THE CHAIRMANSHIP
OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1949–2016

Revised and Updated by

Nathan S. Lowrey

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Foreword

Twenty-seven years ago, one of my predecessors, Lieutenant General Hansford T. Johnson, USAF, provided the Foreword to the first edition of The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On that auspicious occasion, the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Chairmanship in 1949, the focus was on how the institution had evolved from its World War II antecedents through the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Since then, updated issues have added new perspectives on the formulation and implementation of national security policy through the end of the Cold War, its immediate aftermath, and into the turbulent twenty-first century. The current edition reminds us that our commitment to the Nation's Defense is ongoing and ever challenging.

William C. Mayville, Jr.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Director of the Joint Staff
Preface

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the nation's highest-ranking military officer. He presides over the Joint Chiefs and provides military advice to the civilian leadership. Soon after the JCS came into existence during World War II, Admiral William D. Leahy became its presiding officer. This arrangement continued after the war, with General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower serving briefly after Leahy's departure in early 1949. When the National Security Act of 1947 gave legal sanction to the JCS, it did not authorize a chairman. However, service disagreements over roles, missions, and the allocation of funds to meet the growing threat from the Soviet Union led Congress to create the position of Chairman of the JCS in 1949. General Omar N. Bradley, USA, became the first Chairman on 16 August of that year. Although law, executive action, and practice extended the Chairman's role during three subsequent decades, his authority remained restricted, and he served essentially as the first among equals on the JCS. In 1986, however, believing that the JCS system required fundamental reform, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which greatly expanded the Chairman's authority and responsibilities.

This revised fifth edition examines the development of the chairmanship as an institution over the last sixty-seven years. It presents an expanded historical essay and four additional career biographies, with associated updates to the supplementary sections and appendices. The book is a collaborative work and reflects the cumulative efforts of Mr. Willard J. Webb (1989), Drs. Ronald H. Cole (1989, 1995), Lorna S. Jaffe (1995, 2000), Walter S. Poole (1995, 2000), and most recently Nathan S. Lowrey (2012, 2016).

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John F. Shortal
Brigadier General, United States Army (Retired)
Director for Joint History
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THE ROLE OF
THE CHAIRMAN
The Role of the Chairman

The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) dates from 1949. While its roots trace to the experience of directing the United States’ participation in World War II, the impetus for its creation derived from the problems encountered in attempting to create a unified defense organization after the war. In the sixty-seven years since the swearing in of General Omar N. Bradley as the first Chairman on 16 August 1949, nineteen officers have served in the position. Their influence and authority varied widely. Although General Bradley had limited statutory authority, he had considerable power because both Presidents whom he served valued his advice. Until the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act in October 1986, Bradley’s successors, too, found that their actual power derived more from their relationships with the nation’s civilian leadership than from their legal authorities. The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the Chairman far greater power than even the most influential Chairmen had previously exercised. However, in practice, the use of that authority continued to depend upon the Chairman’s personality, his concept of his role, and his relationships with the President and Secretary of Defense.
World War II: Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief

While the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was not created until 1949, the JCS itself came into existence during World War II. The United States entered the war without any high-level organization capable of shaping global strategy and directing operations. The JCS came into being to meet this need; its creation, however, was not the result of a specific decision or plan, nor was any thought initially given to the need for a presiding officer.

Late in December 1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill met with their military advisers in Washington to plan a coordinated effort against the Axis powers, the two leaders established the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to carry out the strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort. British representation on the CCS consisted of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the First Sea Lord, and the Chief of the Air Staff. These officers comprised the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which had been meeting as a body for almost twenty years. Since the United States had no comparable group, the US officers whose positions and duties were closest to those of the members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee formed the US portion of the CCS. Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall represented the Army; Navy representation was shared between Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief (CINC), US Fleet. General Henry H. Arnold represented the Army Air Forces but remained subordinate to General Marshall.1

Though never formally designated by the President or any other authority, the US representatives on the CCS became the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They held their first formal meeting as the JCS on 9 February 1942. Thereafter, the JCS assumed responsibility for the planning and strategic direction of the US war effort. A supporting organization and procedures were gradually developed to assist them in carrying out their responsibilities.

General Marshall saw the need for an impartial presiding officer, free of service responsibilities, to guide JCS deliberations and act as their spokesman with the President. Late in February he proposed that former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William D. Leahy, then serving as ambassador to the French government at Vichy, become “a single Chief of Staff for the President to have over both Army and Navy.” Roosevelt resisted the idea, telling Marshall, “You are Chief of Staff.”2

In March after Admiral Stark departed for a post in London, Admiral King became Chief of Naval Operations as well as CINC, US Fleet. Marshall became concerned that King would resent the Army having two representatives on the JCS to the Navy’s one. Again he urged the President to appoint a naval officer as chairman for the JCS. This time Roosevelt agreed. When Leahy was recalled to Washington for diplomatic consultation, Roosevelt asked him to serve as special military adviser and presiding officer of the JCS. Subsequently, Roosevelt decided upon the title “Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” Admiral Leahy reported for duty on 20 July 1942, and the President announced his appointment the next day.

Leahy later wrote that his most important function as Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff was maintaining daily liaison between the President and the JCS: “It was my job to pass on to the Joint Chiefs the basic thinking of the President on all war plans and strategy. In turn I brought back from the Joint Chiefs a consensus of their thinking.”3 To carry out his responsibilities, he maintained offices in the White House as well as the War Department Building and the Pentagon. Leahy and the JCS operated throughout the war without any formal directive or terms of reference from the President. Roosevelt avoided issuing formal guidance in order to preserve the flexibility of the JCS and to extend their activities as needed.

Despite Leahy’s appointment, Marshall remained the President’s principal military adviser; his imprint was upon the Europe-first strategy and the decision to make a cross-Channel attack the supreme Anglo-American effort in 1944. Nevertheless, Leahy was an active participant in CCS debates on strategy. In November 1943, when the British proposed setting
not always take Leahy’s advice. At the 1945 Yalta Conference, for example, the President asked Leahy to attend all meetings on political issues. But, despite the Chief of Staff’s reservations about the agreement reached there, Roosevelt believed that no better arrangement was possible.5

Early in the presidency of Harry S. Truman, Leahy’s views on policy carried greater weight. His influence when the United States considered the terms for Japanese surrender in August 1945 contrasted with his lack of influence on Roosevelt at Yalta. Leahy’s view that Truman should agree to preserve Japan’s imperial institutions subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers prevailed over the advice of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that the President should demand unconditional surrender without qualification.6

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs. Seated, left to right: James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, and Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War. Standing, left to right: Major General Lauris Norstad, Army Air Forces; Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief; General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, USA; Fleet Admiral Chester N. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations; and Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman.
After the war Leahy sought to restrict the JCS role in foreign policy. Late in 1946 during the civil war in China between nationalists and communists, two JCS committees drafted a recommendation to support the nationalists “by all means short of actual armed intervention.” Leahy rejected the paper on the grounds that the JCS possessed “no authority or right” to communicate with their civilian superiors “on any subject that is not exclusively military in its character and purpose.”

Leahy was less effective in asserting his views on budget priorities. He agreed with Churchill’s 1946 “iron curtain” address with its somber warning about Soviet hegemonic aims and Stalin’s contempt for military weakness. But Truman kept a tight ceiling on military spending. In October 1948, when the Service Chiefs deadlocked over how to allocate the military’s $14.4 billion budget, Leahy suggested simply distributing money among the services and telling them, “This is all the money you can have. Do the best you can with it.” The Service Chiefs refused, believing that they should establish priorities among missions rather than impose percentage cuts. When they could not agree about priorities, civilians made the final budget decisions. Thus, on issues affecting important service interests, Leahy had little influence.

Postwar Reorganization and a Temporary Appointment

Just as Admiral Leahy retained his position after the end of World War II, the JCS also continued without change in the early postwar years. Meanwhile, the question of the postwar organization of the armed forces became the subject of intense and sometimes acrimonious debate. The Army sought a single department of defense with one chief of staff while the Navy wanted a loose confederation of services. The National Security Act of 1947, the so-called “unification” law, represented a compromise. In addition to creating a National Military Establishment under a Secretary of Defense who was granted limited powers, it gave legal sanction to the JCS and established the Air Force as a separate service. With respect to the Joint Chiefs, the act specified their responsibilities; it also authorized the Joint Staff and designated as JCS members the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief “if there be one.” The qualifying language reflected an understanding between the President and congressional leaders that Admiral Leahy would continue to hold the office as long as Truman desired but that no successor would be appointed.

The National Security Act entered into force on 26 July 1947, and President Truman named James V. Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense. Forrestal expected to run a small coordinating, planning, and integrating office rather than a sizable operating one. But he soon found that repeated disagreements among the Joint Chiefs over roles and missions, allocation of funds, and basic strategy forced him to become “more of a commander than a coordinator.”

To deal with this situation, Forrestal in the spring of 1948 asked General Omar Bradley, the Army Chief of Staff, to act as his “principal military adviser” in somewhat the same capacity in which Leahy served the President. But Bradley declined. When the JCS deadlocked over allocation of funds, Forrestal had to make budget decisions himself. Accordingly, in his first annual report he recommended designating a “responsible head” for the JCS, one to whom he and the President could look for the best staff assistance on those matters for which the JCS corporately were responsible. Implementing that recommendation would require changing the National Security Act.

As a temporary expedient, Forrestal asked General Dwight D. Eisenhower, recently retired as Army Chief of Staff, to serve for a short period as presiding officer of the JCS. Eisenhower agreed, and on 11 February 1949, in anticipation of Leahy’s impending departure on 21 March, Truman announced Eisenhower’s temporary appointment as both principal military adviser and consultant to himself and Forrestal and as presiding officer of the JCS.
Between February and June Eisenhower presided over twenty-four JCS meetings. He proposed sets of force levels that were dubbed “Ike I” and “Ike II,” but the services were unable to bring their combined request within the budget limits that Eisenhower set. Then President Truman lowered the fiscal ceiling, making agreement even harder. Late in March Eisenhower became ill and thereafter played a much less active role. However, before relinquishing his duties in mid-July, he recommended restoring funds for strategic air power because he believed that nuclear bombardment should be the linchpin of US military strategy.12

**Creation of the Position of Chairman**

Meanwhile, examination of a more permanent solution to management of the JCS proceeded. In February 1949 the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, headed by former President Herbert Hoover, called for a JCS chairman appointed by the President, though not from among the Chiefs, to preside over JCS meetings. On 5 March 1949 President Truman called upon Congress to convert the National Military Establishment into an executive department called the Department of Defense. His proposal included granting the Secretary of Defense added authority and providing him with military and civilian staff assistance. In addition, Truman asked for a chairman of the JCS to take precedence over all other military officers, be the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense, and perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary might prescribe.13

Senator Millard E. Tydings (D, MD), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, introduced a bill to implement the President’s proposals. At the outset of the hearings on the bill, Secretary Forrestal stressed the need for someone to whom the President and the Secretary could look for “the organization and evaluation of military judgment.” Since each of the Chiefs directed a particular service, the problems that were common to all must be organized and JCS deliberations focused by an officer “who has a full-time preoccupation with that duty.” Appearing as a body, the Joint Chiefs supported creating the position but asked for a prohibition against the Chairman’s exercising command over either JCS members or the services. They wanted to prevent having “a single chief of staff” and to ensure that the services retained control of their own forces. Further, they wished it clearly stated that the Chairman would serve as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary in his capacity as corporate spokesman of the Joint Chiefs and not as an individual.14

The Senate committee revised the bill to prohibit the Chairman from exercising command over the JCS or the services but left unchanged the provision naming him principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary. The Senate adopted this version. But in the House, Representative Carl Vinson (D, GA), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, was sympathetic to Navy fears of centralization and worried that something akin to a Prussian general staff would dominate policymaking. Influenced by Vinson, the House proposed that the corporate Joint Chiefs, not the Chairman alone, should be military advisers to the President, the Secretary, and the National Security Council (NSC) and that the Chairman should not be a member of the JCS. Testifying on behalf of all the Chiefs, General Bradley opposed excluding the Chairman from JCS membership.15

A conference committee reconciled differences. To prevent the Chairman from becoming a de facto chief of staff over the services, House conferees insisted that the JCS as a body and not the Chairman alone be the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary, and the NSC. The final bill, which President Truman signed into law on 10 August 1949 as the National Security Act Amendments, reflected House concerns. It provided for a Chairman who would be presiding officer of the JCS but have no vote. The corporate JCS would be the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary, and the NSC, with the Chairman to inform the Secretary of Defense—and the President when appropriate—of issues about which the Chiefs could not agree. As
presiding officer, the Chairman would provide the agenda for JCS meetings and assist the Joint Chiefs “to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable.” The Chairman’s term was set at two years, with an additional two-year appointment possible; in time of war, however, there would be no limit upon the number of reappointments.16

Over the years, the prohibition against the Chairman’s voting proved to have little meaning. In practice, Chairmen gave Secretaries their own opinions whenever the Joint Chiefs had diverging or “split” views. Of far greater consequence for the Chairman’s role and impact was the fact that the Joint Chiefs as a body, rather than the Chairman, were to function as the principal military advisers.

The First Chairman
On 11 August 1949 President Truman nominated General Omar Bradley as Chairman. Senate confirmation followed quickly, and Bradley was sworn in as the first Chairman on 16 August. Almost immediately, he faced a major challenge to the role and authority of the Joint Chiefs. With increasing emphasis on nuclear bombardment as the linchpin of US military strategy in a conflict with the Soviet Union, Navy leaders feared that their service would have no place in the execution of national strategy. The Navy proposed to build a supercarrier, the USS United States, that could handle nuclear-capable aircraft and give its service a role in nuclear warfare. But Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson agreed with recommendations from the Army and Air Force Chiefs and on 23 April 1949 canceled construction of the planned supercarrier. Senior naval officers countered by attacking the Air Force’s B-36 bomber.

This “revolt of the admirals” prompted an investigation by the House Armed Services Committee. Navy witnesses castigated recent strategic and budget decisions, attributing them to misapplication of
the JCS system and, by inference, challenging the entire unification effort. But in JCS discussions the Navy had been striving to gain a role in nuclear war plans even while Navy spokesmen publicly denigrated the effectiveness of strategic bombing. Navy officers criticized Air Force concepts and weapons but claimed that Navy men were the best judges of their own unique business.

When General Bradley testified before the Committee on 20 October, he spoke bluntly:

While listening to presentations by some Navy officers before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have heard high-ranking Navy men arrive at conclusions that showed they had no conception whatsoever of land operations. This may account for the fact that in joint planning . . . Navy men frequently find their suggestions ‘outvoted’ 2 to 1. This feeling may persist until more Navy men, through the education available under unification, have a broader understanding and perspective of war. . . .

Despite protestations to the contrary, I believe that the Navy has opposed unification from the beginning, and they have not in spirit as well as in deed accepted it completely to date.17

Bradley had promised to be an unbiased Chairman, but impartiality for him did not mean minimizing differences or seeking lowest-common-denominator consensus. In this dispute, the outcome of which he deemed vital to the success of unification, he delivered a straightforward assessment of who he thought was right and who was wrong.18 President Truman replaced the Chief of Naval Operations, and the House Armed Services Committee indicated its approval of the concept of unification and, by implication, the JCS. The controversy subsided.

In presiding over JCS meetings, Bradley acted with scrupulous neutrality. General Maxwell D. Taylor, who had occasionally attended meetings in his capacity as an Army deputy chief of staff, recalled that there were issues on which he could not tell Bradley’s position: “He simply steered the debate and the argumentation.” But Bradley influenced outcomes by other means. In 1951, for example, the Chiefs became deadlocked for months over an Air Force proposal for massive expansion to 140 wings. Bradley worked with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett to make it clear that this scale of aircraft production would not cripple Army and Navy modernization. All of the Chiefs then accepted the 140-wing program.19

President Truman recognized his own limitations in national security affairs and relied heavily upon advisers of proven stature. Hence, as the ranking US military officer, Bradley played an important role in determining national strategy and in asserting US leadership of coalitions. In January 1952, for example, after the British had spent more than a year blocking appointment of a US officer as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Bradley warned them, “People have come to me with inquiries as to what would be done after NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] blows up in the spring. A reasonable segment of the country is talking about going back to isolationism.”20 His intervention helped bring about rapid appointment of an American admiral as SACLANT.

The Korean War was the greatest test of Bradley’s impact as Chairman. He briefed the President frequently and accompanied the Secretary of Defense to NSC meetings. When General Marshall served as Secretary of Defense during 1950–1951, the fact that he and Bradley were of one mind about the conduct of the conflict increased Bradley’s influence. In December 1950, after Chinese intervention in Korea, British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee proposed that a committee be formed to direct the military response. Bradley observed tartly that “a war could not be run by a committee. . . . If others did not like what was going on, they should say so and they would be given assistance in withdrawing.”21 His view prevailed.

Bradley insisted that the Korean commitment be limited in size and scope because Western Europe was the main strategic arena and the Soviet Union the major adversary. In mid-January 1951, when it seemed possible that South Korea would be overrun,
Consequently, the Chairmen who served under him had to establish their influence by different means than Bradley had done under Truman. Bradley served his final seven months under Eisenhower, who, inevitably, was less deferential to the Chairman's judgment than Truman had been. In late March 1953 Bradley argued strongly before the NSC against major budget reductions. His argument prevailed for the short term, but changes were in the offing.25

Soon after assuming office, Eisenhower tried to strengthen the Chairman's position. On 30 April 1953 the President issued an executive order reorganizing the Defense Department. When Congress did not reject his plan during the sixty days allowed for its consideration, Reorganization Plan No. 6 took effect on 30 June. It gave the Chairman responsibility for managing the work of the Joint Staff and its director and made the selection of members of the Joint Staff subject to his approval. The President hoped that the latter step would ensure the selection of officers who could rise above service partisanship to focus on national planning and strategy.26

So, too, in selecting Bradley’s successors, President Eisenhower focused on their capacity to be exemplars of jointness, setting examples of broad-gauged judgment that he hoped would lead the services away from parochialism. Unsurprisingly, Eisenhower defined a broad-gauged officer as one who held the same views about policy and strategy that he did. A Chairman therefore had to be an advocate for the President. But, not infrequently, the Chairman’s work as an advocate undercut his effectiveness as an exemplar of jointness. Chiefs who found their services assigned lower priority under Eisenhower’s “New Look” with its emphasis on the primacy of nuclear weapons did not emulate the Chairman’s example. There were recurring “splits,” as JCS disagreements were termed, over major issues. In these circumstances, Chairmen began bypassing the JCS forum and working out solutions with the Secretary of Defense.

Upon Bradley’s retirement on 15 August 1953, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, became Chairman. As CINC, Pacific, Radford had accompanied

The Eisenhower Chairmen: Advocates and Exemplars

No President has equaled Dwight Eisenhower in his experience with military affairs and foreign policy.

he opposed sending additional divisions there because “[t]here was already too much locked up there and the Far East was no place to fight a major war.”22 At this critical juncture, the Chairman had to distill each service’s assessment of its effectiveness and combine them in an overall strategic assessment. The Army emphasized its lack of readiness. The Air Force appraised matters largely in terms of strategic air power. The Navy, confident of its superiority at sea, had an aggressive attitude. Bradley concluded that while the United States probably would not lose a world war that began in the next two years, “we would have a hell of a time winning it.” Therefore, delaying a great power confrontation in Korea that might lead to a wider war worked in the Free World’s favor.23 When Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur for openly criticizing the limits placed upon his operations, Bradley proved invaluable to the President as a distinguished soldier who publicly rebutted MacArthur’s argument that there was “no substitute for victory.” Bradley’s approach was to avoid appeasement or an all-out showdown by rearming, strengthening alliances, and pursuing limited objectives in Korea.24

Bradley’s imprint upon global strategy in 1950–1952 was as large as Marshall’s had been during World War II. His impact, however, derived more from his own stature and reputation and the reliance on him of a President who had limited experience in national security matters than from his statutory position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Bradley’s tenure began the practice of the President and the Secretary of Defense looking to the Chairman as the spokesman for the JCS, and during the Korean War he established the precedent for the JCS Chairman’s attendance at NSC meetings. His strong influence within the Truman administration did not, however, set a precedent for the Chairmen who followed him.
Admiral Arthur W. Radford emerges from the JCS area, 1954.
Eisenhower on a trip to Japan and Korea in December 1952 and had favorably impressed the President-elect. Radford’s Pacific experience complemented Eisenhower’s expertise in European matters. Yet he seemed a surprising choice. In 1949 during the “revolt of the admirals” Radford had testified before Congress that he believed a nuclear threat could not deter war and an atomic blitz could not win one. In 1953, however, he agreed with Eisenhower that planning for the long pull meant keeping military spending within strict limits. Radford therefore deemed it “obvious that the organization that would evolve would have to be heavy in air power (both Air Force and Navy) and that the other services . . . would have to adjust to organizations that could be fleshed out rapidly in case of emergency. . . . In short, after the deterrent forces were decided upon, almost every other activity had to give to a certain extent.” Thus, in a fairly quick transformation, Radford as Chairman became the leading military advocate of “massive retaliation.”

Recurring disputes between the Army and the Air Force and between Army Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman marked Radford’s tenure. Under Eisenhower’s “New Look” program, the Army took the largest cuts and the Air Force the least. The sharpest JCS split occurred during 1956. Preparation of a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), JSOP–60, delineating requirements for 1960–1963, led to many disagreements. Radford concluded that the services’ force recommendations were not attainable under any realistic budgetary assumptions. He drafted a proposal to reduce overseas Army forces to small nuclear-armed task forces and drastically pare tactical air as well as air- and sealift forces. General Taylor, now Army Chief of Staff, vehemently objected. Leaked to the press, Radford’s proposal drew such opposition that he did not pursue it. Instead, the Chairman took another path to attain part of his goal. In 1957, when the Chiefs again deadlocked over force levels, Admiral Radford sent Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson his own recommendations for less dramatic reductions. Wilson endorsed the Chairman’s proposals, and the President approved them, thereby underscoring the civilian leadership’s acceptance of the Chairman as principal military adviser in the area of force structure.

In dealing with foreign crises, however, the President often did not accept Radford’s advice. In 1954, for example, when the French faced defeat in Southeast Asia, the Chairman recommended US air strikes against the Viet Minh forces encircling Dien Bien Phu. His recommendation did not, however, have the support of the Service Chiefs, who either disagreed or attached major conditions to any intervention. Eisenhower insisted upon, among other things, congressional approval and participation by major US allies. When these conditions were not met, he decided against intervention.

Then, early in 1955, when the Chinese communists threatened to attack the “offshore islands” of Quemoy and Matsu and then to invade Taiwan, Eisenhower again did not follow Radford’s advice. The Chairman appeared almost eager for a fight. Convinced that the communists would have the worst of it, he outlined to the NSC his own plan for anticipating an imminent attack on the offshore islands by dropping atomic weapons on mainland airfields and fuel storage sites. If the communists responded to what Radford characterized as “limited” US attacks by widening hostilities beyond the Taiwan area, broader US air and naval action would be necessary. In sum, communist preparations to invade Quemoy and Matsu would provide the pretext for attacking China. The Secretary of State voiced considerable concern about the political repercussions of using atomic weapons. Believing, correctly, that additional air and naval deployments would be enough to deter a communist attack, President Eisenhower rejected Radford’s approach.

Again, in 1956, after Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, Eisenhower did not take Radford’s advice, although this time the Chairman had the support of the Service Chiefs. Radford favored military action to retake the canal on grounds that Nasser was “trying to be another Hitler.” The President, however, saw no legal, moral, or strategic justification for military action. He strongly opposed the Anglo-French invasion of
Egypt and pressured the British and the French to halt and then withdraw. In the aftermath, Radford argued that, with their move into Syria, the Soviets “were likely to encourage the Syrians to attack Israel.” Eisenhower responded more presciently that he expected the Soviets to “play their game short of anything which would induce the United States to declare war on them.”

Clearly, the President distinguished between Admiral Radford as an advocate of the “New Look,” in which capacity he met Eisenhower’s needs, and as an adviser during crises, where he was too aggressive for the President. Clearly, too, in his conception of the Chairman’s functions, Eisenhower considered the former role to be much more important. Radford retired in mid-August 1957. Two years later, while his successor was recuperating from surgery, Eisenhower brought Radford back as a civilian consultant.

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, who succeeded Radford as Chairman on 15 August 1957, was...
also a “New Look” advocate but did not arouse such strong opposition from the Service Chiefs or offer such bellicose advice during crises. During Twining’s tenure, the Chairman acquired new statutory authority, which, however, was more apparent than real. On 3 April 1958 the President sent Congress proposals for reorganizing the Defense Department. “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever,” he said; “strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified.” He called for organizing all combat forces into unified commands, “singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service,” and for clear command channels to these commands. Eisenhower judged the JCS concept “essentially sound” and wanted no changes in JCS composition or functions. He did ask that the statutory limit on the Joint Staff’s size—210 personnel—be removed and that the Chairman be given authority to assign duties to the Joint Staff and, with the Secretary of Defense’s approval, to select the Director of the Joint Staff. He also asked for elimination of the prohibition against the Chairman’s voting.31

Testifying in support of the President’s proposals, General Twining asked the members of the House Armed Services Committee, “Did any of you ever try to manage an activity without having the authority to assign work to it?” Under current law, Twining said, he would have to call a meeting of the Chiefs every time the Secretary asked him to look into a matter. Technically, this was true but in practice, a Chairman often would take the initiative in assigning work to the Joint Staff and later secure the Service Chiefs’ approval, to select the Director of the Joint Staff. He also asked for elimination of the prohibition against the Chairman’s voting.32

Congress approved the President’s proposals, and the DOD Reorganization Act entered into force on 6 August 1958. It authorized the Joint Staff—raised to four hundred officers—to perform such duties as the Chairman prescribed, allowed the Chairman “in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff” to select the Director, and removed the restriction against the Chairman’s voting. The impact of these changes, however, proved less than expected. The Chairman’s main problem lay not in assigning tasks but in bringing issues to decision; a service’s objections still could cause indefinite delays. The more consequential reform was that making the operational chain of command run from the President and Secretary of Defense directly to the unified and specified commanders rather than through the military departments. As the result of this change, the JCS and the Joint Staff began acting as the military staff to the Secretary in his direction of the unified and specified commands. Ties between the Chairman and the commanders of the unified and specified commands grew steadily stronger.34

In some respects, General Twining proved more useful to the President than Admiral Radford had been. Late in 1957 the launching of the Soviet satellite Sputnik aroused fears that the Soviet Union was winning the race to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles. For the first time, Eisenhower faced widespread criticism on a military issue. Members of Congress and some senior Air Force officers lobbied for a huge crash program to close the alleged “missile gap.” The President thought that this was wasteful and unnecessary. Twining agreed with Eisenhower, who needed support from an Air Force general to hold down defense spending. Similarly, during the 1959 Berlin confrontation with the Soviets, Twining distanced himself from the Service Chiefs and endorsed Eisenhower’s judgment that a major mobilization was unnecessary.

As JCS presiding officer, Twining handled interservice budget disputes in a manner that was assertive but less abrasive than that of his predecessor. Late in 1959, after the JCS had discussed force levels for two weeks without reaching agreement, the Chairman forced the pace by writing to the Service Chiefs:
I believe that the Secretary has provided . . . adequate information for us to proceed. I intend that we proceed expeditiously now; failing that, I can assure you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, will not be in a very strong position to comment on the Secretary’s final action, having failed to provide the Secretary with advice or assistance in his deliberations leading to final action. He has requested this of us, and has given us every reasonable opportunity to furnish him sound military advice in support of a military budget that could be subjected to drastic curtailments in a period of financial stringency.35

As a result, the JCS reached agreement on major issues several days later.

In one important area, however, neither Radford nor Twining fulfilled Eisenhower’s hopes: neither Chairman could lead the Service Chiefs to focus on the broader aspects of their jobs rather than narrow service interests. Early in his tenure Radford had realized that the President’s expectations would not be met. He found the Service Chiefs unwilling to delegate the management of their services to their vice chiefs so that they could concentrate on their national planning responsibilities, which, by default, gravitated to the Chairman.36 Eisenhower, too, reached the conclusion that while Radford and Twining had risen to be broad-gauged Chairmen, the Service Chiefs remained mired in service parochialism. In July 1959 the President complained that he could not “figure out what is causing the trouble in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The organization seems to be failing to do its job.”37 All the services laid claim to an intermediate-range ballistic missile, while the Army and the Air Force quarreled over responsibility for surface-to-air missiles as well as the place of Army aviation.

An August 1960 White House meeting to deal with strategic nuclear targeting and planning showed how deep the divisions ran. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, proposed that the new Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) be prepared strictly on a trial basis. Twinning countered that “the crux of the problem is as it has been for nearly twenty years, that the Navy is completely opposed to serving under a single commander. . . . General Twining said he would have to speak frankly and say that if it were announced that this effort were a trial effort, the Navy would sabotage it.” Twinning felt that he confronted roughly the same challenge that Bradley had faced eleven years earlier. The Navy’s objections to a detailed SIOP prepared by a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff failed because Twining and Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates worked out a solution which fit the President’s objectives.38 In this case, as throughout the Eisenhower presidency, the Chairman’s effectiveness derived from his identification with the policies of his civilian superiors, not from his ability to elicit cooperation among the services.

In making his last appointment as Chairman, Eisenhower chose Army Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who, in the President’s judgment, had been less parochial than his two predecessors in that post. Lemnitzer became Chairman on 1 October 1960. His association with Eisenhower dated to the 1942 North African operation, and he and the President easily adjusted to each other. Less than four months later, however, Lemnitzer found himself working in a completely different environment.

The 1960s: Civilian Encroachment

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy replaced the Eisenhower administration’s strategy of relying on massive nuclear retaliation with the strategy of flexible response, particularly emphasizing counterinsurgency capabilities. Kennedy also dismantled much of the NSC’s formal decision-making apparatus, depending more upon improvisation and informality. Accustomed to working through established mechanisms, Lemnitzer did not adjust quickly.

Poor communication between the President and the Chiefs contributed to the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961. The Central Intelligence Agency had
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organized, trained, and equipped a group of anti-communist exiles to invade Cuba. After the JCS reviewed the invasion plans, the President made important changes without consulting the Chiefs. The invasion failed. Lemnitzer had not taken into account Kennedy’s style, in which decisions were subject to change up until the moment of execution. Unfamiliar with the restrained language of JCS memorandums, Kennedy felt that the Chiefs had not been clear enough in expressing their reservations about the invasion plans. On both sides there was a residue of bitterness. Lemnitzer’s standing at the White House dropped sharply. Further eroding the Chairman’s influence, President Kennedy recalled General Maxwell Taylor to serve in the White House as Military Representative of the President to carry out an “advisory function in the fields of intelligence and of Cold War planning, with particular attention to Berlin and Southeast Asia.”

To set out exactly what he expected of the JCS, Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 55 on 28 June 1961. In it he stated that he regarded the Chiefs in their capacity as his principal military advisers as responsible for both initiating advice to him and responding to requests. He wanted to receive their views “direct and unfiltered.” While he looked to the Chiefs to present the military factors “without reserve or hesitation,” he also expected them to be “more than military men” and to help fit military requirements into the overall context of any situation.

Although Taylor was not interposed between the President and the Chiefs, his hand was evident in some matters that normally would have fallen under the Chairman’s purview. In the autumn of 1961 Taylor made a fact-finding tour of South Vietnam and recommended major increases in US assistance there, which the President approved. At the
height of the Berlin confrontation, Taylor drafted, and Kennedy signed, a paper that asked the Chiefs what sending six more divisions to Europe would accomplish. Their replies revealed a previously hidden split. Lemnitzer emphasized the advantages of a major non-nuclear reinforcement; the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Chiefs disagreed. Taylor then participated in discussions with the JCS that led to a decision for moderate deployments.41

Lemnitzer’s influence also was increasingly circumscribed by the managerial innovations of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Civilian systems analysts closely scrutinized every aspect of strategy and force planning. While Secretary Gates had confined himself to working out the concept of the SIOP, McNamara set about matching types of nuclear weapons with types of targets. McNamara’s Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPM), containing force recommendations buttressed by elaborate supporting rationales, grew in number from two in 1961 to sixteen by 1968. In contrast, the vehicle for the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations, the JSOP, remained a very imperfect instrument. Preparation of JSOP–67’s force tables was suspended amid interservice disputes five months after it had begun in September 1961. In June 1962 Lemnitzer suggested a compromise, but it failed to win acceptance. Two months later he circulated another set of compromises and this time won JCS approval. By then, however, McNamara had circulated his own Five-Year Program. Moreover, JSOP–67’s force tables were neither arranged according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) new “program package” format nor accompanied by supporting rationales.42 Since JSOP–67 did not speak the Secretary’s language, it had no noticeable impact. Lemnitzer sought a partial remedy by creating the Chairman’s Special Studies Group, which came to play a significant role in defining JCS positions but was less successful in winning OSD’s approval of them.

Lemnitzer put a premium on experience and expertise. His difficulty in working with those members of the administration whom he considered ignorant as well as arrogant reduced his effectiveness both as JCS spokesman to the President and the Secretary and as the President’s representative to the Chiefs. President Kennedy did not appoint him to a second term as Chairman, instead nominating him to be Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Lemnitzer’s two-year term as Chairman ended on 30 September 1962. Apparently fearing further civilian encroachment on what he regarded as JCS functions, he made a public plea that the JCS system not be changed. He contended that disagreement among the Chiefs was a strength because it provided civilian authorities with reasoned alternatives on complex military issues.43

On 1 October 1962 General Taylor moved from the White House to the chairmanship. In 1959 Taylor had criticized the JCS system and called for replacing it with a single chief of staff plus an advisory system for policy matters. During the 1962 hearings on his nomination, however, he assured senators that he returned not as a crusader for change but as someone who wanted to see how the current system would work with a new team in a new atmosphere. As Army Chief of Staff, Taylor had often crossed swords with Admiral Radford, objecting to Radford’s role as an advocate for administration policies. Here, too, he changed his mind. As he wrote in his memoir:

> With the opportunity to observe the problems of the President at closer range, I have come to understand the importance of an intimate, easy relationship, born of friendship and mutual regard, between the President and the Chiefs. It is particularly important in the case of the Chairman, who works more closely with the President and the Secretary of Defense than do the Service Chiefs. The Chairman should be a true believer in the foreign policy and military strategy of the administration which he serves or, at least, feel that he and his colleagues are assured an attentive hearing on those matters for which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility.

Put another way, Taylor had objected to what Radford was advocating, not to the fact of advocacy.
He also had resented what he felt were Radford’s attempts to impose consensus upon the Chiefs or at least attain it by compromise. Taylor told McNamara that dissents would be reported forthrightly, and the Secretary assured him that the Chiefs would always have their “day in court.”

When the Cuban missile crisis erupted two weeks after Taylor took office, the Executive Committee of the NSC (EXCOMM) became the main forum for debate and decision. As a member of the EXCOMM, Taylor presented the corporate JCS views in its meetings. Since the EXCOMM spent more time discussing diplomatic solutions than military plans, he listened far more than he spoke. But the Chairman’s critical function, as the President saw it, was ensuring that the Service Chiefs faithfully carried out Kennedy’s decisions. Taylor told them that the President, after rejecting their recommendation for a surprise air attack in favor of a quarantine, had said, “I know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust that you will support me in this decision,” and that the Chairman had “assured him that we were against the decision but would back him completely.”

After the crisis ended, Kennedy privately expressed a “forceful . . . lack of admiration” for the Service Chiefs but called Taylor “absolutely first class.”

General Taylor’s role during the missile crisis—a corporate spokesman advocating steps that civilian authorities rejected—proved to be an anomaly. Rather, Taylor saw himself principally as the agent of his civilian superiors, supporting their policies and working to garner JCS support for them. His role
during arms control discussions offers the best example. The JCS consistently opposed a treaty with the Soviet Union banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. On 16 July 1963, just after US negotiators arrived in Moscow, the Chiefs approved but did not forward to Secretary McNamara a statement that the proposed treaty contained such significant military disadvantages that only overriding nonmilitary considerations could render it in the national interest. Eight days later, after a treaty had been initialed, Kennedy asked the Chiefs to “base their position on the broadest political considerations.” Taylor led the way in doing so. He drafted a statement wherein the JCS would endorse a treaty, subject to important safeguards, and then persuaded the Service Chiefs to agree.46

Unlike his immediate predecessor, Taylor admired Secretary McNamara and saw much merit in his methods. Accordingly, in 1963 the Chairman insisted that JSOP–68 contain supporting rationales comparable to those in the Draft Presidential Memorandums. Then, in 1964 JSOP–69 added “situational analyses” using war-gaming techniques to estimate requirements. But the services split over force recommendations and added analyses swelled the JSOP to daunting size. Thus, despite Taylor’s efforts, the JSOP still had only marginal influence.

When the Secretary employed an index of combat effectiveness to compare the conventional capabilities of NATO with those of the Warsaw Pact, Taylor pointed out that the mathematical calculations underpinning McNamara’s DPMs had their limits. The Sec-
Secretary had extrapolated that Western Europe could be defended without resorting to nuclear weapons. The Chairman commented, “If as most soldiers believe, ‘in war the moral is to the physical as three is to one,’ only about a fourth of the determinants of victory are susceptible to the coefficient approach and they are variables undergoing constant change.” But McNamara made only modest revisions to his DPMs, and by 1964 OSD had supplanted the JCS and the services as the shaper of nuclear and conventional force structure.

During the spring of 1964, the planning of an air campaign against North Vietnam put Taylor in an uncomfortable position. He tried to reconcile the civilians’ attraction to the application of graduated pressure, more deterrent than destructive at the outset, with the Service Chiefs’ conviction that a swift, hard blow was best. Some Service Chiefs saw Taylor as more an adversary than a colleague, suspecting him of misrepresenting or at least toning down their criticism of civilian strategy. Taylor proposed attacking “some significant part of the military target system in North Vietnam.” Before the issue was resolved, however, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Taylor to Saigon as the US Ambassador, in the belief that Taylor’s reputation would prevent Vietnam from becoming a partisan issue during the election campaign. Evidently, Taylor’s civilian superiors valued him less for his advice than for the credibility that his presence gave to their policies. Whereas Radford had been an advocate of the “New Look” but differed with Eisenhower on other points, Taylor acted as the advocate for two Presidents across a broad spectrum of issues.

By the time that General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, became Chairman on 3 July 1964, a tour as Chairman, with its frequent dealings with senior officials, gave the officer who held that position a unique store of knowledge and a set of relationships that no Service Chief could equal. For almost six years the operational chain of command had run from the Secretary directly to the unified and specified commanders. Moreover, the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries had largely ceased acting as “executive agents” for the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Now the stream of information from the field came directly to the Chairman. General Wheeler’s file for one month of Vietnam message traffic sometimes exceeded General Bradley’s file of messages between Washington and Tokyo during the entire first year of the Korean War. Over time, the change in contact with field commanders had brought about a significant power shift. No longer could a Service Chief influence the outcome of JCS discussions to the extent that General J. Lawton Collins had during 1950–1952, when, as Army Chief of Staff, he had acted as executive agent for the JCS in the conduct of the Korean War. What the services lost, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman gained. If the Chiefs were to stay abreast of developments, the Chairman had to keep them informed. In his dealings with the Chiefs, the Chairman had been strengthened.

Despite this accretion of power, Wheeler, in contrast to Taylor, valued JCS collegiality and worked to hold the Service Chiefs’ confidence by keeping them fully informed about what transpired at high-level meetings. He saw himself as a corporate spokesman, charged with persuading civilians to accept military advice. Wheeler also differed with the Taylor approach to splits. By 1965, after there had been a major turnover in JCS membership, the Chairman and the Chiefs decided that their advice might carry greater weight with the Secretary of Defense and the President if it were an agreed position. Accordingly, they began a conscious effort to resolve disagreements rather than sending them to the Secretary for decision; the number of JCS splits dropped sharply. Unanimity did not, however, bring a noticeable increase in JCS influence, and Wheeler became increasingly frustrated and disappointed with his lack of influence with his superiors.

To outsiders, General Wheeler seemed a member of the Johnson administration’s inner circle. Like President Kennedy, Johnson preferred informal advisory groups to the formal NSC system. As US involvement in Vietnam grew, General Wheeler went more and more frequently to the White House. He was included in the small group that advised the President on key decisions in the war, and from October 1967 he regularly attended the President’s Tuesday lunch meetings of senior officials at the White House,
where important policy issues were discussed. He consulted the Chiefs before meetings with the President and reported to them “practically verbatim” what had occurred. Therefore, according to Wheeler, the Chiefs were not unhappy with this procedure and were satisfied to rely on him as their representative to the President. But Wheeler’s access did not equate to influence. Working against him were Secretary McNamara’s assertiveness and self-confidence and the trust that the President placed in the Secretary.

The conduct of the war in Southeast Asia was the major issue of contention between the JCS and the civilian leadership. In late 1964 Wheeler united the Chiefs in recommending a hard, swift blow against North Vietnam with air strikes against ninety-four targets in about one month. On 1 December 1964 he presented the JCS case at the White House. Johnson, however, followed McNamara’s prescription for the application of graduated pressure through Operation ROLLING THUNDER. As a result, some of the targets were not struck until 1966 or 1967; a few still remained untouched when ROLLING THUNDER ended in October 1968. During the spring and summer of 1965, another difference arose over the introduction of US ground combat troops. “I have a very definite limitation on commitment in mind,” McNamara told the President, “and I don’t think the Chiefs do. In fact, I know they don’t.” Although the buildup reached 549,500 by 1968, it was smaller in size and slower-paced than the military wished.

Increasingly, Wheeler found himself acting as the implementer of civilian decisions that he did not support. Johnson characterized him as “a good soldier,” who would “follow [his] Commander in Chief . . . He is loyal to McNamara and me—but has convictions.” Continually carrying out decisions with which he disagreed undermined Wheeler’s standing with the Secretary as an advocate of stronger measures. In December 1965, for example, civilian leaders debated whether to suspend bombing of North Vietnam to test the chance of entering negotiations with Hanoi. When the President asked McNamara, “Is this what you want to explore with the Chiefs?” the Secretary replied, “The Chiefs will be totally opposed… We decide what we want and impose it on them.” In August 1967, as popular opposition to the war mounted and McNamara recommended curtailing the bombing, Wheeler testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He argued against scaling back the bombing on grounds that “the air campaign is going well . . . achieving its objectives,” but his claim undercut the Chiefs’ argument for intensifying ROLLING THUNDER.

The 1968 JCS debate over appointing a “single manager” for tactical air assets in South Vietnam’s I Corps Tactical Zone—among the most acrimonious of Wheeler’s tenure—over taxed the Chairman’s ability to maintain collegiality and achieve corporate consensus. The field commander, General William C. Westmoreland, USA, wished his Air Force deputy to have operational control over all Air Force and Marine fixed-wing aircraft there. Not only did the Commandant of the Marine Corps vehemently and repeatedly object to such a move, but the Army and Navy Chiefs also opposed Westmoreland’s proposal. Wheeler recommended supporting Westmoreland because it would be “militarily unsound” to dictate to a senior field commander how his forces should be organized and commanded but also advised considering the single manager an “expedient” due for review when the tactical emergency ended. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Wheeler’s compromise, but the Marines continued to object and, through local arrangements, regained practical control of their aviation assets. Thus, the Chairman’s attempt to maintain collegiality failed, and his solution was thwarted in the field.

When the shock of the 1968 Tet offensive increased domestic opposition to the war, Wheeler remained committed to an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam. He recommended large-scale mobilization, rebuilding the strategic reserve, sizable reinforcement of South Vietnam, and intensified bombing of the North. Instead, the President approved a small reserve callup, a modest deployment to Vietnam, and a major cutback of bombing. As he prepared to announce decisions that went
against JCS advice, Johnson sought to minimize the differences, and Wheeler went along:

   President Johnson: “With the exception of a few bombing targets, General Wheeler, General Westmoreland, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Clifford and State are in general agreement about the conduct of the war?”

   GEN Wheeler: “Yes.”

Despite his differences with Wheeler, Johnson requested special legislation to extend the Chairman’s tenure, and in June 1968 Wheeler was extended for a year beyond the statutory four-year limit of his term. Wheeler now saw his task as opposing those civilians who wanted to withdraw quickly from Vietnam and accept defeat. He worked with field commanders to paint a picture of battlefield success. By doing so, however, he paved the way for a total bombing halt leading to peace talks, which he believed had no chance of success.

When Richard M. Nixon became President in January 1969, he reinstituted a structured NSC apparatus. General Wheeler represented the JCS at NSC meetings and was a member of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), the administration’s crisis management body. In contrast to McNamara’s centralization of control, Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, returned some functions
to the services and appeared receptive to JCS advice. Laird admired Wheeler’s emphasis on collegiality, which meshed with the Secretary’s own approach, and later rated Wheeler as one of the strongest Chairmen in his public experience. At Secretary Laird’s urging, Nixon obtained another extension to Wheeler’s tenure, giving him an unprecedented sixth year. But the Chairman’s influence remained marginal. Despite his participation in the administration’s senior groups, Wheeler was not a member of the President’s inner circle of advisers, and his views on the prosecution of the war were at odds with the administration’s.

The Chiefs had endorsed a bombing halt on the understanding that bombing would resume if the communists failed to show restraint. When the communists launched a new round of attacks early in 1969, Wheeler recommended an intensive, sustained air campaign against North Vietnam. Instead, Nixon ordered unannounced bombing of enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia. Determined to Vietnamize the war through phased US withdrawals, the President directed larger and faster pullouts than the Chiefs advised. Nonetheless, early in 1970 Wheeler testified before Congress that Vietnamization had “gone well. . . . If we proceed patiently . . . we will, eventually, achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia.” His recommendations rejected by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, Wheeler was worn down by the constant tension between loyalty and conviction. He greeted his successor in the spring of 1970 with the words, “You’ll never survive!”

Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, later offered a perceptive analysis of Wheeler’s dilemma in his final year:

He believed, rightly, that military advice had not been taken seriously enough in the Pentagon of the Sixties, but when the time came to present an alternative he offered no more than marginal adjustments of the status quo. He prized his direct access to the new President, but he rarely used it . . .

High military officers must always strike a balance between their convictions and their knowledge that to be effective they must survive to fight another day. Their innate awe of the Commander-in-Chief tempts them to find a military reason for what they consider barely tolerable. . . . They rarely challenge the Commander-in-Chief; they seek for excuses to support, not to oppose him. In this manner Wheeler had participated in a series of decisions any one of which he was able to defend, but the cumulative impact of which he could not really justify to himself.

The 1970s: Dealing with the Impact of Vietnam

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, who became Chairman on 2 July 1970, had been Chief of Naval Operations during the last three years of Wheeler’s chairmanship and thus had firsthand knowledge of the operation of the JCS system during some of the most difficult years of his predecessor’s tenure. At his nomination hearing Moorer gave his views on the Chairman’s role within the corporate system. He testified that while the Chairman should not hesitate to express his own opinions on issues before the Chiefs, he must prepare the agenda and manage the Joint Staff in a way that encouraged full consideration of opposing points of view. The “melding of different service views into strategic guidance and policy” were, he declared, “not evils to be abolished but . . . healthy values to be preserved.” In times of crisis, however, Moorer frequently exercised his authority in a manner quite different from the approach that he had espoused before his confirmation.

Moorer was not willing to confine himself to the role of corporate spokesman. Selected as Chairman on Secretary Laird’s recommendation, he developed a close working relationship with Dr. Kissinger. This, together with the confidence placed in him by the Secretary, allowed Moorer to exert considerable control over operational matters. Admiral Moorer sometimes acted on behalf of the JCS, informing the Service
Chiefs only afterward—if at all. During the March 1971 Lam Son 719 operation into Laos, the spring 1972 invasion of South Vietnam, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the NSC were in direct telephone contact with the Chairman several times a day to get the latest operational information and to relay directions, which Moorer carried out without informing the Chiefs in advance. It was, he said, “the only practical way” to proceed when dealing “in real time.”

During most of his first term Moorer, like Wheeler, frequently found himself at odds with the administration’s approach to the conduct of the Vietnam War. But by 1972 President Nixon was ready to use unprecedented military pressure against North Vietnam as Moorer and the Chiefs had long advocated. The Chairman was instrumental in the implementation of this new approach. On a number of occasions he deflected the President’s demands to deploy more B–52s and hit more targets than Moorer thought necessary. Moreover, during North Vietnam’s spring 1972 offensive and the B–52 bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, Moorer was in direct contact with the senior air commander in Vietnam about operational procedures and decisions.
Moorer repeatedly expressed his concerns about administration and congressional reductions in JCS recommendations for future conventional force structure. He believed that, in the post-Vietnam era, air and sea capabilities had to be the primary means of projecting US power and persuaded the President to accept his views on the need for a balanced conventional force structure. In September 1970, when the White House proposed keeping the Army at 16⅓ divisions but cutting tactical air, antisubmarine warfare, and amphibious forces, the Chairman advised that an undesirable force mix would result because the Army required tactical air support and protected sea lanes for resupply. As a result, the proposed strength of the Army shrank to 13½ divisions.62

During the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the spring of 1972, Moorer played a somewhat anomalous role, using his influence with the Chiefs to win their support for a presidential position which he had previously opposed. Knowing that the President intended to agree to terms which ran counter to JCS views, Kissinger was nevertheless confident that he could “deliver the Joint Chiefs” because he had “worked on Moorer all week.” When
the JCS balked at the terms that Nixon and Kissinger had negotiated in Moscow, the President and his National Security Adviser relayed to Moorer their “grievous distress” over JCS opposition. The Chairman told the Chiefs that the choice lay between saying no and saying that compromise was better than no treaty at all. The Chiefs agreed to “acquiesce” and then, under presidential prodding, declared themselves “in accord.”

Apparently won over by Kissinger, Moorer persuaded the Chiefs to agree to terms they had initially opposed. The JCS had wanted equality in offensive launchers but accepted Soviet superiority in launchers because of the offsetting US lead in warheads.

Not only did the Chairman’s influence increase during Moorer’s tenure, but administrative action also strengthened his position within the corporate JCS. In December 1971 Secretary Laird revised the World-Wide Military Command and Control System so that the channel of communications for execution of the SIOP and other time-sensitive operations ran from the NCA through the Chairman representing the Chiefs—rather than through the corporate JCS—to the executing commanders. But at the same time that the power of the chairmanship had been enhanced, there was widespread disillusionment with the military.

Moorer’s successor, General George S. Brown, USAF, came to the position well-versed in its political dimensions and its responsibilities. He was the first Chairman whose service had prepared him for the job by arranging assignments as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, a position in which he served both Gates and McNamara, and as Assistant to the Chairman under General Wheeler. Brown functioned well within the JCS system. He emphasized collegiality in working with the Service Chiefs and kept himself unusually well-informed about everything being done within the Joint Staff by meeting almost daily with the directorate heads and usually having lunch with the Director.

But General Brown served during a particularly difficult period for the United States and the JCS. Five weeks after he became Chairman on 1 July 1974, President Nixon resigned and Gerald R. Ford, Jr. became President. Nine months later, South Vietnam surrendered to North Vietnam, marking the failure of the twenty-five-year US effort to maintain a free and independent South Vietnam. Continuing public and congressional frustration with the outcome of the Vietnam War and with the military was reflected in diminished confidence in military leaders and in tighter defense budgets.

Further complicating his tenure, General Brown had a penchant for remarks that embarrassed him and the administration. During a public appearance in October 1974 he referred to the undue influence of Jews and the Israeli lobby in the United States. An outcry ensued, and President Ford publicly admonished him. Brown apologized but, in an interview published two years later, made comments that seemed disparaging of Britain, Israel, and Iran. While he later claimed that he had intended no criticism, his reputation as a Chairman who spoke first and considered the consequences later was not easily corrected. Thus, Brown’s service during the Ford administration was rocky. The Senate vote to confirm him for a second term was only 57–34.

The Chairman’s relationship with the administration of James E. “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., who became President in January 1977, was even more uneasy. The President’s approach to national security issues differed fundamentally from that of the JCS. Carter downplayed the role of military power in foreign policy and wished to lower the defense budget and reduce nuclear arsenals. His administration introduced procedures that strengthened the Chairman’s role within the JCS but diminished the JCS’s ability to carry out its advisory role.

On 10 June 1977 President Carter withdrew NSAM 55, which had guided the JCS since 1961, replacing it on 22 September with a directive that gave the Chairman more latitude to represent JCS views in the absence of his colleagues but required the JCS to inform the Secretary of Defense before presenting advice to the President. While Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, preferred to work with the JCS through the Chairman, he
General George S. Brown with General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, USAF, 1974.
directed that all contacts outside the department be coordinated through OSD. Some of Brown’s subordinates seemed dismissive of the JCS role as an advisory body. For example, when Secretary Brown revised the programming, planning, and budgeting system (PPBS), he introduced greater JCS involvement in analysis of force requirements, program development, and resource allocation. Nevertheless, early in 1978 OSD circulated a lengthy draft of military planning, programming, policy, and fiscal guidance prepared without consulting the Joint Staff. General Brown advised the Secretary that the draft reflected “one view of the world by well intended but militarily inexperienced analysts” and would require “extensive revision” before the Chiefs could take it seriously. Secretary Brown revised the draft and sent the President a brief summary that presented only fundamental issues.

General Brown played a key role in negotiating and securing ratification of a new Panama Canal Treaty that transferred ownership of the canal from the United States to Panama. He established a bond of trust with the Panamanian president and persuaded the Service Chiefs to accept a broadly worded guarantee of the canal’s neutrality that sidestepped the sensitive questions of whether Panamanian sovereignty would be diluted and whether the United States could intervene there unilaterally. During the Senate debate, when the administration faced opposition from four former Chiefs of Naval Operations, one of whom—Admiral Moorer—was Brown’s predecessor as Chairman, Brown wrote letters to senators, organized briefings for them, and helped persuade former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger to endorse ratification. The Chairman’s support for the treaty was crucial to its ratification.

In contrast, during SALT negotiations General Brown found himself at odds with the Carter administration. Despite the Chairman’s warning that cuts in land-based missile launchers contemplated by the President could be highly destabilizing and that the Soviets would reject a US proposal for deep cuts, Carter remained convinced that such reductions were the only alternative to a costly US buildup. In April 1977, as the Chiefs had anticipated, the Soviets rejected a US proposal for deep cuts. Nevertheless, the JCS lost ground to the State Department and the NSC staff in the subsequent reshuffling of policymaking procedures. Thus, in an area in which military advice was crucial but where the Chairman and the Chiefs differed profoundly with the President, the JCS played a subsidiary role. Stricken with cancer in early 1978, Brown was absent much of the time during his last months as Chairman.

The Road to JCS Reform

Developments during the tenure of General David C. Jones, USAF, who became Chairman on 21 June 1978, had important implications for the future of the chairmanship. Jones was nearing the end of his second term as Chief of Staff of the Air Force when President Carter nominated him to be Chairman. As Air Force Chief, Jones had regarded “the many long JCS meetings” as “an intrusion” on his time and hoped that when he became Chairman, he and the Chiefs could reform the JCS system internally.

Jones already had a close working relationship with Secretary Brown and, as Chairman, met with him almost daily. Brown continued to introduce procedures that increased the Chairman’s visibility and influence in the budget process. When the Secretary created the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to assist in screening service requests, he made the Chairman an ex officio member.

According to an officer who served on the NSC staff, Jones was adept at working his views into White House discussions without challenging his superiors. A worsening world situation seemed to offer opportunity for the Chairman to exert his influence on national security policy. However, Jones’s August 1978 warning that the margin of US strategic superiority over the Soviet Union was narrower than ever, though seconded by the Chiefs and Secretary Brown, did not fit Carter’s views, and he discounted it. Later, the failure of the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission, which the President had approved on Jones’s recommendation after the
Chairman had overseen its planning, lessened his ability to affect other decisions.69

President Carter's nomination of Jones as Chairman had been controversial, and his May 1980 nomination for a second term again sparked congressional criticism, as some senators thought the Chairman was too closely identified with the administration. The press reported that, to avoid a reconfirmation fight, Jones had privately agreed to resign if Carter were not reelected. On 4 June General Jones issued a statement that it was “totally inappropriate for senior military officers to adopt the tradition of political appointees of offering resignations whenever an Administration changes.” At his reconfirmation hearing the Chairman defended his support of the Carter administration, citing the principle of civilian control of the military. He testified that while he had a critical responsibility to make the strongest possible case for his views to the Secretary of Defense and the President in deliberative sessions, once they rendered a decision, “I have a clear obligation, by law and by personal conviction, to carry out that order even if I would have decided otherwise.”70

After Ronald W. Reagan's election as President, a campaign to persuade Reagan to replace the Chairman prompted former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and former Chairman Taylor to speak out against politicizing the chairmanship by removing an incumbent. Reagan retained Jones, but the Chairman's association with Carter administration policies, especially his endorsement of the SALT II agreement, limited his effectiveness in the new administration.71
In July 1978, soon after Jones had become Chairman, the Steadman Group, commissioned by Secretary Brown in November 1977 to review the national military command structure, had submitted its report. The group found serious flaws in the JCS system, particularly with the JCS role in resource allocation and force planning. To correct these deficiencies, it recommended expanding the Chairman's role. The Steadman Report proposed that the Chairman, as the only JCS member without service responsibilities, provide the Secretary advice on program, budget, and force structure issues. To assist in performing this function, it recommended additional staff support for him in the studies, analysis, and gaming area. To improve command management, the report recommended that the Secretary designate the Chairman as his agent to supervise the CINCs.72

The Carter administration did not act on the Steadman Report’s recommendations for strengthening the Chairman’s role. Interservice rivalry and disagreements, especially over resource allocation, continued to plague JCS deliberations, often leading to lowest-common-denominator advice that General Jones described as “pabulum.” During his second confirmation hearing Jones recommended strengthening the Chairman’s role, particularly in the budget process, and advocated increased Joint Staff independence from the services.73

Jones had long believed that the JCS system required fundamental change, and he had become convinced that the impetus for reform must come from outside the JCS. In February 1981 the Chairman commissioned a study of JCS reorganization by a group of retired senior officers. Even before this Chairman’s Special Study Group submitted its formal report in April 1982, Jones offered proposals for reform. During a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee in February 1982, he called for JCS reorganization. Later that month he published his views.

General Jones identified long-standing defects in the JCS system: diffused authority and responsibility, military advice that was neither timely nor useful, service domination of the joint system, and built-in conflicts of interest for the Service Chiefs in their dual roles as JCS members and service leaders. He recommended making the Chairman, rather than the corporate Chiefs, the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC; giving the Chairman oversight of the unified and specified commands; providing the Chairman with a four-star deputy; and having the Joint Staff work for the Chairman rather than the corporate Chiefs. Jones also wanted to limit service staff involvement in the joint process and increase the rewards for joint duty to attract the best officers to joint assignments. His proposals framed the terms for a continuing debate on JCS reform. Before his retirement on 18 June a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee had begun an inquiry on JCS reorganization.74

General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, became Chairman on General Jones’s retirement. General Vessey subscribed to the Reagan administration’s assertive approach to the Soviet Union, and his relations with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger were good. Vessey quickly demonstrated his willingness to exercise his authority as Chairman. In order to act in a timely manner to influence decisions, he did not hesitate to forward JCS views to the Secretary even when the Chiefs had not met formally on an issue.75

At his confirmation hearing Vessey indicated that he agreed with many of Jones’s proposals but thought that it was up to the President, the Secretary, and Congress to introduce JCS reform. In response to a presidential request, early in Vessey’s tenure Secretary Weinberger asked the JCS to study the reorganization proposals. During the summer of 1982 Vessey and the Chiefs met frequently to examine the issue of JCS reform, reviewing Jones’s recommendations and a set of proposals by the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, who also recommended an enhanced role for the Chairman. The JCS concluded that most of the recommended improvements could be implemented without legislation; they also proposed putting the Chairman in the chain of command. Meanwhile, in August 1982 the House of Representatives passed a bill that incorporated General Jones’s main proposals. But the bill went no further.76
He met with the CINCs in Washington on a regular basis and ensured that they became regularly involved in the DRB’s programming and budgeting activities. A Joint Requirements Management Board was established, and Vessey established the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency to help the JCS review major materiel and manpower requirements. To ease the problems that resulted from several Service Chiefs being Acting Chairman within one week, the Chiefs agreed that each would be designated Acting Chairman for three months on a rotational basis. They believed that this change would make Jones’s proposal for a deputy chairman unnecessary. Vessey kept the Chief designated to act for him abreast of his activities, but three months out of twelve did not prove enough to replicate the Chairman’s understanding of issues and personalities.

In addition to organizational reform, General Vessey focused on improving operational planning. His efforts resulted in an expansion of the Chairman’s role. With Secretary Weinberger’s approval, Vessey acted as the CINCs’ spokesman for operations and requirements. Shortly after taking office, he ordered a review of major contingency plans aimed at refining JCS oversight of these fundamental products of the joint system. Secretary Weinberger gave General Vessey authority to conduct certain operations on his behalf. During Operation URGENT FURY, the US intervention in Grenada in October 1983, the Secretary gave the Chairman authority to call up backup forces, deploy them, and issue guidance to unified and specified commanders.

Vessey also introduced procedures intended to address some of the deficiencies in the joint system. He met with the CINCs in Washington on a regular basis and ensured that they became regularly involved in the DRB’s programming and budgeting activities. A Joint Requirements Management Board was established, and Vessey established the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency to help the JCS review major materiel and manpower requirements. To ease the problems that resulted from several Service Chiefs being Acting Chairman within one week, the Chiefs agreed that each would be designated Acting Chairman for three months on a rotational basis. They believed that this change would make Jones’s proposal for a deputy chairman unnecessary. Vessey kept the Chief designated to act for him abreast of his activities, but three months out of twelve did not prove enough to replicate the Chairman’s understanding of issues and personalities.
Despite its success, the intervention in Grenada was beset by difficulties with interoperability and interservice cooperation that underscored continuing weaknesses in the joint system. That same month the deaths of 241 US Marines in a terrorist bombing of their barracks in Lebanon prompted a congressional investigation that focused on the problems created by a cumbersome US chain of command. These well-publicized problems in the deployments to Grenada and Lebanon fueled criticism of JCS performance.77

In 1984 Congress passed a law making the Chairman the spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements, allowing him to determine when issues under JCS consideration would be decided, and authorizing him rather than the corporate Chiefs to select officers to be assigned to the Joint Staff. The law did little more than recognize existing practices and did not address what critics saw as fundamental flaws. Several influential journals and think tanks renewed the call for JCS reform. In January 1985 Senator Barry Goldwater (R, AZ), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senator Sam Nunn (D, GA), the ranking minority member, announced formation of a task force on defense organization. That spring the House Armed Services Committee began considering a bill incorporating General Jones’s main
proposals. In an effort to forestall the growing movement for legislative action, President Reagan in June appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission, headed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard; its tasks included a review of JCS responsibilities. When General Vessey retired on 30 September 1985, the report of the Goldwater-Nunn task force was being readied for release.\textsuperscript{78}

The Goldwater-Nichols Act

Just a few days after Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., became Chairman on 1 October 1985, Senators Goldwater and Nunn briefed him, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary on the Armed Services Committee’s staff study on reorganization. On 16 October the Senate released its report, \textit{Defense Organization: The Need for Change}, which was extremely critical of JCS performance. Among the report’s ninety-one recommendations was a proposal to replace the JCS with a joint military advisory council composed of a chairman and a four-star officer from each service, each of whom would be on his final tour and presumably free of service parochialism. In November the House passed the JCS reorganization bill that its Armed Services Committee had considered the previous spring.\textsuperscript{79}

On 12 December Admiral Crowe testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on its staff
report. He opposed replacing the Chiefs with a new body of military advisers but favored designating the Chairman instead of the Chiefs as principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC; giving the Chairman sole control of the Joint Staff; and inserting him into the chain of command. In later testimony, Crowe also supported creating the position of deputy chairman. The Packard Commission’s interim report, issued in February 1986, included all of Crowe’s proposals among its recommendations. In September the Senate and House reached agreement on reform legislation, and Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which became law on 1 October.80

Directing the first major reorganization of the JCS in almost thirty years, the new law made the most significant changes in the joint system since the National Security Act of 1947. It greatly enhanced the Chairman’s authority by making him, rather than the corporate JCS, principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and NSC. It established the position of Vice Chairman, bestowed wide new powers on the CINCs, and increased the prestige and rewards of joint duty. The Chairman would consult the Service Chiefs and the CINCs as he considered appropriate and then submit what he deemed to be a suitable range of advice. Clearly, the intent was to minimize the type of dissent that had plagued JCS deliberations in the past.

Goldwater-Nichols prescribed that candidates for Chairman must have served as Vice Chairman, Service Chief, or CINC, although the President could waive this requirement. It stipulated that a
Chairman’s two-year term would begin on 1 October of odd-numbered years; he might be reappointed for two more terms, except in time of war when there was no limit on tenure. The act retained the language of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, specifying that the Chairman out-ranked all other officers but did not exercise command over the JCS or the armed forces. The new law assigned to the Chairman functions previously discharged by the corporate JCS: assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in the strategic direction of the armed forces; carrying out strategic and contingency planning; advising the Secretary about military requirements, programs, and budgets; and developing joint doctrine, training, and education for the armed forces. The Joint Staff came under the Chairman’s direction and control. Finally, the act defined the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. The President might, however, direct that communications between himself or the Secretary and the CINCs be transmitted through the Chairman. The President also could designate the Chairman to assist him and the Secretary “in performing their command function.”

**Principal Military Adviser**

Admiral Crowe had worked behind the scenes to encourage support for the Goldwater-Nichols Act and had changed some JCS procedures in anticipation of its passage. In assuming direct control of the Joint Staff after the law came into effect, he moved to enhance the quality of the staff, which had suffered in the competition with the service staffs for the most capable officers. He created new directorates to assist him in the areas of interoperability and joint doctrine and resource and budget matters. However, Crowe continued to use the Chairman’s Staff Group—previously one of the few staff entities to work directly for the Chairman—to review Joint Staff papers before they reached him.

Three of the Service Chiefs and Secretary Weinberger had opposed aspects of the new law. Moreover, Crowe believed that he needed the Chiefs’ expertise and experience. Therefore, he adopted an evolutionary approach in exercising his new authority within the JCS. He continued to consult regularly with the Chiefs and to seek consensus. Admiral Crowe worked effectively with Secretary Weinberger although their approach to issues often differed; he found the approaches of Weinberger’s successor, Frank C. Carlucci, more flexible.

Despite his emphasis on collegiality, Crowe fully exercised the Chairman’s expanded authority at important junctures. In 1987 during Operation Earnest Will, which took place near the boundary between two unified commands, he used his enhanced authority to guide the creation of a joint task force to conduct the escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf. In October 1988, when the Chief of Naval Operations strongly opposed establishing a unified transportation command, Crowe decided to support its creation. With the Chairman’s endorsement, the Secretary and the President then approved creating the US Transportation Command. Crowe’s moving forward on a critical issue despite opposition from his own service demonstrated the impact of Goldwater-Nichols.

General Colin L. Powell, USA, came to the chairmanship on 1 October 1989 determined to make full use of the Chairman’s expanded authority. He had the advantage of being the first Chairman to serve his entire tenure under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In addition, his extensive experience at the highest levels of government, his resulting close relationship with President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, and—during the last years of his tenure—the public prominence which he attained during the Persian Gulf War gave him considerable latitude in the exercise of the authority granted the Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols.

Powell had a clear idea of what he wished to accomplish. As Secretary Weinberger’s Military Assistant and President Reagan’s National Security Adviser, he had found that the military advice produced by the corporate JCS system frequently did not meet policymakers’ needs because it was often
Mindful of the operational and command prerogatives of the CINCs, Powell nevertheless exerted considerable influence on operations. During planning for the Panama operation in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990–1991, he pressed civilian leaders to identify national interests, examine all options, and define objectives before using military force. Once the decision to attack had been made, he played a major role in convincing the Bush administration to apply overwhelming force to achieve rapid success at low cost.86

Powell preferred to work outside formal staff structures and processes. His management of the
Joint Staff concentrated power in his hands. He abolished the Chairman’s Staff Group as a buffer between him and the staff. On issues of importance, he preferred working directly with selected staff members rather than using formal staffing procedures. To ensure that the budget provided for his recommended force structure, General Powell had a J-8 deputy director work directly with the DOD Comptroller’s Office rather than using the formal planning, programming, and budgeting system. Powell liked to meet with the Chiefs in his office, where they were less constrained by prepared service staff positions than in the more formal “Tank.”

He relied on frequent telephone conversations to maintain individual contact with the other members of the JCS.

As a result of Powell’s active exercise of his authority, the Chairman’s role expanded and his influence increased. The perceived extent of Powell’s influence and his visibility—particularly publication during the 1992 presidential election campaign of his views on the necessity of limiting the
circumstances in which US military force is applied—led to criticism that he had exceeded the appropriate role for a military adviser. He continued to exert considerable influence during the last months of his tenure, playing an important role in the formulation of President William J. “Bill” Clinton’s positions on such issues as homosexuals in the military and the US role in Bosnia.

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, who became Chairman on 25 October 1993, faced the task of charting a course for the US military in a world in which there was no major conflict and the United States was the sole superpower. Shalikashvili saw his role as principal military adviser as making civilian leaders aware of the range of feasible courses of action and their implications.

Shalikashvili believed that there were circumstances in which the limited application of force was justified. In the Clinton administration’s discussions of the US response to the conflict that had raged in Bosnia since 1992, he opposed the deployment of US ground forces as combatants but supported participation in a NATO peace implementation force after the warring factions had agreed to a framework for peace. Once the peacekeeping mission began, he argued strongly and generally successfully that the US military should perform strictly military tasks and not become involved in law enforcement. The Partnership for Peace, Shalikashvili’s initiative for a NATO military cooperation program with former members of the Warsaw Pact, advanced military contacts with former adversaries and laid the foundation for NATO enlargement. His efforts to place greater emphasis on US military-to-military contact with both Russia and China did not, however, win administration backing.

Shalikashvili’s approach to the Chairman’s role within the corporate JCS was closer to Crowe’s than to Powell’s. He adopted a collegial approach in dealing with the Service Chiefs but, nonetheless, vigorously
exercised his statutory authority. His close working relationship with Secretary of Defense William J. Perry enabled him to assert the Chairman’s prerogatives against those of the Service Chiefs and the CINCs and to introduce procedures that expanded the Chairman’s institutional role within the Defense Department. In using the Joint Staff, Shalikashvili resumed the practice of relying on the formal staff system.

Shalikashvili ensured that he was part of the chain for all communications to and from the CINCs. He convinced Secretary Perry that, during domestic emergencies, orders issued by the Secretary of the Army for deployment of forces assigned to the unified commanders should be conveyed through the Chairman. Shalikashvili also expanded the scope of his activities to include areas traditionally the responsibility of the services. Believing that, as the senior military officer, he should exercise leadership on such issues as sexual harassment, he worked to achieve a coordinated approach to these issues among the services.

Working with Admiral William A. Owens, his Vice Chairman from 1994 until 1996, Shalikashvili extended and systematized the Chairman’s participation in programming and budgeting. Implementing his statutory authority to submit alternative program and budget recommendations to the Secretary, he strengthened the Chairman’s Program...
Assessment and introduced the Chairman’s Program Recommendations into the PPBS. Comfortable using formal structures and processes, General Shalikashvili exercised his authority in a way that strengthened the chairmanship as an institution.

The next Chairman, General Henry H. Shelton, USA, brought a strong operational background and considerable experience in unconventional warfare to the chairmanship. When he assumed office on 1 October 1997, the nation had moved beyond the Cold War. Although the ending of the US-Soviet confrontation had led to significant reductions in the size of the US armed forces and their overseas bases, American military participation in the more diffuse and fluid operating environment had increased. The Clinton administration placed a premium on nontraditional and unconventional military operations, and new peacekeeping and humanitarian missions expanded joint and multilateral cooperation. General Shelton’s grounding in nonconventional operations made the nature and scope of his advice to President Clinton and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen especially pertinent.

In executing his responsibilities, Shelton placed great confidence in General Joseph Ralston, USAF, who served as his Vice Chairman until February 2000, and relied heavily upon the Director of the Joint Staff. The Chairman’s collegial relationship...
with the Service Chiefs allowed him to capitalize on their respective expertise in formulating his advice to the NCA. At the same time, the shifting focus of US foreign and defense policy and the resulting changes in force structure and military posture involved the Chairman in areas formerly the purview of the services. To ensure continued readiness in the new, faster-paced strategic environment, Shelton singled out issues affecting the quality of life, retention, and recruitment of service personnel, winning support for major changes to the military pay and retirement systems by the end of his first term.

**Expanded Influence: The Vice Chairman’s Role**

Contributing to the increased power of the chairmanship was the new position of Vice Chairman. The Goldwater-Nichols Act designated the Vice Chairman as the second-ranking officer in the US Armed Forces. In place of the previous practice of
rotating the chairmanship among the Service Chiefs during the absence of the Chairman, the new law specified that the Vice Chairman would serve as Acting Chairman. It did not further delineate the Vice Chairman’s duties, leaving them to be prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. While Goldwater-Nichols authorized the Vice Chairman to participate in all JCS meetings, it prohibited him from voting unless he was acting as Chairman. This restriction meant that the Vice Chairman was not a full member of the JCS.

Soon after General Robert T. Herres, USAF, became the first Vice Chairman on 6 February 1987, he and Admiral Crowe worked out a list of the Vice Chairman’s specific duties, which Secretary Weinberger accepted. In addition to the Vice Chairman’s statutory responsibilities, they agreed that Herres would carry out several of the Chairman’s duties, primarily in the areas of requirements and joint doctrine, training, and education. Herres’s principal functions were to act for the Chairman in all aspects of the PPBS, serve as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and represent the Chairman on the DRB. He also dealt with nuclear and space policy. When the Bush administration established the Deputies Committee of the NSC in 1989, the Vice Chairman became the Chairman’s representative on that body.
After General Powell became Chairman, the Crowe-Herres arrangement regarding the Vice Chairman’s duties remained in effect for the rest of Herres’s tenure. However, the Vice Chairman played a less active role on the DRB’s successor, the Defense Planning and Resources Board, since Powell preferred to attend its meetings himself.

General Herres viewed his role as not only substituting for the Chairman but also extending the Chairman’s influence. As Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, he institutionalized the role of the military in the requirements process. When he first became Vice Chairman, Herres had to contend with service concerns that he was usurping some of the Chiefs’ functions. But well before his retirement on 28 February 1990, the Vice Chairman’s role had been accepted as integral to the joint system.

The range of the Vice Chairman’s activities and the extent of his influence expanded during the tenure of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, who became Vice Chairman on 1 March 1990. Like Herres, Jeremiah had principal responsibility for requirements and represented the Chairman in the interagency policy-making process. But rather than retaining the formal delineation of the Vice Chairman’s duties that had guided General Herres, General Powell

A meeting in “The Tank” with President George H. W. Bush during Operation DESERT STORM, January 1991. Left to right: John H. Sununu, White House Chief of Staff; Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, Secretary of Defense; President Bush; General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, JCS; and Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman, JCS.
and Admiral Jeremiah agreed that Jeremiah would support Powell across the whole range of the Chairman’s responsibilities and that his specific duties would evolve as their working relationship developed. They decided that the Vice Chairman should participate fully in the management and direction of the Joint Staff and in providing military advice to the Secretary and the President.

Powell and Jeremiah continued the practice of having the Vice Chairman chair the JROC, serve as Vice Chairman of the DAB, represent the Chairman on the Deputies Committee, and deal with nuclear and space policy. Through Admiral Jeremiah’s efforts, the Vice Chairman became an integral part of the intelligence oversight process. With the August 1990 deployment of US forces to the Persian Gulf in Operation DESERT SHIELD, he became involved in operational matters as well. General Powell increasingly relied on Jeremiah as a sounding board and source of advice. At the Chairman’s direction, Jeremiah participated in the budget process, working closely with the Department of Defense Comptroller on the allocation of resources within the defense budget. With the expansion of the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition during the Clinton administration, the Vice Chairman’s responsibilities broadened to include force structure.

The Vice Chairman’s statutory authority was also expanded during Admiral Jeremiah’s tenure. At General Powell’s urging and with the Service Chiefs’ support, the Bush administration in 1991 sought legislation to make the Vice Chairman a full member of the JCS. The Senate passed such a bill unanimously, but the House approved a version that would have prohibited the Vice Chairman from informing Congress and the President when he differed with the Chairman. With the House and Senate deadlocked, General Powell helped to break the impasse. To a leading opponent of the Senate bill he wrote, “The most junior officer in the Armed Forces of the United States is entitled to express disagreement through channels to the next higher authority. How can we, in good conscience, deny that privilege to the second highest military officer in the Armed Forces as a consequence of being elevated to membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff?” Public Law 102-484, signed by President Bush on 23 October 1992, made the Vice Chairman a full JCS member without restrictions.

As Acting Chairman between General Powell’s retirement on 1 October 1993 and General Shalikashvili’s assuming the chairmanship on 25 October, Admiral Jeremiah was a key participant in deliberations regarding US policy in Somalia and Haiti. While the Powell-Jeremiah working relationship closely resembled a partnership, during the short time that Jeremiah served with Shalikashvili, his function was more advisory.

The scope of the Vice Chairman’s influence increased further during the tenure of Admiral William A. Owens, who served from 1 March 1994 through 29 February 1996. With the support of General Shalikashvili, Admiral Owens used his position as Chairman of the JROC to exploit fully the authority vested by Goldwater-Nichols in the Chairman and, by extension, the Vice Chairman.

Owens transformed the JROC, expanding its scope to include programming. He moved far in achieving a consensus among the services and the CINC s on requirements and programming priorities. As part of this effort he increased the frequency of JROC meetings and introduced informal weekly breakfasts with the Service Vice Chiefs. He also brought the CINC s directly into the JROC process by periodically taking the JROC to meet with them. The expanded role of the JROC required an expansion of the Joint Staff’s analytic capabilities and led to a further increase in the influence of the Joint Staff.

Like his predecessors, Admiral Owens also played a key role in the DAB and participated in numerous other senior policy and review groups. However, unlike Herres and Jeremiah, he did not routinely attend Deputies Committee meetings, generally attending only when General Shalikashvili deemed his presence essential.

Under Owens’s leadership, the Chairman’s Program Assessment, which gave the Secretary of Defense the Chairman’s assessment of the services’ budget and programming proposals, attained
greater importance, and General Shalikashvili began to submit the Chairman’s Program Recommendations presenting his priorities for future investment. Through these initiatives, the Chairman for the first time fully exercised his statutory authority to submit alternative programming and budget recommendations to the Secretary. Systematizing the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s participation in programming and budgeting, Admiral Owens thus integrated the JROC process into the PPBS. In so doing, he not only expanded the Chairman’s and Vice Chairman’s roles but also strengthened the overall role of the military within the Defense Department.

Owens also sought congressional support for his initiatives, and toward the end of his tenure the JROC received statutory authority. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act, adding a section that established the JROC, prescribed its mission, and defined its membership. Effective 31 January 1997, the JROC was authorized by law to assist the Chairman in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy, to consider alternatives to acquisition programs identified to meet those requirements, and to assign joint priority among existing and future programs. Designating the Chairman as the JROC’s Chairman and permitting him to delegate the position only to the Vice Chairman, the amendment enhanced the authority of both positions.91

The tenure of General Joseph W. Ralston, who served from 1 March 1996 through 29 February 2000, saw a further extension of the Vice Chairman’s influence. When Ralston became Vice Chairman, he functioned as General Shalikashvili’s deputy and
participated fully in all aspects of the Chairman’s day-to-day activities in addition to carrying out his specific responsibilities as Vice Chairman. This method of operating continued when General Shelton, with whom Ralston had a long association, became Chairman. While the arrangement was similar to that worked out between General Powell and Admiral Jeremiah, Ralston became directly involved in overseeing current operations to a greater extent than Jeremiah had been.

The expanded role of the Deputies Committee during the second Clinton administration meant that the Vice Chairman devoted an increasing amount of time to the interagency process. The fact that Ralston was the first Vice Chairman to serve a significant length of time with more than one Chairman and also the first to serve his entire tenure under one presidential administration contributed to his impact in the policy process. The experience he gained during the nineteen months that he served with Shalikashvili and his consequent familiarity with key officials substantially assisted the transition from Shalikashvili to Shelton. Ralston was a valuable resource not only for General Shelton but also for Secretary of Defense Cohen, who had been Secretary only eight months when the new Chairman assumed office. The continuity that General Ralston brought to deliberations within the Defense Department strengthened the military voice in the policy process.

When the amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act giving the JROC statutory authority went into effect on 31 January 1997, Ralston became the first to operate under this new authority. In addition to performing the Vice Chairman’s duties as Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, Ralston acted for the Chairman in all aspects of the
PPBS. He also coordinated the Defense Department’s review of post–Cold War strategy and force structure. With the increased emphasis placed on the Chairman’s Exercise Program as the armed forces adapted their training to the new missions of the post–Cold War world, he assumed a major role in overseeing that program.

Each of these Vice Chairmen had a different conception of the position’s scope and authority. In defining the Vice Chairman’s role, the Chairmen with whom they served also set out different guidelines. While each Vice Chairman carried out his responsibilities differently, the cumulative effect of their contributions was a significant expansion of the Vice Chairman’s role and of the overall influence of the Chairman.

Into the Twenty-First Century

During his second term as Chairman, General Shelton released *Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military Preparing for Tomorrow*. This document advocated a gradual transformation of the joint force that would enable it to dominate the full spectrum of future military operations. By replacing or modernizing existing equipment, incorporating new technologies, and training skilled personnel, he envisioned a joint force that could “conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations.”

Although General Shelton acknowledged that asymmetric threats presented the nation’s most serious near-term danger—later demonstrated by the October 2000 terrorist attack against the USS *Cole* (DDG 67)—he also saw the need for a robust “overseas presence and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide.”

General Richard B. Myers, USAF, who had become the fifth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 2000, shared the Chairman’s commitment to prepare America’s military for the future. A decorated combat veteran of Vietnam who had recently led US Space Command, he foresaw new organizations, doctrine, training, and technologies that would enable the military to function efficiently in a multidimensional battle space.

As chair of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, General Myers focused the council’s attention on strategic requirements and emphasized that far-reaching joint capability assessments should support its deliberations. To achieve that goal, he reduced the number of missions evaluated in the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment, retaining only those oriented toward full-spectrum dominance. He also established an Enhanced Joint Requirements Board to acquire outside perspectives on selected programs and created a Joint Requirements Panel to direct acquisition and development issues.

President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, appointing Donald H. Rumsfeld as his Secretary of Defense. The new Secretary was intent upon reforming the Pentagon bureaucracy and championed a rapid transformation of the military to meet twenty-first century challenges. Thus, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review reflected a shift toward an agile, network-centric force defined more by future requirements than conventional threats. General Shelton supported this OSD initiative but cautioned against compromising current readiness by sacrificing conventional capabilities.

Al-Qaeda operatives conducted multiple terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, striking the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Within days the administration developed military plans to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, as well as an operational strategy to defeat, disrupt, and degrade terrorist activities around the world, aptly branded the Global War on Terrorism. On 1 October, as plans to retaliate in Afghanistan coalesced, General Myers became the fifteenth Chairman of the JCS, the first Vice Chairman to succeed his predecessor. He promoted a collegial atmosphere among the Joint Chiefs and sought consensus when developing advice on national security matters. The same day that Myers took office, General Peter Pace, USMC, a former director of the Joint Staff Operations Section and current head of US Southern Command, became the sixth Vice Chairman, the first Marine to hold that position.
As the President’s principal military advisor, General Myers played a central role in shaping the Afghan campaign. Coalition forces launched military operations on 7 October 2001, and the Taliban regime toppled three months later, leaving thousands of detainees in Coalition hands. Influenced by his Vietnam service, General Myers insisted that the Geneva Conventions applied to the nation of Afghanistan and entitled all detainees captured in that country to humanitarian treatment. He also supported employment of the International Security Assistance Force sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) to help the interim Afghan authority stabilize the war-ravaged nation and establish a democracy. In 2003 NATO assumed responsibility for the international security mission in the pacified regions to the north and west. Ratification of a new Afghan constitution and presidential elections occurred in 2004, followed by parliamentary elections in 2005.

Concurrently, General Myers coordinated the larger global war effort and pursued the transformation of America’s military. In the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2002/2005), he provided guidance for a multipronged joint and Coalition strategy targeting worldwide terrorist networks at eight key pressure points. He also orchestrated substantive changes to the nation’s unified command plan to protect the homeland. On 1 October 2002 US Northern Command emerged as a new combatant command designed to consolidate and coordinate domestic defense. Among its missions were supporting local, state, and federal authorities and assisting the newly created Department of Homeland Security when responding to national emergencies. On the same day that Northern Command was established, US Strategic Command absorbed US Space Command, consolidating the nation’s nuclear deterrent and space missions.

General Richard B. Myers and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld answer questions from the audience during a "town hall meeting" at the Pentagon in August 2003.
Following its initial successes in Afghanistan, the Bush administration turned its attention toward Iraq. Post–Gulf War sanctions no longer constrained Saddam Hussein, and available intelligence indicated that the Iraqi dictator either possessed or sought weapons of mass destruction that might support terrorist attacks against the United States. Based on guidance from Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the services analyzed the ramifications of increased operational commitments on the nation’s current defense obligations. They concluded that the United States could maintain its global security requirements, wage two regional conflicts, and—with time to prepare—strike Iraq.100

General Myers was a key advisor to the NCA throughout the planning process, accentuating logistics coordination and civil-military operations. To accomplish regime change in Iraq, he modified the evolving operational plan, detailing US Central Command’s responsibility for promoting stability and reconstruction following the cessation of hostilities, and established a combined joint task force to handle postconflict issues.101 General Pace, drawn into coordinating the war effort as Co-Chair of the Campaign Planning Committee, spent more time addressing strategic plans and policy than acquisition issues, a significant departure from the Vice Chairman’s traditional role.102

The constantly evolving plan and changes in force composition complicated the preinvasion buildup and required Generals Myers and Pace to obtain Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval for several
hundred individual deployment orders. To remedy this situation and facilitate the anticipated redeployment of forces following the war, the Joint Staff began transitioning from the Timed Phased Force and Deployment Data System to the Global Force Management System. The staff also assessed the impact of postwar support requirements and force reconstitution plans upon global security. They determined that by increasing the ability to surge capabilities cross-theater, they could reduce requirements to preposition forces in support of regional combatant commanders during times of crisis. These findings helped inform a realignment of the nation’s defense posture the following year and changes to the National Defense Strategy a year after that.

Coalition forces launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on 20 March 2003, occupied Baghdad on 9 April, and heard President Bush declare an end to major combat operations on 1 May. In place of Saddam’s Baathist regime, the Bush administration established the Coalition Provisional Authority to coordinate reconstruction; Central Command activated Combined Joint Task Force-7 to oversee stability and security operations. Hindered by issues of size, structure, and function, this bifurcated civil-military effort confronted a growing al-Qaeda-backed insurgency. Although General Myers and other senior Defense Department officials debated raising troop levels, they decided that a larger US military presence might incite further Iraqi unrest. They chose instead to increase and improve the Iraqi security forces, anticipating that indigenous troops would replace the Coalition forces.

Matters worsened in 2004. As US casualties mounted and detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison became known, American citizens questioned the war, and the Iraqi insurgents grew bolder. General Myers remained steadfast in his belief that abandoning Iraq would harm national security interests, and he advised President Bush to affirm publicly the administration’s determination to persevere in the Iraq war and pushed for the use of all instruments of national power—not just the military—in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the slow pace, there was progress. Coalition forces established the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq, training and equipping a hundred thousand indigenous personnel during its first year of operations. During January 2005, Iraqi citizens voted for National Assembly and Governorate Council officials. That October the elected assembly ratified a new constitution.

Like his predecessors, General Myers continued to promote a joint culture among the nation’s military services. In Joint Operations Concepts (2003), he articulated a vision to develop integrated functional capabilities. The same year, General Pace replaced the aging Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) with the newer, more versatile Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). Conceptually linked to the Chairman’s Joint Operations Concepts, JCIDS promoted interoperability by identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing strategic capability gaps. The JROC also collaborated with the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), an OSD initiative to fulfill immediate warfighting needs that could otherwise result in US casualties or hamper near-term military missions. During his four-year tenure, General Pace became the sixteenth Chairman of the JCS on 30 September 2005, the first Marine to hold that position. He continued to pursue many of the initiatives he had coauthored with General Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld but tempered them with his own perspective. General Pace’s top priority was to win the war on terrorism by “assisting others to create good governance and the rule of law—shaping an environment that precludes the flourishing of terrorism.” He advocated broad-based collaboration as a tool to building and enhancing interagency relationships and emphasized the importance of accelerating transformation and strengthening joint warfighting.
The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review reflected this focus. In concert with efforts to defeat terrorism, defend the homeland, counter weapons of mass destruction, and shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, the document accelerated the shift toward agile expeditionary forces, highlighting a need for information and precision weapons when thwarting nontraditional or asymmetrical threats. It also accentuated the military’s supporting role during interagency stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, underscoring the prevalent DOD sense that the military alone could not win the ongoing conflicts.112

By the time General Pace assumed office, Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN, had already replaced him to become the seventh Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Having served as Secretary Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant before taking charge of US Joint Forces Command, Giambastiani was intimately involved in the transformation of America’s military and sought to revitalize the Pentagon’s management processes, which he referred to as “the business of business.”113 As head of the JROC he increased the involvement of combatant commanders and interagency groups in the JCIDS process and distilled the key requirements into a list of the “most pressing military issues.”114 He avoided making OSD civilian officials permanent members of the council, feeling that it would diminish the Chairman’s ability to present an impartial military perspective to the Secretary.

In order to improve program management, Admiral Giambastiani instituted initial cost-benefit analyses, modified poorly performing initiatives, and grouped interrelated requirements into four Joint Capability Portfolios (logistics, battlespace awareness, net-centric operations, and command and control systems). He acknowledged that technological limitations and a “one-size-fits-all” approach could be counterproductive when fulfilling joint requirements.115 Under his guidance, the JROC findings shaped the recommendations of the Deputies Advisory Working Group, a panel first
Iraq," a strategic realignment to reverse deteriorating conditions in that theater of operations.118 The initiative, which sharply increased the number of US forces involved in counterinsurgency operations, emphasized the security and development portions of the “clear, hold, and build” strategy. It also called for a gradual rise in Army and Marine Corps end strengths by 92,000 personnel over the next five years—adding units and increasing dwell time—which helped alleviate the JCS's concern that a prolonged surge might overburden America’s already strained strategic reserve.119 The first of five surge brigades deployed to Iraq in January 2007. Six months later, General Pace had an opportunity to observe improvements in Iraq’s security situation first hand. After visiting Baghdad and Ramadi he told reporters: “A sea change is taking place in many places here. It’s no longer a matter of pushing al Qaeda out . . . but rather . . . helping the local police and local army . . . get their feet on the ground and set up their systems.”120

created to guide the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and then retained as a permanent organization to implement programs identified during the review process.

Escalating violence still plagued Coalition efforts in Iraq during 2006, giving rise to growing resentment toward what had been recast as “The Long War.”116 Congress subsequently chartered a bipartisan study group to assess the situation and consider alternative strategies, while the White House and Joint Staff conducted their own policy reviews, the latter commissioned by General Pace in September.117 Meanwhile in Afghanistan, where NATO security forces assumed command of the volatile southern and eastern regions, a burgeoning Taliban resurgence threatened progress already made.

Dr. Robert M. Gates, a former member of the Iraq Study Group, succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defense in December 2006. One month later, drawing from the various studies, the Bush administration presented its “New Way Forward in Iraq,” a strategic realignment to reverse deteriorating conditions in that theater of operations.118 The initiative, which sharply increased the number of US forces involved in counterinsurgency operations, emphasized the security and development portions of the “clear, hold, and build” strategy. It also called for a gradual rise in Army and Marine Corps end strengths by 92,000 personnel over the next five years—adding units and increasing dwell time—which helped alleviate the JCS's concern that a prolonged surge might overburden America’s already strained strategic reserve.119 The first of five surge brigades deployed to Iraq in January 2007. Six months later, General Pace had an opportunity to observe improvements in Iraq’s security situation first hand. After visiting Baghdad and Ramadi he told reporters: “A sea change is taking place in many places here. It’s no longer a matter of pushing al Qaeda out . . . but rather . . . helping the local police and local army . . . get their feet on the ground and set up their systems.”120

During his six years at the Pentagon Pace
witnessed successes in Afghanistan, major changes in the United States’ global defense posture and military procurement systems, and hard-won progress in Iraq that eventually led to victory. Throughout those trying times he remained a constant champion for those he led.

On 1 October 2007 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, became the seventeenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He possessed an extensive operational background and, as the Chief of Naval Operations, was already a serving member of the JCS. Two months earlier General James E. Cartwright, USMC, had replaced Admiral Giambastiani to become the eighth Vice Chairman of the JCS. Previous experience directing the Joint Staff’s Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Section and leading US Strategic Command well prepared Cartwright to oversee the military’s requirements, acquisition, and resourcing efforts, as well as address the nation’s strategic deterrent concerns.121

Admiral Mullen’s first priority was to develop a strategy to protect the nation’s interests in the Middle East, at the time dominated by ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.122 A temporary troop surge had improved security conditions in Iraq by the fall of 2007, enabling the additional US forces to gradually withdraw. Nonetheless, Mullen made clear that the Iraqi security forces still needed American military assistance and that a base force would have to remain in place until they were sufficiently trained and equipped.123

In November 2008, after much debate, the Iraqi Parliament approved a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States that restricted US combat operations and called for an intermediate withdrawal of American forces from major urban centers by June
conflict would more likely end in failure. Admiral Mullen concurred and the President committed 30,000 additional troops to the fight. The escalation, he explained, supported a refined strategy to aid Pakistan in its fight against extremism, deny al-Qaeda a safe haven, reverse Taliban momentum, and build Afghan security forces. He anticipated significant progress in eighteen to twenty-four months, which would in turn allow for a gradual US withdrawal.

By January 2011 Admiral Mullen reported that the Taliban were losing ground and would continue to falter if Coalition and Afghan forces persisted in improving their capability, increasing their presence, and applying greater pressure against the enemy.

This success—as well as the death of Osama bin Laden that spring—convinced President Obama to begin a troop withdrawal, with the intention of removing the surge force during 2012 and transitioning with the Afghan security forces by 2014. Mullen endorsed the plan, believing that current gains could be preserved if the drawdown was executed with care.

Admiral Mullen’s second priority as Chairman was to improve the health of the force by balancing current requirements against future national security threats. The toll taken on US ground forces during the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan particularly worried him, and Mullen questioned US readiness to fight a high-intensity war against a major adversary, such as Iran. Besides repairing or replacing worn out equipment, he proposed increasing the interval between deployments, training units for full-spectrum operations, and addressing the welfare of service members and their families, especially the needs of the combat wounded. Mindful of the costs of such initiatives, he suggested that the country devote additional resources to national security and recommended that the absolute minimum defense budget be pegged at 4 percent of the gross domestic product.

Onset of the recession in 2008 challenged modernization efforts, compelling Admiral Mullen to acknowledge that the federal debt represented “the single biggest threat to national security.” During the
next three years the Chairman and Secretary Gates aggressively trimmed expensive, redundant, or failing programs in order to recapitalize funds for higher priority requirements. As head of the JROC, General Cartwright sought to anticipate future military needs and program their development into the annual defense budget. The proliferation of asymmetrical threats and regional conflicts during an era of declining fiscal resources caused him to recommend a more balanced approach when preparing to counter the nation’s “most likely” and “most dangerous” threats. “We need to be in a lot of places,” Cartwright explained. “We need quantity more than we need exquisite capability.” Despite efforts to avoid directed cuts through greater efficiency, in April 2011 President Obama ordered another $400 billion in reductions over the next twelve years. Admiral Mullen agreed that the Defense Department should contribute to resolving the nation’s deficit crisis and believed that it could responsibly manage a build-down, but he worried that indiscriminate personnel cuts could hollow the military.

During his January 2010 State of the Union Address, President Obama reiterated his pledge to end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” a controversial policy that barred homosexuals from serving openly in the military. A week later Admiral Mullen endorsed the President’s plan before members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Secretary Gates concurred but wanted a study on how best to implement the new policy before Congress repealed the current procedures.

When released in late November, the anticipated Pentagon study concluded that allowing gays to serve openly would present minimal risk to military effectiveness. Senior Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps leaders, however, expressed reservations about lifting the ban during wartime. Regardless, after
being separated into a stand-alone bill, the House and Senate finally passed the measure and President Obama signed the repeal into law on 22 December.\(^{145}\) Seven months later Admiral Mullen, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, and President Obama informed Congress that the military would abandon the existing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that officially ended on 20 September 2011.

Admiral Mullen’s third priority was to balance strategic risk around the globe. His 2011 National Military Strategy envisioned “a ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized more by shifting interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power than by rigid security competition between opposing blocks.”\(^{146}\) In this dynamic international environment, he advocated an interagency approach to foreign policy in which military leaders played a wide range of supporting roles. Chinese military modernization and expansion and North Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation, he believed, presented particularly significant risks to regional stability and open access to the global commons. To mitigate these risks Mullen proposed a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable expeditionary force capable of conducting full-spectrum operations with its international partners.

General Cartwright meanwhile advocated several programs that he had previously overseen while commanding US Strategic Command. Focusing on the increasing importance of information technology, he helped formulate the nation’s first cyber strategy and establish US Cyber Command. He stressed a need to layer the nation’s networks, delineate jurisdiction over each domain, and develop offensive and defensive capabilities to detour a range of adversaries. Cartwright likewise promoted the development of ballistic missile defense systems and extended deterrence capabilities, supported refurbishment of the nation’s existing nuclear arsenal, and helped craft a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, which called for a reduced number of missile launchers and paved the way for an improved verification and monitoring system.

Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright were active military diplomats, encouraging military-to-military relations worldwide. Mullen made numerous visits to Pakistan, engaged the Russian chief of defense to promote START, and met with the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean chiefs to ease tensions in East Asia. Perhaps his greatest diplomatic challenge occurred near the end of his tenure as Chairman, during the unanticipated Arab Spring of 2011, when a wave of popular uprisings confronted authoritarian regimes across the Middle East. He met with senior officials from several Gulf States to encourage tolerance and decry escalating violence. After President Obama decided to support the UN Security Council’s resolution to protect Libyan civilians, Mullen coordinated a US-led effort to establish a no-fly zone and supported subsequent NATO-led strike operations that ultimately resulted in the demise of the Gadafi regime.

On 1 October 2011, General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, became the eighteenth Chairman of the JCS. Prior to that he had led the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and then served briefly as the thirty-seventh Chief of Staff of the US Army. Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, had meanwhile relinquished leadership of US Northern Command to become the ninth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on 4 August.

America had by that time begun to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and was only months away from ending its involvement in Iraq to focus more prominently upon growing concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. Amidst those and other changes occurring worldwide, the new Chairman sensed the approach of a “strategic inflection point,” whereby shifting circumstances would fundamentally alter the nature of America’s presence upon the global scene.\(^{147}\) Consistent with his previous guidance as Army Chief of Staff, he directed the Joint Force to prepare for operating in an increasingly competitive environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and persistent conflict. Concurrent priorities included fulfilling present obligations, renewing
commitments to the profession of arms, and keeping faith with the military family.\footnote{148}

General Dempsey contributed to the Defense Department’s strategic review, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense* (2012).\footnote{149} Crafted as a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, it highlighted the need to recalibrate current capabilities and make selective investments that enabled the force to surge and regenerate capacities at future flashpoints. Partnering would continue to be a central strategy, as America and its allies pooled specialized capabilities and sought innovative—but low-cost and discrete—approaches to shared security interests in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. In *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, the Chairman drew from lessons learned during a decade of war to propose “globally integrated operations” as a means to attain those goals.\footnote{150} By integrating emerging capabilities with “new ways of fighting and partnering,” he envisioned “globally postured forces” that could transcend “domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations” to gracefully “form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements in time and space.”

Congress had in the meantime enacted the Budget Control Act of 2011, which mandated a $487 billion reduction in defense funding over the next nine years. General Dempsey sought a strategic balance between capability and capacity.\footnote{151} The resulting budget proposal planned for a gradual transition to a smaller and more affordable force, although investment in space, cyberspace, long-range precision strike capabilities, and special operation forces would continue.\footnote{152} Additional spending cuts, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and the Chairman warned, would jeopardize their carefully calculated defense strategy. Failure to agree upon a plan to lessen the nation’s budget deficit, however, triggered yet another ten-year, across-the-board, $500 billion reduction in funding.\footnote{153} While the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 partially mitigated the effects of sequestration through fiscal year 2015, the Joint Chiefs felt compelled to solicit Congressional
support for reducing infrastructure, retiring weapons systems, and curtailing budget-draining compensation packages in an effort to recapture funds for readiness and modernization.\textsuperscript{154}

Admiral Winnefeld observed that “the trajectory of the security environment and the ongoing turbulence in defense funding have upset the strategic balance . . . and we need to reset it.”\textsuperscript{155} Like his predecessors, he worked to refine the requirements process. He limited the length of capability documents, accelerated the consideration of alternatives, and restricted which issues ultimately reached the JROC for decision. While firmly regulating attendance at JROC meetings to facilitate deliberation, he included the Under Secretary of Acquisition and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to add perspectives on expense and technology. He emphasized that oversight throughout the requirements, acquisition, and development processes was necessary to enable program adjustments in response to changing circumstances.\textsuperscript{156}

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, which Admiral Winnefeld helped to develop and implement, sought to align the ends, ways, and means of national defense by accepting moderate risk.\textsuperscript{157} It presented an updated strategy organized around three priorities: protect the homeland; enhance global leadership; and project power worldwide. Two related initiatives focused on recalibrating the size and shape of the Joint Force, as well as its supporting infrastructure. The persistent message was that left unchecked, sequestration-driven cuts would involve still greater risk and could jeopardize even the downscaled strategy.\textsuperscript{158} Admiral Winnefeld bluntly told Congress: “We simply won’t have enough modernized ready stuff in our force to get all the jobs done.”\textsuperscript{159}

Popular uprisings in Syria during March 2011—part of the wider Arab Spring movement—had escalated into armed rebellion against the totalitarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad by the time General Dempsey took office. Drawing from his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Chairman warned that American intervention could accelerate the conflict and possibly lead to an unstable state.\textsuperscript{160} Although he and other members of the NSC initially advocated a proposal to arm moderate rebel groups, as the situation deteriorated Dempsey conceded that it had become difficult to identify which ones to support.\textsuperscript{161}

In August 2013, the world learned of deadly chemical attacks near Damascus. While Secretary of State John F. Kerry appealed for military strikes to degrade President Assad’s chemical capability, General Dempsey cautioned that rather than ending the conflict, explicit action would likely lead to deeper involvement and “could inadvertently empower
extremists or unleash the very chemical weapons we seek to control.” He advocated humanitarian assistance, coupled with the training of a moderate opposition force. Syria averted reprisal by agreeing to relinquish its chemical arsenal in an arrangement brokered between the United States and Russia, and sanctioned by the UN.

Emergent crises during 2014 served to amplify the uncertainty of global security. In late February, Ukrainian protestors seeking closer ties with the European Union ousted President Viktor Yanukovych from power. Russia surreptitiously mobilized its military to support separatist movements in southeastern Ukraine, and annexed Crimea following a dubious referendum to secede. General Dempsey underscored the changing security environment in Eastern Europe and shared his concern that rising nationalism could fuel the conflict’s spread. Europe could no longer afford to be complacent, the Chairman declared, and America would likely have to “put forces back into Europe . . . substantial enough to allow us to deter Russian aggression against our NATO allies.” In September, as the United States demonstrated its continued commitment to collective security through Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, NATO approved a Readiness Action Plan that included “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance,” and enhancement of the organization’s Response Force.

When the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized vast territories in Syria and Iraq that summer, General Dempsey supported a strategy to contain, then degrade, and ultimately defeat the former al-Qaeda affiliate. While continuing to stress the need for a whole-of-government approach, he consistently pressed a wary Presidential administration to commit sufficient military resources to achieve that goal—and was prepared to employ
In the 2015 update of The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, General Dempsey observed that the United States had begun to relinquish its comparative military advantage at the same time that the global security environment had become more unpredictable than at any other period during his career. America’s aspirations exceeded its available resources, he said, and unless military funding were increased and regularized the nation would have to reconsider the aims of its security strategy. As Dempsey prepared to retire that fall, bystanders described him as a “reluctant warrior.” He knowingly responded that “a military leader should always understand that of all human endeavors, the one that’s most unpredictable and the most costly is warfare.”

After transferring control of US Transportation Command, General Paul J. Selva, USAF, became the tenth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on 31 July 2015. Two months later, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., thirty-sixth Commandant of the Marine Corps, became the nineteenth Chairman of the JCS on 1 October 2015. He quickly established three priorities: restore joint readiness, improve the joint force’s warfighting capability, and develop leaders adept at handling the demands of the future operating environment.

Conclusion

The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was created in 1949 to expedite the carrying out of JCS responsibilities. The hope in establishing the position had been that a presiding officer, free of service responsibilities, could coordinate JCS activities to minimize service disagreements and enable the corporate body to provide the Secretary of Defense and the President with timely and useful military advice. However, the constraints imposed on the Chairman’s role made it difficult for Chairmen during the first thirty-seven years of the position’s existence to fulfill this expectation. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949
In the Rose Garden of the White House on 5 May 2015, President Barack H. Obama announces the nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, second from right, and General Paul J. Selva, USAF, for nineteenth Chairman and tenth Vice Chairman of the JCS, respectively. Left to right: National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter, and Vice President Joseph R. “Joe” Biden also participate.

The JCS, October 2015. Left to right: General Mark A. Walsh, III, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Robert B. Neller, Commandant, USMC; General Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman; General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chairman; General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff, USA; Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Frank J. Grass, Chief of National Guard Bureau.
made the Chairman the highest-ranking member of
the US Armed Forces yet gave him limited authority.
He was first among equals on the JCS—an additional
member of the corporate body. But, by law, it was the
corporate JCS who served as principal military advis-
ers to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the
NSC and who were charged with preparation of plans,
review of requirements, and formulation of policies
for joint training and coordination of military edu-
cation. The Joint Staff worked for the corporate body, and
the JCS system required a lengthy, time-consuming
effort to achieve consensus among the services before
recommendations could be sent to the Secretary
of Defense.

Before the enactment of the Goldwater-Nich-
ols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
a Chairman’s impact on the setting of military pri-
orities and therefore his influence on national secu-
rity policy derived not so much from his legal
authorities as from the force of his personality, the
nature of his relationships with both his civilian
superiors and his JCS colleagues, and the extent to
which his views and style meshed with those of the
administration he served. During this period the
strength of the chairmanship as an institution
closely paralleled the degree of influence of the
incumbent. Over the years the position gradually
attained increased prominence and the Chairman’s
role expanded; he came to be regarded as the rep-
resentative and spokesman of the Chiefs. Increased
prominence did not, however, necessarily equate
with influence either with the civilian leadership or
within the JCS, nor did the influence attained by
one Chairman automatically transfer to his succes-
sors. Even the strengthening of the position through
legislation and administrative action did not resolve
the inherent contradictions of the Chairman’s insti-
tutional role. The organizational framework within
which he operated restricted his ability to overcome
interservice competition and to forward the timely,
cogent advice needed by civilian leaders.

With the implementation of the Goldwater-Nich-
ols Act, not only did the Chairman become the prin-
cipal military adviser to the President, the Secretary
of Defense, and the NSC, but organizational changes
also strengthened his role within the national secu-
rity policy-making structure. The transformation of
the Joint Staff into the Chairman’s staff and the sub-
sequent enhancement of its quality and expansion of
its capabilities gave the Chairman the organizational
support necessary to function effectively in his new
role. As a result, the timeliness and quality of the
advice he offered the Secretary and the President
improved. The exercise of the Chairman’s new
authorities by the first Chairmen to serve under
Goldwater-Nichols and the gradual extension of the
scope of the Vice Chairman’s activities further
strengthened the chairmanship, giving it an unprec-
edented status as an institution. Nevertheless, despite
his increased authority and the enhanced stature of
his position, the Chairman continued to operate in a
political environment. His influence with his civilian
superiors rested ultimately on his ability to work
effectively with them.
THE CHAIRMEN
Omar Nelson Bradley
16 August 1949–15 August 1953

Omar Bradley was born in the farming village of Clark, Missouri, on 12 February 1893. His parents were poor, his boyhood austere. The US Military Academy appealed to Bradley as a means to an education without financial burden for his family. He received an appointment and graduated in 1915, ranking forty-fourth out of 164. His classmates included Dwight D. Eisenhower, James A. Van Fleet, and fifty-six other future generals from “the class the stars fell on.”

During World War I Bradley served with an infantry regiment which, to his chagrin, never left the United States. Most of his interwar assignments were spent as either student or teacher at military schools. In 1941, while Commandant of the Infantry School, Bradley became the first man in his class to reach the rank of brigadier general. During 1942 to 1943, he successively commanded the 82d and 28th Infantry Divisions.
In March 1943, at General Eisenhower's request, Major General Bradley arrived in North Africa. There he joined II Corps as Deputy Commander under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. Bradley took command of II Corps for the final advance to Tunis and during the thirty-eight-day Sicilian campaign served as a corps commander in Patton's Seventh Army. Based upon Bradley's exceptional qualities as a combat leader and his gift for getting along with the allies, Eisenhower chose him to be Army Group Commander for Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of France. During June and July 1944 Lieutenant General Bradley led the US First Army as it fought through the hedgerows of Normandy. On 1 August, just after the breakout at St. Lo, he took command of the 12th Army Group. When the European war came to an end in May 1945, Bradley (now a full general) commanded forty-three divisions and 1.3 million men, the largest body of American soldiers to serve under a US field commander. His modest demeanor and solicitude for his troops earned him the nickname “the GI’s General.”

With the coming of peace, President Harry S. Truman named General Bradley to be Administrator
of the Bureau of Veterans’ Affairs; he began work in August 1945. Bradley returned to the Army on 7 February 1948, when he succeeded General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff. Three months later, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal asked Bradley to become his “principal military adviser.” Bradley was disinclined to leave his Army post after so short a time, and the Secretary of the Army felt that he could not spare Bradley. But when Eisenhower, whom Forrestal had appointed instead, later declined the newly created position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Bradley accepted.

He became the first Chairman on 16 August 1949. During his tenure, the United States began to create a collective security strategy with its allies. After the outbreak of the Korean War, it began to rebuild its military forces, which had been rapidly reduced at the end of World War II. Bradley played a central role in these efforts.

Upon becoming Chairman, Bradley had to deal immediately with the so-called revolt of the admirals. Navy officers, fearing their service would no have no role in a major war and resenting the cancellation of plans for a supercarrier, assailed the concept of strategic bombing with nuclear weapons. The Air Force’s B-36 bomber became their particular target. General Bradley, who as Chief of Staff had been willing to reduce Army divisions in order to strengthen strategic air power, had no patience with what he saw as Navy parochialism. During congressional hearings, he delivered a much publicized call for service cooperation: “This is no time for ‘fancy Dans’ who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team—whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt in the line—must be all-American.” Under new leadership, the Navy began taking a more conciliatory approach.

The Korean War dominated Bradley’s tenure as Chairman. He wholeheartedly supported President Truman’s decision to resist the North Korean attack and quickly became a key adviser to Truman. During the war’s first weeks, Bradley went frequently to

Lieutenant General Bradley pauses to autograph a GI’s helmet in Germany, 1945.
the White House to brief the President and present the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs.

Despite the Korean War, Bradley saw the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to US security and Western Europe as the Free World’s greatest asset. Consequently, he opposed expansion of the Korean conflict to include China. Such a war, he said, would be “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” He opposed proposals by the US commander in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, for bombing and blockading China. President Truman concurred. When General MacArthur persisted in public criticisms of this policy decision, the Joint Chiefs reluctantly agreed that the President should relieve MacArthur. Truman promptly did so and, at the recommendation of Bradley and the Chiefs, named General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, as the new commander in the Far East.
The war in Korea and the fear of further communist aggression triggered a major rearmament effort. Between June 1950 and December 1952 the armed forces grew from 1.45 to 3.51 million men. General Bradley refereed an interservice debate over the nature of this expansion. Working closely with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, Bradley won JCS approval of a plan that emphasized Air Force expansion.

To deter aggression in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) set about creating an integrated military structure. General Bradley played a key role in establishing this structure. He spent much time negotiating with his British and French counterparts over the organization of NATO’s Atlantic and Mediterranean commands.

Omar Bradley was promoted to the rank of General of the Army on 22 September 1950. He was the only Chairman to attain five-star rank. His tenure as Chairman ended on 15 August 1953, three weeks after the Korean armistice. As a five-star general, however, he did not retire.

After leaving the chairmanship, Bradley joined the Bulova Watch Company, subsequently becoming chairman of the board. In March 1968 he was one of the “wise men” who reviewed Vietnam policy for President Lyndon B. Johnson. In recognition of his long-time service to the nation, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977. Bradley died in New York on 8 April 1981.
### Omar Nelson Bradley

**General of the Army**

#### PROMOTIONS

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#### ASSIGNMENTS

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<td>Instructor, US Military Academy, West Point, NY</td>
<td>1920</td>
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<td>Student, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA</td>
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<td>Infantry Unit Commander, 19th and 27th Infantry Regiments, HI</td>
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<td>National Guard and Reserve Affairs, Hawaiian Department</td>
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<td>Student, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS</td>
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<td>Instructor, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA</td>
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<td>Student, Army War College, Washington, DC</td>
<td>1933</td>
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<td>Instructor, Plans and Training Office, US Military Academy, West Point, NY</td>
<td>1934</td>
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War Department General Staff: Chief, Operations
   Branch, G-1, and Assistant Secretary,
   General Staff, Washington, DC ......................... 1938 ......... 1941
Commandant, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA ........ 1941 ......... 1942
Commanding General, 82d Infantry Division,
   Camp Claiborne, LA ...................................... 1942 ......... 1942
Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division,
   Camp Livingston, LA, and Camp Gordon
   Johnson, FL ................................................. 1942 ......... 1943
Commanding General, II Corps, North
   Africa and Sicily ........................................... 1943 ......... 1943
Commanding General, Field Forces, European
   Theater of Operations ..................................... 1943 ......... 1943
Commanding General, First US Army and
   First US Army Group, later Commanding
   General, Twelfth Army Group,
   European Theater of Operations ......................... 1944 ......... 1945
Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, Veterans
   Administration, Washington, DC ......................... 1945 ......... 1947
Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC ................. 1948 ......... 1949
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ...... 1949 ......... 1953

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS

Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Bronze Star
Arthur William Radford
15 August 1953–15 August 1957

Arthur Radford was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 27 February 1896. After growing up in Illinois and Iowa, he entered the US Naval Academy in 1912. Following graduation in 1916, he served during World War I on the battleship USS South Carolina (BB 1) in the Atlantic Fleet. Radford realized a boyhood dream to fly when he entered Navy flight training in 1920. He earned his wings the following year. For the next twenty years, he alternated among assignments with the fleet, naval air stations, and the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington, rising from lieutenant to captain.

Shortly before the United States entered World War II, Radford became Chief of the Navy’s Aviation Training Division. Here he oversaw the expansion of the training program to meet the greatly increased requirements for Navy pilots during the early stages of the war. Promoted to rear admiral, he commanded a carrier division in the Pacific during 1943. After a brief assignment at the Navy Department, he returned to the Pacific in November 1944 to command another carrier division. For the remainder of the war, he directed carrier attacks against Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Tokyo.
Lieutenant Commander Radford as an Alaskan Aerial Survey pilot.
After a series of staff and command assignments in the immediate postwar period, Radford, now a vice admiral, became Vice Chief of Naval Operations in January 1948. In April 1949, as that tour was ending, the “revolt of the admirals” erupted in Washington. Senior naval officers objected strenuously to the Secretary of Defense’s cancellation of a new “super” carrier. The Navy wanted the new carrier, which could carry larger planes, to establish its role in strategic nuclear warfare. The ensuing controversy led to a congressional investigation, and Admiral Radford was called to testify. He supported the Navy’s position and, in discussing future operations, argued that the threat of an atomic blitz would neither deter nor win a war. In retrospect, Radford’s argument appears ironic, since, as Chairman, he would become a champion of “massive retaliation.”

Upon being promoted to admiral in April 1949, Radford returned to the Pacific as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC). Forces under his command provided air and naval gunfire support to United Nations (UN) forces in the Korean War. Radford’s command also sent US military advisers to assist the French in Indochina in the war against the communist Viet Minh.

Impressed with Radford’s performance as CINCPAC, President Eisenhower appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford assumed his duties on 15 August 1953. During Radford’s tenure, President Eisenhower adopted the “New Look,” a national security policy that emphasized Air Force and Navy forces over Army ground forces and provided for massive atomic retaliation in the event of general war. Radford vigorously supported the new policy and convinced a majority of his reluctant JCS colleagues to accept it as well.

In one controversial initiative related to the “New Look” and force planning, Admiral Radford did not succeed. During 1956 Radford proposed to the Chiefs of
drastic cuts in Army forces as a means of staying within the President’s stringent fiscal ceiling. Units overseas would be reduced to small atomic-armed task forces, and the Marines, with atomic weapons, would have responsibility for limited war operations. Leaked to the press, this proposal aroused so much opposition in Congress and among the NATO allies that it was abandoned.

Under Radford’s leadership, plans drawn up by the JCS resulted in the establishment of a new unified Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954.

The Joint Chiefs also undertook planning with the Canadian military for a North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), which was established in 1957.

While Radford was Chairman, the Joint Chiefs dealt with a series of regional crises around the world, and Admiral Radford was always quick to advocate a strong US response. In late March 1954, when the French faced defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Radford, on his own initiative, convened a JCS meeting to consider a massive air strike in Vietnam. All the other JCS members opposed the idea, and President Eisenhower was
unwilling to intervene unless important political conditions were met; they never were.

In the Formosa Straits crisis in early 1955, when communist China seemed ready to attack the nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu and then assault Formosa, Admiral Radford concluded that the situation could not be stabilized “without the Chinese Communists getting a bloody nose.” He favored a preemptive attack unless they ceased their buildup. If war came, Radford argued before the National Security Council, all the advantages would rest with the United States. President Eisenhower, however, chose a more restrained, flexible approach, and the Chinese communists backed away from military threats.

When President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, triggering the Suez Crisis of 1956, Admiral Radford led a united JCS in recommending military action. Nasser must be stopped, they said, by military intervention if necessary. President Eisenhower disagreed and later took strong action to stop the invasion of Egypt launched by Britain, France, and Israel.

Admiral Radford retired from military service on 15 August 1957 but remained active in national security matters. President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy continued to call on him for advice, and during the next several years he conducted studies for the government. He strongly supported President Eisenhower’s call for reorganizing the Department of Defense in 1958 and urged Congress to strengthen the authority of the Chairman. In retirement, he served as a consultant for the Bankers’ Trust Company and as a director of several other firms. Admiral Radford died at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center on 17 August 1973.
# Arthur William Radford

Admiral, USN

## Promotions

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<td>Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet</td>
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<td>Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet (additional duty commanding Alaskan Aerial Survey Detachment)</td>
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Navigation Officer, USS Wright .......................... 1935 .......... 1936
Staff, Aircraft, Battle Force ............................... 1936 .......... 1937
Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Seattle, WA ........................................ 1937 .......... 1940
Executive Officer, USS Yorktown .......................... 1940 .......... 1941
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, DC ............... 1941 .......... 1941
Tenth Naval District (establishment Naval Air Station, Trinidad, BWI, and duty as Commanding Officer) .......................... 1941 .......... 1941
Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, DC ................................... 1941 .......... 1943
Carrier Division TWO ................................................. 1943 .......... 1943
Commander, Carrier Division ELEVEN .................. 1943 .......... 1943
Chief of Staff and Aide, Aircraft, Pacific Fleet ........................................ 1943 .......... 1944
Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, Navy Department (additional duty alternate member Special Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Reorganization of National Defense) .................. 1944 .......... 1944
Commander, Carrier Division SIX, US Pacific Fleet ........................................ 1944 .......... 1945
Commanding Officer, Fleet Air, Seattle, WA .................. 1945 .......... 1945
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) .................. 1946 .......... 1947
Commander, Second Task Fleet .......................... 1947 .......... 1947
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, DC .................. 1948 .......... 1949
Commander in Chief, Pacific and High Commissioner, Trust Territory of Pacific Islands .................. 1949 .......... 1953
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .......................... 1953 .......... 1957

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 gold stars)
Legion of Merit (with gold star)

Naval Aviator
Nathan Farragut Twining
15 August 1957–30 September 1960

Nathan Twining was born in Monroe, Wisconsin, on 11 October 1897. His family later moved to Oregon, where he joined the National Guard in 1916 and saw service along the Mexican border. Rising to first sergeant in the Guard, Twining won appointment to the US Military Academy in 1917. As the result of an accelerated wartime program, he graduated just over a year later in November 1918.

After initial infantry assignments, Twining attended flight school and transferred to the Army Air Service in 1926. During the next several years, he was a flying instructor and then served with pursuit and attack groups stationed around the country and in Hawaii and with the Army Mail Service. After he completed the Air Corps Tactical School and the Army Command and General Staff School, he was Air Corps Technical Supervisor at the San Antonio Air Depot. Staff assignments with the Office of the Chief of the Army Air Corps in the years 1940–1942 rounded out his experience and brought promotion from major to brigadier general.

General Nathan F. Twining
United States Air Force
General Twining began his World War II combat experience in July 1942 as Chief of Staff of the US Army Air Forces in the South Pacific area. In January 1943 he assumed command of the Thirteenth Air Force and in February was promoted to major general. While flying a B-17, Twining crash-landed in the Coral Sea. He and his crew floated in rubber life rafts in shark-infested waters for six days and five nights before being rescued. In July 1943 he became Commander of Aircraft, Solomon Islands, one of the first combined air commands in US history, with tactical control of all Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied Air Forces in the South Pacific.

In late 1943 Twining was transferred to the Mediterranean theater, where he assumed command of the Fifteenth Air Force and the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Forces. His Allied command not only supported operations in Italy and southern France but also conducted bombing raids against Germany, Austria, and Romania. With the surrender of Germany, Twining returned to the Pacific. Now a lieutenant general, he commanded the Twentieth Air Force. Forces under his command launched B-29 attacks against the Japanese home islands, and planes under his command dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

After World War II, Twining commanded the Air Materiel Command at Wright Field in Ohio. With the creation of the US Air Force in 1947, he took command of the newly established Alaskan Command. In 1950 he joined the Air Staff. After serving briefly as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, he received his fourth star and assumed duties as Vice Chief of Staff.

Brigadier General Twining, third from right, following his rescue after six days and five nights adrift in a rubber raft in the Coral Sea, February 1943.
In 1953 General Twining became Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In that position, he worked diligently for the development of aircraft, missiles, and weapons for his service. In 1956 President Dwight Eisenhower selected him to lead a delegation of technical experts invited to inspect Soviet air facilities. This was the first visit by US officers to the Soviet Union since World War II.

General Twining became the third Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1957. Just ten days after he took office, the Soviet Union announced the successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile and, less than two months later, placed the first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik, in orbit. It appeared that the Soviet Union had or would soon have the capability to launch missile attacks against the United States. General Twining endorsed steps to strengthen and protect strategic retaliatory forces but saw no reason for the large accelerated buildup favored by the Air Force. Twining was confident that the Strategic Air Command was superior to its Soviet counterpart. He opposed any major change in US strategy and, like his predecessor Admiral Arthur Radford, remained a firm advocate of the Eisenhower policy of main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons.

Three crises occurred while Twining was Chairman. The first one began on 14 July 1958, when a coup toppled the pro-Western government in Iraq. The president of neighboring Lebanon, concerned about maintaining his regime, appealed for US assistance. Radical Arab nationalism, encouraged by the Soviet Union, appeared to threaten Western interests. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs, Twining told President Eisenhower that he saw “no alternative but to go in.”
The President promptly decided to act. Marines began landing at Beirut on 15 July, followed by Army troops. With the arrival of approximately 14,000 US personnel, enough stability existed for Lebanese factions to work out a political compromise and for US forces to withdraw by the end of October.

Another crisis soon followed in the Far East when the Chinese communists began bombardment of the nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the Chinese mainland. With the eruption of this crisis during August 1958, General Twining and the Chiefs quickly agreed that the United States should not permit the loss of the islands to the communists. They recommended the use of whatever force was necessary, including atomic weapons. General Twining forcefully presented their recommendations to the President. Eisenhower agreed that a show of force was needed but took great care to keep his military options open. He ordered the Seventh Fleet, plus two carriers from the Mediterranean, to the Formosa Strait and provided convoy protection in international waters for Chinese-nationalist supply ships bound for the offshore islands. The show of force, combined with various political initiatives, worked. The bombardment ceased and the crisis passed.

The third crisis came in November 1958, when the Soviet Union announced its intention to transfer its access and occupation functions in East Germany to the East German government unless West Berlin became a demilitarized “free city” within six months. President Eisenhower responded with a firm but low-key approach. Twining told the President that the JCS feared that the United States would “go half way” in meeting Soviet provocations and “then quit.” They believed that the United States had to be ready to risk general war. Some Service Chiefs favored a major mobilization, but Twining told the President that he saw no need to go that far. Eisenhower, however, held resolutely to his low-key approach, and the Soviets backed away from their deadline.

During 1959 and 1960 General Twining played a central role in working out new procedures for coordinating nuclear strike plans. The advent of land-based missiles and Polaris submarines to complement the bomber fleet created major complications in target assignments, command, and control. Twining collaborated with Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., to create the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and the Single Integrated Operational Plan, arrangements which lasted beyond the Cold War.

Following major surgery, General Twining elected to retire on 30 September 1960, midway through his second term, before a new administration took office. During the next decade he worked as vice chairman of the publishing firm Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. In 1966 the firm published Twining’s views on the state of national defense under the title *Neither Liberty nor Safety*. General Twining died on 29 March 1982 at Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.
General Twining makes a statement to the press before his trip to the Soviet Union, July 1956.
### Promotions

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<td>Tour of Observation, France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany</td>
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<td>Student, Basic Course, Infantry School; then Commanding Officer, Company C and later B, 29th Infantry, Camp Benning, GA</td>
<td>1919 1922</td>
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<td>Aide-de-Camp to BG B. A. Poore, Camp Travis, TX; Fort Logan, CO; and later Fort Sam Houston, TX</td>
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<td>Student, Air Service Primary; later Advanced Flying School, Brooks and Kelly Fields, TX</td>
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<td>Instructor, Air Corps Primary Flying School, Brooks Field, TX, and later March Field, CA</td>
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<td>Adjutant and Commanding Officer, 18th Pursuit Group, and later Commanding Officer, 26th Attack Squadron, Schofield Barracks, HI</td>
<td>1930 1932</td>
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<td>Pilot and Operations Officer, 8th Attack Squadron; then Pilot and Commanding Officer, 90th Attack Squadron; then Pilot and Mess Officer, 60th Services Squadron, Fort Crockett, TX</td>
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Engineering Officer, Central Zone, Chicago, IL ............ 1934 .......... 1934
Post and Group Adjutant and later Commanding Officer,
3d Attack Group, 3d Attack Wing, Headquarters
Detachment; then Assistant Operations Officer,
3d Wing, Barksdale Field, LA ............................ 1934 .......... 1935
Student, Air Corps Tactical School,
Maxwell Field, AL ................................. 1935 .......... 1936
Student, Command and General Staff School,
Fort Leavenworth, KS ............................... 1936 .......... 1937
Air Corps Technical Supervisor,
San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field, TX ............. 1937 .......... 1940
Assistant Chief and later Chief, Technical
Inspection Section, Office, Chief of Air Corps;
then Assistant Executive Officer, Chief of Staff
of the Army Air Force, Washington, DC ........................ 1940 .......... 1942
Chief of Staff, US Army Air Forces;
then Commanding General, Thirteenth Air Force,
South Pacific ................................. 1942 .......... 1943
Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force,
Mediterranean Theater ............................ 1943 .......... 1945
Temporary Duty with Headquarters,
Army Air Force (Liaison and Planning,
Headquarters, US Army Strategic Air Force),
Washington, DC ........................................ 1945 .......... 1945
Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Pacific 1945 .......... 1945
Commanding General, Air Materiel Command,
Wright Field, OH ................................. 1945 .......... 1947
Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command,
Fort Richardson, AK .................................. 1947 .......... 1950
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel); then Vice
Chief of Staff; then temporarily assumed duties
Chief of Staff; then resumed duties as Vice Chief
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 1957 .......... 1960
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Army Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star
Air Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Commendation Ribbon

Command Pilot
Combat Observer
Aircraft Observer
Lyman Louis Lemnitzer was born on 29 August 1899 in Honesdale, a small town in northeastern Pennsylvania. At his older brother’s urging, he entered the US Military Academy, graduating in 1920. Over the next twenty years he served with coast artillery units, taught at West Point and the Coast Artillery School, and attended the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College.

In 1941, as the Army began to expand, Major Lemnitzer was transferred from an antiaircraft artillery brigade at Camp Stewart, Georgia, to the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. There and in subsequent assignments with General Headquarters, US Army, and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, he participated in the planning for the mobilization and training of the rapidly expanding wartime Army and for the projected Allied landings in North Africa. Promotions came rapidly, and by June 1942 Lemnitzer was a brigadier general.
Two months later he went to England as Commanding General of the 34th Anti aircraft Artillery Brigade. Because of his familiarity with the plans for the upcoming North African operation, he was soon assigned to General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Allied Force Headquarters as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, responsible for final preparations for Operation TORCH, the North African invasion. In October 1942 Lemnitzer accompanied General Mark W. Clark as second in command on a secret submarine mission to Algeria to meet with friendly French to enlist their assistance with the invasion. Lemnitzer won the Legion of Merit for his participation in this mission.

In January 1943 Lemnitzer became Deputy Chief of Staff to Clark in Morocco, where he worked to organize the US Fifth Army. After resuming active command of his brigade, he led it through the Tunisian campaign and the early landing phases of the Sicily campaign.

Thereafter, Lemnitzer served as Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff to British General (later Field Marshal) Sir Harold Alexander, who was Commander in Chief, 15th Army Group, and later Supreme
Allied Commander, Mediterranean. Lemnitzer, who was promoted to major general in 1944, also served as Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the (US) Mediterranean Theater of Operations. In March 1945 he travelled incognito to Switzerland, where he met with German representatives and began discussions that resulted in the unconditional surrender of German forces in Italy and southern Austria.

After the war Lemnitzer was the senior Army member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS. He then served for two years as Deputy Commandant of the National War College. Concurrently, he headed the US delegation to the meetings of the Military Committee of the Five Brussels Pact Powers in London, which led to the establishment of the NATO. Late in 1949 Lemnitzer became the first Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was instrumental in setting up the US Military Assistance Program.

From December 1951 until July 1952, Lemnitzer commanded the 7th Infantry Division, leading it in the Korean War battles of Heartbreak Ridge and the Punch Bowl. Promoted to lieutenant general in August 1952, he became the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. In 1955 he assumed command of US Army Forces, Far East, and the Eighth US Army. Shortly thereafter, having received his fourth star, he became Commander in Chief of the United Nations and Far East Command and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. In July 1957 he became Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and two years later its Chief of Staff. Appointed by President Eisenhower, Lemnitzer became the fourth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1960.

Soon after John F. Kennedy became President in 1961, the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation caused him to question the judgment of the JCS. A brigade of anticommunist exiles, trained and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), landed in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs but was quickly overwhelmed by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro’s forces. President Kennedy believed that the Joint Chiefs had served him poorly by failing to review the CIA’s plan thoroughly and express their own reservations forthrightly. The President directed that, henceforth, the Joint Chiefs must be “more than military men” and supply “dynamic and imaginative leadership” in Cold War operations.

General Lemnitzer considered the President’s criticisms unfair. The Chiefs, he maintained, had never awarded the plan their “approval”; they simply had rendered an “appraisal” that, given surprise plus air supremacy, the brigade could establish itself ashore. Yet, without consulting the Joint Chiefs, President Kennedy had changed the landing site and cancelled a strike by the exiles’ aircraft. Nevertheless, this military setback early in the Kennedy presidency damaged Lemnitzer’s relationship with the new President.

In the other crises which came in quick succession in 1961, General Lemnitzer’s recommendations for forceful responses met with mixed success. Friendly regimes in Southeast Asia were foundering. In Laos, by late April the communist Pathet Lao had advanced so rapidly that US-backed forces there seemed about to disintegrate. Lemnitzer urged intervention by Southeast Asia Treaty Organization forces, not by the United States alone. Lemnitzer also favored a deployment of US combat forces to bolster the government of South Vietnam, which was struggling with a growing communist insurgency. President Kennedy decided against military intervention in Laos and, instead of deploying combat forces to South Vietnam, gradually increased the number of American advisers there.

When the Soviet Union threatened to end the Western powers’ access rights to Berlin, General Lemnitzer favored a major expansion of conventional forces to demonstrate US determination and allow a wide range of responses. The President agreed to an expansion but on a smaller scale. On 13 August 1961, when the communists began building a wall around West Berlin, the administration was so taken by surprise that Lemnitzer thought “everyone appeared to be hopeless, helpless, and harmless.” He proposed that a 1,600-man battle group be sent down the Helmstedt-to-Berlin autobahn. Many of the President’s civilian advisers assailed the proposal as needlessly provocative. President Kennedy, however,
ruled in Lemnitzer’s favor; the battle group reached Berlin without trouble. During autumn, as the overall US buildup proceeded, the Soviets backed away from a confrontation over Berlin.

When Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed putting the combat-ready forces of the US Strategic Army Corps and the Air Force Tactical Air Command under a unified commander, the Chiefs were divided in their response. Lemnitzer, however, supported the McNamara initiative, and in 1961 the US Strike Command was created.

In response to Secretary McNamara’s introduction of a new planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS), General Lemnitzer in June 1962 established his own Special Studies Group to conduct analyses for the Joint Chiefs. This group played an increasingly important role in defining JCS positions.

There was a basic difference between Lemnitzer and the President over how best to respond to the anticipated increase in communist-sponsored “wars of national liberation.” Kennedy had great
confidence in the efficacy of special forces and other counterinsurgency capabilities. Lemnitzer believed that, historically, regular forces had played a key role in defeating insurgencies. Believing that Lemnitzer was not sufficiently innovative to pursue the type of warfare most appropriate for the Third World, Kennedy did not appoint Lemnitzer to a second term as Chairman. Instead, the President nominated General Lemnitzer to the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), where regular forces still played a paramount role.

General Lemnitzer’s tenure as Chairman ended on 30 September 1962. He became Commander in Chief of the US European Command on 1 November 1962 and SACEUR on 1 January 1963. He served as SACEUR until his retirement on 1 July 1969.

In retirement, Lemnitzer served in 1975 on the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States and from 1976 to 1978 on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 1987 President Ronald Reagan presented him the Medal of Freedom. General Lemnitzer died on 12 November 1988 in Washington, DC.
Lyman Louis Lemnitzer  
General, USA

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Office of Assistant G-3, and then Assistant G-3,
War Plans Division, War Department
General Staff, Washington, DC ........................ 1941 .......... 1942

Chief of Plans Division, Army Ground Forces,
Washington, DC ........................................ 1942 .......... 1942

Commanding General, 34th Antiaircraft Artillery
Brigade, Norfolk, VA, and England
(European Theater of Operations) .................... 1942 .......... 1942

Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, Allied Force Headquarters (European
Theater of Operations: England and North
Africa), and Commanding General,
34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade ..................... 1942 .......... 1943

Deputy Chief of Staff, Fifth US Army; Commanding
General, 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade
(North Africa), and Antiaircraft Artillery
Commander, Seventh Army (North Africa
and Sicily) ............................................. 1943 .......... 1944

Deputy Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group
(later Allied Armies in Italy), and later Deputy
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean ........................................ 1944 .......... 1945

Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Headquarters (Italy)
and Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of
Operations, US Army ................................. 1945 .......... 1945

Army Member of Joint Strategic Survey Committee,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .............. 1945 .......... 1947

Deputy Commandant, National War College,
Washington, DC ...................................... 1947 .......... 1949

Director of Military Assistance, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC .............. 1949 .......... 1950

Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division,
Fort Campbell, KY .................................... 1950 .......... 1951

Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division,
Far East Command, Korea ............................ 1951 .......... 1952

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research,
Office, Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC .... 1952 .......... 1955

Commanding General, Army Forces,
Far East and Eighth Army ............................. 1955 .......... 1955

Commander in Chief, Far East and United
Nations Command ................................... 1955 .......... 1957
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ....... 1960 .......... 1962

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Silver Star
Legion of Merit (Degree of Officer)
Legion of Merit

Parachutist
Maxwell Davenport Taylor
1 October 1962–1 July 1964

Maxwell Taylor was born on 26 August 1901 in the small Missouri town of Keytesville, near Kansas City. After attending Northeast High School and Kansas City Junior College, he entered the US Military Academy, graduating fourth in his class in 1922.

Commissioned as an Army engineer, Taylor transferred in 1926 to the field artillery and served one year with the 10th Field Artillery. Thereafter, most of his assignments before World War II made use of his fluency in foreign languages. He taught French and Spanish at West Point. Then in the 1930s he was attached to the US Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, and served as Assistant Military Attaché in Peking, China. In June 1940 Taylor was sent on a special hemispheric defense mission to Latin America. In December 1940 he returned to an artillery assignment as Commander of the 12th Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
When the United States entered World War II, Major Taylor was serving in the Office of the Secretary of the War Department General Staff. Promoted to colonel in June 1942, he was assigned as Chief of Staff to Brigadier General Matthew B. Ridgway at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. Taylor helped Ridgway transform the 82d Infantry Division into the Army’s first airborne division.

Following promotion to brigadier general in December 1942, Taylor took command of the 82d Division Artillery, which saw combat in Sicily and Italy from July 1943 through early 1944. On 7 September 1943 he participated in a daring secret mission behind enemy lines to Rome just twenty-four hours before the scheduled invasion of Italy. His judgment that the risks of an airborne landing near Rome were too great resulted in cancellation of the planned air drop. In March 1944 Taylor assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division. He was promoted to major general in June. Taylor parachuted with the
division into Normandy on D-Day and commanded it during the airborne invasion of Holland and in the Ardennes and Central European campaigns.

In September 1945 Major General Taylor became the Superintendent of West Point. After four years at the Academy, he filled successive assignments as Chief of Staff of the European Command; the first US commander in Berlin; and, on the Army Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and, after promotion to lieutenant general in August 1951, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

On 11 February 1953 Lieutenant General Taylor assumed command of the Eighth US Army. Under his command, the Eighth Army engaged in the Korean War’s last round of bitter fighting. Taylor received his fourth star on 23 June 1953. After the 27 July 1953 armistice, he presided over several massive exchanges of prisoners, helped expand the Republic of Korea’s army, and administered the US military assistance program for the Republic of Korea. In November 1954 he assumed command of all US ground forces in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa and, in April 1955, of the US Far East Command and the United Nations Command in Korea.

Appointed Chief of Staff of the Army on 30 June 1955, Taylor served in that position for four years. During his tenure he advocated less reliance on the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack and more dependence on flexible response. Taylor’s fight against cutbacks in Army strength put him at odds with his old commander, President Dwight Eisenhower. To make the best use of reduced forces, Taylor decided to substitute firepower for manpower. Under his supervision, the Army replaced the old triangular organization of the infantry division with three regiments with a “pentomic” organization of five small, self-contained battle groups able to disperse or concentrate rapidly on the atomic battlefield and capitalize on the US advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. While Taylor was Chief of Staff, the Army also enforced court-ordered school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 and, together with the US Marines, protected the government of Lebanon during 1958.

After retiring from active duty in July 1959, General Taylor criticized US strategic planning and joint organization in The Uncertain Trumpet, published in 1960. This book influenced President John F. Kennedy’s decision to adopt the strategy of flexible response. Taylor then pursued a civilian career, first as chairman of the board of the Mexican Light and Power Company and later as president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York.

In 1961, at President Kennedy’s request, General Taylor returned to public service. In April the President asked him to lead a group to investigate the Bay of Pigs debacle, which had badly shaken the President’s confidence in the JCS. Kennedy then recalled Taylor to active duty as his Military Representative at the White House. It was in this capacity that General Taylor first became involved in the expanding US military effort in Southeast Asia. In late 1961, after visiting Saigon, Taylor recommended sending 5,000 to 8,000 US support troops to help South Vietnam resist the growing Viet Cong insurgency.

Impressed with Taylor’s advice and ability, President Kennedy appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1962. Just two weeks after Taylor became Chairman, the United States obtained the first definite evidence that the Soviet Union was secretly establishing missile sites and developing an offensive nuclear capability in Cuba. General Taylor was a member of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, the small group of officials that the President summoned to advise him on a daily basis during the Cuban missile crisis. Speaking on behalf of the JCS, Taylor recommended air strikes against Cuba, naval quarantine of the island, and preparation for an invasion. President Kennedy on 22 October directed a naval quarantine of Cuba, alerted a force of some 250,000 men for a possible invasion, and called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles, but he reserved air strikes as a last resort. The Soviet Union removed the missiles in mid-November, and the crisis passed.

On arms control, General Taylor reversed his longstanding opposition to a nuclear test ban and convinced the Chiefs to do likewise. They had
opposed such a treaty as an invitation for the Soviet Union to carry on testing secretly in order to achieve nuclear supremacy. During August 1963, in what Taylor later described as his greatest “diplomatic” triumph, he persuaded his colleagues that a limited test ban was compatible with national security. Following endorsement by the Joint Chiefs, the Senate approved the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union on 24 September 1963.

While General Taylor was Chairman, the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam increasingly occupied the attention of the JCS. A coup in Saigon, resulting in the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in early November 1963, unleashed further political instability in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese patrons exploited the turmoil by intensifying attacks in the countryside and against US military advisers in South Vietnam. In March 1964 the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, directed the Chiefs to draw up plans for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. Following trips to Saigon in the spring of 1964, General Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara urged continued support of the South Vietnamese
counterinsurgency effort, short of US ground combat involvement. They did recommend planning for air strikes and possible commando raids against North Vietnam, a course that was not followed until after Taylor’s retirement.

On 1 July 1964 President Johnson named Taylor the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, and General Taylor retired from military service for a second time. In Saigon, Ambassador Taylor witnessed both the introduction of US ground combat troops into South Vietnam and the launching of a US air campaign against North Vietnam, actions that had been actively considered while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After resigning as ambassador in mid-1965, Taylor served on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and as a special adviser to President Johnson. He was president of the Institute for Defense Analyses from 1966 to 1969. Throughout his retirement General Taylor wrote and lectured widely on defense and national security matters. His major works include Responsibility and Response (1967), Swords and Plowshares (1972), Changing Dynamics of National Security (1974), and Precarious Security (1976). General Taylor died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center on 19 April 1987.
Maxwell Davenport Taylor  
General, USA

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<td>Student of Japanese language, US Embassy, Tokyo, Japan; Assistant Military Attaché, Peking, China (1937)</td>
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<td>Member, War Plans Division, on Hemisphere Defense Mission to Latin America</td>
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<td>Commander, 12th Artillery Battalion, Fort Sam Houston, TX</td>
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Chief of Staff, 82d Airborne Division, Camp Claiborne, LA; then Division Artillery Commander, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC ................ 1942 ........... 1943
Division Artillery Commander, 82d Airborne
Division, Sicily and Italy ............................ 1943 ........... 1944
Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division,
Normandy, Western and Central Europe ............ 1944 ........... 1945
Superintendent, US Military Academy,
West Point, NY .................................... 1945 ........... 1949
Chief of Staff, European Command,
Heidelberg, Germany ............................... 1949 ........... 1949
US Commander, Berlin ................................ 1949 ........... 1951
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and Deputy Chief of
Staff, Operations and Administration,
Department of the Army, Washington, DC ......... 1951 ........... 1953
Commanding General, Eighth Army, Korea,
Army Forces, Far East .............................. 1953 ........... 1954
Commanding General, US Army Forces,
Far East, and Eighth US Army,
Far East Command .................................. 1954 ........... 1955
Commander in Chief, Far East Command ................ 1955 ........... 1955
Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC .......... 1955 ........... 1959
Retired from active service, 30 June 1959
Recalled to active duty, 1 July 1961
Military Representative to the President,
Washington, DC ...................................... 1961 ........... 1962
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .... 1962 ........... 1964

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Distinguished Service Cross
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Silver Star (with oak leaf cluster)
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Purple Heart

Parachutist
Earle Gilmore Wheeler
3 July 1964–2 July 1970

Earle Wheeler was born in Washington, DC, on 13 January 1908. After attending Eastern High School, he joined the DC National Guard at the age of sixteen and rose to the rank of sergeant. He then entered the US Military Academy in 1928. After graduating in 1932, Wheeler spent the next twelve years as an infantry officer, serving from company to division level. He also taught mathematics at West Point and graduated from the Command and General Staff College. In 1942 he commanded an infantry battalion.

During World War II Wheeler rose to colonel. As Chief of Staff of the 63d Infantry Division, he went overseas with the division in December 1944. Wheeler participated in campaigns that halted the German drive in Alsace-Lorraine, breached the Siegfried Line, seized Heidelberg, and crossed the Danube. He was selected to lead an assault regiment against Hitler’s mountain fortress in the Bavarian Alps but missed his opportunity for combat command when Germany surrendered as the operation was about to begin.
After the war Wheeler served in a variety of command and staff assignments. He commanded the 351st Infantry Regiment in Italy in 1951 and 1952. He was then assigned to Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy, first as Readiness Officer and then as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. On his return to the United States in 1955, Wheeler joined the Army Staff as Director of Plans in the Office of the Operations Deputy. He was promoted to major general in December 1955 and in 1957 became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. While serving in that position, he was chosen to head a joint committee to study ways to make interservice planning and decision making more effective.

From 1958 until 1960 Wheeler commanded the 2d Armored Division and III Corps in Texas. Promoted to lieutenant general, Wheeler returned to the Pentagon in 1960 as Director of the Joint Staff. In March 1962 the Army promoted him to general and he was assigned as Deputy Commander in Chief of the European Command.

After only seven months Wheeler returned to Washington in October 1962 as Chief of Staff of the Army. In addition to developing the Army’s air assault division and improving the overseas reinforcement system, he helped persuade the other Service Chiefs to support the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union. During Wheeler’s twenty-one
months in office, Army troops were deployed for possible use during both the Cuban missile crisis and civil rights disturbances in Mississippi and Alabama. Following a visit to South Vietnam in late 1962, Wheeler argued for augmenting US support troops and advisers to help the Saigon government deal more effectively with the Viet Cong insurgency.

General Wheeler became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 July 1964. During the next four years he was a regular attendee at President Lyndon Johnson’s Tuesday luncheons with senior policy advisers and at other high-level national security conferences. Wheeler’s influence, however, was overshadowed by that of Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara. As Chairman, General Wheeler worked with marked success to eliminate dissents or “splits” in JCS recommendations, which, he believed, only invited interference by McNamara. But Wheeler’s approach did not succeed. Unanimity did not translate into greater JCS influence, and McNamara determined military policies to a degree that none of his predecessors had approached.

The Vietnam War consumed much of Wheeler’s time and energy during the six years he served as Chairman. Initially, Wheeler and the Chiefs believed that US air power—without ground troops or the risk of a land war with China—could assist South Vietnam in defeating communist aggression. Throughout late 1964 and early 1965, Wheeler presented the President and his civilian advisers JCS recommendations for retaliatory air strikes and then for a sustained air campaign against North Vietnam. In February 1965 President Johnson approved a bombing campaign, though not on the scale recommended by the Chiefs. By the time the air operations got under way the following month, the situation in South Vietnam had worsened. Wheeler and his JCS colleagues no longer thought an air campaign alone would suffice and recommended the commitment of ground forces. Although Johnson approved ground force deployments, they were not of the magnitude preferred by the Chiefs.

From 1965 through early 1968, Wheeler led the Chiefs in recommending an expanded air campaign against North Vietnam and increased deployment of ground troops to South Vietnam. Johnson listened carefully to Wheeler and approved gradually expanded bombing and larger force deployments, but always at slower and smaller rates than those advocated by the Chiefs. Such “gradualism,” Wheeler and his colleagues argued, failed to punish the enemy sufficiently to force him to end the war in Vietnam.

The Tet offensive that began on 30 January 1968 marked a turning point in Wheeler’s and the Joint Chiefs’ influence on the conduct of the war. Although the offensive was costly for the enemy, it proved a psychological victory. The magnitude of the surprise attack greatly increased opposition to the war in the United States. As a consequence, President Johnson increasingly disregarded JCS advice and proceeded to limit the bombing of North Vietnam, place a hold on further troop increases in South Vietnam, and call for negotiations to end the fighting. Wheeler continued to attend all high-level White House meetings on Vietnam, but his recommendations and advice on the war had little impact. In July 1968, however, Johnson sought and received congressional approval to extend Wheeler’s chairmanship for an additional year.

Though preoccupied with the war, President Johnson planned to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for strategic arms limitations. In July 1968 Wheeler established the position of Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations. Toward the end of General Wheeler’s tenure as Chairman, President Richard M. Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, authorized a support staff for the position, and this office became the focal point for military support to the US delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

In 1969 President Nixon secured another year’s extension of Wheeler’s tenure as Chairman. Determined to end US involvement in the war, Nixon adopted a policy of Vietnamization, the gradual withdrawal of US forces and buildup of South Vietnamese combat capabilities, while also negotiating with the North Vietnamese. Political necessity compelled larger and faster US withdrawals than Wheeler and his colleagues thought prudent.

General Wheeler retired on 2 July 1970 after an unprecedented six years in office. Those who knew him best detected his great frustration over his failure to win civilian approval of the strategy that he believed would win the war in Vietnam. The stress of these six years led to several heart attacks that greatly weakened Wheeler’s health. He died on 18 December 1975 in Frederick, Maryland.
General Wheeler and his family with President Richard M. Nixon following a ceremony at the White House where Wheeler received the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, 9 July 1970.
Earle Gilmore Wheeler  
General, USA

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### ASSIGNMENTS

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<td>Chief of Staff, 63d Infantry Division, European Theater of Operations</td>
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Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters,
Western Base Section, France ........................ 1946 .......... 1947
G-3, Headquarters, US Constabulary,
Heidelberg, Germany ................................. 1947 .......... 1949
Student, National War College, Fort McNair,
Washington, DC .................................. 1949 .......... 1950
Member, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Washington, DC ............................ 1950 .......... 1951
Commanding Officer, 351st Infantry Regiment,
Trieste, Italy; then Deputy Commanding General,
US Troops, Trieste .................................. 1951 .......... 1952
Readiness Officer, then Assistant Chief of Staff for
Plans and Operations, Allied Forces,
Southern Europe (NATO), Naples, Italy ............. 1952 .......... 1955
Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Operations, US Army,
Washington, DC .................................... 1955 .......... 1957
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Commanding General, 2d Armored Division,
Fort Hood, TX ...................................... 1958 .......... 1959
Commanding General, III Corps and 2d Armored
Division, Fort Hood, TX ............................. 1959 .......... 1960
Director, Joint Staff, Washington, DC .............. 1960 .......... 1962
Deputy Commander in Chief, US European
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 1964 .......... 1970

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star (with oak leaf cluster)
Army Commendation Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Thomas Hinman Moorer
2 July 1970–1 July 1974

Thomas Moorer was born in Mt. Willing, Alabama, on 9 February 1912. After he graduated as valedictorian from Cloverdale High School in nearby Montgomery in 1927, his interest in technology and a “natural attraction” to military service led Moorer to enter the US Naval Academy. He graduated in 1933. After completing training as an aviator at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in 1936, he flew with fighter squadrons based on the carriers USS Langley (CV 1), USS Lexington (CV 16), and USS Enterprise (CV 6).

Lieutenant Moorer was serving with a patrol squadron at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, when the Japanese attacked in December 1941. His unit subsequently participated in the Dutch East Indies campaign of early 1942, during which he flew numerous combat missions. He received a Purple Heart after being shot down and wounded off the coast of Australia in February 1942 and then surviving an attack on the rescue ship, which was sunk the same day. Three months later he braved Japanese air superiority to fly supplies into and evacuate wounded out of the island of Timor. For this action, he received the Distinguished Flying Cross for valor. He was promoted to lieutenant commander in October 1942.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
United States Navy
In 1943 and 1944 Moorer commanded Bombing Squadron 132, which conducted antisubmarine warfare against the Germans off the coasts of Florida, Cuba, and North Africa. He was promoted to commander in April 1944, soon after becoming the gunnery and tactical officer on the staff of the Air Commander of the Atlantic Fleet.

After the war Moorer was assigned to the Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan. Before his promotion to captain in January 1952, his assignments included serving as Project Officer for the development of the Sidewinder missile and in air operations at sea. After graduating from the Naval War College in 1953, he served on the staff of the Air Commander of the Atlantic Fleet and then as Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. In 1956 he assumed command of his first ship, the USS Salisbury Sound (AV 13), a seaplane tender that sailed extensively in the Far East.

Captain Moorer joined the Navy Staff as a strategic planner in 1957. In 1958 he became Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for War Gaming Matters and was
promoted to rear admiral. After a year at sea in command of Carrier Division SIX, Moorer returned to the Navy Staff in 1960 to direct the Long Range Objectives Group. In 1962 he was promoted to vice admiral and assumed command of the Seventh Fleet.

In June 1964 Moorer received his fourth star and became Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two months after he assumed command, the United States became involved in a war in Vietnam. In August the destroyer USS Maddox (DD 731) was attacked while on patrol in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of Vietnam, and Pacific Fleet planes took part in a retaliatory strike against North Vietnam. Admiral Moorer left the Pacific Fleet on 30 March 1965, just two weeks after its air forces joined in ROLLING THUNDER, the US air campaign against North Vietnam. He remarked that he felt “like a fire chief that leaves a roaring fire just when he gets the hoses hooked up and is ready to turn on the water.”

On 30 April 1965 Moorer assumed command of NATO’s Allied Command, Atlantic; the US Atlantic Command; and the Atlantic Fleet. He was the only officer in the Navy’s history to command both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. As CINCLANT, Moorer successfully concluded the US operation in the Dominican Republic. As Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic, he initiated a major revision in NATO maritime strategy, developing the concept of a standing naval force for the Allied Command, Atlantic.

On 1 August 1967 Admiral Moorer became Chief of Naval Operations. For the next three years he guided the Navy during the height of the Vietnam War, a period characterized by growing antipathy at home toward US military involvement in Southeast Asia and the beginning of Soviet naval challenges to US maritime dominance. Moorer marshalled available resources to counter the expansion of large Soviet task forces into the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Despite fiscal constraints and the needs of the Vietnam War, he was particularly successful in modernizing US submarines to assure their continued technical superiority.

On 2 July 1970 Admiral Moorer became the seventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He was the first
naval officer to hold the post since Admiral Radford.
As Chairman, Moorer often found his and the Chiefs’
advice disregarded by President Richard M. Nixon
and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Neverthe-
less, he believed that the Chairman’s position was
sufficiently strong and that the joint system worked
well; he saw no need to revamp JCS organization.
According to Moorer, personalities, not organization
charts, made all the difference.

In December 1971 the Secretary of Defense
revised the Worldwide Military Command and Con-
trol System (WWMCCS), the systems and procedures
that linked the President and the field commanders.
The chain for communicating commands continued
to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense
through the Joint Chiefs to the unified and specified
commanders. For emergency and crisis situations,
however, the Secretary specified a shortened chain
through the Chairman representing the Chiefs. This
change merely reflected the existing situation. In
many Vietnam actions during his first eighteen
months in office, Admiral Moorer had dealt directly
with field commanders on operational issues. During
the September 1970 Middle East crisis in which the
regime of Jordan’s pro-Western King Hussein was
threatened, Moorer had acted for the Chiefs because
time was critical and had informed them later.

When Moorer took office, the process of Viet-
namization, whereby the Vietnamese assumed pro-
gressively greater responsibility for combat opera-
tions and US forces withdrew, had been under way
for over a year. Although he and the Chiefs accepted
the concept of Vietnamization, they disagreed with
the President and top civilian advisers over the pace
of the US withdrawals. The Joint Chiefs favored
smaller and slower US reductions to allow the South
Vietnamese more time to adjust to their expanding
combat role.

Moorer was particularly perturbed over the rules
of engagement in Southeast Asia and the restraints
placed on US military action there. He repeatedly
recommended the mining of Haiphong harbor and
heavy bombing around the Hanoi area. He and the
Chiefs believed that increased naval and air pressure
on North Vietnam would lead to a peace settlement,
but their advice was rejected and US forces withdrew
at a rate that the Joint Chiefs deemed “too much too
soon.” From nearly 415,000 troops in South Vietnam
in 1970, troop strength declined to 25,000 by the end
of 1972. In late 1972 President Nixon directed naval
and air bombardment of previously prohibited tar-
gets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area, and on 27
January 1973 the North Vietnamese agreed to an
accord. Moorer felt vindicated, since the military
measures that he had long advocated had worked.

As JCS representative in the various NSC com-
mittees, Moorer was deeply involved in the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT). In May 1972 President
Nixon went to Moscow for the final and climactic
round of SALT. The afternoon and evening of 25 May
witnessed tense exchanges of messages as the Presi-
dent sought JCS acceptance of the final terms negoti-
ated in Moscow. Moorer recommended rejecting
them to make the Soviets give more ground, but
Nixon pressed strongly for JCS concurrence. Moorer
then presided over a hastily arranged JCS conference
from which a statement of their “accord” with the
agreement finally emerged. Afterward, Moorer joked
that he had gone through the entire dictionary to
find this acceptable word.

Admiral Moorer also was concerned about
decreasing conventional force levels. He saw force
recommendations by the Joint Chiefs reduced by the
President and then again by Congress and worried
that conventional capabilities were being cut below
the danger point. Repeatedly, during high-level
meetings he warned that an essential element in any
strategic equation was the communist threat, which
was real and rising, and that the United States
should enhance its ability to respond conventionally
to that threat.

In October 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked
Israeli forces in occupied territory that Israel had won
from them during the 1967 Six Day War, the Joint
Chiefs supervised a large airlift of arms to Israel
directed by President Nixon. Admiral Moorer wor-
rried about whether the Arabs would turn to the
Soviet Union and thereby imperil US access to Middle
East oil. In fact, Israel won such successes against Egypt that the Soviet Union did threaten to intervene. At a midnight meeting in the White House, Moorer said bluntly that the Middle East would be the worst place to fight a war with the Soviet Union. He supported the administration’s decisions, however, to deter Moscow by ordering a worldwide alert, stopping Israel’s advance, and then restoring ties with the Arab states.

Admiral Moorer retired as Chairman on 1 July 1974. In retirement, he served as a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and on several corporate boards. He died at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, on 5 February 2004, at age 91.
# Thomas Hinman Moorer

Admiral, USN

## Promotions and Dates

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## Assignments and Dates

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<td>Air Force, Atlantic Fleet</td>
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Plans Officer, Staff, Commander Air Force,  
Atlantic Fleet .......................... 1953 ............ 1955

Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air,  
Washington, DC ......................... 1955 ............ 1956

Commanding Officer, USS Salisbury Sound .......... 1956 ............ 1957

Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office  
of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC .... 1957 ............ 1958

Joint Operations Analysis Group, Washington, DC .... 1958 ............ 1958

Assistant Chief of Naval Operations  
(War Gaming Matters), Washington, DC .............. 1958 ............ 1959

Commander, Carrier Division SIX ..................... 1959 ............ 1960

Director, Long Range Objectives Group, Office  
of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC .... 1960 ............ 1962

Commander, Seventh Fleet .......................... 1962 ............ 1964

Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet ................. 1964 ............ 1965

Commander in Chief, Atlantic and Atlantic Fleet  
and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic ............ 1965 ............ 1967


Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .... 1970 ............ 1974

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**PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 4 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross
Purple Heart

Naval Aviator
George Scratchley Brown  
1 July 1974–20 June 1978

George Brown was born in Montclair, New Jersey, on 17 August 1918. His father was a West Point graduate and career cavalry officer. After high school in Leavenworth, Kansas, Brown attended the University of Missouri. He then followed in his father’s footsteps and entered the US Military Academy, where he excelled as a cadet captain, regimental adjutant, and polo player.

Following his 1941 graduation and primary and advanced flight training, Brown served as a bomber pilot in Europe during World War II. He participated in the famous low-level bombing raid against the oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania, in August 1943. When the lead plane and ten others of his forty-plane group were lost, Major Brown led the surviving planes back to base. He received the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism. Promotions came rapidly during World War II, and in October 1944 Brown attained the rank of colonel.
After the war, Colonel Brown served in a variety of command and staff billets. During the last year of the Korean War, he was Director of Operations of the Fifth Air Force in Seoul, Korea. After graduating from the National War College in 1957, Brown served as Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and then Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to brigadier general in August 1959 and served as Military Assistant to Secretaries of Defense Thomas S. Gates and Robert S. McNamara. Promoted to major general in April 1963, he commanded the Eastern Transport Air Force, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, from 1963 to 1964 and Joint Task Force II, a JCS all-service weapons testing unit at Sandia Base, New Mexico, from 1964 to 1966. After promotion to lieutenant general in August 1966, Brown became Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two years later he received his fourth star.

From 1968 to 1970 General Brown served as Commander of the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam and Deputy Commander for Air Operations, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). Responsible for all US air operations in South Vietnam, which he coordinated with those of the South Vietnamese air force, Brown advised the USMACV Commander on all matters pertaining to tactical air support. He returned to the United States in 1970 and became Commander of Air Force Systems Command, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

On 1 August 1973 General Brown became the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In that position, he
campaigned to upgrade the strategic bomber program. Brown pushed to replace the aging B-52s with B-1s, swing-wing aircraft that could carry the latest electronic equipment and twice the payload of the B-52s and penetrate deeper into Soviet territory.

Appointed by President Richard M. Nixon, General Brown became the eighth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 July 1974. He was the first Air Force officer since General Twining to fill the position. As Chairman, Brown served under three Presidents during a period of limited budgets and constrained force structure.

A few months after becoming Chairman, General Brown made off-the-cuff remarks that led to a public rebuke by President Gerald R. Ford. In October 1974, during a question-and-answer session following a speech he had delivered at Duke University Law School, Brown suggested that Israel had undue influence over US national security policy and referred to the power of Jews and their money in the United States. When a public uproar followed, Brown apologized for his remarks. Nevertheless, in an interview published two years later, he made similar comments as well as intemperate remarks about Britain and Iran. Despite this episode, President Ford and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld endorsed Brown’s continuing as Chairman, and he served under President James E. “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., as well.

Strategic arms limitation talks took up much of General Brown’s time as Chairman. He and the Chiefs stressed the need to maintain “essential equivalence,” which meant finding a formula by
which the US lead in missile reentry vehicles would offset Soviet superiority in missile throw-weight. The Vladivostok accords of November 1974 established broad limits for both sides. Complex negotiations followed, centering on trading ceilings on US cruise missiles for ceilings on Soviet Backfire bombers. These negotiations were nearing completion when General Brown retired.

After the US withdrawal from Vietnam, the South Vietnamese military was not successful in holding its own against the North Vietnamese forces. General Brown led the Joint Chiefs in urging US air and naval deployments to the area around South Vietnam to signal US support for the Saigon government, but public and congressional opposition to any further involvement in Vietnam precluded approval of any military action. Then in early March 1975 the North Vietnamese launched an offensive that quickly overran the South Vietnamese forces and climaxed with the fall of Saigon on 30 April.

General Brown participated in decision making over the US response to two confrontations in the Far East that were widely perceived as testing US will in the aftermath of the communist takeover of South Vietnam. On 12 May 1975, less than two weeks after the fall of Saigon, sailors of Cambodia’s radical communist regime seized the US merchant ship SS Maya-guez on the high seas in the Gulf of Thailand. While jets from the carrier USS Coral Sea (CV 43) sank three Cambodian naval vessels and attacked a Cambodian
air base, US Marines retook the ship and stormed Koh Tang Island, where they believed the crew was being held. This operation, which brought release of the crew, found wide support in the United States.

In August 1976, when North Korean guards killed two US officers and wounded several US and South Korean enlisted men trying to trim a tree in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the two Koreas, President Ford, at the strong urging of General Brown and the Chiefs, reinforced US forces in and around South Korea. Meanwhile, a large party of US and South Korean soldiers entered the DMZ and cut down the tree, which was obscuring surveillance of the zone.

General Brown played a crucial role in the success of the 1977 negotiations to transfer ownership of the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama. His willingness to make concessions to Panama, softening the US position, made it possible to reach an agreement, and his support for the agreement was instrumental in securing the treaty’s ratification by the Senate in April 1978.

Stricken with cancer, General Brown retired from active duty on 20 June 1978, ten days before the expiration of his second term as Chairman. Less than six months later, on 5 December 1978, he died.
George Scratchley Brown
General, USAF

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<td>Student, Primary and Advanced Flying Schools, Pine Bluff, AR, and Kelly Field, TX</td>
<td>1941</td>
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<td>Pilot, B-24 Transportation Training, 344th Bombardment Squadron, Barksdale Field, LA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilot, B-24; Flight Commander, later Commander, 329th Bombardment Squadron, 93d Bombardment Group, Barksdale Field, LA; Fort Myers Army Air Base, FL; Grenier Field, NH; England, and later Libya</td>
<td>1942</td>
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<td>Air Executive Officer, 93d Bombardment Group, Libya, later England</td>
<td>1943</td>
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<td>Assistant Operations Officer, 2d Bombardment Division, England</td>
<td>1944</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant to Air Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters, Army Air Force Training Command, Fort Worth, TX, later Barksdale Field, LA</td>
<td>1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant to Air Chief of Staff, Operations, Air Defense Command (ADC), Mitchel Field, NY</td>
<td>1946</td>
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Assistant Deputy Chief for Operations, ADC
(later Continental Air Command),
Mitchel Air Force Base, NY .......................... 1948 .......... 1950

Commander, 62d Troop Carrier Group,
McChord Air Force Base, WA ........................ 1950 .......... 1951

Commander, 56th Fighter Interceptor Wing,
Air Defense Command; later Commander,
4708th Defense Wing, Selfridge
Air Force Base, MI ................................. 1951 .......... 1952

Assistant Director and later Director of Operations,
Fifth Air Force, Korea ............................. 1952 .......... 1953

Commander, 3525th Pilot Training Wing,
Williams Air Force Base, AZ ......................... 1953 .......... 1956

Student, National War College, Washington, DC 1956 .......... 1957

Executive Assistant to Chief of Staff, US Air Force,
Washington, DC ..................................... 1957 .......... 1959

Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC ..................................... 1959 .......... 1959

Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC ..................................... 1959 .......... 1963

Commander, Eastern Transport Air Force,

Commander, Joint Task Force II, Sandia Base, NM 1964 .......... 1966

Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC ..................................... 1966 .......... 1968

Commander, Seventh Air Force, and Deputy
Commander for Air Operations, Military

Commander, Air Force Systems Command,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 1974 .......... 1978
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Distinguished Service Cross
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Silver Star
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Distinguished Flying Cross (with oak leaf cluster)
Bronze Star
Air Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal

Command Pilot
David Charles Jones  
21 June 1978–18 June 1982

David Jones was born on 9 July 1921 in Aberdeen, South Dakota. He grew up in Minot, North Dakota, where he often rode his bicycle to a nearby airfield and dreamed of becoming a combat pilot. After graduating from the local high school, he attended the University of North Dakota and Minot State College. Jones left college in April 1942, volunteering for the US Army Air Corps. An aviation cadet, he earned his commission and pilot wings in 1943.

After serving as a flying instructor in New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas, Lieutenant Jones was assigned to the 3d Emergency Rescue Squadron of the Fifth Air Force in Japan in 1945. He began as a unit pilot, flying Catalina flying boats, and rose to command the squadron. He was promoted to captain in April 1946. From 1948 to 1949 Jones was a unit instructor and then Assistant Operations and Training Officer with the 2236th Air Force Reserve Training Center, Godman Field, Kentucky. During this period he also attended the Air Tactical School at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; the Atomic Energy Course at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi; and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Course at Sandia Base, New Mexico.

General David C. Jones  
United States Air Force
General Jones during assignment as aide to General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command.
Assigned to the 19th Bombardment Squadron at March Air Force Base, California, in January 1950, Jones was promoted to major in February 1951. During his three and one-half years with the 19th, he rose to aircraft commander, then operations officer, and finally commander of the squadron. He flew more than three hundred hours on combat missions over North Korea when the squadron was one of the first bombardment units committed to the Korean War. In May 1953 Jones transitioned from bombers to tankers, taking command of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron at March. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in June 1953, he remained at March but returned to bombers the following year as Commander of the 33d Bombardment Squadron.

Jones served at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, during SAC’s buildup. Assigned in September 1954, he was an operations planner in the Bomber Mission Branch until January 1955, when the SAC Commander in Chief, General Curtis E. LeMay, selected him as his aide. Promoted in April 1957, Colonel Jones became Director of Materiel and later Deputy Commander for Maintenance of SAC’s 93d Bombardment Wing at Castle Air Force Base, California.
After graduating from the National War College in 1960, Jones was assigned to the Air Staff’s Operations Directorate for four years. As Chief of the Manned Systems Branch, he worked on the B-70 bomber project. He next served as Deputy Chief and then Chief of the Strategic Division. After F-100 and F-4 training, he assumed command of the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, at its activation in 1965 and brought it to operationally ready status.

Jones then served in key staff assignments with US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). In October 1965 he became USAFE Inspector General, responsible for inspecting units at over ninety installations in ten countries. He was promoted to brigadier general in December 1965. In January 1967 he became USAFE Chief of Staff and in June Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. He received his second star in November 1967.

In February 1969 Jones was assigned to Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He became Vice Commander in June. Promoted to lieutenant general, he returned to SAC in August 1969 as Commander of the Second Air Force, headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.

In April 1971 Jones returned to USAFE as Vice Commander in Chief. He assumed command of USAFE and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force in August and was promoted to general in September. In his NATO capacity as Commander of Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, General Jones directed an international planning team that integrated Central Region air forces into a more cohesive organization. Central to this effort was his creation of a small operational and planning headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe.

After a career that had included operational and command positions in bomber, tanker, training, and tactical fighter units as well as headquarters staff positions, General Jones became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in July 1974. In that position, he advocated the development of high-technology weapons systems, reorganized the Air Force command structure, and substantially reduced headquarters staffs. Appointed by President Richard M. Nixon, General Jones subsequently developed a close working relationship with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and President James E. “Jimmy” Carter, Jr. In April 1978 Carter nominated him to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The nomination was controversial. Critics in the military and Congress argued that Jones should have fought to reverse the President’s 1977 decision to cancel the B-1 bomber. General Jones, however, believed that the Air Force’s earlier efforts to prove the error of President John F. Kennedy’s decision to cancel the B-70 had been detrimental to the long-term interests of the service. Although Jones was a strong advocate of the B-1, he maintained that it was wrong to try to overturn the decision of the Commander in Chief.

General Jones became the ninth Chairman on 21 June 1978. He was the only Chairman who was not a college or service academy graduate. Jones served four years under two Presidents. With the four years that he had served as Air Force Chief of Staff, his tenure with the Joint Chiefs was longer than that of any previous member in JCS history. He presided over the Chiefs during a period of increasing Soviet military power and the emergence of militant Islam as a threat to pro-Western regimes in the Persian Gulf region. His tenure as Chairman saw increased funding for defense in response to the Soviet threat and continuing JCS advocacy of strategic force modernization despite progress on strategic arms control.

Jones accompanied President Carter to Vienna in June 1979 for the final stage of the SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union. While the Joint Chiefs had reservations about aspects of the completed agreement, Jones’s congressional testimony reflected their view that the limitations it imposed did not themselves pose a danger to the United States. He cautioned, however, that maintenance of strategic parity within these limits required ongoing strategic modernization and warned that there was a risk that SALT II could become “a tranquilizer to the American people.” On balance, the Joint Chiefs judged the
agreement to be “adequately verifiable” and recommended its ratification. However, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 doomed already slim prospects for Senate approval, and President Carter withdrew the agreement.

When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised fears that Soviet forces there might move into neighboring Iran, where an anti-Western militant Islamic regime had taken power in early 1979, President Carter created a rapid deployment force (RDF) for Southwest Asia to counter any such attempt in the region. Subsequently, at the Secretary of Defense’s direction, General Jones oversaw planning for the transformation of the RDF into a regional unified command. Planning for what in 1983 became the US Central Command was essentially completed during his chairmanship.

After Iran refused to release US Embassy personnel taken hostage during the November 1979 seizure of the embassy by followers of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, President Carter in early 1980 directed the JCS to plan a rescue effort. General Jones oversaw the planning, which was accomplished in secrecy outside the existing command structure; the result was a proposal for a multiservice mission involving Air Force transports, Army commandos, and Navy helicopters piloted by Marines. The President approved the mission after General Jones informed him that the JCS believed that the plan was militarily feasible and had a good chance of succeeding. When mechanical problems and weather conditions caused failures or crashes of several aircraft, the mission was aborted. Congressional and Defense
Department investigations found that lack of joint training and joint command and control at the tactical level had contributed to the failure. In response, the Joint Chiefs in August 1980 established a counter-terrorist joint task force as a field operating agency to conduct extensive training in joint planning and command and control.

General Jones bore the brunt of criticism for the failure of the hostage rescue mission. When President Carter nominated him for a second term, congressional opponents attacked Jones both for the failure of the raid and for his support of the administration’s defense and foreign policies. However, on 19 June 1980 the Senate voted overwhelmingly to confirm him. After Ronald W. Reagan’s victory in the November 1980 presidential election, critics of Jones launched a campaign to persuade Reagan to dismiss the Chairman. But President Reagan decided to retain Jones.

General Jones had become increasingly dissatisfied with the operation of the joint system. During his last year as Chairman, he conducted an extensive review of the system’s structural problems. This resulted in a proposal for changes to the National Security Act to improve the quality and timeliness of military advice and the combined readiness and effectiveness of the nation’s combat forces. His central recommendation was that the Chairman, rather than the corporate JCS, should be the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. His proposal for JCS reform prompted the most active debate on defense organizational issues since the 1950s. After his retirement on 18 June 1982, General Jones continued to be an active participant in this debate. He saw his ideas come to fruition with the 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. In retirement, General Jones served as chairman of the board of the National Education Corporation and on several corporate and public service boards. General Jones died on 10 August 2013, while living in Potomac Falls, Virginia.
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<td>Pilot; Operations and Training Officer; Commander, 3d Emergency Rescue Squadron, Fifth Air Force, Japan</td>
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<td>Student, Air Tactical School, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL</td>
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<td>Student, Atomic Energy Course, Keesler Air Force Base, MS</td>
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<td>Assistant Operations and Training Officer, Godman Field, KY</td>
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<td>Student, Special Weapons Course, Sandia Base, NM</td>
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<td>Commander, 22d Air Refueling Squadron, March Air Force Base, CA</td>
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Commander, 33d Bombardment Squadron,  
March Air Force Base, CA ............................. 1954 ........ 1954

Operations Planner, Bomber Mission Branch,  
Headquarters, Strategic Air Command,  
Offutt Air Force Base, NE ........................... 1954 ........ 1954

Aide to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air  
Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE ......... 1955 ........ 1957

Director of Materiel; Deputy Commander for  
Maintenance, 93d Bombardment Wing,  
Castle Air Force Base, CA ........................... 1957 ........ 1959

Student, National War College, Washington, DC ........... 1959 ........ 1960

Chief, Manned Systems Branch; Deputy Chief  
and then Chief, Strategic Division, Deputy  
Chief of Staff/Operations, Headquarters,  

Student, USAF Operations Training Course,  
Luke and Davis-Monthan Air Force Bases, AZ ........... 1964 ........ 1965

Commander, 33d Tactical Fighter Wing,  
Eglin Air Force Base, FL ............................. 1965 ........ 1965

Inspector General, Chief of Staff, and Deputy  
Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations,  
Headquarters, US Air Forces Europe,  
Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany ....................... 1965 ........ 1969

Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations and Vice  
Commander, Seventh Air Force,  
Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam ....................... 1969 ........ 1969

Commander, Second Air Force, Barksdale  
Air Force Base, LA ................................. 1969 ........ 1971

Vice Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe,  
Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany ....................... 1971 ........ 1971

Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe,  
Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany (Ramstein  
Air Base, Germany, after March 1973) and  
Commander, Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces,  
Ramstein Air Base, Germany ....................... 1971 ........ 1974


Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ........... 1978 ........ 1982
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star
Air Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Air Force Commendation Medal

Command Pilot
Missileman
John William Vessey, Jr.
18 June 1982–30 September 1985

John Vessey, Jr., was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 29 June 1922. In May 1939, thirteen months before he graduated from Roosevelt High School, he enlisted in the Minnesota National Guard as a motorcycle rider. His unit was activated in February 1941.

During World War II, Vessey served with the 34th Infantry Division. The experience of early American setbacks in North Africa left Vessey with a lifelong appreciation of the need for realistic combat training, modern equipment, physical fitness, and air-ground cooperation. When Major General Omar N. Bradley, Commander of II Corps in North Africa, launched the US drive on Bizerte in April 1943, he gave the 34th the most difficult obstacle: the well-defended Hill 609. In the first clear-cut US Army victory of the campaign, the 34th Division took its objective, opening the way for the US advance on Bizerte. Vessey, who had been a first sergeant since 1 September 1942, later described being a first sergeant in combat as the “toughest job” he had. He was with the 34th when it entered the Anzio beachhead in Italy in May 1944; there he received a battlefield commission as a second lieutenant, serving as a forward observer.

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
United States Army
After the war most of Vessey’s service continued to be in field artillery assignments. In the 1950s he served with the 4th Infantry Division in Germany and the Eighth US Army in the Republic of Korea. During this period he also attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

By the time Vessey became a lieutenant colonel, he had earned enough credits through night school and correspondence courses for a bachelor of science degree, which he received from the University of Maryland in 1963. In 1965 he received a master of science degree from George Washington University. From 1963 to 1965 Vessey commanded the 2d Battalion, 73d Field Artillery in the 3d Armored Division; then he spent a year as a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

During the Vietnam War, Vessey served for a year as Executive Officer of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery in Vietnam. In March 1967, while acting as Commander of the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, he was given the mission of establishing a fire support base at Suoi Tre during Operation JUNCTION CITY. Located deep in enemy-controlled territory, Vessey and his men oriented the firebase’s defenses on the enemy’s likely avenues of approach and rehearsed counterattack plans. During the attack by a reinforced regiment, the base was partially overrun. Vessey and his men fired their howitzers directly into the enemy ranks. Although greatly outnumbered, the defenders, aided by gunships and artillery, killed four hundred of their assailants while successfully defending the firebase. Lieutenant Colonel...
President Ronald W. Reagan and General Vessey.
Vessey received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the battle.

From Vietnam, he went to Germany to serve first as Commander of the 3d Armored Division Artillery from October 1967 until March 1969 and then as Division Chief of Staff for a year. He was promoted to colonel in November 1967. Vessey went back to Southeast Asia in December 1970 to head the US Army Support Command, Thailand. In January 1972 he went into Laos to coordinate all US military operations in support of the war in Laos. Vessey worked with the US ambassador, the CIA station chief, and an assortment of military contingents. When the Laotian cease-fire came in February 1973, the Royal Lao government controlled all major cities and the vast majority of the population.

Upon his return to the United States, Vessey became Director of Operations in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Promoted to major general in August 1974, he assumed command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado. Promoted to lieutenant general in September 1975, he became the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

Vessey received his fourth star in November 1976. From 1976 to 1979 he served in the Republic of Korea as Commanding General of the Eighth US Army; Commander of US Forces, Korea; and Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. In 1978 he became the first Commander in Chief of the Republic of Korea—United States Combined Forces Command. His tour was marked by increased tension caused by evidence of a North Korean buildup and by President James E. “Jimmy” Carter, Jr.’s 1977 announcement that US ground forces would be withdrawn. Vessey worked to assuage South Korean concerns and change the President’s decision. After Carter’s 1979 visit, withdrawal plans were suspended and then cancelled.

From July 1979 until June 1982 General Vessey served as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. On 18 June 1982 he became the tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the last World War II combat veteran to serve in the position. General Vessey was the only Chairman who had been neither a Service Chief nor a commander of a unified or specified command. He served as Chairman during a period of unprecedented growth in peacetime defense spending and an expanded US military presence worldwide intended to counter growing Soviet military power.

Vessey and the Service Chiefs believed that their overriding task lay in convincing Soviet leaders that their quest for military superiority and geostrategic advantage was fruitless. In Europe, they pushed the controversial but successful deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles to offset the Soviet SS-20 missiles. In Southwest Asia, highly visible US military activities underscored the US commitment to defend its vital interests in the region. In Central America, training and intelligence were provided to support counterinsurgency efforts.

Believing that it was a mistake to commit a superpower’s forces to a peacekeeping mission, Vessey and the Joint Chiefs in 1982 and 1983 advised against deployment of a Marine contingent to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force intended to restore peace among warring factions there. Their advice was not taken, and on 23 October 1983 a terrorist attack on the Marine headquarters building in Beirut killed 241 Marines. In late February 1984 President Ronald W. Reagan withdrew the contingent from Lebanon.

Vessey stressed the need for improvement of war plans and, for the first time, JCS members along with commanders of unified and specified commands personally participated in war games. Realizing the need to strengthen the joint system, Vessey and the Service Chiefs improved Joint Staff operations by adding a capability for budgetary analysis and by improving the quality of its personnel, changes that did not require legislation.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger understood the importance of decentralization; he authorized Vessey to direct military operations on the Secretary’s behalf. The 1983 Grenada operation, for example, was planned by Atlantic Command, reviewed by the JCS, and approved by Secretary Weinberger and the President—all in four days. Vessey
oversaw execution of the operation that rescued US citizens and brought a pro-US government into power. During Vessey’s tenure there was increased emphasis on space as a theater of operations. In early 1983 the Joint Chiefs mentioned to the President that defense against nuclear-armed missiles might be technically feasible in the next century. To their surprise, Reagan seized upon the concept and on 23 March 1983 announced his vision of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Realizing the enormous military advantages to be gained from operations in space and to support SDI, the JCS recommended the establishment of a unified command for space. US Space Command was activated on 23 September 1985.

General Vessey retired on 30 September 1985, several months before the expiration of his second term as Chairman. He was the last four-star World War II combat veteran on active duty and, with forty-six years of service, had served the longest of anyone then in the Army. Shortly after General Vessey’s retirement, Secretary Weinberger appointed him to the Integrated Long Term Strategy Commission. Vessey also served President Reagan and his successors, Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. “Bill” Clinton, as a special emissary to Vietnam on the question of American service personnel missing from the Vietnam War. He was a long-term member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board, chairing several of the latter’s task forces and studies. In recognition of his service to the nation, he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1992.
# John William Vessey, Jr.
General, USA

## Promotions and Dates

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## Assignments and Dates

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<td>and Italy as S/Sgt, 1st Sgt, and then battlefield commission to 2Lt (Communications Officer/Forward Observer/Air Observer)</td>
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Artillery Section, Eighth US Army with duty station
CINCPAC Coordination Center, Philippines .......... 1958 .......... 1958
Chief, Operations Branch, Artillery Section,
Eighth US Army, Korea .................................. 1958 .......... 1959
Assignment Officer, then Executive Officer,
Artillery Officers Division, Office of Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, DC .......... 1959 .......... 1963
Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA .......... 1963 .......... 1963
Commander, 2d Battalion, 73d Artillery,
Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Washington, DC ...................................... 1965 .......... 1966
Executive Officer, 25th Infantry Division Artillery,
Vietnam ........................................... 1966 .......... 1967
Commander, 3d Armored Division Artillery,
Chief of Staff, 3d Armored Division,
Student, US Army Primary Helicopter School,
Fort Wolters, TX; later US Army Aviation
Commanding General, US Army Support
Command, Thailand ................................... 1970 .......... 1971
Deputy Chief, JUSMAGTHAI (Chief MAAG, Laos) .... 1972 .......... 1973
Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO ....................... 1974 .......... 1975
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Commanding General, Eighth US Army; and
Commander in Chief, US Forces, Korea; and
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command;
and (1978) Commander in Chief, Republic of
Korea–United States Combined Forces
Command, Korea ...................................... 1976 .......... 1979
Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC .... 1979 .......... 1982
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .......................... 1982 .......... 1985
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Distinguished Service Cross
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Bronze Star (with oak leaf cluster)
Air Medal (with 4 oak leaf clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with “V” device)
Purple Heart

Army Aviator
William James Crowe, Jr.
1 October 1985–30 September 1989

William Crowe was born on 2 January 1925 in La Grange, Kentucky, and grew up in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. After graduating from Classen High School, he attended the University of Oklahoma. Inspired in part by his father’s experiences in the Navy during World War I, Crowe entered the US Naval Academy. After completing the accelerated wartime program he graduated in 1946, but as a member of the class of 1947.

His initial sea tour was aboard the USS Carmick (DMS 33). After completing submarine school in 1948, he qualified in submarines in March 1950 in the diesel submarine USS Flying Fish (SS 29). Almost all of his sea assignments over the next decade were on diesel submarines. In 1951 and 1952 Crowe served as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander of the US Atlantic Fleet’s Submarine Force at New London, Connecticut.
After promotion to lieutenant in 1952 and another submarine tour, he served from 1954 to 1955 as Assistant to the Naval Aide to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. During this tour he attended George Washington University Law School at night. Crowe's assignment in Washington kindled an interest in the study of government, and he began to rethink his Navy career path. Enrolling in the only full-time graduate program then available in the Navy, he received a master's in personnel administration from Stanford University in 1956.

After Stanford, Crowe returned to sea as Executive Officer of the USS Wahoo (SS 565) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Promoted to lieutenant commander in January 1958, he became personal aide to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations the following autumn. This appointment introduced him to the Navy's role in international politics and set his career direction.

In 1960 Crowe received his first command: the Navy's newest diesel submarine, the USS Trout (SS 566), based in Charleston, South Carolina. Promoted to commander in 1962, he was selected that year as one of the Navy's first candidates for a doctorate in the social sciences. Even the possibility of joining the prestigious nuclear submarine program did not dissuade him from his decision to pursue graduate studies. Crowe received a master's and a doctorate in politics from Princeton University.

After he received his doctorate in 1965, he returned to submarine duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander of Submarine Squadron THREE in San Diego, California. At the end of 1966 he was promoted to Commander of Division 31, which concentrated on antisubmarine operations. In 1967 he left San Diego to return to the Plans and Policy Deputy's Office, where he headed the East Asia and Pacific Branch of the Politico-Military Policy Division and was promoted to captain in July 1967. After the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo (AGER 2) in January 1968, he acted as the Navy’s liaison with the State Department. His office drafted the repatriation plan for the captured crew, and at the direction of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Crowe conducted the investigation of the crew’s treatment during captivity.

In 1970, at the age of forty-four, Crowe volunteered for service in Vietnam. He served first as an adviser and then as Senior Adviser to the Vietnamese Riverine Force in the Mekong Delta. He returned to Washington in 1971 as Director of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations and Deputy to the President’s Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations in the Interior Department, an appointment that recognized his policy experience but seemed likely to sidetrack his career. However, the head of the 1973 rear admiral selection board argued that Crowe’s experience as an advocate should outweigh his relative lack of sea duty. This coincided with a push by CNO Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt for the promotion of officers with wider ranges of experience, and Crowe was promoted in July 1973.
Rear Admiral Crowe returned to the Pentagon, where he served as Deputy Director of the Strategic Plans, Policy and Nuclear Systems Division in the CNO’s Office and then as Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In June 1976 he assumed command of the Middle East Force, based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.

Promoted to Vice Admiral in August 1977, he was appointed the Navy’s Plans, Policy and Operations Deputy. After receiving his fourth star, Admiral Crowe became Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe in May 1980 and assumed the additional responsibility of Commander in Chief of US Naval Forces, Europe, in January 1983.

In July 1983 he became Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC). When President Ronald W. Reagan stopped in Hawaii en route to China in the spring of 1984, he was so impressed with Crowe’s briefing on the military situation in the Far East that he reportedly told Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger that if another Chairman was needed, he had found him. When General Vessey decided to retire, Reagan named Crowe to replace him.

Admiral Crowe became the eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1985. He was the first since Admiral Radford to come directly from the helm of a unified command. On 1 October 1986 he became the first Chairman to serve under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which transferred considerable authority from the corporate JCS to the Chairman. After the law came into force, Crowe made the transition from being first among equals on the corporate body to being the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.

Admiral Crowe came to the chairmanship at a time of increasing international terrorism. When Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro a week after he was sworn in, US efforts to obtain custody of the hijackers were frustrated. Then, in December Americans were among those killed during terrorist assaults on the Rome and Vienna airports. In addition, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, a principal sponsor of terrorism, had proclaimed a “Line of Death” one hundred miles off Libya’s shore—well beyond its internationally recognized territorial waters.

On Crowe’s recommendation, the United States responded by adopting new rules of engagement; US units were allowed to respond to apparent threats rather than waiting until they were fired upon. This change led to the sinking of two Libyan patrol boats during a March 1986 Sixth Fleet exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. A week later, when terrorists bombed a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American soldiers, the United States attributed the attack to Qaddafi, and the Reagan administration decided to retaliate.

In deliberations over the US response, Crowe argued that the focus should be on Qaddafi’s military capability. Although the decision to launch a night air strike that included command and control and terrorist targets resulted in an operation that was neither as focused nor as massive as Crowe had recommended, the 26 April raid on Libya led to an immediate reduction in the Libyan military presence in the Gulf of Sidra and in Libya’s terrorist activities.

In October 1986, at a meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, President Reagan, without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed the elimination of all intercontinental ballistic missiles in ten years. Gorbachev accepted the proposal, but the summit adjourned without an agreement. On the President’s return to Washington, the administration did not discuss the proposals with the Joint Chiefs. Nevertheless, Admiral Crowe thought that he had to bring the issue before the Chiefs. They agreed that the President’s proposal was “completely unacceptable” from the point of view of US national security.

With only lukewarm support from Secretary Weinberger, who believed that the zero-ballistic-missile (ZBM) proposal would not be pursued, Crowe initiated discussion of the subject in a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). He informed the President that the Joint Chiefs believed that it would be ill-advised to proceed with the ZBM proposal. The concept was, in fact, not pursued, and
Admiral Crowe, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, at a briefing during a NATO exercise, 1981.
Admiral Crowe believed that his speaking out at the meeting bolstered his relationship with the other members of the NSPG.

During Crowe’s tenure as Chairman there was heightened tension in the Persian Gulf region as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. In 1987 he was actively involved in the planning for Operation EARNEST WILL, the US reflagging and convoying of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf to protect them from Iranian attack. Using the increased authority that Goldwater-Nichols gave the Chairman and the CINCs to design command and control arrangements, Crowe guided the creation of a joint task force to conduct the operation. In July 1988, when the USS Vincennes (CG 49) mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, Crowe, supported by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, urged immediate public disclosure of the shootdown. When the Secretary of State and the President agreed, Crowe was given the responsibility of making the announcement.

With the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, Admiral Crowe initiated a historic dialogue with his Soviet counterpart. When Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev was in Washington in December 1987 for the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Crowe invited him to the Pentagon, where Akhromeyev met with the Chairman and the other JCS members in “The Tank.” A private Crowe-Akhromeyev meeting led to an agreement designed to prevent accidental armed conflict between US and Soviet armed forces and to a formal program of military-to-military dialogue between the services of the two countries. In the summer of 1988 Akhromeyev and the Soviet Service Vice Chiefs visited the United States at Crowe’s invitation. When Crowe and
the US Service Vice Chiefs returned the visit in June 1989, he and Akhromeyev’s successor, General Mikhail Moiseyev, signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities and a military-to-military contacts agreement. Crowe’s initiatives did much to hasten the thaw in the Cold War.

After his retirement on 30 September 1989, Admiral Crowe became a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and University Professor of Geopolitics at the University of Oklahoma. He wrote his memoir, *The Line of Fire*; served on a number of corporate boards; and was a director of the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1990 until 1993 Crowe cochaired the Carnegie Commission on Reducing the Nuclear Danger; he coauthored its 1993 report, *Reducing Nuclear Danger: The Road Away from the Brink*. In 1993 President William J. “Bill” Clinton appointed him Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. From 1994 until 1997 Crowe served as US Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Upon his return to Washington, DC, he became chairman of the advisory board of Capito-line/MS&L, a government relations firm, and then senior adviser to Global Options, LLC, an international crisis management firm. He served on the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel and in 1998–1999 chaired the State Department Accountability Review Boards, appointed after the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, to examine the embassies’ security procedures. He taught political science at the Naval Academy, served as a trustee of Princeton University, and was Shapiro Visiting Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University. In recognition of his long-time service to the nation, Admiral Crowe was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2000. He died at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, on 18 October 2007, at age 82.
### PROMOTIONS

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<td>USS Flying Fish</td>
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<td>Staff, Commander Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>1951</td>
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<td>USS Clamagore</td>
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<td>Naval Administrative Unit, Potomac River, Naval Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer, USS Wahoo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head, New Development/Special Weapons Branch, Personnel Research Division</td>
<td>1958</td>
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<td>Personnel, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Aide to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), Washington, DC</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<td>Commanding Officer, USS Trout</td>
<td>1960</td>
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Commander, Submarine Division 31 ..................... 1966 ........ 1967

Head, East Asia and Pacific Branch,
  Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of

Senior Adviser, Amphibious Task Force 211 and
  Commander, Task Force 210; Senior Adviser,
  Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao,
  Binh Thuy, from 6 Apr 1971 to 20 Aug 1971,
  US Naval Forces, Vietnam, and Naval Advisory
  Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam .... 1970 ........ 1971

Director, Office of Micronesian Status
  Negotiations and Deputy to President’s Personal
  Representative for Micronesian Status
  Negotiations, Department of the Interior,
  Washington, DC ................................... 1971.......... 1973

Deputy Director, Strategic Plans, Policy and
  Nuclear Systems Division, Office of Chief of

Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of
  Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),
  Washington, DC .................................. 1974........ 1976

Commander, Middle East Force .......................... 1976 ........ 1977

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy
  and Operations, and Senior Navy Member,
  US Delegation, UN Military
  Staff Committee, Washington, DC ..................... 1977 .......... 1980

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern
  Europe .............................................. 1980 .......... 1983

Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
  (redesignated US Pacific Command on

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .... 1985 .......... 1989
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star (with “V” device)
Air Medal

Submarine Officer
Submarine Commanding Officer
Colin Luther Powell
1 October 1989–30 September 1993

Colin Powell, the son of Jamaican immigrants, was born on 5 April 1937 in the Harlem section of New York City. He grew up in the South Bronx, where he graduated from Morris High School. At sixteen he entered the City College of New York. Attracted by the panache of the Pershing Rifles drill team, he joined the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). There he found a sense of direction. He became company commander of the Pershing Rifles, attained ROTC’s highest rank of cadet colonel, and was named a “distinguished military graduate.” When he graduated in 1958 with a bachelor of science in geology, Powell was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Regular Army.

During the next decade Powell mastered infantry tactics and unit leadership. After completing Infantry Officer Basic, Ranger, and Airborne schools, he joined the 3d Armored Division in West Germany as a platoon leader. He then transferred to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to command a company of the 5th Infantry Division and in 1962 was promoted to captain.
From December 1962 to November 1963 Powell was assigned to Vietnam, where he served as an adviser to a South Vietnamese infantry battalion. Wounded during this tour, he received a Purple Heart. On his return, he completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; was promoted to major in 1966; and the following year became an instructor at the Infantry School. In 1968 he graduated from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, second in a class of 1,244.

In June 1968 Major Powell returned to Vietnam, serving first as a battalion executive officer and then as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G-3), and later deputy G-3, with the 23d Infantry Division (American). During this tour he received the Soldier's Medal for repeatedly returning to a burning helicopter to rescue others despite being injured himself.

Powell spent 1969 to 1973 in Washington, DC. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1970, he received a master’s in business administration from George Washington University in 1971. In 1971 and 1972 he worked as an operations research analyst in the Planning, Programming and Analysis Directorate in the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Selected in 1972 as one of seventeen White House Fellows from among 1,500 applicants, he was assigned to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as Special Assistant to the Deputy Director.

Lieutenant Colonel Powell returned to a troop assignment in September 1973 as Commander of the
1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, guarding the Demilitarized Zone in the Republic of Korea. His next assignment, from 1974 to 1975, was as an operations research systems analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. During 1975 and 1976 he was a student at the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. Promoted to colonel in 1976, Powell assumed command of the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in April of that year.

Colonel Powell returned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in July 1977 as Executive to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. After promotion to brigadier general in 1979 he continued in OSD as Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary until June 1981, when he became Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado. In August 1982 General Powell became the Deputy Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

In July 1983 he returned to the Pentagon as Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Promoted to major general the following month, Powell continued as Weinberger's assistant until June 1986, when he assumed command of V Corps in Europe. He was promoted to lieutenant general in July.

Six months later, President Ronald W. Reagan summoned him to become the Deputy National Security Adviser under Frank C. Carlucci III, for whom Powell had worked at OMB and in OSD. When Carlucci became Secretary of Defense, General Powell replaced him as National Security Adviser. He served in this position from December 1987 until the end of the Reagan presidency in January 1989.
During this time he organized and coordinated several summit meetings between President Reagan and other world leaders.

In April 1989 Powell received his fourth star and became Commander in Chief of Forces Command (CINCFOR), Fort McPherson, Georgia, responsible for the general reserve of US-based Army forces. Within months of his appointment as CINCFOR, President George H. W. Bush selected General Powell to be the twelfth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Powell became Chairman on 1 October 1989, he was the first African-American; the first ROTC graduate; and, at fifty-two, the youngest officer to serve in the position.

General Powell’s tenure as Chairman coincided with the end of the Cold War; his chairmanship saw more change in the world than that of any of his predecessors. Powell was the principal architect of the reorientation of US strategy and the reduction of the armed forces in response to the changed strategic environment. He directed the most significant change in national military strategy since the late
1940s, devising a strategy that focused on regional and humanitarian crises rather than on the Soviet Union. Powell’s concept of a “base force” sufficient to maintain the United States’ superpower status won Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney’s and President Bush’s support for a 25 percent reduction in the size of the armed forces.

The first Chairman to serve his whole tenure under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense reforms, Powell devoted considerable energy to promoting joint culture in order to enhance the services’ ability to fight together as a team. He guided the development of doctrine for joint warfare and was the driving force behind the expansion of the Atlantic Command’s responsibilities, which transformed it from a principally naval headquarters into one with responsibility for ground and air forces based in the continental United States as well as East Coast naval forces. When the new US Atlantic Command came into existence on 1 October 1993, the day after Powell’s retirement, it was a joint command designed to meet the military requirements of the post–Cold War world.
During Powell's chairmanship, the US Armed Forces made over two dozen operational deployments. An attempted coup against the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega on 3 October 1989 almost postponed Powell's welcoming ceremony at the Pentagon. Over the next two months, the Chairman worked with the Commander in Chief of US Southern Command to develop a contingency plan that would provide a large force should President Bush decide to intervene in Panama. After Panama declared a state of war with the United States and Panamanian soldiers killed an American officer and manhandled another officer and his wife, President Bush ordered the deployment of approximately 14,000 troops to Panama in late December. They joined almost 13,000 troops already there to execute Operation JUST CAUSE, which resulted in the defeat of the Panamanian forces and the downfall of Noriega.

General Powell played a central role in the preparation for and conduct of the Persian Gulf War. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, President Bush ordered the deployment of some 250,000 US troops to Saudi Arabia in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Powell advised keeping all options open, exerting diplomatic and economic pressure while building up sufficient forces in the region to assure quick victory if the United States and its coalition partners concluded that military action was necessary. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not withdraw his forces from Kuwait, Powell endorsed the President's decision to launch an offensive—Operation DESERT STORM—in January 1991. After it became clear in late February that the coalition forces had achieved an overwhelming victory, he supported the President's decision to suspend hostilities. The Persian Gulf victory boosted the military's standing with the American public, and General Powell became a well-known and popular figure. For his leadership during the war, he received a Congressional Gold Medal, struck in his honor, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

In addition to the combat operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf, US forces participated in a number of rescue and relief operations during Powell's chairmanship, including humanitarian relief operations to provide assistance to famine victims in Somalia and to victims of ethnic warfare in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993. While supporting limited use of US forces to contain the crisis in the Balkans and to assist the UN forces on the ground there, General Powell was reluctant to commit US forces to intervene directly in the war and thus become one of the belligerents. He forcefully argued against the commitment of US ground troops in either a peacemaking or combat role. In internal debates in the Bush and Clinton administrations and in published articles, he advocated the use of US forces in combat only when there were clear political objectives and the political willingness to commit sufficient resources to achieve these objectives. Although there was a perception of an uneasy relationship between the military and the new Clinton administration, especially over the issue of homosexuals in the military, General Powell enjoyed a close working relationship with President William J. “Bill” Clinton.

When General Powell retired on 30 September 1993, the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been substantially enhanced due to his aggressive exercise of the expanded powers granted the Chairman in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. His tenure as Chairman subsequently became the subject of debate among some scholars and commentators concerned with the role of the military in policy development.

At his retirement General Powell was awarded a second Presidential Medal of Freedom, this one with distinction. Later that year Queen Elizabeth II made him an honorary Knight Commander of the Bath. In retirement, Powell wrote a best-selling autobiography and became a frequent public speaker. As a member of the three-man delegation, headed by former President James E. “Jimmy” Carter, Jr., that President Clinton sent to Haiti in September 1994, he played a key role in negotiating the peaceful transfer of power from the military dictatorship to the elected president. Powell cochaired the Presidents' Summit for America’s Future in 1997 and subsequently launched and became chairman of America’s Promise—the Alliance for Youth, a national organization.
to mobilize volunteer efforts to assist young people in developing the character and skills needed to become successful adults. A trustee of Howard University and a director of the United Negro College Fund, he also served on the board of governors of the Boys & Girls Clubs of America, on the advisory board of the Children’s Health Fund, and on corporate boards. In 1998 he received the US Military Academy’s Sylvanus Thayer Award for embodying the values expressed in the Academy’s motto, “Duty, Honor, Country,” and in 1999 the Air Force Academy awarded him the Thomas D. White Defense Award for his contributions to national defense. Powell was a member of the US delegation of observers for the 1999 presidential election in Nigeria, one of the steps in that nation’s transition to democratic rule. He also served as the sixty-fifth US Secretary of State under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2005.
Colin Luther Powell
General, USA

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Self Defense Corps Training Center Adviser,
2d Infantry Division, I Corps, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam 1962 - 1963

Senior Battalion Adviser, Unit Advisory Branch,
later Assistant G-3 (Operations) Adviser,
1st Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Military Assistance Advisory Group,
Vietnam 1963 - 1963

Test Officer, US Army Infantry Board,
Fort Benning, GA 1963 - 1964

Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course,
US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA 1964 - 1965

Test Officer, Supporting Weapons Test Division,
US Army Infantry Board, Fort Benning, GA 1965 - 1966

Instructor/Author, Operations Committee,

Student, US Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1967 - 1968

Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry,
11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), later
Deputy G-3 (Operations), Americal Division,

Student, George Washington University,
Washington, DC 1969 - 1971

Operations Research Analyst, Office of the
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC 1971 - 1972

White House Fellow, Office of Management and
Budget, the White House, Washington, DC 1972 - 1973

Commander, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry,
2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea 1973 - 1974

Operations Research Systems Analyst, Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower Requirements and Analysis), Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC 1974 - 1975

Student, National War College, Fort McNair,
Washington, DC 1975 - 1976
Commander, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY ........................... 1976 .............. 1977

Executive to the Special Assistant to the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC ...................................... 1977 .............. 1978

Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary

Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO .......................... 1981 .............. 1982

Deputy Commanding General, US Army Combined
Arms Combat Development Activity,
Fort Leavenworth, KS .................................. 1982 .............. 1983

Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC ............ 1983 .............. 1986

Commanding General, V Corps, US Army, Europe ....... 1986 .............. 1986

Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the White House,
Washington, DC ....................................... 1987 .............. 1987

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the White House, Washington, DC .......................... 1987 .............. 1989

Commander in Chief, Forces Command,
Fort McPherson, GA .................................... 1989 .............. 1989

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ....... 1989 .............. 1993
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Soldier’s Medal
Bronze Star
Purple Heart
Air Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)

Ranger
Parachutist
Air Assault
Pathfinder
Combat Infantryman
John Malchase David Shalikashvili

John Shalikashvili was born 27 June 1936 in Warsaw, Poland. During World War II he lived through the German occupation of Poland, the 1944 Warsaw uprising, and flight to Germany. In 1952 he emigrated with his family to the United States, settling in Peoria, Illinois.

Shalikashvili entered Peoria Central High School, graduating in 1954. He received a scholarship to Bradley University. There he enrolled in the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), but his eyesight was not good enough for him to become a pilot. Shalikashvili became a US citizen in May 1958, received a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from Bradley that June, and was drafted into the Army in July. Six months later Private Shalikashvili was selected for Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Upon graduation in July 1959, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the field artillery.
His first leadership assignment—in charge of a mortar platoon in Alaska—proved so challenging and enjoyable that he decided to make the Army his career. After promotion to first lieutenant in January 1961, Shalikashvili left Alaska for the Army Air Defense School at Fort Bliss, Texas, where he was an instructor in several courses and later a student in the advanced course. Promoted to captain in July 1963, he remained at Fort Bliss as a staff officer at the Army Air Defense Center.

From February 1965 to January 1968 he served in information, operations, and command positions with US Army Europe in Germany not far from where he had spent much of his childhood. He was promoted to major in August 1967.

As a senior district adviser in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969, Major Shalikashvili served in the I Corps Tactical Zone near the North Vietnamese border in an area heavily infiltrated by the Viet Cong. He received a Bronze Star for valor for directing successful resistance to an attack from two enemy positions...
while accompanying a small patrol on a search operation. While a student in the staff course at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, he received a master’s degree in international relations from George Washington University in 1970. Then followed the first of several tours at Fort Lewis, Washington: a year as Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Group.

In June 1971 Major Shalikashvili was sent to Korea as an operations officer with the United Nations Command and US Forces, Korea. When he returned to the United States, he was assigned to the Army Military Personnel Center in Alexandria, Virginia. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in May 1974, he returned to Fort Lewis in July 1975 as Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, Division Artillery, 9th Infantry Division. In December he took command of the 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery. Following successful command, Shalikashvili was selected to attend the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

After graduating from the War College, Lieutenant Colonel Shalikashvili returned to Europe, where from June 1978 to June 1979 he was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), US Army Southern European Task Force. Promoted to colonel in December 1978, he commanded the Division Artillery of the 1st Armored Division, US Army Europe, from June 1979 to August 1981. Next assigned stateside, Colonel Shalikashvili
served his first tour in the Pentagon. From September 1981 to August 1984 he was assigned to the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, where he dealt with the politico-military aspects of military operations, first as Chief of the Politico-Military Division and then as Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate.

Over the next five years he held significant command and staff positions and rose to the rank of lieutenant general. In August 1984 Brigadier General Shalikashvili returned to the 1st Armored Division in Germany as an Assistant Division Commander. He came back to the Army Staff in July 1986 as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Joint Affairs) and Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy. In this capacity he helped develop the Army’s position on the reduction of theater nuclear missiles in Europe in preparation for US negotiations with the Soviet Union. In June 1987 Major General Shalikashvili assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, where he impressed General Colin L. Powell, then Commander in Chief of Forces Command, with his ability to “get things done.” Shalikashvili restored stability and direction to a division that had experienced considerable disruption as a result of years of experimentation with organization and equipment.

He became Deputy Commander in Chief of US Army Europe and the Seventh Army in September 1989 and was promoted to lieutenant general the next month. Shalikashvili directed the evacuation of all US chemical munitions from Germany and assisted with the movement of VII Corps to Saudi Arabia for participation in the Persian Gulf War. Selected in April 1991 to command Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a US-led multinational relief operation of unprecedented scale, Shalikashvili demonstrated exceptional organizational and diplomatic skill.
1892, when he became Commander in Chief of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). As SACEUR, he helped lay the groundwork for recasting the NATO to deal with the new Europe that had resulted from the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

Selected by President William J. “Bill” Clinton, General Shalikashvili became the thirteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 October 1993. He was the first foreign-born Chairman, the first draftee to rise to the position, and the first OCS graduate to be appointed. As Chairman, he continued to prefer to be known, as he had for most of his career, as “Shali.”

Shalikashvili’s tenure saw a dramatic increase in the number of overseas deployments of US forces, particularly in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, including those in Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda. While he supported the military’s participation in these types of operations, he maintained that the United States needed to be “very selective”
in deploying its forces and should become engaged only when important national interests were involved, all other options had been exhausted, and the intervention of its military could be decisive. In the debate over the appropriate US response to the conflict that had raged in Bosnia since 1992, he opposed commitment of US ground forces as combatants but advocated US participation in a NATO peace implementation force once all warring factions had agreed to a peace framework.

The increased frequency of operations during his chairmanship strained troop morale and readiness. As a former enlisted soldier, Shalikashvili felt a special bond with enlisted personnel and took particular satisfaction from his success in winning support for increasing the defense budget’s provisions for pay, housing, and benefits to improve the quality of life for enlistees and their families. While he believed that the nation’s armed forces were prepared to meet any near-term contingency, he was concerned about future readiness if the accelerated pace of operations continued. Accordingly, he recommended closing bases to provide funding to maintain readiness.

To deal with the shifting geostrategic situation, Shalikashvili directed the development of an overarching strategic vision to take the US military into the twenty-first century as a force that could shape the international environment in which it would have to operate instead of continually responding to crises ad hoc. Published in 1996, *Joint Vision 2010* provided a doctrinal framework for the development of service strategies that would employ advanced technology to dominate any battlefield.

The central strategic issue during his tenure was the question of the future of NATO, the linchpin of the US relationship with Europe. Shalikashvili was, in the apt description of the *New York Times*, the "intellectual godfather" of the Partnership for Peace, NATO’s military cooperation program with the former members of the Warsaw Pact. This initiative became the foundation for the Clinton administration’s support for the incremental enlargement of the alliance. Believing that a viable NATO was essential to US interests, Shalikashvili thought that its gradual expansion was a "cost-effective insurance policy" for maintaining European stability. In July 1997, two months before the end of his second term as Chairman, the alliance voted to extend membership to Hungary, the Czech Republic, and his birthplace, Poland.

At his retirement as Chairman on 30 September 1997, General Shalikashvili received the Presidential Medal of Freedom. In retirement, he was a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and worked as a consultant in the high-technology industry. He devoted considerable energy to promoting military-to-military relations between the United States and Russia and China. In early 2000 President Clinton appointed him to head an effort to win Senate support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Shalikashvili also served on the boards of a number of corporations and nonprofit organizations as well as his alma mater, Bradley University. He died in Tacoma, Washington, on 23 July 2011, at age 75.
# John Malchase David Shalikashvili

General, USA

## PROMOTIONS

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## ASSIGNMENTS

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<td>Enlisted Service</td>
<td>1958-1959</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward Observer, later Platoon Commander, Mortar Battery (106 mm), 1st Battle Group, 9th Infantry, US Army, AK</td>
<td>1959-1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward Observer, Headquarters Battery, later Assistant Executive Officer, Battery B, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 15th Artillery, US Army, AK</td>
<td>1960-1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instructor, Air Defense Artillery, later Guided Missile, and later Senior Instructor, Administration and Operations Branch, High Altitude Missile Department, Academic Organization, US Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, TX</td>
<td>1961-1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Officer, Plans and Operations Division, G-3 (Operations), US Army Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss, TX</td>
<td>1963-1964</td>
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<td>Assistant Information Officer, 32d Artillery</td>
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<td>Brigade, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Operations Officer, 32d Army Air Defense</td>
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<td>Command, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 32d Army Air Defense Command, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>Operations Officer, 32d Army Air Defense Command, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>Operations Officer, 32d Army Air Defense Command, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>Senior District Adviser, Advisory Team 19, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Group, Fort Lewis, WA</td>
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<td>Operations Officer, Current Operations, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J–3, United Nations Command/US Forces Korea</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>Assignment Officer, later Personnel Management Officer, Field Artillery Branch, and later Chief, Assignment Branch, Lieutenant Colonels Division, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, US Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, VA</td>
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<td>Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, Division Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Commander, 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA</td>
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<td>Student, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3 (Operations), US Army Southern European Task Force</td>
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<td>Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Armored Division, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
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<td>Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, US Army Europe, Germany</td>
<td>1984</td>
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Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
   and Plans (Joint Affairs)/Director of Strategy,
   Plans, and Policy, Office, Deputy Chief of
   Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army,
   Washington, DC ................................... 1986 .......... 1987
Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division,
   Fort Lewis, WA .................................... 1987 .......... 1989
Deputy Commander in Chief, US Army Europe
   and Seventh Army, Germany ..................... 1989 .......... 1991
Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme
   Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe/
   Commander in Chief, US European
   Command, Belgium ................................ 1992 .......... 1993
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ....... 1993 .......... 1997

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star (with “V” device)
Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Air Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal

Parachutist
Combat Infantryman
Hugh Shelton was born 2 January 1942 in Tarboro, North Carolina, and grew up on a farm near the small town of Speed. After graduating from North Edgecombe High School, he entered North Carolina State University. He enjoyed the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and enrolled for an additional two years beyond the two then mandatory for men attending land-grant colleges. When he received his bachelor of science in textile technology in June 1963, he was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry in the Army Reserve.

Lieutenant Shelton spent two years on active duty at Fort Benning, Georgia, where he was a platoon leader first with the 2d Infantry Division and then with the 1st Cavalry Division. While at Fort Benning, he completed the Ranger course at the Army Infantry School, qualified as a parachutist, and was promoted to first lieutenant. Shelton remained in the Army Reserve when he returned to civilian life in July 1965 to work for Regal Textile Corporation in Ware Shoals, South Carolina, a job he had accepted before entering military service. Although promoted before completing the company’s training program, he decided that he preferred Army life and in 1966 applied to return to active duty as an officer in the Regular Army.

General Henry H. Shelton
United States Army
Several months later he received orders to report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for training in preparation for assignment to the Special Forces in Vietnam. Shelton served from September 1966 until July 1967 with the 5th Special Forces Group along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, engaged in crossborder operations to impede the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam through Laos into South Vietnam. Promoted in March 1967, Captain Shelton received command of Detachment A-104 at Ha Thanh in the mountains of Quang Ngai province in South Vietnam in July. Through December 1967 he worked with the South Vietnamese Special Forces and local Montagnard tribesmen to disrupt Viet Cong infiltration across the Laotian border. He received a Purple Heart after a poisoned punji stake drove through his leg and was
awarded the Bronze Star for valor for leading the repulse of Viet Cong that had attacked one of his South Vietnamese patrols.

Following his tour with the Special Forces, Captain Shelton was assigned to the Army Training Center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. He would spend most of the rest of his career in airborne and light infantry units. In January 1969 he returned to Vietnam as an intelligence officer with the 173d Airborne Brigade, subsequently becoming a company commander and later acting battalion operations officer. From March 1970 through July 1972 he was back at Fort Benning at the Army Infantry School, initially as a student in the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and then as an instructor and later an operations officer in the Florida Phase, Ranger Department.

In June 1973 Shelton graduated from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and received a master's degree in political science from Auburn University. From Alabama, he went to the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, where he held several staff positions, including Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 2d Brigade, and was promoted to major in February 1974. Major Shelton’s next assignment was with the Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia, where he served from June 1977 until April 1979 handling the career management and assignments of other majors.
Promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1978, Shelton assumed command of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, in April 1979. In June 1981 he became the division’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Selected to attend the National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, in 1982 and 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Shelton then served a brief tour at the Pentagon. Assigned to the Army Staff in June 1983, he chaired the Reserve Components Study Group in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel until his promotion to colonel in October, when he received command of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. While brigade commander, Colonel Shelton directed a combined arms task force during several overseas deployments. In November 1985 he became Chief of Staff of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York.

After his selection for brigadier general, Shelton served in the Operations Directorate on the Joint Staff from July 1987 until July 1989 as a deputy director of the National Military Command Center and then as Deputy Director for Current Operations. He received his first star in August 1988. From the Joint Staff, Shelton went to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, as an assistant division commander with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Brigadier General Shelton led the division’s forces in a deep helicopter assault into Iraq. The division was poised to block Iraqi units fleeing to Baghdad when the war ended.

Over the next five years, Shelton held two of the
Army’s most prestigious commands. In May 1991 he returned to Fort Bragg as Commanding General of the 82d Airborne Division; he was promoted to major general that October. He assumed command of XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg upon promotion to lieutenant general in June 1993. As corps commander, Lieutenant General Shelton gained national prominence leading the multinational operation which in 1994 restored an environment safe for the return of Haiti’s democratically elected government. Shelton received his fourth star on 1 March 1996 after becoming Commander in Chief of the US Special Operations Command (USCINC-SOC) at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, on 29 February. Leading the command during a period of greatly increased demand for special operations forces worldwide, General Shelton defined the characteristics necessary for these forces to function effectively well into the twenty-first century. During his tenure the largest operational commitment of special operations forces was to the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans.

General Shelton became the fourteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1997. He was the first to possess a special operations background, expertise that fit well with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen’s interest in unconventional warfare. Shelton often stated that he did not believe in “fair fights” and endorsed the use of overwhelming force when committing American troops to combat.

While the end of the Cold War had brought major reductions in the size of the US military and in the number of forces permanently stationed overseas,
the operational tempo had risen sharply during the Clinton administration. At the time General Shelton became Chairman, the United States had already been involved in peace operations in Bosnia since 1993. During his first term, additional forces became engaged in counterdrug operations in Latin America, peace operations in Kosovo, and enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq, to name but a few instances. In August 1998 the United States also retaliated against terrorist attacks at American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by launching cruise missiles against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan.

In this uncertain strategic environment, General Shelton believed the US military had to be prepared to undertake flexible missions with well-defined and limited objectives. Force readiness, therefore, was a top priority. In 1999 he led the Joint Chiefs of Staff in winning administration and congressional support for major reforms to improve military pay and retirement, as well as resources to maintain and modernize the military. General Shelton also prioritized force integration and interoperability. He recommended replacing the Atlantic Command with a new organization focused on oversight of joint doctrine and experimentation and the preparation of US-based forces for deployment overseas. This occurred on 1 October 1999, when US Joint Forces Command came into existence, the same day that Shelton began his second term as Chairman.

In May 2000 General Shelton released *Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military—Preparing for Tomorrow*. He advocated a gradual transformation of the joint force that would enable it to dominate the full spectrum of future military operations. By replacing or modernizing existing equipment, incorporating new technologies, and preparing highly trained personnel, the joint force could “conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations.” General Shelton identified asymmetric threats as the nation’s most serious near-term danger, but also prioritized the need to maintain a strategic deterrence posture, which included an “overseas presence and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide.” As if to emphasize the danger from asymmetric threats, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists attacked the USS Cole (DDG 67) in a Yemeni harbor five months later.

President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, installing Donald H. Rumsfeld as his Secretary of Defense. The new defense secretary championed a rapid transformation of the military to meet twenty-first century challenges, using the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to shift toward a force structure defined by joint capabilities, rather than regional requirements. General Shelton supported this initiative, but cautioned against compromising current readiness to accomplish future modernization and maintained that existing regional threats warranted a significant overseas presence. Consistent with his earlier efforts to improve the quality of life for service personnel and their families, he reiterated that people remained the nation’s most critical strategic asset.

Al-Qaeda operatives launched multiple terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, striking the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Already scheduled to retire in October, General Shelton spent his remaining weeks in office coordinating military plans to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan and helping to develop an interagency strategy to defeat, disrupt, and degrade terrorist activities around the world; these endeavors would become known as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the Global War on Terrorism.

President Bush later awarded General Shelton a Congressional Gold Medal, recognizing more than thirty-eight years of dedicated military service. Following retirement, he served as Executive Director of the General Hugh Shelton Leadership Center at North Carolina State University, established in 2002, and Director of the Hugh and Carolyn Shelton Military Neurotrauma Foundation, established in 2005. He has also held senior management positions in several corporations, most involving the defense industry.
Henry Hugh Shelton
General, USA

PROMOTIONS

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*Date of rank adjusted for time not spent on active duty.

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Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course; later
Instructor, then Operations Officer, Ranger
Department, US Army Infantry School,

Student, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL ....................... 1972 .......... 1973

S-1, then S-3, 2d Brigade; then Chief, Officer
Management Branch, then Deputy G-1, then
Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry,
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield
Barracks, HI ........................................ 1973 .......... 1977

Professional Development Officer, Combat Arms
Branch, later, Chief, Assignments Branch,
Majors Division, Officer Personnel
Management Directorate, US Army Military

Commander, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry,
2d Brigade; then Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA ....... 1979 .......... 1982

Student, National War College, Fort McNair,
Washington, DC ..................................... 1982 .......... 1983

Chairman, Reserve Components Study Group,
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,

Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division, Fort Bragg, NC .......................... 1983 .......... 1985

Chief of Staff, 10th Mountain Division (Light
Infantry), Fort Drum, NY .......................... 1985 .......... 1987

Deputy Director for Operations, National
Military Command Center, J-3; then Deputy
Director for Operations (Current Operations),

Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY,
(including Operation DESERT STORM,

Commanding General, 82d Airborne
Division, Fort Bragg, NC .......................... 1991 .......... 1993

Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps
and Fort Bragg, NC; also Commander, Joint
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ........... 1997 ........... 2001

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Distinguished Service Medal (with 4 oak leaf clusters)
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Bronze Star (with “V” device)
Bronze Star (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Purple Heart
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)

Special Forces
Ranger
Master Parachutist
Military Freefall Parachutist
Air Assault
Pathfinder
Combat Infantryman
Richard Myers was born on 1 March 1942 in Kansas City, Missouri. He grew up in a middle class suburban neighborhood, the son of a regional manufacturing representative and former primary school teacher. While attending Shawnee Mission North High School he played the saxophone and piano in a small band and competed in football, basketball, and track. After graduating from high school in 1960, Myers entered Kansas State University–Manhattan. Enamored with airplanes—jet fighters in particular—since his first ride on a commercial airliner, he enrolled in the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Course and acquired his private pilot’s license while participating in the program. In January 1965 he graduated with a bachelor of science in mechanical engineering and was subsequently commissioned a second lieutenant on 3 February 1965.
in March 1971. During this assignment, he served as a weapons and tactics officer, as well as a flight commander. He also forward deployed to Korat, Thailand, for a second combat tour in 1972, where he flew F-4C Wild Weasel missions to detect and suppress North Vietnamese air defenses during Operations LINEBACKER I and II.

After returning from Asia in August 1973, Captain Myers joined the 414th Fighter Weapons Squadron. During the next three years, he served as an instructor pilot and later as the air-to-ground flight commander at the Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The school’s mission was to educate and train already proficient pilots to be the best instructor pilots in the US Air Force. Following this assignment, in July 1976 Major Myers attended the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In addition to being a distinguished graduate of the staff college, he concurrently earned his master’s degree in business administration from Auburn University.

In June 1977 Major Myers reported to the Directorate of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He served as an operational test and evaluation officer for the next three years, working to enhance the realism of the electronic warfare ranges at Nellis Air Force Base, and as the Air Force representative to joint test and evaluation. Interactions on Capitol Hill provided him with practical insights into the national security decision-making process. After this assignment, in June 1980 Lieutenant Colonel Myers attended the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

In June 1981 Lieutenant Colonel Myers returned to the operational forces at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, this time flying the F-4E. He served briefly as Chief of Weapons and Tactics for the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing until October and then as the Operations Officer and Commanding Officer of the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron until November 1983. He subsequently returned to the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, where he temporarily served as the Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations.
In June 1987 Colonel Myers returned to Langley Air Force Base. His first of five assignments there was as Commander of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, which was responsible for the air superiority mission and primarily focused on the Persian Gulf region. After completing this tour in February 1989, he transferred to Headquarters Tactical Air Command. He subsequently served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans until June 1989, Inspector General until January 1990, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans until June 1990, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements until December 1991. These successive staff assignments enabled him to become intimately familiar with operational requirements and modernization programs, such as the joint surveillance and target attack radar system, that would launch the Air Force into the twenty-first century. On 1 April 1990 Myers received his first star.

Brigadier General Myers returned to the Pentagon in December 1991, where he worked as Director of Fighter, Command and Control, and Weapons Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. He helped to shepherd current and future weapons systems through the Pentagon’s complex acquisition process and defended them on Capitol Hill; this occurred during a period of major Defense reductions following the Cold War. Simultaneously, he became an advocate for new systems to support the nation’s increased involvement in mid-intensity conflicts around the globe and to address the potential proliferation of nuclear threats among developing countries. On 1 September 1992 he advanced to major general, and the following summer he was nominated for a third star.

In November 1993 Lieutenant General Myers returned to Yokota Air Base to command US Forces Japan and the Fifth Air Force. This was his first joint command, and Myers led forces from all four services assigned to defend US interests in northeast Asia. His assignment combined military duties with diplomatic responsibilities. He worked to allay Japanese concern over the implication of the American military presence upon their national sovereignty and planned for a consolidation of US bases.

Promoted to colonel, Myers reported to Headquarters Tactical Air Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, in January 1984. His first assignment, held until October of that year, was as Deputy Director of Personnel Plans and Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He then served as a Team Chief of the Inspector General Team. Both billets provided him with insights into the structure and function of the Air Force personnel system and the administrative and operational details of the US Air Force’s largest major command.

Colonel Myers returned to Nellis Air Force Base in September 1985, this time as Commandant of the Fighter Weapons School. During his twelve-year absence the school had transitioned to the more sophisticated F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon and had added complex exercises simulating the presence of allied air forces and involving airborne early warning and control system aircraft. One year later he assumed command of the 325th Tactical Training Wing at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, training pilots to fly the advanced F-15 Eagle fighter.

Captain Myers, left, and David Haas, his backseater, sit atop 500-pound bombs loaded on board their F-4 Phantom at Udorn Air Force Base, Thailand, in June 1970.
on Okinawa that would not decrease America’s military posture in the Pacific.

Returning to Washington in June 1996, Lieutenant General Myers served as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the official liaison between the Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, USA, and the Department of State, headed by Secretaries Warren Christopher and then Madeline Albright. Myers participated in major policy issues, including the reintegration of France into NATO’s command structure, expansion of the North American Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe, and formulation of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia.

In July 1997 General Myers received his fourth star and assumed command of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. He was now responsible for an area that stretched from California to India, with authority over four numbered air forces situated in Japan, South Korea, Guam, and Alaska. During his tenure, the command integrated the joint direct attack munitions into its arsenal. Although the new precision guided bombs required aircraft modifications and new tactics, the bombs extended the life of aging airplanes by greatly enhancing accuracy and therefore combat effectiveness. General Myers had expected to retire after his PACAF assignment, but one year later he was selected for unified command.

General Myers moved to Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, in August 1998 to command US Space Command, which directed all integrated attack warning and space operations, and Air Force Space Command, one of its subordinate commands. Among a broad spectrum of responsibilities were overseeing space control and space support activities and employing space assets to enhance the operational effectiveness of the nation’s other combatant commands. Strategic activities ranged from launching spacecraft and monitoring satellites to maintaining an intercontinental ballistic missile capability as a component of the nuclear deterrent. He also helped improve the reliability of the aging Titan IV Launch Rocket System, which had threatened to disrupt the satellite launches until a new launch vehicle appeared.

Concurrently, General Myers led the North American Aerospace Defense Command, a combined US and Canadian command charged with defending North America against an air or missile attack. He also managed contingency support of the Space Transportation System, otherwise known as the Space Shuttle program.

In September 1999 President William J. “Bill” Clinton nominated General Myers to become the fifth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Senate Armed Services Committee confirmed his appointment, and on 1 March 2000 he joined the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, USA, and Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in the Pentagon. As second-ranking member of the uniformed services, Myers was a full member of the JCS and chaired the group’s meetings during Shelton’s absence.

The Chairman and his Vice shared a commitment to prepare America’s military for the twenty-first century. General Myers believed that this involved developing new organizations, doctrine, training, and technology that would enable the military to function efficiently in multidimensional battlespace. The new Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, was already acquainted with the Vice Chairman from previously chairing the US Ballistic Missile Commission and the US Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization.

Secretary Rumsfeld was intent upon reforming the Pentagon bureaucracy and transforming the military into an agile, network-centric force capable of acting immediately from a forward position to defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively. This constellation of strategic goals, structural changes, and management traits sometimes frustrated the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requiring that General Myers mediate between the service requirements and the Secretary’s vision.

One of General Myers’ principal duties was to chair the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Council considered issues such as strategic needs, acquisition processes, and resource availability in order to advise the Chairman on the
General Myers believed that the JROC had to focus on strategic requirements, supported by far-reaching joint capability assessments. He reduced the number of missions evaluated in the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment, orienting the remaining items toward “full spectrum dominance,” as described in General Shelton’s *Joint Vision 2020*. General Myers also established an Enhanced Joint Requirements Board to acquire outside input on selected programs and a Joint Requirements Panel to direct acquisition and development issues. He made the process more inclusive than it had been and relied upon a larger number of subsidiary boards to refine topics for the Council’s consideration.

General Myers was also a member of the National Security Council Deputies Committee. The deputies usually discussed policy issues among themselves and then recommended potential courses of action to the Principals Committee. A major concern was the steady rise in global terrorism. In October 2000 Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization attacked the USS *Cole* (DDG 67) in Yemen. Less than a year later, al-Qaeda launched multiple terrorist attacks in the United States, striking the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon. General Myers, while serving as acting Chairman on 11 September 2001, participated in the immediate response to the 9/11 attacks and assisted General Shelton in developing a strategy to defeat, disrupt, and delay terrorism around the world—the Global War on Terrorism—as well as eradicate al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Nominated by President George W. Bush to become the fifteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers completed the confirmation process in the midst of the post-9/11 turmoil and was sworn into office on 1 October 2001, becoming the first Vice Chairman to succeed his predecessor. He laid out three personal priorities: to continue the Global War on Terrorism, to pursue transformation of the military, and to support military personnel and their families. As the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, he relied on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff’s advice on national security matters and promoted a collegial atmosphere conducive to reaching consensus.

Coalition forces launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, toppling the radical Islamist regime three months later. General Myers subsequently supported the employment of NATO forces to help secure and stabilize the war-torn nation. General Myers argued forcefully that the Geneva Conventions applied to the nation of Afghanistan and that it required humanitarian treatment of all prisoners captured in that country. Influenced by his Vietnam service, he believed that the Geneva Convention was the gold standard for US forces. That standard must be maintained, he urged, to ensure that potential US prisoners were treated decently and to provide an example for others to emulate.

In March 2002 General Myers directed the Joint Staff to plan a strategic offensive to neutralize al-Qaeda leaders. Working with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff identified two of the organization’s principal leaders and seven key planners or subordinate commanders. During the next thirteen months, collaborating interagencies captured five of the subordinates. Meanwhile, progress in Afghanistan continued. Following the ratification of their new constitution in January 2004, Afghan citizens voted in presidential elections in September and parliamentary elections a year later.

Influenced by his Vietnam service, he believed that the Geneva Convention was the gold standard for US forces. That standard must be maintained, he urged, to ensure that potential US prisoners were treated decently and to provide an example for others to emulate.
Assembly and Governorate Council officials during January 2005. The assembly ratified its new constitution in October.

General Myers also pursued the transformation of America's military, orchestrating substantive changes to the nation's unified command plan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On 1 October 2002 US Northern Command emerged as a new combatant command designed to consolidate and coordinate domestic defense. Among its missions were supporting local, state, and federal authorities and assisting the newly created Department of Homeland Security when responding to national emergencies. Comprised of several joint task forces previously assigned to US Joint Forces Command, Northern Command directed the North American Aerospace Defense Command. On the same day that Northern Command was established, US Strategic Command absorbed US Space Command, consolidating the nation's nuclear deterrent and space missions.

Like his predecessors, General Myers continued to promote a joint culture among the nation's military services. In the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2002/2005), he provided guidance to the service chiefs and regional commanders for a multi-pronged strategy targeting terrorist networks at eight key pressure points. In Joint Operations Concepts (2003) and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (2005), he articulated a vision to develop integrated functional capabilities. In National Military Strategy (2004), he reiterated the importance of protecting the United States against external attacks and aggression, preventing conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against adversaries.

General Myers retired from the military on 30 September 2005, after more than forty years of active service. In recognition of his contribution, which included more than six-hundred combat flight hours during the Vietnam War, he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom on 9 November 2005. During retirement, Myers accepted a part-time appointment as a Foundation Professor of Military History at Kansas State University, and he holds the Colin L. Powell...
Chair for National Security, Leadership, Character and Ethics at the National Defense University. He also served on the board of directors for the USO, as well as the Northrop Grumman, United Technologies, Aon, and John Deere corporations.
Richard Bowman Myers
General, USAF

PROMOTIONS

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ASSIGNMENTS

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<td>F-4 Phantom II Weapons and Tactics Officer and Flight Commander, 67th TFS, Kadena Air Base, Japan</td>
<td>1971 - 1973</td>
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<td>Instructor Pilot and Flight Commander, 414th Fighter Weapons Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV</td>
<td>1973 - 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Operational Test and Evaluation Staff Officer,
Directorate of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans and Operations, Headquarters

Student, US Army War College,

Chief of Weapons and Tactics, 4th Tactical Fighter
Wing (TFW), Seymour Johnson AFB, NC ............ 1981 .......... 1981

Operations Officer and Commander, 335th TFS,

Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations,
4th TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC ................ 1983 .......... 1984

Deputy Director of Personnel Plans and
Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Headquarters Tactical Air
Command (TAC), Langley AFB, VA ................... 1984 .......... 1984

Team Chief, Inspector General Team,
Headquarters TAC, Langley AFB, VA ................ 1984 .......... 1985

Commandant, US Air Force Fighter Weapons
School, Nellis AFB, NV ............................ 1985 .......... 1986

Commander, 325th Tactical Training Wing
(TTW), Tyndall AFB, FL ............................. 1986 .......... 1987

Commander, 1st TFW, Langley AFB, VA ............. 1987 .......... 1989

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans,

Inspector General, Headquarters TAC,
Langley AFB, VA ................................. 1989 .......... 1990

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Headquarters
TAC, Langley AFB, VA .............................. 1990 .......... 1990

Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements,

Director of Fighter, Command and Control, and
Weapons Programs, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,

Commander, US Forces Japan, and Commander,
5th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan ............... 1993 .......... 1996

Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, HI .... 1997 .......... 1998
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ................................. 2000 ........ 2001
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ................................. 2001 ........ 2005

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross (with oak leaf cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Air Medal (with 18 oak leaf clusters)

Command Pilot
Peter Pace was born in Brooklyn, New York, on 5 November 1945. The son of an Italian immigrant who worked as an electrician in the city, he was the third of four children. Growing up in Teaneck, New Jersey, Peter played soccer and baseball, ran track, and learned that constant practice developed proficiency. He applied this philosophy throughout his adult life.

Following graduation from Teaneck High School in 1963, Midshipman Pace entered the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, joining his older brother Simone, two years his senior. The younger Pace majored in Mechanical Engineering (Ship Propulsion Option) and earned a varsity letter in soccer. The experience of training novice midshipmen during their Plebe Summer convinced him that he was more suited for a career in the Marine Corps infantry than the Navy submarine service. The precedent set by his older brother, a Marine who had earned a Silver Star and Purple Heart in Vietnam, also influenced Pace’s decision to join the Marines.
Midshipman Peter Pace joins his older brother, Simone, at the US Naval Academy in 1963.

Upon graduation from the Naval Academy on 7 June 1967, Second Lieutenant Pace received a commission in the US Marine Corps. In August he reported to The Basic School at Quantico, Virginia. A student in Basic Course 2-68, he received training in military fundamentals and infantry tactics and finished at the top of his class. Next, he completed a brief course in supporting arms coordination at Camp Pendleton, California.

Lieutenant Pace deployed to Vietnam in February 1968 and assumed command of 2d Platoon, Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. Arriving at the end of the North Vietnamese Tet offensive, he took part in the conclusion of the battle for Hue City. During the following year he participated in eleven major search and clear operations; these involved aggressive patrolling and could escalate into brigade-size engagements. On 18 August Pace earned the Bronze Star for valor by leading his platoon in a flanking maneuver against a fortified position that had halted the company’s advance on an enemy supply complex. Crossing a stream and several rice paddies under enemy fire, Pace’s platoon enveloped the fortified enemy position. Afterward, he became the battalion’s assistant operations officer and was promoted to first lieutenant on 7 September.

Lieutenant Pace returned to the United States during March 1969 and reported to the Marine Barracks in Washington, DC. After serving as Head of the Infantry and Intelligence Writer Unit at the Marine Corps Institute for six months, he took command of 2d Platoon, Guard Company. Besides performing official ceremonies, the platoon provided security at the presidential retreat at Camp David,
Maryland. A year later he took charge of the Special Ceremonial Platoon, which included the Silent Drill Team, Marine Corps Color Guard, and Body Bearer sections. He also served as a White House Social Aide and advanced to captain on 1 March 1971.

In September 1971 Captain Pace transferred to Fort Benning, Georgia, where he attended the US Army Infantry Officer’s Advanced Course, graduating second in his class. Simultaneously, he finished a masters degree in business administration at George Washington University, which he had begun during his previous assignment. He then completed the Nuclear and Chemical Target Analysis Course in July, finishing first in his class, and the Basic Airborne Course in August.

Captain Pace’s next assignment took him to Okinawa, Japan, in September 1972. After briefly commanding Headquarters and Service Company, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, he deployed to Nam Phong, Thailand, in October. He joined Task Force Delta, serving as the operations officer and later executive officer of a battalion-size security detachment attached to Marine Air Base Squadron 15. The detachment protected the Thai Air Force Base hosting Marine Aircraft Group 15, then engaged in air combat operations in Vietnam. As part of his duties, Pace also advised a Royal Thai security guard company.

In October 1973 Captain Pace returned to Washington, DC, where he became the Assistant Major’s Monitor for the Officer Assignments Branch at
Headquarters Marine Corps. In this capacity, he managed the careers of over 2,000 ground officers, matching professional skills, development needs, and individual desires when fulfilling specific manpower requirements.

Captain Pace subsequently reported to Camp Pendleton in October 1976. He first served as the operations officer for 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and was promoted to major on 1 August 1977. His next assignments were as the Executive Officer for 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and finally as Staff Secretary to the Commanding General of 1st Marine Division.

In August 1979 Major Pace returned to Quantico, Virginia, to attend the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Following graduation, he assumed command of Marine Corps Recruiting Station, Buffalo, NY, in July 1980. During this three-year tour, Pace was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 October 1982 and led the organization during its ascent from forty-third to the fifth ranked station in the nation.

Lieutenant Colonel Pace came back to Camp Pendleton in May 1983 and took command of 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, which served as the air contingency battalion for 1st Marine Division. The battalion then deployed to Okinawa, Japan, in September 1984, where it became the air contingency battalion for 3d Marine Division. The following January it joined the 35th Marine Amphibious Unit. During that time Pace also served as the amphibious unit’s operations officer and commander of the landing force during Exercise Beach Guard 1-85 in the Republic of the Philippines.

In June 1985 Lieutenant Colonel Pace entered the National War College in Washington, DC. After graduation the following year, he moved to Seoul, Korea, for duty with the joint and combined US Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and United Nations Command. He initially served as Chief of the Ground Forces Branch, Operations Section, of the Combined-Joint Staff. He reorganized the branch to lead the combined battle staff within the crisis action system and personally authored revisions to contingency plans. In April 1987 he became the Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. This assignment enabled him to develop an appreciation for the varied perspectives that different organizations might have for the same issue.

After assuming command of Marine Barracks Washington, DC, in August 1988, Pace was promoted to colonel on 1 October. In addition to overseeing traditional ceremonial and security functions, he intensified the unit’s tactical training and developed a light infantry capability within the command. His efforts enabled the barracks to deploy a reinforced rifle company to Southwest Asia during Operation DESERT SHIELD, which provided security to the 2d Marine Division Command Post during Operation DESERT STORM. Concurrently, Pace was the Director of the Marine Corps Institute; he revised nonresident professional military education and enhanced the tactical training guides for units deploying to the Persian Gulf region.

In July 1991 Colonel Pace moved to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He served as Chief of Staff for the 2d Marine Division until February 1992, when he became the Assistant Division Commander. Frocked to brigadier general on 6 April, he oversaw establishment of the Riverine Assault Craft Platoon and its initial deployment to South America, as well as exercise employment of the Mobile Riverine Force.

Brigadier General Pace then went to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico in June 1992. While serving concurrently as the president of Marine Corps University and Commanding General of Marine Corps Schools, he completed the Harvard Program for Senior Executives in National Security and received two temporary assignments. From December 1992 to February 1993 he served as Deputy Commander of Marine Forces Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE. This US-led international effort secured the area around Mogadishu and enabled humanitarian relief operations to resume after disruption by the nation’s warring factions. Then, from October 1993 to January 1994 Pace served as Deputy Commander of US Joint Task Force Somalia during Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Part
of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II, this initiative sought to maintain security and foster development leading to long-term stability.

Frocked to major general on 21 June 1994, Pace reported to Yokota Air Base in July as the Deputy Commander of US Forces Japan, serving under then-Lieutenant General Richard B. Myers, USAF. Leadership of the joint force assigned to defend Japan and support operations in Korea necessitated both military and diplomatic skills. In the latter capacity, Pace served as the US Representative to the Joint Committee, the principal interlocutor between the United States and Japan on all status of forces issues. He worked to allay Japanese concern over the implication of the American military presence upon their national sovereignty and planned for consolidation of US bases in Okinawa that would not decrease America’s military posture in the Pacific.

Major General Pace returned to Washington in July 1996, where he was promoted to lieutenant general on 5 August and assigned as Director of Operations (J-3), the Joint Staff. His arrival coincided with the publication of Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman’s framework for employing advanced technology to enhance service strengths and dominate any battlefield. During the next year, the military responded to crises in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, and NATO incorporated three Eastern Bloc nations formerly associated with the Soviet Union.
In November 1997 Lieutenant General Pace assumed command of US Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, as well as Fleet Marine Forces and Marine Bases, Atlantic, located at Norfolk, Virginia. Besides US Atlantic Command, Pace’s responsibilities included command of Marines in both US European and Southern Commands. To facilitate that role, he transformed existing liaison elements assigned to those organizations into subsidiary Marine component commands. This direct approach proved useful when supporting NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

After receiving his fourth star on 8 September 2000, General Pace became the Commander in Chief of US Southern Command. Headquartered in Miami, Florida, this economy of force command promoted democracy, stability, and prosperity throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It achieved these goals by conducting training, civic assistance, and military interaction exercises. These exercises built rapport, enhanced host nation capabilities, and advanced the national drug control strategy, designed to reduce the flow of illicit substances into the United States. By helping to organize, train, and equip partner nations’ security forces, Southern Command enabled them to conduct interdiction operations against the drug growers and traffickers, especially those in the Andean Ridge region. Ongoing efforts to establish the Colombian Counternarcotics Brigade, operate the Joint Peruvian Riverine Training Center, and improve regional aviation facilities were among the initiatives. Southern Command simultaneously developed its theater architecture to meet twenty-first-century requirements, and provided humanitarian assistance following a hurricane in Belize and an earthquake in El Salvador.

General Pace became the sixth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2001, the first Marine to hold that position. Once again, he found himself serving with General Richard B. Myers, USAF, who became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same day. Just three weeks earlier, on 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda operatives had launched multiple terrorist attacks against the United States, striking the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. As the nation prosecuted its Global War on Terrorism, Pace spent more time addressing strategic plans and policy than acquisition issues, a departure from the Vice Chairman’s traditional role.

Coalition forces launched military operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan on 7 October, toppling the radical Islamist regime three months later. As the administration shifted its attention to other nations that supported terrorism, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and Combatant Commands prepared for a strike against Iraq and its impact upon the nation’s global defense posture. While the Joint Chiefs evaluated US Central Command’s evolving operations plan, late changes in force composition complicated the preinvasion buildup. This required that Generals Myers and Pace seek Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s approval for hundreds of individual deployment orders. To remedy this situation and facilitate the anticipated redeployment of forces following the war, the Joint Staff J-8 began transitioning from the Timed Phased Force and Deployment Data System to a new Global Force Management System.

Coalition forces launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on 19 March 2003, occupied Baghdad on 9 April, and heard President George W. Bush declare an end to major combat operations on 1 May. Concurrently, during the Elaborate Crossbow exercise series, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and services considered postwar support requirements, force reconstitution plans, and their impact upon global security. Their findings contributed to a realignment of the nation’s defense posture in 2004; increasing the ability to source and surge capabilities cross-theater reduced the requirement to preposition forces to support regional combatant commanders during times of crisis.

Although fighting continued in Afghanistan and Iraq, both countries established fragile democracies and showed gradual gains. In Afghanistan, local delegates ratified a new constitution in January 2004, enabling its citizens to vote in presidential elections.
during September, followed by parliamentary elections a year later. In Iraq, citizens elected a National Assembly and Governorate Council during January 2005; the Assembly ratified Iraq’s new constitution in October 2005.

As Vice Chairman, General Pace also chaired the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which validated force capability requirements; cochaired the Defense Acquisition Board, which approved all major acquisition programs; and served on the National Security Council Deputies Committee, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee, and the Nuclear Weapons Council. As head of the JROC, General Pace replaced the aging Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment with a newer, more versatile Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) in 2003.

Conceptually linked to the Chairman’s Joint Operations Concepts, JCIDS promoted interoperability by identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing strategic capability gaps. To filter the flow of issues through subsidiary “capability” boards, General Pace appointed as “Gatekeeper” the Joint Staff J-8, Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment. He also instituted the use of operational availability analysis within the evaluation process, enabling the JROC to consider the sustainability of different capabilities when comparing alternatives and to avoid redundancy when fulfilling joint requirements. Board discussions opened to a wider portion of the interagency community.

The JROC also supported the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), an Office of the Secretary of Defense initiative to fulfill joint requirements that, if left unmet, could result in casualties or hamper near-term military missions. Combatant commands forwarded urgent operational needs to the Joint Staff J-8 for validation as immediate warfighting needs. The JRAC then filled the requirements within 120 days, often procuring off-the-shelf capabilities, such as protection from improvised explosive devices, side body armor, and Arabic interpreters.

On 30 September 2005 General Pace became the sixteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the first Marine to hold that position. His top priority was to win the war on terrorism by, in part, “assisting others to create good governance and the rule of law—shaping an environment that precludes the flourishing of terrorism.” He advocated broad-based collaboration as a tool to building and enhancing interagency relationships. He emphasized applying the military instrument in a way that would complement and strengthen the actions of other elements of national power. General Pace’s remaining priorities were to accelerate transformation, strengthen joint warfighting, and improve the quality of life of service members and their families. General Pace hired the first senior enlisted adviser to the chairman, Army Command Sergeant Major William J. Gainey. He published the “Chairman’s Planning Guidance” on 1 October 2005, the first ever comprehensive written guidance to the Joint Staff.

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review reflected this focus. In concert with efforts to defeat terrorist extremism, defend the homeland, counter weapons of mass destruction, and shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, the document advanced the shift toward expeditionary forces, highlighting a need for speed, agility, precision, and lethality when thwarting nontraditional or asymmetrical threats. It also accentuated the military’s supporting role during interagency stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, underscoring that the Department of Defense alone could not win the current conflict.

During July 2006 escalating violence in Afghanistan and Iraq prompted a comprehensive policy review. Early in January 2007, one month after Robert M. Gates succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defense, the Bush administration presented its “New Way Forward in Iraq.” This initiative, a strategic realignment to reverse deteriorating conditions in that theater of operations, emphasized the security and development aspects of the “clear, hold, and build” counterinsurgency strategy. It also strengthened the nation’s overall strategic reserve by raising thresholds for the Army and Marine Corps end strengths.
The first of five surge brigades reached Iraq during late January 2007. Six months later General Pace had an opportunity to observe the improvements in Iraq’s security situation firsthand. After visiting Baghdad and Ramadi he told reporters: “A sea change is taking place in many places here. It’s no longer a matter of pushing al-Qaeda out . . . but rather . . . helping the local police and local army . . . get their feet on the ground and set up their systems.”

General Pace retired on 1 October 2007, after more than forty years of active military service. In recognition of his contribution to the nation, President Bush presented him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom on 19 June 2008. Following retirement, Pace served on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Policy Board. He also held leadership positions in several corporations involved in management consulting, private equity, and information technology security, and taught as a visiting/adjunct faculty member at Kelley School of Business, Indiana University; Fordham University; and Georgetown University. He is co-founder and Chairman of Wall Street Warfighters Foundation and has held advisory positions with a number of other organizations designed to support the troops and their families, to include the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation, USO, American Corporate Partners, Snowball Express, and Our Military Kids.
### PROMOTIONS DATES

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<td>Rifle Platoon Commander and then Assistant</td>
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<td>Operations Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<td>Head, Infantry Writer Unit, Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute, and Platoon Leader, Special Ceremonial Platoon and Guard Company, and Camp David Security Detachment Commander and White House Social Aide at Marine Barracks, Washington, DC</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>Student, Infantry Officer’s Advanced Course, Nuclear and Chemical Target Analysis Course, and Basic Airborne Course, Fort Benning, GA</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>Operations Officer and then Executive Officer, Security Element, Marine Aircraft Group 15, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Nam Phong, Thailand</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>Assistant Major’s Monitor, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC</td>
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Operations Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, then
Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,
and then Staff Secretary, 1st Marine Division,
Camp Pendleton, CA ................................. 1976 .......... 1979

Student, Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
Quantico, VA ...................................... 1979 .......... 1980

Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting
Station, Buffalo, NY ............................... 1980 .......... 1983

Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment,
1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, CA .......... 1983 .......... 1985


Chief, Ground Forces Branch, Combined-Joint Staff,
and then Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Operations, United Nations Command-
Combined Forces Command-US Forces Korea-

Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks,

Chief of Staff and then Assistant Division
Commander, 2d Marine Division,

Served concurrently as President, Marine Corps
University and Commanding General, Marine
Corps Schools, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Quantico, VA.
Temporarily assigned as Deputy Commander,
and Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, US Forces
Japan, Yokota Air Base, Japan ......................... 1994 .......... 1996

Director for Operations, the Joint Staff,

Commander, US Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic-
Europe-South, Norfolk, VA .......................... 1997 .......... 2000

Commander in Chief, US Southern Command,
Miami, FL ........................................ 2000 .......... 2001

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC .................................. 2001 .......... 2005

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
PRINCIPLE US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal (with “V” device)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with gold star)
Navy Commendation Medal (with "V" device)
Navy Achievement Medal (with gold star)
Combat Action Ribbon

Parachutist
Michael Glenn Mullen
1 October 2007–30 September 2011

Michael Mullen was born in Los Angeles, California, on 4 October 1946. The son of a prominent Hollywood publicist, he was the eldest of five children. While attending Notre Dame High School in Sherman Oaks, he participated in service and social clubs and excelled in basketball, becoming the team’s most valuable player. Following high school he enrolled in the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. Midshipman Mullen graduated on 5 June 1968, earning a bachelor of science degree in systems engineering and a commission in the US Navy.

Ensign Mullen reported to San Diego, California, for ten weeks of training in military justice and antisubmarine warfare operations. He then joined the USS Collett (DD 730) in October 1968. Serving as an antisubmarine warfare officer, he oversaw employment of the ship’s Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter, an unmanned aircraft armed with torpedoes, designed to extend the destroyer’s stand-off attack capability. He was promoted to lieutenant (junior grade) in June 1969, and that September the destroyer sailed for a six-month deployment to the Western Pacific. As part of Seventh Fleet, the crew participated in operations off the coast of Vietnam, including naval gunfire in support of US Army, US Marine Corps, and South Vietnamese forces near Da Nang.

Admiral Michael G. Mullen
United States Navy
In February 1971 Lieutenant (junior grade) Mullen graduated from the Department Head Course 32 at Naval Destroyer School, Newport, Rhode Island. After completing a brief course in nuclear weapons at Norfolk, Virginia, he reported aboard the USS Blandy (DD 943) as Weapons Officer and was promoted to full lieutenant in July 1971. As part of Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Six, nicknamed “The Mod Squad,” the Blandy participated in an experimental program designed to give junior officers more responsibility by assigning them to billets normally held by personnel of greater rank. While serving consecutively as the ship’s Weapons and Operations Officer, Mullen participated in NATO operations in the Mediterranean, tracked Soviet ships in the Caribbean, and qualified to command destroyers.

After completing short courses in damage control and fleet petroleum operations in January 1973, Lieutenant Mullen assumed command of the USS Noxubee (AOG 56), a World War II–era gasoline tanker, home ported in Little Creek, Virginia. The crew provided replenishment services to the Atlantic Fleet and completed two successful deployments to the Mediterranean, including providing support to US Navy ships in the eastern Mediterranean during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Lieutenant Mullen returned to the US Naval Academy in July 1975. He served two years as a Company Officer for 150 midshipmen, with concurrent assignments as an instructor, a member of the admissions board, and assistant officer-in-charge for summer midshipman training. During his final year at
the academy, Mullen was promoted to lieutenant commander in October 1977 and became the Commandant’s executive assistant.

To prepare for his next assignment, Lieutenant Commander Mullen completed the five-month prospective engineer officer’s course at Idaho Falls, Idaho, and Great Lakes, Illinois. A month after graduation in October 1978, he reported aboard the USS Fox (CG 33), a guided missile cruiser homeported in Bremerton, Washington, as Chief Engineer. Mullen oversaw a fifteen-month overhaul of the ship’s propulsion system. The Fox deployed to the Western Pacific in September 1980 and served briefly as flagship in the Persian Gulf during the continuing crisis with revolutionary Iran. During the deployment, Mullen held concurrent responsibilities as the force antiair warfare commander for the USS Ranger Aircraft Carrier Battle Group.

In July 1981, after completing a short course in surface ship operations at Newport, Rhode Island, Lieutenant Commander Mullen became the Executive Officer of the USS Sterett (CG 31), homeported in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, while supporting Seventh Fleet operations in the Western Pacific. This involved battle group and multilateral exercises with partner nations, including Japan and the Republic of Korea, and included an encounter with a Vietnamese fishing boat that fired upon the task group. The Sterett also recovered Vietnamese nationals at sea who were fleeing from South Vietnam.

While attending the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, from January 1983 to March 1985, Lieutenant Commander Mullen advanced in grade to commander and earned a master of science degree in operations research. After completing a brief refresher course in ship operations at Newport, Rhode Island, Mullen transferred to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and took command of the USS Goldsboro (DDG 20) in June 1985. The guided missile destroyer executed Third Fleet operations until August 1986, when it deployed to the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf. As part of the Middle East Force from November to January 1987, the crew conducted maritime security operations during the Iraq-Iran conflict. In recognition of his performance while commanding afloat, Mullen received the Pacific Fleet’s 1987 Vice Admiral Stockdale Leadership Award.

Commander Mullen returned to Newport in October 1987. After completing the integrated warfare course for postcommand officers at the Naval War College, in December he assumed the duties of Director of the Surface Warfare Division Officer Course. Promoted to captain in September 1989, Mullen transferred to Washington, DC, where he became the Navy’s staff assistant to the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). He was involved in modernization initiatives such as the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, the AEGIS SPY-1B radar testing and evaluation, improvements to the Standard Missile capabilities, Seawolf-class submarine, and Tomahawk missile programs. As OSD pursued its new “Fly-before-Buy” procurement strategy, he proved especially adept at enhancing evaluation methods, drafting technical assessments for the Defense Acquisition Board, and briefing members of Congress.

Captain Mullen next completed the 11 week Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School in November 1991, followed by command refresher training in Rhode Island and Virginia. In April 1992 he assumed command of the AEGIS guided missile cruiser USS Yorktown (CG 48), that year’s Atlantic Fleet winner of the Marjorie Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall readiness. With the Cold War ended, the ship visited Severomorsk, Russia, and trained with the Romanian and Bulgarian navies. The crew earned an award for battle efficiency during 1993, while conducting counter-drug operations in the Caribbean as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) 4 and maritime interdiction operations off Haiti as part of JTF-120 during Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY.

Returning to Washington in February 1994, Captain Mullen served as Director of the Surface Officer Distribution Division at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. This was a tumultuous period, characterized by reductions in personnel, resources, and ultimately
The duties as commander of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) Aircraft Carrier Battle Group. The battle group participated in inter-deployment training as part of the Atlantic Fleet until October 1997, when it deployed to the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf. George Washington participated in multi-battle group operations in the Gulf as the cornerstone of US Central Command’s military presence in the Middle East. The readiness of US forces helped convince Saddam Hussein to allow United Nations weapons inspectors into Iraq.

Newly promoted Rear Admiral (upper half) Mullen returned to the Office of the CNO in May 1998, this time as Director of the Surface Warfare Division (N-86). Inheriting a reduced force with growing littoral responsibilities, he told Congress, “We can no longer safely mortgage our future readiness by further deferring recapitalization and modernization.” Advocating a “measured revolution” that acknowledged fiscal limitations, he addressed retention issues through systems automation, continuation pay, and
reduced seatime. He also sought a modest increase in shipbuilding and installed new technologies aboard existing vessels. Among several key twenty-first-century initiatives were the tactical Tomahawk cruise missile, theater ballistic missile defense, and the multimission DD-21 destroyer programs.

In October 2000 Vice Admiral Mullen accepted concurrent command of the US Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, embarked upon the USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20). The Second Fleet operated from the North to the South poles and as far east as Europe. Besides training the Atlantic battle fleet, evaluating new tactics, and maintaining battle group readiness, Mullen could also assemble JTF-120 to address emergent regional crises. The Striking Fleet maintained maritime superiority in the Atlantic and guaranteed NATO's sea lines of communication.

Vice Admiral Mullen returned to Washington in August 2001 as the Deputy CNO for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N-8) in the Office of the CNO. During his two-and-a-half-year tenure, Mullen improved the efficiency of the Navy's acquisition process and identified program cuts to recapitalize funding for force modernization and transformation. A principal architect of Sea Power 21, the CNO's strategic vision to address twenty-first-century threats, he advocated for a Global Concept of Operations that reconfigured naval forces to create additional expeditionary strike groups. This enabled the fleet to expand its geographic scope of influence and enhance the nation's deterrence capability.

Following his promotion to admiral in August 2003, Mullen was appointed Vice CNO. He represented Navy interests as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and led implementation of the CNO's Fleet Response Plan, designed to replace rigid Cold War–era training, maintenance, and deployment cycles with a more flexible timetable that increased the fleet’s surge capacity.

In October 2004 Admiral Mullen took concurrent command of US Naval Forces, Europe, and Allied Joint Force Command, situated in Naples, Italy. In this dual role he commanded the Combined and Joint NATO Force in the Balkans (17,000 troops in Kosovo), coordinated ongoing NATO counterterrorism efforts in the Mediterranean during Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, and stood up the first NATO training missions in Iraq (NTM-I). This varied experience provided a fresh understanding of the dynamic global changes and an appreciation of the need for a secure environment to allow democracy an opportunity to flourish.

Eight months later, on 22 July 2005, Admiral Mullen became the twenty-eighth CNO. His initial guidance to the Navy identified three priorities: sustaining combat readiness, building a fleet for the future, and developing twenty-first-century leaders. Readiness meant maintaining a responsive force—ships and personnel—with a wide range of operational capabilities.

Dedicated to developing the Sea Power 21 vision, Admiral Mullen began to “build today a force that is properly sized, balanced, and priced for tomorrow.” To bolster the nation's flagging shipbuilding industry, he recommended replacement of aging vessels and expansion of the current fleet to 313 ships by 2020. Much of the fleet’s anticipated growth was linked to a new multimission littoral combat ship, which would reduce costs and improve the Navy’s capability to deal with terrorist threats and humanitarian crises worldwide.

Admiral Mullen also championed revamping the National Fleet Policy between the Navy and Coast Guard and led the naval services to update the unified maritime strategy in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” The global strategy established dispersed fleet stations to build international relationships and sustain the joint fleet’s constant forward presence. Acknowledging growing requirements for interoperability among maritime nations sharing similar interests, Mullen proposed that allies collaborate to form a “Thousand Ship Navy” to secure the “global maritime commons.” He envisioned a “free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners” facilitated by the implementation of an automatic identification system for ships at sea and the creation of a Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center.
Admiral Mullen became the seventeenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2007. He arrived in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism and immediately established three priorities that would resonate throughout his four-year tenure as Chairman. His first priority was to develop a strategy to protect the nation’s interests in the Middle East, then dominated by the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As CNO, Admiral Mullen supported President George W. Bush’s temporary troop surge in Iraq, support that was made possible through the Chiefs’ collective insistence that the surge would be accompanied by economic development and political reconciliation. During his confirmation hearings for Chairman, he testified that America’s ground forces were severely strained, but defeat would strengthen the nation’s adversaries and further undermine Middle East stability.

Security conditions in Iraq had improved by the fall of 2007, enabling the additional US forces to start their gradually withdraw. Nonetheless, Admiral Mullen made clear that the Iraqi security forces still needed American military assistance to counter insurgent and terrorist violence. A base force would have to remain in place until the Iraqis were sufficiently trained and equipped. In November 2008, after much debate, the Iraqi Parliament accepted a status of forces agreement with the United States that restricted US combat operations and called for an intermediate withdrawal of American forces from major cities by June 2009, followed by their complete departure by the end of 2011.

Relegated by necessity to an economy of force mission, the situation in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan worsened during 2007. Frustrated by NATO shortfalls in capability and capacity, Admiral Mullen called for “a well-coordinated counterinsurgency strategy.” He also started an effort for alternative logistics supply to reduce reliance on Pakistan. As the Bush administration reassessed its military and diplomatic strategies the following year, Mullen acknowledged that coalition forces were losing ground and advocated greater involvement. “In Afghanistan, we do what we can,” he told members of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in December 2007. “In Iraq, we do what we must.”

Shortly after his inauguration in 2009, President Obama shifted the military’s focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, presented a new counterinsurgency strategy for the region, and increased the number of deployed forces. He pledged collaboration with Pakistan in the fight against terrorism and emphasis on more resources for training security forces, fighting government corruption, and combating drug trafficking in Afghanistan.

By January Admiral Mullen was repeatedly warning about the detrimental effect that poor governance and corruption was having on the population. “Despite a dramatic increase in our civilian presence in Afghanistan this past year,” Mullen told members of the HASC in February 2011, “improvements in sub-national governance and reconstruction have not kept pace with progress in improving security. This has impeded our ability to hold, build and transfer.”

There were further gains in security—particularly in the south and east over the spring—and a robust effort to continue to grow and develop competent Afghan security forces. Admiral Mullen worked with special operations forces to provide options for President Barack H. Obama in the spring of 2011, the execution of which resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden. Together these developments made it possible for Admiral Mullen to support President Obama’s plan to withdraw US troops and turn over security to Afghan forces by 2014. He advised, however, that the drawdown did not occur too swiftly.

Admiral Mullen’s second priority as Chairman was to improve the health of the force by balancing current requirements against future national security threats. The toll taken on US ground forces during protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan particularly worried him, and Mullen questioned their readiness to fight a high-intensity war against a major adversary. Besides repairing or replacing worn out equipment, he proposed increasing the interval between deployments, training to full-spectrum operations, and
addressing the welfare of service members and their families, especially the needs of the combat wounded and families of the fallen. Mindful of the costs of such initiatives, he suggested that the country devote additional resources to national security and considered a defense budget pegged at 4 percent of its gross domestic product the absolute minimum.

The recession in 2008 challenged modernization efforts, compelling Admiral Mullen to acknowledge that the federal debt represented “the single biggest threat to national security.” During the next three years the Chairman and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates aggressively trimmed expensive, redundant, or failing programs in order to recapitalize funds for higher priority requirements. They curtailed multiple high-technology items, disestablished US Joint Forces Command, and ultimately reduced the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps to support the all-volunteer force, meet current operational needs, and address the most-likely future threats. Nevertheless, in April 2011 President Obama ordered another $400 billion in reductions over the next twelve years. Admiral Mullen agreed that the Defense Department should contribute to resolving the nation’s deficit crisis and believed that it could responsibly manage a build-down, but he worried that reckless cuts could hollow the military.

Admiral Mullen voiced concern over a widening gulf between the military and the public. The military enjoyed what he called a “Sea of Goodwill” on the part of the American people, but only a small percentage of the general population had a personal connection to those in uniform. He urged communities to embrace returning veterans, and he called on the military to remember their own duties of citizenship as well.

During his January 2010 State of the Union Address, President Obama pledged to end Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, a policy that barred gays and lesbians from serving openly in the military. A week later, Admiral Mullen endorsed the President’s plan before members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, testifying, “no matter how I look at the issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we
Admiral Mullen’s third priority was to balance strategic risk around the globe. His 2011 National Military Strategy envisioned “a ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized more by shifting interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power, than by rigid security competition between opposing blocks.” In this dynamic environment, he advocated an interagency approach to foreign policy in which military leaders played a wide range of supporting roles. Chinese military modernization and expansion, and North Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation, he believed, presented particularly significant risks to regional stability and open access to

have in place a policy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens.”

In November a comprehensive Pentagon study concluded that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly would present minimal risk to military effectiveness. President Obama subsequently signed the repeal into law on 22 December and nine months later, after Admiral Mullen, Secretary Leon E. Panetta, and President Obama “certified” to Congress that the military was ready to execute the new policy, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell officially ended on 20 September 2011.

Admiral Mullen and General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, congratulate each other on signing a memorandum of understanding on combating terrorism in St. Petersburg on 6 May 2011.
the global commons. To mitigate these risks he proposed a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable expeditionary force capable of conducting full-spectrum operations with its international partners. The establishment of US Africa Command in 2007 and US Cyber Command in 2010 reflected the wide range of emerging twenty-first-century challenges.

Admiral Mullen was an active military diplomat and statesman, encouraging improved military-to-military relations throughout the world. He met frequently with the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, leading efforts to establish a more collaborative association with that country. He also led the US delegations that successfully negotiated nuclear arms reductions (New Start Treaty) with the Russians; met with the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean chiefs to ease tensions in East Asia; and laid the groundwork for increasing America’s presence in the Pacific.

Perhaps his greatest diplomatic challenge occurred during the Arab Spring of 2011, when a wave of popular uprisings confronted authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East. He encouraged tolerance and decried escalating violence. Once President Obama decided to support the UN Security Council’s resolution to protect civilians in Libya, he led NATO and Arab allies to quickly establish a no-fly zone and supported subsequent operations that resulted in the demise of the Qaddafi regime.

Admiral Mullen left office on 1 October 2011. He retired one month later, after serving over forty-three years in uniform.
### PROMOTIONS

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<tr>
<td>Student, Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare School, San Diego, CA</td>
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<td>Anti-Submarine Officer, USS <em>Collett</em></td>
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<td>Student, Naval Destroyer School, Newport, RI</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>Student, Nuclear Weapons Training Group, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>Weapons and Operations Officer, USS <em>Blandy</em></td>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>Student, Damage Control Course, Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student, Fleet Petroleum School, Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, VA</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>Student, Staff, Commander Service Force, US Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, VA</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>Commanding Officer, USS <em>Noxubee</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Company Officer and Executive Assistant to the Commandant, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD</td>
<td>1975</td>
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Student, Ship Material Readiness Group,
   Idaho Falls, ID ................................... 1978 .......... 1978

Engineering Officer, USS Fox ........................... 1978 .......... 1981

Student, Surface Warfare Officers School
   Command, Newport, RI ........................... 1981 .......... 1981

Executive Officer, USS Sterett .......................... 1981 .......... 1983

Student, Naval Postgraduate School,
   Monterey, CA .................................... 1983 .......... 1985

Student, Surface Warfare Officers School
   Command, Newport, RI ........................... 1985 .......... 1985

Commanding Officer, USS Goldsboro ........................ 1985 .......... 1987

Student, Naval War College, Newport, RI ................. 1987 .......... 1987

Director, Surface Warfare Division Officer Course,
   Surface Warfare Officers School Command,
   Newport, RI .................................. 1987 .......... 1989

Military Staff Assistant to the Director,
   Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the

Student, Harvard University Advanced

Student, Surface Warfare Officers School

Student, Tactical Training Group Atlantic,
   Naval Air Station Oceana, VA ...................... 1991 .......... 1991

Student, Commander, Naval Surface Force
   Atlantic, Norfolk, VA ................................ 1991 .......... 1992

Student, Aegis Training Center, Dahlgren, VA ........... 1992 .......... 1992

Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown ...................... 1992 .......... 1994

Director, Surface Officer Distribution Division,

Director, Surface Warfare Plans, Programs, and
   Requirements Division, Office of the Chief of

Deputy Director, Surface Warfare Division, Office
   of the Chief of Naval Operations,

Student, Tactical Training Group Atlantic,
   Naval Air Station Oceana, VA ...................... 1996 .......... 1996

Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO and
Director, Surface Warfare Division, Office of the
Commander, US Second Fleet and NATO Striking
   Fleet Atlantic, Norfolk, VA ......................... 2000 .......... 2001
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,
   Requirements, and Assessments, Office of the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Office of the
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe, and Allied
   Joint Force Command, Naples, Italy ................. 2004 .......... 2005
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

**PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with gold star)
Distinguished Service Medal (with gold star)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with silver star)
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy Commendation Medal
Navy Achievement Medal

Surface Warfare Officer
Martin Edward Dempsey
1 October 2011–30 September 2015

Martin Dempsey was born in Bayonne, New Jersey, in 1952. He was one of five siblings whose father worked as a ware-houseman and postman and whose mother worked in a department store. The family relocated to Greenwood Lake, New York, during his early teens. He later attended John S. Burke Catholic High School in nearby Goshen where he excelled in track, basketball, and as a member of the concert band. Upon graduation he entered the US Military Academy at West Point. As a cadet he played lacrosse and participated in the French Language Club, the Year Book Staff, and the Fine Arts Forum. In 1974 he was awarded a bachelor’s degree and commissioned a second lieutenant of armor in the United States Army.

After completing the Armor Officer Basic Course and Airborne School, Lieutenant Dempsey reported to the 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in Bindlach, Germany. As a scout platoon leader responsible for conducting reconnaissance along the Czechoslovakian–West German border, he was recognized as the regiment’s outstanding junior officer. Later he led the squadron’s logistical support-platoon and eventually became the unit’s adjutant.
Captain Dempsey completed the Armor Officer Advanced Course in 1979 and joined 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, at Fort Carson, Colorado. He held a variety of staff and command assignments over the next three years including Motor Officer, Operations Officer, and Commander of both Alpha and Headquarters Troops. During this period the Army was deeply involved in adjusting to the All-Volunteer Force, revising its doctrine, and adding rigor to combined-arms maneuver training.

In 1982 Captain Dempsey enrolled in Duke University. Two years later, having earned a master’s degree in English literature, he was assigned to the faculty at West Point. As an associate professor he developed and taught a variety of English classes and contributed to an Army-wide initiative to revise the writing curriculum at all officer basic and advanced courses. Additional schooling at the Army’s Command and General Staff College followed. In his master’s thesis at the college he examined the meaning of duty and its essential place.
within the military profession, a theme that would resonate throughout his career.

Major Dempsey returned to Germany in 1988, this time as the Executive Officer of 4th Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment. A year later he became the Operations Officer and later Executive Officer of 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division. This assignment included combat operations during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, as the brigade participated in the Allied Forces’ strategic flanking movement through western Iraq into northern Kuwait. For his contributions during battle with two Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions, he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Dempsey assumed command of 4th Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment. This period presented him with the dual challenges of maintaining combat readiness and adjusting to the largest reduction of force structure in Europe since World War II.

In 1993, Lieutenant Colonel Dempsey began his first of several Washington, DC, assignments, this one at Army Personnel Command. As Armor Branch Chief he oversaw the assignment, career management, and professional development of all company and field-grade officers in that occupational field. He entered the National War College two years later and shortly thereafter was promoted to colonel. Upon graduation from the National War College, where he graduated as a Distinguished Graduate and with his third master’s degree, he took command of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Carson. In this role he had the distinction of being the Army’s “senior scout.”

Assigned to the Joint Staff in 1998, Colonel Dempsey first served in the Strategic Plans and
Policy Directorate (J-5) as Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs for Europe and Africa. He participated in President William J. “Bill” Clinton’s Africa Crisis Response Initiative, helped redefine the NATO Strategic Concept, and contributed to national security policies involving Bosnia, Kosovo, and Nigeria. A year later he was selected to be the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, USA. In that capacity he assisted the Chairman in preparing the Joint Force for operations in the twenty-first century.

In September 2001, Brigadier General Dempsey embarked on what would become a series of sequential wartime assignments in the Middle East. As Manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Mobilization Program from 2001 to 2003, he served as military advisor to Crown Prince Abdullah and was responsible for facilitating the training and equipping of the elite force tasked with protecting the royal family. Quickly becoming the principal conduit between the Saudi and United States governments, his efforts proved critical in acquiring the Arab-nation’s acceptance of a ten-year strategic vision for their relationship with the United States Army.

Command of 1st Armored Division followed in June 2003. He took command of Task Force Iron, one of the largest in Army history, two months after they had arrived in Baghdad, Iraq. During the summer of 2003, the Iron Soldiers worked to provide security and improve public works in and around Baghdad despite escalating insurgent activity and the appearance of armed militias. While the division was deploying back to Germany in April 2004, the first of what would be a series of Shia Militia uprisings occurred. As a result, the division’s deployment was extended from twelve to sixteen months, and nearly 2,000 troopers who had already redeployed to Germany...
were called back into action. Quickly reconstituting combat power, the division turned south and were successful in battling Moqtada Al Sadr and his Mahdi Army to a standstill. Brigadier General Dempsey was awarded a Combat Action Badge and the Bronze Star Medal with “V” device in recognition of this service. He was promoted to major general that September and completed his command tour in Germany.

Lieutenant General Dempsey began his second tour in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom during August 2005. Concurrently, he commanded the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq (MNSTC-I) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Iraq. While driving Iraq’s military and police leaders toward self-sufficiency and building institutional capability in Iraq’s Ministries of Defense and Interior, he oversaw the manning, training, equipping and mentoring of their Army and Civil Police Forces. Developing doctrine and instituting educational programs to enhance professionalism among the nascent Iraq Security Forces was a key aspect of that undertaking as was his success in enrolling the government of Iraq in the United States Foreign Military Sales program to ensure they responsibly spent their own growing defense budget.

After twenty-two months in command of MNSTC-I, Lieutenant General Dempsey was appointed Deputy Commander and then, in March 2008, Acting Commander of US Central Command. As security conditions improved in Iraq, but deteriorated in Afghanistan, he planned and coordinated the initial strategic realignment of Coalition forces between the two theaters of operations. During this time he also established the Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare to integrate multiagency efforts against terrorist networks throughout the Central region.

On 8 December 2008, General Dempsey received his fourth star and took command of the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. By allowing subordinate commanders to make more operational decisions he enabled the command to more effectively address both current challenges and future requirements. After seven years of combat, updates to the Army’s Capstone, Operating, and Learning concepts stressed the importance of maintaining a competitive advantage by developing independent—yet collaborative—leaders who could anticipate and adapt to change when operating under conditions of uncertainty and complexity in an era of persistent conflict. He successfully promoted “Mission Command” as a replacement to “Command and Control” in Army Doctrine. He led an institutional self-assessment of what it meant to be professional soldiers in the twenty-first century.

When General Dempsey was appointed thirty-seventh Chief of Staff of the Army on 11 April 2011, those concepts informed his plans for moving the Service forward. Other important initiatives included reducing the duration of operational deployments from twelve to nine months and realigning brigades with their parent units.

General Dempsey became the eighteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2011. America had by that time begun to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and was only months away from ending its involvement in Iraq to focus more prominently upon growing concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. Congress had just enacted the Budget Control Act of 2011, which mandated dramatic reductions in government spending over the next decade. Amidst those and other changes occurring worldwide (climate change, demographic shifts, rapid technological change, and major shifts in the global economy), the new Chairman sensed the approach of a “strategic inflection point,” whereby shifting circumstances would fundamentally alter the nature of America’s presence on the global stage. Consistent with his previous guidance to the Army, he directed the Joint Force to define and then prepare for its future role in an increasingly competitive security environment. His stated priorities included fulfilling existing obligations, adapting the Joint Force to twenty-first century challenges, rekindling the commitment of leaders to the profession of arms, and keeping faith with the military family.

General Dempsey’s insights contributed to the
Defense Department’s presidentially directed strategic review, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense* (2012). Crafted as a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, it highlighted the need to recalibrate current capabilities and make selective investments that enabled the force to surge and regenerate capacities at future flashpoints. Partnering would continue to be a central strategy, as America and its allies pooled specialized capabilities and sought innovative, lower-cost, and sustainable approaches to shared security interests in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.

In *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, General Dempsey drew from lessons learned during ten years of war to propose “globally integrated operations” as a means to attain those goals. By integrating emerging capabilities with “new ways of fighting and partnering,” he envisioned “globally postured forces” that could transcend “domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations” to rapidly and seamlessly “form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements in time and space.” The Chairman continued to develop this concept through a series of follow-on white papers on education, professionalism, mission command, information environment, air and missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Facing a $487 billion reduction in defense funding over nine years, General Dempsey sought a strategic balance between capability and capacity. The resulting budget proposal planned for a gradual transition to a
smaller and more affordable force, although investment in space, cyberspace, long-range precision strike capabilities, and special operation forces would continue. Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and the Chairman warned that additional spending cuts would jeopardize their carefully calculated defense strategy, but congressional inability to agree upon a plan to reduce the nation’s budget deficit triggered sequestration, another ten-year, across-the-board, $500 billion reduction in funding in March 2013. While the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 partially mitigated the effects of sequestration through fiscal year 2015, the Joint Chiefs recognized the need to solicit Congressional support for reducing infrastructure, retiring weapons systems, and slowing the growth of compensation packages in an effort to recapture funds necessary for readiness and modernization. However, only 40% of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were accepted, and readiness suffered.

Popular uprisings in Syria during March 2011—part of the wider Arab Spring movement—had escalated into armed rebellion against the totalitarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad by the time General Dempsey took office. Drawing from his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Chairman warned that American intervention could accelerate the conflict and possibly lead to an unstable state. Although he and other members of the National Security Council initially advocated a proposal to arm pro-democracy rebels, as the situation deteriorated Dempsey advised that it had become difficult to identify which groups to support. President Barack H. Obama ultimately chose to pursue a political solution via diplomatic and economic means, but cautioned the Syrian government against employing weapons of mass destruction.

In August 2013, the world learned of deadly chemical attacks near Damascus. While Secretary of State John F. Kerry appealed for military strikes to degrade Assad’s chemical capability, General Dempsey noted that military action should be considered as part of a broader coalition and whole-of-government campaign or it “could inadvertently empower extremists or unleash the very chemical weapons we seek to control.” While presenting strike options as requested, he also proposed increased support to regional partners, humanitarian assistance, and the training of a moderate opposition force while preserving the ability to strike unilaterally when intelligence revealed threats to US persons and facilities at home and abroad. Syria averted reprisal by agreeing to relinquish its chemical arsenal a month later, in an arrangement brokered though Russia and sanctioned by the UN.

Emergent crises during 2014 increased the uncertainty of global security. In late February, protestors seeking closer ties with the European Union seized Ukrainian government facilities in Kyiv and ousted President Viktor Yanukovych from power. Russia surreptitiously mobilized its military to support separatist movements in southeastern Ukraine, and annexed Crimea following a dubious referendum to secede. General Dempsey emphasized the changing security environment in Eastern Europe and shared his concern that Russia’s aggressiveness had likely ignited a fire of nationalism in Europe that could fuel the conflict’s spread. Although the administration preferred to resolve the situation through diplomatic means, the Chairman advised that the military had a role to play. Europe could no longer afford to be complacent, he declared, and America would likely have to “put forces back into Europe . . . substantial enough to allow us to deter Russian aggression against our NATO allies.” In September, as the United States sought to demonstrate its continued commitment to collective security through Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, NATO approved a Readiness Action Plan that included “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance,” and enhancement of the organization’s Response Force.

When the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized vast territories in northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq that summer, General Dempsey supported a strategy to initially contain, then degrade, and ultimately defeat the former al-Qaeda affiliate. While stressing the need for a whole-of-government approach to get at the underlying
issues that had created ISIL, he provided the administration with military options to place pressure on the growing and transregional threat. In particular, he emphasized that as a priority we should enable regional partners with our unique capabilities including air power, special operations forces, trainers, intelligence, and logistics. Further he advised that if US ground force were to be employed in a direct combat role it should be in support of state and substate regional partners, for discrete periods of time, and in offensive operations to achieve strategic effect.” He expressed the military judgment that the ISIL threat would require a transregional strategy at a sustainable level of effort for a decade-long campaign. During the first year of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL halted the enemy's advance and began to liberate population centers along the periphery of the contested areas.

At the same time, an Ebola outbreak in West Africa quickly reached epidemic proportions that threatened world health. General Dempsey anticipated the formation of an international medical relief effort and initiated planning to identify possible courses of action, which facilitated the launch of Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE in September. Resisting a desire within the interagency to involve military personnel in direct patient care, the Chairman affirmed that the Joint Force would instead leverage its unique capabilities. By adding speed and scale to the civilian-led intervention, the military expedited the buildup of medical capacity and capability in the troubled region. The military also constructed treatment centers, provided mobile laboratories, and trained hundreds of healthcare workers.

Other issues faced by the Chairman on a continuing basis included cybersecurity, Chinese militarization and territorial expansion, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies in North Korea and Iran. In a realm where cyberattacks had become the norm and America now faced peer-competitors, he championed the build up of military cyber capability and warned of weaknesses within the civilian infrastructure. With Congress he encouraged greater integration of national efforts and legislation to encourage sharing of information between the public and private sectors. General Dempsey also worked to strengthen military ties with China, but remained firm that the United States would honor its alliances and respond to threats in the Pacific, “because we can and should, and . . . have to.” He likewise acknowledged that although a negotiated nuclear agreement with Iran was preferable to military strikes, he was cognizant of Iran's other malign activities and would sustain military options in case they became necessary. In the foreword to the 2015 update of The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, General Dempsey observed that the United States’ comparative military advantage in certain domains had begun to erode while the global security environment had become more unpredictable than at any other period during his career. America’s aspirations exceeded its available resources, he said, and unless military funding were increased and regularized during Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond, the nation would have to reconsider the aims of its security strategy.

General Dempsey retired on 1 October 2015, after forty-one years in uniform. When some bystanders described him as a “reluctant warrior” he knowingly responded that “a military leader should always understand that of all human endeavors, the one that’s most unpredictable and the most costly is warfare.” Shortly after leaving office he was appointed Chairman of the Junior National Basketball Association’s Leadership Council. He was also named a 2016 Rubenstein Fellow at Duke University, to teach courses on civil-military relations, management, and leadership.
Martin E. Dempsey  
General, USA

## PROMOTIONS

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## ASSIGNMENTS

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<td>Cadet, US Military Academy, West Point, NY</td>
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<td>Student, Armor Officer Basic Course, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY</td>
<td>1974 .......... 1975</td>
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<td>Platoon Leader, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany</td>
<td>1975 .......... 1976</td>
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<td>Motor Officer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO</td>
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S-3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry,
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters
Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO ............... 1981 .......... 1982
Graduate Student, Duke University, Durham, NC ........ 1982 .......... 1984
Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of
English, US Military Academy, West Point, NY ....... 1984 ........ 1987
Student, US Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, KS ......................... 1987 ........ 1988
Executive Officer, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor,
3d Armored Division, US Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Germany .................................. 1988 .......... 1989
Operations Officer, later Executive Officer,
3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division, US Army
Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
(Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM,
Saudi Arabia) ............................................. 1989 ........ 1991
Commander, 4th Battalion, 67th Armor,
1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, US Army
Europe and Seventh Army, Germany ................. 1991 ........ 1993
Chief, Armor Branch, Combat Arms Division,
Officer Personnel Management Directorate,
US Total Army Personnel Command,
Alexandria, VA .......................................... 1993 ........ 1995
Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J.
McNair, Washington, DC ............................ 1995 .......... 1996
Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment,
Fort Carson, CO ...................................... 1996 .......... 1998
Assistant Deputy Director for Politico Military
Affairs, Europe and Africa (J-5), the Joint Staff,
Washington, DC ....................................... 1998 ........ 1999
Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC ....... 1999 ........ 2001
Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard
Commanding General, 1st Armored Division,
US Army Europe and Seventh Army
(Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) ....................... 2003 ........ 2004
Commanding General, 1st Armored Division,
   US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany ........ 2004 ........ 2005
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition
   Command Iraq and NATO Training Mission
   Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) ...................... 2005 ........ 2007
Deputy Commander, later Acting Commander, US
   Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL .......... 2007 ........ 2008
Commanding General, US Army Training and
   Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA .................. 2008 ........ 2011
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
   Washington, DC ....................................... 2011 ........ 2015

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with 5 oak leaf clusters)
Navy and Marine Corps Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star Medal (with "V" device and oak leaf cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal (with oak leaf cluster)

Combat Action Badge
Parachutist
Joseph Dunford, Jr., was born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1955. After graduating from Boston College High School in 1973 he entered Saint Michael’s College in Vermont and participated in the Platoon Leader’s Class program. Upon graduation he was commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve on 29 May 1977.

As a company grade officer, General Dunford held infantry commands in the 1st, 9th, and 6th Marine Regiments, and served as the Operations, Plans, and Training Officer at 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. He also fulfilled staff duties at III Marine Amphibious Force and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), completed the Amphibious Warfare School, and earned a master’s degree in government from Georgetown University. Having demonstrated his capacity as a leader, he received a regular commission and was assigned as the Marine Officer Instructor at the College of the Holy Cross.
As a field grade officer, General Dunford alternated between operational and staff assignments. After earning a second master’s degree in international relations from Tufts University, he was appointed Senior Aide-de-Camp to General Carl E. Mundy, thirtieth Commandant of the Marine Corps. Returning to the Fleet Marine Forces, he was 6th Marine Regiment’s Executive Officer before taking command of its 2d Battalion in 1996. During successive Pentagon assignments he was the Executive Assistant to General Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, fourth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then Chief of the Global and Multilateral Affairs Division of the Joint Staff’s Strategic Plans.
and Policy Directorate (J-5). He led the 5th Marine Regiment during its march on Baghdad in 2003, as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and later served as Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Division. During this period in his career, he completed both the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (nonresident) and the US Army War College.

General Dunford advanced to flag rank on 1 January 2005, while serving as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division. Executive assignments in Washington followed: Director of the Operations Division at HQMC; Vice Director of the Joint Staff’s Operations Directorate (J-3), and—upon receipt of his third star—Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations at HQMC. In September 2009, he took command of I Marine Expeditionary Force and US Marine Corps Forces Central Command, and provided leadership during the escalation of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Promoted to General in October 2010, he next served as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. In February 2013, he assumed command of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force and US Forces in Afghanistan, and oversaw the transition to Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT. He was appointed thirty-sixth Commandant of the Marine Corps in October 2014 and became the nineteenth Chairman of the JCS one year later.
Joseph F. Dunford, Jr  
General, USMC

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<td>From</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student, The Basic School, and then the Infantry Officer’s Course, Quantico, VA</td>
<td>1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, Executive Officer, and then Company Commander, Company K, 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Camp Pendleton, CA</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>Aide, Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Okinawa, Japan</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>Administration Officer and Head, Reserve, Retention, and Reenlistment Unit, Headquarters Marines Corps, (HQMC) Washington, DC</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student, Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, VA</td>
<td>1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company Commander, 3d Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, Camp Lejeune, NC</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>Operations, Plans, and Training Officer, 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, Camp Lejeune, NC</td>
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Student, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University, Medford, MA .......................... 1991 .......... 1992

Commandant of the Marine Corps Staff Group,

Senior Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the

Executive Officer, 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine
Division, Camp Lejeune, NC .............................. 1995 .......... 1996

Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment,


Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chief, Global and
Multilateral Affairs Division, Strategic Plans
and Policy Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff,
Washington, DC ........................................ 1999 .......... 2001

Commanding Officer, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine
Division, Camp Pendleton, CA .......................... 2001 .......... 2003

Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division, Camp
Pendleton, CA ........................................... 2003 .......... 2004

Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine
Division, Camp Pendleton, CA .......................... 2004 .......... 2005

Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policy and,

Vice Director, Operations Directorate (J-3),

Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies,

Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary
Force; and Commander, US Marine Corps
Forces Central Command,
Camp Pendleton, CA ...................................... 2009 .......... 2010

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps,

Commander (concurrently) of NATO
International Security Assistance Force-
Afghanistan and US Forces-Afghanistan,
Kabul, Afghanistan ........................................ 2013 .......... 2014

Commandant of the Marine Corps, HQMC,
Washington, DC .......................................... 2014 .......... 2015

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ....... 2015 .......... Present
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (1 oak leaf cluster)
Legion of Merit (with “V” device)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with gold star)
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (with 3 gold stars)
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Combat Action Ribbon

Ranger
Parachutist
THE VICE CHAIRMEN
Robert Herres was born on 1 December 1932 in Denver, Colorado. His father had taught Morse code to Army aviators in World War I, and Herres’s older brother graduated from the US Military Academy. Graduating from East High School in Denver, Herres applied for appointments to both West Point and the US Naval Academy, winning appointment to the latter in 1950. During the summer before his final year as a midshipman, he learned to fly seaplanes over the Chesapeake Bay. Enthralled by flying and eager to begin flight training immediately upon graduation, Herres exercised an option available before the establishment of the Air Force Academy and entered the Air Force as a second lieutenant after graduating from the Naval Academy in 1954. Following flight training, Lieutenant Herres flew F-86 fighters for the next three years.

General Robert T. Herres
United States Air Force
After earning a master’s degree in electrical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, in 1958, Herres was promoted to captain in 1959 and to major five years later. From 1960 to 1963 he was assigned as an analyst at the US European Command Electronic Intelligence Center, Lindsey Air Station, West Germany, where he developed estimates of the technical capabilities of Soviet bloc forces. After a year in flight operations at Chateauroux Air Station in France, he entered the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. During this period he also earned a master’s degree in public administration from George Washington University.

Herres was selected as an astronaut-pilot in the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program in 1966. Promoted in February 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Herres graduated from the Aerospace Research Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, California, where he flew F-104 Starfighters and a variety of other aircraft. Moving to the MOL program at Los Angeles Air Force Station, California, he served from August 1967 to August 1969 as an aerospace research flight test officer, Chief of the Flight Crew Division, and Assistant to the Deputy Program Director for Test Operations.

He was promoted to colonel in November 1968 and, on cancellation of the MOL program in June 1969, became Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Requirements at the Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base. From 1970 to 1971 Herres attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, where he helped draft a text on the military uses of space.

In 1971 Colonel Herres became Vice Commander of Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) 449th Bombardment Wing, Kincheloe Air Force Base, Michigan, flying B-52 bombers, and was appointed wing commander in February 1973. In April 1973 he left Kincheloe to command the 310th Strategic Wing (Provisional) at U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Air Field, Thailand, where KC-135 tankers under his command flew missions in support of US military operations in Southeast Asia. Six months later Herres returned to Kincheloe to resume command of the 449th. He remained there
until March 1974, when he was designated Director of Command and Control at SAC Headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. In September 1974 he was promoted to brigadier general.

During the next decade General Herres served both in command positions and in staff assignments involving command, control, and communications (C3). In 1975 he became Deputy Commander, Security Assistance Programs, in the Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, where he managed foreign military sales programs.

In August 1977 Herres joined the Air Staff as Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Computer Resources. He was promoted to major general in March 1978.

received his third star in August 1981, he returned to the Pentagon in 1982.

As Director of Command, Control, and Communications on the Joint Staff from October 1982 to July 1984, General Herres worked closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, and the Service Chiefs on programs, plans, and budgets affecting all unified and specified commands and their service components.

In July 1984 Herres was promoted to general and became the Commander in Chief of the US-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command and its supporting US organization, the USAF Aerospace Defense Command, and Commander of the USAF Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. His skills as a pilot, engineer, technical intelligence analyst, commander, programmer, and manager of strategic command, control, and communications systems uniquely qualified him for these responsibilities.

From Colorado Springs, Herres continued to work with General Vessey on two related projects, the Strategic Defense Initiative—a program to develop both terrestrial and space-based systems for the defense of North America against attack by Soviet ballistic missiles—and the establishment of a unified command for space. This new command was to assume broad responsibilities for military space systems supporting all three military departments and for both the ballistic missile defense effort and selected missions of the Aerospace Defense Command. The campaign to unify all US military space efforts succeeded on 23 September 1985, when President Ronald Reagan established the US Space Command and selected Herres as its first Commander in Chief.

On 6 February 1987 General Herres became the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position established by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. He served for two and one-half years with Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. In formulating the responsibilities for this new position, Crowe, Herres, and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger agreed that the Vice Chairman would chair the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Nuclear Command and Control System; serve as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB); and represent the Chairman on the Defense Resources Board, the executive committee of the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, and the National Space Council. When the Bush administration established the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in 1989, the Vice Chairman served as the Chairman’s representative on the committee. Admiral Crowe relied on Herres for his technical expertise, particularly in the areas of space and command and control.

As Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, Herres institutionalized the role of the military in setting requirements for major weapons systems. As Defense Weekly summarized, he “breathed new life into the JROC . . . and put the process back in the hands of the military and the Joint Staff.” In the JROC, Herres and the Service Vice Chiefs developed procedures for review and evaluation of potential joint military requirements, selected new programs to recommend to the DAB for joint development and acquisition, oversaw cross-service requirements and management issues, and resolved service differences that arose after initiation of joint programs. During Herres’s tenure the JROC focused on close air support, space-based surveillance, and antisatellite systems.

Herres served briefly as Vice Chairman with General Colin L. Powell, who became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1989. During the early months of Powell’s chairmanship, Herres worked with his counterparts in the National Security Council Deputies Committee during the attempted rebel coup against Philippine President Corazon Aquino in November 1989 and the US intervention in Panama that December.

General Herres chose to retire before the expiration of his second term. Following his retirement on 28 February 1990, he joined USAA, a diversified insurance and financial services association headquartered in San Antonio, Texas. He was appointed its chairman and chief executive officer in Septem-
General Herres, Vice Chairman of the JCS, looks out from the driver’s hatch of an M-2A2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle during his visit to the US Army Armor Center.

An Eagle Scout, Herres was elected to the national executive board of the Boy Scouts of America. He also served as chairman of the national board of directors of Junior Achievement and was a member of the board of the Atlantic Council of the United States, the National Mentoring Partnership, and the Neighborhood Housing Services of America. In April 2000 he retired as chief executive officer of USAA but remained chairman of the board. General Herres died on 24 July 2008 in San Antonio, Texas, at age 75.
Robert Tralles Herres  
General, USAF  

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<td>Pilot, later Air Electronics Maintenance Officer, 93d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM</td>
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<td>Student, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH</td>
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<td>Technical Intelligence Analyst (Electronics Engineer), later Chief, Defensive Capabilities Section, US European Command, Electronic Intelligence Center, Lindsey Air Station, Germany</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief, later Chief, Flight Training Branch, 7322d Air Base Wing, Chateauroux Air Station, France</td>
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Aerospace Research Flight Test Officer; later Chief, Flight Crew Division; and Assistant to the Deputy Program Director for Test Operations, Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program, Los Angeles Air Force Station, CA ............................... 1967 .......... 1969
Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, DC ....................... 1970 .......... 1971
Vice Commander, later Commander, 449th Bombardment Wing, Kincheloe Air Force Base, MI ............................. 1971 .......... 1973
Commander, 310th Strategic Wing (Provisional), U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Airfield, Thailand .......... 1973 .......... 1973
Commander, 449th Bombardment Wing, Kincheloe Air Force Base, MI ...................................... 1973 .......... 1974
Director, Command and Control, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE ................................. 1974 .......... 1975
Deputy Commander, Security Assistance Programs, Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA ............................................ 1975 .......... 1977
Commander, Air Force Communications Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL .............................................. 1979 .......... 1981
Director, Command, Control and Communication Systems, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .................................................. 1982 .......... 1984
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC ........................................... 1987 ........ 1990

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal

Command Pilot
Senior Missileman
Air Traffic Controller
David Jeremiah was born on 25 February 1934 in Portland, Oregon. He graduated from Lincoln High School in Portland and earned a bachelor of business administration in 1955 from the University of Oregon, Eugene. Jeremiah entered Naval Officer Candidate School and was commissioned an ensign on 30 March 1956. During the next ten years he served on five destroyers in the US Pacific Fleet and rose to lieutenant commander.

From 1966 to 1968 Lieutenant Commander Jeremiah worked in the Surface Electronic Warfare Systems Section in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Operations and Readiness. During this period he saw that policy was often made through the financial process, so in 1968 he earned a master of science in financial management from George Washington University. After a tour as executive officer of the guided missile destroyer USS *Joseph Strauss* (DDG 16), Commander Jeremiah attended Armed Forces Staff College from August 1970 to January 1971. Four months later he graduated from the program management development course at the Harvard Business School.
Over the next several years, staff assignments alternated with sea duty. In 1971 Jeremiah became an analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. From 1974 to 1976 he commanded the guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG 46). In 1976 he headed the Programs, Plans, and Development Branch in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). He was promoted to captain in 1977. From 1979 to 1980 he commanded Destroyer Squadron 24. The following two years he served as Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He next served as Executive Assistant to the CNO and was promoted to flag rank on 1 October 1983.

From August 1984 to April 1986 Jeremiah, now a rear admiral, commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight and during that period twice saw action in the Mediterranean. As Commander of Task Force 60, embarked in the carrier USS Saratoga (CV 60), Jeremiah coordinated naval air efforts in October 1985 that forced down an Egyptian commercial airliner carrying the hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. While engaged in freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, forces under his command destroyed several missile patrol craft and two Libyan surface-to-air missile sites.

Jeremiah left the Mediterranean and, after promotion to vice admiral, served in the Office of the
CNO as Director of Program Planning from April 1986 to September 1987. On 29 September 1987 the Navy promoted him to admiral and selected him to be the twenty-third Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet.

With extensive operational experience, including commands in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and programmatic and fiscal management expertise, Admiral Jeremiah became the nation’s second Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 March 1990. He assumed responsibility in the areas of joint warfighting requirements development, resource allocation, crisis-policy management, nuclear weapons development and security, and oversight of intelligence requirements. Jeremiah once observed that, in fulfilling these responsibilities for the Chairman, the
Rear Admiral Jeremiah, as commander of Task Force 60, in the task force command and control room of the USS Saratoga during operations off the coast of Libya, 1986.
job of Vice Chairman was “the broadest in the Department of Defense, certainly the broadest job in military uniform.”

Admiral Jeremiah served with General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for three and one-half years. Their working relationship closely resembled a partnership, with Powell describing Jeremiah as his “alter ego.” They decided that the Vice Chairman should participate fully in the management and direction of the Joint Staff and in providing military advice to the National Command Authorities. Jeremiah dealt with the services on programs and budgets, with the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee in crisis management, and with the Director of Central Intelligence on intelligence requirements and oversight. Powell relied on Jeremiah as a sounding board and source of advice on a wide range of issues. Thus Jeremiah’s influence went well beyond his responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and as the Chairman’s representative in the interagency policymaking process. In October 1992, with strong backing from Powell, Congress made the Vice Chairman a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Admiral Jeremiah worked as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee to orchestrate the military buildup in Saudi Arabia, preserve a diverse coalition, define US objectives, and oversee operations to liberate Kuwait. For his contributions during the Persian Gulf War, he received the President’s Citizens Medal.

During both the Bush and Clinton administrations, when the Deputies Committee debated the use of US forces in regional crises in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, Jeremiah opposed such involvement unless it was part of a comprehensive program to address the roots of the crisis in each country. Nevertheless, in 1992, when international famine relief efforts in Somalia were frustrated by Somali warlords and roving bandits, Admiral Jeremiah supported President George H. W. Bush’s decision to deploy US forces there in December as part of a relief operation. Operation RESTORE HOPE succeeded in reopening delivery routes and protecting UN food relief convoys.

When a UN follow-on force took over the operation in May 1993, it lacked a clear chain of command, agreed objectives, and the supporting economic and political support that Admiral Jeremiah persistently advocated, and forces controlled by Somali warlords, notably Mohammed Farah Aideed, resumed their depredations. In June, after gunmen ambushed and killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers, the UN Security Council called for the capture of those responsible for the killings. Together with General Powell, Admiral Jeremiah opposed calls for deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) but reluctantly agreed in August after repeated attacks on US troops.

After Powell retired on 30 September 1993, attacks on US forces in Somalia led to a change in US policy. As Acting Chairman until General John M. Shalikashvili became Chairman on 25 October, Admiral Jeremiah was a key participant in setting a new course. On 3 October 1993, after a successful SOF raid in which important subordinates of Aideed were captured, Somali gunmen shot down two US helicopters. When US troops attempted a rescue, a large force of Somalis pinned down the Americans, killing eighteen and wounding eighty-four. Public reaction led President William J. Clinton to withdraw SOF forces. He set a specific timetable for withdrawal and, at Jeremiah’s urging, directed both ground and sea-based reinforcement of the remaining forces to stabilize the situation.

Wary of deploying US ground combat troops to areas where no US vital interest was at stake, Admiral Jeremiah also argued within the Deputies Committee against ground operations in Haiti and Bosnia. He recommended multinational efforts to reorganize the Haitian security forces, restore the elected president, and provide developmental aid. Despite his warning that adequate diplomatic groundwork was not in place, the USS *Harlan County* (LST 1196), with a US training mission of nearly 200 troops, was sent to Haiti in October 1993, only to be prevented from docking at Port-au-Prince by paramilitary gangs loyal to the ruling military junta.
The contingencies in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia; the threat from Iraq and North Korea; international terrorism; and the worldwide activities of the drug cartels presented an array of strategic challenges. At the same time, US public opinion called for a shift of resources to domestic needs. As they restructured defense posture after the Cold War, senior defense officials in both the Bush and Clinton administrations relied upon Admiral Jeremiah’s advice to reshape policy on acquisition, force structure, and resource issues, particularly the DOD infrastructure.

As Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, Jeremiah faced the basic challenge of choosing weapons and communications systems for the twenty-first century at a time when little money was available to start new projects. He sought to move away from systems that could not be easily adapted to exploit new technologies or that were so highly...
specialized that they could only be used against a narrow threat or in a unique environment.

Admiral Jeremiah worked with the other members of the JROC to develop a requirements system in which advanced weapons and systems could be produced on a smaller scale and combined with existing systems to satisfy contingency requirements while maintaining the US lead in defense technology. In Jeremiah’s view, this would speed production, reduce costs, and allow the military to exploit new technologies in designing doctrine, tactics, and organizations. Within the JROC, Admiral Jeremiah pushed for several weapons systems he deemed vital to joint warfighting. Among these were joint command and control systems for global and theater contingencies, strategic sealift and the C-17 aircraft for modern strategic lift capability, better means for combat identification of friendly forces, and increased deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles to improve battlefield intelligence for the theater and joint task force commander.

Following heart surgery in November 1993, Admiral Jeremiah continued to serve as General Shalikashvili’s Vice Chairman and to perform a broad range of national security duties until his retirement on 28 February 1994. On his retirement, Australia awarded him the first Order of Australia given to a foreign officer.

In retirement, Jeremiah became president of Technology Strategies & Alliances, a Northern Virginia–based strategic consulting and investment banking firm engaged primarily in the aerospace, defense, telecommunications, and electronics industries. He was a member of the Defense Policy Board and in 1997 served on the National Defense Panel, which studied how the US military should prepare for the twenty-first century. On a number of occasions the US intelligence community called upon him as a troubleshooter. In 1996 Jeremiah chaired a blue-ribbon panel that examined the organization of the National Reconnaissance Office and recommended changes to improve its responsiveness. In 1998 he headed an inquiry for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) into the intelligence community’s failure to anticipate India’s testing of nuclear weapons, and the Director of Central Intelligence selected him to chair the 1999 independent review of the CIA’s internal assessment of the damage to national security resulting from Chinese espionage activities at US nuclear weapons laboratories. Jeremiah also served on the boards of several corporations and nonprofit organizations.
# David Elmer Jeremiah

Admiral, USN

## PROMOTIONS

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Head, Program, Plans and Development Branch,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, DC .............................. 1976 ........ 1979
Commander, Destroyer Squadron 24 ..................... 1979 .......... 1980
Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief,
Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations, Office of the Chief of Naval
Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group EIGHT ............ 1984 .......... 1986
Director, Navy Program Planning, Office of the
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC ..................................... 1990 .......... 1994

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with gold star)
Meritorious Service Medal (with gold star)
Navy Achievement Medal (with “V” device)

Surface Warfare Officer
William Owens was born 8 May 1940 in Bismarck, North Dakota. His maternal grandfather had served in the Spanish-American War, his father had been a Navy enlisted man during World War I, and the uncle for whom he was named had been a US Naval Academy graduate. Originally planning to attend the University of North Dakota, Owens decided to seek an appointment to the Naval Academy after seeing a movie about life there. He entered the Academy after graduating from Bismarck High School in 1958. In June 1962 he received a bachelor of science degree in naval science and his commission as an ensign.

After almost two years of training, Owens, who had been promoted to lieutenant (junior grade) in December 1963, embarked on a career as a nuclear submariner, eventually spending a total of over six years undersea. His first undersea tour was on the ballistic missile submarine USS *James Monroe* (SSBN 622) from April 1964 until March 1966. During that tour he was promoted to lieutenant.

**Admiral William A. Owens**
United States Navy
Following naval guided missile school, Lieutenant Owens served briefly on the USS Tecumseh (SSBN 628). From there, he was selected to be Engineering Officer of the nuclear attack submarine USS Seadragon (SSN 584). During his time aboard, the Seadragon participated in surveillance operations off North Vietnam during 1966 and 1967. Owens remained with the Seadragon until June 1971, playing a key role during its almost three-year overhaul. Named Submarine Force Pacific Fleet Officer of the Year in 1969, he was promoted to lieutenant commander in September of that year.

Owens's first staff assignment was in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, where from June 1971 until July 1972 he was Assistant Head of the Special Studies and Objectives Division in the Office of Program Appraisal. The recipient of a Chief of Naval Operations Fellows scholarship to study at Oxford University in England, Lieutenant Commander Owens received both bachelors and masters degrees in politics, philosophy, and economics from Oxford in 1974. Following a training assignment with Commander, Submarine Squadron ONE, he served as Executive Officer of the Pacific Fleet's USS Pogy (SSN 647) from December 1974 until August 1977. He received a masters degree in engineering management from George Washington University in 1975.

After his promotion to commander in July 1977, training at Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's Division of Naval Reactors at the Department of Energy and the Commanding Officers' School in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, prepared Owens for the next stage of his career. From July 1978 to August 1980 he commanded the Pacific Fleet’s USS Sam Houston (SSBN 609). Next he served short assignments as Deputy Commander for Readiness on the squadron staff of Submarine Squadron TEN and then as Commanding Officer of the USS Corpus Christi (SSN 705).

After a year with the first Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he participated in the development of the Navy’s maritime strategy, Commander Owens became Executive Assistant to the Director of Naval Warfare in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He served in that position from August 1982 to June 1984, a period during which the directorate’s scope expanded to include electronic, arctic, and theater nuclear warfare. During this time Owens also guided the Navy’s war gaming effort.

He was promoted to captain in August 1983 and assumed command of Submarine Squadron FOUR in the summer of 1984. As squadron commander supervising the operations of fourteen ships that deployed from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic, Captain Owens introduced some of the first tactics for the employment of fast attack submarines with other Navy and Air Force systems. He next served as Chief of Staff to the Commander Submarine Force, Atlantic, from June 1985 to March 1986.

There followed a series of increasingly important assignments ashore and afloat. After serving as Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations from March 1986 to June 1987 and receiving his promotion to rear admiral (lower half) in May 1987, Owens assumed command of Submarine Group SIX, the Navy’s largest submarine group. In that capacity he exercised operational control of nuclear-powered submarines operating in the Western Atlantic. When the Navy established the Strategic Think Tank in the spring of 1988, Owens received additional responsibilities as its first director. In June 1988 he returned to the Office of Program Appraisal on the Secretary of the Navy’s Staff as Director. After only a month in that position, he became Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci. Owens continued to serve in that position under Carlucci’s successor, Secretary Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, and received his second star in August 1990.

In October Rear Admiral Owens assumed command of the Sixth Fleet and NATO’s Strike Force South, Allied Naval Forces South. He was promoted to vice admiral in February 1991. The first shots of the Persian Gulf War were launched from ships under Vice Admiral Owens’s command in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the war, carriers from his command were deployed to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. To carry out these additional
responsibilities while meeting heightened requirements in the Mediterranean, new force configurations were introduced emphasizing joint capabilities and information warfare. These smaller configurations proved to have greater capability than expected. The Navy’s need to modify its operational doctrine during the war greatly influenced Owens’s thinking. Concluding that the Gulf War had been “a doctrinal disaster for the U.S. Navy,” he became convinced of the need “to free operational thinking from the assumptions of the past” and to move beyond a maritime strategy that relied almost solely on carrier battle groups for almost all operations.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II selected Vice Admiral Owens to be the first Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessment (N-8). From July 1992 to December 1993 Owens directed the reorganization of the Navy Staff to meet the new challenges of the post–Cold War world. He oversaw the radical reduction in the Navy’s force structure from almost 600 ships to about 340. To enhance the flexibility and effectiveness of a reduced force, he integrated surface, submarine, and aviation warfare; pressed for increased reliance on high technology; and advocated greater Navy participation in joint warfare. In 1995 the Naval Institute Press published his book *High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World*, in which he described the reforms he had introduced and presented his proposals for a new strategy for the Navy and the nation for the twenty-first century.

Promoted to admiral in December 1993, when he was designated Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Owens had just arrived to assume his new...
objectives, he increased the JROC’s analytical capabilities; established the Joint Monthly Readiness Review, which he chaired; and was instrumental in the creation of the National Imagery Agency Senior Steering Group, which he cochaired.

With the support of the Chairman, General John M. Shalikashvili, Admiral Owens fully exploited the authority that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act vested in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, by extension, the Vice Chairman. Under his direction, the JROC’s scope broadened to include programming; the commanders in chief of the unified commands became direct participants in the JROC process; and that process was integrated into the Defense Department’s planning, programming, and budgeting system. Owens also sought congressional support for his initiatives. As a result, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act to give statutory authority to the JROC and designated the JCS Chairman as its chairman, allowing him to delegate the position only to the Vice Chairman.

Admiral Owens chose to retire at the end of one term as Vice Chairman. His tenure had greatly increased both the authority and the visibility of the Vice Chairman’s position and expanded the military’s role in defense programming. His ideas, especially his advocacy of greater reliance on high technology, were controversial and inspired considerable debate, which continued beyond his tenure as Vice Chairman.

After his retirement on 29 February 1996 Owens became vice chairman of the board and then president of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), the nation’s largest employee-owned high-technology company. In late 1998 he was named vice chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Teledesic Holdings, Ltd., part of a new firm founded by corporate leaders in the high-technology field to deploy a network of satellites to provide a range of telecommunications services worldwide. He became co-chief executive officer of the parent company, Teledesic, in April 1999. Owens also wrote a second book, *Lifting the Fog of War*, presenting his ideas on the role of advanced technology in future warfare.
William Arthur Owens  
Admiral, USN

**PROMOTIONS**

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<td>Student, Nuclear Power School, Mare Island, Vallejo, CA</td>
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<td>Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit, Idaho Falls, ID</td>
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<td>Student, Naval Submarine School, Groton, CT</td>
<td>1963 - 1964</td>
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<td>USS <em>James Monroe</em></td>
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<td>Student, Naval Guided Missiles School, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA</td>
<td>1966 - 1966</td>
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<td>USS <em>Tecumseh</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineering Officer, USS <em>Seadragon</em></td>
<td>1966 - 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Head, Special Studies and Objectives, Office of Program Appraisal,</td>
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<td>Student, Oxford University, United Kingdom</td>
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Training, Division of Naval Reactors, 

Student, Commander Submarine School, 
Pearl Harbor, HI ................................... 1977 .......... 1978

Commanding Officer, USS Sam Houston ............... 1978 .......... 1980

Deputy Commander for Readiness, 

Commanding Officer, USS Corpus Christi ............... 1981 .......... 1981

Research Fellow, Naval War College ..................... 1981 .......... 1982

Executive Assistant to the Director, Naval 
Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Commander, Submarine Squadron FOUR ............... 1984 .......... 1985

Chief of Staff to the Commander Submarine 

Executive Assistant/Senior Aide to the Vice 
Chief of Naval Operations, Office of the 

Commander, Submarine Group SIX ........................ 1987 .......... 1988

Director, Office of Program Appraisal, Office of 
the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, DC ........... 1988 .......... 1988

Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of 

Commander Sixth Fleet and Commander, Strike 
Force South, Allied Naval Forces South ............... 1990 .......... 1992

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, 
Warfare Requirements, and Assessment, 
Washington, DC ................................... 1992 .......... 1993

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with gold star)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 3 gold stars)
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy Commendation Medal (with gold star)

Submarine Officer
Missile Submarine Officer
Nuclear Power Engineer
Submarine Commanding Officer
Joseph W. Ralston
1 March 1996–29 February 2000

Joseph Ralston was born in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, on 4 November 1943 and spent his early childhood in Fairview, Kentucky. He moved to Norwood, Ohio, a suburb of Cincinnati, when he was eleven and graduated from Norwood High School. Ralston worked his way through Miami University of Ohio, receiving a bachelor of arts in chemistry in June 1965. A distinguished graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Regular Air Force that July.
Following pilot and combat crew training and promotion to first lieutenant in January 1967, Ralston served as an F-105 fighter pilot with tactical fighter squadrons based at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, from April 1967 until October 1969. During that time Lieutenant Ralston flew missions over Southeast Asia out of Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, and deployed to Korea in response to North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo (AGER 2). He was promoted to captain in July 1968. Captain Ralston returned to Southeast Asia in 1970 as an F-105 Wild Weasel pilot with the 354th Tactical Fighter Squadron, flying out of Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, to counter North Vietnamese antiaircraft missile defense. During his two tours in Southeast Asia, Ralston flew 147 combat missions over Laos and North Vietnam and received four awards of the Distinguished Flying Cross. His accomplishments included coordinating the rescue of a downed crew while under prolonged hostile fire. On his return to the United States in October 1970, Ralston became a Wild Weasel instructor pilot with the 66th Fighter Weapons Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

In December 1971 Ralston moved to his first assignment in the development of systems requirements, an area in which he would spend a significant
portion of his career. Until June 1973 he was a fighter requirements officer and project officer for F-15 and lightweight fighter programs in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. From there he went to Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, where he was Assistant Operations Officer with the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron and then Chief of the Standardization and Evaluation Division of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Ralston organized and directed the flight planning team responsible for the rapid, nonstop movement of F-4 fighters from Seymour Johnson to Israel. He was promoted to major in December 1973. From June 1975 until June 1976 Major Ralston attended the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1976 he also received a master’s degree in personnel management from Central Michigan University.

In his first assignment at the Pentagon, Ralston spent the next three years on the Air Staff as a tactical systems requirements officer and program manager in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition, where he was part of the original team overseeing development of Stealth technology. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in April 1978. In July 1979 he moved to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, as Operations Officer of the 68th Tactical Fighter Squadron and later assumed command of the squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Ralston returned to Headquarters Tactical Air Command in July 1980 as Special Assistant and then Executive Officer to the Commander.
Promoted to colonel in June 1981, he was selected to attend the National War College at Fort McNair, Washington, DC, during 1983–1984.

The next dozen years saw him selected for increasingly important positions in requirements and acquisition as well as for significant command assignments. After graduating from the National War College, Colonel Ralston returned to the Air Staff, where, as Special Assistant for Low Observable Technology in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition, he again played a key role in the development of Stealth technology and its application to the F-117 aircraft. In February 1986 Ralston received his second command: the 56th Tactical Training Wing at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Returning to Headquarters Tactical Air Command in March 1987, he was responsible for the acquisition, production, and fielding of major weapons systems modernizing tactical air forces, first as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and then as Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements. He was promoted to brigadier general in March 1988. In June 1990 Brigadier General Ralston returned to the Pentagon; he received his second star in August. For the next two years he continued to work in requirements and acquisition as Director of Tactical Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and then as Director of Operational Requirements in the Plans and Operations Directorate on the Air Staff.


Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen swears in General Ralston as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 March 1996.
Task Force Alaska at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. In July 1994 he returned to the Air Staff as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. In June 1995 Ralston assumed command of Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, responsible for training and equipping all Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve combat wings and squadrons in the United States and Panama. He received his fourth star in July.

General Ralston became the fourth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 March 1996. He was the first Vice Chairman to serve a substantial portion of his tenure with more than one Chairman: nineteen months with General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, and twenty-nine months with General Henry H. Shelton, USA. When General Ralston became Vice Chairman, General Shalikashvili and he agreed that Ralston would function as Shalikashvili’s deputy, fully participating in all aspects of the Chairman’s day-to-day activities, in addition to carrying out his specific responsibilities as Vice Chairman. Shalikashvili came to regard Ralston as his “most trusted adviser.” Shelton and Ralston had an association of many years, which enabled them to work closely together from the beginning of Shelton’s chairmanship and to continue the approach to sharing responsibilities adopted at the beginning of Ralston’s tenure. As a result of this arrangement, Ralston devoted at least half of his time to overseeing current operations.
During the four years of his tenure Ralston found himself increasingly absorbed in the inter-agency process. His active participation in the Deputies Committee, described by one of its members as “the chief operating committee for American foreign policy” during the second Clinton administration, ensured the inclusion of military advice in the early stages of policy formulation. General Ralston played a key role in the development of administration policy on the intervention in Kosovo and in guiding its implementation in the US-led air campaign there, where the US air forces demonstrated the results of his contributions to Air Force modernization.

Ralston brought to his duties as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board his extensive experience in the requirements and acquisition process and in overseeing the development of future technologies. In managing the JROC, he saw his function to be “harmonizing” service positions on programs so that national security needs could be met within budgetary constraints. To facilitate this, he created the two-star JROC Review Board to determine which issues would go forward to the JROC. Ralston’s work in coordinating the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Department’s review of post–Cold War strategy and force structure, so impressed Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen that Cohen turned to the Vice Chairman for advice in other areas as well.

General Ralston completed his second term as Vice Chairman on 29 February 2000. President William J. “Bill” Clinton, upon Cohen’s recommendation, had nominated him to become Commander in Chief of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe the following May. He was the first Vice Chairman to move to another military position at the end of his tour of duty. He retired from that post on 1 March 2003.
## Promotions

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Assistant Operations Officer, 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron; then Chief, Standardization and Evaluation Division, 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, NC .......... 1973 .......... 1975

Student, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS .................. 1975 .......... 1976


Operations Officer, then Commander, 68th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Moody Air Force Base, GA ...................... 1979 .......... 1980

Special Assistant, then Executive Officer to the Commander, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA .................. 1980 .......... 1983

Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC ..................... 1983 .......... 1984


Commander, 56th Tactical Training Wing, MacDill Air Force Base, FL ...................... 1986 .......... 1987

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, then Deputy Chief of Staff, Requirements, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA .................. 1987 .......... 1990

Director of Tactical Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, DC ...................... 1990 .......... 1991


Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
  Washington, DC ................................... 1996 ............ 2000

Commander in Chief, US European Command  
  and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe ............. 2000 ............ 2003

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**Principal US Military Decorations and Qualifications**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)  
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal  
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)  
Distinguished Flying Cross (with 3 oak leaf clusters)  
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)  
Air Medal (with 19 oak leaf clusters)  
Air Force Commendation Medal (with 4 oak leaf clusters)

Command Pilot
Richard Bowman Myers
1 March 2000–30 September 2001

General Richard Myers, USAF, became the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 March 2000. He served one abbreviated term in that capacity before advancing to the position of Chairman on 1 October 2001. His biography is presented in the Chairmen’s section of this volume.
General Peter Pace, USMC, became the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2001. He served two terms in that capacity before advancing to the position of Chairman on 1 October 2005. His biography is presented in the Chairmen’s section of this volume.
Edmund Giambastiani, Jr., was born on 4 May 1948 in Canastota, New York, where his father owned an electrical contracting business. The eldest of three children, he spent much of his early years on his grandparent’s onion farm, which was a family endeavor. After graduating from Canastota High School in 1966, he enrolled in the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. As a midshipman, Giambastiani studied electrical engineering, was the manager of the Navy wrestling team, and commanded the Color Company. Following graduation on 3 June 1970, he was commissioned an ensign in the United States Navy and temporarily assigned to Whitestone, New York. While there he served as executive officer of the Naval Reserve Training Center and represented the Naval Academy Information Program.
the first submarine to be certified for employment of the MK48 heavy weight torpedo.

After completing a recruiting management orientation course at Pensacola, Florida, in August 1974, Lieutenant Giambastiani transferred to the Navy Recruiting Command, Washington, DC, at the beginning of the all-volunteer force. For the next two years he served as the enlisted recruiting program manager for all six-year obligor advanced technical specialties, including the medical, electronics, nuclear, and submarine fields. He also helped design and implement the computerized Enlisted Recruiting Production Management and Activity Analysis System, as well as several management reports.

Lieutenant Giambastiani returned to Groton, Connecticut, in September 1977, where he completed the Submarine Officer's Advanced Course. Graduating with distinction, he then reported aboard the USS Francis Scott Key (SSBN 657) in April 1978 and was subsequently promoted to lieutenant commander on 1 September. For the next three years Giambastiani served as the ship's engineering officer, with responsibility for operating its nuclear propulsion plant. In this capacity he assisted in the installation and successful completion of the test program for the C-4 Trident I ballistic missile, including a follow-on evaluation cruise, and then participated in three strategic deterrent patrols.

In May 1981 Lieutenant Commander Giambastiani completed a three-month prospective commanding officer course in nuclear propulsion taught by the Department of Energy in Washington, DC. Later that year he completed a two-month combat course for prospective commanding officers taught by Commander Submarine Forces, US Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia. That December he reported aboard Submarine NR-1 in Groton, Connecticut, as the Prospective Officer-in-Charge. After familiarizing himself with the world’s only nuclear-powered deep submergence ocean engineering and research vessel, he was flocked to the rank of commander on 22 April 1982 and assumed command of NR-1 on 7 May. During his three-year command the submersible conducted a variety of survey, recovery, and security
attack submarines and directed the submarine tactical development program for both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet submarine forces. As part of this effort, he expanded the squadron's focus beyond antisubmarine warfare to include a wide variety of missions in support of both aircraft carrier battle group and amphibious task force operations.

In June 1993 he transferred to Norfolk, Virginia, becoming the first Director of the Strategy and Concepts Division at the newly established Naval Doctrine Command. In this capacity he reviewed the Tomahawk cruise missile system and helped define operational concepts for theater ballistic missile defense and combined and amphibious warfare. He also contributed to the evolving strategic vision, "From the Sea," a seminal document that shifted the naval services' focus from open-ocean operations involving competing superpowers to expeditionary forces participating in multinational operations in littoral regions around the globe.

Rear Admiral-select (lower half) Giambastiani reported to Pacific Fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in August 1994, where he became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments. He was frocked to rear admiral (lower half) in December. Giambastiani managed the command's $5 billion dollar budget during a period of fiscal austerity, addressing such issues as force structure, modernization, and readiness requirements for the fleet.

Rear Admiral Giambastiani returned to Washington, DC, in January 1996 to become Director of the Submarine Warfare Division for the Chief of Naval Operations, as well as Executive Secretary of the Submarine Technology Council, and advanced in grade to rear admiral (upper half) on 1 August 1997. As the Navy realigned itself after the Cold War, he crafted an innovative acoustic modernization program for the aging Los Angeles-class attack submarines. Giambastiani also coordinated resourcing for the production of the first Seawolf-class attack submarine, the Los Angeles-class replacement, worked to win approval for the third Seawolf submarine to be constructed; fostered and developed the conventionally armed and special
Commander Giambastiani is piped aboard the US Navy's nuclear-powered Deep Submergence Craft, NR-1.

The nuclear-powered submarine USS Richard B. Russell passes beneath the Golden Gate Bridge while departing San Francisco Bay for open ocean.
forces equipped Trident submarine conversion (SSGN) concept; and gained Defense Department and congressional support for a fleet of smaller Virginia-class attack submarines that could operate in both open-ocean and littoral environments, and include a robust technology insertion program. In conjunction with these programs and in concert with the Director of Surface Warfare, he was instrumental in the conception and introduction of the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile.

A month after his promotion to vice admiral in May 1998, Giambastiani reported to Norfolk. He assumed three concurrent commands: Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet; Antisubmarine and Reconnaissance Forces Atlantic; and Submarines Allied Command Atlantic, NATO. In these roles, Giambastiani coordinated the employment of ten ballistic missile submarines and twenty-eight attack submarines. The ballistic submarines, Task Force 144, conducted strategic deterrent patrols in support of US Strategic Command, while the attack submarines, Task Force 84, engaged in anti-submarine warfare and provided special surveillance support to US Special Operations Command and the regional combatant commanders.

Vice Admiral Giambastiani returned to Washington, DC, in July 2000 as the head of the prospective CNO's transition team and subsequently served as Deputy CNO for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (OPNAV N8). Admiral Vernon E. Clark, CNO at the time, reorganized his staff's responsibilities to better define the service's warfighting requirements and enhance fleet readiness. In support of that effort, Giambastiani's directorate assessed strategy, requirements, and the allocation of resources during the annual budget formulation process and provided for greater representation from among the field commands.

Beginning in May 2001 Vice Admiral Giambastiani served for eighteen months as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. During this tumultuous period he supported the Secretary's transformation initiative to reform Pentagon bureaucracy and employ advanced technologies to recast the military as a smaller, more flexible fighting force. He also participated in crafting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the campaign to oust the Taliban regime from Afghanistan.

On 2 October 2002 Vice Admiral Giambastiani was promoted to admiral and took charge of US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk. In response to changes made to the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP) that divested the combatant command of its homeland security mission and operational responsibility for the North Atlantic region, he refocused JFCOM's attention on transforming America's armed forces to meet twenty-first-century challenges, enhancing interoperability, and supporting operating forces around the globe. On 19 June 2003, following the transition of Allied Command Atlantic to Allied Command Transformation, Admiral Giambastiani assumed the additional role as the first NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. He pursued many of the same goals that he had as commander of JFCOM, but oriented command focus toward America's European allies. Giambastiani increased the number of foreign liaison officers at JFCOM and, as head of NATO transformation, supported the establishment of a Joint Warfare Center in Norway, a Joint Force Training Center in Poland, and a Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Portugal.

New concepts designed to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of warfighting heavily influenced military transformation. In theoretical terms, Effects Based Operations (EBO) offered a dynamic approach to attack vulnerabilities within an adversary's diplomatic, information, military, and financial systems, thereby achieving desired effects in a more timely and economical manner. In practice, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) integrated people, information, and analytical tools into a collective process to identify, target, and reassess vulnerabilities. Fostering a Collaborative Information Environment and establishing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to share information were essential because data analysis was the key to success.
Numerous training initiatives, guided by a new mandate for JFCOM to lead the development of joint command and control capabilities, enhanced service interoperability. Before launching Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) conducted several exercises to address operational issues in the Persian Gulf region. A Standing Joint Force Headquarters, staffed by officers experienced in EBO and ONA who focused on postconflict stability and support operations, further enhanced planning. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned also deployed a collection and analysis team overseas to document the invasion first hand.

The cascading success of these efforts created further improvements: the JWFC initiated a series of smaller mission rehearsal exercises to educate joint task force headquarters deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa; all combatant commands established Standing Joint Force Headquarters, with the JFCOM element deploying to support relief operations along the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina and in Pakistan following a massive earthquake; and the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (formerly lessons learned) stationed permanent collection teams in US Central Command’s area of operation and dispatched other teams to cover peacekeeping operations in Haiti and relief efforts following the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina. A concurrent effort, the Joint National Training Capability, linked various installations and networks for training purposes and mandated that all military exercises involve joint participation.

Early in 2003, together with its transformation and interoperability initiatives, JFCOM began managing...
first identified requirements, then the JROC approved them as “Immediate Warfighting Needs,” and lastly the Defense Department’s Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell procured them using supplementary contingency funding. Two key issues during Giambastiani’s tenure were combating improvised explosive devices and enhancing intelligence gathering capabilities. At the first Joint Rapid Acquisition Workshop, held in June 2006, the Vice Chairman emphasized the need to track delivery and sustainment of such capabilities and ensure their assignment at the appropriate level of interoperability.

As head of the JROC, Admiral Giambastiani oversaw the more deliberate requirements process, which utilized the newly established Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to anticipate future military needs and program their development into the annual defense budget. The conventional system had grown cumbersome and failed to adequately prioritize the capability gaps it was designed to identify. Giambastiani focused the process by bringing combatant commanders and the interagency groups into the discussion and distilling key requirements into a list of the “most pressing military issues.” He was careful to avoid making Defense Department officials permanent members of the council, which he believed would diminish its ability to present an impartial military perspective to the Secretary.

In order to improve program management, Admiral Giambastiani instituted up-front cost-benefit analyses, modified poorly performing initiatives, and grouped interrelated requirements into four Joint Capability Portfolios. These were logistics, battlespace awareness, net-centric operations, and command and control systems. He also acknowledged that technological limitations and a “one-size-fits-all” approach could be counterproductive when fulfilling joint requirements, as shown by the faltering Joint Tactical Radio Program and National Polar Orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System.

Findings of the JROC subsequently informed the Deputies Advisory Working Group, a panel first created to guide the 2005 Quadrennial Defense
Review and then retained as a permanent organization to implement programs identified during the review process. When released in February 2006, the defense review reflected an accelerated evolution of the transformation campaign, using speed, agility, and precision to check asymmetrical threats against the homeland, defeat terrorists, counter weapons of mass destruction, and influence the international community. The formulation implied an increase in intelligence gathering platforms, special operations forces, and expeditionary forces to support stability, security, transition, and reconstruction efforts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Regarding the latter conflict, the Vice Chairman commented that while Coalition forces remained committed, the military could not resolve the crisis alone, and he advocated for greater interagency participation.

In December 2006 Robert Gates succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. One month later the Bush administration presented its “New Way Forward in Iraq,” a strategic realignment to reverse deteriorating conditions in that theater of operations. The initiative sharply increased the number of US forces involved in counterinsurgency operations in order to create a secure space for political and economic progress to occur. In February 2007 Admiral Giambastiani reported that the deployed forces were optimistic about the new approach; by June, the Commander of Multi-National Force Iraq saw signs that Baghdad was returning to normal.
Admiral Giambastiani left office on 6 August 2007 and retired on 30 September, after more than thirty-seven years of active military service. Since retirement he has continued to serve in a variety of public and private roles. He is currently the chairman of the Secretary of the Navy Advisory Panel and has served on numerous US Government advisory boards, investigations, and task forces for the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Interior in addition to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Examples of these activities include the Secretary of Defense’s Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, the Defense Science Board, the National Academy of Engineering/National Research Council committee that examined the Deepwater Horizon blowout and recommended Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety and the Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Board.

He also serves on the boards of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the US Naval Academy Foundation. He is a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy and the Council on Foreign Relations. Admiral Giambastiani is active in the business community, where he serves as a director on the boards of the Boeing Company and Monster Worldwide, Inc., where he is the lead independent director. He is a member of the board of trustees for the MITRE Corporation and is a member of the Advisory Board of the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. In addition to independent consulting as president of Giambastiani Group LLC, he also served as the Chairman of Alenia North America.
# Edmund Peter Giambastiani, Jr.

Admiral, USN

## Promotions

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## Assignments

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<td>Midshipman, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD</td>
<td>1966</td>
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<td>Executive Officer and Blue and Gold Recruiting Officer, Naval Reserve Training Center, Whitestone, NY</td>
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<td>Student, Naval Nuclear Power School, Bainbridge, MD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student, Naval Submarine School, Naval Submarine Base New London, Groton, CT</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torpedo, Fire Control, and Assistant Weapons; Main Propulsion Assistant; and then Weapons Officer, USS <em>Puffer</em></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Student, Recruiting Officer Management Orientation Course, Pensacola, FL</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Program Manager, Nuclear Field and Advanced Electronics Field (enlisted), Navy Recruiting Command, Washington, DC</td>
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Engineer Officer, USS Francis Scott Key ..................... 1978 .......... 1981

Student, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Washington, DC ........ 1981 .......... 1981


Prospective Officer-in-Charge and Officer-in-Charge, Submarine NR-I, Naval Submarine Base New London, Groton, CT .............................. 1982 .......... 1985

Head, Operations Security Section, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and concurrently Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC ................................... 1985 .......... 1986

Student, Prospective Commanding Officer Course, Commander, Submarine Force, US Pacific Fleet, Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI ............. 1986 .......... 1986

Student, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Washington, DC ................................... 1987 .......... 1987

Prospective Commanding Officer and Commanding Officer, USS Richard B. Russell .......................... 1987 .......... 1990

Fellow, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group, Naval War College, Newport, RI .................... 1990 .......... 1991


Director of Strategy and Concepts, Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Station Norfolk, VA .................... 1993 .......... 1994


Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC ................................. 2001 ............. 2002
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ................................... 2005 ............. 2007
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with silver star)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 3 gold stars)
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 gold stars)
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (with gold star)

Submarine Officer
Strategic Deterrent Patrol
Deep Submergence Insignia
Submarine Commanding Officer
James Edward Cartwright
31 August 2007–3 August 2011

James Cartwright was born on 22 September 1949 in Rockford, Illinois, where his father worked as a salesman for a plumbing and heating company. He came from a large family, with five sisters, and spent much of his childhood laboring on his grandparent’s farm. After graduating from West High School in 1967, he entered the University of Iowa on a swimming scholarship and studied premedicine. Although drafted into the military during his junior year, he received a deferment to complete college. This influenced his decision, following graduation in 1971, to enroll in the Marine Corps Aviation/Naval Flight Officer program.
After completing the Officer Candidate Course at Quantico, Virginia, James Cartwright received his commission as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve on 12 November 1971. He then began a rigorous training program oriented toward serving as a backseat weapons and targeting systems operator in the F-4J Phantom II fighter-bomber. This included preliminary training at Naval Air Station (NAS), Pensacola, Florida, and radar intercept training at NAS, Glynco, Georgia. After being designated a Naval Flight Officer on 22 September 1972, Cartwright transferred to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry Point, North Carolina, and underwent flight training with Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 201 (VMFAT-201). Although his performance throughout was notable, it was during the final phase of training that he attained the highest grade point average of any replacement air crewman assigned to the squadron until that time.

In May 1973 Second Lieutenant Cartwright left the training squadron and relocated to MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina. Over the next four years, he served with several different units in a variety of capacities. Initially assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 (VMFA-251), he functioned as the squadron’s embarkation officer in addition to his duties as a radar intercept officer. Promoted to first lieutenant in November 1973, he received a regular commission in the US Marine Corps shortly thereafter. Next, Cartwright transferred to VMFA-232 in April 1974. The squadron was deployed at the time and operating out of MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan, and Naha Air Force Base, Okinawa. He continued serving as the unit’s embarkation officer and was designated lead radar intercept officer and air combat tactics instructor, roles normally reserved for more seasoned officers. After returning to Beaufort in July 1975, Cartwright served briefly as the Marine Air Base Squadron 31 operations officer before transferring to VMFA-333 in November. He deployed on board the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and advanced to captain in November 1976. Upon his return to Beaufort in March 1977, Cartwright became the embarkation officer for Marine Aircraft Group 31.

Captain Cartwright returned to Pensacola in July 1977, this time as a student naval aviator. After completing his basic flight training in November, he relocated to NAS, Kingsville, Texas, for flight instruction in the F-4J Phantom II. Besides distinguishing himself academically, he also achieved impressive scores in aerial gunnery and dive bombing. After being designated a naval aviator on 13 February 1979, Cartwright transferred to MCAS, Yuma, Arizona, where he underwent advanced flight instruction with VMFAT-101. Upon completion of the combat capable syllabus, he easily transitioned to the status of instructor.

In December 1979 Captain Cartwright joined VMFA-235 at MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. During this three-year tour he advanced in grade to major on 23 October 1981. As the squadron’s aircraft maintenance officer, he exceeded capability standards established by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and contributed significantly to the unit’s overall combat readiness; this was accomplished as the squadron transitioned to the F-4S Phantom II aircraft and participated in a deployment to the Western Pacific. In addition to his normal flight duties, he was also a division leader, postmaintenance test pilot, and air combat tactics instructor. In recognition of these achievements, Cartwright was chosen as the squadron’s Naval Aviator of the Year for 1981, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s (1st MAW) Naval Aviator of the Year for 1982, and the Association of Naval Aviation’s Outstanding Carrier Aviator for 1983.

Major Cartwright returned to Yuma in December 1982, where he served as the administrative officer for VMFAT-101, as well as an F-4 instructor pilot and postmaintenance check pilot. Cartwright directed the most efficient squadron administrative section in the 3d MAW, led five carrier qualification detachments without mishap, and received credit for successfully averting a potentially disastrous airborne emergency.

In July 1985 Major Cartwright reported to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. While attending Air Command and Staff College, he received the Commandant’s Research Award runner-up trophy for his
He also arranged training in Alaska and California, which enabled his pilots to develop their air-to-air and air-to-ground skills before deploying to the Western Pacific.

In January 1993 Lieutenant Colonel Cartwright returned to Washington, DC, for his second tour with the Department of Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps. Two months later, on 9 March, he was promoted to colonel. As Deputy Head of the Aviation Plans, Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters and Budget Branch, he quickly became an advocate for Marine tactical aviation within the Navy and Defense Departments. Furthermore, he also participated in various studies pertaining to force structure, requirements, integration, and employment, including the Marine Corps Long Range Planning Group, a collaborative initiative to address post–Cold War force reductions and chart a course for the Marine Corps into the twenty-first century. Despite a heavy workload, he completed the Seminar 21 Program on foreign politics, international relations, and national interests at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

From May 1994 Colonel Cartwright commanded MAG-31 at Beaufort, South Carolina. His eight flying squadrons conducted both unit deployments to Iwakuni and aircraft carrier deployments to the Mediterranean. While operating from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and USS America (CV 66), as well as Aviano Air Base, Italy, several of the group’s squadrons flew combat missions during the Balkans conflict. Augmenting US Air Forces, Europe, MAG-31 helped enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina during Operation DENY FLIGHT, protect humanitarian relief efforts during Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, and bomb Serbian targets during Operation DELIBERATE FORCE. On several occasions Colonel Cartwright took advantage of visits to the squadrons to fly combat sorties with his pilots. While in command of MAG-31, he introduced new weapons technologies that enhanced the group’s combat effectiveness and established the F/A-18 Hornet’s reputation as a true multimission aircraft.

In July 1996 Colonel Cartwright again returned to Washington, DC, where he served as a special analysis of the implications of integrating remotely piloted vehicles into Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Forces. He was also selected as the top performer in two seminars and graduated with distinction.

Major Cartwright relocated to Arlington, Virginia, in June 1986. Assigned to the Systems and Engineering Management Division at Naval Air Systems Command, he served as the deputy assistant program manager for the research, development, and testing of F/A-18 Hornet weapons systems. While overseeing multimillion-dollar budgets and field testing assets at several locations, he helped integrate the night-attack system into the F/A-18 and transition the Blue Angels demonstration squadron to the Hornet. On 1 October 1988 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In May 1989 Lieutenant Colonel Cartwright returned to Iwakuni, Japan, assuming command of Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 12. His unit deployed more than fifty detachments during thirty multforce exercises conducted throughout the region. Beyond developing support capabilities for the newly arrived F/A-18 Hornet and AV-8B Harrier aircraft, he also initiated advance battle damage repair procedures, instituted an expeditionary oxygen and nitrogen system, and coordinated inaugural missile training. During his tenure the squadron was chosen as Fleet Marine Force, Pacific’s nominee for the Marine Corps Aviation Association’s Exceptional Achievement Award and was the Marine Corps’ nominee for the Department of Defense’s Maintenance Efficiency Award.

Lieutenant Colonel Cartwright next attended the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, in July 1990. After graduating with a masters degree in national security and strategic studies the following June, he returned to Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Initially assigned as the assistant operations officer for Marine Aircraft Group 24 (MAG-24), he was in charge of daily flight operations and developed the unit’s training, exercise, and employment plan. In May 1992 Cartwright took command of VMFA-232. By revising the squadron’s maintenance priorities, he increased the number of mission capable aircraft.

He also arranged training in Alaska and California, which enabled his pilots to develop their air-to-air and air-to-ground skills before deploying to the Western Pacific.

In January 1993 Lieutenant Colonel Cartwright returned to Washington, DC, for his second tour with the Department of Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps. Two months later, on 9 March, he was promoted to colonel. As Deputy Head of the Aviation Plans, Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters and Budget Branch, he quickly became an advocate for Marine tactical aviation within the Navy and Defense Departments. Furthermore, he also participated in various studies pertaining to force structure, requirements, integration, and employment, including the Marine Corps Long Range Planning Group, a collaborative initiative to address post–Cold War force reductions and chart a course for the Marine Corps into the twenty-first century. Despite a heavy workload, he completed the Seminar 21 Program on foreign politics, international relations, and national interests at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff and led the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study. This project assessed the military’s deep strike capabilities in relation to changing national security interests and informed the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which sought to promote a more affordable, balanced, and strategic oriented defense. Promoted to brigadier general on 1 October 1997, Cartwright became the Deputy Director for Resources and Requirements, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, the Joint Staff J-8.

He guided modification of the Requirements Generation System, reviewed documents for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and was involved with the services’ annual Program Objective Memorandums relevant to the combatant command and Joint Staff priorities. He supervised the Reserve Component Employment Study, which considered innovative strategies for organizing and employing the nation’s guard and reserve forces during the twenty-first century.

Brigadier General Cartwright transferred to Norfolk, Virginia, in July 1999, where he served as Deputy Commander of US Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, and worked for Lieutenant General Peter Pace, who would later become the sixth Vice Chairman and sixteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cartwright had wide-ranging duties that contributed to both Marine Corps and Joint Forces Command programs: oversight of Marine operations at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; training and employment of Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams; establishment of subsidiary Marine component commands at US European, Central, and Southern Commands; development of Joint Forces Command’s experimentation campaign plan; and supervising Marine participation in Joint Task Force Civil Support, a new initiative involving military collaboration with federal agencies during domestic emergencies involving chemical, biological, or radiological incidents.

In July 2000 Brigadier General Cartwright relocated to Okinawa, Japan, to command 1st MAW. He established three priorities: to enhance the wing’s warfighting capabilities, to promote security in the Pacific, and to improve the Marines’ deployment experience. These goals were simultaneously achieved by participation in numerous training exercises that enabled the Marines to hone their skills and establish international relationships throughout the region. The wing was more than ready to meet rapidly escalating operational requirements following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Besides expanding security throughout the Pacific, its squadrons also participated in Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Following his promotion to lieutenant general in May 2002, Cartwright once again headed back to Washington, DC.

At the Pentagon, Lieutenant General Cartwright became Director of the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8, of the Joint Staff during a tumultuous period. The Defense Department was not only prosecuting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was also transforming itself to meet twenty-first century requirements. One major change in acquisition involved a switch from the bottom-up and service-driven Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment to the top-down and strategy-driven Joint Capabilities Integration Development System.

As the new system’s official “Gatekeeper,” Cartwright orchestrated the program reviews and determined which items would be considered by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Key issues included adjusting force structure and composition around the globe, increasing interoperability by integrating warfighting capabilities, and developing enhanced weapons technologies.

In July 2004 General Cartwright moved to Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, and became the first Marine to lead US Strategic Command. As one of nine unified commands, Strategic Command was responsible for addressing national defense requirements on a global scale and supporting the other regional and functional combatant commanders. Two months later, on 1 September, he received his fourth star.

General Cartwright completed a major restructuring effort initiated shortly following 11 September 2001, which involved the consolidation of eight global
assets under the auspices of Strategic Command. Because the size and scope of the expanded mission set had aroused concern among some of the government agencies and combatant commands, Cartwright resolved to be as responsive and reliable as possible when fulfilling support requests. He subsequently instituted a more decentralized command structure at Strategic Command, which enabled the central headquarters to concentrate on strategic-level integration and advocacy, while the subordinate organizations focused on mission planning and execution. The new joint force component commands included: Space; Global Strike; Network Warfare; Integrated Missile Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and the Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. Together, they encompassed a broad range of interrelated capabilities: access to physical and cyber spaces, collection and dissemination of information, and offensive and defensive measures to advance national security on a global scale.

Responsible for managing the nation’s nuclear arsenal and deterrence capability, General Cartwright also implemented several interrelated research and development programs following the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The Cold War-era Nuclear Triad had focused predominantly on offensive delivery systems (missiles, bombers, and submarines), but the New Triad combined nuclear, conventional, and nonkinetic capabilities into a menu of scalable offensive and defensive options. The Reliable Replacement Warhead program was a modernization effort to enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the aging stockpile of existing
Acquisition Board, tasked with approving all major acquisition programs. He also served as the acting Chairman during Admiral Michael G. Mullen’s frequent absences from the Pentagon.

For the sake of accountability and efficiency, General Cartwright proposed that the Vice Chairman be made permanent chairman of the JROC. Moreover, rather than rely solely on committee action to ascertain military requirements, he suggested that the Vice Chairman be given final decision making authority along with the ability to delegate responsibility for specialized requirements to the appropriate functional combatant command: transportation (US Transportation Command), special operations (US Special Operations Command), command and control (US Joint Forces Command), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (US Strategic Command). For the sake of thoroughness, Cartwright advocated extending full JROC membership to the combatant commands and to the Defense Department’s policy, acquisition, and comptroller’s offices. Although not all of these recommendations were officially adopted, the JROC was often able to operate as if they were.
While executing his requirements, acquisition, and resourcing responsibilities, General Cartwright divided his attention between current and future needs. In the former, he supported the rapid validation and resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs by exploiting conventional technology and existing capabilities to meet emergent war fighter requirements. These were identified by the combatant commands, approved by the JROC, and then procured by the Defense Department’s Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell using supplementary contingency funding.

In the latter case, General Cartwright oversaw the more deliberate requirements process, which sought to anticipate future military needs and program their development into the annual defense budget. The proliferation of asymmetrical threats and regional conflicts during an era of declining fiscal resources caused him to recommend a more balanced approach when preparing to counter the nation’s “most likely” and “most dangerous” threats. He explained, “We need to be in a lot of places, we need quantity more than we need exquisite capability.”

General Cartwright and Secretary Gates campaigned to realign shrinking resources to best support the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and to modernize conventional forces to counter the actual and prospective capabilities of future adversaries. They canceled or curtailed failing programs that either were irrelevant to current realities or had become cost prohibitive because of the rising price of advanced technologies, such as the F-22 Raptor fifth-generation fighter. Savings were reallocated to other programs, particularly those supporting the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, such as the procurement of additional unmanned aerial vehicles. Then they increased efficiency by reducing the workforce, reforming the military procurement process, and eliminating redundant or obsolete capabilities, such as JFCOM.

General Cartwright advocated several programs that he had previously overseen while commanding...
General Cartwright speaks with General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, during a Senate Armed Services Committee session in December 2010. He and the Service Chiefs provided testimony concerning the proposed repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”

STRATCOM. Focusing upon the increasing importance of information technology, he continued to stress the need to layer the nation’s networks, delineate jurisdiction over each domain, and develop offensive and defensive capabilities to detour a range of adversaries. He likewise promoted the development of missile defense systems and extended deterrence capabilities and supported refurbishment of the nation’s existing nuclear arsenal. Similarly, he facilitated regional security and diplomatic initiatives around the globe (North Korea, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe), including the Obama administration’s Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia.

General Cartwright left office on 3 August 2011, concluding more than forty years of uniformed service. Shortly following retirement, he was appointed to the influential Defense Policy Board, which advises the Secretary of Defense on key policy issues. He also became a fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
James Edward Cartwright  
General, USMC  

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<td>Student Naval Flight Officer, Marine Aviation Training Support Group (MATSG), Naval Air Basic Training Command, Naval Air Station (NAS), Pensacola, FL</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>Naval Flight Officer–Under Training, Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 201 (VMFAT-201), Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry Point, NC</td>
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<td>Naval Flight Officer and Squadron Embarkation Officer, VMFA-251, Marine Air Group 31 (MAG-31), 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (2d MAW), Beaufort, SC</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>Naval Flight Officer and Squadron Embarkation Officer, VMFA-232, MAG-15, 1st MAW, MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and Naha Air Force Base, Okinawa</td>
<td>1974</td>
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<td>Operations Officer, Marine Air Base Squadron 31 (MABS-31), MAG-31, 2d MAW, Beaufort, SC</td>
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Line Division Officer, VMFA-333, MAG-31, Beaufort, SC (USS Nimitz) .......................... 1975 .......... 1977

Embarkation Officer, Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 31 (H&MS-31), MAG-31, Beaufort, SC ........................................ 1977 .......... 1977

Student Naval Aviator, MATSG, MAFC, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL ...................... 1977 .......... 1977

Student Naval Aviator, Training Squadron 23 (VT-23), NAS, Kingsville, TX ....................... 1977 .......... 1978

Basic Training Officer, VMFAT-101, MCCRTG-10, 3d MAW, MCAS Yuma, AZ ..................... 1978 .......... 1979

Aircraft Maintenance Officer, VMFA-235, MAG-24, 1st Marine Brigade, MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, HI ................................. 1979 .......... 1982

Administration Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Deployed Carrier Operations, VMFAT-101, 3d MAW, MCAS, Yuma, AZ ............................. 1982 .......... 1985

Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL .................. 1985 .......... 1986

Deputy Assistant Program Manager (F/A-18 Hornet), Systems and Engineering Management Division, Naval Air Systems Command; Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Arlington, VA .................................. 1986 .......... 1989

Commander, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 12, MAG-12, 1st MAW, MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan ................................. 1989 .......... 1990

Student, Naval War College, Newport, RI .................................... 1990 .......... 1991

Assistant Operations Officer, MAG-24, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, HI ................................. 1991 .......... 1992


Special Projects Officer, MAG-24, 1st MEB, MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, HI ............................. 1992 .......... 1992

Deputy Branch Head, Aviation Plans, Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters and Budget Branch, Department of Aviation, HQMC, Washington, DC ........................................ 1993 .......... 1994

Commander, MAG-31, 2d MAW, MCAS, Beaufort, SC ........................................ 1994 .......... 1996
Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff,

Deputy Director, Directorate for Force
Structure (J-8), Resources and Assessment,

Deputy Commanding General, US Marine Corps
Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, VA ............................... 1999 .......... 2000

Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,
Okinawa, Japan ............................................. 2000 .......... 2002

Director for Force Structure, Resources and
Assessment (J-8), Joint Staff, Washington, DC .......... 2002 .......... 2004

Commander, US Strategic Command,

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC ............................................. 2007 .......... 2011

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PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Legion of Merit (with gold star)
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy Commendation Medal (with gold star)
Navy Achievement Medal

Naval Aviator
Naval Flight Officer
James Winnefeld, Jr., was born on 24 April 1956 in Coronado, California, as the younger of two siblings and son of the future Commandant of Midshipman at the US Naval Academy. He played football at Fort Hunt High School in Alexandria, Virginia, before enrolling in the Georgia Institute of Technology. While pursuing a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering, he was a member of the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps and vice president of Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity. Upon graduation with high honors, he was commissioned on 7 June 1978.

Ensign Winnefeld’s first assignment involved a brief posting at Naval Station Annapolis, Maryland, where he participated in the Summer Offshore Sail Training Program and then became the administrative assistant for offshore sailing. Five months later, he reported to Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida, for primary flight instruction with Training Squadron SIX (VT-6). This was followed by basic and advanced jet instruction at NAS Kingsville, Texas, with VT-23 and VT-22. He was designated a Naval Aviator on 16 May 1980.
The next month, Lieutenant (junior grade) Winnefeld reported to NAS Miramar, San Diego, California. As hub to the West Coast fighter community, the station would serve as his homeport for the next decade. After qualifying to pilot the F-14A Tomcat he departed Fighter Squadron 124 (VF-124) to join VF-24 in May 1981. Over the next two and a half years, he deployed to the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans aboard the aircraft carriers USS *Constellation* (CV 64) and USS *Ranger* (CV 61). In addition to his regular flight duties, he qualified as a Wing Landing Signal Officer and served as Pilot Training Officer and Power Plants Branch Officer. He also authored the first of many insightful articles that would appear in professional journals through his career.

Shore duty that followed as an instructor at the Navy Fighter Weapons School was concurrent to duties that included those of Quality Assurance
Officer, Training Officer, and editor of the Topgun Journal. Widely known for his expertise in radar missiles, he coordinated strike attacks and combat tactics. Lieutenant Winnefeld revamped the school’s training curricula, fostered professional discussion among the Navy’s fighter community, and participated in Servicewide development initiatives that informed weapons acquisition programs and enhanced fleet readiness.

After refresher training with VF-124 in April 1987, he became VF-1’s Assistant Operations Officer and was soon recognized for his innovative outer-air battle tactics. While serving aboard the USS Ranger that October, he devised Carrier Wing TWO’s (CVW-2) role during Operation NIMBLE ARCHER. The attack on two Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf was part of Operation EARNEST WILL, a larger effort to protect Kuwaiti shipping during the Iran-Iraq War. As the Operations Officer and Assistant Maintenance Officer, Lieutenant Commander Winnefeld prepared the unit for a second deployment to the Western Pacific/Indian Ocean aboard the Ranger. He planned and coordinated multinational exercises and contingency operations in support of national policy.

Transitioning to Washington, DC, Lieutenant Commander Winnefeld began his first Joint Staff tour during the winter of 1990. Detailed to the European and Central Commands Branch of the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3), he quickly took charge of contingency planning for the Persian Gulf region. In that capacity, he assisted in planning for the evacuation of American citizens from Liberia during Operation SHARP EDGE, helped define US force options and draft deployment orders during the opening days of Operation DESERT SHIELD, coordinated the strategic target list during Operation DESERT STORM, and designed the global naval presence policy following the Persian Gulf War. For his efforts, he received the Admiral William J. Crowe Award as Joint Staff Action Officer of the Year. In July 1991, he was appointed senior aide-de-camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Colin L. Powell.

Commander Winnefeld returned to NAS Miramar the following summer to complete refresher training with VF-124 before becoming the Executive Officer of VF-211. He earned an Air Medal while serving aboard the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) during Operation SOUTHERN WATCH when he led missions to enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq in the spring of 1993. A year later, he took command of the squadron and led it to unpresented success during the Pacific Fleet’s fighter command competitions. He chaired CVW-9’s Anti-Air Warfare Action Board and graduated with Highest Distinction from the Naval War College’s nonresident program.

In March 1995, Commander Winnefeld embarked on a rigorous sixteen-month training program that prepared him to supervise the operation of nuclear-powered vessels. This included a course in nuclear engineering at Orlando, Florida, another in nuclear propulsion plants at Charleston, South Carolina, on-the-job-training aboard the newly launched aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), and instruction for prospective commanding officers at Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Washington, DC. During this period he was frocked to captain and earned the Vice Admiral William W. Behrens award by graduating at the top of his nuclear power class at Orlando.

Upon completion of his training, Captain Winnefeld held three consecutive operational assignments, each involving deployments to the Arabian Gulf in support of SOUTHERN WATCH. As Executive Officer of the Stennis, he prepared the crew for their maiden deployment during the winter of 1998. While serving overseas, the battle group patrolled the skies over southern Iraq and participated in multinational maritime interdiction operations throughout the region.

Captain Winnefeld then took charge of the amphibious transport USS Cleveland (LPD 7) in May 1998. While deployed the following year, it served as flagship for the amphibious ready group. When an embarked unmanned aerial vehicle identified an Iraqi missile site that had been threatening Coalition forces, he developed the concept for linking the drone imagery with strike aircraft from a nearby carrier to destroy the installation.
In February 2000, Captain Winnefeld assumed command of USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Already forward deployed when terrorists attacked America on 11 September 2001, his was the first vessel to arrive on station in the Arabian Sea following the tragedy. During the first weeks of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, CVW-8 from the Enterprise flew strike missions in support of Coalition forces in Afghanistan. In recognition of his contribution to the war effort he received the Bronze Star.

Shore duty followed in March 2002 as Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Winnefeld led the staff during the Global War on Terrorism and, in the wake of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, spearheaded a review of aircraft carrier and airwing reconstitution options, which led to the development of the Fleet Readiness Plan, or FRP. A year later, having been promoted to rear admiral (lower half), he became Director of Warfare Programs and Transformational Concepts at US Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. In that role, he directed a fleetwide cost analysis and led the fleet effort to apply business measures of effectiveness to management decisions and investment strategies.

In December 2004, Rear Admiral Winnefeld took charge of the Carrier Strike Group TWO, a seven-ship task force organized around the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). While deployed to the Persian Gulf from October 2005 to February 2006, he led Combined Task Forces 50, 58, and 152. These units conducted maritime strike, surveillance, security operations throughout the region, to include attacking insurgent targets and providing close air support to Coalition ground forces during IRAQI FREEDOM. He was among the aircrew that flew the F-14’s final combat missions over the skies of Iraq.
Later that spring, shortly after returning to Norfolk and receiving his second star, Rear Admiral Winnefeld became Director of Joint Innovation and Experimentation (J-9) at US Joint Forces Command. He shaped the team that deployed Operational Net Assessment and Synthetic Environments for Modeling and Simulation in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; its mission was to provide integrated insights into how people might respond to actions against elements of Afghan society. He also oversaw exercises URBAN RESOLVE and NOBEL RESOLVE, large-scale experiments that tested the efficacy of alternative civil-military responses to various urban terror scenarios.

In 2007, Vice Admiral Winnefeld served as Commander of US Sixth Fleet, NATO Allied Joint Command Lisbon, and Striking and Support Forces NATO. He also served as Deputy Commander of US Naval Forces Europe and commander of US European Command’s Joint Task Force. He reorganized the Naval Forces Europe staff along functional lines to better support US African and US European commands, led the Sixth Fleet to maintain its joint task force certification during Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE, and established a viable naval capability along the Eastern Mediterranean when civil violence erupted in Lebanon.
Vice Admiral Winnefeld returned to Washington a year later for a second Joint Staff tour, this time as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), and Senior Member of the US delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. He often represented the military at National Security Council meetings and contributed advice on a wide range of strategic issues: counterinsurgency operations in Yemen, responding to ballistic missile tests in North Korea, halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran, and the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. He coordinated an in-depth review that informed President Obama’s decision to surge US forces in Afghanistan, participated in Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Follow-on negotiations with Russia, and led the effort to update the Chairman’s National Military Strategy.

In May 2010, Admiral Winnefeld received his fourth star and assumed leadership, concurrently, of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at Colorado Springs, Colorado. In this dual role, his principal responsibility was to protect the US homeland. To the north, he worked with Canadian allies to develop Arctic capabilities and extended traditional aerospace missions to the land and sea environs. To the south, he strengthened military-to-military relationships with Mexico and increased collaborative efforts to combat transnational crime, such as interdicting the illicit drug trade. He was also responsible for supporting civil authorities during domestic emergencies, ranging from disaster relief operations to countering the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond building rapport with government agencies (Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Boarder Protection), he promoted the Contingency Dual-Status Commander concept. That authority significantly...
enhanced unity of effort during times of crisis by temporarily aligning state-controlled National Guard forces and Federal military forces under a single joint task force commander. It also closed a lingering gap between the National Guard and the Active Component.

Admiral Winnefeld became the ninth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 August 2011. The next four years were hallmarked by declining fiscal resources and an increasingly uncertain global security environment. In addition to a $487 billion reduction in defense spending mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011, Congressional failure to agree upon a plan to lessen the Nation’s budget deficit the following year triggered yet another $500 billion cut to the next decade of funding (it was partially mitigated by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013). During this period, he was a principal contributor to the Defense Strategic Guidance, which sought to codify in strategic terms both new global realities and the implications of ongoing budget challenges. Meanwhile, as America began to turn its attention from Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific region, the Syrian Civil War continued to escalate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatened Middle East peace, Russian annexation of Crimea revived Cold War anxieties, and a deadly outbreak of Ebola ravaged West Africa.

As Vice Chairman, Admiral Winnefeld chaired the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and cochaired the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). These enterprises together encompassed the review, validation, and approval of force capabilities necessary to execute the National Security Strategy. In an economy increasingly driven by private innovation, rather than federally funded research and development, he stressed the need for a “robust and enduring relationship” between the Defense Department and commercial industry to sustain the country’s diminishing technological superiority.

Like his predecessors, Admiral Winnefeld continued to refine the requirements process. He limited the length of capability documents, accelerated the consideration of alternatives, and restricted which issues ultimately reached the JROC for decision. While firmly regulating attendance at JROC meetings to facilitate deliberation, he included the Under Secretary of Acquisition and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to add perspectives on cost and technology. He emphasized that oversight throughout the requirements, acquisition, and development processes was necessary to enable program adjustments in response to changing circumstances.

After collaborating with Defense officials on a Strategic Choices and Management Review, which evaluated the relevance of the Pentagon’s existing war plans, Admiral Winnefeld helped oversee the development and implementation of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Commenting on the current state of affairs, he observed that “the trajectory of the security environment and the ongoing turbulence in defense funding have upset the strategic balance . . . and we need to reset it.” The QDR sought to achieve moderate risk by aligning the ends, ways, and means of national defense. It presented an updated strategy organized around three top priorities: protect the homeland from attack and mitigate the effects of natural disaster; enhance leadership to preserve regional stability; and project power globally, to provide assistance or defeat aggression as necessary. Two related initiatives focused on recalibrating the size and shape of the Joint Force, as well as its supporting infrastructure (including plans to reconfigure budget-draining compensation packages for military personnel and veterans). The persistent message was that left unchecked, sequestration driven cuts would involve greater risk and could jeopardize even the downscaled strategy. Admiral Winnefeld plainly stated the bottom line while testifying before Congress: “We simply won’t have enough modernized ready stuff in our force to get all the jobs done, both in the near and long term.”

Admiral Winnefeld also cochaired the Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint Department of Defense and Department of Energy organization tasked with managing America’s nuclear weapons arsenal, and
the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee, which was created to protect the nation’s diminishing technical superiority in that realm by coordinating programs, strategy, and acquisition. He maintained that America’s “nuclear deterrent force is the ultimate protection against a nuclear attack on the U.S., the one known existential threat to the nation,” and advised that “we must find a way to pay for simultaneously modernizing all three legs of the triad, our dual capable tactical aircraft, and our nuclear command and control systems.” The preferred approach was to extend the life of existing warheads while narrowing the types of delivery vehicles. He favored geographic extension of a robust and capable missile defense system, not only to protect the homeland, but also to safeguard regional partners in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.

He likewise worked to develop sensible and measurable cybersecurity requirements and was lead author of “Cybersecurity’s Human Factor: Lessons from the Pentagon,” which appeared in Harvard Business Review. The key to reducing institutional vulnerability, he stressed, was to limit human error by establishing a culture that minimized mistakes.

Admiral Winnefeld retired on 31 July 2015, after forty-one years in uniform. Shortly thereafter, he joined the faculty at the Georgia Institute of Technology, as a Distinguished Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, and was welcomed as a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He remained a strong advocate for a robust Navy, but emphasized the need for innovative approaches to force composition, modernization, and employment during an era characterized by fiscal austerity and global uncertainty.
# James Alexander Winnefeld, Jr.

Admiral, USN

## Promotions

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## Assignments

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<td>Division Officer, Naval Station, Annapolis, MD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student, Naval Aviation Schools Command, Naval Air Station (NAS), Pensacola, FL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student, Training Squadron SIX (VT-6), NAS Whiting Field, Milton FL</td>
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<td>Student, VT-23 and later VT-22, NAS Kingsville, TX</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>Replacement Pilot, Fighter Squadron 124 (VF-124); Power Plants Branch Officer, VF 24, NAS Miramar, San Diego, CA</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality Assurance Officer and later Training Officer, Naval Fighter Weapons School, NAS Miramar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacement Pilot, VF-124; Operations Officer, VF-I, NAS Miramar</td>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action Officer, European and Central Commands Branch, Directorate of Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Aide-de-Camp to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td>1991</td>
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</table>
Replacement Pilot, VF-124; Executive Officer and
later Commanding Officer, VF-211, NAS Miramar 1992-1995

Student, Naval Nuclear Power Training
Command, Orlando, FL 1995-1996

Student, Naval Nuclear Power Training
Command, Charleston, SC 1996-1996

Prospective Executive Officer, USS John C. Stennis 1996-1996

Student, Naval Reactors, Department of Energy (DOE), Washington, DC 1996-1996

Executive Officer, USS John C. Stennis
Naval Station (NS) Norfolk, VA 1996-1998

Commanding Officer, USS Cleveland
San Diego, CA 1998-1999

Student, Prospective Commanding Officer Refresher Course, Naval Reactors, DOE Washington, DC 1999-2000

Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise
NS Norfolk, VA 2000-2002

Executive Assistant, Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC 2002-2003

Director, Warfare Programs and Transformational Concepts (N-8), US Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, VA 2003-2004

Commander, USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (Carrier Strike Group TWO), Norfolk, VA 2004-2006

Director for Joint Innovation and Experimentation (J-9), US Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA 2006-2007

Commander, US SIXTH Fleet, NATO Allied Joint Command Lisbon, and Striking and Support Forces NATO; and Deputy Commander, US Naval Forces Europe 2007-2008

Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, Washington, DC, and Senior Member, United States Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee 2008-2010


Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 2011-2015
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 gold stars)
Bronze Star
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal (with First Strike/Flight Award)
Navy Commendation Medal (with gold star)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Navy Achievement Medal

Naval Aviator
Paul Joseph Selva
31 July 2015–Present

Paul Selva was born on 27 September 1958 in Biloxi, Mississippi. Shortly thereafter his family relocated to Terceira Island in the Azores archipelago, Portugal, where his father worked at Lajes Field. After attending the base high school he enrolled in the US Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. In 1980 he received a bachelor’s degree in aeronautical engineering and was commissioned a second lieutenant. After pilot training he served consecutively in the 917th and 32d Air Refueling Squadrons as a copilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and flight commander. During this period of his career he completed Squadron Officer School, and earned a master’s degree in management and human relations from Abilene Christian University.
Consecutive staff assignments followed in 1989 at Strategic Air Command Headquarters. He initially served as Company-Grade Adviser to the Commander. With promotion to major he managed the Offensive Aircraft Systems Panel and later became Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources. In 1992, after attending Air Command and Staff College, and earning a second master’s degree in political science from Auburn University, he returned to flight duty. He filled sequential roles as an instructor pilot and flight commander with the 9th Air Refueling Squadron, Commander of 722d Operations Support Squadron and then the 9th Air Refueling Squadron, and ultimately as Deputy Commander of 60th Operations Group. He was appointed a National Defense Fellow in the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Studies Group in 1995, before becoming the Assistant to the Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment one year later. During subsequent command billets, beginning in 1998, he led the 60th Operations Group, 62d Airlift Wing, and the Tanker Airlift Control Center.

Brigadier General Selva became Director of Operations at US Transportation Command in 2004. Two years later he reported to Air Force Headquarters, where he served concurrently as Director of Strategic Planning for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, and Director of the Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review for the Vice Chief of Staff. Promoted to lieutenant general in 2008, he was appointed Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Three years later he
Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter congratulates General Selva and his wife Ricki, following the ceremony swearing him in as the tenth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 July 2015.

became Vice Commander of Pacific Air Forces. After receiving his fourth star in 2012, he took charge of Air Mobility Command, and two years later assumed leadership of US Transportation Command. He became the tenth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 July 2015.
### Promotions

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### Assignments

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<td>Student, Pilot Training, Reese Air Force Base (AFB), TX</td>
<td>1980 ..... 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copilot and Aircraft Commander, 917th Air Refueling Squadron, Dyess AFB, TX</td>
<td>1981 ..... 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copilot, Aircraft Commander, Instructor Pilot, and Flight Commander, 32d Air Refueling Squadron, Barksdale AFB, LA</td>
<td>1984 ..... 1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company-Grade Adviser to Commander, Strategic Air Command (SAC); later, Manager of Offensive Aircraft Systems Panel and Executive Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Resources, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, NB</td>
<td>1989 ..... 1991</td>
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<td>Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL</td>
<td>1991 ..... 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instructor Pilot and Flight Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron; later, Commander, 722d Operations Support Squadron, March AFB, CA</td>
<td>1992 ..... 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron; later, Deputy Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, CA</td>
<td>1994 ..... 1995</td>
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National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense  
Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, VA. 1995 – 1996

Assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary  
of Defense for Net Assessment,  

Commander, 60th Operations Group,  
Travis AFB, CA 1998 – 2000

Commander, 62d Airlift Wing,  
McChord AFB, WA 2000 – 2002

Vice Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center,  
Scott AFB, IL 2002 – 2003

Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center,  
Scott AFB, IL 2003 – 2004

Director of Operations, US Transportation  
Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott AFB, IL 2004 – 2006

Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy  
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs,  
Headquarters US Air Force (USAF),  
Washington, DC 2006 – 2007

Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy  
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs,  
Headquarters USAF, and Director, Air Force  
QDR, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff,  

Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, DC 2008 – 2011

Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint-Base  
Pearl Harbor–Hickam, HI 2011 – 2012

Commander, Air Mobility Command,  
Scott AFB, IL 2012 – 2014

Commander, USTRANSCOM, Scott AFB, IL 2014 – 2015

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, DC 2015 – Present
PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Air Force Commendation Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal

Command Pilot
The JCS Conference Room: “The Tank”
The JCS Conference Room: “The Tank”

In early 1942 the new US Joint Chiefs of Staff and US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff organizations moved into the US Public Health Building in Washington, DC, on Constitution Avenue between 19th and 20th Streets, NW. The building was soon redesignated the Combined Chiefs of Staff Building. Here the Joint Chiefs of Staff held their first formal meeting on 9 February 1942 in a conference room on the second floor (restored by the building’s later occupant, the Interior Department, in 1992). They continued to use this room throughout World War II.

The conference room, or “presentation” room as it was initially called, soon became known as “The Tank.” A popular explanation of the origin of this nickname is that access to the entrance used by staff officers was down a flight of stairs through an arched portal, supposedly giving the impression of entering a tank.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet in the original JCS Conference Room, 23 October 1942.

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. and the Joint Chiefs, October 2015. Left to right: General Paul J. Selva, Vice Chairman; General Dunford; General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff, USA; General Robert B. Neller, Commandant, USMC; Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations; General Mark A. Walsh III, Chief of Staff, USAF; and General Frank J. Grass, Chief of National Guard Bureau.
The nickname survived the JCS Conference Room’s moves to various locations. In January 1946 “The Tank” moved with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the New War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, NW (later the US Department of State Building). In April 1947 the conference room moved with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Pentagon, where it has occupied several locations on the second floor. From April 1947 until October 1949 it was located on corridor 2 in the D ring. The JCS Conference Room then moved to corridor 9 in the C ring. Since August 1957 “The Tank” has been on corridor 9 in the E ring. In addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operations Deputies and the Deputy Operations Deputies may meet there.
THE FLAG OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The Flag of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Soon after General Omar N. Bradley took office as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson asked the Secretary of the Army to prepare designs for a distinguishing flag for the Chairman. The Heraldic Branch of the Army Quartermaster General’s Office (later the US Army Institute of Heraldry) drew up two designs, which the Secretary of the Army submitted to Secretary Johnson on 17 November. On 6 December Johnson approved the design preferred by General Bradley and requested that the Secretary of the Army provide the Chairman with such a flag.

The Manufacturing Division of the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot made the flag, and it was delivered to General Bradley on 19 January 1950 and displayed in his office for the first time on 26 January. He also received a flag made of bunting for field use, small boat and automobile flags, and the flag reproduced on aluminum plates for use on aircraft.
The flag of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is of medium blue and white silk (the colors of the flags of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, respectively) divided diagonally from upper hoist to lower fly, blue above and white below. The central design consists of an American eagle with wings spread horizontally.

On the eagle’s chest is a shield consisting of thirteen stripes, seven white and six red, representing the thirteen original colonies, with blue in chief (the upper part of the field), representing Congress joining the colonies into unity. The eagle, facing the pike, the point of honor in heraldry, holds three crossed gold arrows in its talons, representing the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is indicated by four stars, each with one point upward, placed on a diagonal line from upper fly to lower hoist, two to each side of the eagle. The stars on the blue field are white; those on the white field are blue. The placement of the stars on a diagonal line is intended to be representative of all three services. In Army and Air Force flags, stars are placed in a horizontal center line, while in the Navy a vertical center line is used for two stars, an imaginary triangle for three stars, and an imaginary lozenge for four stars.

The eagle and stars of the Chairman’s flag are hand embroidered, and three edges of the flag are trimmed with knotted fringe of yellow silk. In addition, the flag has a cord and tassels of medium blue and white silk strands attached below the spearhead of the pike. The Chairman’s flag is displayed in his office and carried in honors ceremonies when he is present.

In September 1950, when General Bradley was promoted to five-star rank, the Secretary of the Army asked whether an additional flag should be designed for use when the Chairman was a five-star officer. General Bradley did not think an additional flag was needed. He believed that the flag represented the position, not the rank of the individual occupant, and should not be changed to show the rank of the incumbent. The Secretary of Defense acceded to General Bradley’s wishes and a five-star Chairman’s flag was not designed.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
IDENTIFICATION BADGE
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

Until 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no unique seal, emblem, or other identification device. From March 1949, personnel serving on a full-time duty status in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and associated boards and staffs were authorized to wear the National Military Establishment Identification Badge (subsequently renamed the Department of Defense [DOD] Identification Badge). Military personnel assigned to the OJCS wore the DOD Identification Badge until January 1961, when Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates suspended further issuance of the badge.

On 5 February 1962 Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, who was just completing his tour of duty as Director of the Joint Staff, wrote to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower on the matter of the identification badge. Wheeler favored reinstitution of the badge or a similar device for military personnel on the Joint Staff. In December 1962, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric reinstated the DOD Identification Badge as the Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge but limited its issuance to individuals assigned to OSD, he informed the Director of the Joint Staff that he did not object to institution of a similar device for Joint Staff personnel.
After the Personnel Directorate of the Joint Staff recommended adoption of a JCS identification badge, the US Army Institute of Heraldry designed an appropriate device. On 2 April 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge and on 3 April issued JCS Memorandum of Policy 142 authorizing award of the badge to members of the US Armed Forces assigned to the OJCS. Subsequently, the criteria were expanded to include military personnel assigned to agencies in direct support of the OJCS and later the Joint Staff. Over the years the JCS Identification Badge has been used as the seal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although no official action has ever designated it as such.

The design features, within an oval silver metal wreath of laurel two and one-half inches in height and two inches in width overall, the shield of the United States. The chief (the upper one-third of the shield) in blue enamel and the base (the lower two-thirds of the shield) of thirteen stripes in alternating white and red enamel are superimposed on four gold metal unsheathed swords, two in pale (vertical) and two in saltire (crossed). The points and pommels of the swords are resting on the wreath; the blades and grips are entwined with a gold metal continuous scroll surrounding the shield with the word “Joint” at the top and the words “Chiefs of Staff” at the bottom, all in blue enamel letters.

The symbolism of the badge includes the laurel for achievement, courage, and victory and the four unsheathed swords for the armed might of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and their combined constant vigilance and readiness in the defense of the United States. Patented on 1 December 1964 (Patent No. Des. 199,678), the JCS Identification Badge appears on the covers of all JCS publications, plans, and official files.
Quarters Six: The Chairman's Residence
Quarters Six: The Chairman’s Residence

Quarters Six, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Virginia, official residence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was constructed in 1908, the same year that Orville Wright made the world’s first military test flight at Fort Myer. It was built from standard plan 120-H, designed by the Office of the Army’s Quartermaster General in Washington, DC.

The 120 plan series, issued in 1898, was based on standard plans designed in the 1870s under Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs. A distinguished engineer officer and an able administrator, Meigs designed many of the public structures in the Washington, DC, area. His efforts to improve the efficiency of his department included the introduction of standardized plans for the various types of buildings built for the Army.
Guests are welcomed into the spacious foyer, which provides access to the living room, library, and kitchen; a staircase leads to the second floor.

The large living room provides ample space for entertaining guests. The space is decorated with personal items collected by the Dunfords during their thirty-eight years of service.
The library provides the family with casual space to relax and entertain guests.

With its spectacular view of Washington, DC, the sunroom is a favorite spot for guests. The sunroom provides additional space for guests of the Chairman and Mrs. Dunford to mingle before dinner.
Set for an official function, the dining room's extended table seats up to twenty-eight guests. The crystal, silverware, and china belong to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are used for official entertaining.

The official guest suite in Quarters Six.
The capital city as viewed from Quarters Six.
The 120 series of plans for family housing was widely used during the major building boom that started at Fort Myer after it became a permanent post in 1896. At that time Fort Myer was not only a bustling Signal Corps center but also a cavalry station. The spurt in construction gathered even more momentum after Secretary of War Elihu Root's reorganization of the expanded Army at the beginning of the twentieth century. The plan variation known as 120-H was issued in 1907 toward the end of this period of expansion. The dwellings built to this plan rose at the heart of Fort Myer. Their brick facades stand on granite block foundations and are representative of officers' quarters built on numerous military posts during this period.

Quarters Six, consisting of three stories and a basement, was originally built as a duplex. It was the largest building among the stately homes of Officers' Row. Housing two junior officers and their families, the neo-Federal style building had eleven rooms and cost $19,202 to build. It was among the first homes at Myer to be built with provision for electrical lighting, although installation of indoor plumbing was still three years away.

The design of the house reflects an architectural transition from the complicated and elaborate forms and features of Victorian residential construction to the simpler, more classical character of the Colonial Revival. The use of stone below the water table is characteristic of the former, while the plain windows and pedimented facade are characteristic of the latter.

In 1960 planning began for conversion of the duplex into a single residence for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations had long had official residences, and in June 1960 an official home had been designated for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. There was, however, no specific set of quarters set aside for the Chairman. During congressional consideration of the proposal for official quarters for the Air Force Chief, Senator John C. Stennis asked if there were plans for permanent quarters for the Chairman. President Dwight D. Eisenhower called the Army Chief of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, whom he had selected to be the next Chairman, to the White House to discuss the matter. As the Chairman, Lemnitzer would have had the prerogative of remaining at Quarters One at Fort Myer, the official residence of the Chief of Staff of the Army, as General Omar N. Bradley, another former Army Chief, had done during his tenure as Chairman. However, the President wished Quarters One to be available for the new Army Chief of Staff. He asked Lemnitzer to arrange for a permanent residence for the Chairman.

In September 1960 the Army reviewed quarters at Fort Myer that might be suitable for conversion into permanent housing for the Chairman. General Lemnitzer selected Quarters Six, which was a few doors from Quarters One and next door to Quarters Seven, recently designated as the official residence of the Air Force Chief of Staff. The projected cost of converting the duplex to a single dwelling was $75,000. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker recommended Quarters Six's conversion to Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and both Secretary Gates and President Eisenhower approved the choice.

Renovation of the house began in early 1961. The project included major exterior and interior changes and new mechanical and electric systems. Among the additions were a sun room and a carport. The final cost of the renovation was $105,487. As remodeled, the house has 7,365 square feet of living space. General Lemnitzer and his wife moved into Quarters Six in early January 1962 and remained until his service as Chairman ended.

Since then, most of the Chairman have resided in Quarters Six during their tenure. The first floor is used primarily for official entertaining, while the family quarters are on the second and third floors.

On Grant Avenue on a bluff looking north across the Potomac River, the house faces the flagpole on Whipple Field and has a panoramic view of the monuments along the Washington Mall. As part of Generals' Row, Quarters Six belongs to the Fort Myer National Historic District.
APPENDICES
Section 211 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer thereof but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties, in addition to such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct:

(1) preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces;
(2) preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the military services of logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
(3) establishment of unified commands in strategic areas;
(4) review of major material and personnel requirements of the military forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans;
(5) formulation of policies for joint training of the military forces;
(6) formulation of policies for coordinating the military education of members of the military forces; and
(7) providing United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Chairman’) shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the Regular officers of the armed services to serve at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and shall be eligible for one reappointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except in time of war hereafter declared by the Congress when there shall be no limitation on the number of such reappointments. The Chairman shall receive the basic pay and basic and personal money allowances prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army, and such special pays and hazardous duty
pays to which he may be entitled under other provisions of law.

(d) The Chairman, if in the grade of general, shall be additional to the number of officers in the grade of general provided in the third proviso of section 504(b) of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress) or, if in the rank of admiral, shall be additional to the number of officers having the rank of admiral provided in section 413(a) of such Act. While holding such office he shall take precedence over all other officers of the armed services: Provided, That the Chairman shall not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or over any of the military services.

(e) In addition to participating as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of the duties assigned in subsection (b) of this section, the Chairman shall, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, perform the following duties:

1. serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
2. provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable; and
3. inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been reached.
Appendix 2

Extracts of Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986

Chapter 5—Joint Chiefs of Staff
Sec.
151. Joint Chiefs of Staff: composition; functions.
152. Chairman: appointment; grade and rank.
153. Chairman: functions.
154. Vice Chairman.
155. Joint Staff.

Sec. 151. Joint Chiefs of Staff: composition; functions
(a) Composition.—There are in the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the following:
   (1) The Chairman.*
   (2) The Chief of Staff of the Army.
   (3) The Chief of Naval Operations.
   (4) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
   (5) The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
(b) Function as military advisers.—(1) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
   (2) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subsections (d) and (e).

*1992 Amendment (Public Law 102-484, 23 October 1992) added subparagraph “(2) The Vice Chairman”; the following subparagraphs were renumbered.
(c) Consultation by Chairman.—(1) In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of—

(A) the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and

(B) the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(2) Subject to subsection (d), in presenting advice with respect to any matter to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be, of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter.

(d) Advice and opinions of members other than Chairman.—(1) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.

(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) Advice on request.—The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.

(f) Recommendations to Congress.—After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

(g) Meetings of JCS.—(1) The Chairman shall convene regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall—

(A) preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(B) provide agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff);

(C) assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying on their business as promptly as practicable; and

(D) determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided.
Sec. 152. Chairman: appointment; grade and rank*

(a) Appointment; term of office.—(1) There is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces. The Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years, beginning on October 1 of odd-numbered years. Subject to paragraph (3), an officer serving as Chairman may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(2) In the event of the death, retirement, resignation, or reassignment of the officer serving as Chairman before the end of the term for which the officer was appointed, an officer appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve as Chairman only for the remainder of the original term, but may be reappointed as provided in paragraph (1).

(3) An officer may not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the combined period of service of such officer in such positions exceeds six years. However, the President may extend to eight years the combined period of service an officer may serve in such positions if he determines such action is in the national interest. The limitations of this paragraph do not apply in time of war.

(b) Requirement for appointment.—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer has served as—

(A) the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(B) the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or the Commandant of the Marine Corps; or

(C) the commander of a unified or specified combatant command.

(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) Grade and Rank.—The Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces. However, he may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.

*1987 Amendment (Public Law 100-180, 4 December 1982) substituted “grade and rank” for “rank.”
Sec 153. Chairman: functions

(a) Planning; advice; policy formulation.—Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following:

(1) Strategic direction. Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

(2) Strategic planning.—(A) Preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

(B) Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

(C) Performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

(3) Contingency planning; preparedness.—(A) Providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

(B) Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

(C) Advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

(D) Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(4) Advice on requirements, programs, and budget.—(A) Advising the Secretary, under section 163(b)(2) of this title, on the priorities of the requirements identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(B) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(C) Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities referred to in clause (B).

(D) Recommending to the Secretary, in accordance with section 166 of this title, a budget proposal for activities of each unified and specified combatant command.
(E) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

(F) Assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

(5) Doctrine, training, and education.—(A) Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.

(B) Formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces.

(C) Formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces.

(6) Other matters.—(A) providing for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(B) Performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or the Secretary of Defense.*

Sec. 154. Vice Chairman

(a) Appointment.—(1) There is a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman may not be members of the same armed force. However, the President may waive the restriction in the preceding sentence for a limited period of time in order to provide for the orderly transition of officers appointed to serve in the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(3) The Vice Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) Requirement for appointment.—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer—

(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and

(B) has served in at least one joint duty assignment . . . as a general or flag officer.**

(2) The President may waive paragraph—(1) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) Duties.—The Vice Chairman performs such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.*

(d) Function as acting Chairman.—When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

*Additional legislation in 1986 (Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986) added a section (b) requiring a report on assignment of roles and missions.

**1988 Amendment (Public Law 100-456, 29 September 1988) substituted “completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title)” for “served in at least one joint duty assign- ment (as defined under section 668(b) of this title).”
(e) Succession after Chairman and Vice Chairman.—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

(f) Participation in JCS meetings.—The Vice Chairman may participate in all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but may not vote on a matter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff except when acting as Chairman.**

(g) Grade and rank.—The Vice Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except the Chairman. The Vice Chairman may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.

Sec. 203. Participation in the National Security Council meetings

Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

(e) The Chairman (or in his absence the Vice Chairman) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may, in his role as principal military adviser to the National Security Council and subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.

*1992 Amendment changed this section to read “Duties.—The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.”

**1992 Amendment struck this subsection that prohibited the Vice Chairman from voting except when acting as Chairman and redesignated subsection (g) as subsection (f).
## Appendix 3

Chronological Listing of Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>Chairman, JCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harry S. Truman</td>
<td>James V. Forrestal</td>
<td>Gen. of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53</td>
<td>17 Sep 47–27 Mar 49</td>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Louis A. Johnson</td>
<td>16 Aug 49–</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 Sep 50–12 Sep 51</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert A. Lovett</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 Sep 51–20 Jan 53</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>Charles E. Wilson</td>
<td>Gen. of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 53–20 Jan 61</td>
<td>28 Jan 53–8 Oct 57</td>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>09 Oct 57–01 Dec 59</td>
<td>Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Thomas S. Gates, Jr.</td>
<td>15 Aug 53–15 Aug 57</td>
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<td>15 Aug 57–30 Sep 60</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>01 Oct 60–</td>
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<tr>
<td>John F. Kennedy</td>
<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 61–22 Nov 63</td>
<td>21 Jan 61–</td>
<td>–30 Sep 62</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 62–</td>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Chairman, JCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson</td>
<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Nov 63–20 Jan 69</td>
<td>–29 Feb 68</td>
<td>–01 Jul 64</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clark M. Clifford</td>
<td>Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 Mar 68–20 Jan 69</td>
<td>03 Jul 64–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard M. Nixon</td>
<td>Melvin R. Laird</td>
<td>Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
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<td>20 Jan 69–09 Aug 74</td>
<td>22 Jan 69–29 Jan 73</td>
<td>–02 Jul 70</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Elliot L. Richardson</td>
<td>Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jan 73–24 May 73</td>
<td>02 Jul 70–01 Jul 74</td>
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<td></td>
<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>Gen. George S. Brown, USAF</td>
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<td>02 Jul 73–</td>
<td>01 Jul 74–</td>
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<td>09 Aug 74–20 Jan 77</td>
<td>–19 Nov 75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
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<td></td>
<td>20 Nov 75–20 Jan 77</td>
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<td>Gen. David C. Jones, USAF</td>
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<td>21 Jun 78–</td>
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<td>20 Jan 81–20 Jan 89</td>
<td>21 Jan 81–23 Nov 87</td>
<td>–18 Jun 82</td>
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<td>Frank C. Carlucci</td>
<td>Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., USA</td>
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<td>23 Nov 87–20 Jan 89</td>
<td>18 Jun 82–30 Sep 85</td>
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<td>Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN</td>
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<td>01 Oct 85–</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Jan 89–20 Jan 93</td>
<td>21 Mar 89–20 Jan 93</td>
<td>–30 Sep 89</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>01 Oct 89–</td>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Chairman, JCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>William J. “Bill” Clinton</td>
<td>Les Aspin</td>
<td>Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Jan 93–20 Jan 01</td>
<td>20 Jan 93–3 Feb 94</td>
<td>~30 Sep 93</td>
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<td>William J. Perry</td>
<td>Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA</td>
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<td>03 Feb 94–24 Jan 97</td>
<td>25 Oct 93–30 Sep 97*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>William S. Cohen</td>
<td>Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 Jan 97–20 Jan 01</td>
<td>01 Oct 97—</td>
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<tr>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 01–20 Jan 09</td>
<td>20 Jan 01–18 Dec 06</td>
<td>~30 Sep 01</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Robert M. Gates</td>
<td>Gen. Richard B. Myers, USA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18 Dec 06—</td>
<td>01 Oct 01–30 Sep 05</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Gen. Peter Pace, USMC</td>
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<td>01 Oct 05–30 Sep 07</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 07—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Dr. Robert M. Gates</td>
<td>Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Jan 09–</td>
<td>~30 Jun 11</td>
<td>~30 Sep 11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leon E. Panetta</td>
<td>Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, USA</td>
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<td>01 Jul 11–26 Feb 13</td>
<td>01 Oct 11–30 Sep 15</td>
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<td>Charles T. Hagel</td>
<td>Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, USMC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>27 Feb 13–17 Feb 15</td>
<td>01 Oct 15—</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ashton B. Carter</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17 Feb 15—</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, served as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1 to 24 October 1993.
NOTES


4 John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 6 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), 341; CCS 409, 25 Nov 43; Minutes of the 132nd Mtg of the CCS, 0930, 30 Nov 43, 459; Papers and Minutes of Meetings, Sextant and Eureka Conferences (Joint History Office [JHO]).


6 Leahy, I Was There, 434–435; David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994), 434–436. Truman’s decision had large consequences. In Asia, communists gained power when they were able, as in China and Vietnam, to identify with nationalist aspirations. In Japan, the imperial institution remained the focus of national loyalty.


9 National Security Act of 1947, Statutes at Large 61, sec.1, 495 (1948).


British Joint Services Mission, “Record of Meeting in Pentagon at 1630 hours, 15 Jan 51,” 17 Jan 51, copy in JHO.


Congress, Senate, Military Situation in the Far East, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 729–734; Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, 653–654.


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As examples, during the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis, South Korean President Syngman Rhee offered to send a division to Laos. Adm. Radford informed the NSC that he favored rejecting the offer on military grounds “but that the Chiefs had outvoted him on the issue.” In 1974 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., wanted a JCS memorandum to state that there was “no military rationale” for endorsing a treaty imposing an upper limit or threshold on the size of nuclear devices that could be tested. “The Army and the Air Force particularly felt that that statement was counterproductive,” Zumwalt wrote later, but “I had the votes. The Marines went along with the Navy and I, as acting Chairman, was the tiebreaker. However, the spirit of compromise prevailed. . . .” FRUS: 1952–1954, vol. 13 (Washington, DC, 1982), 1095; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), 497–498.


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“Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 14, 1959,” by BG A. J. Goodpaster, Staff Notes, July ’59 (3), Eisenhower Library.

“Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October-October 1962, Dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis,” JHO; Benjamin F. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy (New York: Norton, 1975), 122.

“Notes by Tom Johnson of the President’s Meeting with GENs Wheeler and Abrams in the White House Family Dining Room, 11:30-12:15 hours, 26 March 1968,” Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings
Collection, Johnson Library. Clark M. Clifford had succeeded McNamara on 1 March 1968.

55 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), reappointment, Statutes at Large 82, 180 (1969).

56 Memorandum of TELCONS with The Honorable Melvin Laird on 8 June 1999 by David A. Armstrong, JHO.


58 “Structural Difficulties—Is a JCS Reorganization Really Needed?” (Interview with Former JCS Chairman ADM Thomas H. Moorer), Sea Power 28, no. 13 (1985): 33. Shortly after retiring, Wheeler wrote to GEN Harold K. Johnson, who had been Army Chief of Staff during 1964–1968, “Frankly, Johnny, I feel that I have been a colossal failure.” GEN Johnson showed this letter to Walter S. Poole during an interview on 21 March 1979.

59 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 35.

60 Congress, Senate, Nomination of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, To Be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Committee on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 4–5 June 1970, 30.


62 Moorer Papers, CJCS Files.

63 Kissinger, White House Years, 1231–1241; Moorer Papers, CJCS Files; Gerard Smith, Doubletalk (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 374; ACSAN–108–72 to CJCS, 5 Jul 72, Chairman’s File 388.3 SALT (Jan-Dec 72).


69 LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret), interview by Walter S. Poole and Steven L. Rearden, 16 Sep 98, JHO; Memo, GEN Jones to SecDef, “Overview of Budget Implications-Action Memo,” 12 Aug 1978, U, Brezinski Collection, Staff Office File, Box 1,

70 Washington Star, 4 Jun 1980, 1; GEN Jones, Statement, 4 June 1980, JHO; Congress, Senate, Nomination of David C. Jones to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 16 June 1980.


75 GEN Vessey, Letter to Director for Joint History, 23 Sep 95, JHO; CM–2–82 to SecDef, 19 Jun 82, CJS Files 820 (Lebanon), S.


81 GNA, sec. 211(a).

82 Crowe, Line of Fire, 126–128.

83 Ibid., 187–188.

84 GEN Alfred G. Hansen, USAF (Ret), interview by Dr. James K. Matthews, USTRANSCOM Historian, 1998, 12, JHO.


86 See Ronald H. Cole, Operation JUST CAUSE: Panama (Washington, DC: JHO, 1995); George Bush


88 CM–660–87 to SecDef, 6 Apr 87; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, “Duties of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 15 Apr 87.

89 GEN Robert T. Herres, interview by Willard Webb, Walter Poole, and Lorna Jaffe, 13 Feb 90, JHO.


93 Idem.


97 Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 3, 268.

98 Ibid., 197–208.


102 GEN Peter Pace, interview by BGEN Mark P. Hertling, 8 May 2003, transcript, Washington, DC, Joint Staff (DJ7); Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 185–186.

103 Pace interview, 8 May 2003.

104 “Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI),” Concept Paper, Washington, DC, Joint Staff (DJ-8), 16 Apr 07.


107 Ibid., 273.


111 GEN Peter Pace, “The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff—Shaping the Future” (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 Oct 2005).


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142 “Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Subject: . . . The Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Policy,” Federal News Service, 2 Feb 2010.


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