **commander’s guidance** communicates the commander’s initial thoughts for a given operation to the staff, which enhances effective planning.

- **Commander’s critical information** requirements are elements of information the commander identifies as critical to timely decision making.

**Commander’s Role in Preparing for Operations**

As the JTF prepares for an upcoming operation, it conducts a series of activities to improve its ability to conduct the actual operation. The CJTF closely supervises the JTF HQ and component commanders during this critical period. These activities include:

- Continued analysis of the situation.

- Reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

- Refinement of the plan.

- Coordination and liaison.

- Rehearsals.

- Training.

- Inspections.

- Movements.

**The Commander’s Role in Directing Operations**

The commander generates effective action by directing forces, synchronizing joint functions, and, within authority and capability, integrating other instruments of national power. The CJTF directs operations by:
Executive Summary

- Guiding the command toward mission accomplishment.
- Assigning missions.
- Prioritizing and allocating resources.
- Assessing and taking risks.

Assessing the situation and determining what opportunities and adjustments are needed to increase progress and mitigate regression of campaign or operation objectives towards the desired end state.

**Command Relationships**

**C2 Functions of the JTF Establishing Authority.** The JTF establishing authority exercises either combatant command (command authority) or operational control (OPCON) of the JTF. The JTF establishing authority either transfers forces from subordinate commands and attaches them to the JTF or transfers forces allocated to the CCMD by SecDef via the GFM process, as appropriate. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the CJTF and other subordinate commanders.

**C2 Functions of the CJTF.** The CJTF normally exercises OPCON or tactical control (TACON) over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders.

**Understanding the Operational Environment**

The JFC’s OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. Understanding the OE helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect the JTF mission accomplishment.

**Operational Area Management**

The CJTF can employ areas of operations, joint special operations areas, amphibious objective areas, and joint security areas to support the organization of the operational area (OA) within the assigned JOA.

**Operational Limitations**

Operational limitations include actions required or prohibited by higher authority (a constraint or restraint) and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action (such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, diplomatic/political considerations, economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues).
A coordinated or cooperative effort between the JTF and United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations is essential to achieve our national objectives. While these participants are not under the CJTF’s C2, the commander is responsible for the coordination necessary to facilitate unified action with them in the interest of unity of effort toward the CJTF’s objectives.

**Command Authority.** The President retains and does not relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or multinational commander for specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council, or approved by the North Atlantic Council, or other authorized regional organization.

The President always retains command authority over federal (Title 10, USC) military forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place appropriate Title 10, USC, forces under the OPCON or TACON of a dual-status commander (Title 10/Title 32, USC) in support of the governor of a US state or territory.

**Information Management (IM).** IM, combined with knowledge sharing initiatives, contributes to creating conditions for shared understanding through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures.

**Commander’s Decision Cycle.**

The commander’s decision cycle has four phases:

- **Monitor.** Monitoring involves measuring ongoing activities that may affect the JTF’s OA or the JTF’s ongoing or future operations.

- **Assess.** Assessment is the determination of the impact of events as they relate to overall mission accomplishment.

**Plan.** The commander and staff make adjustments to the current plan or develop new plans, branches, or sequels with the purpose of successful completion of the broader mission.
• **Direct.** JTF HQ directs actions to ensure current orders and directives are completed.

**Battle Rhythm.** The battle rhythm provides structure and sequencing of actions and events within the HQs regulated by the flow and sharing of information supporting all decision cycles.

**Manpower and Personnel Directorate**

The director J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the CJTF on manpower management, personnel management, personnel readiness, and personnel services for the total force (military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). The J-1 maintains the JMD, is the focal point for personnel support actions, and manages and synchronizes the level of personnel support provided to the task force during all phases of an operation. Although the Services have the primary responsibility for providing personnel services support to their Service members, the joint force J-1 tracks the efforts of Service components to stay abreast of personnel activities that could affect the joint force.

**Intelligence Directorate**

The J-2’s primary function is to provide information and analysis to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. This is accomplished through an intelligence process that begins with planning and direction; involves collection, analysis, and production; and culminates with evaluation of important information and feedback to decision makers.

**Operations Directorate**

The J-3 assists the commander in the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for successful unified action to achieve unity of effort.

**Logistics Directorate**

The **J-4** forms logistic plans and services, to include the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, health services, operational contract support, food service, and other
operationally required logistic support activities. Given the functional role of this directorate and the Service responsibilities for support to their respective JTF components, consideration should be given to the established policies and procedures of the various Military Departments. The J-4 advises the CJTF on the logistic support that can be provided for proposed courses of action and approved concept of operations.

Plans and Policy Directorate

**Plans**

The J-5 assists the commander in planning and preparation of joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation. The J-5 may also contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff.

**Policy**

At the discretion of the CJTF, and based on factors such as size and expected duration of the CJTF, a policy division may be established within the JTF J-5. A policy division is typically responsible for the following:

- Analyze, interpret, disseminate, and provide recommendations on national policy documents to ensure compliance with USG, DOD, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans, directives, and instructions.

- Serve as the lead office to advise, coordinate, track, and maintain copies of the CJTF’s executive agreements.

Communications Systems Directorate

The J-6 is the principal staff assistant to the CJTF to provide a robust, protected, interoperable, and flexible joint communications system. This includes development, integration, and synchronization of electronic warfare; electromagnetic spectrum operations; design of the communications system architecture; establishment and operation of secure DOD information network segments; cyberspace operations (CO), to include offensive and defensive CO; and plans that support the command’s operational- and strategic-level requirements. Additionally, J-6 provides policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable joint communications which enable CJTF’s command of the mission. The integrated communications system supports a collaborative information environment that
assists commanders in conducting detailed, concurrent, and parallel planning.

**Training and Education Directorate**

The training and education directorate of a joint staff (J-7) assists the commander in planning and executing the joint training program for the staff and theater-assigned forces to enhance joint and multinational mission readiness and warfighting capabilities. A J-7 is an optional directorate normally formed for a standing JTF.

**Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate**

Based on the scope and duration of the JTF’s mission and nature of the operation, the CJTF may establish a resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff (J-8). The CJTF and chief of staff will determine the extent of J-8 responsibilities. Resource management is a financial management function that provides advice and guidance to the commander to develop command resource requirements. It involves an ongoing analysis of the commander’s tasks and priorities to identify and ensure adequate and proper financial resources are available and applied under appropriate management controls to support mission accomplishment. The JTF’s resource requirements must adequately reflect the concept of logistic support. Resource requirements include, but are not limited to, contracting; transportation; and support to multinational and interagency partners, international organizations, foreign humanitarian assistance, and force sustainment.

**Civil-Military Operations Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate**

The civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) is an optional directorate the CJTF may establish to assist in the pursuit of unified action by facilitating the integration of interorganizational perspectives in planning, execution, and assessment. J-9s in CCMDs may have a variety of titles, which may include interorganizational coordination.

**Special and Personal Staff**

Public affairs (PA), the staff judge advocate (SJA), chaplain, surgeon, inspector general (IG), provost marshal (PM),
Executive Summary

comptroller (if no J-8), headquarters commandant (HQCOMDT), historian, and safety officer do not neatly fit within the J-codes.

**Public Affairs**

PA operations contribute to the achievement of strategic- and operational-level objectives through the dissemination of factual information and imagery concerning JTF operations and capabilities.

**Staff Judge Advocate**

The JTF SJA is the principal legal advisor to the CJTF and employs legal personnel assigned or attached to the JTF. The SJA provides all legal services to the CJTF and staff and coordinates with the supported CCDR’s SJA to optimize legal support.

**Chaplain**

The joint force chaplain is the personal staff officer responsible to the commander for the execution of religious affairs. Religious affairs is comprised of religious support and religious advisement.

**Surgeon**

The JTF surgeon is a senior medical department officer from the Army, Navy, or Air Force who ideally completed the joint planning orientation course and the JTF senior medical leader seminar. As the JTF senior medical leader, the JTF surgeon serves as the CJTF’s principal advisor for joint force health protection and health service support and reports directly to the CJTF.

**Inspector General**

The IG provides the CJTF with a sounding board for sensitive issues and is typically a trusted agent in the command. The IG is a candid broker and an impartial fact finder.

**Provost Marshal**

The JTF PM is the principal staff advisor to the CJTF on antiterrorism and force protection matters, as well as military police and criminal investigation division employment across the conflict continuum. This consists of security support to promote stability operations within the joint security area.

**Comptroller**

Although the component commanders have the primary responsibility for providing resources, the JTF comptroller is responsible for integrating JTF-wide resource management and finance support policy planning and execution efforts. The JFC may designate a component commander’s comptroller or finance staff officer to also serve as the JTF comptroller.
## Executive Summary

### HQ Commandant
The HQCOMDT coordinates direct support to the JTF HQ at its employment location. Typically, the HQCOMDT has functional specialists who liaise with the host installation for this support. The HQCOMDT also has support elements that provide dedicated support to the JTF staff.

### Historian
The JTF historian provides historical coverage for all JTF operations and ensures proper documentation and historical reports are available for future researchers.

### Safety Officer
The JTF safety officer assists the CJTF and subordinate component commands in executing their responsibility to protect government personnel, property, and prevent unintended impact on civilians by ensuring safe operations in support of their mission.

## CONCLUSION
This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a JTF HQ to C2 joint operations. It provides guidance for the JTF HQ to plan, prepare, execute, and assess JTF operations.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“Organizing for joint operations involves many considerations. Most can be associated in three primary groups related to organizing the joint force, organizing the joint force headquarters, and organizing operational areas to help control operations.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1. General

   a. Joint task forces (JTFs) operate in a complex strategic environment that consists of a variety of national, international, and global factors that affect the decisions of senior civilian and military leaders with respect to the employment of US instruments of national power in peace and periods of conflict. This environment is uncertain and complex and can change rapidly, requiring JTF commanders and staff to maintain persistent military engagement with multinational partners. The JTF commander will encounter threats that are increasingly transregional, multidomain, and multi-functional in nature. Joint forces today operate across multiple combatant commands (CCMDs), employ capabilities across all domains, and involve conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF). The strategic environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.

   b. A CCMD is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). A commander of a unified command, when authorized by SecDef, may establish subordinate unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing geographic or functional basis. A combatant commander (CCDR) is the JTF establishing authority in most situations, but SecDef, a subordinate unified command commander, and a commander, joint task force (CJTF), may also establish subordinate JTFs. A joint task force-state (JTF-State) may also be established under the command and control (C2) of their respective governor. This JTF-State will normally be a subordinate element under a National Guard (NG) joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State).

   c. A JTF is one of several C2 options for conducting joint operations. A JTF may be established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the operation require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC). The JTF establishing authority designates the CJTF, assigns the mission, designates forces from currently assigned or allocated forces, or, in the case of CCMDs without or with not enough assigned or allocated forces, submits a request for initial or additional forces through the global force management (GFM) process to stand up a JTF. Additionally, the JTF establishing authority delegates command authorities and relationships and provides other C2 guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force...
and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. There may also be situations in which a CJTF has a logistics-focused mission. In these situations, the CCDR should delegate directive authority for common support capabilities over specific logistic forces, facilities, and supplies to the CJTF. Figure I-1 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities.

d. A CJTF has authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among subordinate commanders. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Generally, a CJTF should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the CJTF’s mission requirements while maintaining the functional integrity of Service components. A CJTF typically organizes the joint force with a combination of Service and functional components and additional attachments as required. A functional component is a command normally composed of forces of two or more Military Departments, such as a joint force air component command. A CJTF may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. The CJTF and component commanders will typically augment their headquarters (HQ) with additional enabling capabilities from sources such as the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) through the Global Response Force execute order (EXORD) or an emergent request for forces (RFF) and combat support agency (CSA) capabilities. A CJTF can also form a subordinate JTF when necessary. Figure I-2 shows basic JTF organizational options.

For further information on JECC capabilities and details on JTF component commands, see Chapter II, “Forming and Organizing,” and Chapter III, “Subordinate Commands.”

e. The CJTF and staff have a fundamental role in ensuring unified action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. The interface between a JTF and these entities is considered interorganizational cooperation—the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense (DOD); participating United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. JTF commanders are challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence when operating in conjunction with such a potentially diverse group of participants. However, JTF HQ staff can often act as facilitators for unified action under challenging conditions through inclusive planning processes, coordination mechanisms, and the identification of (and focus on) common interests in accomplishing the broader mission.

See Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for additional information.
Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities

- Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF).
  - In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.
  - Allocate or request forces required.
- Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations.
- Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.) The information environment and cyberspace and their effects should be addressed.
  - Provide or coordinate communications, personnel recovery, and security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA thus facilitating the commander’s freedom of action.
- Develop, modify as required, and promulgate to all concerned rules of engagement and rules for the use of force tailored to the situation.
- Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through periodic reports.
- Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).
- Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary.
- Provide or coordinate administrative and sustainment support.
- Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.
- Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.
- Determine supporting force requirements.
  - Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).
- Approve CJTF plans.
- Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

NOTE:
Directive authority for logistics is only exercised by combatant commanders.

Figure I-1. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities

f. Establishing commanders can organize, staff, and equip JTFs for a variety of operations across the conflict continuum. The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of
the operational environment (OE), such as the threat, the geography of the JOA, the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission. CJTFs typically function at the operational level and employ their capabilities throughout the JOA. The CJTF and CCDR usually collaborate on framing theater-strategic objectives, as well as tasks the CCDR will eventually assign to the JTF. CJTFs and their staffs collaborate with the JTF’s Service and functional components through the joint planning process (JPP) and other mechanisms to plan and execute operations that achieve operational-level and theater-strategic objectives.

g. The establishing authority typically establishes a JTF for a focused and temporary purpose and disestablishes it when the JTF achieves its purpose and is not required for other operations. Occasionally, the temporary circumstances that originally required joint operations may become more long-lasting, and the establishing authority must determine the best option to accomplish a continuing requirement. The establishing authority should reevaluate the task and OE to determine if there is still justification for a JTF or if another option is more suitable. Options include:

(1) The existing JTF’s mission will continue and is projected for the long term. The JTF would then become a standing JTF. Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N), in the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), is an example of a standing JTF. This JTF supports federal law enforcement agencies on a continuing basis in the identification and interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental US.

(2) Transition the mission to a replacement JTF.
(3) Assign the mission to a Service component HQ when joint operations are not required.

(4) Transition to control of operations by a CCMD staff directorate if the focus is more on management of a long-term program rather than C2 of forces in operations (characteristic of military engagement and security cooperation activities).

(5) Transition to a multinational HQ.

(6) Transition to a subordinate unified command.


For specific guidance for organizing and staffing a JTF and for information and guidance concerning the various components and subordinate task forces that may comprise a JTF, refer to Chapter II, “Forming and Organizing,” and Chapter III, “Subordinate Commands,” respectively.

For additional guidance concerning JTF C2, refer to Chapter IV, “Command and Control.”

2. Joint Functions

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the JFC and component commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven basic groups: information, C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as information, C2, intelligence, and sustainment, apply to all operations, whereas the others apply selectively on the basis of mission requirements. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some could apply to more than one joint function. The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. See Chapter II, “Forming and Organizing,” for more information on staff organization options to manage these joint functions.

For a comprehensive discussion of joint functions, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

3. Interorganizational Cooperation Considerations

a. DOD coordinates with a wide variety of organizations across the range of military operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interest and structures. The term interorganizational cooperation refers to the interaction that occurs among elements of DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector. This interaction is especially pronounced for operations that are governed by different authorities and have considerably different USG
governing structures and stakeholders. The nature of interaction and considerations (e.g., type, authorities, and protocols) vary with each potential participant.

b. **Interagency Considerations.** This area of interaction pertains to USG departments and agencies, including DOD. These departments and agencies represent the US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Effective and efficient interaction and collaboration among these agencies is essential for unified action to achieve USG unity of effort. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an initiative that can help the CJTF and staff coordinate effectively with other USG departments and agencies. The JIACG, an element of a CCDR’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Comprised of USG civilian and military experts assigned to CCDRs and tailored to meet the CCDRs’ specific needs, the JIACG provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG departments and agencies. JIACG members participate in development of CCMD campaign plans, contingency plans, and operation orders (OPORDs). They provide a collaborative conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of nonmilitary organizations.

c. Achieving the necessary degree of collaboration, both before and during a response, requires expansion of current cross-organizational collaboration and execution authorities. Granting coordinating authorities to response forces via plans and other directives before a crisis, and then expanding the authorities early in the response, enables responders to rapidly solidify the network and enhance collaboration. Approaches should facilitate horizontal coordination without usurping existing command authorities or burdening staffs with additional requirements. Another construct to consider in promoting unity of effort is the use of a joint interagency task force (JIATF). An example is in the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR, where JIATF-South has conducted interagency and international detection and monitoring operations for over 20 years to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narcoterrorism threats in support of national and partner nation (PN) security.

*For more information on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

d. **Multinational Considerations**

(1) US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). These operations, which could occur in a formal multinational alliance or a less formal coalition, could occur across the conflict continuum and require coordination with other interagency partners and participants. Much of joint doctrine’s information and guidance on unified action and joint operations applies to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs must account for differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language. Multinational considerations also include international laws, agreements, and arrangements in place or required to protect the sovereign interests of national territories that JTF forces must cross, particularly if affected nations do not participate in
JTF operations. There is no standard template, and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own protocols and operation plans (OPLANs). Multinational operations may complicate traditional US joint planning and decision making and require additional procedures to properly address a host of issues, such as information sharing, communications systems, intelligence, personnel matters, and operational contract support (OCS).

(2) **Strategic-Level Context.** Through dual involvement in national and multinational security cooperation processes, US national leaders integrate global, national, and theater strategic planning with that of the alliance or coalition. Within the multinational structure, the CJTF and other US participants ensure objectives complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, US participants ensure international commitments are reflected in the National Military Strategy and are adequately addressed in strategic direction for joint planning and operations.

(3) **Command Relationships.** Within the US chain of command, JTF commanders command joint US forces and prepare joint plans and orders in response to tasks from their chain of command. When nations participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. The MNF commander’s authority is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. This authority is typically limited to operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), designated support relationships, or coordinating authority. Important considerations for determining the level of authority include mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). Regardless of the command relationships, the US commander coordinates joint planning with multinational planning to achieve unity of effort.

*See Chapter IV, “Command and Control,” and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for more information on multinational command relationships.*

(4) **Transition of a JTF into an MNF or Transition to a Follow-on MNF.** At the direction of higher authority, a US JTF HQ may transition to a MNF HQ. This transition and subsequent operations present various considerations and challenges for the CJTF, staff, and components. To ensure the resulting MNF becomes a fully integrated multinational command, there must be consideration and respect for all participating nations’ national guidance, planning input, capabilities, and limitations. The same holds true for follow-on MNF HQ under a different lead nation.

*To further assist the JTF staff in planning for transition, refer to Annex M, "Checklist for Transition of a Joint Task Force into a Multinational Force or Transition to a Follow-On Multinational Force," and Appendix A, “Checklists.”*
Additional multinational guidance is available in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-16, Multinational Operations; and JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.

e. **Private Sector Considerations.** The private sector is an umbrella term used domestically and internationally to apply to all nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. The private sector can assist the CJTF and staff by sharing information, identifying risks, performing vulnerability assessments, assisting in planning, and providing other support as appropriate.

For more information on the interaction between military forces and the private sector during joint operations, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

f. **Considerations Related to Other Potential Participants**

1. Integration and coordination between the military force and nonmilitary counterparts are much less rigid than military C2. The lack of a prescribed or uniform interorganizational coordination process will require the CJTF and staff to be aware of the other participants’ varied and unique structures, processes, procedures, and organizational cultures to accommodate their participation with the military. Some organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the USG, particularly those of the US military. Depending on the operation and degree of nonmilitary involvement, the focal point for coordination may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center (CMOC), or the humanitarian operations center.

2. Unlike many USG departments and agencies and MNFs, most other participants will not have the capability and appropriate authorization to handle or access classified information. An important consideration is how to balance and control information in a way that involves relevant stakeholders’ capabilities and contributions while preserving operations security (OPSEC). Information sharing with NGOs and the private sector may be more restrictive, but options such as the JIACG and CMOC are available to the JFC to facilitate interorganizational coordination and information sharing.

4. **Types of Joint Task Forces**

a. **Operational JTF.** This is the most common type of JTF and is established in response to a SecDef-approved military operation or crisis. An establishing authority normally disestablishes an operational JTF when the mission is complete but can also transition it into a standing JTF. Examples include JTF Katrina (USNORTHCOM), JTF Lebanon (United States European Command [USEUCOM]), JTF-515 (United States Pacific Command [USPACOM]), and Combined JTF-101 (United States Central Command [USCENTCOM]).

b. **Contingency JTF.** This is a JTF identified and designated to support OPLAN execution or specific on-call missions, such as national special security events, on a contingency basis. These JTFs normally remain in a cadre or reduced manning status for planning purposes within a Service component HQ or one of its subordinate HQs until
required to conduct operations. A contingency JTF becomes an operational JTF when SecDef issues the EXORD. Examples include JTF National Capital Region (USNORTHCOM), Joint Task Force-Israel (USEUCOM), and joint task force-port opening (JTF-PO) (USTRANSCOM).

c. **Standing JTF.** This is a JTF originally established as an operational JTF but that has an enduring mission that is projected to continue indefinitely. Some standing JTFs will have transitioned to permanently assigned personnel, while others will rely on continued rotation of core HQs’ elements and joint individual augmentees (JIAs). Examples include JTF Bravo (USSOUTHCOM), JTF Global Network Operations (United States Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM]), JTF-N (USNORTHCOM), and JIATF-West (USPACOM).

5. **Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters**

The North Atlantic Council, the principal political decision-making body of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), may consider forming a combined JTF composed of forces drawn from member states should a crisis occur. A combined JTF is a multinational JTF the commander commands from a multinational and joint HQ. The purpose of creating a combined JTF is to provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable combined JTFs with dedicated C2 capability and to facilitate operations in concert with partners and other non-NATO nations. A combined JTF is an organizational option for US operations with other PNs in a non-NATO multinational operation.

*For more information on NATO’s combined JTF concept, refer to Allied Joint Publication-01, Allied Joint Doctrine.*

*For more information on multinational command relationships and combined JTFs, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.*

6. **Joint Task Force-State**

a. An NG JFHQ-State provides C2 of all NG forces in the state for the governor and can act as a joint HQ for national-level response efforts during contingency operations. The NG JFHQ-State is comprised of Army National Guard and Air National Guard members of that state and is also staffed with liaison officers (LNOs) from the Services.

b. The state adjutant general, under the authority, direction, and control of their respective governors, may establish one or more JTF command elements to provide C2 for domestic operations in Title 32, United States Code (USC), or Title 10, USC status. The JTF-State establishing authority is the governor of a state and is based on state law.

c. The non-federalized NG is commanded and controlled by the governor through the adjutant general of each state (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, by SecDef through the commanding general of the District of Columbia NG.) The adjutant general exercises C2 through that state’s NG JFHQ-State. It operates as a C2 organization for Army National Guard and Air National Guard forces during an emergency response. In addition, they are
designed and aligned to correspond to the HQ staff of a CCMD to facilitate a joint approach to plans, operations, and military-to-military coordination.

For more details concerning JTF-State, refer to Appendix E, “Joint Task Force-State,” and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.83, National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State). For more information on defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
CHAPTER II
FORMING AND ORGANIZING

“Integrating Service components capabilities under a single joint force commander maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1. General

This chapter addresses options for forming the JTF HQ and organizing the staff. It reflects the significance of a well-balanced HQ staff that is representative of the whole force. CJTFs organize staffs and forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and the concept of operations (CONOPS). An efficient and effective JTF HQ organization helps the CJTF set conditions that enable the joint force’s mission accomplishment.

2. Authorities

a. JTFs are established by SecDef, a CCDR, subordinate unified commander, existing JTF commander, or a state governor (for JTF-State) in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, Title 10, USC, and Title 32, USC. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands. A JFC has the authority to organize assigned or attached forces with specification of OPCON to best accomplish the assigned mission based on commander’s intent, the CONOPS, and consideration of Service organizations.

b. OPCON is a command authority commanders may exercise to C2 subordinate forces. It includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, by itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

c. TACON is a command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area (OA) necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the commander exercising OPCON or TACON of the attached force. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.

For further details concerning authorities, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
SECTION A. FORMING

3. Forming Options

a. The preferred approach to forming a JTF HQ is around an existing C2 structure. Typically, this is a CCMD’s Service component HQ or a subordinate Service component HQ. The establishing authority (typically the CCDR) determines the appropriate level based on the scope and scale of the operation and nature of the mission. In some cases, the CCDR may request a deployable team from USTRANSCOM’s JECC to help the designated Service HQ transition to the JTF HQ, which the CCDR and CJTF would then augment with additional Service functional experts.

b. Building Upon an Existing Service HQ

(1) DOD relies primarily on Service component HQ to adapt with little or no notice into a JTF HQ, often under crisis planning conditions. However, the newly designated JTF HQ typically requires additional resources that are not organic to the core Service HQ. Examples include joint C2 equipment and training, regional language and cultural experts, an operational contract support integration cell (OCSIC), augmentation from the JTF’s Service components, and CSA elements. The CJTF and staff should plan for the time required to integrate new personnel and capabilities and accommodate other military and nonmilitary liaison personnel and the private sector expected to be involved in the operation. Once the JTF HQ is established, it takes time to receive, train, and integrate new members and then to begin functioning as a cohesive HQ with common processes, standards, and procedures. Furthermore, mission requirements may limit the time available for a Service HQ to reorganize into a fully functioning and proficient JTF HQ prior to deployment.

(2) To mitigate these challenges, CCDRs may designate one or more Service HQ from their assigned forces to become “JTF-capable” HQ and integrate them into CCMD planning efforts and joint exercise programs. A designated Service HQ can be considered a JTF-capable HQ if it has achieved and can sustain a level of readiness to transition, organize, establish, and operate as a JTF HQ and is acceptable to the establishing authority (CCDR). CCDRs may select any number of Service HQ to effectively meet the JTF-capable HQ requirements in their AOR. The designated Service HQ may request contingency joint manning document (JMD) positions be identified on Service manning documents as dual-hatted positions and JTF-capable HQ training requirements. Designated Service HQ, in coordination with the establishing CCDR, should develop a joint mission-essential task list (JMETL) and a comprehensive joint training plan (JTP). Appendix B, “Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters,” provides a framework and considerations for designating and sustaining the readiness of CCDR-designated Service HQ to be a “JTF-capable HQ.”

c. Tasking an Existing JTF HQ. In some situations, the establishing authority could task an existing JTF with the mission rather than establish a new joint force. Many of the organizational factors mentioned before apply to this option. For example, the new mission and OE could require a different mix of Service component capabilities and command and
organizational relationships to facilitate interorganizational coordination. Supporting commands and sustainment requirements might change. The CJTF might have to adjust the composition of the JTF HQ accordingly. The existing CJTF and staff must carefully consider and plan for the associated complexities if faced with this new mission.

d. **Build a New JTF HQ.** The optimal sourcing method for a new JMD is the identification of a core unit around which to build the JTF HQ, submitting RFFs as necessary for skills/capabilities resident in the core unit (or units), and finally augmenting the JTF HQ with JIAs for subject matter expertise or unique experience not inherently resident in the core unit or the enabling units contributing to the JTF HQ’s JMD. Sourcing a JTF HQ from a new JMD would only be used in a narrow set of circumstances where an existing Service HQ is not available, nor is there an existing JTF HQ. Additionally, this option may be more ideal for unique operations where an existing Service or JTF HQ does not meet the requirement. This option would require an extended period of time to resource, stand-up, and train. It is the least preferred for short-notice requirements. An option would be to develop the new JTF HQ as a follow-up sourcing to replace a current JTF HQ when it is no longer required or practical to retain a Service HQ or existing JTF HQ for the mission.

4. **Options for Augmenting the Headquarters**

   a. Augmentation of the JTF HQ is a function of both the CJTF’s mission and the JTF’s force composition. The CJTF’s mission is the most important factor in determining the required type of core staff augmentation. Mission analysis should consider the JTF HQ-required capabilities and other related functions. The following factors are among many the new CJTF and staff must consider as they determine augmentation requirements and sources.

   (1) **Current staffing level of the designated HQ.** Fill key vacancies and replace non-deployable personnel.

   (2) **Linguist and Interpreter Support.** Requirements for interpreters and translators (I/Ts) will vary according to the location of the OA and must be considered during peacetime planning and early in the augmentation process. The identification, assignment, training, security clearance processing, and verification of the skills represent a significant undertaking for a newly forming JTF. Some I/Ts might be academically trained in the language, but they are not native speakers. The most effective I/Ts are typically native speakers from the region or dialect desired.

   (3) **Interagency Requirements.** Does the mission require other USG department or agency experts with the JTF HQ, or is working through the CCDR’s JIACG sufficient?

   (4) **Multinational Involvement.** Consider command relationships, language expertise, etc. See JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, for detailed discussion.
(5) **Sustainment.** Logistic and personnel support requirements beyond normal organizational capabilities (contracted support and contracting capability for supplies, facilities, services and construction, host-nation support [HNS], legal expertise, etc.).

(6) **Liaison Requirements.** The CJTF and staff must generally manage significant liaison requirements both to and from the JTF HQ. These requirements may include, but are not limited to, the following: higher HQ and JTF components, supporting commands, the US embassy, multinational military forces, interagency partners, and host nation (HN) organizations.

b. The JTF composition is a key factor that affects the type of augmentation the core staff should receive. Generally, the JTF staff should be representative of the force composition as to numbers, experience, and influence of position and rank of members among the JTF’s Service and functional components. The CJTF should also consider whether and how to represent supporting commands and MNFs in the HQ. However, HQ composition is more an issue of having relevant expertise in the right positions to ensure the most effective employment of the JTF’s capabilities in the context of the mission than of having equal component representation.

(1) For example, a JTF may be formed around an Army corps HQ if ground combat dominates the mission requirements. Consequently, many key positions may be filled by members of that Army corps HQ and other Army organizations. That same JTF, however, may have significant mission requirements to integrate airpower and SOF and operate in close conjunction with multinational partners. The CJTF will likely augment the Army corps staff with expertise from the Air Force, SOF, and perhaps multiple multinational partners. The multinational augmentation might be even greater if the JTF has a subordinate multinational component or is operating as a subordinate element of a multinational HQ. Historical examples include JTF Sea Angel in Bangladesh in 1991, which was formed around the III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters and the HQ for the 1991 Operation FIERY VIGIL, which was formed around the HQ of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Several JTFs have been built around Navy fleet HQs afloat, most recently 2011 Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.

(2) Figure II-1 depicts several sources of augmentation available to the core staff. The following subparagraphs and others in this publication discuss these sources.

c. **JECC** is a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM and provides global, rapidly deployable, temporary joint expeditionary capabilities across the range of military operations to assist in the initial establishment, organization, and operation of joint force HQs; fulfill global response force execution; and bridge joint operational requirements. Its joint capability packages are mission-tailored plans, operations, logistics, knowledge sharing, intelligence, communications, and public affairs (PA) capabilities.

(1) Communication capabilities include deployable, en route, early entry, and scalable command, control, communications, computer, and combat systems services to CCDRs and other agencies as directed to facilitate the rapid establishment of a joint force HQ, bridge system requirements, and provide reliable and interoperable communications
that link the CJTF and staff to the President and SecDef, geographic combatant commanders (GCCs), their component HQ, and multinational partners. The tactical communication packages vary in capability from small initial-entry and early-entry teams to a significantly larger deployable joint C2 system. Packages can support operations worldwide, as well as in homeland defense (HD) and DSCA missions.

(2) PA capabilities provide ready, rapidly deployable, combat ready joint PA capability to CCDRs to facilitate the rapid establishment of a joint force HQ, bridge joint PA requirements, and advise and assist commanders to address current and emerging challenges in the information environment. Early-entry PA capabilities enable the CJTF to gain and maintain the initiative in the information environment.

(3) Planning support capabilities provide rapidly deployable, tailored, ready joint planners, operations planners, logisticians, knowledge sharing managers, and intelligence specialists to accelerate the formation, and increase the effectiveness, of newly formed joint force HQs. These planners are specialists in the JPP. Operations and plans personnel can integrate into an operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5). They can also help form the core of a newly forming operations or plans battle staff. Logistics personnel can integrate into the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) and help integrate, coordinate, and implement joint logistics planning and operations in various logistics and personnel areas. Intelligence specialists can integrate into the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and assist with various aspects of intelligence support to help the joint force effectively neutralize enemy forces. Information management (IM) specialists can integrate into the staff to establish and maintain processes.
that achieve and maintain effective decision support and shared understanding, increase situational awareness, and support the commander’s decision cycle.

d. **JIA.** JIA requirements are for subject matter experts or personnel with unique experience to augment the core unit HQ capability. JIA sourcing is meant to be the last method to obtain manpower for a JMD. The JTF HQ or the establishing authority (usually a CCDR) enters the requirements for all JTF HQ positions on JMD documents in Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System (FMTS), including those positions being filled with assigned forces. Each JMD position is classified as a multinational, contractor, unit fill, USG departments and agencies, general officer/flag officer (GO/FO), or JIA. JTF HQ submits the JMD requirements to the CCDR for approval. The CCMD will attempt to source positions on the JMD from assigned forces and annotate shortfalls. Per the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, the CCDR approves the JMD and submits it to the Joint Staff J-1 [Manpower and Personnel] for validation. The Joint Staff J-35 [Joint Force Coordinator] (future operations cell) will develop sourcing solutions for validated requirements for joint individual augmentation shortfalls in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.06, *(U)* Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures. The designated HQ should identify individual augmentation requirements as early as possible when forming the JTF HQ due to the extended time that may be required to source, process, and deploy individual augmentees, especially those with special technical or language skills.

*For more details concerning joint individual augmentation, refer to CJCSI 1301.01, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures; JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support; and CJCSM 3130.06, *(U)* Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.*

  e. **Joint Organization Augmentation.** Following is a list of organizations, other than the JECC, that may provide JTF augmentation. This list is not all-inclusive, but it should provide insight into the type of augmentation a JTF can receive and the purpose behind that augmentation.

  (1) **National Intelligence Support.** National intelligence support can be sourced from intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other agencies. The purpose is to provide national-level, deployable, all-source intelligence personnel to meet CCMD or JTF requirements.

  (2) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** DTRA integrates, synchronizes, and provides expertise, technologies, and capabilities to safeguard the US and its allies from global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and improvised threats. DTRA has a unique role in DOD efforts regarding countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and supports a broad range of activities across the CWMD mission. DTRA provides integrated technical and operational solutions, as well as intellectual capital, to inform and support both DOD and national-level policies and strategies to address WMD threats to the homeland, as well as to the warfighter. As such, DTRA supports the CWMD
activities of the USG and its allies at the nexus between WMD and terrorism with deployable teams and reachback to its 24/7 operations center. DTRA is the focal point for DOD’s National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical Reachback Enterprise, which is the singularly focused, national CWMD support element that provides full-time CWMD analysis and decision support capability for planning, operations, and post-event analysis to CCMDs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence community (IC), DOD command elements, other USG departments and agencies, and first responders.

For further details on DTRA capabilities, refer to DOD 5105.62, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

(3) Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). The JIOWC is a CJCS-controlled activity reporting to the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] via the Joint Staff J-39 [Deputy Director for Global Operations]. The JIOWC provides information-related subject matter expertise and advice to the Joint Staff and CCMDs and develops and maintains a joint information assessment framework that measures and reports performance of information-related capabilities (IRCs) supporting joint operations.

(4) Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity (JCMA). JCMA can provide information security monitoring and analysis support to JTFs.

(5) Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). JPRA is a CJCS-controlled activity and is designated as DOD’s office of primary responsibility for personnel recovery (PR) matters, less policy. JPRA’s mission is to enable commanders, forces, and individuals to prevent, prepare for, and respond to events that require recovery of US military, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and others designated by the President or SecDef.

For additional information on specific procedures and requirements concerning coordination of PR activities, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(6) Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). JWAC assists in preparation and analysis of joint OPLANs and Service chiefs’ analysis of weapons effectiveness. It normally provides this support to JTFs through the supported CCMD.

(7) JTF-PO is a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM that provides rapid opening and establishment of ports of debarkation and facilitates distribution operations in response to emergencies, incidents, and global contingencies.

For additional information, see JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations, or JP 4-01.2, Seelift Support to Joint Operations.

(8) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA supports the JTF using various capabilities, which include, but are not limited to, robust planning experience, surge and sustainment expertise, expeditionary organizations, and personnel embedded physically and virtually with warfighting and support organizations. DLA is the executive agent for the following classes of supply: I (subsistence), IIIB (bulk petroleum), IV (construction and barrier materiel), and VIII (medical materiel). DLA also exercises item manager duties
for supply support across the other classes of supply, except class V. DLA can access and use a variety of IM tools to monitor supplies and equipment. GCCs can also request DLA’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) as temporary augmentation to the CCMD or a JTF to synchronize and integrate OCS.

(9) United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and directs the operations and defense of the Department of Defense information network (DODIN). USCYBERCOM conducts military cyberspace operations (CO) to enable activities in an OE. USCYBERCOM facilitates US/allied freedom of action in cyberspace while denying the same to our enemies. CCDRs determine cyberspace element support for subordinate joint forces through the supported CCMD and the CJTF in coordination with USCYBERCOM.

For more details concerning cyberspace, refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

(10) Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC). The JEWC provides CCMD support along multiple lines of effort (LOEs) to provide a deployable electronic warfare (EW) planning and coordination cell to assist in the initial establishment of a joint electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) cell within the JTF, assist in the preparation and analysis of joint OPLANs from an EW and EMS perspective, provide reachback support to CCMD EW officers, and perform EMS wave propagation analysis supporting CCMD requests.

For more details concerning EW, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

f. Integration and Sustainment of the JTF Staff. Integration and sustainment of the JTF staff is a routine but important function. The headquarters commandant (HQCOMDT) is normally the primary planner and executor of these integration and sustainment functions for the JTF HQ. For a more detailed discussion of the HQCOMDT responsibilities, refer to Chapter XIV, “Special and Personal Staff,” paragraph 8, “Headquarters Commandant.”

g. Additional Information. There are a number of products and resources that will assist CJTFs and staffs in expediting the process of forming the JTF HQ and organizing the staff. These products and resources include notional JTF HQ templates that contain JMDs and C2 architectures, systems, software, telecommunications, and video requirements; Joint Force Headquarters Training website on the Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+); and learning resources for JTF staff positions. The Joint Force Headquarters Training website can be found on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp and on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) at: http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp by clicking on “Training” in the banner.

SECTION B. ORGANIZING

5. Command and Staff Roles and Responsibilities

a. CJTF. The CJTF is ultimately responsible to the establishing authority for JTF actions. The CJTF duties are, but are not limited to:
(1) Determine the C2 and support relationships for the proper employment of assigned and attached forces for accomplishing assigned missions.

(2) Supervise all aspects of the JTF’s planning efforts, to include development of OPORDs, OPLANs, concept plans (CONPLANs), time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), base plans, and command estimates.

(3) Establish requisite policies and guidelines. This includes providing guidance to the chief of staff (COS) concerning the establishment of the appropriate organization structure.

(4) Exercise the risk management process to all levels of warfare, across the conflict continuum, and all phases of an operation to include any branches or sequels of an operation.

(5) Exercise, or delegate as appropriate, OPCON over assigned and normally over attached forces. The CJTF may also exercise TACON, have coordinating authority, or be in a support relationship as either a supported or supporting commander.

(6) Provide guidance to subordinate and supporting forces to plan and conduct operations.

(7) Ensure ongoing operations are properly monitored to include maneuver, fires, communications, information operations (IO), PA, and other supporting activities.

(8) Keep the JTF establishing authority informed on the progress of ongoing operations and the progress towards overall mission accomplishment.

(9) Ensure the JTF staff conducts proper coordination with other forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, NGOs, or international organizations.

(10) Establish, if necessary, coordinating procedures for specific functions or activities among assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

(11) Establish the succession of command.

(12) Exercise directive authority for those common support capabilities deemed essential to the accomplishment of the mission by the CJTF that may be delegated by the CCDR. If the CCDR has not delegated this authority to the CJTF by way of warning order, OPORD, or other formal directive, then the CJTF may initiate a request for this authority if needed.

(13) Ensure cross servicing support is provided and that forces operate as effective, mutually supporting teams.

(14) Identify any requirement for additional forces or personnel to the establishing authority.
(15) Appoint the space coordinating authority (SCA). A CJTF normally designates an SCA to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the CJTF can either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The CJTF considers the mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities made available; and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the appropriate option. The SCA responsibilities are detailed in JP 3-14, Space Operations.

(16) Determine whether to retain control of joint security operations, normally coordinated through the JTF J-3 or to designate the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) as an area commander with joint security responsibilities. To facilitate joint security operations, commanders should establish a joint security element, led by the joint security coordinator, to coordinate these operations.

(17) Serve concurrently as a Service component commander. A commander who is assigned as both a CJTF and a CCMD-level Service component commander retains all responsibilities associated with both command positions. This command organization is not optimal as it may detract from the CJTF’s primary duties.

(18) Establish personnel tracking policies and standards.

b. **Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force (DCJTF).** The selection of the DCJTF usually is based on mission requirements and the composition of the JTF as a whole. Typically, the DCJTF is not from the same Service as the CJTF. The DCJTF should be of equal or senior rank to the component commanders. Based on the situation, there can be more than one DCJTF. The duties of the DCJTF are, but are not limited to:

(1) Serve concurrently as JTF COS, if required.

(2) Serve as the principal assistant to the CJTF.

(3) Perform special duties as directed by the CJTF. Examples include:

   (a) Represent the CJTF when authorized.

   (b) Assume command if the commander is incapacitated or unavailable to exercise command.

   (c) Chair designated boards in support of JTF decision-making processes.

   (d) Supervise designated aspects of JTF planning.

   (e) Supervise designated subordinate units.

c. **COS.** As the key JTF staff integrator and synchronizer, the COS establishes a framework of trust, shared understanding, and intent within the staff. This is accomplished through the establishment and management of staff processes and procedures,
understanding and management of staff capacity, setting priorities, and knowledge sharing and IM. The COS duties include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Coordinate and direct the staff directorates’ work.

(2) Supervise the preparation of staff estimates, plans, and orders.

(3) Coordinate and manage the battle rhythm, if directed by the CJTF. This includes establishing and monitoring the JTF battle rhythm.

*For more details concerning battle rhythm, refer to Chapter IV, “Command and Control.”*

(4) Manage the JTF processes and procedures, such as creating conditions to promote shared learning through IM, knowledge sharing, and collaboration, to support the commander’s decision making and staff’s shared understanding. This includes the following:

(a) Establish a JTF battle rhythm and develop a process and mechanism to deliberately manage it.

(b) Assign a battle rhythm manager.

(5) Represent the CJTF when authorized.

(6) Implement JTF policies as directed by the CJTF.

(7) Formulate and disseminate staff policies.

(8) Ensure effective liaison is established with the JTF’s higher and subordinate HQ, adjacent HQ, and with other critical agencies and organizations in the assigned OA.

(9) Supervise sustainment of the JTF staff and its HQ and facilities.

(10) Supervise staff training and integration programs.

(11) Supervise the development and implementation of the JMD. Works with superior HQ and Service components to provide required personnel and identify and requisition critical shortfalls.

d. **Command Senior Enlisted Leader (CSEL).** The CSEL is a key advisor to the commander, often serving as a sounding board for the commander. The CSEL can also serve as a trusted observer of activities within the OA in the commander’s absence. The CSEL’s duties are, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Serve as the primary advisor to the commander on issues related to JTF enlisted personnel.

(2) Perform special duties as directed by the CJTF. Examples include:
Chapter II

(a) Monitor or observe critical subordinate unit actions.

(b) Monitor the discipline, morale, and mission readiness of JTF elements.

(c) Be a command spokesperson.

(d) Review documents that impact the command’s performance, operations, and related activities.

(3) Develop the command’s noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

(4) Act as a liaison to multinational contingents that may not place the same responsibilities on their enlisted personnel, emphasizing the important roles and responsibilities US military NCOs perform in military operations.

6. Staff Organization

a. HQ Organization Options. Mission requirements drive organization and manning since each joint force’s mission is different. The CJTF provides early guidance that affects how the JTF HQ will organize and function. HQ staffs exhibit a tendency to grow in size over time. A large HQ may often take on unnecessary functions, require more internal coordination, and have the potential to overwhelm mission partners with demands for information. These characteristics can impede information exchange and reduce focus on providing agile and optimal support to the CJTF’s decision requirements.

(1) J-Code Organization. The traditional J-code organization continues to be the preferred basic staff structure for joint HQ. Typically, these are the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1), J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6). These primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the joint functions described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations. Some directorates, such as the J-2 and J-4, focus on specific functions (intelligence and logistics respectively), but all directorates have responsibilities that ensure the integration of the joint force’s capabilities and operations across the functions. Depending on the JTF scope and purpose, additional directorates may be established as required for training and education, resource management, and civil-military operations (CMO). The vertical J-code structure promotes unity of command, speeds hierarchical information flow, and ensures the directorate principals remain accountable through the COS to the commander for the major functions of the HQ. In addition to clear accountability and authority lines, the J-code structure also adds significant interoperability benefits when compared to other basic staff structures. The structure provides recognizable locations within the staff where functional information exchanges occur across the JTF staff and with JTF components, supporting commands, and interorganizational participants. The J-code structure allows different HQs, to include multinational HQs, to speak a common language, facilitate the rapid integration of staff augmentees, and enhance communication with outside mission partners. As a basic organizing model, the J-code structure provides a common reference point for broad functional expertise, staff oversight, and accountability (e.g., logistics and intelligence). The drawback of a pure J-code structure is the tendency for information to get stove-piped...
within the directorates. This challenge can be mitigated by creating conditions to promote shared understanding, which seeks to enhance decision making and unity of effort through knowledge sharing, collaboration, and establishing a common perspective. Shared understanding improves staff integration in cross-functional working groups (WGs), operational planning teams (OPTs), and cross-staff organizations. Cross-functional coordination is typically accomplished through the commander’s battle rhythm. The directorates also manage systems and processes internal to their staff directorate. Chapter V, “Manpower and Personnel Directorate,” through Chapter X, “Communications System Directorate,” describe in detail the internal organizations and responsibilities of these directorates. Based on mission requirements and the nature of the OE, CJTFs commonly establish additional staff directorates. Examples of these (training and education, resource management, and CMO) may be represented by J-codes. These possible additional directorates are discussed in Chapter XI, “Training and Education Directorate;” Chapter XII, “Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate;” and Chapter XIII, “Civil-Military Operations Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate.” The addition of directorates does not fundamentally change any of the staff processes described in this publication.

(2) **Functional/Mission-Oriented HQ Organization.** Experience continues to support the J-code structure as the best HQ organizational option for most missions. Figure II-2 depicts a traditional J-code structure on the lower portion and other organizational options on top. Alternative HQ organization structures may be useful in some circumstances, such as security cooperation, and to achieve unit of effort with other partner organizations. However, HQs that have organized other than by the traditional J-code functions (J-1, J-2, J-3, etc.) typically find interaction more difficult with other traditionally organized HQ J-code staffs. Challenges to effective interaction can include lack of a common reference point (counterpart). This problem becomes more pronounced during crisis operations and when there is frequent rotation of HQ personnel. With this type of HQ organization, there can be a loss of accountability for certain traditional functions (e.g., intelligence and logistics) as personnel in the mission-oriented HQ focus on nontraditional tasks.

b. **J-Code Staff Directorates.** The staff recommends content for the commander’s intent, informs the commander’s decision-making process, and contributes to the execution and assessment of operations.

(1) **J-1.** JTF manpower and personnel support requirements must be determined early in the planning process and continue through the execution of operations and redeployment. To ensure optimal JTF personnel support, the JTF J-1 synchronizes and coordinates personnel support efforts with Service components and functional components and establishes and publishes policies, procedures, and standards to accomplish personnel visibility in the JOA.

*For background information and guidance on JTF personnel and administration matters, refer to Chapter V, “Manpower and Personnel Directorate,” and JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.*
Headquarters Organization Options

### Functional Organizations
- Planning
- Command Group (CMO)
- Information Management
- Protection
- Sustainment
- Communication Synchronization

### Mission-Based Organizations
- Political Military
- Reconnaissance
- Command Group (JFC)
- Communications Synchronization
- Security

### J-Code Structural Organizations
- Commander
- Personal and Special Staff
- Command Senior Enlisted Leader
- Deputy Commander
- Chief of Staff

#### J-Code Legend
- **CMO**: Civil-military operations
- **Comm**: Communications
- **Pers**: Personnel
- **Ops**: Operations
- **Log**: Logistics
- **Res**: Resource
- **JFC**: Joint force commander
- **Ops**: Operations
- **Pers**: Personnel
- **Res**: Resource
- **J-1**: J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-2**: J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-3**: J-3 Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-4**: J-4 Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-5**: J-5 Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-6**: J-6 Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-7**: J-7 Training and Education Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-8**: J-8 Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate of a Joint Staff
- **J-9**: J-9 Civil-military Operations Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff

Legend:
- **command authority**
- **coordination**

NOTE: Above organizations structures are greatly simplified for illustrative purposes only.

*Optional directorates established at JFC’s discretion.

Figure II-2. Headquarters Organization Options
(a) The JTF J-2 informs the commander; describes the OE; identifies, defines, and nominates objectives; supports planning and execution of operations; counters adversary deception and surprise; supports friendly deception efforts; and assesses the effectiveness of operations. Both DOD and non-DOD intelligence agencies and organizations provide assistance to the J-2 in support of activities and operations within the JOA.

(b) The CJTF may establish a JTF-level intelligence element, such as a joint intelligence support element (JISE) or a joint intelligence operations center (JIOC), under a JTF J-2 director, to manage intelligence collection, production, and dissemination. The decision as to the type of intelligence element required will be based on the scope and breadth of the mission assigned to the JTF. If the CJTF requires a JIOC, the decision to establish a fully staffed JIOC at the JTF level may require augmentation and should be approved by the CCDR. This publication uses “JISE” to refer to the JTF-level intelligence element.

For specific guidance concerning JTF intelligence support, refer to Chapter VI, “Intelligence Directorate,” and the JP 2-0 series of publications.

(3) **J-3**

(a) The JTF J-3 helps the commander direct and control current operations. The J-3, typically in concert with the higher HQ and JTF components’ operations directorates, plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The J-3 accomplishes this, in part, by working closely with the rest of the staff. The staff makes recommendations to be included in the commander’s intent, informs the commander’s decision-making process, and contributes to the execution and assessment of current operations. JTF planning and execution typically consider supported or supporting activities and the integration of interagency partners, multinational participants, NGOs, and international organizations.

(b) The CJTF should establish a joint operations center (JOC), under the director JTF J-3, to manage all matters related to planning and executing current operations.

For more details concerning organization and procedures of the JTF J-3, refer to Chapter VII, “Operations Directorate.”

(4) **J-4**

(a) The J-4 helps the JFC manage the provision of logistics to the joint force. The ultimate goal is for logistics planners to develop a feasible, supportable, and efficient concept of logistic support that is able to identify risks to the execution of the CONOPS.

(b) The JTF J-4’s concept of logistic support often involves interorganizational coordination with the HN, private contractors, and other participants or stakeholders. The quality and quantity of potential HNS and acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) can significantly affect the logistics concept and the JFC’s CONOPS.
(c) The JTF J-4 should establish a joint movement center (JMC). The CJTF or GCC, respectively, approve forming a joint logistics operations center (JLOC) or a joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC), if the director JTF J-4 determines one is necessary. Because logistic limitations affect all planning and execution, it is essential that logistic planners are integral members of the joint planning group (JPG) and appropriately integrated throughout the staff.

For more details concerning JTF logistic support, including information on forming a JLOC, refer to Chapter VIII, “Logistics Directorate,” and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(5) J-5

(a) Before execution, the JTF J-5 develops, updates, reviews, and coordinates joint plans required for successful accomplishment of JTF mission(s). During execution of current operations, the J-5 focuses on future plans, which are typically for the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. The J-5 also supports the future operations planning effort, which normally occurs in the J-3.

(b) The J-5 typically establishes a JPG to facilitate integrated planning across the staff. A JPG should include representation from all JTF principal and special staff sections, components and other interagency partners, and other participants, as required. For HD or DSCA operations, the J-5 typically includes National Guard Bureau (NGB) and/or NG JFHQ-State elements in the JPG.

For more details concerning JTF planning and policy procedures, refer to Chapter IX, “Plans and Policy Directorate.”

(6) J-6

(a) The JTF J-6 provides a protected, interoperable joint communications system to enable a CJTF to have C2 of the JTF throughout the OE. This includes development and integration of communications systems, architecture, and plans that support the command’s operational- and strategic-level requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications system support to exercise command in the execution of the mission covered under DODIN operations. The JTF J-6 may need to reach back to the J-6 at the CCMD level to accomplish accreditation of communications systems. The JTF J-6 also manages activities described in JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

(b) The JTF communications system should support all JTF operations and an organizational design that encourages timely, effective, and accurate flow of information and guidance within the joint force and with other interagency partners and participants as necessary. The system must effectively link all higher, supporting, and subordinate organizations. It should also provide a rapid, reliable, secure flow of data to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the JTF from the earliest stages of planning through redeployment. Communication limitations influence all planning efforts. Therefore, communications planners must be integral members of the JPG and appropriately integrated throughout the staff.
For more information on the J-6, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. For specific guidance for JTF communications support, refer to Chapter X, “Communications System Directorate.”

(7) Training and Education Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-7). The J-7 is an optional directorate a CJTF may establish if there are sufficient immediate or continuing training and education requirements associated with forming and operating the JTF. The J-7 assists the commander in planning and executing the joint training and education programs for the staff and theater-assigned forces in order to enhance joint and multinational mission readiness and warfighting capabilities. A J-7 is most likely formed for a standing JTF.

For more information, refer to Chapter XI, “Training and Education Directorate.”

(8) Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-8). The J-8 is an optional directorate a CJTF may establish if there are sufficient immediate or continuing resource management requirements associated with forming and operating the JTF. The J-8 can assist the COS and CJTF in determining the command’s resource requirements, identifying sources of funding, establishing internal management controls, and conducting operation assessment.

For more information, refer to Chapter XII, “Resource Management and Financial Support Directorate.”

(9) Civil-Military Operations Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-9). The J-9 is an optional directorate a CJTF may establish if there are sufficient CMO requirements associated with the JTF in the CJTF’s mission. The J-9 assists in the identification and establishment of linkages and contacts with the appropriate external organizations that may influence or affect the command’s mission throughout the operation. The J-9 may serve as the initial and primary point of contact (POC) for interorganizational coordination and the single, physical location for partner representatives and LNOs. Depending on operational requirements and nature of participants, the CJTF could establish the J-9 as the interagency operations directorate.

For more information, refer to Chapter XIII, “Civil-Military Operations Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate.”

(10) Personal and Special Staff Groups. Personal and special staffs perform duties as prescribed by CJTF and handle special matters over which the CJTF wishes to exercise close, personal control. These staff groups may include, but are not limited to, public affairs officer (PAO), staff judge advocate (SJA), joint force chaplain (JFCH), surgeon, inspector general (IG), provost marshal (PM), comptroller, HQCOMDT, historian, safety officer, and policy advisor (POLAD), as directed.

For more detailed discussion of the roles and responsibilities of these staff groups, refer to Chapter XIV, “Special and Personal Staff.”
c. **A Cross-Functional Approach to Staff Organization.** Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. There are clear benefits of the J-code structure in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, administration, accountability, and “plug and play” functionality. However, there is a common tendency for knowledge and expertise to “stovepipe” within the J-code directorates due to the sheer number of ongoing staff actions. Effective knowledge sharing and IM plans will increase collaboration and sharing, which can mitigate this risk.

d. **Cross-Functional Organizations and Integration.** The most common technique for promoting cross-functional collaboration is the formation of an organizational structure that blends J-code functional management with task accomplishment by cross-functional teams of subject matter experts from multiple J-codes (Figure II-3). Although cross-functional in their membership, most of these teams fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates or their functional chiefs. This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its commander in mission execution. These organizations are venues through which the cross-functional expertise of the staff is

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**Cross-Functional Organizations and Staff Integration**

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**Legend**

- J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
- J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
- J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
- J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
- J-7 training and education directorate of a joint staff
- J-8 resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff
- J-9 civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff

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*Optional directorates established at JFC’s discretion.*
brought to bear on the planning and execution problems being addressed by the commander. Horizontal, cross-functional organizations overlaid on the vertical J-code structure provide a powerful method of staff integration. For many new staff members, the interaction of cross-functional organizations in relation to a typical functional staff can be confusing, so the COS must continually reinforce the value and necessity of this horizontal, cross-functional approach and ensure appropriate participation by the J-code directorates.

e. Cross-Functional Organizations that Support the JTF Staff

(1) **Center.** A center is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within a JFC’s HQ. Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the JOC, joint personnel processing center (JPPC), and the CMOC.

(2) **Group.** A group is an enduring functional organization formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC’s HQ. Normally, groups within a JTF HQ include a JPG that manages JTF HQ planning. JPG functions include leading designated planning efforts, resourcing and managing subordinate planning teams, and coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates.

(3) **Cell.** A cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC’s HQ. A cell usually is part of both functional and traditional staff structures. An example of a cell within the traditional staff structure could be a joint electronic spectrum operations cell subordinate to the operations branch within the J-3. An example of a cell within a functional staff structure could be a current operations cell within the JOC.

(4) **Office.** An office is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a JFC’s HQ to coordinate and manage support requirements. An example of an office is the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO).

(5) **Element.** An element is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JFC’s HQ. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional cells. An example of an element is the joint fires element (JFE).

(6) **Boards.** A board is an organized group of individuals within a JFC’s HQ, appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority that established the board. Boards are chaired by a senior leader with members representing major staff elements, subordinate commands, LNOs, and other organizations as required. There are two different types of boards:

   (a) **Command Board.** A command board is chaired by the commander, and its purpose is to gain guidance or decisions from the commander.

   (b) **Functional Board.** A functional board’s purpose is to gain functionally specific guidance and decisions from the commander (or designated representative) based on a staff recommendation. These boards often focus on:
1. Synchronizing particular activities (e.g., IO, targeting, collection, and distribution) across multiple planning initiatives.

2. Allocation of resources between ongoing or future operations.


(7) **WG.** A **WG** (see Figure II-4) is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a JFC’s HQ formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The WG consists of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives.

(8) **OPT.** OPTs are established to solve a single problem related to a specific task or requirement on a single event horizon. In most cases, OPTs are not enduring and will dissolve upon completion of the assigned task. OPT membership is typically determined by the staff officer responsible for the event horizon in which the OPT is working (i.e., the J-5 [future plans], J-35 [future operations], and J-33 [current operations]).
Figure II-5 depicts the interaction between OPTs, WGs, and J-code directorates. The two-way arrows represent the flow of information as OPTs request and receive support from the multiple WGs. As the OPT works its way through the JPP, it provides planning guidance to multiple WGs. In return, it receives cross-functional expertise in the form of analysis and staff estimates.

f. **Staff Alignment of Cross-Functional Organizations to Support Planning and Decision Making.**

(1) Figure II-6, which is not meant to be directive or all-inclusive, depicts an example of a JTF HQ’s staff alignment of **cross-functional organizations**. The figure shows the most common proponent (by staff directorate or special staff group) for each cross-functional organization. As a practical matter, the CJTF and staff establish and maintain only those **cross-functional organizations** that enhance planning and decision making.
Chapter II

Figure II-6. Notional Joint Task Force Staff Organization

Legend

CJTF  commander, joint task force
DCJTF deputy commander, joint task force
J-1  manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2  intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3  operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4  logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5  plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6  communications system directorate of a joint staff
J-7  training and education directorate of a joint staff
J-8  resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff
J-9  civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff

* This functionality may be assigned to a subordinate commander.
making within the HQ. They establish, modify, and dissolve these entities as the needs of the HQ evolve. Subsequent chapters on specific J-code directorates provide more information on their related cross-functional organizations.

(2) The cross-functional organization of the staff must facilitate the planning and decision-making processes that are crucial to the JTF’s success. Figure II-7 is a notional depiction of the differences in relationships between WGs and planning teams in the three event planning horizons.

(a) Based on the complexity of the planning problem and time available, future plans and future operations planning teams interact primarily through the JPP with elements both internal (e.g., WGs, cells) and external (other HQ, agencies, and

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**Staff Interaction Supporting Decision Making**

**Commander’s Guidance, Intent, and Decision**

**Decision Boards**

**Battle Update Assessment**

“**What next**”

“**What if**”

“**What is**”

Joint task force staff interaction through centers, groups, planning teams, and working groups.

**Legend**

- J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
- J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
- PT planning team
- WG working group

**Figure II-7. Staff Interaction Supporting Decision Making**
II-24 JP 3-33

organizations) to the HQ. As the planning teams move through the JPP, they ultimately gain guidance, intent, and decisions via designated decision boards.

(b) In contrast to the future operations and future plans planning teams, the current operations planning teams normally complete their assigned planning tasks without significant interaction with other staff elements (e.g., WGs). Generally, these teams are established and execute planning in the JOC under the supervision of the chief of operations. The commander is kept advised of ongoing, near-term planning initiatives through appropriate mechanisms (e.g., commander’s critical information requirements [CCIRs], serious incident reports, or battle updates).

7. Staff Integration

Effective staff integration is achieved when functional expertise from across the staff and from external mission partners is brought together in direct support of the commander’s decision requirements. Thought-out interaction, J-codes, WGs, OPTs, and decision boards leverage the analytical capability of the entire staff and mission partners to support decision requirements. The use of such staff integrating elements (sometimes referred to as cross-functional organizations and events) makes staff coordination more routine; facilitates monitoring, assessment, and planning; and allows for the management of activities across the three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans).

8. Liaison Personnel

a. General. Exchanging LNOs is the most commonly employed technique to establish close, continuous, physical communication among organizations. Liaison personnel enhance information sharing and contribute significantly to mission success.

(1) The CJTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel based on command relationships and mission support requirements. LNOs must be requested at the earliest opportunity. Per this request, any specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the CJTF. LNOs to the JTF HQ should be of sufficient rank (recommend equal rank to JTF primary staff officers) to influence the decision-making process. Ideally, LNOs should possess the requisite skill sets (technical training or language) to liaise and communicate effectively with receiving organizations.

(2) Liaison should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands; between adjacent units; and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and the JTF

“During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit’s capabilities, and make recommendations.”

Lieutenant General C. W. Stiner, United States Army
Commander, Joint Task Force South
Additionally, the JTF may also exchange LNOs with other interagency partners, MNFs, HNs, and other significant entities.

b. LNOs provide an essential C2 bridge between the JTF HQ, its parent organizations, and its subordinate organizations.

c. To help ensure LNOs are properly employed and not misused, the JTF should follow certain basic guidelines. See Figure II-8 for details.

*For additional information concerning liaison personnel, refer to Appendix C, “Liaison Officers.”*

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**Liaison Officer Guidelines**

- Liaison officers (LNOs) are personal and official representatives of the sending organizations and should be treated accordingly.
- LNOs support the gaining organizations and serve as critical conduits between organizations.
- LNOs remain in their parent organizations’ chain of command.
- LNOs perform four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.
- LNOs (to include multinational LNOs) must have sufficient access to information to be effective.
- LNOs are not full-time planners.
- LNOs are not watch officers.
- LNOs are not substitutes for delivering critical information through normal command and control channels or a conduit for general information sharing.
- LNOs are not replacements for proper staff-to-staff coordination.
- LNOs are not replacements for augmentees or representatives.
- LNOs do not have the authority to make decisions for their commander without coordination and approval.

*Figure II-8. Liaison Officer Guidelines*
CHAPTER III

SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

“In any joint operation, the JFC [joint force commander] can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1. Task Organization and Common Responsibilities

   a. Task Organization. A JTF is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single CJTF. The subordinate Service components’ HQ and their forces provide the basic building blocks for the JTF’s component structure. The CJTF can organize the JTF with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the OE. All joint forces include Service component commands, because those commands provide administrative and logistic support for their forces. Typical JTFs have a combination of Service and functional components. A CJTF can also establish one or more subordinate JTFs if necessary. Figure III-1 shows the possible JTF components and subordinate commands. This chapter discusses Service and functional component commander responsibilities and provides examples of functional component commands and special purpose task forces.

   b. Common Responsibilities. In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, following are typical general responsibilities common to both Service and functional component commanders.

       (1) Plan and execute operations to accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the higher commander’s plans or orders.

       (2) Advise the CJTF on employment of the component command’s capabilities, progress toward mission accomplishment, and other matters of common concern.

       (3) Assess the progress of operations; integrate, manage, and share information as part of the JTF’s assessment activity; and provide timely updates to the higher commander relating to the progress or regression of tasks, objectives, and/or effects.

       (4) Coordinate with other JTF component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.

       (5) Provide liaison personnel to other commands and organizations as appropriate.
For more information on C2 as it relates to subordinate commands, refer to Chapter IV, “Command and Control.”

2. Service Component Commands

   a. A JTF-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces assigned or attached to the JTF. In general, a Service component commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the next higher commander.

   b. Service component commanders have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services support function. The CJTF may conduct operations through the Service component commander or, at lower echelons, other Service force commanders. A CJTF can delegate to subordinate commanders no more than the level of authority the establishing authority has given the CJTF. When a Service component commander exercises OPCON of forces, and the CJTF delegates that OPCON or TACON over those forces to another component commander or other subordinate JFC, the Service component commander retains the following responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions:
(1) Advise the CJTF on the proper employment, task organization, and command relationship of the Service component’s forces.

(2) Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.

(3) Select and nominate specific units of the parent Service component for attachment to other subordinate commands. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component commanders’ control when such subordinate commands are dissolved.

(4) Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility or for which the Service component’s facilities and capabilities are suitable.

(5) Inform the CJTF, other component or supporting commanders, and the CCDR, if affected, of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation.

c. Service component commanders or other Service force commanders assigned to a CCDR are responsible through the chain of command, extending to the Service chief, for the following:

(1) Internal Service administration and discipline (administrative control [ADCON]).

(2) Training in joint doctrine and their own Service doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(3) Logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority. The operating details of any Service logistic support system are retained and exercised by the Service component commanders in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the CCDR.

3. Functional Component Commands

a. CJTFs normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more Military Departments established to perform designated missions.

b. Functional component commanders exercise command authority (e.g., OPCON, TACON) as delegated, over forces or military capabilities made available to them consistent with JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. The CJTF designates the military capability that is made available for tasking by the functional component commander, as well as that commander’s authority and responsibilities. Establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the CJTF.
c. The CJTF establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander, with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces, will be designated as the functional component commander. However, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander. A Service component commander who is also the functional component commander retains the responsibilities associated with Service component command for assigned Service forces.

d. Commanders of functional component commands advise the CJTF on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities. They are also responsible for meeting the reporting criteria for entities and events in the JOA as outlined in the CCDR’s directives and CJTF’s amplifying instructions.

e. Since a functional component commander will employ forces from more than one Service, the component commander’s staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the JFC with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available. The functional component commander should identify staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets and use the individuals when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without loss in coordination or capability. The commander must also be aware of the constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the assigned and attached forces and the responsibilities retained by the Services.

For more details on functional components, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; and JP 3-05, Special Operations.

f. Examples of Functional Component Commanders

(1) Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The CJTF usually designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. A CJTF will typically assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces tasked and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air.

(2) JFLCC. The CJTF should designate a JFLCC and establish the commander’s authority and responsibilities to exercise C2 over land operations, when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation.

(3) JFMCC. The CJTF may designate a JFMCC to C2 joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces or assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions. Generally, maritime assets may include navies, marines, SOF, coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the
government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked), and air and air defense forces operating in the maritime domain.

For further details concerning the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFMCC, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.

(4) Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF). A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate JFCs based on the strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level context. When theater SOF requirements exceed the theater special operations command’s (TSOC’s) capacity, GCCs may request a SOJTF from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In coordination with the GCC, theater component, and JTF commanders, the SOJTF commander is responsible for planning, integrating, and conducting special operations in a designated OA. When tasked, the SOJTF commander may plan, integrate, and conduct specified military operations in the designated theater of operations. Depending on circumstances, the SOJTF commander may be directed to serve as the CJTF or a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). The SOJTF provides a capability to C2 multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) and a joint special operations air component (JSOAC) or a JTF consisting of both CF and SOF. The JSOAC is responsible for the centralized planning, direction, and execution of joint special operations aviation activities within a designated theater of operations. The JSOAC commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets and greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate task, control, and support the assigned/supporting air assets. The JSOAC is a theater-wide organization which can support a joint force special operations component, special operations task force, or a JSOTF.

(5) JSOTF. A JSOTF is generally composed of units of two or more SOF Service components formed to unilaterally carry out specific special operations or activities or to support a JFC conducting joint operations. A JSOTF may have CF supporting it for specific missions. A JSOTF is normally established by a JFC. For example, a GCC could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a specific JOA of the theater; then, either the GCC or the CJTF could designate a JSOTF commander and establish a JSOTF, subordinate to that CJTF, to plan and execute special operations. Likewise, a TSOC commander could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or OA assigned by the GCC. When a JSOTF is formed to directly support a GCC, the TSOC commander normally acts as the JSOTF commander. The JSOTF commander is a JFC and exercises the authority and responsibility assigned by the establishing JFC. A JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the TSOC staff and augmented by Service components or an existing O-6-level HQ from an existing SOF Service component with augmentation from other SOF or CF. As directed by the President or SecDef, a JSOTF may also be established and deployed from outside the theater into the AOR in coordination with that GCC.

(6) JFSOCC. The CJTF may designate a JFSOCC, SOJTF commander, or JSOTF commander to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA. The
JFSOCC will generally be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2. The commander of the TSOC may function as the SOJTF commander, JSOTF commander, or JFSOCC. In certain situations, the SOJTF commander or JSOTF commander may be appointed by CDRUSSOCOM. Normally, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces. C2 of SOF is usually executed within the SOF chain of command. The JFSOCC allocates forces as a supported or supporting commander based on guidance from the CJTF. When multiple JTFs are established, the TSOC commander, functioning as a JFSOCC, may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs and/or a JSOAC to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTFs special operations requirements. The supported JFC, as the common superior, will normally establish supporting or TACON command relationships between JSOTF commanders and CJTFs.

For further details concerning joint special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.

4. Subordinate Joint Forces

a. A CJTF is authorized to establish subordinate JTFs as circumstances require. For example, a CJTF assigned a large JOA, characterized by difficult terrain that restricts movement and maneuver, might determine C2 could be more effective with a subordinate JTF responsible for operations in a remote portion of the JOA. The decision to do so requires careful consideration because of the many factors that will complicate forming a new JTF during ongoing operations.

b. It is more common to form special-purpose JTFs that focus on specific functional aspects of the CJTF’s operations. Because of the nature and visibility of CMO, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations, and military information support operations (MISO), the CJTF may establish separate task forces for these activities. As a general rule, CMO, C-IED, and military information support task force commanders work directly for the CJTF. However, in certain circumstances (e.g., crisis response and limited contingency operations), these task forces may also be attached to the JSOTF.

(1) Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). A CJTF may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which a civil affairs (CA) representative on the staff could accomplish. The JCMOTF must be resourced to meet specific CMO requirements.

For further information on CMO and CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(2) Joint Military Information Support Task Force (JMISTF). A CJTF may establish a JMISTF when the scope of MISO requires coordination and activities that exceed the capability of the MISO support element to advise and assist. The JMISTF supports joint operations at the tactical and operational levels and deconflicts all MISO that occur under the JTF and other commands as designated by the establishing authority. It may also be organized as a multinational or combined JMISTF if multinational partners provide military information support staff personnel and forces to support operations.
For further details concerning MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

(3) **Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (C-IEDTF).** A CJTF may establish a C-IEDTF when the scope of C-IED operations exceed the capabilities of the JTF staff to plan and direct. Procedures for the proper exploitation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and IED materials must be established to include the leveraging of reachback exploitation centers. The C-IEDTF provides C-IED support to joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels.

For further details concerning C-IED operations and the C-IEDTF, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.
CHAPTER IV
COMMAND AND CONTROL

“…success rests in the vision, the leadership, the skill, and the judgment of the professionals making up command and staff groups…”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. General

This chapter describes C2 factors and management processes that influence JTF C2. The C2 factors are: the role of the commander in the JTF C2, command relationships, understanding the OE, OA management, operational limitations, interorganizational coordination considerations, multinational considerations, and CMO considerations. The management processes are: JTF IM, the commander’s decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm.

2. Command and Control Factors

a. Role of the CJTF in C2. The CJTF has the authority and responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. The CJTF’s actions associated with these responsibilities are central to JTF C2. The CJTF leverages the full range of skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to guide the command through the fog and friction of operations toward mission accomplishment.

(1) Commander’s Role in Planning Operations. The commander provides guidance that drives the JPP and supervises execution of the products. Early in the JPP, the CJTF’s vision of an operation is translated into a broad operational approach that guides subsequent detailed planning and produces plans and orders for execution. The CJTF communicates the operational approach through three important mechanisms: commander’s intent, commander’s planning guidance, and CCIRs. These mechanisms help the commander and JTF staff establish an effective dialogue to enable efficient planning. Later, during preparation activities and execution, these mechanisms help the entire JTF remain focused on the commander’s evolving vision and desired outcome of the operation consistent with an evolving OE and evolving strategic direction.

(2) Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation, the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission, and the desired military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired objectives without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation.

(3) Commander’s Guidance. The commander’s guidance communicates the commander’s initial thoughts for a given operation to the staff, which enhances effective planning. This guidance may be as broad or detailed as circumstances require. Although
commanders provide guidance to their staffs throughout the planning process, there are two opportunities to provide early guidance to the staff to focus their efforts:

(a) **Commander’s Initial Guidance.** Upon receipt of a mission, the commander and staff conduct an analysis of the initiating directive to determine time available to mission execution, the current status of intelligence products and staff estimates, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The commander will provide initial guidance to the staff, which could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the CJTF’s authority, and direct other actions as necessary.

(b) **Commander’s Planning Guidance.** Planning guidance is an important input to subsequent mission analysis, but the completion of mission analysis is another point at which the CJTF may provide updated planning guidance that affects course of action (COA) development. The CJTF may have been able to apply operational design to think through the operation before the staff begins the JPP. In this case, the CJTF provides initial planning guidance to help focus the staff in mission analysis. Otherwise, the CJTF and staff will develop their understanding of the OE and problem to be solved during mission analysis. Then the commander will issue planning guidance to help focus the staff’s efforts. At a minimum, the CJTF issues planning guidance, either initial or refined, at the conclusion of mission analysis and provides planning guidance as the operational approach matures. The format for the commander’s planning guidance varies based on the personality of the commander and the level of command, but the guidance should adequately capture the commander’s understanding of the OE, the problem the force must solve, and the operational approach to the problem’s solution. It may include the following elements:

1. A description of the OE.
2. A statement of the problem that military operations must solve.
3. A description of the operational approach.
4. The CJTF’s initial intent.
5. Operational limitations.
6. Other factors as desired.

For more information on the JFC’s guidance, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning. For more information on command planning, see CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

(4) **CCIRs** are elements of information the commander identifies as critical to timely decision making. CCIRs focus IM for the CJTF and help the commander assess the OE and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. The CJTF determines what information is critical based on personal experience, the mission, the higher commander’s intent, and input from the staff. **CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.**
(a) There are two broad categories of information sought in the CCIRs: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), which focus on the enemy, adversaries, and the OE, and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), which focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the friendly force and supporting capabilities. Not all proposed PIRs and FFIRs are selected as CCIRs. Intelligence requirements designated as PIRs receive increased levels of intelligence support and priority in allocation of resources, while those not designated as PIRs are satisfied as time and resources allow. PIRs drive requests for information (RFIs) to determine the need for intelligence collection and subsequent production requirements. FFIRs drive reporting and RFIs.

(b) CCIRs change as the decisions the commander must make change. The initial CCIRs often address information needed to make decisions during planning. These information requirements often relate to selecting a COA. During preparation and execution, CCIRs address information required in making anticipated operational decisions, inform the campaign or operation assessment, or plan adjustments.

(c) CCIRs often seek information the commander requires to decide whether to execute a branch or sequel. The number of CCIRs in effect at one time must be limited. This practice sets priorities the staff uses to allocate resources and manage information. CCIRs normally focus on near-term decisions. As decisions are made, the CCIRs change to support other anticipated decisions. CCIRs spare the commander from receiving irrelevant information. They also protect subordinate HQs and supporting agencies from receiving excessive RFIs.

(d) CCIRs set IM and resource allocation priorities for the staff by establishing the information most important to the commander. CCIRs also establish priorities for allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources.

(e) To assist in managing CCIRs, CJTFs should implement a process to guide the staff. This process should include specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying and deleting) of CCIRs.

For more details concerning CCIRs, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(5) Commander’s Role in Preparing for Operations. As the JTF prepares for an upcoming operation, it conducts a series of activities to improve its ability to conduct the actual operation. The CJTF closely supervises the JTF HQ and component commanders during this critical period. These activities include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Continued analysis of the situation.

(b) Reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

(c) Refinement of the plan.
(d) Coordination and liaison.
(e) Rehearsals.
(f) Training.
(g) Inspections.
(h) Movements.

(6) **The Commander’s Role in Directing Operations.** Directing converts the commander’s decisions into effective action by subordinate forces. The commander generates effective action by directing forces, synchronizing joint functions, and, within authority and capability, integrating other instruments of national power. The CJTF directs operations by:

(a) Guiding the command toward mission accomplishment.
(b) Assigning missions.
(c) Prioritizing and allocating resources.
(d) Assessing and taking risks.
(e) Assessing the situation and determining what opportunities and adjustments are needed to increase progress and mitigate regression of campaign or operation objectives towards the desired end state.

b. **Command Relationships**

(1) **C2 Functions of the JTF Establishing Authority.** The JTF establishing authority exercises either combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or OPCON of the JTF. The JTF establishing authority either transfers forces from subordinate commands and attaches them to the JTF or transfers forces allocated to the CCMD by SecDef via the GFM process, as appropriate. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the CJTF and other subordinate commanders to ensure the success of the JTF.

(2) **C2 Functions of the CJTF.** The CJTF normally exercises OPCON or TACON over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. The CJTF may also be a supported or supporting commander. Further, the CJTF may delegate OPCON or TACON of, or establish support relationships for, specific JTF forces or military capabilities to or between subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. The CJTF assigns responsibilities, delegates authorities, and establishes command relationships. Establishing command relationships and delineating coordinating instructions are also particularly important when JTF component and other subordinate commanders are assigned missions that bring their forces into common or contiguous areas.
(3) The establishing authority may direct the CJTF to simultaneously act as a functional component commander and the JTF commander (i.e., JTF and JFLCC). The scope of the operational problem will inform the establishing authority decisions as to the functions the CJTF retains.

_For more details concerning command relationships, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations._

c. Understanding the OE

(1) The JFC’s OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment [which includes cyberspace]); EMS; and the operational variables described in JP 3-0, _Joint Operations_, and JP 2-01.3, _Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment_, as political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure in relation to time. Included within these are enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the OE helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect the JTF mission accomplishment.

(2) The CJTF and staff can benefit by a comprehensive perspective of the systems in the OE relevant to the mission and operation at hand. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) is an analytic process yielding tailored products that can assist the CJTF in gaining a greater understanding of the OE. Developing a systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the OE among the joint force and other participating entities, thereby facilitating unified action. A systems perspective of the OE strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems (e.g., political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and others) relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. A commonly shared dynamic visual representation and associated Global Command and Control System (GCCS) data management tools can be used to integrate and manage relevant data sources. This will help the commander and staff analyze centers of gravity (COGs), critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points; determine lines of operation (LOOs) and LOEs; refine objectives and desired and undesired effects; provide the operational approach to the staff as part of planning guidance; and focus limited resources during execution.

(3) The CJTF will face increasingly complex environments characterized by a wide variety of participants, enemies using combinations of traditional and irregular warfare, adversaries with capabilities to influence information, information flow, and global interconnected relationships. The JIPOE products for an OE will assist the commander in understanding and navigating the complex environment. This broader, more
inclusive approach to understanding the environment will assist in determining CCIRs and the operation or campaign assessment activity.

For further information on the OE and systems perspective, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

d. **OA Management**

(1) **Organization of the OA.** A critical function of the CJTF is to organize the OA to assist in the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of joint actions. The CJTF can employ areas of operations (AOs), joint special operations areas (JSOAs), amphibious objective areas (AOAs), and joint security areas (JSAs) to support the organization of the OA within the assigned JOA. Figure IV-1 depicts typical JTF OAs.

(a) **Boundaries** are lines that delineate surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.

1. JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or maritime force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.
2. Theater-wide air operations must take into account surface boundaries of the land and naval forces and the trajectory of their surface-to-surface fires as they may impact sorties flown during JTF air operations. Because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, the airspace control authority, on behalf of the JFC, promulgates airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space. In addition, delivery of air weapons inside surface boundaries requires coordination with the applicable land and/or naval force commanders.

For additional airspace control guidance, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

3. Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the OE.

   (b) A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters (e.g., operations that will occur in an area that crosses between two GCCs).

For additional guidance on JOAs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

   (c) An AO is an OA defined by the CJTF for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire OA of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, these commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing within their AOs.

   (d) JSOA. The CJTF may establish a JSOA to execute operations. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and/or airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, friendly and hostile situation, and political-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous use of CF and SOF in the same general OA. When a JSOA is designated, the SOF commander is the supported commander within the designated JSOA.

   (e) The AOA is a geographical area (delineated for C2 purposes in the initiating directive) within which is the objective(s) an amphibious force is to secure. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious forces mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations.

For more details concerning AOs, JSOAs, and AOAs, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations; and JP 3-05, Special Operations.
(f) A JSA is a specific surface area, designated by the CJTF as critical, to facilitate protection of joint bases and supports force protection (FP), movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JSAs may include intermediate staging bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements.

For more details concerning JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(2) Control Measures. The CJTF establishes additional control measures to further integrate joint actions within the JOA and subordinate OAs in coordination with their subordinate commanders. Control measures are directives to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate joint actions, and control operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher commander’s intent, their own mission, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. The CJTF may employ control measures for the following types of joint actions (Note: this list is not meant to be either all-inclusive or restrictive):

(a) Control of designated air, land, or maritime areas.
(b) Control movements.
(c) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
(d) Conduct security operations.
(e) Provide or coordinate fires.
(f) Conduct air defense.
(g) Designate lines of communications.
(h) Identify critical logistic nodes or facilities.
(i) Identify critical communications nodes or facilities.
(j) Control C2 architecture.
(k) Control data management operations.

e. Operational limitations include actions required or prohibited by higher authority (a constraint or restraint) and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action (such as diplomatic agreements, ROE, diplomatic/political considerations, economic conditions in affected countries, and HN issues). Authorities, in the form of international and domestic law, national policy, and higher HQ guidance and intent, determine the commander’s freedom of action. Authorities can be both permissive and restrictive, at times permitting a wide range of options available to the commander, while at other times restricting the actions that may be taken. An operational constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that directs an action, thus
restricting freedom of action. An operational restraint is a requirement placed on the command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. Authorities approved for an operation play an integral role in planning, while operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must identify the approved authorities and operational limitations, understand their impacts, and develop options that maximize approved authorities. This must be done while minimizing the impact of operational limitations to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. Commanders must involve the legal staff as soon as practicable. Integrating the legal staff into the planning process assists the commander in identifying and understanding these authorities and limitations and helps the commander frame requests for authorities necessary to accomplish the mission.

1. A common area of concern for every commander with regard to authorities and limitations is the use of force in mission accomplishment and self-defense. Use of force is framed by the commander’s guidance and intent and approved ROE and rules for the use of force (RUF). ROE and RUF are specific authorizations and limitations by which the President, SecDef, and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and international law. When read in conjunction with the commanders guidance and intent, ROE and RUF govern when, where, against whom, and how force can be used. RUF are distinguished from ROE in that RUF are typically used for armed forces performing security or law enforcement functions. In addition, non-DOD entities, such as state and local law enforcement or NG forces, may also have established RUF that need to be considered in domestic operations where DOD forces operate in close proximity.

2. ROE and RUF generally provide authority for, or impose limitations on, the use of force by commanders and individuals based on three types of considerations:

   (a) **Military.** Properly developed ROE and RUF clarify the inherent right and obligation of unit self-defense. ROE may regulate a commander’s capability to influence a military action by granting or withholding the authority to use particular weapons systems or tactics, and may also reemphasize the scope of the mission.

   (b) **Diplomatic and Political.** ROE and RUF are a reflection of USG and PNs diplomatic and political will.

   (c) **Legal.** ROE and RUF are established with the consideration of international and domestic law and existing multilateral and bilateral agreements and arrangements.

3. **ROE and RUF** issues emerge during the planning process as the staff begins to develop COAs. Desired ROE should be identified during COA development. The supported CCDR may provide ROE and RUF guidance to the CJTF via initial planning documents, which may precede COA development. The CJTF’s proposed mission-specific ROE and RUF should be developed, exercised, and modified as necessary to support mission planning during the COA development, war gaming, analysis, and selection process. Mission objectives must drive the ROE and RUF formulation process and not
vice versa. The JTF HQ SJA should review the ROE and RUF to ensure they are consistent with the DOD Law of War Program and domestic and international law.

(4) **ROE and RUF will change as the mission evolves.** Commanders should develop use of force measures that provide subordinate commanders with sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. Those measures may be influenced by the commander’s judgment, the intent of higher authorities, the requirements of subordinates, the training of the force, and the concerns of multinational partners. Nothing in the ROE or RUF limits the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in unit self-defense consistent with the law of war.

(5) **ROE and RUF development, distribution, training, and modification must be timely and responsive to changing mission and threat parameters.**

(6) **Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).** SecDef has provided SROE as standalone guidance for US forces worldwide. They are equally applicable to all the CCMDs and can be easily amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in addition to specific guidance, if any, from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures. SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular situation.

(a) SROE generally do not apply to MNFs; DSCA operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their OPCON) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a CCDR or performing missions under the direct control of the President or SecDef, Military Departments, or other nonmilitary entities.

(b) GCCs may augment the SROE to properly respond to the mission and threat in their AORs.

(c) The commander and staff must understand the military, diplomatic, political, and legal considerations that influence ROE and be able to distill the SROE and any CCDR-specific ROE into baseline ROE for the unit commander, weapon system operator, and individual Service member to apply in the field.

(d) The CJTF and staff can lessen confusion and contribute to the readiness and effective use of force by providing timely, clear, and concise ROE guidance and by assisting the components in training at every level.

(e) Subject to specific restrictions, commanders at all levels are authorized to use all lawful weapons and tactics available to accomplish assigned missions. ROE should strive, to the extent possible, to preserve this flexibility.

(f) Nonlethal capabilities offer a wider range of response to an increase or decrease of force consideration, and their employment should be clearly addressed in ROE and RUF.
7) **Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF).** SRUF provide operational guidance and establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions taken by DOD forces performing DSCA missions (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities and military support for civilian law enforcement agencies) and routine Service functions (including FP duties) within US territory (including US territorial waters). SRUF also apply to land HD missions occurring within US territory and to DOD forces, civilians, and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DOD installations (and off-installation, while conducting official DOD security functions), within or outside US territory, unless otherwise directed by SecDef. HN laws and international agreements may limit US forces’ means of accomplishing law enforcement or security duties. Additional examples of these missions, within the US, include protection of critical infrastructure both on and off DOD installations; military assistance and support to civil authorities; DOD support during civil disturbances; and DOD cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, including counterdrug and border enforcement support.

(a) Unit commanders at all levels must ensure their personnel know how and when to use either nonlethal or lethal force in self-defense.

(b) JTF SJAs should coordinate with NG counterparts when providing domestic support to confirm the RUF approved for use by the NG. There may be a difference between the ROE or RUF approved for DOD forces and the RUF for each state’s NG forces operating in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. NG RUF are based on the criminal law of the state in which an NG unit is performing the mission. Therefore, the NG RUF may be more or less restrictive than the approved DOD RUF.

For more details concerning ROE and RUF, refer to the CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

f. **Interorganizational Cooperation (Less Multinational) Considerations**

(1) Relationships between the JTF and USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector should not be equated to the C2 relationships and authorities of a military operation. During combat operations such as Operation DESERT STORM, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG departments and agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide DSCA or foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), its forces typically perform in a supporting role. For example, in most FHA operations, DOD is not the lead agency but is in support of the Department of State (DOS) and/or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination. Successful interorganizational and private sector coordination enables the JTF to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared objectives through unity of effort.

(2) NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, United Nations (UN), or other international organization hierarchies. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting role to the military. However, an associate or
partnership relationship may develop during some missions. For example, if the UN has provided a grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would be considered its “implementing partner.” If formed, the CMOC is the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs.

(3) A coordinated or cooperative effort between the JTF and USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations is essential to achieve our national objectives. While these participants are not under the CJTF’s C2, the commander is responsible for the coordination necessary to facilitate unified action with them in the interest of unity of effort toward the CJTF’s objectives. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG departments’ and agencies’ different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make achieving unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some NGOs and international organizations may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military.

(4) The military, on the other hand, tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies similarly employ standardized, methodical decision-making principles, but likely will not have the same degree of C2 capabilities as does the US military. Across agency lines, international organizations and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized arrangement. Close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation are necessary for many reasons and may include ensuring a clear understanding of each organization’s objectives, addressing inadequate structure and limited available commercial facilities and logistic support, developing coordination/mutual support procedures, and overcoming bureaucratic and personal limitations. This understanding could help harmonize agencies’ responses in conjunction with joint operations, thus promoting unified action.

For further details concerning interorganizational coordination during joint operations, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

(5) The level of partner integration will vary based on the environment’s complexity and tempo of change, as well as on the degree to which partners’ roles, responsibilities, and capabilities are mutually dependent. It is important to determine the desired and achievable levels of integration with each partner as these may vary from one partner to another. As there are many legal and regulatory authorities that impact the JTF’s interaction with outside organizations, the CJTF should consult regularly with the JTF SJA when interacting with outside agencies or organizations.

For additional information regarding relationships and liaison considerations, refer to Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis study, Joint Task Force (JTF) Relationship-Building Best Practices.

g. Multinational Considerations
(1) **Command Authority.** The President retains and does not relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a UN, NATO, or multinational commander for specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council, or approved by the North Atlantic Council, or other authorized regional organization.

(a) US forces under the OPCON of a multinational force commander (MNFC) will follow the MNF ROE for mission accomplishment when directed by SecDef. Regardless, US forces should retain the right and means of self-defense per the SROE. After assignment to a MNF, US forces will report any changes to MNF ROE to higher authority for review and approval.

(b) US forces will remain under the OPCON of an MNFC only if the CCDR and higher authority determine the MNF ROE are consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and the rules for individual self-defense contained in the current version of CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for Use of Force for US Forces.

(2) **Organizational Structure.** The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command.

(a) **Integrated Command Structure.** Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example is found in NATO where a strategic-level commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational make up.

(b) **Lead Nation Command Structure.** A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is International Security Assistance Force and US Forces—Afghanistan, wherein a US-led HQ provides the overall military C2 over the main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

(c) **Parallel Command Structures.** Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The MNF leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of multinational coordination centers. Because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.

(d) Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to ensure effective administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national
forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national support element.

(3) **Use of SOF.** SOF have an inherent capability to provide the multinational JTF commander with an accurate assessment of the capabilities, location, and activities of MNFs, other partners, or indigenous forces. SOF teams have played an integral role in assisting and integrating PN units into multinational operations. Multinational support includes assisting with a communications interface to integrate multinational partners into the command and intelligence structure, establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support, and training multinational partners on tactics and techniques, ensuring deconfliction to prevent friendly fire incidents. When authorized, SOF may be tasked to provide direct assistance to partners during combat operations.

(4) Additionally, JTFs must consider relationships and arrangements with HNs that do not directly participate in the operation but are requested to grant overflight of, access to, and transit through their sovereign territories. This coordination typically will occur through US embassy representatives.

(5) Other multinational considerations include international laws, agreements, and arrangements in place or required to protect the sovereign interests of national territories that JTF forces must cross, particularly if affected nations do not participate in JTF operations. Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide, (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil) lists HN peacetime restrictions to determine if additional bilateral agreements/arrangements should be coordinated through US embassies.

*For additional guidance concerning multinational C2, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.*

h. **Considerations for DSCA Operations.** The President always retains command authority over federal (Title 10, USC) military forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place appropriate Title 10, USC, forces under the OPCON or TACON of a dual-status commander (DSC) (Title 10/Title 32, USC) in support of the governor of a US state or territory. Title 10, USC, forces under the command of a DSC will follow Title 10, USC, RUF unless directed otherwise by the President or SecDef.

*For more details concerning JTF-State, refer to Appendix E, “Joint Task Force-State.”*  
*For more details concerning DSCA, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.*

3. **Management Processes**

a. **General.** The CJTF and staff use a number of processes, such as the JPP, that support the JTF’s requirements, activities, and products. Three of these processes—JTF
IM, the commander’s decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm—are especially important for the efficient management of day-to-day HQ operations.

(1) **IM.** The complexity of JTF operations requires methodical and disciplined IM, combined with other processes and capabilities, to create conditions for shared understanding to help the commander exercise C2. IM refers to the processes of managing an organization’s information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information. The IM process facilitates the commander’s decision making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow, as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. **IM, combined with knowledge sharing initiatives, contributes to creating conditions for shared understanding through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures.**

(a) The CJTF sets the command’s IM focus through the priorities for information and knowledge sharing requirements and dissemination. The commander defines knowledge requirements to fulfill gaps in understanding decision points and the information resources for sharing. The commander additionally focuses the staff by designating certain information as critical. These CCIRs often change over time as the situation continues to evolve. The COS understands the HQ information and knowledge sharing requirements and dissemination needs and directs and synchronizes the staff in these efforts. The COS appoints the information management officer (IMO). The IMO ensures the information management plan (IMP) is operationally focused on facilitating the command’s information flow processes (internally, externally, vertically, and horizontally).

(b) The IMO develops, implements, and manages execution of the IM process. The IMO ensures all staff adheres to the approved processes. The IMO captures the staff directors’ information exchange requirements (IERs), establishes the IM processes, and publishes the formal command IMP or standard operating procedures (SOPs). The IMO also coordinates IM training for the staff and components to ensure familiarization with the IMP. The IMO chairs the joint information management board (JIMB) and coordinates its activities.

(c) The JIMB acts as the center point for oversight and coordinating IM within the JTF. It is comprised of operational or functional information managers and information managers from all the primary staff sections, JTF components, and stakeholder information managers. The JIMB enables decisions made by the COS or CJTF. The JIMB convenes initially to capture and identify both the existing and evolving processes needed to ensure effective flow of information throughout the command and to develop the IMP. Once a plan is approved, the JIMB provides oversight of processes and resolves IM cross-functional issues.

To further assist the JTF IMO in the preparation of an IMP and the coordinating of IM with other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs, refer to Annex L, “Checklist for Information Management,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

(2) **Commander’s Decision Cycle.** The commander’s decision cycle is a process that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. The commander’s decision cycle has four phases (Figure IV-2).

(a) **Monitor.** Monitoring involves measuring ongoing activities that may affect the JTF’s OA or the JTF’s ongoing or future operations. The baseline for this measurement of the situation is the current plan or plans. This baseline allows the commander and staff to identify where the current situation deviates from the one envisioned in the plan. Although staff sections monitor their individual staff functions to maintain current staff estimates, the preponderance of the JTF’s monitoring function is conducted by the JTF’s centers (e.g., JOC and JLOC) and depicted visually through the common tactical picture (CTP) display.

(b) **Assess.** Within the commander’s decision cycle, assessment is the determination of the impact of events as they relate to overall mission accomplishment. Judgments are fundamental to assess JTF progress toward the necessary tasks, effects, objectives, and desired end state, including recommendations to mitigate risks, act on opportunities, and improve mission accomplishment. These judgments allow the commander and the staff to determine where adjustments should be made to operations and
serve as a catalyst for planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.

(c) **Plan.** In the planning portion of the commander’s decision cycle, the commander and staff make adjustments to the current plan or develop new plans, branches, or sequels with the purpose of successful completion of the broader mission.

(d) **Direct.** JTF HQ directs actions to ensure current orders and directives are completed as intended. This direction is done with the broader purpose of accomplishing the overall mission. Tools like the commander’s intent and CCIRs assist the JTF HQ in this role. The preponderance of the JTF’s directing function is conducted by the JOC.

(3) **Battle Rhythm.** The battle rhythm provides structure and sequencing of actions and events within the HQs regulated by the flow and sharing of information supporting all decision cycles. The logical arrangement of OPTs and other cross-functional organizations and factors within the HQ, such as the commanders’ decision making, training, manpower, and experience, contribute to an effective and efficient organization.

(a) **General.** A battle rhythm is a cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. As a practical matter, the HQ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities (see Figure IV-3). These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements. **Typically, the COS manages the JTF HQ’s battle rhythm.** The essential functions for a battle rhythm include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Provide a routine for staff interaction and coordination within the HQ.
2. Provide a routine for commander and staff interaction (in so much as it can be).
3. Synchronize staff organizations’ activities.
4. Facilitate the staff’s shared understanding, planning, and commander’s decision making.

(b) **Factors that Shape a Battle Rhythm.** Subordinate commanders are responsible for linking the planning, decision, and operating cycles of their command to those of the higher HQ and must synchronize their unit battle rhythm with that of the higher HQ. Factors that influence the establishment of a battle rhythm include:

1. The higher HQ battle rhythm and reporting requirements.
2. Battle rhythm must support the commander’s decision cycle.
3. Planning requirements within the HQ (e.g., future plans, future operations, and current operations).
4. Other factors (e.g., battlefield circulation).

(c) Management. An effective battle rhythm requires the COS’s active management and the staff’s meeting discipline. The COS should establish a deliberate
battle rhythm control process and structure that achieves and maintains effective decision support for the commander and staff shared understanding by the following:

1. Establishing a battle rhythm management and change control process that requires JTF proponents for cross-functional staff elements to justify event establishment (i.e., purpose and authority, agenda, proposed membership, event location and timing, required product inputs and outputs) or modification. The COS can impose a “seven-minute drill” requirement on proponents of prospective cross-functional staff elements for this purpose. The name “seven-minute drill” refers to the fact that the proponent staff officer has seven minutes, using the sample format in Figure IV-4, to explain to the COS “why” that particular cross-functional staff element is necessary and how it supports the commander’s decision cycle.

2. Document and routinely evaluate critical path information flows and identifying opportunities to streamline or eliminate unnecessary or redundant events and processes.

3. Regularly checking battle rhythm events to ensure the time of the staff, J-directors, or command group is in support of the commander’s decision cycle and/or staff shared understanding. Meeting chairpersons should research and understand techniques for effective meeting discipline, such as establishing a clear agenda that supports processing inputs in support of the commander’s decision cycle and selectively limiting attendance to essential personnel.

4. Placing accountability on J-directors for developing effective critical path/information exchange flows with clear inputs and outputs for their respective functions and supporting cross-functional battle rhythm events.

5. Maintaining awareness of critical staff positions that are in high demand for event participation. Additionally, J-directors should not automatically be assigned to participate in every cross-functional battle rhythm event. Instead, event membership should be based on who has the delegated authority to make decisions. For example, some high demand subject matter experts (e.g., POLAD and SJA) are important members of events but will likely not be able to support multiple events at the same time.

6. Providing discipline in the battle rhythm execution necessary to maintain sufficient unscheduled time. Without a conscious effort to preserve valuable time for both the commander and staff to think and work, the battle rhythm can become overwhelming and counterproductive.

b. Information Systems and Information Sharing. Information systems are the equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers, networked attached storage, cloud-based servers, and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. Information systems assist commanders and staffs to gain situational awareness and support the CJTF’s decision-making process.
(1) **Physical Information Sharing.** Physical information sharing is done primarily in cross-functional staff elements and other forums and also shared via LNOs and through documents.

Figure IV-4. Seven-Minute Drill Example: Civil-Military Operations Working Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Event Name (Acronym)**
Descriptive and unique name for the event typically describing the cross-functional organization.

**Chair:**
Who has authority to conduct the meeting? This is often not the same as the facilitator office of primary responsibility (OPR). Also identify who can take the meeting in the absence of the primary chair member, which becomes important with decision boards. Should be listed by position.

**Purpose:**
Provide a clear description of the event responsibilities, authorities, and information exchange requirements it supports. What are the specific decisions and products, recommendations, or types of staff guidance?

**Location/Time/Frequency:**
When and where does this event take place? Allocation of resources (time and facilities) and any collaborative tool requirements, such as Defense Collaboration Services sessions/rooms or video teleconferencing equipment needs to support the event. These events should be cross-checked with the command room scheduling tool and J-6 [communications system directorate of a joint staff] equipment support scheduling tools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INPUTS (Products)</th>
<th>From Whom/Event</th>
<th>Time/Method of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the specific input products required and which event or staff section is responsible to provide them? (Once the battle rhythm is approved by the chief of staff, these become specified tasks on the J-Codes). It may be important to also specify the delivery time of these inputs if event membership requires time to act or digest the input prior to the event.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS (Products)</th>
<th>From Whom/Event</th>
<th>Time/Method of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the specific output products from this event and which event are they provided as inputs to? Format for those products, processes required to produce the products. Provide locations where the outputs can be found. When outputs will be available, time and place to include who, what event it is delivered to if it supports other events.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Facilitator/Review Date:**
Who is the OPR that will receive, compile, and deliver information on behalf of the event participants. This is typically also the person responsible for keeping the seven-minute drill information updated. Should be listed by name. Date and point of contact of who last reviewed and updated the seven-minute drill.

**Members:**
Who has to attend (task to staff to provide representation). It's critical in event planning to guard against over taxing low-density, high-demand staff sections and special staff. Membership should be identified as positions identified on the joint manning document or as specific as possible.

**Key Tasks (Agenda):**
Providing an agenda assists with facilitation and ensures an effective and efficient meeting that stays on topic. It also informs others of what the discussion order will be for the meeting providing further guidance than just what's in the purpose statement and achieve the key tasks of the event.
- Meeting agenda posted (Displayed as members assemble)
- Security classification check of attendees
- Roll call of required membership
- Chair opening comments
- Review/update of outstanding event requests for information (RFIs)/tasks
- Summary of event new RFIs/tasking
- (RFIs/RFI responses) (Task/OPR/Suspect)
- Chair closing comments

**Figure IV-4. Seven-Minute Drill Example: Civil-Military Operations Working Group**
(2) **Virtual Information Sharing.** Virtual information sharing allows organizations and elements within or external to an HQ, whether collocated or geographically separate, to access the same information. This occurs both horizontally within an HQ and adjacent units and staffs and vertically with components and higher HQ. A virtual network approach can provide an easily accessible point for information sharing through employment of web pages and directories for authorized uses. Information also can be disseminated via e-mail, message traffic, one of the Defense enterprise services (e.g., Defense Enterprise Portal Services or Defense Collaboration Services), or video teleconferencing (VTC). Members of the JTF staff, LNOs, JTF components, and higher and adjacent commands can all collect or disseminate information in accordance with defined access permissions. If in support of another agency, the HQ should give priority to using systems, web pages, and other conventions preferred by the lead agency, wherever possible. Failure to do so can inhibit information sharing among USG entities.

(3) **Joint Visibility Information.** Personnel visibility is having reliable information that provides visibility of US Service members, DOD civilian employees, and DOD-funded contractors physically present in a GCC’s AOR. Additionally, personnel visibility may be expanded to include multinational partners, security forces, and local national and third-country employees as appropriate. The goal of personnel visibility is to provide accurate, timely, readily available personnel information to senior leadership. The GCC will plan for and cause the establishment of a process, using existing Service systems, to account for all personnel in their AOR to achieve personnel visibility. The GCC has the authority to accomplish personnel service support functions through a single-service manager.

(a) The JTF HQ and Service component commands are responsible for providing accurate personnel visibility data to the GCC for their OAs. A Service has the responsibility of operating an aerial port of debarkation (APOD)/seaport of debarkation (SPOD) or aerial port of embarkation (APOE)/seaport of embarkation (SPOE) in a GCC’s AOR to process their personnel. Various categories of personnel from other Services and organizations may arrive in the theater through the APOD/SPOD or depart through their APOE/SPOE.

(b) The GCC has the authority to accomplish personnel service support functions through the single-service manager concept. Service components may be tasked to collect personal data, using their Service system, for personnel from other Services and organizations who arrive in theater through their APOD/SPOD or depart the theater through their APOE/SPOE. Service components organizations tasked as a single-service manager will receive guidance and direction from and be under the operational oversight of the GCC’s J-1.
Intentionally Blank
1. General

   a. The director J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the CJTF on manpower management, personnel management, personnel readiness, and personnel services for the total force (military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor). The J-1 maintains the JMD, is the focal point for personnel support actions, and manages and synchronizes the level of personnel support provided to the task force during all phases of an operation. Although the Services have the primary responsibility for providing personnel services support to their Service members, the joint force J-1 tracks the efforts of Service components to stay abreast of personnel activities that could affect the joint force.

   b. **J-1.** The J-1 has primary responsibility for personnel management; manpower management; personnel augmentation; JPPC; personnel accountability and strength reporting; rotation policy; pay and entitlements policy; postal operations; morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR); casualty reporting; personnel performance evaluations; awards and decorations; and civilian personnel. To manage personnel, the J-1 establishes personnel visibility policies and procedures based on CJTF guidance.

      (1) The JTF J-1 co-chairs the JMD WG with the JTF J-3.

      (2) In addition, the J-1 provides support and assistance to the office of primary responsibility with regard to Reserve Component (RC) call-up, stop-loss, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and noncombatant repatriation, PR, and detainee operations. The JTF J-1 is responsible for the development of the JTF personnel estimate during the JPP. The J-1 must be fully involved in all phases of planning to support effective planning for personnel support to joint operations and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander’s estimate and plan development. The J-1 also coordinates with the supported CCMD J-1 for personnel planning issues.

      (3) Determine required force capabilities beyond the capacity of forces attached to the JTF and request them via the JTF J-3 RFF manager.

*For further details on personnel planning guidance, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, and CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*
2. Organization

a. Figure V-1 depicts a notional J-1 organization. However, the COS will determine the actual composition of the J-1 based on the overall organization of the JTF and operations to be conducted.

b. Personnel readiness division provides plans, policy, and guidance on joint personnel issues. In some cases, it might prove useful to establish a joint personnel operations center to provide a linkage between the J-1 and other directorates responsible for current and future operations and plans. The joint personnel operations center synchronizes efforts across the staff and subordinate commands.

c. Human capital division provides policy oversight on joint manpower and management of joint forces and US contributions to multinational military organizations.

d. Military personnel division administers internal military personnel programs of the joint force.

3. Responsibilities

Typical responsibilities and functions executed by the J-1 include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Personnel Management. A JTF J-1 is responsible for overseeing personnel management activities.

b. Manpower Management
Manpower and Personnel Directorate

(1) Manpower management consists of providing plans, policy, and oversight on joint manpower issues. The J-1 plays a key role in facilitating the consolidation and management of manpower requirements and sourcing personnel for the JTF HQ. Through the conduct of joint personnel planning, as described in JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*, the J-1 facilitates the identification and consolidation of the JTF HQ manpower and personnel requirements into a JMD, which identifies all manpower requirements essential to the C2 of an HQ organization.

*For additional guidance, refer to CJCSI 1301.01, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.*

(2) Effective manpower management entails the timely development and accurate maintenance of the JMD to ensure the right people are available at the right time throughout the joint operation in support of the CJTF’s mission requirements. The JTF can improve its chances of getting the right qualified individuals by including any specialized training for the billets or ensuring security clearances are not beyond the scope of duties. High-demand/low-density military occupational specialties are a challenge to effective manpower management, as the individuals/capabilities are often not available.

c. **JMD Development Process**

(1) JMDs are manning documents that identify all manpower requirements essential to the operation, functions, and processes of the JTF HQ. JMDs are documented in the electronic FMTS. Each billet on a JMD is labeled in one of six categories for subsequent sourcing: unit, GO/FO, multinational, contractor, USG departments and agencies, or JIA. The JMD process is further explained in CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*, and CJCSI 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

(a) Unit fills are individual HQ manning requirements that are filled by units that are designed to function as a part of an HQ. The unit requirement is documented in Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM) and in the JMD in FMTS and sourced per the bi-annual Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).

(b) GO/FO requirements are for general and flag officer billets in the JTF HQ. These requirements are documented on the JMD in FMTS and sourced through the Joint Staff General Officer’s Matters Office after approval of the CJCS as explained in CJCSI 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

(c) Multinational requirements are for HQ billets from participating nations and are documented in the JMD in FMTS. The CCMD coordinates with participants to source these billets.

(d) Contractor requirements are sourced through CCMD contracts per CJCSI 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

(e) USG departments and agencies requirements are for billets to be filled by personnel from government agencies and departments outside of DOD. USG departments
and agencies fills are coordinated through the CCMD per CJCSI 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

(f) JIA is an unfunded temporary manpower requirement identified on a JMD by a supported CCDR to augment JTF staff operations during contingencies. These positions may be filled by Active Component or RC from a Service or DOD civilians. JIAs will fill task force HQ requirements; tactical-level deployment is not appropriate for JIA sourcing. Sourcing by JIA is meant to be the last method for obtaining manpower for JMD positions. This includes positions at permanent organizations required to satisfy an elevated mission in direct support of contingency operations. Aside from mandated personal protective equipment, JIAs will not deploy with additional equipment. Joint individual augmentation enables CCMDs to augment JTFs with allocated temporary personnel resources to enable them to effectively perform assigned joint missions. The J-1 may not use the joint individual augmentation process to fill permanent manning shortfalls or for joint training or exercise positions. Filling permanent manpower and training (including scheduled exercises) billets is covered by CJCSI 1001.01, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*, and CJCSI 1600.01, *Charter for United States European Command NATO Manning Division*.

(2) The JTF HQ JMD development process, as part of the planning process, is as follows: the CCMD J-1, in conjunction with the Services and JTF J-1s, will develop and maintain one or more JMDs to support potential JTF operations. The organizational structure and size of a JTF HQ, as reflected in the JMD, should be based on mission requirements; a CONOPS; the CJTF decision-making process; both the supported CCDR’s and CJTF’s guidance; and other factors external to the JTF HQ control, such as an imposed maximum footprint ceiling or multinational participation. A well-balanced JTF HQ staff should be representative of its subordinate forces, as well as interagency and multinational partners, and possess a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The CJTF or the COS should direct each staff element to participate in the JMD WG, which defines and refines the manpower requirements for the JTF HQ to perform joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs) and subsequently builds and maintains the JMD. The JMD WG, chaired by J-1 with a co-chair from J-3, meets on a recurring basis with a set agenda with all staff sections participating. JMD development should occur in conjunction with, and be based upon, a thorough mission analysis and the required capabilities and tasks reflected in development of the CJTF-approved JMETL. At this phase in the planning process, the J-1 and other JTF staff elements work in support of the J-3- or J-5-led mission analysis effort to identify JTF HQ capability requirements, JMETs, and the corresponding manpower requirements. Clearly delineating roles and responsibilities is critical to the organization of an effective staff. The JMD WG may seek to identify similar mission JMDs, such as JTF HQ C2 baseline templates and architectures, which may be used as a guide in determining JTF HQ manpower requirements. Such templates must be tailored, based on mission analysis and the CJTF’s guidance, to the specific mission.

(3) To facilitate subsequent sourcing of the JTF HQ by the optimal means of using an established unit HQ as the core of the JTF JMD, the WG should identify the type and size HQ required. The core HQ billets are labeled as unit fills on the JMD. The JMD WG must collaborate with the JTF and CCMD J-3 planners to document force
requirements for the unit HQ requirement. JMD planners also include additional GO/FO, joint individual augmentation, multinational, contractor, and USG departments and agencies manning requirements to define the JTF HQ. During JMD development, organic Service billets may be identified as the “core billets” on the contingency JTF HQ JMD. Many of these “core billets” may be further identified as key billets, for which the presence of the individual filling the billet is determined to be essential to the readiness of a JTF HQ to execute the directed JTF HQ mission(s) within the timeframes required. The CJTF should, however, ensure the JTF HQ avoids over-reliance on a single Service to fill its JMD, as this limits the scope of joint advice that will ultimately be available to them. The JMD WG should also anticipate the need for liaison, interpreter, and communications personnel, especially as these relate to effective coordination and integration with MNFs, interagency partners, international organizations, and NGOs. Manning, communications, and other technological interoperability commonly associated with mission partners can impact the organizational structure of the JTF HQ. Generating multinational and interagency billet descriptions in conjunction with the senior national representatives and senior agency representatives facilitates overall HQ integration and provides the best means of successfully influencing the assignment of partner personnel to the JTF HQ staff. When possible, advance coordination and exercises with these partners can lead to the development of common procedures prior to the execution of an operation and can contribute to the development of a comprehensive JMD.

(4) The JMD WG refines the JMD, to include skill, grade, and position descriptions; reporting instructions; and proposed organizational structure. When the JMD WG has defined the HQ in a JMD, it is submitted for CJTF review and endorsement. Following CJTF endorsement, the JMD is forwarded to the CCMD for review and CCDR approval. The JMD is then entered into FMTS per procedures specified in CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures. FMTS is the primary management information system used to manage and document Joint Staff, CCMDs, CICS-controlled activities, associated joint activities, and NATO manpower authorizations. Depending on CCDR guidance this data entry into FMTS may be done by the JTF or the CCMD.

d. JMD Manning Plan

(1) After documenting its manpower requirements in a JMD, the JTF HQ, in coordination with its supported CCMD, should build a joint manning plan to source the JTF HQ manpower requirements. A joint manning plan can provide a methodical approach to transitioning the existing organic staff of a single-Service organization into a joint staff HQ, and it should consider the full range of available personnel sources.

(a) The designated Service HQ own organic staff.

(b) Augmentees from the CCMD assigned forces, such as the Service components.

(c) Contractors.
(d) Other temporary duty (TDY)/temporary additional duty augmentation requirements.

(e) Interagency and multinational partners.

(f) RC personnel.

(2) Proper consideration of these personnel sources will enhance the JTF HQ ability to acquire the requisite joint expertise to plan and execute the assigned mission(s). This is particularly important if the manning requirements are initially beyond the ability of the supported CCMD to source. Filling the JMD requirements from outside the CCMD can be a lengthy process and is subject to the priorities of the GFM process.

(3) A well-thought-out joint manning plan that provides for the immediate fill of key billets from all available sources can reduce the time it takes to get a JTF established and organized.

e. **Sourcing JMD Requirements**

(1) The CCDR first sources the JMD requirements from assigned forces by forwarding the JMD, to its Service component commands to fill. The Service components, per their respective service policies, identify units and individuals to fill the JMD and report back to the supported CCMD what personnel will fill positions on the JMD. The supported CCDR will identify the billets on the JMD that can be sourced with assigned forces.

(2) The supported CCDR will also coordinate with CSAs to source JMD requirements in accordance with DODD 3000.06, *Combat Support Agencies (CSAs)*.

(3) The supported CCDR will document sourced JMD requirements in FMTS and forward the JMD and any remaining force requirements on the JMD to the Joint Staff for validation and sourcing via the GFM allocation process.

(4) The Joint Staff J-1 will validate the JMD and forward the unsourced JIA requirements to Joint Staff J-35 to develop sourcing recommendations. The Joint Staff J-3 will validate the unsourced force requirements in the JMD in JCRM and forward validated force requirements to the Joint Staff J-35 to develop sourcing recommendations. Validation criteria are contained in the SecDef’s Global Force Management Guidance.

(5) Sourcing recommendations are forwarded for SecDef approval via the SecDef Orders Book process and the resultant SecDef-approved order to the force providers to source is communicated in the GFMAP. JMD sourcing and GFM allocation procedures are detailed in the Global Force Management Guidance; CJCSI 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*; and CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*.

(6) Subsequent to sourcing, ordered force providers, including military departments, supporting CCMDs, and applicable DOD agencies, shall track personnel filling JMD positions and report status in FMTS.
f. Maintaining the JMD

(1) As the OE changes, and the JTF mission adapts in response to those changes, the JTF HQ Manning requirements may change. The JTF should communicate additions, deletions, and other changes to the JMD to the CCMD. These changes should be coordinated with the JTF J-1 and J-3 RFF manager and the CCMD J-1 and J-3.

(2) The JMD should be reviewed and evaluated in conjunction with all readiness training events. To this end, the JTF HQ staff, and especially the J-1, must maintain proficiency in developing, sourcing, and maintaining JMDs for contingency operations. Refer to the Joint Force Headquarters Training website at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/Master_Document/chapters/JTFJMD.xls for a sample JMD.

g. JPPC

(1) Establishing a JPPC facilitates the reception, accountability, training, processing, and onward movement or integration of individual replacements, augmentees, DOD civilian employees, contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), and units into the JTF.

(2) The establishment of a JPPC within the JOA will be at the direction of the CJTF.

(3) For JOAs with multiple entry and exit points, the CJTF should consider establishment of satellite JPPCs.

(4) A JPPC should be staffed with representation from all JTF Service components to facilitate reception of JTF component personnel and provide Service specific administrative support.

(5) Normally, the JTF J-1 would have overall responsibility for managing the JPPC. The J-1 will coordinate with the J-4 for billeting, transportation, food service, and other required logistic support. Outside the continental United States (OCONUS), the JTF will use a designated contractor management system (e.g., Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker [SPOT], Joint Asset Movement Management System [JAMMS], and Defense Biometric Identification System [DBIDS]). The CCMD or the Service component may also require the use of Service deployment tracking systems such as the Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Execution Segments or the Deployed Theater Accountability System.

(6) The JPPC can provide such things as orientation, briefings (e.g., ROE and RUF; cultural concerns; safety; OPSEC; and familiarization with JTF HQ, dining areas, and other facilities), religious support (RS), initial billeting, joint training, onward movement of units or personnel, and accountability of all personnel joining the JTF.

(7) The JPPC should be planned for, and established, when the JMD is developed and distributed to the Service components and the Joint Staff.
For additional guidance, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

h. Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting

(1) The CJTF provides an accurate personnel strength report to the supported CCDR.

(2) J-1 prepares the report by combining Service component reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT).

(3) The J-1 monitors unit strength, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports from Service component commands.

(4) The supported CCDR submits a JPERSTAT daily to the CJCS.

For more guidance on JPERSTAT format, refer to CJCSM 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure-Personnel Manual.

i. Rotation Policy

(1) The supported CCDR coordinates tour-length policies with the Service components, the Joint Staff, and the Services.

(2) The decision to establish a specific rotation policy depends on the mission, anticipated length of the operation, OE, personnel tempo, unique training requirements, and the availability of required skills.

(3) The nature of any operation necessitates a rotation policy that addresses both mission and individual needs. Morale and job performance often improves when individuals know when they will rotate. This is true for both individuals assigned to the joint force and those who are identified for future rotations.

(4) Services tour length policies should be the norm and exceptions to Service rotation polices addressed on a case-by-case basis.

j. Pay and Entitlements

(1) The CJTF should determine, or recommend to the supported CCDR, policy concerning pay, and entitlements. The JTF J-1 should be involved in this policy decision and consult with the JTF financial management and the JTF support services officer.

(2) A consistent policy should be developed to prevent inequities among personnel from the various Services. Pay and entitlement requests normally take time to enact, so an early policy determination should facilitate personnel receiving proper and timely pay. The JTF J-1 should address the following during the planning process:

(a) TDY allowances (per diem rates); use of field conditions.
(b) Imminent danger pay, if applicable. This pay is not placed in effect until authorized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy and is not retroactive.

(c) Hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay, if applicable.

(d) Combat zone tax exclusion benefits, if applicable.

(e) Government civilian employees.

   1. Danger pay allowances.

   2. Foreign post differential.


k. Postal Operations

   (1) The supported CCDR’s J-1 coordinates the movement of mail to the JOA, normally via a designated single-service manager. The JTF J-1 implements postal operations in the JOA based on guidance from the supported CCDR’s J-1 and single-service manager.

   (2) The JTF J-1 develops postal policies. Below are topics for consideration:

      (a) JTF postal staffing requirements.

      (b) Postal restrictions and embargo procedures.

      (c) Establishment of postal infrastructure in the JOA.

      (d) Start date for mail service.

      (e) Free mail.

      (f) Any Service member mail.

      (g) Holiday mail programs.

      (h) Designation of the JTF J-1 as the single manager of postal operations to accomplish the above functions.

      (i) Postal support to CAAF.

For additional planning guidance, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, and CJCSM, 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

1. MWR
(1) The JTF J-1 is responsible to organize component command support, identify temporary and permanent obstacles to MWR activities, identify external requirements to sustain and improve MWR operations in the JOA, and determine MWR privileges for CAAF. The CJTF should establish equitable MWR support policies and may designate a lead agent(s) for execution.

(2) MWR programs are essential to combat readiness. Establishment of these programs should be predicated on the combat situation. MWR programs can be “stress relievers.”

(a) Morale calls.
(b) VTC access.
(c) Pass program.

(3) These programs may include:

(a) Exchange services.
(b) Fitness and recreation facilities.
(c) Entertainment services.
(d) Food and beverage sales.
(e) Newspaper issue and sales.
(f) Commercial telephone access.
(g) Rest and recuperation programs.
(h) Internet cafés.

m. Casualty Reporting

(1) While casualty reporting is a Service responsibility, the JTF J-1 ensures casualty information is reported through the chain of command to make superiors aware of status-of-forces and events that may have significant DOD or media interest.

(2) JTF casualty reporting is accomplished via event or incident reports (Operational Report 3 Serious Incident Report, JPERSTAT, or SPOT for contractors), depending upon the intensity of operations and numbers of casualties.

(3) The JMAO (under the cognizance of the J-4) must coordinate with the J-1 to affect casualty projections for each warfighting scenario.
n. **Personnel Performance Evaluations.** The JTF J-1 must ensure the timely preparation and submission of performance evaluations for assigned individuals in accordance with the established guidelines of the individual Services.

o. **Awards and Decorations**

(1) The JTF J-1 should develop and promulgate guidance concerning awards and decorations consistent with DOD and CCMD awards policies.

(2) The JTF J-1 also should ensure timely recommendations and supporting information for individual, unit, and campaign awards are forwarded to the appropriate command.

*For additional information, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.*

p. **Civilian Employees and CAAF**

(1) The J-1 coordinates and integrates personnel plans and procedures for civilian support to joint operations. The GCC issues guidance on theater admission requirements for use of DOD civilians and CAAF to support OPLANs during contingencies. CCDRs coordinate with DOD components to ensure theater admission requirements and other terms and conditions affecting the integration of CAAF personnel into plans and OPORDs are incorporated into applicable contracts. The JTF OCSIC will coordinate with the JTF staff to identify predeployment requirements to include proper identification cards, security clearances, training, clothing, equipping, and medical processing. For CAAF, the link to the deployment is established by a government contracting officer (or designee)-issued letter of authorization (LOA). The LOA is required for CAAF to process through a deployment center; to travel to, from, and within the AOR; and to identify any additional authorizations, privileges, or government support they are entitled to under the contract. The JTF OCSIC should coordinate with component personnel officers and the J-4 to ensure contract LOAs reflect CCDR requirements and LOAs are required at all vetting points processing CAAF. The JTF OCSIC monitors contract issues, including administration, and coordinates with the J-1 for any special CAAF issues, including administration support. The JTF J-1 will execute CAAF accountability through the use of a designated contractor management system (e.g., SPOT, JAMMS, and DBIDS). SPOT generates LOAs and provides authoritative information on the whereabouts of CAAF in the JOA. Total numbers of contractors by location will be provided from SPOT to the J-1 for inclusion in the JPERSTAT. Development and employment of SPOT is directed in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, *Operational Contractor Support (OCS).*

*For further details concerning contractor accountability, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.*

(2) Contractors provide important expertise in a variety of fields. Thus, there are contractor-specific support issues that need to be addressed.
(a) **Personnel Issues.** CAAF personnel issues for military operations are coordinated between multiple parties: JTF OCSIC, the contract program manager, the contractor, and the JTF J-1. CAAF status does not apply to contractors in the US; USNORTHCOM will provide specific guidance for contractors supporting JTF operations in the US.

(b) **Medical Issues.** In OCONUS military operations, DOD medical assets may provide ill or injured CAAFs with first-responder or forward-resuscitative care until such time they are transferred to a civilian medical facility for further treatment. DOD medical assets may treat CAAF with reimbursement based upon existing contractual arrangements or determined using other DOD criteria. The JTF surgeon is responsible to determine the level of care CAAF may use when supporting military operations. USNORTHCOM will provide specific guidance regarding medical care available for contractors supporting JTF operations within the US.

(c) **Logistic Issues.** CAAF are an integral part of the JTF. The JTF must consider and plan for support for CAAF (e.g., base operating support, billeting, messing, and FP). The requiring activity is responsible for planning CAAF logistics support. The JTF OCSIC will designate how logistics for CAAF is to be integrated and synchronized within the JTF (e.g., assignment of lead Service).

(3) The CCMD J-1 serves as the lead for personnel service support and acts as the lead for all members of the DOD civilian workforce serving in the JTF OA.

(a) Members of the DOD civilian workforce who are US citizens, and whose position has been designated as emergency essential in accordance with DOD and Service policy, may be considered an available resource when creating and filling a JTF JMD.

(b) Members of the DOD civilian workforce who are foreign nationals, are not normally deployed. Commanders may make exceptions for individual cases where the skills are critical to the mission, are not available from military or US civilian employee sources, and where the foreign national volunteers to deploy.

(c) Each deploying member of the DOD civilian workforce is assigned to a military unit with a unit identification code (UIC) for accountability, training, and support. Civilian travel orders include a UIC showing the unit of assignment.

*See DODD 1400.31, DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution; DODD 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce; and DODI 1400.32, DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning Guidelines and Procedures.*

q. **Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities (JPTTAs).** JPTTAs may be established in a supporting GCC’s AOR upon request of the supported CCDR. These centers facilitate accountability, training, processing, and onward movement of both military and DOD civilian individual augmentees preparing for overseas movement for assignment to joint or combined staff positions. The Joint Staff manages an established JPTTA. DOD civilians and CAAF should also be processed through a military-run
replacement center, or Service-authorized, contractor-run process, in conjunction with the JPTTA prior to deploying to the OA. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contractor Support (OCS)*, provides policy and procedures governing CAAF, including predeployment requirements and processing at deployment centers and reception centers.

r. **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response.** As part of personnel policies and procedures, JTF J-1 is responsible for implementing sexual assault prevention and response polices for the CJTF. The details for a sexual assault prevention and response program can be found in JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.

s. **Additional JTF J-1 Responsibilities**


   (2) Maintains a dialogue not only with the other staff sections but with the components and significant participants outside the JTF as directed by the JFC.

   (3) Consolidates and processes requests from directorate or staff sections for nonmilitary personnel (e.g., POLADs, linguists, and I/Ts). Coordinates and synchronizes contracted support requirements (personnel) with the JTF OCSIC.

   (4) Ensures subordinate commanders are kept informed of personnel actions that will affect their commands and their Service members.

   (5) Coordinates, and is responsible to the CJTF for, liaison and repatriation planning for NEOs. The CJTF assigns staff personnel for planning and administration as required and submits total numbers of evacuees through CCMD J-1 to Joint Staff J-1. To coordinate effective support at a safe haven, the CJTF can use the automated NEO tracking system to manage individuals during NEOs. *For details concerning NEOs, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.*

   (6) Coordinates with the JTF J-3 and the OCSIC on the procedures concerning the use of local civilian labor (coordinate with the JTF J-4, J-2, and SJA).

   (7) Ensures personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities and support military deception initiatives.

   (8) Determines and enforces strict procedures for maintaining records management program.

   (9) Ensures equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity support is provided to all personnel in the JOA.

   (10) Coordinates early identification of personnel requirements under an RC call-up, when appropriate.
Additional information on specific procedures and requirements concerning RC call-up can be found in JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning.

(11) Coordinates PR activities, from a personnel perspective, with the CCMD J-1. The JTF J-1’s role in PR is systematic management for casualty assistance to isolated personnel and their families. It includes accountability and reporting (Department of Defense Form 2812, Commander’s Preliminary Assessment and Recommendation Regarding Missing Person) to the CCMD J-1. As directed by the CJTF, the JTF J-1 establishes a PR procedure that coordinates the efforts of other JTF staff sections.

For further details concerning PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(12) Determines the joint and multinational publication requirements for the JTF.

(13) In coordination with other staff sections, estimates and reports casualty rates.

(14) Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP). The JTF must plan for the protection of the total force, to include third-country nationals employed by HN contractors. CTIP affects numerous staff sections within the JTF. For additional information see DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP).

4. Personnel Planning

a. The JTF J-1 should be fully involved in planning efforts and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander’s estimate and plan development. The following are JTF J-1 personnel planning responsibilities:

(1) Participate in the JTF decision-making and planning processes from the inception.

(2) Provide membership to appropriate staff organizations and events in support of planning and operations.

(3) Inform the CJTF and other staff sections of personnel issues that may impact the operation. The requirement for the possible early deployment of postal personnel, linguists, I/Ts, contractors, and other personnel support specialists to the JOA should not be overlooked.

(4) Develop and Maintain the Personnel Estimate. For an example of a personnel estimate, refer to CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures.

(5) Casualty Estimates. The personnel estimate should contain a casualty estimate. Casualty estimates support the following:

(a) Commander’s evaluation of COAs, by analysis of force strength, for missions within the CONOPS and scheme of maneuver, personnel replacements, and flow planning and allocation among forces.
(b) Health service support (HSS) planning, for both force structure and logistic support.

(c) Transportation planning, including both intertheater and intratheater requirements, to deliver medical force structure and to evacuate and replace personnel and evacuation policy options to sustain the force by balancing minimal support force footprint, maximum in-theater returns-to-duty, and stable personnel rotation. Service components in a joint force command provide their casualty estimates to the JTF J-1 who then makes the information available to the J-3, J-4, J-5, the JFCH, and the joint force surgeon. Casualty estimates should include input from medical planners.

b. The JTF J-1 also coordinates related personnel planning issues with the supported CCMD J-1.

*To further assist the JTF J-1 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex C, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-1,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”*
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CHAPTER VI
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

“Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ca. 500 BC

1. General

a. The J-2’s primary function is to provide information and analysis to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. This is accomplished through an intelligence process that begins with planning and direction; involves collection, analysis, and production; and culminates with evaluation of important information and feedback to decision makers.

b. The JTF J-2 conducts all-source, multi-discipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all sources in accordance with DOD policies and CJCS- and CCDR-approved procedures. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the J-2 participates in joint staff planning and in coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling intelligence efforts. The JTF J-2 is the principal staff assistant to advise the CJTF on what enemies or adversaries are doing, their probable intent, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. The J-2 has the lead for JIPOE and is responsible for managing the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the OE. A full understanding of the OE typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff directorates, organizations, or elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, other interagency organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and centers of excellence.

c. DOD intelligence component capabilities, resources, and personnel may not be used for activities other than foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (CI), unless that use is specifically approved by SecDef and/or the Attorney General. In addition, due to potential violations of the Posse Comitatus Act through direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies, requests for military support to civilian law enforcement agencies are closely reviewed and processed for approval separately. All requests for imagery or other intelligence support for areas within the US are subject to USG intelligence oversight regulations and DOD 5240.1R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons.

d. The J-2 coordinates intelligence personnel requirements and force requirements for the CJTF.
(1) Determines personnel requirements, including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate and forwards these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet descriptions and justification.

(2) Determines required force capabilities beyond the capacity of forces attached to the JTF and requests them via the JTF J-3 RFF manager.

2. Organization

a. J-2 Organization. Figure VI-1 depicts a notional JTF J-2 organization. The J-2’s actual size and composition will vary based on the mission, scope of the operation, and unit that forms the core of the JTF.

b. JISE. The JISE is normally the primary intelligence organization at the JTF level managing and controlling the various types of intelligence functions and operations that comprise the intelligence process. The JISE provides the JTF with tailored intelligence products and services with a continuous analytical capability. Paragraph 7, “Joint Intelligence Support Element,” provides additional information on the JISE.

c. A number of the J-2 functions may be placed under the JISE, based on the CJTF’s preference. The JISE coordinates processes with the other J-2 organizations to integrate all intelligence functions and disciplines across the JTF. The J-2 intelligence operations stress-persistent awareness and local precision and are characterized by net-centric and fused organizations that provide timely and actionable intelligence.
d. Joint intelligence should be provided at all command levels once the objectives, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the JTF.

e. At the JTF level, production focuses on the fusion of intelligence from all sources to support the JTF mission and operations. Intelligence capabilities vary depending on organizational composition. CCMD JIOCs possess organizational processes to integrate and synchronize military, national, operational, and tactical intelligence capabilities to increase intelligence fidelity and timeliness of dissemination to warfighters and to decrease duplication of effort by intelligence centers. See paragraph 6, “Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center,” for more details concerning a CCMD JIOC.

f. Joint intelligence has evolved to a balanced “share” system, where the lower echelons, as desired or directed, request tailored intelligence support from the higher echelons. A JTF can acquire timely, relevant intelligence to thoroughly evaluate the OE and the enemy’s situation based on its mission and specific phase of the ongoing operation. With the “share” system, information (e.g., indications of imminent or actual threats, significant military or political events, and force movement) is available to the JTF in a timely manner. The OE requires a “share” process at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.

g. Figure VI-2 highlights some of the critical intelligence responsibilities of the CJTF.

h. The JTF intelligence staff must understand the intelligence requirements of superior, subordinate, and Service and functional component commanders; be able to identify organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls; and access theater and national systems to ensure appropriate intelligence is provided or available to the JTF.

i. All intelligence requirements should be identified, documented, and prioritized. The prioritized requirements should be passed to the supported CCDR’s JIOC.

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**Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities**

- Understand intelligence doctrine, capabilities, and limitations.
- Provide mission guidance and commander’s intent.
- Define area of interest.
- Specify intelligence priorities.
- Protect and promote intelligence integrity and objectivity.
- Integrate intelligence in plans and operations.
- Proactively work with the intelligence staff.
- Demand high-quality, accurate, timely, and predictive intelligence.

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*Figure VI-2. Commander, Joint Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities*
j. The intelligence effort should be integrated throughout the JTF structure by J-2 participation in cross-functional battle rhythm organizations and events. Such participation allows the J-2 to gain a broader understanding of the OE through the efforts of other staff sections.

k. CI activities provide key support to both the CJTF FP mission and compartmented planning. The joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element (J-2X) should be included in all FP planning, including planning for IRCs. Additional information on this CI/human intelligence (HUMINT) element can be found in subparagraph 8b.(1), “Joint CI/HUMINT Support Element.”

*For more details concerning CI, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations.*

*For more details concerning the intelligence organization and processes, refer to the JP 2-0 series. For additional intelligence planning guidance, refer to CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, and CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning.*

3. Responsibilities

   Each JTF J-2 organizational structure is situation-dependent. At a minimum, a core element of intelligence process and administrative capabilities is required. J-2 responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, the following:

   a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. These requirements must be forwarded to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

   b. Provide the intelligence staff, all watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of friendly objectives, intent, plans, and the unfolding conduct of joint operations.

   c. Prioritize the intelligence requirements. This should include review of CJTF CCIRs to ensure intelligence requirements identified by the CJTF are being processed in a prioritized order.

   d. Request additional intelligence capabilities through established command channels.

   e. Ensure intelligence support to, and representation on, all appropriate staff organizations. The JTF J-2 directs the overall JTF intelligence staff to incorporate the following:

      (1) Synchronize intelligence support with CJTF planning, execution, and assessment.

      (2) Determine organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls.
(3) Develop a JTF collection and exploitation plan.

(4) Provide fused, tailored, and timely all-source intelligence to the JTF.

(5) Inform the CCMD’s J-2 and senior subordinate commanders of the current JTF intelligence situation, priorities, and requirements.

(6) Provide requested intelligence information and support to JTF subordinate command’s intelligence staffs.

   f. Monitor movement, status, and activities of national, theater, and organic intelligence and intelligence-related assets.

   g. Apprise the CJTF and JTF staff of intelligence capabilities and limitations, as well as the potential effects on operations.

   h. Develop and refine the intelligence estimate.

   i. Manage the JTF’s JIPOE process and products.

   j. Manage development of a systems perspective of the OE and identify enemy COGs and decisive points to support JTF planning.

   k. Assist the CJTF to:

      (1) Develop and refine the estimate of the situation.

      (2) Identify relevant and attainable objectives.

      (3) Draft and prepare PIRs to support the JTF’s mission, commander’s estimate, and objectives for the CJTF’s approval.

   l. Provide intelligence support to targeting by analyzing the enemy and situation as specified in the JFC’s plans and orders.

   m. Identify liaison, coordination, and communications requirements with higher, adjacent, and subordinate intelligence organizations.

   n. Validate intelligence information requirements of subordinate and supporting commands.

   o. Determine security requirements for intelligence information.

   p. Plan for CI, to include:

      (1) Provide multidisciplinary CI threat assessments.

      (2) Coordinate CI plans and operations.
(3) Ensure tailored CI or counterterrorism (CT) support to JTF FP programs.

q. Develop the JTF intelligence concept of the operation to include the following:

(1) Identify intelligence systems and personnel.

(2) Identify tasking authorities and reporting responsibilities.

(3) Document procedures to:

(a) Develop intelligence for subordinate commands and forces.

(b) Obtain intelligence from CCMD JIOC and other supporting entities, as appropriate.

(c) Obtain geospatial information support and services, including digital products and services.

(d) Obtain intelligence-related communications infrastructure support. Coordinate communications architecture requirements with JTF J-6.

(e) Identify and maintain continuity of minimum-essential support if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.

(f) Identify JTF requirements for external intelligence-related staff organizations. See paragraph 8.c., “National Intelligence Support,” for more details.

(g) Plan for the integration and synchronization of the collection, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of information derived from captured threat materials.

r. Develop annex B (Intelligence) and its appendices as necessary and provide input as needed to other annexes and appendices to the CJTF plans and orders.

s. Appoint an RFI manager to input valid intelligence requests into appropriate national databases and manage the RFI portal.

t. Develop and recommend foreign disclosure policies and procedures for intelligence products to the next higher HQ foreign disclosure office for CJTF approval.

u. Provide a Red Team. A red team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities in the context of the OE and from the perspective of enemies, adversaries, and others.

For more information on red team, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
Additional JTF J-2 responsibilities can be found in JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

4. Intelligence Disciplines and Sources

Intelligence disciplines are well-defined areas of intelligence planning, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. Intelligence sources are the means or systems that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. Intelligence sources can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. Intelligence sources are grouped according to one of the seven intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), HUMINT, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and CI.

For more details concerning intelligence doctrine, refer to the JP 2-0 series, which also provides detailed implementing methodology for joint intelligence support and operations.

5. Collection Management

a. Intelligence is developed from information that is processed from data collected through human or technical means associated with the seven major intelligence disciplines.

b. The JTF J-2 may establish elements to:

   (1) Coordinate and deconflict source operational interests between intelligence disciplines (i.e., CI and HUMINT).

   (2) Use the “federated approach” to intelligence operations, which decreases duplication of effort by divergent intelligence centers, increases timeliness of dissemination and fidelity of intelligence products, and speeds resolution of PIRs for the commander.

   (3) Minimize duplication of efforts between intelligence disciplines.

   (4) Coordinate the reallocation of collection tasks among intelligence disciplines.

   (5) Ensure proper resource application.

   (6) Provide coordination and integration of intelligence and reporting efforts for the JTF.

6. Supported Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center

a. The CCMD JIOC is the primary intelligence organization that provides intelligence to joint warfighting organizations at all levels. The JIOC fuses national-level, operational-
level, and tactical-level intelligence and acts as the CCDR’s intelligence support mechanism to deployed JTFs, as required.

b. The JIOC support to JTF operations includes, but is not limited to, providing an understanding of the OE by integrating all intelligence information. It is the focal point for in-theater intelligence analysis, production, dissemination, support to operation planning, and RFI processing and validation. While a particular CCMD JIOC may not be able to satisfy every JTF RFI, it can coordinate support from external intelligence organizations for those it is unable to fulfill.

c. The joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) is a transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a CCMD JIOC to a JTF J-2. It helps form the common baseline for all sensitive compartmented information support systems in the intelligence architecture. JDISS is the principal means by which intelligence flows throughout the JTF. Local area networks or Service-specific systems are merely supporting assets.

7. Joint Intelligence Support Element

a. The JISE is the JTF J-2’s focal point for multi-disciplined, all-source analysis, fusion, collection management, and dissemination. The JISE uses reachback capabilities to the CCMD JIOC and Services, as well as national intelligence organizations and centers as specified in the appropriate establishing base order or intelligence annex. The JISE coordinates with the J-2 to integrate and synchronize tailored JIPOE products with planning, execution, and assessment functions. By design, the JISE is scalable to meet the needs of the JTF, and it is tailored to fit the OE based on identified CJTF requirements. Figure VI-3 shows a notional JISE. As shown, the JISE is a principal J-2 organization integrating with joint operations and plans.

b. The JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components. These all-source analysis
teams should be focused on continuous JIPOE analysis using pertinent information that is timely, relevant, and complete.

c. The JISE’s tailored JIPOE products should be integrated and synchronized by intelligence planners with JTF planning, execution, and assessment processes to help the CJTF to better understand the OE regarding how the enemy thinks (e.g., how an enemy will conceptualize the situation, what options an enemy will consider, and how an enemy will react to the JTF actions).

(1) The JISE integrates its activities with the JTF J-2 planning and operations elements throughout the JPP by:

(a) Coordinating with the J-2 operations element to develop and maintain the necessary DOD information and intelligence system tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination architecture for collection operations and management; and coordinating with the intelligence planning element to continuously develop tailored JIPOE products based on the latest available information in support of ongoing JTF planning and assessment processes.

(b) Providing intelligence targeting products and target systems analysis as specified in the CJTF’s plans and orders and described in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(2) The JISE integrates its activities with JTF plans and operations elements throughout execution by:

(a) Coordinating with JTF J-3 watch teams and collection managers, managing all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy that are necessary for understanding the situation, identifying objectives and opportune targets, and providing warning to forces.

(b) In coordination with the JTF J-2 intelligence planning element, continuously provide tailored JIPOE products based on the latest available information to support the continuous JTF operation assessment process.

d. In addition, the JISE may also be used to coordinate senior, subordinate, and supporting commands’ intelligence activities.

For additional information on JISE, see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

8. Intelligence Centers and Other Support

a. While not all of the organizations listed below may be required, each should be evaluated based on projected operations.

b. The following may be established or requested by the CJTF as an adjunct to the JTF J-2.
(1) **Joint CI/HUMINT Support Element**

(a) During joint operations, CI and HUMINT capabilities complement each other and work in partnership under the J-2X to provide JTF intelligence and FP. In concert with the mission, a J-2X may be established in joint force structures at every level during military operations. In addition, individual Service or tactical components may often establish their own “2Xs” to manage internal CI and HUMINT functions, which interact with the J-2X. The J-2X reports to the JTF J-2.

(b) Planning and coordination for early CI and HUMINT collection and CI operations are essential to military operations, and respective capabilities may take months or years to develop. It is important to initiate these operations, to the maximum extent possible, before the outbreak of a crisis. As soon as a JTF is established, a J-2X should be appointed by the CJTF and immediately begin to integrate CI and HUMINT support into planning and operations efforts in the JOA.

(c) The basic J-2X structure includes the following four elements: a J-2X, a task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA), a human intelligence operations cell (HOC), and an operations support element.

(d) Service components could be tasked to provide LNOs to augment the J-2X, HOC, and other joint HUMINT centers to facilitate the flow of their Service collection requirements and responses to the customer.

*For more details concerning J-2X, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.*

(2) **Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC)**

(a) A JCMEC is formed from elements of the DIA Foreign Material Program and the Services’ technical intelligence organizations and explosive ordnance disposal personnel. It is activated during periods of hostilities and assists in management of recovery, exploitation, and disposal of captured enemy equipment. This type of equipment can provide critical information on enemy strengths and weaknesses that may favorably influence operational planning.

(b) A scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) LNO should be included in the JTF J-2. An S&TI LNO evaluates the need for a JCMEC or coordinates with an existing one. Since the JCMEC is formed and operated by DIA, it may operate with little JTF support. S&TI LNOs bridge the communication gaps that might arise. The JTF J-2 should notify the CJTF for JCMEC support and inform the CCMD J-2. The CCMD JIOC will then source and allocate any support as required.

(c) The JCMEC and joint document exploitation center (JDEC) conduct exploitation in the OA, but their functions are not limited solely to combat operations. Both peace operations and refugee relief, for example, could require confiscating weapons and contraband; refugee relief could also require screening refugees for critical information. Cosmetic name changes of these centers in such scenarios may be required.
(3) **Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC)**

(a) A JIDC conducts follow-on exploitation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or detainees. EPWs or detainees are screened, and those of further intelligence potential are identified and forwarded to the JIDC for follow-on interrogation and debriefing in support of JTF and higher requirements. Besides EPWs or detainees, the JIDC may also debrief civilian detainees or internees, refugees, displaced persons, legal travelers, and other non-prisoner sources.

(b) The J-2X HOC manages JIDC activities. The HOC coordinates CI augmentation with the TFCICA for exploitation of those personnel of CI interest, such as civil or military leaders, intelligence and political officers, and terrorists. Appendix 5 (Human Intelligence) to annex B (Intelligence) to a CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD contains JIDC planning considerations.

(4) **JDEC**

(a) A JDEC collects and exploits captured material (to include documents, electronic media—computer files, video) to obtain intelligence. Material exploitation can obtain information on a great range of topics, such as information on enemy intentions and planning (including deception), locations, dispositions, tactics, communications, logistics, and morale, as well as a wealth of information for long-term exploitation. The JDEC integrates the DOD documentation and media exploitation capabilities into strategic- and operational-level plans as applicable.

(b) Coupled with other intelligence sources, document exploitation provides the CJTF (through the J-2) with a more complete picture of an unfolding operation and enemy capabilities.

(c) The JDEC is activated during periods of hostilities, deployed to the CCMD JIOC, or assigned to the JTF to manage the recovery, exploitation, automated processing, and disposal of captured enemy documents. The JDEC may be collocated with the JIDC or the JCMEC to capitalize on the common use of I/Ts and linguists.

(d) The JTF J-2 should notify the CJTF that the JTF requires JDEC support and inform the CCMD J-2. The CCMD JIOC director will then source and allocate any support as required.

c. **National Intelligence Support**

(1) National intelligence agencies can provide support to commanders during crisis or contingency operations. Joint force J-2s coordinate with their CCMD JIOCs and IC liaisons to initiate requests for contingency intelligence support capabilities. The Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence Directorate] communicates support requirements to the IC, defense intelligence officers, and national intelligence managers and coordinates development and staffing of a national intelligence support plan. The DIA senior representative and other CSA representatives are given—and provide—broad access to information affecting JIOC
intelligence operational planning and execution, consistent with applicable security policies.

(2) National intelligence support is tailored to meet the needs of the JFC and to eliminate duplication of skills and functions. Throughout its tenure, the size and composition of the supporting effort should be reviewed and modified as required in coordination with the supported commander. Each agency is responsible for communication equipment and workstations.

(3) Support received from national intelligence agencies may not be self-sufficient; it may require infrastructure, transportation, logistic, and bandwidth support from the supported command. At a minimum, it will require electric power, adequate workspace within a temporary sensitive compartmented information facility, and expendable administrative supply items. The supported command arranges the transportation for personnel and equipment from the continental US marshalling area to the OA during initial deployment and redeployment. Lodging and dining facilities are provided and funded by the supported command. Additionally, the supported command may need to provide mission-specific military equipment.

To further assist the JTF J-2 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex D, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-2,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

9. Multinational Intelligence Sharing Agreements

a. Typically, in a multinational operation, PN intelligence counterparts may locate or co-locate around the JTF HQ in the form of national intelligence cells. It is imperative to establish good working relationships with MNFs to encourage a shared view of the OE. PNs also bring valuable intelligence contributions and can often provide niche capabilities in support of the overall JTF mission. Different participants in a multinational organization can contribute unique intelligence sources and useful perspectives. However, US analysts should be aware of the differing standards each country has for evaluating the reliability, validity, and confidence of their raw and processed intelligence. In addition, some PNs may be limited by their policy on the information provided, and their analysis may be biased towards national interests.

b. There is no standard template for a J-2’s relationship with MNFs since it is situation-dependent. There are certain issues that may be addressed before multinational intelligence collaboration can proceed. Intelligence architecture and workspaces can become major issues. The national policies and domestic laws for every nation state in the MNF must be taken into consideration. Some nations’ laws may forbid participation in certain types of operations, and this may impact what sorts of intelligence the PNs will contribute to the effort at different points. As levels of access may differ between participants in the multinational organizations, the J-2 needs to ensure the variations in access do not jeopardize the J-2’s relationship with the PNs needed for multinational access.
c. Detailed planning for information sharing should be accomplished well in advance of operations with MNFs. This may be very complicated based on the multiple classification levels allowed and by the nature of PNs involved in the operation. Some PN countries have established intelligence-sharing agreements with the US. STONEGHOST is an encrypted communications network designed to support collaboration and intelligence sharing between the US defense IC and its Commonwealth allies during combat operations. Other MNFs have long-standing relationships with US Services and intelligence agencies, but release of US-produced intelligence is subject to review by the foreign disclosure officer. The United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (US BICES) and United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System Extended (US BICES-X) are capabilities that provide US intelligence services and agencies a mechanism for sharing intelligence with PNs who have the appropriate agreements with the US. By mutual agreement, US BICES also allows nations to use the system for bi-lateral or multilateral intelligence sharing by implementing additional security measures. US BICES-X services in support of USPACOM are known as the Asia Pacific Intelligence Information Network. Within USCENTCOM’s AOR, the system is referred to as the USCENTCOM Partner Network. US BICES-X is implemented with PNs or a grouping of nations in alignment with CCMD requirements and the appropriate policy, security, and technical agreements with the PN(s).

For more additional information concerning multinational intelligence sharing, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

1. General

a. The J-3 assists the commander in the **direction and control of operations**, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the J-3 **plans, coordinates, and integrates** operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for successful unified action to achieve unity of effort.

b. The J-3 coordinates operations personnel and force requirements for the CJTF. This includes determining personnel requirements to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

*For additional guidance, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*

2. Organization

a. Figure VII-1 depicts a notional JTF J-3 organization to support the accomplishment of the above responsibilities. It reflects both the traditional staff structure and the cross-functional staff elements and organizations, as required, associated with the execution of operations. The actual J-3 composition will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted.

b. The **J-3 (and Deputy).** Serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters.

c. Administrative Section. Supports the J-3 section by maintaining J-3 correspondence, providing file maintenance, and general administrative support.

d. The JOC is the CJTF’s C2 center. See paragraph 4, “Joint Operations Center,” for additional details concerning the JOC.

e. The **JFE** is an optional staff element comprised of representatives from the JTF directorates and J-3; the components (for example, the Army fires cell or the Marine Corps force fires coordination center); and other JTF staff elements, to include the J-2 targeting staff, the J-5, and others. The JFE is an integrating staff element that synchronizes and coordinates fires and effects planning and coordination on behalf of the CJTF. The JFE also assists the J-3 in accomplishing responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the J-3 and may include any and all of the J-3 joint fires tasks with the CJTF’s approval.

*For further details concerning the JFE and related matters, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.*

f. **Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)**
Notional Joint Task Force Operations Directorate Organization

Figure VII-1. Notional Joint Task Force Operations Directorate Organization

Legend
- CCS: commander's communication synchronization
- J-3: operations directorate of a joint staff
- JCEWS: joint force commander's electronic warfare staff
- JDN: joint data network
- METOC: meteorological and oceanographic
- MISO: military information support operations
- ROE: rules of engagement
- RUF: rules for the use of force

* May be organized under separate staff directorate
** May be organized under one of the component commands
(1) The CJTF should establish a JTCB to provide a review and approval mechanism for targeting. The JTCB ensures targeting efforts are consistent with the CJTF’s CONOPS and the law of war.

(a) The CJTF defines the role of the JTCB and appoints its director. The DCJTF generally chairs the JTCB.

(b) The CJTF may delegate responsibility for running the JTCB to a subordinate component.

(2) The JTCB is composed of representatives from the staff, components (Service and functional), and others as required. The JTCB provides a forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure they are synchronized and integrated.

(3) JTCB products may include approval of recommended modifications to targeting; guidance and priorities; summaries of assessments; and approval of the joint integrated prioritized target list, joint target list, restricted target list, and no-strike list.

(4) The JTCB is conducted daily or as required.

For further details concerning the JTCB and related subject matter, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

g. Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)

(1) CCS is a process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities. CCS entails focused efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and communicating with key audiences through the use of coordinated information, themes, messages, plans, programs, products, and actions, synchronized with the other instruments of national power.

(2) **Integral to joint planning**, CCDRs and subordinate commanders should ensure their CCS efforts support higher-level CCS plans, programs, and actions aimed at key audiences. One approach to accomplish this is to develop a CCS LOE and related plans that provide intent, objectives, thematic guidance, and the process to coordinate and integrate CCS-related ways and means. This approach provides consistency of messages, activities, and operations to the lowest level with supporting commands, interagency partners, and other relevant stakeholders. Synchronization of IRCs, PA, and other information-related actions is essential for successful CCS.

(3) The JTF J-3 facilitates CCS through the integration, deconfliction, and support of IRCs. IRCs constitute tools, techniques, or activities employed through the information environment that can be used to create effects, accomplish tasks, or achieve specific objectives at a specific time and place. IRCs reinforce and complement one another, and their integration is essential to mission accomplishment. Integration and
synchronization of and across IRCs enables many aspects of joint operations. JFCs and staffs integrate, synchronize, employ, and assess a wide variety of IRCs within and across joint functions, in concert with other actions, activities, and operations to influence a target audience's decision making while protecting our own.

For more information on CCS, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs; and Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.

h. IO are described as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs, in concert with other LOOs, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies and adversaries while protecting our own. The JTF IO staff coordinates and synchronizes IRCs to accomplish CJTF objectives. Failure to plan and execute IRCs properly within the operations process can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JTF military operations, adjacent military operations, and other USG information activities. CJTFs must ensure IO planners are fully engaged in the planning and targeting processes, assigning them to the JTCB to ensure full participation in all other planning and execution efforts. Successful execution of an information plan supporting a commander’s scheme of maneuver also requires early detailed staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts to effectively integrate IRCs and coordinate their operations and activities to create desired effects within the information environment.

(1) IO Staff. The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure IRCs are integrated into all operational activities and planning functions of the JTF staff and are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs. The IO staff typically includes a cyberspace element that assists in coordinating USCYBERCOM cyberspace support. The IO cell chief is normally responsible for functions depicted in JP 3-13, Information Operations. During an operation, IO planners should be available to the JOC or its equivalent to assist in integration, deconfliction, support, or adjustment of IO activities, IRCs, and related operations as necessary.

(2) IO Cell. The IO cell integrates and synchronizes IRCs and information-related activities with JTF operations. The cell may be part of the staff’s JPG or equivalent organization. The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations or capabilities that support the IO cell are per CJTF guidance. These supporting organizations and capabilities provide guidance on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities. The IO cell chief and senior representative of each supporting entity should establish their specific supporting duties and responsibilities. The J-3 should tailor the composition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. The IO cell and CCS cell maintain close and continuous coordination to ensure synchronization and deconfliction of information-related actions to achieve the CJTF’s objectives. Capability, staff function, and organizational representation on the IO cell may also include personnel identified in the information operations working group (IOWG).

(3) IOWG
(a) The IOWG provides support to planning, execution, and assessment of information operations, both holistically and by individual capability. It assists the IO cell with establishing an IO concept of support, IO objectives, and specific IRC tasks. As such, the representation within this group includes not only the core IO staff, but other staff directorates and special staff to include PA, CMO/CA, engineers, SJA, intelligence, assessment, and planning, as well as IRC and subordinate IO staff representatives. IO intelligence integration data and analysis provided by JTF J-2 personnel are critical to effective planning and assessment.

(b) The IOWG meeting agendas should include, as a minimum, intelligence and operational updates, as well as functional updates by IRC representatives. Outputs of this meeting can include a coordinated staff estimate for the JPG and OPTs, updated synchronization matrix, revised measures of performance and effectiveness, and updated taskings to IRCs, as appropriate. Additionally, the group provides input to the assessment process by synthesizing representative data for the task and assessment data for the assessment cell.

For further details concerning IO, refer to CJCSI 3210.01, Joint Information Operations Proponent; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-13, Information Operations; and JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

i. FP. As required, FP may encompass US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and other participants as deemed necessary. It includes preventive measures taken to prevent or mitigate external hostile and insider threat actions against DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.

(1) FP Element. The FP element is responsible for providing analysis and recommendations to the staff concerning risks to the mission, FP measures, vulnerability assessments, resource allocation, and any other products required by the CJTF and staff. The FP section consists of the JTF FP officer and should contain personnel that have backgrounds in operations, planning, security and CT operations, and any other expertise required depending on the mission of the JTF. The FP element forms the nucleus of the protection WG.

(2) The Protection WG

(a) This group is chaired by the JTF FP officer and meets, as required, to review and discuss protection issues raised by the CJTF, staff, planning teams, and the JTF’s major subordinate commands. Each principal staff section should be represented and provide an accurate intelligence, operations, and logistic assessment. The staff sections in black represent the recommended standing membership of the protection WG. Personnel in red should attend depending on the discussion issues.

(b) The purpose of the protection WG is to be the commander’s primary body for handling protection issues. Protection WG tasks include:

1. Provide detailed staff estimates to planning teams to assist with the development of plans and orders.
2. Develop recommended risks to the mission.

3. Recommend allocation of resources to mitigate risks.

4. Monitor and disseminate protection information throughout the JTF (threat levels and threat warnings).

5. Conduct protection vulnerability assessments to assist major subordinate commands with development of FP plans.

6. Develop guidance for arming contractors and the use of private security contractors. J-3 is responsible for developing the guidance, and it may be delegated to the protection WG.

(c) Protection WG products should include:

1. Detailed staff estimates and analysis to planning teams to allow planners the ability to produce OPORDs.

2. Annexes and appendices to plans and orders.

3. Protection matrices to assist the staff with risk and threat management.

For more details concerning protection and FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

j. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Staff Function. The CBRN staff provides operational expertise in CBRN defense. The CBRN function should be integrated into the existing staff. Augmentation, by Service CBRN staff, could be required depending upon the mission or joint OE. A JTF HQ may also require additional CBRN staff augmentation based on geographic mission area, assigned Service components, or CBRN situation. The CBRN staff works closely with DTRA on-site specialists or through reachback capability. The CBRN staff provides specialized operational and functional expertise to the protection WG, JPG, JISE, JOC, JLOC, JTCB, and other cross-functional staff organizations as required.

k. Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Cell. The CJTF should appoint a joint meteorological and oceanographic officer (JMO) to oversee and coordinate joint force, functional component, and Service component METOC operations. During the planning and execution of joint operations, the JMO’s duties typically include, but are not limited to:

1. Assemble the JTF’s METOC staff and equipment.

2. Advise the CJTF on the need for additional METOC capabilities and whether to request or establish a joint METOC coordination organization to provide or arrange for direct support.
(3) Assist the CJTF in developing and executing METOC roles and responsibilities in operational plans and procedures.

(4) Establish and publish information requirements and formats and coordinate METOC operations for the joint force.

(5) Communicate with the senior meteorological and oceanographic officer (SMO) and Services for specific METOC capabilities required by deploying forces so they arrive equipped and ready for operational employment.

(6) Monitor METOC operations within the JOA.

(7) Identify support requirements for the JOA’s forecast and other METOC products as required by the supported joint force and staffs.

(8) Prepare input to the CJTF’s situation report to the CCDR.

(9) Request additional resources through the CJTF.

(10) Coordinate with the supported CCDR’s SMO and Joint Staff on updates to the various annexes supporting the OPORD.

(11) Coordinate with the SMO to ensure all available METOC information and resources, as well as HN assets, are properly considered and made available for use by joint forces.

(12) Ensure all METOC personnel and equipment are included in the TPFDD and coordinate with the SMO to ensure METOC TPFDD requirements are validated.

(13) Develop, update, and implement a METOC collection plan to identify all sources of METOC data across the JOA.

(14) Provide direction to the joint METOC coordination cell supporting the JOA.

(15) Actively monitor and evaluate the planning and execution of METOC operations and work METOC issues that arise.

(16) Integrate METOC effects into JIPOE, the JPP, the commander’s situational awareness, C2, and decision making.

See CJCSI 3810.01, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, and JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, for further details concerning joint METOC operations.

1. CMO and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)

(1) Based on CJTF direction, the J-3 may be responsible for planning and executing CMO and CAO. However, the CMO staff element may be organized with its own J-staff coding, J-9, as designated by the CJTF.
(2) The organization of the civil-military section consists of a civil-military officer and personnel who advise the CJTF and staff on CMO that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities and the civilian populace in an OA. Depending on the significance of CMO or CAO, a CMO WG may be formed to coordinate CMO throughout the JTF staff. The CMO or CAO tasks may also be delegated to a JTF component.

For further details concerning CMO and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

m. Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC)

(1) The CJTF should establish a JPRC or its functional equivalent in the earliest stages of establishing a JTF. A JPRC may be established by the CJTF under the cognizance of the JTF staff (usually the J-3), or the CJTF may assign the responsibility to one of the component commanders. The JPRC coordinates with and assists, as necessary, the separately organized component PR coordination cells during an isolating event.

(2) The JPRC should be augmented with appropriate representatives from the other JTF components.

(3) The JPRC coordinates with the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell through the JFSOCC, SOJTF, or the JSOTF operations center for SOF nonconventional assisted recovery and unconventional assisted recovery operations.

(4) Multiple JPRCs may be necessary when there are multiple JTFs in an OA or when the geographic size of an OA requires additional nodes.

(5) Specific JTF guidance for PR will be in appendix 5 (Personnel Recovery Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the CONPLANs, OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

For further details concerning PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

n. ROE and RUF WG. The JTF J-3 or J-5 is responsible for the development of ROE or RUF in the planning process. The ROE/RUF WG provides a formal planning structure that can effectively perform this responsibility. The ROE/RUF planning process requires timely and extensive cross-functional staff coordination and planning (usually between the J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA). The starting point for mission-specific ROE/RUF is the SROE/SRUF, which may be modified with approved supplemental ROE/RUF. ROE and RUF are not static. They are tailored to the individual mission and threat and must remain responsive to changes in either. The ROE/RUF planning process does not end when the plan or order is approved. The ROE WG should track and review the ROE or RUF and respond according to threat or mission changes. It also is the responsibility of the WG to ensure core SROE or SRUF training concepts from the Service and functional component forces are integrated into the ROE or RUF development process and subsequent training on the approved mission-specific ROE or RUF build upon that core training base.
The WG ensures early ROE or RUF development. For details on ROE and RUF, refer to Chapter IV, “Command and Control.” Key points are as follows:

(1) At a minimum, J-2, J-3, J-5, and SJA representatives attend (other participation may vary according to the mission).

(2) The initial focus of effort is in support of the overall planning effort by the J-5 or JPG.

(3) Develop ROE or RUF early in the planning process (before or during COA development).

(4) Consideration of ROE or RUF issues is critical to the COA analysis process. Prepare for war gaming of COAs in the same manner as an opposition force cell by predicting probable ROE or RUF impact on operation planning and by discussing political and military aspects of the mission statement and forecasting probable ROE or RUF restrictions and allowances for use of force. Proposed ROE or RUF must be modified as necessary to support the mission objectives accomplishment.

(5) Gather threat indicators and decision points during COA development that will become the basis for drafting, requesting, or issuing mission-specific ROE or RUF.

(6) Draft mission-specific ROE or RUF in the OPORD, appendix 7 (Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force) to annex C (Operations). The need to request additional ROE or RUF authorities will be identified during COA analysis process.

(7) Develop or review, for uniformity and compliance with the ROE or RUF, the tools for tracking, interpreting, and training these rules.

(a) Use ROE or RUF pocket cards (unclassified, if possible) at the unit level for training.

(b) Post the current ROE or RUF in force to secure web pages or portals as appropriate.

(c) Develop ROE or RUF situation vignettes for use in training.

(8) Oversee ROE or RUF dissemination and training.

(9) React to component requests for mission-specific ROE or RUF.

(10) Generate mission-specific ROE or RUF requests based on the changing threat or mission.

(11) Participate in other cross-functional staff elements (e.g., FP WG) where ROE or RUF expertise is required.
(12) Coordinate with multinational legal advisors to address differences in legal guidance and various national caveats to facilitate maximum multinational participation in the mission.

o. **Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC).** An EHCC may be established to predict, track, distribute information about, and mitigate explosive hazards within the JOA. The EHCC should establish and maintain an explosive hazards database, conduct pattern analysis, investigate mine and IED strikes, and track unexploded explosive ordnance hazard areas. The cell provides technical advice on the mitigation of explosive hazards, including the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and provides training updates to field units. The EHCC coordinates explosive hazard teams.

*For more information about the EHCC, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.*

p. **Joint Security Coordination Center.** A CJTF may establish a joint security coordination center using the designated joint security coordinator and representatives from the components in the OA. Component and staff representation will vary based on the mission, forces, and threat and should support the planning, coordination, and execution of all joint security-related operations, especially those conducted in the designated JSA.

*For more details concerning joint security operations, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.*

q. **Key Leader Engagement (KLE) Cell.** A KLE cell may be established to map, track, and distribute information about the key nodes within the JOA. The KLE cell should establish and maintain a human information database, recommend KLE responsibility assignment, deconflict KLE activities, conduct pattern analysis, develop a detailed background briefing on each key leader, suggest specific approaches for encouraging support for JTF activities/objectives, ensure debriefs are conducted following engagements, and update the map with current information and intelligence and debrief information. The cell provides to field units and staffs an updated map (with human information of the area), background information, and desired effects for KLE in the JOA. The KLE cell coordinates subordinate command KLE activities to ensure a coherent effort across the JOA, gathering of debriefing information, and updating of the data base.

r. **C-IED WG.** The C-IED WG addresses specific issues related to the C-IED plan. These issues can include anything from developing major refinements to the C-IED plan to developing the command response to major developments in the enemy’s employment of IEDs. While the WG usually focuses on specific IED issues, it can become a standing body to establish, plan, coordinate, and manage the JTF’s overall C-IED initiatives.

*For further details concerning the C-IED WG, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.*

s. **Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center.** A GCC may establish a joint patient movement requirements center to coordinate the patient movement requirements function within a unified command AOR.
For further details on the joint patient movement requirements center and aeromedical evacuations, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, and JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

t. **Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) Cell.** GCCs and JFCs may maintain a standing JEMSO cell to plan, coordinate, execute, and assess joint operations to achieve and maintain EMS superiority. The JEMSO cell provides the commander with the means to organize, prioritize, integrate, synchronize, direct fires, and deconflict joint force EMS throughout the OE. JEMSO are the coordinated efforts of EW and joint EMS management operations to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic OE. The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for JEMSO, both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves.

*For more information, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations; and Joint Doctrine Note 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.*

u. **Joint Force Commander’s Electronic Warfare Staff (JCEWS).** The JCEWS is headed by the command EW officer, who is designated as the JCEWS chief. The JCEWS assists in the development of OPLANs and CONPLANs and monitors routine EW operations and activities.

*For more information, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.*

v. **Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Cell.** CTF cells are a central point to integrate threat finance intelligence into CTF operations and coordinate execution of CTF activities. The principal mission of a CTF cell is to identify and disrupt funding flows, financiers, and financial networks of terrorists, insurgents, and other actors. CTF actions, activities, and operations are designed to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and/or use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary’s ability to negatively affect US interests. When establishing CTF cells, it is important to ensure the relevant participants have been included as a part of the collaborative effort. The CTF cell’s staffing structure, toolset, and command hierarchy are designed to leverage tools and resources from across the intelligence, policy, military, and law enforcement communities to complement and enhance the military and other objectives of the USG. When optimally configured and supported, a CTF cell is a force multiplier that can increase insight into the threat’s capabilities, exploitable weaknesses, and intentions. The involvement of various interagency stakeholders enables the CTF cell to leverage multiple authorities and unique capabilities.

3. **Responsibilities**

   The J-3 (and deputy) responsibilities normally include, but are not limited to, the following:

   a. Determine personnel requirements, including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these
requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification. Appoint a representative to co-chair the JMD WG with the JTF J-1 representative.

b. Serve as principal advisor to the CJTF on operational matters for assigned, attached, and supporting forces within the JOA.

c. Assist the CJTF in the direction and control of operations.

d. Plan, coordinate, and integrate military operations.

e. Monitor current operational status of friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral forces.

f. Conduct current operations planning.

g. Recommend JTF organizations.

h. Recommend and publish plans and orders.

i. Control combat camera teams and ensure support throughout an operation. It is essential the CJTF makes certain that visual imagery requirements are identified and prioritized throughout the planning cycle.

j. Assess operations for CJTF.

k. Request modification of assigned JOA.

l. Develop guidance and tasks as requirements for components.

m. Identify the requirement for additional combat forces beyond what is attached to the JTF and request them via the JTF J-3 RFF manager.

n. The JTF J-3 RFF manager will consolidate requirements from across the JTF for additional forces and capabilities beyond what is attached to the JTF. Submit RFFs to higher HQ per CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.*

o. Ensure the force requirements are properly entered in JCRM requirements module for sourcing via the GFM allocation process and in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database for phasing and movement per CCMD procedures and CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.*

p. Plan and execute CMO and CAO, as required. Associated with these types of operations, the J-3 may also be responsible for planning, integrating, and conducting stability activities.

q. Formulate requests to higher HQ for the use of lethal and nonlethal weapons not under the JTF control.

r. Manage the J-3’s assessment process.
s. Disseminate the results of JTF planning, execution, and assessment.

t. Train joint forces.

u. Supervise METOC support.

v. Recommend a joint or MNF organization.

w. Establish interorganizational coordination with interagency and multinational partners, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector, as necessary, to synchronize JTF efforts with these organizations.

x. Initiate requests for operations to be conducted outside the assigned JOA.

y. Plan, coordinate, monitor, and integrate joint air operations and coordinate and integrate the use of airspace and joint air defense in the JOA when the CJTF does not designate a JFACC, airspace control authority, or area air defense commander.

z. Plan, coordinate, monitor, and integrate joint land operations and coordinate and integrate the use of land areas of the JOA when the CJTF does not designate a JFLCC.

aa. Plan, coordinate, monitor, and integrate joint maritime operations and coordinate and integrate the use of maritime domain within the JOA when the CJTF does not designate a JFMCC.

bb. Plan, coordinate, monitor, and integrate joint CO and coordinate and integrate the use of cyberspace to create effects within the JOA with the CCDR’s cyberspace support staff.

c. Establish a JPRC within the JOC to plan for, execute, and monitor PR within the JOA, unless the CJTF designates a subordinate component commander as the supported commander for PR.

dd. Prepare the operations estimate and other planning products, and prepare annex C (Operations) of plans and orders. This may also include preparing the CMO estimate and annex G (Civil-Military Affairs Operations) if there is not a separate CMO directorate.

ee. Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase.

ff. Serve as the CJTF’s proponent for IO and the CCS process.

gg. Develop the protection estimate in support of planning activities.

hh. Organize the functional aspects of the JTF HQ to include establishing and directing the JOC.

ii. Establish and organize cross-functional staff organizations as required.
jj. Develop, maintain, and share a common operational picture (COP) in accordance with CCDR reporting instructions.

kk. Provide for CBRN defense.

ll. Minimize the effects of CBRN threats and hazards through CBRN response.

mm. Be prepared to chair/advise the joint requirements review board (JRRB).

To further assist the JTF J-3 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex E, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-3,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

4. Joint Operations Center

a. The JOC is the most familiar center typically found in a joint HQ. Early JOC establishment may assist in the flow of information, since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information. The JOC establishes a formal process to communicate and gain guidance from the CJTF through the battle update assessment brief. The JOC focuses on supporting the direct, monitor, assess, and plan functions for the commander. It is necessary to have cross-functional representation from all critical functions affecting the mission. Placement of the various functions on the JOC floor is a deliberate process that facilitates cross-functional coordination and synergy. For example, collocating functions and processes like PA and IO in the JOC provides added value and speed of coordination in planning, executing, and assessing CCS efforts. The CJTF establishes a JOC to serve as a focal point for all operational matters and, in the absence of a JISE, intelligence matters. The JOC is led by the chief of operations.

b. The JOC relies on the joint data network operations cell (JDNC) to manage friendly and enemy information and maintain and share a CTP. The JOC should be staffed to maintain status-of-forces, make recommendations, and promulgate CJTF orders in the execution of current operations. The JOC monitors, analyzes, and plans ongoing operations to allow effective modifications to exploit success or to avoid failure. The JOC also tracks CCIRs and makes recommendations to the CJTF on decisions required.

c. The JOC should be organized to perform and interface with each of the basic JTF HQ functions to support the commander’s decision cycle (see Figure IV-1) described in Chapter IV, “Command and Control.” The related functions are described below:

1) Monitor

(a) Monitors the current status of assigned or attached forces and resources and provides information to aid in allocating and moving forces and materiel.

(b) Monitors the ongoing situation of JTF forces and continuously reviews their progress in relationship to the plan being executed.

2) Assess
(a) Measures progress in meeting CJTF’s objectives and end states based on the CJTF’s OPORD. Establishes mechanisms and dedicates personnel to development of assessments. Based on assessment, the JOC leadership determines whether to adjust the plan (resources applied or adjusted) within the JOC’s planning horizon. If the window is beyond this horizon or it is a complex planning problem, the JOC refers it to the future operations planning staff for action.

(b) Evaluates actions to identify operational deficiencies and develops methods to improve joint effectiveness.

(3) **Plan.** The JOC assists in the preparation of current plans and orders. The JOC should also have the capability to conduct planning within its event horizon; this requires staff expertise to quickly develop plans that integrate all of the JTF staff.

(4) **Direct.** Facilitates CJTF direction to JTF component commanders and takes other necessary actions within the authority delegated to the JOC by the CJTF. During current operations this requires the drafting, gaining approval for, and issuing of fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs).

d. The JOC executes these functions with a current operations element and a JDNC.

(1) The current operations element is staffed by J-3 air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations watch officers. This group monitors the OE, maintains operational status, assesses the impact of current operations on future plans and operations, and prepares and transmits orders and reports. Assisting the J-3 watch officers are a cadre of watch officers from other JTF staff sections and various cells and centers within the JTF staff, as well as JTF component LNOs. In addition, functional LNOs provide information and expertise to the current operations section and, in the case of component LNOs, represent their respective commander’s interests at the JTF level.

(2) The **JOC IM element** support includes:

(a) RFF and RFI management, processing, and tracking.

(b) Dissemination and display of JOC information to include CCIRs, execution and synchronization matrixes, and significant events displays.

(c) CTP display management.

(d) Compilation and presentation of briefings.

(e) Transmission, receipt, and tracking of message traffic.

e. The **JDNC** is staffed to manage friendly and enemy information, plus maintain and share a CTP. The JDNC is a task-organized team of experienced personnel that supports the joint data network (JDN) operations. The term JDNC is presumed to be the CJTF’s JDNC, unless specifically identified otherwise (i.e., JDNC equivalent). The JDNC should be trained and equipped to support continuous operations and should consist of personnel
knowledgeable in the operations of participating components to optimize multi-Service experience and overcome C2 system interoperability challenges.

(1) The JDNC’s task is to plan the C2 architecture, maintain configuration control, manage and integrate selected data provided by the various networks, execute the cell’s operations, and develop a CTP that meets the JTF commander’s situational awareness and decision-making requirements.

(2) The JDNC, as an element of the JTF J-3, manages the CTP to provide a reliable, complete, and timely status of entities and events in the OA to the JOC. The JDNC continuously monitors the JDN and specifically supports the CJTF through oversight of both horizontal and vertical integration of data.

For further information on the JDNC, refer to CJCSM 3115.01, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations: Volume I.

5. Current Operations

a. Planning continues as execution begins, with an initial emphasis on producing the OPORD if one does not yet exist. As the operation progresses, planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations. Current operations addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This activity often includes the development of FRAGORDs to adjust or sustain these ongoing operations. The current operations planning function normally occurs in the JOC or J-3.

b. During execution, the cross-functional organization of the staff must be responsive not only to planning requirements for current operations, but must also support the JFC’s mid- and long-term planning needs. The current operations planning teams normally complete their assigned planning tasks without significant interaction with other staff elements (e.g., WGs). The J-3 or JOC chief keeps the JFC informed of ongoing near-term planning initiatives through appropriate mechanisms such as CCIRs, serious incident reports, and battle update assessments.

6. Future Operations

a. The focus of the JTF’s future operations is the development of orders and FRAGORDs that are inside the threshold of the long-term efforts of the future plans, but are not directly related to the management of current operations. Future operations staff is the core set of J-3 planners. Based on the complexity of the planning problem and the time available, future operations planning teams interact with elements both internal to the staff (e.g., WGs, cells) and external to the staff (other HQ and agencies). As the planning teams move through the JPP, they ultimately gain guidance, intent, or decision through designated decision boards.

b. The future operations function typically takes place in the JOC. Future operations ensure continuity between J-5 planning and current operations. Future operations staff develops and maintains a projection of future status of friendly forces and projections of
enemy threat actions as advised by the J-2. Future operations planners also develop the branch plans in support of current and ongoing operations, leveraging their functional expertise. Planning for future operations often is accomplished under the cognizance of the J-3. Future operations staff conducts parallel planning coordination with JTF components.

7. Cyberspace Considerations

a. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

b. CO are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. CO include both offensive and defensive missions, as well as the mission to secure and operate the DODIN.

c. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace and related operations. The CJTF and staff should plan for and integrate CO during all joint operation phases. The J-3 must address a number of challenges to fully integrate CO during planning and execution. They include centralized CO planning for DODIN operations and defense; the JFC’s need to synchronize operations and fires, including those in cyberspace; deconfliction requirements between government entities; PN relationships; and the relationships between CO and IO, between CO and operations conducted in the physical domains, and the wide variety of legal issues that relate to CO.

d. During multinational CO planning, coordination, and execution, there are several items that must be considered:

   (1) National agendas may differ from those of the US, creating potential difficulties in determining the CO objectives.

   (2) National standards and laws pertaining to sovereignty may differ in cyberspace and affect willingness or the legality of their participation in certain CO.

   (3) Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of individual CO plans and orders with multinational partners and hamper synchronization efforts.

   (4) Different cybersecurity standards may complicate the creation of multinational networks.

   e. Legal Considerations. DOD conducts CO consistent with US domestic law, applicable international law, and relevant USG and DOD policies. The legal framework applicable to CO depends on the nature of the activities to be conducted (such as offensive or defensive military operations), DSCA, service provider actions, law enforcement and CI activities, intelligence operations, and HD. Before conducting CO, commanders, planners, and operators should consult with the legal staff to understand the relevant legal framework.
to comply with laws and policies. These can be challenging given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and the often geographic orientation of domestic and international law.

*For more information on the law of war, see JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, and CJCSI 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.*
1. General

a. The J-4 is charged with forming logistic plans and services, to include the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, health services, OCS, food service, and other operationally required logistic support activities. Given the functional role of this directorate and the Service responsibilities for support to their respective JTF components, consideration should be given to the established policies and procedures of the various Military Departments. The J-4 is responsible for advising the CJTF of the logistic support that can be provided for proposed COAs and approved CONOPS. In general, the J-4 formulates policies for the CJTF’s approval to ensure effective logistic support for all forces in the command and coordinates execution of the CJTF’s logistic policies and guidance.

b. Logistics should be based on mission requirements and established priorities.

c. Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments’ logistic resources to support the joint force. From a national perspective, it can be thought of as the ability to project and sustain a logistic ready joint force through the sharing of DOD, interagency, and industrial resources.

d. Joint logistics should use existing individual Service policies and procedures whenever possible. If this is not possible, the differences should be identified to the supported CCDR as early as possible for resolution.

e. Successfully integrating or synchronizing logistics resources within the joint force and with partners is paramount in achieving sustained joint logistics readiness that enables operational adaptability and freedom of action for the JFC. Political, legal, and fiscal concerns should be identified and addressed prior to providing support.

f. The J-4 coordinates the logistics personnel requirements and force requirements for the CJTF.

   (1) Determines personnel requirements to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

   (2) Determines required additional capabilities beyond what is assigned to the JTF and request them via the J-3 RFF manager.
2. Organization

   a. JTF J-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation. To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistic core functions: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, health services, OCS, and logistic services (e.g., food service, billeting, textile repair and clothing exchange, and laundry and shower).

   b. Figure VIII-1 shows a notional JTF J-4 organization. The actual composition of the J-4 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. See paragraph 12, “Logistics Staff Organizations,” for an explanation of various staff organizations.

   c. Logistic responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; therefore, it is recommended the JTF J-4 staff have representatives or liaison personnel from each Service involved in the JTF. Since SOF sometimes relies on conventional Service counterparts for support, it also is recommended that the special operations components, if activated, have representatives involved as well.

   d. It is recommended that the CJTF establish a JLOC, staffed to provide the following joint logistic control and coordination functions in support of ongoing operations.

      (1) Monitor current and evolving JTF logistic capabilities.

      (2) Coordinate logistic support and maintain asset visibility.

      (3) Advise the CJTF on supportability of proposed operations or COA.

      (4) Determine logistic requirements for planning and execution.

      (5) Coordinate with the supported CCMD’s J-4, JDDOC, or JLOC, and act as the JTF agent and advocate for logistic support.

      (6) Provide a central point for logistic-related functions and cross-functional staff elements.

      (7) Integrate its efforts with the JTF J-3 current operations through the establishment of a logistic cell within the JOC. The JLOC should be responsible for the time horizons assigned to J-3 current and future operations while the remaining J-4 functional divisions focus on long-term planning by integrating with the J-5 and JPG.

   e. HNS specialists, HN liaison representatives, an international agreements liaison, linguists and I/Ts, and domestic interagency liaisons on the JTF J-4 staff are essential when dealing with the HN, MNFs, civilian populace, and contractors. CA can provide invaluable assistance in obtaining these personnel.
GCCs may establish a JDDOC to synchronize and optimize national and theater multimodal resources for deployment, distribution, and sustainment. The JTF J-4 section (e.g., JMC) may be required to coordinate some of its deployment and distribution activities with the CCMD JDDOC to better support JTF operations, or the CJTF may choose to stand up a JDDOC under the J-4 if approved by the GCC.

For detailed discussion of the JDDOC and its functions, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
3. Responsibilities

The JTF J-4 responsibilities may include the following:

a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

b. Evaluate the need for and (as appropriate) request DLA LNOs, DLA support teams, and/or DLA JCASO mission support teams to augment JTF staff.

c. Evaluate the need for and (as appropriate) request JECC logistic planner support teams to augment the JTF staff.

d. Coordinate the overall JTF logistic functions and requirements.

e. Advise the CJTF concerning JTF logistic matters that affect mission accomplishment.

f. Formulate JTF logistic policies.

g. Develop annex D (Logistics) and annex W (Operational Contract Support) to CONPLANs, OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans. Develop appropriate sections of paragraph 4 of the basic plan and CCDR’s strategic concept. Participate in JIPOE process.

h. Coordinate common item supply and services support in accordance with tasking assigned in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD, annex D (Logistics) and annex W (Operational Contract Support).

i. Coordinate common-user logistics (CUL) Service responsibilities as designated by the GCC, agreements for inter-Service supply and support, and local procurement and controls, and allocate indigenous facilities and logistic resources available at staging bases in the JOA. This includes items/services designated as common contracted support items/services in annex W (Operational Contract Support).

j. Monitor critical classes of supply support capabilities for the purpose of mission tasking and economy of resources and allocating critical resources.

k. Arrange for and monitor transportation movement requirements; also, evaluate capabilities and limitations of assigned and attached forces, supporting commands, agencies, contracted support, and in-country assets.

l. Coordinate the operation of transportation nodes within the JOA including airports, seaports, and beaches.

m. Identify, coordinate, and arrange HNS and contracted support requirements with the JIACG, CMOC, or primary agency. The J-4 can play an important supporting role to
the CMOC in meeting NGOs or international organizations requests for assistance and aid them in coordinating all aspects of providing assistance with limited resources.

n. Arrange HNS with the appropriate agency in the JOA.

o. Integrate requirements for contracted support and contracting.

(1) Designate the contracting C2 construct for the JTF, if not directed by higher HQ. Take necessary actions, in coordination with the GCC, to stand up requirements and contracting-related cross-functional organizations to maintain JOA-wide visibility of JTF requirements and component contracting efforts and effectively support JTF requirements. Request contracting officers with appropriate warrants. Develop, in coordination with appropriate J-staff members, a contractor management plan to address the numerous contractor-related issues such as accountability, medical, legal, FP, the management of contractors and equipment, and contractor oversight. Organizations that need contractors will determine their requirements, register contractors/contracted support in the TPFDD, and provide trained contracting officer representatives to oversee the execution of contracted support.

(2) Ensure the CCDR’s SJA reviews all applications for arming DOD contractors for personal defense and use of private security contractors so there is a legal basis for approval. A DOD contractor may be authorized to provide private security services for other than uniquely military functions as identified in DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, if it is consistent with applicable US, local, and international laws; relevant HN agreements or other international agreements; and DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS). DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises, provides specific procedures relating to contingency contractor personnel who provide private security services. Additionally, identify resource requirements to support the contracting activities, including protection, financial management, linguist, and legal support.

For further information, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

p. Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable military engineering matters (e.g., construction, maintenance, and site development).

q. Coordinate maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations to ensure economy of inter-Service and HN resources, even though these are primarily a Service responsibility.

r. Assist the JTF surgeon in developing the logistic aspects of the JTF’s HSS system. Assist the surgeon in the development of annex Q (Medical Services), medical requirements, and input to the contractor management plan for CJTF’s plans and orders, if required.

For more details on the JTF surgeon’s responsibilities, refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE (2010)

On 12 January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit the small Caribbean country of Haiti. The resulting death toll was estimated at over 230,000 with over 700,000 people displaced within Port au Prince alone. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Execute Order 2236 on 13 January authorizing foreign humanitarian assistance operations for Haiti. On 14 January, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) obtained Secretary of Defense approval for, and stood up, Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti). A wide variety of US military assets were used to support the operation, which included two amphibious readiness group/Marine expeditionary units with their organic landing craft and helicopters, a carrier strike group, a hospital ship, high-speed vessels, Military Sealift Command ships, Army forces from the 82d Airborne Division, Army watercraft, and strategic airlift and sealift. Seabasing played an important role in supporting the operation because of damage to the port facilities and infrastructure on land. JTF-Haiti quickly identified key mission partners and offered capabilities in support of the lead federal agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USSOUTHCOM selected its military deputy commander, Lieutenant General P. K. Keen, to lead JTF-Haiti, leveraging his presence in Haiti at the time of the earthquake and his preexisting relationships with key mission partners. By all accounts, it was the preexisting relationships that were the primary driver for the success of JTF-Haiti. Key mission partners were USAID, members of the US embassy’s country team, and representatives of the United Nations (UN). The US embassy country team was key to the provision of physical space for the collocation of the joint task force (JTF) forward land-based element with other response partners, initial communications capabilities, and other support. The UN served as a facilitator for coordination among the various international humanitarian efforts to respond to the earthquake. Additionally, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) shared security responsibilities with US military forces during the crisis response.

JTF-Haiti established international planning and coordination mechanisms with the vast number and types of partners and stakeholders. This effort could have been an organizational nightmare, but a workable structure was established, in part because of existing relationships. The JTF-Haiti commander realized early on that it would be critical to organize in a way that would best facilitate a collaboration and align efforts with the UN, MINUSTAH, USAID, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). JTF-Haiti stood up a 30-person humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) as a mechanism to integrate with the UN “cluster” system. The HACC’s mandate was to: coordinate, synchronize, track, and assess humanitarian assistance operations; create and maintain the humanitarian assistance common operational picture; integrate with all stakeholders in order to develop a prioritized list of support requirements; and serve as the primary JTF interface with UN, NGO, and interagency partners.

Various Sources
s. Coordinate joint mortuary affairs, including the return of remains. Mortuary affairs include the responsibilities for coordinating search and recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within the theater. The responsibility extends not only to US forces and civilians, but, when requested by DOS and authorized by SecDef, also to multinational, partner, third country, local national, and enemy dead. Mortuary affairs in a DSCA scenario (i.e., JTF operations within the US) requires close coordination with civil authorities to ensure compliance with applicable statutes and established procedures.

For further details concerning mortuary affairs, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

t. With the PM, coordinate support for returning EPWs or detainees, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained or retained persons.

u. Refine logistic planning guidance, ensure logistic-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities, and support military deception initiatives.

v. Maintain liaison with the other JTF staff agencies, subordinate task forces, and component commands.

w. Coordinate agreements, transactions, and implementing instructions with the appropriate component and multinational POCs for US and multinational mutual support logistic exchange issues.

x. Provide reporting guidance and ensure Service components use published procedures for positive control of the total force and assets during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations.

y. Coordinate with the JTF J-1 to establish personnel accountability operations in the JOA.

4. Authority

a. Title 10, USC, empowers the CCDR to exercise COCOM over assigned forces. Inherent in COCOM is directive authority for logistics (DAFL), which is the CCDR’s authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved OPLANs. DAFL will only be executed by CCDRs.

b. Although DAFL is a logistic authority of COCOM, and thus only applies to assigned forces, under crisis or wartime conditions, the CCDR may use the facilities and supplies of all forces, assigned or attached, necessary to accomplish the missions.

(1) DAFL cannot be transferred.
(2) When forces are transferred or attached OPCON from one CCDR to another, DAFL does not transfer unless specifically authorized by SecDef. Granting of such authority is usually addressed in the EXORD or other directives that transfer forces.

c. DAFL cannot be delegated to a subordinate commander.

d. A CCDR always retains DAFL but may delegate the authority for the planning, execution, and/or management of common support capabilities to the CJTF within the JOA.

e. It is critical the JTF J-4 determine what, if any, logistic directive authority for common support capabilities the GCC has delegated to the CJTF and if the scope of the authority meets the JTF requirements. The joint theater logistic concepts, described in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, should be used to optimize resources by synchronizing materiel support efforts in-theater to provide the assets required for joint force mission accomplishment in a timely manner.

For a more detailed discussion of DAFL, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

5. Planning Considerations

a. Employment planning considerations directly impact the projection or deployment of forces. From employment planning decisions, the CJTF identifies force requirements/capabilities; intent for the deployment operation; the time-phased arrival of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in-theater; sustainment requirements; and the closure of forces required to execute operations. Equally important to the successful conclusion of joint operations will be effective reconstitution and redeployment planning performed to either return a unit to home station or deploy it to another OA. Transition planning must begin early and include the following:

(1) Planning for what logistic infrastructure, materiel, equipment, contracts that will remain in country (if any).

(2) Determining what is required for redeployment of forces, materiel, equipment, and contracted support.

(3) Determining the proper legal transfer authority before turning over US assets to HN or MNFs.

b. Synergy. Effective logistics is derived from the synergy of information and logistic resources required to provide rapid, continuous, and responsive support to the commander. This includes delivery, tracking, and shifting of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies (even while en route) to optimize support to the warfighter. There are multiple organizations within the J-4 that contribute to this synergy: JLOC, OCSIC, joint petroleum office, and JDDOC. A JDDOC may be forward deployed from the supported CCMD to the JTF HQ to facilitate distribution and deployment. The decision to deploy this
organization forward is operationally dependent and determined by the CCDR in coordination with the CJTF.

c. **Logistic C2.** Unity of effort requires coordination not only between Services, but also among USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and MNFs.

d. **Apportionment and Allocation.** Apportionment is, in a general sense, distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point for planning. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning. Allocation is distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, forces, and others. Failure to maintain a system of apportionment and allocation can cause inflation of priorities, ultimate breakdown of the priority system, and loss of control over the logistic system.

e. **Accommodation for Requirements.** An effective J-4 organization should be able to meet all the anticipated JTF logistic requirements. If the scope or mission of the JTF should change, it is imperative the staff and structure of the J-4 organization adapt.

f. **Economy.** As one of the principles of logistics, true economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources and facilities (based on threat distribution and phase duration) that are essential to initiate and sustain operations. At the same time, planners should avoid building too large a stockpile. Excess stocks waste resources, decrease flexibility, drain transportation resources from other priorities, and deny logistic support to other areas. Availability of strategic and intratheater transportation capability (e.g., people, materials handling equipment, lift assets) is critical to successful supply planning.

g. **Movement Control and In-Transit Visibility.** Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective operations. A JTF needs the capability to track and account for forces, equipment, and supplies coming into and within the JOA. Appropriate automated information system support, augmented by automated identification technology, is essential for this requirement.

(1) **Transportation by air, land, and sea, is the “linchpin” of the JTF operation.** The JTF J-4 not only must understand the roles and functions of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF, but also the impact of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations on operational movement.

   (a) Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The JTF J-4 requires the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies in and out of the JOA.

   (b) Success of Service logistic streamlining initiatives is heavily reliant on intratheater distribution support. The JTF J-4 must coordinate with the theater J-4 to ensure
the theater distribution network is focused to meet the JTF’s deployment and initial logistic requirements.

(c) Coordination of movement and access to JOPES is critical to deploying and supporting JTF forces.

(d) Establish logistic flow priorities in the initial assessment and continually updated as operations progress. Materiel arriving before cargo handling equipment is on hand or personnel deploying well in advance of their equipment can cause major problems.

(e) The JTF J-4 integrates theater movement requirements with strategic movement to ensure continued support of ongoing operations. Inadequate control of movement reduces efficiency and could cause bottlenecks (especially at seaports and airports).

(2) The JTF J-4 and J-3 coordinate requirements to create feasible force flow that best supports the CJTF’s CONOPS within the constraints of time, available lift, and JOA infrastructure. Prioritized requirements are then passed by the JTF J-3 to the supported CCMD for validation to USTRANSCOM. The JTF should define its movement requirements, specifically the movement timeline, and allow the Defense Transportation System to effectively move its requirements.

h. **Deployment Information.** The coordination and sharing of accurate, up-to-date information is vital to effective logistic planning, coordinating unit movements, and conducting sustainment operations. Knowing where units and supplies are located is critical to successful equipment and materiel support.

i. **Logistic Reserves.** Logistics can affect timing and tempo at the operational level of warfare when it determines how quickly a campaign can proceed. It is necessary to establish the requirement for logistic reserves with the supported CCDR.

j. **Industrial Base Requirements.** To ensure appropriate industrial surge planning for troop support items and spares, critical items must be identified and communicated through the appropriate inventory control point and through either DLA or Service materiel command to the industrial base.

k. **Additional Planning Considerations**

(1) Logistic plans should be written to anticipate changes.

(2) Early involvement of the JTF J-4 logistic staff is critical to the success of the operation and ensures logistic requirements are balanced with capabilities.

(3) **Logistic Planners.** Key logistic representatives and their responsibilities are listed below.

(a) Determine JTF resupply requirements and understand Services’ resupply abilities and restraints.
(b) Identify requirements and pass them to the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR validates the requirements and passes them to the appropriate Service component, DLA, or outside agency for sourcing. Working with the Service components, the JTF J-4 can determine whether the JTF support should be provided from the military (Services), contracted support, HN, UN, or other nations.

(4) Transportation infrastructure analysts from USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands (TCCs) evaluate airports, seaports, and inland transportation systems capabilities against requirements. Short duration logistic planner support can be requested from USTRANSCOM through global response force requests, an emergent RFF, or coordination from the supported CCMD J-3 to USTRANSCOM J-3 [Director, Operations and Plans] for expedited execution of existing Unified Command Plan authorities.

(5) OCS personnel evaluate capabilities to provide support services, storage, and materiel from local and regional assets, which includes not only HNS but also the private sector.

(6) Engineers determine the capabilities of existing infrastructure and develop plans and requirements to upgrade existing or provide new infrastructure to support the JTF. The provisions of JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, detail engineer capabilities.

(7) Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the OA. Operations from a sea base allow for rapid movement to the area of crisis and the buildup of combat power while in international waters without political restrictions. For planning considerations and other information on seabasing, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations; JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations; and Navy Warfare Publication 3-62/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-31.7, Seabasing.

(8) A JTF logistic plan should be integrated with component commands and other organizations and agencies, as well as HN and MNFs, to ensure success. Additionally, consider requirement to assign JTF base operation support integrator for each logistical support node.

For further details concerning planning guidance and areas to consider when developing the logistic plan, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System; and CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Planning Formats and Guidance.

6. Multinational Logistic Considerations

a. In the absence of appropriate international agreements, no authority exists for the MNFC to provide for, or accept logistic support from, multinational partners. Once multinational support is established, the JTF J-4 should ensure it is clearly understood what assistance can be rendered or received from MNFs and what reports higher authorities require—detailed accounting is a must.
b. The JTF J-4 staff must be aware of cultural differences (e.g., language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks), which may impact logistic support to/from MNFs.

c. In conjunction with the JTF SJA, the JTF J-4 staff develops a list of current agreements with other participating nations that provide logistic support and should establish quality control and monitoring compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); water; and food.

Additional multinational logistic information, considerations, and issues can be found in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations; JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; and JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.

7. United Nations Logistics

a. UN logistic systems depend on member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for a given length of time, normally 60 to 120 days. This period allows the UN to organize a logistic structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and memorandums of understanding, which will provide logistic support for the forces involved.

b. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate the mission requirements and develop planning data for logistic support. When participating in a UN mission, the JTF should, if possible, send a US logistic representative with the UN mission survey team to assist in preparing the UN assessment. JTF efforts to participate and coordinate with UN forces will further unified action and reduce potential conflicts for use of facilities or resources.

c. Once established, the UN logistic support structure will normally provide a measure of continuing support through a system of a lead nation(s) (one or more nations providing the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement), civilian contractual arrangements, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.

d. The UN normally coordinates such logistic areas as bulk supplies (water; fuel; and rations of common-user items, for example, UN clothing, domestic consumables, batteries, and some vehicle spares) and services, such as waste disposal, laundry, and bath.

e. For UN operations, the JTF J-4 should determine what standards are to be followed regarding support.

   (1) US standards tend to exceed UN standards (e.g., consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels). US military equipment and system sophistication and the expectations of US forces may be different than the quality of support the UN is providing.

   (2) UN standards must be clearly understood regarding the level and quality of UN support provided and funded. Logistic support that is significantly more extensive than what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable.
(3) The JTF should be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support may not meet US requirements, especially in critical areas such as HSS.

8. Other Logistic Considerations

a. USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations provide for their own logistic support. However, JTF logistic capabilities often are requested and provided to these organizations. The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operations groups.

b. The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG departments and agencies, MNFs, UN forces, NGOs, and international organizations that may be established. A JMC, JDDOC, or like organization is the primary organization for coordinating movements, including those provided by HNs or MNFs, to support joint operations in the OA. Close communication should be established with all elements to ensure their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

c. Although the JTF Service components or participating nations are responsible for their own logistics, these components and nations may use the common distribution system and other JTF-directed CUL support to execute the overall logistic mission. Interagency support requirements will fall within this process, and a single Service executing all CUL functions directed by higher authority, contractual agreements, or a lead agency may provide this support. The JTF J-4 has overall responsibility to coordinate this effort.

9. Operational Contract Support Considerations

a. The US has always used contracted support in military operations at various levels of scope and scale. The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning reductions, mission-specific force cap restrictions, and high operating tempo mean that contract support will augment military forces in most operations. **The key for a CJTF is to make a decision early on as to what capabilities the JTF will need to fill the gaps caused by fast-moving, crisis action situations.** Effective contract support integration planning and contractor management within the OA are also essential to ensure contractor-provided support is orchestrated and synchronized with the overall plan or order and contractor employees are properly accounted for, protected, and supported.

b. **The CJTF and components must abide by applicable laws, regulations, and international agreements,** while implementing appropriate contractor planning, deployment, and redeployment requirements, and adhere to theater management procedures as they relate to the management of CAAF. In addition, they must ensure the contract, as the legal basis for the relationship between the government and contractor, carefully specifies the terms and conditions under which the contractor is to perform and
procedures to process contractor personnel prior to deployment. They also must ensure the specific support relationship between the contractor and the government contains standardized clauses to ensure efficient deployment, employment, and redeployment of contractor personnel.

c. A theater business clearance (TBC) process should be established for the theater by the CCMD. This TBC process should identify specific requirements and provide guidance for the JTF to develop a detailed contractor management plan. TBC and the contractor management plan should address, but is not limited to, predeployment training and medical requirements, accountability and use of the SPOT, billeting, subsistence, medical care, and other government-furnished support.

For further details concerning contracting, refer to DODI 3020.41, Operational Contractor Support (OCS), and JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

10. Host-Nation Support Considerations

a. HNS can be a significant force multiplier. Whenever possible, available, and suitable, HNS should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from locations outside the JOA. HNS may increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce the strategic airlift and sea lift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the JOA.

b. Countries without a government infrastructure may not be able to provide logistic assistance.

c. To maximize the JTF logistic effort, HNS functions (e.g., identification of requirements and procurement) should be centralized and coordinated within the J-4.

d. CA personnel assigned to the JTF are trained to identify and coordinate HNS resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

e. The HNS agreement should include the authority for the CJTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

f. Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs. The J-2 may assist in obtaining personnel for use in negotiations.

g. A JTF legal advisor should be involved in the development process for HNS agreements.

h. It is critical to determine a lead agency (UN, DOS, Service, component, or other agency) to negotiate HNS.

i. Areas of potential HNS are shown in Figure VIII-2.
j. Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported CCDR, Joint Staff, OSD, and DOS channels. Negotiations for HNS fall under two basic categories.

(1) No HNS Agreement Exists

(a) The JTF J-4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support required by the JTF and develops a concept of requirements for HNS.

(b) The JTF concept of requirements for HNS is passed to the supported CCDR for approval and action.

(c) The supported CCDR reviews and approves the JTF’s HNS requirements and forwards them to DOS via OSD with a request that a general agreement be established between the HN and the US. The general agreement provides the framework, procedures, and the authority for the supported CCDR to conduct military-to-military negotiations. (If possible, the agreement should provide for direct negotiations between the JTF or component commanders and the HN.)

(d) Once the general HNS agreement is established, the JTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN and begins the negotiations for detailed JTF logistic support.

(2) A Current HNS Agreement Exists

(a) The JTF J-4 leads a review (in conjunction with the other JTF staff members) of the current HNS agreement, identifying the support items in the HNS agreement the JTF would like the HN to “activate.” The JTF then requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement, these logistic support items be implemented.

(b) The JTF J-4 identifies additional HNS logistic support the JTF requires and begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement) to obtain it.
(c) The JTF J-4 ensures the components use existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.

(d) Component commanders inform the JTF J-4 if an ACSA exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist, the JTF, via the supported CCDR and DOS, should take steps to initiate an ACSA with the HN.

11. Logistic Supporting Agencies and Organizations

a. The supported CCDR, through the JLOC or JDDOC (if established), provides the link to interface with the Joint Staff, Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies. The supported CCDR’s JLOC/JDDOC normally performs the following:

   (1) Provides guidance concerning the CCDR’s DAFL and coordinates the resolution of logistic issues and problems.

   (2) Acts as the JTF agent for requesting additional resources, deconflicting demands on common use resources (when demand exceeds capabilities), and coordinating logistics with other MNFs at the DOS and Joint Staff levels.

b. USTRANSCOM, as the distribution process owner:

   (1) Provides global mobility, from origin to destination, to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy military forces.

   (2) Procures commercial transportation services through component commands.

   (3) Activates, with SecDef approval, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, Sealift Readiness Program, and the Voluntary Intermodal Shipping Agreement Program (Stages I and II). Stage III requires the Secretary of Transportation’s approval.

   (4) Provides representatives to the JTF survey team to help evaluate seaports, airports, and inland transportation system requirements. Through its TCCs, USTRANSCOM performs the functions of the single port manager for both APODs and SPODs.

   (5) Monitors movement data.

   (6) Nominates a director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR), upon request.

   (7) Assists in the development and validation of the TPFDD may also provide training to TPFDD development personnel on the JTF staff.

   (8) Coordinates movement and transportation information in JOPES. This data is critical to deploying and supporting forces.
(9) Coordinates airlift and refueling aircraft diplomatic clearances through US embassies with HNs for en route and overflight and access.

For further details concerning logistics, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For a more detailed discussion of DIRMOBFOR, see JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

12. Logistics Staff Organizations

a. Separate logistics staff organizations may be required; the need for each should be evaluated based on the projected operations.

b. The following may be established by the CJTF to coordinate logistic efforts.

   (1) JLOC. This center serves as the JTF J-4 operations center for all logistic functions and staff organizations and can provide the JTF with logistic oversight, coordination, and control of logistic functions. It also provides the link to interface with the CCMD J-4 staff, Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies.

   (2) The JMC implements the CJTF’s taskings and priorities for movement. It tracks strategic-level movements by maximizing use of available in-transit visibility automation tools to ensure they meet the CJTF expected flow of force capabilities into the OA. Additionally, the JTF’s JMC coordinates the employment of all (including multinational and HN) transportation assets within the JOA.

   (3) JDDOC. The mission of the JDDOC is to support the CCDR’s and, if approved, the CJTF’s operational objectives by synchronizing and optimizing strategic and multimodal resources to maximize distribution, force deployment, and sustainment. Its ultimate goal is to maximize the commander’s combat effectiveness through improved end-to-end distribution and asset visibility.

For detailed discussion on a JDDOC, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(4) Subarea Petroleum Office. When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk POL in theater, the subarea petroleum office is established by the joint petroleum office to coordinate, plan, and execute common bulk petroleum products for the JTF.

For more information on the responsibilities of the subarea petroleum office, see JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine.

(5) Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB). The JFUB evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction at the JTF level. The provisions of JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, will guide JFUB actions.

(6) The OCSIC is the key organizational element to conduct effective and efficient OCS planning and integration. The primary task of the OCSIC is to lead the OCS planning and execution oversight effort across the joint force. This OCS-focused cell also
serves as the primary collector and consolidator for major OCS-related information from various sources, which in its totality becomes the OCS COP. It should be composed primarily of planners, to include OCS planners, logistics planners, and engineering planners, as well as program managers, personnel specialists, and financial analysts. OCSIC members are tailored to the mission and should come from various staff directorates.

For more information, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(7) JMAO. In most cases, the CJTF will direct the JTF J-4 to establish and operate a JMAO. Once established (see the checklist in Annex F, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4,” to Appendix A, “Checklists”), the JMAO:

(a) Provides guidance to facilitate the conduct of mortuary affairs for the CJTF.
(b) Maintains data pertaining to the recovery, identification, and disposition of all US dead and missing in the JOA.
(c) Serves as a mortuary affairs liaison between the JTF and the JMAOs of the supported CCMD and Services.
(d) Serves as the central clearing point for mortuary affairs-related information.
(e) Monitors the deceased and missing personal effects program.
(f) Performs planning, execution, technical, and management functions.
(g) Develops/disseminates standards/procedures and collects/presents mortuary affairs management statistical data.

For further details concerning mortuary affairs and the JMAO, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

(8) The JRRB is the subordinate JFC’s formal mechanism to review, validate, prioritize, and approve selected Service component contract support requests. The JRRB should be established at the subordinate JFC’s level during any sustained operation that includes significant levels of contracted support. It may also be used as a venue to evaluate possible operational impacts of specific contract support requests and, when appropriate, is used to provide guidance on recommended contract support request consolidation actions, as well as acquisition plan to the joint contracting support board (JCSB) (e.g., the required service is a potential high-security threat so guidance is to not use a local national company for this support). It also serves as a mechanism to enforce the subordinate JFC’s cost control guidance. The JRRB is normally chaired by the subordinate deputy commander for support or J-4 and made up of subordinate staff and command representatives. Designated OCSIC members are normally responsible for JRRB...
secretariat functions. The JRRB also includes non-voting theater support contracting activity, CSA, and Service civil augmentation program representatives, as appropriate.

(9) **The JCSB** is the subordinate JFC’s primary mechanism to coordinate and deconflict common contracting actions between theater support contracting and external support contracting activities executing or delivering contracted support within the OA. It is also the major mechanism to implement JRRB guidance when it comes to determining the appropriate contracting mechanism (theater support, civil augmentation program task orders, and other common external contract) for major, common services. The goals of the JCSB are twofold: ensure contract support actions support the JFC’s OCS-related command guidance (e.g., maximize the use of local national firms, reduce costs) and maximize contracting capabilities of the JOA while minimizing the competition for limited vendor capabilities.

*To further assist the JTF J-4 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex F, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”*
CHAPTER IX
PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE

1. General

a. Plans. The J-5 assists the commander in planning and preparation of joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation. The J-5 may also contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff.

b. Policy. At the discretion of the CJTF, and based on factors such as size and expected duration of the CJTF, a policy division may be established within the JTF J-5. A policy division is typically responsible for the following:

   (1) Analyze, interpret, disseminate, and provide recommendations on national policy documents to ensure compliance with USG, DOD, and CJCS plans, directives, and instructions.

   (2) Serve as the lead office for advising, coordinating, tracking, and maintaining copies of the CJTF’s executive agreements.

c. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the planning organizations and responsibilities. Details of the planning process are addressed in JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and the CJCSTM 3122 and CJCSTM 3130 series of publications.

d. The CJTF and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art, operational design, and JPP. They combine art and science to develop products that describe how (the ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to attain the military end state (ends).

e. Planning Horizons. Like most complex organizations, JTFs have long-, mid-, and near-term objectives. JTFs organize to conduct future planning, future operations planning, and current operations planning. The division of labor between these planning efforts is linked to time or events and is situation, as well as level of command, dependent. Using time horizons to delineate responsibilities, a JTF HQ may focus current operations on activities inside of 24 hours, focus future operations on activities between 24 and 96 hours, and focus future plans on activities beyond 96 hours and possibly up to and over six months. Using these event horizons to delineate responsibilities, a JTF HQ may focus current operations on activities associated with ongoing operations, focus future operations on branch planning, and focus future plans on sequel planning.

   (1) Future Plans Planning. The focus of the JTF’s future planning is development of plans and OPORDs. Future planning processes and products generally require significant coordination with entities both internal and external to the JTF staff. They also generally require adequate time to integrate the work of this broader planning audience. During operations, the focus of the J-5 and JPG is on the development of sequel planning. Depending on the situation, the JPG may also be tasked to conduct branch
planning. The future planning function usually takes place in the J-5 or JPG. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there.

(2) **Future Operations Planning.** The focus of the JTF’s future operations is the development of orders and FRAGORDs that are beneath the threshold of the long-term efforts of the future plans, but not directly related to the management of current operations. Future planning processes and products generally require significant coordination with elements internal to the JTF. They may also require coordination with entities external to the JTF staff. The future operations function typically takes place in the JOC. Future operations planning also develop the branch plans in support of current and ongoing operations. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there. The planning for future operations often is accomplished under the cognizance of the J-3 (future operations cell).

(3) **Current Operations Planning.** The focus of the JTF’s current operations planning is the management of the current operation(s). This activity often includes the development of FRAGORDs to adjust or sustain these ongoing operations. The current operations planning function normally takes place within the JOC or J-3. This allows it to leverage the functional expertise that resides there.

   f. The J-5 coordinates the planning personnel requirements and force requirements for the CJTF.

   (1) Determines personnel requirements to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

   (2) Determines required additional capabilities beyond what is assigned to the JTF and request them via the J-3 RFF manager.

2. **Organization**

   Figure IX-1 depicts a notional JTF J-5 organization. The overall JTF organization and mission dictates the actual J-5 composition.

3. **Responsibilities**

   The JTF J-5 provides political-military oversight for all aspects of JTF operations. The following is a list, not all inclusive, of JTF J-5 responsibilities:

   a. Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate. Forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

   b. Develop, revise, and coordinate required plans and orders in support of assigned CJTF missions.
(1) These plans or orders may exist as a coordinated part of a CCDR’s plans or orders or as a supporting plan or OPORD based on the planning guidance provided by the Guidance for Employment of the Force and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(2) Plans may be prepared in response to a CCDR’s planning directive or a CJTF directive.

(3) During execution, the J-5 will prepare plans branches and sequels as directed in support of future operations.

(4) Prepare the J-5 staff estimate.

c. Lead the JTF planning process.

d. Plan and coordinate future operational phases during current execution phase.

e. Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational HQ, interagency partners, international organizations, and NGOs as required.

(1) Review subordinate supporting plans for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine.

(2) Advise the CJTF on any supported CCDR’s plans and orders that relate to and may impact the JTF’s mission.
(3) Keep the supported CCMD’s J-5 or OPT aware of the JTF’s status of operational planning especially during the initial planning efforts.

f. Determine the forces required and available, and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.

g. Coordinate and review TPFDD input to ensure the force flow requirements are accurately entered and support the CONOPS.

h. Provide planning recommendations for HNS. This includes assisting other JTF staff sections during the coordination of HNS for JTF operations or training when conducting operations in countries that do not have an existing status-of-forces agreement (SOFA). Coordinate with DOS for SOFAs, status-of-mission agreement, overflight and access agreements with nations en route and within the OA, or some other type of HN agreement.

i. Provide assistance to the JTF J-3 in the preparation of orders.

j. Coordinate with the JTF J-3 to ensure political-military activities, such as NEOs and CMO or CAO, are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassies and HN governments (including en route countries) from a strategy and policy viewpoint.

k. Participate with the JTF J-3 and SJA in development of operational limitations.

l. Recommend, as part of the planning process, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Ensure these measures are consistent with those established by the higher HQ plan or order. Coordinate with the JTF J-3 on the adjustment of these measures during execution.

m. Provide J-5 personnel to the JTF HQ advanced echelon (ADVON).

n. Coordinate and incorporate planning with representatives of other nations, interagency partners, NGOs, international organizations, and other interested non-US parties concerning the overall JTF mission, as directed. Take into account that a number of these representatives and organizations may have limited accessibility to information and facilities.

o. Provide the CJTF with an expanded perspective of theater strategy.

p. Form and supervise future plans through the JPG.

(1) Manage JPG planning requirements.

(2) Establish and resource planning teams coordinating with other staff directorates to ensure these teams are adequately staffed with functional expertise.
(3) Manage planning processes conducted by JPG planning teams to include planning timelines and receipt of planning guidance, intent, and decisions from the command group.

(4) In coordination with the COS, integrate events required for planning into the JTF HQ battle rhythm or calendar.

To further assist the JTF J-5 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex G, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-5,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

4. Adaptive Planning and Execution System

a. Joint operation planning is accomplished through the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) uses APEX to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. APEX’s focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of feasible, embedded options for the President and SecDef to leverage as they seek to shape the situation and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in plans that are continually updated. APEX also promotes earlier, robust, and frequent discourse between DOD planners and their interagency/multinational counterparts throughout the planning process.

b. CCMDs participate routinely in all planning efforts. Due to the nature of the organization, a JTF HQ primarily participates in crisis planning. However, Service component HQs designated in peacetime as prospective JTF HQs for specific plans usually participate in all the CCMD’s planning efforts.

5. Operational Art, Operational Design, and Joint Planning Process

a. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. It is a thought process to mitigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the problems at hand. Operational art also promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency partners and other interorganizational participants, when they determine objectives, establish priorities, and assign tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, the integration of military operations with activities of other participants, thereby promoting unity of effort.

b. Operational design supports commanders and staff in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct operations and campaigns. Operational design assists commanders in developing the operational approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to attain their end state.
For a detailed discussion of operational art, operational design, and the elements of operational design, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

c. The JPP is an orderly, analytical process through which the JFC and staff translate the broad operational approach into detailed plans and orders. The process occurs across a collaborative network, which requires dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development across staff echelons, and extensive coordination and synchronization across multiple planning groups. Clear strategic-level guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable, embedded options for the commander to consider as the situation develops. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in plans that are continually updated. Key to the JPP is the interaction of CJTF, JTF staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next higher, lower, and supporting commands. Although an ultimate product is the plan or OPORD for a specific mission, the JPP is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, it produces plans and orders for future operations as well as FRAGORDs that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation.

d. The JPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate continuous interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate HQs throughout planning. The JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and

The Joint Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Planning Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Course of Action (COA) Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>COA Analysis and Wargaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>COA Comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>COA Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 7</td>
<td>Plan or Order Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IX-2. The Joint Planning Process
commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. This planning process applies to all planning efforts. The JPP is also used by joint organizations that have no specific APEX responsibilities. Furthermore, the JPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the EXORD is issued. In common application, the JPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by the commanders at various levels. Figure IX-2 shows the primary JPP steps. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for a detailed discussion.

6. Joint Planning Group

   a. The JPG is a group of staff and command representatives formed by the J-3 and charged with developing JTF plans and orders. The JPG typically forms for crisis planning, but the J-3 can also use it for more deliberate future operation planning requirements.

   b. Early designation of a JTF can facilitate forming the JPG and beginning the planning process. It may be possible to form a JPG without the JTF being fully organized and staffed. The CJTF should clearly articulate the JPG’s function, tasks, and interaction with the JTF staff to prevent misunderstandings and disputes. The J-3 should ensure a synchronization process is in place so the diverse JPG members of the newly formed JPG can work in unison as early as possible.

      (1) The JPG is often the focal point for OPORD development. The JTF OPORD will typically be based on the establishing authority’s OPORD (if available).

          (a) The JPG chief must ensure staff sections and individuals responsible for developing various sections of the OPORD are aware of their responsibilities.

          (b) The format for an OPORD is provided in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures. Information that can be referenced in the supported OPORD need not be repeated in the supporting OPORD unless directed.

      (2) Upon completion of the plan or OPORD and based on CJTF guidance, designated planning teams focus on execution phase planning. Figure IX-3 represents one organizational option to synchronize long- and short-term planning, assessment, and guidance for commanders.

      (3) A core JPG should be expanded for select planning functions. Typically, these additional planners will be needed when specific subject matter expertise and staff or component planning input is required. Many of these representatives are LNOs and JTF staff action officers with specific duties and responsibilities to the CJTF.

      (4) JPG members provide analysis to the planning teams to which they are assigned based on their functional expertise. The JPG members maintain staff estimates that are informed through their participation in WGs and through the continued coordination with their parent staff directorate center or cell.
c. Composition of a JPG varies depending on the planning activities being conducted. Normally, all supporting components will have permanent representation in the JPG.

(1) There are no mandatory rules to determine the precise number of personnel to staff the JPG.

(2) Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure.
(3) These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, directorates, components, or organizations.

(4) Often representatives from the supported and supporting CCMDs and multinational representatives or LNOs will augment the JPG.

(5) Composition of the JPG from the JTF staff may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. A task specific organization may work best.

(6) The JTF HQ battle rhythm should be deconflicted to facilitate staff representative and LNO participation in the JPG.

(7) Often international organizations and NGOs who have extensive experience in the region/JOA, to include language and cultural knowledge, have a better understanding of the OE than the JTF planners themselves. The JPG should ensure a system is in place that provides international organizations and NGOs input into the planning process, while taking into account OPSEC and the sensitivities of cooperation and coordination with international organizations and NGOs.

d. The JPG chief forms planning teams to address specific planning requirements. The JPG chief organizes each planning team with the appropriate functional expertise and administrative support. Planning teams normally are organized with a lead planner, requisite functional planners, component or major subordinate command representatives, and other stakeholders (as required). Planning teams complete planning on assigned tasks and usually are dissolved upon completion of those tasks. Figure IX-4 depicts a notional JPG composition.

(1) Other planning teams may plan for termination of the joint operation and transition of the JTF to another military force, UN, regional organization, or civilian organization. The JPG chief also supervises these teams to ensure they provide the type of analysis and planning that meets the needs of the command group and ensures the command group in turn provides the required guidance, intent, and decisions to allow them to complete their tasks.

(2) To ensure the planning teams remain focused, the JPG chief:

(a) Supervises their conduct of the JPP.

(b) Ensures they meet command group requirements.

(c) Synchronizes their activities to ensure they do not compete for the same resources or functional experts.

(d) Ensures the JPG’s planning teams are effectively linked to other staff agencies (e.g., WGs, centers, and staff directorates). This link is solidified through the staff estimate process in which planning team members inform the planning process through their staff estimates while continuing to keep their functional director informed of ongoing planning efforts.
### Chapter IX

**Figure IX-4. Notional Joint Planning Group Composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Operations Cell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO Planner(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMOTF Planner(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMISTF Representative</td>
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</tbody>
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**Orders Cell**
- WARNORD Planning Order
- OPORD Other Related Orders

**Information Management Cell**
- Message Boards
- RFI Control
- Suspense Management
- Agendas

**Planning Cell**
- Core Planners
  - Mission Analysis
  - COA Development
  - COA Analysis
  - COA Comparison
  - Synchronization Matrix
  - Decision Support Template
  - Multi-Level Planning Element
  - Level 1-Level 4
  - OPORD Development
  - Branch Plans

**Deployment Cell**
- JOPES/TPFDD Planner
- USTRANSCOM LNO
- J-4 Transportation Representative
- J-4 Logistic Representative
- J-3 Representative
- Component LNOs as required

**Representatives to the JPG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component LNOs</th>
<th>JTF Staff</th>
<th>Supporting Combatant Command LNOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFFOR</td>
<td>J-1, J-6</td>
<td>POLAD, J-7, J-9, SJA, PAO, Surgeon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>J-2, J-7</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM, JTCB, LNO, JTF, JOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVFOR</td>
<td>J-3, J-8</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM, JTCB, LNO, JTF, JOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG LNO</td>
<td>J-4, J-9</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM, JTCB, LNO, JTF, JOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>J-5, Engineer</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM, JTCB, LNO, JTF, JOC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**
- **AFFOR**: Air Force forces
- **ARFOR**: Army forces
- **CCS**: commander’s communication synchronization
- **COA**: course of action
- **IO**: information operations
- **J-1**: manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- **J-2**: intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- **J-3**: operations directorate of a joint staff
- **J-4**: logistics directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5**: plans directorate of a joint staff
- **J-6**: communications system directorate of a joint staff
- **J-7**: training and education directorate of a joint staff
- **J-8**: resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff
- **J-9**: civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff
- **JCMOTF**: joint civil-military operations task force
- **JFACC**: joint force air component commander
- **JFLCC**: joint force land component commander
- **JFMCC**: joint force maritime component commander
- **JMISTF**: joint military information support task force
- **JOC**: joint operations center
- **JOPES**: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
- **JPG**: joint planning group
- **JSOTF**: joint special operations task force
- **JTGB**: joint targeting coordination board
- **JTF**: joint task force
- **LNO**: liaison officer
- **MARFOR**: Marine Corps forces
- **NAVFOR**: Navy forces
- **NG**: National Guard
- **OPORD**: operation order
- **PAO**: public affairs officer
- **POLAD**: policy advisor
- **RFI**: request for information
- **SJA**: staff judge advocate
- **USSTRATCOM**: United States Strategic Command
- **USTRANSCOM**: United States Transportation Command
- **WARNORD**: warning order

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**JPG**
- Core Planners
- Possible Subcells:
  - Mission Analysis
  - COA Development
  - COA Analysis
  - COA Comparison
  - Synchronization Matrix
  - Decision Support Template
  - Multi-Level Planning Element
  - Level 1-Level 4
  - OPORD Development
  - Branch Plans

- **Possible Subcells**
  - Component LNOs:
    - Component LNOs
    - Supporting Combatant Command LNOs:
      - JOC: joint operations center
      - JOPES: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
      - JPG: joint planning group
      - JSOTF: joint special operations task force
      - JTGB: joint targeting coordination board
      - JTF: joint task force
      - LNO: liaison officer
      - MARFOR: Marine Corps forces
      - NAVFOR: Navy forces
      - NG: National Guard
      - OPORD: operation order
      - PAO: public affairs officer
      - POLAD: policy advisor
      - RFI: request for information
      - SJA: staff judge advocate
      - USSTRATCOM: United States Strategic Command
      - USTRANSCOM: United States Transportation Command
      - WARNORD: warning order
(e) Determines procedures for coordination with higher authority to include message traffic and distribution.

(f) Arranges for briefings to appropriate individuals (e.g., CJTF, supported CCDR, and others as required) as JPG milestones are reached.

(3) One planning team formed by the JPG chief provides initial evaluation of a crisis situation, develops the organization of the JTF, and conducts crisis planning. This planning team is familiar with the planning process and APEX products. A focused effort is critical during the initial phases of planning in a crisis. USTRANSCOM’s JECC could augment this core group to provide continuity to the JTF planning process. Figure IX-5 illustrates the forming and informing of the planning group and teams.

![Forming and Informing the Planning Groups and Teams](image-url)
7. Assessment

a. **Operation assessment** is an integral part of planning an operation or campaign. It is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint operation toward mission accomplishment. It enhances the commander’s decision making to make planning and operations more effective. Ultimately, assessment helps the commander and the staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.

(1) Staff integration is crucial to planning and executing effective assessment that, in turn, enables more effective planning and execution. Assessment is the responsibility of commanders, planners, and operators at every level and not the sole work of an individual advisor, committee, or assessment entity. Integrating perspectives and expertise from across the staff should minimize errors (e.g., duplication of effort, incorrect identification of causes, or insufficient information to prioritize issues by level of impact) which arise from a process with a limited focus.

(2) Planning for the assessment process is concurrent with joint planning, as part of both operational design and the JPP. As such, the development of an assessment plan is nested within the planning process and integrates roles across the staff and subordinate commands. Defining assessment roles and responsibilities early will assist the assessment design and overall assessment planning effort and enable assessment efficiency during execution.

(3) Develop a credible and transparent assessment plan and assessment products, including integration of assessment indicators into CCIR and PIR development and collection requirements. Vet the assessment plan and assessment products to increase staff understanding of the assessment process and their role in it. Assessment products should cite all sources of information used to build the report; as much as possible, sources and assessment results should be unbiased.

(4) Integrate operation assessment into the battle rhythm to deliver information at the right time. The assessment process should be synchronized with the commander’s decision cycle and battle rhythm.

(5) Integrate External Sources of Information and Intelligence. A more complete understanding of the OE can be acquired by including relevant information from the HN and interagency partners, multinational partners, and all other participants as necessary into the assessment.

*For a detailed discussion of operation assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

b. **Staff Organization.** Cross-functional staff representation is required to effectively assess progress toward achieving objectives. This provides the assessment activity with varied perspectives and the broad expertise necessary for assessment’s credibility and rigor. The level of access to the commander, access to the information and intelligence being collected, and the ability to work across the staff will impact the quality and relevance
of the assessment effort. The commander should identify the director or staff entity responsible for the collective assessment effort to synchronize activities, achieve unity of effort, and avoid duplication of effort. The assessment activity should be routine, not ad hoc. The COS can play a pivotal role in staff synchronization for the assessment. Within typical staff organizations, there are three basic locations where the responsible element could reside:

(1) **Special Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment team reports directly to the commander via the COS. An example of this arrangement is the Afghan Assessment Group within the International Security Assistance Force HQ. Advantages of this approach may include increased access to the commander and visibility on decision-making requirements and increased unity of effort by appointing a designated section to lead the assessment activity, as well as an increased ability to make recommendations to the commander as part of the assessment process. Disadvantages may include being isolated from the other staff sections and, to some extent, potentially being viewed with suspicion by them due to the direct access to the commander and the nature of the assessment function.

(2) **Separate Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment team is its own staff section, comprising the functions of plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications. An example of this arrangement is the USSTRATCOM J-9 [Mission Assessment and Analysis Directorate]. The advantage of this approach is it legitimizes operation assessment as a staff function on par with the other staff functions and allows the assessment team to participate in staff coordination and activities as co-equals with the other staff sections. A disadvantage to this approach is it has the potential to create additional tension within the staff that, if not managed properly, can lead to dysfunctional staff processes.

(3) **Integrated in Another Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment team is typically integrated into the operations or plans sections and the assessment chief reports to the plans chief or the operations chief. An example of this arrangement can be found in the Assessment Division of the Operations Directorate of United States Forces Korea. The advantage of this approach is that it tends to create close ties between the assessment team and either the plans or operations teams; however, this approach significantly limits access of the assessment team to the commander, may have issues with other competing priorities or objectively critiquing the plan or operation, and typically introduces another layer of review (and potential censorship) of the assessment team’s products.

(4) The general composition of an assessment staff section/team may include a data management cell, a survey cell, and an analysis cell. The data management cell collects, collates, and distributes quantitative and qualitative data. The survey cell creates and administers surveys and polls, as well as collects, collates, and distributes survey results. Both of these cells feed data to the analysis cell and the rest of the command and staff. The analysis cell fuses data from the data management and survey cells, along with information and analyses from other sources (e.g., intelligence assessments, external sources such as media reporting, and think tank reports, and direct staff and command input.
to the assessment process), to generate an assessment that provides recommendations to mitigate risk, act on opportunities, and improve campaign or operation effectiveness.

(5) The skill requirements for personnel will vary depending on the function they perform within the assessment team. The following skills should be considered:

(a) **Data Management Cell Skills.** Strong understanding of, and experience with, quantitative and qualitative analytic techniques; experience with common data analysis software and programs (to include database programs); good briefing and writing capabilities; basic programming capabilities; and some experience with, or understanding of, military operations.

(b) **Survey Cell Skills.** Strong understanding of, and experience with, survey and polling techniques and analysis; cultural understanding of the AO; experience with common survey analysis software and programs (to include database programs); good briefing and writing capabilities; and some experience with, or understanding of, military operations.

(c) **Analysis Cell Skills.** Strong critical thinking capabilities; excellent briefing and writing skills; experience with quantitative and qualitative analytic techniques; strong understanding of assessment principles, military planning, military operations, and military decision-making processes; ability to facilitate structured discussions of contentious issues; and basic mediation skills.

*For a detailed discussion of staff organization for assessment, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

c. **Operational Assessment Process.** There is no single way to conduct assessment. Every mission and OE has its own unique challenges, making every assessment unique. However, the following steps can help guide the development of an effective assessment plan and performance of the assessment during execution. Assessment steps provide an orderly, analytical process to help organizations understand the underpinnings of assessment. Organizations should adapt these steps as necessary to fit their needs.

(1) **Step 1—Develop the Assessment Approach**

(a) Assessment begins during joint planning while the command develops its operational approach and identifies their desired end states and associated tasks, effects, conditions, and objectives. The staff also begins to develop the assessment approach by identifying and establishing the appropriate framework and structure needed to assess progress during the operation or campaign. The assessment approach becomes the assessment plan and is a description of the specific information needed to monitor and analyze the creation of desired effects, achievement of objectives, and success toward attainment of the end state. In short, the command tries to answer the following questions: “How will we know we are accomplishing our mission,” “What information do we need,” and “Who is best postured to provide that information?”

(b) These broad actions typically fall under one of three categories—organize and collect, analyze, and communicate.
(c) During planning for an operation or campaign, a baseline understanding of the OE assists the commander and staff in setting goals, if useful, for desired rates of change within the OE and thresholds for success and failure.

(d) Nonmilitary aspects of the OE may be critically important in some operations. Information derived from multiple agencies, warfighting functions, and subordinate commands may be focused to address specific questions about nonmilitary relationships within the OE.

(2) **Step 2—Develop Assessment Plan**

(a) Develop and refine the assessment plan throughout joint planning and modify as necessary during execution. This step overlaps with the previous step during identification of objectives and effects. The assessment plan should identify staff or subordinate organization responsibilities for monitoring, collecting, analyzing information, and developing recommendations and assessment products.

(b) Link desired outcomes to appropriate indicators. It should contain a data collection plan, which includes responsibilities on gathering and disseminating the data.

(c) Determine how this information will be archived, shared, and classified as part of the assessment plan.

(3) **Step 3—Collect Information and Intelligence**

(a) Commands should collect relevant information throughout planning and execution.

(b) Use the data collection plan and reporting procedures during mission execution to gather information about the OE. Typically, staffs and subordinate commands provide information about plan execution on a regular cycle through specified battle rhythm events.

(4) **Step 4—Analyze Information and Intelligence**

(a) Identify operational trends and changes to the OE and the operation. Analysis must be conducted with, and/or vetted through, functional experts within the staff.

(b) The staff can use the analysis to estimate the effects of force employment and resource allocation, determine whether objectives are being achieved, or determine when a decision point has been reached. Additional risks and challenges may be determined from this information.

(c) During analysis, organizations should address the following questions:

1. Where are we?
2. What happened?
3. Why do we think it happened?

4. So what?

5. What are the likely future opportunities and risks?

6. What do we need to do?

(d) The conclusions should lead the staff to develop recommendations for consideration. Recommendations should highlight ways to improve the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions.

(e) Recommendations are vetted and validated through the staff before being presented to the commander for action. The assessment plan should detail the staff processes required to ensure assessment products are valid and associated recommendations improve the effectiveness of operations.

(5) **Step 5—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations**

(a) Develop assessment products containing recommendations for the commander based on the assessment plan, which may include summary reports and briefings. Ensure the products are communicated to the commander based on their personal style of digesting information and making decisions.

(b) **Assessment products are not the assessment itself and are not the data collected for analysis.** Assessment products serve the functions of informing the commander about current and anticipated conditions within the OE, provide accountability to higher authority, evaluate the ability of the joint force to impact the OE, and communicate progress to multinational and interagency partners. The process helps the staff evaluate changes in the OE and supports the commander’s decision making regarding the operation.

(c) Ensure the different staff entities align their efforts when communicating assessment results and recommendations. This may provide efficiencies and possibly eliminate duplicative briefings and decision boards.

(6) **Step 6—Adapt Plans and Operations**

(a) Commanders review recommendations and direct changes or provide additional guidance that dictate updates or modifications to the operation. There may be implications which require a change or modification to the assessment plan. As the OE changes or adjustments to information or intelligence requirements are made, the assessment plan may require updating.

(b) Transitions between phases will likely change objectives, effects, and tasks associated with the new phase. This, in turn, will require review and updating of the assessment plan.
(c) Create organizational procedures to capture the commander’s decisions and guidance to ensure necessary actions are taken. Actions could include releasing FRAGORDs, actions requiring requests for policy/authorities changes or funding/resourcing requirements, additional forces, PN KLE requirements, support from other USG departments and agencies, interagency partner, or modifications to the ROE.

For a detailed discussion of the assessment process, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
CHAPTER X
COMUNICATIONS SYSTEM DIRECTORATE

“During [Operation] PROVIDE COMFORT, we probably brought in 1300 short tons of communications equipment over and above the TO&E [table of organization and equipment] equipment to gain the necessary interoperability between all national forces . . . .”

Major General A. C. Zinni, United States Marine Corps
Deputy Commanding General,

1. General

   a. The JTF J-6 is the principal staff assistant to the CJTF to provide a robust, protected, interoperable, and flexible joint communications system. This includes development, integration, and synchronization of EW; EMS operations; design of the communications system architecture; establishment and operation of secure DODIN segments; CO, to include offensive and defensive CO; and plans that support the command’s operational- and strategic-level requirements. Additionally, JTF J-6 provides policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable joint communications which enable CJTF’s command of the mission. The integrated communications system supports a collaborative information environment that assists commanders in conducting detailed, concurrent, and parallel planning.

   b. The objective of the joint communications system is to facilitate the proper integration and employment of joint force operational capabilities through effective C2. The role of the communications system is to collect, transport, process, protect, and disseminate data and information to provide CJTFs with the capability to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain joint operations.

   (1) All military forces, interagency partners, NGOs, international organizations, HN agencies, and other organizations involved in an operation (e.g., peace operations, stability activities, or DSCA) must be able to effectively and efficiently communicate with one another, when appropriate. If JTF is in support, use lead federal agency’s or partner’s preferred method of communication if possible. Agreement among partners on means of communications, type of information to share, and protection of sensitive (but not necessarily classified) information is needed. For example, if conducting a humanitarian assistance disaster relief operation and USAID prefers to exchange information via Relief Web, the JTF should support their preferred mode of communications. Relief Web is a portal that is administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and is accessible via the Internet.

   (2) The communications system primarily supports JTF C2 capabilities; however, it also supports all functional capability areas and IERs of JTF operations. Detailed communications system techniques and procedures necessary to deploy and sustain a JTF are contained in CJCSM 6231.01, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical
Communications, and annex K (Communications Systems) of the OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans.

c. The communications system gives the CJTF the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The CJTF uses information to support decision making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the CJTF’s advantage.

d. Component tactical communications systems must be responsive to the CJTF. Because of their inherent capabilities, all communications are considered for joint use. Commercial communications systems may offer a cost-effective alternative means to satisfy the commander’s needs and may effectively augment constrained DOD resources.

e. The complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of communications system resources may require the CJTF to adjudicate or assign subordinate commands responsibilities for providing this support. This normally is done in annex K (Communications System) and annex C (Operations), appendix 16 (Cyberspace Operations) to the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

f. The design of a communications system should be based on the continuous need for quality information to support JTF operations. Figure X-1 provides information quality criteria to be used by the JTF staff. USSTRATCOM or Service DODIN components control the communications system with input from the CJTF to ensure data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Information Quality Criteria</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Accuracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Timeliness</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Usability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Completeness</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Brevity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
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</table>

*Figure X-1. Information Quality Criteria*
g. The JTF establishing authority ensures communications system requirements are supported, coordinates these activities, prepares policy and guidance, and ensures JTF systems compatibility.

h. Communications systems must be interoperable, flexible, responsive, agile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable.

i. The J-6 coordinates the communications personnel and force requirements for the CJTF.

   (1) Determines personnel requirements, to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

   (2) Determines required additional capabilities beyond what is assigned to the JTF and request them via the J-3 RFF manager.

For additional details on integrating CO, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

2. Organization

   J-6 Organization. Figure X-2 depicts a notional JTF J-6 organization. The actual composition of the J-6 will be dictated by the overall JTF organization and operations to be conducted. Several of the J-6’s functions may be placed under the joint network operations control center (JNCC).

3. Responsibilities

   a. JTF Establishing Authority

      (1) Ensure communications system personnel, communications security (COMSEC), and equipment requirements are supported.

      (2) Coordinate communications system activities with the Joint Staff, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Services, CCMDs, component forces, and others, as appropriate.

      (3) Prepare communications system policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to operate within the CCMD structure.

      (4) Ensure or facilitate compatibility of subordinate communications systems.

      (5) Share information within the joint force and with mission partners, which could include interagency partners, MNFs, international organizations, and other participants, to the maximum extent practical given strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level considerations. Multinational partners’ information is sensitive and should be protected regardless of classification. Dissemination of mission partner information should be carefully controlled.
For policy on sharing information with foreign entities, see DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

b. **CJTF Communications System Support Responsibilities**

   (1) Provide overall management and protection of all communications systems not within joint or Service-provided DODIN supporting the JTF.

   (2) Ensure a compatible, adequate, and effective communications system that allows reliable, near-continuous access to enterprise information and services are available to support JTF C2 infrastructure.

   (3) Publish communications system plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission and coordinate plans prepared by subordinate commands.

   (4) Adjudicate or assign subordinate commands the responsibility to provide communications systems support based on the situation or available resources.

   (5) Determine personnel requirements including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications for the directorate and forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet descriptions and justification.
(6) Determine required force capabilities beyond the capacity of forces attached to the JTF and request them via the JTF J-3 RFF manager.

(7) Coordinate and provide CCDR/Service/CJTF directives to joint/Service DODIN functions to ensure the proper level of service to JTF operations and units.

c. **JTF J-6 Responsibilities**

(1) Determine personnel requirements, including number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special qualifications, for the directorate and forward these requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

(2) Provide the communications system to support reliable, timely information flow in support of joint operations. This includes the development of communications system architectures and plans, as well as policy, guidance, and instructions for the integration and installation of operational communications system. The JTF J-6 exercises staff supervision of all communications system assets. This also includes CJCS-controlled transportable assets, automated information systems, COMSEC, and networks necessary to accomplish the overall JTF mission.

(3) Ensure subordinate Service or component HQ establish network operations centers. The JTF J-6 establishes clear lines of communications and reporting obligations between control centers. Each element of the JTF must have clearly defined missions and responsible areas within the network.

(4) Establish a JNCC to plan the joint communications system and to manage its deployment and utilization and to manage its deployment and utilization during operations and exercises.

(5) Review all communications system plans prepared by subordinate component commanders. The JTF J-6 facilitates the execution of all communications system actions to maximize support to the CJTF and adjudicates any conflicts.

(6) Provide J-6 planning support to the JTF.

(7) Direct DODIN and retain situational awareness. The JNCC requires timely support from a subordinate command’s communications control center, commonly referred to as systems control. Subordinate command and agency network operations and security centers are responsible for assimilating and integrating DODIN situational awareness of their respective OAs.

(8) Coordinate cross-servicing agreements between the JTF HQ, component planners, and the JNCC.

(9) JTF information systems support responsibilities include:

   (a) In consultation with the CCDR’s J-6, JTF staff elements, JTF components, and other supporting organizations, develop the JTF communications plan
(Annex K), to include the establishment of C2 systems architecture, including preplanned responses for system restoration, bandwidth reallocation, prevention of network intrusions, and recovery from data exchange bottlenecks.

(b) Assist the IMO in developing documented processes and procedures for standardizing and effectively using information systems and technology.

(c) Process security accreditation packages for CJTF approval.

(d) In consultation with the CCDR’s J-6, JTF IMO and staff elements, JTF components, and other supporting organizations, consolidate and validate a list of communications system requirements based on validated IERs. Ensure compliance with the joint technical architecture.

(e) Oversee the process of providing network status and architecture to the JOC in coordination with the joint data network operations and JNCC.

(f) Establish cybersecurity procedures in coordination with CCMD J-6, cyberspace support team, and/or USCYBERCOM.

(g) Plan and ensure deployed nonmilitary information systems are open and nonproprietary with commonly accepted standards and protocols that interoperate with military information systems. This should be coordinated by the supported CCMD prior to establishment of a JTF.

(h) Assign appropriately trained and certified personnel to privileged user and cybersecurity management positions.

d. JNCC

(1) Exercise control and technical management over communications control centers belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands.

(2) Serve as the senior control agency for management and operational direction of the joint communications networks and infrastructure.

(3) Perform planning, execution, technical, and management functions.

(4) Develop and disseminate standards and procedures and collect and present communications system management statistical data. The JNCC manages all tactical communications systems and communications connectivity as defined by the joint operational architecture.

(5) In conjunction with JTF J-3 or J-5, support future operations planning or future plans activities.

e. Associated Communications Elements
(1) **Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)**

(a) The JCSE, a sub-element of the JECC, is a unique communications systems organization that consists of an active duty element and two Air National Guard joint communications support squadrons. JCSE’s primary mission is to provide rapidly deployable, en route, early entry, and scalable coalition command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance services capability to CCDRs or other agencies as directed to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force HQ and bridge joint communications requirement. The JCSE possesses a wide range of tactical communications systems capabilities tailored to meet a variety of contingency missions. The unit is staffed with personnel from all Services and can support up to four joint force HQ and USSOCOM as directed.

(b) JCSE personnel are allocated to support communications system requirements during predeployment, ADVON deployment, main-force deployment, and employment phases.

(c) Transmission equipment available to meet the requirements of a JTF or JSOTF HQ include military (ultrahigh frequency [UHF], super-high frequency [SHF], and extremely high frequency), commercial satellite systems, tropospheric scatter, and line of sight microwave.

(d) JCSE can provide a full range of C2 support capability, including secured and unsecured voice, data, and VTC.

(e) Communications packages available to subordinate and component HQ include SHF satellite terminals, multiplexing equipment, and UHF single channel satellite systems. These packages are tailored to the requirement.

(2) The **DISA LNO** serves as the principal interface between the JTF J-6 and DISA HQ and assists the JTF J-6 in coordinating, planning, executing, and evaluating the DODIN. DISA manages the employment of communications resources at designated gateways and extends the DODIN services to installation and campus area networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance for the request and termination of Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services at the tactical level. The appropriate DISA enterprise operations center supervises the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits to provide positive DISN support of deployed forces.

(3) **Regional Space Support Center Liaison Officer (RSSC-LO).** The RSSC-LO serves as the primary POC in coordinating all ground mobile forces satellite requirements for JTF support. The CJTF requests deployment of the RSSC-LO when needed.

(4) **Frequency Management Detachment.** A frequency management detachment, known as a joint spectrum management element, normally deploys with the JTF. The detachment coordinates, manages, and deconflicts joint force frequency allocation and assignments with the area-supported CCDR’s J-6 and HN communications authorities.
(5) CJCSM 6231.01, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*, provides a detailed description of each tactical communications element, its responsibilities, and reporting requirements.

(6) The **Joint Communications Security Management Office (JCMO)** provides joint COMSEC support to meet the operational needs of the JPEC, traditional and nontraditional allies, and non-DOD agencies. JCMO is the controlling authority for all joint intertheater COMSEC packages material and all global Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) COMSEC programs. Deploying forces require JCMO-controlled keying material to communicate. JCMO controls worldwide joint COMSEC access, including multinational circuits in support of shared early warning systems.

4. **Requirements**

   a. JTF HQ and each assigned component must be prepared to provide its own communications support. JTF HQ communications support may be provided by the JCSE or other CJCS-controlled assets when requested by the supported CCDR and approved by the CJCS. However, if the JCSE is already committed, the supported CCDR may direct that this support be provided by a Service component or a consolidation of assets from the CCDR’s components. In either case, communications support to the JTF HQ and connectivity to the components routinely will be coordinated by the JTF J-6.

   b. Extension of the DISN services into the assigned JOA initially is accomplished through DOD gateways (teleport, standardized tactical entry point [STEP] sites), and high frequency entry stations. As forces build in the JOA, requirements will surge past the capability of STEP sites to support. Other means to connect the JTF with the DISN in the JOA include commercial satellite and leased communications services. These systems will assume the primary support role from the STEP sites due to their greater bandwidth and ability to put the tactical entry point within the JOA. DISA will direct the employment of communications resources at designated gateways to extend DISN services to tactical networks. DISA contingency and support plans provide guidance on the requesting and termination of DISN services at the tactical level. The DISA Global Enterprise Operations Center or subordinate enterprise operations centers will supervise the allocation, routing, and restoration of channels and circuits of the DODIN for positive communications support of deployed forces.

   c. Component commanders may be tasked with providing personnel and equipment required to install, operate, and maintain communications for their HQ support and for communications circuits from the component HQ to subordinate commanders. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications from their component HQ to the CJTF. Contracted support solutions for communications requirements should be considered.

   d. When two or more commanders are collocated, communications system requirements should be coordinated and consolidated to the maximum degree possible. The JTF J-6 will initiate and coordinate any cross-servicing agreements with the JNCC (if
formed) and the component planners. Additionally, component commanders may be tasked to provide communications (i.e., a deployable joint C2 capability) from their component HQ to the JTF.

5. Cyberspace Considerations

   a. Cyberspace consists of many different and often overlapping networks, to include the nodes on those networks, and the system data that support them. Three layers can describe cyberspace: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona. In contrast to physical domains (air, land, maritime, and space), intrusions in cyberspace may not always result in visible, physical damage. Incidents in cyberspace normally can be traced to three factors: poor user practices, poor network and data management practices, and poor implementation of network architecture. A significant challenge is to identify and protect against harm due to human error by both information technology professionals and a great number of everyday DOD users.

   b. Protecting the DODIN by establishing a culture of security awareness, particularly through DOD and interagency policies, practices, and training, is critical to the success of all types of cyberspace-enabled DOD missions.

   c. There are a number of challenges the JFC faces while executing CO. Cyberspace presents the JFC with many threats ranging from nation states to individual actors. The most challenging aspect of cyberspace is connecting a cyberspace actor (cyber-persona) or action to an actual individual, group, or state actor, with sufficient confidence and verifiability. The effects of CO may extend beyond the target, the JOA, or even the AOR.

   d. Cybersecurity and cyberspace defense. There are a number of internal and external threats to secure communications. Achieving and maintaining secure networks requires employment of secure configurations; comprehensive security training for all DODIN users; and monitoring, detection, and restoration capabilities to shield and preserve information and information systems.

   (1) Cybersecurity is integral to DODIN operations and is the foundation for an effective cyberspace defense. Cybersecurity involves applying a number of protection paradigms and best practices across very broad and heterogeneous networks. The construct for cyberspace is much more complex than operating as a single information system on a network. The focus incorporates security aspects of operating in cyberspace and addresses the following questions: How are the JFC’s systems comprised and configured? Are the systems sufficiently protected from threats and vulnerabilities? Can the JFC trust the network on which the force relies for information and data exchange? Are personnel sufficiently trained to secure, operate, and defend the JFC’s portion of the DODIN?

   (2) There are a variety of malicious actors in cyberspace that threaten critical information infrastructures. Of primary concern is the threat of organized cyberspace attacks capable of denying DOD forces freedom of movement in cyberspace. Each of the three layers of cyberspace represents a level on which CO may be conducted. From the
perspective of cybersecurity, these layers reveal specific avenues of approach for protecting against cyberspace threats.

(3) Cybersecurity principles must be included in the planning considerations to minimize the threats posed by computer viruses, hackers, and cyberspace attacks. Cybersecurity events and cyberspace incidents should be correlated with respect to their impact on C2 systems and networks and the CCDR’s ability to accomplish the mission.

_for more information on CO, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations._

6. Network and Information Technology Support

a. The JTF J-6 has overall responsibility for JTF information systems support.

b. The J-6 ensures information systems support enables the IMP and the JFC’s shared understanding.

_for more information, refer to Appendix D, “Shared Understanding and Information Management.”_

7. Global Command and Control System

GCCS is a suite of software applications and hardware designed for planning, execution, C2 of forces, data, information, and multi-discipline intelligence processing. The system receives multiple sensor feeds and reports that assist in the development of the COP. Planning and execution applications (JOPES and Status of Resources and Training System) also support supply, maintenance, transportation, acquisition, finance, personnel, engineering, and force health protection (FHP) needs. JOPES also supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs through all planning efforts. GCCS operations are addressed in CJCSI 3151.01, _Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements_; CJCSM 3115.01, _Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations_, Volume I; and CCDR’s directives.

_to further assist the JTF J-6 and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex H, “Checklist for Joint Task Force J-6,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”_

8. Information Sharing

US national security depends on the ability to share the right information, with the right people, at the right time and provide the CJTF with actionable intelligence. Innovation increased the ability to share, but the increase created potential vulnerabilities, which requires strengthened safeguarding practices.

a. The _Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy_ guides DOD’s sharing of information within DOD and with federal, state, local, tribal, and multinational partners; foreign governments and security forces; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector.
b. The *National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding* identifies three core principles to address the challenge of improving information sharing and safeguarding processes and capabilities: information is a national asset, information sharing and safeguarding requires shared risk management, and information informs decision making.

c. The *National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding* focuses on achieving five goals: drive collective action through collaboration and accountability; improve information discovery and access through common standards; optimize mission effectiveness through shared services and interoperability; strengthen information safeguarding through structural reform, policy, and technical solutions; and protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties through consistency and compliance.

*For more information on information sharing, see JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*
CHAPTER XI
TRAINING AND EDUCATION DIRECTORATE

“Keeping our military the best led, trained, and equipped in the world is a nonnegotiable imperative.”

General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, 6 February 2012

1. General

The J-7 assists the commander in planning and executing the joint training program for the staff and theater assigned forces to enhance joint and multinational mission readiness and warfighting capabilities. A J-7 is an optional directorate normally formed for a standing JTF.

a. CCDRs conduct the joint training of assigned forces, unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. CCMDs ensure the readiness of assigned HQ staffs designed to perform as a JTF or functional component HQ staff. The CCDR, as the establishing authority, defines the readiness criteria for JTF-capable HQ. These readiness criteria shape the design of joint training for those HQ.

b. Joint training must be accomplished by effectively matching the training requirements and training audiences with appropriate training methods and modes within available resources. There are two types of training:

(1) **Individual Joint Training.** Training that prepares individuals to perform duties in joint organizations (e.g., specific staff positions or functions) or to operate unique joint systems.

(2) **Collective Joint Training.** Training, instruction and applied exercises that prepare joint staffs, joint staff elements, and joint organizational teams to integrate and synchronize capabilities to perform tasks deemed necessary by CCDRs.

c. The J-7 coordinates the training personnel and force requirements for the CJTF.

(1) Determines personnel requirements to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

(2) Determines required additional capabilities beyond what is assigned to the JTF and request them via the J-3 RFF manager.

2. Organization

The commander and COS will determine the structure of the J-7 based on the mission, expected duration, and magnitude of the operation. The notional organization in Figure
XI-1 is one possible solution. The organization may change as the operations progress through the phases.

3. Responsibilities

Conduct training within the command including, but not limited to:

a. Prepare training guidance for the commander’s approval.

b. Identify training requirements based on the unit mission.

c. Determine requirements for, and allocation of, training resources.

d. Maintain the unit readiness status of each unit in the command.

e. Incorporate available Joint Knowledge Online or equivalent resources into ongoing individual and staff training and exercise events.

f. Incorporate functional training requirements into individual and collective training as necessary to meet mission readiness requirements.

  
g. Regularly incorporate and evaluate CO training objectives to develop and refine the ability to operate under denied or disrupted conditions and to execute continuity of operations plans.

4. Training the Joint Task Force Headquarters

The JTF trainer should ensure a joint training program is established for the JTF staff. This joint training can be accomplished, even in a time-sensitive operation.
JTF operation, in part, depends upon the training the JTF staff receives prior to and during the operation. The following are potential training areas for the JTF staff:

a. **Individual Military Skills Training.** Individual military skills deemed critical for training in the joint OE will focus on the level of preparedness necessary to protect against any threat of danger related to CBRN, health protection, and FP measures. While most of these skills may have been accomplished by the Service HQ prior to formation of the JTF, it is prudent to make this training available for those individuals on the JTF staff.

b. **Functional Area Staff Training.** The JTF should ensure each staff participates in an office/staff orientation training program that provides each new staff member with computer training, an overview of the JTF staff’s office (mission, purpose, and function), individual billet responsibilities, watch/duty assignments, and the day-to-day expectations of all JTF staff members. The Joint Force Headquarters Training website, on JEL+, and learning resources for JTF staff positions are resources and products that can be found on NIPRNET at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0 or on SIPRNET at http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pendix=0 by clicking on “Training” in the banner.

c. **JTF HQ Situational Awareness Training.** All incoming JTF staff members should receive an orientation to the JTF HQ area, billeting spaces, dining area, a JTF operational overview, and other requisite training that will facilitate the rapid assimilation of newly reporting personnel and make them a more productive member.

d. **JOA-Specific Culture and Customs.** JTF staff members should receive awareness training in local customs, culture, religious practices, language (key phrases), political situation, and local attitudes towards western cultures. This will equip each member of the JTF with a familiarization of the OE and will serve to minimize the risk of misunderstanding in interactions with the local populace.

e. **Mission-Focused Training and Exercises.** The establishing authority determines the readiness requirements for the JTF-capable HQ. Those readiness requirements drive the development of collective training for the designated HQ. Mission-focused training and exercises focus on building and sustaining readiness in the designated HQ staff to transition, organize, establish, and operate as a JTF HQ. The tasks the JTF HQ performs post transition from a Service HQ to a JTF HQ in an exercise focus on the requirements identified by the establishing authority.

5. **Lessons Learned**

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) provides a method for facilitating awareness of observations, issues, best practices, and lessons learned (LL) across DOD. Its primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. There are five phases to the JLLP: discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination. Develop analysis collection plans by defining the requirements and determining the scope, tasks, and objectives to maximize effectiveness of collection resources.
a. The CJTF will assign a lesson manager and Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) administrator.

(1) The lesson manager manages the LL program for the JTF and will track, coordinate, and evaluate lessons through all relevant phases of the JLLP.

(2) The JLLIS administrators are the primary JLLIS POCs and are authorized to present the single, unified position on the JLLIS requirement. Additional responsibilities include:

(a) Explain the JLLIS requirements.

(b) Administer the JLLIS user group.

(c) Participate in the assessment and validation of JLLIS capabilities.

b. The JLLP provides a framework and common terms of reference for development and assessment of LL. Ensure all entities of the command participate in the JLLP and their observations, insights, best practices, and recommendations are exchanged.

For more information concerning the JLLP, see CJCSM 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program, and CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
CHAPTER XII
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

1. General

a. Based on the scope and duration of the JTF’s mission and nature of the operation, the CJTF may establish a J-8. The CJTF and COS will determine the extent of J-8 responsibilities. For example, the J-8 could simply focus on comptroller requirements for the JTF and have no assessment responsibilities. If a J-8 is not established, see Chapter XIV, “Special and Personal Staff,” paragraph 7, “Comptroller,” for information on the comptroller. To avoid duplication, this chapter will not repeat comptroller duties and responsibilities.

b. Resource management is a financial management function that provides advice and guidance to the commander to develop command resource requirements. It involves an ongoing analysis of the commander’s tasks and priorities to identify and ensure adequate and proper financial resources are available and applied under appropriate management controls to support mission accomplishment. The JTF’s resource requirements must adequately reflect the concept of logistic support. Resource requirements include, but are not limited to, contracting; transportation; and support to multinational and interagency partners, international organizations, FHA, and force sustainment.

c. Financial support for a joint operation can present a challenge because of diverse fiscal requirements, sources, and authorities of funds. The JTF J-8 must identify multiple funding sources and authorities to balance constraints imposed by fiscal law with emergent, time-critical operational requirements.

For more information on resource management and funding, see JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

d. The J-8 coordinates the resource management and financial support requirements for the CJTF.

(1) Determines personnel requirements to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

(2) Determines required additional capabilities beyond what is assigned to the JTF and request them via the J-3 RFF manager.

2. Organization

a. If a JTF J-8 is established, the CJTF and COS will determine the scope of the J-8’s role in the assessment process and composition of personnel and subject matter expertise. This includes determining the physical location of the JTF comptroller staff. In all cases the comptroller staff should be a cross-Service representation of the JTF. Augmentees should include personnel with experience in financial services and resource management. The actual organization will be shaped by the types of planned military operations.
b. While the JTF comptroller is normally part of the CJTF’s personal or special staff, the CJTF may designate a component commander’s comptroller or finance officer to also serve as the JTF comptroller. The JTF comptroller, as well as the supported CCMD comptroller, must be involved early in the planning process to clearly define financial management requirements. Although the component commanders have the primary responsibility for providing resources, the JTF comptroller is responsible for integrating JTF-wide resource management and finance support policy planning and execution efforts. The JFC may designate a component commander’s comptroller or finance staff officer to also serve as the JTF comptroller. The discussion in this chapter addresses the comptroller as a subordinate organization under the J-8.

3. Responsibilities

a. Resource managers establish reporting procedures for their command’s subordinate units to report their estimated or actual commitments, obligations, reimbursable costs, and estimated future costs. The ability to report to Congress on the use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds is critical in meeting the responsibility for stewardship of public resources. Effective cost-capturing is achieved through a joint effort between finance and resource management personnel.

b. The comptroller portion of the JTF J-8 supports the higher HQs’ comptroller in ensuring official accounting records are accurate and properly supported by source documentation, and resolving accounting issues in a timely manner.

c. Finance support includes providing financial advice, limited pay support, disbursing support, and supporting the procurement process.

*For more information on finance support, see JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.*

d. When a J-8 is not established, see Chapter XIV, “Special and Personal Staff,” paragraph 7, “Comptroller,” for a detailed list of responsibilities for the comptroller.

e. Responsibilities of the J-8 include:

(1) Serve as principal financial management advisor to the CJTF and as the focal point for JTF financial management matters.

(2) Provide a single POC for financial management requirements and act as a liaison to subordinate commanders.

(3) Prepare paragraph 4, (Administration and Logistics), of the base plan for annex W (Operational Contract Support).

(4) Establish JTF financial management responsibilities. Based on the missions and geographic locations of the JTF components, the JTF comptroller may be authorized to designate lead agent(s) for specific financial management functions, special support requirements, or a specific location.
(5) Review estimated and actual costs of the joint operation, when available, and provide recommendations for addressing the differences.

(6) Establish internal management controls to ensure the efficient and appropriate use of resources.

(7) Ensure a process is established (e.g., JRRB or JFUB to facilitate the boarding of acquisition requirements).

(8) Coordinate the JTF entitlement policy (pay and allowances) through the JTF J-1, with the geographic CCMD J-1. This includes the CCDR determination of the appropriate TDY option for JTF personnel.

(9) Coordinate with the JTF J-4 on logistic and contracting requirements to ensure they complement the financial management responsibilities. Participate in the JTF J-4 planning groups and boards, as required. Develop a system, in coordination with the JTF J-4 and IG, to ensure the accountability and disposition of items purchased to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

(10) Coordinate with other JTF staff members concerning financial management requirements and provides guidance on meeting financial management responsibilities.

(11) Identify funding sources and obligation authority. Review applicable agreements that require financial management support.

(12) Coordinate with contracting officials to verify funding availability for local contracting needs and determines contract payment requirements.

(13) Coordinate with the Service components to ensure early deployment of finance personnel into the JOA. This supports the immediate contracting requirements of the deploying force that are not readily available from other USG sources.

(14) Coordinate the designation of a limited depository account (LDA) in accordance with DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 5, Disbursing Policy.

4. Tasks, Functions, and Procedures

a. Essential Elements of Resource Management. Although each contingency has a unique set of resource management parameters, the 10 essential elements of resource management will be involved and are discussed and described in the following paragraphs.

(1) Provide resource management advice and recommendations to the commander. When authorized by SecDef, the supported CCDR will issue fiscal and logistical guidance to subordinate commanders. Accordingly, the JTF comptroller advises the CJTF about the effective use of available resources and financial management lead agent responsibilities. Financial managers should then participate early and actively in the JPG to assist in the successful integration of financial management efforts.
(2) Develop Command Resource Requirements

(a) Budget estimates, operating budgets, and financial plans do not normally include costs incurred in support of unplanned contingency operations. Funding will be drawn from current appropriations and authority, unless provided by a reimbursable agreement with another USG or international organization. It is necessary for the command to absorb these costs initially from existing funds. The Service component command resource managers ensure that the capability exists for funding all participation costs, separating and collecting the incremental and total costs, and reporting these costs to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) (OUSD[C/CFO]). To assist in reprogramming and supplemental funds requests, Service component command resource managers must estimate future costs, accumulate all costs, and promptly submit bills to DFAS for payment and estimated future costs to OUSD(C/CFO).

(b) When developing resource requirements, existing agreements must be reviewed by the appropriate staff section. Based on this review, the Service component resource managers will ensure adherence to proper billing and reimbursement procedures. It is important the command resource requirements adequately reflect the concept of logistic support. Resource requirements include, but are not limited to contracting, transportation, multinational support, support to interagency partners, international organizations, FHA, and force sustainment.

(c) Available HNS should be considered as an alternative to deploying logistic support from the US. HNS agreements should authorize the JFC to coordinate directly with the HN for support and acquisition and for the use of facilities and real estate. The legal advisor must be involved in determining specific support requirements contained in HNS agreements. Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported CCDR, Joint Staff, DOD, and DOS.

(d) Once a COA is selected, and preparation of the OPLAN or OPORD begins, the JTF comptroller develops resource management policy and guidance to paragraph 4, (Administration and Logistics) of the base plan for annex W (Operational Contract Support) of the OPLAN or OPORD, which must also identify components that are funding any unique aspects of the operation. The financial management appendix should adequately reflect support of logistic requirements.

(3) Identify Sources of Funding

(a) Funding a joint operation can present a challenge because of diverse fiscal requirements, sources, and authorities of funds. Multiple funding sources may be used to accommodate the constraints imposed by fiscal law. The JTF comptroller should work with the legal advisor when making these determinations to ensure compliance with Title 31, USC, Section 1301. Guidance from OUSD(C/CFO) spelled out in DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Special Accounts, Funds, and Programs, should also be followed.
(b) Resource managers must be aware of extraordinary measures, including emergency funding authorities, such as the Feed and Forage Act (Title 41, USC, Section 11), which may be used to incur obligations in excess of, or in advance of, available appropriations. A thorough understanding of sources and authorities can provide resource managers with a means of remaining within the limits of the law and a method to develop alternative funding options. To the extent that a specific funding source has not been identified for a joint operation, Service component commanders should pursue additional funding authority, reprogramming, and supplemental appropriation requests to minimize the effect on component readiness.

(4) Determine Costs

(a) For anticipated joint operations, preliminary cost estimates are developed before or early in the deployment of forces by the OUSD(C/CFO), working in consonance with the Joint Staff, Services, USSOCOM, and DOD agencies and activities, as appropriate. DOD requests for supplemental funds or reprogramming are based on detailed budget estimates developed by the Services, USSOCOM, and DOD agencies and activities. Resource managers should apply the policies contained in DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2B, Budget Formulation and Presentation, which cover the estimated costs of additional personnel plus mutual logistic support with other countries and NATO components.

(b) Preparing these estimates involves making assumptions about a variety of factors such as the joint operation’s duration, logistic support, force size, environment, transportation, and special pay and allowances. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations must be considered in developing assumptions and cost estimates. Costs are estimated using standard cost factors developed from historical experience and judgment where there are no standard cost factors. This process requires input from various staff sections.

(c) Services utilize the “contingency cost report” format issued by OUSD(C/CFO) to provide DFAS and DOD with the joint operation’s total incremental cost. Instructions for completing the contingency cost report can be found in DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Special Accounts, Funds, and Programs.

(d) When developing an estimate, misuse of terminology can lead to an inaccurate cost estimate. An understanding and consistent use of terms are essential when determining costs.

1. Baseline Costs. Baseline costs are the continuing annual costs of military operations funded by the operations and maintenance and military personnel appropriations.

2. Offset Costs. Costs for which funds have been appropriated that may not be incurred as a result of a contingency operation.
3. Incremental Costs. Incremental costs are additional costs to the Service appropriations that would not have been incurred absent support of the contingency operation. DOD reports to Congress the incremental costs of its participation in contingency operations. For a complete explanation of incremental costs, see JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

(5) Acquire Funds. Once potential sources and authority of funds are determined, the Service component resource managers will request use of various funding authorities. In many cases, contingency operations require supplies and services not available to the JFC through the normal funding process. One example is funding for transportation required in support of FHA operations. In this case, component resource managers will seek separate obligation authority through the appropriate channel.

(6) Distribute and Control Funds. Normally, the distribution and control of funds remains with the Services. Procedures will adhere to US laws, regulations, and applicable policies. Effective and efficient fund control and certification is critical in the conduct of financial management operations.

(7) Track Costs and Obligations. Upon notification of an impending joint operation, each participating DOD component will develop special program codes for cost capture and reporting purposes. These relate to the three-digit CJCS project code published for contingency operations.

(8) Establish Cost-Capture Procedures. Resource managers establish reporting procedures for units to report estimated or actual commitments, obligations, reimbursable costs, and estimated future costs. Reporting procedures should be simple and flexible enough to ensure accurate reporting under any circumstances. Component commanders must be able to account for and receive reimbursement for the costs of supporting contingency operations by meeting the following conditions:

(a) Follow consistent and approved procedures in determining and calculating baseline and incremental costs recorded in accounting records.

(b) Use special interest and/or program accounting codes, object class codes, and customer codes, as applicable, to trace costs.

(c) Use automated accounting systems that interface with a designated DFAS central billing system or provide a means to generate a manual bill.

(d) Resource managers capture costs using existing finance and accounting systems and procedures. Cost reporting procedures are published by OUSD(C/CFO).

(9) Establish Reimbursement Procedures

(a) Reimbursable costs may occur from providing support to international organizations, HNs, foreign nations, NGOs, or other USG departments and agencies. Accurate, detailed cost reports are needed to determine how costs should be apportioned and billed. Financial managers capture these costs and provide the required reports and

(b) When support agreements are established by the CCDR or subordinate JFC, the JTF comptroller should ensure it is clearly understood what assistance can be rendered to requesting units and agencies. The JTF comptroller, with the SJA, reviews agreements for proper procedures and support. If agreements do not exist, the JTF comptroller will coordinate with the JTF J-4 and the SJA for required support.

(c) Only billable costs are submitted to USG departments and agencies, international organizations, or foreign governments in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, other US laws, and the requirements of the organization being billed. The JTF comptroller may provide specific guidance for costs incurred that are reimbursable by another organization. Each DOD component must follow contingency operations billing procedures.

1. NEO. Reimbursement procedures for a NEO will be accomplished in accordance with the appropriate memorandum of agreement (MOA) between DOS and DOD. Contact OUSD(C/CFO) or Service comptrollers for provisions of existing MOAs.

2. UN Reimbursement Procedures. For UN operations, reimbursements fall into one of four categories: UN determined costs, invoiced costs, letters of assist, and leases.

For more information on UN reimbursement categories, see JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

3. NATO Reimbursement Procedures

a. Support Arrangements with NATO. NATO will sometimes require specialized logistic support from one or more of the contributing nations. Support is generally requested as a mission contribution on a nonreimbursable basis. NATO may request consumable supplies on a reimbursable basis. Such requests should include an advance commitment from NATO financial controller that reimbursement will be provided. Costs should be invoiced to and reimbursed by the NATO financial controller.

b. Support Arrangements with Allied Nations. The establishment of a support agreement annex is necessary to document support to Allied forces. During peacetime, this is accomplished through the foreign military sales program. During Article 5 or non-Article 5 operations, support may be provided under the following arrangements.

   (1) Role Specialization Arrangements. Prior to a NATO operation, the nations providing forces may mutually agree to a division of responsibility in the OA. This could result in one nation establishing a field medical facility, with another nation providing an airlift capability. Ideally, the tasks should be divided such that mutual benefit and equity are apparent and supported by law.
(2) Standardization Agreements (STANAGs). NATO nations have made commitments to pursue standardization and interoperability in a number of areas. One means of achieving this is through adaptation of common technical standards and procedures, documented in STANAGs. Many such agreements also include standard reimbursement procedures.

(3) Direct Reimbursement. In the absence of suitable arrangements, Allied nations may negotiate for support subject to reimbursement procedures of the nation providing the required supplies or services.

(4) ACSAs. Bilateral ACSAs exist with many allied nations and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, enabling operational commanders to arrange mutual support under payment in cash, replacement in kind, or equal value exchange procedures.

4. HNS Reimbursement Procedures. Once the HNS agreement is established, the JTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN and begins the negotiations for logistic support. Specific procedures for cost capturing and billing must be negotiated with the HN. This will prevent locally-negotiated agreements that may not be legal or authorized. A Standard Form 1080 (Voucher for Transfers Between Appropriations and/or Funds) to DFAS with sufficient detailed documentation and a certified contingency operations cost report to support the request for reimbursement must be submitted.

5. Foreign Nation Support Reimbursement Procedures. Foreign nation support is provided to foreign forces from countries other than the country in which the contingency operation is occurring. This support is generally provided under one of three circumstances. First, support can be provided under the existing rules of a parent organization that is controlling the operation (e.g., NATO, UN). Second, support may be provided if the US and the supported country have a bilateral agreement in place prior to the operation. Third, support can be provided based upon an agreement that is negotiated expressly for the operation. Any negotiated agreement for support should include billing and reimbursement instructions. The resource manager must consult with the legal advisor or SJA for a copy of any existing bilateral agreements and follow procedures outlined in the agreement for reimbursement. Bills prepared for support during a UN or NATO operation should follow procedures established by those organizations.

6. Replacement in kind is the provision of material and services for a logistic exchange of materials and services of equal value between the governments of eligible countries. These items are accountable as future reimbursements to the country that initially provides them on a gratis basis. Costs for these items have a current value that is captured as future reimbursements.

7. NGO Reimbursement Procedures. NGOs do not operate within the military or governmental hierarchy. However, because NGOs operate in remote areas of high risk, they may need the logistic, communication, and security support that military forces can provide. Expectations of military support (including supplies, services, and
assistance) are reviewed with the NGOs. The JTF comptroller consults with a legal advisor or SJA to determine the JFC’s authority to provide support on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. Commanders should only provide support to NGOs after they receive approval.

8. Non-DOD Departments and Agencies Reimbursement Procedures. Congress provides DOD with funds for very specific needs. Therefore, providing support to other USG departments and agencies can be complex. When presented with such a request for support, the resource manager should consult with the legal advisor. An MOA or interagency agreement should form the basis for any reimbursable relationship with interagency partners.

9. DSCA. Federal agencies may request assistance from DOD. When approved by SecDef, the assistance is reimbursable under the appropriate authority, usually the Economy Act or the Stafford Act. The federal agency will provide a funding document to DOD that provides reimbursable budget authority to cover DOD expenses incurred in rendering the requested support.

10. Ensure Accounting and Fiscal Validation. Resource managers should continuously validate funding documents and recoup or cancel invalid obligations if it is evident that funds will not be executed in a timely manner to ensure funds do not revert and are lost at the end of the fiscal year.

11. Establish Management Internal Controls. The JTF’s comptroller should coordinate internal controls throughout the joint force that will provide reasonable assurance that obligations and costs comply with applicable laws, funds and other assets are protected, and proper accounting and documentation is kept of all expenditures. These management internal controls should be established as soon as possible, but not at the expense of operational considerations.

12. Establish a Financial Assistance Visit and Inspection Process. The JTF comptroller conducts financial management training, financial management assistance visits, and financial management inspections to ensure all matters pertaining to resource management are operating properly and legally. The frequency of the financial management visits and/or inspections will depend upon the duration of the operation.

13. Provide Accurate and Complete Accounting Support. The JTF comptroller supports the Service comptroller in ensuring official accounting records are accurate, properly supported by source documentation, and resolving accounting issues in a timely manner.

b. Essential Elements of Finance Support. Though each contingency operation has a unique set of parameters, all operations involve the essential elements of finance support discussed in the following paragraphs.

(1) Provide Financial Advice and Recommendations. Early and active participation by the JTF comptroller in the planning process is critical to successful integration of all components’ finance support. The JTF comptroller obtains and analyzes
the economic requirements of the OE and begins initial coordination with the DFAS Crisis Coordination Center. The DFAS Crisis Coordination Center provides advice and acts as the primary DFAS liaison. The JTF comptroller recommends JTF financial management policies and develops the concept of finance operations support to an OPLAN or OPORD.

(2) The JTF comptroller analyzes the economic systems in the OA, determines the impact of a joint operation on those systems, and predicts the ability of the economic systems to support operations. The JTF comptroller should coordinate with the J-2, J-4, and CMO/CA organizations to ensure RFIs are forwarded to appropriate sources. Other sources of information include DOS, local embassy, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook country reports. The analysis includes how well the infrastructure in the JOA can support logistic and banking operations, how US currency would affect the economic system, and which currencies or scrip should be used. Procurement of additional labor, materials, food, lodging, sanitation, and other services available in the JOA allows for scarce strategic lift to be used for other purposes. Additional factors to consider in analyzing this information are listed below.

(a) Development of the Economy. If the economy is very rudimentary, such as a barter economy, it may provide only limited capabilities. Conversely, a highly developed, industrialized economy may be capable of providing a greater level of support.

(b) Banking System. Highly developed economies can provide banking services such as local currency, checking accounts, and automated teller machines. These banks can also provide an inexpensive source of foreign currency or US coin and currency. Cash requirements may be reduced by local acceptance of a USG purchase card. It may even be possible to effect the payment of accounts payable through a HN bank. Access to a local electronic funds transmission network may also be possible.

(c) Currency. Some currencies are not readily available on the open market. This can be critical in the early stages of a covert joint operation. Availability of currency can have a major effect on exchange rates and lead to large discrepancies between the official and black market exchange rates. Another consideration is the impact of a sudden large influx of US dollars on the local economy.

(d) Prices of Goods and Services. Determination of fair and reasonable labor rates is essential. Prices for goods also should be determined and disseminated during planning or in the initial phase of a joint operation so that ordering officers have a measure against which to judge the reasonableness of prospective procurements.

(e) Customs and Practices of the affected populace in the JOA must be considered. For example, personal checks, traveler's checks, and credit cards are not acceptable in some countries.

(3) Support the Procurement Process. Support of the logistic system and contingency contracting efforts is critical to the success of all joint operations. Component finance units, when required, provide funds for the local purchase of goods and services.
Normally, it is more economical to purchase locally than transport from a home station. A large percentage of the finance unit's effort may be directed towards execution of this function. Procurement support is divided into two areas: contracting support and commercial vendor services (CVS) support.

(a) Contracting support is normally conducted by a Service component’s finance unit and involves the payment for contracted services and supplies. The finance unit, to the maximum extent feasible, applies the principles of electronic commerce or electronic data interchange, which includes maximizing the use of electronic funds transfer (EFT) payments to vendors. Because an increased demand for locally procured items will tend to inflate prices, the supported JFC normally establishes a JRRB to manage the prioritization and allocation of funds and available commercial support.

(b) CVS support is used to satisfy requirements that cannot be reasonably provided through established logistic channels. If USG purchase cards are not recognized, the vendors are normally paid in cash by finance support teams and paying agents, normally in local currency. Services and supplies such as day labor, rations supplement, and construction materials are commonly paid using CVS procedures.

(c) The fast pay procedure is used for processing payment vouchers with special requirements. It allows payment prior to verification that supplies have been received and accepted, under limited conditions (e.g., medical supplies for direct shipment overseas). When a purchase is made using fast payment procedures, payment is made based on the supplier's submission of an invoice, which constitutes a certification that the contractor has delivered the supplies to a post office, common carrier, or point of first receipt by the government and that it will repair, replace, or correct nonconforming items.

(4) Provide Pay Support

(a) US Military. The JTF J-1 coordinates, as necessary, with the Service components to facilitate pay support and ensure Service members are receiving financial support. Pay support includes answering pay inquiries, initiating various types of individual local payments (e.g., casual payments, travel payments), check cashing, and local currency exchange.

1. Various entitlements have been established to compensate military members for the rigors and sacrifices caused by different types of military operations. JFCs and their staffs are more involved in making entitlement determinations and ensuring equity among participants in joint operations. Thorough consideration of pay and entitlements issues in the early stages of planning ensures a level of consistency throughout the operation.

2. The CCMD J-1, in coordination with the joint force comptroller, makes a recommendation to the CCDR pertaining to Service member entitlements, including the authorization of a TDY allowance. TDY status needs to be determined for the initial deployment as per diem, field duty, or essential mess. The intent is to avoid situations where various Service members, serving side-by-side under similar
circumstances, earn different entitlements due solely to differing determinations made by subordinate Service component commanders.

3. Decisions made regarding pay and allowances for Service members apply equally to all components serving under similar circumstances. The JFC should announce the conditions of the operations affecting entitlements as soon as possible to ensure deploying Service members are financially prepared. Actions to request entitlements should be initiated so they are in place when the joint operation begins. Entitlement policy is a supported CCDR responsibility and will be accomplished by the CCMD J-1, in accordance with the applicable DOD 7000.14-R, *Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation*, and Joint Travel Regulations.

(b) US Civilian. If necessary, the JTF comptroller will develop the CJTF’s policy on finance support for USG civilians and contractors. The policy should include, at a minimum, travel pay, civilian pay, check cashing, foreign currency conversion, and entitlements as noted in DOD policy and JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*. Eligible personnel should include contractors and their employees, US citizens who are federal employees, employees of engaged and authorized, dependents ordered to safe haven posts, and other designated civilians.

(c) NEOs. Overseas evacuations of US citizens are the responsibility of DOS. However, there will be times when DOS requests military assistance to execute a NEO. The evacuees may consist of nonessential military personnel, federal employees and their families, DOD family members, private US citizens, and designated foreign nationals. For more information on NEO, refer to JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*.

(d) Special Payments to Non-US Military Forces. Multinational operations may require special payments to authorized members of friendly forces in support of transition assistance programs. The JTF comptroller should coordinate with JTF staff/legal personnel concerning this support. The supported CCDR’s comptroller must ensure specific authority and funding is obtained from DOD and provided to the JFC before any payments are authorized. The supported CCDR’s comptroller will obtain copies of such agreements and make them available to the JTF comptroller early in joint operation planning. When an agreement has been negotiated between the US and an Allied or coalition PN, US disbursing officers may be authorized to advance currency on an emergency basis to cashiers, disbursing officers, or individual members of that nation’s armed forces. Such agreements may require reciprocal support to US forces.

(e) Non-US Pay Support

1. Day-Labor Pay. HN employee and day-labor pay are provided through arrangements with the HN or by a designated component commander. The JFC has the authority to contract HN employees for day labor and to make payments. Payment rates are determined by DOS. These rates, if available, should be obtained by the supported CCDR and provided to the JTF comptroller during planning.
2. EPWs and Civilian Internees. The CJTF is responsible for providing EPW and civilian internees pay. The CJTF may designate the Army component commander to provide currency and other required support. The Army component commander ensures that controls are established to properly process deposits to, and payments from, designated accounts. The JTF comptroller coordinates with the assigned SJA on EPW or civilian internees matters.

3. Claims Payments. Claims payments are monetary payments made by the USG for noncombat injuries or property damages. Claims are processed and adjudicated by an area claims office or, in the case of the Foreign Claims Act, by a foreign claims commission. As a practical matter, it will apply most often in US-based disaster operations. In DSCA operations, claims will likely be processed and paid by the civilian lead federal agency. CCDR’s should consult their legal advisors to determine claim responsibilities. Claims payments can reach significant dollar amounts. The finance unit is responsible for the disbursement of, and accounting for, all claims payments.

4. Solatium. A solatium is monetary compensation given in areas where it is culturally appropriate to alleviate grief, suffering, and anxiety resulting from injuries, death, and property loss with a monetary payment. In some societies, this payment is the culturally acceptable way of expressing sympathy to a victim or the victim’s family. Prompt payment of solatia helps ensure the goodwill of local national populations, thus allowing the US to maintain positive relations with the HN. Payment of solatium is not an admission of liability by the US. The supported CCDR or, if delegated, the local commander in whose OA the incident occurred, is responsible for determining entitlement for solatium if it is not specified in local regulations. Consult with the SJA before offering or making solatium. The finance unit, through use of paying agents, is responsible for the disbursing and accounting of all solatia.

5. Support to Special Programs. The DOD Rewards Program offers incentives for information and can be a remarkably effective tool in preempting enemy operations and denying sanctuary and weapons. It provides monetary, goods, or services rewards for information and other nonlethal assistance beneficial to FP or operations against international terrorism. The program’s scope is limited to specific prenominations and preapproved categories in which reward payments are restricted to instances where information leads to the capture of wanted individuals or weapons. Units may take steps to expedite the reward nomination, approval, and payment processes, but they must follow strict guidelines regardless of the procedures used.

6. Other Support. Authorized mission requirements or agreements may require Service component finance sections to support occupants of migrant camps, refugees, and dislocated civilians.

(5) Provide Banking and Disbursing Support

(a) Functions. Disbursing support includes making various types of payments certified as correct and proper, check cashing, and local currency conversion.
(b) Establishment and Control of Financial Institutions. The supported CCDR, in coordination with DOS and US embassy representatives, will designate an HN banking activity with Department of the Treasury approval. Banking support will be provided by military banking facilities or the HN banking industry. When the CJTF has authorized the establishment of a financial management lead agent from a Service component, the financial management lead agent will procure and provide US and local currency for disbursement for the joint force HQ. Each Service component will provide US and local currency for disbursement. The JTF comptroller, when required, will negotiate and provide liaison with designated HN banking institutions to establish LDAs and banking procedures. See DOD 7000.14-R, *Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 5, Disbursing Policy.*

(c) Currency Control and Support

1. Currency Control. The JTF comptroller, when required, is responsible for coordinating US and local currency procurement and control in support of CJTF requirements. The CJTF may set conversion limits and policies as recommended by the Department of the Treasury and DOS.

2. Currency support includes supplying US currency, foreign currencies, Department of the Treasury checks, foreign military scrip, and, in some operations, precious metals to US and MNFs. Currency and coins may also be provided to designated facilities as operational considerations permit. Finance units will exchange currency for Department of the Treasury checks or EFT for Service members, nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, and postal units. Finance units also can provide cash for automated teller machines during joint operations. Commanders should maximize use of existing technology (to include EFT) to minimize the use of cash in the OA. The financial management lead agent should synchronize central funding locations with supported elements of all joint force components and the joint force HQ. The central funding agency must ensure currencies are available to support finance and contracting missions for all subordinate commands and all elements not supported by assigned finance elements.

3. Smart Cards. DOD utilizes several smart card applications to conduct financial transactions in a number of settings. Smart cards include stored value cards, debit cards, and combination cards (contain both stored value card and debit card features). Smart cards store or provide access to “electronic money” and provide a more secure method of handling funds. They alleviate the need to carry cash and provide electronic payment to vendors for items purchased or services rendered. Examples include the Deployed Forces Card (known as Eagle Cash) used by Service members, DOD civilians, and contractors for electronic financial transactions in overseas locations; the Navy/Marine Cash Card used aboard naval vessels; and the US Debit Card used as an alternate device for payments made by USG departments and agencies. Currently, Department of the Treasury guidance is pending for these programs.

*For more information, refer to DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 5, Disbursing Policy.*
1. General

a. The J-9 is an optional directorate the CJTF may establish to assist in the pursuit of unified action by facilitating the integration of interorganizational perspectives in planning, execution, and assessment. J-9s in CCMDs may have a variety of titles, which may include interorganizational coordination. Successful interaction with these organizations, who are most often not under US military command authority, depends on the establishment of coordination mechanisms and processes to build and share a common understanding of strategic-level guidance and the OE, develop relevant objectives, and harmonize required actions. The J-9 is a hub from which the CJTF can facilitate unified action. The J-9 may serve as the initial and primary POC for interorganizational coordination and the single, physical location for representatives/LNOs. The specific role and staff structure of the J-9 may vary based on the nature of CJTF’s mission and the specific HQ designated as the JTF HQ.

b. A role of the J-9 is to assist in the identification and establishment of the linkages and contacts with the appropriate external organizations who may influence or affect the command’s mission across all phases of the operation. Cross-functional staff representation in planning forums is important in understanding some of the following interorganizational coordination considerations:

   (1) Determining the influence/effects of external organizations on the JTF’s mission.

   (2) Identifying and understanding the perspectives of current partners and stakeholders with whom the JTF is interacting.

   (3) Evaluating the effectiveness and adequacy of current interorganizational coordination processes for supporting JTF operations when the JTF is in either a supported or supporting role.

   (4) Determining future requirements and identifying potential partners.

   (5) Defining future coordination mechanisms, processes, and transitions.

c. The CJTF and staff should assess interorganizational coordination throughout planning and execution due to changes in the OE and other factors that can affect relationships and the objectives of participants. This assessment will help the CJTF and staff determine the most efficient and effective ways to interact with mission partners and
stakeholders. An accurate assessment can help determine who the key participants are, what the best way is to interact with them, and efficient procedures for integrating their inputs into our staff processes (Figure XIII-1).

d. The J-9 coordinates the CMO personnel and force requirements for the CJTF.

(1) Determines personnel requirements to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance and any special requirements to the JTF J-1 with appropriate billet description and justification.

(2) Determines required additional capabilities beyond what is assigned to the JTF and request them via the J-3 RFF manager.

2. Organization

a. The CJTF and COS determine the structure of the J-9 based on the CJTF’s mission and expected magnitude of the operation. The notional organization in Figure XIII-2 is

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**Figure XIII-1. Interorganizational Cooperation**

- **Academia**
- **Nongovernmental Organizations**
- **International Organizations**
- **USG Departments and Agencies**
- **Multinational**
- **State, Local, and Tribal**
- **Private Sector**

Legend
- **USG** United States Government

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one possible solution that highlights the J-9 as a separate J-code directorate. Other options include placing an interorganizational coordination division or branch within the J-3 or J-5, integrating personnel across existing staff structures, or establishing a JIACG. This organizational structure may also evolve as JTF operations progress through phases.

b. In addition to the organization of the J-9 within the staff, the placement and use of LNOs and other interagency representatives within the joint staff also depends on the mission and structure of the staff. It is possible to cluster LNOs and other representatives in a cell or branch within the J-9 for ease of collaboration and coordination, if these representatives are not habitually located in the JOC, joint information center, JPG or similar group or center. Another option is to assign them to appropriate functional areas or J-codes, such as a USAID representative to the J-4 due to the confluence of logistics coordination. When formed, the J-9 facilitates effective command interaction and interorganizational coordination with external stakeholders and partners. The J-9 is also the cross-functional staff entry point to the command for any external coordination mechanisms (e.g., a CMOC, an embassy country team, the UN cluster system), if established or available. At the JTF level, the use of a CMOC is often overshadowed by the HN or UN-led coordination or operations centers and, therefore, CMOCs are increasingly rare at the operational, JTF level. However, organized, the J-9 must work

![Diagram](Figure XIII-2. Notional Joint Task Force Civil-Military Operations Directorate or Interagency Operations Directorate Organization)
closely with the JTF SJA to ensure CJTF meets numerous legal and regulatory obligations in this area.

3. Responsibilities

When established, the J-9 is responsible for all matters concerning CMO and interorganizational coordination. Following are typical responsibilities:

a. Work with other functional directors to determine where and how interorganizational coordination considerations are or could be enriching their processes and products to ensure a comprehensive approach to achieve unified action.

b. Ensure interorganizational perspectives are included in appropriate staff processes (e.g., OPTs, assessments, daily commander briefs, the operations center).

c. Develop and maintain a close relationship with the POLAD’s office to ensure mission partner perspectives and diplomatic considerations are represented in key battle rhythm events. The POLAD is an advisor to the commander on foreign policy issues and does not have the responsibility or capacity to represent the broader DOS portfolio (e.g., public diplomacy, arms reduction, migration) to the staff.

d. Establish a regular event, such as an interorganizational coordination WG or synchronization forum, that meets as required to cross-level interorganizational coordination across the staff, share information, identify gaps and redundancies, de-conflict, and standardize information exchanges.

e. Develop, maintain, and refine additional coordination processes as required. This could include LNOs, KLEs, IM/knowledge sharing tools and process, and the above-mentioned interorganizational coordination WG.

f. Develop and maintain relationships with interorganizational coordination directorates (or their equivalent) at higher HQ. A strong and familiar relationship with those staffs will allow leveraging of their interagency contacts, relationships and capabilities which support JTF operations.

g. Develop and maintain close relationships with interorganizational coordination efforts at the component level. Some subordinate organizations may be more able to access the mission partner and stakeholder organizations than the JTF due to resource constraints which limit organizations at the operational level. The JTF J-9 should be aware of coordination occurring at echelons below and be ready to provide support when needed.

h. Maintain relationship with the equivalent office/directorate at the CCMD and as required, NG JFHQs-State.

i. With authority from the GCC, establish direct relationships with key agencies, organizations, and state/local governments (as required) for reachback on specific issues, particularly in time-sensitive situations. Maintain these relationships to ensure they are readily available for inputs into relevant staff sections or OPTs.
j. Develop and maintain relationships with pertinent commercial or private entities that may impact the mission.

k. Develop and maintain relationships with private sector entities as appropriate, for their specialized expertise, access to research, and further contacts within their networks.

l. If the scope of responsibility includes multinational partners, ensure their equities and perspectives are also considered in staff processes.

m. Develop annex G (Civil Military Operations) and annex V (Interagency Coordination) to the OPORD or OPLAN.

n. Ensure the staff is aware of interagency capabilities and roles that impact the command’s mission. This is a continual effort which informs the commander and staff on the importance of interagency coordination for unity of effort and mission success. This may include integrating key agencies and partners, through forums, panels, conferences, site visits, and printed publications.

o. Develop CMO input to the targeting process to reduce destruction of essential civilian capabilities.

p. Plan and coordinate with participating interagency partners CMO activities for the JFC that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions, by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN within the scope of the JTFs mission.

q. Normally, CMO planning conforms to five LOEs: economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, public education and information, and rule of law.

r. Continuously assess and advise the JFC as to the status of civil component of the JOA; provide options for CMO that facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services.

s. Provide staff oversight and direction to the CMOC if established by the JFC.

Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for more information on participants such as the UN and NGOs. For more information on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For more information on DSCA operations, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
CHAPTER XIV
SPECIAL AND PERSONAL STAFF

This chapter addresses those areas which do not neatly fit within the J-codes. This traditionally includes PA, SJA, chaplain, surgeon, IG, PM, comptroller (if no J-8), HQCOMDT, historian, and safety officer. Figure XIV-1 depicts a notional JTF special and personal staff organization.

1. Public Affairs

   a. Overview

      (1) Information relating to the military and its operations is available to the public from countless sources including official information from DOD, as well as unofficial information disseminated by Service members, distributed by the media, or by our enemies or adversaries. This information shapes the perceptions the public forms about the military and its activities and operations. Regardless of the source, intention, or method of distribution, information in the public domain either contributes to or undermines the achievement of communication and operational objectives. Official information released in a timely manner can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies, and help mitigate unofficial information. The ultimate goal is unity of effort among USG, state, local, and tribal communication...
activities through the use of coordinated themes, plans, programs, and products integrated with the actions of all instruments of national power.

(2) Mass information dissemination is no longer solely the purview of journalists and the media. The people formerly considered the audience now play an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing, and disseminating news and information; anyone with access to the Internet has the power to influence perceptions.

For more details concerning the DOD principles of information, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

(3) PA operations contribute to the achievement of strategic- and operational-level objectives through the dissemination of factual information and imagery concerning JTF operations and capabilities. The CJTF may share JTF preparations and results to international and domestic audiences to put operational actions in context, facilitate the development of informed perceptions about military operations, undermine enemy propaganda efforts, and gain and maintain public support for military operations. The CJTF must be prepared for a surge of local, regional, and international interest prior to and upon arrival in the JOA. If the press is not already in the JOA to cover military activities, the CJTF may be asked to take the media to the appropriate locations to ensure coverage.

b. Plans. PAOs participate throughout the JPP, have access to open-source reports and relevant intelligence, understand common enemy propaganda techniques, and aggressively anticipate and counter enemy propaganda—putting accurate information out first so friendly forces gain the initiative and remain the preferred source of information. PAOs should advise the CJTF on potential implications of operational decisions on public perception and prepare the CJTF and applicable personnel to work with the media prior to arrival in the JOA.

(1) PA planners establish and maintain a routine, ongoing relationship with other planners within the CCMD and JTF, and other USG departments and agencies. PA representatives participate in JTF cross-functional staff elements as appropriate. The PA plan supports the commander’s objectives, including assessment, and is coordinated with key staff agencies. Synchronization across the staff ensures services and support required by PA is provided and available to execute the PA plan. Every phase of PA planning should match the plan or order it supports and include coordination with the HN, the country team, other USG departments and agencies, and NGOs as appropriate.

(2) PA planners should ensure PA plans support the commander’s operational objectives, as well as the strategic guidance objectives and are developed in conjunction with other public communications efforts (e.g., MISO, CA). The use of coordinated communication plans and efforts throughout operations allows for the delivery of consistent messages to key audiences and serves to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests and policies.

(3) The level of effort required to support the media must be developed as soon as planning begins. Once the media learn that forces are preparing for a deployment, the
information likely will be reported in a manner accessible by enemy forces. The OE needs to be shaped with the timely release of information consistent with security concerns. PA plans should facilitate media access to meet CJTF objectives (e.g., countering or neutralizing enemy disinformation efforts). PA demands often are highest at the outset of operations as they inform the media and the public about military activities.

(4) PA planners must understand the audience and their culture. Once aware of the audience, determinations can be made on how the presentation of news and information affects publics’ perceptions. After the fact attempts to mitigate the joint force and adversary actions is often ignored or ineffective.

For more detailed discussion of PA planning, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

c. Execution

(1) During execution, PA personnel should ensure their efforts continue to be coordinated across the staff and with interagency partners. They should participate in various coordination boards to integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize information dissemination plans and activities derived from PA, MISO, and interagency partners at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

(2) In support of CCS, PA and other IRCs, activities, and operations help to convey synchronized information and can directly support military objectives; counter enemy propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation; and deter enemy actions. Although both PA and some other IRCs plan and execute public information activities and conduct media analysis, they differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent and must be coordinated and synchronized.

d. Assessment. As with all operations, the success of PA activities should be assessed and modified accordingly. PA planners should determine objectives for PA activities that support achievement of the CJTF’s objectives, as well as relevant assessment measures and criteria to determine success. The PA staff collaborates with pertinent members of the joint force staff (e.g., CA, MISO, and intelligence) on assessment development.

For further details, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

e. CJTF Responsibilities

(1) Provide overall direction and focus to PA activities in the OA.

(2) Assess PA personnel situation and request augmentation as necessary.

(3) Ensure required PA support identified in annex F (Public Affairs) is available.

(4) Plan for the support of media representatives and military personnel supporting PA from the earliest predeployment stages of any operation.
(5) Ensure the media receives access to military operations, access to command and staff personnel for briefings and interviews, and the logistic support necessary to accomplish their mission.

(6) Establish media operations centers (MOCs), as appropriate, to provide timely public and command information products and services.

(7) Designate JTF PAO and a MOC director as required.

(8) Conduct media interviews when feasible.

(9) Designate an officer to accomplish a security review of combat camera imagery. All cleared imagery should immediately be provided to PA for potential release to the media.

(10) Ensure all classified and unclassified imagery of joint operations is forwarded to the Defense Imagery Management Operations Center, DOD’s central reception and distribution point for joint interest imagery.

f. MOCs

(1) MOCs. The CJTF should consider establishing a MOC to support media operations and facilitate media coverage within the JOA. A MOC is a single point of interface between the military and media representatives covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders and PA staffs to discuss their units and their roles in the joint operation and helps journalists obtain information quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex activities. It should be staffed to support local and regional non-English speaking media. The MOC may also manage and use social media tools for information dissemination in accordance with approved policies.

(2) The MOC director is responsible for all activities conducted in support of the media relations mission. This includes close coordination with the joint force operations staff to ensure releasable information is accurate, timely, and issued with security sensitivities in mind. The MOC director also must ensure HN sensitivities and media guidelines are considered. The deputy MOC director assists in the management of the tasks associated with support of the joint operation, including daily feedback summaries that include media support activities, analysis of media reporting, and theme or message development. The deputy MOC director also performs the functions of the MOC director in their absence.

Refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information concerning MOC operations.

2. Staff Judge Advocate

a. Responsibilities

(1) The JTF SJA is the principal legal advisor to the CJTF and employs legal personnel assigned or attached to the JTF. The SJA provides all legal services to the CJTF
and staff and coordinates with the supported CCDR’s SJA to optimize legal support. The SJA should have direct access to the CJTF. Their advice should not be filtered through an intermediary. General responsibilities include:

(a) Task organize the SJA’s office to meet the JTFs mission-specific requirements. The office should be joint and provide the appropriate mix of legal subject matter experts necessary to fully support the CJTF. The task organization will vary depending on the JTF mission.

(b) Provide legal advice and support to the CJTF and staff in the following areas:

1. International and operational law (e.g., law of war, ROE, RUF, rule of law operations, law of the sea, airspace law, intelligence law, CO, detention operations, international agreements, and concepts and regional issues concerning national sovereignty).

2. Military justice (including uniform policies) to maintain good order and discipline, disposition for misconduct, and facilitation of the military justice process.

3. Claims (including Personnel Claims Act, Military Claims Act, Foreign Claims Act, SOFA claims, tort claims, admiralty, solatia payments, Article 139 claims, and affirmative claims).

4. Legal assistance (including access to special victim counsel, if required).

5. Administrative law (including environmental law, federal employment law, investigations, Freedom of Information Act, and Privacy Act).


7. Any legal issues concerning the employment of IRCs.

(c) Provide legal advice to the entire JTF staff.

(d) Serve as a single POC for component SJAs regarding legal matters affecting forces assigned or attached to the JTF.

(e) Serve as a CJTF POC with non-DOD agencies, international organizations, and NGOs in the execution of rule of law operations.

(f) Ensure all plans, ROE, RUF, policies, and directives are consistent with DOD Law of War Program and domestic and international law. When DOD forces under DOD control operate in coordination with other federal agencies, the applicable RUF will be coordinated with the on-scene federal agency personnel. During domestic operations, RUF do not apply to NG forces while in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. These NG forces operate under the state’s RUF.
1. Draft appendix 2 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) of the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan (legal services support plan) and oversee execution of the legal services support plan at the JTF and component levels (component SJAs are primarily responsible for the execution of the legal services support plan, except as it concerns JTF staff members).

2. Assist in the development, review, and drafting of general and restrictive orders (e.g., General Order No. 1).

3. Assist in the development, review, and drafting of appendix 7 (Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force) to annex C (Operations), as well as requesting modification of ROE or RUF. The SJA or a representative is a member of the ROE or RUF WG. Refer to Chapter IV, “Command and Control,” and Chapter VII, “Operations Directorate,” for more details on the ROE or RUF WG, as well as CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

4. Assist in the development, review, and drafting of tab B (Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Detainees), appendix 5 (Human Intelligence) to annex B (Intelligence).

5. Assist in the development, review, and drafting of appendix 1 (Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel) to annex E (Personnel) to the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

6. Review the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan for legal sufficiency.

7. Review target and weapon plans for compliance with the law of war. In this regard, the SJA or a representative should be a member of the JTCB, if one is established (see Chapter VII, “Operations Directorate,” for more details on the JTCB).


   (g) Coordinate and oversee JTF and component ROE and RUF training.

   (h) Assist in resolving claims for compensation by foreign personnel within the JOA. The SJA must also consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

   (i) Assist in resolving cases where foreign authorities assert criminal jurisdiction over US forces within the JOA. The SJA must also consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

   (2) Capture and share joint legal LL, issues, and significant observations from training events and operations and provide input to the appropriate LL organization.

b. The Planning Process
(1) The SJA must be involved throughout the planning process, including COA development, to ensure plans comply with US and international laws, treaties, and agreements. SJA involvement in the planning process from the beginning is especially critical to the issues of EPWs, detainees, CMO, targeting, ROE, or RUF.

(2) **Legal Estimate.** The SJA also develops the legal estimate during the planning process. A draft legal estimate is reflected in appendix 2 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel). The legal estimate should reflect the description of legal support required to support the CJTF and the assigned mission as developed during the planning process. It should include a review of laws that influence and govern the operations (e.g., foreign and domestic statutes and regulations as well as international treaties and customs). The legal estimate should clearly identify all anticipated issues related to the law of war, human rights, claims, contracts, contractors and procurement, HNS, fiscal law, environmental law, SOFAs, and status-of-mission agreements. Depending on the mission, the legal estimate may include consideration of the following:

(a) Describe any legal considerations (authorities and limitations) that may affect implementation of the plan or order.

(b) Cite applicable references and inter-Service, HN, and reciprocal support agreements.

(c) Define key terms.

(d) Identify the legal section organization and staffing.

(e) Describe the provision of legal assistance and military justice support to the JTF including claims, military justice, legal assistance, trial defense, and trial judiciary services.

(f) Identify the requirements for submitting legal status reports.

(g) Identify the authority under US and international law, agreements, and arrangements for military operations and the use of force including freedom of navigation and overflight/access of international and sovereign national airspace in support of military operations for all en route and OAs.

(h) Describe the exercise of disciplinary authority over members of other Services, including establishment of joint command convening authority if desired.

(i) Describe the process and procedures for responding to assertions of foreign criminal jurisdiction over US personnel. The SJA must also consider similar circumstances for JTFs conducting domestic operations.

(j) Identify SOFA and status of mission agreement issues.

(k) Describe the legal authorities and constraints associated with the negotiation and enforcement of international agreements.
(l) Describe the process for reporting and investigating serious incidents (e.g., friendly fire incidents, violations of the law of war, ROE, or RUF noncompliance).

(m) Describe the process and procedures for responding to requests for political asylum and temporary refuge.

(n) As appropriate, describe the legal issues relative to migrant and refugee operations.

(o) Address legal issues related to civilian employees and contractor employees who accompany US forces abroad.

(p) Identify the legal issues associated with the acquisition of real property, goods, and services during combat or other military operations.

(q) Develop the legal procedures associated with accounting for captured weapons, war trophies, documents, and equipment.

(r) Identify any fiscal law issues that may affect operations, to include fiscal and accountability issues related to property transfer or disposal.

(s) Describe the legal issues related to provision of logistic support to non-USG entities (e.g., MNF, HN authorities, NGOs, and international organizations).

(t) Describe the legal review of plans, orders, and target lists at every echelon.

(u) Identify the legal issues related to the treatment of EPWs and other detainees.

(v) Describe the legal support for intelligence oversight and the CCS process.

(w) Describe the process for review of ethics issues (e.g., giving and accepting gifts).

(x) Identify the environmental aspects of the operation.

For further details concerning legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

(y) Provide guidance and JTF policy (in coordination with the SJA and OCSIC) for CTIP.

For further details concerning CTIP, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.
3. Chaplain

a. General. The JFCH is the personal staff officer responsible to the commander for the execution of religious affairs. Religious affairs is comprised of RS and religious advisement.

(1) RS consists of chaplain-facilitated free exercise of religion through worship; religious and pastoral counseling services; ceremonial honors for the dead; crisis intervention; and advice to the commander on matters pertaining to morals, ethics, and morale as affected by religion.

(2) Religious advisement consists of the practice of informing the commander on the impact of religion on joint operations including, but not limited to, worship, rituals, customs and practices of US military personnel, international forces, and the indigenous population.

b. Functions

(1) Advise. The JFCH advises the CJTF and staff on all matters of religion, morals, ethics, quality of life, and morale. The JFCH also advises the CJTF and staff on matters pertaining to the ethical/moral implications of plans, policies, and operations. The JFCH advises subordinate JTF religious support teams (RSTs) on the conduct of religious affairs. RSTs consist of at least one chaplain and at least one enlisted RS personnel.

(2) Supervise. The JFCH supervises assigned staff to communicate command religious priorities, assess and direct religious affairs activities, answer specific religious inquiries, facilitate unity of effort, and enhance lines of communications and situational awareness. The JFCH also provides functional oversight and guidance to subordinate JTF RSTs.

(3) Plan. The JFCH prepares RS portions of plans/annexes and participates in identifying religious affairs requirements during planning. The JFCH ensures required RS capabilities are identified and included in the command RFF and requests for individual augmentees.

For more details on chaplain planning guidance, refer CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

(4) Resource

(a) The JFCH identifies RS materiel, force structure, and facilities requirements.

(b) The JFCH plans chaplaincy force structure to meet force deployment requirements, special religious holidays, and sacramental duties and integrates these RS force requirements in the CCDR’s RFFs and requests for individual augmentees.
(c) The JFCH coordinates with appropriate legal agencies to develop responsive methods to receive and acknowledge private donations, mailings, and unique religious articles. The JFCH recommends command policy for the decommissioning of sensitive religious articles, clothing, chapels, and the return of such items to the sustainment base.

c. **RST Tasks.** Religious affairs in joint military operations require a variety of actions supporting different types and phases of operations executed by RSTs.

(1) **RST includes actions to:**

   (a) Plan and coordinate for the accommodation of the religious needs of Service members.

   (b) Offer spiritual care, counseling, and coaching which meet personal and relational needs through the shared experience of service, professional wisdom, and pastoral understanding.

   (c) Care for the wounded and honor the dead.

   (d) Advise on RS of military operations.

   (e) Coordinate for RST replacements.

(2) **Religious liaison is:**

   (a) Any command-directed contact or interaction where the chaplain meets with a leader on matters of religion for the relief of human suffering and the benevolent expression of religion.

   (b) Liaison and coordination activities in support of the commander’s security cooperation program to include participation in humanitarian and civic assistance missions.

   (c) When directed by the commander, establishing relationships with appropriate local religious leaders in consultation with the CCMD chaplain.

   (d) As requested or directed by the commander and consistent with their noncombatant status, building and maintaining partnership capacity by assisting other militaries in establishing or improving their own military chaplaincies.

   (e) Building relationships and collaborating with the USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and international organizations.

   (f) Advising the JFC and staff on the constraints and restraints as defined by the noncombatant status of chaplains and Service policies.
(g) Information on specific LOOs or functions can be found in the applicable JPs (e.g., JP 3-07, Stability, and JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations).

d. Chaplain Liaison in Support of Military Engagement

(1) In many situations, clergy-to-clergy communication, as with military chaplains, is preferred by the indigenous religious leader.

(a) Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.

(b) Chaplain liaison in support of military engagement is any command-directed contact or interaction where the chaplain, as the command’s religious representative, meets with a leader on matters of religion to ameliorate suffering and to promote peace and the benevolent expression of religion. These activities can take place during any phase of an operation and may have implications at all levels of operations.

(2) Chaplains involved in chaplain liaison maintain dialogue with indigenous religious leaders, communities, NGOs, international organizations, and other actors as directed by the commander.

e. Enlisted RS Personnel Roles and Responsibilities. The Army religious affairs specialist, the Air Force chaplain assistant, or the Navy religious program specialist (RP) provide enlisted support to the chaplain. The RS senior enlisted leader is the principal enlisted advisor to the command chaplain. Services train their respective religious affairs specialists, chaplain assistants, or RPs to work directly within their Service chaplaincy prerogatives. The skills vary by Service and mission set.

For more detailed responsibilities of the JTF chaplain, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

4. Surgeon

a. General

(1) The JTF surgeon is a senior medical department officer from the Army, Navy, or Air Force who ideally completed the joint planning orientation course and the JTF senior medical leader seminar. As the JTF senior medical leader, the JTF surgeon serves as the CJTF’s principal advisor for joint FHP and HSS and reports directly to the CJTF. The JTF surgeon coordinates, integrates, and implements FHP and HSS policies and programs designed to protect and sustain the health of forces assigned or attached to the JTF and directs personnel that comprise the JTF surgeon’s office.

(2) Working with the CCMD surgeon, the JTF surgeon assesses JTF FHP and HSS requirements and capabilities (both quantitatively and qualitatively) and provides
recommendations to the CJTF. The responsibilities of the JTF surgeon are similar to those of the geographic CCMD surgeon. Specific details of the JTF surgeon responsibilities can be found in JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(3) Coordinate with planners to develop annex Q (Medical Services).

b. Organization. The JTF surgeon’s office should be adequately staffed and task organized to support the mission of the JTF.

c. Responsibilities

   (1) The mission of the JTF surgeon’s office functional areas and primary staff are detailed in JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

   (2) Checklist. To assist the JTF surgeon and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex J, “Checklist for Health Services,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”

d. Considerations

   (1) Health support is a Service responsibility. Each component must plan to care for their own forces; however, all beds within the JOA will be considered joint.

   (2) Commanders and medical units should work to deploy a healthy and fit force and employ an early, forward, responsive FHP and disease surveillance system. They meld medical intelligence and communications systems into a joint system to perform HSS collaborative planning, achieve situational awareness, and perform decision making; clear the OE of patients; stabilize patients using forward surgical capabilities; and move patients utilizing an en route care capability for theater hospitalization and return to duty. Hospital capabilities in the JOA should be appropriately planned to provide requisite essential care in the theater. Patients requiring treatment beyond the capabilities of medical units in the JOA should be evacuated to definitive care capabilities outside the JOA. All hospitals’ deployable medical systems are considered theater assets and, as such, care for all US forces. Medical treatment of casualties within the combat zone are limited to that which can be reasonably and safely performed by US medical treatment facility deployed in the JOA. Casualties requiring medical care beyond those capabilities should be evacuated to US medical facilities within the AOR per established patient movement policy.

   (3) All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of detention facilities and to prevent epidemics. Detainees will have access to sanitary facilities that conform to preventive medicine sanitation standards. In facilities where women detainees are accommodated, feminine hygiene supplies will be provided. Detainees will receive a full medical history and physical exam during in-processing. A medical record will be created for each detainee and a narrative summary of that record should be forwarded to the detainee’s new facility location. If the detainee is released, he or she should be given a narrative clinical summary detailing past and present medical status and recommendation of medical follow-up, if any. All treatment provider names will be redacted. No records will be released directly to the detainee or a foreign country. Patient services should include first responder, forward resuscitative, and theater hospitalization capabilities, as operational
circumstances permit. As a contribution to the maintenance of good order, mental health services should be provided to detainees when feasible.

5. Inspector General

a. General

(1) The IG is an extension of the eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the CJTF. The CJTF should strive to have this function as part of the JTF. The IG provides the CJTF with a sounding board for sensitive issues and is typically a trusted agent in the command. The IG is a candid broker and an impartial fact finder. The rank of the IG should be commensurate with the overall JTF organization.

(a) Basic IG functions are to inspect, assist, and investigate.

(b) IG responsibilities may include actions to:

1. Monitor, evaluate, assess, or inspect operational and other areas essential to mission performance and assess the ability of all echelons of the JTF to accomplish assigned missions.

2. Respond to operational matters; however, at the direction of the CJTF the IG may inspect any matter within the scope of the CJTF’s authority.

3. Provide assistance to all members of the JTF. The IG will refer cases, to include those dealing with family members, to the supported CCDRs’ or component commanders’ IGs as appropriate.

4. Review and assist with JTF member morale and welfare, family, and other issues as appropriate.

5. Conduct inquiries and investigations as necessary.

6. Serve as the POC for coordination with the supported CCDR’s IG to include coordination relevant to assessment of the JTF.

(2) The JTF IG may provide support on site from “a normal working location” or through a combination of regular site visits and reachback based on the situation and the CJTF desires. The JTF IG maintains points of contact with IGs of the supported CCDR and each of the JTF component commanders to facilitate referring cases that are Service-specific. The JTF IG ensures information on how to contact the supported CCDR’s IG, component commanders’ IGs, and the DOD IG Hotline is displayed at all times in a conspicuous JTF location.

(3) Typical JTF IG actions include assessing and reporting to the CJTF on the following:
(a) Mission: orders, documents, and agreements; mission clarity; mission rules for termination or extraction; and “mission creep.”

(b) Resources: equipment and personnel appropriate to mission(s) and sufficiency of administration, support, and logistics.

(c) Operational readiness: joint planning and conduct of operations, joint doctrine, readiness reporting, OPSEC, intelligence oversight, communications, and the discipline of assigned and attached personnel.

(d) Welfare and morale of assigned and attached personnel.

(e) Fraud, waste, and abuse.

(f) Other duties as specified by the CJTF.

b. Organization

(1) General. The JTF HQ IG office should be tailored to suit the mission, size, scope, and expected duration of the JTF. Other factors that should be considered are the geographic location, dominant Service, and political conditions. The following guidelines should be considered:

   (a) The JTF IG should be a field grade officer (O-4 or above) with grade directly linked to the level of JTF employed (e.g., 2-star JTF = O-4/O-5 IG, 3-star JTF = O-5/O-6 IG, and for a 4-star JTF = O-6 IG).

   (b) To be effective, the JTF IG must work for and have access to the CJTF and all elements and activities within the command.

   (c) The JTF IG office should draw on augmentees to gain the functional expertise needed for inspection teams.

(2) JTF IG Minimum Personnel Requirements. If the JTF maintains an IG function on-site, the minimum recommended staff would include the IG (O-4 or above) and an E-7 assistant. A notional JTF IG organization is provided in Figure XIV-2.

(3) JTF IG Minimum Equipment Requirements

   (a) Means of transportation to visit all JTF locations.

   (b) Unclassified phone and fax (with access to classified phone and fax).

   (c) Computer system with software compatible with systems in use by the JTF.

c. Tasks, Functions, and Procedures
(1) The JTF IG is concerned with operational matters and compliance with policies and procedures at the JTF level. For cases that deal solely with a single-Service issue and do not affect the joint force, the JTF IG normally will refer the matter to the respective Service component.

(2) The JTF IG prepares an activity plan for approval by the CJTF. The activity plan should list inspections, assistance visits, and any IG-related activity directed by the CJTF.

(3) The JTF IG should ensure IGs of subordinate units establish contact upon assignment or arrival in the JOA. The JTF IG will provide technical guidance to subordinate IGs and coordinate common IG activities.

(4) When a lead IG for an overseas contingency operation is designated, the JTF IG will support the lead IG in the conduct of comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency (per Title 5, USC, Appendix 8L, [Special Provisions Concerning Overseas Contingency Operations], as amended).
d. **Considerations**

1. Become involved, early on, in the CJTF’s planning process to understand the commander’s intent and CONOPS.

2. Focus on high-payoff issues that impact on the JTF’s ability to rapidly deploy, sustain itself, conduct operations, redeploy, and prepare for the next mission or reconstitution. These issues may include, but are not limited to, unit readiness for deployment, training, ammunition distribution, mail service, standards of discipline, and other Service member welfare issues.

3. IGs can expect an increasing frequency of RFIs and assistance. Historically, assistance cases account for the majority of the deployed IG’s workload.

e. **Planning Rhythm.** The JTF IG battle rhythm is synchronized with and responsive to JTF operational requirements. It includes conducting scheduled inspections, providing assistance to members of the JTF as required, and conducting investigations as directed.

f. **Reports.** The IG will report directly to the CJTF on the results of each inspection or investigation.

*To further assist the JTF IG and staff in accomplishing their tasks, refer to Annex K, “Checklist for Inspector General,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”*

6. **Provost Marshal**

a. **General.** The JTF PM is the principal staff advisor to the CJTF on antiterrorism and FP matters, as well as military police and criminal investigation division employment across the conflict continuum. This consists of security support to promote stability operations within the JSA. The PM is capable of developing and issuing policies, programs, and guidance for the planning and conduct of military police operations. JTF security elements will perform six functions: maneuver and mobility, area security, internment and resettlement, law and order, police intelligence, and antiterrorism. An additional special function includes air base defense. The JTF PM is the principal command liaison with US civilian and military law enforcement agencies, as well as the HN and US embassy security elements.

b. **Responsibilities**

1. Assist with the collection, processing, and reporting of EPWs or detainees.

2. Advise the CJTF on technical and procedural aspects of physical security and FP.

3. Provide the CJTF with a focal point on all matters of law enforcement planning, policy, and reporting and provide a liaison for the CJTF with civilian law enforcement authorities.
(4) Recommend ways in which military police and security forces capabilities can best support the JTF’s mission based on the CJTF’s intent and CONOPS.

(5) Provide the CJTF with guidance and recommendations regarding detainee operations.

(6) Principal liaison with HN police, security forces, and DOS, and embassy security officials.

(7) Coordinate and maintain liaison with other PMs and security chiefs, as required.

(8) Plan to support the transfer of control of detainees. Detainees will be moved from detainee collection points to detainee holding areas and then to a theater internment facility.

(9) Coordinate with security contractors performing armed security services to reduce risk of friendly fire incidents in the OA.

(10) Be cognizant of limitations of active duty JTF PM in domestic operations such as those imposed by Posse Comitatus Act restrictions.

(11) Coordinate with planners to develop appendix 14 (Force Protection) to annex C (Operations).

For further details concerning the CJTF PM, refer to JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, and the Joint Force Headquarters Training website on JEL+.

c. Organization

(1) The PM operates under the general staff supervision of the JTF COS and is functionally aligned with the JTF J-3.

(2) The JTF PM staff should be tailored to suit the mission and the size, scope, and duration of the operation. Normally, the PM will come from the dominant Service with other Service representation for the deputy PM or operations officer positions. A joint military police agency will be established when warranted by the scope of military police operations.

(3) The PM staff should be staffed to enable 24-hour operations and representation at other JTF HQ locations or an intermediate staging base and forward operating base.

(4) In situations that do not require a major JTF HQ, the CCMD PM may be tasked to deploy an augmentation cell to support a JTF. The size and composition of the PM augmentation cell is dependent on the situation. The CCMD will task the appropriate component command for this augmentation cell.
Chapter XIV

7. Comptroller

a. General. The JTF comptroller is normally part of the CJTF’s personal or special staff. The CJTF may designate a component commander’s comptroller or finance officer to also serve as the JTF comptroller. The JTF comptroller, as well as the supported CCMD comptroller, should be involved early in the planning process to clearly define financial management requirements. Although the component commanders have the primary responsibility for providing resources, the JTF comptroller is responsible for integrating JTF-wide resource management and finance support policy planning and execution efforts. The JFC may designate a component commander’s comptroller or finance staff officer to also serve as the JTF comptroller.

b. Responsibilities

(1) Serve as the principal financial management advisor to the CJTF.

(2) Represent the CJTF in identifying JTF financial management requirements to the supported CCDR, component commanders, and others as required.

(3) Establish financial management responsibilities and coordinate the designation of lead agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.

(4) Provide estimates of resource requirements to the supported CCDR, component commanders, and others as required.

(5) Establish positive controls over the funding authority received.

(6) Coordinate with the JTF J-4 and IG to develop a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.

(7) Coordinate with the JTF J-4 on logistic and contracting requirements to ensure they complement financial management responsibilities.

(8) Review estimated and actual costs of the joint operation, when available, and provide recommendations for addressing the differences.

(9) Coordinate JTF entitlement policy (pay and allowances) through the JTF J-1, with the geographic CCMD J-1. This includes the CCDR determination of the appropriate TDY option for JTF personnel.

(10) Provide resource management advice and recommendations to the commander. When authorized by SecDef, the supported CCDR issues fiscal and logistical guidance to subordinate commanders. Accordingly, the JTF comptroller advises the CJTF about the effective use of available resources and financial management lead agent responsibilities. Financial managers should participate early and actively in the JPG to assist in the successful integration of financial management efforts.
For further details concerning the comptroller, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations.

c. Organization. The JTF comptroller staff should be a cross-Service representation of the JTF. Augmentees should include personnel with experience in financial services and resource management. The actual organization should be shaped by the types of planned military operations. Figure XIV-3 depicts a notional JTF comptroller organization.

d. Tasks, Functions, and Procedures

(1) Essential Elements of Resource Management. Each contingency has a unique set of resource management parameters, but the following essential elements of resource management should be involved: providing financial advice and recommendations to the commander, developing command resource requirements, identifying sources of funding, determining costs, acquiring funds, distributing and controlling funds, tracking costs and obligations, capturing costs, conducting reimbursement procedures, accounting and fiscal validation, establishing management internal controls, establishing a financial assistance visit and inspection process in coordination with the Service components, and providing accurate and complete accounting support.

(2) Essential Elements of Finance Support. Finance support during joint operations ensures banking and currency support for personnel payments, OCS, and other special programs. The finance support structure should provide funding (cash and
negotiable instruments) and establish expedient methods of payment. The essential elements are: provide financial advice and recommendations to the commander, support the procurement process, provide pay support, and provide banking and disbursing support.  

For further details concerning essential elements of resource management and essential elements of finance support, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations.

8. Headquarters Commandant

   a. General. The HQCOMDT coordinates direct support to the JTF HQ at its employment location. Typically, the HQCOMDT has functional specialists who liaise with the host installation for this support. The HQCOMDT also has support elements that provide dedicated support to the JTF staff. Currently, there is no unit type code for the HQCOMDT. The design of the HQCOMDT organization is notional and should be considered during planning. There may be a requirement for the JTF COS to direct one of the staff directorates (e.g., J-4) to perform HQCOMDT planning and other responsibilities until the establishment of this position or until the designated HQCOMDT joins the JTF.

   b. Organization. Normally, the JTF HQ will be located at a host base and will have access to standard base support, making HQCOMDT planning highly dependent on coordination with the host support and logistic groups. In some cases, the host installation may be a foreign military installation and may present difficulties in establishing reliable agreements quickly. In the instance of a non-US host installation, the HQCOMDT organization will need to be more self-sufficient. Additionally, split-based operations are becoming more common, in which case multiple HQCOMDTs may have to be utilized. Figure XIV-4 shows a notional organization for HQCOMDT.

   c. Identifying Support Requirements

      (1) The lead HQCOMDT planner should work with the JTF COS to identify the HQCOMDT chief(s) at the earliest possible time. The lead HQCOMDT planner(s) should develop a WG consisting of functional specialists from the staff that can advise on the specific requirements needed to support the JTF HQ staff. Suggested WG members include the J-4 (logistic plans, supply, deployment/distribution, engineering, OCS, services), PM, J-1 (personnel), and J-6 (communications plans). Additionally, the lead HQCOMDT planner should coordinate with the JTF COS and other staff principals in identifying detailed support requirements.

      (2) HQCOMDT Development at a US Base. Agreements need to be made early on with the host base with respect to specific support requirements. A support agreement should be established (time permitting) to identify specific support arrangements. In some cases, the HQCOMDT chief may require a small staff to coordinate with the base support element; in other cases, the HQCOMDT chief may need an entire element to provide complete functional support to the JTF HQ staff, to include FP. After evaluating the level of base support expected, the lead HQCOMDT planner should develop a liaison staff to
coordinate with host base supporting elements and identify augmentation elements to fill gaps the host base is not able to support. The HQCOMDT planning WG should advise the lead HQCOMDT planner on all functional requirements and assist in designing the HQCOMDT composition.

(3) HQCOMDT Development at a Non-US Host Installation. Past experience has shown that support made available by other Services or foreign militaries generally is very limited. The HQCOMDT planning WG should design the HQCOMDT organization with careful consideration of all augmentation requirements and consider identifying standard support unit type codes to support the deployed location when necessary.

(4) Obtaining Augmentees. Once support requirements are identified and the HQCOMDT organization is designed, the HQCOMDT lead planner should identify HQCOMDT positions and augmentees that must be sourced. Position requirements, reporting instructions, and line remarks (special qualifications) must be submitted to the J-1 for sourcing by the relevant Service components.

9. Historian

a. General

(1) The JTF historian provides historical coverage for all JTF operations and ensures proper documentation and historical reports are available for future researchers.

(2) Typically, the JTF historian is a senior officer (O-4 to O-5 level) or appropriate level civilian with training as a military historian. Depending upon the circumstances of the JTF employment, the historian may have an assistant. The historian is considered part of the special staff with direct access to the COS.

(3) The JTF HQ historian receives staff guidance and support from the supported CCMD historian, not his/her Service history office. At the conclusion of the operation, the
historian’s records and materials are turned over to the CCMD historian. The JTF historian coordinates with the component historians and provides assistance and advice, as necessary; component historians receive guidance from their respective Service history offices.

(4) The JTF historian’s work centers upon recording the key decisions made at the operational level. Tactical-level decisions are relevant only to the extent they affect the course of the campaign or operation. To accomplish this end, the historian collects key documents (including Focal Point material), conducts in-depth oral history interviews, and maintains a suitable chronology. The value of the field historians’ work is measured by the insight provided into key decisions, not merely the quantity of material collected or the number of interviews.

(5) A robust historical program serves as the basis for factual, objective histories, both official and unofficial. The results of the history program are most apparent during the years following the operation, as the need for an informed account grows.

(6) Ensure the JTF historian has an adequate security clearance to collect all documentation, collect classified photographs, and conduct classified oral histories. Supporting information technology must support storage of classified information.

b. Functions of the JTF Historical Office

(1) Maintaining the command historical file, to include a chronology of significant JTF activities.

(2) Maintaining a document reference collection in either electronic or paper copies. This duty is distinct from the formal records management requirements of a JTF.

(3) Conducting an oral history program, to include interviews of the CJTF and key staff members.

(4) All other duties as related to the command history program. To perform these duties, the command historian should have access to key staff meetings, as well as access to key documents.

For further details concerning the joint historian, refer to CJCSI 5320.01, Guidance for the Joint History Program, and CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.

10. Safety Officer

a. General. Safety is a command responsibility. The JTF safety officer assists the CJTF and subordinate component commands in executing their responsibility to protect government personnel, property, and prevent unintended impact on civilians by ensuring safe operations in support of their mission. The safety officer supports the CJTF’s safety programs to enhance mission success by developing proactive mishap/accident prevention programs, providing effective cross-flow of safety information between components,
collecting and disseminating joint safety lessons identified, and tracking mishap/accident investigations. The safety officer tracks corrective actions applicable to JTF operations and reports the results to the commander.

b. **Fundamental Principles**

(1) CJTFs establish command-level, joint safety programs for assigned and attached forces and should appoint a safety officer to assist in developing these programs. A safety officer may be a member of the CJTF’s personal staff or special staff. In smaller JTFs, a safety officer may be a subordinate staff officer, collateral duty, or additional duty.

(2) The scope of the safety program should be limited to those activities designed to ensure proper mishap/accident reporting and investigation; enhance mishap/accident prevention; and protect DOD personnel, resources, and the public without duplicating the efforts of Service safety programs.

(3) Effective safety programs require leadership involvement in risk management at all levels, enforcement of discipline, and compliance with applicable standards. Subordinate commands should establish specific procedures (e.g., inspections and risk assessments) to ensure all personnel and activities comply with those standards. Commanders should ensure risk management is integrated at each functional level and is effectively applied throughout the command.

c. **JTF Safety Officer Responsibilities**

(1) Provide commanders an unbiased perspective of the safety climate and preclude conflicts of interest with other staff sections. Subordinate unit safety officers, safety managers, and safety specialists provide mishap/accident data, trend analysis, process accident reports, and submit safety recommendations to the JTF safety officer.

(2) Provide timely reports of Classes A through D mishaps/accidents and other potential high-interest safety incidents (near miss) to the CCMD safety office.

(3) Provide timely summaries, trends, and analysis of Classes A through D mishaps/accidents for the commander and key staff review.

(4) Notify CCMD safety office of all critical safety issues that might impact other components or operations. Disseminate safety information, issues, and recommendations to the JTF and all components.

d. **Mishap/Accident Prevention**

(1) Safety is a function of risk assessment. To that end, commands should identify operations and activities that pose an increased risk for mishaps/accidents and develop procedures and programs to minimize losses of manpower and equipment, injury to personnel, and unintended impact on civilians. Mishap/accident prevention efforts should be implemented in such a manner as to have minimal adverse impact on operations.
Whenever possible, safety measures should be applicable to combat, as well as peacetime, operations to reduce training artificialities and promote sound operational techniques.

(2) Particular emphasis should be given to accident prevention efforts in the following areas: pre-mishap/accident plans, weapons and explosive safety, vehicle safety, and aviation safety. Depending on the organizational mission, other areas may pose greater hazards than those listed and should be addressed. Based on an analysis of mishap/accident potential and operational risk, commanders should place emphasis on a “worst hazard first” basis. Where joint or multinational operations are being conducted, safety personnel should ensure inter-Service/national coordination of elevated-risk operations to reduce the potential of accidents due to differences in equipment and procedures.

(3) **Pre-Mishap/Accident Plans.** Commanders should ensure they have a current pre-mishap/accident plan established. This plan should be tailored to a specific location and situation during the operation or exercise. The plan should include, at a minimum, lifesaving and rescue information, notification procedures for contacting firefighting assets, medical evacuation and ambulance services, notification of key personnel in the chain of command, and notification of personnel responsible for mishap/accident investigation and safeguarding the mishap/accident scene. Standing mishap/accident investigation boards may be established.

e. **Risk Management.** Risk assessments should be completed for all training and operations. The assessment may be formal or informal in accordance with Service-specific directives. Risk assessments provide a means to systematically review potential hazards associated with specific operations; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and plans to mitigate those risks. Once identified, unnecessary risks should be eliminated and operational risks reduced to a level the commander determines is acceptable. If a risk cannot be reduced to a level acceptable to the responsible commander, the decision to conduct the operation should be elevated to the appropriate level in the chain of command.
APPENDIX A
CHECKLISTS

The sample checklists in this appendix inform joint planners as to the details that mission planners, task force planners, and operators need and use in conducting their activities. Additionally, there are a myriad of tasks that individual directorates of a joint staff must consider in their planning to support JTF operations.

Annex  A  Checklist for the Chief of Staff
B  Checklist for Transition to Permanent Operations
C  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-1
D  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-2
E  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-3
F  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-4
G  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-5
H  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-6
J  Checklist for Joint Task Force J-9
K  Checklist for Health Services
L  Checklist for Inspector General
M  Checklist for Information Management
N  Checklist for Transition of a Joint Task Force Into a Multinational Force or Transition to a Follow-On Multinational Force
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. Has a terms of reference or directive in accordance with the commander’s guidance and deputy commander’s input to delineate roles and responsibilities of the command group and key staff members been developed?

2. Has a deliberate process been established for staff training for receiving new personnel and augmentees, in the areas of predeployment, reception, and continuous sustainment?

3. Is there an effective staff training and integration program in place?

4. Has an effective RFI management process across the staff been established that effectively supports and employs the cross-functional and functional staff structures?

5. Has a staff tasker tracking system and business rules for use and management been assigned and has the staff been trained?

6. Has a post meeting minutes’ process for all battle rhythm events been established?

7. Does the post meeting minutes process support staff integration and staff shared understanding in support of the commander’s decision cycle?

8. As the designated battle rhythm process owner:
   a. Does the JTF battle rhythm effectively support the JTF planning, decision cycles and other commander requirements and functions?
   b. Has the JTF battle rhythm been mapped to provide a logical arrangement of events to show the critical path information flows to the commander using the JECC/JPSE IM and knowledge sharing methodologies or another technique?
   c. Does the battle rhythm provide unscheduled time to support product development?
   d. Is there a process and seven-minute drill template in place to facilitate the development of seven-minute drills? This process and drills will support effective cross-functional staff planning events that process inputs and deliver required outputs in support of the commanders decision cycle.
   e. Does the battle rhythm effectively support continued staff shared understanding of the current SA and commander’s intent?
   f. Does the battle rhythm support commander battle field circulation time?
   g. Is there a staff member assigned to be the battle rhythm manager?
   h. Is there a battle rhythm management control process in place?
   i. Does the battle rhythm support effective decision cycles for all critical paths?
j. Does the battle rhythm identify specific cross-functional staff events that would need to meet more frequently to process inputs into outputs in support of the commander’s decision cycle?

k. Has the battle rhythm been developed with external stakeholders considerations addressed?

l. Are current or planned battle rhythm organizations, elements, and events staffs supportable?

m. Do all battle rhythm changes go through an approved process prior to implementation?

n. Is the battle rhythm posted and updated daily (if required) to the web portal and does everyone required to read the posted information have access to it?

9. Has an IM officer with oversight and responsibility for IM and knowledge sharing been specified to ensure effective and efficient information sharing?

10. Is there an authoritative JTF command calendar that clearly shows battle rhythm and staff schedule of events?

11. Is there effective liaison with the joint force higher, subordinate, and adjacent HQ; lead federal agency (as applicable); and other critical agencies and organizations in the OA?

12. Is there a process in place to support the development and implementation of the JMD?

13. Have all IERs been prioritized and submitted to the JTF J-6 to ensure communications platforms are accessible and all parties involved can communicate effectively? Has a primary, alternate, contingency and emergency communications plan been developed and verified? Has a list of designated information systems been published to notify subordinate organizations about the systems they must access and on all pertinent security enclaves?
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION TO PERMANENT OPERATIONS

1. An establishing authority typically forms a JTF for a temporary purpose and disbands the JTF when the purpose is fulfilled (i.e., when the JTF accomplishes the task or mission). In some cases, however, the circumstances may require that operations continue on a more permanent basis. Therefore, the establishing authority or higher authority must determine whether to continue operations more permanently with the existing JTF or transition to a different C2 option. This checklist is intended to help the establishing authority and the existing CJTF and staff determine the best C2 option.

2. The primary HQ options for C2 of permanent operations include the following (there may be variations of these options depending on the specific circumstances):
   a. Task the existing JTF.
   b. Transition to a replacement JTF.
   c. Transition to a Service component HQ if joint operations are not required.
   d. Transition to a functional component.
   e. Transition to control of operations by a CCMD staff directorate if the focus is more on management of a long-term program (characteristic of military engagement and security cooperation activities) rather than C2 of forces in operations.
   f. Transition to a multinational HQ.
   g. Transition to a subordinate unified command.

3. At a minimum, the determination of an appropriate option requires mission analysis based on future requirements and updates of the CJTF’s and staff’s understanding of the OE. The current CJTF and staff should accomplish this in collaboration with the JTF establishing authority, subordinate commanders, and other experts as required. Following are key questions related to making the initial determination on an appropriate C2 option for permanent operations:
   a. What strategic-level guidance exists on the new mission or tasks?
   b. What is the new desired end state?
   c. What is the fundamental problem that must be solved to attain the end state (the factors that must be addressed to move the current system to the desired system)?
   d. What is the new mission or set of tasks associated with the desired end state?
   e. Do mission analysis and a revised understanding of the OE and problem confirm that military presence and operations are required for the foreseeable future?
f. Does the mission require joint operations?

g. If the mission requires joint operations, what level of joint HQ is required: current JTF level, a higher joint HQ, or a subordinate JTF?

h. If a current-level JTF is most appropriate, should the existing JTF continue operations with a revised mission or should it be replaced by a new JTF?

i. If the mission does not require joint operations, what Service component is most suited to assume the mission (i.e., will future operations be primarily land, air, or maritime in nature)?

j. Do circumstances and analysis indicate a CCMD staff directorate can manage a long-term program to attain the desired end state rather than committing a separate joint or Service HQ?

k. Do circumstances and analysis indicate a multinational HQ could be the best option?

4. Once the establishing authority has approved a C2 HQ option, the existing CJTF and staff should continue planning accordingly.

a. If the existing JTF will continue long-term operations, then planning and other joint processes will continue as they would for any other operation. Examples of the many potential areas where changes may need to occur quickly include the following:

   (1) Joint force task organization, including establishing the C2 relationships of attached forces.

   (2) JOA and other OA boundaries.

   (3) Relationships with supporting commands.

   (4) Relationships with the other participants in unified action.

   (5) JTF HQ augmentation. When an operational JTF HQ attempts to transition to a permanent HQ, there is coordination between CCMD J-1 and Joint Staff J-1 on all of the joint manpower validation process procedures. See CJCSI 1000.01, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*, for additional information.

   (6) JTF training requirements.

   (7) LNOs to and from other organizations.

   (8) Basing requirements.

   (9) HNS.

   (10) Operational limitations (constraints and restraints).
(11) Has the theater support contracting construct been designated in the appropriate order/plan as follows: Service support to own; lead Service for contracting (LSC); lead Service for contracting coordination (LSCC); joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC)?

b. If the decision is to transition to another C2 HQ option for permanent operations, the specific nature of transition actions will vary based on the nature of future operations and what type of C2 HQ will assume responsibilities. For example, transitioning to a long-term security cooperation program managed by the CCMD should be less complicated than transitioning to a multinational HQ charged with conducting peace operations. The existing JTF HQ should focus in three primary areas:

(1) Maintain the stability of the current situation pending transition to another HQ. JTF operations during transition will depend on tasks and other guidance from higher HQ.

(2) Continue planning for future operations in collaboration with the newly designated HQ and higher HQ until the new C2 organization is ready to assume full planning responsibilities.

(3) Continue planning for transition between the existing and new C2 organizations to ensure the smooth transfer of responsibilities (assumption of operations by the new HQ and its forces, turnover of equipment and facilities, redeployment of organizations and personnel, etc.).
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-1

1. Does a personnel IM system exist that allows summation of separate Service personnel (including DOD civilians and CAAF) status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualty accounting; and personnel requisitions, and is the JPPC established?

2. Do plans include a current summary of JTF manpower requirements?
   a. Are minimum grade, security clearances, and occupational skill requirements specified?
   b. Are critical positions (billets) identified?
   c. Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?
   d. Have procedures been established to identify JTF augmentation requirements and functional component augmentation requirements? Have shortfalls been identified to the appropriate authority?
   e. Have RC personnel been considered to fill manpower requirements?

3. What staff organizations require J-1 representation?

4. Have procedures been established to capture personnel information on all in-bound JTF personnel (including DOD civilians and CAAF) immediately upon their arrival?

5. Have reporting instructions been issued addressing, as a minimum: reporting date, passports, visas, immunizations, uniform and equipment requirements, and travel restrictions? If appropriate, billeting arrangements should also be addressed in reporting instructions.

6. Has guidance been issued in applicable CONPLAN/OPLAN/OPORD annex E (Personnel) and appendix 2 (Contractor Management Plan) in annex W (Operational Contract Support) for component commanders to accomplish Service-specific preparation for movement actions prior to deployment?
   a. Giving deploying members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney.
   b. Allowing deploying members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit.
   c. Making provisions to pay members while deployed.
   d. Providing passports and visas if required.
e. TBC updated and contractor management plan developed to inform CAAF of predeployment requirements.

7. Have other personnel actions been accomplished, by component commanders, such as medical screening, (e.g., immunizations, dental readiness, human immunodeficiency virus screening); identification cards and tags; and Service record updates, including records of emergency data?

8. Consideration must be given as to how personnel will be deployed (TDY, field conditions) to ensure adequate compensation is provided and to prevent unnecessary loss of pay and allowances.

9. Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?
   a. Special leave.
   b. Hostile fire or imminent danger pay.
   c. Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion.
   d. Free mail.
   e. Sole surviving son or daughter.
   f. Absentee voting.

10. Have MWR activities for JTF personnel been coordinated?
    a. Are MWR fitness facilities available?
       (1) Has coordination been made with exchange services for immediate and short-term support?
       (2) Has POC information been provided to the responsible agent for receiving newspapers?
    b. Has a morale call policy been established and all personnel informed?
    c. Has the CJTF identified a location for a local rest and recreation program? Has it been coordinated and approved by the supported CCDR?
    d. Has a location for MWR computer support for e-mail and video teleconference access been identified and the information provided to the supported CCMD?

11. Do JTF and component commands’ plans adequately and equitably address military postal support? If the operation will be dependent on mail for supplies and equipment, consider increasing postal support.

12. Is there adequate J-1 staff to support operations?
a. 24-hour operations.

b. Distributed locations of HQ or JPPC.

13. Has the JTF J-1 coordinated with the HQCOMDT to ensure personnel services to the JTF HQ are uniformly provided?

14. Has coordination been made with other staff sections to ensure unambiguous reporting of personnel information within the HQ?

15. Have reporting procedures been established for subordinates that account for operational phases and all C2 relationships throughout the operations? Do they meet the commander’s decision cycle?

16. Are all JTF J-1 personnel proficient with the command’s software standards?

17. Has liaison been established with the International Red Cross?

18. Has coordination with the JPRC been accomplished to address PR, especially reintegration responsibilities and isolated personnel reports?

19. Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning to duty from medical channels?

20. Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?

21. Consistent with operational requirements (and in consultation with the J-3 and OCSIC), is maximum practical use being made of local national civilian labor?

22. Have JTF J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatant and civilian personnel?

23. Have internal SOPs been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?

24. Have all JTF components been provided reporting formats and requirements?

25. Have requirements for Service, joint, and multinational publications been identified?

26. Has a rating scheme been developed for JTF HQ personnel?

27. Have criteria been established for nomination of JTF members for awards and decorations?

28. Has a POC list been developed and published?

29. Has a rotation policy been established and published?
30. Has CJTF guidance been issued regarding the Sexual Assault Response Program, personnel visibility standards, award submissions, and proficiency reports preparation?

31. Employ OPSEC.

32. Provide input to the OCSIC for the development of a contractor management plan for the operation as well as any updates to the CCMD TBC information.
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-2

1. General

All DOD intelligence activities, resources, and personnel involved in the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning US personnel are governed by US Government intelligence oversight DOD Manual 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities, and DOD 5240 1-R, Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons. In addition, due to potential violations of the Posse Comitatus Act through direct DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies is governed by Procedure 12 (Provision of Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities) in DOD 5240 1-R.

   a. With inputs from the JTF functional directorates and special staff, have the JTF J-2’s missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the CJTF?

   b. Employ OPSEC.

   c. Have intelligence support requirements to PR (manpower and collection requirements) been identified for the JPRC?

   d. Have the current warning intelligence requirements in the JOA been identified?

   e. Has JIPOE been conducted?

      (1) Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?

      (2) Are situation assessments periodically updated?

      (3) Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the CJTF and up the chain of command?

      (4) Has an initial J-2 staff estimate been completed?

   f. Are the CJTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional or theater assessments?

   g. What staff organizations require J-2 representation?

   h. Are PIRs regularly updated and staffed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?

   i. Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of JTF’s and CCMD’s organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?
j. Has the JTF J-2 designated a J-2X to coordinate and deconflict CI and HUMINT collection activities?

k. Has the J-2 designated a J-2E to plan, coordinate, and deconflict JTF-wide exploitation activities for captured material.

l. Has national intelligence support been requested?

m. Have the JTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, or reservists, been identified?

n. Have the deployable elements to support the JTF’s efforts in collection management; Service expertise; communications; and tactical, in-depth analysis been identified?

o. Have the JTF JOPES managers been kept up-to-date on intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?

p. Have the personnel, subject matter expert, and functional requirements for a JISE to support the JTF been determined?

q. Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF J-6, developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that allows interoperability laterally, vertically, and with MNFs? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)

r. Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for PIRs and RFIs been determined?

s. Have intelligence responsibilities been clearly delineated between JTF, supported CCDR, and national intelligence organizations?

t. Have any JTF subordinate units, such as SOF, been receiving intelligence support from the supported CCDR or national intelligence organizations?

u. Has the JTF coordinated with the supported CCDR’s JIOC to determine whether PIRs have been established for the current situation? (CCMD PIRs should be considered when recommending CJTF CCIRs.)

v. In concert with the JTF J-3 and the supported CCDR’s JIOC, have PIRs been tailored for the current situation?

w. Have the CJTF and component commanders been fully apprised of all relevant current events?

x. Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?
y. Have the JTF J-2’s information and data management systems requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported CCDR’s and subordinate’s systems (to include compatibility for multinational JTF operations when required)?

z. In concert with the supported CCDR’s J-2 and the JTF J-3, have all the JTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?

aa. Have JTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities and collection management been identified?

bb. Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded to the supported CCDR’s JIOC for collection by theater resources?

c. Have requirements for all GEOINT and geospatial information and related services support been identified?

dd. Have JTF geospatial information and services shortfalls been identified?

ee. Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed to the Joint Staff J-25?

ff. Has the annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan, and was the National Intelligence Support Plan used?

gg. Can the JTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the senior commander as directed?

hh. Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

ii. Have deliberate targeting plans been reviewed, and are target materials up-to-date?

jj. Have the JTF’s requirements for HUMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection been identified?

kk. Have the requirements for a HUMINT operations cell and supporting HUMINT collection forces, to include facility locations and personnel requirements, been established?

ll. Has the requirement for establishment of a JCMEC or JDEC and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?

mm. Is a S&TI LNO coordinating with the J-2E to determine foreign materiel acquisition and recovery requirements?

nn. Has joint combat assessment team support been requested to assist in identifying threats to air operations.

oo. Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC as required?
(1) If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?

(2) Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been identified?

pp. Have HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?

qq. Have foreign disclosure procedures for various intelligence sources and emergency disclosure authority for GEOINT been obtained?

rr. Has tailored GEOINT (i.e., mission specific data) been requested (once target has been identified)? Has all imagery been forwarded to the requesting command?

ss. Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? If not, work with cryptologic support group and command national cryptologic representative to obtain.

tt. Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?

uu. Has a sensitive compartmented information facility been established and accredited?

vv. Have processes been established to support the vetting of contractors to comply with “no contracting with the enemy” policy?

ww. Have intelligence (potential) requirements that would be supported via contracted support been identified and documented?

2. Counterintelligence

a. Have JTF CI-, CT-, and FP-related intelligence requirements been identified?

b. Has the CJTF appointed a TFCICA?

c. Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a FP measure?

d. Has CI been included in collection management planning?

e. Have component CI organizations been advised of possible TFCICA staff augmentation requirements?

f. Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

g. Has appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to annex B been adequately prepared?
3. Multinational Interaction

   a. Has liaison been established between joint and combined force intelligence structures?

   b. Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with MNF (e.g., sanitize products)?

   c. Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?
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1. Is the directorate implementing OPSEC procedures?

2. Is there a necessity to establish a JOC, or portions thereof, during crisis planning?

3. Crisis planning process
   a. Is the JOC staff trained or experienced?
   b. Has a split JOC operation been considered for infrastructure or reachback concerns?
   c. Has the JOC joint mission essential equipment list (JMEEL) been developed?

4. What role does the JOC play during crisis planning?

5. Has a battle rhythm manager been assigned to deliberately manage the recommended scheduling of cross-functional organizations and events affected by crisis operations for approval and in support of the COS?
   a. Is there a process within the battle rhythm CJTF decision cycle touch points to allow for transition into and out of crisis operation conditions?
   b. Do cross-functional organizations’ or events’ seven-minute drills account for both routine and crisis conditions?

6. What staff organizations require J-3 representation?

7. Has the JTF been registered and assigned a joint UIC by the supported CCDR?

8. Has the senior commander’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?

9. Has the JTF reported its readiness in the Defense Readiness Reporting System?

10. Have current campaign and branch plans been evaluated?

11. Has the CJTF issued initial guidance, intent, vision, and end state for the operation?

12. Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed, and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing ROE or RUF, requesting modification if necessary.)

13. JOPES for each COA?
   a. Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?
b. Has notional TPFDD been entered in JOPES?

c. Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified in JOPES?

14. Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

15. What is the extent of multinational participation and resolve, and how will multinational involvement affect remaining aspects of the checklist?

16. Have completed COAs, including synchronization matrices, validated forces, and sustainment, been developed?

17. Have PR capabilities and limitations been addressed in COA development, and have the PR capabilities of components, MNFs, and other government agencies been assessed for PR support to operations?

18. Have pre-hostility special operations core activities (e.g., special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, direct action, CT, counterinsurgency, counterproliferation, unconventional warfare) been considered during COA development?

19. Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized? (Wargaming is one method.)

20. Has USTRANSCOM been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?

   a. Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?

   b. Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?

   c. Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the senior commander?

   d. Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the senior commander for resolution?

   e. What is the deployment status of reserve units?

   f. Have medical evacuation and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?

21. What is the effect of identified shortfalls on the COA?

22. Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, ACSA/HNS, or contracted support or do they require elevation to the senior commander?

23. How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and PN publics?

24. Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?

25. Has the COA been adjusted based on the senior commander’s guidance?
26. Has the JPEC been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?

27. Based on COAs selected, has risk been identified? What actions must be taken to mitigate this risk, or will the commander accept risk?

28. Has the commander’s estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the senior commander?

29. Have objectives been developed and forwarded to the senior commander?

30. Have regional options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the senior commander? Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?

31. Has the JTF SJA been consulted concerning applicable international agreements or other operational constraints unique to the operation?

32. Has guidance been developed for components? Have components been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs?

33. Is the C2 architecture sufficient to meet JTF CCIRs, PIRs, and IERs?
   a. Have the GCCS suites or deployable joint C2 suite achieved full operational status connectivity, and have reporting requirements been met?
   b. Has the JDNC been established? Has a joint operation task COP/CTP been promulgated?

34. Upon COA selection or approval by senior HQ, has the CJTF issued any refinements to his guidance, intent, vision, and end state for the operation?

35. Is the plan or OPORD complete and in the proper format?

36. Has the plan or OPORD been submitted to the senior commander for approval?

37. Has the TPFDD been validated by the supported CCDR and sent to USTRANSCOM for a feasibility analysis?

38. Have appropriate JPEC organizations been tasked to develop information for support annexes?

39. Have NEO requirements been developed in support of the OPORD? Has the status of noncombatants in the JOA been evaluated to determine the requirement for a NEO plan?

40. Has the senior commander’s CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities and are the priorities supporting ongoing operations?
   a. Have CMO priorities been coordinated with the JTF component staffs?
b. Have US and friendly government departments and agencies and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CMO?

41. Have all support annexes been incorporated in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan?

42. Has an EXORD been received?

43. Has the OPORD or campaign plan been adjusted for the senior commander’s EXORD before issuing the CJTF EXORD?

44. Can the JTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the senior commander as directed?

45. Are plan objectives being met?

46. Is a reassessment of objectives required?

47. Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

48. Has replanning guidance been issued to the JPEC (if necessary)?

49. Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?

   a. Have requests for additional forces been sent to the CCDR?

   b. Has the CCDR submitted the RFFs and JMDs to the JS?

   c. Has the JS validated the requirements?

   d. Has SecDef approved allocating the additional forces and JIAs?

   e. Have deployment requirements been verified?

   f. Has transportation lift allocation been verified?

   g. Has each daily deployment increment been validated?

   h. Have intratheater movement plans been developed?

   i. Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?

   j. Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is underway?

   k. Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD requirements?
1. Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?

m. Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?

n. Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM?

o. Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the JOPES? (Continue to update deployment information on the JOPES deployment database.)

p. Is unit status being reported after arrival, and is a JPPC established?

q. Is contracted support/contracting action(s) needed to support the CONOPS?

r. Are predeployment standards established for training and equipping civilians?

s. Have contractor personnel been included in the FP/security plan?

t. Are force requirements submitted via JCRM for rotational requirements?

50. Does the situation call for termination of operations?

51. Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

52. If directed by the CJTF (based on J-3 recommendation):

   a. Has a JPRC been established?

   b. Has a JTCB been established?

   c. Has a JFE been established?

   d. Has a ROE planning cell been formed?

   e. Has a weather cell been formed?

   f. Have CCS and IO cells been formed?

   g. Is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and direct execution of joint air operations?

   h. Is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JOA?

   i. Is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JOA?

   j. Has the CJTF (or designee) provided initial guidance concerning the functions and responsibilities of the above organizations?
(1) Have these organizations been properly staffed?

(2) Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?

k. Is there a requirement to establish a CMOC?

53. Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization, use, and integration of attached CA forces?

a. Have civil-military plans, programs, and policies been coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with strategic-level objectives and interagency partner efforts?

b. Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified and integrated with the CMO plan?

c. Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the relationship between the JTF and the civil component in the JOA?

d. Has the CJTF been advised on the effect of civilian populations on JTF operations?

e. Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the JOA? (This may include dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.)

f. In coordination with the SJA, has the CJTF been advised of legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of JTF operations on civilian populations?

g. Have systems been emplaced prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated overseas, humanitarian, disaster and civic assistance aid, Commanders Emergency Response Program, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO?

h. Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to subordinate units been identified?

i. Has coordination been established with CMO funds controlling authority/financial managers to meet the CJTF objectives?

j. Have the requirements for CMO and CAO area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?

k. Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the JTCB as no-fire or restrictive fire areas?

l. Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the CJTF COP?

54. Have combat identification measures been established?
55. Have all aspects of space operations been considered during planning and COA development? See JP 3-14, *Space Operations*, for specifics.

56. Has USSTRATCOM/Joint Space Operations Center been contacted to provide space operations support to the JTF?

57. Has the SCA coordinated with USSTRATCOM for a space COP?

58. Have the effects of CBRN hazards and weapons been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations components been notified?

59. Has the CBRN threat been integrated into the operational considerations, mission-oriented protective posture levels established, and CBRN warning and reporting system established?

60. Have these systems been integrated with civilian civil defense systems as appropriate?

61. Have military units that can perform detainee/EPW missions been identified and a qualified chief of detainee operations appointed?

62. Have JSAs been identified to protect high-value facilities and a joint security coordinator appointed?

63. Has the JMETL and mission statement been approved and distributed?

64. If DSCA support/domestic operation is required, has coordination been established with the NGB’s National Guard Coordination Center?

65. If this is a DSCA support/domestic operation, will there be one or several state-based (NG) JTF J-3 elements?

66. How will NG involvement affect this checklist?

67. What is the deployment status of NG units?

68. Has the SJA been consulted regarding the impact of varying state RUF for impact on JTF domestic operations?

69. Will there be a requirement for a DSC for the JTF, and what will be the effect on JTF J-3?

70. What is the impact of emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs) on JTF operations?

71. What is the role of the Department of Homeland Security’s Integrated Planning System?

72. If response is in the National Response Framework (NRF), which of the ESFs is the JTF J-3 responding to?
73. Have security or FP requirements for contractor personnel been analyzed and recommended?

74. Has a Defense Collaboration Services collaborative session or teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?

75. Has a joint requirements review and approval process been established?

76. Have CTF capabilities, requirements, and coordination been considered?
ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-4

1. General

   a. Has a thorough review of the campaign plan, OPLAN, or OPORD been made?

   b. Employ OPSEC.

   c. Has the establishing authority’s (CCDR’s) logistic guidance been reviewed?

   d. What, if any, logistic directive authority for common support capabilities has the CCDR delegated to the CJTF?

   e. Has the JFC designated a lead Service to develop the contract support integration plan?

   f. Are annex D (Logistics), annex W (Operational Contract Support), and the appropriate estimates prepared?

   g. Is initial distribution of supplies included?

   h. Have logistic plans been coordinated with component commanders and other involved/interested partners?

   i. Are movements of personnel, equipment, and supplies included? Have adequate provisions been made for security during movements?

   j. Do force deployment plans include early movement of port openers, cargo handlers, and required CSA elements?

   k. Are construction and other engineering requirements included?

   l. What major logistic tasks need to be performed, including support relationships by phase and component? What tasks will be requested of supporting agencies? Have potential ISBs, forward operating bases, or domestic base support installations been identified? Has the necessary base operating support-integrator been assigned?

   m. What staff organizations require J-4 representation?

   n. Has an OCSIC been established?

   o. Has a JMC or JDDOC been established?

   p. Which CCMD staff organizations impact the JTF?

   q. What logistic support currently is in place from contracted support and/or from HNS? What authority and responsibilities does the JTF have for this support? What additional support is required from either contractor or HNS?
r. Are support organizations, such as an Army theater sustainment command, in place? What coordination authority does the JTF have to request support?

s. Has the JFC promulgated guidance concerning a lead Service for designated logistic area?

t. Has the JFC promulgated guidance concerning ACSAs?

u. What major CUL has the CCDR chosen for theater support? What related organization and management options (single-Service logistic support, or lead Service or agency support with or without OPCON or TACON) have the CCDR chosen for theater support?

v. Which common items/CUL are designed for support of the JTF, multinational partners, and other organizations? What control/authority does the CJTF have over these items? What Service or agency is responsible for the support?

w. For multinational operations, what support is provided and received from the MNF? What authority does the JTF have over multinational support?

x. What process (e.g., joint theater logistics management) does the CCDR use to manage joint theater logistics? How does the JTF interface with this process?

y. Has the establishing authority promulgated guidance concerning common support capabilities?

z. Has the CJTF promulgated guidance concerning HN logistic support?

aa. Are mission-essential services provided by contractors and civilians incorporated into contingency plans? What are the requirements to provide life support for contractors or other US civilians supporting the operation? What is the backup plan if a contractor cannot produce to standard? Have identified manpower and materiel been incorporated into planning and deployment databases?

bb. How many days can assigned forces sustain operations with organic supplies? Are sustainment supplies phased to provide uninterrupted operations? What is the supply safety level?

cc. What is the potential impact on logistic capabilities from competing government and nongovernmental agencies or organizations?

dd. Have specific supplies or services been designated as commodities that will be obtained through “common contracted support”?

ee. Has the contracting C2 construct been designated in the appropriate order/plan (Service support to own, LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC)?
ff. Has a logistics portal web page on the JTF web page been established, is it being continually updated as changes or information is promulgated, and can all users of the information access the site?

2. Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants

a. Should a subarea petroleum office for resupply of POL be established?

b. What is the CONOPS for petroleum support?

c. What HNS is available?

d. What are component responsibilities for petroleum support? Have components provided estimates of POL requirements? Who is compiling volatile strategic airlift requirements? Have requirements been provided to the defense energy support region?

e. Have arrangements been made with either the supported joint petroleum office or the DLA Energy support region to contract for HN sources?

f. Has a quality control program for POL or liquid oxygen been established?

g. Have POL storage methods and sites been selected? Have security arrangements for the sites been established?

h. Have arrangements been made for transportation of POL within the assigned JOA?

3. Munitions

a. What are the critical munitions required for this operation as determined by the warfighter? Are there suitable substitutions available?

b. Are sufficient stocks of these preferred munitions available?

c. Have munitions been properly relocated or positioned to support the operations?

d. Can any preferred munitions shortfalls be remedied through transfer between component commands or from foreign forces? (This question presumes transfer agreements have been approved and are in place to allow this consideration.)

e. Have components provided estimates of ammunition resupply requirements and common-user support?

f. Have ammunition storage sites been selected, and what are the explosive safety concerns (e.g., fire protection, explosive route, and site for munitions storage building/build-up pad)?

g. Have security arrangements for the ammunition sites been established?

h. Have arrangements been made for transportation of ammunition within the JOA?
Annex F to Appendix A

i. Have specialized munition handling teams (such as USN vertical launch system canister) been accounted for?

4. Joint Mortuary Affairs

a. Has a JMAO been established to:

   (1) Provide oversight of mortuary affairs support within the AOR?

   (2) Maintain two-way coordination with the central JMAO?

b. Have mortuary affairs guidelines been established in accordance with JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*?

c. Does the plan provide for establishment, staffing, and support of the mortuary affairs collection point? Does this site plan include:

   (1) Procedures for contamination mitigation of remains?

   (2) Theater mortuary evacuation point?

   (3) Personal effects depot?

   (4) Current death, concurrent return, and graves registration programs?

   (5) Have regional fatality search and recovery teams been requested for a DSCA response?

5. Sustainability

   a. Are procedures established for maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations? Is there a requirement to provide disposal support within the theater where there is no DLA Disposition Services office? Is a useable DLA Disposition Services office located in the vicinity of the theater?

   b. Have HNS and contracted support availability and requirements been determined?

   c. Has it been determined if any HNS agreements exist? Have required steps been taken to start the process for requesting authorization to begin negotiations?

   d. Have arrangements been made to obtain maintenance support not organic to the JTF?

   e. Have the Services established procedures for the return of retrograde to the repair source? Does the capability exist to track movement of retrograde?

   f. Have laundry and bath support requirements been generated in coordination with the medical authority, with consideration for environmental factors?
g. Does the JTF require contracting personnel in country? Is a JTF OCSIC required?

h. Have procedures been established to coordinate with US embassies and HNs for acquisition of supplies and services?

i. Are paying agents/field ordering offices required, and has coordination been made with contracting and financial management operations?

j. Has a joint logistic communications plan been developed to support J-4 C2 requirements?

k. Are adequate security procedures established for classified logistics data transmission?

l. Have requirements for the Army logistics civil augmentation program, Air Force contract augmentation program, Navy global contingency construction contract program, and DLA JCASO assistance been evaluated?

m. Do the Services have procedures established for equipment accountability during deployment and redeployment operations?

n. Is a DLA Support Team required to augment the JTF J-4 staff (e.g., within the JDDOC or the JPG)?

o. Has a contractor management plan been developed and promulgated to ensure contractors comply with specific CAAF and non-CAAF requirements.

6. Deployment and Distribution

   a. Have joint-use transportation requirements been established?

   b. Has a JMC or JDDOC been established (if needed) to ensure transportation requests are validated and theater common-user transportation resources are employed with maximum effectiveness?

   c. Are common-user transportation requirements, capabilities, and performance monitored?

   d. Are transportation shortfalls and conflicts in priorities deconflicted?

   e. What HN or contracted support transportation facilities and equipment are available?

   f. Has the JMC or JDDOC evaluated and disseminated information about HN transportation systems, facilities, equipment, and personnel?

   g. Has the JMC or JDDOC established the necessary communications (via GCCS, DJC2, or other means) to monitor and effect changes to the deployment of forces and supplies?
h. Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with USTRANSCOM throughout planning, deployment, execution, and redeployment phases, including for transition between USTRANSCOM and Service port operators?

i. Has the JTF J-4 coordinated with the SJA and JTF J-1 to ensure customs and duty issues do not hinder the expeditious movement of DOD cargo and personnel?

7. Engineer

a. Has a JTF engineer been assigned or identified?

b. Have engineer policy and guidance been established?

c. Have a joint civil-military engineering board and JFUB been established? Are board procedures in place?

d. Have traffic regulations, dictated by physical conditions of routes and communications, been established?

e. Has engineer support in the collection and processing of information for preparation and revision of maps and related geospatial databases been identified?

f. Have future engineering requirements been anticipated and planned?

g. Have component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction been evaluated and prioritized? Are procedures in place for this to occur?

h. Have provisions been made for battle damage repair (e.g., airfield damage repair)?

i. Has the JTF engineer established, issued, and executed the JTF environmental management support plan?

j. What HN engineer support is available?

k. What Class IV (construction and barrier material) is available, on hand or locally, or is being sourced from DLA via the JDDOC?

l. What are the component responsibilities for engineering support?

m. Will contract construction (to include Service civil augmentation program task orders) be used?

n. Have life support standards been established?

o. Has a real estate management plan been established?
ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-5

1. Has the problem been framed and a commander’s statement or intent been developed?

2. What is the current politico-military situation?

3. Have plans been evaluated for unified action? Are plans developed in accordance with CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance?

4. Employ OPSEC.

5. What staff organizations require J-5 representation?

6. Have all appropriate warning, planning, and implementing directives been thoroughly reviewed and mission analysis completed?

7. Have regional military objectives been developed and forwarded to the CCDR?

8. Has SCA coordinated with USSTRATCOM to provide space planning support? (Coordinate with JTF J-3 who has same question.)

9. Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

10. Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JTF establishing authority for resolution?

11. Has the supported CCDR’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?

12. Has guidance been developed for components?

13. Have planning or OPORD shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?

14. Have all support annexes been incorporated in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD?

15. Is the plan or OPORD complete and in the proper format?

16. Has the composition of the JPG been determined?

17. Have the J-5 and appropriate JPG/OPT battle rhythms been established?

18. Does the JOPES database accurately reflect all force requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission? Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?

19. Do current conditions indicate the need for re-planning actions?
20. Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during pre-hostilities (e.g., special operations, MISO, PA, and CMO)?

21. Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

22. Has a military end state been identified?

23. Are there any requirements for DSCA or support of international CBRN response?

24. Is planning for stability activities or peace operations required?

25. Has a strategic theater estimate been developed?

26. Have protection issues been identified?

27. Have special technical operations requirements been considered?

28. Has military deception planning been conducted and included in the overall plan?

29. Is plan in response to a DSCA mission within the NRF?

30. To what key scenario set(s) and national planning scenario(s) are JTF J-5 planning efforts responding?

31. Have the JTF J-5 personnel requirements and shortfalls been passed to the JTF J-1, and are they being monitored through appropriate J-1-led battle rhythm events?

32. If JTF is formed in response to a domestic situation, what is the relationship between Active Component JPG and NGB and state JTF (NG) JPG?

33. Have J-5/plans-related LNO requirements been appropriately identified and coordinated for both LNOs required within the JTF J-5 and LNOs that the JTF needs to establish external to the JTF?

34. Has an operational synchronization matrix been developed and used to support future plans and operations?
ANNEX H TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-6

1. General

a. Is the communications system planner brought into the planning process early?

b. Is a joint communications system planning meeting scheduled? Is a communications system planner from each organization attending the communications system planning meeting? Have JTF J-6 planners reviewed the Joint Lessons Learned database regarding JTF communication requirements before initiating planning?

c. Has the OPSEC program been implemented?

d. What cross-functional staff elements require J-6 representation?

e. Are the command relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and communications system decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?

f. Are the communications system planners familiar with the command relationships for this operation and are these relationships adequately covered in communications system planning documents?

g. Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?

h. Which countries or partners are not allowed access to particular information?

i. Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the OPLAN or implementing instructions?

j. Have special operations liaison and system requirements been considered?

k. Can communications system support each COA being addressed?

l. Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?

m. Is planning adequate to ensure all communications nets have interoperable COMSEC devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted UHF satellite communications [SATCOM] narrowband secure voice terminals)?

n. Has a cybersecurity manager been assigned?

o. Has the JTF J-2, in coordination with the JTF J-6, developed a JTF intelligence communications architecture that allows interoperability laterally, vertically, and with
MNFs? (JTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and local area network to carry intelligence information.)

p. Has a MOA been established between the designated approving authorities responsible for each interconnected system?

q. Is the use of the intertheater communications security package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying materiel? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has NATO COMSEC been considered?

r. Have considerations been made, or plans formulated, to accommodate multinational personnel and communications and information equipment into the JTF deployment?

s. Has interoperability been considered? Are sufficient numbers of CENTRIXS terminals available to US and multinational partners?

t. Are provisions being made to ensure all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?

u. Has a joint spectrum management element been tasked and stood-up?

v. Is there adequate planning to ensure joint communications-electronics operating instructions (JCEOI) are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed? Is the Joint Revised Battlefield Electronic JCEOI System being employed for generating JCEOI or signal operating instructions?

w. Are operations codes available at all commands?

x. Is planning for SOF and CF interoperability adequate for this operation?

y. Are procedures in place to adequately plan communications system for special operations under both special operations and mission-imposed, close-hold restrictions?

z. Are theater and tactical communications system interfaces (DISN entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to senior commanders, the Joint Staff, and SecDef?

aa. Does communications system planning for deployment include command relationships, force OPCON procedures, force communications for underway sea or airlift, and Air Mobility Command communications system?

bb. Are deployable GCCS terminals needed and planned for?

cc. Is planning adequate to have communications into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the tactical operation?
dd. Have the functions of the JNCC been developed and published?

(1) Has the J-2, in coordination with the J-3 and J-6, prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?

(2) Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications, and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?

(3) Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the EMS?

(4) Are adequate communications systems available to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the tactical commanders?

(5) Are communications with all participating civilian organizations adequately addressed in planning to include those only with unclassified commercial capabilities?

(6) Does communications planning include means for electronic conferencing/virtual collaborating with multiple disparate organizations (military and civilian)? Do branch plans include adding additional organizations as missions expand?

(7) Is the CJTF aware of various Global Positioning System (GPS) user equipment employed in theater, to include commercial sets?

(8) Are the GPS frequencies L1 (1575.42 megahertz [MHz]) and L2 (1227.60 MHz) incorporated into unit and HQ frequency plans to preclude inadvertent GPS interference from tactical communications equipment?

ee. Has a GPS CONOPS been disseminated?

ff. Has the JTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?

gg. Have PR personnel coordinated PR communications early?

(1) Are PR communications adequately covered in planning?

(2) Are plans for PR adequately promulgated to the operating forces?

hh. Are medical evacuation and casualty evacuation communications adequately covered in planning?

ii. Are plans for medical evacuation and casualty evacuation communications adequately promulgated to the operating forces?
jj. Have planners provided for dedicated and secure communications for PA to provide quality public information products to internal and external audiences both within and outside the JOA?

kk. Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation (e.g., UHF SATCOM)?

ll. Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets?

mm. Have user requirements and use patterns been evaluated to determine the feasibility of time sharing or combining SATCOM nets to reduce total nets required and loading of satellite networks?

nn. Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

oo. Have provisions been made to plan for replacement of tactical communications (tactical satellite and ground mobile facility terminals) at the earliest opportunity (if applicable) with commercial or other appropriate longer-term communications?

2. **Predeployment**

a. Do the JTF HQ and identified component HQ have systems to provide secure voice, record, and data communications (including GCCS) for:

   (1) Issuing command instructions?

   (2) Updating the force database?

   (3) Coordinating COAs?

   (4) Managing force status and generation?

   (5) Multinational partners?

b. Do marshalling and loading sites possess interoperable communications and compatible cryptographic keys?

c. Have authenticating memorandums been written and signed by the CJTF within 24 hours of JTF activation, authorizing JTF directors or their designated representatives to pick up message traffic up to and including special category?

d. Have the threats to the communications system been clearly defined and actions taken to eliminate or minimize the impact to these systems?
3. Advanced Echelon Deployment

a. During ADVON deployment, are secure communications available to communicate with JTF HQ, the supported and supporting CCDRs, and the appropriate US embassy? If ADVON deploys aboard a ship, are communications capabilities adequate?

b. Once in the assigned JOA, does the ADVON have secure voice, common-user telephone circuits, and secure record and facsimile capabilities for effective exchange of current intelligence, graphics, planning, and adjustments to operational assessments and orders?

4. Main Force Deployment

a. Are arrangements required for airborne or maritime communications system capabilities (e.g., joint airborne communications center or command post, Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Strategic Targeting and Reconnaissance System, or command ship)?

b. Have radio nets for en route communications been developed and coordinated with the supported CCDR and components?

c. If an ISB is used:

   (1) Have ISB communications requirements been developed and coordinated?

   (2) Has a responsible element been identified to make installation?

5. Joint Task Force Requirements

a. As forces deploy into the area and the JTF HQ joins the ADVON (if used), has a ground- or sea-based communications package (capable of providing secure voice, record, and data transmission capabilities) been made available to satisfy requirements for communications links with:

   (1) Supported CCDR?

   (2) SecDef?

   (3) Component HQ?

   (4) Multinational HQ?

   (5) UN?

   (6) US embassies?

   (7) DISN?
(8) Civilian organizations, including other interagency and multinational partners, international organizations, NGOs, and media? (May have only unclassified commercial capabilities—including teleconferencing and virtual collaboration.)

(9) Commercial access—single channel?

(10) Commercial access—multichannel?

b. If requirements exist, are there adequate capabilities to:

(1) Link deployed forces with the DISN, the Defense Special Security Communications System, and GCCS?

(2) Duplicate communications capabilities at the alternate JTF HQ?

c. Have procedures been established for reporting meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion to the appropriate JOC?

d. Are sufficient frequencies available to support the COA?

e. If the deployment is to foreign soil, has the HN approved frequencies for the operation?

f. Are the J-2, J-3, and J-6 working together to develop a joint restricted frequency list to protect friendly operations and exploit enemy operations? Did the J-3 approve the list?

g. Has a procedure been developed to standardize operating systems, their client computer workstations, and associated group policies throughout the JTF HQ and subordinate commands?

h. Has interoperability of communications systems been ensured?
ANNEX J TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR JOINT TASK FORCE J-9

1. Has the senior commander’s CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities and are the priorities supporting ongoing operations?
   a. Have CMO priorities been coordinated with the JTF component staffs?
   b. Have USG and friendly government departments and agencies and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CMO?
   c. Has a running estimate been initiated?
   d. Does the CMO plan provide appropriate and SJA coordinated guidance for populous and resources control measures?
   e. Did the President authorize for the establishment of military governance?
      (1) Has CJCS ICW OSD put forth broad policy formulation and initial planning for transitional military authority?
      (2) What related governance directives have been received by the JTF to date?

2. Have annexes G (Civil–Military Operations) and V (Interagency Coordination) been incorporated in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan?

3. What cross-functional organization (boards, centers, cells, WGs, and OPTs) require J-9 staff integration?

4. Have Class X supplies been identified by USTRANSCOM? What is the estimate of availability of Class X within the OA?

5. Did the CJTF or COS direct an interorganizational element be established in the J-9?
   a. Has JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, been consulted to determine initial construct?
   b. Is there a requirement to task attached CA forces to establish a CMOC expand the capabilities and effectiveness of the interorganizational cooperation beyond the JTF HQ?
   c. Has a line of coordination been established with the GCC’s JIACG?
   d. Have civil-military plans, programs, and policies been coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with strategic objectives and interagency partner efforts?
   e. Has consideration for or coordination of NGO humanitarian corridors been included in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan?
6. Is there a requirement to recommend the establishment of a subordinate JCMOTF? Has internal criteria been developed?

7. Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization, use, and integration of attached CA and CMO forces?
   a. What phase of mobilization are the requested reserve units in? Latest arrival date?
   b. Does the TPFDD introduce CA and CMO forces to meet the CMO LOE of the applicable CONPLAN, OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan?
   c. Was a RFF for an USAR CA planning team processed?
   d. Is reachback to the regionally aligned CA command established?
   e. Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified and integrated with the CMO plan?
   f. Have required language(s) been identified? Have interpreter requirements been verified and passed to the J-3 for validation, J-8 for contracting, and to the J-2 for fulfillment?

8. Civil Component
   a. Has the status of US noncombatants and civilians in the JOA been evaluated to determine the requirement for a NEO plan?
   b. Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the relationship between the JTF and the civil component in the JOA?
   c. Has the CJTF been advised on the effect of civilian populations on JTF operations?
   d. Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the JOA?
   e. Does the CMO plan provide appropriate and SJA coordinated guidance for populous and resources control measures? (This may include dislocated civilian operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.)
   f. In coordination with the SJA, has the CJTF been advised of legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of JTF operations on civilian populations?

9. Have fiduciary duties been accounted for?
   a. Have systems been emplaced prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated overseas, humanitarian, disaster and civic assistance aid, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO?
b. Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to subordinate units been identified?

c. Has coordination been established with CMO funds controlling authority/financial managers to meet the CJTF objectives?

10. Is civil IM integrated horizontally and vertically?

a. Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the CJTF COP?

b. Have the requirements for CMO and CAO area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?

b. Have the requirements for CMO and CAO area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?

c. Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the JTCB as no-fire or restrictive fire areas?
ANNEX K TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICES

1. Are the medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities delineated and assigned?

2. Is a comprehensive medical surveillance plan developed for the total force (military, DOD civilians, and CAAF) predeployment (threat assessment conducted and preventive medicine countermeasures integrated into the plan), deployment (environmental monitoring and disease and nonbattle injury statistics collected), and post-deployment (health assessments) actions?

3. Are there any specific plans, policies, agreements, or treaties to consider?

4. What staff organizations require HSS representation?

5. Are provisions made to provide emergency medical assistance to US nationals in the JOA and to EPWs, civilian internees, displaced civilians, and other detained persons?

6. Has the theater evacuation policy been established for the total force and others? If so, have requirements for hospitals and patient movement workload been identified?

7. Is sufficient medical support available for deploying forces to ensure a continuum of care for those ill, injured, or wounded? Are all units on the TPFDD scheduled for timely arrival?

8. Have estimates of medical sustainability and anticipated resupply requirements been established?

9. Have resupply channels been determined? If applicable, have provisions been made to establish a theater lead agent for medical material and/or single integrated medical logistics item manager for medical equipment and supplies? Are sufficient supplies and equipment in place; has a program for sustainability and resupply been established; is a single integrated medical logistics system required?

10. Has a JTF joint patient movement requirements center been established to coordinate movement of patients within and out of the assigned JOA?

11. Has a blood program system been established?

12. Has an area joint blood program office been activated to plan and coordinate the handling, storage, and distribution of whole blood within the assigned JOA and consolidate and forward resupply requirements to the Armed Services Blood Program Office?

13. Has a joint medical operations center been established to provide a central location for medical planning and operations?

14. Have medical personnel augmentation packages been identified and requirements submitted? Do hospitals have enough personnel and equipment to support movement of
critical patients? Are there sufficient litters, straps, blankets, and other supplies, as required, to support anticipated workload?

15. Have the numbers, types, and locations of patient evacuation conveyances been identified? Are they sufficient to meet projected workload?

16. Has an evacuation plan for ground and air ambulances been prepared?

17. Are noncombatant evacuees a consideration for HSS?

18. Have primary and secondary aeromedical airfields been identified?
   a. Are sufficient aeromedical staging assets planned or in place?
   b. Are aeromedical evacuation liaison teams located at key locations within each component’s medical system?

19. Have preventive medicine procedures been established and sufficient personnel identified to ensure protection of the health and well-being of personnel assigned to the JTF?

20. Have medical communications channels/frequencies to be used by medical personnel, and any dedicated or medical-unique communications nets, operating procedures, or requirements, been identified?

21. Has coordination with the JPRC been accomplished for recovery and reintegration support?

22. What does medical intelligence indicate?

23. Has the supported CCDR requested that National Center for Medical Intelligence be tasked to provide an area medical threat assessment?

24. What military forces are involved? What are their organic medical capabilities? Have provision of care agreements and/or limitations been established?

25. If other nations are involved, what are their unique medical requirements? If other nations are contributing medical assets, what are their capabilities, limitations, and national caveats?

26. Are HN medical support systems in place? Are rules of eligibility established and published for providing care to HN military or civilians in a manner that does not supplant HN medical support systems?

27. What are the HSS reporting requirements?

28. Should RC medical support be considered?

29. Should civilian contracts for medical support be considered?
a. If so, how many contractors will be part of the deployment?

b. Do OPORDs/OPLANs appropriately address medical support to contractors?

30. Is pre-regulation of patients to specific hospitals required?

31. Are sufficient supplies and equipment in place; has a program for sustainability and resupply been established; is a single integrated medical logistics system required?

32. Has liaison or coordination with other agencies been established?

33. Have all other areas of HSS and FHP been addressed (e.g., patient movement, dental, behavioral health, and veterinary support)? For a complete listing of planning considerations refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

34. Reinforce the importance of the mission and staying abreast of the situation. Highlight the importance of working as a “team.”

35. Integrate PA in all phases of transition planning to ensure public awareness of policy and operational changes with respect to the JTF.

36. Reevaluate or establish MWR requirements—means to prevent or reduce complacency.
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ANNEX L TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL

1. Is the IG prepared to accept and work an increased number of assistance cases? Typical requests for assistance include:
   a. Early return of family members.
   b. Emergency leave procedures.
   c. Nonsupport of family members.
   d. Family support issues (identification card, health care, exchange and commissary privileges).
   e. Service member entitlements.
   f. Shipment or storage of household goods.
   g. Family care plans.

2. Have inspections been scheduled and announced? Inspections should verify the status of:
   a. Personnel and equipment readiness.
   b. JTF operational readiness or effectiveness.
   c. Processing for overseas movement.
   d. Ports of debarkation processing.
   e. Casualty affairs and graves registration.
   f. Deployment operations.
   g. Pre-operational training.
   h. Sustainment distribution operations for all classes of supply.
   i. Operational feeding.
   j. EPWs of war or detainees processing.
   k. Mail services.
   l. Reconstitution.
   m. Replacement system.
n. War trophies or contraband.
o. Accountability and serviceability of returning equipment.

3. IM, IO, and CCS.

4. OPSEC.

5. FP and safety.

6. Is the IG prepared to conduct investigations? Investigations are normally more difficult to complete because of:
   
a. Limited access to the CJTF.
   
b. Time and distance factors.
   
c. A greater reliance upon technical channel support from other IGs.

7. Has the IG coordinated with DOD IG and Service component IGs to discuss the review and monitoring of contracting to ensure that the appropriate actions and a review process is in place to prevent waste/fraud/abuse?
ANNEX M TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. Does paragraph 1 (Introduction) of the IMP address the following?
   a. Purpose.
   b. Scope.

2. In paragraph 2 (Joint Task Force Information Management Organization) of the IMP, are the following discussed?
   a. JTF.
      (1) CJTF.
      (2) DCJTF.
      (3) COS.
      (4) IMO.
      (5) Others, as required.
   b. JTF IM roles and responsibilities.
      (1) JTF IM organization.
      (2) JIMB.
      (3) Joint IM cell.
      (4) JTF components.
      (5) Multinational partners.
   c. Roles and responsibilities to higher HQ and other organizations.
      (1) Higher HQ.
      (2) Other organizations (NGOs, international organizations, and interagency partners).

3. Does paragraph 3 (Commander’s Dissemination Policy) of the IMP address the following?
   a. Development of a display plan for information identified by the COS as critical to the JTF battle rhythm.
b. Critical information elements.

c. Information flow guidelines, structure, and priorities.

d. Information exchange, policies, and procedures.

e. Information systems and networks architecture.

f. CCS and IO policies and procedures.

g. Identification of operational information products, including who produces and who updates the information.

h. Storing, access, and handling guidelines to specific information based on content, source, type, location, and classification.

i. Procedures for releasability of information based on security level and classification.

j. CCIRs.

k. User’s level of access to information by:

(1) User.

(2) Organization.

(3) Mission.

l. Information type (e.g., survival, administration, operational, and intelligence).

m. Information release policies:

(1) PA guidance.

(2) Release of real-time operational information to subordinate units and multinational partners.

(3) Release of real-time intelligence information to subordinate units and multinational partners.

n. Limit access to specific information by content, source, type, or location.

o. Releasability of information transfer due to security or classification policy.

4. Are the below topics addressed in paragraph 4 (Information Requirements and General Procedures) of the IMP?

a. CCIRs.
(1) FFIRs.
(2) PIRs.
b. RFI.
c. RFFs.
d. Requests for assistance.
e. Information services management.
   (1) COP management.
   (2) Collection management.
   (3) Records management.
   (4) Records manager’s responsibilities.
   (5) Records custodian’s responsibilities.
   (6) Action officers’ responsibilities.
   (7) Information technology services branch responsibilities.
   (8) Files and records maintenance and disposition plans and policies.
   (9) Records collection.
f. Other required reports.

5. Does paragraph 5 (Digital Rules of Engagement) of the IMP discuss the following?
   a. Minimization of bandwidth protocols.
   b. Virtual meeting rooms facilitator.
   c. Audio practices—standard military radio/telephone procedures should be employed.
   d. Text chat practices.
   e. Session/meeting closure.
   f. Collaboration tools file cabinets.
   g. Whiteboard.
   h. Virtual conference center/auditorium collaboration.
i. Ad hoc meetings via chat.


k. Briefing slide show file production and management.

l. File management.

m. Calendar operations.

6. Does paragraph 6 (Battle Rhythm) of the IMP discuss the impact of the battle rhythm of higher HQ and subordinate commands? (Applicable to each organization pursuant to their procedures.)

7. Does paragraph 7 (Cybersecurity and Defensive Cyberspace Operations) of the IMP address the following?

   a. Information priority matrix of critical mission systems.

   b. Information reliability and currency.

      (1) Information content and completeness.

      (2) Use of the information confidence convention.

   c. Defensive CO:

      (1) Joint intrusion detection and monitoring plan.

      (2) Cybersecurity vulnerabilities analysis.

      (3) IO condition actions.

      (4) Operational impact analysis.

      (5) Continuity of OPLAN.

   d. OPSEC procedures (to include use of social networking).

8. Are the below issues discussed in paragraph 8 (Information System Tools and Procedures) of the IMP?

   a. Tactical data systems.

   b. Collaborative tools.

   c. Voice communications.

   d. Local area network or wide area network management.
e. Data management.

f. Electronic messaging:
   (1) Organizational messaging.
   (2) E-mail.
   (3) Chat.

g. Publish instructions for user access to the collaborative information technology environment (how to get a user account, password, etc.).

9. Does paragraph 9 (System Recovery Procedures) of the IMP provide sufficient information concerning system recovery procedures? (Applicable to each organization pursuant to their operating system.)
ANNEX N TO APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR TRANSITION OF A JOINT TASK FORCE INTO A
MULTINATIONAL FORCE OR TRANSITION TO A FOLLOW-ON
MULTINATIONAL FORCE


2. Establish transition JPG with planners from the existing and incoming HQ.

3. Establish senior national representative planning review group.

4. Determine objectives of the transition process: timely and rapid activation of the MNF and component HQ, and participating nations integrated into the MNF organization.

5. Conduct transition risk assessment. The level of violence can “rise” during or after a transition occurs; develop counter-contingency plans to avoid serious escalations and ensure operational security.

6. Establish senior-level MNF transition board to coordinate participating nation’s reconnaissance/survey teams, liaison teams, support and force levels, ROE, negotiate ACSAs, memorandums of understanding, SOFAs, transfer of responsibility, and funding.

7. Establish MNF HQ location, real estate, and resource requirements. Identify MNF logistics, medical, and other required areas if different from existing JTF facilities.

8. Receive and integrate MNF HQ forward command element and LNOs.

9. Coordinate/implement agreed information sharing arrangements with MNF HQ and force elements.

10. Establish communications with UN and the new strategic level command if required.

11. Determine requirements for JTF communications detachments during transition period.

12. Coordinate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and relief in place between JTF and MNF HQ and force elements. Recommend a staging base and points of entry (APODs and SPODs). Coordinate force preparation program and recommend an acclimatization period.


14. Establish multinational PA office.

15. Recommend MNF deployment priority and sequence into theater.
16. Develop relief in place schedule, procedures, and timeline. Include the force lay down plan. Develop transition synchronization matrix including major events and timing.

17. Identify MNF capability shortfalls and means to address shortfalls, to include consideration of leaving key JTF assets in place with appropriate logistic support. Determine equipment and resource to gift to MNF. Identify key areas of MNF interoperability.

18. Determine MNF funding and national implementing arrangements. Ensure local contacting arrangements have been considered by incoming MNF. Confirm existing arrangements that will transfer to incoming force with HN government, international organizations, and NGOs.

19. Recommend tactical AOs within an AO/JOA.

20. Develop FP plan for incoming and outgoing forces during transition period.

21. Ensure transition addresses PR capability and MNF requirements.

22. Transfer LL.

23. Develop handover package and acceptable level of achievement on existing civil and military projects to the MNF.

24. Transition addresses coordination with international organizations and NGOs. The MNF/follow-on force understands cultures of key players and respect the roles and missions of local authorities and these organizations; determine how to leverage their contributions.

25. Establish mutually agreed criteria to set the preconditions before transition of command may occur.

26. Identify the timing and prepare for formal transfer of command.

27. When the MNF or follow-on force is prepared to assume command, clear and distinct change of responsibilities and authority must occur.

28. Address OCS and the exchange of supplies/services.
APPENDIX B
JOINT TASK FORCE-CAPABLE HEADQUARTERS

“It was widely recognized in this event, and is reported in AARs [after action reports] from many agencies, that it is the preexisting relationships among staff that are greatly responsible for the success of the mission. No amount of planning can account for all variables in a disaster and so it is up to individuals to identify problems and find solutions. Having a pre-existing relationship helps to do this and to lessen the extreme stress caused by these events. Participants recommended these relationships need to be created and fostered by joint training and exercises, and through the sharing of personnel between agencies.”

Haiti Earthquake Interagency Lessons Learned Workshop Report

1. Overview

This appendix provides a framework and considerations for forming and sustaining the readiness of JTF-capable HQ within DOD. A designated Service HQ can be considered a JTF-capable HQ if it has achieved and can sustain a level of readiness to transition, organize, establish, and operate as a JTF HQ and is acceptable to the establishing authority (CCDR). For more information on other options for forming a JTF HQ, refer to Chapter II, “Forming and Organizing.”

2. Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters Readiness Model

   a. Figure B-1 depicts a typical JTF-capable HQ readiness model that guides the designation, organization, staffing, C2 equipping, training, and readiness of designated Service HQ. The generic force readiness model in Figure B-1 can be used to portray the anticipated status of any designated Service HQ within a CCMD. Figure B-1 depicts the performance typically associated with forming a JTF HQ in an ad hoc manner, compared to the projected readiness levels and performance of a Service HQ that is designated to become a JTF-capable HQ and initiates pre-crisis readiness preparations. The model should be tailored for each designated Service HQ based on various factors, such as the AOR in which the JTF-capable HQ is formed and existing Service force generation cycles and materiel fielding schedules.

   b Designation. The Unified Command Plan assigns CCDRs with responsibility for “...designating, and establishing the readiness requirements of, assigned Service HQ to be JTF-capable HQ.” CCDRs may select any number of Service HQ to effectively meet the JTF-capable HQ requirements in their AOR, with all risks considered. Given sufficient resources, any Service HQ may be designated to be a JTF-capable HQ by the CCDR to whom it is assigned. The number of Service HQ in the JTF-capable HQ formation phase at any one time will be constrained by resources; globally prioritized, Service fielding schedules; and overall CCMD demand. As a result, CCDRs should coordinate their C2 operational requirements with the Joint Staff and Military Departments in conjunction with designating a Service HQ to form and sustain itself as a JTF-capable HQ. If CCDR force
requirements for JTF-capable HQ cannot be met with assigned forces, then requests for additional forces will be resolved through the GFM process.

c. **Organization.** A JTF HQ structure, size, and command relationships will be based on mission requirements, a CONOPS, both the establishing authority’s and designated Service HQ commander’s guidance, and other factors external to the designated Service HQ control (e.g., as an imposed maximum footprint ceiling or multinational participation). Based on its JMETL and required capabilities, a designated Service HQ, in conjunction with the Service component and supported CCMD, develops a draft JMD to reflect the proposed organizational structure and personnel requirements of the JTF HQ. The designated Service HQ should submit their draft JMD, in accordance with CJCSI 1301.01, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*, to the supported CCDR for review and approval. Following approval, the CCMD should load the document into FMTS as a contingency JMD. The contingency JMD should be used and evaluated by the designated Service HQ throughout the JTF-capable HQ formation phase and subsequent training and readiness sustainment events. The designated Service HQ may request that contingency JMD positions be identified on Service Manning documents to reflect dual-hatted positions and JTF-capable HQ training requirements.

*For more details concerning the FMTS, refer to CJCSI 1001.01, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program.*
d. **Manning.** In conjunction with preparing a JMD, the designated Service HQ should prepare a joint manning plan to source identified personnel requirements in coordination with its supported CCMD. The plan should ensure the right personnel are available at the right time for a JTF-capable HQ to transition into a JTF HQ and successfully plan and execute joint operations. To this end, the joint manning plan should be based on JMD requirements resulting from a complete and comprehensive mission analysis and on the approved JMETL, which will help identify the capabilities required to accomplish the joint mission.

e. **C2 Equipping.** Joint force communications system operations planning and management (see JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*) are critical to the JTF-capable HQ readiness posture and ensuring full connectivity with higher and lower HQ. Designated Service HQ commanders should emphasize the development of a joint mission-essential equipment list (JMEEL) of C2 systems, applications, communications systems, and support equipment for the JTF-capable HQ. Equally important is the preparation of a C2 equipping plan that includes the JMEEL, identifies required manning and system-specific training for C2 systems and applications, and addresses how C2 capability shortfalls or gaps will be sourced. Such precrisis C2 equipment planning will help JTF-capable HQ have joint C2 systems, applications, and communications capabilities that are interoperable with the supported CCMD’s C2 architecture, functional component commands, subordinate Service and multinational tactical forces, and potential mission partners.

f. **Training.** Once selected to become a JTF-capable HQ, designated Service HQ commanders, in coordination with the supported CCDR, should develop a JMETL and a comprehensive JTP in accordance with CJCSM 3500.03, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of United States.* The designated Service HQ should conduct joint training in addition to Service training and mission requirements. The JTP should identify individual and collective training, to include training to sustain the readiness of the HQ through the duration of its mission as a JTF-capable HQ. The JTP also should address the requirements and means by which both the designated Service HQ and mission partners can better prepare to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate their activities to achieve unity of effort in planning and operations.

g. **Readiness**

(1) **Readiness Standard (Core Tasks)**

(a) The JTF establishing authority prescribes the readiness requirements for a JTF-capable HQ. The establishing authority determines the organization’s readiness according to these requirements, based on their status in training, manning, equipping, and ability to transition to and perform as a JTF HQ. The establishing authority also evaluates the prospective HQ ability to command and control and integrate joint operations employing assigned and attached forces, including MNFs, and to coordinate and integrate relevant interorganizational participants’ support to accomplish assigned missions.

(b) The establishing authority periodically approves the readiness plan created by the JTF-capable HQ commander. This JTF-capable HQ readiness plan
addresses the training, manning, and equipping plans designed to enable that HQ to perform the requirements directed by the establishing authority. The establishing authority can then review and approve that the JTF-capable HQ readiness plan, if followed, will enable the designated Service HQ to gain and maintain the readiness levels required by the establishing authority for a period of time identified by the establishing authority. The JTF-capable HQ commander can report the HQ training, manning, and equipping readiness against those requirements in accordance with his readiness plan through the Defense Readiness Reporting System or message traffic to the establishing authority. Readiness is temporal, meaning time will affect the JTF-capable HQ training, manning, and equipping readiness to transition to a JTF HQ. Therefore, the **JTF-capable HQ must apply a sustained readiness model**.

(c) Based on mission analysis, the JTF-capable HQ commander may adjust the JMETL when a related Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) task better describes their required capability. The commander may also add additional mission-related JMETs to the core tasks to comprise the JMETL that will help prioritize the capabilities and actions needed to increase and sustain readiness. If any required JMETL tasks are not listed in the UJTL, a new task can be created using the UJTL Task Development Tool and associated process. JTF-capable HQ will then develop the necessary conditions and standards for their JMETs using a variety of sources: the sample standards from the associated UJTL tasks, mission guidance, and other relevant information. Regardless of the source, the commander approving the JMETL establishes the associated standards.

(2) **Readiness Criteria.** CCDRs should promulgate JTF HQ readiness guidance that identifies the criteria and process by which the supported CCDR, Service component and designated Service HQ commanders prepare, mature, and verify the designated Service HQ’s readiness to perform the missions envisioned by the supported CCDR. A JTF-capable HQ should be proficient in its approved JMETs, have the proposed organizational structure and personnel requirements of the JTF HQ documented in a contingency JMD, have required C2 systems and other key equipment on hand to the maximum extent possible, continue individual and collective training to sustain staff proficiency, and accurately report readiness to perform as a JTF HQ.

(3) **Readiness Reporting.** CJCSI 3401.02, *Force Readiness Reporting*, and DODD 7730.65, *Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*, with subsequent serial guidance, designate readiness reporting requirements for DOD, including Service HQ and JTF HQ. Designated Service HQ and JTF-capable HQ are considered “measured units” and should report readiness against CCDR-approved JTF HQ missions in accordance with DOD, the CJCS, and establishing authorities promulgated readiness protocols. See CJCSM 3150.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)*, for additional information concerning “measured units.” CCDRs should review the periodic readiness reporting of designated Service HQ and JTF-capable HQ and take action, if necessary, to correct or mitigate readiness shortfalls. When ordered to conduct actual operations as a JTF HQ, the JTF-capable HQ commander will revalidate the JMETL, JMD, JMEEL, and training status for the assigned mission(s) and commence reporting readiness, per the governing instructions, every 30 days or when the JTF HQ readiness status changes, whichever is sooner.
(4) **Validating Initial and Full Operational Capability.** Determining initial and full operational capability of the JTF HQ is a discussion between the establishing authority and the CJTF. The requirements the establishing authority prescribes for the JTF HQ drive the analysis and determination of initial and full operational capability. This is an iterative process as the JTF HQ builds in capacity and capability to perform as a joint force HQ. Readiness or status reports from the CJTF will inform the establishing authority and enable him to determine initial and full operational capability in the JTF HQ.

3. **Resources**

The Services are responsible for providing designated Service HQ with the capabilities and resources necessary to operate as a JTF-capable HQ. CCDRs normally rely on established programs to identify and address JTF HQ capability gaps and associated resource constraints (specifically manpower and funding). The JTF or functional component HQ certification program element of the CCDR’s Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program may be used to gain senior leadership visibility on JTF HQ readiness issues.

*For more details concerning the CCDR Exercise and Training Transformation program, refer to CJCSI 3265.01, Command and Control Governance and Management, and CJCSM 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.*
APPENDIX C
LIAISON OFFICERS

1. General

When forming the JTF staff, it is important to have LNO representation from all organizations with which the JTF will conduct a significant level of coordination. LNOs facilitate the communication maintained between elements of a JTF to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison is the most commonly employed technique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous, physical communication between commands. Typically, LNOs are exchanged between higher, lower, and adjacent units. When working as a combined force, the liaison assignment should be reciprocal. Additionally, LNOs may be provided from other interagency partners, NGOs, and domestic and international organizations. LNO requirements are determined based on the command relationships established by the JTF commander and the anticipated support requirements necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. The JTF commander has several options available for organizing forces. The JTF commander may decide to organize by Service component, functional component, subordinate JTFs, or a combination of these methods. Each of these organizational options has implications on LNO requirements to the JTF HQ.

2. Functions

LNOs, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the range of military operations.

a. **Monitor.** The LNO must monitor the operations of both the JTF and the sending organization and understand how each affects the other. As a minimum, the LNO must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and be sensitive to parent commanders and the JTF commander’s desires.

b. **Coordinate.** The LNO facilitates synchronization of current operations/future plans between the sending organization and the JTF. The LNO does this through coordination with other LNOs, members of the JTF staff, and the parent command. LNOs should routinely meet with staff officers and commanders in the JTF HQ and readily know how to contact them. The understanding and procedures the LNO builds while monitoring the situation helps facilitate the synchronization of the sending unit’s operations/future plans with those of the JTF by coordinating the communication process.

c. **Advise.** The LNO is the JTF’s expert on the sending command’s capabilities and limitations. The LNO must be able to advise the JTF commander and the staff on the optimum use of the command they represent.

d. **Assist.** The LNO must assist on two levels. First, the LNO must act as the conduit between the sending command and the JTF. Second, by integrating into the JTF and attending various boards, meetings, and planning sessions, the LNO can answer their questions and ensure they make informed decisions.
3. Determine Liaison Officer Requirements

The receiving unit should identify and define requirements for the LNOs/teams.

a. Defining LNO Requirements. There may be specific requirements or desires for an LNO or liaison team that might include:

   (1) **Rank.** The receiving unit may specify the rank desired based upon the rank structure of the receiving unit or MNF HQ or the level of responsibility and decision-making capability expected by the receiving commander.

   (2) **Service.** If appropriate, the receiving unit may specify the Service desired based upon the structure of the receiving unit or MNF HQ.

   (3) **Weapon System Specialty.** A specific military operating specialty or weapon system expert may be specified. For example, if the receiving unit is planning to conduct an air assault forced entry, the receiving unit HQ might request an LNO who is an assault helicopter pilot.

   (4) **Experience.** Specific experience within a specialty may be desired. For example, if the receiving unit plans to conduct an airborne assault forced entry, an LNO with prior JTF or theater experience or an airborne qualified LNO may be required.

   **NOTE:** The LNO represents the sending organization and should not be construed as only a ready source of tactical-level information for the JTF. Although a weapon system specialty or specific operational experience might be helpful, and should certainly be considered, the sending organization should send their best overall representative.

b. Uniform/Equipment Requirements. Geographic locations, weather conditions, and receiving unit HQ/support facilities may dictate that LNOs bring specific personal and duty-related gear. If so, these requirements need to be negotiated between the gaining and sending commands and should be designated in joining instructions. This may include:

   (1) Individual equipment (clothing and individual equipment/mobility gear/deuce gear, individual weapon, etc.). LNOs may be required to deploy with individual equipment to include weapon, chemical protective gear, or other mobility equipment. Conversely, if deploying to an embarked HQ, there may not be a requirement for certain equipment and there might not be room to store it.

   (2) Communications/information technology support (laptop computers, radios, secure telephone unit, SATCOM, fax, modem, etc.). The receiving unit should specify what communications and automated data processing equipment will be available for use by the LNO. This allows the sending organization to tailor the communications/information technology package it sends forward. Additionally, any limitation such as bandwidth for VTCs, etc., should be made known up front.

c. Submission of LNO Request. LNO Manning is normally coordinated by the theater commander’s J-1. The JTF HQ will submit a consolidated manning document,
usually in spreadsheet format, that articulates the LNO requirements. After the command providing the LNO is identified by the theater commander J-1, the J-1 of the supplying activity should be contacted to articulate any specific qualifications.

d. **Support Requirements.** The receiving organization should plan to fully integrate the LNOs/LNO teams.

   (1) **Manpower Limitations.** Identify any manning limitations to the sending unit. Some US Navy or US Coast Guard vessels may have limited female berthing.

   (2) **Dedicate Workspaces for LNO Teams.** Ensure sufficient workspaces are provided for the LNOs/LNO teams. Considerations include centrally locating the LNOs versus dispersing them into specific receiving unit staff sections, sufficient space for the number of LNO personnel, and access to adequate communications/information technology/telephones/administrative supplies.

   (3) Provide administrative/service support.

   (4) Provide publications/documents for LNOs.

      (a) Maps and command SOP.

      (b) Doctrinal publications/reference materials and command organization with responsible POCs.

 e. **Reception and Staff Integration.** Upon receiving LNOs/LNO teams, the receiving organization should fully integrate them into the organization. Identify single staff POCs to assist in a successful integration of LNOs into the staff. The staff POC should ensure LNOs understand the JTF’s operating procedures and the JFC’s expectations of LNOs. The staff POC should be in a position to assist in providing the access the LNO requires to the JFC. The reception/integration plan should include the following:

   (1) **Situation Update.** Brief arriving LNOs on the current receiving unit situation and mission with particular emphasis on any changes since the LNO’s departure from the sending unit.

   (2) **Conduct Necessary Unit/Individual Training.** Although it is the LNO’s responsibility to complete all required/desired unit or individual training (for example, marksmanship, communications familiarization) before departing from the parent organization, sometimes the training is not available due to scheduling or time constraints. If it is critical to the success of the LNO, specified training should be provided by the receiving organization upon their arrival.

   (3) **Issue/Train on Equipment.** Issue any required individual equipment that may be unique to the OE the LNO may be working in (e.g., emergency escape breathing device and life preserver). Additionally, the JTF should provide training on any technical equipment that will be used to facilitate the interaction between the LNOs and their sending unit.
Appendix C

(4) **Command Orientation.** LNOs should be given an orientation of the receiving command facility/location. This is effectively done by a videotape orientation and/or followed by a walking tour.

(5) **Establish Access to Key Groups.** Ensure the LNOs have access to the receiving unit’s key command and staff groups. An in-brief with the receiving unit commander may be appropriate. Quickly establish the role of the LNO as a key information conduit and facilitator. Ensure the command relationship/chain of command between the LNO, the receiving unit, and the sending unit is clearly understood by all concerned.

(6) **LNO Briefing Requirements.** Inform the LNO of any requirement to speak at meetings or briefings. Generally, preparation and presentation of detailed briefings go beyond the scope of the LNO’s mission. An exception would be a detailed briefing concerning the capabilities and limitations of the LNO’s parent organization. If essential and agreed upon, the receiving unit should be prepared to assist the LNO with preparation of any formal briefing (briefing slides, point papers, etc.).

(7) **Identify and Facilitate Information Reporting Procedures.** Identify the timing of any required reports to and from the LNO. Assist the LNO in executing any reporting requirements of the sending command.

(8) **Include LNOs in Planning Process.** Ensure the LNOs are used to represent their sending organization during the collaborative planning process. Recognize, due to the variety and range of their duties, it will be unlikely the LNO will participate full-time in such organizations as the JPG.

4. **Liaison Officer Duties and Responsibilities**

   a. Before departure for the gaining HQ, an LNO should be briefed thoroughly on:

      (1) The current situation of parent unit.

      (2) Parent commander’s CONOPS, unit locations, and all combat readiness factors.

      (3) The current status and missions of the JTF and OPSEC applicable to the mission.

   b. LNOs must:

      (1) Obtain specific information and/or liaison requirements from each staff section.

      (2) Understand the mission, responsibilities, and chain of command.

      (3) Ensure arrangements for communications and transportation will meet mission requirements.
(4) Verify language and interpreter requirements if conducting liaison with an Allied unit.

(5) Become familiar with potential issues, capabilities, doctrine, and operational procedures of the parent unit and the unit assigned, to the extent possible.

(6) Become familiar with command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.

(7) Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.

c. On arrival at the gaining HQ, the LNO should:

(1) Report to the supported commander or designated representative (J-3 or the COS), state assigned mission and provide directive or credentials (if in writing), offer assistance and be prepared to brief on parent unit’s situation.

(2) Attend staff section briefing, provide information, as required, and transmit all information to the parent unit, as required.

(3) Establish communications with parent unit and exchange updated information.

(4) Verify language and interpreter requirements if conducting liaison with an allied unit.

(5) Inform JPG lead of presence and provide local contact information.

d. During the assignment, the LNO should:

(1) Maintain situational awareness of parent unit and make that information available to the CJTF through JOC.

(2) Report to parent command on those matters within the scope of assigned mission.

(3) Determine expected employment by the JTF (e.g., CJTF intent, probable mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, and all other relevant information).

(4) As permitted by official orders, inform the CJTF of contents of reports dispatched to the LNOs’ parent commands.

(5) Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or CJTF regarding:

(a) Significant problems being experienced by the LNO’s parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa.
(b) LNO’s suggestions to enhance the effective employment of parent command.

(6) Report promptly to their own HQ if they are unable to accomplish their liaison mission.

(7) Attend the CJTF’s daily situation update briefing and other meetings, as required.

5. Redeployment of Liaison Officers

At the completion of the liaison tour, the LNO will be expected to execute the following responsibilities:

a. Prepare equipment and other items for shipment, ensuring all classified material is properly destroyed or transferred to the sending organization. Complete the appropriate JTF checkout procedure. If the LNO is being replaced, schedule appropriate in-briefs for the incoming LNO and ensure a comprehensive turnover package is prepared and delivered.

b. Outbrief with JTF commander and other members of the HQ staff, as appropriate. The outbrief should include, but not be limited to, evaluation of LNO’s employment during the deployment period; feedback on the flow of information, both into and out of the organization; self-evaluation of LNO’s contribution to the JTF staff; and identification of any remaining, unresolved issues or sending organization’s requirements.

c. Construct an in-depth after action report (AAR) that summarizes the deployment regarding the LNO’s responsibilities. This report should also contain a comprehensive listing of deployment LL. The LNO is also responsible to interface with the JTF COS to develop specific LL to be inputted into the joint AAR for the exercise or operation.

d. Upon return to parent command, brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent information received during their visit (e.g., detailed information concerning the mission of the higher HQ unit locations, future locations, and commander’s intent). The LNO should promptly transmit any requests from the JTF commander and forward the AAR for review.

e. Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

f. Update JTF SOPs to reflect AAR comments, LL, and best practices for future LNOs/teams and future operations.
APPENDIX D

SHARED UNDERSTANDING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. General

   a. The role of IM is to provide a timely flow of relevant information that supports all aspects of planning, decision making, and execution, to include all activities involved in identifying, collecting, filtering, fusing, processing, focusing, disseminating, and using information. IMOs assemble information that promotes a shared understanding of the information environment and enable the CJTF to better formulate and analyze COAs, make decisions, execute those decisions, and understand results from previous decisions.

   b. IM uses established procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, protect, display, disseminate, and dispose of information. A JTF requires a continuous flow of quality information to support operations. Information flow process is developed to ensure this quality information gets to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients. To that end, the effective flow of information requires the information to be:

      (1) Positioned Properly. The requirements for specific types of information often are predictable. Positioning the required information at its anticipated points of need speeds the flow and reduces demands on the communications system (e.g., using public folders to post required information).

      (2) Mobile. The reliable and secure flow of information must be commensurate with the JTF’s mobility and operating tempo. Information flow must support vertical and horizontal data sharing (e.g., collaborative [integrated] planning system).

      (3) Accessible. All levels of command within the JTF must be able to locate the information they need to support concurrent or parallel planning and mission execution. If possible, information should be channeled to the required user via automated means, reducing the need for manual exchange (e.g., graphic depiction of forces in a COP).

      (4) Fused. Information is received from many sources, in many mediums, and in different formats. Fusion is the logical blending of information from multiple sources into an accurate, concise, and complete summary. A key objective of IM is to reduce information to its minimum essential elements and in a format that can be easily understood and acted upon (e.g., threat assessment disseminated in graphic form on an automated COP system).

   c. The JTF’s communications system provides the means for information dissemination. Users of information are ultimately responsible for its management. Principal, special, and supporting staff directors or chiefs must clearly identify their information requirements and work closely with the JTF IMO ensuring processes are automated in the most effective way possible.
d. Knowledge sharing complements the value of IM with processes to encourage information and knowledge sharing to gain a shared understanding throughout the command. Information is collected, processed, and stored as structured or unstructured content, but knowledge is acquired through a cognitive process and exists in the minds of individuals. Knowledge sharing is a learning activity and is not a systematic process with inputs and outputs.

2. Information Management Plan

   a. An effective IMP provides guidance to ensure availability of decision-quality information. It articulates not just the processes that exist, but also the means by which the JTF will perform those processes.

   b. The JTF IMP should cover the JTF IM requirements that cut across all elements of the organization. A construct that works well is that of the “4 Ps”: people, process, pipes, and protection. Examples include the duties, responsibilities, and skill requirements (people); IM processes and procedures (process); IM systems and requirements (pipes); and IM system protection (protection). Some of the key items are:

   (1) Commander’s dissemination policy.

   (2) Information requirements and general procedures (COP management, CCIRs).

   (3) Digital rules of protocol (also referred to as business rules). These rules provide correct use and promote proper etiquette when working with collaboration tools and other digital information systems within a JTF.

   (4) Battle rhythm or schedule of events.

   (5) Cybersecurity or defensive CO.

   (6) Information systems tools and procedures (to include collaborative planning tools).

   (7) RFI management procedures.

   (8) Network applications and architecture. This guidance may include web pages or other applications.

   (9) Reports management.

   (10) Master suspense action log.

   (11) Significant events log.

   (12) Orders distribution.

   (13) Records management.
c. **Commander’s Dissemination Policy.** The commander’s dissemination policy serves as the commander’s guidance on dissemination of information within and outside of the JTF. The commander’s dissemination policy is not a separate document, but a part of the IMP. It provides a foundation for developing the IMP and aids in prioritizing IM activities. It provides policy to guide JTF IM decisions in the absence of specific guidance or detailed instructions. Critical information needs must be predetermined and prioritized to ensure support for critical missions, prevent overload of routine information, and provide guidance to apportion information assets.

(1) The commander’s dissemination policy may incorporate policies pertaining to:

   (a) CCIRs.

   (b) PA guidance.

   (c) Communications network architecture.

   (d) Release of real-time operational information.

   (e) Release of real-time intelligence information.

   (f) IO and CCS processes and any information-related objectives.

   (g) Communications system status.

(2) Other areas a commander should consider for inclusion in the commander’s dissemination policy are:

   (a) Identifying the routine information products that must be sent to users based on their functional role(s) or mission(s).

   (b) Weighing the main effort, allowing for dynamic adjustment to available bandwidth, and a reallocation of bandwidth to specific missions.

   (c) Prioritizing information flow within an OA.

   (d) Prioritizing RFIs based on:

      1. User.

      2. Organization.


      4. Location.
5. Information type (i.e., strike warning, contact report).

(e) Overriding automatic assignment of priorities.

(f) Interfacing with databases and other information sources associated with building the COP and providing for rapid tailoring of information required to create a new or updated COP.

(g) Limiting access to specific information by content, source, type, or location.

(h) Limiting file transfer sizes.

(i) Limiting information transfer due to security or classification policy and delivery tools.

For further details concerning IM at the JTF level, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and the Joint Force Headquarters Training website on JEL+.

3. Responsibilities

To aid the commander in tracking, controlling, and fusing the vast amounts of information a JTF can encounter, an effective IM organizational structure must be established. For a large JTF, a group of individuals could be required to accomplish effective IM. Regardless of its size, though, an IM organization provides the JTF with an information flow process designed to meet the commander’s needs for relevant and timely information while optimizing the use of information infrastructure resources. Depending on the JTF size, a CJTF may use some, all, or none of the elements listed below to create an IM organization. In the organization discussed below, the IMO reports directly to the COS. An advantage of putting the IMO under the COS is to provide leverage to manage IM policies effectively. In some situations, however, the JTF J-3 may be best positioned to manage the IMO. Ultimately, the CJTF decides where to place the IMO function.

a. CJTF

(1) Establishes priorities for information gathering and reporting by identifying the type of information needed to attain a shared understanding of the situation. This also includes establishing the CCIRs and commander’s dissemination policy.

(2) Approves the command IMP.

(3) Approves the command communications plan that supports the IMP.

b. COS

(1) Owns the JTF IM process.

(2) Approves the HQ battle rhythm or operations cycle.
(3) Manages the battle rhythm.

(4) Implements and enforces the IMP.

(5) Appoints the IMO.

(6) Appoints the RFI manager.

(7) Establishes the JIMB.

(8) Determines liaison requirements, establishes liaison IERs, and receives liaison teams.

c. **IMO.** The information manager’s position is a primary duty assigned to a qualified individual with operational experience. The IMO is policy-focused and, as the senior JTF information manager, is responsible for developing and publishing the commander’s IMP. The IMO should be intimately aware of the JTF’s information needs and possess the authority to coordinate actions and processes accordingly. The IMO must be capable of working closely with JTF personnel of all ranks and specialties to coordinate procedures and capabilities that satisfy CJTF warfighting requirements and the JTF staff. Specifically, the IMO needs to understand how the command operates and be able to articulate that understanding to communicators. The IMO:

   (1) Ensures the JTF IM system accurately reflects the JTF IMP.

   (2) Approves the format and structure of information posted and distributed from JTF briefings and reports using the JIMB.

   (3) Coordinates additional training requirements by staff and component elements to support IM.

   (4) Works to develop effective and efficient JTF COP management procedures.

d. **JIMB**

   (1) The JIMB is policy-focused and responsible for building the JTF’s IMP in conjunction with the staff directorates’ information managers. Periodically, the board is required to make updates or changes to the IMP. JIMB composition should include:

      (a) JTF IMO chairs the JIMB.

      (b) Staff section IM coordinators.

      (c) JNCC representative.

      (d) RFI manager.

      (e) Cybersecurity representative.
(f) Web/database administrator/manager.

(g) External organization representatives, as required.

(h) Records manager.

(i) JDN officer.

(2) The JIMB:

(a) Identifies and validates IERs and their prioritization.

(b) Creates and maintains the IMP.

(c) Acts as a focal point for coordinating JTF IM policy.

(d) Operates under the supervision of the COS (or designated staff directorate).

(e) Resolves cross-functional and contentious IM issues.

(f) Coordinates additional training required by staff and component elements to support production of quality information through effective IM procedures.

e. **JTF Staff Directors**

(1) Implement internal staff directorate procedures to comply with the IMP.

(2) Identify critical and relevant information to be placed on the HQ battle rhythm matrix. The JOC staff informs the IMO of any changes to information needs prompted by the HQ battle rhythm.

(3) Appoint a staff directorate IM representative and RFI manager as POCs for IM matters and RFIs. This can be the same individual, though it is not recommended to dual-hat in the JTF J-2 and J-3 directorates.

(4) Ensure training is completed for basic IM, RFI management, and security procedures for all personnel in the staff directorates.

(5) Assess IM to assure the flow of quality critical and relevant information.

(6) Note: The JNCC, as an element of the JTF J-6, exercises control over the communications system and serves as the single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network. The JNCC performs planning, execution, technical direction, and management over the communications system. See Chapter X, “Communications System Directorate,” for further discussion of JTF J-6 IM responsibilities as they relate to IM systems management.

f. **JDNC**
(1) The JDNC is a task-organized team of experienced personnel that supports the JDN operations officer. The JDNC should be staffed, trained, and equipped to support continuous operations and should consist of personnel knowledgeable in the operations of participating components to optimize multi-Service experience and overcome C2 system interoperability challenges. The JDNC’s mission is to plan the C2 architecture, maintain configuration control, manage and integrate selected data provided by the various networks, execute JDN operations, and develop a COP/CTP that meets the commander’s situational awareness and decision-making requirements.

(2) **Mission.** The JDNC, as an element of the JTF J-3, manages the JDN to provide the JOC with a reliable, complete, and timely CTP of entities and events in the OE. The JDNC will continuously monitor the JDN and specifically support the CJTF through oversight of both horizontal and vertical integration of data, to include the following activities:

   (a) Analyze the quality, timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of CTP information to ensure it meets the CJTF’s data requirements and supports the JTF mission.

   (b) Manage the CTP development processes and assess the connectivity and performance of C2 systems used to provide the required level of situational awareness needed to support decision making.

   (c) Implement a coherent CTP management plan, incorporating hardware/software configuration control, filter settings, and permissions sets needed to meet tactical and operational IERs.

   (d) Identify and assist in the resolution of interoperability issues.

   (e) Perform multi-source data integration and track management by managing and integrating selected data provided by the various networks.

   (f) Act as the focal point for COP/CTP coordination within the JTF.

   (g) Review and validate subordinate data inputs to provide an accurate JTF COP/CTP.

   (h) Remain actively involved in resolving all cross-functional COP/CTP issues.

   (i) Advocate that the components establish their own COP/CTP POC to manage their portion of the JTF’s COP/CTP.

*For further information on the JDNC, refer to Chapter VII, “Operations Directorate,” and CJCSM 3115.01, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations, Volume I.*

g. **Joint IM Cell.** Depending on the size of the JTF and scope of operations, the JTF COS may establish a joint IM cell within the JOC. The joint IM cell reports to the JOC chief (or possibly the JTF J-3) and facilitates information flow throughout the JOA. In the
absence of a standing joint IM cell, the responsibilities defined below must be assumed by other positions within the IM structure. The joint IM cell:

1. Ensures the commander’s dissemination policy is implemented as intended.

2. Takes guidance published in the commander’s dissemination policy and combines it with the latest operational and intelligence information obtained from the JOC or joint analysis center.

3. Works closely with the JNCC to coordinate potential changes in communications infrastructure to satisfy changes in the commander’s information dissemination requirements.

4. Coordinates the accurate posting of all current, approved CCIRs.

h. **JTF Staff Directorate IM Representatives**

1. May be commissioned or staff NCOs, regardless of rank or specialty.

2. Oversee the internal and external information flow of their staff directorates.

3. Provide the IMO with staff directorate information requirements for incorporation into the IMP.

4. Provide the JNCC a list of their respective requirements for network support.

5. Ensure compliance with the priorities, processes, and procedures in the IMP for websites, message handling, e-mail, RFIs, and suspense control procedures.

6. Coordinate and conduct IM training for internal staff directorate members.

i. **JTF RFI Managers**

1. The JTF RFI manager is a non-table of organization billet, normally a secondary duty assigned to an individual in the JTF J-3 with operational experience. The JTF J-2 will designate an RFI manager for intelligence-related requirements, and these requirements will be tracked via community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers.

2. JTF section or component RFI managers are responsible for receiving, validating, prioritizing, and submitting RFIs to the appropriate authority for resolution in a timely manner. RFIs should be focused upon validating planning assumptions.

3. The JTF RFI manager develops and manages a tracking system to ensure RFIs are processed and the responses expeditiously disseminated to the requester. It is critical that the question, response, and identification of who responded is displayed—web-based RFI tools work best.
j. The **Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO)** is the senior interface control officer in support of the joint multi-tactical data link network (MTN) operations within the JOA. The JICO is responsible for planning and managing the architecture and technical integration of joint data and communications systems for the MTN. The JICO controls and acts as the coordinating authority for the joint interface control cell and for any regional interface control officer/sector interface control officer for planning and executing tactical data link (TDL) functions that cross regional or sector boundaries or impact the theater-wide MTN. When a JTF is formed, there should be only one JICO per JTF. The JICO will normally be located in a C2 facility with connectivity to the primary TDLs (normally the joint air operations center, if established). There may be Service component interface control officers located at the joint information coordination center.

For a full discussion of the JICO, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats; CJCSM 3115.01, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations, Volume I; and CJCSM 6120.01, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link (TDL) Operating Procedures.

k. **Component IMOs.** Each component commander appoints an IMO as a primary POC for IM matters. Component IMOs have similar duties and rank requirements as the JTF IMO. The JTF and component IMOs:

1. Conduct liaison with the JTF IMO.
2. Coordinate and assist personnel with training required to produce quality information throughout the command.

l. **JTF Information System User Responsibilities.** Every user has inherent responsibilities to acquire, assess, reason, question, correlate, and disseminate quality information to other users. The JTF information and information system user responsibilities are to:

1. Handle all information as directed in the IMP.
2. Ensure accuracy and relevance of information before further dissemination. Clearly differentiate between original information and previously reported information to avoid duplicative reporting.
3. Properly control, classify, protect, and archive all information and information systems for which they are responsible. This requires a clear understanding of approved control measures for various classifications of information.
4. Validate the authority to dispose of JTF information in accordance with IMP and CJCSM records management guidance before destruction.
5. Read and comply with the information requirements published in the JTF IMP.
4. Information Management Processes and Procedures

Central to the success of meeting the operational needs of the user is the JTF IMO, the JIMB, and the joint IM cell. The IMO supports the COS in the horizontal and vertical integration of the command and its subordinates, primarily by integrating the command’s key processes. It is not necessary or desired to document every single IMP process, but to describe those processes critical to how the command operates. As such, the IMO must focus on the integration of the key processes. “Best practices” have shown that the following are critical processes for which procedures are required to properly integrate them.

a. **CCIRs** are elements of information required by the commander that directly affect decision making. CCIRs are a key IM tool for the commander. They help the commander assess the OE and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.

For more details concerning CCIRs, refer to Chapter IV, “Command and Control,” and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

b. **RFI**

   (1) RFIs are primarily designed to validate planning assumptions. The CJTF establishes RFI procedures to provide a systematic method for requestors to obtain information. Providing visibility to the rest of the organization on the questions, answers, and identification of those providing answers to those questions is more important than merely allowing requestors to get information.

   (2) An RFI can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the CCMD’s or NG JFHQ-State’s procedures. RFIs are sent to higher, subordinate, and adjacent HQ or to other agencies requesting the information necessary to support the planning and decision-making processes.

   (3) The JTF J-2 processes intelligence-related RFIs and the JTF J-3 all other RFIs. They assign an RFI manager to receive and prioritize RFIs. A tracking system known as the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers is established to register, validate, track, and manage crisis and non-crisis intelligence information requirements.

   (4) Effective RFI procedures provide requestors with an “information pull” mechanism for access to a variety of vital information. RFI procedures do not replace typical internal staff research available to JTF members (e.g., intelligence link via the SIPRNET and NIPRNET). Instead, the RFI process provides a mechanism for a formal request to other echelons when the issue or question is beyond the resources of the staff. The process also provides visibility of those requests forwarded, their status, and responses to these requests.
Shared Understanding and Information Management

(5) Component RFI managers submit RFIs to the JTF RFI manager that are beyond the components capability and staff resources to answer. Component RFI managers submit intelligence-related RFIs, in accordance with established procedures.

(6) Normally, RFIs are not necessary among JTF directorates. However, if a JTF is not in a single location or the RFI is exceptionally complex, the JTF staff directorate RFI manager submits it to the JTF RFI manager by posting it to a JTF web page or other approved means. The JTF RFI manager processes the request and forwards it to the appropriate agency for resolution. Each directorate RFI manager is responsible for monitoring their RFIs and closing the request.

c. **Battle Rhythm.** This is the COS’s tool to integrate the staff actions and events in such a manner to provide the CJTF and staff with the information and knowledge sharing required to achieve effective decision support and staff sharing understanding to accomplish the mission. The JTF COS should be the approval authority for changes in actions, events, or information flows that support battle rhythm.

d. **Reports.** Standardized reports help reduce the amount of staff work to meet recurring information requirements.

e. **Orders and Distribution.** Orders are the means for the JTF to direct the actions of other organizations. The CJTF issues guidance and direction in the form of warning orders, FRAGORDs, EXORDs, OPORDs, and other directives. The JTF JOC is the focal point for disseminating orders. The JTF IMP must address procedures for the management of plans and orders throughout their life cycle to include, distribution, acknowledgment, and protection.

f. **Briefings and Meetings**

(1) Briefings and meetings can be the biggest time consumer for JTF members if they are not conducted properly. Meetings should occur to accomplish a specific purpose, on an as-needed basis. There are three roles that need to be specified for all meetings. The **meeting organizer** schedules the meeting and publishes the agenda. This agenda will specify the attendees, purpose of the meeting, and desired outcomes. The **moderator** is the person who runs the meeting, gathers input, and assigns tasking during the meeting. The final role is that of the **recorder**, who acts as the scribe and at the end of the meeting reads back all taskings, to include who was tasked. The COS determines which meetings occur via the published JTF HQ battle rhythm. The IMO is responsible for specifying procedures in the IMP to disseminate the products of the meeting, especially any decisions or direction given during the meeting.

(2) **CJTF Daily Update Brief.** This brief is normally conducted once daily to update the CJTF on current operations and future and long range plans and provides the CJTF with analyzed information essential for decision making and synchronizing the JTF efforts. A secondary purpose is efficient cross-leveling of information within the staff. Brevity, clarity, and a cross-functional analysis of the OE are goals of the CJTF update brief. The most common error occurring in the daily update brief is that the focus is purely
on what happened, versus the future. CJTFs and staffs should ensure their update briefs remain focused on the future, rather than the past.

g. **Multinational Procedures and Systems.** The CJTF establishes procedures for information and data transfer between the JTF and multinational components. The CJTF establishes a security CONOPS for the specific “how-to” for data transfer and develops information sharing/disclosure policies in accordance with DOD or approved multinational policy or procedures. Multinational procedures for transferring data addressing sensitive compartmented information are handled through special security office channels.

5. **Information Systems**

a. The goal of information systems and IM procedures is to produce an accurate picture of the OE and to support decision making. Information systems must provide effective and secure information exchange throughout the JTF. Users need to develop an understanding of the information systems available and IM procedures to match their information requirements.

b. **Network Application Management**

(1) Networking technologies are expanding the options available for managing the flow of information. The JTF can establish a collaborative environment for sharing information using web pages, public folders, and e-mail. For example, networks provide the JTF access to information, allowing individuals to send and receive unclassified and classified information worldwide. The NIPRNET provides access to the Internet. SIPRNET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System provide access to classified information.

(2) The intranet network infrastructure for a JTF HQ may differ from one JTF to another, but the concepts are generally the same. A JTF intranet is a communications network in which access to published information is restricted.

(3) The JTF IMO must work closely with the JTF web administrator and the component IMOs to develop and establish procedures for local area network management. The JTF IMP should identify how the JTF shares information. The JTF IMO must establish procedures enabling each staff section to access, post, and update information. Each staff section ensures the information posted is accurate, current, and relevant.

(4) **Websites and Portals**

(a) A well-organized website assembles, organizes, and presents vital information in a timely manner. The JTF HQ, staff directorates, components, and supporting agencies should develop and maintain their own web pages. Information on these web pages should include important updates, status reports, common staff products, and current activities.

(b) The JTF should organize the website around a master “JTF home page.” The JTF home page or “front door” sits at the top of the JTF website and acts as a point of
entry into the site. In a complex JTF website, it is impractical to populate the JTF home page with dozens of links. Complicated or large home pages are long and will not load quickly under bandwidth-constrained conditions. Therefore, each major element or unit of the JTF should have their own home page with direct links back to the JTF home page. However, a JTF home page could list links for other applicable JTF home pages to advertise their existence. Web pages or pages within a component should have a consistent design to facilitate navigation.

(5) E-mail

(a) E-mail is a common tool that can be highly effective in communicating time-critical information within the JTF. However, the benefit of permitting rapid and asynchronous communications and eliminating “telephone tag” is tempered by the ever present potential for performance degradation, loss of situational awareness, and loss of referential information. The IMP should restrict and include processes to capture e-mail C2 and responses into more readily accessible common resources such as portals, network share spaces, or other similar capabilities. It permits a single user to communicate with one or several users simultaneously. E-mail can overload the network if used improperly (e.g., unnecessary information, large message attachments). Use websites, public access drives, or send a link (vice the actual attachment) on the local area network to disseminate information. Remove graphics, imagery, and text documents that do not add information content.

(b) At times, it is necessary to notify a large audience that a particular piece of information is available (e.g., warning orders). Users should use some discretion in selecting e-mail addresses. In most situations it is preferable to send a link to the information and notify intended recipients where it may be retrieved, versus attaching the item to multiple e-mail messages. This procedure reduces the bandwidth used when sending multiple copies of e-mails with attachments. Users should periodically review their e-mail group addresses for accuracy and ensure topic-related group members are still current. Remember, undeliverable e-mail may double the network load (once to attempt delivery and again to notify the sender of the delivery failure). Users should take prompt action to resolve the cause of undeliverable e-mail.

(6) Shared disk drives and folders are another means to allow common access to information. Organizations using shared drives should have an established policy for deleting obsolete and outdated information. Shared drive folder names may be topical or use the same titles as those shown in the file plan drive.

c. Collaborative Tools. Collaborative tools, such as Defense Collaborative Services and Intelink, can be used to bridge seams across an organization (e.g., between components separated by distance or for elements within the JTF staff). These tools, however, will not improve information flow and decision making if procedures are not developed, documented in the IMP, trained to, and enforced to standardize their use. Collaborative tools fall into two categories: synchronous (real time) and asynchronous (non-real time). Examples of the former include VTC, collaboration suites on computers, and telephones.
Examples of the latter are shared web spaces and web portals. The following are some examples of how to use such tools:

(1) Present an interactive visual projection enabling JTF members to see the collaborative effort both on their workstation screens and on a large “movie screen” display.

(2) Support the JTF planning process by permitting JTF planners to enter virtual meetings to share intent and build common planning documents across all echelons.

(3) Provide means that enable meetings and products to be shared throughout the JOA.

(4) Share and work on documents between the JTF HQ and subordinate organizations. These documents include force lists and availability, intelligence information, TPFDD, worldwide map system, unit capabilities, equipment, and organization for each US Service force and MNF as required.

(5) Using unclassified information sharing capabilities bring into the JTF’s collaborative systems persons and organizations unable or unwilling to connect to DOD (.mil) systems due to location or cultural or political sensitivities.

d. **Local Area Network or Wide Area Network Requirements.** The JTF local area network can be set up with shared or private hard drive space. Private drive space is intended to limit access to stored data. Access generally is limited to specific functional areas as defined by user login names (i.e., specific J-code staff sections). Since this capability is difficult to share across organizations, it is a good location for work that is not ready for publication. The IMP must specify the requirements for publication. Staff sections are responsible for the currency, accuracy, and maintenance of their shared drive information.

e. **VTC Procedures.** The purpose of the JTF VTC capability is support of the CJTF and JTF staff. VTCs are effective for sharing information and C2 between the CJTF and geographically dispersed subordinate commanders and staffs. While VTC is a key means of C2, the CJTF could use alternate methods of communications such as conference calls if a VTC system is not available. Since this is a high-bandwidth tool, the IMP should specify prioritization for its use (i.e., mainly focused on the command echelon).

f. **Priority Communications.** Information and the value of information based on the commander’s requirements drive the installation and restoration of communications means. To assist in making this happen, the JTF J-6 establishes specific responsibilities for establishing connectivity between the JTF HQ and components. Normally, the higher HQ is responsible for establishing all connections to a lower HQ. The JTF should possess redundant means of voice communications, data transfer, and functional specific data systems.
6. Information and Information System Protection

a. The increasing dependence of societies and military forces on advanced information networks creates new vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities. The J-6 primarily is responsible for cybersecurity; however, the IMO must include JTF J-6 approved cybersecurity procedures for the command. Adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities through means such as offensive CO. Vulnerabilities caused by advancements in C2 systems must be mitigated. Mission accomplishment depends on protecting and defending information and information systems from destruction, disruption, and corruption by safeguarding them from intrusion and exploitation. These are critical tenants for mission accomplishment and aid in accomplishing information superiority.

b. To ensure information integrity and cybersecurity for the force, the CJTF must have an understanding of the various types of threats to JTF information systems and the consequences if these threats are not mitigated. Threats against friendly C2 vary by adversaries’ technical capabilities and motivation. The IMP must anticipate internal and external threats. Additionally, sound system configuration along with a proactive network monitoring plan aid in risk mitigation.

(1) External Threats. Attacks emanating from outside of the network continue to challenge security professionals due to the ethereal complexities of detection. Attack techniques, such as e-mail spoofing or Internet protocol hopping, require a significant level of skill for the system administrator to detect and mitigate. Antivirus software, cybersecurity vulnerability alerts, and DOD computer emergency response team advisories provide measures to protect against many external attack weapons.

(2) Insider Threat. Threats emanating from within the joint information infrastructure pose a significant risk to information systems. Individuals with legitimate system access, whether recruited, self-motivated, or through carelessness, have entry to information and information systems that are otherwise protected against outside attack. Within the system, a malicious insider may launch a series of computer attacks, which may create spill-over effects throughout the entire JTF network.

To further assist the JTF IMO in the preparation of an IMP and coordinating IM with other USG organizations, international organizations, and NGOs, refer to Annex L, “Checklist for Information Management,” to Appendix A, “Checklists.”
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1. Background

The NG will normally be on-scene, in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status, supporting a state-managed emergency response if DOD is directed to conduct a DSCA, HD, or homeland security (HS) mission. Various command arrangements are available when the armed forces operate in different legal statuses and separate chains of command, supporting civil authorities. A clear understanding of these arrangements is essential for effective coordination to ensure unity of effort. The DSC is the preferred C2 method for forces during a federal and state response. This appendix describes state authorities and operational relationships, simultaneous state and federal responses, and domestic considerations.

2. Authorities and Operational Relationships

a. JTF-State Establishment. Per DODD 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State), each state maintains an NG JFHQ-State under their respective state’s adjutant general. These NG forces may be in a purely state active duty status, or in federally funded Title 32, USC, status, or a combination of either status. Regardless of status, these NG forces may be organized as a JTF-State under the OPCON of a predesignated DSC and staff. Just as the preferred option for organizing a Title 10, USC, JTF HQ is to form it around a CCMD’s Service component HQ or the Service component’s existing subordinate HQ, the JTF-State command element is nominally formed around an existing NG command within a state. DOD provides specialized training for predesignated commanders and staffs via USNORTHCOM.

b. JTF-State C2. The JTF-State commander is responsible for the safe, efficient, and legal employment of all assigned NG units. The JTF-State commander, staff, and any assigned LNOs provide C2 and facilitate the flow of information between the governor or adjutant general and the activated units. The JTF-State commander must maintain situational awareness of local, state, and federal actions to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of response, support, and safety activities by working closely with the event coordinator, incident commander, or the designated lead state agency. The JTF-State commander also has the responsibility to know what capabilities the various NG units in the state possess and how they might be applied to the incident at hand in the most effective manner possible. The JTF-State commander can request the NG JFHQ-State activate and deploy additional units if additional capabilities are required. The JTF-State commander may also be appointed as a DSC. A DSC is a commissioned officer of the regular Army or Air Force or a federally recognized Army or Air NG officer authorized, pursuant to Title 32, USC, Section 315 or 325, by SecDef, with the consent of the applicable governor of a state, to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a federal chain of command and exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a state chain of command, this includes a DSC-led JTF. This facilitates unity of command for all federal and state forces used in response to a domestic incident.
c. **Supporting States.** NG forces operating within the US and its territories remain under the command of their governor, exercised through the adjutant general and NG JFHQ-State. The exception is the Washington, DC, NG where the adjutant general position does not exist. A general officer commands the Washington, DC, NG. Other states may provide NG forces to the affected state under an EMAC or other agreement between the respective governors. In cases where one state’s NG forces support another state, OPCON is specified by the supporting state governor to the supported state’s governor for a specified period (normally 30 days or less). ADCON remains with the supporting state’s adjutant general and NG JFHQ-State. Other support responsibilities, such as logistics, may be modified within a MOA between the respective governors.

d. **State and Federal Coordination.** In the event active duty, Title 10, USC, forces are directed to respond to a domestic incident, state-controlled NG forces and federally controlled DOD forces can operate independently in the OA. Robust coordination is essential to unity of effort. NG forces likely will be the first on the scene and may have better knowledge of the area and existing relationships with local civil authorities; therefore, DOD forces should leverage the state NG forces as a source of situational awareness and important information during all phases of the incident. There is a potential for NG forces to be federalized as part of a Title 10, USC, response. However, non-federalized NG forces from the supported state or from supporting states (by invitation) remain under the command of their respective state governor. Should a Title 10, USC, force be responding within a state, coordination between the federal and state military commands will be required. To facilitate this, the exchange of LNOs to coordinate and deconflict operations may be necessary.

e. **State and CCMD Coordination.** DODD 5105.77, *National Guard Bureau (NGB)*, and DODD 5105.83, *National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State)*, allow for direct communication between the Chief, NGB, and the commanders of USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and other geographic and functional CCMDs (as required) relating to HD, HS, and DSCA. Direct coordination between a CCMD and the NG of a state should occur only when time does not permit communication via the NGB. In each such instance, the Chief, NGB, will be informed of the direct coordination.

*For more information on DSC, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.*

### 3. Simultaneous State and Federal Responses

a. **Situation Overview.** In most domestic incidents, Air and Army NG forces, under the state governor’s control, will provide military support requested by civil authorities. However in a catastrophe, civil authorities may be so overwhelmed that they request large-scale federal assistance. Based upon the request of the primary federal agency, normally the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the President and SecDef may commit federal military forces. Designated federal military forces normally deploy as directed by the CCDR and operate under the command of a subordinate CJTF. This leads to a situation where federal and state military forces are operating within the same OA, but supporting different civil authorities (i.e., NG forces are operating under state response efforts for the governor and the federal military forces are supporting the federal authority for the
President and SecDef; both types of forces focus on the same response effort). This can be facilitated by ensuring approved mission assignments are communicated to the impacted state(s) NG JFHQ-State with the relevant details of the mission assignment.

b. Per DODD 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State), the CCDRs, through the CJCS, coordinates with the Chief, NGB, to integrate the NG JFHQ-State into joint training, contingency plans, and exercise. The Chief, NGB, provides liaison and shared situational awareness capability and services as a channel of communications among the NG JFHQs-States, the Joint Staff, the CCMDs, the Military Departments, and the OSD components.

c. Command Structure Options

(1) A dual-status command structure exists when a commander operates within, and subject to, both federal and state chains of command to command both responses. The decision to have a DSC in a given state is a separate agreement between the President and the respective governor (see Figure E-1). Since JTF-State is a governor-controlled entity, it has no authority outside the state border. For the same reasons, trying to establish DSC across state lines is challenging at best. A multi-state response normally will involve at least a JTF-State in each state.

For a detailed discussion of DSC, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

(2) A parallel command structure exists when state and federal authorities retain control of their employed forces through existing state and federal chains of command. For legal reasons, command of federal and state military forces usually remains separated, and forces may operate in parallel chains of command (see Figure E-2). When a DSC is not appointed, unity of effort may be more difficult to achieve. To ensure unity of effort, both state and federal military forces coordinate continuously at every deployed echelon, and particularly at the JTF level. This coordination between commanders becomes a critical basis for situation updates and recommendations to the state emergency manager (who is the adjutant general in some states) and federal coordinating officer directing their respective efforts.

4. Joint Task Force-State

a. When a governor or adjutant general deploys NG forces to support requests from civil authorities, they may create a JTF-State under the NG to maintain C2 of those forces. The JTF-State provides C2 for state NG resources deployed in support of civil authorities or a specific event or incident and facilitates the flow of information between the NG JFHQ-State and the deployed units.

(1) The JTF-State commander must maintain situational awareness of local, state, and federal actions to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of response, support, and safety activities by working closely with the event or incident commander. As the senior NG commander on scene, the JTF-State commander is responsible for the safe, efficient, and legal employment of all state military forces. The JTF-State commander also has the responsibility to know what capabilities the various NG units in the state possess and how
they might be applied to the incident at hand so they can be efficiently used to provide the most effective response possible.

(2) The JTF-State commander (may also be a DSC) can request the NG JFHQ-State activate and deploy additional units, if additional capabilities are required. The JTF-State commander may also, with the approval of the governor and with the consent of the President of the United States, be called into federal service and continue service under
state regulations so they may command both regular and NG forces (DSC), thus facilitating a unity of command for all military forces at the incident site.

b. The JTF-State commander, through the governor and/or the state adjutant general, may request forces and capabilities that are not resident in that state through an EMAC to respond to a crisis.

5. Additional Considerations

a. The JTF-State commander and staff require a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and procedures that govern the status of state active duty, Title 32, USC, and Title 10, USC, forces. These duty statuses establish the actions and limitations for planning.
and employment of forces, RUF, and incident awareness and assessment. In addition, the JTF-State operates in close coordination with local, state, tribal, and federal agencies that will have different statuses and RUF. Depending on the size of the operation, augmentation from the NG JFHQ-State staff and Army and Air NG may be needed. In some cases, active duty, Title 10, USC forces’ augmentation might be needed.

b. NG JFHQ-State planners should also possess detailed understanding of JOPES, APEX, and the NRF. In addition, the NG JTF-State planning community should be cognizant of CONPLANs, such as USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*; USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3400, *Homeland Defense*; USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3475, *Regional War on Terrorism (RWOT)*; USPACOM CONPLAN 5001, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*; USPACOM CONPLAN 5002, *Homeland Defense*; and USPACOM CONPLAN 5075, *Regional War on Terrorism—Overseas Contingency Operation*, as well as individual state emergency response plans and planning systems.

c. The JTF-State commander interacts with multiple outside elements in working to achieve unity of effort in support of domestic operations. Command always remains vested in the governor and the adjutant general of that state, unless the forces and HQ in question have been federalized under Title 10, USC.
APPENDIX F
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS ENABLING CAPABILITIES – POINTS OF CONTACT

1. Joint Staff, J-7, Joint Doctrine Division
   Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
   E-mail Support: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
   Phone number: 703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

2. Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor
   Joint Staff, J35, Deputy Director for Regional, Force Management and Future Ops
   Phone number: 757-836-6454 (DSN 836)

3. Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
   Mailing Address:
   9712 Virginia Avenue
   Building X-132
   Naval Station Norfolk, VA 23511
   Website: http://www.jecc.mil/
   JECC Communication/Public Affairs:
   Phone number: 757-836-8935
   DSN: 836-8935
   E-mail: transcom.jeccnews@mail.mil
   24/7 JECC Watch Officer:
   Phone number: 757-836-8939
   DSN: 836-8939
   E-mail: transcom.jeccewatchofficer@mail.mil

4. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
   Mailing Address:
   8725 John J. Kingman Road
   Stop 6201
   Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6201
   Website: http://www.dtra.mil/Home/Contact.aspx
   E-mail: dtra.publicaffairs@dtra.mil
   Phone Number: 703-767-5870
   Toll Free: 800-701-5096
5. **Joint Personnel Recovery Agency**

Mailing Address:
10244 Burbeck Road, Building 358
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5805

Website:  https://public.jpra.mil/default.aspx

JPRA Operations Support Center
Phone Number: 703-704-4111

6. **Defense Intelligence Agency**

Mailing Address:
Office of Corporate Communications
Joint Base Anacostia Bolling
Building 6000
Washington DC 20340-5100

Website:  http://www.dia.mil/
Phone Number: 202-231-5554
E-mail: DIA-PAO@dia.mil

7. **Joint Warfighting Analysis Center**

Mailing Address:
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
4048 Higley Road
Dahlgren, VA 22448-5144

Website:  http://www.jwac.mil/
Phone Number: 540-653-3749
540-653-3750

8. **Defense Logistics Agency**

Mailing Address:
Defense Logistics Agency
Andrew T. McNamara Building
8725 John J. Kingman Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6221

Website:  http://www.dla.mil/

Information/Staff Duty Officer
Security: 703-767-4010
Staff Duty Officer: 1600-0730/Weekends/Holidays: 703-767-5200
9. Joint Electronic Warfare Center

Mailing Address: US Strategic Command
Public Affairs Office (J020)
901 SAC Boulevard, Suite 1A1
Offutt Air Force Base, NE 68113 – 6020

Website: http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/978985/joint-electronic-warfare-center-jewc/
Phone Number: 402-294-4130 (DSN 271)
APPENDIX G
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-33 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Department of Defense Publications
   a. DODD 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce.
   b. DODD 3000.06, Combat Support Agencies (CSAs).
   c. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW).
   d. DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.
   e. DODD 5105.77, National Guard Bureau (NGB).
   f. DODD 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State).
   g. DODD 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program.
   h. DODD 7730.65, Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).
   i. DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.
   j. DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.
   k. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.
   l. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).
   m. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.
   n. DODI 5400.13, Public Affairs (PA) Operations.
   o. DODI 5400.14, Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations.
   p. DODI 6055.01, DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program.
   q. DODI 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevent and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
   a. CJCSI 1001.01B, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program.
Appendix G

b. CJCSI 1301.01F, Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures.

c. CJCSI 1600.01, Charter for United States European Command NATO Manning Division.

d. CJCSI 2700.01F, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Activities.

e. CJCSI 3110.10F, Communications Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).


g. CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

h. CJCSI 3151.01C, Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements.

i. CJCSI 3210.01C, Joint Information Operations Proponent.

j. CJCSI 3241.01, Counterintelligence (CI) Support (U).

k. CJCSI 3401.02B, Force Readiness Reporting.

l. CJCSI 3810.01E, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

m. CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

n. CJCSI 6211.02D, Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Responsibilities.

o. CJCSI 6510.06C, Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations.

p. CJCSM 3115.01D, Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations: Volume I.

q. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.

r. CJCSM 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.

s. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

t. CJCSM 3130.06, Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

u. CJCSM 3150.01C, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions.

w. CJCSM 3150.25A, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.

x. CJCSM 3500.03E, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States*.


z. CJCSM 6231.01E, *Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications*.

aa. CJCSM 6510.01B, *Cyber Incident Handling Program*.

3. **Joint Publications**

   a. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.


   e. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.


   g. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support in Joint Operations*.

   h. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

   i. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations*.

   j. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

   k. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

   l. JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*.

   m. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.

   n. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.


   p. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.

t. JP 3-14, *Space Operations*.
x. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
y. JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*.
bb. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
gg. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*.
hh. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
i. JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.
kk. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
ll. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
mm. JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine*.
nn. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*.
oo. JP 4-08, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*.
qq. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

rr. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

4. **Other Publications**


   d. Title 5, USC, Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, Section 848.

   e. *Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy*.

   f. *National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding*. 
APPENDIX H
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the Joint Staff Director for Joint Force Development (J-7). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Rick Rowlett, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; JSDS, Mr. Ron Aasland, Joint Staff J-3, J35 South; Mr. Chris Marple, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and CDR Brian Watt, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 30 July 2012.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

JLLP primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. JLLIS is the DOD system of record for LL and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of LL to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by
providing lessons and LL derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and LL are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

AAR  after action report
ACSA  acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADCON  administrative control
ADVON  advanced echelon
AO  area of operations
AOA  amphibious objective area
AOR  area of responsibility
APEX  Adaptive Planning and Execution
APOD  aerial port of debarkation
APOE  aerial port of embarkation

C2  command and control
CA  civil affairs
CAAF  contractors authorized to accompany the force
CAO  civil affairs operations
CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR  combatant commander
CCIR  commander’s critical information requirement
CCMD  combatant command
CCS  commander’s communication synchronization
CDRUSSOCOM  Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CENTRIXS  Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CF  conventional forces
CI  counterintelligence
C-IED  counter-improvised explosive device
C-IEDTF  counter-improvised explosive device task force
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF  commander, joint task force
CMO  civil-military operations
CMOC  civil-military operations center
CO  cyberspace operations
COA  course of action
COCOM  combatant command (command authority)
COG  center of gravity
COMSEC  communications security
CONOPS  concept of operations
CONPLAN  concept plan
COP  common operational picture
COS  chief of staff
CSA  combat support agency
### Glossary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td>command senior enlisted leader</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<td>counter threat finance</td>
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<td>combating trafficking in persons</td>
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<td>CWMD</td>
<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>directive authority for logistics</td>
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<td>DBIDS</td>
<td>Defense Biometric Identification System</td>
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<td>DCJTF</td>
<td>deputy commander, joint task force</td>
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<td>DFAS</td>
<td>Defense Finance and Accounting Service</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
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<td>DIRMOBFOR</td>
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<td>emergency management assistance compact</td>
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<td>FFIR</td>
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<td>Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System</td>
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<td>FP</td>
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<td>FRAGORD</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>geospatial intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFM</td>
<td>global force management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFMAP</td>
<td>Global Force Management Allocation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GO/FO</td>
<td>general officer/flag officer</td>
</tr>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>homeland defense</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>HOC</td>
<td>human intelligence operations cell</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HQCOMDT</td>
<td>headquarters commandant</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>homeland security</td>
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<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>intelligence community</td>
</tr>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>intertheater communications security package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IER</td>
<td>information exchange requirement</td>
</tr>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>inspector general</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>information management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>information management officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>information management plan</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOWG</td>
<td>information operations working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>information-related capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/T</td>
<td>interpreter and translator</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2X</td>
<td>joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element</td>
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<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-6</td>
<td>communications system directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-7</td>
<td>training and education directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-8</td>
<td>resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-9</td>
<td>civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-35</td>
<td>future operations cell</td>
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<td>Joint Asset Movement Management System</td>
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<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (DLA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCEOI</td>
<td>joint communications-electronics operating instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCEWS</td>
<td>joint force commander’s electronic warfare staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMA</td>
<td>joint communications security monitoring activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMEC</td>
<td>joint captured materiel exploitation center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMO</td>
<td>joint communications security management office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCRM</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSB</td>
<td>joint contracting support board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSE</td>
<td>Joint Communications Support Element (USTRANSCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDDOC</td>
<td>joint deployment and distribution operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDEC</td>
<td>joint document exploitation center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDISS</td>
<td>joint deployable intelligence support system</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDN</td>
<td>joint data network</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDNC</td>
<td>joint data network operations cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>JECC</td>
<td>Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (USTRANSCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEL+</td>
<td>Joint Electronic Library Plus</td>
</tr>
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<td>JEMSO</td>
<td>joint electromagnetic spectrum operations</td>
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<td>JEWC</td>
<td>Joint Electronic Warfare Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCH</td>
<td>joint force chaplain</td>
</tr>
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<td>JFE</td>
<td>joint fires element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
</tr>
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<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
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<td>JFSOCC</td>
<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>joint facilities utilization board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIA</td>
<td>joint individual augmentee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
</tr>
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<td>JICO</td>
<td>joint interface control officer</td>
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<td>JIDC</td>
<td>joint interrogation and debriefing center</td>
</tr>
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<td>JIMB</td>
<td>joint information management board</td>
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<td>JIOC</td>
<td>joint intelligence operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJIOWC</td>
<td>Joint Information Operations Warfare Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>JISE</td>
<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
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<td>JLLIS</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Learned Information System</td>
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<td>JLLP</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Learned Program</td>
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<td>joint mortuary affairs office</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>joint movement center</td>
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<td>JMD</td>
<td>joint manning document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMEEL</td>
<td>joint mission-essential equipment list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMET</td>
<td>joint mission-essential task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMETL</td>
<td>joint mission-essential task list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMISTF</td>
<td>joint military information support task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMO</td>
<td>joint meteorological and oceanographic officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNCC</td>
<td>joint network operations control center</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JPECC</td>
<td>joint planning and execution community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPEG</td>
<td>joint personnel status and casualty report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPP</td>
<td>joint planning process</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPPC</td>
<td>joint personnel processing center</td>
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<td>JPR</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Agency</td>
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<tr>
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<td>joint personnel recovery center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPTSTA</td>
<td>joint personnel training and tracking activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRRB</td>
<td>joint requirements review board</td>
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<td>JSA</td>
<td>joint security area</td>
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<td>JSOA</td>
<td>joint special operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOAC</td>
<td>joint special operations air component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTCB</td>
<td>joint targeting coordination board</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JTF-N</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-North</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-PO</td>
<td>joint task force-port opening</td>
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<td>JTF-State</td>
<td>joint task force-state</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTP</td>
<td>joint training plan</td>
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<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>joint theater support contracting command</td>
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<td>JWAC</td>
<td>Joint Warfare Analysis Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>limited depository account</td>
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<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>lessons learned</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>letter of authorization</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
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<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
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<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
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<td>LSCC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting coordination</td>
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<td>METOC</td>
<td>meteorological and oceanographic</td>
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<td>megahertz</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
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<td>MNFC</td>
<td>multinational force commander</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<td>media operations center</td>
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<td>MTN</td>
<td>multi-tactical data link network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG JFHQ-State</td>
<td>National Guard joint force Headquarters-state</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NIPRNET</td>
<td>Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Response Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>operational area</td>
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<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
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<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
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<td>operational control</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>operations security</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
<td>operational planning team</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>OUSD(C/CFO)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>provost marshal</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>partner nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>policy advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>religious program specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>religious support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSSC-LO</td>
<td>regional space support center liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RST</td>
<td>religious support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>rules for the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;TI</td>
<td>scientific and technical intelligence</td>
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<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>space coordinating authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHF</td>
<td>super-high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>senior meteorological and oceanographic officer</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<td>SOJTF</td>
<td>special operations joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOD</td>
<td>seaport of debarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>seaport of embarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRUF</td>
<td>standing rules for the use of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement (NATO)</td>
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<td>STEP</td>
<td>standardized tactical entry point</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<td>theater business clearance</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>transportation component command</td>
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<td>TDL</td>
<td>tactical data link</td>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>temporary duty</td>
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<td>TFCICA</td>
<td>task force counterintelligence coordinating authority</td>
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<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultrahigh frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>unit identification code</td>
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<tr>
<td>UJTL</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task List</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US BICES</td>
<td>United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System</td>
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<tr>
<td>US BICES-X</td>
<td>United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System Extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCYBERCOM</td>
<td>United States Cyber Command</td>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>video teleconferencing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

battle rhythm. A deliberate, daily schedule of command, staff, and unit activities intended to maximize use of time and synchronize staff actions. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

board. An organized group of individuals within a headquarters, appointed and tasked by the commander (or other authority), that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

cell. A subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

center. An enduring, functional organization, with a supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within a headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

chief of staff. The senior or principal member or head of a staff who acts as the controlling member of a staff for purposes of the coordination of its work or to exercise command in another’s name. Also called COS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-33)

common-user network. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

element. An organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

group. A long-standing functional organization that is formed to support a broad function within a headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

hazard. A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-33)

information exchange requirement. An exchange of information that is essential to command and control, enabling the situational needs of the joint task force and component commanders’ to support force employment and decision making. Also called IER. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

joint mission-essential task. A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of task, condition, and standard. Also called JMET. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-33)

office. An enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a headquarters to coordinate and manage support requirements. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
personal staff. Aides and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-33)

planning team. A functional element within a headquarters established to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement, and which dissolves upon completion of the assigned task. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

section. A subdivision of an office, installation, territory, works, or organization; especially a major subdivision of a staff. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

task organization. An organization that assigns to responsible commanders the means with which to accomplish their assigned tasks in any planned action. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-33)

unit. 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority. 2. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

Universal Joint Task List. A menu of tasks that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Also called UJTL. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

working group. An enduring or ad hoc organization within a headquarters consisting of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives whose purpose is to provide analysis on the specific function to users. Also called WG. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature