PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Development
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 4-10
DATED 16 JULY 2014

• No major changes to the publication’s scope, organization, or doctrinal constructs, but some current operational contract support (OCS) constructs have been modified for clarity.

• Changed the term “requirements determination” to “requirements management,” with more emphasis on post-award contract oversight functions.

• Updated and expanded the multinational support discussion, to include a new appendix.

• Added a new risk assessments reporting discussion.

• Deleted some planning text with reference to the recently published Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

• Removed Service capabilities appendices, as this information is now covered in a new OCS for Service tactics, techniques, and procedures publication.

• Updated phasing and planning-related text per newly revised Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

• Modified, added, and removed terms and definitions from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Describes the principles of operational contract support.
- Outlines proactive approaches for commanders and contracting officers to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
- Describes the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and Military Departments, as well as joint and Service commanders and staffs, related to operational contract support.
- Discusses the multidisciplinary team efforts essential to plan and integrate operational contract support in joint operations.
- Provides examples of effective in-theater contracting organizational structures to maximize contracting support.
- Presents the five steps and associated tasks of the contractor management process.

Introduction

Operational contract support (OCS) is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander (CCDR)-directed operations, as well as CCDR-directed, single-Service activities, regardless of designation as a formal contingency operation or not. OCS is a multi-faceted, cross-functional staff activity executed primarily by the combatant command (CCMD), subordinate staffs, Service components, theater special operations commands, and, in some cases, functional components, along with supporting combat support agencies (CSAs).

Principles

OCS planning and execution require a programmatic approach on behalf of the joint force commander (JFC) and supporting CCMDs, Service components, CSAs, and their associated contracting organizations. In addition to this singular, overarching OCS principle, the following principles are key to understanding the potential opportunities and challenges of OCS:
Executive Summary

- Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier, but it is only one of numerous sources of support to the joint force.

- Most military operations will include contracted support.

- Contracted support is not restricted to logistics support; it may include significant non-logistics support as well.

- There are other nonmonetary cost factors associated with contracted support that may not be readily apparent.

- Contracted support and its associated contractor management responsibilities must be integrated early in the operation planning process.

- Shaping activities in support of the CCMD campaign plan are often dependent on contracted support.

- Contracted support can have a direct strategic impact on civil aspects of the operation.

Prevention of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

The procurement of supplies and services in support of military operations can be prone to fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA), even more so in a foreign contingency where there are many contracts with local firms. FWA can be a problem in military operations due to numerous factors, including lack of properly trained and supervised government oversight personnel, local cultural and business environment, and pressure to meet mission requirements. **Commanders and contracting officers at all levels must take a proactive approach to fighting FWA and to conserving resources. Failure to do so can undermine the commander’s legitimacy to conduct military operations in a foreign environment and at home.**
Roles and Responsibilities

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff (JS), and Military Departments, as well as joint and Service commanders and staffs, related to OCS is important to all commands and staffs that may be involved with planning and managing OCS actions in support of joint operations.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) OCS responsibilities fall into two general areas: those related to defense acquisition policy and programs oversight and those related to the assignment and attachment of the forces to the combatant organizations necessary to carry out joint operations. SecDef issues directives and instructions and oversees force management. In some cases, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) may be called upon to assist the supported geographic combatant commander (GCC) in resolving and/or providing guidance or additional authorities related to specific organization command and control, legal, funding, or other contracting or contractor management operational issues.

The Joint Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, has specific responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, campaign and contingency planning, joint doctrine, and joint education and training. Principal JS OCS-related responsibilities are:

- **Joint Staff J-1 [Manpower and Personnel]** establishes the manpower management, personnel support, and personnel service support policies and procedures for the deployed force (military, DOD civilian, and designated DOD contractor personnel) during joint operations and administers oversight of joint personnel issues affecting the force.

- **Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics]** provides policy, guidance, and oversight on joint logistics and is the primary staff directorate in the JS for OCS matters.
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- **Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy]** provides policy, guidance, and oversight on joint operation planning.

- **Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development]** supports the CJCS and the joint commanders through joint force development to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force.

- The **JS Legal Counsel** provides legal advice and guidance to the CJCS and other members of the JS and the CCMDs, as directed.

**Military Departments**

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCMDs. One way Military Departments fulfill their responsibilities is by augmenting military support capabilities with contracted support and other nonorganic support through their respective Service component commands assigned to the CCMDs. The Military Departments prepare their forces to execute both requiring activity and contracting authority tasks. All contracting tasks must be accomplished in accordance with (IAW) US laws and executive orders; the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and Service FAR supplements; DOD policy; CJCS policy; joint and Service doctrine; and GCC mission-specific directives and orders, along with other applicable regulations and policies.

**Geographic Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Force Commands**

The GCCs lead the OCS planning and integration effort within their areas of responsibility by promulgating and enforcing general OCS planning and policy guidance. Subordinate JFCs play a key role in the execution of this GCC-directed planning and policy guidance, thus enabling more effective and efficient use of contracted support and with less risk to the supported force.

**Service Component Commands**

The **Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Service component commands**, along with their associated Service component contracting organizations, plan and execute OCS IAW the guidance received from their respective Military Departments and supported JFC.
Contract Support Integration

Operational Contract Support Team

OCS planning and integration is a multidisciplinary team effort. In all joint operations, OCS planning and integration tasks require involvement of many commands, various staff elements within these commands, and supporting contracting activities, along with numerous GCC and/or subordinate JFC-directed boards, cells, and working groups. **No single OCS-related organization or staff element is in direct control of all OCS actions in a joint operation; rather, multiple joint, Service, and CSA commands and supporting acquisition and contracting organizations coordinate through designated cross-functional organizations.**

Planning and Integration

OCS planning and integration are primarily an operational, not contracting, function. The GCC, subordinate JFCs, and supporting component commander’s staff determine support requirements and the appropriate source of support (i.e., organic support, multinational support, host-nation support, or contracted support). A wide variety of OCS-related organizations advise, augment, and assist GCC planning efforts but do not lead the OCS planning process. No matter how augmented or advised, the GCC leads the OCS planning effort unless delegated to a subordinate JFC.

Requirements Management

Requirements management is a contracting support integration function that consists of three major subordinate functions: requirements development, requirements review and approval, and post-contract award oversight. **Because requirements management is an operational command, not a contracting responsibility,** the JFC and, more importantly, component commanders, must ensure their subordinate units serving as the requiring activities are properly trained in requirements management tasks.

Contracting Support

While much of the support provided by contracting activities is Service-specific, there is a need for joint planning and CCDR guidance related to contingency contracting capabilities to ensure effective and efficient
In-Theater Contracting Organization

The GCC may designate a lead Service for contracting coordination (LSCC), lead Service for contracting (LSC), or joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC) in joint operations to ensure effective and efficient use of local commercial vendor base and to coordinate common contracting actions with designated contracting activities in support of the specific operation. The GCC may also choose to establish an LSCC (or LSCCs) in shaping activities and, in some cases, an LSC for specific high-priority countries or regions or security cooperation activity support to assist the CCMD-level operational contract support integration cell in planning as part of the CCMD campaign plan.

In-Theater Contracting Planning and Coordination

Contracting Planning. Contracting planning is related to and driven by, but not the same as, OCS planning. Contracting planning is a contracting activity function executed, to some extent, by all contracting agencies, not just an LSCC, LSC contracting activities, or JTSCC, to develop, award, and administer contracts in support of GCC-directed operations. Contracting planning, referred to as acquisition planning in the FAR, is executed on a requirement basis and has a particular meaning and application as prescribed in the FAR, DFARS, and contracting authority guidance.

In-Theater Contracting Coordination. The Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB) is the primary JFC-directed coordination mechanism to synchronize contracting actions for common supplies and services within a designated joint operations area or operational area. The JCSB is the forum for theater support, Service civil augmentation programs, and other designated external contracting organizations to share information, coordinate acquisition strategies, and minimize chances of competition and redundancies between individual contracts and/or task orders and look for opportunities to optimize filling of like requirements.

Contractor Management

Contractor management is the oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment providing use of locally available, mission-critical, or command special-interest items.
support to military operations. While some aspects of contractor management are only relevant to contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), some aspects (e.g., base access and security procedures) can also apply to contractors not authorized to accompany the force (non-CAAF). Furthermore, contractor management often extends to other US Government departments and agencies and other mission partner contractor personnel operating in the vicinity of the joint force. The contractor management process is composed of five steps and several associated tasks.

The contractor management steps include planning, predeployment preparation, deployment and reception, in-theater management, and redeployment.
centers are key to proper NURP CAAF in-theater reception. The J-3 integrates CAAF into the deployment process, while the J-1 is responsible, in coordination with the OCS staff, for ensuring applicable contractor personnel are properly integrated into the reception process.

**In-Theater Management**

In-theater contractor management tasks include: legal authority and discipline, contractor personnel visibility and contractor personnel accountability, movement control, authorized government support, and force protection (FP)/security.

**Redeployment**

Redeployment involves movement of CAAF and selected non-CAAF and their equipment out of the operational area upon completion of the designated period of performance or, in some cases, early individual contractor personnel re-deployment (such as for administrative actions or changes in deployment eligibility).

**Equipment Management**

Major contractor-related equipment items include Class VII government-furnished property; contractor-acquired, government-owned equipment; and contractor-owned, contractor-operated equipment.

**Security Considerations for Contractors**

CAAF personnel, for the most part, are treated similarly to DOD civilians in relation to joint security, antiterrorism (AT), and FP programs. They are, IAW their contract, required to abide by JFC and component AT and FP guidance, as well as other joint security-related directives and policies. Area commanders, base commanders, and supported unit commanders are responsible for individual AT and FP support and may have security responsibility for contractor personnel.

**Contractor-Provided Security**

The GCC may authorize the use of contractors to provide specified security functions, consistent with applicable US, host nation, and international law and any status-of-forces agreements or other security agreement that may exist for the specified operational area. Armed private security contractor (PSC) functions consist of guarding personnel, facilities, and property as directed by their contract. Use of PSCs should be carefully considered by the JFC, because PSC-provided services, more than any other contracted service, can have a direct impact
Executive Summary

(sometimes a very negative impact) on civil-military aspects of the operation.

The scope of non-DOD OCS integration requirements are very mission-dependent. In some joint operations, the subordinate JFC may only have limited requirements to integrate non-DOD contracted support into military operations, while in others, there may be major challenges that defy any simple solutions.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“OCS [operational contract support] is a commander’s business, and is an integral part of the multi-domain, multi-region problem sets facing our nation.”

General Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2017 Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Senior Leader Summit, June 20, 2017

1. General

The US military has used, and continues to use, contracted support in nearly all operations at various levels of scope and scale. The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning reductions, mission-specific force cap restrictions, and high operating tempo, means contracted support will augment military forces in most operations. Planned and executed correctly, operational contract support (OCS) can mitigate some force structure constraints and, in some operations, enhance the flexibility and operational reach and achieve objectives for the supported commander. Accordingly, the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs); Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSOCOM); subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs); and their staffs must be familiar with how to plan, integrate, and manage OCS during military operations. Additionally, the Service components, theater special operations commands (TSOCs), some functional components, and supporting combat support agencies (CSAs) play a major role in OCS planning, execution, and integration.

2. Value of Operational Contract Support

Prudent, risk-based use of globally available contracted supplies and services in support of deployed forces can be a significant force multiplier in both individual operations and to the Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole. More specifically, using selected contracted services can enhance operational responsiveness by reducing strategic lift requirements, allowing prioritization of combat power in the deployment process. In some operations, the JFC can also significantly enhance the responsiveness of the in-theater joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process by utilizing locally available commercial facilities, equipment, and labor. From a national strategic perspective, contracted support can allow DOD to retain selected military forces for higher-priority missions and/or reduce operational tempo of certain support-related forces. Finally, contracted services can be used to augment existing high-demand, low-density organic support force capabilities (e.g., translators, explosive ordnance disposal, port operations) or provide capabilities not existent in the military force structure (e.g., buses, dining facilities).

3. A Programmatic and Functional Approach to Operational Contract Support

Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 2333, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), require the GCCs and
CDRUSSOCOM, when operating as a supported commander, to plan for and integrate contracted support in all combatant commander (CCDR)-directed military operations. Furthermore, a systems approach to joint planning and execution, as described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, is directly related to OCS planning, especially in complex operations where OCS-related actions can have significant direct impact on the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign. A thorough understanding of how major use of contracted support can impact the overall operation or campaign objectives requires cross-functional participation by all joint force staff elements, Military Departments, Service components, and supporting CSAs and collaboration with various supporting contracting organizations, other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, and, in some cases, major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

a. Effective and efficient OCS execution requires a programmatic approach by the JFC. This JFC-centric approach requires commanders and staffs to not only consider cost, performance, schedule, and contract oversight requirements but also to identify and manage joint force dependencies associated with contracted support. The JFC aligns this contracted support with the overall operation or campaign and specific mission objectives. OCS can provide the JFC greater flexibly, enhanced responsiveness, increased operational reach, and, for some services, mission-critical services at lower cost than military support. The JFC should emphasize the need to synchronize contracted support and consider potentially OCS and mission-critical-related matters (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform, civil-military impact, operations security). Specifically, the combatant command (CCMD), and other stakeholders, should plan for a sufficiently resourced OCS staff.

b. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations, as well as CCDR-directed, single-Service activities, regardless of designation as a formal contingency operation or not. OCS is a multi-faceted, cross-functional staff activity executed primarily by the CCMD, subordinate staffs, Service components, TSOCs, and, in some cases, functional components, along with supporting CSAs. OCS is planned and integrated through cross-functional organizations and associated lead Service or joint

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**CONTRACTED SUPPORT FILLING KEY GAPS IN DEPLOYED FORCE CAPABILITIES**

In early 2017, US Transportation Command awarded several contracts for airlift services for designated regions within the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility. These mission-critical contracted airlift services included both fixed-wing and rotary-wing passenger service and light cargo delivery, as well as limited medical evacuation and support to personnel recovery operations. Of note, the commercial firms awarded these contracts have significant experience operating in remote locations across the African continent. Overall, these airlift contracts offered USAFRICOM responsive, safe, flexible, and cost-effective airlift support to deployed US forces in lieu of unavailable organic military support.

Various Sources
Introduction

theater support contracting-related activities. The three overall supporting functions and associated tasks contained in Figure I-1 help to characterize OCS. OCS includes the ability to plan, orchestrate, and synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. These three functions are inextricably linked to achieving favorable operational and acquisition objectives.

(1) Contract support integration is the planning, coordination, and synchronization of contracted support in military operations. It is also applicable to exercises, security cooperation, and shaping activities in support of operations and campaign plans. Related tasks include planning, validating, and prioritizing requirements; performing OCS information management; closely managing mission-critical contracted requirements throughout the contract life cycle from both the requiring and contracting activities; collaborating in JFC-approved cross-functional organizations; and conducting assessments and reporting and providing recommendations.

![Figure I-1. Operational Contract Support Description and Subordinate Functions](image-url)
(2) Contracting support is the planning, coordination, and execution of contracting authority to legally bind contractors in support of military operations. Contracting support tasks include contracting support planning; coordinating common contracting actions; translating requirements into contract terms; and developing, soliciting, executing, administering, and closing out contracts. Contracting support also includes OCS planning advice and assistance, along with coordination/deconfliction, to optimize the procurement of contracting for common in-theater services and supplies.

(3) Contractor management is the oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment in support of military operations. Contractor management tasks include planning contractor management, preparing contractor personnel for deployment, deploying or redeploying contractors, managing contractors, and sustaining contractors.

c. This multifunctional approach to OCS, which is applicable to all phases of military operations, is necessary to ensure programmatic aspects of cost, performance, and schedule are properly planned for and executed. Additionally, complex, large-scale operations requiring stabilization efforts may require a significant civil-military affairs aspect to the commander’s line of effort and require the establishment of mission-specific, program management (PM)-like office(s) to plan and manage selected large-dollar-value service or construction contracts. These types of operations may also require adjustments to OCS staffing and organizations to ensure OCS actions are synchronized with integrated financial operations (IFO) as described in JP 1-06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations, and in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration.”

4. Key Terminology

a. General OCS-Related Terms and Related Discussion Points. Commanders and their staffs should have a working knowledge of key OCS-related terms. Since these terms are not widely known outside of the professional acquisition community, a discussion is provided here. Without a basic understanding of these terms, effective planning and execution of this complex source of support is more difficult and may lead to unintended consequences or additional challenges.

(1) OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies and services, including construction, from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations and activities through the related contract support integration, contracting support, and

IMPORTANT NOTE

Many of the terms discussed below are found in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. However, some of the actual doctrine definitions established in this publication have been modified from the regulatory definition to meet joint doctrine administrative guidelines. In no case has the actual meaning of the term been changed.
contractor management functions. Contingency contracting is directly associated with theater support contracts.

(2) **Requirements management** includes all activities necessary to develop and approve contract support requirements, along with associated post-contract award functions. **Requirements management is an operational command responsibility, not a contracting activity responsibility.** Effective and efficient OCS is driven significantly by timely and accurate requirements. Additionally, active post-contract award requirements management, oversight, and performance monitoring are directly tied to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based contract administration process and are essential to ensuring the subordinate JFC receives contract support at the right place, at the right time, and at reasonable cost. Key subsets of requirements management include requirements development and requirements approval and post-contract award oversight with requiring activities, with designated supported units playing a critically important role in this process.

(a) **Requirements development** is the process of defining specific contract support requirements and capturing the requirements in procurement-ready contract support requirements packages. Once developed, contract support requirements packages are submitted through the requirements approval process. While requirements development is primarily a component responsibility, in some extreme cases, subordinate joint force or even CCMD staff may find themselves performing requiring activity functions in operations where there is no deployed support unit available to perform this important function. The requirements development process is outlined in detail in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-10/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-40B.6/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 4-09.1/Air Force Instruction (AFI) 64-102, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operational Contract Support*, and in subordinate component standard operating procedures. In some operations, acquisition of high-dollar contracted services may fall under the processes (e.g., Service requirements review board) promulgated by DODI 5000.74, *Defense Acquisition of Services*.

(b) **Requirements approval** is the joint force or component command process to consolidate, validate, approve, and prioritize contract support requests prior to the hand-off of these requirements to the supporting contracting activity. The subordinate JFC-level determination process is described in detail in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration.” Service and special operations forces (SOF) component procedures also apply to requirements requests that do not reach the subordinate JFC requirements determination process thresholds.

(c) **Post-contract award oversight** is the non-acquisition function of monitoring and reporting contract execution as it relates to unit-mission readiness. This function is a requiring activity function but may be of interest to the subordinate JFC as it relates to overall joint force readiness. This process is directly related to, and in support of, the acquisition policy-directed contract administration function. This contract administration support is through the unit-provided contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) and receiving officials. The subordinate JFC-level post-contract award
requirements management functions are covered in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” while details on the related tactical-level tasks can be found in ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support.

(d) A requiring activity is a military organization responsible for developing contract support requests and submitting requests through established contract support approval processes. The requiring activity is also responsible, in coordination with (ICW) the requisite contracting activity, for ensuring there is adequate post-contract award oversight. In most cases, the acquired service or commodity supports the mission of the requiring activity; hence, these units are responsible for the requirements development and post-contract award oversight functions.

(e) As related to contracted support, the supported unit is an organization that is the recipient, but not necessarily the requestor, of contracted support. A supported unit may also be the requiring activity if it initiates the request for support. Even when not officially designated as a requiring activity, supported units play an important role in assisting the JFC and Service component commanders and may be required to provide a COR and receiving officials to assist the requiring activity and supporting contracting officer to monitor contracted support. In almost all situations, supported units will, at a minimum, play a role in integrating selected contractor personnel into local military operations, to include such things as expeditionary base services and force protection (FP).

(3) Contractor management is the oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment in support to military operations. It is a shared responsibility between the JFC staff, requiring activity, supported unit, base commander, and supporting contracting officer. Contractor management is directly linked to the FAR-based contract administration process used to ensure the USG receives what it has paid for in accordance with (IAW) the terms and conditions of the contract, with specific focus on matters related to the JFC’s ability to properly integrate contractor personnel and associated contractor equipment into joint operations. Contractor management includes both the management of contractor performance in complying with contractor personnel-related requirements and the management of the government’s responsibilities for life and other support when such support is required by the JFC. Contractor management includes those activities necessary to deploy, receive, manage, and redeploy contractor personnel per DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), and Chapter V, “Contractor Management.” The contractor performance piece of contractor management is executed via the contract administration process IAW the terms and conditions of the applicable contract. The government’s responsibilities for contractor management should be executed through the normal staff and command processes.

b. Key Contracting-Related Terms. Understanding contracting-related terms and authorities is key to successful OCS planning and integration.

(1) A contract is a legally binding agreement for supplies, services, and/or construction awarded by government contracting officers. Contracts used in support of
CCDR-directed operations include theater support, systems support, and external support contracts described below.

(2) A **defense contractor** is any individual; firm; corporation; partnership; association; or other legal, non-federal entity that enters into a contract directly with DOD to furnish services, supplies, or construction. Foreign governments, representatives of foreign governments, or foreign corporations wholly owned by foreign governments that have entered into contracts with DOD are not defense contractors. Unless otherwise stated when used in this publication, the term “contractor” is synonymous with “defense contractor.”

(3) The **head of a contracting activity (HCA)** is the official with responsibility for managing the contracting activity. HCAs do not typically exercise command authority within the operational area. Additionally, there are multiple contracting activities, both those deployed to the operational area and those supporting from outside the operational area, in support of joint operations.

(4) A **senior contracting official (SCO)** is the staff official designated by a Service HCA to execute theater support contracting authority for a specific command and/or operational area. In joint operations, SCOs are normally commanders of Service component theater support contracting activities or designated senior staff officers within a joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC).

(5) A **contracting officer** is the government official (military or civilian) with the legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts. Within all Service components, the contracting officer is appointed in writing through a warrant (Standard Form 1402, Certificate of Appointment). Only duly warranted contracting officers are authorized to obligate the USG, legally binding it to make payments against contracts. The three main types of contracting officers are procuring contracting officers (PCOs), administrative contracting officers (ACOs), and termination contracting officers (TCOs). Often, the PCO is also responsible for ACO and TCO functions when there is no separate ACO and/or TCO appointed. Unlike PCOs, ACOs’ duties are focused exclusively on contract administration. The PCO should delegate broad authority to the ACO to conduct contract administration and COR management for all ongoing service contracts that require periodic surveillance.

(6) **Contract administration** is a subset of contracting and includes efforts to ensure supplies, services, and construction are delivered IAW the terms, conditions, and standards expressed in the contract. Contract administration is the oversight function, from contract award to contract closeout, performed by contracting professionals and designated non-contracting personnel. It includes ensuring both parties (government and contractor) meet the specified terms and conditions of the contract. Contract administration is composed of more than 90 functions, as described in FAR Part 42, Contract Administration and Audit Services, and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 242, Contract Administration, including monitoring contract compliance, performing property administration, and performing quality assurance. Contract administration
conducted during CCDR-directed operations is referred to as contingency contract administration services (CCAS).

(7) A COR is a US Service member, multinational partner service member, or government civilian nominated by the requiring activity or designated supported unit and appointed in writing by the contracting officer. Primary COR duties include on-site monitoring of contractor performance, providing quality assurance, certifying receipt of services, and acting as a liaison between the requiring activity and the contracting officer. While CORs require formal COR process training and, in many cases, technical subject matter expertise certification IAW DODI 5000.72, *DOD Standard for Contracting Officers Representative (COR) Certification*, and Service-equivalent policy, they do not have authority to change, add to, or otherwise modify a contract or enter into a new contract.

(8) A prime contract is a legally binding agreement entered into by the USG with a contractor to obtain supplies, services, or construction. The prime contractor is the person, business, or entity that has entered into a contract with the USG. Warranted contracting officers and government purchase cardholders are the only USG officials authorized to legally bind the USG to a prime contract. The US has privity of contract only with the prime contractor.

(9) A subcontract is an agreement entered into by a prime contractor, or subcontractor, with another commercial contractor to obtain supplies, services, or construction. The prime contractor is responsible for the actions of the direct subcontractor. Likewise, subcontractors manage any subcontractor at the next lower tier. Unless it states otherwise in the prime contract, subcontractor employees must be treated the same as the prime contractor when it comes to things such as identification (ID) cards, base access, and authorized government support (AGS). With some exceptions, such as a local emergency, only government contracting officials and CORs have the authority to communicate with the prime contractor management, and contract changes can be made only by the cognizant contracting officer.

(10) Privity of contract is the legal relationship that exists between two contracting parties, for example, between the prime contractor and the USG. This term is important to the JFC in that only the prime contractor has direct responsibility to the government and, therefore, all contract compliance matters must be enforced through the prime contractor. This fact can limit the ability of the JFC and subordinate commanders to directly enforce OCS policies on subcontractors and their personnel. However, the contracting officer can direct the prime contractor to incorporate flow-down provisions to legally compel subcontractor performance. If this direction occurs after subcontract award, then it may require subcontract modification and may result in additional costs to the USG.

c. Types of Contracted Support. It is important to understand the different types of contracted support commonly used in support of CCDR-directed operations. This construct breaks support contracts into three categories describing the numerous contracting, funding, and contract administration authorities providing support within the operational area.
(1) A **theater support contract** is a type of contract awarded by contingency contracting officers in the operational area serving under the contracting authority of the Service component and, in some limited operations, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), or the designated joint HCA for the operation. When operations are designated as a contingency per USC or Presidential declaration, contracts are executed under contingency acquisition or emergency authority allowing expedited acquisition of supplies, services, and minor construction from commercial sources generally within the operational area. Theater support contracts can range from small, local contracts for a single unit or operational area-wide contracts in support of multiple components of the deployed force. From a contractor management perspective, it is also important to note that local national (LN) personnel commonly make up the bulk of the theater support contractor employees in operations outside the US.

(2) **Systems support contracts** are awarded by a Military Department and USSOCOM PM offices for the provision of fielding, technical, and maintenance support for selected military weapons and support of other systems. Systems support contracts are routinely awarded to provide support to newly fielded weapons systems, including aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated command and control (C2) systems. In most cases, these contracts are not related to any specific operation but are written to provide support in future contingencies. Systems support contracting authority and PM authority resides with the Military Department systems materiel acquisition program offices. Systems support contractor employees, often called field services representatives, are comprised mostly of US citizens who provide support in garrison and often accompany the force in both training and military operations.

(3) **An external support contract** is a contract awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from a theater support contracting HCA(s) or from system support contracting authorities. As depicted by Figure I-2, external support contracts provide a variety of logistics and other support services. The

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**Common External Support Contract Capabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics Support</th>
<th>Non-Logistics Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Base operating support (e.g., billeting, food service, laundry and bath)</td>
<td>- Communications services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transportation</td>
<td>- Linguist/translation services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Port and terminal</td>
<td>- Commercial computers and information management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Warehousing and other supply support operations</td>
<td>- Signal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construction</td>
<td>- Physical security*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Facilities maintenance and management</td>
<td>- Staff augmentation (various functions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prime power</td>
<td>- Intelligence support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Materiel maintenance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Limited in accordance with Department of Defense policy

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**Figure I-2. Common External Support Contract Capabilities**
most common and well-known external support contracts are the Services’ civil augmentation programs (CAPs), which include the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, the Navy Global Contingency Construction Multiple Award Contract, and Global Contingency Service Multiple Award Contract. Other commonly used external support contracts include DLA prime vendor contracts, the Army Intelligence and Security Command global linguist contract, and military construction agent contracts. External support contracts can include a mix of US citizens, third-country nationals (TCNs), and LN contractor employees.

See ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support, for more details on the Service theater support, system support, and external support contracting organizations and capabilities.

d. **Key Contractor Personnel-Related Terms.** The following contractor personnel-related terms are based in international law and DOD policy. These terms are integral to understanding the legal status of contractor employees, as well as determining AGS requirements. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), incorporates these terms within DOD policy.

1. **Contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF)** are contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are authorized to accompany the force in applicable contingency operations outside the US and are afforded such status through the issuance of a letter of authorization (LOA). CAAF generally includes all US civilian and TCN employees not normally residing within the operational area whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of US forces and who are routinely collocated with US forces (especially in uncertain or hostile environments). In some cases, the CCDR or subordinate commanders may designate mission-essential host nation (HN) or LN contractor employees (e.g., interpreters), who reside with and receive AGS such as billeting and access to dining facilities, as CAAF. CAAF status only applies to selected contractor personnel in foreign operations and is not applicable in operations within the US. During international armed conflicts, CAAF are protected as prisoners of war IAW the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In situations where US forces are in an HN at its request, the terms of any status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) will have to be reviewed to determine their applicability to CAAF. CAAF status also makes the contractor person subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). CAAF-related information can be found in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.”

2. An LN is an individual who is a permanent resident of the nation in which the US is conducting operations.

3. A TCN is a non-US citizen who is working in, but not a permanent resident of, the nation in which the US is conducting operations.

4. **Contractors not authorized to accompany the force (non-CAAF)** includes LN and some non-LN employees working on a DOD contract in the operational area but
are not afforded CAAF status IAW the nature of the contract. These include DOD contractor prime and associated subcontractor employees whose area of performance is not in the direct vicinity of US forces. Non-CAAF are usually non-mission-essential personnel (e.g., day laborers, delivery personnel, and cleaning service personnel) who neither reside with US forces nor receive AGS such as billeting and subsistence. During international armed conflict, non-CAAF contractor employees are not entitled to protection under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War but may still be afforded protected status under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The applicability of any existing SOFA between the US and the HN to non-CAAF will be determined by the terms of that SOFA.

(5) An LOA is a document issued by a PCO or designee that authorizes CAAF to travel to, from, and within an operational area and outlines AGS within the operational area, as agreed to under the terms and conditions of the contract. In some cases, a non-CAAF contractor employee may be issued an LOA for limited AGS purposes.

5. Principles

OCS planning and execution require a programmatic approach on behalf of the JFC and supporting CCMDs, Service components, CSAs, and their associated contracting organizations. In addition to this singular, overarching OCS principle, the following principles are key to understanding the potential opportunities and challenges of OCS.

a. Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier, but it is only one of numerous sources of support to the joint force. The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs should judiciously consider the proper mix of different sources of support, to include organic (i.e., US military and civilian) support and nonorganic (i.e., multinational military, HN, and contracted) support sources. Each of these sources of support has advantages and disadvantages that should be carefully weighed by the JFC and subordinate Service component commanders to determine the most appropriate source of support.

b. Most military operations will include contracted support. While some limited-duration operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations, may use limited contracted support, all major operations will involve significant contracted support. This is especially true for stability activities.

c. Contracted support is not restricted to logistics support; it may include significant non-logistics support as well. Non-logistics-related support capabilities can include linguist, signal, and private security contractor (PSC) services; hence, it is imperative all staff members, not just logistics staff, are involved in the OCS planning, integration, and oversight processes.

d. There are other nonmonetary cost factors associated with contracted support that may not be readily apparent. Hidden, secondary nonmonetary OCS-related costs include, but are not limited to, inability to assign collateral or extra duties to contractor personnel, contract oversight responsibilities (i.e., COR and receiving official duties), security escort responsibilities, and other FP-related requirements. These factors should
be carefully weighed when conducting OCS planning, especially in the risk assessment process.

e. Contracted support and its associated contractor management responsibilities must be integrated early in the operation planning process. Proper planning will integrate the contractor force into military operations and mitigate unplanned burdens on the joint force such as increased base camp services and FP requirements. The importance of such integrated planning cannot be overemphasized.

f. **Shaping activities in support of the CCMD campaign plan are often dependent on contracted support.** Consequently, OCS planning and integration in support of these activities can have a significant impact on OCS in later phases of the operation. Without such effort, contracted support in later phases of the operation, or in new operations, may be much less responsive and potentially more costly. Care must be given to follow proper operations security procedures to impede a potential flow of operationally relevant information to enemies or adversaries.

g. **Contracted support can have a direct strategic impact on civil aspects of the operation.** While the most important factor of OCS is effectiveness of support to the military force, in certain operations, the JFC may choose to utilize theater support and some external support contracts to provide a positive economic and social impact on the local populace. Additionally, the use of contracted support as an alternative to deploying US forces may have other benefits, including minimizing the military footprint in the operational area, reducing force operational tempo, and improving domestic US political support or buy-in. This effort can be especially important in counterinsurgency (COIN) or stability activities.

6. **Contracting and Command Authorities**

Contracting authority is not the same as command authority. Contracting authority is the legal authority to enter into binding contracts and obligate funds on behalf of the USG, while command authority includes the responsibility for effectively using available resources and planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Command authority does not include the authority to obligate funds or enter into contracts on behalf of the USG. These two different authorities should be closely coordinated to provide effective and efficient contracted support to the joint force.

a. **Contracting Authority.** A unique aspect of contracting support is that only the contracting officer has the authority to obligate the USG. This authority to acquire supplies, services, and construction for the government comes from four sources: the US Constitution, statutory authority, legislative appropriations, and the FAR (including DOD and Military Department supplements). Contracting authority in the operational area flows from the US Constitution to the Service or agency head, to the Service senior procurement executives (SPEs), to designated HCAs, then either directly to the contracting officer or to the contracting officer through the SCO. This contracting authority is explicitly documented via the contracting officer’s warrant. A warrant is the document that
authoizes a contracting officer to award a contract to obligate the government to expend funds for contracted support requirements. Any restrictions on a contracting officer’s authority to purchase items or services will be explicitly stated on the warrant. The most common restriction is placed on the maximum amount a contracting officer is authorized to obligate per contract action.

b. **Command Authority.** Combatant command (command authority), prescribed in Title 10, USC, Section 164, includes the authority to direct functions involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks and designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of an operation. However, it does not include authority to make binding contracts or modify existing contracts for the USG. It is also important to note that GCCs do not have their own contracting authority. The GCCs direct and coordinate contingency contracting support primarily through their subordinate Service components. Additionally, command authority does not include the authority to direct contractor or contractor personnel actions outside the terms and conditions of their contract. However, in emergency situations, the ranking commander may direct contractor employees working on a US-controlled facility to take temporary, emergency FP-/security-related response actions not specifically authorized in their contract, as long as those actions do not require them to perform inherently governmental functions.

c. **Avoiding Improper Command Influence.** Commanders at all levels must avoid improper command influence, or perception thereof, on the contracting process. The contracting officer must be able to independently exercise sound, unbiased business judgment and contract oversight in the accomplishment of the contracting mission. Contracting officers can only fulfill their responsibilities for safeguarding the interests of the USG in its contractual relationships through functional independence from the requiring activity, allowing them to properly execute their business judgment in the formation, negotiation, award, and administration of contracts. If there is a valid, certified, operational need to direct contracts to specific commercial sources, such as in support of stability activities where the JFC needs to balance civil-military impacts and cost-effectiveness of specific contracts, the HCA is responsible for developing policies to implement this aspect of the operation plan (OPLAN) with appropriate contracting procedures IAW federal law and the acquisition policies and regulations at the federal, DOD, and Service levels. In all cases, care must be taken to avoid unauthorized commitments where non-warranted military or civilian personnel make commitments (without authority) to change existing contractual agreements or request that contractors provide goods or services that are not already under contract.

7. **Operational Contract Support Actions by Phases (Notional)**

OCS and related contracting tasks vary significantly between operation phases and the types of activities and operations conducted. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, provides a notional joint combat operation model with six operation phases: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. These phases will generate certain OCS requirements. These OCS activities, like operational phases in general, often overlap and may or may not apply to all operations. However, OCS actions can be generalized by activity and phase of operation in focus, complexity, and amount of JFC coordination and
direct control required. The supporting text below provides an overview of typical OCS actions by the notional phase of operation.

a. **Shape.** In general, shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations. Shaping activities include military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. These CCMD campaign plan-driven, day-to-day activities help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor and adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability. Significant OCS-related shaping actions may include establishment of contract-related cross-functional organizations, development and execution of standard reporting and other standard procedures, GCC-directed training, gathering OCS-related analysis of the operational environment (OE) information, planning, and support to security cooperation activities. Contract support to security cooperation activities is generally characterized by low-dollar, short-term, locally awarded contracts **executed IAW peacetime contracting procedures.** To enable prompt contract support actions, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC may plan and establish theater support contracting and CAP arrangements for posturing for execution in later phases. OCS security cooperation activities support OCS planning actions by providing US forces experience and knowledge of the local commercial vendor base and general business climate. Some level of shaping activities, including some major security cooperation activities in an operational area, may continue through all phases of the operation.

b. **Deter.** Deterrence is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate the intent or ability to execute subsequent combat operations. This includes contract support to deterrence activities, such as support to SOF operations, but contracting support is often limited due to fiscal constraints, lack of emergency procurement authority flexibilities, and the urgent nature of deterrence missions. In deterrence operations where there is a strong likelihood of follow-on military actions, contracted support may be utilized to establish specific sustainment capabilities, such as a staging base for enabling follow-on joint operations should deterrence fail.

c. **Seize Initiative.** Seize initiative actions are focused on applying force to gain access to the operational area and expand friendly freedom of action. Military actions during this time period are characterized by an extremely high operating tempo and freedom of action of maneuvering forces and their supporting organizations. Theater support contracting tasks during seize initiative activities are characterized by limited service and supply contracts intended to augment organic military support of early deploying units. Maximum use of existing “peacetime” contracting command, support, and contracting authority arrangements should be considered. Additionally, CAP support may also be executed in support of joint RSOI, as well as other traditional rear-area actions. To enable prompt in-theater contracting support, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC should ensure theater support contracting and CAP management organizations are deployed as part of the advanced echelon. Additionally, limited numbers of mission-essential systems, support-related CAAF may deploy during initial combat operations.

d. **Dominate.** This phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control the OE. During the dominate phase, contracting personnel
(military and civilian) and CAAF will continue to arrive, though not necessarily at a rate commensurate with the number of troops to be supported. In major operations, a mix of theater support and external support contracts may be utilized. Theater support contracting efforts will focus on satisfying major forces support requirements that are not covered by CAP task orders or other means of support. During the dominate phase, deployed Service component contingency contracting teams will normally operate in direct support (DS) of their habitually supported units, with effectiveness and responsiveness being paramount. Coordination of common contract support will generally be limited to major contract actions in support of operational-level logistics and other selected support requirements, such as increased numbers of mission-essential systems, support-related CAAF who deploy and provide support to newly fielded weapon systems.

e. Stabilize. Stabilization activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations but may be the focus of the entire operation. As decisive combat actions come to a close, theater support contracting organizations may be consolidated and transitioned from a DS to a general support arrangement, possibly under direct joint C2. At the same time, the subordinate JFC’s OCS effort will expand from forces support requirements to non-forces support, such as security force assistance (SFA) actions or emergency support to the reconstruction of local civil infrastructure. During this transition, the subordinate JFC will generally expand and formalize the requirements review, validation, and approval process and may implement measures to control the flow of contracted support and the associated personnel from outside the operational area. During stability activities, the number of contracts often increase and become more complex and costly. Therefore, a planned and well-executed programmatic systems approach to contract support is imperative. During stability activities, increased use of external support contracts for services such as staff augmentation and SFA tasks can be expected. Additionally, the systems support contract effort may include significant new equipment fielding and existing equipment modification. Because of the particular complexity and importance of contracted support actions in stability activities, the subordinate JFC must also have a detailed OCS plan for ensuring contract support actions are fully coordinated between multinational and interagency partners, have a synchronized acquisition strategy, and are overall supportive of the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign plan. During this phase of the operation, the JFC and the supporting contracting organizations should consider moving away from cost-type contracts (e.g., CAP task orders) to fixed-price contracts if operational conditions are sufficiently stable to support such a transition. Additionally, the subordinate JFC, supporting Service components, TSOCs, CSAs, functional component commands (if established), and their supporting contracting agencies need to work closely together on planning for major operational transitions.

f. Enabling Civil Authorities and Transition. These operations are predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance, along with a reduction in the deployed US military and CAAF footprint. Subordinate JFCs normally apply significantly more stringent controls on new requirements not directly related to the drawdown of forces from the operational area. If redeployment or force drawdown operations are conducted, requirements may include packing, crating, and freight services; commercial transportation of military equipment; construction and operation of wash racks for vehicles; and environmental
cleanup. Additional focus should be applied to the synchronization of the drawdown of military forces along with associated reduction in contracted support. This reduction in contracted support may entail a reduction in quality-of-life standards for remaining military personnel and CAAF as they prepare to exit the operational area. Parallel to this effort, supporting contracting activities will focus on contracts termination or closeout. To the extent any contract support capabilities need to remain in place at the end of an operation, arrangements should be made to transition pertinent contract support to the applicable successor organizations (e.g., the Department of State [DOS]).

8. Prevention of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

a. The procurement of supplies and services in support of military operations can be prone to fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA), even more so in a foreign contingency where there are many contracts with local firms. FWA can be a problem in military operations due to numerous factors, including lack of properly trained and supervised government oversight personnel, local cultural and business environment, and pressure to meet mission requirements. **Commanders at all levels and contracting officers must take a proactive approach to fighting FWA and to conserving resources. Failure to do so can undermine the commander’s legitimacy to conduct military operations in a foreign environment and at home.** Ethical conduct in the procurement process is particularly important to ensure fair and competitive in-theater acquisition efforts and ensure these processes do not have a negative impact on the JFC’s mission. Problems affecting any aspect of the acquisition process can affect timely provision of support to the commander and, in some cases, negatively impact the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign.

b. Associated OCS-related ethical issues are varied but span the gamut of FWA. Commanders at all levels need to set expectations and a framework of training and oversight to ensure the ethical conduct of all personnel associated with the procurement process. Commanders also need to ensure checks and balances are in place to protect the taxpayer and to ensure compliance with laws and regulations while accomplishing the mission. A key point in preventing waste is the assignment of adequately trained CORs and/or technically qualified subject matter experts (SMEs) to monitor contractor performance and ensure these personnel are given adequate time to perform these roles, even if on an additional/collateral duty basis. The ACO (or PCO if the contract has not been delegated) must provide clear guidance to the COR and take swift action to address contractual nonconformities and initiate further administrative action, as appropriate. Additional FWA prevention efforts should include regular ethics and procurement training for commanders, contracting personnel, and CORs, as well as implementation of checks and balances such as segregation of duties between ordering, receiving, and payment functions. All US military and DOD civilian personnel dealing with contracted support matters should be trained to look for and report FWA indicators. Upon recognition of FWA indicators, advice of legal counsel should be requested.
FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE IN RECENT OPERATIONS

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a host of audit organizations uncovered numerous instances of fraud, waste, and abuse and recovered over $10 billion between 2003 and 2011. In its final report, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan estimated that wartime contracting waste in Iraq and Afghanistan ranged from 10 percent to 20 percent of the $206 billion spent since fiscal year (FY) 2002 and projected through the end of FY 2011. Additionally, numerous US Government and contractor personnel have been tried, convicted, and sent to jail for acts of fraud in recent operations. Convicted government officials included military members serving as contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, Commander's Emergency Response Fund project officers, and pay agents.

SOURCE: Commission on Wartime Contracting Final Report August 2011 and numerous other open-source reports
CHAPTER II
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

“A lot of what we have done in terms of reducing the size of active and reserve component force structure means there’s a greater reliance on contractors. And there’s a lot of technology that requires contractor support.”

David McKiernan, Lieutenant General, Third Army Commander, Atlanta Constitution, 2003

1. Introduction

OCS planning and integration, along with the associated contractor management actions, involve all levels of command and staffs. This chapter outlines the roles and responsibilities of DOD, the Joint Staff (JS), and Military Departments, as well as joint and Service commanders and staffs, related to OCS. Understanding the roles and responsibilities of these organizations is important to all commands and staffs that may be involved with planning and managing OCS actions in support of joint operations.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff

a. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) OCS responsibilities fall into two general areas: those related to defense acquisition policy and programs oversight and those related to the assignment and attachment of the forces to the combatant organizations necessary to carry out joint operations. SecDef issues directives and instructions and oversees force management. In some cases, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) may be called upon to assist the supported GCC in resolving and/or providing guidance or additional authorities related to specific organization C2, legal, funding, or other contracting or contractor management operational issues.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer develops policy addressing the use of funds, as well as the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical, transportation, and other AGS received by contractor personnel in applicable military operations.

c. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) provides advice and assistance on all matters associated with the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. USD(P) integrates interagency priorities and regional and country-specific assessments into DOD planning. USD(P) OCS-related responsibilities are to:

(1) Serve as DOD lead for interagency planning and policy guidance and oversee the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

(2) Serve as DOD lead for developing the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Defense Planning Guidance, including defense planning scenarios and multi-Service force deployment that drive OCS matters.
d. The **Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S])** serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive and has overall responsibility for the performance of the DOD Acquisition System, including establishing and publishing policies and procedures governing the operations of the DOD Acquisition System and the administrative oversight of defense contracts. While these responsibilities are more traditionally associated with oversight of systems acquisition, USD(A&S) develops and oversees the implementation of DOD-level OCS policy. Assistants charged with carrying out related responsibilities are addressed below.

(1) The **Director, Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC)**, is responsible for all contracting and procurement policy matters, including E-Business, in DOD, executed through the issuance of, and updates to, the DFARS associated procedures, guidance, and information (PGI), as well as promulgation of acquisition policy found in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.01, *The Defense Acquisition System*, and DODI 5000.02, *Operation of the Defense Acquisition System*. Director, DPC, OCS-related responsibilities are to:

(a) Develop DOD contracting policy and issue necessary directives for effective contracting support of military operations, to include policies related to the integration of contracts requiring performance or delivery to designated operational areas; operational-specific contracting authorities, contract delegations, and coordinating relationships; and other operational-specific policies, as required.

(b) Lead and coordinate efforts of Military Department senior acquisition executives, including actions related to GCC support.

(c) Lead the Defense Emergency Procurement Committee. This committee develops solutions to emergent procurement issues affecting the execution of contingency contracting in various contingencies.

(d) Propose legislative initiatives that support the accomplishment of contracting in support of specific joint operations.

(e) Maintain a contingency contracting Internet portal that includes guidance and information on policies, tools, and processes, as well as links to GCC-directed, mission-specific OCS policies, procedures, and other related guidance.

(f) Proactively and expeditiously disseminate CCDR-related information and guidance affecting DOD contracting officers at large.

(g) ICW the supported GCC and the Services, develop, issue, and enforce theater business clearance (TBC) policies and procedures.

(h) In concert with the supported GCC and lead Service for contracting (LSC)/lead Service for contracting coordination (LSCC)-designated contracting activity or JTSCC (if formed), issue procedures and instructions supporting the conduct of contracting in support of specific operations, as required.
(i) Develop and implement a DOD-wide contingency contracting-related lessons learned program and ensure validated lessons from this program are disseminated and incorporated into relevant Defense Acquisition University instruction.

(2) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics) (DASD[Log]) develops and manages a comprehensive OCS policy framework and program support governing logistical and support operations and contractor planning, management, and execution. Specific responsibilities include:

(a) ICW the other OSD staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), develop, integrate, and enforce overarching OCS policies as stated in DODD 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution; DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.

(b) Proactively integrate OCS matters across OSD staff and applicable DOD programs and policies.

(c) ICW USD(P), undertake interagency coordination with respect to OCS, as appropriate.

e. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R]) is the primary staff assistant and advisor to SecDef for total force management. USD(P&R) is responsible for policy, plans, and program development for the total force, which includes military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor personnel. Responsibilities relevant to contractor personnel management include:

(1) ICW USD(A&S), establish the central repository for contractor personnel accountability information.

(2) Develop, promulgate, and administer DOD policy and procedures, to include specific guidance on government ID card issuance to eligible contractor personnel.

(3) Establish and issue guidance IAW DODD 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management, and DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, to be used by all DOD components regarding manpower management, including manpower mix criteria, to ensure contracted services are not inherently governmental or otherwise unsuitable or not allowed for commercial performance.

(4) Through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, develop policy and set standards for managing contract linguist capabilities supporting the total force, to include requirements for linguists and the tracking of linguists and role players to ensure force readiness and security requirements are met.

f. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence OCS-related responsibilities are to:
(1) ICW USD(A&S), oversee the exercise of acquisition authority by the
directors of DOD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develops, coordinates, and oversees the
implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel, physical, industrial,
information, and operations security programs.

(2) Assist USD(A&S) in determining appropriate contract clauses for
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

(3) On behalf of SecDef, waive prohibitions of award of certain contracts to
entities controlled by a foreign government, according to Title 10, USC, Section 2536(b).

(4) Establish policy for contractor employees under the terms of the applicable
contracts that support background investigations.

(5) Provide policy and procedural guidance on screening of foreign contractors
and personnel to reduce or mitigate vendor risk when contracting with non-US contractors
for support to deployed forces.

(6) Coordinate security and counterintelligence policy affecting contract linguists
with the Secretary of the Army.

g. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P):

(1) Serves as the principal civilian advisor to SecDef and USD(P) on DOD
counter threat finance (CTF) activities, capabilities, and employment of SOF, strategic
forces, and conventional forces to conduct CTF activities.

(2) Develops and coordinates CTF policy guidance found in DODD 5205.14,
DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy.

h. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) is responsible for
developing and implementing policies and procedures for medical preparation, screening,
and baseline health services requirements of CAAF operating in support of military
operations. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) assists in the
development of policy addressing the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical
support received by CAAF in applicable US military operations.

i. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Combating Terrorism (DASD[SO/CT]) is designated as the office of primary
responsibility by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict for personnel recovery (PR) policy, control, and oversight. As the DOD
lead for PR, DASD(SO/CT) is responsible for the coordination among the Services, the JS,
the CCMDs, and with all other USG departments and agencies on all matters concerning
the isolation of CAAF (and any non-CAAF specifically designated by the GCC or
subordinate JFC) from friendly control.
For more information on DASD(SO/CT), see DODD 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)); for more information on PR, see JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.

j. The **Office of General Counsel** provides advice to SecDef and the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding all legal matters and services performed within, or involving, DOD and legal advice to OSD organizations and, as appropriate, other DOD components. Responsibilities pertinent to OCS are to:

1. Provide advice on legal matters, including law of war, military justice, and standards of conduct for CAAF.
2. Provide legal review and interpretation of acquisition policy and guidance language.
3. Coordinate DOD positions on legislation and executive orders.
4. Provide for the coordination of significant legal issues, including litigation involving DOD and other matters before the Department of Justice in which DOD has an interest.
5. Determine DOD’s position on specific legal problems and resolve disagreements within DOD on such matters.
6. Act as lead counsel for DOD in all international negotiations conducted by OSD organizations.
7. Maintain the central repository for all international agreements (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing agreements [ACSAs], mutual logistics support agreements, or SOFAs) coordinated or negotiated by DOD personnel.

3. The Joint Staff

a. The **CJCS**, as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, has specific responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, campaign and contingency planning, joint doctrine, and joint education and training. Principal JS OCS-related responsibilities are as follows:

b. **Joint Staff J-1 [Manpower and Personnel]** establishes the manpower management, personnel support, and personnel service support policies and procedures for the deployed force (military, DOD civilian, and designated DOD contractor personnel) during joint operations and administers oversight of joint personnel issues affecting the force. This includes coordinating manpower and personnel support to CCMDs. Key responsibilities are to:

1. Assist USD(P&R), USD(A&S), and Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics] to resolve personnel service-support issues relating to contractor personnel in joint operations.
(2) Establish policy for contractor accountability data in the joint personnel status report.

(3) Provide deployed force strength data and casualty reporting of personnel, including CAAF, in a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR) to the CJCS for situational awareness.

(4) Provide input, if deemed appropriate by JS J-1, to Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy] and Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development] on the integration of contractor personnel in the CJCS Exercise Program.

c. **JS J-4** provides policy, guidance, and oversight on joint logistics and is the primary staff directorate in the JS for OCS matters. Specific responsibilities are to:

   (1) Develop and promulgate OCS planning policy, related procedures, and templates. Ensure such policy and procedures are incorporated into the appropriate CJCS policy documents and doctrinal publications.

   (2) Interpret OSD policies (and where applicable, regulations and laws) into joint doctrine and facilitate OSD efforts to implement OCS-related policy within the Military Departments, CCMDs, and CSAs.

   (3) Ensure OCS is incorporated into CCMD plans and orders per relevant DOD and CJCS policy and other DOD guidance.

   (4) ICW JS J-7, facilitate the inclusion of OCS learning objectives in joint professional military education, joint doctrine, joint training, and CJCS exercises.

   (5) ICW JS J-7 and Joint Staff J-3 [Operations], institute OCS readiness reporting through development of universal joint tasks and the inclusion of OCS-related joint mission-essential tasks as exercise objectives in CJCS-directed exercises.

   (6) Ensure risk assessments regarding the use of contracted support in operations and associated mitigation planning are performed and reported.

   (7) Ensure OCS-related lessons learned are captured and entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System.

d. **JS J-5** provides policy, guidance, and oversight on joint operation planning. Specific OCS responsibilities are to:

   (1) Ensure OCS policies and procedures are included in overarching policy documents to facilitate planning for military operations.

   (2) Ensure CAAF are included in planning policies and procedures for deployment and redeployment (e.g., if applicable, included into time-phased force and deployment data [TPFDD]).
e. **JS J-7** supports the CJCS and the joint commanders through joint force development to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. Pertinent JS J-7 responsibilities include the integration of OCS-related collective training requirements for CJCS exercises and joint professional military education programs.

f. The **JS Legal Counsel** provides legal advice and guidance to the CJCS and other members of the JS and the CCMDs, as directed. Specific OCS responsibilities are to:

1. Review and coordinate policy, plans, and other guidance.
2. Participate in related working groups.
3. Maintain strategic awareness on evolving issues affecting joint contingency contracting and the integration of contractor personnel in joint operations.
4. Provide legal review of the OCS aspects of joint force OPLANs and orders.

### 4. Military Departments

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCMDs. One way Military Departments fulfill their responsibilities is by augmenting military support capabilities with contracted support and other nonorganic support through their respective Service component commands assigned to the CCMDs. The Military Departments prepare their forces to execute both requiring activity and contracting authority tasks. All contracting tasks must be accomplished IAW US laws and executive orders; the FAR, DFARS, and Service FAR supplements; DOD policy; CJCS policy; joint and Service doctrine; and GCC mission-specific directives and orders, along with other applicable regulations and policies. Major Military Department OCS roles and responsibilities are to:

1. Provide trained, equipped, and organized units and individual personnel to perform OCS functions, to include contracting, in support of their deployed Service forces.
2. Participate in and, when designated, lead the development of joint OCS-related policy and capability development (e.g., doctrine, training, concepts) actions.
3. Incorporate OSD and joint OCS policy, as well as joint doctrine, into applicable Service policy, doctrine, training, and leader development and education, as appropriate.
4. Integrate OCS into training, exercise, and lessons learned programs.
5. Plan, resource, and execute CAAF deployment as requested by GCCs.
6. Perform OCS reporting IAW DOD guidance.

*See ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support, for details on the Service OCS-related capabilities.*
5. Geographic Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Force Commands

The GCCs lead the OCS planning and integration effort within their AORs by promulgating and enforcing general OCS planning and policy guidance. Subordinate JFCs play a key role in the execution of this GCC-directed planning and policy guidance, thus enabling more effective and efficient use of contracted support and with less risk to the supported force.

a. GCCs. The supported GCC must work closely with the appropriate subordinate joint force commands, functional CCMDs, TSOCs, Service and certain functional components, and CSAs to determine OCS requirements as part of their logistics supportability analysis. GCC OCS responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

(1) Incorporate contracted support into plans and planning IAW strategic planning guidance and JS policy.

   (a) Develop annex W (Operational Contract Support) and incorporate OCS matters, to include applicable risk assessments, into other portions of plans and orders, as appropriate.

   (b) Direct Service subordinate components and supporting CSAs to participate in the OCS planning process and to develop subordinate annex W, as appropriate.

   (c) Ensure OCS planning incorporates multinational and USG department and agency requirements, as appropriate.

   (d) Ensure contracting and contract oversight capabilities, to include theater support contracting C2, contracting authorities, and contracting coordination arrangements, are incorporated into plans and all annex W.

   (e) Develop, publish, and enforce OCS-related regulations, instructions, orders, and directives necessary for the conduct of efficient and effective OCS support to joint operations.

   (f) Direct the establishment and execution of appropriate OCS-related boards, cells, and working groups.

   (g) Develop and promulgate CAAF predeployment, deployment, reception, in-theater management, and redeployment guidance and procedures.

   (h) Ensure CAAF and associated equipment are incorporated into deployment and in-theater support plans and processes.

(2) Perform OCS reporting.

(3) In direct coordination with the subordinate components and supporting CSAs, develop contingency plans to ensure continuation of essential contract services per DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.
(4) ICW DPC, develop and implement theater-specific TBC policies and procedures, as required.

(5) Establish and enforce the contractor individual arming policy and use of armed PSCs IAW DODD 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force, and DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.

(6) Ensure OCS-related combating trafficking in persons (CTIP) guidance is established and followed.

(7) Integrate OCS into joint and GCC-directed exercises, as appropriate.

(8) Review, share, and integrate OCS lessons learned into plans, staff training, and exercises, as appropriate.

(9) ICW the JS, review, develop, and promulgate standardized CAAF predeployment training standards.

(10) ICW DPC, maintain an unclassified OCS webpage that contains current mission-specific and/or AOR-wide guidance and information pertinent to requiring activities, contracting officers, contractors, and contractor personnel.


b. **Subordinate Joint Force Commands.** Subordinate unified command and joint task force (JTF) commanders play a key role in determining specific contracted support requirements and contracting planning, as well as executing OCS oversight within a specified operational area. Working closely with the Service components and other elements of the joint force, a subordinate JFC’s unique OCS responsibilities are to:

(1) Comply with CJCS, OSD, and GCC OCS-related regulations, instructions, directives, plans, and orders necessary for the conduct of efficient and effective OCS support to joint operations.

(2) Monitor, integrate, and report OCS matters across the force.

(3) Establish and enforce procedures to ensure contracted support is executed IAW overall priorities of support across the joint force, multinational partners, and USG departments and agencies.

(4) Recommend changes to GCC-directed lead Service or joint contracting arrangements, as required.

(5) Update and enforce operational-specific contractor management requirements, directives, and procedures.
(6) Provide contractor personnel with the necessary AGS as required by operational conditions and ensure this support is properly coordinated between the component commands.

6. Functional Combatant Commands

Most functional CCMDs and their staffs play a limited role in planning and managing OCS in support of military operations. Specific OCS-related functional CCMD responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

a. As the requirements are being developed and prior to contract award, ensure personnel (both acquisition and non-acquisition) who will manage and oversee contracts during US military operations are identified and trained.

b. Develop, issue, and enforce, as necessary, OCS-related guidance and procedures IAW established DOD policy; joint doctrine; GCC operational-specific directives; complementing US laws and executive orders; and the FAR, DFARS, and Service component supplements for contracting.

c. Comply with CJCS, OSD, and GCC OCS-related regulations, instructions, directives, support plans, and orders necessary for the conduct of efficient and effective OCS support to joint operations.

d. Coordinate with supported GCCs to ensure unique roles regarding OCS are integrated as described below:

(1) **USSOCOM** has procurement authority for special operations-peculiar equipment and related services. Contracting, related to SOF systems, may be executed and are normally provided via reachback but, in some cases, may be executed in the operational area. Non-SOF peculiar contracting support, as coordinated by the appropriate TSOC, is normally provided through Service component or existing joint contracting support arrangements directed by the JFC. Deployed SOF units normally receive non-SOF-peculiar support, to include contracted support, from their parent Service or through GCC-directed, common-user logistics (CUL), lead Service or base operating support-integrator (BOS-I)-designated support units and/or contracting activities.

(2) **United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)** has its own contracting authority. USTRANSCOM contracted support generally involves strategic transportation contracts that have an area of performance outside the operational area. However, in some cases, these transportation contracts may be fully or partially executed in the operational area (e.g., dignified remains airlift, air ambulance, defense courier, commercial airlift of outsized cargo). In these situations, USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating with the supported GCC, as required. Additionally, USTRANSCOM’s surface component command, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), may be designated as the port manager and/or operator within an operational area. When so designated, SDDC will normally depend on USTRANSCOM for contracting support, or otherwise the Army contracting support brigade providing
support to the respective operational area, to assist SDDC in procuring stevedore and transportation service support via theater support contracts in support of port operations.

*See Defense Transportation Regulation 4500.9R*, The Defense Transportation Regulations, *for additional guidance related to transportation contracted support and other movement-related activities governed by USTRANSCOM.*

7. **Service Component Commands**

The **Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Service component commands**, along with their associated Service component contracting organizations, plan and execute OCS IAW the guidance received from their respective Military Departments and supported JFC. Specific OCS-related Service component responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

a. Comply with CJCS, OSD, and GCC OCS-related regulations, instructions, directives, plans, and orders necessary for the conduct of efficient and effective OCS support to joint operations.

b. Participate in joint planning activities and develop Service component plans to integrate contracted support per GCC guidance. OCS planning responsibilities are to:

   (1) Support all GCC-directed OCS planning and execution requirements and ensure all primary and special staff members participate in and provide input to the process, as appropriate.

   (2) Ensure staff is trained and organized to carry out required OCS-related tasks.

   (3) Determine operational-specific requiring activity and contracting and contract oversight personnel force requirements and responsibilities. Capture these requirements in Service component annex W (Operational Contract Support) and deployment plans, per JFC guidance.

   (4) Develop contingency plans to ensure continuation of essential contract services per GCC guidance and DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.*

   (5) Plan to provide (or receive) contract support to other Services, SOF elements, DOD agencies, multinational partners, and USG departments and agencies, as directed by the GCC.

   (6) Incorporate all CAAF and their associated equipment into deployment and in-theater reception plans regardless if this deployment is via military means or self-supported.

   (7) Integrate OCS into Service component-directed exercises.
(8) Develop, maintain, publish, and utilize OCS planning factors in support of operational planning requirements.

c. Execute or support lead Service contracting responsibilities, as directed by the GCC.

d. Execute contracting IAW JFC guidance, as well as applicable FAR and DFARS policies, PGI instructions, and Service component supplements.

e. Comply with the GCC’s contractor management plan (CMP) policies and processes.

f. Ensure subordinate requiring activities and/or supported units execute requirements management tasks (e.g., contract request package development, post-contract award oversight functions such as COR and receiving official management) as directed by the JFC and supporting contracting organizations.

g. Coordinate the provision of Service component contracting and CCAS manning per GCC guidance when directed.

h. Enforce JFC-established priorities of support across the joint force, multinational partners, and USG departments and agencies.

i. Ensure sufficient and correct funds are available to meet contract requirements.

j. Ensure CAAF are received, accounted for, managed, and redeployed IAW established DOD and Service policy along with JFC operational-specific directives.

8. Functional Component Commands

Air, land, and maritime functional component commands (if established) do not constitute formal joint commands and, therefore, are not directly responsible for joint logistics matters for the entire force as a functional component command. As such, they also do not normally perform major OCS tasks but may find it necessary to monitor and coordinate selected OCS actions that could potentially directly affect their operations. The exception may be when the GCC directs a joint force land component command, per JP 3-31, Command and Control of Joint Land Operations, to provide common support to land component forces, which could include significant contracted support. In this situation, the joint force land component command would perform OCS responsibilities described in the Service component section above.

9. Department of Defense Agencies

a. DLA is the CSA responsible for providing worldwide logistics support to Military Departments and the CCMDs under conditions of peace and war, as well as to other DOD components and other USG departments and agencies, and when authorized by law, state and local government organizations, foreign governments, and international organizations.
The DLA director reports to USD(A&S) through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.

(1) DLA will comply with DOD, CJCS, and GCC OCS-related regulations, instructions, directives, and orders necessary for the conduct of efficient and effective OCS support to joint operations.

(2) DLA provides a joint OCS enabling and limited deployable contracting capability through its Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) (see Appendix H, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office”).

See DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for more details on the DLA organization and functions.

b. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is the CSA responsible for providing contract administration services to the DOD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the operating force. While not a core mission, DCMA also serves as a CCAS and OCS staff augmentation force provider in contingency operations, when requested, through the normal global force management (GFM) process by the GCC, a subordinate JFC, or a component and as directed by USD(A&S).

See DODD 5105.64, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), for more information on DCMA’s CSA mission.

c. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is a defense agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). DCAA is responsible for performing all contract audits for DOD and providing accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible for procurement and contract administration. These services are provided in connection with negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts. DCAA also provides contract audit services to other USG departments and agencies on a reimbursable basis. DCAA’s services are provided under contingency contracting situations, both in support of military operations and during a national emergency. DCAA personnel can be deployed, as circumstances warrant, to the operational area. DCAA on-site auditors are responsible for identifying practices needing improvement on a real-time basis and recommending cost avoidance opportunities to selected operational contracts.
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“Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective planning for operational contract support can help reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. The Department of Defense (DOD) has made an effort to emphasize the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level through new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts.”

Timothy J. DiNapoli, Acting Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, September 12, 2012

1. Overview

   a. General. This chapter provides an overview of contract support integration during military operations. It describes actions the supported GCC can take to ensure the subordinate JFCs, Service component commands, supporting CSAs and, as necessary, functional component commands are prepared and organized to plan and manage OCS actions. The supported GCC executes this requirement through directive authority for logistics as prescribed in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Execution of this requirement may also require changes to contracting authorities that may require coordination by the affected Service SPEs. This chapter also includes significant discussion on other contract support integration considerations, to include OCS information tracking; shaping actions; multinational support; interagency support; OCS aspects of IFO; other special programs offices; fiscal authorities; transition to stabilize and enable civil authorities; homeland defense (HD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA); foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA); and National Guard (NG) operations under Title 32, USC.

   b. OCS Team. OCS planning and integration is a multidisciplinary team effort. In all joint operations, OCS planning and integration tasks require involvement of many commands, various staff elements within these commands, and supporting contracting activities, along with numerous GCC and/or subordinate JFC-directed boards, cells, and working groups. No single OCS-related organization or staff element is in direct control of all OCS actions in a joint operation; rather, multiple joint, Service, and CSA commands and supporting acquisition and contracting organizations coordinate through designated cross-functional organizations. The joint OCS planning and execution team is depicted in Figure III-1.

   c. Organizational Construct. No single OCS organizational construct applies to every joint operation. In general, there should be a permanent operational contract support integration cell (OCSIC) or, at a minimum, some type of dedicated OCS staff capability at each geographic CCMD, USSOCOM, Service component headquarters (HQ), and TSOCs to perform contract support integration functions and contract management and to provide oversight of any subordinate joint force command OCSIC, functional, and Service component OCS staff as applicable. In addition to the subordinate joint force command
### Joint Operational Contract Support Planning and Execution Team

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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Mission Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS integration cell – Synchronize OCS actions across CCMD staff, Service components, CSAs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CLPSB – Coordinate major AOR-wide OCS and other requirements support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Component/CSA/TSOC</td>
<td>OCS working group matters in other working groups.</td>
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<td>Assists in planning, directly coordinates shape activities, and assists in OCS actions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-JFC/Service Component</td>
<td>Mission Guidance</td>
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<td>OCS integration cell – Synchronize OCS actions across CCMD staff, Service components, CSAs, LSC/JTSCC.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>JRRB – Review, approve, and prioritize requirements.</td>
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<td>OCS working group matters in other working groups.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop requirements and assist in contract/contractor management.</td>
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<td>LSCC/LSC (TS)/JTSCC</td>
<td>Provide theater support contracting services coordinate common contracting actions.</td>
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<td>Joint Contracting Support Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Provide funding approval and RM advice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Contracting Activities</td>
<td>Execute contracts in accordance with GCC guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Services</td>
<td>Vendor Payments</td>
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**Legend**

- AOR: area of responsibility
- CCMD: combatant command
- CGORB: commander’s contract oversight review board
- CLPSB: combatant commander logistic procurement support board
- CSA: combat support agency
- GCC: geographic combatant commander
- JFC: joint force commander
- JRRB: joint requirements review board
- JTSCC: joint theater support contracting command
- LSC: lead Service for contracting
- LSCC: lead Service for contracting coordination
- OCS: operational contract support
- RM: resource management
- Sub: subordinate
- TS: theater support
- TSOC: theater special operations command

**Figure III-1. Joint Operational Contract Support Planning and Execution Team**
OCSIC, there should also be a GCC-designated lead theater support contracting activity to coordinate common contracting actions in the operational area. Depending on the operation, there may be additional OCS-related boards, working groups, and cells (see Figure III-2). As with all joint boards, working groups, and cells, the GCC or/and subordinate JFC may combine them, modify them, or create new ones as required by specific operational requirements. **It is important to note that this joint OCS organizational construct, less the CCMD-level OCSIC, is not applicable to single Service operations. In these operations, the Service executing the GCC-directed mission is generally responsible for all OCS tasks and associated contracting execution requirements.**

2. Planning and Integration

   a. **General.** OCS planning and integration are primarily an operational, not contracting, function. The GCC, subordinate JFCs, and supporting component commander’s staff determine support requirements and the appropriate source of support (i.e., organic support, multinational support, host-nation support [HNS], or contracted support). A wide variety of OCS-related organizations advise, augment, and assist GCC planning efforts but do not lead the OCS planning process. No matter how augmented or advised, the GCC leads the OCS planning effort unless delegated to a subordinate JFC. Additionally, while the preponderance of contracted support is for logistics services and supplies, OCS functions are not just a logistics matter and require involvement from other non-logistics staff. Contracted support, no matter what service or supply is being acquired, has both direct and indirect costs and often impacts a variety of non-logistical matters from FP to civil-military aspects. Close coordination between all primary and special staff members is required to ensure OCS planning balances effectiveness with efficiency and risk while seeking to attain the JFC’s directed strategic end state.

   b. **Staff Roles.** All primary and special staff members play specific roles in OCS matters. These responsibilities vary in scope and scale, but many will be applicable to all joint operations. Because the preponderance of contracted support is for logistics services, the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) often has logistics-related OCS planning and AGS coordination functions at a significantly greater magnitude than other primary staff members. However, many of the staff members are still responsible for planning and coordinating OCS actions for functions related to their staff functions. For example, the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) is responsible for contractor personnel accountability, and the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) is responsible for planning for the use, management, and control of PSCs. Proper OCS synchronization among the collective staff will enable the commander to leverage contracted support to create desired OCS-related effects and achieve operational and strategic objectives. Key OCS-related staff functions are captured in Figure III-3. Additional information on staff responsibilities specifically related to contractor management can be found in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.”

   c. **OCS Planning and Coordination Boards, Cells, and Working Groups.** The establishment and operation of OCS boards, cells, and working groups determines the success of the overall OCS planning and integration effort. The following is a general overview of OCS planning, requirements management, coordination boards, working groups, and cells.
## Operational Contract Support-Related Boards, Working Groups, and Contracting Organizational Constructs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Construct</th>
<th>Area Focus</th>
<th>Primary Function</th>
<th>Duration/Battle Rhythm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLPSB</td>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Address AOR-wide OCS and other logistic matters, to include policies and directives</td>
<td>Permanent board that meets, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>AOR and JOA</td>
<td>General OCS planning, advice, coordination, and maintaining OCS information</td>
<td>CCMD level: permanent cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-joint force (possibly functional component command) command: full-time cell for duration of specified operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Full-time or additional/collateral duty function at Service component level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS Working Group</td>
<td>AOR and JOA</td>
<td>Address specific OCS issues with applicable joint force command primary and special staff members</td>
<td>Meets as needed–no specific schedule in peacetime or during operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRRB</td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Review, approve, and prioritize major contract support requests</td>
<td>Meets per established schedule for duration of specified operation; emergency basis, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSB</td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict major common contracting actions in the JOA. Determine best contracting solution</td>
<td>Meets per established schedule; emergency basis, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCORB</td>
<td>JOA, tactical level support command</td>
<td>Track, assess, report mission-critical, post-contract award-related information, to include key performance measures.</td>
<td>Normally monthly or quarterly during long-duration operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC</td>
<td>JOA or AOR</td>
<td>Lead the common contracting coordination effort in the designated JOA or geographic area. Execute coordination function through the JCSB process</td>
<td>Operational command for duration of specific operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legend

- **AOR**: area of responsibility
- **CCMD**: combatant command
- **CCORB**: commander’s contract oversight review board
- **CLPSB**: combatant commander’s logistic procurement support board
- **JCSB**: joint contracting support board
- **JOA**: joint operations area
- **JRRB**: joint requirements review board
- **JTSCC**: joint theater support contracting command
- **LSC**: lead Service for contracting
- **LSCC**: lead Service for contracting coordination
- **OCS**: operational contract support
- **OCSIC**: operational contract support integration cell

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**Figure III-2. Operational Contract Support-Related Boards, Working Groups, and Contracting Organizational Constructs**
## Primary and Special Staff Operational Contract Support-Related Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Staff Position</th>
<th>Key Operational Contract Support-Related Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>Maintain CAAF accountability, in-theater reception, postal, and MWR support; coordinate/consolidate human resource-related contract support requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Assist in collection and analysis of selected OCS-related JIPOE information and contract company/personnel security vetting; coordinate/consolidate intelligence-related contract support requirements (i.e., contracted interrogator/interpreter/translator support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Chair/advise JRRB; plan and coordinate force protection (of contractors) and security (from contractors); establish CAAF training requirements; coordinate PR actions; plan for use of private security contractors, to include RUF; provide contractor arming (for self-defense) policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>Conduct logistic-related planning/coordination; coordinate AGS; chair CLPSB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>Develop constraints and risk analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>Coordinate/consolidate signal contract requirements and contractor frequency allocation and management; establish and oversee cybersecurity procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-7*</td>
<td>Incorporate OCS into exercises and staff training plan as applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-8*</td>
<td>Resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-9*</td>
<td>Assist in assessing OCS effects on civil population and coordinating contracted support with major interagency partners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMPTROLLER**

- **Engineer**
  - Coordinate land and facilities for contractors; perform/coordinate construction classification/planning/quality surveillance oversight; coordinate/consolidate construction requirements.

**SURGEON**

- Plan/coordinate CAAF medical support and operational-specific predeployment medical requirements.

**STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE**

- Provide operational, contract, and fiscal law advice; advise as to the feasibility of asserting US federal criminal jurisdiction over CAAF.

**PROVOST MARSHAL**

- Investigate allegations of trafficking in persons, fraud, CAAF criminal activity; develop contractor base access policy/procedures.

*NOTE: Optional directorates established at joint force commander's discretion.

### Legend

- **AGS** authorized government support
- **CAAF** contractors authorized to accompany the force
- **CLPSB** combatant commander logistic procurement support board
- **IPG** integrated financial operations
- **J-1** manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- **J-2** intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- **J-3** operations directorate of a joint staff
- **J-4** logistics directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5** plans directorate of a joint staff
- **J-6** communications system directorate of a joint staff
- **J-7** training and education directorate of a joint staff
- **J-8** resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff
- **J-9** civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff
- **JIPOE** joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
- **JRRB** joint requirements review board
- **MWR** morale, welfare, and recreation
- **OCS** operational contract support
- **PR** personnel recovery
- **RUF** rules for the use of force

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**Figure III-3. Primary and Special Staff Operational Contract Support-Related Responsibilities**
(1) **Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board (CLPSB).** A CLPSB is established by the GCC to coordinate OCS and related logistics efforts across the entire AOR. The CLPSB is normally established as a permanent CCMD-level board, functioning during day-to-day operations as part of the CCMD campaign, as well as during contingencies and is convened as necessary as directed by the J-4.

(2) **Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB).** The JRRB is the subordinate JFC’s mechanism to review, validate, prioritize, and approve selected component contract support requests. The JRRB is an operations-focused, vice contracting-focused, board designed to provide the subordinate JFC control of mission-critical, high-dollar contracted services and ensure other sources of support have been properly considered before going to a contracted support solution. The JRRB, with the advice of appropriate Service and CSA contracting SMEs, is also often used to determine appropriate sourcing solutions.

(3) **Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).** The JCSB is a contracting-focused functional board used to coordinate and deconflict common contracting actions between theater support contracting and external support contracting activities executing or delivering what could be overlapping contracted supplies and services, possibly from the same local vendor base within the operational area. It also serves as the JFC contracting-related advisory forum, especially for issues that cannot be resolved through the JCSB consensus-driven process. It may also serve as a coordination board to determine proper contract source for requirements not directed to a specific contract venue through the OCS planning and/or JRRB processes. The JCSB has no authority to direct contracting-related actions to JCSB member organizations.

(4) **Commander’s Contract Oversight Review Board (CCORB).** The CCORB is a commander’s forum that ensures mission-critical service contracts are properly tracked and assessed for both effectiveness and efficiency and to ensure they are properly extended, curtailed, or closed out based on the operational requirement. In general, the CCORB focuses on the same contracts and task orders covered through the JRRB process. A subordinate JFC may implement a CCORB process directly or, more likely, direct subordinate Service and possibly SOF component commands to set up such boards and receive reports to ensure OCS effectiveness and efficiencies across the

**OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT FOR LOGISTICS SERVICES**

In 2008, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the J-4 [Logistics Directorate] to lead a detailed assessment to determine DOD’s [Department of Defense’s] reliance on contracted support in current operations. Using eight quarters of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM contractor personnel census data, it was determined that logistics services represented about 85 percent of all contracted services in support of the joint force. This estimate appeared consistent with historical data from previous military operations.

**SOURCE:** J-4 Briefing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 June 2010
operational area. CCORBs are normally only applicable to long-term operations supported by high-dollar-value contracts.

(5) OCS Working Group. The OCS working group is a coordination mechanism to coordinate specific, major OCS matters with the applicable staff members and with key mission partners; OCS working groups should only be established when the issue at hand is not directly aligned to other existing cross-functional organizations. OCS working groups normally meet as necessary to work specific OCS-related planning or execution-related issues but, in some cases, can be enduring in nature.

Additional details on these OCS boards and working groups can be found in Appendix C, “Operational Contract Support-Related Boards and Working Groups.”

(6) OCSIC. The primary purpose of this cell is to plan, coordinate, and integrate OCS actions across all applicable joint directorates and special staffs, subordinate components, supporting CSAs, and any designated lead theater support contracting activity in the operational area. Higher-level OCSICs also coordinate with lower-level OCSICs (if established). The OCSIC is a permanent, full-time cell at the CCMD level and is normally stood up as a full-time cell at the subordinate joint force command level for the duration of the command’s existence. The OCSIC can be subordinate to a joint staff or, in major operations, may serve as a separate personal staff element. There is no set structure or size for an OCSIC at either level; size and configuration is mission-dependent. This cell should be made up of a mixture of specially trained personnel with operational-level logistics and contingency contracting experience. In some operations, this cell could be as small as two individuals, while in other operations, it could be significantly larger. The CCMD-level OCSIC normally includes two JCASO planners, as well as a limited number of permanent CCMD HQ staff, but could include additional temporary augmentation staff, as required. Initial manning of a subordinate joint force command OCSIC is very mission-dependent but could include a JCASO mission support team (MST) or other augmentation staff, along with a liaison officer (LNO) from the lead contracting activity.

Additional details on the OCSIC can be found in Appendix A, “Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Organization and Processes.” Additional information on the JCASO can be found in Appendix H, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office.”

(7) Working OCS Matters in Other Cross-Functional Organizations. When possible, OCS staff members should utilize other cross-functional staff organizations within the HQs to address OCS-related matters. For example, contractor personnel-related FP/security matters should be addressed in the protection working group not a separate OCS working group. When appropriate, the JFC OCSIC staff should work with the appropriate staff facilitator to ensure key OCS issues are identified in the board, center, cell, working group, or planning team meeting agenda.

d. Planning Overview

(1) Introduction. IAW JP 5-0, Joint Planning, joint planning fosters understanding, enabling commanders and their staffs to provide adequate order to ill-
defined problems, reduce uncertainty, and enable further detailed planning. And while JP 5-0, **Joint Planning**, has, historically, covered the process of determining the “ways” (how to employ forces) and the “ends” (the objectives), it has only recently recognized contracted support as a major option in determining the “means” of the force. This significant doctrinal change, coupled with other recent strategic and operational policy guidance, requires planners to recognize, account for, and integrate contracted support on par with military provided support. This point is especially true in contingency planning where significant contracted support is anticipated.

(a) **Strategic Guidance.** DOD-level guidance shapes and directs specific operational guidance developed and enforced by the CCDRs. OCS-related information in national strategic guidance may be found or interpreted from multiple documents, but specific OCS guidance can be found in the GEF; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, *(U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)* (commonly referred to as the JSCP); and CJCSI 3110.03, *(U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) to the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*. The GEF, issued by SecDef, provides two-year direction with strategic end states used to inform the development of CCMD campaign plans and contingency plans. The GEF states that CCMDs, together with their Service components and relevant CSAs, will plan for the integration of contracted support and the associated contractor personnel (contractor management) into military operations for all phases of military operations. The JSCP, issued by the CJCS, complements the GEF but does not repeat details already published in the GEF. The JSCP specifically addresses the requirement for CCMDs to synchronize and integrate both contracted support, in general, and the associated contractor personnel in support of the joint force. Of particular note, the **JSCP directs OCS planning for all plan levels and types, to include commanders’ estimate; base plan; concept plan; OPLAN; and campaign plan, to include considerations of existing contracts or task orders within the operational area.** Additionally, CJCSI 3110.03, along with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 4301.01, **Planning Operational Contract Support**, provides guidance for preparation of the annex W (Operational Contract Support). CJCSI 3110.03 also contains information pertaining to completion of the logistics supportability analysis matrix, appendix 4 (Logistics Supportability Analysis) to annex D (Logistics), generated during plan development and refined during plan assessment.

(b) **Importance of OCS Planning.** DOD increasingly relies on contractors to perform a variety of functions and tasks, some of which are not organic capabilities found in our active or reserve force structure (e.g., dining facilities, ice services). Planning for contracted support has also become increasingly critical due to:

1. Reductions in the size of and changes to the composition of military forces (general reduction in the availability of uniformed support capabilities).

2. Increased operations tempo and nontraditional missions undertaken by the military.

3. Increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems.
4. Continued emphasis on efficiencies and cost reductions through the outsourcing or privatizing of commercially adaptable materiel support and services.

5. Recognition that, in some operations, contracting with local sources may, when planned and executed properly, have positive impacts on the civil-military aspects of the operation.

6. Need for operational flexibility, including obtaining required capabilities in the presence of force management limit caps.

7. Creation of the conditions for more responsive contracting actions.

(c) **Value of OCS Planning.** The positive value of proper OCS planning is hard to measure, but poor OCS planning assures some decrease in effectiveness, a possible significant reduction in efficiency and an environment more conducive to FWA.

(d) **OCS Planning Challenges.** Specific OCS planning challenges include, but are not limited to:

1. Complexity of OCS.

2. General lack of knowledge and experience in OCS planning.

3. Difficulty in determining associated risk when planning for significant levels of contracted support.

4. Lack of detail related to logistics and other support matters.

5. Lack of detailed stability activities planning.

6. Large number and diverse nature of requiring activities, customer activities, and supporting contracting organizations.

7. Lack of detail on the OCS aspects of the OE information.

8. Lack of integration of OCS information in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process.

9. Insufficient understanding of the importance and cost (both direct and indirect) of OCS as a source of support prior to execution.

10. Lack of emphasis on the critical nature of OCS in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities.

11. Required synchronization of contract support requirements with acquisition law and policies.

12. Lack of trust in contracted support responsiveness and in effectiveness when compared with organic force structure.
13. Difficulty incorporating OCS planning into IFO.

14. Lack of understanding for the importance of requirements management and contract oversight.

(c) **Planning for Different Types of Contracted Support.** It is important to understand that there are differences in planning for the use of systems support, theater support, and external support contracts. In general, the GCC and subordinate JFC, through the JCSB process, have control over decisions on the use of theater support and external support contracts. This point is not true for systems support contracts, many of which are in place long before the operation commences or is even contemplated. Also, the JFC should be aware that, while CAP support may be more expensive than theater support contracts, it brings significant internal corporate management capabilities not easily duplicated via theater support contracts. Additionally, CAP support is particularly suitable for use early in the operations and for some long-term operations where military support capability is not available or not needed. In any case, the GCC, via the CLPSB if necessary, and in close coordination with the Service CAP program office and LSC/LSCC’s contracting activity or JTSCC, should provide formal annex W (Operational Contract Support) guidance on the use of CAP support. This planning guidance should include specific services appropriate for CAP (e.g., dining facility services, facilities management) or not appropriate (e.g., private security services, simple services that could be performed via theater support contracts). Additionally, annex W or later fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) should provide guidance on transition of individual CAP capabilities to theater support contracts or other fixed-price, external support contracts if/when appropriate, based on operation-specific factors such as performance and/or cost risk, security considerations, availability of local sources of support, capability of other-than-CAP contracting, and availability of additional requirements management and contract administration capabilities. Additional information on contracting planning is covered later in this chapter.

(2) **OCS in the Joint Planning Process (JPP) Overview.** Contracted support should be considered in all JPP activities, to include the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5)-led operational planning teams. The OCS planners in the OCSIC assist the J-5 planner and other staff members to ensure OCS is considered in these planning teams, to include major contracted support-related risk factors. The OCS planning effort is initially driven by the theater posture plan, which identifies posture, footprints, and agreements. OCS planners have a direct role in identifying existing contracts and task orders that may be applicable to the plan under review/development. These existing contracts and task orders, per JPP-related policy, should be included in the overall OCS-related analysis of the OE factors, along with OCS-related matters found in the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2)-led JIPOE effort (e.g., threat to contractor personnel and contract companies). Based on this OCS-related analysis of the OE and JIPOE effort, the OCSIC planners, ICW other staff members, develop OCS-related input to the J-5-developed courses of action (COAs). OCS input should include estimated risk for any major potential use of contracted support for deployed forces. OCSIC planners also work directly with the subordinate component commands and supporting CSAs to develop back-up plans for essential contract services per DODI 1100.22, **Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.** More
specifically, OCS planners at the CCMD and Service component, as well as supporting CSA planners, recommend designation of lead Service or joint contracting-related organizations, advise on establishment of OCS-related cross-functional organizations, ensure contracting and contract support-related organizations are identified and included in the troop list, and integrate OCS into all phases of the operation. HCA authority must also be considered in planning processes and may require coordination through Service SPEs. Finally, OCS planners coordinate the incorporation of pertinent OCS information into the commander’s plans, orders, and policies and prompt OCS planning by other staff elements, as appropriate.

A detailed discussion of OCS support to JIPOE can be found in Appendix D, “Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment.”

(a) **Providing Options.** In all operations, contracted support is a joint force multiplier. When properly integrated into the JPP, **OCS can provide the JFC enhanced operational flexibility and rapid increases in support force capabilities.** The use of contracted support available in or near the operational area may enable the JFC to front-load combat power or high-priority military personnel and equipment in the deployment process. Additionally, the JFC may also be able to reduce the uniformed footprint within the operational area by employing multinational support, HNS, ACSAs, or contracted support to supplement or replace certain military support capabilities. Contrary to traditional planning thought, **contracted support should not be the source of last resort.** In some operations, contracted support may be considered a primary choice of support, especially in operations which require a minimal uniformed footprint due to the establishment of force management-level restrictions seen in some recent operations.

(b) **Assessing and Mitigating Operational Risks.** Determining acceptable operational risk levels for various contracted services and balancing this risk with the importance of these services to the overall success of the supported operation is the responsibility of the subordinate JFC, ICW applicable requiring activities. Conducting a thorough risk assessment is particularly important when planning for the continuation of mission-essential contract services and when determining acceptable levels of risk associated with utilizing LN commercial firms and/or employees. **The CCDR and subordinate JFC should not place overly restrictive guidance on the use of contracted support (e.g., placing sections of the operational area off limits to contractor personnel that prevent mission-essential systems support contractors from having access to the supported equipment).** Areas of potential operational risk associated with contracted support that should be considered in the planning process include:

1. Contract execution time lines that may not meet mission time lines.
2. Increased FP/operations security risks to deployed force when using foreign contractors and non-US contract employees.
3. Protection of the contracted workforce and their limited capability to provide for their own self-defense.
4. Inability to secure proper funding.

5. Contractor failure to perform, especially when utilizing LN contractors.

6. Potential damage to the HN economy.

7. Excessive FWA is a more likely risk when using LN contractors.

8. Contractor inability or failure to perform due to operational conditions such as a chemically contaminated area of performance (less contractors who are hired specifically to provide hazardous material handling/clean-up services).

9. Strategic implications of using armed PSCs.

10. Inability to fully control the flow of contract dollars to inappropriate/unacceptable contract companies with known or suspected links to the adversary and/or criminal elements.

11. Inability to secure required government civilian/military resources to let, manage, and oversee contracted support, such as contracting officers, technical SMEs, and CORs.

12. Obtaining the Office of Foreign Assets Control (Department of the Treasury) license to conduct business with entity/individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals or Blocked Persons List.

13. Administrative, time, and/or resource requirements to terminate contracts after entities are identified as part of, or associated with, the Specially Designated Nationals or Blocked Persons List.

(c) **Assessing Nonmonetary Costs.** While contracted support can be a huge force multiplier, this form of support comes with additional nonmonetary costs that should be assessed in the planning process against the potential benefits. These costs include, but are not limited to:

1. Loss of flexibility (every proposed change to the contracted service must be incorporated into the terms and conditions of the contract by the contracting officer, and no change can be outside the general scope of the existing contract).

2. Increased planning work load (planning for contracted support, to include requirements approval process, is much more complex and time consuming than planning for organic military support).

3. Contract oversight costs (supported units can be burdened with significant CORs and receiving official requirements).

4. Increased legal support.
5. Increased security and FP costs (lack of ability of contractors to protect themselves, supported unit security escort duties).

6. Additional complexity in planning and managing AGS (e.g., medical, housing, messing, transportation, training) and government-furnished property (GFP), as well as contractor-acquired, government-owned (CAGO) equipment.

(d) **Constant Assessment, Change, and Adaptation.** Plan assessment is a critical element of OCS planning, as it relates to providing sound information necessary to support command decisions. Plans are constantly assessed and updated, potentially requiring updates to the OCS portions of the plan. The open and collaborative planning process provides common understanding, vertically and horizontally, across multiple levels of organizations and the basis for adaptation and change. Given the non-static nature of military operations and the OE, the joint force, subordinate commands, and supporting CSAs must continually assess and learn during execution to adapt and update plans to ensure military actions are effectively contributing to the attainment of the strategic end state. Furthermore, planners must constantly assess whether the military actions, and by extension, contracted support, remain relevant to the attainment of the commander’s directed end state. Feedback, generated from the assessment process, forms the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent refinements to the commander’s guidance and operational concept. The commander and staff must constantly make certain that military actions are effective, correctly aligned with resources, and contributing to the accomplishment of directed strategic and military end states. **OCS planning plays a critical role in providing the commander options as changes to support requirements and the OE are identified.** Maintaining an ongoing and current assessment of the OCS-related factors of the OE, to include contracting force and existing contractor base, allows the force to quickly adapt to changes in the plan.

*For more information on the OCS planning process and formats, see CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support; CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) to the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); and CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance. Additionally, more guidance on contractor personnel and equipment management-related planning can be found in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.”*

3. **Requirements Management**

As described in Chapter I, “Introduction,” requirements management is a contracting support integration function that consists of three major subordinate functions: requirements development, requirements review and approval, and post-contract award oversight. **Because requirements management is an operational command, not a contracting responsibility,** the JFC and, more importantly, component commanders, must ensure their subordinate units serving as the requiring activities are properly trained in requirements management tasks. Identifying, synchronizing, and prioritizing requirements are essential precursors to effective contract development and essential to ensuring the subordinate JFC receives contracted support at the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost/price. Determining accurate requirements up front has a much higher
payoff than trying to modify the requirements during contract execution. Effective contract support is highly dependent on accurate and timely requirements development and validation along with proper in-theater management of the execution of these requirements.

a. **Requirements Development.** Requirements development is the process of defining actual requirements for contracted support that include detailed cost, performance, and scheduling information necessary to make these requests “procurement-ready.” This process is normally a tactical-level requiring activity function, but in some cases, it can and should be done at the operational level by a Service component or subordinate JFC’s HQ staff, often with the assistance of supporting contingency contracting activity or CAP planning personnel. In some operations, it may be necessary for the GCC or subordinate JFC to establish and publish standards of support. Standardized support requirements are especially important when it comes to minor construction. In some operations, standards of support can also be an important JFC tool to reduce contracted costs across the force.

*JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; and JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations, provide additional information on JFC-established standards of support.*

**REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION CHALLENGE**

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, an Army aviation brigade needed to renovate a building on forward operating base (FOB) Taji. Because of the estimated cost and type of project (minor construction), this requirement required both joint acquisition review board and joint facilities utilization board approval. Since this unit had no engineering expertise on staff, they requested technical assistance from the FOB engineering office, an Air Force Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers, in developing their contract support requirements package. Once approved, the package was sent to Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, which assigned it to the regional contracting center (RCC) Taji. The RCC Taji contracting officer then prepared the solicitation, compared bids, and because the “Iraqi First” program was in effect, awarded the contract to a local construction company. Once the contract was awarded, the Iraqi company had 30 days to complete all work not including Friday “Holy Days” and any delays caused by the government. Since this was a minor construction contract, the unit was required to provide a contracting officer representative (COR) to ensure work was completed IAW [in accordance with] the contract. Again, because this Army unit had no engineer expertise on staff, they went to a local Air Force unit to seek assistance in validating the technical related COR checks. Additionally, since the vendor and his employees were local nationals, the unit was required to provide an armed escort for its employees. This renovation project took approximately 70 days to complete from the time of identification of the requirement to time of completion of the work.

*SOURCE: Contracting Officer, Taji Regional Contracting Center*
b. **Requiring Activity Responsibilities.** Requiring activities are responsible, IAW local command policies, for ensuring appropriate approvals are received, adequate funding is available, and trained requirements management personnel (e.g., unit provided CORs, technical inspectors, and/or receiving officials) are identified prior to submitting the contract support requirements package for approval. Requiring activities also need to take procurement lead time into consideration as they conduct their requirements development planning. Prior to submitting the contract request to a supporting contracting office or the JRRB as directed by JFC policy, the requiring activity clearly determines performance, cost, schedule, and risk, to include:

1. A general description of the required supply, services, or construction.
2. A cost estimate based on market research.
3. Requested supply and/or service delivery dates/period of required performance.
4. GFP plan (if applicable).
5. AGS requirements or constraints for any anticipated contractor personnel (if applicable).

*Detailed discussion on the requirements development process can be found in ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support.*

c. **Requirements Approval.** Requirements approval authorities should be decentralized and delegated to subordinate levels to the extent possible. The requirements approval authorities are provided by the GCC to a subordinate JFC and the components. A subordinate JFC may further delegate requirements approval authorities to subordinate commands. The decentralization of requirements approval authorities, while requiring these commands to establish a separate JRRB-like process, facilitates more responsive contracted support to the subordinate commands. It also facilitates more operationally-focused validation and risk assessment process based on current and projected operational factors. Finally, this process includes verification of the availability of the proper type and amount of funds to pay for the requirement, possible consolidation of the common requirements guidance, and an opportunity to provide prioritization guidance. The higher-level command may retain approval authority for command-interest items (e.g., armed private security contracts and FP).

1. **Validation.** Depending on the type and estimated cost of the requirement, as well as local command policies, the contract support requirements package may be subject to numerous staff reviews to ensure the requested contract support is a valid, mission-driven requirement. Common staff reviews include:

   a. Staff judge advocate (SJA) supporting the commander exercising requirement approval authority reviews contract support requirements for legal sufficiency. These legal reviews encompass funding sources and constraints, contracting methods, and associated issues. They also include operational and jurisdictional issues concerning HN
agreements, security agreements, and other contractor personnel-related issues. Legal reviews should also address any statutory and regulatory issues, as well as any other pertinent issues (e.g., appropriateness of armed PSC support) that may not have a statutory or regulatory basis but do reflect appropriate judgment and analysis for the best decision.

(b) Manpower review to assess suitability of services for sourcing via contracting per DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.

(c) Security, FP, and antiterrorism (AT) that involve contracted services with performance on a military-controlled base/facility or in the vicinity of US forces.

(d) Communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) review of communications or information technology-related commodity and/or service requests.

(e) Supply officer review of all commodities requests to ensure the item is not readily available through normal military channels.

(f) Joint facilities utilization board review for minor construction requests.

(g) Civil affairs review for possible civil-military impact matters.

(h) Comptroller reviews JRRB packets to ensure proper type and amount of funds are available to pay for the requested contracted support.

(2) Requirements Consolidation. Service component commands assigned as the LSC should consider consolidation of contracted service and supply requirements under a single designated management activity as part of this process. The JRRB may sometimes serve as a forum to determine recommended contract requirement consolidation. Additionally, the CLPSB provides a forum to develop OCS requirements management strategies to determine how CUL requirements will be managed (decentralized/tactical level or centralized/operational level). Advantages of consolidation of contract requirements include:

(a) Increased JFC and Service component commander control of mission-critical, often limited LN, contracted services and commonalities.

(b) A reduction in subordinate unit requirements development and supporting contracting organization workload.

(c) Better enforcement of common standards of support.

(d) More effective and efficient contracting, including increased economies of scale and reduced contract cost.

(e) Reduced requirements for deployed contingency contracting personnel.

(3) Requirements Prioritization. While there are no formal procedures for how contract requests are prioritized, each subordinate joint force command and component
command should establish their own procedures on how to prioritize for major mission-critical, high-dollar contracted service requests. Components should establish their own mechanism to establish contracted support priorities for a contract support request not meeting the JRRB thresholds. The JRRB, as described above and in Appendix C, “Operational Contract Support-Related Boards and Working Groups,” is a good mechanism to establish these priorities.


d. Post-Contract Award Oversight. Commanders at all levels must understand contract oversight requires significant planning and management efforts, starting with the subordinate JFC staff but mostly focused on Service and SOF component requiring activities, supported units, and the supporting contracting activities. And, while the servicing contracting activities are legally responsible for contractor compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract, it is the requiring activity’s responsibility to assist in the process. More importantly, it is a requiring activity and operational command staff responsibility, not a contracting activity responsibility, to assess and report readiness impacts of the contracted services within their mission areas in routine command updates and reports.

(1) Quality Surveillance and Other Non-Contracting Activity-Related Support Requirements. For services and construction contracts, the JFC and component commanders must ensure there are sufficient contract-qualified oversight personnel (CORs and associated technical inspectors, if necessary) available to adequately monitor contractor performance, to include both technical and tactical matters as required by the approved quality assurance surveillance plan. While direct COR tracking is not normally a subordinate JFC function, the OCSIC should monitor, assess, and report general COR trends and take applicable actions to address major COR-related issues. In addition to CORs, units in need of contracted commodities are responsible for identifying and making available requisite receiving officials. These receiving officials are responsible for ensuring the commodities received meet the contract-related quality, quantity, and delivery stipulations. Additional non-COR support, such as personnel to perform security checks and/or escort the contractor personnel, may also be required. For cost-type contracts, there is also a periodic need to revalidate requirements and ensure the contractor is operating efficiently. Without proper command involvement and post-contract award oversight capabilities in place, the JFC is likely to experience significantly increased operational costs and, more importantly, increased risks to forces and mission.

(2) Assessing Contract Execution Readiness Impact and Determining Future Need. Another important part of a post-contract award oversight process is tracking and assessing the mission impact of key mission-critical contracted services (Figure III-4). This key OCS function begins at the requiring activity level but should be fully integrated into the Service (and SOF if applicable) component’s and JFC’s overall command readiness assessments and reporting processes. Again, while the supporting contracting activity is responsible for the legal aspects of contractor compliance, the
requiring activity, ICW the appropriate staff section, is responsible for analyzing and reporting the overall effectiveness and efficiency of contracted logistic supplies or services and other support capabilities (e.g., line-haul trucking, signal support, translator services), to include any related force readiness impacts. The primary focus of this process is on contractor performance effectiveness as it relates to force readiness, but there should at
least be some measures of efficiency as well to ensure the deployed force is getting proper value for its investment. Another key component of the oversight process is ensuring the contracted support being provided is properly matched to changing mission requirements. This task requires close and deliberate assessments of the contract, to include period of performance, possible changes to area of performance, and reduced need or increased demand. Again, the requiring activity is the lead for tracking their contracts, but it is also responsible for ensuring these contracts are considered in any future plans effort that may require a contract change or task order modification. Close coordination with the supporting contracting activity is imperative in this contract change/task order modification or close out process. In extended operations, the subordinate JFC and/or major support commands should consider instituting a formal CCORB, especially in long-term, OCS-centric operations.

See ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support, for more information on tactical-level, post-contract award requirements management.

4. Other Key Considerations

There are numerous other OCS planning and execution considerations that must be weighed by the supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders. These considerations range from establishing and maintaining an OCS information tracking process to arranging common contracting support in multinational operations to determining the civil-military impact of OCS in major operations requiring stability activities. The following paragraphs provide a general discussion on the challenges related to these OCS considerations.

a. Vendor Threat Mitigation and Prohibition on Providing Funds to the Enemy. As part of OCS risk assessments within the planning and execution processes, the JFC and supporting contracting activities must ensure all contracting actions are in compliance with US law, to include ensuring DOD-related in-theater contracts with local contractors do not provide indirect support to our adversaries. IAW DTM-18-003, Prohibition on Providing Funds to the Enemy and Authorization of Additional Access to Records, DOD components must establish and follow processes, procedures, and practices for ID of covered persons or entities.

b. OCS Information Management. The OCSIC provides the commander and staff with situational awareness and visibility of key OCS-related information. This information supports the decision making and mitigation of risk associated with use of contracted supplies and services to support military forces conducting CCDR-directed missions. OCS information management begins with OCSIC staff participation in the planning process and other JFC-directed battle rhythm events. Such participation is necessary to gain situational awareness of general command matters, to understand what OCS information is needed to support such organizational cross-function events, and to answer JFC requests for information (RFIs).
(1) The OCSIC generally does not own or create the data it needs to meet commander’s informational requirements, so they must communicate and coordinate data and information management objectives across the staff, as well as with selected subordinate and supporting commands and activities. In order for the OCSIC to provide timely analysis of OCS data, it must:

(a) Determine key data requirements.

(b) Develop a list of sources and develop a plan on how this data will be collected.

(c) Coordinate a data collection plan with appropriate subordinate commands and supporting activities.

(d) Promulgate data collection guidance in appropriate command order (normally annex W [Operational Contract Support] FRAGORD) or OCS standard operating procedures.

(e) Coordinate data collection efforts.

(2) Determining what major OCS data points need to be collected, tracked, and, most importantly, analyzed can be a challenge and varies based on the level of command. Selection of OCS-related reporting requirements and measurements depends on specific mission factors such as type of operation, time available, scope of contracted support, and any specific OCS-related command guidance. However, there are some common data elements that are generally useful to OCSIC personnel and that can be aggregated to develop a baseline for local and higher HQ organizations and support reporting on matters that could have strategic consequence to the GCC. Typically, a subordinate joint force OCSIC develops a site picture that includes:

(a) Location, capacities, and points of contact of subordinate OCS staffs, contingency contracting organizations, and Service CAP activities.

(b) Location of primary commercial centers.

(c) Information on major contractor companies.

(d) List of critical contracted support capabilities, to include the contract number, period of performance, requirement owner, and COR status.

(e) Contractor personnel numbers and locations (shared function with the J-1).

(f) Open RFIs and issue reports.

(3) Another OCSIC information management task is determining what OCS-related specific essential elements of information should be designated for subordinate commands to report to the OCSIC and if any of these elements should be submitted as potential commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). While most OCS
information will not reach official CCIR level, the following are examples of information that should be treated as essential information for the OCSIC:

(a) CAAF (or LN working on US facility) death.

(b) Contractor performance issue that could lead to major degradation of mission-essential support function or excessive costs.

(c) Contracted support issue that could lead to discrediting the JFC’s objectives or otherwise attract significant negative media attentions.

(d) Congressional report, inspector general audit or investigation.

(4) Data sources, timelines, and OCSIC methodology for data collection varies based on information needed and the tools or systems available. Many systems support execution of the three OCS functions, but the OCSIC does not decide which systems activities will use. Decisions on which systems will support the operation are determined by policy and/or made at the Service component level. However, OCSIC personnel need to be aware of the capabilities of the systems so they can make recommendations on the use of systems to the functional owners, request access to reports, and implement methods to address known data gaps. Pulling together data from multiple sources is a complex task. To help address this challenge, USD(A&S) and JS J-4 (Operational Contract Support Division) coordinate information requirements across the OCS community to develop tools that support access to joint data sources and training to help users tackle answering commonly asked questions. The OCS Data Analysis Guide can help answer OCS information requirements and conduct unique, detailed analyses using source system reports, explained via text, video tutorials, and real examples. The OCS Data Analysis Guide can be accessed at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ocs/SitePages/Data%20Analysis%20Guide.aspx.

(5) Once OCSIC personnel understand the target information requirements and systems available, they update the OCS data collection plan either through a formal annex W (Operational Contract Support) FRAGORD or through routine communications with appropriate staff and subordinate commands. Collected data is not actionable information until it has been properly analyzed. OCSIC staff should look at the collected data elements for relevant trends and potential major mission impacts. Data analysis assistance, depending on the data subject, can come from applicable joint force functional staff; supporting CSAs; and, subordinate command OCS staff, SCO, and CAP management personnel. The OCSIC uses this coordinated knowledge to refine their information requirements, prioritize data collection efforts, and to refine information gathering procedures.

(6) The final step in OCSIC information management is to communicate key analyzed information to appropriate command and staff. The OCSIC typically communicates this information through commander update briefings and various logistics reports using the formats preferred by the local organization. The OCSIC also communicates this information through other staff through normal battle rhythm events, the command’s RFI process, and between other OCS activities and staff.
c. **Shaping Activities (Support).** While sometimes overlooked, OCS is a significant enabler during non-contingency-related shaping activities. In fact, most shaping activities are entirely supported by contracted support vice military sources. These sources can provide the CCMD OCSIC with significant information through the OCS analysis of the OE. Historically, DOD has been challenged to provide sufficient warranted or otherwise authorized personnel (i.e., credit card holders) to be able to conduct procurement support of security cooperation activities. While DOS personnel can provide some assistance (i.e., suggest sources of supplies and services), DOD is inherently responsible for executing procurements in support of military-related requirements. Additionally, OCS planners should be aware of special challenges when planning and executing contract support in shaping-related activities, to include lack of contingency acquisition authorities/waivers (i.e., contract support must be executed IAW peacetime contracting procedures), lack of contingency funding, and lack of applicability and clarity of some contractor personnel policies and laws. For additional guidance, see OSD DPC’s Procurement Support of Theater Security Cooperation Efforts Website at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/security_assistance_efforts.html.

d. **SOF Support.** GCCs, ICW their aligned TSOC and the appropriate Service component commands, collectively plan for SOF logistic support, often to include significant amounts of contracted support. SOF support can be challenging, as SOF often operate in remote locations, sometimes conducting operations with very limited notice. Except for SOF-peculiar systems support, contracted support to deployed SOF will normally be provided by their parent Service contracting activity or, in cases where SOF units are colocated with conventional forces, through GCC-designated CUL and/or BOS-I arrangements. In cases where there is no readily available Service, CUL, or BOS-I contracted support, USSOCOM may deploy contingency contracting capabilities utilizing USSOCOM contracting authority to support SOF normally for short-duration missions or until other support arrangements can be put in place.

e. **Multinational Support.** The JFC, components, and supporting CSAs must be cognizant of challenges and potential pitfalls on planning and executing major levels of contracted support in a multinational environment. Efforts should be taken to arrange multinational contracting support for common locally procured supplies and services when feasible. At a minimum, the US force coordinates and deconflicts major local procurements with any multinational partner that could be in competition for the same local contractor base. This coordination effort should also cover adjacent and in-transit countries used by two or more partner nations.

(1) **Planning and coordination.** Major challenges to planning contracted support in a multinational environment include nationalization of selected industries in wartime, funding processes, freedom of movement for local and foreign labor between countries, quality of support standards, requirements generation and post-contract award quality surveillance processes, and language barriers. At a minimum, there should be a contracting coordination and information sharing process established in the multinational HQ in which the US would participate. Other coordination requirements would be based on the contracting support arrangement applicable to the individual multinational operation.
(2) **Common multinational contracting support arrangement options.** Recent operational lessons and insights indicate there are three primary contracting arrangements utilized in major multinational operations:

(a) **Support to own national forces.** In this option, there are no mutual contracting arrangements in place, and contributing nations execute contracting in support of their own forces. Key to success in this arrangement is coordination and deconfliction of locally sourced contracts.

(b) **US support to multinational partners.** In this support arrangement, multinational partner nations are provided common items and services through existing US contract support arrangements, which will normally be through locally sourced theater support contracts, reachback, and/or CAP task orders. This type of multinational contracting arrangement is generally tied to designated lead/role specialist nation designation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations.

(c) **Alliance-provided support of deployed US forces.** This multinational support arrangement can come in two forms, multilateral support from an alliance contracting activity or bilateral support for a single, lead nation, existing operational contract arrangement. An example of alliance multinational support contracting arrangement is found in NATO through their NATO Support Procurement Agency. Bilateral support arrangements are a more limited-support arrangement, where certain US forces, normally a single component force operating separately from the majority of US forces, receive limited, commercially provided common supplies and services through existing contract support arrangements of a single alliance or coalition country.

*Additional details on multinational contracted support can be found in Appendix F, “Multinational Contracted Support.”*

(3) **Contract Oversight.** Providing contract oversight, especially CORs, for DOD contracts in multinational operations can be a significant challenge. The acquisition policy required option is to provide on-site governmental personnel to perform COR functions. Additionally, multinational military and civilian employees of a foreign government can be designated CORs when needed.

See DODI 5000.72, DOD Standard for Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Certification, for more information on COR standards.

f. **Interagency and NGO Support.** Similar to multinational support, US forces may be required to provide CUL support to both USG departments and agencies and NGOs. In many operations, DOD support to USG departments and agencies and NGOs is limited in scope and may not pose a significant challenge to the supported GCC and subordinate JFC. However, in DSCA, FHA, and some stability activities, significant effort may be required to synchronize JFC, interagency, and NGO planning. In most cases, a lead Service will provide this support through theater support contracts or CAP task orders or combination of both. Key to the success of interagency support is ensuring CCMD planners, to include the OCSIC, are aware of, and are involved in, interagency and NGO planning efforts.
Planners should address specific DOD contracting support responsibilities to other USG departments and agencies and NGO operations, to include specific requirements, as this shapes the operational limitations for the JFC and the subordinate commanders. Coordination channels to the supported interagency partners and NGOs should be included early in the planning cycle and included as part of the orders process including coordination mechanisms and funding procedures (e.g., Economy Act reimbursement or cite to specific Foreign Assistance Act authority) to manage this support in the operational area.

See JP 3-07, Stability; JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for more information. Additional interagency support discussion can also be found in Appendix E, “Stabilize-Enable Civil Authorities Transition Planning and Processes.”

g. **OCS Aspects of IFO.** The JFC, Service components, and supporting contracting officials should be aware that OCS actions can affect more than just the quality and timeliness of forces support. Contracted support, whether intended or not, can produce both positive and negative effects on the civil-military aspects of the operation. Theater support contracts, and in some cases external support contracts such as the Service CAP task orders, utilize local contractor and subcontractor companies and employees to provide goods and services in support of the joint force. Planned and integrated properly, use of contracted support can indirectly support the key IFO aspects to build the local economy, promote goodwill with the local populace, and contribute to long-term HN economic growth and stability. Done without proper planning and oversight, these actions can lead to potentially serious problems that, in some situations, may undermine the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives.

(1) As described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, the OE includes a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems. In major, long-term operations, contracted support can have a significant impact on all PMESII systems. This point is especially true when conducting COIN and SFA missions. Therefore, it is imperative contracted support in these types of missions be carefully planned and closely coordinated with all major multinational and interagency partners, especially with the chief of mission (COM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). When integrating contracted support into IFO planning and execution, a proper understanding of the OE typically requires cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements, supporting contracting organizations, various intelligence organizations, major USG departments and agencies, and possibly NGO centers that possess relevant expertise to ensure these actions support IFO and the JFC’s overall plan.

(2) In COIN and SFA-related missions, all major contract actions must be synchronized, monitored, deconflicted, and, most importantly, measured. This ensures these contracts are properly supported and are not detrimental to the key IFO-related aspects of providing funds for economic development and infrastructure projects that win the support of a local population and separate the population from an insurgency. Understanding who benefits from contracting actions by thoroughly vetting potential vendors for possible security concerns and other threats to the mission or US interests in
general, encouraging contractors to hire and mentor local firms, and considering local standards and methods (whenever possible and practicable) when building contract support requirements packages will ensure contract actions are properly aligned to mission objectives. Also, understanding the impact of unique contractor-provided services (e.g., use of armed PSCs) and/or general contract behavior that can have a direct impact on the local populace is also a major consideration. Chapter V, “Contractor Management,” of this publication includes more detail on PSCs and other contractor personnel matters.

(3) In some major COIN and SFA-focused operations, special processes and organizations may be required to ensure OCS and IFO actions are properly monitored, analyzed, and integrated across the command. In these types of operations, consideration must be given to establishing special teams, including, but not limited to, contractor security vetting cells and interagency IFO task forces. All OCS and IFO actions must be compliant with US laws and sanctions. A special team or task force is not always necessary and can be manpower intensive. Regardless of necessity of a special team or task force, compliance and regulatory requirements still apply and due diligence requirements must be met. These special teams and task forces are established to prevent contracting with individuals and entities who pose an unacceptable threat to the mission and to national security interests.

More information on the civil-military aspects of OCS and IFO synchronization challenges can be found in JP 1-06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations.

h. Fiscal Authorities. It is vitally important to ensure inter-Service support agreements are considered when planning and executing contract support. Special attention must be given to funds that are used during stability activities to ensure proper funding for DOS-related support (IAW Title 22, USC) and special mission-specific programs such as the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. In all operations, careful attention should be paid to ensure proper separation of unspecified minor military construction funded through operations and maintenance funds and unspecified and specified military construction actions funded through military construction appropriation funds. Additionally, the JFC must be cognizant of issues related to the transition from DOD funding to efforts financed by USAID, specifically, fiscal law reviews from the requiring organization.

See DODI 4000.19, Support Agreements, for more information.

Additional information on fiscal authorities and types of funds can be found in JP 1-06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations.

i. Transition To Civil Authorities/Drawdown. Transitioning from a stabilize to enable civil authorities phase and/or large-scale force drawdown efforts in a major operation will almost always include significant OCS-related challenges. In preparation for transition/drawdown, the subordinate JFC should strongly consider augmenting the OCSIC to perform this function. This temporary augmentation would most likely come from selected GCC’s and subordinate JFC’s staff members, along with additional LNOs from designated JFC contract support-related organizations and key USG department and agency
partners. The focus of this effort is to ensure contracted support, with associated CAAF and selected non-CAAF, as well as associated contractor equipment, is fully considered and incorporated into the subordinate JFC’s transition/drawdown plan. The OCS-related portion of the drawdown plan must be closely coordinated with the J-4 and J-5 and, likewise, its execution must be closely coordinated with the J-3. Additionally, the OCSIC would help to coordinate descoping of contract requirements and contracts, as well as planning the transition of any remaining contracted support to the appropriate multinational, HN, COM, or other USG department and agency partner. Part of the descoping will include redeployment of remaining CAAF and selected non-CAAF personnel and associated equipment.

Additional stabilize-enable civil authorities’ transition information can be found in Appendix E, “Stabilize-Enable Civil Authorities Transition Planning and Processes.”

j. HD and DSCA. Planning for and managing contracted support in HD and DSCA operations has similarities, as well as significant differences, from planning for and managing contracted support in foreign military operations. For example, utilizing systems support contracts in a DSCA mission is similar to utilizing systems support contracts in foreign contingencies except for the fact that the contractor personnel integration challenges may be significantly less due to a lower threat level and less stringent predeployment requirements. As described below, planning and execution of theater support and external support contracting in HD operations or DSCA missions can differ significantly from how we plan and execute this support in a foreign operation.

(1) HD. DOD is the lead federal agency (LFA) for all HD operations and, therefore, leads the HD response, with other USG departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts. In HD operations, Services are generally responsible for providing
contracting support to their own forces in conjunction with HD missions, whether inside the continental US or outside the continental US.

See JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, for more information on HD operations.

(2) DSCA. Normally, as delegated by the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the LFA during domestic incident responses. When required, US Northern Command and US Indo-Pacific Command will plan and execute DSCA missions within their AORs as directed by the President or SecDef. Additionally, both the US Army Corps of Engineers and DLA have DSCA emergency response missions in DS to FEMA, which are not executed under the command authority of a GCC. Generally, military-related disaster assistance comes in the form of military forces operating under a mission assignment from FEMA. The key value of military support is it deploys with significant internal logistics and other support capabilities. Contracted support to deployed joint forces in DSCA operations is generally very limited but may increase the scope and scale in a catastrophic, multi-state event that requires much larger-scale and more long-term military support. Military-related contracted support is focused on providing support to DOD forces operating in support of the DSCA operation, not support to local authorities or local population. The main exceptions to this rule are the US Army Corps of Engineers and DLA, which may contract specific recovery efforts directly related to their federally approved emergency response functions executed outside of the GCC’s command authority. Key advantages to contracted support in domestic operations are the well-documented industrial base and the well-developed contracting infrastructure; however, contracted support in DSCA operations is, for the most part, sourced from outside the disaster area, as the local vendor base will often not be available due to the effects of the disaster and, if it is, should be prioritized for first responder, not DOD, access. When performing DSCA missions, the contracting activity will normally provide most tactical-level contracting support to military forces operating in their designated support area. Service contingency contracting teams or from individual augmentees to the contracting activities may provide additional support. The actual size of this contingency contracting team or individual augmentation support depends on the mission. There should be a designated lead contracting activity responsible for common contracting actions for DSCA missions. Key DSCA-related OCS principles and planning considerations follow:

(a) FEMA is the LFA responsible for coordinating contracting support to disaster relief operations with the General Services Administration serving as the primary source for FEMA contracting capability augmentation.

(b) DOD does not augment other federal agencies with contracting staff but could, in unusual circumstances, perform specific emergency response-related, contracting-related tasks as directed by the President or SecDef.

(c) While DOD is not the LFA, the LSC’s contracting organization should continuously coordinate with other federal, state, local, and tribal contracting operations to avoid competing for limited local commercial resources.
(d) All contracting actions must be executed IAW the law (Title 42, USC, Chapter 68, Section 5121, The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act), which requires preference for hiring contractors from the affected area.

(e) Established DOD contractor management (accountability, theater entry) policies and contract clauses do not apply to domestic operations; any mission-specific contractor management policies will have to be developed and issued on a mission-by-mission basis and coordinated directly with supporting contracting activities and as necessary with OSD DPC for DOD-wide implementation.

(f) Contract oversight requirements (e.g., CORs, receiving officials) still apply.

For information on DSCA operations, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

(3) Operations under Title 32, USC. There are many domestic operations that are conducted at the state level by Army National Guard and Air National Guard units providing military support under state active duty or Title 32, USC, authority. When NG units deploy within their states and territories, they normally receive contracting support from their home station. In these situations, they will usually have several government purchase card holders with the unit and, when required, warranted contracting officers from the US Property and Fiscal Office, Purchasing and Contracting Division. These are generally short-term deployments such as disaster response. When the NG has contracting personnel shortages in a particular state, the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB’s) Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting will coordinate with the appropriate property and fiscal office(s) or Air National Guard base contracting office(s) in other states to provide short-term contracting personnel support augmentation to the state requesting assistance. In some cases, NGB’s Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting may also form and dispatch a “contracting tiger team” of experienced contracting personnel that is capable of soliciting, awarding, and administering large service and military construction contracts. At all times, NG contracting offices have authority to obligate federal funds in support of active component forces. Active component forces may establish support agreements with NG contracting offices to provide contracting support during HD or DSCA operations.

k. FHA. FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the US. FHA operations are generally limited-notice, short-duration where US military support is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. Similar to DSCA operations, DOD is not the LFA for FHA operations. In this case, the LFA will be USAID. When it is determined DOD will provide FHA support, USAID requests this support through, what is called, a mission tasking matrix (MITAM) order process. These MITAM requests for DOD support, with very few exceptions, will be executed via organic military support capabilities, not via contracted services; hence, any contracted support in FHA operations will normally be focused solely on support to deployed forces. And, even though contracted support will most likely be limited in FHA operations, the JFC must still ensure the military use of this support does not impede or compete with USAID, HN, or NGO contracted support efforts. To alleviate competition for resources and to synchronize contracted support, USAID, other USG departments and
CONTRACT SUPPORT IN A NEAR NO-NOTICE FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE MISSION

In the fall of 2014, the President directed the US military to support international efforts to combat the West African Ebola crisis. Under the direction of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA) was initiated in Liberia under a task force initially headed by US Army Africa. Shortly thereafter, OUA leadership was transitioned to the 101st Airborne Division. During planning for this no-notice event, USAFRICOM staff looked closely at operational contract support (OCS) aspects of the mission and issued the following senior leader guidance: 1) look at OCS as a possible exit strategy and 2) do no harm to host nation commerce through OCS. In execution, OCS played a major role in military tasks issued by the lead federal agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Specifically, USAID tasked the military to set up numerous Ebola treatment units (ETUs) in Liberia, which ended up being constructed via commercial means. While this type of foreign humanitarian assistance task would typically be executed by international relief agencies, force health protection issues associated with the Ebola outbreak prevented these relief agencies from taking on the ETU build task; hence, why it eventually was tasked to US military. In a unique twist to this inter-US governmental tasking, the military force determined contracted labor support as the best course of action despite health threats as US organic construction capability was not readily available for this mission. This contracted labor, however, was under the technical supervision of the US Navy Construction Battalion (Seabees) personnel. In addition to the ETU construction contract, the Army-based task force utilized the logistic civil augmentation program task order to provide base operating support to the deployed US force.

Various Sources

See JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), for more information.

1. Urgent Systems Development Process. While not a direct part of OCS, ongoing operations may lead to the ID of urgent operational needs (UONs) for a new or modified materiel system. UONs are appropriate for systems gaps that may lead to mission failure or unacceptable loss of life if not satisfied by a rapidly acquired capability solution. Joint urgent operational needs (JUONs) are UONs affecting two or more DOD components. JUONs are validated through a streamlined staffing process to allow rapid acquisition efforts to field a capability solution in an expedited time frame. JUONs must be endorsed by the CCDR, CCMD deputy commander, or CCMD chief of staff. The Joint Staff J-8 [Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate] is the validation authority for JUONs. See CJCSI 5123.01, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), for more information.
CHAPTER IV
CONTRACTING SUPPORT

1. Overview

Many DOD contracting activities and authorities provide contracts with an area of performance in, or supply delivery to, the operational area. These activities include, but may not be limited to, Service contingency contracting organizations, stateside Service contracting centers providing various external and systems support contracts, DLA major subordinate commands, DOD construction agents, USTRANSCOM, and even USSOCOM. Information on the Service contracting capabilities can be found in ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support. While much of the support provided by these contracting activities is Service-specific, there is a need for joint planning and CCDR guidance related to contingency contracting capabilities to ensure effective and efficient use of locally available, mission-critical, or command special-interest items. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on organization, roles, and CCDR-assigned tasks of Service contingency contracting organizations and their role, not just in providing theater support contracts but coordinating other contracting efforts in the operational area.

2. In-Theater Contracting Organization

a. While not necessary for single-Service operations, the GCC may designate an LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC in joint operations to ensure effective and efficient use of local commercial vendor base and to coordinate common contracting actions with designated

LACK OF CONTRACTING COORDINATION AND PRIORITIZATION FOR MISSION-CRITICAL ITEMS EXAMPLE

Early on in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, an unexpected change in the force protection/security posture caused what became a significant force protection materiel acquisition crisis. The change resulted in a significant unplanned demand for additional force protection materiel, particularly large concrete barriers capable of protecting buildings and personnel from explosive effects of both indirect fire and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks. At the time of the change, there was no plan of how to collectively acquire or even prioritize force protection materiel from the Joint Task Force (JTF) J-3 Force Protection/Security staff. Instead, there was an uncoordinated effort of various Service contracting activities competing against each other to purchase these mission-critical force protection-related items. Each Service’s efforts were based on a first-in, first-out prioritization process within each supporting contracting activity. Eventually, the JTF designated a lead contracting activity to consolidate purchases of these items and distribute them through military-controlled supply support activities to requesting units based on JTF J-3-established priorities.

Various Sources
contracting activities in support of the specific operation. The GCC may also choose to establish an LSCC (or LSCCs) in shaping activities and, in some cases, an LSC for specific high-priority countries or regions or security cooperation activity support to assist the CCMD-level OCSIC in planning as part of the CCMD campaign plan. A summary of these options and how they are tasked is depicted in Figure IV-1.

b. Contingency contracting organizational options are dependent on the specific mission CUL and BOS-I and other operational factors, to include estimated OCS requirements and extant Service component contracting activity capabilities existing in or near the operational area. Additionally, contingency contracting organizational requirements may change as the operation progresses. In any case, the contingency contracting organization structure should be planned and specifically addressed in annex W (Operational Contract Support), appendix 1 (Summary of Contracting Capabilities and Capacities Support Estimate), by phase of operation when possible. Common factors used to determine the appropriate contingency contracting organizational option are discussed in detail in Appendix B, “Theater Support Contingency Contracting Organizational Options.”

c. **Lead Service Options.** There are two lead Service theater support contracting organizational arrangements: LSCC and LSC. The LSCC is a contracting coordination and
advisory function that includes administering and chairing the JCSB as directed by the JFC. Of note, in this contracting organizational arrangement, the Services provide contracting support to their own forces. The LSC includes the contracting coordination and advisory functions but also acquires CUL and/or BOS-I-related contracted supplies and services for a particular operational area as directed by the GCC.

(1) **LSCC.** The GCC may designate a specific Service component to perform LSCC functions. In this role, the LSCC’s designated contingency contracting activity is responsible for coordinating theater support contracting and other common external support contract actions for a particular geographical region, normally a country, region, or joint operations area (JOA). The LSCC contracting activity will also assist the subordinate joint force OCSIC (if established) in contract capabilities and business information analysis of OCS aspects of the OE matters. This lead Service organizational option is most appropriate for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities/shaping activities operations, as well as smaller-scale, short-notice, and short-duration operations. In this organizational option, the Services retain C2 and contracting authority over their deployed theater support contracting organizations, but a designated lead Service coordinates common contracting actions within the operational area through a JCSB or JCSB-like process as directed in annex W (Operational Contract Support). This organizational option is also applicable to operations where the bulk of the individual Service component units will be operating in distinctly different areas of the JOA, thus limiting potential competition for the same vendor base. In most operations, the LSCC’s contracting activity will either be the Army or Air Force component during contingencies due to other Services’ limited theater support contracting capabilities.

(a) Advantages of the LSCC organizational option:

1. Does not require adjustments to theater support contracting C2 or HCA authorities.

2. Does not require any changes to Service component-established habitual C2 or support relationships, standard contracting procedures, or financial support arrangements between contracting organizations and their supported units.

3. Does not require joint manning document (JMD) establishment and fill.

4. Services retain control in meeting their Title 10, USC, responsibilities, to include financial arrangements in administration and support of their forces assigned or attached to CCMDs.

(b) Disadvantages of the LSCC organizational option:

1. Less efficient use of limited Service contracting officer capability.

2. Provides less direct JFC control of theater support contracting and priorities of support.
LSC. The GCC may designate a specific Service component as the LSC responsible for GCC-designated theater support contracting. Normally, this is the Service component with the preponderance of forces and having significant CUL/BOS-I responsibilities in the operational area. In this organizational construct, the designated Service component contracting activity is responsible for providing theater support contracting, along with associated funding arrangements, for specified common commodities and common services for a particular geographical region, normally a JOA or major expeditionary base. Additionally, the lead Service supporting financial management activity is responsible for coordinating an inter-Service support agreement, IAW DODI 4000.19, Support Agreements, as appropriate. The LSC option is most appropriate for smaller-scale, long-term-duration operations when a single Service has a preponderance of forces. Similar to the LSCC construct, the designated Service component contracting activity is responsible for coordinating common contracting with designated external support contract agencies through a JCSB or JCSB-like process.

(a) Advantages of the LSC organizational option:

1. Decreases the likelihood of competition for limited local vendor base and affords greater opportunity to reduce or eliminate redundant contracts or to promote cost avoidance through leveraged buys and economies of scale.

2. Provides more efficient theater support contracting by leveraging lead Service contracting capabilities to support all Service component forces.

3. Does not require JMD establishment and fill.

(b) Disadvantages of the LSC organizational option:

1. Changes some Service component habitual C2 or support relationships, standard contracting procedures, and/or financial support arrangements between contracting organizations and their supported units.

2. Provides less direct JFC control of theater support contracting actions and priorities of support than JTSCC option.

3. Requires special finance arrangements, possibly including inter-Service agreements.

4. If contracting officers from other Services or CSAs are detailed to the lead Service contracting activity, requires new procedures to warrant contracting officers from other Services and CSAs, along with associated training on the LSC’s contracting activity-specified contracting procedures.

Appendix B, “Theater Support Contingency Contracting Organizational Options,” provides more details on the LSC organizational construct.

d. JTSCC. The JTSCC is a functionally focused JTF with C2, normally tactical control, and contracting authority over contracting personnel assigned and/or organizations
attached within a designated operational area, normally a JOA. The JTSCC’s contracting authority is delegated by the SPE of the Service component designated by the GCC to form the nucleus to the JTSCC. Because contracting authority is not resident in CCMD Service components but instead provided by their parent Military Departments, contracting authority arrangements must be worked out as part of the planning process and as far in advance as practicable. When the Service SPEs cannot come to agreement on JTSCC contracting authority arrangements, the issue will have to be elevated to OSD for resolution. The JTSCC normally reports directly to a subordinate JFC and executes all theater support contracting and any delegated CCAS actions, as well as coordinates contracting matters with designated contracting organizations executing or delivering contracted support within the JOA. The JTSCC organization option is most applicable to larger, long-duration, or more complex stabilize and enable civil authority activities, where the subordinate JFC requires more direct control of common contracting actions than what can typically be provided through either of the lead Service support contracting organizational options.

(1) Advantages of the JTSCC organizational option:

(a) Decreases the likelihood of competition for limited local vendor base and affords greater opportunity to reduce or eliminate redundant contracts or to promote cost avoidance through leveraged buys and economies of scale.

(b) Allows for efficient use of the limited contracting professional staff across the operational area.

(c) Increases the JFC’s ability to enforce a baseline for standards for support.

(d) Allows the JFC to have better control and visibility of the overall theater support contracting and CCAS effort.

(e) Increases the JFC’s ability to link contract support to the civil-military aspects of the OPLAN.

(2) Disadvantages of the JTSCC organizational option:

(a) Requires implementing new organizations, C2 relationships, and contracting procedures.

(b) May require extensive reachback contracting support, complicating coordination efforts, and extending procurement lead times.

(c) May require more lead time to get JMD approval and fill.

(d) Requires a Service to issue HCA designation orders.

(e) May require additional authorities from USD(A&S) to achieve control over all contracting efforts supporting the operational area.
(f) Requires continuing interface and support from OSD to implement policies that affect DOD contracting activities’ execution or delivery of support in the operational area.

(g) Generally requires an increase in the number of HQ staff personnel, to include logistics and administrative support.

(h) Complicates the transition of existing contracts and could cause confusion with the vendors/contractors and closeout issues, as well as the compilation of historical data/lessons learned.

(i) Presents additional challenges for the Services in executing their Title 10, USC, responsibilities to provide administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCMDs.

Appendix B, “Theater Support Contingency Contracting Organizational Options,” provides detailed discussion on the JTSCC organizational construct.

3. In-Theater Contracting Planning and Coordination

a. Contracting Planning. Contracting planning is related to and driven by, but not the same as, OCS planning. Contracting planning is a contracting activity function executed, to some extent, by all contracting agencies, not just an LSCC, LSC contracting activities, or JTSCC, to develop, award, and administer contracts in support of GCC-directed operations. Contracting planning, referred to as acquisition planning in the FAR, is executed on a requirement basis and has a particular meaning and application as prescribed in the FAR, DFARS, and contracting authority guidance. Planning guidance is derived from annex W (Operational Contract Support) and other operational guidance, as well as the FAR, DFARS, Service supplements, and other policy guidance (e.g., DOD directives outlining DLA’s commodity acquisition responsibilities, US Army Intelligence Command’s linguist contract responsibilities). Contracting planning, in the context of OCS, means supporting contracting commands are responsible for planning that ensures contracts provide the required supply, service, and construction in the most effective, economical, and timely manner allowed by regulation and HCA guidance, while enforcing GCC contractor management guidance, either through standard contingency clauses or specific contract clauses as applicable. From a JFC perspective, there are two primary contracting planning concerns: theater support contracting acquisition instruction (AI)

NOTE

There has been some confusion regarding the “T” in the JTSCC abbreviation. The operative term in the JTSCC title is not “theater,” but “theater support contracting.” The JTSCC name comes from the fact that the JTSCC commander only commands Service theater support contracting organizations. It is not derived from an operational area (i.e., joint operations area, area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations) construct.
development and execution and common contracting planning related to transitions between external support and theater support contracting. Contracting planning also includes planning to ensure contracts are closed out in a timely manner, considering personnel turnover and pre-award, contract administration, and other contracting workload. A plan for reachback support of contract closeouts should be included, if required.

1. **Financial Arrangements.** Any common contracting support requirements directed by the GCC or locally coordinated by two or more Service components will require mission-specific financial arrangements. These financial arrangements will often include an inter-Service memorandum of agreement or memorandum of understanding per DODI 4000.19, *Support Agreements*.

2. **Service and Joint AIs.** Unless there is a designated JTSCC, individual Service component contracting activities follow their own contingency contracting guidance and, when necessary, develop mission-specific guidance (i.e., AIs). Regardless of the theater support contracting organizational option, Service components will ensure their supporting contracting activities comply with the JFC’s contract coordination guidance. In operations where there is a JTSCC, a joint AI will be developed to ensure standardization of the procurement process to be executed or delivered in the JOA. In addition to providing guidance on the operation of the contracting activity, these AIs capture theater guidance (e.g., JFC policies, orders) that apply to contractors and their personnel in required local provisions and clauses. Given such guidance can change frequently, maintaining an AI and ensuring provisions and clauses are updated and disseminated in a timely manner to DOD contracting officers is a complicated and labor-intensive process. In addition, such contract language will need to be coordinated with the Service that provided the HCA authority as well as OSD DPC. Contingency contracting AIs are valuable tools to direct individual contracting actions that are consistent with GCC, subordinate JFC, and any theater-specific TBC guidance that applies to systems support and external support contracts. For example, TBC directives may direct external support and systems support contracting organizations to incorporate specific AI provisions and/or clauses for mission-specific contracts.

3. **Transitioning from External Support to Theater Support Contracts.** Another major contracting planning challenge is transitioning from external support to theater support contracting authorities. Based on JRRB guidance, the JCSB members should coordinate contract transitions, such as moving the requirements off a cost-type CAP task order, to a fixed-price individual theater support contract or other type of contract, as appropriate. Review of CAP task orders should be done on a continual basis, especially in missions as they transition in focus from combat to stability activities. In this process, the LSC/LSCC contracting activity, or JTSCC, must work closely with the subordinate JFC (normally through the JRRB) and requiring activity to assess what the best COA is from an operational, versus purely contracting, aspect regarding transitioning from external support to theater support contracts. Some factors to consider are the scope and duration of the type of operation, including “nation first” contracting effects on local economies. Other operational considerations should include quality and benefits to the solution, quality of performance metrics and measurement approach, risks (e.g., FP/security, GFP) associated with solution, management approach and controls.
(contract oversight requirements), and past performance/experience (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform).

(4) **Contract Closeout.** Contract closeout ensures accountability for physical completion of the contract and recoupment of any excess funds remaining on the contract. In joint operations, the LSC or LS(CC-designated contracting activity or JTSCC SCO develops a plan to meet contract closeout requirements. This plan can include additional deployed contracting officers or, more preferably, contracting reachback arrangements. Any lack of contract closeout support or other major unresolved contract closeout issues should be elevated by the SCO to the appropriate HCA official and to the JFC.

b. **In-Theater Contracting Coordination.** The JCSB is the primary JFC-directed coordination mechanism to synchronize contracting actions for common supplies and services within a designated JOA or operational area. The JCSB is the forum for theater support, Service CAP, and other designated external contracting organizations to share information, coordinate acquisition strategies, minimize chances of competition and redundancies between individual contracts and/or task orders, and look for opportunities to optimize filling of like requirements. Through this process, the LSC’s/LS(CC’s contracting activity or JTSCC develops a contracting database for the contracts awarded under their authority, which is then shared with the subordinate JFC’s OCSIC. To improve the overall economy and efficiency of contracting actions being delivered or executed in the operational area, the GCC or subordinate JFC should direct the formation of a JCSB in any operation where there is the possibility of significant competition for local contract supplies and services and redundancy in-theater contracting capabilities. The JCSB is supported and convened by the LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC, as appropriate, and meets as necessary to accomplish its JFC-directed mission. JCSB membership must include appropriate Service CAP and CSA representatives, as well as a J-3/J-4 advisor.


c. **Contingency Contracting Administration Services**

(1) **General.** CCAS is a Service-led process recognized by acquisition policy to centrally administer selected CAP task orders and complex theater support contracts executed in the operational area. Acquisition corps specialties related to CCAS include ACOs, contract administrators, quality assurance representatives (QARs), and property administrators, along with Service component CORs. In some cases, technical inspectors will be utilized to assist in technical surveillance matters in certain complex contracted services. In the absence of GCC-requested, USD(A&S)-directed, joint CCAS guidance, or when contracts fall below or outside of these pre-established GCC criteria, Service component contracting and CAP organizations are responsible for providing their own CCAS capability, as appropriate. The actual scope of CCAS measures and supporting organizational structure will vary depending on operational requirements. Doctrinally, joint-directed CCAS is a JTSCC function that will be overseen by the SCO-CCAS.
(2) Planning Considerations. CCAS is a Service responsibility generally applicable to complex, long-term service contracts and requires the deployment of contract administration SMEs, including ACO, quality surveillance, and property administration personnel. CCAS manpower must be planned for and incorporated into the JFC’s annex W (Operational Contract Support) and related Services’ annex Ws and/or associated contracting support plans. In major operations, the Service components may require additional CCAS manpower from DCMA. In these situations, the Service should request DCMA support through the normal GFM process.

d. TBC

(1) General. TBC is a CCDR policy or process to provide visibility of and control over systems support and external support contracts executing or delivering support in designated areas of operations. TBC enables the JFC and supporting JTSCC, in some cases an LSC contracting activity, to more effectively synchronize and integrate contracted support in joint operations. TBC combines the GCC’s directive authority over logistics and OSD acquisition authority in a formal contract solicitation and contract review process to ensure compliance with GCC guidance and to enhance visibility of support contracts before they are executed in the operational area. TBC provides:

(a) Visibility of key DOD contracts with an area of performance or delivery in a designated operational area.

(b) A higher level of certainty that all DOD solicitations and contracts with an area of performance or delivery in a designated operational area contain appropriate provisions and clauses.

(c) The JFC with the ability to better coordinate and control CAAF theater entrance/exit and AGS requirements IAW the published CMP.

(2) Planning Considerations. While TBC is best suited for long-term, large-scale operations, it can be applied during any phase of an operation and may change over time. TBC measures could range from passive visibility of contract actions to active and detailed level of review and pre-approval of solicitations and contracts that incorporate numerous mandatory local provisions and clauses. TBC entrance and exit criteria and applicability delegation parameters should be determined as part of the planning process. TBC applicability to specific contracts could range from all contracts for services with an area of performance within the designated operational area to selected contracts based on predetermined criteria, such as risk level, type (cost), high dollar, theater-wide performance, or other considerations. Implementing TBC processes requires a full-time staff to process and adjudicate TBC requests; hence, why TBC should be implemented only when the risk of not implementing it exceed the costs, which can be considerable. The GCC must determine depth and breadth of measures required. The GCC must coordinate with USD(A&S) to provide the authority to the CCMD to initiate TBC processes and notify DOD components of the specific requirements. Additionally, proposed mission-specific contract language requirements must be cleared with the DOD component providing the contracting authority to the JTSCC or LSC, as well as
USD(A&S) DPC. Normally, such guidance would be derived from the lead contracting activity’s AI. TBC procedures, provisions, and clauses, must be posted to the GCC’s OCS webpage.

e. **Reachback Contracting.** Reachback contracting is a viable method to augment deployed theater support contracting capabilities. In general, reachback is most appropriate for large-scale, long-term operations with significant levels of contracted support. Types of functions particularly suited for reachback support include:

1. Complex, large-scale contract actions.
2. TBC-related contract/solicitation reviews.
3. Contract closeout support.

f. Recent operational experience demonstrates reachback contracting arrangements are best handled by a separate SCO-reachback who operates under the LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC control and HCA authority. Additional operational insights and reachback contracting challenges include, but are not limited to:

1. Need to coordinate all reachback contracting arrangements with the HCA and USD(A&S) to ensure proper contingency acquisition authorizations are in place (e.g., use of contingency procurement thresholds by a contracting activity located in the US supporting the JOA requires legislative action).
2. Ensure reachback contracting personnel understand the priorities and OE.
3. Receive proper documentation.
4. Contractor payment arrangements.
CHAPTER V
CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT

“Contractors are part of the total military forces.”

General Martin E. Dempsey, US Army
18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Operational Contract Support Leaders Conference, 6 March 2012

1. Overview

a. General. Contractor management is the oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment providing support to military operations. While some aspects of contractor management are only relevant to CAAF, others (e.g., base access and security procedures) can also apply to non-CAAF. Furthermore, contractor management often extends to other USG departments and agencies and other mission partner contractor personnel operating in the vicinity of the joint force. The contractor management process is composed of five steps and several associated tasks. The contractor management steps include planning, predeployment preparation, deployment and reception, in-theater management, and redeployment, all of which are discussed in detail in this chapter. Additionally, equipment management, contractor FP/security, use of private security companies, and other USG department and agency contractor management considerations are also addressed.

b. Major Contractor Management Challenges. Contractor personnel will make up a part of almost any deployed joint force. In some operations, contractor personnel can even make up the majority of the deployed force. In any case, contractors and their equipment impose unique challenges to the JFC and, therefore, must be treated as a formal part of the deployed force rather than an afterthought when contractor management issues arise.

CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL NUMBERS IN RECENT OPERATIONS

While the number of total US citizens, third-country nationals, and local national contractor personnel in support of US forces in Iraq was estimated to peak at 160,000 at the height of operations circa 2008, the significance of contractor support remained impactful, even as their total numbers fluctuated over the course of operations in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). At the end of 2017, the Department of Defense officially reported a total of 43,273 contractors in the USCENTCOM AOR. In relation to the estimated 35,000 deployed military personnel, contractor personnel in support of US military operations outnumbered deployed uniform members. As seen by these numbers, contracted support continues to play a significant role in US military operations in the USCENTCOM AOR.

SOURCES: US Central Command Quarterly Contractor Census 4th quarter Fiscal Year 17 and Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, US Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee 9 March 2017
(1) Differences Between Contractor Personnel and Military/DOD Civilian Personnel. As discussed briefly in Chapter I, “Introduction,” management and control of contractor personnel is significantly different than C2 of military members and DOD civilians. Unlike military members and DOD civilians, contractor personnel are managed and controlled through the contractor’s management personnel and governmental oversight staff IAW the terms and conditions of their contract. Because of this acquisition policy process, commanders do not generally have legal authority to direct contractor personnel to perform tasks outside of their contract; however, in emergency situations (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions or natural disaster), the ranking area or base commander may direct CAAF and non-CAAF working in a military-controlled area to take FP or emergency response actions not specifically authorized in their contract as long as those actions do not require them to assume inherently governmental functions or incur any additional cost to the contractor. There are also numerous additional risks and challenges the JFC must deal with when utilizing contractor personnel vice military personnel to provide support in the operational area (see Figure V-1).

(2) Coordinating Contractor Management Planning and Execution Tasks Across Staff Lines. All primary and special staff members have significant roles to play in contractor management planning and execution. And while the OCSIC can and should assist in the coordination of these matters across the JFC’s staff, each staff member must take on specific tasks within their area of concern. For example, establishing PSC rules

### Contractor Management Risks and Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk to being able to properly identify and provide adequate government-furnished support to contractors accompanying the force</td>
<td>General lack of command and staff knowledge on how to plan and integrate contract personnel and equipment into military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk to mission accomplishment from contractor nonperformance</td>
<td>Limited and complex legal authority over contractor personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased security risk to the force when utilizing third-country national and local national contractors</td>
<td>Administrative burden on supported units in providing government oversight of contract personnel and associated government-owned, contractor-operated equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased force protection/security burden on supported units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing adequate government contract surveillance on contractor management aspects of the contract</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Establishing and maintaining accountability of contractor personnel</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Myriad different contracting organizations with service contracts with areas of performance within the operational area</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Use of multiple tiers of subcontractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authorized government support planning and coordination</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure V-1. Contractor Management Risks and Challenges
for the use of force (RUF) is a J-3 function. Figure V-2 depicts major contractor management planning and execution-related tasks by primary and special staff positions.

(3) Providing Government Oversight. Contractor management is a shared responsibility between commanders, requiring activities, the supporting contracting activity, and contractor company management personnel. Well-planned and deliberate post-contract award government oversight of contractor personnel and their associated requirements in support of military operations must be directly integrated into the contract administration process via the requisite contracting officer and/or designated ACO and appointed CORs. This supported-unit contracting activity teaming approach is critical to ensure contractors properly perform contractor management functions IAW the terms and conditions of their contract. Additionally, while specific contractor management policy and doctrine have been promulgated over the past several years, contractor management procedures are still not well understood by some commanders and staff officers. OCSICs can assist the other primary and special staff officers in this area of concern, but contractor management remains a responsibility of each staff member for matters related to their functional responsibilities.

(a) Key to success in the contractor management challenge is for the GCC and subordinate JFCs to establish clear, enforceable, and well-understood theater entrance, accountability, FP, and general contractor personnel management policies and procedures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Position</th>
<th>Key Contract Management Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>Accountability reporting; reception; morale, welfare, and recreation; postal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Threat assessment; contractor screening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Establishing CAAF predeployment training requirements; coordinating deployment; force protection/security and base access procedures; private security contractor rules for the use of force; personnel recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>Authorized government support; movement control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force Surgeon</td>
<td>Mission-specific predeployment medical requirements; in-theater medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>Legal jurisdiction; use of armed private security advice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAAF</th>
<th>J-1</th>
<th>J-2</th>
<th>J-3</th>
<th>J-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAAF</td>
<td>contractors authorized to accompany the force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-3</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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early in the planning stages for a military operation. The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs must work closely with the Service components and CSAs to ensure proper contract and contractor management oversight is in place, preferably well before joint operations commence. TBC can be utilized to assist the GCC in contractor management policy enforcement. The GCC and/or subordinate JFC may also direct subordinate units to integrate key contractor management matters into the CCORB (if established).

(b) It is important to understand that the terms and conditions of the contract establish the relationship between the military and the contractor; this relationship does not directly extend through the contractor supervisor to the contractor’s employees. Only the contractor’s management personnel can directly supervise contractor employees. The military chain of command exercises limited control of contracted support through the contract oversight team consisting of the appropriate contracting activity and requiring activity personnel. In some situations, such as with LOGCAP support, this oversight team may also include special management organizations such as the Army’s LOGCAP deployable program officer civilians or US Army Reserve LOGCAP support officers. In general, it is not appropriate to use contractor employees to perform contractor oversight functions, although provisions can be made to use contracted technical inspectors as long as these technical inspector contracts have nondisclosure and non-compete agreements and their work is ultimately overseen by a government employee (contracting officer, QAR, or COR). One of the key challenges for the supported GCC and subordinate JFC is that, for many contracts, the contracting officer may not even be located within the operational area. A similar situation is also true for some contractor supervisors and managers. Many small contract companies may not have actual “on-site” supervisors and instead may only have a limited number of managers deployed to the operational area. This operational reality is why the CORs are such an important part of the post-contract award requirements management team and the reason the JFC and supporting Service components must ensure appropriate command administration and oversight personnel are in place when using contracted support as a major source of support to the deployed force.

(c) IAW DOD policy, specific contractor management policies and procedures apply equally to prime and subcontractor personnel at all tiers. However, due to privity of contract, the USG has direct contractual relationship only with the prime contractor. In all situations, the prime contractor ensures contractor management policies and procedures are disseminated to and followed by subcontractors. Hence, multiple tiers of subcontractors performing services in the operational area can significantly add to the JFC challenge in enforcing contractor management policies.

(4) Avoiding Unscrupulous Labor Practices. Per DOD CTIP policy, the GCC is required to establish mission-specific CTIP policies and procedures. To ensure appropriate awareness of supporting contracting support organizations and contractors, these policies and procedures should be posted to the CCMD’s OCS webpage. All supporting contracting organizations are responsible for including the FAR CTIP clause and incorporating any related CCMD CTIP guidance in their contracts. The supported CCMD, subordinate JTF, and Service component commands must take great care to avoid contractor management-related actions that may be construed as trafficking in persons. Specific concerns in this area include, but are not limited to, illegal confiscation of
passports, providing substandard housing, forcing sex acts, and use of unlicensed labor brokers (normally through subcontractors) to avoid deployment preparation requirements. These practices are clearly against international law, US law, Presidential directives, DOD policies, and military alliance policies and will not be tolerated. Commanders, per DOD policy, should ensure all deployed personnel receive training on CTIP and promptly report any alleged incidences of CTIP to law enforcement. Commanders, ICW the requisite contracting officer, should also ensure routine health and safety inspections are conducted on applicable contractor personnel working areas and living spaces and ensure any violations are promptly addressed with the contractor via the COR and contracting officer.

For legal references, refer to Title 22, USC, Sections 7103, 7104, 7104a, 7104b, 7104c; Title 8, USC, Section 1101; and Title 18, USC, Section 1351 (originating from the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Title XVII, Sections 1701-1707). Also, refer to National Security Presidential Directive-22, Combatting Trafficking in Persons; DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP); FAR Clause 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons, including Alternate 1; DFARS Clause 252.222-7007, Representation Regarding Combating Trafficking in Persons; and DFARS Clause 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Supporting US Armed Forces Deployed Outside the United States, for more information on this subject.

(5) **Major Prime Contractor Transition.** It is important for the supporting contracting activity and supported requiring activity to keep the subordinate JFC informed of any transitions between major service contractor providers that could cause an interruption to service. This transition in many ways is much like a unit relief in place/transfer of authority where individual contractor employees may need to be issued new LOAs, new military ID cards, and/or base access cards. This transition may also require the transfer of government-furnished equipment.

2. **Contractor Management Planning Considerations**

   a. **General.** The global nature of the systems and external support contractor base dictates that contractors may deploy CAAF employees and their equipment from anywhere in the world. Even US-based contractors may have personnel originating from foreign
locations and/or TCN employees. Proper deployment and in-theater management of CAAF personnel and equipment requires early planning, establishment of clear and concise theater entrance requirements, and incorporation of standard deployment-related clauses in appropriate contracts.

b. **Contractor Management Planning Process Overview.** The CMP is a major subset of OCS planning discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration.” While the body of annex W (Operational Contract Support) is focused on how the JFC will acquire and integrate contracted support in general, contractor management planning is focused on contractor personnel and equipment tasks, to include government obligations under the terms and conditions of the contract to provide support to contractor personnel. The CMP part of the OCS planning effort should be focused on risk assessments and mitigation actions regarding the impact of contractors in support of military operations. The CMP can also shape the determination of in-theater staff required to oversee and enforce contractor management activities. Related GCC tasks include developing policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of contractor personnel into the military operations. **The CMP development effort requires active involvement of all primary and special staff officers** (Figure V-2). To address this challenging situation, the JFC should consider directing the OCSIC to establish a contractor management-focused working group to address and synchronize the challenges across all primary and special staff lines. Contractor management planning also occurs in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies (including the appropriate COMs). This planning coordination is necessary to facilitate proper coordination of partner contractor management requirements that may impact on-going or future joint operations.

c. **CMP Content, Applicability, and Promulgation.** A CCMD-level CMP provides AOR or operational area-specific contractor personnel and equipment-related guidance to ensure CAAF supporting an operation are qualified to deploy, processed for deployment and redeployment, received in theater, and visible and managed in theater, per GCC guidance and as required under the terms and conditions of the contract. These requirements include, but are not limited to, restrictions imposed by applicable international and HNS agreements; contractor-related deployment, theater reception, accountability, and strength reporting; operations security plans and restrictions; FP; PR; contractor personnel services support; medical support; equipment requirements; and redeployment requirements. The CMP applies to all US citizen and TCN CAAF deploying into the operational area. Parts of the CMP may also be applicable to any LN CAAF, as well as some non-CAAF, whose area of performance is on a military base or within the vicinity of US forces. For each operation, the GCC and/or subordinate commander should publish a separate CMP appendix to annex W (Operational Contract Support) or ensure this CMP guidance is published elsewhere in the operation order (OPORD). **It is imperative the appropriate staff SME is directly involved in applicable CMP section per Figure V-2.** The GCC should also publish specific CAAF-related theater entrance requirements and other CMP guidance as necessary at the CCMD’s OCS Website found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html. If/when TBC is in place, the OCSIC should work with the LSC or JTSCC to ensure proper CAAF-related provisions and clauses are included in appropriate solicitations and contracts covered by the operational specific TBC policy.
3. Predeployment Preparation

a. Predeployment preparation includes actions taken by the government and contractors to ensure CAAF meet GCC-directed requirements before entering the operational area. This preparation requirement can include designated mission-essential contractor personnel in certain domestic emergencies (e.g., a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event) where CAAF status does not apply. This process involves coordination among requiring activities, CCMD J-1/J-3/OCS staff, contracting officers, designated BOS-I, or other organizations providing common support to the force and company administrators to ensure CAAF meet all predeployment requirements. Eligibility, as defined in the Foreign Clearance Guide and other GCC-specific theater entrance guidance processes, may require country and theater clearances, waiver authorities, immunizations, required training, and/or issuance of required organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). Predeployment actions also include issuance of ID cards and Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)-generated LOAs.

b. Determining Contractor Status. The contracting officer, working with the requiring activity and the supporting JFC’s SJA, determines contractor employee CAAF/non-CAAF status in all operations outside the US as early as possible in the contracting process. For many employees, determining their status is relatively simple; for others, it is not. The key to success is for the contracting officer to be familiar with and follow DOD contractor management policy, including applicable DFARS guidance and specific theater requirements. This determination should be made in close coordination with the JFC’s SJA.

UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA INVITED CONTRACTOR AND TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM

United States Forces Korea (USFK) Regulation 700-19, The Invited Contractor and Technical Representatives Program, establishes policies and procedures for the designation of corporations and individuals as invited contractors (ICs) and technical representatives (TRs) who work in support of the US Armed Forces or other armed forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in times of armistice, contingency, or war. The current US-ROK status-of-forces agreement defines an IC as a person(s), including (a) corporations organized under the laws of the US, (b) their employees who are ordinarily resident in the US, and (c) the dependents of the foregoing, present in the ROK solely for the purpose of executing contracts with the US for the benefit of the US Armed Forces. Per USFK policy, only IC and TR designated contractor personnel can qualify for USFK logistics support.

Various Sources
(1) The key factors that determine the specific status of a contractor employee are: area of performance (normal proximity to US forces), citizenship, place of hire, normal place of residence, and place of residence in the operational area. For example, all US citizens employed under a systems support contract or subcontract that require the service to be performed in support of deployed equipment will, consistent with DOD policy, to include, but not limited to, DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), be automatically afforded (except in domestic contingencies) CAAF status. Contractor employees in support of domestic contingencies are not CAAF; however, some of these contractor personnel may deploy and live with military forces for short periods of time. In these situations, the local commander may deem it necessary to provide limited base operating support (BOS) for these individuals. Likewise, all TCN contractor and subcontractor employees who do not normally reside in the operational area, whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of US forces, and who routinely are collocated with US forces should be afforded CAAF status. In some cases, mission-essential LN contractor employees who are required to work and live on a military facility or in the direct vicinity of US forces may be afforded CAAF status through an LOA. A good example of a LN CAAF would be an interpreter who has a habitual relationship with a supported unit. It is imperative the contracting officer and requiring activities be aware of the appropriate DOD policy and GCC contractor management guidance when determining the contractor personnel status of TCN and LN employees.

(2) CAAF status will be formally codified by the issuance of a SPOT-generated LOA that reflects the appropriate level of AGS such as security; base camp services; post/base exchange access; morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR); and medical care. Selected non-CAAF may also be issued an LOA for the purposes of allowing them to have access to AGS. The GCC, the subordinate JFC, component commanders, and CSAs must be prepared to address issues that arise related to contractor employee status and/or in-theater support.

c. Establishing and Promulgating Theater Entrance Requirements. The supported CCMD J-1/J-3/OCS staff, ICW the appropriate subordinate JFC and Service component staff, determines and publicizes operational-specific theater entrance requirements for all CAAF hired outside the operational area through the CMP development process. In cases where there are LN CAAF, these personnel will receive appropriate training and equipment, as required by GCC policy at the place of hire. Theater entrance requirements include, but are not limited to, operational-specific administrative preparation and medical preparation, as well as general training and equipping guidance. For services contracts for support in foreign contingencies, the contracting officer will use standard DFARS deployment clauses to ensure the contractors understand and are prepared to execute their contract within the operational area. While generic in nature, these clauses ensure contractors understand and comply with basic deployment preparation and in-theater management requirements found at the GCC’s OCS Website linked to the DPC contingency contracting page at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html.

Overarching DOD policy on theater entrance requirements can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS). This policy document also provides a comprehensive list of other related DOD, CJCS, and Service policy documents.
Additionally, operational-specific contractor management requirements are found in DFARS Subpart 225.3, Contracts Performed Outside the United States.

d. **Overview of Specific Theater Entrance Requirements.** The following is a synopsis of the key administrative and other theater entrance requirements that can and will affect the joint force and Service components. The supported CCMD and subordinate staffs should work closely with the Service component staffs, special operations units, and other organizations as required to ensure they understand, promulgate, and enforce these theater entrance requirements:

   (1) **HN Requirements.** In some military operations, there may be HN-directed theater entrance requirements for non-LN contractor employees. These requirements are normally related to obtaining work visas and other related labor regulation-related administrative paperwork that may or may not be codified in formal SOFAs or security agreements. OCS planners need to work closely with the servicing legal office and requisite contracting organizations to determine if such requirements may affect the command’s ability to execute OCS in the operational area.

   (2) **ID Cards.** All eligible CAAF must be issued an ID card with their Geneva Conventions Accompanying the Force designation. CAAF are required to present their SPOT-generated LOA as proof of eligibility at the time of ID card issuance. Military Departments ensure eligible CAAF receive an ID card prior to beginning deployment to the operational area. Expiration dates on the ID card should correspond to the end date of the contract period of performance or the end of their deployment. Normally, only replacement cards will be issued in the operational area. The appropriate J-1 and Service equivalents need to ensure they include CAAF in the appropriate ID card in-theater replacement program planning.

   For additional guidance, see JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. See DODI 1000.13, Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals; DODI 8520.02, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling; and the appropriate Service regulations for more information on issuance of personal ID cards to contractor personnel.

   (3) **LOAs.** A SPOT-generated LOA is required for CAAF to process through a deployment center and to travel to, from, and within the operational area. LOAs contain specific dates to cover the deployment and are issued to contractor personnel prior to arrival in the operational area. Additionally, the LOAs identify authorizations and AGS contractor personnel are entitled to under the contract. The contracting officer, ICW the requiring activity, validates requirements for and availability of AGS at the deployment center and within the operational area prior to preparing the final solicitation package and prior to preparing the LOA. Any change in the contract dates or entitlements will result in revocation and reissuance of a new LOA to the contractor. Contractor personnel are required by policy to maintain a copy of their LOA and have it in their possession at all times.
**DOD policy on LOA requirements can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).**

(4) **Medical Preparation.** Under the terms and conditions of their contracts, contractors are responsible for providing employees who are medically and psychologically fit to perform duties as specified in their contracts. All CAAF must undergo a medical and dental assessment within 12 months prior to arrival at the designated deployment center. The medical preparation of CAAF per theater or location reporting instructions includes deployment health briefings, medical surveillance screening, medical and dental evaluations, DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] specimen collection, determining prescription and eyewear needs, and immunizations. Specific medical-related theater entrance requirements, such as HIV [human immunodeficiency virus] screening requirements, are established by the supported CCMD’s surgeon in consultation with the subordinate joint force surgeons. This medical-related theater guidance normally covers specific immunization requirements and restrictions applicable to certain TCN or LN personnel for specific mission functions (e.g., food service workers). Dental conditions that may preclude medical clearance include lack of a dental exam within the last 12 months or required dental treatment or re-evaluation for oral conditions, which are likely to result in dental emergencies. Service components and their associated contract oversight organizations validate CAAF predeployment medical processing and screening requirements. The GCC should develop procedures and criteria that require removal of contractor personnel identified as no longer medically qualified and post them on the CCMD OCS Website and published in the reporting instructions. Per DOD policy, contracting officers incorporate these requirements into all contracts for performance in the AOR via standard contract clauses or mission specific contract language as applicable.

Additional medical screening and evaluation guidance can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); DODD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance; DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health; DODI 6205.4, Immunization of Other Than US Forces (OTUSF) for Biological Warfare Defense; and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(5) **Individual Protective Equipment and Uniforms.** Normally, contractors are responsible for ensuring their employees are outfitted with appropriate occupational-specific protective clothing and equipment necessary to safely carry out their contract requirements. Service components are responsible for ensuring CAAF have adequate military OCIE as specified in the contract (e.g., helmet, body armor, protective mask equipment) IAW the supported GCC’s directives and Service policies. Normally, contractor personnel will not be issued or wear regulation US Service uniforms and/or other military uniform items that may cause them to be mistaken for a combatant; however, the GCC or designated subordinate can authorize certain contractor personnel to wear standard US Service uniforms (less military patches and other accoutrements) on an operational needs basis. Contractor personnel authorized to wear military uniforms are required by policy to carry written authorization for the wearing of said uniforms on them at all times. When commanders authorize issue of standard uniform items to contractor personnel, care must be taken (consistent with FP measures) to ensure contractor personnel are...
distinguishable from military personnel through the use of distinctive patches, arm bands, nametags, or headgear.

Additional guidance on individual protective equipment and uniforms can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).

(6) Special Training Requirements for Contractor Personnel. The Services, DOD agencies, and CCMDs ensure current DOD-required training and any operational-specific, JFC- and Service-mandated training is accomplished prior to deployment of CAAF into the operational area. The JFC’s J-3, ICW the J-1 and OCS staff, ensure CAAF-unique training requirements are properly considered and promulgated. Key contractor personnel training requirements include, but are not limited to:

   (a) Legal status familiarization to ensure all CAAF understand their legal status IAW international law, to include prohibition and prevention of trafficking in persons information.

   (b) Familiarization training for all CAAF on US laws, local laws, and SOFAs that contractor personnel may be subject to.

   (c) AGS familiarization for contractor personnel on what contract-authorized support (e.g., postal, MWR, medical) is available to them at their place of performance.

   (d) Law of war training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. Specific training should include, but is not limited to, Geneva Conventions enemy prisoner of war training.

   (e) Special training for contractor personnel who may come in contact with enemy prisoners of war or other detainees.

   (f) RUF training for contractor personnel authorized to carry weapons.

   (g) PR training to inform CAAF and selected non-CAAF of the processes and actions required should they become isolated. This training may include individual survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training as determined by the risk assessment and supported CCMD, the subordinate joint force command, and the Service component commands.

   (h) Medical awareness training related to local health risks, medical-related policies, and procedures (required for all CAAF, optional for non-CAAF working on a US installation).

   (i) Theater-specific requirements, to include specific FP and security; hazard awareness, to include local commander’s authority; wear and use of military protective gear (if issued); compliance with theater deployment and redeployment accountability standards and requirements; and related information, such as customs and religious awareness training, as determined by the supported GCC, subordinate JFC, or Service component commander (required for all CAAF as directed by subordinate JFCs and
Service component commanders and may include in-theater briefings to non-CAAF whose area of performance is on a US base or in the immediate vicinity of US forces).

Along with DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), other key reference documents for contractor training include FAR Part 22.17, Combating Trafficking in Persons; DFARS Clause 252.222-7007, Representation Regarding Combating Trafficking in Persons; DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense; DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program; DODI O-3002.05, Personnel Recovery (PR) Education and Training; DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health; DODD 6200.04, Force Health Protection (FHP); JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support; and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

e. Contractor Personnel Certification. Service component commanders, heads of DOD agencies, and field activities are responsible for ensuring contractor personnel being deployed into an operational area are properly certified and fully integrated into the supported GCC and subordinate JTF deployment planning process and reported in SPOT. Per DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), there are three different CAAF certification and deployment methodologies approved for use:

(1) Process with the Supported Unit. This is the preferred method of deployment for CAAF who have a habitual relationship with a specific supported unit such as system support contract-related personnel. This group deployment process involves certification and deployment of CAAF in a coordinated fashion between the supported unit, contracting officer, and the contractor.

(2) Process Non-Unit-Related Personnel (NURP). NURP include CAAF who deploy as individuals or as part of a small group not associated with a particular deploying unit. CAAF NURP are required to be certified by a Service-designated replacement center or equivalent-certified government-run process.

(3) Self-Certification. Self-certification and/or deployment applies to CAAF employees of subcontractor employees of a contract company specifically authorized by a Service to perform self-certification of their deploying employees.

Self-certification authorization is usually restricted to major contract companies such as Service CAP contractors. CAAF self-certification must meet or exceed replacement center processing and preparation standards and should be approved and monitored by government standardization/evaluation personnel.

f. TPFDD. Contracted support originating outside of the operational area must be formally integrated into the deployment process. This is especially important in uncertain or hostile environments where commercial access may be limited or non-existent. US and TCN contractor personnel and related equipment, depending on the operational situation, may move into the operational area using either contractor or government-arranged transportation as directed in the contract. Both methods require contractor companies provide cargo and personnel movement details IAW deployment processes to ensure the supported commander is aware of the timing and extent of contracted support entering the operational area. When the contractor company arranges its own movement, the contractor
is required to provide the timing, the gross short tons, and number of personnel entering the operational area. If the government provides transportation support, the contractor is required to provide additional cargo detail (at either level IV or VI, as directed) and the number of personnel to be moved. In-place contracted support planned for use in the designated operational area should also be included on the TPFDD. The requiring activity and/or designated supported commander, assisted by the contracting officer, ensures contractor movements are fully integrated with operational needs and the GCC-approved deployment plan.

_CJCSM 3122.02, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), provides additional information on incorporating contract personnel and equipment in the deployment process._

4. Deployment and Reception

Deployment and reception involves managing the flow and reception of CAAF and selected non-CAAF and associated equipment IAW established OSD- and GCC-approved operational-specific policies and procedures. This step, which includes contractor personnel RSOI, has its own unique set of challenges, especially for NURP CAAF. Joint personnel processing centers (JPPCs) are key to proper NURP CAAF in-theater reception. The J-3 integrates CAAF into the deployment process, while the J-1 is responsible, ICW the OCS staff, for ensuring applicable contractor personnel are properly integrated into the reception process.

a. **Coordinating and Tracking Contractor Deployments.** Similar to the three methods of CAAF predeployment processing previously discussed, there are three methods of contractor deployment: deployment as part of the supported unit, deployment as NURP, and self-deployment. Deployment and subsequent movements for any contractor personnel issued an LOA, regardless of the deployment method, should be tracked using automated tools, such as SPOT and the Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMS). However, the JFC may have to accept risk in tracking contractors during early phases of a
deployment or when CAAF are imbedded into land force maneuver units operating in forward areas of the battlefield during combat operations. It may not be possible to establish the JAMMS infrastructure necessary to provide routine tracking of contractor personnel in these situations. Obtaining and maintaining personnel accountability enables the JFC to control the entrance and exit of contractor personnel issued an LOA into and out of the operational area. It further allows the JFC to automatically track—by name and location—the movement of deployed contractor personnel issued an LOA throughout the individual deployment process. Contractor self-deployment should include coordination of contractor arranged flights through the air tasking order process.

b. RSOI. RSOI actions vary depending on the contractor deployment methodology. NURP CAAF RSOI begins at the JFC-designated JPPCs, Service, or authorized contract company reception sites. These sites are the points where CAAF predeployment processing is validated and onward-movement guidance is provided. Upon arrival at their area of performance location, NURP CAAF report to their requiring activity or designated supported unit, at which point in-theater oversight and contracted support begins. CAAF deploying as part of a military unit execute the RSOI process with the supported unit. In this process, the supported unit is fully responsible for coordinating all RSOI actions for their habitually related contractor personnel and ensuring they are fully integrated into the operation at their area of performance location. Per DOD policy, self-deploying CAAF must go through a USG-certified deployment process. Historically, self-deploying CAAF have been LOGCAP employees who went through a prime contractor-controlled RSOI process. In this deployment methodology, the prime contractor is responsible for ensuring CAAF in-theater movement and associated equipment is properly coordinated and all their prime and subcontractor personnel are properly integrated into the operation at the area of performance location.

JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, provides additional information on the JPPCs.

5. In-Theater Management

a. General. In-theater contractor management tasks discussed in this section include: legal authority and discipline, contractor personnel visibility and contractor personnel accountability, movement control, AGS, and FP/security. The doctrinal guidance below is based on existing DOD and CJCS policies and can, in some major operations, be a significant challenge to the JFC and staff. And, while all primary and special staff officers play at least some role in the in-theater contractor management process, the OCSIC must actively monitor contractor management execution and assist other staff members, as necessary, in dealing with issues under their purview.

b. Contractor Personnel Legal Status and Discipline. As stated earlier, contractor personnel are not part of the direct chain of command. However, there are existing legal statutes that provide the JFC and subordinate commanders significant legal authority over selected contractor personnel in support of the deployed joint force. It is important to note however, the legal and disciplinary authorities discussed below only apply to foreign contingencies and have restrictions based on any SOFA/security agreement, types of
contractor employees, nationality of the employees, type of operation, and nature of the criminal offense.

(1) **Types of Contractor Employees and Their Legal Status.** As described in DOD policy and Chapter I, “Introduction,” DOD contractor employees fall into two primary categories:

   (a) **CAAF** are contractor employees, including all tiers of subcontractor personnel, who are authorized to accompany the force in applicable operations outside the US and have been afforded such status through an LOA. CAAF generally include all US citizen and TCN employees not normally residing in the operational area but whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of US forces and who are routinely colocated with US forces. In some cases, the JFC may designate mission-essential LN contractor employees (such as interpreters) as CAAF. However, granting CAAF status of LN employee does not automatically grant the JFC legal jurisdiction over these personnel because not all contractor discipline-related federal statutes are applicable to LN employees.

   (b) **Non-CAAF employees** are DOD contractor employees who are not designated as CAAF, such as US citizens operating under contract in the US, LN and TCN employees, or TCN expatriates who are permanent residents in the operational area. Non-CAAF may also be issued LOAs if they require access to US installations or certain other AGS to perform their work; their LOAs will indicate their non-CAAF status and afford them AGS as determined appropriate by the contracting officer. Common examples of non-CAAF include LN day laborers, delivery personnel, and supply contract workers.

(2) **Contractor Personnel Status and Legal Rights.** Law of war treaties (e.g., Hague and Geneva Conventions) establish the status of civilian contractor personnel when supporting military operations during international armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Article 4) provides prisoner of war status upon capture to be extended to, among others, contractor employees, provided...
they are authorized to accompany the force. Additionally, some contractor personnel may be covered by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilians in Time of War, should they be captured during international armed conflict.

(3) **Contractor Personnel Discipline.** During US military operations, commanders, with assistance from contractor supervisors and supporting contracting officers, are responsible for ensuring CAAF discipline as it relates to incidents of alleged major misconduct. This includes investigating incidents, apprehending suspected offenders, and addressing the immediate needs of the situation. The GCC and/or subordinate JFC should designate a responsible organization to develop processes for reporting alleged offenses and misconduct by or against contractor personnel, including sexual assault, and investigation of those incidents. CAAF who commit serious legal infractions may be subject to prosecution under the UCMJ or the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). All alleged criminal activity and incidents related to weapons discharge are reportable IAW federal laws.

(a) **Other Disciplinary Options.** The supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders can address CAAF disciplinary issues or misconduct through revocation or suspension of clearances, restriction from installations or facilities, revocation of privileges, or redeployment out of the operational area. DFARS rules allow the contracting officer to direct the contractor, at its own expense, to remove and replace any employee who jeopardizes or interferes with mission accomplishment or who fails to comply with or violates applicable requirements of the clause. The process of removing contractor employees is dependent upon the established GCC policies and the extent to which those policies are incorporated in the terms and conditions of the contract. COR reporting and participation in award fee boards may also reduce or preclude contractor fiscal compensation to drive desired behavior of the company and enforce contractor actions and behaviors required by the contract. When confronted with disciplinary problems involving contractors and contractor employees, commanders should seek the assistance of their legal staff, the contracting officer, and the contract company management personnel. This enables a thorough review of the situation and a recommendation for a COA based on the terms and conditions of the contract, applicable international agreements, and HN or US law.

(b) **Legal Jurisdiction.** Legal jurisdiction over contractor personnel varies depending on contractor personnel nationality, CAAF or non-CAAF designations, operational-specific policies, and the type and severity of the disciplinary infraction. Normally, LN contract employees are subject to local laws, while US citizens and TCN CAAF may or may not be subject to local laws depending on provisions, if any, documented in existing SOFAs or other security agreements. **CAAF, with some exceptions, are subject to US federal law, to include the UCMJ jurisdiction as discussed later in this section.** While minor CAAF discipline infractions are normally handled by the contractor, serious CAAF discipline infractions can and should be addressed through military legal and/or Department of Justice channels. To the extent commanders determine disciplinary actions may be necessary for CAAF, they should first coordinate their actions with their SJA and the government contract oversight team. This coordination is necessary because of potential jurisdiction issues, along with possible impact on contract
Contractor Management

performance, cost, and government liability, as well as determining the appropriate manner to address the situation.

1. **Local/HN Law.** All non-CAAF are subject to local laws. CAAF are also subject to local laws unless specifically exempted by SOFAs, other security agreements, and in cases where there is no functioning or recognized HN. **HN law, to include in-transit country law, can directly affect contracting as well as contractor management actions.** The supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commander must ascertain how these laws may affect contracted support, to the extent feasible, and consider any limiting factors in the JPP. Service components ensure contracting officers take these laws into account as they develop and oversee the execution of contracts. Limiting factors may include workforce and hour restrictions; medical, life, and disability insurance coverage; taxes; customs and duties; cost of living allowances; hardship differentials; access to classified information; and hazardous duty pay. This requires the Service components to articulate guidance to the Service contracting organizations to ensure mission-specific factors are included in contracts with an area of performance or delivering in the designated operational area.

2. **SOFAs and Other Bi-Lateral Security Agreements.** SOFAs are international agreements between two or more governments that address various privileges, immunities, and responsibilities and enumerate the rights and responsibilities of individual members of a deployed force. They can be, although rarely are, used to define CAAF legal status (e.g., the circumstances of HN criminal and civil jurisdiction), as well as contracting-related legal obligations (e.g., taxes, customs). When applicable, SOFAs may establish legal obligations independent of contract provisions.

3. **US Federal Law.** Barring a SOFA or other security agreement, an HN will generally have primary jurisdiction over offenses committed within its territory. In the absence of any HN jurisdiction or the exercise of it, US federal law may apply to CAAF misconduct. The DFARS requires DOD contractors supporting US Armed Forces outside the US to report alleged offenses against the UCMJ and MEJA and to tell their employees where to report such offenses and where to seek victim and witness protection.

   a. **War Crimes Act of 1996.** Depending on the offense committed, CAAF who are US nationals may be prosecuted for war crimes under the War Crimes Act of 1996. This act defines a war crime, to include any grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (such as willful killing or torture) or any violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Penalties include fines, imprisonment, or the death penalty if death results to the victim. Prosecutions under the War Crimes Act of 1996 are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities.

   b. **MEJA of 2000.** In November 2000, the MEJA was passed by Congress and signed into law. This law permits prosecution in federal court of civilians who, while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces overseas, commit certain crimes. Generally, the crimes covered are any felony-level criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The law applies to any DOD contractor or subcontractor (at any tier) or their employees, provided they are not a national, or a legal
resident, of the HN. It does not apply to non-DOD contractor employees unless their employment relates to supporting the mission of DOD. This law authorizes DOD law enforcement personnel to arrest suspected offenders IAW applicable international agreements and specifies procedures for the removal of accused individuals to the US. It also authorizes pretrial detention and the appointment of counsel for accused individuals. Prosecutions under the MEJA are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities.

*DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members, provides more information on the implementation of MEJA.*

c. **Uniting and Strengthening America.** In October 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [Short title: USA PATRIOT Act] was passed by Congress and signed into law. The USA PATRIOT Act was enacted by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. One of its provisions allows the US to apprehend and prosecute US citizens and foreign nationals who commit crimes on overseas US bases and facilities. Similar to the War Crimes Act and MEJA, prosecutions under the USA PATRIOT Act are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities.

d. **Federal Anti-Torture Statute.** Contractor personnel, such as those serving as military interrogators, can also be prosecuted under the federal anti-torture statute. A person found guilty under the act can be incarcerated for up to 20 years or receive the death penalty if the torture results in the victim’s death. Similar to the other federal laws, actual prosecutions under this statute are the responsibility of the appropriate federal civilian agency.

e. **UCMJ.** The UCMJ has jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States in the field, both in times of declared war and during operations meeting the legal definition of a formal contingency. IAW DOD guidance, the unique nature of this extended UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians requires sound management over when, where, and by whom such jurisdiction is exercised. The
c. Sexual Assault Prevention. DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program applies to all US-citizen CAAF. US-citizen CAAF have the same rights and obligations related to this program as do military members and DOD civilians.

See DODD 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, for detailed policy guidance.

d. Contractor Personnel Accountability, Visibility, and Casualty Reporting. Contractor personnel accountability is the process of identifying, capturing, and recording the personally identifiable information and assigned permanent duty location of an individual contractor employee through the use of a designated database. Contractor personnel visibility provides users with the information on the daily location, movement, status, and identity of contractor personnel, which facilitates the capability to act upon that information to improve the overall performance of contracted support to the mission. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), includes guidance relative to accounting and visibility for contractor personnel in support of contingencies outside the US in SPOT. Personnel visibility is attained by having reliable personnel data from various authoritative data sources for all Service members, DOD civilian employees, and CAAF physically present in a GCC’s AOR. Establishing personnel visibility is a joint mission with a goal of providing accurate, near-real-time, readily available personnel information DOD-wide in a net-centric environment. Contractor personnel accountability and visibility are essential to determine and resource government support requirements such as facilities, life support, FP, PR, MWR, and medical services in uncertain, hostile, and/or austere OEs. In some operations, accountability of contractor personnel may be a CCIR. DOD contracting agencies ensure contract and contractor personnel data is entered and maintained in the designated joint database, SPOT or its successor. This database provides

**CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL PROSECUTION**

While very rarely used, the US military has successfully prosecuted at least one contractor employee under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in recent operations. More specifically, in July 2008, Mr. Alaa Mohammad Ali, a dual Iraqi/Canadian citizen, contracted interpreter supporting the US military in Iraq, was sentenced by a military judge sitting at a general courts martial to five months of confinement for assault. After stabbing a coworker, Mr. Ali pled guilty to making a false statement, wrongful appropriation, and wrongfully endeavoring to impede an investigation. The US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces confirmed this conviction in 2012 and the US Supreme Court refused to review the case in 2013, thus letting the conviction and the initial appeal findings stand as is.

SOURCE: United States v. Ali, 71 M. J. 256, and numerous open-source news articles
the supported CCDR and subordinate JFC by name accountability of all CAAF and other designated non-CAAF, to include personnel predeployment certification and location data via a point of scan system such as JAMMS. CAAF casualties will be reported in SPOT IAW SPOT business rules.

Additional guidance for contractor accountability and visibility requirements can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), and JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. Specific guidance on SPOT can be found in the SPOT Business Rules which are maintained at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/spot.html.

e. Reporting Law of War Violations. All CAAF are required to report possible, suspected, or alleged law of war violations. Additionally, CAAF are required to report such incidents to their requiring activity or to the CCMD staff. The supported CCDR, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders, especially when utilizing PSCs, should ensure adequate coordination mechanisms are in place to ensure timely and accurate law of war incident reporting.

DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program, provides detailed policy guidance on law of war incident reporting.

f. Movement Control. Intratheater movement control includes directing contractor movement through DOD, USG departments or agencies, or other partner-contracted support convoys along specified routes and times. The subordinate JFC’s J-4 or lead Service component organization responsible for land movement control must establish, publish, and implement operational-specific movement, control-related standards and procedures. Depending on the operational situation, there are three general options when it comes to contractor vehicle movements: contractor vehicles are required to be directly integrated into military convoys, contractors are authorized to transit the operational area in convoys made up exclusively of contractor vehicles but are fully integrated into the military movement control authority, and contractors authorized to transit the operational area outside of the military movement control authority. In general, CAP task order-provided transportation services will be integrated into military convoys under direct movement control authority or, at a minimum, operate in an all contractor convoys operating under military movement control authority. Contractor vehicle movement outside of the military movement control authority is most applicable to theater support contract transportation services in low threat environments.

g. AGS. IAW DOD policy, contract companies are required to provide life, mission, and administrative support to their employees necessary to perform services unless otherwise directed by the terms and conditions of the contract. However, in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments, support to CAAF may be more efficiently provided through collective means (potentially via another contract directed by the military) controlled and executed by the JFC and designated Service component(s). The J-1, J-4, and OCS staff must ensure guidance on standards of support are in place, to include clear lead Service/BOS-I directives, as planning and oversight of AGS is primarily a Service component responsibility. However, DOD policy requires the appointment of an AGS adjudication authority to ensure AGS for contractor personnel is coordinated and approved.
prior to approval of the contract. Normally, the CCMD-directed Service component responsible for BOS and other CUL support serves as the JOA-wide AGS adjudication authority. The designated AGS adjudication authority would be responsible for tracking major AGS capabilities across the JOA and serves as the central coordination point for requiring activities and supporting contracting officers in determining what level of AGS is available to contractor personnel. **After the requiring activity determines support requirements and availability of such support, the contracting officer will include available AGS in the terms and conditions of the contract and negotiate price accordingly.** Also, the SPOT LOA serves to outline the approved agreement between the government and contractor as to what services will be provided to their employees operating in the designated operational area. Key AGS-related tasks are discussed below in more detail, along with major references for areas of support. **Of note, AGS is contractor personnel-related support and should not be confused with other government-furnished support to the contract firm itself for such things as use of facilities and providing fuel for contractor vehicles.**

(1) **BOS.** In permissive and non-austere operations, contractors should arrange for their own lodging, subsistence, and facility support; however, in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments, this may not be practical or operationally desirable. The circumstances under which the military provides this support would be those in which the contractor has no commercial infrastructure from which to draw or when the cost for a contractor to furnish the support is not economical. In situations when contractor-arranged BOS would impede the government’s efforts to provide FP, generate competition with the military, or adversely influence prices, the military must consider providing the support or, at a minimum, directly coordinating this support within US bases through BOS directives. The supported GCC and subordinate JFC have the authority to direct where CAAF reside, within the terms and conditions of the contract. CAAF must generally be provided the same standard of support applied to DOD civilian personnel.

(a) In some operations or phases of operations, selected CAAF may be required to temporarily live under field conditions. Field conditions are quite different from normal civilian life and are characterized by austere and communal living and a collective responsibility for the living area. **Contracting officers should ensure there is appropriate language in the contract for CAAF expected to perform their duties in field conditions.**

(b) Subsistence may be provided to contractors, either in conjunction with government-provided lodging or separately, when contractor employees are unable to obtain subsistence for operational reasons or if it is determined to be in the best interest of the government. For those CAAF living in field conditions, the food provided might be prepackaged rations with little opportunity for choice; consequently, special diets may not be accommodated. In sustained operations, it may be desirable to have separate contractor-run CAAF dining facilities that provide ethnic-based subsistence that may be both less expensive and more appealing to non-US-citizen CAAF.

(c) Although it is logical to expect reimbursement from contractors for the cost of lodging and subsistence, the cost for such support would normally be included in
the overall cost of the contract. Therefore, when possible, subsistence support should be done on a non-reimbursable basis, eliminating the unnecessary administrative burden of tracking and collecting reimbursement. However, joint force and Service component planners must include the cost of supporting contractors in the overall cost of the operation so adequate funding is provided.

(d) A subset of BOS, facility support to contractors is situationally dependent. Facilities support must be planned for as early as possible, especially in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments where contract companies cannot coordinate their own facility support. In these situations, external and systems support contractor managers must provide any unique facilities requirements during contract negotiations. The contracting officer or designated ACO must then coordinate these requirements with the appropriate joint force or Service component staff engineer. In some situations, theater support contracts that utilize TCN CAAF vice LN non-CAAFF, employees may also require AGS provided by the BOS-I.

Refer to JP 4-04, Contingency Basing, for more information on how the CCDR can manage the various functions of BOS between Service components or partner nations within a theater of operations from one base to another and within a single contingency base.

(2) **PR.** PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. The geographic CCMD and subordinate J-3s are the lead for all PR actions, to include planning for the possible isolation, capture, or detention of CAAF by adversarial organizations or governments. Recovery of isolated personnel may occur through military action, action by NGOs, other USG-approved action, diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. IAW DOD policy, all CAAF must be incorporated into the PR program and, therefore, be covered in subordinate OPLANs and OPORDs, to include the CMP. The contract and CMP should address how contractors are included in the theater PR plan and receive PR training and support products.

DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense; and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, provide additional details on the PR program.

(3) **Medical Support and Evacuation.** During military operations in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments, CAAF may be unable to access medical support from local sources. Generally, DOD will only provide first responder care, forward resuscitative care, and theater hospitalization and assistance with patient movement in emergencies where loss of life, limb, or eyesight could occur. Any deviations to this policy will be coordinated by the appropriate-level joint force surgeon. Hospitalization will be limited to stabilization and short-term medical treatment, with an emphasis on return to duty or evacuation by means of the patient movement system. All costs associated with the treatment and transportation of contractor personnel to the selected civilian facility are reimbursable to the USG and shall be the responsibility of contractor personnel, their employer, or their health insurance provider. DOD does not provide long-term care to contractor personnel.
(a) **Emergency Medical and Dental Care.** All CAAF will normally be afforded emergency medical and dental care if injured while supporting military operations. DOD policy requires the supported GCC and subordinate JFC to provide emergency medical and dental care to contractor employees, including CAAF and non-CAAF, who are injured while in the vicinity of US forces. Examples of emergency medical and dental care include examination and initial treatment of victims of sexual assault; refills of prescriptions for life-dependent drugs; repair of broken bones, lacerations, and infections; and traumatic injuries to the dentition.

(b) **Primary Care.** Normally, primary medical or dental care is not authorized or provided to CAAF at medical treatment facilities (MTFs). When determined necessary and authorized by the GCC or subordinate JFC, this support must be specifically authorized under the terms and conditions of the contract and detailed in the corresponding LOA. Medical care is provided for CAAF and designated non-CAAF as required by US and international law, mission requirements, established medical treatment protocols, DOD policy, contractual obligations, and applicable national agreements. MTF-provided primary medical care for CAAF must be closely planned and coordinated by the joint force surgeon, contracting officer, and SJA, as the mission dictates. Primary care includes routine inpatient and outpatient services, nonemergency evacuation, pharmaceutical support, dental services, and other medical support as determined by appropriate military authorities based on recommendations from the joint force command surgeon and existing capabilities of the forward-deployed MTFs.

*Much more detailed guidance on medical support to deployed contractor personnel can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health; and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.*

(4) **Postal.** The nationality of the contractor employee usually determines postal support. CAAF who are US citizens that deploy in support of US Armed Forces may be authorized use of the Military Postal Service (MPS) if there is no reliable or local mail service available and if MPS use is not precluded by the terms of any international or HN agreement. In most circumstances, TCN and LN contract employees are not provided access to the MPS. However, CAAF who are not US citizens are afforded occasional mail service necessary to mail their paychecks back to their home of record. The J-1 includes contractor support matters in the postal plan, to include the use of contractors to supplement deployed military postal capabilities.

*Additional information on postal operations can be found in DOD 4525.6-M, Department of Defense Postal Manual.*

(5) **Mortuary Affairs.** The joint mortuary affairs program provides for the necessary care and disposition of deceased personnel, including personal effects, during military operations. The JFC’s J-4, ICW the Service components logistics staffs, plans and coordinates the recovery, preparation, and evacuation of US military, USG civilian, and CAAF human remains. This program includes the search, recovery, tentative ID, care, and evacuation or temporary interment, disinterment, and re-interment of deceased personnel, to include all CAAF, within the operational area. The specific nature and extent of the
support is determined during the planning process and communicated to military forces and contractors through governing OPLANs/OPORDs and contractual documents.

Additional information on mortuary affairs can be found in DODD 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(6) Post/Base Exchange Privileges. US-citizen CAAF are generally eligible to use military exchange facilities for health and comfort items in operations where CAAF do not have access to similar commercial sources. This privilege depends on the overall operational situation, SOFAs, and individual contract terms and conditions. The J-1 determines CAAF-related post/base exchange utilization procedures ICW the lead Service for this function (if designated).

Additional information on exchange privileges for deployed contractors can be found in DODI 1330.21, Armed Services Exchange Regulations.

(7) MWR. In general, contractors have a responsibility to provide MWR and other quality-of-life support to their own employees as much as practical. The availability of MWR programs in the operational area vary with the deployment location. Available MWR activities may include self-directed recreation (e.g., issue of sports equipment), entertainment associated with the United Services Organization and the Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Office, military clubs, unit lounges, and some types of rest centers. The subordinate JFC, coordinated by the J-1, may authorize US-citizen CAAF to utilize MWR support on a space-available basis when contractor and/or other sources are not available.

(8) Legal Assistance. Contractors and their employees are not entitled to military legal assistance either in-theater or at the deployment center.

6. Redeployment

Redeployment involves movement of CAAF and selected non-CAAF and their equipment out of the operational area upon completion of the designated period of performance or, in some cases, early individual contractor personnel re-deployment (such as for administrative actions or changes in deployment eligibility). Contractor personnel should conduct redeployment actions in the reverse manner of how they deployed. At the end of the contract period, NURP CAAF should redeploy through the JPPC to their original point of embarkation. The final part of the NURP deployment processing should be through their designated deployment center where they will return all government-provided OCIE (or pay retribution to the Service that issued the OCIE for non-returned OCIE), return government-issued ID cards, and complete any other replacement center-directed out processing actions. Habitually, associated CAAF can redeploy as a NURP if their individual employment or company period of performance ends prior to unit redeployment. CAAF authorized to self-deploy will redeploy under the direction of their contract company per the terms and conditions of their contract.

a. General Redeployment Tasks. The subordinate joint force command, components, DOD agencies, and CCMDs are responsible for ensuring redeploying
contractor personnel and their equipment are properly managed and controlled. Key redeployment tasks include, but are not limited to, updating SPOT, recovery of government-issued badges and ID cards, recovery and disposition of all government-owned equipment, required intelligence and other required out-briefs/debriefings, and withdrawal of security clearances (as applicable).

b. **Base Closure.** The subordinate JFC, ICW the appropriate contracting activity, BOS-I lead, and applicable component, will ensure CAAF depart the base/operational area upon completion or closeout of their contracted service unless they are immediately transferred by their company to an existing service contract within the operational area. Care should be taken to ensure CAAF personnel do not remain in the operational area once their contract is completed (e.g., go “job hunting”).

c. **Transportation Out of Theater.** If specified by the contract, the USG will, IAW each individual’s LOA, provide contract employees transportation from the theater of operations, via strategic lift through the TPFDD process, to the location from which they deployed, unless otherwise stated in the contract. The contracted employee, through their company, will coordinate departure and arrival times and with the appropriate JPPC and/or replacement center. Contractors who are US citizens returning to the US are subject to US reentry customs requirements in effect at the time of reentry. Transportation of contractor personnel from the replacement center to the home location is a contractor responsibility.

### 7. Equipment Management

Major contractor-related equipment items include Class VII GFP; CAGO equipment; and contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) equipment.

a. **GFP.** GFP includes Service component-provided, government-issue Class VII items. GFP can be provided to the contractor prior to deployment into the operational area or theater-provided equipment that is issued to the contractor in the operational area. Actions related to GFP issuance, maintenance, accountability, and return to stock are the responsibility of the Service component providing this equipment and the applicable contracting officer. Service components should provide the subordinate JFC’s OCSIC GFP-related information, to include any major GFP issue that may impact JFC overall force readiness.

b. **CAGO Equipment.** CAGO (referred to as contractor-acquired property in FAR Subpart 45) is equipment acquired by the contractor, normally in a cost-reimbursement type contract, for the performance of the contracted service but remains the property of the USG. Like GFP, CAGO accountability and disposition is a responsibility of the Service component and the applicable contracting officer.

c. **COCO Equipment.** COCO equipment consists of items acquired by and owned by the contractor for use in the performance of the contracted service. COCO is normally associated with fixed-price contracts and, unlike GFP and CAGO, the government has no legal authority over this equipment. Additionally, the contractor, not the USG, is responsible for COCO disposition and any costs associated with the transport of this equipment in, around, and out of the operational area.
d. **Government Visibility.** Service component visibility of GFP and CAGO is required by DOD policy. More specifically, CAGO accountability is accomplished through a USG-approved contractor equipment accountability system. While GFP and CAGO accountability and disposition is the responsibility of the Service component contracting officer, general GFP and CAGO information is necessary to determine deployment, facilities, and redeployment support. Additionally, in some operations, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC may be involved in determining the disposition of this equipment. For example, in major operations requiring stability activities, OSD, in consultation with Service HQ, may direct that certain GFP and/or CAGO equipment, if deemed excess to DOD and USG needs, be transferred to the HN or a designated multinational force. If transfer of GFP and/or CAGO equipment is anticipated, the subordinate JTF J-4 should work closely with the appropriate DOS, DOD, and affected Service component organization to ensure clearly understood and properly coordinated disposition instructions are provided in a timely manner. Legally, the JFC does not get involved in COCO disposition but may require visibility over major COCO items in situations where the JFC may be required to assist in the transport of this equipment into or out of the operational area.

*Additional information on government-owned contractor equipment can be found in DODI 4161.02, Accountability and Management of Government Contract Property.*

8. **Security Considerations for Contractors**

CAAF personnel, for the most part, are treated similarly to DOD civilians in relation to joint security, AT, and FP programs. They are, IAW their contract, required to abide by JFC and component AT and FP guidance, as well as other joint security-related directives and policies. Area commanders, base commanders, and supported unit commanders are responsible for individual AT and FP support and may have security responsibility for contractor personnel. To accomplish this task, area commanders should have oversight of all supporting contingency contractor personnel in their area of operations. Contractors must comply with oversight organization policies stated in their contract and ensure their employees follow all individual FP and PR security requirements. Contractors are expected to take passive FP measures for their safety and security. Also, contractors should require their deployed employees to take measures for self-defense, such as driving classes, carrying cell phones, and following procedures to report suspicious incidents. CAAF and selected other contingency contractor personnel should, as a minimum, receive information on local and security procedures; be issued chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other protection equipment (along with the requisite training); and travel and movement security support. Such training and equipment should be designated in the contract and be given before deployment at the designated deployment center. Contractor personnel may be armed for self-defense subject to US law and pursuant to DOD policy and HN and international law, including SOFAs and international agreements. All requests for permission to arm contractor personnel must be reviewed by the appropriate GCC’s SJA. The JFC and Service component commanders or DOD agencies determine and execute operationally specific FP and general security training requirements for non-CAAF personnel. Normally, CAAF FP/security measures are the same for DOD civilians accompanying the force.

a. **Security Screening/Biometrics ID Card/Base Access.** The subordinate JFC and individual base commanders are responsible for the security of military facilities within the operational area. Part of this process is the screening and badging of contractor personnel authorized base access. Currently, there is no standard methodology for screening and issuing base access security badges for contractor personnel. The JFC must ensure local screening and security badge issuance policies and procedures are in place for all contractor personnel requiring access to US facilities. This requirement is especially pertinent to contractor personnel who have not been issued a DOD common access card. Not having these policies and procedures in place can severely reduce the effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility, and/or efficiency of contracted support. This can be a significant issue when changes to the operation require a quick surge of contracted support from one base to another. Delay in contractor access to locations and facilities can increase the cost of a contract and impede contractor ability to provide services in support of operations’ requirements. However, expeditiously facilitating contractor access must be balanced against the risk to forces for obtaining required access.

b. **Establishing FP/Security Requirements in the Contract.** Provided no theater-specific clause has been established for inclusion by the contracting officer, specific security measures are mission- and situation-dependent as determined by the GCC. **All supporting contractor personnel, not just CAAF, whose area of performance is in the vicinity of US forces are required to comply with applicable supported GCC and subordinate JFC FP policies and procedures IAW the terms and conditions of their contract.** Contract support requirements packages and subsequent contracts should include the requirement that non-CAAF requiring base access participate in the local command’s screening and vetting program as a condition of employment. The notification process should be established to allow/restrict contractor access, as appropriate, between locations without impeding contract requirements (driving up costs) or allowing unauthorized access (threatening/compromising FP).

DFARS Subpart 225.3, Contracts Performed Outside the United States, and DFARS PGI 225.370, Contracts Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country, provide guidance on placing standard contingency contract language in contracts.

c. **Individual Movement Protection.** Another key concern for the JFC is protection of contractor personnel during individual or small group movements within the operational area. In general, **all CAAF should be provided protection during transit within the operational area commensurate with protection provided to DOD civilians.** It is important the JFC and subordinate commanders balance FP requirements with the need for contractor personnel to have ready access to their place of performance. Overly restrictive movement requirements can hinder the responsiveness of contracted support, especially for systems support contractors who are providing support on an area support basis. Too lenient movement restrictions may have a negative effect on contracted support if CAAF
become casualties due to the lack of/or improper enforcement of movement-related FP and security measures. In operations where more than a level I (agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorist, civil disturbances) threat or a high road crime rate exists, routine military movements should include CAAF. Otherwise, commanders responsible for local FP and requiring activities organizations will need to make special arrangements.

d. **Convoy Protection.** The subordinate JFC or lead Service component responsible for land movement control must establish, publish, and implement operational-specific, contractor-related convoy FP standards and procedures. Contractor vehicles and personnel required to join military convoys will be included in convoy FP planning and execution. Contractor convoys and movement conducted outside of military movement control channels may include PSC-provided FP if so directed IAW the contract. PSC convoy protection is discussed later in this chapter.

*See ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7 [MCRP 4-11.3H]/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, for more information on integrating contractor vehicles and personnel into convoy operations.*

e. **Issuance of Personal Defense Weapons.** In general, individual contractor personnel should only be armed in exceptional circumstances and require documentation and approval of a waiver (e.g., exception to policy). However, consistent with applicable US, HN, international laws, relevant SOFAs or other international agreements, and DOD policy, the supported CCDR may authorize contractor personnel to carry a government-issued or approved individual weapon for personal protection. Arming of individual contractor personnel is strictly voluntary, requires contractor approval, and must be reflected in the terms and conditions of the contract. When military FP and legitimate civil authority are deemed unavailable or insufficient, the CCDR will establish RUF IAW US, HN, or international law; SOFAs; or other arrangements with local authorities. Variables such as the nature of the operation, the type of conflict, any applicable SOFA related to the presence of US forces, and the nature of the activity being protected require case-by-case determinations. As per DOD policy, the supported CCDR can delegate this authority down to a designated general officer, normally the subordinate JTF joint security officer.

*DO
di 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), provides detailed policy guidance on issuance of personal defense weapons to contractor personnel.*

9. **Contractor-Provided Security**

The GCC may authorize the use of contractors to provide specified security functions, consistent with applicable US, HN, and international law and any SOFA or other security agreement that may exist for the specified operational area. Armed PSC functions consist of guarding personnel, facilities, and property as directed by their contract. Use of PSCs should be carefully considered by the JFC, because PSC-provided services, more than any other contracted service, can have a direct impact (sometimes a very negative impact) on civil-military aspects of the operation. Use of armed PCSs does not negate the responsibility of the JFC for protecting US forces, facilities, and CAAF.
a. As a general rule, use of armed force by PSCs will be limited to providing protection from criminal or terrorist threats, not to exceed level I threat. Although direct participation of PSC personnel in hostilities is not a violation of international law, it may change their legal status and can subject them to direct attack. Also, combat is identified as an inherently government function; commanders are not to use PSCs where the likely threat will involve defense against organized attacks by hostile armed forces (level II or III) or any offensive operations.

b. Whether a particular use of a PSC to protect military assets is permissible is dependent on the situation and requires detailed operational and legal analysis and coordination by the subordinate JFC and SJA. Variables such as the nature of the threat, the type of conflict, applicable HN laws, and the nature of the activity being protected require case-by-case determinations.

c. PSCs operate under RUF rather than rules of engagement. Operational-specific RUF, promulgated by the GCC or designated subordinate flag officer, generally limit PSC use of deadly force to self-defense or the defense of others against criminal violence and other unlawful attack. Defense of others may include the protection of inherently dangerous property or specified critical infrastructure, the loss or destruction of which is likely to lead to loss of life. The authority to use force by PSCs is no greater than the authority for self-defense exercised by other civilians. Armed PSC employees are subject to domestic (US and HN) law and may not be protected by SOFA provisions. PSCs who exceed the limits imposed by applicable law may be subject to prosecution by the HN government, as well as under the UCMJ or other US laws.

d. Commanders must recognize the civil-military-related risks when utilizing PSCs in military operations and take measures to manage those risks. For example, the local populace may not distinguish between a PSC and a US military member; misconduct on the part of PSC personnel can be attributed to the US military and any other PSCs operating in the area, regardless of its quality of performance. Positive or negative behavior of PSCs employed by the US military will almost always be associated with the USG and deployed US military force.

Additional information on PSCs can be found in DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises, and Appendix G, “Private Security Contractor Services Planning and Processes.”

10. Coordinating Non-Department of Defense Contractor Management

a. Scope of Challenge. The scope of non-DOD OCS integration requirements are very mission-dependent. In some joint operations, the subordinate JFC may only have limited requirements to integrate non-DOD contracted support into military operations, while in others, there may be major challenges that defy any simple solutions. For example, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, contractors in support of USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs could be found throughout the operational area, to include significant use of contracted security forces.
b. Specific Challenges. In complex, long-term operations requiring stability activities, there are a myriad of challenges related to USG departments and agencies and NGO contractors. The key to addressing these requirements is an active civil-military coordination effort, to include the use of civil-military operations centers or other mechanisms to facilitate civil-military information sharing and cooperation. Two of the biggest challenges for the JFC are coordinating non-DOD contractor movements and non-DOD contracted security elements.

(1) Movement Coordination/Deconfliction of Non-DOD Contractor Personnel and Equipment. The subordinate JFC may be required to assist in integrating non-DOD contractor personnel and equipment into both air and surface movements, especially during ongoing major reconstruction and transition to civil authority-related actions in high threat environments. While presenting a planning challenge, it is in the best interest of the subordinate JFC to assist DOS and other non-DOD organizations in contract-related actions within the operational area. The major challenges associated with this support include obtaining advance knowledge of the requirement, determining military responsibility for FP and security requirements, and establishing communications with the contractor.

(2) Coordination and Support to Non-DOD-Contracted Private Security Company Operations. Of all of the non-DOD, OCS-related coordination tasks, none is more important and challenging than coordinating with non-DOD agencies who utilize PSCs within the operational area. These non-DOD-contracted PSCs, sometimes including contracted uniformed foreign military members, may be used by various USG departments and agencies and NGOs to provide protection of their personnel in transit and at work sites in high threat areas. Without proper coordination, the risk of an incident involving friendly military forces on contractor employees can be significant. The subordinate JFC and its subordinate component commanders must take great care in establishing adequate visibility (location, mission, RUF) and coordination procedures associated with these non-DOD private security-related contracts.
Additional information on coordinating non-DOD PSCs can be found in Appendix G, “Private Security Contractor Services Planning and Processes.”
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APPENDIX A
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT INTEGRATION CELL
ORGANIZATION AND PROCESSES

1. General

As described in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” the OCSIC is the key organizational element to effective and efficient OCS planning and integration. The primary task of the geographic CCMD and subordinate OCSIC is to lead the OCS planning and execution oversight effort across the joint force. Service and certain functional components may also have an OCSIC or designated OCS staff members to perform these functions at their level. This OCS-focused cell also serves as the primary collector, consolidator, and integrator for major OCS-related information from various sources, to include the supporting LSC/LSCC contracting activity or JTSCC SCO and other cross-functional organizations (e.g., joint logistics operations center, civil-military operations center, IFO-related cells or working groups, and other support boards such as the joint facilities utilization board). This information, in its totality, becomes the command’s OCS-related operational picture. The OCSIC ensures relevant OCS information flow so stakeholders are generally able to find, access, and integrate OCS information and data they need to support the operation via the common operational picture and facilitates appropriate interpretation and use of that data by and between relevant stakeholders, including between the subordinate JFC’s primary and special staff members; the designated lead contracting activity; and other key supporting contracting activities such as DLA, the designated military construction agent, and Service CAP offices. The information provided can be as simple as a geographic depiction of contracting activities operating in the JOA or as complex as contractor management reports, to include CAAF-related, IFO information, and other mission-specific OCS reports.

2. Tasks and Coordination Requirements

As discussed above and in Chapter III, OCSICs should be established at both the geographic CCMD and subordinate joint force command levels. At each level, OCSICs perform similar functions but interface with different organizations. Similarities and differences between these cells are discussed below.

a. Common OCS Integration Tasks. OCSICs at the strategic theater and operational levels focus on integrating major OCS-related actions across primary and special staff members, major subordinate commands, and key supporting contracting organizations. These common tasks range from providing OCS command advice to supporting and participating in OCS-related cross-functional organizations (see Figure A-1).

b. CCMD-Level Tasks and Coordination Requirements. At the CCMD level, the OCSIC focuses on OCS planning, operations oversight, reporting, and training. This cell’s functions include all common OCS functions as depicted in Figure A-1, as well as GCC-specific functions captured in Figure A-2. This strategic theater-level OCSIC differs from the subordinate JFC cell in that it focuses across the entire AOR, not just on one operation or single JOA. It is also a permanent, vice temporary, cell. Geographic CCMD OCSIC
personnel may be used to assist in forming the subordinate joint force OCSIC primarily on
the basis that the geographic CCMD OCSIC, a permanent cell, is most familiar with the
specific planning for the military operation. However, the subordinate joint force command
OCSIC positions should be filled by other sources as soon as practicable to allow the CCMD
OCSIC personnel to return to their AOR-focused mission. The CCMD OCSIC routinely
coordinates with various supporting and supported organizations, to include subordinate joint
force command OCSICs if/when established (Figure A-3 is an example of an OCSIC placed
in the J-4). It is imperative the CCMD OCSIC keep active contacts and an open dialogue
with these organizations. Only through this strategic level teaming approach can contracted
support be properly planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels.

c. **Subordinate Joint Force Command-Level Tasks and Coordination Requirements.** At the subordinate joint force command level, the OCSIC focuses on
execution planning, near-term integration, and single operations oversight. The operational-
level OCSIC functions include all common OCS tasks listed in Figure A-1, as well as the

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**Common Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks**

- Collect, analyze, and share analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information.
- Lead the OCS planning and integration effort across primary and special staffs.
- Provide OCS-related advice to commander and staff.
- Coordinate assessments and provide input to readiness reports.
- Ensure JFC-directed, OCS-related policies and guidance are properly executed.
- Establish and maintain OCS COP.
- Establish and run working groups.
- Coordinate multinational, interagency, and other operational-specific OCS matters/challenges.
- Develop and maintain OCS policy and other operational guidance documents.
- Review all orders, policies, etc., for OCS equities and impact.
- Participate and provide secretariat to OCS-related boards.
- Participate in non-OCS-related boards and working groups (as required).
- Track and work any major contract management issues.

**Legend**

- COP: common operational picture
- JFC: joint force commander
- OCS: operational contract support

**Figure A-1. Common Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks**
**Geographic Combatant Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks**

- Integrate OCS matters across all primary and special staff members.
- ICW the Service components, CSAs, and lead contracting activity, collect, analyze, and disseminate shaping OCS-related analysis of the operational environment information.
- Coordinate with the J-2 to identify and analyze business environment-related JIPOE information.
- Coordinate with the J-4 to synchronize theater logistic analysis and OCS-related requirements efforts.
- Plan for and coordinate OCS actions for shaping operations.
- Plan and support OCS matters in GCC-directed exercises.
- Coordinate OCS training and education for selected staff members (to include OCSIC staff) and subordinate commands.
- Coordinate, develop, present, and assist in resolution of CLPSB OCS matters.
- Develop, promulgate, and oversee the implementation of GCC-directed, OCS-related policies, plans, directives, and instructions, to include theater business clearance guidance, as applicable.
- Plan and coordinate the establishment and training of subordinate joint force OCSIC.
- Maintain direct contact with subordinate OCSICs and, when directed, detach personnel to augment and/or provide an LNO to same.
- Coordinate OCS issues directly with the Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics] and OUSD(A&S) staff, as required.
- Support national strategic OCS forums, lessons learned programs, and capability development actions, as appropriate.
- Maintain and update CCMD OCS Website information.
- Assist in stabilize and enable civil authority OCS transition planning and integration with USG departments and agencies, OSD, and multinational partners.

**Legend**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLPSB</td>
<td>combatant command logistics procurement support board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICW</td>
<td>in coordination with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(A&amp;S)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A-2. Geographic Combatant Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks
tasks listed in Figure A-4. This strategic theater-level OCSIC differs from the subordinate joint force command OCSIC in that it focuses across the entire AOR, not just on one operation or single JOA. It is also a permanent, vice temporary, cell. Like the CCMD-level OCSIC, the subordinate joint force command OCSIC routinely coordinates with various supporting and supported organizations (see Figure A-5, J-4 OCSIC placement example). Unlike the CCMD-level cell, this cell often does not have time to build long-term relationships and, with assistance from the CCMD-level OCSIC, initiates these contacts as soon as it is formed. As with the CCMD-level OCSIC, it is imperative the subordinate OCSIC keep active contacts and an open dialogue with these organizations.

d. **Service Component Tasks and Coordination Requirements.** Service component OCSICs/OCS staff members perform similar tasks and coordination functions listed in Figure A-2. These OCSICs/OCS staff members are also the conduit between tactical- and
Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Organization and Processes

Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks

- Review orders for OCS equities; ensure other staff elements incorporate OCS into their planning efforts.
- Collect, analyze, and share analysis of OCS aspects of operational environment information.
- Integrate OCS matters for a specific operation at the JOA level.
- Conduct OCS planning; develop OCS estimates; generate and publish required planning products; serve as a member of the joint planning group.
- Conduct vertical coordination with geographic CCMD OCSIC and key subordinate command’s OCS staff.
- Maintain visibility on and ensure compliance of higher-level OCS orders, directives, and policies, to include TBC directives, as applicable.
- Establish and maintain OCS common operational picture.
- Develop, refine, and recommend OCS-related EEIs, to include mission-specific metrics.
- Track and report OCS CCIRs to the JLOC; recommend changes to same as necessary.
- Participate in/supplement JLOC daily battle rhythm actions/meetings, as required.
- Share key/OCS-related battle assessment updates with the LSC/LSCC contracting agency/JTSCC.
- Perform JRRB secretariat function; assist in the development, promulgation, execution, and refinement of JFC JRRB policies and procedures.
- Participate in JCSB as non-voting member policy/procedures development and execution matters.
- Coordinate with other staff elements and OCS-related boards/centers (e.g., JFUB, CMOC, force protection working group).
- Lead the stabilize and enable civil authority phases of OCS transition planning and integration across the JOA with components supporting CSAs, as well as other USG departments and agencies and multinational partners.
- Develop and implement post-contract award reporting process to ensure subordinate commands provide proper oversight on the execution of mission-critical contracts.
- Utilize required business systems for contract oversight and contractor accountability.
- Create and maintain complete records for transparency and auditability.
- Conduct commander’s contract oversight review board.
- Provide input to readiness reports.

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential element of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSB</td>
<td>joint contracting support board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>joint facilities utilization board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>joint logistic operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRRB</td>
<td>joint requirements review board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>joint theater support contracting command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>theater business clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A-4. Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks

operational-level staff functions and play an important role in requirements management conducted by Service component requiring activities and the subordinate JFC’s OCSIC.
3. Establishment and Manning

a. **CCMD Level.** All geographic CCMDs have permanent OCSICs of various sizes and configuration, that include DLA JCASO OCS planners and, in some cases, other CCMD-assigned staff members. In addition, USSOCOM OCS planners are assigned to Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (Contracts) and aligned to Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In general, these staffs are comprised of both military and DOD civilians with a variety of logistic planning and contingency contracting experience. During some major operations, it may be necessary to temporarily augment this standing cell.
b. **Subordinate Joint Force Command Level.** When considering the establishment of a subordinate joint force command (normally a subordinate unified command or JTF) OCSIC, the GCC’s OCSIC staff should plan for estimated scope and scale of planned OCS actions within a particular operation. Subordinate joint force command OCSICs fluctuate in size and skill sets based on the phase of operation. In some operations, this subordinate joint force command OCSIC may be very small and never fluctuate significantly in size, while in other operations, it may start out relatively small but grow significantly in both scale and scope of expertise during large-scale operations, especially sustained stabilize activities and transition to enabling civil authorities. In most operations, the subordinate joint force command OCSIC should have an LNO from the lead contracting activity and other organizations as needed. This LNO requirement may significantly expand in major stabilize and enable civil authorities operations.

*See Appendix E, “Stabilize-Enable Civil Authorities Transition Planning and Processes,” for more information on OCSIC manning and processes in support of major contract support drawdown and transition requirements.*

c. **Functional Component Command.** In some operations, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) could require an OCSIC if the GCC directs the command to perform CUL responsibilities for subordinate forces and if significant portions of this support is coming from contracted means. In these situations, the JFLCC would perform subordinate JFC OCS tasks.

d. **Service Component Level.** The Services’ OCSIC capability varies at CCMD and subordinate joint force levels, but in general, it is very limited. In most component HQs, logistics staff officers perform OCSIC-like functions as an additional/collateral duty when there is no full-time, stand-alone OCSIC. The individual Service component determines the organization and manning of these Service component OCS-focused staffs. They will vary based on specific operational requirements.

e. **JMD/Augmentation Sourcing Options.** The subordinate joint force OCSIC JMD manning and GCC-level augmentation can come from numerous sources. Initial subordinate OCSIC manning may be sourced from the aligned JCASO MST. Other staff members can come from the Services, supporting CSAs, and even contractor augmentation (see Figure A-6). If contractor augmentation is contemplated, ensure the contract support requirements package clearly states the need for non-disclosure and non-competition agreements as part of the terms and conditions of the contract. In no case should the OCSIC chief position itself be occupied by a nongovernment employee. Also of importance, contracting officers with duty in the OCSIC will serve as staff officers focusing on integrating OCS throughout the command and not awarding or administering contracts.

*See Appendix H, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office,” for more information on the JCASO OCS planners and MST.*
### Possible Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Manning Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Provider</th>
<th>Type of Personnel</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Contracting (unwarranted), logistics, and engineer with OCS training</td>
<td>In most operations, a task-organized MST will be the primary source of initial OCSIC staff augmentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD OCSIC</td>
<td>OCS planning, contracting</td>
<td>Can be used as staff augmentation, can also serve as liaison officer to CCMD-level OCSIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Logistics planner, contracting and/or program manager</td>
<td>Program manager personnel normally only required in major operation with significant SFA requirements; Army additional skill identifier 3C (Operational Contract Support) personnel preferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA (non-JCASO)</td>
<td>Logistician</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC/LSCC Contracting Agency/JTSCC</td>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Agent</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Contracting, property administration, quality assurance</td>
<td>Augmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>All skills listed above</td>
<td>Cannot serve as cell chief, must sign non-disclosure and non-compete agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Force Headquarters</td>
<td>Logistics officer</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **CCMD**: combatant command
- **DCMA**: Defense Contract Management Agency
- **DLA**: Defense Logistics Agency
- **JCASO**: Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
- **JTSCC**: joint theater support contracting command
- **LSC**: lead Service for contracting
- **LSCC**: lead Service for contracting coordination
- **MST**: mission support team
- **OCS**: operational contract support
- **OCSIC**: operational contract support integration cell
- **SFA**: security force assistance
APPENDIX B
THEATER SUPPORT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

1. General

As stated in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” there should be an LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC designated for each joint operation. Per Chapter V, “Contractor Management,” the LSCs and the LSCCs designated contracting activity and the JTSCC have two primary functions: provide theater support contracting services and coordinate common contracting actions through the JCSB or JCSB-like process (Figure B-1), to include TBC, if directed.

2. Organizational Decision Process

Theater support contracting organizational options are dependent on the specific mission support requirements and a myriad of other operational factors (Figure B-2). The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contracting Coordination Focus and Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Focus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure effective and efficient theater support contracting actions.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate and ensure proper integration of common contracting actions for the joint force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Major Functions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collect, analyze, and share contracting-related information of the operational area with the OCSIC and other contracting organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate common contracting actions to reduce/eliminate duplication of effort, achieve economic ordering quantities, and eliminate undue competition between Service component theater support and Service/CSA external support contracting actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assist in implementing cost-reduction strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide guidance/direction on consolidation of purchases.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish and enforce JOA-specific theater support contracting procedures.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate/prescribe payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate and chair the JCSB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintain/share foreign vendor vetting &quot;no contract&quot; list.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Functions performed via coordination authority in the lead Service model but would be directive in nature under the JTSCC’s C2 and HCA authority.

Legend

| C2 | command and control |
| CSA | combat support agency |
| HCA | head of a contracting activity |
| JCSB | joint contracting support board |
| JOA | joint operations area |
| JTSCC | joint theater support contracting command |
| OCSIC | operational contract support integration cell |

Figure B-1. Contracting Coordination Focus and Functions
Appendix B

GCC should determine the appropriate contingency contracting organizational option during annex W (Operational Contract Support) development, as this decision is necessary to inform the contracting capabilities and capacities estimate portion of this annex. In general, a JTSCC organizational construct should only be considered for large, complex, long-term operations where there will be significant contracted support requirements and a strong likelihood of competition for limited, locally available, commercially provided services and supplies. In less complex operations, an LSC or LSCC construct would be more appropriate.

3. Contracting Related Lead Service Organization Considerations

   a. General. The LSC and LSCC designations are a GCC-level function. Normally, a GCC institutes LSCC designations for specific geographic areas or regions within their AOR as part of shaping activities where there are two or more Services operating. In these activities, the Services retain C2 and HCA contracting authority over their deployed contingency contracting organizations. In most cases, the LSCC would come from the Service component with the preponderance of forces and/or established resources, bases, and security cooperation activities in the country or region. In general, the Army and the Air Force are the most capable Services to perform this mission. When and if warranted by changes to operational requirements, the GCC may direct the transition to an LSC or JTSCC organizational construct.

   b. Organizational Construct. Service contingency contracting organizations are designed to meet Service component requirements. In joint operations, the designated LSC contracting activity may require at least limited staff augmentation from the JCASO or

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Contingency Contracting Organization

- Size, primary mission focus, and expected duration of the operation
- Expected scope, criticality, and complexity of the contracting coordination requirements
- Most capable Service in-theater support contracting capability
- Existing common-user logistics and/or base operating support-integrator designations
- Existing intra-Service, intra-agency, and/or acquisition cross-servicing support agreements
- Location of supported units as compared to available commercial vendor base
- Need for enhanced joint force commander control of the theater support contracting, to include contingency contract administration services
- Need to implement formal theater business clearance authority
- Need to more directly synchronize contracting actions with integrated financial operations

Figure B-2. Contingency Contracting Organization
other Service contracting activities to perform contracting coordination functions (see Figure B-3). In long-term joint operations, where there is significant support to other Services and/or multinational partners, the LSC contracting activity may also require augmentation to perform contracting and/or CCAS functions. In any case, LSC augmentation requests would need to be forwarded to and endorsed by both the subordinate JFC and the supported GCC.

c. In determining mission-specific LSC or LSCC coordination cell requirements, care must be taken to not use scarce contracting personnel for positions that could be adequately filled with non-contracting officer military occupational specialties. In any case, the supported GCC should ensure the LSC or LSCC is properly augmented when necessary. Specific LSC or LSCC coordination cell positions, general qualifications, and associated functions include, but may not be limited to:

(1) **Contracting Coordination Staff Augmentation.** The contracting coordination staff position is a full-time position that should be filled with an individual possessing Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) level III certification in contracting and significant operational experience. This staff officer’s responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

![Figure B-3. Lead Service for Contracting Organization Chart](image-url)
(a) Lead the common contracting coordination effort in the operational area.

(b) Serve as JRRB advisor, as directed.

(c) Serve as the JCSB chair, as directed.

(d) Provide contracting advice to supported units, when requested.

(2) **Contracting Plans and Operations Officer(s).** This full-time position (or positions) will always be necessary when forming a contracting coordination staff. The staff officer supplements the existing lead Service theater support contracting activity plans and operations staff to perform the expanded LSC contracting planning and operations mission. This individual (or individuals) should have DAWIA level III contracting certification, preferably with contingency contracting, and, if possible, planning experience. The contracting plans and operations officer’s primary duties include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Manage and analyze the effectiveness/efficiency of in-theater contracting organization structure and the joint contracting coordination process.

(b) Continue to collect, analyze, and share OE information as it relates to OCS information.

(c) Analyze and recommend operational area-wide contracting strategies.

(d) Develop and coordinate JCSB agenda.

(e) Work closely with the command’s OCSIC LNO to ensure effective and efficient synchronization of the JRRB and JCSB.

(f) Recommend changes to the CMPs and the supporting TBC policies and procedures.

(3) **Contracting Database Manager.** This full-time position will always be necessary when forming an LSC contracting coordination cell. This position does not require DAWIA certification or any specific military occupation specialty. The contracting database manager’s primary duties include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Tracking contracting organization office/JCSB organization information (e.g., title, contact information, location).

(b) Maintaining information on the contracting force laydown (e.g., number of deployed contracting personnel by organization, DAWIA certification level, contracting warrant levels, location).

(c) Maintaining information on major, mission-critical, and other designated contracts and task orders for commonly procured goods and services (e.g., theater support contracts, CAP task orders).
(d) Maintaining contact information of pay agents supporting the JOA (e.g., name, e-mail, phone number, location, units supported).

(e) Sharing all of the above information with the subordinate joint force command OCSIC.

(4) **JCSB Secretary.** The JCSB secretary is a required position that could be either a part-time or full-time duty depending on the workload. This position does not require a DAWIA-certified person but should be filled with someone with conference coordination experience and related skills. The JCSB secretary’s primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) ICW the database manager, maintain and distribute designated JCSB members contact information.

(b) Develop and promulgate JCSB meeting schedules and agendas.

(c) Prepare and promulgate policies and procedures for JCSB meeting sessions.

(d) Serve as the JCSB meeting coordinator/facilitator.

(e) Capture and distribute critical JCSB decisions and due-outs, and ensure follow-up to questions or issues.

(5) **OCSIC LNO.** This could be a full-time or part-time position depending on the specific operational requirement. The person filling this position should be experienced in planning and contracting. The OCSIC LNO’s primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Serve as the day-to-day LSC contracting activity representative to the subordinate joint force command HQ.

(b) Facilitate communications and information sharing between the subordinate JFC and the LSC contracting activity.

(c) Assist subordinate joint force command OCSIC in developing OCS-related plans, orders, and other command guidance.

(d) Provide contracting-related advice to OCSIC members and other subordinate joint force command staff members, as required.

(6) **Service and/or CSA LNO.** These would be full-time positions provided by the appropriate Service component theater support contracting activity and/or CSA (normally DLA).

(a) Serve as the day-to-day representative to the LSC contracting activity.
(b) Facilitate communications and information sharing between the Service contracting activity and CSA to the LSC contracting activity.

(c) Assist LSC contracting activities in developing contracting-related plans and strategies.

(7) **Multinational/Interagency Coordinator.** This coordinator position could either be part-time or full-time depending on specific operational factors. An experienced contracting officer, preferably with interagency experience, should fill this position. The multinational/interagency coordinator’s primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) ICW the contracting database manager, establish and maintain contact information on multinational and USG departments and agencies contracting organizations.

(b) Share DOD and collect multinational/interagency contracting information, whenever possible.

(c) Synchronize and deconflict DOD, other USG, and multinational contracting to the extent possible.

(d) Assist the subordinate joint force command OCSIC staff to consider, develop, obtain approval for, and implement multinational contracting support agreements.

(e) Assist the subordinate joint force command OCSIC staff to plan and execute contracting support of designated USG departments and agencies.

(f) Assist the subordinate joint force command OCSIC staff to plan and execute the stabilize-enable civil authorities transition of contracting support to other USG departments and agencies.

d. **Coordination Process.** The designated LSC contracting activity, through its contracting coordination cell and the JCSB process, is responsible for coordinating common contracting actions across multiple contracting organizations operating within the operational area (Figure B-4). The LSC or LSCC contracting coordination cell ensures all in-theater Service, CSA, multinational, and, when feasible, other USG departments’ and agencies’ contracting organizations share contracting-related analysis of OCS aspects of the OE information, coordinate/deconflict contract actions, and, in general, attempt to avoid competition for the same commercial commodities and services within the operational area.

4. **Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Considerations**

a. **General.** The primary task of the JTSCC is to effectively and efficiently synchronize all theater support contracting under a single C2 structure and provide responsive contracting support to the joint force command. Like the LSC and LSCC construct, the JTSCC would have a key secondary task to execute coordinating authority
over designated contracting activities supporting the joint force. In some cases, this coordinating authority will include specific TBC functions over DOD contracts with performance or delivery in the operational area.

b. **Authorities.** Per Title 10, USC, and JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, the GCC has the authority to establish subordinate joint commands (i.e., a JTSCC) to accomplish specific mission tasks. However, since acquisition authority is not inherent to combatant command (command authority), the supported GCC coordinates the issuance of an HCA authority designation letter from the Service SPE of the Service component directed to form the building block for the JTSCC SCO contracting authority to support the operations as directed in the annex W (Operational Contract Support). The GCC would normally pre-coordinate the HCA authority requirement with the appropriate Service SPE with the authority to become effective upon the standup of the JTSCC as
directed in the execute order or FRAGORD. The execute order or FRAGORD should also include specific common contracting coordination requirements (i.e., requirement to participate in the JCSB process and follow TBC guidance) to designated contracting organizations delivering or executing support in the operational area. Such guidance will require pre-coordination and support from USD(A&S) to extend appropriate authorities to the GCC to ensure DOD components comply with contracting-related boards and TBC guidance.

c. Planning. Planning for the establishment of a JTSCC can be a significant effort due to the complexity of such a command, the associated workload analysis, required staffing, and supporting acquisition authority documentation. Therefore, to ensure there is no gap in contracting support, the GCC should designate an LSC at the earliest possible time with the intent of transforming the LSC contracting activity into a JTSCC, possibly tied to specified operations or specific trigger points. The GCC will task the Service component responsible for forming the JTSCC to lead the JTSCC planning effort, although the aligned contingency contracting activity may actually spearhead this effort. Specific planning considerations are covered in Figure B-5.

d. Organizational and Manning Construct. Like other subordinate joint force command HQs, a JTSCC HQ is organized along the standard joint command and staff model (see Figure B-6). However, there are significant differences when it comes to the organization and manning of some of these staff elements.

e. The subordinate elements organization, manning, and functions are unique to the JTSCC. Specific JTSCC staff and subordinate organizational and manning discussion follows:

(1) HQ Element. The JTSCC HQ element is similar to any other subordinate JFC organization and consists of:

(a) Commanding Officer. The JTSCC commander is normally a one- or two-star-level flag/general officer with significant contracting experience. The JTSCC commander serves as the HCA and provides contract warrant authority to subordinate SCOs and all attached contracting officers.

(b) Aide de Camp. Performs similar functions as any other aide de camp and does not require DAWIA certification.

(c) Senior Enlisted Advisor. Performs similar functions as any other senior enlisted advisor, and while this position does not require DAWIA certification, a senior noncommissioned officer with contracting experience is preferred.

(2) Primary Staff. The JTSCC primary staff element is similar to any other subordinate joint force primary staff organizations with some differences in the J-2, J-3, and J-5 functions. At a minimum, a JTSCC primary staff element should consist of the following staff sections and personnel qualifications:
Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Establishment Planning Considerations

- Scope of operation, to include TBC and CCAS requirements
- Base organization (LSC contracting activity)
- Extant contracting activities in/near the operational area and contract vehicles that can be modified to support the anticipated mission requirements
- Augmentation/staffing requirements, to include HQ staff and subordinate contracting elements, to include numbers, standards of grade, and/or DAWIA certification levels (should strive to minimize DAWIA-certified positions)
- HCA and TBC authority designations and/or policies
- Transition points, milestones, triggers
- Sourcing strategy, to include CCMD-aligned Service contracting organizations, the JCASO, CSAs, and non-aligned Service organizations (priority to CCMD-aligned organizations)
- Reachback capabilities plan
- Budget estimates
- Location, infrastructure, and other base operating service requirements
- Acquisition instruction (including process for expeditiously translating JFC requirements affecting contractors and their personnel into local guidance [provisions/clauses] and disseminating them)
- Ancillary support requirements (e.g., translators, FP, facilities)
- HCA oversight and support arrangements
- Internal staff procedures, training plan

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCAS</td>
<td>contingency contract administration services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWIA</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>head of contracting activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>theater business clearance</td>
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</table>

Figure B-5. Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Establishment Planning Considerations

(a) **Chief of Staff.** Performs similar functions as any other chief of staff but because of the contracting operations-focused mission, requires DAWIA level III certification in contracting.

(b) **J-1 Personnel.** Performs similar functions as any other J-1 and does not require DAWIA certification.
Figure B-6. Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Organization Example
(c) **J-2/J-3/J-5 Security, Operations, and Plans.** Primary staff position that plans and prioritizes contracting actions for the commander to effectively and efficiently support the JFC’s mission. This staff section should be led by a senior DAWIA level III-certified contracting officer with significant operational experience. In major long-term operations, the intelligence and contracting plans cell could be separate primary staff. The contracting operations section should include:

1. **Intelligence Branch.** The intelligence directorate may not be required for a JTSCC if the JTSCC can leverage support from the JFC’s J-2. If formed, the JTSCC J-2 performs similar functions as any other J-2 but is more focused on OCS matters within the JIPOE process. This section does not require DAWIA-certified personnel.

2. **Contracting Operations Branch.** This branch provides staff oversight on the day-to-day contracting operations, to include CCAS and TBC actions affecting the command. If there are major TBC requirements and the TBC process is not otherwise being covered as part of the functions of the OCSIC, this branch could include a separate TBC reachback cell or this mission could be tasked to the SCO reachback. It should be headed by a DAWIA level III-certified contracting officer, but its overall staff should be a mixture of DAWIA and non-DAWIA personnel.

3. **External Operations Branch.** This branch is similar to the LSC coordination cell described above. It conducts external coordination, to include the JCSB and OCSIC LNO functions. This branch should be headed by a DAWIA level II- or III-certified contracting officer.

4. **Training Branch.** This branch provides internal staff and contracting officer training. It should be headed by a DAWIA level II- or III-certified contracting officer.

5. **Policy Branch Section.** This branch is responsible for creating and maintaining the JTSCC AI and working acquisition-related policy issues and actions with the Service HCA coordination office and subordinate organizations, as required. It should be headed by a DAWIA level II- or III-certified contracting officer.

6. **Future Plans Branch.** This branch is responsible for working future plans-related actions in close coordination with the higher-level J-5 office. This branch should be a mixture of DAWIA-certified contracting officers and non-DAWIA officers with planning experience.

(d) **J-4 Logistics.** Performs similar functions as any other J-4 and does not require DAWIA-certified personnel.

(e) **J-6 Communications.** Performs similar functions as any other J-6 and does not require DAWIA-certified personnel.

(3) **Special Staff.** The JTSCC will have a very small special staff, with the legal office being of primary importance. Details follow:
(a) **Contract Law.** Performs in a legal advisory capacity for the command in the execution of contracts. This section requires experienced SJA personnel with contract and fiscal law backgrounds.

(b) **Other.** A JTSCC may or may not have additional special staffs such as chaplain, public affairs, and comptroller. If these staff positions are not organic to the JTSCC, arrangements for such support should be made with the next higher-level command.

(4) **Subordinate Commands.** In some situations, a JTSCC will have multiple SCOs and subordinate contracting organizations.

(a) **SCO.** The SCO serves as the principal contracting representative for the JTSCC commander. The SCO commands, and provides mentorship and contracting oversight of, subordinate regional contracting centers (RCCs) and regional contracting offices (RCOs). In some operations, there could be a separate SCO for CCAS and for reachback contracting. All SCOs must be DAWIA level III-certified contracting officers, preferably with significant operational experience. Responsibilities of SCOs in a typical JTSCC include:

1. **SCO Theater Support.** The SCO for theater support (referred to as simply the SCO if no other JTSCC SCO is established) ensures efficient and effective pre-award processes and contract awards for all in-theater contracting actions.

2. **SCO for CCAS.** The SCO for CCAS executes theater-wide contract administration as directed by the JTSCC commander. This includes concept of CCAS support of selected theater and external support contracts/task orders, COR requirements, training, and oversight. JMD manning for this office will include ACOs, QARs, property administration, and, where appropriate, technical inspectors. These military or DOD civilian technical inspector SMEs will assist both unit CORs and JTSCC QARs in any and all technical oversight matters. Contracted technical inspection services may be utilized if insufficient military or DOD civilian SMEs are available. All technical inspection services will be executed in strict compliance with the FAR.

3. **SCO Reachback.** The SCO reachback, when formed, executes reachback contracting using stateside or forward-stationed contracting capabilities as directed by the JTSCC commander. The SCO reachback works very closely with SCO theater support to determine which contracts should be executed in theater or via reachback. SCO reachback may also be responsible for processing TBC requests, maintaining TBC data, and working with the OCSIC TBC on related issues.

(b) **RCCs and RCOs.** RCCs are regionally focused organizations made up of warranted contracting officers tasked to execute contracts in support of deployed joint forces. RCOs are similar, but smaller, versions of the RCCs.

(c) **CCAS Regional Offices.** Regionally focused CCAS offices should be established when there is an SCO CCAS. These offices provide CCAS to JTSCC commander-designated theater support contracts and external support contracts (mostly
CAP task orders). These offices are composed of DAWIA-certified ACOs, QARs, and property administrators.

(d) **HCA Authority Oversight/Support Office.** As stated at the beginning of this section, the JTSCCs receive their contracting authority from one of the Service SPEs, normally the Army or the Air Force. The Service providing this authority will normally stand up an HCA authority oversight office to ensure JTSCC contracting is performed IAW the FAR, DFARS, and other contracting authority-related guidance. This Service HCA organization is not covered in the JTSCC JMD, is not deployed, and is not under the C2 of the GCC, but it is an important part of the JTSCC operations. These types of operational matters should be worked through the subordinate JFC, to the GCC, and back to the JS in the Pentagon, if necessary. The HCA oversight/support office responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

1. Plan and execute program/contract management reviews.
2. Assist in the establishment of JTSCC reachback capabilities, to include contract closeout support.
4. Approve acquisitions above the JTSCC approval level.
5. Provide legislative coordination/issue support.
6. Review and coordinate local clauses with the Defense Acquisition Regulation System Council.
7. Coordinate contract audit support.
8. Provide reachback contract law support.
APPENDIX C
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT-RELATED BOARDS AND WORKING GROUPS

1. General

As discussed in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” the CLPSB, JRRB, and JCSB are the primary OCS-related boards used to ensure OCS actions, to include any operational-specific TBC directives, are properly synchronized across the joint force. Like other related joint force command-level boards, these boards can be held as needed, meet simultaneously, or even be merged as needed. Service components can set up and run similar boards and working groups as necessary.

2. Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board

   a. Purpose. The CLPSB is the GCC’s primary mechanism to establish AOR-wide OCS policies and procedures; determine theater support contracting and coordination organizational options; coordinate with other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and HNs on OCS issues and actions; and coordinate with DOD and the Military Departments on potential loss of contract support and risk management. This board can also address mission-specific OCS matters that cannot be resolved at the subordinate joint force command level.

   b. Applicability. The CLPSB is applicable to all GCCs.

   c. Organization. The CLPSB meets on an as-needed basis. The CLPSB has no fixed structure and minimal formal processes. It is chaired by the GCC’s J-4, with the OCSIC staff functioning as the board secretary. Normal CLPSB members include selected representatives from the CCMD, CSA, and Service component logistics staffs. Contracting activity representatives attend as needed. Common CLSPB matters can be found in Figure C-1.

   d. Process. The GCC’s OCSIC staff, per local standard operating procedure, identifies CLPSB agenda items and required attendees, notifying said attendees on CLPSB agenda, and publishes an appropriate read-ahead. The OCSIC staff will take notes, publish results, and track any due-outs.

3. Joint Requirements Review Board

   a. Purpose. The JRRB is the subordinate JFC’s mechanism to review, validate, prioritize, and approve selected Service component contract support requests. The JRRB is an operations-focused, vice contracting-focused, board designed to control mission-critical, high-dollar contract requests and ensure other sources of support (organic military, multinational, and HNS) have been properly considered before contracted support solutions. The JRRB also serves as the subordinate JFC’s venue, with acquisition officer advisor input, to assess possible operational impacts of specific contract support requests and, in some cases, determine appropriate contract venues. At a minimum, the JRRB should provide mission-/contract request-specific acquisition strategy guidance to the JCSB (e.g., the required service is a potential high-security threat, so guidance is to not use an LN company
for this support; request priority to local commercial sources per “LN first” policy). As an operations-focused board, the subordinate JFC needs to ensure the JRRB has proper J-3 staff advisors and/or links to the joint operations center. Finally, the JRRB is also a key mechanism to enforce standards of support, other JOA/theater restrictions, and command cost control measures. Of note, in some operations, Service components may establish their own requirements review boards. These Service component boards are often used to ensure Service requirements packages are properly prepared and justified prior to being submitted to the JRRB.

In some major operations, contracted services in support of US forces and authorized partner nations may meet the Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5000.74, Defense Acquisition of Services, threshold thus mandating a separate requirements development and approval process in lieu of or sequential to the joint force commander-directed joint requirements review board (JRRB) process. Per DOD policy, exemptions to this separate acquisition of services procedures may be granted for contracted support to early phases of combatant commander directed operations; however, per this policy, these exemptions will be terminated as soon as practical, based on conditions on the ground and a determination by the decision authority. Also per this policy, the formal issuance of such exemptions would be granted by the designated senior military Service acquisition officer from the Service coordinating funding for the operation.
b. **Applicability.** The JRRB is normally established during any sustained operation that includes significant levels of contracted support.

c. **Organization.** There is no fixed or mandated JRRB structure. The JRRB is normally chaired by the subordinate JFC’s deputy commander for support or designated primary staff officer. Its membership normally includes both voting and non-voting representatives from the subordinate JFC’s staff, lead Service (or JTSCC if formed) SCO, and CAP organization advisors (Figure C-2). Designated OCSIC members are normally responsible for JRRB secretariat functions. It is also important to note, contractor personnel may not serve as JRRB voting members, and any contractor involved in JRRB administrative support must have a signed nondisclosure agreement.

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**Suggested Joint Requirements Review Board Organization**

Chair
- Deputy commander or designated staff officer

Primary (Voting) Members
- J-2 representative
- J-3 representative
- J-4 representative
- J-5 representative
- J-6 representative (if required for communication/information technology requirements)
- Comptroller
- Engineer (if required for construction, facility maintenance-related requirements)
- Other special staff as appropriate

Advisory (Non-Voting) Members
- Service component staff representative
- LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC senior contracting official
- Service civil augmentation program representatives
- Staff judge advocate
- Defense Logistics Agency liaison officer
- Others as required
- Cost analyst
- Board secretary
- Civil affairs

Legend
- J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
- J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
- J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
- J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff

JTSCC joint theater support contracting command
LSC lead Service for contracting
LSCC lead Service for contracting coordination

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*Figure C-2. Suggested Joint Requirements Review Board Organization*
(1) **Primary Member Duties.** Primary members serve as the voting body of the JRRB. They are responsible for reviewing individual requirements packages in a timely and unbiased manner, as well as supporting JRRB meetings. **Most importantly, primary members must be empowered to represent their staffs/commands in the voting process.**

(2) **Advisory Member Duties.** JRRB advisory members’ (to include LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC, CSA, and CAP representatives) main responsibilities are to inform the primary (voting) JRRB members what contracting mechanisms are readily available to meet requested contract support and to provide advice on the limits, constraints, and other issues related to their specific contracted support. **JRRB advisory members must have sufficient expertise to provide sound and timely advice in their respective AOR.**

(3) **Secretariat Duties.** The OCSIC-provided JRRB secretariat is responsible for ensuring JFC-directed JRRB policies and procedures are enforced. This includes coordinating requirements package processing and recording the JRRB process and results. The JRRB secretary or other designated OCSIC member should also conduct an on-going analysis of JRRB requests and processes to ascertain:

(a) The general effectiveness and responsiveness of the JRRB process and individual members.

(b) The need to modify the JRRB controlled item list, battle rhythm, membership, and/or processes.

(c) Which common services or commodities should be consolidated under a single requiring activity, normally the Service component or CSA responsible for related CUL or other common support function.

(d) If JFC-directed cost control guidance is being enforced and/or if this guidance needs to be modified.

(e) Effectiveness of the JRRB in providing contract sourcing guidance (especially important in COIN operations).

d. **Process.** Initial JRRB guidance is established in the JFC’s annex W (Operational Contract Support). This initial JRRB guidance should be based on established JRRB policies and procedures adjusted for mission-unique requirements, to include reasonable monetary approval thresholds, to enhance the responsiveness of the JRRB process. Initial mission-specific JRRB establishment guidance will normally include any changes to primary and advisory membership, battle rhythm, initial thresholds/controlled requirements, contract support requirements package required document list, and meeting methodology (e.g., physical or virtual meeting process). The subordinate joint force command-level OCSIC coordinates and publishes mission-specific changes to JRRB policies and procedures via the FRAGORD process.

(1) **Establishing Thresholds and Controlled Services.** Not all requirements need to be controlled by the JFC via the JRRB process. Normally, only high-dollar and
mission-critical contract support requests will be required to be processed through the JRRB process. In the determination of thresholds, the joint comptroller recommends the dollar threshold, while each staff directorate should recommend mission-critical contracted services or supplies for JRRB control related to their staff function. Approval of JRRB threshold resides with the deputy commander for support or the chief of staff on the behalf of the subordinate JFC. As the mission progresses, the JRRB thresholds and controlled services list will be adjusted. For example, the dollar threshold is likely to be increased as the mission progresses from dominate to stabilize activities. JRRB controlled commodities and services vary depending on specific mission requirements but could include the following restricted contract support items:

(a) Service or commodity request that exceeds a designated estimated value (e.g., $1,000,000).

(b) Services with a period of performance in excess of 90 days.

(c) Initial establishment of CAP support and recommended changes to CAP use guidance as appropriate.

(d) Special-interest items as determined by the subordinate joint force command chief of staff or J-3 (e.g., armed PSC services, FP supplies).

(e) Minor construction and facility-related services above designated dollar amount (when joint facilities utilization board is not established).

(f) Request for communications and information technology equipment or systems (less ancillary communication-related supplies such as computer/printer cables, compact disks) that will be connected to the network regardless of estimated cost.

(2) JRRB Staffing Package Requirements. There are two basic approaches to JRRB staffing package requirements: an abbreviated “quad chart” approach and a full “procurement-ready” contract support requirements package. The specific approach chosen is based on mission conditions and commander’s intent. In general, the “quad chart” approach is applicable in fast-moving operations where responsiveness of contract support is of essence, while the full package approach is more appropriate to long-term operations where contract support efficiencies are a higher command priority. Figures C-3 and C-4 provide a basic overview of the different information required in each of these approaches. In any case, specific JRRB guidance should be codified in annex W (Operational Contract Support) and any subsequent FRAGORDs.

See ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support, for more details on the contents of a full “procurement-ready” contract support requirements package.

(3) Battle Rhythm and Meeting Process. There are no predetermined JRRB meeting battle rhythms or processes, but the JRRB meeting frequency, venue (e.g., physical or virtual), and processes must be designed to be responsive to specific mission requirements. In any case, JRRB meeting procedures should include an “emergency”
contract request process accompanied by specific parameters on what constitutes an “emergency” (e.g., a request for MWR-related services would not be considered an emergency). Basic JRRB steps are addressed below and graphically depicted in Figure C-5.

(a) Requirements that meet JRRB thresholds will be formatted per annex W (Operational Contract Support) or subsequent FRAGORD guidance for submission to the JRRB secretariat. Whenever possible, the JRRB secretariat should use automated tasking/routing tools or software packages to improve the efficiency of the requirements review process.

(b) The JRRB secretariat reviews the package for completeness. If the package requires additional items, the JRRB secretariat will coordinate with the requiring
activity point of contact for correction of any discrepancies noted. Incomplete packages will not be presented to JRRB members.

(c) The JRRB secretariat assigns a JRRB number to the completed package and forwards it to the JRRB members for review (via automated means or e-mail).

(d) JRRB members review the package; voting members render their vote and return their comments to the JRRB secretariat within prescribed timelines. During this step, non-voting members have an opportunity to submit any major concerns related to the specific requirement document (e.g., the resource manager may submit input related to funding concerns). All votes recommending approval will include recommended priority based on priority of support guidance found in annex D (Logistics) or annex W.
Additionally, the JRRB will provide contract sourcing solution guidance as appropriate.

(e) If minor issues arise, the voting member will normally coordinate with the requiring activity point of contact for resolution. If significant issues arise (e.g., questions on appropriate contract sourcing solution, need for consolidation of contract requirements), the voting board member may request a physical or virtual JRRB meeting to discuss packages submitted for review. Non-voting members also may request a JRRB meeting to discuss a specific contract support request or to address general trends. These
JRRB meetings will include all primary and advisory members. If a meeting is requested, the JRRB secretariat will schedule the meeting within the prescribed timelines.

(f) If there are no questions or concerns, the JRRB secretariat records the results submitted by voting members and forwards them to the JRRB chairman who makes the final decision.

(g) Approved packages are forwarded to the decision authority (the JFC, normally represented by the chief of staff) for formal approval.

(h) Upon decision authority approval, packages with an undetermined contract mechanism are forwarded to the appropriate resource manager then on to the JCSB where specific acquisition solutions are agreed to, or when agreement cannot be reached, acquisition solutions recommendations are made to the appropriate commander. The JCSB secretariat will coordinate with the JRRB secretariat to initiate a resolution process between them in the event JCSB members do not agree with the JRRB-recommended contract sourcing solution.

(i) The JRRB secretariat will notify requiring activities of disapproved packages. A common misconception is that, once the JRRB recommends approval of a contract support request, the requiring activity can expect to see the contract support initiated in very short order. Depending on the urgency and priority of the request and other factors (e.g., whether or not the contract solicitation is required to go out for bid), time from JRRB recommended approval to contract execution can take weeks or even months.

4. Joint Contracting Support Board Function and Processes

a. Purpose. The JCSB is a functional board that provides the subordinate JFC’s mechanism to provide acquisition guidance to the command. It also serves as a JFC’s directed forum to coordinate and deconflict common contracting actions between theater support contracting and selected external support contracting activities executing or delivering contracted support for common supplies and services within the operational area. And while the JCSB does not have directive authority to make specific contract solution decisions, it can serve as, in some situations, a commander-directed forum to implement JRRB guidance when it comes to determining the appropriate contracting mechanism (theater support, CAP task orders, and other common external contract) for major, common services where sourcing solutions are not already determined via the JFC’s planning or JRRB processes. The objectives of the JCSB are twofold: ensure contract support actions support the JFC’s OCS-related command guidance (e.g., maximize the use of LN firms, reduce costs) and maximize contracting capabilities of the JOA while minimizing the competition for limited vendor capabilities. More specific JCSB tasks are captured in Figure C-6.

b. Applicability. JCSBs can be established as long-term coordination and advisory boards at the AOR or regional level. They can also be established at the JTF level when needed.
Joint Contracting Support Board Tasks

- Identify, avoid, reduce, and, where possible, eliminate duplication of contracting efforts within the operational area and maximize achievement of economic order quantities.
- Reduce, avoid competition between contracting efforts within the operational area.
- Maximize in-theater contracting officer capabilities.
- Coordinate appropriate external or theater support contracting mechanism best suited to meet the JFC’s operational requirements when sourcing solutions have not been determined via the JFC planning or JRRB processes.
- Develop, coordinate, and synchronize contracting organizations contracting strategies.
- Assist in the implementation of the JFC’s cost reduction/avoidance guidance.
- Serve as the principal forum for the exchange of information among in-theater contracting activities with emphasis on such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.
- Direct consolidation of contracts as appropriate.
- Provide advice (via the JRRB and/or OCSIC) on requirements consolidation.
- Analyze and report estimates of the overall effectiveness and efficiencies of the common contracting effort within the operational area.

Legend

| JFC | joint force commander |
| JRRB | joint requirements review board |
| OCSIC | operational contract support integration cell |

**Figure C-6. Joint Contracting Support Board Tasks**

c. **Organization.** A JCSB is normally made up of representatives from the Service component’s theater and external support contracting organizations (to include facility/engineering contracting and CAP offices), DLA, and a representative from the subordinate joint force command OCSIC. The JCSB membership may also include multinational and other USG department and agency representatives, as appropriate. The LSC/LSCC contracting activity or JTSCC SCO should work with the OCSIC to address specific JCSB membership issues such as enforcing participation and adding or deleting members. The LSC, LSCC contracting activity, or JTSCC is responsible for the JCSB’s administration. Some of the JCSB secretary duties are to:

1. Establish and maintain the JCSB member contact information.
2. Coordinate meeting times, venues (to include technical aspects).
3. Develop and announce meeting agendas.
In the United States Pacific Command’s (USPACOM’s) area of responsibility (AOR), the aligned Service component contracting organizations set up what amounted to an AOR-level standing joint contracting support board (JCSB), which included pre-coordinated and approved standard operating procedures. This USPACOM coordination board, chaired by the US Air Force Pacific’s A7K Contracting Command senior contracting officer, met on a regular basis to coordinate shaping activities and other major common contracting actions and issues across the AOR. Having this established AOR-level board allowed USPACOM to quickly transition this standing JCSB to a joint operations area-level board in support of Operation TOMODACHI.

SOURCE: USPACOM After Action Report, July 2011

(4) Develop, disseminate, and archive meeting minutes.

d. Process. The GCC should direct the establishment of a JCSB in any major contingency operation where there will be a significant possibility of redundancy and competition between different Services, functional CCMDs, or CSA contract actions. JCSBs can also be utilized in certain GCC campaign and shaping activities. The JCSB is convened and administratively supported by the LSC, LSCC, or the JTSCC as directed by the OPORD annex W (Operational Contract Support) or follow-on FRAGORD. JCSB meetings can be physical, virtual, or a combination of both. A JCSB’s battle rhythm should be tied to the subordinate JFC’s battle rhythm, with focus on the JRRB schedule. Of course, off-cycle JCSB meetings can be held as necessary. JCSB agendas vary but can include any and all actions necessary to ensure proper synchronization and deconfliction of contracting actions in the JOA.

5. Commander’s Contract Oversight Review Board

a. Purpose. The CCORB is a formal process for key requiring activities to ensure their supporting service contracts within their doctrinal mission areas are properly integrated into the command’s mission execution process. In general, these will be the same contracts or task orders that went through the JRRB process.

b. Applicability. This mostly tactical-level OCS board is generally only applicable to long-term operations with significant contracted support and where there is command direction to closely track, report on, and assess, not just for effectiveness but for efficiency as well.

c. Organization. The CCORB is normally chaired by the requiring activity commander with support from the unit’s OCS staff. Board participants normally include the unit’s support operations staff and appropriate subordinate unit commanders/support operations staff. In some cases, higher-level HQ OCS staff and supporting contracting activities may participate in these boards, especially when there are major issues to be covered that are beyond the requiring activities control.
d. **Process.** While the CCORBs can be directed by the subordinate JFC, they are normally established by higher-level requiring activities such as an Army theater or expeditionary sustainment command, Marine logistics group, or Air Force support wing. If directed by the subordinate JFC, the subordinate JFC’s OCSIC usually receives reports from these boards and provide board observers when possible.

*See ATP 4-10/MCRP 3-40B.6/NTTP 4-09.1/AFI 64-102, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support, for more details on CCORB process.*

6. **Operational Contract Support Working Group**

   a. **Purpose.** While best business practice is to try to work OCS issues in existing, non-OCS cross-functional organizations, there will be times where the JFC may need to establish OCS-specific working groups. These working groups serve as a coordination mechanism by the GCC or subordinate JFC to plan and coordinate specific OCS matters with applicable staff and subordinate organizations who have equities in the specific working group agenda item.

   b. **Process.** OCS working groups are ad hoc or enduring events per the JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, working group construct. Ad hoc OCS working groups serve as-needed, temporary events intended to address specific, non-reoccurring OCS issues. Enduring OCS working groups serve a similar purpose but are focused on OCS issues that require long-term, constant management by the JFC. Both ad hoc and enduring OCS working groups are normally chaired by a designated OCSIC member, while the actual working group members will vary depending on the issue/action at hand. Some CCMD-level OCS working groups may also include representatives from the Services, the JS, and OSD, when required. Unresolved OCS working group issues may be forwarded to the CLPSB if/when deemed necessary. OCS working group examples can be found in Figure C-7.
### Operational Contract Support Working Group Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda/Title</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Primary Focus</th>
<th>Ad Hoc/Enduring</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractor AGS</td>
<td>AOR/JOA</td>
<td>Government-provided support to contractors</td>
<td>Ad Hoc</td>
<td>OCSIC, J-4 (services, engineer, medical), J-1, lead Service(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements Development</td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Requirements flow process, JRRB procedural guidance and advice</td>
<td>Enduring (could meet monthly)</td>
<td>JTF OCSIC, selected JTF staff, requiring activities OCS staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS Data Reporting</td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Coordinating OCS Data Flow</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>OCSIC, selected JTF staff, Service component OCS staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS AOE</td>
<td>AOR/JOA</td>
<td>Coordinating OCS AOE tasks, focus, processes</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>OCSIC, J-2, J-4, Service component OCS staff, SCO, Service CAPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **AGS**: authorized government services
- **AOE**: analysis of the operational environment
- **AOR**: area of responsibility
- **CAP**: civil augmentation program
- **J-1**: manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- **J-2**: intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- **J-4**: logistics directorate of a joint staff
- **JOA**: joint operations area
- **JRRB**: joint requirements review board
- **JTF**: joint task force
- **OCS**: operational contract support
- **OCSIC**: operational contract support integration cell
- **SCO**: senior contracting official
APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT ASPECTS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. General

OCS can significantly affect a commander’s ability to execute the mission. However, OCS can also influence diplomatic relations, the HN’s economy, and the enemy. It is imperative a detailed analysis of the OCS aspects of the OE be prepared within the overall JFC’s JPP to help shape COA development and determine the possible intended and unintended effects of OCS to support the commander’s objectives. The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Understanding the OE is fundamental to identifying the conditions required to achieve stated objectives; avoiding the effects that may hinder mission accomplishment (undesired effects); and assessing the impact of friendly, adversarial, and other actors, such as the local populace, on the commander’s concept of operations and progress toward achieving the JFC’s objectives. The commander describes both the current state of the OE and how the OE should look when operations conclude (desired end state) to visualize an approach to solving the problem. OCS planners support the commander’s understanding of the OE by analyzing OCS aspects of the OE and enabling the operational approach by nesting the OCS plan within the desired end state.

2. Analyzing Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment

a. The GCC’s and subordinate JFC’s OCSICs are responsible for gathering and analyzing OCS aspects of the OE data ICW the components, supporting CSAs, and various staff organizations. This collaboration will strengthen the organization’s holistic view of the OE, support COA development, and synchronize contracting activities actions. The OCSIC should conduct data analysis using the same methods, techniques, and terminology outlined by joint planning groups or coordination cells. As an example, it is very common for the OE to be analyzed through PMESII lenses. The OCSIC should analyze OCS aspects of the OE using PMESII factors.

b. Collection and analysis of OCS data is an intensive, complex, and interactive process involving multiple organizations. Coordinating and analyzing OCS aspects of the OE is one of the most critical functions a GCC’s or subordinate JFC’s OCSIC performs and can be manpower-intensive. By its nature, it must be performed regularly and diligently. The effort required to routinely collect, update, analyze, and share OCS data and information about the OE can be significant; CCMDs and JFCs should prioritize staffing and resourcing for this function whenever possible. Additionally, OCS data will change periodically, and there are no automated systems to update the data. It is imperative the GCC’s OCSIC and the LSCC (if designated) prioritize OCS analysis efforts based upon JSCP-directed level three and four plans, security cooperation activities, exercises, and a limited number of other areas. The OCSIC should publish its priority countries, OCS analysis data requirements, frequency of reporting, and duties of the Service components in the CCMD’s campaign plan. Because information changes frequently, the OCSIC and
supporting contracting organizations should strive to maintain OCS analysis data as current as possible. This data will help inform the OCS estimate, security cooperation activities, and multinational objectives throughout its campaign.

c. Figure D-1 identifies campaign plan and minimum “known” data elements in the green and blue boxes. Data points identified in the red box are “unknown” and typically gathered, analyzed, and coordinated in support of JSCP-directed level three and four plans, security cooperation activities, and specific priority areas designated by the CCDR.

d. Figure D-1 also shows the use of a “known/unknown” construct to organize OCS aspects of the OE. Known data is business and market intelligence already available to the OCSIC and LSCC, which are gathered together to develop the initial OCS analysis. Unknown data is similar information derived from sources outside OCS channels, which the entire staff must analyze to determine its significance and impact on the mission. This

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Environment Information</th>
<th>Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment-Related Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General business capability</td>
<td>General level of local populace view (hostile, friendly, neutral) to US forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking structure, to include electronic commerce capabilities</td>
<td>Criminal element (organized or unorganized) effects on local business environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency (shadow economy, secondary currency)</td>
<td>Threat level and risk assessment to using local national contractor companies or employees to support the force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption index, to include customary business practices (e.g., bribes, kickbacks)</td>
<td>Threat level and risk assessment to using US citizen/third-country national contractor companies or employees to support the force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local laws and regulations impact and barriers to conduct business</td>
<td>Adversaries ability to infiltrate or establish local businesses to fund their activities or gain intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to trade with neighboring countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language challenges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, host-nation support agreements, security agreements, and/or status-of-forces agreements in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Survey Information</th>
<th>Theater Logistics Analysis-Related Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General market information on commonly purchased commodities and services</td>
<td>Categorization of logistic infrastructure in operational and transit areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major contracts in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting offices/officers currently supporting in operational or in-transit areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vendor lists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure D-1. Operational Contract Support Analysis of the Operational Environment Information Construct
list is not comprehensive and may vary based upon the level of preparation in shaping activities.

e. The OCSIC will maintain “known” data and ensure the OCSIC, LSCC, and other contracting organizations share the same analysis. The OCSIC must seek a collaborative response to “unknown” data that is specific to a mission, country, or partners. The OCSIC, in close coordination with the LSCC contracting organization (if designated), must also analyze OCS data and collaborate with various boards and working groups. The OCSIC’s analysis of OCS aspects of the OE will shape discussions during joint planning groups.

f. Although the OCSIC could determine the significance of unknown data to OCS analysis, it is imperative they develop a holistic view with other staff members. As an example, a specific region’s customary business practices (e.g., bribes, workday) may adversely affect the commander’s plan for that specific region. However, customary business practices in other regions may support the commander’s plan. In this example, a detailed understanding of customary business practices throughout the operational area, coupled with the J-2’s understanding of centers of gravity could drive a specific COA for the commander.

g. In some operations, there may be strategic impacts when using contracted support as a major source of support to an operation. As an operational example, political concerns may drive the JFC to desire to set aside contracts to LN contractors to improve the local business climate and provide increased employment opportunities to the local populace. Conversely, the political environment, coupled with the availability of skilled and reliable labor, may drive a JFC to seek additional military means of support or TCN contractors.

h. The OCSIC plans staff, if properly integrated into the JPP, uses the analysis of the OE to frame problems and develop an informed OCS concept of support unique to the mission-specific OE. Of note, the OCSIC does not create a separate operational approach solely for OCS considerations.

3. Links to Theater Logistics Analysis and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Processes

a. The J-4 and J-2 prepare and assess the OE early in the planning cycle. The J-4 conducts the theater logistics analysis (TLA) process, and the J-2 chairs the JIPOE coordination cell.

b. It is important the OCSIC planner participate actively in the TLA and JIPOE processes to help shape and ensure a holistic view of the OE. The OCSIC’s role is to synchronize contracted support-related analysis of the OE matters and its potential relevance with other staff sections, Service components, interorganizational partners, and OCS community of interest organizations such as the LSCC/LSC/JTSCC (see Figure D-2).

4. Theater Logistics Analysis

a. The OCSIC has a strong connection to the J-4 because eighty percent of the contracting effort in past operations and campaigns supported logistics functions. The TLA
process in the J-4 is designed to assist in improving the JFC’s situational awareness and understanding of theater logistics support capabilities to support/execute operations.

b. The TLA process provides a detailed country analysis of key infrastructure, existing projects, and HNS agreements to support planned logistical operations. The TLA process provides the framework for planning, which involves understanding the OE and
associated logistical problems, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach to logistics.

c. During the TLA process, the J-4 will assess critical capabilities and limitations (constraints and restraints) to lay the groundwork for future contracted capability requirements. This initial information will identify theater OCS capabilities and limitations and become the basis for the OCS estimate, the J-4’s theater logistics overview, and the theater posture plan.

5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

a. JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decision-making process. The J-2 uses the JIPOE process to formulate and recommend priority intelligence requirements and other information requirements crucial to joint force planning.

b. The JIPOE process consists of four steps described in detail in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Figure D-3 outlines OCS considerations in the JIPOE process.

c. The JIPOE coordination cell executes the steps of the JIPOE process. The JIPOE coordination cell has core and non-core members ranging from staff directorates, DOD agencies, and interagency organizations to Service component planners. These staff members, combined with the OCSIC, can coordinate a holistic view of the OE during mission analysis or on an “as-needed” basis. The OCSIC’s collaboration with the JIPOE coordination cell should synchronize contracting activities and help shape those plans during COA development.

6. Example Data Sources

Many potential sources of data exist in shaping activities. Figure D-4 lists the most relevant sources; depending on the country or region, other sources may exist.

7. Example Operational Contract Support Data Requirements

Local market and business climate information is very important for planning. The following are sample market and business climate data points that should be considered for all operations:

a. Political

(1) What local laws/customs might affect contracting with local vendors?

(2) What is the current state of business law? Are laws enforced? Are bribes a common business practice? Are there competing factions of government/politics that may disrupt or complicate fair/transparent business practices?
## Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Steps and Operational Contract Support Considerations Crosswalk

### JIPOE 4-Step Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Define the Operational Environment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identify the joint force’s operational area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Analyze the mission and joint force commander’s intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine the significant characteristics of the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Identify the limits of the joint force areas of interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Determine the level of detail required and feasible within the time available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Determine intelligence and information priorities, gaps, and shortfalls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Collect material and submit requests for information to support further analysis.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Develop a geospatial perspective of the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Develop a systems perspective of the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Describe the impact of the operational environment on adversary and friendly capabilities and broad courses of action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Evaluate the Adversary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Update or create adversary models.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Determine the current adversary situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Identify adversary centers of gravity and decisive points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Identify adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities.</td>
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</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determine Adversary Course of Action</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired end state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Identify the full set of adversary courses of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time allows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Identify initial collection requirements.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### OCSIC Functions of JIPOE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Define the Operational Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide business environment information to the JIPOE coordination cell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Synchronize the business environment information between the JIPOE staff and the contracting community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine business environment information gaps and submit RFIs to JIPOE coordination cell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Review the JIPOE cells information gaps to see if OCSIC or LSC/LSCC can answer those gaps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Conduct a PMESII business environment analysis and determine its impacts to the adversary and friendly forces. Items leveraged by both friendly enemy forces could be skilled labor pools, scarce equipment, corrupt officials and organizations, economic capacity, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support JIPOE efforts to link system nodes and capabilities to centers of gravity. Use that data to support contracting actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluate the Adversary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Determine the ability for the adversary to influence intermediaries (such as bidders on US contracts).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support analysis of the “Adversary Perspective Template,” to include criminal elements, and share with the contracting community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine the ability of contracting support to inadvertently influence adversary goals when pure competition is applied (no black list/vetting).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Analyze which commercial capabilities the adversary could use to their advantage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determine Adversary Course of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Determine the adversary’s ability to infiltrate or establish businesses to fund their activities or gain intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence how vendors leveraged by the adversary are paid and how to isolate those vendors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine the force risk of using US, TCN, and local national contracts or contract personnel to support the force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JIPOE</th>
<th>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>third country national</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure D-3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Steps and Operational Contract Support Considerations Crosswalk**
(3) What is the local security climate? Will LN support inside US security perimeters be feasible? Will US and TCN contractors be required to live inside US security perimeters and be afforded CAAF status?

(4) If security climate permits, is there sufficient (quantity and quality), commercially available support (e.g., billeting, medical) for TCN and US citizen contractor personnel or will AGS have to be provided?

(5) Has the local government requested US/multinational forces use specific vendors? If so, why? Do those vendors have ties to the government? What is the impact?

b. Military

(1) Does the military play any role in securing economic centers or logistics routes (e.g., patrol for pirates and smugglers to protect shipping or provide guards for selected economic activities)?

(2) Are factions in the HN military or local militia corrupt, and how does this affect business in the country?
Appendix D

(3) Which local contractors does/did the HN military, local embassy, or other Services/agencies use? Could those contractors be used for/against us? Are there any issues with past vetting and/or performance?

(4) List military-related, locally available supplies/services by type with rough estimates of amounts that could be procured.

c. Economic

(1) Does the operational area have an austere, moderate, or robust business environment?

(2) Which local taxes will make contracting with local vendors difficult?

(3) Which local customs could affect business operations?

(4) Will customs clearance and export/import regulations be an obstacle?

(5) Is skilled/unskilled labor readily available?

(6) Are there barriers to TCN workers? Are there visa/work permit restrictions?

(7) What are the local labor and other costs for unskilled, construction, and engineering work?

(8) Are local unions a factor in contract execution?

(9) Are vendors capable of responding rapidly? If not, what are the constraints/markets most affected? If so, what commercial capabilities exist that could respond rapidly?

(10) Are major international companies operating locally? If so, which ones and what products do they produce locally?

(11) What is the local currency, and how fluid/stable is it? Will business have to be conducted in an alternate currency?

(12) What impact could we have on the local economy and/or civilian population if we contracted for large amounts of commodities and services locally?

(13) What is the estimated ratio of total contracts with local vendors versus the country’s gross domestic product? What are the effects of more money going into specific segments of the economy (e.g., are we destabilizing the national government by strengthening a regional economy)?

(14) What form of payment is typically used in this region?

(15) What type of banking/financial institutions will be available? Is the financial system sound? Are electronic funds transfers possible? Will cash be required?
(16) What trade data is available for cross-referencing in support of vendor vetting processes? What is the current evaluation of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations according to the regional financial action task force?

(17) What regulatory and audit capabilities exist to trace, recreate, or monitor transactions? What financial laws, regulations, and organizations exist that are relevant to contracting activities and FP activities?

(18) What informal value transfer systems exist outside the financial sector? What shadow economy (shadow financial sectors) exists that should be considered for FP and economic impacts, such as black and gray markets?

(19) Any particular supply/demand considerations with respect to specific supplies/services? How is that supply/demand dynamic impacted by the OE?

d. Social

(1) Will language barriers (including dialects) make contracting with local vendors difficult?

(2) Do cultural issues affect business operations (e.g., local taboos, religious observances)?

(3) Are sub-cultures prevalent? Does sub-culture interaction affect business (e.g., tribal disputes)? Are bribery and extortion acceptable business practices?

(4) What are the local workweek and business hours? Will they affect OPLANs or requirements?

(5) How does adverse weather or natural occurrences (e.g., earthquakes, fires, tides) affect business? Do they affect contracting?

e. Information

(1) What resources are available to solicit local vendors and what are the culturally accepted “norms” to do so (e.g., television, Internet, local community groups, newspapers, underground newspapers)?

(2) Are there ways to train the local communities to respond to request for proposals?

(3) Are any of our existing or planned contracting efforts significant enough to create opposition from outside groups?

f. Infrastructure

(1) How does the J-4’s transportation analysis affect OCS and vice versa (road, bridge, airport, seaport analysis)?
(2) How does the engineer staff estimate affect OCS and vice versa?

(3) Does trained labor and heavy equipment exist in the area country to support various base life support, building construction, road improvements, and materials handling equipment?

(4) Is there a large demand for construction projects above the military construction threshold? What are the post-construction requirements? If construction is for civilian use, is the local government capable of maintaining the building?

(5) Do local energy sources exist? Do they have the capacity to support local requirements? Beyond local requirements? How does that affect contracting (e.g., more generators and contract labor and parts)?

(6) Do any PMESII factors change due to regional or sub-regional considerations (e.g., when doing business in country “y,” electronic funds transfers in the northern region is customary but cash transactions are required in the south)?

(7) What United Nations or international organization logistics infrastructure is already in place?
APPENDIX E
STABILIZE-ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITIES TRANSITION
PLANNING AND PROCESSES

1. General

Transition between stabilize activities to enable civil authorities activities will always include contract support drawdown tasks. In some operations, stabilize-transition to civil authorities’ will always include tasks related to transition and/or elimination of selected contracted support services to other USG departments and agencies, the HN, and/or multinational partners. The scope and complexity of stabilize activities and their OCS-related transition tasks vary greatly depending on the specific OE. In some operations, such as seen in FHA or foreign disaster assistance missions, the contract support drawdown may be very limited and there may be no transition planning required. On the other hand,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRACT SUPPORT DRAWDOWN IN OPERATION NEW DAWN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In 2011, as the force drawdown planning was underway, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) identified the need to closely manage the demobilization of contracts and associated contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) providing vital support to US forces. Accordingly, a contractor demobilization cell was established to provide centralized contract support planning and execution. This cell, in coordination with USF-I and what was called “the big 7” in contracting/contract support activities, which included Contracting Command Iraq, Defense Contract Management Agency-Iraq, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Forward office, Air Force Civil Augmentation Program office, US Army Corps of Engineers, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Army Field Support Brigade, developed specific contract support drawdown objectives and priorities along with operational-specific methodology to gain an accurate and complete information of all the major contracts and associated CAAF in the joint operations area. The “big 7” reviewed all of their associated contracts to ensure that they contained appropriate demobilization clauses and that appropriate actions were taken for all contracts being terminated or expiring due to the drawdown. The “big 7” input was also a vital ingredient in maintaining the accuracy of the self-generated contractor database. Additionally, this cell coordinated directly with USF-I and the area commanders to establish base-by-base CAAF census data, to develop standards of support reduction plan, and a plan to move selected local contracts to LOGCAP task orders. This transition of a limited number of theater support contracts to LOGCAP support was deemed necessary to reduce risk and to enhance the transition of selected contracted services to the Department of State. Overall, this unique operational contract support integration cell proved invaluable in the successful demobilization of multiple hundreds of contracts and many thousands of supporting CAAF in Operation NEW DAWN.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Various Sources
OCS drawdown and transition tasks in major, long-term operations can be significant and involve numerous supporting commands, as well as multiple USG departments and agencies, the HN, and multinational partners. In all operations, the CCMD-level OCSIC, OCS planners at all levels, and major supporting contracting organizations must work closely with the GCC and subordinate JFC to ensure contract support is fully integrated into any and all stabilize-transition to enable civil authorities planning and execution.

2. Planning and Execution

   In general, there are two separate OCS planning tasks associated with stabilize-transition to enable civil authorities actions: descoping of contract support and transition of contract support responsibilities to other USG departments or agencies, the HN, and/or designated multinational partners. Descoping of the contract support requirements takes place, to some degree, in all operations, while transition of contract support responsibilities is much more operational-specific requirement. In all operations, this planning and execution must be fully documented in the overall plan and done in a collaborative manner with all major supporting and supported organizations.

   a. **Organization and Manning.** The CCMD and subordinate staffs, with the OCSIC leading the overall effort, are responsible for OCS-related drawdown planning and execution. In major, long-term stability activities, this effort may require some temporary augmentation of the CCMD-level OCSIC and possibly significant augmentation to the subordinate joint force command OCSIC. Specific numbers, skill sets, and standards of grade of this augmentation staff are operationally driven.

   b. **Descoping Contract Requirements.** This step starts with the subordinate JFC, working closely with its components and supporting CSAs, to plan the descoping of contract support requirements, to include a detailed plan for the phased reduction of standards of support across the JOA. This standards-of-support reduction plan is especially important in threat environments where contractor personnel would be at significant risk without military-provided FP, hence the need to have contracted support redeploy on a timeline similar to military units. Other contract support descoping considerations range from contractor equipment disposition to base closure plans (see Figure E-1).

   c. **Timelines.** Contracted support cannot be terminated immediately without serious operational and financial consequences. Even when the contracted service expires or is terminated, large external support contractors can take up to 30 days or more to prepare and implement CAAF and equipment redeployment tasks. There is no fixed contract support drawdown timeline, but when planning a formal contractor drawdown process, specific timelines must be established, tracked, and rigorously enforced (Figure E-2). Contractor drawdown planning needs to factor in a time to end services and then a time for drawdown to complete. The contracted services may end on X day. Depending on the scale of the operation, the time needed for the contractor to return GFP, redeploy personnel out of country, and dispose of or retrograde equipment may take several weeks to months to complete. CAAF are prohibited from remaining on a contingency base beyond the terms of their contract or obtaining AGS.
d. **OCSIC Functions.** The subordinate joint force command OCSIC normally ensures the contract support drawdown progresses according to plan. Contract support drawdown milestones must be aggressively reported, tracked, and analyzed to ensure the overall plan is progressing on JFC-approved timelines. Specific OCSIC contract support drawdown functions are numerous and range from maintaining remaining CAAF numbers by major location to contract closeout status (see Figure E-3).

**e. Liaison Considerations.** At a minimum, the following organizations should provide an LNO to the subordinate joint force command OCSIC when executing major contract support drawdown plans: LSC contracting organization or JTSCC, DLA, the designated construction agent (i.e., US Army Corps of Engineers or Naval Facilities Engineering Command), and Service CAP offices (as appropriate). These LNOs would normally be colocated with the OCSIC to facilitate coordination and dissemination of information to and from their respective organizations. Specific contract support drawdown LNO duties are comparable to LNO duties related to other operational functions (see Figure E-4).

### 3. Contract Support Transition Organization and Processes

As stated, transition of contract support responsibilities varies significantly in scope and complexity depending on specific operational factors. In some operations, there may be no major OCS transition-related planning and execution requirements. In these operations, the key planning action would be related to acquisition planning focused
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primarily on contract closeout. In major, long-term operations, OCS-related transitions may include significant requirements, which must be closely coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, the HN, and multinational partners. In some cases, this effort may include limited (in both time and scope) residual DOD support to DOS or other non-DOD organizations upon the termination of an actual military operation.

a. Transition of Contract Requirements. The objective of the OCS transition effort is to identify and synchronize OCS requirements and issues and to collaborate on acquisition strategy among DOD, DOS, and other partners in support of the transition from DOD-provided support to other USG departments and agencies, the HN, or multinational military contracts. It is important to note, DOD does not normally transfer actual contracts to multinational or USG contracting authorities. In some operations, however, OSD may authorize some DOD contracts to be used as a bridge until the multinational or USG departments and agencies can put their own contract vehicles in place. In all transitions, DOD contracting organizations should share contracting-related information with our multinational, HN, and USG partners to assist them in the transfer of these commercially provided support responsibilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notional Contract Support Drawdown Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Contract companies and personnel notified of base closure (T-180).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local drawdown clause prepared and implemented as a requirement for all affected contracts (T-180).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• GFE and CAGO equipment inventories updated and validated by designated government representatives (T-180).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contractor notified of reduction and cease service plans/dates (T-127).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contractor demobilization plan coordinated (T-120).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Approved demobilization plan, to include GFE and CAGO equipment disposition instructions issued (T-90).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CAAF and equipment movement (to include COCO equipment, as necessary) coordinated with base senior tactical commander (T-90).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cessation of services (T-45).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Begin transfer, disposition, and transit of equipment; CAAF begin transfer to other bases or transit out of the JOA (T-30).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All CAAF and remaining contractor equipment departs base (T-10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Track final invoice and camp clearance (T-3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAAF</th>
<th>contractors authorized to accompany the force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAGO</td>
<td>contractor-acquired, government-owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCO</td>
<td>contractor-owned, contractor-operated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFE</td>
<td>government-furnished equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>transition date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure E-2. Notional Contract Support Drawdown Timeline**
b. **Process.** The subordinate OCSIC, with direct assistance from the CCMD-level OCSIC and other staff members, will normally serve as the DOD lead for OCS-related transition planning and execution. The key to the success of this process is for the subordinate (or CCMD, if desired) OCSIC to establish an active collaborative forum in the form of a multi-agency contract support transition working group. At a minimum, the following agencies/organizations should be represented at the working group: CCMD and subordinate joint force command OCSICs, CCMD and subordinate plans offices, LSC/LSCC contracting activity or JTSCC, DOD construction agent, lead Service component logistics plans office (if a lead Service is designated to lead residual DOD support), Service CAP representative (as appropriate), DLA, COM general services officer, USAID, and key HN or multinational military partners (as appropriate). Other agencies/organizations that may have interest and equities in the transition of OCS.

### Contract Support Drawdown Functions

- Establish and maintain liaisons.
- Keep supporting contracting activities informed of the drawdown plan and changes to same as early as possible in the planning cycle.
- As much as feasible, keep contract companies informed of the drawdown plan.
- Establish contract support drawdown/transition database.
- Maintain status of key drawdown milestones and associated contract information.
- Assist the area commanders in maintaining and reporting contractor personnel accountability, to include initiating a base-by-base contractor head count if required.
- Develop, promulgate, and implement local policy to prevent contractor employee “job skipping.”
- Track key milestones (e.g., final base closeout, contract closeout).
- Analyze tracked data to determine trends, identify potential bottlenecks, propose potential solutions.
- Keep key staff members informed on progress of the effort and of any major issues.
- Coordinate with other staff members for staff specific functions (e.g., contractor accountability with the J-1, force protection matters with the J-3, transportation requirements with the J-4 transportation officer).
- Assist the area commanders to identify and resolve issues.
- Assist the cell information management officer to improve information reporting processes.

### Legend

- J-1: manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- J-3: operations directorate of a joint staff
- J-4: logistics directorate of a joint staff

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**Figure E-3. Contract Support Drawdown Functions**
requirements include, but are not limited to, DASD(Log), DPC, JS J-4, USSOCOM, various supporting Service organizations, and additional USG departments and agencies affected by the transition. Contract transition working group functions vary depending on operational-specific factors but must include information sharing, ID of transition timelines, and other major tasks (see Figure E-5).

Liaison Functions

- Provide subject matter expertise of their respective functional area and familiarity with processes within their parent organization.
- Assist their parent organizations to remain current on overall drawdown plans.
- Work with the operations team to ensure provided data is accurate and timely.
- Help resolve data discrepancies.
- Assist the operations team to analyze data, develop trends, identify potential bottlenecks related to their respective organization.
- Assist operations team to resolve issues related to their parent organization.
- Provide suggested improvements to the contract drawdown reporting and collection process and systems.

Figure E-4. Liaison Functions

Contract Support Transition Working Group Functions

- Establish key working group members and other points of contacts necessary to facilitate issue resolution.
- Share contract data and other related information.
- Determine any residual Department of Defense contract support requirements.
- Identify and resolve key matters; refer unresolved issues to the next higher level at the organization(s) as required.
- Maintain operational awareness.
- Assist the area and base commanders in maintaining and reporting contractor personnel accountability (may require off-line CAAF personnel census).
- Develop, promulgate, oversee enforcement of measure to prevent unauthorized CAAF “job skipping.”
- Ensure there is proper legal review of plan.

Figure E-5. Contract Support Transition Working Group Functions

Legend

CAAF contractors authorized to accompany the force
c. **Timelines and Battle Rhythm.** The contract support transition working group should be formed as soon as possible and meet as often as necessary to ensure success. As discussed in the contract drawdown section, transitioning contracted support requires significant procurement lead time normally measured in multiple months, not days or weeks. As transition efforts intensify, the frequency of the working group meetings will increase based on the assessment from the group. The primary meeting location will depend on the situation but will usually be at the HQ of the GCC within appropriate distance; use of technology is encouraged for participants not residing within the local area.
APPENDIX F
MULTINATIONAL CONTRACTED SUPPORT

1. Introduction

Planning and coordinating contracted support in multinational operations can be a significant challenge and, if not done properly, can lead to undue competition for critical locally available contractor capabilities and cause major support shortfalls to one or more multinational partners. In all situations, US OCS planners should put measures in place to ensure the US forces do not undermine multinational partner plans to acquire locally sourced contracted support. Of note, this appendix does not include discussion on HNS, despite the fact some HNS may come from commercial sources, as these are coordinated through a formal HNS agreement process that is outside the scope of this publication.

2. Allied Contracted Support-Related Doctrine Summary

US forces operating in a NATO operation should be familiar with NATO logistics doctrine per Allied Joint Publication-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*. In general, NATO support is provided through CUL-related lead and role specialist nation arrangements which can be fully or partially executed via contracted means. An example of role specialist nation with a major contracted support component would be the US providing fuel support to deployed contributing nation forces where bulk fuel procurement, storage, and limited battlefield delivery is executed by DLA for the entire multinational force. An example of a US lead nation function with a major contracted support component would be the US Army providing BOS and other CUL functions to our multinational partners via LOGCAP. Also, NATO doctrine refers to OCS as contract support to operations except for preplanned, broad-base contracts such as LOGCAP, which is referred to as third-party logistic support services.

3. Planning

Contracted support in a multinational environment is not routinely practiced or exercised. Probably the biggest challenge is identifying each contributing nations’ major planned contracted support requirements and coordinating, force-wide assessments on ability of the local contractor base to meet those requirements. Other common multinational contracted support challenges include: determining if there will be any wartime nationalization of certain industries precluding these contractors from providing support to the force as a whole; establishing clear, acceptable quality of support standards; establishing and enforcing a workable requirement generation and post-contract award quality surveillance processes; language and lack of knowledge of contracted support in general; and funding arrangements. The final major challenge to planning for contracted support in a multinational operation is determining the specific contracting support arrangement for the operation.

4. Multinational Contracting Arrangement Options

As discussed earlier in this publication, there are three common multinational contracted support arrangement operations: national support to own forces, US support
to multinational partners using existing CUL- and BOS-related contracts and task orders, and multinational support to US forces from either multilateral alliance (i.e., NATO) or bilateral-provided support for selected contracted supplies and services. These arrangements are not mutually exclusive and may exists together in some operations. Each of these support arrangements is discussed in detail below.

a. **National Support to Own Forces.** In this option, there are no mutual contracting arrangements and contributing nations execute their own contracts in support of their own deployed forces. The key to success in this arrangement is coordination and deconfliction of locally sourced contracts through the appropriate multinational logistics C2 organization.

b. **US Support to Multinational Partners.** In this multinational support arrangement, the US force would provide support through lead and role specialist nation designation to other contributing nations through both organic and contracted means. In most cases, this support would come from existing GCC-directed CUL and BOS-I arrangements, again, executed in whole or part through contracted means. An example of a US lead nation contracted support arrangement would be LOGCAP-provided services planned and coordinated by the Army component. An example of the US as role specialist nation would be DLA-Energy contracting for bulk fuel procurement, storage, and, possibly, limited delivery within the operational area. Of note, if a contributing nation needed a supply or service outside of the existing CUL or BOS-I support arrangements, they would normally have to acquire this support through their own acquisition authority or through organic support capabilities. US contracting law and procedures will be used by US contracting officers when providing contracted support through DOD contracts.

(1) **Requirements Development, Consolidation, and Approval.** In general, our multinational partners provide basic support request information that is then consolidated into existing US force requirements for the same supply or service. Normally, a major US land component logistics unit such as an Army expeditionary sustainment command would perform this function.

(2) **Post-Award Contract Actions.** The supporting US logistics unit would coordinate the execution of this common contracted support to the applicable multinational logistics unit, to include implementation of a contract oversight process. Providing this oversight can be a significant challenge. The preferred option to this contract oversight challenge is for the US force to provide on-site USG personnel to perform COR functions at the major multinational support locations. It is permissible, however, to utilize multinational military and/or foreign government civilian employees, to include NATO and coalition partner members, as CORs when needed; however, contractors are prohibited from being CORs.

See DODI 5000.72, DOD Standard for Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Certification, for more information on COR standards.
(3) **Funding.** In all cases, appropriate funding (type and amount) and associated ACSAs must be in place before executing this support.

c. **Alliance Contracting Activity-Provided Support to US Forces**

(1) **Multilateral Contract Support Arrangement.** The primary mechanism to execute multilateral contracting support to deployed US forces is through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). In this multilateral contract support arrangement, the deploying NATO command coordinates NSPA-provided contracted support with interested contributing nations. Pre-arranged agreements are typically negotiated to facilitate the movement of funds between countries to NSPA to fund these contracts. An example of this agreement is the NATO Operational Logistics Support Partnership Committee. NSPA has provided contracting support similar to US theater support contracts via warranted NSPA contracting officers. In this case, NSPA will fully develop the requirements documents, solicit the contract, make the award, and provide the management and oversight of the contract. NATO-contributing nations cannot be forced to join this alliance contracting support arrangement, but if they do join, they can generally pick and choose which NSPA-provided supplies and services they desire to receive; however, this support will be provided IAW pre-coordinated standards of support agreed to by all supported nations. Figure F-1 provides detailed planning information when contemplating establishing a multilateral alliance contracting support arrangement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multinational Alliance Contracting Agreement Set-Up Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Contracting office Manning considerations (tour length, contracting certifications, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Types of support desired (by country and multinational headquarters)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Requirements development and validation procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Administrative costs sharing procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Operational funding, to include billing procedures along with period and method of payment</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reporting and oversight procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Audit authority and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Fraud investigation policy and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Dispute resolution procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Process to amend the agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Process to add and terminate countries from the agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy, make-up, and procedures for working groups and/or management forums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure F-1. Multilateral Alliance Contracting Agreement Set-Up Requirements*
(2) **Bilateral Support Arrangements.** There may be operations where some deployed US forces are provided limited common supplies and services from a partner-nation contract. Normally, this form of support will come from an existing supporting nation’s preplanned CAP-like contract support arrangement. In these situations, the supported US force will coordinate this support and follow procedures, to include contract oversight, directed by the supporting nation. Any additional contracted support outside the scope of this bilateral support agreement will normally be provided by the applicable Service contingency contracting activity. Again, funding for this support would be through an ACSA.
1. General

Private security companies are a legitimate source of support in joint operations, but commercially provided security services require careful planning and very deliberate government execution oversight. The supported GCCs, subordinate JFCs, and associated J-3 and legal staffs should closely review all PSC plans and procedures when contemplating the possibility of utilizing commercial security services to protect US forces (to include DOD contractors), facilities, and supplies. Commanders at all levels must clearly understand the roles, capabilities, limitations, and lines of authority related to use of PSCs in support of military operations. The supported GCCs, subordinate JFCs, and associated J-3 need to work very closely with their legal staffs and with existing DOD policy, which has been revised per current USC to cover all USG PSCs when there is an area of combat operation or other significant military operation and/or requirement for interagency coordination. Questions regarding the PSC policy should be coordinated with DASD(Log).

Overarching PSC policy guidance can be found in DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises. Additional overarching policy guidance can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), and DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix. Specific business and operational standards can be found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/psc.html.

2. Planning and Processes Consideration

The supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and/or designated subordinate Service or functional component commanders must ensure operational-specific procedures to coordinate PSC and military-provided security/FP support (to include incident reporting and investigations) are developed, promulgated, and enforced within the operational area, across key USG departments and agencies, and with other partners. Key PSC planning and process considerations include general procedures and reporting requirements, staff organizational constructs, establishing PSC RUF, and coordination of non-DOD-contracted PSC services within the operational area.

a. Establishing General Procedures and Reporting Requirements. The subordinate JFC and/or designated subordinate Service or functional component commanders must ensure operational-specific PSC procedures are developed and promulgated. These procedures should, at a minimum, include:

   (1) Registration and accounting for all DOD PSCs, to include US, TCN, and LN contractor employees who are required to carry weapons in the performance of their duties.
(2) Verification by the PSCs’ company that its personnel have met the legal, training, and qualification requirements.

(3) Procedures for the request and authorization for arming PSCs.

(4) Registration in the designated joint database (SPOT or its successor) of armored vehicles, helicopters, and other vehicles operated by PSCs.

(5) Incident reporting and independent review of said reports.

b. Organizational Considerations. In operations where there is a significant level of PSC support, the supported GCCs and the subordinate JFC may establish an armed contractor oversight cell as part of the joint security coordination center. This J-3 cell would lead the PSC coordination and oversight effort by maintaining situational awareness of PSC activity throughout the JOA and ensuring PSC services are executed IAW JFC-approved plans and procedures and as stipulated in the terms and conditions of the contract. An armed contractor oversight cell’s functions include, but are not limited to:

(1) Work with the supporting contracting offices to ensure PSC-related arming, licensing, and reporting requirements are included in the terms and conditions of all applicable contracts.

(2) ICW the subordinate area commanders, coordinate and manage the JOA-wide PSC contract oversight effort.

(3) Establish and maintain PSC tracking-related database, to include COR information.

(4) Coordinate PSC movement.

(5) Facilitate information sharing between PSCs and area commanders.

(6) Receive, track, analyze, and report PSC incident reports.

(7) Assist in the development and coordination of PSC-related arming requests. Ensure only properly documented requests are staffed for approval by the GCC-designated flag officer.

c. Establishing PSC RUF. The subordinate JFC develops, promulgates, and revises (as necessary) operations-specific PSC RUF. PSC RUF is, in turn, captured in the terms and conditions of the contract through a common clause requiring all PSCs to be aware of and to follow the most current published PSC RUF guidance. PSC RUF considerations should, at a minimum, include procedures related to:

(1) Clear definitions on what constitutes the need for deadly force related to self-protection, defense of facilities/designated protected persons, and/or threat against civilians.
(2) Clearly defined graduated force steps, to include specific threat warning procedures.

(3) Weapons firing guidance (e.g., fire only aimed shots, ensure due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders).

(4) Strict and clear guidance preventing PSCs from joining military combat operations.

(5) Specific guidance on when and where weapons can be loaded.

*DODD 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force, describes RUF requirements for civilian guards, to include security contractors.*

d. **Coordination and Support to Non-DOD PSC Operations.** Of all of the non-DOD contracting-related coordination tasks, none is more important and challenging than coordinating with non-DOD or non-USG departments and agencies that hire PSCs that operate within the JOA. These non-DOD-associated PSCs, which in some cases may include contracted uniformed foreign military members, are routinely used to provide protection of non-DOD personnel in transit and at work sites in high threat areas. The subordinate JFC and subordinate area commanders must ensure they obtain and maintain adequate visibility (location, mission, RUF) of these non-DOD PSCs operating in their operational area. And, as much as feasible, develop procedures to coordinate movements and share threat and other information with them.

e. **Key considerations when coordinating non-DOD PSC operations include, but are not limited to:**

(1) Is there a memorandum of agreement between the GCC and the COM covering the PSC operations in the AOR? What are the responsibilities of each party and level of command?

(2) Does the subordinate JFC have back-up security support requirements to DOS or other non-DOD organizations? If so, are these organizations using PSCs for protection?

(3) What is the subordinate JFC’s authority, if any, in planning and utilization of non-DOD PSCs?

(4) What other PSCs are operating in the AOR that do not fall under US control? Do we have input into the operations of PSCs contracted by multinational partners? International and other private organizations?

(5) Where are these PSCs operating? What are their RUF? Did the subordinate JFC have input to the non-DOD PSC RUF?

(6) Are there provisions for sharing and maintaining situational awareness over other PSCs that may not be operating under US or partner nation authority? Have communications and reporting format mechanisms been developed between the JFC,
Appendix G

COM, and other interested parties? Are communications systems compatible with the on-hand military systems? Has the communication/information sharing plan been exercised?

(7) Are subordinate commanders properly informed of their local requirements? Have they conducted proper coordination with these PSCs and/or rehearsed back-up security actions (as required)?

*Title 32, Part 159, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other Significant Military Operations, of the Code of Federal Regulations, describes requirements for coordinating PSC operational procedures in contingencies and related operations across USG departments and agencies.*
1. General

The JCASO was established in compliance with SecDef’s GEF (Fiscal Years 2010-2015) and Congressional mandates in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2007 and 2008 that require DOD to establish a capability to orchestrate, synchronize, and integrate OCS across geographic CCMDs and USSOCOM and for DOD support to USG departments and agencies during joint operations.

2. Mission

The JCASO, under the command of DLA, provides enabling capability support to geographic CCMDs, subordinate unified commands, and USSOCOM through permanent planning positions, as well as temporary staff augmentation, in support of contingency operations and other OCS-related support to shaping activities, to include exercises.

3. Organizational Design and Function

a. The JCASO is organized in three major parts: a Warfighter Staff OCS Readiness Division, Operations Division, and Expeditionary Contracting Division. A brief discussion of each of these major JCASO subordinate elements follows.

(1) Warfighter Staff OCS Readiness Division. The Warfighter Staff OCS Readiness Division participates in strategic national forums to institutionalize, advance, and mature OCS within DOD. It provides resources for OCS governance, augmentation, and reachback for JCASO MSTs in contingency and major humanitarian assistance operations and assists CCMDs/subordinate joint force commands in developing OCS events/scenarios for joint exercises and participating with the Joint Exercise Control Group in support of readiness reporting. This division also captures joint lessons learned and conducts OCS research and analytics for process improvements; prepares doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities changes and joint solutions to policymakers; facilitates OCS integration with interagency and multinational partners; and develops and conducts external and internal OCS staff training and education.

(2) Operations Division. The Operations Division enables OCS planning and execution with OCS planners, multifunctional MSTs, and reserve component sections, all of which are tailorable, as required.

(a) OCS Planners. JCASO OCS planners are DOD civilian employees who are experienced in logistics planning and general OCS matters. JCASO OCS planners are embedded in each geographic CCMD, USSOCOM, US Forces Japan, US Forces Korea, and the JS J-7 to advise and assist OCS planning, training, exercises, integration, and execution. While these planners serve as part of the CCMD or subordinate unified command OCSIC, they report to the JCASO HQ for administrative matters, as well as to coordinate OCS best practices, issues, lessons learned information, initiatives, and other
related matters. The JCASO OCS planners normally perform their duties in the CCMD OCSIC. The JCASO senior OCS planner, located at JCASO HQ, provides oversight of OCS planning conducted by JCASO OCS planners to ensure OCS is considered and integrated in CCMD/JTF plans/orders to align with OCS policies, directives, laws, and intent. The senior OCS planner incorporates best practices that support OCS planning and execution and supports strategic initiatives, shaping operations, and contingencies, as required.

(b) **MSTs.** The MSTs are the operational arm of the JCASO. They are headed by an O-6 team leader with significant contracting and/or logistics experience. Team members consist of field-grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers with contracting, logistics, and engineering experience. The JCASO MSTs are available to deploy for contingency, exercise support, and other shaping activities as discussed in paragraph 4, “Execution.” When deployed, the JCASO MST is in DS of the requesting unit and personnel report to the JCASO HQ for administrative matters, as well as to coordinate OCS best practices, issues, lessons learned, and other related matters.

(c) **Reserve Component.** JCASO has a limited number of field-grade officers with contracting, acquisition, and/or logistics experience assigned to the reserve component. These reserve component elements serve as an MST augmentation capability.

(3) **Expeditionary Contracting Division.** The JCASO’s Expeditionary Contracting Division is made up of a volunteer cadre of experienced, deployable civilian contracting officers who are also trained in general OCS matters. These individuals can be task-organized as needed and serve two purposes when deployed: providing emergency procurement authority using DLA working capital funds that can bridge in-theater contracting gaps in certain operations and provide additional OCS staff augmentation when needed. The Expeditionary Contracting Division personnel are intended to deploy with an MST but may also deploy with, and provide contracting support to, a DLA rapid deployment team.

4. **Execution**

   a. **Planning Support.** As part of the CCMD and subordinate unified command OCSICs, the JCASO OCS planners support and drive the OCS planning effort. These specially trained staff officers provide significant support and continuity to the support staff. When necessary, JCASO can arrange additional, temporary planning support from JCASO personnel.

   b. **Exercise Support and Staff Training.** The JCASO planners and MSTs support CCMD and subordinate unified command level exercises and staff training. The JS J-7 JCASO planner also focuses on coordinating OCS matters in joint exercises and training efforts.

   c. **Shaping and Contingency Support.** JCASO MSTs are a significant enabling capability in support of major operations. When requested by the supported GCC, an MST will be task-organized to deploy and serve as the initial building block of a subordinate
joint force command OCSIC. In some situations, the MST may also provide augmentation to the geographic CCMD, subordinate joint force, component, LSC/LSCC contracting activity, and/or JTSCC.

d. **Expeditionary Contracting Support.** JCASO expeditionary contracting provides expeditionary contracting and augments MSTs as required.

e. **Doctrine, Policy, Lessons Learned, and Training Support.** The JCASO’s Warfighter Staff OCS Readiness Division coordinates and synchronizes the JCASO’s effort to advance OCS doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy across DOD. ICW the JCASO OCS planners and MST personnel, the Warfighter Staff OCS Readiness Division collects, reviews, and analyzes joint OCS-related observations, insights, and lessons. ICW the JS J-4 and OSD staff, JCASO develops suggested OCS process improvements, participates in policy and doctrinal efforts, assists in the development of and conducts OCS-related training, and participates in various interagency coordination actions.

f. **Requesting JCASO Support**

   (1) **Contingency Support Request.** GCCs request contingency-related JCASO support by including the JCASO MST in planning (e.g., annex W [Operational Contract Support], support plans) and the TPFDD (for applicable plans).

   (2) **Crisis Planning Request.** During crisis planning or for other operations that may require JCASO support, the GCC may request JCASO support through the formal request for forces (RFF) process IAW the **Global Force Management Implementation Guidance**. The JCASO OCS planners will assist the GCC’s staff in preparing and coordinating RFFs for JCASO MST support.

   (3) **Shaping and Short-Term Peacetime Support.** An RFF is generally not required for shaping or short-term support during peacetime, such as establishing or augmenting an OCSIC, providing OCSIC support during humanitarian assistance, or conducting staff training or staff assistance visits. Generally, the GCC will request this type of JCASO support through the MST Governance process. JCASO OCS planners will assist the GCC’s staff in preparing and coordinating the MST Governance form for JCASO MST support.

   (4) **Exercise Support.** GCCs and subordinate commanders request JCASO support by including JCASO OCS planners and MSTs in Joint Training Information Management System and exercise planning. JCASO OCS planners assist the GCC and subordinate commanders in defining the JCASO support requirements, as well as preparing and coordinating the MST Governance form for JCASO MST support.

   (5) **MST Governance Process.** Upon receipt of a JCASO support request, JCASO support requirements, tasks, deliverables, and funding are further defined through discussions among the requesting activity, geographic CCMD, and the JCASO Operations Division. Once this information has been sufficiently defined, the geographic CCMD and JCASO will complete and sign the MST Governance form.
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APPENDIX J
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Joint Doctrine Division
Comm:  703-692-7276 (DSN 222)
Website:  http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail:  js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-4 Logistics Directorate, Operational Contract Support Division
Mailing address:  4000 Joint Staff, J-4 Pentagon
Room 2C947
Washington, D.C. 20318-4000
Comm:  571-256-1005/571-256-9803
Website:  https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/ocs/
E-mail:  js.pentagon.dom.list.j4-ocs-connect@mail.mil

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DASD[Log])
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Suite 14G07-01
Alexandria, VA 22350
Comm:  571-372-5207
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Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), J32J
Mailing Address:  Andrew T. McNamara Building
8725 John J. Kingman Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6221
Comm:  571-767-1373
Website:  http://www.dla.mil/HQ/LogisticsOperations/JCASO/
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APPENDIX K
REFERENCES

The development of the JP 4-10 is based upon the following primary references:

1. General
   d. Title 8, USC.
   e. Title 10, USC.
   f. Title 18, USC.
   g. Title 22, USC.
   h. Title 32, USC.
   i. FAR Clause 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons including Alternate 1.
   j. FAR Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations-Federal Acquisition Regulations System.
   k. FAR Part 22.17, Combating Trafficking in Persons.
   m. DFARS Clause 252.222-7007, Representation Regarding Combating Trafficking in Persons.
   o. DFARS Subpart 225.3, Contracts Performed Outside the United States.
   p. DFARS PGI 225.370, Contracts Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country.

2. Department of Defense Publications
   a. DODD 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management.
   b. DODD 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy.
   c. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.
d. DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.

e. DODD 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution.

f. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).

g. DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

h. DODD 5105.64, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

i. DODD 5110.10, Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA).

j. DODD 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force.

k. DODD 6200.04, Force Health Protection (FHP).

l. DODD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance.

m. DODD 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program.

n. DODI 1000.13, Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals.

o. DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.

p. DODI 1330.21, Armed Services Exchange Regulations.

q. DODI O-2000.16, Volume 1, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DOD AT Standards.

r. DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP).

s. DODI O-3002.05, Personnel Recovery (PR) Education and Training.

t. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).

u. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.

v. DODI 4000.19, Support Agreements.

w. DODI 4161.02, Accountability and Management of Government Contract Property.

x. DODI 5000.66, Defense Acquisition, Workforce Education, Training, Experience, and Career Development Program.
References

y. DODI 5000.72, DOD Standard for Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Certification.

z. DODI 5000.74, Defense Acquisition of Services.

aa. DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members.

bb. DODI 6205.4, Immunization of Other than US Forces (OTUSF) for Biological Warfare Defense.

cc. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

dd. DODI 8520.02, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling.

ee. DOD 5500.07-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER).

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3110.01J, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

b. CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) to the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

c. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

d. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

e. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

f. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

g. JP 1-06, Financial Management Support to Joint Operations.

h. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-07, Stability.

k. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

l. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

m. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

Appendix K

- JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.
- JP 4-04, *Contingency Basing*.

### 4. Service Publications


- ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7 [MCRP 4-11.3H]/AFTTP 3-2.58, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations*. 
APPENDIX L
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Chuck Mauer, US Army; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, MAJ Andrew Espinoza, Joint Staff J-4; Lt Col Nathan Maresh, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Mr. Larry Seman, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, 16 July 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

   c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
# GLOSSARY
## PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>administrative contracting officer</td>
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<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
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<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force instruction</td>
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<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>AGS</td>
<td>authorized government support</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>acquisition instruction</td>
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<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>base operating support</td>
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<td>BOS-I</td>
<td>base operating support-integrator</td>
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<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CAAF</td>
<td>contractors authorized to accompany the force</td>
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<td>CAGO</td>
<td>contractor-acquired, government-owned</td>
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<td>civil augmentation program</td>
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<td>CCAS</td>
<td>contingency contract administration services</td>
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<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>commander’s contract oversight review board</td>
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<td>CDRUSSOCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>CJSO</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<td>combatant commander logistics procurement support board</td>
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<td>contractor management plan</td>
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<td>course of action</td>
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<td>contractor-owned, contractor-operated</td>
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<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>contracting officer’s representative</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>counter threat finance</td>
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<td>CTIP</td>
<td>combating trafficking in persons</td>
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<td>CUL</td>
<td>common-user logistics</td>
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<td>DASD(Log)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics)</td>
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<td>DASD(SO/CT)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism</td>
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<td>DAWIA</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act</td>
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<td>DCAA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Audit Agency</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>Defense Pricing and Contracting</td>
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<td>direct support</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
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<td>directive-type memorandum</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
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<td>fraud, waste, and abuse</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GFM</td>
<td>global force management</td>
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<td>government-furnished property</td>
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<td>head of a contracting activity</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>homeland defense</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
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<td>ICW</td>
<td>in coordination with</td>
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<td>identification</td>
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<td>integrated financial operations</td>
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<td>Joint Asset Movement Management System</td>
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<td>JCASO</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
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<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>LSCC</td>
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<td>mission tasking matrix</td>
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<td>mission support team</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>non-CAAF</td>
<td>contractors not authorized to accompany the force</td>
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<td>NSPA</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Support and Procurement Agency</td>
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<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
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<td>NURP</td>
<td>non-unit-related personnel</td>
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<td>OCIE</td>
<td>organizational clothing and individual equipment</td>
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<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
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<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>procuring contracting officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGI</td>
<td>procedures, guidance, and information</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>program management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>private security contractor</td>
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<td>QAR</td>
<td>quality assurance representative</td>
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<td>regional contracting center</td>
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<td>RCO</td>
<td>regional contracting office</td>
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<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>rules for the use of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>senior contracting official</td>
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<td>SDDC</td>
<td>Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command</td>
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<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE</td>
<td>senior procurement executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>theater business clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>third-country national</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>termination contracting officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLA</td>
<td>theater logistics analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UON</td>
<td>urgent operational need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(A&amp;S)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative contracting officer. Contracting officer whose primary duties involve contract administration. Also called ACO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

civil augmentation program. Standing, long-term external support contracts designed to augment Service logistics capabilities with contracted support in both preplanned and short-notice contingencies. Also called CAP. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

combatant commander logistics procurement support board. A combatant commander-level joint board established to ensure contracting support and other sources of support are properly synchronized across the entire area of responsibility. Also called CLPSB. (Approved for replacement of “combatant commander logistic procurement support board” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

contingency contract. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

contingency contract administration services. A subset of contingency contracting that includes efforts to ensure supplies, services, and construction are delivered in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract through delegated contracting authority. Also called CCAS. (Approved for replacement of “contract administration” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

contingency contracting. The process of obtaining goods, services, and construction via contracting means in support of contingency operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

contingency contracting officer. A military or emergency-essential government civilian contracting officer in a position that is intended to provide contracting services in a deployed environment. Also called CCO. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

contracting officer. A Service member or Department of Defense civilian with the legal authority to enter into, administer, modify, and/or terminate contracts. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

contracting officer’s representative. An individual designated in writing by the contracting officer to perform specific technical or administrative functions. Also called COR. (Approved for replacement of “contracting officer representative” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

contracting support. The planning, coordination, and execution of contracting authority to legally bind contractors in support of military operations. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)
contractor management. The oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment in support of military operations. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

contractor personnel accountability. The process of identifying, capturing, and recording the personally identifiable information and assigned primary duty location of an individual contractor employee through the use of a designated database. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

contractors authorized to accompany the force. Contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are authorized to accompany the force in applicable contingency operations outside of the United States and have afforded such status through the issuance of a letter of authorization. Also called CAAF. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

contract statement of requirement. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

contract support integration. The planning, coordination, and synchronization of contracted support in military operations. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

cost-type contract. A contract that provides for payment to the contractor of allowable costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract, incurred in performance of the contract. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

external support contract. Contract awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting head(s) of a contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

fixed-price contract. A type of contract that generally provides for a firm price or, under appropriate circumstances, may provide for an adjustable price for the supplies or services being procured. (Approved for replacement of “fixed price contract” in the DOD Dictionary.)

head of a contracting activity. The official who has overall responsibility for managing the contracting activity. Also called HCA. (Approved for replacement of “head of contracting activity” in the DOD Dictionary.)

joint contracting support board. A board established to coordinate and deconflict common contracting actions in the designated operational area. Also called JCSB. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

joint requirements review board. The subordinate joint force commander’s established board to review, validate, approve, and prioritize selected Service and special operations forces component contract support requests. Also called JRRB. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
letter of authorization. A document issued by the procuring contracting officer or designee that authorizes contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force to travel to, from, and within an operational area and outlines authorized government support authorizations within the operational area, as agreed to under the terms and conditions of the contract. Also called LOA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

off-the-shelf item. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

operational contract support. The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. Also called OCS. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operational contract support integration cell. A cell established to coordinate and integrate operational contract support actions across all primary and special staffs for an operational area. Also called OCSIC. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

performance work statement. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

post-contract award oversight. The non-acquisition function to monitor and report contract execution as it relates to unit-mission readiness. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

prime contract. A contract or contractual action entered into by the United States Government to obtain supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

privity of contract. The legal relationship that exists between two contracting parties. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

procurement lead time. The interval in time between the initiation of procurement action and receipt of the products or services purchased as the result of such actions. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

procuring contracting officer. A contracting officer who initiates and signs the contract. Also called PCO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

requirements approval. The process of consolidating, validating, approving, and prioritizing contract support requests. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

requirements development. The process of defining specific contract support requirements and capturing these requirements in procurement-ready contract support requirements packages. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

requirements management. All activities necessary to develop and approve contract support requirements, along with the associated post-contract award oversight.
functions, in support of combatant commander-directed operations.  (Approved for replacement of “requirements determination” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

requiring activity. A military or other designated supported organization that identifies the need for contracted support during military operations.  (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

senior contracting official. The staff official designated by a Service head of a contracting activity to execute theater support contracting authority for a specific command and/or operational area. Also called SCO. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

supported unit. As related to contracted support, an organization that is the recipient, but not necessarily the requester, of contracted support. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

systems support contract. A prearranged contract awarded by a Military Department and the United States Special Operations Command program management office that provides fielding, technical, and maintenance support for selected military weapon and other systems. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

task order. Order for services placed against an established contract. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)

theater support contract. A type of contract awarded by contingency contracting officers in the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of the Service component, United States Special Operations Command, or designated joint head of a contracting activity for the operation. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

third-country national. A non-United States citizen who is working in, but not a resident of, the nation in which the United States is conducting operations. Also called TCN. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

unauthorized commitment. An agreement that is not binding solely because the United States Government representative who made it lacked the authority to enter into that agreement on behalf of the United States Government. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-10)
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 4-10 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

Joint Publication (JP) 4-10 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications.