History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy

1957–1960
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with his JCS colleagues, September 1957. Left to right: General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, USA; General Twining; Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant, USMC.
The Library of Congress has catalogued Volume V as follows:

Watson, Robert J., 1920–
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954.

(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff / Robert J. Watson; v.5)
Includes index.
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.
UA23.W366 1986 355.3'3042'0973 86-4621
Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized.

The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in the text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume.

Volume VII describes JCS activities during the period 1957-1960 except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. Although only the names of its principal authors appear on the title page, the preparation of Volume VII was truly a collaborative effort. Originally written in the 1960s, the classified publication had thirteen chapters. Initial drafts of eight chapters as well as portions of several others were written by Dr. Byron R. Fairchild. After Dr. Fairchild accepted a position with the Historical Office of the Department of State, the remaining chapters were completed by Dr. Albert C. Stillson, Mrs. Anne C. Webb, Mr. Morris J. MacGregor, and Mr. Kent S. Larsen. Revision and editing were carried out by Mr. Vernon E. Davis; Miss Arma M. Siney prepared the manuscript for classified publication.

During the early 1990s, Dr. Walter S. Poole reworked the classified manuscript to prepare it for publication in its unclassified form. In addition to reorganizing it to conform to the structure of earlier volumes in The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series, Dr. Poole took advantage of the great amount of material that had become available as well as the perspective afforded by thirty years. While chapters 1 and 3 are largely Dr. Poole's work, chapters 2, 6, 9, and 11 are taken from the original with only minor revision. Chapters 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, and 15 contain material from the original version together with substantial additions and revisions by Dr. Poole. Chapters 4 and 12 and the conclusion were written by Dr. Poole. Mr. Willard J. Webb reviewed and critiqued the unclassified version. Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the Index, and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication.
Foreword

The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC
February 2000

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Preface

From forty years’ perspective, the second Eisenhower administration’s record in national security affairs seems better than many rated it at the time. The danger posed by a “missile gap” was countered without resorting to massive expenditures. Threats to West Berlin and to the “offshore islands” of Quemoy and Matsu were mastered by relatively low-key responses. An intervention in Lebanon was short and successful. Cuba, the Congo, and Southeast Asia remained volatile, however, and all were approaching crisis states by January 1961.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff as staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of direction over the unified and specified commands. That, in turn, prompted a reorganization of the Joint Staff. The joint committees (Strategic Plans, Intelligence, and Logistics) that had existed since 1947 were abolished; the numbered “J” Directorates of a conventional staff replaced them.

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, served as Chairman from August 1957 until September 1960. His contributions, although not well known, were significant. He sided with the President, and broke with the Air Force, in maintaining that a costly crash effort to develop and deploy missiles was unnecessary. Twining also backed Eisenhower, and opposed the Service Chiefs, in concluding that modest steps would be enough to make the Soviets shy away from a confrontation over Berlin. The Chairman was instrumental, when the Service Chiefs became deadlocked, in working out solutions that created the Single Integrated Operational Plan and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

An official history is the work of many hands, this one more so than most. In writing and revising chapters, I built upon foundations laid by Dr. Byron R. Fairchild and his collaborators. Mr. Willard J. Webb, Chief of what was then the JCS Historical Division, reviewed my manuscript and proposed numerous improvements. Dr. Robert J. Watson, whose authoritative History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960 was published in 1997, made valuable suggestions and provided information gathered from his research at the Eisenhower Library. For any errors of fact or interpretation, however, I alone bear responsibility.

WALTER S. POOLE
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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

1957–1960
The antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had come to seem permanent and implacable, dominated the international scene as President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered his second term of office in January 1957. Lack of success in solving such persistent problems as the arms race and the division of Germany, inability to prevent what looked like communist fishing in troubled waters, and the apparently irresistible momentum of the Cold War had taken on more menacing aspects as both superpowers acquired sizable nuclear arsenals. At the time of President Eisenhower's second inauguration, there still remained threatening repercussions from the Hungarian revolt and the Suez crisis. For many people, however, the implications of an emerging "balance of terror" had become the overriding concern. Peace seemed to depend upon each superpower possessing the ability to destroy the other.

During the latter half of 1957, that balance seemed to shift markedly in the Soviet Union's favor. On 26 August, 1957, Moscow announced the successful test flight of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), something the United States had not done. Then, dramatically, the Soviets launched the world's first earth satellite on 4 October. "Sputnik," weighing 184 pounds, circled the earth every ninety minutes. A second satellite, weighing 1,120 pounds and carrying a live dog, went into orbit on 3 November. These feats, in the judgment of one contemporary observer, "provided the USSR and international Communism with a world-wide psychological victory of the first order." Militarily, the survivability of US strategic retaliatory forces seemed doubtful. How soon might the Soviets have enough ICBMs to destroy US bombers by surprise attack?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were military advisers to the President and the National Security Council (NSC), faced what many believed would be a time of mortal peril. First and foremost, the nuclear deterrent had to be kept viable. Which missile programs should be accelerated and at what pace? Should reliance on massive nuclear retaliation be modified to put more stress on conventional capabilities? A succession of confrontations kept tensions high. Berlin, Lebanon, and the "offshore islands" of Quemoy and Matsu became crisis points during
1958–1959. The year 1960 witnessed not only troubles over Cuba, Laos, and the Congo but also the downing of an American spy plane deep in Soviet territory and the collapse of a summit meeting. As the Eisenhower years ended, the Cold War was in a frigid state.

For many Americans, the late 1950s were a time of gnawing anxiety. A sizable number became convinced that the West was losing the Cold War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave voice to a fairly widespread feeling when, in March 1959, they warned that the USSR was pursuing a “bold, dynamic, expansive strategy” designed to achieve global hegemony. The free world, they charged, often reacted with “passivity and lack of initiative.” Whenever the Soviets created a crisis, they complained, the West’s standard response seemed to be, “How far can we retreat from the status quo but still not seriously jeopardize our security or prestige?” To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this was thinly disguised defeatism. Events would prove the pessimists wrong but at the time such feelings were very deeply held.

An Experienced Team

No President has entered office with more experience in national security affairs than Dwight Eisenhower. Taken together, his successes in World War II, his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, and his achievements while serving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were unrivaled. Yet, during his first term as President, Eisenhower’s hallmark in dealing with military matters was restraint. He kept a tight rein on defense spending and tried to avoid an atmosphere of constant crisis when dealing with communist challenges. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was the President’s closest adviser about foreign affairs, held some views that were more moderate and flexible than his public image would have suggested. But Mr. Dulles did not survive Eisenhower’s second term. A recurrence of colon cancer forced him to resign on 18 April 1959; he died a month later. Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, who succeeded him, did not attain the preeminence that Dulles had enjoyed.

Charles E. Wilson, a former president of General Motors, had been Secretary of Defense since 1953. He concentrated on defense management, mediating many roles and missions disputes among the Services. Wilson left office on 8 October 1957. His successor, Neil H. McElroy, had been the head of Procter and Gamble; he also devoted himself to managerial streamlining. McElroy agreed to serve for only two years and resigned, some felt, just when he was starting to master the job. The next Secretary was Thomas S. Gates, Jr., an investment banker who had served as Under Secretary and then Secretary of the Navy and, finally, as Under Secretary of Defense. Among other things, Gates instituted the practice of meeting regularly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The men who held the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported President Eisenhower’s primary reliance on massive nuclear retaliation. During Eisenhower’s first term, Admiral Arthur W. Radford pressed hard for sizable conventional cutbacks, particularly in the Army, and thereby provoked sharp
disagreements among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Radford retired on 15
August 1957, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, succeeded him. General Nathan F.
Twining came to the job with wide experience in joint matters. In 1943, he had
been placed in tactical command of all Army, Navy, Marine, and allied air forces
in the South Pacific. Later that year, he transferred to the post of Commander of
Allied Strategic Air Forces in the Mediterranean. Twining advanced to Vice Chief
of Staff, Air Force, in 1950 and to the Chief of Staff in 1953. As Chairman, he react-
ted to Sputnik and the "missile gap" by supporting the President's policy of mod-
erate budget increases rather than the Air Force's call for drastic measures. Twin-
ing proved less outspoken than Radford on how far to go in cutting conventional
forces and in confronting Communist China.

Inevitably, reliance upon nuclear retaliation left the Army as the least favored
Service when Defense budgets were being drawn up. General Maxwell D. Taylor
served as Chief of Staff from 30 June 1955 until 1 July 1959. He had commanded
the 101st Airborne Division in Europe during 1944-1945 and the Eighth Army in
Korea during 1953. But his tour as Chief of Staff proved an unhappy experience.
Constantly, Taylor found himself at odds with the Secretary of Defense and the
President. Soon after retiring, he published The Uncertain Trumpet in which he
cri t i cized massive retaliation as outdated and called for "flexible response" with
greater reliance on conventional forces.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Taylor's successor, had unusually broad
politicomilitary experience. During World War II, he had served as Deputy Chief
of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and played a key
part in negotiating the surrender of German forces in Italy and southern Austria.
In 1949, he was named first Director of the Office of Military Assistance. In 1957,
he became the Army's Vice Chief of Staff and then Chief of Staff two years later.
General Twining decided to retire on 30 September 1960, before a new adminis-
tration took office. He knew, also, that the President wanted to make General
Llemnitzer Chairman. When Lemnitzer moved up, General George H. Decker
replaced him as Army Chief of Staff.

The Navy enjoyed an unusual continuity of leadership. Admiral Arleigh Burke
had won distinction in the war against Japan, first as commander of Destroyer
Squadron 23 and then as chief of staff to the Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force
58. During the Korean War, he spent six months as a member of the United Nations
(UN) delegation negotiating a military armistice. Burke was only a rear admiral,
eighth in seniority, when President Eisenhower selected him to be Chief of
Naval Operations in 1955. After assuming office, Admiral Burke gave great empha-
sis to the Polaris ballistic missile submarine program, which moved forward rapid-
ly. The President reappointed him in 1957 and, in 1959, considered Burke's per-
formance good enough to nominate him for an unprecedented third term.

When General Twining became Chairman, General Thomas D. White suc-
cceeded him as Chief of Staff, Air Force. General White had spent most of World
War II in the United States, going to the Pacific only in September 1944. Subse-
sequently, Pentagon assignments culminated in his 1953 appointment as Vice Chief
of Staff, Air Force. General Randolph McC. Pate served as Commandant of the
Marine Corps from 1 January 1956 until 31 December 1959. Repercussions from a
training mishap in which six recruits drowned troubled General Pate's tenure. The next Commandant, General David M. Shoup, was a colorful, blunt-spoken man who had won the Congressional Medal of Honor at Tarawa in 1943.

The Structure of Decisionmaking

President Eisenhower, who was accustomed to a military staff organization, constructed a somewhat similar structure for making and implementing national security policy. A highly formalized, pyramidal organization came into being. During eight years, the President presided over 339 meetings of the National Security Council. Usually, the NSC considered papers which were derived from twice-a-week, three-hour-long sessions of the NSC Planning Board. The Board, which included a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative, had broad representation from executive agencies; the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs served as its chairman. Its task, basically, lay in producing recommendations that reduced differences to "as clearly defined and narrow an area as possible." Nonetheless, about two-thirds of the papers that went forward to the NSC did contain "splits."

The NSC meetings often did not go beyond debate and discussion; President Eisenhower usually rendered his decision several days later. The task of implementation then fell to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The Under Secretary of State (during 1960-1961, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) chaired this body; the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence, were among its members. Unlike the Planning Board, it had no JCS representative. The OCB acquired a reputation as little more than a paper mill, and President Eisenhower was not wholly satisfied with its performance. According to one participant, however, the Board functioned best when it functioned most informally, as when members exchanged views at weekly luncheons. In any case, the President did not wholly rely upon formal mechanisms. Often, during crises or after NSC meetings adjourned, he would talk with a small group of trusted advisers. Here the President's Staff Secretary, Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, acted like a combined NSC Planning Board and OCB. The Joint Chiefs of Staff participated fully in this process. They critiqued the Planning Board's drafts; the Chairman or his representative attended NSC meetings. Even when President Eisenhower resorted to small meetings in the Oval Office, the Chairman took part when matters with military implications were at issue.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958

Revolutionary advances in military technology, particularly in missile delivery systems, underscored the need for a more direct and responsive chain of
command. President Eisenhower believed that, just when Sputnik was raising alarm, interservice feuding had undermined public confidence in military leadership. On 10 December 1957, General White urged his JCS colleagues to launch their own study of Defense reorganization. Currently, he claimed, major JCS decisions were being delayed and interservice controversies eluded solution. As a result, civilian authorities had to render judgment upon purely military matters. One week later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that an ad hoc committee headed by Major General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, would review these matters, focusing on the system for directing military forces in peace and wartime. This interservice committee submitted findings late in January 1958. Among other things, it suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume operational responsibilities and that they, rather than the Service Chiefs, act as executive agents for the unified commands.\(^5\)

At the Pentagon, on 25 January, President Eisenhower conferred with senior military and civilian officials. Admiral Radford, who had retired five months earlier, observed that the Service Chiefs never had adequate time to consider JCS business. He said that the Chairman was, in effect, the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Burke argued that the joint committees, which are described below, could be eliminated "with profit to all." Papers were better when they reached the committees than when the committees finished with them. General Twining remarked that even his five-month tenure as Chairman led him to agree—an opinion, he added, that he had not held before becoming Chairman. President Eisenhower commented that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could agree about overall strategic plans and concepts but not about "specifics of men and money." Eisenhower called the existing system too complicated and favored replacing the committee system with an integrated staff. Likewise, he had lost confidence in the concept of an executive agent for strategic control. Instead, under the Secretary of Defense, "the JCS must be supreme. . . . If we cannot make decisions quickly, we will lose our forces before they are ever effectively used."\(^6\)

Concurrently, in his State of the Union message, President Eisenhower announced that he soon would recommend reforms for Congress to consider. Secretary McElroy then formed a committee chaired by Mr. Charles Coolidge to assist him in proposing such reforms. Members included General Twining as well as Admiral Radford and another former Chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. General Twining sent copies of the Wheeler report to both Secretary McElroy and Mr. Coolidge. The Coolidge committee made no written report. The Secretary, however, kept in constant touch with it while developing his own recommendations for the President. Mr. McElroy also discussed his proposals with the Armed Forces Policy Council, which included the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^7\)

On 3 April, President Eisenhower sent Congress a special message detailing his proposals on Defense reorganization. These were the principal ones: First, all operational forces would be assigned to unified and specified commands, subject only to exceptions personally approved by the Commander in Chief. Second, orders would flow directly to unified commands from the President and the Secretary of Defense. To this end, the Service Departments would be removed from the chain of command and lose their function as "executive agents" for the Secretary of Defense.
Orders issued by the President and the Secretary would be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to commanders of unified and specified commands. Third, the Secretary's military staff had to be strengthened by improving the way in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned. Henceforth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as staff assisting the Secretary in his exercise of control over unified commands. For this purpose, the Joint Staff's statutory size would increase; an integrated operations division would be created and the existing system of joint committees abolished. The Chairman would win a vote in JCS deliberations as well as authority to assign duties to the Joint Staff and (with the Secretary's approval) appoint its Director. Also, each Service Chief should be given clear legislative authority to delegate Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief. Once this change occurred, the Secretary would require Service Chiefs to make JCS duties their principal responsibility.x

During Congressional hearings, Generals Twining, Taylor, and White all testified in support of the President's plan. So did Admiral Burke, although he voiced concern that an enlarged Joint Staff might grow into a national general staff, opening the way for a merger of the Services. General Twining described the coordination procedures by which individual Service viewpoints would continue receiving full consideration while the Joint Staff was developing its positions. General Pate, however, opposed proposals relating to the unified commands. Relaxing restrictions on the Secretary's power to transfer, reassign, consolidate, or abolish combatant functions, he feared, might become a means to "rationalize the Marine Corps out of a job." Pate also worried that a Chairman with enhanced authority might abuse his office. Nonetheless, both houses passed this legislation; President Eisenhower signed it into law on 6 August 1958. The Joint Staff's statutory size grew from 210 to 400 officers. The Act further stipulated that the Joint Staff "shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority." Congress added this language to ensure that nothing resembling the supposedly all-powerful Prussian General Staff would emerge.9

Meantime, General Twining had asked the Director, Joint Staff, to recommend changes needed to implement the President's plan. Late in April, the Director proposed recasting the Joint Staff's committees, groups, and teams into a conventional military staff consisting of numbered directorates (J-1, Personnel; J-2, Intelligence; J-3, Operations; J-4, Logistics; J-5, Plans; and J-6, Communications-Electronics). Admiral Burke opposed such a "radical" shift as being "unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of war." If a J-Staff was instituted, he argued later, J-sections should not exercise executive authority but be limited to a planning and advisory role. General Pate, who also objected, saw a J-Staff as harboring "the substance of creation of the single armed forces general staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Director to consider these arguments and draft alternatives.10

President Eisenhower already had ordered Secretary McElroy to do away with the joint committee system. Early in June, General Twining abolished the following part-time Joint Committees: Strategic Plans, Logistic Plans, Military Transportation, Intelligence, and Communications-Electronics. He also redesignated the full-time Joint Strategic Survey Committee as the Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC). On 13 August, one week after President Eisenhower signed the Reorganization Act,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved changes in which the Joint Staff grew from 210 to 400 officers and the old functional groups served as the nuclei for J-Directorates. Thus the Joint Intelligence Group became J-2, the Joint Logistics Group became J-4, the Joint Strategic Plans Group became J-5, and the Joint Communication/Electronics Directorate became J-6. The J-1 had no counterpart in the old organization, but personnel matters had been under the cognizance of the Joint Logistics Plans Group. The J-3, of course, was new. As Admiral Burke and General Pate wished, the J-Staff had no executive or command authority.\textsuperscript{11}

With hindsight, the improvement in JCS performance wrought by these reforms is not readily apparent. Familiar interservice divisions persisted; lowest-common-denominator compromises remained a regular feature of the JCS system. Unified commanders did gain some stature and authority. But perhaps the main benefits flowed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Reorganization clarified and strengthened the Secretary's position, giving him full authority over the Military Departments. During the 1960s, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's power would grow considerably at JCS expense.

The Joint Program for Planning

In 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to create a Joint Program for Planning. A family of long-, medium-, and short-range plans came into being. By 1957 the Joint Program for Planning contained the following components:

1. A Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) that would forecast, for a four-year period beginning eight years in the future, the probable areas of conflict, the outline of the type of war expected, and the basic undertakings required. Each year, by 30 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were supposed to note and disseminate it. Primarily, the JLRSE would serve as a guide for research and development. Though necessarily broad in nature, it would include a year-by-year forecast of expected technological changes.

2. A Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) that would cover a three-year span beginning on 1 July four years after its approval. In April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set the JSOP's effective date at five years, rather than four, subsequent to its approval date. It provided strategic concepts for a war as well as the period preceding D-day and served as a guide for force development. Also, the JSOP would provide the Services with a basis for drafting budgets to cover the fiscal year immediately preceding D-day; aid in determining military assistance requirements; and supply short-range guidance for weapons development. A JSOP consisted of three sections, dealing with (a) peacetime or conflict short of general war, (b) the first phase of a general war, and (c) the additional forces and resources needed for the peacetime mobilization base as well as for US and allied mobilization requirements during the first forty-eight months of a general war. This midrange plan, to be disseminated every 30 June, would constitute the first step in preparing the Defense Department's annual budget.

3. A Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that would guide the disposition, employment, and support of existing forces during the approaching fiscal year.
This was the short-range plan that would go into effect if war began. It followed the JSOP's format in providing guidance for three different contingencies. Every year, by 31 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would approve and circulate a JSCP. That way, unified and specified commanders would have time to prepare supporting plans prior to the JSCP's assumed D-day, 1 July.

Severe interservice differences prevented the Joint Program for Planning from functioning smoothly. The JSOP suffered most and became by far the weakest link of a none-too-strong chain. In 1956, after the drafting of JSOP-60 had led to many interservice differences, Secretary Wilson imposed stringent fiscal ceilings. Admiral Radford then proposed, among other things, reducing overseas Army units to small nuclear-armed task forces and limiting the mobilization base to support of D-day forces only. Bitter opposition by the Army led to press revelations about Radford's plan and then to a six-month suspension of JSOP preparation. When work resumed in 1957, Service recommendations resulted in costs so excessive that Secretary Wilson again imposed a strict budgetary ceiling. At last, in January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent JSOP-61 to the Secretary accompanied by a statement that risks were incurred by keeping their force recommendations within Wilson's fiscal limits. Two months later, Wilson approved JSOP-61 as a common point of reference for strategic and mobilization planning. This was, in fact, the first JSOP to reach completion.

Merely producing a JSOP did not make that document influential. The problem of correlating military requirements with projected funding eluded solution. Constantly, as will be seen, JSOP force-level recommendations fell between two fires. Those that the Services proposed cost more than the administration was willing to fund, those that the Secretary favored frequently proved too low to meet the Services' requirements. The next plan, JSOP-62, contained force "tabs" reflecting what each Service considered necessary for itself. This approach returned JSOP planning to a more purely military basis, although the resulting force levels clearly would not be the ones ultimately accepted by higher authority. Early in June 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent JSOP-62 to Secretary McElroy and asked him to approve it, less the force tabs. On 31 March 1959, the Deputy Secretary approved all of JSOP-62 except the force tabs, related personnel strengths, the mobilization concept, and the logistics annex—highly important exceptions!

Meanwhile, in February 1959, General Taylor urged that there be functional or "horizontal" budget making, cutting across Service lines. While the JSOP's strategic concept was being developed, he suggested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should propose "criteria of sufficiency" for nuclear retaliatory forces, forward deployed forces, strategic reserves, air defense units, and sea control forces. After the Secretary had given his approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the size and type of forces within each category. The Services then would develop their programs, which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller would consolidate into an "order of magnitude requirements budget."

When the Joint Staff studied this proposal, Navy and Marine Corps spokesmen stated their opposition to substantive JCS participation in the making of Service budgets. The upshot was a modest procedural change. On 1 May, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed unified commanders to have their component commanders submit advice on FY 1961 requirements to their respective Services. Also, such comments as unified commanders chose to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made only after consultation with their component commanders. This was the first small step toward giving field commanders an enhanced role in planning and programming.15

On January 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed JSOP-63. General White concurred only on condition that he be allowed to send Secretary Gates additional views. In them, he noted that JSOP-63 had been postponed until the National Security Council rendered a decision about the size of the mobilization base. Consequently, program and budget decisions were rendered prior to the production of JSOP-63. Moreover, he believed that JSOP-63 did not take into account how the Reorganization Act enlarged the responsibilities of the unified commanders and modified those of the Services. Thus the resulting plan did not satisfy the JSOP's true purpose, which he described as "the definition of an over-all national military posture toward which Service programs should be directed in order to ensure a coordinated, balanced and effective military instrument in support of a national policy." Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer, on the other hand, believed White had overemphasized the JSOP's weaknesses. As Lemnitzer observed, it would be meaningless, in a plan that began four years in the future, to provide unified commanders with guidance about the operational employment of their forces.16

In April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to set the JSOP's effective date five years, rather than four, from the date of approval. Thus the next JSOP would have an M-day of 1 July 1965, even though it affected mainly the FY 1963 budget cycle; it was designated JSOP-66.17 In September the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed JSOP-66. They asked Secretary Gates simply to note its force tabs, which contained many interservice splits, and promised to reexamine them after the NSC completed action on the FY 1962 budget. They recognized that force goals must stay within budget ceilings but wanted to preserve the JSOP's validity as a statement of objectives consistent with their assessment of military needs. One year earlier, Admiral Burke had urged the preparation of "a true mid-range objectives plan," not a JSOP so constrained by budget ceilings as to be "an annual exercise of balancing account books at the expense of military considerations."18 Whatever its faults, JSOP-66 had accomplished this purpose.

During Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, the Joint Program for Planning proved much more successful in some respects than in others. By any measurement, the JSOP had fallen well short of the role intended for it. This came about largely because, despite the Reorganization Act, interservice differences remained just as great in 1960 as they had been in 1953. President Eisenhower's NSC papers established national policy but did not reconcile the Services to the priorities that they established.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate fared better. During 1957 and again during 1959-1960, interservice disputes postponed (but did not prevent) the completion of JSCP's. Beginning with the
publication of JSCP-62 in December 1960 and continuing thereafter, these plans did appear regularly at the designated time.

Not so with the JLRSE. Efforts to prepare an estimate raised a basic question about its purpose and content: Did strategy evolve from weapons, or did weapons evolve from strategy? When a draft of JLRSE 68–71 appeared in October 1960, for example, the Joint Strategic Survey Council criticized it harshly. Instead of indulging in free-ranging thought about conditions ten years hence, said the Council, it simply accepted the appraisal and concept from JSOP-66. Moreover, the JLRSE did not provide guidance to assist in carrying out or changing current policies and programs, nor did it establish a basis for evolving a long-range military strategy. On 13 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted JLRSE 68–71 as it stood but agreed to consider the JSSC's recommendations in developing the next Estimate.19

During July 1960, meantime, each Service Chief had appraised existing methods for correlating budgetary with military planning. General Lemnitzer judged the Joint Program for Planning to be adequate. Conversely, General White urged "fundamental" revisions, aimed particularly at enhancing the role of unified and specified commanders. Admiral Burke suggested broad changes, some of which would be accomplished by the next administration:

The complexity of modern weapons requires years of research, development, test, and evaluation. . . . To ensure steady and economical progress, a system must be funded at a programmed rate. Present budgets are annual matters. They respond to pressures of the current year. . . . Planning . . . is then subject to ups and downs which are costly and disruptive of orderly progress. DOD action directed toward long-range program planning would place the current year's budget in proper perspective and would assist in justifying individual programs as a whole rather than as yearly increments.20

At this point, though, no changes occurred. The Kennedy administration would try to correlate all elements by introducing a radically different planning-programming-budgeting system.
Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation"

Dedicated to providing maximum protection at a bearable cost, the Eisenhower administration had chosen from the outset to stress US superiority in nuclear weapons. Its civilian leaders were determined to avoid hostilities of the scale and character of the Korean conflict. Rather than maintain huge conventional forces, the United States would make overwhelming nuclear striking power its chief contribution to the defense of the noncommunist world. This approach was termed the "New Look." To deter aggression, the United States would rely on a proclaimed intention to retaliate with massive power at times and places of its own choosing, with a clear implication that the aggressor's homeland would be the target. Though hindered by the demands of recurring crises and by commitments arising from its alliance system, the United States, during President Eisenhower's first term, had shaped its military policy and forces to accord with a strategy of massive retaliation. Admiral Radford and, predictably enough, Air Force officers backed the New Look. Army generals, seeing their Service relegated to a secondary role, argued against an undue reliance upon massive retaliation.

Emphasizing a Nuclear Response

When the second term began, Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) rested on NSC 5602/1. This statement had been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with other agencies, then adopted by the National Security Council and approved by the President on 15 March 1956. According to it, the United States and its allies must possess "for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility...to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop." Nuclear weapons were to continue being integrated into the nation's armory for use in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. To deter general war, the
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United States would rely upon its nuclear retaliatory power, in conjunction with accelerated programs for continental defense. Deterring or defeating local aggression would require "ready forces..., highly mobile and suitably deployed" and sufficiently versatile to employ either conventional or nuclear weapons. These forces needed a "flexible and selective nuclear capability," since the United States did not intend to deny itself the use of nuclear weapons in a local situation. But reliance on tactical nuclear capabilities should not become so pronounced "that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons."

There were those, among them the Army's Chief of Staff, who claimed that a policy of concentrating attention on nuclear weapons resulted in relying on massive retaliation as the means of meeting all situations. When presented in the form of suggested changes to the BNSP, however, their case proved difficult to argue effectively. The BNSP's language was, in fact, sufficiently broad to authorize a strengthening of nonnuclear forces such as its critics desired. The real issue was the proper and feasible allocation of resources under NSC 5602/l—first the allocation between the civilian economy and the Military Services and then the specific apportionment among the Services, and particularly among the functions they were designed to perform.

The 1957 review of the Basic National Security Policy began on 19 February, when the NSC Planning Board circulated a report analyzing major changes in the world. Foremost, of course, was the superpowers' ability to destroy each other and how this situation deterred both nations from actions that risked general war. Nonetheless, there was growing fear that nuclear war could come about by a calculated Soviet surprise attack, by one superpower's move which the other saw as unacceptably threatening, or by the spread of a local conflict.

The remaining problems had developed independently of the first. The Planning Board saw in the Suez crisis, the Polish disturbances, and the Hungarian revolt evidence of a continuing decline in Western Europe's power position and a weakening of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. The Board also noted problems posed by Communist China's continuing economic and military growth, the rise of nationalism and anticolonialism in Africa and Asia, the increasing role of the United Nations, and the growing influence of "neutralist" nations, as well as continuing strains on the US budget.

As its next step, the Planning Board intended to prepare papers on various "major issues," which the NSC would discuss at meetings beginning on 28 March. In light of these discussions, the Board then would submit a revised statement of BNSP, which the Council was supposed to consider on 16 May.

This procedure differed in two respects from those usually followed. For the first time since 1953, when three ad hoc task forces launched a policy review by preparing a series of analyses, the Planning Board proposed to seek guidance from the NSC on various elements as the review progressed, instead of attempting to reconcile differences itself and then present the Council with a complete draft. Perhaps more significantly, the Board hoped that the NSC would explore Basic National Security Policy in an untrammeled intellectual exercise, without regard for standing departmental positions. Thus, in its report of 19 February, the
Board sought to interpret major problems as they appeared to a group of thinkers and not necessarily as they were viewed by departmental representatives.

However laudable in conception, this new approach found the Council little disposed to come to grips with an expression of opinion that lacked the usual identification of departmental positions. No Council member found the Board's report satisfactory, and Secretary of State Dulles was especially critical of it. The Council's reaction augured ill for the success of the Planning Board's experiment.

A few days after the Board's report of 19 February reached the NSC, the Defense Department gave the Council its own proposed guidelines for creating military strength to support the existing BNSP. It marked a departure from previous guidance, which had envisioned mobilization occurring over a period of thirty-six months. When he forwarded the new concept to the Council on 25 February, Secretary Wilson pointed out that in the event of general war the armed forces no longer could rely on a vast expansion of industry. The mobilization base, therefore, would have to be capable of equipping and maintaining the armed forces at their full peacetime allowances, keeping selected reserve units in a high state of readiness, permitting phased expansion over a six-month period, and meeting the combat requirements of all forces mobilized by M+6 months. Additionally, reasonably protected supply stocks would have to be placed outside the continental United States before hostilities began, so that overseas forces could perform their tasks without having to depend on resupply from the United States. On 14 March, Admiral Radford explained these points more fully to the NSC.4

In his presentation, Admiral Radford said that the main change affecting the mobilization base stemmed from recognition that combat needs for the first phase of general war had to be on hand before hostilities commenced. The six-month level should not be considered an attempt to prejudge the length of mobilization but was an arbitrary (albeit realistic) period. In other words, the M+6 period was merely a way of expressing the force level for which logistical support would have to be available on D-day. The strategic concept, Secretary Wilson had noted and Admiral Radford now repeated, assumed that in operations short of general war “atomic weapons will be used when required to achieve military objectives,” subject to prior presidential approval. This was a considerably stronger statement of intention than could be found in the Planning Board's draft.5

No doubt as a result of the unfavorable reception accorded the Planning Board's report of 19 February, the Board's subsequent papers reverted to a more familiar pattern. Although basic issues still underwent preliminary discussion, papers increasingly reflected established departmental views. By 11 April, a gap had widened in views about certain military provisions, chiefly those dealing with the substitution of nuclear weapons for conventional firepower when waging limited wars. The issue was whether to revise current policy so as to express without reservation an intent to rely upon nuclear weapons.

At the NSC meeting of 11 April, President Eisenhower made known his opinion that existing policy should be revised. Responsibility for writing the military portion of a draft BNSP went to the Defense Department and the remaining portions to departments with primary interest. But the result was a
more pronounced divergence than had occurred when the Planning Board’s own staff members did the drafting.\textsuperscript{6}

In a draft BNSP submitted to the Council on 14 May, the Planning Board changed Defense’s phraseology in the hope of making the statement acceptable to all concerned. The Board recommended placing “main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons,” integrating them with other weapons in the US arsenal, considering them “as conventional weapons from a military point of view,” and using them “when required to achieve military objectives.”\textsuperscript{7} Except for the reservation against placing sole reliance on nuclear weapons, the wording was that of Admiral Radford’s March presentation and Defense’s April draft.\textsuperscript{8}

The Planning Board also asserted that “the use of nuclear weapons in limited war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war.” To put down local aggression before it escalated into general war, US forces must possess “a flexible and selective nuclear capability and, when its use is required, apply it in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war.”

The Board provoked another dispute by recommending that the United States “continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively” advanced weapons systems less their nuclear elements. In addition, selected major allies should be provided with “nuclear weapons with nuclear elements,” and with help in developing their own advanced weapons systems. No ally except the United Kingdom, which already had become a nuclear power, would be eligible for nuclear elements. Defense’s draft had not excluded nuclear elements and stipulated that only “small” weapons would be provided to allies.

A further point at issue was whether the national stockpile of strategic and critical materials should be maintained at a three-year or a five-year level. On this, the Planning Board’s draft was terse and direct: “The United States should not authorize further procurement for additions to the stockpile . . . , except to complete the three-year objectives.” The Defense Department wished to discontinue procurement of certain materials that, pursuant to Public Law 520, 79\textsuperscript{th} Congress, were being added to the stockpile in excess of military needs in order to support domestic production. The stock of most items stood at the three-year level.\textsuperscript{9} Actually, the Planning Board expressed Defense’s views more succinctly than had the latter in its own draft.

So deep-seated were interdepartmental differences, however, that the Planning Board’s attempt at accommodation failed. The statement presented to the NSC contained completely disparate views on critical issues. The State Department strongly opposed using nuclear weapons in limited wars, on grounds that US public opinion would not accept, and US allies would not support, their use. Secretary Dulles conceded that the time would come when small, tactical nuclear weapons were available in sufficient quantity to permit using them as conventional weapons. Doubtless, by that time, attitudes and opinions would have changed, but Dulles, pending a thorough analysis of limited use of force, deemed premature a change in BNSP and a decision to provide selected allies with components for nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{10}
The Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) supported State about nuclear weapons and also objected to changing the stockpiling provision. There should be no change, ODM insisted, unless the NSC considered stockpiling as a domestic issue and decided to withdraw production support programs. The Atomic Energy Commission firmly opposed transferring nuclear warheads and revising the Atomic Energy Act for this purpose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had played no direct part in preparing Defense's paper for the Planning Board. Their first opportunity to do so came in reviewing NSC 5707/7, the Board's submission to the NSC. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) prepared a critique, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered on 22 May. The JSSC recommended three changes. First, drop the statement that the United States would "place main, but not sole, reliance" on nuclear weapons and "consider them as conventional weapons." The JSSC favored saying that, in a general war, nuclear weapons would be used from the outset no matter how a war started, and that in military operations short of general war such weapons would be used when required to achieve military objectives. Second, delete the Board's claim that resorting to nuclear weapons in a limited war was unlikely to result in general war. That struck the JSSC as a questionable conclusion, untested by experience. Third, oppose any transfer of nuclear elements or warheads to the allies. The JSSC also considered a study of limited war, such as State had suggested, to be unnecessary.11

The Chief of Staff, Air Force, judged the JSSC report generally unsatisfactory. General Twining strongly urged acceptance of the Planning Board's draft, including its observation about the unlikelihood that using nuclear weapons in a limited war would lead to general war. Opposing the transfer of nuclear warheads, he further pointed out, would prevent the completion of current and pending arrangements with Canada and the United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he noted, were on record as favoring discussions with Canada, on the assumption that the Atomic Energy Act would be amended to permit peacetime transfers of nuclear weapons for continental air defense. General Twining stood with the JSSC only in deeming a study of limited war to be unnecessary.12

By and large, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with General Twining. The only changes they recommended in the Board's draft were substituting "the United Kingdom and Canada" for "selected major allies" as potential recipients of nuclear warheads and deleting sentences that authorized assistance to major allies in developing their own advanced weapons systems. They informed Secretary Wilson on 24 May that, with this modification, they considered the Planning Board's paper militarily acceptable. The Secretaries of the Army and Navy, like the JSSC, opposed a policy of placing main but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons and considering them as conventional weapons. Nonetheless, Secretary Wilson's staff advisers recommended that he accept JCS views.13

At its meeting on 27 May, the NSC agreed that nuclear weapons should indeed be considered as conventional, standard weapons for US forces. Although this was the first time that the Council had approved such a statement, the concept itself was not new. It had been implicit from the first in military plans developed to implement the New Look, and President Eisenhower already had indicated
that BNSP should be brought into conformance with those plans. Still, the Council did not fully accept the concept's implications. While eliminating any distinction between the role of nuclear weapons in general war and in lesser hostilities, the NSC nevertheless adopted Secretary Dulles' suggestion that such weapons be used to achieve “national objectives,” rather than “military objectives,” as the Planning Board had phrased it.

During a lengthy NSC discussion about limited war, Secretary Wilson voiced concern over lack of definition for this term. He was convinced that the United States should exploit its nuclear power, but he also believed that the proper course was to stay out of all “little wars.” At the suggestion of Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Council then agreed upon a definition of limited war: participation of “limited U.S. forces” in “conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world.” Military planning for such conflicts would be “based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability.” This was somewhat more qualified than the Planning Board's draft.

As for the disputed claim that using nuclear weapons in limited war was not likely to spark a general war: Admiral Radford observed that a crisis over Berlin and probably one over the Middle East could not be held down to a local war. President Eisenhower objected that the passage in question was not, in substance, policy. Consequently, the NSC deleted this passage. The Council also decided, with Secretary Wilson's agreement, to reject JCS and Planning Board arguments against transferring nuclear weapons. Instead, the Council adopted State's and the Atomic Energy Commission's views. Finally, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished, the Council decided against pursuing a study of limited war which the State Department had recommended.

President Eisenhower approved a new delineation of BNSP in NSC 5707/8 on 3 June 1957. It downplayed the possibility that US forces, responding to local aggression, might become extensively engaged in conventional warfare. Significantly, NSC 5707/8 did not retain its predecessor's cautionary statement that US ready forces “must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons.” NSC 5707/8 moved closer to a policy of using nuclear weapons against local aggression but without affirming categorically that they would be used. It also redefined the mobilization base in terms of a concept developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then presented to the NSC by Secretary Wilson on 25 February.

Another month passed before the NSC reached agreement about the stockpile problem. On 11 July, the Council agreed to hold stockpile procurement at the three-year level, except that acquisition of the minerals in the domestic production support program would continue without regard for this limit. Although their argument against making any exceptions failed, Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could say their point had been acknowledged; this was a political rather than a military matter.

Additionally, the new BNSP seemed to put even greater emphasis upon nuclear retaliatory power by placing less stress on continental defense. The old
statement had spoken of "accelerated" programs for continental defense; the new statement called only for "adequate" programs. The NSC also reaffirmed the importance of collective defense but agreed that dependence on overseas bases was likely to diminish over the long run. Moreover, the Council wanted to reduce military aid commitments by encouraging recipients (chiefly the non-European ones) to place their armed forces on a self-supporting basis. They should make their armed forces self-supporting by reducing them to the level required for internal security while relying upon the United States for protection against external aggression. Finally, the new BNSP accentuated the need for fiscal restraint by citing President Eisenhower's statement that he did not intend to ask Congress for more than $39 billion in defense funds, which was the current level, in any fiscal year during his remaining term.\(^7\)

Approval of NSC 5707/8 marked the apogee of the New Look. On 25 July, Secretary Wilson presented the NSC with his proposed military programs for fiscal years 1958 and 1959, with projections through 1961. His program followed closely the recommendations of Admiral Radford, which expressed what Radford considered to be the New Look's logical extension in current circumstances. Broadly, Wilson intended to "maximize air power and minimize the foot soldier"; chapter 3 provides the details about force planning. President Eisenhower approved the programs for fiscal years 1958-1959 and even spoke of lowering defense expenditures.\(^8\)

There was no formal link between BNSP and the Joint Strategic Planning System, described in chapter 1. Obviously, though, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan had to reflect the strategic concepts described by NSC 5707/8. In both JSOP-61 and JSCP-59, the concept for general war rested on a definition hammered out in 1956 and reargued during a NATO review early in 1957. A general war would consist of, first, "an initial phase of comparatively short duration . . . characterized by an intensive exchange of atomic blows and the initiation of operations and deployments . . . designed to achieve strategic advantage" and, second, "a subsequent phase of short duration." As for the role of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war, the two plans simply repeated the BNSP's wording: such weapons "will be used, when required, in order to achieve national objectives."\(^9\)

No Change of Course

Challenges to the New Look came quickly. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* held a place on the best-seller list for thirteen weeks during the autumn of 1957. Those who read or heard about it probably carried away one main idea: the advent of nuclear parity, while greatly lessening the likelihood of a deliberate resort to general war, would degrade the credibility of massive retaliation as a deterrent to lesser aggressions and provocations by the Soviets. Did the United States possess a suitable means of responding to what now seemed the more likely form of communist challenge—small, limited, or "peripheral" wars?
Dr. Kissinger’s work suggested that it did not. Secretary Dulles undertook to rebut some of the criticisms leveled at massive retaliation. Through an article published in *Foreign Affairs* that fall, he outlined what amounted to an unclassified version of NSC 5707/8. The United States, he wrote,

could not be content to rely on a peace which could be preserved only by a capacity to destroy vast segments of the human race. Such a concept is acceptable only as a last alternative. In recent years there has been no other. But the resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapon engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons. . . . Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be substantially confined to predetermined targets.

In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt . . . and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. Thus the tables may be turned, in the sense that instead of those who are non-aggressive having to rely upon all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war.\(^20\)

Continuing US nuclear superiority, of course, was the premise upon which all this rested. But then came the two “Sputniks” in October and November 1957. A sense of apprehension, even approaching panic, swept over a good part of the American public. What if, by 1960, the USSR had an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the United States had none? Which superpower then could wield the threat of massive retaliation?

In its 1958 review of BNISP, the Planning Board avoided any major reconsideration. The draft that it submitted to the NSC on 15 April did not, in its military portion, differ appreciably from NSC 5707/8. The existing statement concerning the role of nuclear weapons remained intact, with an added recommendation that the nuclear stockpile include standard and “clean” weapons, which would minimize radioactive fallout, in varying sizes “to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war.” The paragraph on localized conflicts repeated language in NSC 5707/8.

The only radical changes dealt with overseas bases and transferring nuclear weapons to US allies. First, since intermediate-range ballistic missiles soon would be deployed, the Board proposed a possible expansion of overseas bases. Second, the Board contemplated transferring complete nuclear weapon systems, although the warheads would remain under US control. A new provision called for the United States to “consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority to determine the requirements for, hold custody of, and control the use of nuclear weapons, in accordance with NATO policy and plans for defense of NATO areas.” This was the first hint of what became, during the 1960s, US advocacy of a NATO multilateral force.\(^21\)

Controversy did arise over NSC 5707/8’s paragraph on limited war. When the
Planning Board submitted its draft to the NSC, a majority of the Board’s members—State, Defense, Treasury, Budget, and JCS—wanted to postpone consideration of that paragraph until a State-Defense study had been completed. The NSC had launched this study, a broad consideration of US and allied capabilities for limited military operations, in January 1958. Commissioning of that study was a result of the Gaither Report, described in chapter 4. Thus the rejection of State’s similar proposal had been reversed.

The Planning Board’s Chairman, Mr. Robert Cutler, circulated his own view of what the paragraph on limited war should say. In a draft dated 15 April, he argued that it had become “increasingly important—while maintaining our nuclear capability to deter general war—to develop further and maintain a capability to oppose limited military aggression,” not simply in the less developed areas of the world but wherever US security interests were involved. NSC 5707/8 stated that decisive defeat of local aggression by “prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary” was the best means of preventing such hostilities from broadening into general war. Mr. Cutler now suggested that the United States provide itself the options of either reacting in this manner or merely applying sufficient force to keep the area and scope of conflict limited and to achieve such limited objectives as restoration of the status quo ante. It was therefore necessary, he argued, to maintain highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces which, with allied help, would be adequate either to defeat or to contain any such limited aggression. Planning for such forces should be “based on a flexible and selective capability, including an appropriate nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President.” There could be limited wars for limited objectives, perhaps fought with conventional weapons alone.

Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review Mr. Cutler’s proposal. Their responses proved widely divergent. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations endorsed Cutler’s proposal. He criticized NSC 5707/8’s strategy as neither appropriate to the current threat nor capable of being marketed to the rest of the free world. The BNSP, he said, should recognize the existence of a mutual deterrence to general war and the “reduced political usefulness” of massive retaliation as the principal means of ensuring the free world’s security. That would mean deleting the statement about placing main reliance on nuclear weapons and considering nuclear weapons as conventional weapons.

General Taylor took the same position. Increasingly, he was convinced, relative nuclear parity would deter both superpowers from resorting to massive retaliation in any situation except an attack that threatened their national survival. Therefore, the United States must “maintain forces capable of reacting to aggression with either nuclear or nonnuclear means in the most effective manner to achieve US national objectives while at the same time minimizing the risk of general war.”

General Taylor looked upon limited war as essentially any conflict in which the national survival of the United States or the USSR was not at stake, which might include hostilities between US and Soviet forces, and which might be “intense and of significant duration. The objective may require a military victory, in the traditional sense, or some lesser solution which is to our net advantage.”
Arguing that limited aggression had become the more probable form of conflict, Taylor claimed that “national policy should put increasing emphasis on suitable ready forces with a flexible combat capability and provided with transportation which insures their strategic mobility.”

General White, on the other hand, argued against adopting the Cutler proposal. To him, the approach of relative nuclear parity made the maintenance of American nuclear power even more essential, since the possibility of failing to deter an all-out Soviet attack remained the most dangerous threat to US security. Primary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and their selective use in hostilities short of general war, impressed him as the only course of action “compatible with the economic well-being of the United States and the free world, and hence with the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions.” The military establishment must include forces capable of deterring or defeating local aggression, but NSC 5707/8 already recognized that need, by assuming that such forces would be drawn from those readied for general war.

General White criticized the Cutler proposal for departing from “the concept of the maintenance, as a matter of certainty, of safeguarded, effective nuclear retaliatory power by advocating an increase, presumably within existing means, in the resources specifically tailored for limited aggression.” That seemed to him a move toward “attempting to match the Communist Bloc, world-wide, through means not involving nuclear weapons.” Previously in NSC, NATO, and other debates, he pointed out, “similar proposals have been judged militarily unwise, practically infeasible, and economically unsound.” Moreover, General White saw “no apparent basis for the inferred axiom that a limited response to aggression will be more likely to prevent broadening of hostilities than would the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such aggression.”

Late in April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their opposing views to Secretary McElroy. Those of General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General Pate were consolidated into a single statement based on General Taylor’s memorandum above. The Chairman sided with General White. Limited wars, General Twining believed, did not require a specially designed force but rather the political will to employ available forces, including their nuclear firepower. In three years, he noted, the number of low-yield nuclear weapons would be five times that of the high-yield strategic weapons. This growing arsenal provided flexibility for reacting to localized aggression but should be created in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the “number one task” of maintaining the strategic deterrent.

General Twining considered the term “mutual deterrence” dangerous and wanted it “stricken from our vocabulary.” The USSR was being deterred from acts of aggression by fear of the consequences, whereas the United States was not being deterred from any course of action, since it harbored no expansionist aims. To presume the existence of mutual deterrence, General Twining continued, was to invite piecemeal Soviet aggression, since the United States could not prevent aggression against a country such as Turkey except by using its massive retaliatory power against the USSR.

Before the NSC, on 1 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their opposing views. General Taylor, speaking also for Admiral Burke and General Pate, argued
that strategic nuclear weapons did not provide a means of maneuver. Therefore, limited war forces must furnish the active elements of US military strategy. This did not imply a vast expansion of forces or increased expenditure but rather a shift of emphasis "directed at developing a truly balanced system of deterrent forces." General White replied that developing and maintaining safeguarded, effective nuclear retaliatory power as well as adequate continental defense, while not the only priority tasks, did remain essential "first-priority tasks." Forces needed to implement existing policy already existed within the US capability for general war. Though requiring modernization, improvement, and continuing attention, these forces were able to fulfill the aim of current policy. General White assumed that any hostilities in the NATO area would continue to be regarded as something more than "local aggression," and he strongly advocated maintaining this distinction.28

General Twining began his presentation by stressing the harmful psychological consequences that he feared would flow from changing BNSP. The change advocated by General Taylor, "even if absolutely sound," probably would become known and have an extremely adverse effect on the will and confidence of European allies. Also, the more the US Government talked of limited war as a consequence of mutual deterrence, the greater would be the Soviets' assurance that the United States would in fact accept such wars at whatever time and place it might please Moscow to start them. Finally, if the American people gained the impression that their leaders considered general war to be a remote possibility, their will to keep facing courageously a dangerous world situation might erode.

General Twining emphasized what he called the "tremendous" US capability to fight limited wars. This capability had not been fully used, he said, in Korea, against China, in Indochina, or in Indonesia. The decision not to use full capabilities had been a political one, with which he had no quarrel; his point was that political decisions had more bearing upon the waging of limited wars than did military capabilities. Still, if an expansion of tactical forces was deemed desirable, this could be done within the framework of existing BNSP. But this could not be done at the strategic deterrent's expense, because detracting from the power of that deterrent and other general war forces would be "absolutely fatal." Therefore, expansion could be accomplished only by making considerably more funds available.29

During the discussion following these presentations, President Eisenhower expressed doubt that "small wars" could be waged in the NATO area without expanding into general war. He asked for further study of this and other aspects of deterrence. The NSC then asked the Defense Department to recommend what revisions, if any, should be made in the BNSP. The Council, deciding to keep BNSP as it was, adopted the Board's draft. President Eisenhower then gave it his approval as NSC 5810/1.30 This was substantially what Generals Twining and White had recommended.

In March, as mentioned earlier, the NSC had ordered a study of US and allied capabilities to conduct limited military operations as far ahead as mid-1961. Significantly, though, the study excluded operations that were either covert in nature, conducted against overtly employed Soviet forces, or involved
an enemy who used nuclear weapons. Another crucial assumption was that “the United States could engage in effective military action against mainland China without undue risk of initiating general war.” The State Department prepared hypothetical scenarios for twelve situations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The Joint Staff then drafted working papers estimating the military reactions required. Subsequently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Central Intelligence added their contributions.

The report, circulated for review in May, asserted that the United States could successfully conduct limited operations. However, carrying out two concurrent operations requiring major deployments and heavy logistic support probably would compel a partial mobilization. According to the report, nuclear weapons were not necessary “in every situation throughout the spectrum of military operations.” But in some situations they evidently would be.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a commentary dated 11 June, stressed how the study’s limitations and artificialities prevented it from serving as a “conclusive basis” for developing limited war forces. Six days later, Secretaries McElroy and Dulles sent the NSC a similar critique. Among other things, they observed that serious consideration would have to be given to proclaiming at least a national emergency. Also, even one limited operation requiring major deployments and heavy logistic support might necessitate a partial mobilization. On 26 June, the NSC discussed both the report and the commentaries.

Since the issue was not so much whether responding to limited war situations required resorting to nuclear weapons as whether that condition should be changed, this study did little to resolve differences. Generals Twining and White endorsed NSC 5810/1; General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General Pate still rejected it. Already, Secretary McElroy had decided that the Twining-White view should be the Defense Department’s position. McElroy informed the NSC that, since Soviet ability to precipitate general nuclear war still constituted the major threat, he saw no reason to change NSC 5810. Military programs must continue giving highest priority to deterring all-out nuclear war. Even though US and allied forces possessed “significant” capability to cope with a wide variety of limited war situations, McElroy held that any hostilities with the Soviet Union could not be confined to limited operations and limited objectives.

During an NSC discussion on 24 July, Secretary Dulles agreed that no change should be made in NSC 5810/1’s military portion. He urged, however, that it be kept under study and review. Four days later, President Eisenhower approved Secretary McElroy’s recommendation, with the understanding that NSC 5810/1 would remain under continuing study. The “New Look” had survived a serious challenge.

Since the BNSP did not change, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not need to alter the strategy portions of JSOP-62 and JSCP-59 in any significant way. Some small revisions did occur. In JSOP-62, the designation “limited war” replaced such terms as “local aggression,” “peripheral wars” or “hostilities short of general war.” The plan, however, did not provide a separate strategic concept for limited war.
A Nonnuclear Conflict Becomes Conceivable

To set the 1959 review of BNSP in motion, a Planning Board subcommittee drawn from the Departments of State and Defense made a preliminary review of the most contentious paragraphs in NSC 5810/1. These dealt with the role and employment of nuclear weapons and with capabilities for limited war. At the Defense member’s suggestion, the State Department described the foreign policy requirements that military strategy should satisfy. Moving far toward the views of General Taylor and Admiral Burke, the State Department now stressed the need for a limited war capability separate from strategic nuclear strength. The latter would come into play in defense of vital US interests and in case of substantial Soviet aggression against the NATO area. The former was conceived to be primarily nonnuclear, for use against overt communist aggression outside the NATO area. Flexibility was required, however, to permit limited and local use of nuclear weapons against military targets if aggression continued.

Neither the Soviet Union nor US allies, in the Department of State’s judgment, doubted that the United States would use its strategic nuclear arsenal in a situation that clearly endangered vital US security interests, but doubts about whether the United States would use its nuclear power in less grave situations were growing among the allies, in proportion to the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities. To rebuild the free world’s confidence that local communist aggressions would be deterred or defeated, the United States needed “an evident, adequate and flexible capability for military operations short of general war.”

Upon hearing these views, General Twining promptly informed Secretary McElroy of his deep concern that “State Department pressures, augmented by some unilateral Service pressures,” were working toward an extremely dangerous revision of BNSP. To proceed in the direction indicated by the Department of State would require either greatly increased budgets and force levels or lower strategic nuclear strength and reduced combat capability of the tactical forces. Barring a major budgetary increase, tactical forces (even though enlarged) would be less powerful owing to political restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons, while strategic nuclear capability would decline relative to the need, since a lesser portion of the fixed budget would be devoted to improving it.

Shortly after submitting this paper, dated 29 April, General Twining underwent major surgery and thereafter took no active part in the debate. Already, on 18 April, Christian Herter had succeeded the ailing John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. On 1 July, General Taylor retired and General Lyman Lemnitzer succeeded him as Chief of Staff, Army.

Divisions over the BNSP did not abate, however. A majority of the Planning Board favored retaining NSC 5810/1’s language about placing “main, but not sole, reliance” on nuclear weapons and considering them as conventional weapons. But the Department of State and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) proposed an alternative that distinguished between general and limited war.
It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to place main reliance on nuclear weapons in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons. Nuclear weapons will be used when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use in either general or limited war is as determined by the President.38

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (minus, of course, the convalescent General Twining) divided in the same way that they had split over the Cutler proposal—not surprisingly, since the State-OCDM draft was essentially the same thing. Generals Taylor and Pate as well as Admiral Burke had endorsed the State-OCDM substitute; General White opposed it. General White also objected to an addition designed to place some limit on the resources devoted to strengthening the strategic deterrent. Other Service Chiefs, however, felt that the magnitude of nuclear retaliatory capability should be determined by its sufficiency "to reduce the Soviet power complex to impotency." A few months earlier, in congressional testimony, General Taylor and Admiral Burke had argued that the number of mass-destruction weapons exceeded the need, even when computed with ample margins for all contingencies. Maintaining an excessive retaliatory force, they said, was consuming funds that might better be devoted to improving limited war capabilities. On another issue, whether to help friendly nations develop their own nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed their stand of previous years. Arguing that the policy of withholding aid had proved futile, they now advocated such assistance. Ultimately, though, the NSC rejected their views.39

On 9 July 1959, the NSC discussed this proposed revision of BNSP and then returned it to the Planning Board for further work. Mr. Gordon Gray, who had succeeded Mr. Cutler as Chairman of the Planning Board, then circulated a new paragraph on the use of nuclear weapons. He had prepared it on the basis of oral remarks by President Eisenhower. The paragraph read as follows:

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

When the Planning Board met on 1 July, the Defense member tabled a note, which had originated with Secretary McElroy, on the interpretation of this redraft. The note prescribed that Mr. Gray's paragraph was not to be construed as a change of policy. Rather, it clarified existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. A majority of the Planning Board approved the Defense Department's note. The Defense member thereupon accepted Mr. Gray's paragraph, with the understanding that
the first sentence applied to both general and limited war and with extended stipulations regarding the second sentence. Interpretation of the latter was to be based, among other things, on an assumption that, in Europe, limited war involving sizable US and Soviet forces was not a possibility, while situations short of limited war, such as incursions and local hostile actions, were covered by NATO's political directive and strategic concept.  

On 29 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed this whole matter. General Lemnitzer recommended approving Mr. Gray's redraft but without the Defense Department's note. He felt that the note would weaken Gray's redraft and, more importantly, "might have the effect of continuing in force any misinterpretations which may have become attached to the superseded language" of NSC 5810/1. He also objected that the lengthy interpretation of Gray's second sentence by the Defense Department would "introduce rigidity in our planning since it tends to prejudge...the situation in which the United States will, or will not, use nuclear weapons." The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained divided, however, and did not forward any written views to Secretary McElroy. 

On 30 July, the NSC adopted Mr. Gray's wording about the use of nuclear weapons, along with the Defense Department's note terming the new language a clarification rather than a change of policy. With regard to deterring or countering limited war, the Council modified the relevant paragraph in NSC 5810/1. It no longer spoke of local aggression as that occurring in "less developed areas of the world." Instead, it defined local aggression as "conflicts occurring outside the NATO area," and in any event excluding any hostilities involving "sizable" US and Soviet forces. President Eisenhower approved this new statement of BNSP, which became effective on 5 August as NSC 5906/1. It certainly did not signify any major change. Nonetheless, waging limited war without nuclear weapons emerged as a distinct possibility. That marked a discernible retreat from NSC 5707/8. 

In the course of BNSP review, the Planning Board undertook a thorough study of mobilization base and stockpiling policies. Misunderstanding about the mobilization base concept had arisen in the two years since its adoption. The "M+6 factor," originally presented as an arbitrary means of establishing the force levels for which supplies would have to be available when hostilities began, had instead taken on the traditional meaning of a specific mobilization period prior to D-day. At an NSC meeting on 18 December 1958, President Eisenhower had questioned whether "a mobilization period of six months prior to D-day" could be assumed and directed the Defense Department to keep this question under study. 

This question bore on both the Board's review of BNSP and the Services' logistical planning. In February 1959, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics proposed guidelines that would, among other things: limit the mobilization buildup to M+2 force levels prescribed by JSOP-61, instead of M+6 levels; limit reserves for general war to ninety days and prohibit establishment of a pipeline; and confine mobilization planning to M+3 rather than M+6 months. Deputy Secretary Quarles requested comments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they learned, informally, that their views would be construed as advice on the length of the mobilization period.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the proposed guidance unsatisfactory, saying that it would seriously restrict the attainment of objectives they had established on the basis of military considerations. The fundamental purpose of objectives planning, they stressed, would be vitiated unless logistics planning guidance directly derived from and supported the strategy. Instead, the Services should proceed with their FY 1960–1961 materiel planning under existing guidance. After BNSP and the mobilization base concept had been reviewed, new guidelines should be included in the next Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, JSOP–63. Deputy Secretary Quarles accepted JCS recommendations about current military programs but kept the Assistant Secretary's proposal under consideration.45

On 27 July, after Mr. Quarles' death, the new Deputy Secretary, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., circulated a draft that eliminated any reference to a specific time period for mobilization. In fact, what previously had been covered by the term “mobilization base” now became the “military logistics base,” providing requirements for cold, limited, and general war.46

During JCS consideration of the new draft, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps members strongly objected to dropping the M+6 factor. Nonetheless, on 12 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the new draft, subject to several changes. They clarified the statement of requirements, eliminated references to successive phases of general war as well as to different categories of forces having specific tasks within those phases, and generally simplified the text. Deputy Secretary Gates accepted virtually all their recommendations.47

The NSC adopted and, on 14 October, President Eisenhower approved a statement defining the military logistics base as “the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to the military effort in order to meet foreseeable wartime needs.” It said nothing about phased expansion to M+6 levels. Accordingly, logistics requirements for general war were limited to those of the active forces as of D-day, selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission, and such additional forces as subsequently proved necessary to achieve national objectives.48

The new statement recognized explicitly, for the first time, the necessity of including “appropriate consideration of nuclear damage” in planning for general war. This was a new element also in formulating the strategic stockpile policy. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, in 1958, had tied three-year stockpiling objectives to the extent to which supply sources outside North America would be exploited. In place of this formula, the 1959 draft established as the basis for determining stockpile objectives “the time required for supplies of materials in a national emergency to meet essential needs of the emergency.” Besides a three-year ceiling, the draft set a floor of six months:

Pending a determination of the essential needs of the nation after a nuclear attack (including reconstruction), the planning period should be limited to a maximum of three years, provided that until such determination is made the 'maximum objective' should not be less than six months' usage by the U.S. industry in periods of active demand.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 6 November, informed Secretary McElroy that they endorsed this change. A month later, on 3 December, the NSC adopted and President Eisenhower approved OCDM’s draft.49

In light of BNSP modifications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made changes to JSOP-62 and JSCP-60. Throughout JSOP-62, the phrase “limited war” replaced such terms as “local aggression,” “peripheral wars,” or “hostilities short of general war.” The plan, however, did not provide a separate strategic concept for limited war; nor were the categories of cold, limited, and general war defined, except in a section giving a strategic appraisal of Soviet capabilities.

NSC 5906/1 reignited a long-running dispute over the nature and extent of operations during the initial and subsequent phases of a general war. The Air Force held that the initial nuclear exchange would be decisive and that subsequent operations would be primarily nuclear. The Army countered that the possibility of ground operations during the initial phase (or at least preparations for them) should not be ignored, and that the subsequent phase would be much broader in scope than the Air Force believed.

In JSOP-63, forwarded to Secretary Gates on 8 January 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff merged opposing views by largely acknowledging the decisiveness of the initial nuclear exchange without slighting the probable need for further operations to complete the victory. “The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons in the initial phase is that the United States must emerge... with the residual over-all advantage.” The enemy’s losses should be such as “either to (a) bring about his capitulation, or (b) provide a margin of advantage to the United States and its Allies sufficient to assure victory.” The subsequent phase would be “one of recovery, reconstitution of forces and exploitation of the strategic advantage gained in the initial phase.” At “the earliest practicable time,” the United States and its allies would mount joint and combined offensive operations “to defeat remaining enemy military forces and to attain other... war and post-war objectives.”

For the first time, JSOP-63 included a strategic concept for limited war. Much of what went into it, though, came from the statements of national and military objectives or basic undertakings contained in previous plans. According to the concept, planning should be based upon “a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President.” To deter limited war and either defeat an enemy or hold him until additional power could be applied, the US military establishment would have to include ready forces, highly mobile and suitably deployed. Whenever US forces were committed to a limited war, “force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat the enemy.”50

Among JCS members, the drafting of JSCP-61 sparked a similar debate. The draft contained a separate section with rather elaborate definitions of cold, limited, and general war. The Air Force’s version made no provision for conflict with the Soviet Union short of general war—a view that the other Services refused to accept. In fact, as 1959 ended, it appeared that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might have to send Secretary Gates two conflicting sets of definitions. This the Chairman was loath to do. Finally, at a meeting on 29 February 1960 attended by the Secretary of
Defense, conferees decided to omit the entire section on definitions. Instead, the statement of military objectives incorporated brief phrases describing each type of conflict without labeling them as definitions. Thus the approved JSCP listed the military objectives “under conditions of cold war, which is the complete scope of actions other than limited or general war that can be used in a power struggle between nations,” and in “limited war, an armed conflict short of general war, in which U.S. forces are overtly engaged,” and in “general war, a war with the USSR.”

A Final Revision

Since 1960 was to be the Eisenhower administration’s final year, no full-scale review of BNSP took place. Instead, on 7 April, President Eisenhower directed the NSC to bring all policy papers up to date, in preparation for the turnover. On 10 November 1960, the Planning Board advised Council members that it had reviewed NSC 5906/1, found that paper still valid, and did not consider revision necessary.

Earlier, in mid-July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had started their own revision, so that they could hand the new administration their own proposed BNSP. It does not appear, however, that they intended any radical recasting. The Joint Strategic Survey Council recommended rewriting to eliminate “certain obscurities and ambiguities” and to introduce a more positive tone. The JSSC envisioned a paper “which is more dynamic and which would stimulate U.S. agencies to initiate actions…, rather than be content with actions responsive to Sino-Soviet initiative.” By the beginning of 1961, the JSSC had completed a paragraph-by-paragraph revision of NSC 5906/1. But that paper never received formal consideration. Instead, the Kennedy administration launched a much broader reappraisal of national security policies.

This time, the JSCP rather than the JSOP contained noteworthy changes. In JSOP-66, unlike its predecessor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made no distinction between the two phases of general war. “The onset of a general war,” the new plan read, “probably will be characterized by an intensive exchange of nuclear blows and the initiation of further operations and deployments by Army, Naval, and Air Forces… Offense opportunities created by the initial exchange will be exploited.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did recognize that the administration had become more willing to accept the possibility of a nonnuclear conflict. JSCP-62, approved on 27 December 1960, amended limited war guidance to allow more clearly for operations without nuclear weapons. Further, JSCP-62 gave to USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCARIB, CINCPAC, and CINCLANT a new task of planning to support “pro-western and neutral governments against communist or other anti-western uprisings or movements.” Further, guidance for Latin America stated that if steps taken under the Rio Treaty against armed attack or aggression were not successful, “overt unilateral action will be decided by the President, if he
deems appropriate, as a last resort.” Fidel Castro’s communization of Cuba, described in chapter 12, had created a fresh danger.

The JSCP became the arena for arguing again about whether to retain existing definitions of cold, limited, and general war. The Air Force insisted on doing so. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps remained unwilling to accept the view that there could be no conflict with the Soviet Union short of general war. They argued that the language being carried forward from JSCP-62 did not allow for such contingencies as a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Africa, where the national survival of neither superpower was at stake. On 27 December 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to retain the definitions, as the Air Force desired. General Decker, Admiral Burke, and General Shoup agreed on condition that it be made a matter of record that they would have preferred changing them.55

Between 1957 and 1960, the Eisenhower administration underwent a modest but marked shift in its thinking about limited war. NSC 5707/8 strongly implied that tactical weapons would be employed against local aggression. NSC 5906/1, by contrast, envisioned situations “where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives....” Further evidence of this change can be drawn from a study, completed in September 1960, that analyzed US and allied capabilities for conducting limited operations.

In mid-1959, senior officials agreed that limited war capabilities should undergo a periodic review. For such an exercise, unlike the one described on pages 23–26, the possibilities of direct Soviet involvement and an enemy’s resorting to nuclear weapons were not ruled out. A group drawn from the Department of State, OSD, JCS, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) studied five situations—Berlin, Laos, Iran, Quemoy and Matsu, and Korea—deemed representative of the areas and types of situations that the United States might confront. When a draft report circulated in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Gates a critique that challenged some of the report’s basic assumptions. They argued, for example, that the study downgraded the perception and resolution of US allies by postulating an alarmed reaction to US military steps against overt aggression. After reviewing the report’s scenario for Laos, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged its principal weakness to be an assumption that North Vietnam would continue attacking all by itself in the face of an expanding SEATO response. More probably, China would sanction North Vietnam’s attack beforehand and then come to her aid if necessary.

The final report, appearing in September, rated US and allied strength adequate (if augmented by a partial mobilization) to conduct operations in any one of the five areas listed above. There were instances where escalation risked nuclear retaliation and broadening of the conflict. Meeting each of the five cases would require substantial conventional forces, even if no nuclear weapons were employed. On 5 January 1961, presumably based upon this report, the NSC concluded that there was no need for a “radical” reallocation of resources to strengthen nonnuclear forces. Nonetheless, particularly among President-elect Kennedy and his advisers, arguments against a nuclear strategy were gaining ground.56
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

Ever since the Korean War had ended in July 1953, ground forces had been contracting while strategic air power expanded. During President Eisenhower's first term, the Army shrank from 1.5 to 1 million men; the Navy's strength declined from 800,000 to 670,000 and the Marine Corps from 230,000 to 200,000 personnel. The Air Force, however, dropped only from 950,000 to 910,000. Predictably, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acrimony became commonplace. The Army stoutly opposed continuing cutbacks which drained it more than any other Service. The Navy also objected but not so outspokenly because it suffered less. The Air Force, feeling itself to be the favored Service, wholeheartedly supported the New Look. Admiral Radford, the Chairman, likewise advocated putting air power first. These differences would persist throughout President Eisenhower's second term.

1957

On 30 June 1956, major elements of the active armed forces included: an Army of eighteen divisions and 998,000 personnel; a Navy and Marine Corps with 409 warships, three division/wing teams, and 677,000 personnel; and an Air Force with 131 wings and 920,000 personnel. The Air Force was the only Service that grew in size during FY 1956, by ten wings; all-jet, swept-wing B-52s were replacing much slower piston and turbojet B-36s.

The administration's underlying approach to force planning, in Secretary Wilson's words, consisted of maximizing firepower and minimizing the foot soldier. On 30 June 1957, Army divisions still numbered eighteen, but they were being reorganized along "pentomic" lines, with each division built around five small battle groups, five artillery battalions, and one nuclear-capable battery of Honest John rockets. Under the FY 1958 force structure, approved by President Eisenhower in December 1956, the Army would shrink again; so would the Air
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Force, this time, because of fighter and tactical bomber reductions. A growing array of Army and Air Force missiles, as well as the advent of more effective aircraft, permitted these cutbacks without any sacrifice of combat power.

The Basic National Security Policy was supposed to provide the starting point for FY 1959 force planning. If matters had proceeded according to schedule, a BNSP statement would have won approval in the early months of 1957. By 1 April, the Joint Staff would have drafted JSOP-61, covering a 36-month period beginning on 1 July 1961; the Joint Chiefs of Staff were supposed to approve JSOP-61 by 31 May. Then, during the summer, FY 1959 programs and budgets would be reassessed and guidelines for preparation of the FY 1960 budget developed. Work on a JSCP for the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1958 would have started, so that an approved plan could emerge by 31 December.

Instead, as chapter 2 has shown, the process of BNSP review ran until 31 July 1957. More importantly, JSOP-61 had to be prepared after the overall level of Defense expenditures—whose determination, in theory, the completed JSOP was supposed to guide—already had been set. On 6 March 1957, Secretary Wilson told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume that annual appropriations for FYs 1959-1960 would remain at $39 billion, the FY 1958 level. In particular, he wanted them to weigh the merits of force modernization against the advantages of keeping a large force in being (i.e., quality versus quantity). For planning purposes, D-day would be assumed to occur after six months of mobilization, at M+6. Finally, Secretary Wilson called for a single set of force “tabs” to meet the eventualities of cold, limited, or general war.

On 25 April, Admiral Radford advised Secretary Wilson that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed thus far to produce what the Chairman considered workable and realistic force tabs for the JSOP. Two approaches had been tried. In the first, each Service listed the minimum forces it considered necessary to carry out essential tasks. This effort yielded a clearly unattainable total of $52-55 billion per year. In the second, Services assumed that funds would be divided among them in the same proportion as in the FY 1958 budget. This exercise resulted in force tabs which the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged inadequate in many respects.

Admiral Radford, for different reasons, questioned many points in this second set of force tabs. The Services, he believed, had failed to follow the strategic concept to its logical conclusion. The Air Force and the Navy had met the $39 billion ceiling by making deep cuts in modernization as well as research and development programs. The Army proposed to reduce its active forces and increase the Selective Reserves’ strength. The Army’s hope of deploying nineteen divisions overseas during the first six months of a general war depended on having sufficient time for mobilization and undisrupted lines of communication. Radford thought this unrealistic since, according to the strategic concept, nuclear weapons would be used from the outset in general war. The Army apparently anticipated peripheral wars “of considerable magnitude in which we do not use atomic weapons.” By contrast, Radford read the strategic concept as calling for indigenous allied forces plus a small, highly mobile and thoroughly modernized US ground force that, with air and naval support, could be deployed on short
notice. The US force need not be large because it would be ready to employ nuclear weapons whenever the occasion arose.

Admiral Radford asked Secretary Wilson to make several points “absolutely clear” to the Service Chiefs. First, in general war, nuclear weapons would be used from the outset. Second, in peripheral wars, nuclear weapons would be used when necessary to achieve military objectives. Third, the annual budget would remain at $39 billion. He also suggested stressing the desirability of reducing overseas deployments as soon as politically feasible and holding the Selective Reserve to the small numbers usable in the first few weeks of a general war.3

The Services tried again to produce a $39 billion force structure for JSOP-61—and failed. The Acting Chairman, General Taylor, told Secretary Wilson on 15 May that they probably could reach agreement on a $41 to $42 billion budget. Otherwise, they would have to submit force tabs that were split three ways and based on conditional appropriations figures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended suspending work on JSOP-61 until the FY 1958 budget became firm. Wilson agreed to a delay, as long as there was hope of eventual agreement, but he expected to see some overseas withdrawals and said that the budget ceiling would not be raised.4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained deadlocked. On 16 July, the Chairman informed Secretary Wilson that he saw little point in asking the Service Chiefs to rework their figures without further guidance. At that point, Service positions on the active force structure ran as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>FY 1959</th>
<th>FY 1961</th>
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<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
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<tr>
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<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>825,000</td>
<td>805,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Navy | | |
| Attack Carriers | | |
| Navy | 15 | 15 |
| Army | 14 | 11 |
| Air Force | 13 | 12 |

| Personnel | | |
| Navy | 655,000 | 645,000 |
| Army | 638,000 | 607,000 |
| Air Force | 647,000 | 586,000 |
Admiral Radford argued that, in order to find a force structure that would fit within the budget ceiling, "we must thoroughly understand and accept the strategic concept..." Properly applied, that concept would compel not only reassessing plans for large-scale overseas deployments during the first six months of war but also rejecting the possibility of employing large ground forces in conflicts short of general war. Ground and tactical air force reductions should follow from those factors, as well as from taking full account of allied capabilities. As new weapons entered the inventory, all Services should be able to provide the same level of defense with either fewer combat units or units with reduced complements.

Further, Admiral Radford held that the administration's refusal to increase defense spending underscored the need to scale back continental air defenses. Instead of large expenditures on short-range missiles and fighter interceptors, whose best efforts would not materially decrease overall damage, the program should stress a perfected early warning system and retaliatory capability. Radford also concluded that "the United States cannot continue year after year to maintain large overseas ground forces and land-based air forces." He, therefore, advocated withdrawals from Europe, resolutely accepting the political difficulties involved.

The Chairman proposed concentrating cutbacks in Army and Marine divisions, Army air defense battalions, and interceptors, tactical, and airlift units. His specific proposals appear below:5

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<tr>
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<th>FY 1959</th>
<th>FY 1961</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>875,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>840,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>883,000</td>
<td>826,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

30 June 1959          30 June 1961

**Army**
- Divisions          13          11
- Personnel          850,000     700,000

**Navy**
- Attack Carriers    14          13
- Personnel          630,000     590,000

**Marine Corps**
- Division / Wing Teams 3          2
- Personnel            170,000    135,000

**Air Force**
- Wings               107         85
- Personnel           850,000    775,000

On 25 July, Secretary Wilson presented the NSC with his recommendations for FYs 1958–1961. Generally adopting Admiral Radford’s proposals, he forecast a personnel reduction from the current 2,794,411 to 2,200,000 by mid-1961. Just over half this cut would come from the Army, which he projected as declining from the current 997,916 to 700,000. The Service Chiefs all gave the NSC their views, and General Taylor naturally argued against steep Army cuts. Nonetheless, the Council substantially endorsed Wilson’s program. President Eisenhower said that, barring an unforeseen emergency or any major international or economic change, he would hold Defense spending to $38 billion annually for the rest of his term. He warned, in fact, that Congress and the American public might not support even that much.6

President Eisenhower approved the FY 1958 program as well as FY 1959 budget submissions under a $38 billion ceiling. Planning for FYs 1960-1961, he continued, “should recognize the trend toward more expensive military equipment with some reductions in personnel.” Secretary Wilson, on 6 August, prescribed the following personnel strengths for the Services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Jan 1958</th>
<th>30 Jun 1958</th>
<th>30 Jun 1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>950,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>645,000</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in the third column, which went beyond what had been decided at the NSC meeting, were precisely those that Admiral Radford had recommended.7 Their adoption symbolized the Chairman’s emergence, de facto if not de jure, as
the Secretary's principal military adviser. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proven ineffective as a corporate advisory body.

In mid-October, the new Secretary, Neil McElroy, asked for fuller data about Service programs plus an evaluation of whether these represented the most effective forces attainable within fiscal guidelines. The Services replied and, after reviewing their presentations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 November advised Mr. McElroy that these comprised the "most effective" FY 1959 posture attainable. Among the major forces were: fourteen Army and three Marine divisions; 396 warships, including fourteen attack carriers; and 103 Air Force wings. They added, though, that these levels represented a considerable reduction in size and rate of modernization from FYs 1957-1958. In their judgment, too, such reductions would seriously affect overseas deployments. Europeans might use US withdrawals as an excuse to cut their NATO commitments; attainment of US objectives in the Far East also would grow more difficult.⁸

In the wake of "Sputnik," President Eisenhower agreed to support some increases, provided the Defense budget remained below $40 billion. The Services recommended $4 to $5 billion worth of additions for FY 1959; well over half these funds were earmarked for missile systems and research and development efforts. The final FY 1959 request totaled $39.145 billion in new obligational authority and $39.779 billion in estimated expenditures. The administration also sought a $1.270 billion supplemental appropriation for FY 1958. Congress voted a $1.260 billion supplemental appropriation for FY 1958 and $39.840 billion for the Services during FY 1959.⁹

1958

Late in November 1957, the Joint Staff resumed work on JSOP-61. Planning, Secretary McElroy instructed, should assume that force levels and personnel strengths for FYs 1960-1961 probably would not exceed FY 1959 figures by more than five percent. On 9 January 1958 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a finished JSOP-61 to Mr. McElroy. Its force tabs for 1 July 1961 read as follows:

Army: 15 divisions (10 infantry, 3 armored, 2 airborne).

Navy: 397 warships, including 14 attack carriers and 3 ballistic missile submarines.

Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams.


Each Service Chief detailed the risks that his own Service would incur by holding to these levels. General Taylor said, among other things, that logistic and Service support for units overseas would be insufficient to sustain combat operations and absorb reinforcements. Also, Taylor did not consider the seven divisions that would be stationed in CONUS enough to deal with an emergency. Admiral Burke claimed that naval forces were "marginal for the accomplishment
of vital initial tasks." General White rated the Air Force capable of launching a "significant" offensive, disrupting an air attack against the United States, and providing in-place striking power overseas. However, the bomber fleet would be hobbled because modernization was not progressing at an optimum rate and complete dispersal of the strategic force remained out of reach. Deputy Secretary Quarles approved JSOP-61 as a common point of reference for strategic and mobilization planning but cautioned that it could not be used as "automatic justification of a personnel, procurement, installation, or budget program."\(^{10}\)

Budget decisions for FY 1959 also served as guidance for FY 1960. JSOP-62, submitted on 6 June 1958, contained force tabs prepared unilaterally by the individual Services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the total cost of these tabs, $57.4 billion, exceeded what would be available. They asked Secretary McElroy to provide FY 1960–1961 fiscal guidance, not rigidly set, so that they could reconsider JSOP-62's force tabs. As JSOP-62 now stood, tailored to $57.4 billion, its force tabs read as follows:

- **Army**: 15 divisions (10 infantry, 3 armored, 2 airborne).
- **Navy**: 413 warships, including 14 attack carriers, 9 ASW carriers, and 11 ballistic missile submarines.
- **Marine Corps**: 3 division/wing teams.
- **Air Force**: 110 wings (46 strategic, 27 air defense, 28 tactical, 9 airlift).

To compound JSOP-62's weaknesses, the Service Chiefs sharply criticized each other's proposals. General Taylor remarked upon what struck him as excessive retaliatory capability. Until technical difficulties were solved, he argued, plans for the Navy's fleet of ballistic missile submarines should not expand beyond three. Taylor also called fourteen attack carriers excessive, since these ships duplicated the capabilities of land-based aircraft as well as land- and ship-based missiles. Admiral Burke believed that the advent of strategic missiles should cause a reduction in bombers, based upon comparison of delivery capability. General White claimed the Army could perform its functions with fewer divisions, the Navy with fewer attack carriers. He also questioned whether, when compared to bombers and land-based missiles, ballistic missile submarines could pass the test of cost-effectiveness.\(^{11}\)

Obviously, a paper burdened with all the shortcomings of JSOP-62 exercised very little influence upon anybody. Fiscal and force planning continued, according to General Taylor, "in the usual way, each Service producing its budget in isolation from the others." By 2 December 1958, OSD officials had pared Service requests from $48.5 to $40.85 billion in new obligational authority (NOA). But President Eisenhower, deeply concerned over a $13 billion deficit for FY 1959, felt that further cuts in military spending might be needed. At a Cabinet meeting on 3 December, attended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President asked each JCS member to state his views. General Taylor protested the inadequacy of funds for Army modernization and argued that the broader issue of keeping the economy on a sound footing lay "outside of his responsibility." Admiral Burke said that additional taxes should be voted if needed. General White thought that, over
time, Defense reorganization would generate savings by eliminating duplication. General Twining, speaking last, felt that US forces were sufficient to deter general war and meet limited aggression. The important thing, he asserted, was to act decisively in using available strength when a crisis occurred.\footnote{12}

On 6 December Secretary McElroy and General Twining presented the FY 1960 program to the NSC. McElroy described it as the best that could be developed, and the Chairman gave his personal opinion that it was adequate. President Eisenhower then approved the military program "in general," although asking that all possible economies be made. On 20 January 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally advised Secretary McElroy that the FY 1960 budget adequately provided for essential programs and contained no serious gaps. Each Service Chief, however, had major reservations about funding levels for his own Service. Congress finally appropriated $39.89 billion for the Services. On 30 June 1959 major force levels stood as follows:

- **Army:** 15 divisions, 862,000 personnel.
- **Navy:** 386 warships (including 14 attack carriers), 626,000 personnel.
- **Marine Corps:** 3 division/wing teams, 176,000 personnel.
- **Air Force:** 105 wings (43 strategic, 27 air defense, 35 tactical and airlift), 840,000 personnel.\footnote{13}

1959

In the spring of 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began their work on the FY 1961 budget with an exercise proposed by General Twining. Each Service was asked not only to formulate its own programs but also to propose objectives for the others as well. As a ground rule in developing force levels, new obligational authority was fixed at $41.379 billion in FY 1961, a figure which would increase by 5 percent each year thereafter.

If this exercise was intended to demonstrate interservice cooperation, it had exactly the opposite result. By including the utmost for itself and recommending minimum amounts for the others, each Services' submission came close to the overall targets. But the Service's estimates of their own needs—$55.3 billion—totaled about 34 percent more than the established ceiling.\footnote{14}

On 8 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a memorandum outlining their areas of agreement and disagreement. The major interservice splits are listed on page 39. Thus, thanks to its lack of "jointness," another JCS paper left almost no imprint upon the force planning process.\footnote{15}

Late in June, the Service Secretaries decided to submit FY 1961 budgets equal to the FY 1960 amount of new obligational authority, minus 10 percent of the sums allocated for procurement, research and development, and construction. Also, each Service would submit an addendum restoring that 10 percent sum plus another $500 million. For all Services, the former approach would total $38.759 billion, the latter $42.755 billion. On 1 July, Secretary McElroy discussed
budget preparation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He granted them a two-week period, following OSD's review, in which to advise him about the implications of these budgets.\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1961</th>
<th>FY 1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Divisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack Carriers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Bomber Wings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Squadrons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missile Submarines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 27 October, the Secretary of Defense completed his initial examination of the budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then began their two-week review. By 10 November, no meeting of the minds seemed imminent. Accordingly, General Twining felt it necessary to force the pace by advising the Service Chiefs as follows:

I believe that the Secretary has provided ... adequate information for us to proceed. I intend that we proceed expeditiously now; failing that, I can assure you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, will not be in a very strong position to comment on the Secretary's final action, having failed to provide the Secretary with advice or assistance in his deliberations leading to final action. He has requested this of us, and has given us every reasonable opportunity to furnish him sound military advice in support of a military budget that could be subjected to drastic curtailments in a period of financial stringency.\textsuperscript{17}
On 13 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed upon a statement couched in general terms that voiced their concern over the proposed budget’s implications. “The present margin of relative military capabilities is so thin,” they agreed, “that to further reduce US relative military strength without similar Soviet reductions, would place the United States in a vulnerable position.” Nonmilitary considerations, they recognized, would help determine the size and distribution of any budget. Nonetheless, “there are risks in this proposed budget because of the increase in enemy capabilities, rising costs, and the decrease in our relative military capability.”

Three days later, Secretary McElroy and General Twining flew to Augusta, Georgia, where they talked with President Eisenhower about the budget. On 18 November, the Joint Chiefs as a body did the same. The President urged them to take a fresh look at things that had become matters of habit, such as keeping sizable forces in Europe and two attack carriers in the Mediterranean. He outlined the military’s task as follows: “We should maintain the reserves for the whole free world, and rely on local people to provide the local elements of defense, especially on the ground. We should provide air, naval and mobile land forces.” He described the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being “the hinge between the professional forces and the supporting nation.” Defense spending, he insisted, had to be supported by taxes and not by deficit spending. Consequently, “we must cut off every excrescence.”

On 25 November, the Defense budget was presented to the NSC. The administration ultimately requested, for the Services, an appropriation of $39.296 billion; Congress voted $40.549 billion. What did these sums buy? On 30 June 1960, major forces were constituted as follows:

**Army:** 14 divisions, 873,000 personnel.

**Navy:** 812 warships (including 14 attack carriers), 618,000 personnel.

**Marine Corps:** 3 division/wing teams, 171,000 personnel.

**Air Force:** 96 wings (40 strategic, 23 air defense, 33 tactical and airlift), 815,000 personnel.

**1960**

Through JSOP-63, submitted to Secretary Gates on 8 January 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended force levels for 1 July 1963. Their figures were based on an assumption that expenditures would increase at a rate of 5 percent annually through FY 1963. For the only time during President Eisenhower’s second term, they forwarded a JSOP unburdened by interservice splits.
Army: 14 divisions.
Navy: 15 attack carriers, 13 ballistic missile submarines.
Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams.
Air Force: 405 B-47, 720 B-52, and 225 B-58 bombers; 130 Atlas, 120 Titan, and 150 Minuteman ICBMs. 21

Secretary Gates, however, promulgated a different procedure for FY 1962 budgeting and force planning that rendered JSOP-63's recommendations obsolete. On 24 June 1960, he ordered each Service to draw up four alternative submissions: “A,” 5 percent less than the new obligational authority for FY 1961; “B,” the same amount as FY 1961; “C,” 5 percent more; and “D,” containing additional programs deemed important enough to warrant serious consideration by the Secretary. In his response, General Lemnitzer said the Army's structure would be the same under “A,” “B,” and “C”; a “D” budget would allow one more division and an array of smaller units. Admiral Burke reported that all four alternatives could fund the same number of ships; only the number of personnel would vary. General White found that Air Force units and personnel strength would be identical under each alternative.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 August, sent Secretary Gates their assessment of the Services' alternative submissions. They began by citing “increasing Communist boldness in international affairs,” which they attributed to a Soviet perception that US national will was weakening and that relative military capabilities were shifting in the USSR's favor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted what impressed them as the inadequacies of a straight-line “C” budget. First, the rising price of goods and services raised the costs of readiness and effectiveness every year. Second, since increasing Communist capabilities precluded cuts in quantitative commitments, qualitative reductions would be required. Third, increasing lead times for development, procurement, and training lengthened the span needed to transform additional resources into effective forces. Taken together, these factors explained why force structures remained so similar under all four alternatives. Over the long term, straight-line budgets would lead to annual qualitative cuts in flexibility, readiness, and effectiveness, to a continuing loss of ability to expand rapidly during an emergency, and finally to the elimination of combat units. Consequently, only a budget “significantly” above “C” would permit the improvements essential to maintaining an effective long-term posture. 22

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were working on JSOP-66. They had agreed to base JSOP-66's force tabs upon FY 1961 expenditures, increased by 5 percent annually through FY 1966. This time, though, interservice differences resurfaced with a vengeance. When JSOP-66 went to Secretary Gates on 20 September 1960, Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer rejected as excessive the Air Force's plans for its strategic retaliatory forces. General White, in turn, rated as too rapid the pace of Army and Navy modernization programs, recommended that carriers emphasize anti-submarine rather than attack missions, and proposed reducing the ballistic missile submarine program. Burke had touted submarines as superior to ICBMs because of their survivability; White stressed
the comparative cheapness of Minuteman. The table below details how wide these interservice divisions had become:

Available on 1 July 65:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Subs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52s</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlas ICBMs</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan ICBMs</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman ICBMs</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secretary Gates noted these force tabs without, of course, approving any of them. The administration decided to hold the Air Force and Navy fairly close to “A” level funding while allowing the Army almost a “C” level. By 1 July 1962, if these decisions stood, the active force structure would include: fourteen Army and three Marine divisions; fourteen attack and nine ASW carriers; nine ballistic missile submarines; 780 B-47, 630 B-52, and eighty B-58 bombers; and fifty-eight Titan and ninety-five Atlas ICBMs. The Kennedy administration, however, felt compelled to embark upon a considerable expansion of the armed forces.

Conclusion

Consistently, force-planning debates showed the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their fractious worst. Among the Service Chiefs, parochial interests remained predominant. Privately, in July 1959, President Eisenhower complained that he could not “figure out what is causing the trouble in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The organization seems to be failing to do its job.” When he made this observation, General Lemnitzer was about to replace General Taylor as Army Chief of Staff. The President told Secretary McElroy that he hoped Lemnitzer would prove to be another man like General Twining who, once a decision had been made, did not try to undercut it by appealing to Congress or the media. McElroy suspected that Taylor had allowed his subordinates to argue publicly against administration decisions. General Lemnitzer, as the President hoped, proved a loyal subordinate. Within the Pentagon, though, guerrilla warfare remained as fierce as ever.
Closing the "Missile Gap"

Between 1957 and 1960, no Defense issue aroused so much public concern as the emergence of a "missile gap," in which the USSR appeared to be outstripping the United States. President Eisenhower responded by accelerating some programs but flatly rejected calls for a massive "crash" effort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted along the same lines as they had during the force-level debates described in chapter 3. Each Service pushed its own projects. The Air Force wanted to deploy the largest possible number of Atlas, Titan and Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles. A land-based ICBM would travel 5,500 nautical miles. The Navy advocated cutting back ICBM production plans in favor of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with a range of 1,200 nautical miles. The Army, seeing anti-ICBM (ABM) defense as its piece of the action, zealously pushed the Nike-Zeus program.

The "Sputnik" Supplemental

By the mid-1950s, the superpowers plainly were racing to be first in deploying ICBMs. On 13 September 1955, President Eisenhower decided that the ICBM research and development effort should have "the highest priority above all others," and directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed "with maximum urgency." By early 1957, Air Force plans called for the first Atlas ICBMs to become operational by 1960. The Air Force's Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with a range of 1,200 nautical miles, was slated to become operational during 1959–1960; the Army's Jupiter IRBM should follow a year or so later. According to a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued on 12 March 1957, the Soviets probably could deploy an IRBM in 1959 and an ICBM in 1960–1961.1

Late in August 1957, Moscow announced the successful flight-testing of an ICBM. Sputnik I, the world's first earth satellite, weighing 184 pounds, went into orbit on 4 October; Sputnik II, weighing 1,120 pounds, followed on 3 November.
Clearly, the Soviets had a lead. Just how greatly this lead alarmed the American public may be seen in the language of the Gaither Report. A panel of nongovernmental experts headed by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., identified the foremost danger facing the United States as strategic bombers' vulnerability to surprise attack during a period of reduced tension, a weakness that would become critical by early 1960. Therefore, an overriding priority must be given, in the short run, to implementing promptly the bomber alert and dispersal measures already planned by the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Over the longer term, there should be accelerated missile production leading to the earliest possible deployment of IRBMs overseas, construction of hardened and dispersed ICBM silos, and expansion of the Polaris submarine fleet. Every effort should be made to have a significant number of IRBMs operational overseas by late 1958 and ICBMs operational by late 1959. Specifically, the Panel recommended deploying 600 Atlas and Titans by mid-1963, bringing the first Polaris submarine into service by 1962, and completing eighteen of the submarines by 1965.

The report also recommended improving and extending radar warning nets, developing ABMs, greatly augmenting antisubmarine programs, intensifying intelligence efforts, and initiating a nationwide fallout shelter program. The Gaither Panel estimated that the most urgent measures would cost $19 billion over the coming five years. The other recommendations, including the shelter program, were calculated as requiring an extra $25 billion over the same period. But the Panel, which numbered such luminaries as former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, declared such expenditures to be well within the country's economic capabilities. Members felt confident that the American people willingly would shoulder heavy costs, if the national leadership effectively explained the nature of the threat.2

After the NSC heard the Gaither Report on 7 November, its various recommendations were assigned to appropriate departments and agencies for study. But before any responses appeared, a number of things took place. On 12 November, a new NIE tentatively advanced the operational date of a Soviet IRBM to 1958, and the operational date of ten prototype Soviet ICBMs to 1959. Two days later, the Services submitted about twenty supplemental proposals costing between $4 and $5 billion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 17 November, endorsed a dozen of them costing around $1.5 billion. These included: Polaris, $260 million; Thor IRBM, $154 million; Atlas ICBM, $159 million; ballistic missile detection, $100 million.3

On 4 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy their response to the Gaither Report. They fully agreed that hardened ICBM silos should be completed as rapidly as possible and that proposed measures to disperse SAC bombers and place more of them on alert status should be adopted, "although the cost estimate appears open to question." Already, they had directed that improving the defense of SAC bases against bomber attack should be among those continental air defense programs having the highest priority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also had endorsed, as an urgent requirement, development of an ABM system. They further noted that, by NSC direction, ICBM and IRBM research and development programs already had been assigned the highest
priority. Thus programs responsive to virtually all the report’s recommendations were already under way; the JCS response, in effect, endorsed all of them as worthy of emphasis. That they went no further probably reflected a recognition that, to an unusual degree, a decision to accelerate efforts would depend on economic and political judgments that were beyond their province.4

Bearing heavily on such judgments were comments forwarded to the NSC by the Treasury Department, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), and the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). All three concluded that the costs and economic consequences of adopting even a substantial portion of the report would be far greater than estimated by the Gaither Panel. Its full adoption, they predicted, would require either sharp tax increases or large deficit spending, as well as rigorous controls over credit, manpower, and materials to guard the economy against dislocation and inflation.5 These views, which were received in mid-December, may well have reinforced the President’s native disposition against what seemed like going to extremes.

Deputy Secretary Quarles, on 21 December, sent the NSC views which reflected JCS recommendations on most matters. Mr. Quarles reported that the number of bombers able to get airborne, if they had between thirty minutes and two hours of tactical warning, would rise from 157 on 1 January 1958 to 517 by 1 January 1959. (On 31 December 1957, SAC had 127 B/RB-36, 1,285 B-47, and 243 B-52 bombers.) The Gaither Panel envisaged deploying 600 ICBMs by mid-1963. Currently funded programs, according to Quarles, would provide forty Titan and ninety Atlas ICBMs (four squadrons and nine squadrons, respectively) by then. Considering the likely improvements in second-generation ICBMs, a goal of 600 first-generation types struck him as questionable. The Atlas was costly, cumbersome, and liquid-fueled; the second-generation Minuteman would be solid-fueled, making it much easier to maintain on alert status and to place in hardened silos. As for Polaris, three submarines were scheduled for completion by mid-1961. The IRBM program also had been accelerated to provide 120 missiles by early 1960, so production capability would exist to meet the Panel’s goal of 240.6

Back in July 1957, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) had completed an evaluation of ABM efforts. WSEG responded to directives from the Assistant Secretary (Research and Development) and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vice Admiral John H. Sides was its Director. The Group rated proposed ABM systems as being able to defend targets against ICBM attacks uncomplicated by decoys and electronic countermeasures (ECM). But by 1965, the earliest time any ABM system could become operational, the Soviets probably would possess decoys and ECM. Until more was known about how to deal with decoys and ECM, the Group thought it dangerous to concentrate upon a single system or concept.7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 December, informed Secretary McElroy that they could not agree about whether ABMs deserved the same priority as ICBMs. Only General Taylor advocated assigning the highest national priority to Nike-Zeus. Neither Admiral Burke nor General White considered Nike-Zeus sufficiently advanced to warrant excluding all other approaches. Burke and White therefore advocated concentrating on offensive systems: Atlas, Titan, and Polaris.8
Meanwhile, on 10 December, a new and much more pessimistic NIE forecast that the Soviets would deploy ten prototype ICBMs sometime between mid-1958 and mid-1959, one hundred operational ICBMs by mid-1960, and 500 within two or three years after that. On 16 January 1958, the NSC decided that “predominant emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen effective US nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve US active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures....” Six days later, President Eisenhower awarded certain programs priority over all others for research and development and for achieving initial operational capability. These included, without one program having priority over another: (1) Atlas; (2) Titan; (3) Thor and Jupiter; (4) Polaris; and (5) ABM systems, including Nike-Zeus.9

On 27 February, Secretary McElroy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review Service suggestions for supplemental funding for FYs 1958 and 1959, assuming the amounts would be either $1.5 or $2.5 billion. The JCS reply, dated 12 March, came close to meeting the $1.5 billion limit. Each Service Chief, however, had accepted with little change the full requests from his own Service while drastically cutting those from the others. A total reflecting what each Chief had requested for his own Service would have come to more than $3.2 billion. The Secretary, on 17 March, circulated a “preliminary package” of eleven proposals. How the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to the main ones, two days later, appears below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>SecDef View</th>
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It is interesting that only the Marine Corps, which had no stake in any of these systems, agreed with the Secretary. General Taylor wanted to telescope Nike-Zeus' development and production time by two years, so that three batteries could be deployed by December 1961. But none of his JCS colleagues supported him and neither did Secretary McElroy. Ultimately, on 3 April, the administration asked Congress for $1.59 billion overall: $50 million for Titan, $70 million for Minuteman, $323.5 million for Polaris, and $195 million for Nike-Zeus.10

The deployment of IRBMs moved forward, probably driven more by political and psychological factors than by military considerations. In March 1957, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had agreed to station four squadrons (with fifteen missiles per squadron) in the United Kingdom. After Great Britain had been supplied, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy in November 1957, there were thirteen other suitable locations. By October 1958, in light of budgetary considerations as well as some governments' reluctance to accept IRBMs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended holding deployments at eight squadrons. Ultimately, sixty Thors became operational in Britain between June 1959 and April 1960, thirty Jupiters in Italy between April and July.
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1961, and fifteen Jupiters in Turkey between November 1961 and March 1962—a total of seven squadrons.11

Setting Program Priorities

President Eisenhower was determined to avoid simply throwing money at the problem of the missile gap. Secretary McElroy, at an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting on 28 January 1958, voiced concern about a number of things: the growing number of offensive and defensive systems under development; the fact that there was no overall evaluation comparing the merits of various systems; and the immediate possibility of overlap and duplication among strategic delivery systems, such as bombers, Thor, Jupiter, Atlas, Polaris, and aircraft carriers. Two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to appraise offensive and defensive systems.12

WSEG’s reply, which appeared on 15 July, measured deterrence as the ability of bombers and missiles to survive a severe surprise missile attack and still retaliate and inflict considerable losses. If steps had to be taken to augment the deterrent posture during 1960–1962, then Titan and Polaris appeared to be the most promising systems. The Group also advocated accelerating research and development on Minuteman. As for Nike-Zeus, technical problems had to be overcome (e.g., the effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations and the ability to discriminate warheads from decoys) before “point” defense of retaliatory bases could be made effective or the feasibility of area defense of cities determined.13

The NSC, on 13 October 1958, discussed WSEG’s report. President Eisenhower emphasized the need to identify “obsolescent, antithetical, or overlapping” weapons systems. Unless tough decisions were taken to prevent unnecessary spending, he feared that Americans would encounter increasing difficulty preserving their free way of life. On 6 December, the President increased ICBM objectives from thirteen squadrons to twenty, nine of them Atlas and eleven Titan. He also authorized construction of six Polaris submarines during FY 1959 and three more in FY 1960. Eisenhower authorized planning for another three boats in FY 1961, bringing the total to twelve.14

At this point, the missile gap seemed real enough. On 28 November, an Atlas was fired successfully over a 5,500 nautical mile range, equaling the Soviet feat of fifteen months before. By mid-1962, according to best estimates, the US arsenal would contain seventy-eight Atlas and forty-five Titans ready to fire, while the Soviets would be deploying about 500 ICBMs. It must be remembered, though, that administration leaders always believed that the US deterrent was fully adequate during 1957–1960. Even in the aftermath of Sputnik, when public concern was at its height, President Eisenhower felt sure that “Soviet ICBMs will not overmatch our bomber power in the next few years.” As General Twining told the President early in 1959, the Strategic Air Command was four times larger than its Soviet counterpart and “ten times as good.”15
The ABM program remained a bone of contention. Early in November 1958, an OSD Steering Group headed by Dr. Hector J. Skifter gave Secretary McElroy its judgment that Nike-Zeus research and development were sufficiently advanced to warrant an immediate transition to production. The Steering Group believed that Nike-Zeus could distinguish light decoys from missile warheads, as atmospheric re-entry slowed them down. The Steering Group acknowledged that heavy, sophisticated decoys could saturate the defense. However, even against heavy decoys, Nike-Zeus would force the enemy to use considerably more missiles in order to achieve a kill. No technology, either in hand or in prospect, promised to be significantly better.

Deputy Secretary Quarles asked for JCS judgments. Their response, dated 24 November, restated a familiar division of opinion. General Taylor sided with the Steering Group. Conversely, Admiral Burke, General Twining, and General White rejected an immediate decision for production as “premature, unduly costly and unwise in light of the many serious developmental problems to which no solution is now in sight.” They did urge, however, that research and development efforts continue and expand as a matter of urgency. The administration decided against initiating production.

The Minuteman program was making good progress, and the Air Force looked upon this solid-fuel ICBM as its best competitor against the Navy’s solid-fuel Polaris, which promised to become operational in 1960. The liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan, by contrast, would be less reliable as well as harder to place in silos and maintain on alert status. Back in August 1958, OSD’s Director of Guided Missiles (DGM) had raised a question about Air Force plans to make Minuteman operational by mid-1962. Would not extending its development time result in a more desirable and effective system? He asked for a JCS judgment. In September, before a reply appeared, the Air Force proposed making Minuteman a program of the highest national priority. On 19 February 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the position that Minuteman was “required as soon as possible without a crash program.” Establishing 1962 as the critical year, they said, called for an accuracy in forecasting that was simply not attainable.

On 18 August 1959, the NSC added Minuteman and Nike-Zeus to the list of programs having the highest priority for research and development. Two months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied Secretary McElroy with split opinions about the proper production rate for Minuteman. General White wanted 150 operational missiles by mid-1963. He believed that by 1963–1964 the magnitude of the threat would require an early and substantial ICBM augmentation. Minuteman, because of its simplicity, reliability, and cost-effectiveness, should constitute a major part of that augmentation. He considered 800 missiles by mid-1964 to be a reasonable and valid objective. Nonetheless, Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer recommended producing only fifty during the first year and stopping at a total of 300 to 500. In justification, they cited numerous technical problems that remained unresolved. General Twining did support White’s plan for 150 missiles by mid 1963. Beyond that, however, he would endorse only those production commitments necessary to ensure that whatever objectives the Joint Chiefs of Staff did establish could be met. Saying that the 1963–1964 threat “may”
prove critical, Twining favored a production base big enough to permit acceleration if necessary. General White, by contrast, had called both the magnitude of the threat and the need for substantial augmentation “evident.”

In mid-October 1959, the first Atlas became operationally ready. President Eisenhower, on 13 January 1960, increased the ICBM program to twenty-seven squadrons, thirteen of them Atlas and fourteen Titan. For Polaris, he continued the policy of starting three submarines per year. The three to be started in FY 1961 would raise the total to twelve. He also authorized long lead-time planning and procurement for another three boats.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nike-Zeus proved a perennially divisive issue. Late in September 1959, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group circulated its evaluation of Nike-Zeus’ ability to defend population centers and retaliatory bases. Nike-Zeus would work, WSEG concluded, only against small numbers of warheads arriving simultaneously or against larger numbers spaced enough apart so that they failed to overpower the defenses. Saturation attacks, employing either cluster warheads or well-coordinated launchings, could quickly overwhelm Nike-Zeus. Since cluster warheads appeared technically feasible for the United States, presumably the Soviets were working along those lines too.

Secretary Gates learned, through a memorandum dated 3 December, that JCS divisions over Nike-Zeus had not closed. General Lemnitzer wanted FY 1961 funds used to start production. Installing thirty batteries with 1,500 missiles, he declared, would add to the uncertainties and complexities facing an attacker. Otherwise, in allocating missiles against targets, an adversary would be limited only by the numbers and reliability of his own weapons. Admiral Burke still believed that, since the “underlying development” of Nike-Zeus was incomplete, production would be premature. Generals Twining and White, who also opposed Nike-Zeus production, argued that the best defense lay in a good offense. Even 120 Nike-Zeus batteries, White claimed, could be beaten by “a few missiles with cluster warheads or sophisticated decoys directed against only those Zeus defenses the enemy chooses to attack.” On 10 December, Secretary Gates decided against putting Nike-Zeus into production.

During the mid-1950s, SAC had started working on ways to keep one-third of its bombers on 15 minute ground alert. General Thomas S. Power (Commander in Chief, SAC) ordered that such an alert commence at several bases on 1 October 1957. Not until May 1960, however, did one third of all bombers and tankers attain 15-minute alert status. Meanwhile, in March 1959, General Power argued for establishing an airborne alert as well. By January 1960, he believed, the Soviet arsenal of ICBMs might reach 100—one year earlier than when the National Intelligence Estimates forecast such a threat. On 30 April 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered CINCSAC to proceed with planning, training, and other necessary measures but postponed actual execution. Each day, as a result, twelve B-52s ran training and indoctrination flights.

On 10 September 1959, Secretary McElroy asked for JCS opinions about establishing an airborne alert. Their reply, dated 28 October, cannot have been particularly helpful. General White recommended creating, by 1 April 1961, a capability for keeping one-fourth of the B-52 fleet continuously airborne. To do that, an
extra $325 million would be needed in FY 1961. Admiral Burke and General Lemenzter felt that enough already had been done. If more Defense funds became available, they said, such money could be better spent in other ways. General Twining supported White’s proposal but, under current budgetary guidelines, saw no way of doing it “without unacceptable reductions and dislocations of other essential programs.”

The FY 1961 budget provided for only six daily flights and for enough spare parts to keep one-eighth of the B-52 force airborne by 1 April 1961. Late in June 1960, General Power proposed expanding the effort, by 1 November 1960, to twenty-nine flights daily—one for each B-52 squadron. In justification, he cited recent evidence of a “tough and uncompromising attitude” by the USSR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that six flights were too few but advised CINCSAC on 22 July that his proposal would interfere with achieving a one-eighth capability by 1 April 1961. Nonetheless, General Power repeated his recommendation for twenty-nine sorties per day. On 25 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Power that they approved his requirement, calling it “desirable and realistic.”

Achievements Exceed Expectations

The year 1960 witnessed major advances in US missile programs. Secretary Gates, during congressional testimony on 1 February, predicted that the Soviets might enjoy a moderate numerical superiority in missiles during the next three years. He insisted, however, that US retaliatory capability would remain entirely adequate to deter aggression. A National Intelligence Estimate, issued eight days later, concluded that the Soviet threat would be most serious in 1961. After 1961, a tremendous increase in the number of Soviet ICBMs would be required to destroy hardened US silos. And, even if the Soviets did launch a perfect surprise missile attack during 1961, enough US bombers probably would be airborne to retaliate effectively.

President Eisenhower, on 6 April, committed Minuteman to production and set a goal of 150 operational missiles by mid-1963. On 5 October, he raised the Polaris program from twelve to fourteen submarines and authorized long lead-time planning and procurement for five additional boats. The USS George Washington departed for the first Polaris patrol on 15 October; the USS Patrick Henry followed on 31 December. The Soviets were some years away from deploying a comparable system.

Was the missile gap narrowing? A National Intelligence Estimate issued on 16 August stated that the Soviets had only a few ICBMs operational as of 1 January 1960. Estimates of the number that would be available by mid-1963 varied widely, from a low of 200 by the Army to a high of 700 by the Air Force. Overflights by U-2s, which ended abruptly in May 1960, did not supply enough evidence to tell conclusively whether the Soviets were making major, rapid ICBM deployments. Only the evidence collected subsequently using other means definitely
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proved that they were not. By the summer of 1961, US officials knew that the missile gap—which probably never existed—had disappeared.

The strides made by US missile programs between 1957 and 1960 were impressive, but it is hard to say whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff deserved much of the credit. Each Service Chief pushed his own program (Air Force: Minuteman, Navy: Polaris, Army: Nike-Zeus) and seemed willing to do so at the other Services’ expense. General Twining distanced himself somewhat from the Air Force, as befitted his role as Chairman, and was the JCS member most in harmony with the views of civilian leaders. Clearly, though, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group’s reports stand out as being objective and influential. An evaluation done by WSEG during 1959–1960, described below, supports this judgment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 1959, asked WSEG to evaluate offensive systems available during 1964–1967 from the standpoints of reliability, reaction time, responsiveness to effective control, accuracy, vulnerability, and cost. Its response, circulated on 30 December 1960, identified ballistic missiles as the primary systems to be used against “known fixed targets where time of delivery is of military importance.” For a first strike, either Titan or a fixed (silo-based) Minuteman appeared most suitable. For retaliation, fixed and mobile Minuteman as well as Polaris all offered advantages, depending upon the particular circumstances.

Minuteman and an improved Titan II would be entering the inventory concurrently. WSEG rated Minuteman generally superior in terms of cost, effectiveness, and vulnerability. That left the large Titan II justified mainly where, for certain targets, a single missile had to carry enough decoys or cluster warheads to overwhelm any defenses. The B–70 bomber, which was still under development, appeared competitive with Minuteman “only if successful delivery of a large number of weapons per bomber to different targets can be achieved.” Much more study, the Group believed, would be needed to ascertain whether that was feasible. The Kennedy administration, after making its own appraisal, chose much the same path that WSEG had proposed: increasing Minuteman and Polaris, restricting Titan II, delaying Nike-Zeus; and killing the B–70.

The Single Integrated Operational Plan

The advent of IRBMs, ICBMs, and especially SLBMs focused attention on how to plan, coordinate, and command a nuclear attack. Since 1955, the integration of commanders’ strike plans had taken place at annual World-Wide Coordination Conferences, held at the Pentagon and (starting in 1958) monitored by a senior member of the Joint Staff. In December 1958, Acting Secretary Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce a concept for employing Polaris and to recommend how that system should fit into the unified and specified command structure.

Six months went by before a JCS reply appeared—evidence of what deep interservice differences this issue had provoked. Admiral Burke, in fact, discerned basic differences that went “to the very heart of our national strategy.” Polaris submarines would be operating in the same general area as air, surface,
and subsurface naval forces. Unless all these forces were closely controlled and coordinated, Burke argued, Polaris' effectiveness would be degraded and the submarines subjected to unnecessary hazards. He deemed it "axiomatic" that Polaris' full potential could best be achieved under commands having a proprietary interest in naval weapons systems. Consequently, Admiral Burke proposed assigning the first submarines to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), the later ones to the US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). General Pate agreed with him. So did General Taylor, at least while Polaris remained untried and unproven. By contrast, General White recommended creating a functional unified command for strategic warfare. Such a command would have two subordinate components: one from the Air Force, containing USAF bombers and land-based missiles; and one from the Navy, comprising Polaris.30 Obviously, White expected that an Air Force officer would head any unified strategic command.

Late in July 1959, after General Twining had recovered from surgery and returned to duty, Secretary McElroy requested his views about procedures for coordinating nuclear strike plans. Answering in mid-August, Twining said that not much more progress could be achieved under existing arrangements. The Chairman identified three thorny issues: the process of selecting targets, which would determine how large a force was needed; the development of integrated operational plans; and the question of operational control. Already, President Eisenhower had ordered the NSC’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee to appraise the relative merits of (1) an urban-industrial target system favored by the Army, (2) a more ambitious military target system advocated by the Air Force, and (3) an optimum mix of the two. Once a targeting system had been chosen, Twining believed, the commander responsible for the strategic mission should take the initial steps to develop a national strategic target list. To perform that task, he should be provided with an approved targeting philosophy and guidelines. After Polaris had qualified as a proven weapons system, a unified strategic command might become necessary. If not, Twining continued, the targets to be struck by Polaris and the timing of such an attack ought to derive from a single integrated operational plan. Soon, therefore, a nucleus of naval officers should be assigned to CINCSAC’s operational planning staff. The Chairman presented his JCS colleagues with eighteen questions. These included: What agency should develop a national strategic target list, and what agency should review it? Do we need a single integrated operational plan? Is there an immediate, or a more distant, need for a unified strategic command?31

On 30 October, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee recommended adopting an optimum mix target system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed that approach and, on 12 February 1960, President Eisenhower approved it. But this did not bring command and coordination problems any closer to solution. On 6 May 1960, Secretary Gates learned from a JCS memorandum where each Service Chief stood. General Lemnitzer wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue a single “strategic” plan, as opposed to an “operational” one. It would contain a national strategic target list and assign geographic areas to unified and specified commanders, who then would coordinate the planning and execution of attacks within those
areas. Creating a new command, Lemnitzer claimed, would establish a single superior commander. Such a position would impinge upon other unified and specified commanders, take away responsibilities properly borne by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and preclude the decentralization necessary to deal with the fluid and unpredictable situation following a massive nuclear attack. General Shoup took approximately the same position.

Admiral Burke, reaffirming his earlier recommendation, also opposed a single command. Establishing one, he argued, would mean either withdrawing forces from unified and specified commanders or denying them the prerogative of striking critical targets immediately. Thus, for all its apparent simplicity, a unified strategic command would raise more problems than it solved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, enjoying access to all necessary resources, could and should prepare a national strategic target system.

General White again argued for a unified strategic command. He also held that the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), was uniquely qualified and equipped to develop a national strategic target list and a single integrated operational plan. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his opinion, was neither conceived nor designed to carry out such detailed planning; its proper role lay in review.

After meeting with Secretary Gates on 30 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried once more to reach agreement—and failed. On 16 August, following what he called “exhaustive” discussions with JCS members, the Secretary rendered his decision. His solution came fairly close to what General Twining had suggested back in August 1959. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prepare and promulgate a National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy. Gates saw no need for a new unified command. Instead, CINCSAC, taking on an added role as Director of Strategic Target Planning, would develop a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to review and approve both the NSTL and the SIOP. In his capacity as Director, CINCSAC would organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), with a deputy from a different Service.

Admiral Burke still wanted the Joint Staff to prepare a target list and an operational plan. Otherwise, he maintained, the JSTPS would use SAC’s methods and procedures, which might prove unsuitable for other unified commands. Why not, then, make a test run prior to a final decision? This was thrashed out on 11 August, at a stormy meeting with the President. General Twining argued that “we have tried to coordinate separate activities in this field for ten years, and we have failed utterly.” He identified, as the crux of the problem, the Navy’s twenty-year long opposition to serving under a single commander. Burke replied that all the Navy’s operating forces were under unified commanders, which was not the case with the other Services. (True, but naval forces all were assigned to commands headed by admirals, while major Army and Air Force units were assigned to commands headed by officers from other Services.) Secretary Gates said that the basic issue was having an integrated plan. When Burke replied that he supported an integrated plan which assigned tasks rather than specified details, Gates countered that Burke did not truly support it because specific detail was

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the essence of a real and effective integrated plan. Coordination was not integra-
tion. President Eisenhower commented that the first strike required rigid,
detailed planning; putting large forces outside the plan would defeat the whole
concept of our retaliatory effort, which took priority over everything else. How-
ever, when the President spoke approvingly of a trial plan, General Twining said
“he would have to speak frankly and say that if it were announced that this effort
were a trial effort, the Navy would sabotage it.” Eisenhower replied that it was
wrong to talk of sabotage and cautioned that too much emotion was being dis-
played. He said that if Admiral Burke accepted the premise that for the first
strike no unified commander would do other than what he was told to do, then
matters could be resolved. Essentially, the Gates-Twining approach won out.

On 18 August, General Power assumed the duties of Director, Strategic Target
Planning; Rear Admiral (subsequently, Vice Admiral) Edward N. Parker became
his deputy. A JCS liaison group, which was an integral part of the Joint Staff,
assisted the Director in interpreting JCS guidance and informing the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as well as the Services of progress in preparing the NSTL and the SIOP.
The first SIOP won JCS approval in December 1960 and became effective on
1 April 1961.

Perhaps Secretary Gates’ solution appears sound because it left no Service
fully satisfied. The Air Force certainly was disappointed by its failure to gain con-
trol, through a new unified command, over all strategic weapons systems. The
Navy’s attitude can be inferred from the fact that it tacitly allowed the Air Force
to dominate the JSTPS. Nevertheless, these arrangements would remain
unchanged during thirty years of cold war.
Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

During 1957–1960, arms control became an area where public concern collided with what the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw as military necessity. Explosions of thermonuclear or “hydrogen” weapons produced radioactive fallout great enough to trigger worldwide protests against the continuation of such tests. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed continued testing essential to develop reliable warheads for ICBMs, SLBMs, and ABMs. Obviously, on this issue, no compromise could emerge.

The Linkage Issue

As 1956 ended, the superpowers stood far apart on arms control issues. On 17 November, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin offered a comprehensive plan that included immediate cessation of all nuclear weapons testing, destruction of all nuclear weapons, and major military manpower cuts. An international body with undefined powers would exercise control over these measures. To prevent surprise attack, though, control posts would be established at major ports, air terminals, and rail junctions. All these proposals had been made before, but Bulganin added a new one: aerial inspection of an area in Central Europe extending eight hundred kilometers on each side of the “Iron Curtain.”

Only four days later, on 21 November, President Eisenhower approved a new statement of US policy. Its main features read as follows:

1. Halt the production of new fissionable material for weapons purposes on 31 December 1957, or as soon as possible thereafter, and within one month after an inspection system began functioning satisfactorily. Upon implementation of that measure, all future production would be stockpiled for nonweapons purposes under international supervision. Possessors of nuclear weapons would transfer
previously produced materials in agreed, equitable, and proportionate increments. During early stages of this transfer, the United States must retain a “very substantial” weapons capability.

2. After the steps above had been implemented, the United States would be willing “to limit or to eliminate” nuclear tests. In the interim, such tests should be conducted after advance notice and under limited international observation.

3. To assure that outer space would be used for peaceful and scientific purposes only, there should be agreements prohibiting “the production of objects designed for travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes.”

4. Negotiations should continue for an “open skies” plan of mutual aerial reconnaissance and an exchange of military “blueprints” in combination with Premier Bulganin’s proposal for ground observation posts. As a safeguard against surprise attack, an inspection and control system with air and ground components should be progressively developed and installed. To promote the opening of the USSR to such inspections, there could be minor mutual reductions in conventional arms and in personnel, down to a first-stage level of 2.5 million men.

On 14 January 1958, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., presented these proposals to the United Nations General Assembly, with small changes. He spoke of limiting, and ultimately eliminating, nuclear tests. For obvious reasons, he did not mention retaining a very substantial US weapons capability during the early stages of transferring fissionable material.2

Meanwhile, the President’s Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters, Mr. Harold E. Stassen, had begun drafting a general disarmament treaty. To assist him, a White House Disarmament Staff had been established, a special interdepartmental committee appointed, and eight presidential task groups created. A draft would be presented to the UN Disarmament Committee’s five power subcommittee (US, UK, France, Canada, and USSR) when it met in London in March 1957. First, of course, agreement would have to be achieved among the Western allies.

During December 1956 and January 1957, Mr. Stassen and his assistants discussed the proposals above with representatives of the Western powers. Mr. Stassen outlined a flexible approach. The United States should be willing “to get moving on the conventional side of disarmament, on the surprise attack factors, on the problem of reducing the volume of nuclear threat—either all together or any one.” Although these proposals generally represented only a first stage program, some might serve as stepping-stones while others might fit into succeeding stages. Stassen emphasized that, except for those related to outer space, all these proposals were inseparably linked together. For every reduction, limitation, or commitment, there must be adequate and effective inspection measures. Each new step would be contingent on the adequacy of the inspection system devised for the preceding one. Moreover, each step—indeed, any piecemeal approach—should help movement toward a broad, comprehensive agreement.3

On 10 December, only a few days after work on a draft treaty began, Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson suggested to Mr. Stassen that priority be given to perfecting an inspection and control system. Stassen, however, had no intention of letting such an effort delay the drafting of a treaty. Secretary Wilson then posed a number of questions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Would it be more
desirable to incorporate nuclear, conventional, and outer space weapons in a single
treaty or to deal with them separately? What minimum requirements for effective
inspection should be set? What types of weapons and forces ought to be included
in the first stage of reductions?4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reply, dated 4 February 1957, recommended treating
nuclear, conventional, and outer space weapon areas as a whole and incorporating
them within a single treaty. Primary emphasis, however, should be placed not
on conventional cutbacks but upon the limiting elements of a "nuclear weapons
system capable of conducting great surprise attack." This position, they said, had
been fixed at the London Disarmament Conference of March 1956, when the United
States had rejected Soviet proposals on grounds that an agreement must pro­
vide for inspection, control, and limitation in all three weapon areas simultane­
ously. They knew of no change in Soviet policy that would require a revision of
the US position. Minimum US requirements included the unimpeded right to
inspect nuclear delivery systems, the exchange of military blueprints and satisfac­
tory verification of them, aerial inspection of any significant military activity, a US
majority on international inspection teams in the USSR, and finally, facilities for
"full, free, rapid, and uninterrupted transmission" from members of inspection
teams to regulating agencies and to the US Government.5

Subsequently, Mr. Stassen suggested determining overall force levels by
assigning manpower quotas to various types of armaments: for example, a B-47
medium bomber would be "worth" 188 men. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly
objected, principally because many dual-capable systems had been designed pri­
marily as nuclear weapons, so no measurable relationship existed between the
personnel and the systems. Furthermore, the rigid formula proposed by Mr.
Stassen would not permit the United States to absorb reductions where they
would least affect the deterrent.6

The White House Disarmament Staff outlined a control and inspection system
based on two geographical areas—one in Europe and the other embracing eastern
Siberia and the northwestern corner of North America. On 20 March, Secretary
Wilson proposed a system based on objects of inspection rather than areas.
Following an exchange of blueprints and establishment of a verification organi­
zation, controls would successively be placed on nine categories of armaments,
beginning with long- and medium-range missiles, then moving to long- and
medium range bombers, and so on. Wilson repeated the JCS position that a
weapon-manpower formula might be developed from verified blueprints, but
agreement on general principles must be reached first.7

On 18 March, the UN Disarmament Subcommittee convened in London. At
Bermuda, on 21 to 24 March, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmil­
lan agreed that nuclear testing had to continue for the present. Both govern­
ments, though, would be willing to register advance notice of tests and accept
limited international observation, if the Soviets did likewise. The USSR promptly
stated its willingness to agree upon a temporary cessation of tests. Mr. Stassen,
on 13 April, urged the administration to consider a 12-month suspension
beginning on 1 August 1958.8

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Should a suspension of nuclear tests be separated from other arms control measures? Major General Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy and Defense member of the President's Special Committee on Disarmament, advised committee colleagues that his department could not support Mr. Stassen's proposal as it stood. A suspension of tests would have to be contingent upon the prior cessation of nuclear production and the transfer of nuclear materials to nonweapons stockpiles, under a functioning inspection and control system. General Loper also proposed including, as an inseparable provision, reductions to 2.5 million men and concomitant cuts in armaments, through a formula worked out as part of the agreement.9

On 9 May, with the Soviets showing signs of flexibility at the London talks, Secretary Dulles asked Mr. Stassen to outline the type of limited agreement that he believed would be acceptable to the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany as well as the USSR. Stassen's response was "limited" primarily in the sense that many of the specific measures necessary for carrying out the agreement were left for future negotiation. Among other things, it proposed prohibiting nonnuclear powers from manufacturing nuclear weapons, stopping all military production of fissionable materials, transferring equitable proportionate quantities to peaceful uses, and establishing aerial inspection zones with ground control posts. When a partial agreement treaty became effective, signatories would suspend all nuclear tests for twelve months. Those twelve months would be devoted to devising an inspection system. Failure to agree upon and install one would nullify any obligation to continue the suspension beyond twelve months.10

Secretary Wilson displayed a chilling lack of enthusiasm for Mr. Stassen's proposals. Believing that the proposals approved on 21 November 1956 had defined the outer limits of a safe position, he saw Stassen's plan as a projection well beyond those limits. He told Secretary Dulles that a European zonal arrangement, by reducing conventional forces and prohibiting nuclear weapons within that zone, would render NATO forces incapable of sustained defense. Wilson also opposed either reducing the armed forces below 2.5 million or suspending nuclear testing, no matter what conditions were attached to either commitment. Even if those conditions were not met, he felt sure that the government would be unable to resist public pressure to fulfill any commitments. He would accept nothing more than limitations upon testing, rather than cessation, even though the statement of 21 November specifically mentioned the possibility of prohibiting nuclear tests. In summary, the Secretary characterized Stassen's proposals as a mistaken attempt "to settle too many things too far ahead... in too much detail."11

Mr. Stassen stoutly defended his plan as providing major assurance against a large-scale surprise attack and improving the prospects for evolutionary change in Central Europe and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, in a memorandum dated 22 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called his plan "completely unacceptable." Yet, whereas Secretary Wilson had criticized Stassen's proposals for going into too much detail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged them in many respects unduly vague and indefinite. The respective zones, for instance, should be proportionate areas of equal strategic importance, not equal geographic areas. The objects of ground inspection should be defined and ought to include air bases; provision should be
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made for simultaneous aerial inspection, fixed ground control posts, and fully mobile ground inspection teams.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled as unacceptable a prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Russian and Central European aerial inspection zones. Prohibiting other nations from joining the nuclear ranks would preclude NATO’s use of US nuclear capabilities and negate joint plans for US–Canadian air defense of North America. The approved strategic concept relied on just the opposite—an improving nuclear capability. Equally unpalatable were provisions that would not only prohibit future production of fissionable material for weapons purposes but also require the transfer of all material not already contained within nuclear weapons. They viewed the latter as impractical and beyond any effective inspection, since it was virtually impossible to account for past production. No less objectionable, because of its crippling effect on research and development programs, was a provision banning ICBMs and guided missiles as well as regulating outer space objects.

Mr. Stassen’s timetable also came in for criticism. The exchange of blueprints should occur on the effective date of the agreement rather than later in the first phase, particularly since ground posts could be located appropriately only on the basis of information supplied by blueprints. Moreover, no provision had been made for progressively expanding the zones to allow complete inspection at an early date. Instead, Stassen would not expand the inspection system until first-year reductions in armaments had been completed. The reductions themselves were of such scope as to require inspections covering the entire territories of the signatory states. But, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, the USSR’s vast size made the requisite expansion of an inspection system within one year impossible. Finally, and broadly, they argued that reductions below 2.5 million men and progressive restrictions on nuclear weapons would “completely negate present United States military planning and prevent the fulfillment of collective defense obligations throughout the world.” On 24 May, Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded the JCS views to Mr. Dulles.12

Meantime, Mr. Stassen had made some modifications to his proposals. A White House meeting on 25 May, attended by Admiral Radford and presided over by the President, produced more revisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that, while the new plan still had serious faults, most of the objectionable features in the original proposal had been remedied. Even so, they desired more explicit language indicating that the initial zone of inspection would expand by orderly stages and that treaty signatories would be free to employ nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear attack that could not be repelled otherwise.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their concern that too little time had been allowed for establishing an inspection system and once more argued that an exchange of blueprints should precede establishment of an inspection system. The European-Russian zonal arrangement would do no harm at best, they said, and at worst inflict irreparable injury upon NATO. In fact, they considered that risk so serious as to warrant separating the zonal proposal from the rest.

As for a twelve month suspension of tests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it would be “psychologically impossible” for the United States to resume
testing after the twelve months expired. Only irrefutable evidence of Soviet cheating would restore US freedom of action. "Therefore, provisions for obtaining such irrefutable evidence through an effective inspection system must be agreed to prior to any suspension of testing." Mr. Quarles forwarded these remarks to Secretary Dulles, adding that he generally agreed with them.\textsuperscript{13}

From further interdepartmental discussions there emerged a "US Position on the First Phase of Disarmament," which President Eisenhower approved on 12 June. On 29 August, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada jointly presented a comprehensive plan before the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, which was meeting in London. Its main features read as follows:

1. Within one year after adoption, the United States and the USSR would reduce their armed forces to 2.5 million personnel each, France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 each. Further cutbacks would follow, contingent upon verification of compliance and progress toward solving political issues.

2. Each party would assume as obligation not to use nuclear weapons except in self-defense.

3. Once an effective inspection system had been installed, all future production of fissionable materials would be devoted to nonweapons purposes. Previously produced materials would be transferred equitably, in successive quantities, from weapons to nonweapons purposes.

4. All parties would suspend nuclear testing for 12 months, if there was prior agreement about establishing controls, including inspection posts within the territories of the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Pacific Ocean area, and such other places as might prove necessary. The suspension would continue for another 12 months after that if progress also was being made toward supervising the cessation of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes.

5. To safeguard against surprise attack, zonal inspection would be established by opening one of two zones. One proposed zone would cover territory north of the Arctic Circle; another would include much of Western Europe as well as a significant part of Soviet territory. Once again, agreement upon an inspection system had to come first. Besides opening the skies to aerial observation, there would be mobile ground teams as well as ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields.\textsuperscript{14}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had scored some important victories, particularly in maintaining the linkage between a suspension of testing and a production cutoff and in making agreement upon an effective inspection system precede anything else. The bar on ICBMs and guided missiles disappeared. Already, though, Soviet spokesmen had heaped scorn on the plan's separate elements as they appeared. Instead, the USSR began to concentrate upon nuclear testing alone. Nothing loosened the deadlock, and the London negotiations adjourned \textit{sine die} on 6 September.
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Separating the Testing Issue

In mid-September 1957, the United States announced that it would carry out a series of tests at the Eniwetok proving area during the coming spring. Mr. Stassen, on 23 September, proposed to Secretary Dulles that there be bilateral negotiations with the USSR for the sole purpose of obtaining an agreement to ban nuclear tests after the Eniwetok series ended. He believed that, divorced from the other provisions of the 29 August plan, such a prohibition stood a fair chance of winning acceptance.15

Secretary Dulles concluded that Stassen wanted to “seek some sort of an agreement with the Russians on almost any terms—their terms, if necessary.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose views he requested, declared Stassen’s proposal to be inconsistent with what they believed to be US security interests. They considered all elements of the 29 August plan inseparable. Mr. Stassen’s proposal, however, contained no provisions for halting fissionable materials production for weapons purposes or installing an inspection system. In fact, except for the effective date, Stassen’s proposal paralleled a Soviet resolution presented in the UN General Assembly three days earlier. Mr. Quarles, supporting their views, told Secretary Dulles that the Defense Department opposed Stassen’s approach. Subsequently, the President decided against any change of position but did endorse an effort to ascertain how far the Soviets would “open up” for inspection.16

On 18 November, in the wake of Sputnik, Secretary Dulles asked the Defense Department to develop an outline inspection plan for ensuring that outer space would be reserved for peaceful purposes. Just after Christmas, the indefatigable Mr. Stassen elaborated upon his earlier proposal. First would come installation in the USSR of eight to twelve inspection stations for monitoring nuclear tests, a like number in the United States, and a suitable number in the Pacific. Next, the United States, the USSR, and all other nations whose territory would be subject to inspection would suspend tests for two years. Additionally, to guard against surprise attack, two inspection zones roughly similar to those defined in the 29 August proposals would be established. Finally, Stassen recommended establishing a multilateral technical committee to study an inspection system for outer space objects.17

Acting on their own initiative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 December informed Secretary McElroy that Stassen’s latest ideas still posed unacceptable security risks. None of his suggestions could be divorced from a comprehensive proposal without incurring this objection. General Twining presented these views to the NSC on 6 January 1958. Secretary McElroy, Secretary Dulles, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) supported him. Stressing how a change in the US position would affect world opinion, Dulles disagreed with Stassen’s argument that this proposal would be acceptable to the Western allies. The British had tests scheduled, and the French were striving to become a nuclear power.

President Eisenhower, apparently swayed by fear that a bilateral agreement with Moscow might cause fissures within NATO, decided to stand by the 29 August proposals, at least for the time being. However, the President approved
his Science Advisory Committee’s recommendation that there be interdepartmental technical studies on the feasibility of monitoring a halt in nuclear testing and an outer space agreement. Since the Defense Department had not yet answered Mr. Dulles’ request for an outline inspection plan, Secretary McElroy decided to defer a response.

In February 1958, Mr. Stassen resigned and tried to re-ignite his political career. After his departure, ironically, the approach which he had advocated unsuccessfully began gaining ground. From this point on, the administration concentrated not upon a comprehensive program but upon reaching separate agreements to stop nuclear testing and safeguard against surprise attack. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff steadily maintained that such agreements, when pursued without regard for the inseparability provision of the 29 August proposals, did not meet their minimum security requirements.

Late in February 1958, in connection with studies commissioned by the Science Advisory Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate how a total suspension of nuclear testing would affect the relative military positions of the United States and the USSR. They replied that, in order to keep approximate technological and engineering parity with the USSR, a suspension of testing must be accompanied by a complete, verifiable suspension of weapons production.

Deputy Secretary Quarles, himself a distinguished scientist, assessed the superpowers’ positions more optimistically. In transmitting JCS views to the chairman of the Science Advisory Committee’s working group, he wrote that the United States possessed an advantage in technological development and would continue to do so through the end of 1958. Eventually, he continued, the USSR would achieve parity regardless of whether testing stopped. But he agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a cessation of testing would be militarily acceptable only as part of a broader agreement offering very large compensatory advantages.

On 24 March, President Eisenhower discussed the testing issue with senior advisers, including General Twining, Secretary McElroy, and Deputy Secretary Quarles. According to US intelligence, Moscow would announce a unilateral suspension of testing as soon as the USSR’s current series of tests ended. Hardtack was scheduled to start in ten days and run until August. Secretary Dulles urged the President to announce immediately that, after Hardtack, no further testing would occur during his term of office. Dulles said that he “desperately” wanted some gesture to influence world opinion. Defense and AEC representatives strongly opposed such an announcement, and Dulles withdrew his proposal to stop testing. General Twining said that he failed to see how stopping tests would reduce world tension, “because everybody knows we already have a stockpile large enough to completely obliterate the Soviet Union.” The President replied that world anxiety over testing, even if not well founded, did exist and was itself a cause of tension. Sooner or later, he predicted, the United States would have to accept a suspension.

The momentum for a policy change kept building. On 27 March, the Science Advisory Committee’s working group completed its assessment of the difficulties in monitoring a test ban. For reasons different from those stated by the Joint
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The decision to suspend testing

On 31 March, the Soviet Union scored a propaganda coup by announcing a unilateral suspension of all nuclear testing. Of course, if other powers refused to follow suit, the Soviets said that they reserved the right to resume testing. Three days later, the NSC discussed the working group's report as well as JCS and OSD views. After a meeting in Puerto Rico that ran from 8 to 10 April, the Science Advisory Committee decided that a test ban "would leave the US in a position of technical superiority for at least several years." Accordingly, it recommended negotiating "a satisfactory agreement for sustained test cessation as soon as possible after the Hardtack tests." The President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Dr. James Killian, presented these findings to the Chief Executive on 17 April. Secretary Dulles, now a full-fledged apostle of suspension, took the next step. He drafted, and on 28 April President Eisenhower dispatched to Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, a letter proposing that a technical conference convene to work out the inspection system for a future test ban.23 By separating a suspension of testing from a stoppage of production, the Chief Executive had taken a decisive step; linkage was dead.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted during the deliberations that led to this turnabout. President Eisenhower obviously believed that their anxieties were exaggerated. On 30 April, in the wake of his decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a "reiteration and amplification" of their views about why testing should continue. They asked the Secretary to convey their views to President Eisenhower. Mr. Quarles did so on 9 May, together with his own general concurrence.24

On 1 July, a conference of technical experts convened in Geneva. Besides the two superpowers, representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania attended. In mid-August, a week before the experts completed their task, the State Department proposed changing US policy to separate a cessation of testing from a halt in fissionable material production for weapons purposes. The administration, according to State, should announce its intention to resume testing in two years unless an agreement to stop production had been reached in the meantime. The Office of the Secretary of Defense opposed such a separation and drafted an alternative. Deputy Secretary Quarles asked for a JCS appraisal of both proposals.25

Their reply, dated 15 August, discussed no "cause for a basic change in the military factors which influenced the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in earlier memoranda...." When Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded JCS views to

Chief of Staff, the group considered it "undesirable and practically not feasible" to halt testing before Hardtack ended. In fact, judging that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Quarles related in part to matters beyond the scope of its inquiry, the group did not take account of them. They were, however, circulated to the NSC.22
the President, as they requested, he added his own judgment that military factors weighed heavily against a decision to discontinue testing. But he recognized that "international political factors" might prove controlling, and in that case, he was prepared to support a revision of policy. An air of artificiality surrounds this whole exercise. It is impossible to imagine the President doing anything other than ratifying his earlier decision to separate testing from production.

From Geneva, on 21 August, the conference of experts issued a report concluding that it was "technically feasible" to create "a workable and effective control system" to detect testing violations. There should be one hundred to 110 control posts on the various continents, sixty on islands, and another ten aboard ships. This network would have a good chance of detecting explosions as low as one kiloton on the earth's surface and as high as fifty kilometers. As for underground explosions, these posts could identify as being of natural origin about 90 percent of those earthquakes whose signals were equivalent at least to five kilotons. The next day, President Eisenhower announced a one-year suspension of testing, effective 31 October, provided the USSR entered into negotiations and refrained from further tests of its own. Whether the US suspension would continue depended upon (1) whether an inspection system was functioning effectively and (2) whether substantial progress toward major arms control measures was taking place. General Twining privately told the Chief Executive, "This is the worst mistake you've ever made, Mr. President. You'll regret it."

The USSR agreed to convene at Geneva, on 31 October, a Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests attended by US, UK, and Soviet representatives. However, on 30 August, Chairman Khrushchev stated that recent US and UK tests in the Pacific plus forthcoming ones at the Nevada proving ground freed the USSR from any further obligations under its 31 March statement. Accordingly, the Soviets opened a new series of their own on 30 September.

In preparation for the Geneva conference, an interagency working group drafted a proposed treaty. Although the Office of the Secretary of Defense was represented on this group and the Services informally submitted views to International Security Affairs (ISA), no request came for JCS views. Accordingly, on 15 October, Admiral Burke urged his colleagues to define what they considered the essential elements of national security in a draft treaty. He defined them as follows:

1. The right to use nuclear weapons in warfare.
2. A one-year suspension of testing, extendable on a year-by-year basis.
3. Absolute safeguards against surreptitious testing, particularly in the guise of peaceful applications of nuclear explosives.
4. Prompt establishment of an international control system.
5. A veto-proof international organization to administer the control system.
6. The legal obligation of all nuclear powers to institute a suspension simultaneously at a mutually agreed-upon date, "not at some indefinite time to be later set by the international control organization."
7. The right to resume testing if, after one year, a control system either had not been established or was not functioning to the satisfaction of all powers.
8. Adequate notice of intention not to renew the suspension.
9. Automatic abrogation of all obligations immediately upon any violation, any
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interference with efforts of the control organization to investigate possible explo-
sions, or the successful testing of a nuclear device by a nonsignatory power.
(10) The reinstatement of abrogated obligations only after negotiation of a new
agreement.

Admiral Burke urged that these views be presented to the interagency
working group, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded a chance to review
the final draft treaty before the US delegation went to Geneva. On 21 October,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a memorandum containing all
these recommendations.29

Actually, the US delegation left for Geneva before a final draft had been
drawn up, but Acting Secretary Quarles judged a preliminary version, as well as
a statement of the US position made available on 1 November, to be substantially
in accord with JCS recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw matters differ-
ectly and held out against any change.30

The Geneva conference began inauspiciously. Two Soviet nuclear tests, on 1
and 3 November, were detected and announced by the United States. After that,
apparently, no more explosions took place in the USSR. Two issues, however,
deadlocked the Geneva talks. Soviet negotiators insisted (1) that on-site inspec-
tion require the host nation’s consent and (2) that teams manning the ground
posts be almost totally dominated by the host country. The Western powers, of
course, rejected these positions as amounting to self-enforcement.31

On 10 November, another experts’ conference assembled at Geneva to study
methods of safeguarding against surprise attack. In preparing guidance for the
US delegation, the President’s science advisers had insisted that military, politi-
cal, and technical questions were inextricably mixed. They argued, in fact, that
the surprise attack conference could not succeed unless it considered the general
problem of disarmament.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, conversely, sought to confine the terms of reference
within narrow limits: a common understanding about either the feasibility of
detecting or methods of inspecting against surprise attack. They deemed meas-
ures of general disarmament, such as limitations on the disposition, readiness,
size, and type of forces, as well as “purely political questions,” to be inappro-
priate subjects for technical discussions. If they were included, the Soviets could
advance a wide range of subjects, such as the elimination of overseas bases and
the establishment of denuclearized zones, which for a decade the United States
repeatedly had rejected.32

Deputy Secretary Quarles, Under Secretary of State Herter, and Dr. Killian
agreed that terms of reference should be limited along lines recommended by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, if the Soviets seemed willing to make “construc-
tive progress in substantive discussions of the agenda,” the US delegation should
request authority to discuss “the effect that hypothetical limitations on instru-
ments of surprise attack might have on the problem of reducing the danger of
surprise attack.” In fact, that very issue proved to be the rock on which the con-
ference foundered. The Soviets promptly insisted upon discussing force

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limitations and political matters. The Western powers refused to do so and the conference adjourned on 18 December 1958, never to resume.33

Afterwards, senior US military delegates gave General Twining their judgment that Soviet behavior had saved the Western powers from pursuing an “ill-conceived” agenda. Its underlying concept struck them as unsound and impractical. To create and maintain powerful forces for defense while simultaneously developing complex machinery to prevent these forces from performing their mission was anomalous and contradictory. A technical assessment of surprise attack could not be made except in connection with the “real world situation.” Thus the Soviet position, they believed, had “great validity.” Future talks should be preceded by thorough studies and ought to take place during or after negotiations over concrete proposals for the phased reduction of armaments.34

The “Threshold” Debate

Meantime, test ban negotiations ran up against a new obstacle. Project Argus, carried out during August and September, involved explosions three hundred miles above the South Atlantic which escaped detection. Then Hardtack II tests, made in Nevada during September and October, indicated that distinguishing underground explosions from earthquakes would be much more difficult than previously supposed. Apparently, too, the number of earthquakes equivalent to a given low-yield blast was considerably higher than had been calculated. Therefore, to hold down the number of inspections, the threshold or allowable yield for underground explosions would have to be revised upward. On 28 December, at President Eisenhower’s request, Dr. Killian appointed a panel chaired by Dr. Lloyd Berkner to study the feasibility of detecting underground tests. The Berkner panel reported, in March 1959, that the Geneva system could not identify blasts below twenty kilotons. To make matters worse, “decoupling” techniques could reduce the seismic signal by a factor of ten or more.35

There were severe limits, evidently, upon what types of explosions could be detected. In a letter to Premier Khrushchev dated 13 April, President Eisenhower proposed a suspension of atmospheric testing up to an altitude of fifty kilometers. The Soviet leader replied that all tests should be stopped and an annual limit placed upon the number of inspections.36

The one-year suspension of US testing would end on 31 October 1959. If President Eisenhower did not renew it, plans were being laid for a series of tests in mid-1960. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 27 May, defined for Secretary McElroy the areas in which they discerned pressing needs for more data on weapons effects. These were antisubmarine warfare, surface war at sea, coastal defense against bursts from large-yield weapons that exploded over the sea, ballistic missile defense, communications and radar systems, air defense, structural design of military installations, and tactical land warfare.37

Back in August 1958, President Eisenhower had appointed a Committee of Principals to formulate arms control policy. Its membership consisted of the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the AEC, and the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, General Twining was not a principal but did attend a number of these meetings. On 23 July 1959, Eisenhower requested a prompt interdepartmental study on the subject of resuming nuclear tests. Six days later, he approved a "phased" approach to negotiations that would exclude underground tests from any agreement. But when the Committee of Principals met on 13 August, Deputy Secretary Gates learned that Eisenhower had decided to extend the moratorium by two months, until 31 December. According to Dr. George Kistiakowsky, who had taken Dr. Killian's post, Gates' reaction was "wild." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he insisted, would have to be consulted.38

On 14 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy that the longer the wait, the greater the danger—a rumor could arise about the questionable safety of US weapons. Such a rumor could have catastrophic effects upon US ability to maintain overseas storage bases, strip alerts, air alert exercises, and logistic movements.

On 21 August, through another memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the long-range effects of a test ban would be distinctly disadvantageous. They considered testing essential not only for the programs they had listed in their paper of 30 April 1958 but also to obtain the weapons-effects data cited in their memorandum of 27 May 1959. They believed that the "inevitable result" of continued suspension "must be stagnation in the effectiveness of our present weapons systems," an antiquated stockpile "of questionable reliability and confidence," and finally a stoppage of production followed by physical deterioration of the stockpile. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that both of their August papers be passed on to President Eisenhower.39

On 26 August the State Department announced a two-month extension of the moratorium. The Joint Chiefs' recommendations reached Secretary McElroy only after Dr. Kistiakowsky's panel had finished its review of the issue. Defense and AEC representatives raised all the points made in the JCS memorandums above, but President Eisenhower rendered his decision before the panel finished its work. On 14 September, Secretary McElroy did forward JCS views to the President. However, he added his own belief that world opinion and public concern about fallout precluded relatively unlimited testing. He suggested, instead, (1) seeking a suspension agreement that still allowed underground testing and (2) resuming underground tests after 31 December, unless a comprehensive agreement had been concluded by then.40

In October, the Committee of Principals recommended convening a Soviet-American technical conference to consider the problems about detecting underground tests that had been raised by Hardback II data. Such a meeting did convene but ended amid failure and recrimination in December. The Committee of Principals, reconvening on 28 December, agreed to seek a ban on atmospheric tests and on underground explosions above a specified kiloton level or "threshold." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had fallen into line grudgingly. General Twining told committee members that, although they were now prepared to accept an adequately controlled cessation of tests, they had always thought that any cessation
was "a big mistake." They were convinced that, once tests stopped, "we would never be able to resume them."

On 29 December, President Eisenhower ended the formal moratorium. He publicly promised, though, that "we shall not resume...without announcing our intentions in advance of any resumption." A panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee favored setting the threshold for underground tests at explosions registering 4.75 or more on the Richter earthquake scale, thereby permitting detection of tests above twenty kilotons. After initial resistance, Secretary Gates endorsed this new approach; the administration announced it on 11 February 1960.41

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1959, a State-Defense study group began an overall review of US policy and positions. Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer and former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, headed this group. It considered partial as well as comprehensive measures, giving particular attention to measures that might reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war.

As 1960 opened, the whole pace of arms negotiations was quickening. A Ten Nation Disarmament Conference would be opening at Geneva on 15 March. To settle upon a joint approach beforehand, US, UK, French, Canadian, and Italian representatives would start consultations in Washington during late January. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized a need for continuous, specialized staff support. Accordingly, in December 1959, they established the Office of Special Assistant for Disarmament Affairs and named Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley as its head.42

Mr. Coolidge submitted his report on New Year's Day 1960. He recommended discarding the comprehensive "package" approach to arms control, which dated from 1957 and which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had never liked. In a commentary to the Secretary of Defense dated 8 February, they observed that "the major difficulty with the 1957 policy has been the restrictive nature of a 'package' approach, the various elements of which are so interdependent." They wanted Coolidge's report sent to the NSC. Secretary Gates concurred. Secretary Herter, however, saw it simply as another contribution to interdepartmental preparations for the Ten Power Disarmament Conference.43 Ultimately, in fact, the report did become simply another contribution.

On 4 February, the State Department circulated a draft policy statement which had won Secretary Herter's approval. The ISA judged it unsatisfactory, and Rear Admiral Dudley informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he strongly supported ISA's view. Admiral Dudley highlighted three areas of disagreement. First, should each superpower be allowed, initially, an overall ceiling of 2.5 or 2.1 million personnel? State favored the latter figure, ISA the former. Second, should we try to negotiate a cessation of fissionable materials production for military purposes? Third, would it be wise to seek a halt to the testing of long-range missiles as well as restrictions on their deployment? To both questions, State said yes while ISA answered no. Admiral Dudley worried that "decisions will be taken quickly that might be considered by the military authorities to be exceedingly dangerous to our security."44
Admiral Burke warned his JCS colleagues that, if they were to have "any effect at all at this critical juncture," their views must be expressed promptly and unanimously. Accordingly, on 12 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Gates that they considered State's draft unacceptable in its broad approach as well as in a fair number of its specific proposals; they enumerated twenty "specific principals" to guide arms control policy. Fourteen of them were taken from a paper drafted about two weeks earlier by ISA; the others showed an unmistakable affinity with Mr. Coolidge's recommendations.

Secretary Gates informed the Secretary of State that he generally agreed with JCS views. Answering on 21 February, Secretary Herter denied that State was proposing measures merely because they might prove acceptable to the USSR. Areas of agreement, though, must contain sufficient mutual value to be accepted by each party. For instance, the Soviets would not break their curtain of secrecy unless inspection was accompanied by some measures which justified such a concession.

President Eisenhower already had approved tabling a proposal to halt the military production of fissionable materials. The State Department recommended seeking a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to nonweapons uses. Responding to ISA's request for their views, on 2 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued against early dismantling.

Simultaneously, Secretary Gates asked for a "definitive" JCS appraisal of how stopping IRBM and ICBM flight testing in 1962, 1963, or 1965 would affect the posture of the United States and its allies vis-à-vis the Communist Bloc. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 2 March, detailing the disadvantages that they believed would affect a range of weapons systems.

Meanwhile, a State Defense meeting attended by Secretaries Gates and Herter resulted in agreement on a working paper that Admiral Dudley felt conformed with JCS views enough to make it acceptable. That working paper, however, was not deemed sacrosanct, and changes were made or taken under consideration during February. Numerous revisions took place without JCS participation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that they be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on all substantive changes. In reply, Deputy Secretary James Douglas warned that time pressures frequently might preclude formal, deliberate consideration. Keeping in close touch with ISA's disarmament staff struck him as the best way to stay abreast of developments.

At Geneva, on 14 March, the Western powers made public their "working paper on general disarmament." Immediately, according to their paper, each superpower should limit itself to a personnel ceiling of 2.5 million. Joint studies ought to be undertaken, for example, of how to verify a stoppage of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes, the transfer of such materials to peaceful uses, measures to give greater protection against surprise attack, and a ban on orbiting or stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Nothing was said about halting the flight-testing of long-range missiles. The working paper stated that, once a control system began operating effectively and progress was being made in conventional disarmament, military production of fissionable materials would cease and agreed quantities would be transferred to nonweapons
uses. The United States and the USSR would lower their personnel ceilings to 2.1 million each.  

A limited ban on nuclear testing still seemed like the measure most likely to succeed. On 19 March, the Soviets declared themselves willing to accept a supervised ban on atmospheric, underwater, and underground tests measuring 4.75 or more, in return for an indefinite, unsupervised moratorium on underground tests below 4.75. After meetings on 23 and 24 March, the Committee of Principals recommended a positive reply. Deputy Secretary Douglas saw an advantage in opening the USSR to limited inspection. At an NSC meeting the next day, President Eisenhower decided to offer the Soviets a one- or two-year unsupervised moratorium. On 29 March, he and Prime Minister Macmillan announced that, as soon as a treaty had been signed and arrangements made to improve control methods for underground events below 4.75, they would institute a voluntary moratorium on tests below that threshold. In mid-May, British, French, and American leaders would be meeting Premier Khrushchev in Paris. There, if the duration of a moratorium and the annual number of inspections could be settled, a test ban agreement seemed within easy reach.

The Bubble Bursts

The tale of how high hopes came to naught is startling and dramatic. On 1 May 1960, following a flight plan approved by President Eisenhower, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft went deep inside Soviet territory. The President's son, who was working in the White House, later recalled that General Twining had been "very anxious" for this particular mission to proceed. Premier Khrushchev, on 5 May, announced that an American plane on a "bandit flight" over his country had been shot down. The administration claimed that a weather research plane had been lost. But Khrushchev, two days later, revealed that "we have parts of the plane and we also have the pilot, who is quite alive and kicking." The State Department put out a communiqué denying that an overflight had been authorized. Secretary Gates, behind the scenes, insisted that more must be said to avoid any implication that military officers were acting on their own. On 9 May, State issued a clarification that President Eisenhower had approved the U-2 overflight program but not this particular mission. The Soviet Government used bitter language in condemning US behavior. President Eisenhower responded by publicly calling U-2 flights "a distasteful but vital necessity."

When the Paris summit meeting opened on 16 May, Premier Khrushchev demanded an apology from President Eisenhower as a precondition for further talks. Eisenhower said that no more flights would occur during his tenure but went no further. So, after loosing some choice invective, Khrushchev brought the conference to an abrupt end. Shortly after returning to Washington, Eisenhower told Dr. Kistiakowsky "very sadly that he saw nothing worthwhile left for him to do now until the end of his presidency."
Nonetheless, on 2 June, the USSR published a plan that emphasized the early dismantling of nuclear delivery systems and foreign bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff declared it unacceptable; Secretary Gates agreed with that assessment.\textsuperscript{53}

An interdepartmental group drafted relatively minor revisions to the Western position which the Joint Chiefs of Staff received for review on 21 June. The next day, Secretary Gates received their reply deeming the revisions militarily acceptable. No matter! At Geneva, on 27 June, all Communist Bloc delegations abruptly withdrew from the Ten Nation Conference before US spokesmen even could table these proposals. At least for the next six months, another avenue to arms control was closed.\textsuperscript{54}

In September, both President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev came to New York and addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. When General Twining reviewed a draft of the President’s speech, he identified several passages that struck him as drastic departures from the US proposals tabled at Geneva on 27 June. It advocated, for example, a reduction of nuclear capabilities without requiring substantial reductions of conventional armaments and failed to specify that general disarmament must be under effective international control. Twining objected to the following specific suggestions: that the United Nations call on members not to engage in military activities on celestial bodies; that an urgent study of the control of nuclear delivery systems be undertaken; and that production plants be shut down one by one. When he spoke on 22 September, President Eisenhower declared that controls must extend to both “conventional and non-conventional” weapons and omitted any specific suggestion for studying how to control nuclear delivery systems. In all other respects, though, his address retained the features that General Twining had considered unsound.\textsuperscript{55} When Premier Khrushchev spoke, his verbal pyrotechnics about other issues overshadowed his disarmament proposals.

Late in October, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth repeated before a UN subcommittee US proposals that had been presented back in August to the UN Disarmament Committee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff registered objections, which Secretary Gates incorporated in a November letter to the Secretary of State. Replying in December, Secretary Herter said that all Ambassador Wadsworth’s remarks, except for one that he had identified as his personal opinion, were legitimate restatements of the President’s 22 September address and hence accorded with national policy.\textsuperscript{56} In any case, the General Assembly session ended without registering any forward movement.

Heightened international tensions prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to press for a tougher stance on the test ban. They argued against a threshold proposal on 13 June, and on 26 August urgently recommended a resumption of initially limited testing. Acting Secretary Douglas replied that, following further studies and consultations, “specific and comprehensive” recommendations would go to the Committee of Principals and the President.\textsuperscript{57}

Instead, nothing happened. So, on 21 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented Secretary Gates with another memorandum describing how they believed time was “working to our disadvantage.” During the last two years, they repeated, the USSR could have been conducting underground tests that escaped detection.
Even after an agreement was reached, four to six years would be spent implementing control arrangements. Obviously, Soviet cheating over such an extended period could cost the United States its relative nuclear superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it imperative that their arguments in favor of nuclear testing be brought immediately to the highest officials’ attention. Secretary Gates decided not to approach the President, presumably because the changeover to a new administration had started. President Eisenhower privately believed testing should resume but felt that a decision properly rested with the incoming Chief Executive.58

Summation

If President Eisenhower had followed JCS advice, there certainly would have been no testing moratorium and probably no changes of position about any other aspects of arms control. In extenuation, though, it must be remembered how the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed their basic responsibilities. Charged with maintaining the military security of the United States, they did not feel free to endorse proposals whose adoption might jeopardize the nation’s military position vis-à-vis the USSR. Their duty lay in making clear to their superiors the military consequences of every arms control measure, so that this factor would receive full weight during policy deliberations. No one could deny that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been forthright in discharging this responsibility.
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

When describing the late 1950s, generalizations about trends in the military assistance program (MAP) become well-nigh impossible. In 1950, the Korean War triggered a buildup that made Western Europe the chief beneficiary of a tremendously increased, rapidly accelerated military assistance effort. After hostilities in Korea ended, the growing strength and prosperity of Western Europe made possible a curtailment of aid in that direction. But recurrent alarms and crises in Asia and the Middle East prevented similar retrenchments there. Although the value of MAP goods and services provided to Western Europe in 1957 still exceeded that to all other countries combined, it was less than what it had been in the peak year of 1953. Two years later, in 1959, aid to Western Europe had declined by 48 percent, and eastern Asia alone was receiving a larger share than Europe. However, as a result of increased emphasis on missiles and advanced aircraft, the value of deliveries and services to Europe during FY 1960 rose nearly 23 percent over the preceding fiscal year. Once again, the value of aid to Europe exceeded that extended to any other single region and accounted for approximately 47 percent of all military assistance. The table below lists annual deliveries by major regions, in millions of dollars:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1958</th>
<th>FY 1959</th>
<th>FY 1960</th>
<th>FY 1961</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East and South Asia</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual MAP appropriations, which Congress always cut between 10 and 20 percent below the President's request, amounted to $1.3 billion for FY 1958, $1.5 billion for FY 1959, $1.3 billion for FY 1960, and (in response to greater global tensions) $1.8 billion for FY 1961.
In preparing annual military assistance programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a two-fold responsibility; first, to provide the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) with "broad program guidance from a military standpoint"; and second, to review in relation to each country's military requirements the forces which the US Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) recommended for support. The purpose of the JCS review was to determine whether the recommended forces and supporting facilities were adequate without being excessive, whether the relative importance and timing of projects accorded with Defense guidance and priority lists established by US commanders in the area, and whether these forces' combat readiness was consistent with their mission, probable employment, and proximity of supply sources and with US plans and objectives.

The logical sequence of MAP development proceeded from establishing the priority of allocations to the formulation of general program guidance, then moved to the adoption of a tentative program based on country requirements, and finally, to determination of a "refined" program based on budgetary considerations. As 1957 opened, the Defense Department was preparing the military assistance program for FY 1958 and the budget request for FY 1959 MAP funds. Concurrently, in connection with the NSC's periodic review of military assistance, Defense had to consider changes that had been proposed in the NSC's statement of priorities governing worldwide allocations of military equipment.

On 11 August 1955, President Eisenhower had approved NSC 5517/1, a statement of priorities that served as general guidance for the peacetime allocation of equipment to US forces and to countries receiving military assistance. The only aid program in the first priority group was that covering materiel needed by Chinese Nationalist forces for current combat operations. Second priority belonged to NATO forces "on active front line duty in areas vital to US security, when the nation contributing such forces has the capacity to maintain them," along with Canadian units specifically designated for defense of the United States and Canada. In third priority were all other NATO and Chinese Nationalist forces, South Korea, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Japan, and the air defense of Spain.

These priorities were subject to a number of qualifications that gave them considerable flexibility. Allocations were governed by the definition of "priority" which the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted in consonance with their war plans. As so defined, the term priority simply indicated relative importance and was not to be taken in "an exclusive and final sense." Allocations of lesser priority need not necessarily depend upon whether adequate provision already had been made for higher priority allocations. Also, the need for adjusting priorities to take account of current capabilities was recognized.

During the summer of 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed revisions to NSC 5517/1. Considering the description of NATO forces in the second priority to be "vague and insufficiently definitive," and maintaining that delays in delivering equipment were reducing the effectiveness of South Korean forces, they
recommended changing the former to read "D-Day or M-Day forces (other than US) vital to US security deployed in Europe, including Greece and Turkey," and raising South Korean forces from third to second priority. Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson agreed and forwarded these proposals to the NSC Planning Board. A debate over sending tactical nuclear weapons to Korea led the Board to defer action. When it did take up the matter early in February 1957, the Board was unable to devise an accommodation between Defense's recommendations and State's objections.

The State-Defense split over NATO revolved around whether D-day or M-day forces deployed outside Europe were sufficiently capable of fulfilling their NATO mission to warrant second priority. The JCS recommendation, which originated with General Taylor, may have been nothing more than an attempt to give USCINCEUR a measure of flexibility in applying priorities. But the recommendations submitted to the NSC did not include a stipulation that USCINCEUR determine whether a recipient nation could maintain D-day or M-day forces. State Department representatives viewed the recommendation as an attempt to reduce the priority given French NATO forces that had been redeployed to fight the Algerian rebellion. According to the JCS Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, State was "congenitally distrustful" of JCS proposals, particularly those applicable to NATO.

The State-Defense split highlighted one of the major problems facing the North Atlantic alliance. With the bulk of the French Army tied down by the Algerian insurrection, only five of the seventeen French divisions allocated to NATO by the alliance's 1956 force goals remained on the Continent. State did not want French forces in North Africa to forfeit their priority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. On 15 February 1957, they advised Secretary Wilson that second priority should be limited to D-day or M-day forces positioned in Western Europe and Turkey for immediate action against aggression by the Soviet bloc. Units deployed elsewhere, such as Algeria, should not be considered available for "active front line duty" and thus should not enjoy second priority.

The JCS proposal for raising Korean forces from third to second priority also became entangled in an extraneous issue. The $610 million in economic and military aid tentatively programmed for Korea during FY 1958 was by far the largest sum allocated to any single country. The administration was looking for ways to cut it, and a proposal had been made to reduce the active strength of Republic of Korea (ROK) ground forces. In October 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed transferring four ROK infantry divisions from active to reserve status over the next two years, subject to several conditions: necessary reserve facilities should be made ready beforehand; prior provision should be made for the reserves' adequacy and effectiveness; and US forces in Korea first should be provided with modern weapons. The State Department opposed introducing nuclear-capable weapons, and this issue was still under discussion when the question of priorities came before the NSC in February 1957.

During a debate before the NSC Planning Board, State's representative objected to raising Korea's priority unless "advanced weapons" were specifically excluded from that change. The JCS and OSD members countered that a priority change would apply only to currently approved programs and that a priority
statement was not the proper vehicle for introducing a larger policy question. Unable to resolve either the Korean or the NATO dispute, the Planning Board submitted both to the NSC.9

The National Security Council ruled in favor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although it did not precisely follow their recommendations. NATO forces in the second priority were confined to those “deployed in Europe and Turkey, and bases overseas essential thereto.” President Eisenhower made the addition about bases overseas. As for Korean forces’ priority, Eisenhower felt that rigid guidance was inappropriate for officers of the rank and status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Mr. Cutler pointed out that the statement of priorities was sufficiently flexible as it stood to permit a higher priority for Korea, President Eisenhower decided to handle the change as an “administrative matter” rather than an amendment to the policy statement.10

To help prepare the FY 1958 MAP and develop FY 1959 budget requests, the Assistant Secretary (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 February 1957 to recommend changes in currently approved force objectives and in the unified commands’ priority lists of accomplishments. Replying nine days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a reply in which they redrafted the entire military portion of the programming guidance. However, they characterized priority lists of accomplishments as having negligible value in guiding MAP development and saw no point in recommending changes to them. But they did offer the following views about which countries among the thirty-nine MAP recipients deserved first priority:

- **European Area**: West Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
- **Middle East and Africa**: Iran.
- **Far East**: Japan, Republic of China (Taiwan), South Korea, Thailand, and South Vietnam.
- **Latin America**: Brazil.

They also recommended raising Iraq from third to second priority along with Pakistan, since Iraqi forces were committed to defending Baghdad Pact nations against Soviet aggression and helping hold the main lines of resistance in the event of general war. In the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to give Thailand first priority, the Philippines second, and Laos and Cambodia only third, because they felt that aid should be “maximized for countries...strongly aligned with the United States, and minimized for countries whose orientation is drifting toward the Soviet bloc.”

Major force objectives proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which appear on pages 88–93, embodied changes recommended during the preceding twelve months by the Services and by the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. For Korea, as noted earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored transferring four infantry divisions from active to reserve status. They also proposed reorganizing the Cambodian and Vietnamese armed forces without changing their actual strengths. Late in the summer of 1956, against the advice of CINCPAC and the country team, President Eisenhower had approved limiting the Cambodian
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

armed forces' mission to one of internal security. Revision in the Vietnamese Army's objectives, recommended by the MAAG Chief, added two divisions by making a change in the type of unit, so that objectives would correspond with the actual establishment.11

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee began drafting guidance for the FY 1959 military assistance program. However, its members could not settle an interservice argument over whether Japan had the resources and "tradition" needed to build and maintain a navy capable of controlling Far Eastern waters. The Navy and Marine Corps said yes and urged a sizable increase in objectives. The Army and Air Force, on the other hand, objected in light of limited MAP funds, the serious impact on other Services' programs, and Japanese reluctance to increase their defense budget. On 20 February 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided in favor of the Army-Air Force view.12

The Joint Chiefs sought a number of other minor additions: one cruiser and one light bomber squadron for Pakistan; ten minesweepers for Greece; two submarines for Chile; and two destroyer-type vessels for Brazil, two for Ecuador, three for Peru, and one for Uruguay. In preparation for a conversion from propeller to jet aircraft, they recommended reductions totaling 143 fighter-bombers in the air forces of eight Latin American countries.

On 14 March 1957, Assistant Secretary Mansfield D. Sprague informed Admiral Radford that Greek and Pakistani increases were not being included since they would not be supported by grant aid before 1960. The naval increases for Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay were not included in programming guidance because the vessels were to be offered as a loan, without expense to the United States; recipients would bear the cost of maintenance and rehabilitation. All other JCS recommendations won approval.13

Three weeks later, responding to objections by CINCPAC and the country team, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to consider expanding the Cambodians' mission from internal security to limited defense against external attack. On 7 May, however, Wilson replied that in view of unchanged attitudes expressed at recent NSC meetings and of the President's desire for smaller aid programs for Southeast Asia, he did not want to bring this issue before the NSC.14

Throughout 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff debated whether to change the method used in computing force levels that were a basis for determining the amount of MAP support. As recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February and defined in the programming guidance, the stated force objectives were the major combat units that the administration expected each country eventually to contribute for the common defense. These objectives originally had been intended to represent the upper ceiling on US support, not the forces that necessarily would be supported. Inevitably, though, the ceiling had tended to become the floor below which support could not fall. In the absence of a specific list of forces eligible for support in any given fiscal year, the force objectives themselves came to be used as an eligibility list. When they reviewed program guidance in February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed concern about the disparity between definition and actual practice. Because of "political considerations, compromise with national authorities concerned, and other factors," they decided

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that the definition was not an accurate description of force objectives. Almost identical criticism of the force objectives appeared in a report by the General Accounting Office dated 31 March.\textsuperscript{15}

In their recommendation to Secretary Wilson, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not mention their concern. They accepted both the questionable definition and the corresponding list of force objectives. In a separate action, though, they instructed their Special Assistant for Mutual Defense Affairs to study the matter. Late in April, Admiral Burke pointed out that meaningful criteria for determining either force objectives as currently defined or forces eligible for MAP support were lacking. He recommended retaining the definition of force objectives but limiting the forces listed to those reasonably attainable in four years and to units either on active duty or capable of mobilization within thirty days. A separate listing of forces eligible for support should be made, he said, within the limits established by the force objectives, and he suggested a number of specific criteria for eligibility.\textsuperscript{16}

In mid-May, General Twining raised an issue that Admiral Burke had touched only lightly. Burke had noted the desirability of establishing allied force objectives that would complement the efforts of US forces but considered it impractical to establish this as a criterion because it depended heavily upon joint agreements and national decisions about the positioning and employment of US forces. But, in Twining's judgment, to do otherwise was "fallacious planning." The effort to pattern indigenous forces after US examples and to establish balanced forces within each country, he believed, had resulted in sending highly complex and expensive equipment to countries which could not use such armaments effectively. Also, MAAG chiefs and US commanders had been encouraged to advocate progressively larger indigenous forces, even though US units now had more effective weapons and greater nuclear capabilities. Accordingly, General Twining proposed that the basic objective be to make up the equipment shortages of those indigenous units capable of complementing US forces. The equipment provided should consist of relatively inexpensive, uncomplicated types, easy to maintain and operate, and not necessarily drawn from US inventories.\textsuperscript{17}

On 14 November 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy their views about a new basis for defining MAP force objectives. The term should no longer be applied to the total requirements for allied forces, they argued, but only to those combat units that could be activated, equipped, and supported by the beginning of the mid-range period (1962–1965) and were either beyond the allies' capability to raise and maintain or were units that the United States had committed itself to support. Further, such units should be within the total forces that the administration had determined should be developed and maintained for any of the following purposes: preserving internal security; guarding against communist or communist-inspired aggression; contributing to the free world's collective military strength during the mid-range period; or ensuring that necessary bases and strategic facilities would remain available to the United States.
How could this new definition be translated into numbers and types of units? First, each country's total strategic requirement had to be established. Estimating the overall requirements meant taking into consideration the force goals developed by NATO and other allied pact agencies, but the results would not necessarily coincide. Assumptions were made that, during the next 3 ½ years, the global politico-military situation would remain basically unchanged and that economic conditions in most allied countries would improve somewhat. Further, it was assumed that the United States would make nuclear delivery systems available to selected allies, deploy forces (nuclear as well as nonnuclear) when needed to support allies, and fulfill its international commitments in the event of overt communist aggression. Additionally, each country's forces were assumed to be capable of maintaining their own internal security. Finally, it was to be assumed that new obligational authority for MAP during FYs 1959–1961 probably would not exceed the 1958 appropriation.

The Secretary of Defense and the NSC had made three decisions that bore directly upon the size and type of units included in the force objectives. First, nuclear-capable missile systems being made available to chosen allies would be included in grant aid programs. Second, a general reduction in MAP expenditures should occur, either by cutting a standard percentage from each country's total or by reducing in degrees that varied according to individual circumstances. Third, sales programs should be substituted for grant aid wherever possible.18

1958

On 30 January 1958, as recommendations for FY 1960 programming guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff resubmitted to Secretary McElroy the general views and definitions of force objectives expressed in their memorandum of 14 November 1957. The main differences from the objectives listed on pages 88–93, were the inclusion of missile units for most of the European countries as well as Japan and Taiwan and the elimination or reduction of MAP support (missile units excepted) for those nations whose economic development made such support seem unnecessary. Also, no MAP force objectives were listed for Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito's rapprochement with Moscow had led the Yugoslav Government, in December 1957, to express gratitude for past US assistance but ask that MAP now be terminated.

In the JCS submission of 30 January 1958, Army objectives were the same as those listed in February 1957, except for minor changes affecting the Philippines and several Latin American countries. Navy and Air Force objectives underwent more extensive readjustments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended sizable naval reductions for Japan and the NATO countries (Turkey excepted), with smaller reductions or no changes in air units. For Turkey, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan (Republic of China), South Vietnam, and seven of the Latin American nations, small increases were recommended in the destroyer, patrol vessel.
and minesweeper categories, and a substitution of antisubmarine, air-sea rescue, or reconnaissance units for fighter-bomber or light bomber squadrons. \(^9\) Secretary McElroy disallowed any increases for Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, or Latin America. He also deemed inappropriate a few units carried in the previous year's approved force objectives that had not been included in any commitments or tentative programs. With these exceptions, and subject to interagency coordination, he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March that their strategic and force objectives would be incorporated in the Defense Department's programming guidance. \(^20\)

Concurrently, a minor change was made in the NSC's statement of worldwide priorities. Like the revision of force objectives, it represented a recognition of actual practice rather than a shift of policy. The existing statement, NSC 5517/1, had placed in first priority all materiel required by Taiwanese (or Chinese Nationalist) forces for current combat operations. However, approved and projected aid programs for Taiwan made no provision for furnishing equipment under that priority. Therefore, on 29 January 1958, Secretary McElroy proposed that the NSC place all Chinese Nationalist forces under Priority III, the status that governed current programs. Such a change would not preclude the expeditious replacement of combat losses, he explained, since the February 1957 decision about South Korea's priority would permit the use of "administrative flexibility" to award Taiwan a higher priority if necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed his proposal and so did the State Department, on condition that there would be no significant slowdown in deliveries. Upon this basis, President Eisenhower approved the change on 12 March. \(^21\)

Administrative flexibility would be needed because, unlike 1957, the year 1958 witnessed a succession of crises: Lebanon in July, the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in August, and Berlin in November. The confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu, described in chapter 14, put MAP under the greatest strain. Emergency allocations during August exhausted the balance of the FY 1958 program for Nationalist China. As the communist bombardment continued without letup and requests for additional aid flowed into Washington, materiel programmed for delivery during FY 1959 had to be delivered immediately and, indeed, substantial additions made to the FY 1959 program. On 5 September, the Office of the Assistant Secretary (ISA) authorized the Military Departments to divert major materiel programmed for other countries but not yet delivered. A few days later, the Departments received authority to deliver, as replacements for items expended or lost in combat, requested items not available in approved programs. Upper limits were set at $10 million for the Army and $2 million each for the Air Force and Navy. \(^22\)

Such a prompt and effective response to the Taiwan emergency came about at the expense of established order and regularity. In language reminiscent of that used eleven years earlier when the Greek-Turkish crisis had called for extraordinary measures, the Director, Joint Military Assistance Affairs, observed early in December 1958: "At present, funds must be diverted from other MAP recipients to meet these unforeseen threats. Programming under such a procedure tends to become meaningless, military balance in support of US strategic concepts
becomes distorted beyond the point of acceptable risk to US security." The cost of emergency aid to Taiwan, over and above the FY 1959 program, came to approximately $200 million by 31 October. By the end of 1958, according to JCS estimates, that amount would reach approximately $350 million.23

1959

During mid-summer 1958, at the height of the Taiwan crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff embarked upon their annual review of force objectives, strategic priorities, and other elements that would go into the making of MAP guidance for FY 1961. This process consumed the remaining months of 1958. The proposed revisions to Defense’s programming guidance, which they submitted to Secretary McElroy on 14 January 1959, were considerably more extensive than those of the preceding year.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that Secretary McElroy provide them with an estimated dollar ceiling, within which they would develop and submit a balanced, worldwide program based on individual Service submissions. After reviewing JCS recommendations and submitting them to interagency coordination, the Assistant Secretary (ISA) should transmit the revised program together with the reasons for any substantive changes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified commands, and the Military Departments. After refinement, the program would be returned through the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final review and coordination by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that this procedure would enable them to prepare a balanced, integrated, and effective program within fiscal limitations. They did not mention that such reforms would enhance their role and place them in a new relationship to the Military Departments, the unified commands, and ISA during the programming process. The 1958 Reorganization Act could be invoked to justify such changes, and creation of the Draper Committee (described on page 83) gave further impetus for a JCS initiative.

Defining force objectives caused some contention within the Joint Staff. Rather than continuing to describe strategic force objectives as those “considered desirable... and which should be in existence by the beginning” of the mid-range period, a draft report by the Joint Staff proposed substituting “considered to be reasonably attainable by the beginning of the mid-range period.” The Army and Navy withheld concurrence, on grounds that the phrase “reasonably attainable” was meaningless, needless, and dangerous to the integrity of the JCS responsibility for providing advice on a professional military basis. Before final action was taken on the report, the Army-Navy view had won acceptance.24

The previous definition of force objectives had embodied a descriptive statement taken from the US strategic concept and applicable to forces comprising the strategic force objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now decided to clarify that statement by eliminating whatever language did not apply to MAP force objectives (i.e., forces recommended for MAP support). They also spelled out
what had been implicit in the old definition, that among the forces eligible for
grant assistance were those that the United States had committed itself to sup­
port for political reasons.

Turning to regional guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended replacing
functional priorities and general objectives with a list of missions, tasks, and
requirements for each region and country. In the European area, France was raised
from second to first priority, Spain moved from second to third, and Yugoslavia
(somewhat belatedly) was dropped from the list completely. In the Middle East,
Jordan and Saudi Arabia were lowered from first to second priority, Pakistan
raised from second to first, and Iraq deleted for reasons described in chapter II.
They proposed no changes for the Far East or the Western Hemisphere.

As for Army force objectives, the changes recommended for NATO countries
(Greece, Turkey, and Italy excepted) primarily involved adding Honest John sur
face-to-surface and Hawk air defense missile battalions. Since negotiations for
deploying IRBMs in France had collapsed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deleted the
squadron previously included. They recommended making eligible for MAP
support one IRBM squadron slated for Greece, one for Turkey, and an additional
one for Italy, for a total of two there.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed reducing Greek Army divisions eligible for
MAP support from eleven to ten, so as to accord with NATO requirements, drop­
ning one Italian division, and reorganizing Turkish units into formations pres­
umably better designed to use Turkey’s largely unskilled manpower. Cuts in
naval objectives were confined primarily to France, Italy, and the Netherlands;
the ships involved were mostly patrol craft, minesweepers, destroyers, and
destroyer escorts. The number of Air Force squadrons eligible for MAP support
remained virtually unchanged.

Moving to the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed rather substan­
tial additions to the objectives for Iran and Pakistan. In September 1958, the
Headquarters, United States European Command (USEUCOM), had recom­
mended expanding Iranian ground forces in order to strengthen border defenses.
In place of twelve infantry divisions, half of them at reduced strength, and five
brigades, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended supporting thirteen full-strength
divisions and adding two fighter squadrons as well. As for Pakistan, they rein­
serted the cruiser that had been disallowed two years earlier and added one tac­
tical reconnaissance squadron and ten patrol vessels. The latter had been recom­
bemed by USEUCOM to help prevent smuggling and for “political reasons.”

In the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended increasing antisubma­
rine vessels, landing craft, and naval transports for all countries except land­
locked Laos. Japan should get one aircraft carrier, the Philippines one destroy­
or destroyer escort, and Taiwan three vessels of either type. Changes in Army
objectives included: for Taiwan, dropping four infantry and adding two armored
divisions; for Laos, replace one parachute and seven infantry battalions with one
infantry regiment and two airborne battalions; for Thailand, adding two infantry
divisions, one reserve division, and one airborne battalion and eliminating one
regimental combat team.
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

For Latin America, finally, the principal revisions concerned objectives for Brazil. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated inserting one aircraft carrier and twelve minesweepers and, for the army, deleting two infantry regiments and adding airborne, field artillery, armored cavalry, and combat engineer units.

The JCS memorandum provided only meager explanatory comments. Except for citing political considerations in a few instances, their justification was always the same: "To align force objectives with the threat, mission, tasks, and capability of country to absorb." Even when a more explicit reason was available, they did not give it. For example, the armored division that they recommended dropping from Italian objectives was in fact being deactivated. Likewise, the Dutch tactical reconnaissance squadron that they added would replace a missile squadron carried on previous lists which the Dutch did not want and had agreed to trade with West Germany for the reconnaissance squadron. The 10,000-man Philippine Constabulary had been supported by MAP for eight years without having been listed among the force objectives. Adding it now meant no change, just a belated recognition of actual fact.

These recommendations fared poorly at ISA's hands. ISA spokesmen, at the yearly programming conference for representatives of unified commands, held on 19 January 1959, circulated a draft containing markedly different force objectives from those in the JCS memorandum above. Those for the NATO countries, being based exclusively on NATO's minimum requirements, included none of the Joint Chiefs' recommendations. Most of the Hawk units were disallowed on grounds that prospective recipients intended to fill their needs from European production. The ISA also expunged increases for Iran and Pakistan, most naval increases for the Far East, additional armored divisions for Taiwan, and increases for Thailand. Except for Brazil, Latin America had generally the same force objectives as in 1958. ISA held that, in those countries, military forces were an undesirable drain on local resources and provided less protection than sound economic development.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that ISA's draft showed evidence of an erroneous application of NATO requirements, that their own recommendations were in consonance with basic national security policy, and that the financial burden should be calculated with an awareness that the listed units need not be supported in full, nevertheless, very few of the JCS recommendations survived. Those that did were mainly the IRBM squadrons for Western Europe as well as most of the reductions. The final programming guidance issued by ISA on 5 August contained no specific definition of force objectives, nor were the programming procedures proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted.

On Capitol Hill, the military assistance program was being criticized as a costly anachronism. In August 1958, for example, eight Senators told the Chief Executive that they believed military aid was being given too much importance and economic aid too little. Three months later, at the urging of Secretaries McElroy and Dulles, President Eisenhower appointed a committee to appraise how well MAP could advance US interests. Mr. William H. Draper, a former Under Secretary of the Army, served as the committee's chairman; Admiral Radford was one of the members. In March 1959, the Draper Committee
released preliminary conclusions calling for a long-range program of $2.4 billion annually. “In our fascination with our own mistakes,” the committee cautioned, “and the constant use of foreign aid as a whipping boy, we may be choking this vital feature of our national security policy to death.” The final report, made public on 20 August, maintained that any “marked decline” in MAP would pose a serious threat to free world security. Congress did not appropriate anything like $2.4 billion, as the figures on page 73 show, but neither did it impose major reductions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given the Draper Committee their views on a broad range of issues, arguing for improved programming procedures, long-range planning, and the establishment of dollar guidelines prior to the development of country programs. The committee endorsed the idea of decentralizing programming procedures by giving more responsibility to unified commands. It did not, however, accept the JCS view that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have a role in the programming process similar to the one they had in the planning process. The committee recommended vesting full responsibility for the program’s operation in a Director of Military Assistance working under the Assistant Secretary (ISA). The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, with the proviso that the Director always be a military officer of appropriately high rank. They opposed the committee’s further recommendation that a separate staff, independent of the Director’s office, be created to conduct a continuing evaluation of the program. Neither the JCS proviso regarding the Director nor their objection to an independent evaluation staff found its way into the committee’s report; but General Williston B. Palmer, USA, did become the first Director of Military Assistance.

The Defense Department put into effect a worldwide, long-range plan and added dollar guidelines to the programming instructions. The distinction between planning and programming became more sharply etched by documenting the former in the shape of a Military Assistance Plan. As one of the first steps in implementing the Draper Committee’s recommendations, the State Department, the International Cooperation Agency, and ISA jointly formulated a statement of the general political, economic, and military objectives to be sought and the appropriate courses of action. This statement—the Mutual Security Objectives Plan—presented the objectives and courses of action worldwide, regionally, and country by country. With the addition of dollar guidelines, it constituted the Basic Planning Document for preparation of the final Military Assistance Plan by the various unified commands.

On 20 October 1959, also as guidance for developing the Military Assistance Plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided unified commanders with an Annex to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1963. It included overall strategic priorities, missions, tasks, requirements, and force objectives for allied nations as well as those that might become allies during limited or general war. As J-5 characterized it, the guidance constituted “the initial step in the implementation of the long-range military assistance planning and decentralization concept recommended by the Draper Committee.”
On 15 December 1959, the unified commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a draft Basic Planning Document for FYs 1962–1966. A dollar ceiling established by Secretary Gates was to replace force objectives as the basis of country programs. This ceiling, which amounted to $2.2 billion per year, represented the average value of deliveries during 1955–1959. Accordingly, the Document set annual expenditure limits at $1.12 billion for the EUCOM area (i.e., Europe, Near and Middle East, South Asia); $140 million for regional programs administered by the Defense Representative to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas (DEFREPNAMA) (i.e., Infrastructure, Weapons Production Program, and International Military Headquarters), plus $40 million for the Mutual Weapons Development Program also administered by DEFREPNAMA; $800 million for the PACOM area (i.e., Far East and Southeast Asia); and $55 million for Latin America. Within these limits, the unified commands were to establish the number and types of major combat units that MAP could support.

The final Basic Planning Document, issued by ISA on 31 March 1960, expressed fiscal guidelines as an “assumption,” for planning purposes only, that $2.2 billion in new appropriations would be requested each year, which with the carryover from previous years would permit an annual “average level of accomplishment” around the same amount. Thus the guidelines constituted neither delivery ceilings nor expenditure allowances. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had argued, without success, that control of expenditures and deliveries could be effected more easily through the military departments than by the unified commands and that dollar guidelines should be expressed in terms of obligational authority.

Through a memorandum dated 17 February 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had urged numerous revisions to the draft Basic Planning Document. Their seventy-three pages of recommendations constituted approximately one page of comment for every two pages of the draft Document. Most of their recommendations sought to bring the Document’s language into line with the tasks and missions set forth in the Annex to JSOP-63; the remainder would give greater emphasis to the military aspects of stated objectives. The JCS recommendations totaled approximately 180. About 55 percent were adopted as recommended; approximately 11 percent were accepted in substance but not in that exact wording; 9 percent were incorporated partly or with qualifications attached; and 21 percent were rejected.

In preparing the Military Assistance Plan, however, the unified commands had looked for guidance to the draft document of 15 December 1959. The unified commands’ submissions then were revised by ISA in light of the 31 March Planning Document and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review in the form of ISA staff papers. The JCS critique, dated 15 July, claimed that ISA placed too much emphasis on political and financial aspects, instead of giving “paramount importance” to military requirements. Nevertheless, they judged the submissions to be “feasible and supportable at this point,” since they would be further revised each year.
The Military Assistance Plan that won State-Defense approval on 1 August 1960 amounted to an expanded version of ISA's staff papers, substantially unchanged. For individual countries within each area (Latin America excepted) it analyzed the enemy threat, force capabilities, and related economic and political factors. The US objectives—economic, political, and military—were summarized and the major combat units constituting Mutual Security Forces listed. The latter were no longer the mold within which MAP would be shaped but a goal toward which the program would be directed. In numbers and types, and by definition, they resembled what previously had been designated as "strategic force objectives." Indeed, the Plan's definition combined the one that the Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier had approved with the one they had considered but rejected. "Mutual Security Forces," it read, were those "desirable and reasonably feasible of accomplishment. . . ."

As the measure for feasibility, the plan estimated the annual level of financial effort that each country might be expected to devote to defense and the amount of US aid required, within Defense's regional dollar guidelines. Finally, the plan summarized key projects deemed worthy of support that eventually might constitute country programs. The projects, approved as of 1 August 1960, provided a basis for listing the estimated funds to be programmed during FYs 1962-1964 and the cost of deliveries through FY 1966.35

Conclusion

The military assistance program suffered from two recurring problems. First, a gap remained between what ought to be done to attain the ends sought and what could be done within the limits of available resources. Second, the impact of crises on established plans and programs, or how to meet emergencies without disrupting the entire order of things, eluded solution. The Draper Committee noted that, in FY 1954, the backlog of undelivered MAP goods came to $8.4 billion. When FY 1960 ended, that backlog had shrunk to about $2 billion, putting MAP almost on a pay-as-you-go basis. Flexibility diminished greatly; no longer could undelivered balances be shifted from country programs to crisis areas. The shift in 1960 to a dollar ceiling as the basis for programming actions and the adoption of a five-year plan represented procedural attempts to solve these problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff tried but failed to gain a larger voice in military assistance programming. Instead, creating a Director of Military Assistance as well as an independent evaluation staff under the Assistant Secretary (ISA) put more power in OSD's hands.

As the Eisenhower administration ended, the military assistance program was coming under heavy criticism from the Treasury Department and the Budget Bureau. During an NSC meeting on 31 October 1960, General Lemnitzer argued for an annual appropriation of $2.4 billion, so that deliveries could continue at a rate of $2.2 billion per year. He described MAP as a "vital component" of our security policy, deserving strong support. However, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson
emphasized the damage being done by a growing US balance of payments deficit. Never in his lifetime, Anderson insisted, had the United States faced such a serious problem. The drain on US gold reserves and the loss of confidence in the dollar simply could not continue. Even so, Secretaries Gates and Herter claimed that cutting the modest programs for Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan could stir fears abroad of a return to “Fortress America” and lead allies to reduce their efforts. Secretary Anderson’s rejoinder was blunt: “If our alliances are that weak, the time has come to reappraise them.” The outgoing administration deferred any decisions, of course, but these issues would last as long as the Cold War.
## Major Force Objectives

Recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 February 1957, for the FY 1959 Military Assistance Program

### A. ARMY

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<th>Regiments /RCTs</th>
<th>Battalions /BCTs</th>
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Notes:
- <sup>a</sup> Later changed to armored brigade
- <sup>b</sup> Six divisions and all brigades to be at reduced strength
- <sup>c</sup> Reserve divisions

68
## Major Force Objectives—continued

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Notes:  
- a. Battleship  
- b. Helicopters  
- c. Marine regiment  
- d. Includes patrol vessels (PC)  
- e. One Marine division and two Marine battalions  
- f. Marine division  
- g. Marine battalions
Major Force Objectives—continued

C. AIR FORCE

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Notes:  
- a. 27 medium bomber, 3 intruder all-weather, and 1 AEW squadrons  
- b. Not to be provided before FY 1960  
- c. AAA battalions
NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities

The North Atlantic Treaty, considered the keystone of US foreign policy, bound its signatories to treat "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America" as "an attack against them all." Each party would take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Fifteen nations belonged to NATO: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.

To help make the treaty more than words, a unique organizational structure had come into being. At its apex stood the North Atlantic Council, consisting of foreign and/or defense ministers from each country, which gave political guidance to the military authorities. A Military Committee, normally consisting of one chief of staff or his representative from each country, provided advice to the Council as well as guidance and direction to subordinate military authorities. Since the Military Committee met infrequently, a three-member executive agency called the Standing Group undertook the detailed work required for strategic direction, coordination, and integration of defense plans. Only US, UK, and French officers served on the Standing Group; a Military Representatives Committee that included all members kept other allies in touch with the Standing Group and vice versa.

NATO had three major commands: Europe, Atlantic, and Channel. In 1957, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), was General Lauris Norstad, USAF; the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), was Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN; a British officer, Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, held the post of Commander in Chief, Channel Command (CINCHAN). General Norstad wore a second hat as US Commander in Chief, Europe; Admiral Wright did the same as US Commander in Chief, Atlantic. An annual review of NATO's force requirements began early every year with the issuance of a detailed questionnaire to member states. From their replies, the NATO staff would recommend the major commands' "firm" force goals for the following year, "provisional"
goals for the second year, and “planning” goals for the third. The North Atlantic Council, in December, would give final approval.

A New Strategic Concept

In December 1954, through MC 48, the North Atlantic Council had adopted a strategy that placed primary reliance on nuclear weapons and combat-ready conventional forces in being. The alliance's military authorities decided that the active forces in Europe needed to carry out MC 48 totaled 58 ½ divisions, 1,197 naval vessels, and 8,810 aircraft. Yet, when 1956 ended, substantial shortfalls in all these categories still remained. At that time, US forces either assigned or earmarked for assignment to SACEUR included:

**Army:** Five divisions in West Germany and eleven more in CONUS that could reach Europe between D+30 and D+180.

**Navy:** Sixth Fleet with two attack carriers, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers in the Mediterranean, which would be augmented by D+30 with two Marine division/wing teams as well as two attack carriers and other warships from the Pacific.

**Air Force:** Six light bomber and twelve interceptor and twenty fighter-bomber squadrons in Europe; three light bomber and thirteen fighter-bomber squadrons earmarked in CONUS.

Conventional forces served as NATO's shield but nuclear forces were its sword. During the latter part of 1956, the British pressed for a new strategic concept that would emphasize deterrence through thermonuclear weapons and reduce conventional forces. The Eisenhower administration opposed any implication that NATO strategy should rely entirely upon nuclear retaliation. Also, during the latter part of 1956, the Standing Group drafted a new strategic concept for defense of the treaty area. The US Representative to the Standing Group, General Leon W. Johnson, USAF, sent this draft to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 January 1957. He recommended that they approve it as written.

Essentially, the draft concept stated that NATO could not prevent the rapid overrunning of Western Europe without immediately employing nuclear weapons. In case of general war, therefore, NATO would have to use nuclear weapons promptly, regardless of whether the Soviets did so. Logically, then, a war would divide into two phases. The first would be short and violent; the second would be marked by regrouping and operations leading to a conclusion of the conflict.

When they reviewed this draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff split along the same lines as they had during the strategy and force planning debates described in chapters 2 and 3. General Twining maintained that the initial nuclear exchange would last only a few hours or days, that it would decide the war's outcome, that large-scale organized operations could last no longer than thirty days, and that any subsequent operations would be limited ones. Conversely, Admiral Burke
NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities

and General Taylor held that large-scale operations could go on longer and might well decide the war's outcome.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff settled upon a compromise that skirted around their differences without really solving them. Through memorandums to General Johnson and Secretary Wilson dated 9 February 1958, they recommended describing the first phase as being one “of comparatively short duration...” The second phase, they proposed, would be one of “indeterminate duration.” They favored deleting a reference to “limited” operations and speaking simply of “military operations leading to a conclusion of the war.”

General Johnson soon reported that Standing Group members disagreed over the wording used to describe how long the first phase of a war would last. Should it be “comparatively short” or “not likely to exceed 30 days?” He asked for authority to accept a compromise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 March, authorized him to accept either alternative, or a combination of them, as necessary to obtain agreement. They preferred language stating that phase two would be of indeterminate duration, and that plans should ensure an immediate capability to exploit superiority gained during the first phase. The State Department concurred but cautioned that JCS language might conflict with what State called “the clear priority for forces-in-being” during the first phase.

The Standing Group worked out a compromise on the first phase's duration that contained both definitions. The JCS objection to speaking about “limited operations” during the second phase also won acceptance. On 9 May, the North Atlantic Council approved MC 14/2, a strategic concept for overall defense of the NATO area. Stated in very general terms, it rejected the idea of defending Europe by fighting a large-scale conventional war. There might be incursions, infiltrations, or local hostile actions, and the allies had to be capable of stopping them by conventional means. But NATO would not try to wage a limited war against the Soviet Union. Even if the USSR did not employ nuclear weapons, NATO must be prepared to do so.

MC 14/2 harmonized with NSC 5707/8, the statement of basic national security policy described in chapter 2 that President Eisenhower approved on 3 June. Like MC 14/2, NSC 5707/8 downplayed the possibility that US forces might become extensively engaged in conventional warfare. In 1959, through NSC 5906/1, the administration modified this concept by placing main but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons. But, according to the new US policy, planning for conventional, limited war would exclude not only the NATO area but also hostilities anywhere that involved sizable US and Soviet forces. Thus a willingness to employ nuclear weapons promptly in general war remained the centerpiece of NATO strategy.

Since it was the product of prolonged negotiations and compromises, MC 14/2 contained some ambiguous language that was open to interpretations. What, exactly, were incidents short of general war and how should NATO respond to them? General Norstad wanted enough nonnuclear strength to impose a true pause and not serve merely as a tripwire. In briefing the North Atlantic Council, he described shield forces as providing the essential alternative to resorting to the “ultimate capability.” If there were only token conventional forces, he warned,
JCS and National Policy

NATO would invite local actions and be compelled to reply principally upon massive retaliation.9

Cutbacks in Conventional Commitments?

President Eisenhower, in October 1956, said he was convinced US divisions in Europe should not be withdrawn “at this time.”10 The adoption of MC 14/2 strongly implied that, in the defense of Western Europe, nuclear firepower would be substituted for manpower. On 6 June 1957, during a conference aboard the USS Saratoga attended by most NSC members, President Eisenhower said that he did not see how divisions based in the United States but committed for deployment to Europe could play any part in a general war. Perhaps, he remarked, their NATO commitment should be rescinded. The question soon became whether, if that happened, the units themselves could be eliminated or reduced, particularly those designated as “second echelon divisions.”

There were nine divisions—three Regular Army and six National Guard—in this second echelon category, the lowest of all priorities for US forces committed to NATO. Highest, of course, were the five Army divisions in West Germany. Next came five “M-day divisions”—three Army and two Marine—stationed in the United States. In case of a surprise attack, they probably could not reach Europe in time to influence the critical first phase of operations. Nonetheless, General Norstad expected them to play a significant role in the second phase, assuming they could reach Europe on or before D+30. These M-day divisions also were the best-trained units in the strategic reserve. If a period of tension pre­ceded the attack, they might reach Europe in time to have an important effect upon initial operations.

At President Eisenhower’s direction, Secretary Dulles queried the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, about eliminating the commitment of divisions located in the United States. General Norstad believed that as long as the five M-day divisions were retained for any purpose they should remain committed to NATO. Releasing them from their NATO commitment, he felt sure, would prompt the European allies to question US support and interest. Conversely, eliminating some of the nine second echelon divisions would have no significant impact upon NATO, either psychologically or militarily, if it was properly presented. Retention or reduction of second echelon divisions, he advised Secretary Dulles on 1 October, should be determined by their national rather than their NATO role. They should remain committed to NATO, though, as long as they continued in existence.11

Secretary Dulles proposed that he, Secretary Wilson, and Admiral Radford recommend to the President that any reduction be taken from the second echelon divisions and then, if necessary, from M-day forces in the United States. Assistant Secretary Sprague requested JCS comments. Their answer, dated 18 September, stated that the Services’ force structures were determined by national requirements stemming from national objectives that were worldwide in
scope. Therefore, eliminating a contingent NATO commitment would not necessarily eliminate the requirement to maintain the forces concerned.\textsuperscript{12}

By this time, Secretary Wilson had directed the Services to cut 100,000 personnel by the year's close and another 100,000 by 30 June 1958. During the summer of 1957, before the full impact of these reductions had been studied and separate Service programs prepared, SACEUR, SAACLANT, and CINCHAN initiated studies projecting their minimum requirements for the next several years. These ran through 1963 for SACEUR and through 1962 for SAACLANT.

Concurrently, for the Annual Review, the Defense Department had to list firm, provisional, and planning force goals through 1960. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 17 July, recommended to Secretary Wilson that the US reply to the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire include the following units for 1958:

\textit{Army:} Eight divisions available on M-day, followed by nine more in the second echelon.

\textit{Navy:} Eight attack carriers, ten cruisers, 147 destroyers, and sixty-six submarines available on D-day; one battleship, ten attack carriers, eleven cruisers, 149 destroyers, and sixty-nine submarines available by D+30.

\textit{Marine Corps:} Two division/wing teams available on D-day.

\textit{Air Force:} Thirteen fighter/interceptor squadrons in Europe; sixteen fighter-bomber squadrons in Europe and fourteen earmarked in CONUS; six light bomber squadrons in Europe and three earmarked in CONUS.\textsuperscript{13}

By early October, the administration had decided to limit FY 1958 and 1959 expenditures to $38 billion annually and to cut personnel to 2.5 million by 30 June 1959. Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether any changes should be made in US force goals for NATO. On 11 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff apprised General Norstad of tentative Service plans to cut 11,000 men from US Army, Europe, and to pare US Air Forces, Europe, to thirty-one combat squadrons by 1963. SACEUR's own requirements study, mentioned above, reflected two changes: the second echelon divisions in the United States were deleted and USAF combat squadrons in Europe would fall from forty-nine in 1957 to thirty-five in 1963. The latter change would be offset by a corresponding increase in allied nuclear capability as well as a buildup of missile units. Nonetheless, Norstad responded by calling this "the worst possible time" for cutbacks in light of Sputnik and continued Middle East turmoil. The example set by the United States, he warned, might well prove irresistible to the allies.\textsuperscript{14}

Writing to Secretary McElroy on 23 October 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed changing the Air Force's commitments to NATO as follows:

1958: Nine fighter/interceptor squadrons in Europe; seventeen fighter-bomber squadrons in Europe and nineteen earmarked in CONUS; three light bomber squadrons in Europe.

1959–1960: Seven fighter/interceptor squadrons in Europe; eighteen fighter-bomber squadrons in Europe and eighteen earmarked in CONUS; three light bomber squadrons in Europe.\textsuperscript{15}
At a 12 November conference attended by Secretary McElroy and Generals Norstad, Taylor, and White, it was agreed that USAF combat squadrons would not be reduced below SACEUR's minimum requirements. Cuts would be limited to transport and troop carrier squadrons. After returning to Paris, Norstad reported that, by 30 June 1959, 4,600 personnel could be trimmed from US Army, Europe, without eliminating any battle groups. Instead, he would speed up integration of Italian troops into the Southern European Task Force, transfer equipment from two Honest John missile battalions to the allies, reduce headquarters strength of US Army, Europe, and “squeeze” the line of communications. No announcement of any major cutbacks should take place until after the year's end, when State and Defense would be considering an overall NATO report on minimum force requirements.16

MC-70 Sets Slightly Lower Force Goals

The NATO report mentioned above was supposed to translate MC 14/2’s strategic concept into a specific pattern of forces. Work began in the Standing Group. Late in January 1958, Army and Air Force planners proposed telling the Standing Group that five divisions would remain in Europe and that the nine second echelon divisions would retain their NATO status. During a State-Defense conference on 10 January, Secretary Dulles had confirmed his understanding that these divisions were being retained for “purely national military reasons,” there being no NATO or other foreign policy consideration that required their commitment to NATO. He agreed that as long as the divisions were being retained for national reasons they should remain committed to NATO.17

The Joint Chiefs of Staff split their comments on the NATO report, now known as MC-70, into two parts: one set on the report itself, the other on the force tables appended to it. Through a memorandum dated 14 February 1958, they recommended nearly one hundred changes to the report. Their principal points had to do with the relative importance of missiles compared to manned bombers and the significance to be attached to forces in being. On the former, the effect of their recommendations was to minimize the importance of missiles as a nuclear delivery system during 1958–1963. On the latter, they attached less importance to forces in being, pointing out that other forces (including those in the second echelon) were part of the deterrent and might contribute to wartime tasks. Finally, they urged that references to war with the Soviet Union be changed to read “general war.”18

Through a critique dated 27 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled MC-70’s force tables “acceptable for the purposes intended,” subject to a few amendments. The tables for US forces were “in consonance with Service programs through 1 July 1961” and “reasonable prognostications thereafter.” Of course, they advised Secretary McElroy, approving MC-70 should not be construed as committing the United States to provide the allies with enough equipment to let them meet their goals. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also cautioned that modern weapons requirements
and deployments, while desirable, were not entirely necessarily attainable within this time period.19

In the end, less than half the JCS recommendations about the NATO report were incorporated without change into the final, approved version. Most of their views about the implications of missile development, for example, won adoption. Other proposals were incorporated in part or in substance, while about thirty were rejected outright. Their suggestion that references to conflict with the USSR be narrowed to “general war” ran afoul of the State Department’s view that this was not the place to define types of war. The US Representative to the Standing Group was granted latitude in seeking the change sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as a result it was not done. Likewise, State and OSD agreed that the Joint Chiefs’ emphasis on forces in being had to be softened, as did their implication that the allies should commit themselves now to achieve specific force goals during 1959–1961.20

Deputy Secretary Quarles did not accept JCS views about either second echelon divisions or earmarked air and naval forces. He deleted second echelon divisions from the table of NATO requirements. Instead, they would be listed as a separate category of reserves, maintained for national reasons. Likewise, earmarked naval and air units in excess of stated NATO requirements should be shown in a similar, separate category of reserve forces. Mr. Quarles worried that allied countries might also include forces in excess of those requested by major NATO commanders and thus generate requirements for additional US military assistance. The inclusion of excess forces in NATO requirements, he feared, might be used to justify Service programs larger than those in the current JSOP.21

Most of the JCS revisions that survived interdepartmental review were incorporated into the final version of NATO’s “Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958–1963.” On 14 March 1958, the Military Committee amended and then approved this document as MC-70; its goals for 1963 included fifty-five active divisions and 4,802 aircraft. General Twining, who attended the Military Committee meeting, gave his judgment that US interests had been “fully protected.” He stressed, however, that considerable give and take had been necessary to reconcile discordant national views. In fact, Twining advised his JCS colleagues,

Recalling the magnitude of the US guidance furnished the United States Representative to the Standing Group, I am convinced that we contributed in no small measure to this problem. Our contribution toward a solution must, it seems to me, lie in reducing to the minimum the comments developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other US agencies. While we must adopt the strongest possible position on each and every issue which affects our vital security interests, we must avoid generation of minor comments which, in the final analysis, have little influence on the main issues.22

During the next two years, the US military presence in Europe underwent only minor changes. Thus the JCS recommendations for 1960, submitted as a response to the Annual Review in June 1959, read as follows:

Army: Eight divisions (five in West Germany, three in CONUS) available on M-day, nine more in the second echelon. In 1960, the Army would meet MC-70’s goals for
surface-to-surface missile units. Five Honest John, six Corporal and four Lacrosse battalions, as well as two Redstone groups, would be stationed in Europe.

Navy/Marine Corps: Six attack carriers, seven cruisers, 129 destroyers, sixty-six submarines, and two Marine division/wing teams immediately available.

Air Force: Seven fighter/interceptor, twenty-one fighter-bomber, and three light bomber squadrons in Europe; ten to twelve squadrons in CONUS "from which reinforcement for Allied Command Europe may be allocated."23

Cutting Back the US Commitment?

President Eisenhower felt a personal obligation to start bringing some US troops back from Europe. In 1951, when he was SACEUR, the dispatch of four US divisions to Germany had sparked considerable opposition among Congress and the American public. Eisenhower's aim as SACEUR, he constantly had assured congressional delegations, was "to strive for a very intensive but relatively short program of American assistance which should begin to pass its peak, especially in ground force content, within two and one-half or three years." Writing to President Truman in July 1951, Eisenhower estimated that ground reductions should prove possible "within some 4–8 years."24 But eight years had passed and nothing had happened. Yet the United Kingdom, during 1957–1958, took steps to reduce the British Army of the Rhine by 30 percent and to cut its Second Tactical Air Force even more. West Germany informed the allies that it would have 300,000 men under arms by April 1961, well short of the original goal of 500,000. Sizable French forces remained in North Africa, fighting the uprising in Algeria.

During the early autumn of 1959, the Air Force reacted to what it saw as stringent budgetary guidance by proposing to withdraw fourteen squadrons of all types from the USAF units committed to NATO during 1960. But General Norstad reacted just as vigorously as he had when reductions were proposed in 1957. There would be no way to minimize the political impact, he warned Assistant Secretary John Irwin; even the suggestion that such a move was being considered could prove disastrous. Confidence in US leadership would be undermined, the trend toward increased allied defense budgets reversed, and the Western position in negotiations with the USSR weakened. Secretary Irwin assured him that the United States would stand by the figures reported to NATO for the 1959 Annual Review.25

In mid-October, during a discussion with State Department officials, the President suggested appointing a European to be SACEUR, ending military assistance to Europe, and keeping only one US division there. On 2 November, Secretary McElroy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a presidential statement about reducing US forces in Europe. The JCS organization began composing responses that emphasized the dangers of such a step. On 11 November, the NSC discussed whether to cut US commitments in Europe. President Eisenhower maintained that "the US had maneuvered itself into a greater position of responsibility than
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was necessary." He recognized, however, that political groundwork had to be laid before any shifting of burdens took place. Secretary McElroy said that maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent should be the most important US contribution to NATO. Two divisions in Europe, he thought, would be enough to demonstrate US determination. But McElroy agreed with President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter that this was not the time to announce a reduction of ground forces: "To do so would lead the Europeans to feel that we were reneging on our commitments and would throw away our bargaining position vis-à-vis the USSR." Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson and Budget Director Maurice Stans emphasized how keeping so many troops in Europe had aggravated the budget and balance-of-payments deficits. Nonetheless, President Eisenhower decided against making any significant cuts in NATO-committed forces during 1960 "unless agreed to through negotiations." He also asked the State and Defense Departments to recommend what the future roles and contributions of NATO members ought to be.26

As a first step, on 16 November, the NSC ordered a State-Defense study of NATO's defense posture. Simultaneously, the President talked with General Twining about modest US withdrawals. The Air Force, Twining replied, would like to pull out some of its units. Eisenhower remarked that he could not break faith with NATO allies and withdraw any forces during 1960. When he conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 November, though, the President asked them to "take a new look" at long-standing deployments, such as the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and ground forces in Europe.27

The NSC's guidance, in effect, called for more study and postponed a decision. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 1960, recommended a response to the annual review that showed no changes of any consequence for 1961. As had been agreed in 1959, three light bomber squadrons were retained in Europe by dropping two all-weather fighter squadrons. But the Air Force projected subsequent withdrawals that, in 1963, would leave only eighteen strike and four fighter squadrons in Europe. Qualitative improvements would offset these quantitative reductions to some extent.28

In September 1960, ISA completed a study, "NATO in the 1960's," written in response to the NSC directive of November 1959. According to the study, NATO possessed only "marginal capabilities" to deny an attacker any option except all-out attack, thereby risking nuclear retaliation. Consequently, NATO's shield forces should be made adequate (1) to deny the Soviets any options except all-out assault or abstention from attack and (2) to initiate and carry on tactical nuclear warfare. Assistant Secretary Irwin asked for JCS comments. Their critique, dated 28 October, once again demonstrated the difficulty of reconciling Service viewpoints. General White wanted to place equal emphasis upon nuclear and conventional capabilities. But Admiral Burke, General Shoup, and General Decker all advocated putting greater emphasis upon increases in conventional strength. The Chairman, General Lemnitzer, supported them. Secretary Gates, however, chose to adopt General White's view.29 By then, of course, the transition to a new administration had begun.
During his final weeks in office, fiscal pressures drove President Eisenhower to weigh making the major cutbacks that he repeatedly had postponed. On 16 November, he ordered a drastic reduction in the number of military dependents overseas. Nonetheless, West Germany rejected Washington's request that it contribute $600 million to help support the US troops stationed there. At a White House meeting on 30 November, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson stressed the danger created by continuing budget and balance-of-payments deficits. "We have now reached the end of an era," Anderson argued, "and we can no longer live as we did in the past." President Eisenhower remarked that "we are now approaching the hardest choice possible to make." The world situation had grown worse but "we can defeat ourselves by violating fiscal soundness." Eisenhower talked about informing NATO that "we plan to withdraw two divisions. We should reduce the overstaffed NATO infrastructure, bring home Americans, and hire French and Germans." But he left office without taking any action.

In sum, the adoption of MC 14/2 and MC-70 seems to have had very little impact upon US deployments in Europe and US commitments to NATO. Political and psychological factors, as President Eisenhower recognized, preserved the US presence without significant change. It is noteworthy that the Air Force, alone among the Services, constantly tried to remove units from Allied Command Europe. The Army and Navy saw Europe's defense as their major mission and justification. The Air Force focused upon general war, which to airmen meant a short, intense nuclear exchange. In such a conflict, obviously, conventional forces would play only a minor part.

A Nuclear Arsenal for NATO

Although nuclear retaliation was the centerpiece of NATO strategy, only the United States possessed the means to accomplish it. The United Kingdom had a small number of weapons and bombers to deliver them. France had begun a research and development program but, in 1957, stood some years away from exploding a nuclear device. There was growing concern that West Germany also might be tempted to join the nuclear club. In principle, the solution seemed simple: allay the allies' concerns and satisfy their aspirations by creating a NATO nuclear force or stockpile. In practice, though, obstacles would prove enormous.

A system already existed for integrating US nuclear weapons into Allied Command Europe. Each year General Norstad, as USCINCEUR, received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff an allocation of nuclear weapons based on the requirements of NATO defense plans. As SACEUR, he in turn applied these allocations to the various programs and regional commands. Then, after approving the operational plans of his regional commanders, General Norstad reverted to his role as USCINCEUR and put the weapons into the custody of US Special Weapons Units. These units were distributed so as to make nuclear weapons readily available to the appropriate delivery force. When the need arose, and after
authority to employ nuclear weapons had been granted, custodians would release weapons to the delivery forces.31

By January 1957, US Thor and Jupiter IRBMs were entering the final testing stage and were scheduled to go into production about ten months later. For the past eighteen months, the United States and the United Kingdom had been exchanging technical information about these missiles to the extent permitted by the Atomic Energy Act, as amended in 1954. Other considerations, too, made it timely to consider emplacing IRBMs on British soil. The British were implementing their own version of the New Look, building more long-range bombers while cutting back on their conventional commitments to NATO. The deployment of IRBMs, especially if a certain measure of control was vested in British authorities, might induce the British to spend less on nuclear and more on nonnuclear arms. Early in January 1957, Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray informed Admiral Radford that forthcoming talks with British officials would present an opportunity to open negotiations about IRBM deployments.32

Writing to Secretary Wilson on 24 January 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended providing the British with four squadrons of Thor IRBMs “at the earliest practicable date.” Of course, they emphasized, US personnel must retain custody and provide security for the warheads. They favored an agreement under which, in the event of hostilities, warheads would be transferred and operational employment coordinated through arrangements similar to those covering the transfer of weapons to, and their employment by, Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers.33

On 29 January, Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford conferred with British representatives. Stressing the need to disperse NATO’s retaliatory capability, Radford warned that dispersal measures in Britain would be inadequate without IRBM deployments. The British were receptive towards IRBMs but refused to consider reducing their bomber force until IRBMs were actually on hand. In Bermuda, on 21 to 24 March, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed in principle that IRBMs would be stationed in the United Kingdom.34

The French also appeared interested in acquiring IRBMs. In July 1957, when Admiral Radford attended a meeting of the Military Committee, his French counterpart asked about the conditions under which France might obtain them. On 24 September, the French Ambassador in Washington formally requested talks leading to an arrangement like that with the British.35

By this time, in Washington, interdepartmental discussions had produced the idea of a “NATO Common Stockpile,” in which would be maintained (under US control) all the nuclear warheads for NATO weapons. The French apparently held a different conception, in which NATO would have at least a measure of control over stockpiling and employment.

Responding on 18 October to a request from Assistant Secretary Sprague, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dwelt at some length on the “dangerous implications” of the term, “NATO Common Stockpile.” They wanted to draft a document titled “Procedures for Providing US Atomic Weapons for the Common Defense of the NATO Area,” and submit it for approval by appropriate NATO agencies. Mr. Sprague agreed but asked them to prepare a position paper for use at the NATO Heads of Government and Ministerial Meeting in December. In an answer dated
14 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended continuing the existing system by which nuclear weapons were made available to Allied Command Europe. For the future, the United States might propose that delivery forces of other allies, as well as the United Kingdom and nations for which Honest John deployments were planned, be made eligible to receive nuclear weapons.

The proposal that Secretary Dulles presented to the North Atlantic Council on 16 December followed JCS wishes rather than those of General Norstad and the French. The United States, Dulles said, was prepared to participate in a stockpile system within which "nuclear warheads would be deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander for employment by nuclear-capable NATO forces." The United States also was prepared to provide IRBMs "for deployment in accordance with the plans of SACEUR," their deployment being "subject to agreement between SACEUR and the countries directly concerned." Such matters as materiel and training would be handled by bilateral agreements between each country and the United States. The IRBM warheads would become "a part of the NATO atomic stockpile system."36

An agreement concluded with the British on 22 February 1958 specified that, although the nuclear warheads for Thor IRBMs would remain "in full United States ownership, custody and control in accordance with United States law," the decision to launch would be "a matter for joint decision between the two governments." This language about joint decision repeated the wording of a US-UK agreement dating from 1951. The French, by contrast, hoped to gain full control over nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, negotiations about IRBM deployments had begun with Italy; General Norstad hoped that progress in these talks would prod the French into being more flexible. During the spring of 1958, however, an army revolt in Algeria threw France into political chaos. Out of the turmoil emerged the Fifth Republic with a new government headed by an outspoken critic of NATO, General Charles de Gaulle. The IRBM discussions with France came to a halt.37

In October 1958, the United States and Italy reached agreement in principle to deploy two Jupiter squadrons (thirty missiles). By then, with ICBM programs making good progress, the Services began leaning toward IRBM cutbacks. On 31 October 1958, in fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that IRBM production be curtailed. General Norstad now proposed adding only one IRBM squadron to Greece and one to Turkey beyond the two for Italy and four in the United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored even deeper cutbacks, leaving only four in the United Kingdom, one for Turkey, one for an unspecified NATO area, one for Okinawa, and one for Alaska. Negotiations with Italy went forward, however, on the basis of two squadrons. Final arrangements were concluded in March 1959; the first Jupiter complex became operational in March 1960. Meanwhile, four Thor squadrons (sixty missiles) became operational in the United Kingdom between June 1959 and April 1960. Political problems and funding difficulties not only brought an end to discussions with Greece but also delayed agreement with Turkey until October 1959. Sites for the Jupiter squadron in Turkey only became operational between November 1961 and March 1962.38
Origins of the Multilateral Force

Of course, IRBM deployments did not solve the issue of nuclear sharing. Early in 1959, the NSC Planning Board began a review of basic national security policy that is described in chapter 2. A draft circulated in June argued that the United States should discourage:

1. The development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons production capabilities.
2. The acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reversing their stand of previous years, claimed that such an approach had proved sterile and tended to alienate our most reliable allies. They now argued that “it should be US policy to exchange with, or provide to, additional selected allies scientific and technical information…”

President Eisenhower accepted JCS arguments. According to NSC 5906/1, approved on 5 August, the United States should enhance selected allies’ capabilities by exchanging with them or providing to them information, materials, or weapons. In anticipation of this step, the administration should give urgent consideration to developing NATO arrangements for the custody and control of nuclear weapons.

Just when US interest in Thor and Jupiter started to wane, NATO’s interest in a weapon with a range of 300 to 1,500 miles began to mount. The SACEUR wanted to have a second generation of IRBMs operational by 1963. In November 1958, a NATO working group discussed the possibility of adapting the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile to intermediate-range purposes. Besides the technical arguments in its favor, Polaris probably would be available no later than mid-1963.

Early in 1959, Deputy Secretary Quarles asked for a JCS assessment of the problems posed by furnishing NATO Europe with second-generation IRBMs. They replied, on 16 April, that a military requirement for such weapons did exist. But they opposed any relaxation of US/SACEUR control over warheads: “So long as the United States is the sole supplier of these weapons to the West, we should retain absolute control over their use.” Four months later, Secretary McElroy raised these issues again. His queries, and the JCS responses dated 15 October, are summarized below:

1. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor changing US policy so as to permit allies to develop nationally-controlled nuclear forces? No. If an ally or friendly neutral seemed capable of becoming a nuclear power, offer US-produced weapons under controls to be determined. Every effort should be made to dissuade a nation from attaining a nuclear capability outside the control of a regional defense organization.
2. Should the French nuclear program be provided with technical information and assistance? Yes, but only in support of established NATO objectives.
3. Should the United States release weapons to allied ownership or custody in conditions short of war? Yes, in principle. Studies of how to carry out a liberalized policy ought to be prepared.
4. Which of two IRBM alternatives seemed preferable? First, furnish a limited number of Polaris missiles (with warheads remaining under US control), and then help the allies produce either a version of Polaris designed to meet national as well as NATO needs or a European IRBM. Second, explore the feasibility of meeting SACEUR's needs by developing other missile characteristics and target dates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the first alternative.41

Meantime, in October 1959, General Norstad had recommended that NATO military authorities establish a requirement for a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with characteristics similar to Polaris. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 January 1960, sent Secretary Gates a split opinion. General White recommended rejecting SACEUR's requirement. He did not believe that, by 1963, any US weapon system could be modified to meet all of General Norstad's needs. Further, past experience led him to conclude that the costs would tax US as well as allied resources severely. These and other reasons led him to conclude that an extended-range Pershing missile might serve the purpose.

Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer, supported by the Chairman, did endorse SACEUR's proposal. Such an endorsement, they noted, would simply constitute step two in a lengthy nine-step NATO procedure. Thus the United States would not, at that point, be committing itself to any subsequent actions. Burke and Lemnitzer also thought it unlikely that a single system could meet all the characteristics in SACEUR's requirement. Accordingly, they wanted to consider fulfilling the requirement with two separate missile systems. The administration did follow the JCS majority and approved SACEUR's requirement.41

Following a conference between Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Defense Research and Engineering in OSD reviewed alternatives for a mobile IRBM, available by 1963, with a range of 400–800 nautical miles. Research and Engineering concluded that Polaris provided the "highest confidence" for any range up to 1,200 nautical miles; Pershing could meet a 400 nautical mile requirement with only "fair" confidence.

Secretary Gates, on 19 February 1960, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the time had come "to secure Defense and interagency agreement on a specific missile and a specific proposal to make to the NATO countries outlining the limits of US assistance." He presented for their consideration a proposal that the United States make available fifty complete Polaris missiles through grant aid, as well as reimbursable parts and components for another thirty missiles to be assembled in European factories.42

Answering ten days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported giving $100 million of grant aid in order to provide fifty complete missiles as well as technical and facilities assistance. Interestingly, they did not specify that Polaris should be the only missile considered. They also endorsed SACEUR's revised requirement for 300 MRBMs by 1965 and again recommended entering bilateral arrangements for furnishing additional missiles to those nations that insisted upon having more than a capability within NATO (i.e., France). By a memorandum dated 11 March, they advocated a bilateral arrangement for providing the United Kingdom with Polaris submarines and bomber-launched Skybolt air-to-ground missiles, if the
British would help NATO deploy 300 MRBMs by 1965. When Prime Minister Macmillan visited Washington during 27 to 31 March, President Eisenhower promised to make available either Skybolts or Polaris missiles (minus warheads). The British then canceled their own Blue Streak ballistic missile. France, meanwhile, had exploded its first nuclear device on 13 February 1960.43

Shortly before Secretary Gates left for the Paris meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers on 31 March, MRBM proposals were altered at the State Department’s insistence. The offer to provide fifty missiles as grant aid disappeared, as did any mention of US approval of national missiles over and above national requirements. Late in April, just before President de Gaulle arrived in Washington for an official visit, officers representing General Twining urged OSD officials to reargue the issue with the State Department. Nonetheless, State continued to oppose offering de Gaulle a bilateral MRBM agreement similar to the US-UK arrangement in exchange for France’s participation in the NATO MRBM program. State prevailed and no such offer was made.44

During the summer of 1960, State and Defense restudied the entire subject of MRBM armament for NATO. On 1 August, Acting Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he considered the United States committted to supplying NATO with Polaris missiles, at least in limited numbers. Still, he asked for an assessment of existing and proposed MRBMs in order to avoid any repetition of the Thor/Jupiter duplication. The Army responded by proposing an extended-range Pershing, the Navy a land-based Polaris, and the Air Force a tactical ballistic missile. Rejecting all three, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 29 September, recommended that a smaller, more flexible, land-based system of “third generation” missiles adaptable to surface ships as well as hardened ground sites be developed as soon as possible.

The National Security Council, in November 1959, had commissioned a State-Defense study of NATO’s defense posture over the long term. As part of the preparation for a report, an ad hoc working group drawn from State, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission drafted a study of “Pros and Cons of Nuclear Sharing with Allies.” Should the President, it asked, be permitted to sell or otherwise make nuclear weapons available to selected allies? State and AEC saw no need for doing so and considered the disadvantages sufficient to recommend against any immediate action. Defense did see a need to give the President enough flexibility to negotiate agreements.

On 9 September 1960, Assistant Secretary Irwin asked for JCS comments. Their assessment, submitted two weeks later, labeled the State-Defense-AEC study inadequate because it addressed the overall problem rather than the specific issue of NATO and France. The arguments purporting to present pros and cons, they claimed, were actually weighted to support positions reached independently of the arguments. Single sets of facts were “twisted to argue both ways.” The working group had not considered JCS views.45

A lengthy report on NATO’s “Tasks for the 1960’s,” responding to the NSC directive, appeared late in August. This document, which treated the overall problem of nuclear sharing, had been drafted in the State Department under the direction of Mr. Robert R. Bowie. Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found nothing to
applaud. What they viewed as a desirable end—using bilateral arrangements to help selected allies achieve a nuclear capability—the Bowie Report regarded as a dubious means by which to reconcile European nationalisms, US nuclear preponderance, and the common defense. Instead, the Bowie group proposed an interim force of twelve to fourteen US-manned Polaris submarines under SACEUR’s control in peace and war. It would be succeeded by a permanent multinational force manned, administered, owned, and financed multilaterally and, like the interim force, controlled by SACEUR.  

Since their viewpoint differed so fundamentally from that of the Bowie Report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not do otherwise than label the report unacceptable, centering upon the questions of bilateral agreements and arrangements for the custody and employment of NATO-committed weapons. 

Regardless of the form in which the problem was presented, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently had been unwilling to recommend a specific missile as the answer to the MRBM conundrum. Nevertheless, by mid-September a definite proposal to offer Polaris as the nucleus of a NATO deterrent had emerged from State-Defense discussions. By the month’s close, Assistant Secretary Irwin and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy D. Kohler had drafted a proposal that, by the end of 1963, five Polaris submarines be committed to SACEUR as an interim force. Allied governments would contribute approximately one hundred additional missiles to help meet MRBM requirements through 1964. For maximum security and survivability, these too should be seaborne Polaris missiles. Furthermore, the United States would offer to facilitate creation of a permanent multilateral force if other NATO governments, in conjunction with SACEUR, developed a plan that was accepted by the North Atlantic Council and met certain other conditions.

At a White House meeting early in October, President Eisenhower decided that basic conditions for the permanent force should include mixed manning of ships (to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR) along with multilateral ownership, financing, and control. However, if detailed examination and negotiation revealed multilateral ownership to be infeasible, the United States would not insist upon it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 25 October, submitted advice that only served to make a murky situation even more opaque. They agreed upon the importance of permitting the United States to use its contribution to the NATO MRBM force for national purposes, without obtaining specific approval from the North Atlantic Council. They disagreed, though, about how the Irwin-Kohler proposal should be revised to reflect their views and, specifically, what it should say about the role of SACEUR.

Admiral Burke and General Decker argued that, in case of a Soviet nuclear attack, employment of both the interim and the permanent forces should be decided by SACEUR. For other contingencies, decisions ought to be taken in accordance with existing procedures or any other procedure approved by the North Atlantic Council. General White, conversely, recommended that the interim force be available for use “in accordance with procedures as approved by the North Atlantic Council to meet specific military situations” and that the existing
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"prerogative of independent US action with any or all US forces... be zealously retained." As for the permanent force, White proposed that MRBMs "be released to and employed by national forces committed to NATO" under the same procedures that he had outlined for the interim force. In effect, he seemed to be saying, the commitment of national forces to NATO roles would constitute the establishment of a multilateral force.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that President Eisenhower's decision could be better expressed by omitting multilateral ownership and financing as basic conditions for establishing the permanent force, specifying only that such ownership and financing should be further explored. General White wanted the reference to mixed manning dropped, but Admiral Burke and General Decker supported President Eisenhower's position that the permanent force have mixed manning "to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR." Lastly, should seaborne Polaris be specified as the missile for the permanent force? Admiral Burke answered yes; Generals Decker and White said no.49

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke with several voices, Secretary Gates chose to rely upon a memorandum written in ISA. He held to his original view that Polaris was the most practicable answer to the MRBM problem. As for operational control, he solved the problem of dealing with the interim force of five Polaris submarines by not specifying any procedure, which in effect placed them in the same category as all other national forces committed to NATO. Gates also pared the basic conditions governing the permanent force to "multilateral control" alone, with multilateral ownership and financing left for later examination and negotiation. Mixed manning, he concluded, should be adopted to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.50

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting on 16 December, Secretary of State Herter put forward an MRBM proposal that went well beyond JCS wishes. Presenting it as a "concept for consideration," he described the force in terms that ignored even the narrow area of agreement the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been able to reach. The force, Secretary Herter said, would be "truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR." Herter skirted the issue of how a decision to employ the force would be made, merely observing that some suitable formula would have to be developed. The commitment of five Polaris submarines with eighty missiles as an interim force and the further sale of approximately one hundred seaborne missiles, which Herter tabled as a firm offer, substantially paralleled the Kohler-Irwin proposal. And, with that, the matter had to be left for the next administration.

Nuclear sharing proved to be a Gordian knot that no one could sever. Political considerations dominated the decisions taken to meet NATO's IRBM and MRBM requirements. How far was the United States willing to go in sharing control over nuclear warheads? The Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed, without success, for a bilateral arrangement to help France acquire a nuclear capability. Yet, where custody and control were involved, they directed their attention mainly to procedures that would not disrupt the status quo. They responded as though the exercise of control by the United States was immutably fixed and not a matter for discussion.
President de Gaulle obviously felt otherwise. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not entirely avoid the control issue—as in their consideration of the Kohler-Irwin proposal—they failed to reach agreement. Yet it would be unfair to single out the Joint Chiefs of Staff for criticism. They were far from alone in having reservations about mixed manning and multilateral control. Even though US officials were to expend much effort during the early 1960s promoting a multilateral force, Europeans' hostility killed it. Ultimately, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished, US control remained unshaken.
Germany and Berlin

In Europe, the Cold War’s onset dashed hopes of securing what Oliver Cromwell called a “Peace without a worm in it.” Temporary dispositions made in 1945, pending the signing of a peace treaty with Germany, had hardened into almost unshakable positions. Germany stopped being a piece to be fitted into the postwar mosaic and became a valuable counter in the East-West contest. West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany, became a member of NATO in 1955 and started to rearm. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted West Germany to remain firmly wedded to the North Atlantic alliance. They saw no practicable way, without endangering the military balance, either to reunify and neutralize Germany or to establish a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

US Objectives Remain Unchanged

Current US policy toward Germany had been set forth in NSC 160/1, which dated from 1953. It defined US objectives as follows:

1. Ensure West Germany’s firm association with the western community.
2. Provide for an effective contribution by that nation to the effective strength of the West.
3. Bring about Germany’s reunification on a basis that would, as a maximum, ensure a united Germany’s firm association with the western powers and, as a minimum, pose no threat to US security.

As 1956 ended, the NSC Operations Coordinating Board reported that many of the courses of action listed in NSC 160/1 had been overtaken by events. Most importantly, the creation of West German military forces was proceeding but lagged well behind earlier expectations. At Lisbon, in 1952, the North Atlantic Council had set goals that included twelve divisions and 1,158 aircraft. When
West Germany entered NATO in 1955, a goal of 270,000 men under arms had been set for 1957. That objective now had been reduced to 125,000.2

On 31 January 1957, the NSC directed its Planning Board to consider a review of policy toward Germany. The result was NSC 5727, circulated on 13 December. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deletion of a paragraph calling for development of alternative methods to bring about the reunification of Germany. Alternatives should be considered, they said, only if the administration became convinced that its original goal of reunifying Germany through free elections could not be attained. The Planning Board circulated a new draft in January 1958 which contained minor revisions to reflect December deliberations by the NATO heads of government. The JCS recommendation above had been overruled. Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the new draft. On 7 February 1958, President Eisenhower approved it as NSC 5803.3

The statement of policy in NSC 5803 aimed at encouraging a greater West German contribution to the political, economic, and military strength of the West. Specifically, US objectives included:

1. Seeking an adequate West German financial contribution to support allied forces in the Federal Republic, at least until that country assumed full responsibility for achieving its NATO force goals.

2. Continuing to press for reunification through free, all-German elections, under conditions that would take into account the legitimate security interests of all countries concerned, making clear that reunification was essential to any genuine relaxation of East-West tension. The United States would not agree, however, to any reunification involving:
   a. Communist domination of a reunified Germany.
   b. A federal Germany that would perpetuate the existing Communist government of East Germany.
   c. The withdrawal of US and other allied forces from West Germany without an effective military quid pro quo from the Soviet Union and its satellites.
   d. The political or military neutralization of Germany.

Although the time was not propitious for advancing new US proposals on reunification, policymakers should give continuing attention to developing alternatives for a long-run solution.4

By the fall of 1957, the West German armed forces, or “Bundeswehr” had grown to 140,000 personnel. Seven army divisions had been placed under NATO command, albeit at less than full strength, and two more would be activated in the fall of 1958. The West German Government planned to have twelve divisions, forty air squadrons, and a small naval arm in operational status by 1961. The Bundeswehr then would total 350,000 men, well under the 1955 goal of 518,00 by the end of 1959.5 East Germany, meanwhile, was creating a considerably smaller force.

Rearmament, of course, further dimmed the already remote prospects for unification and neutralization. The US policy, NSC 5524/1, had been established at the time of the 1955 Geneva summit conference and remained in effect throughout the Eisenhower years. It defined the long-range US objectives in Europe as bringing about the retraction of Soviet power from Central and Eastern Europe,
keeping a united Germany in NATO, and establishing arrangements to ensure lasting security in Europe. The United States would not accept a regional security arrangement that expressed or implied acceptance of permanent Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, compromised NATO's effectiveness, or prevented the establishment of a free, united Germany.

In the meantime, according to NSC 5524/1, the administration would seek the continued strengthening of NATO and other Western defenses, especially by providing for a West German contribution as well as a continuing US presence in Europe. NSC 5524/1 included the essence of the “Eden Plan,” presented to the USSR during the Berlin foreign ministers’ conference of October 1955. The Eden Plan, which took its name from the British Prime Minister, encompassed a complete scheme for reunifying Germany and assuring European security by interlocking stages. It had three elements: reunification through free elections; concluding a treaty of assurance among Germany, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; and limiting and controlling armaments along both sides of Germany’s eastern frontier, with mutual radar inspection. The Eden Plan continued to represent the basic Western position throughout the 1950s.8

When 1956 ended, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact seemed in sound condition. The USSR had faced what it called “deviation” in Poland and had intervened to suppress an anticomunist revolt in Hungary. During the Suez crisis, the United States sharply condemned actions taken by France and Great Britain. Possibly attempting to capitalize upon Western disunity, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, on 17 November, proposed a mutual reduction of forces, a ban on nuclear weapons, reductions in and eventual elimination of foreign forces in Europe, some inspection measures, and a nonaggression pact between the two blocs. The Soviets wanted these proposals discussed before the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. The Western powers refused, on grounds that they were ready to discuss disengagement and other European security arrangements only in connection with German reunification. A UN subcommittee did not strike them as the proper forum for such talks.7

Concurrently, on 16 November, Admiral Burke urged his JCS colleagues to consider endorsing a British proposal to create, in connection with Germany’s reunification, zones where armaments would be either reduced or eliminated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred this proposal to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. The JSSC acknowledged that either creating a demilitarized zone or neutralizing some satellites while maintaining NATO’s integrity would be militarily advantageous to the United States, but the problem of German unification remained, and the US Government should not retreat from its position that unification “in freedom” must precede any agreement to change allied military deployments. The JSSC concluded and, on 12 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed not to pursue Admiral Burke’s suggestion. It was unrealistic, the committee suggested, to suppose that the Soviets would consider such a plan without calling for the relocation or withdrawal of US forces based in Europe. Just recently, in fact, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations had said that the USSR would remove its
troops from Warsaw Pact countries “as soon as you withdraw your troops from Western Germany, as soon as you liquidate your bases on foreign territory.”

On 24 January 1957, Admiral Radford asked the JSSC to renew its study of European security arrangements. He had concurred in the JCS decision above but now observed that proposals of this sort seemed to have popular appeal. He anticipated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff soon might be required to express their views on such matters, since the State Department was considering a French suggestion to establish a Four Power Working Group on European security. Admiral Radford felt that, in formulating US policy, the great strides made in weapons technology should be taken into account. The advent of tactical nuclear weapons, he argued, soon would permit reductions of US forces deployed to Europe. This was an echo of his 1956 proposal to make drastic cuts in conventional ground and tactical air units. Radford requested the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to submit their views on European security arrangements, “in light of the currently approved Strategic Concept.”

The JSSC, replying on 14 March, concluded that:

1. For at least the next fiscal year, the state of weapons development would not justify changing the US force commitments to NATO. In succeeding years, though, progressive reductions might be warranted.

2. Attainment of NATO’s current force goals, including greater nuclear capability for Allied Command Europe, lay at least several years in the future. Moreover, there was no basis for assuming that, either during the buildup or when NATO units became fully armed with nuclear weapons, relative capabilities vis-à-vis the USSR would have improved enough to permit force reductions. Furthermore, said the JSSC, continuous modernization was an agreed and valid objective in itself, required by the strategic concept. It should not be used as a basis for proposing reductions during negotiations about European security.

3. In view of known Soviet objectives, NATO must maintain solidarity in strength and avoid any negotiations with the USSR likely to weaken or dissolve the alliance. Under current circumstances, the JSSC believed, any proposals for significant reductions to US forces in NATO would risk the alliance’s collapse.

4. Disarmament talks should be confined to the UN framework and not be permitted to obscure negotiations about basic European issues. Unless there were compensatory, adequate, and worldwide safeguards, disarmament in Europe alone could weaken the West. The administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed regional arrangements and should continue to do so.

5. Finally, if the United States found itself drawn into negotiations during the immediate future, NSC 5524/1 provided appropriate guidance.

The European situation as well as recent indications of a hardened Soviet attitude prevented any relaxation of the Western position, the JSSC added. It recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 March approved, continuing to use NSC 5524/1 as the basis of their position.

A Four Power Working Group on German reunification and European security did meet in Washington from 6 to 15 March. In its report, the US, UK, French, and West German Governments recommended that the basic Western position be
maintained but that efforts be intensified to promote a better public understanding of it. To this end, the Working Group suggested clarifying and amplifying a proposal made at the 1955 Geneva summit meeting that had alluded to a demilitarized zone through phrasing that referred to "special measures" near the border. The Working Group saw some political advantage in putting forward a precise proposal for the possibility of a reunified Germany joining NATO. That could entail either complete demilitarization of East Germany or special arrangements governing the disposition of any military forces and installations. The Working Group saw little likelihood, in the near future, either that the Soviets would be receptive to new Western suggestions or that the USSR would put forward satisfactory proposals of its own. Assistant Secretary Sprague informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that no military studies need be prepared at this point, since the Working Group had not recommended departures from military positions established for the 1955 Geneva conference.11

With West German elections approaching, however, US and UK leaders decided that a more positive approach was needed. Accordingly, the four powers decided that the Working Group would reconvene in May. Since this would involve reexamining the military aspects of policies established in 1955, Assistant Secretary Sprague now asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reappraise them, taking account of technological advances, military reorganization, and tactical innovations.12

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 April, forwarded to Secretary Wilson the position they had established one month earlier. This, in turn, became Defense's position. When the Four Power Working Group met on 13 May, it drafted a presentation of the Geneva proposals, which was published on 29 July 1957 as the Berlin Declaration.13 This was not the more positive approach envisaged by US and UK leaders back in April but simply a restatement and clarification of an existing position. That, of course, was exactly what the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted.

Reacting to the Rapacki Plan

A new proposal did appear from the other side of the "Iron Curtain." Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1957, Poland's Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, called for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. Premier Bulganin repeated the offer, coupled with calls for another summit conference as well as negotiations about disarmament and European security, through a letter to President Eisenhower dated 10 December. On 14 February 1958, Foreign Minister Rapacki formally presented the US Government with the details of his plan. Within Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and West Germany, the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons would be prohibited, as would the emplacement and installation of equipment designed for their servicing. The countries in the zone, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the USSR, and other countries with forces in the area would undertake not to allow any nuclear weapons or equipment (including launchers) in the zone. The United States and the USSR, as well as any other nuclear powers,
would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any territory within the zone. To ensure implementation of these obligations, the states concerned would create a system of broad and effective control within the zone.14

Already, in January, the State Department had circulated a preliminary assessment that the Rapacki Plan posed unacceptable security risks for the West. It would freeze the division of Germany and offered no prospect of progress in settling European problems. By excluding nuclear weapons from Germany, it would invalidate the NATO strategy adopted in 1954. Nevertheless, the State Department urged that NATO as well as the Defense Department study this proposal because of the public attention it was receiving. On 24 February, Under Secretary of State Herter asked for the Department of Defense's views on the plan's military aspects, particularly the inspection requirements.15

Assistant Secretary Sprague referred this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their reply, dated 11 March, opposed a formal exchange with the Polish Government over military details of the inspection scheme, mainly on security grounds but also because focusing on this aspect might enable the Poles to enhance the apparent worth of their plan before world opinion. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concentrated upon the Rapacki Plan's broader implications. They found in it decided military disadvantages for the West. Broadly put, Allied Command Europe would lose its nuclear superiority but the Warsaw Pact would maintain its conventional advantage. The result could be the erosion and eventual collapse of Western Europe's military strength as well as the concept of collective defense under NATO.

The US Government, they continued, should emphasize to any NATO allies who might be attracted by the Rapacki Plan that it would:

1. Reduce the effectiveness of West Germany's contribution to the defense of Western Europe.
2. Increase the hazard of a Soviet surprise attack, through acceptance of an inadequate inspection system.
3. Require retreat from NATO's forward strategy, which depended upon nuclear weapons.
4. Create a situation that could lead to further Western concession under the duress of Soviet nuclear blackmail.

As for the denuclearized zone that constituted the Rapacki Plan's central feature, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves forcefully:

It is naive to assume that if general war were initiated, the parties would continue to abide by an agreement not to fire nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in the zone... This commitment would be honored only as long as it was in the military interest of both sides. For example, if the zone were overrun by enemy ground forces in support of a ground offensive against France, Belgium, and Denmark, the Western allies, in continuing to abide by this agreement would be affording the enemy a nuclear-free safe-haven from which to launch an overwhelming ground attack which might be successful with conventional weapons.
alone, particularly if supported by IRBM nuclear attacks launched from Hungary and the Western part of the USSR and aircraft overflying the zone.

Obviously, therefore, the plan struck them as unacceptable. On 20 March, Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded JCS views to Secretary Dulles, adding his own opinion that the JCS memorandum plus the Department of State's earlier appraisal constituted an adequate basis for rejecting the Rapacki Plan.\footnote{16}

On 3 May, the United States formally rejected the Rapacki Plan, declaring it too limited in scope either to reduce the danger of nuclear war or to provide a dependable basis for European security. It neither dealt with the essential question of nuclear weapons production nor took account of current inadequacies in detecting nuclear weapons. Since main launching sites remained unaffected, the plan depended upon the good intentions of powers outside the denuclearized zone. Finally, accepting Germany's division would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe.\footnote{17}

Preparations were being made, however, for the negotiations proposed by Premier Bulganin back in December. On 11 February 1958, Secretary Dulles had cautioned Secretary McElroy that the United States should be prepared to discuss specific proposals on reunification and European security, in order to formulate a "persuasive" Western position that would capture the support of German and world opinion. He asked the Defense Department to study arms and force limitation arrangements for Central Europe, assuming a reunified Germany either remained in NATO or withdrew from it.\footnote{18}

Through a memorandum to Secretary McElroy dated 27 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their belief that any tampering with allied deployments in Germany, such as total or partial withdrawal, establishment of demilitarized zones, or limitations upon forces and armaments, would require major concessions by the Soviets. Such concessions were necessary to compensate for the risks incurred by such adjustments: maldeployment, retreat from a forward strategy, the weakening of NATO, and de-emphasis on collective security arrangements in general. In fact, regional restriction of armaments involved even more risks than clearcut relocation. This impressed them as being especially true for arrangements to restrict the use of nuclear weapons, such as the Rapacki Plan. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that:

1. The United States could accept withdrawal of all foreign forces from reunified Germany, either in or out of NATO, provided that:
   a. Allied forces in West Germany could be relocated in areas contiguous to Germany;
   b. Soviet forces in Germany were repositioned behind the borders of the USSR;
   c. Germany was allowed a compensatory military buildup;
   d. The agreement could be adequately enforced.
2. Withdrawal or disengagement from a divided Germany posed unacceptable military risks, as would the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no reason to modify the policies set forth in NSC 5524/1.\footnote{19}
Secretary McElroy informed Secretary Dulles that, with one exception, he supported JCS views. While the United States should explore the possibilities of redeployment with its NATO allies, Secretary McElroy believed that relocating a substantial number of US forces to contiguous areas would create such political, financial, and military difficulties that US troops probably would have to be withdrawn from the continent altogether. This, said the Secretary, accentuated the need to assure Germany’s right to raise and maintain adequate forces. McElroy also felt that the United States must continue linking European security arrangements with German reunification. NATO’s conventional “shield” forces, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pointed out, could not by themselves defend Western Europe. Consequently, creating a nuclear-free zone, thinning out US and allied forces, or withdrawing them from a divided Germany would leave an inadequate military structure as long as the political problems that originally justified the buildup remained unresolved.

Focusing on Prevention of Surprise Attack

Instead of a summit conference, the USSR, on 27 November 1958, demanded that negotiations start within six months to terminate the four-power occupation regime in Berlin and establish West Berlin as a separate, demilitarized free city. Failing such negotiations, the Soviets would transfer all their Berlin occupation rights to the East German Government. The next section describes US and allied reactions. Briefly, they denounced the proposed Soviet moves as illegal and insisted that Berlin negotiations occur within a wider framework of German and European security.

The USSR, on 10 January 1959, declined to link the Berlin problem with either German reunification or European security. The Soviets did, however, renew their long-standing proposal to conclude an all-German peace treaty and settle the Berlin matter within that framework. That opened up a wider area for diplomatic maneuvering, and the Western powers started drafting counterproposals. By 6 March, an interdepartmental group chaired by a State Department official, and including JCS and OSD representatives, had developed a paper on the entire complex of problems concerning Germany. Their purpose was to provide guidance for the Four Power Working Group on German reunification and European security, scheduled to reconvene in Paris on 9 March. The paper proposed a draft treaty or a statement of the principles that would govern one and a comprehensive plan covering reunification, European security, and Berlin, which would be put into effect by stages. The plan contained provisions for a Special Security Area consisting of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary, with arms restrictions and an inspection system similar to those of the Rapacki Plan. No chemical and bacteriological weapons or nuclear warheads would be produced or stationed in the Special Security Area. There also would be restrictions on the emplacement of missiles and ceilings on the number of foreign and indigenous troops allowed in the area. An inspection system,
established to reduce the danger of surprise attack, subsequently would expand to cover proportionate areas of the United States and the USSR. Stage I of the plan provided for the unification of East and West Berlin, through free elections held under UN auspices. Simultaneously, another UN-supervised plebiscite would determine which foreign troops, if any, would remain in the city.22

On that same day, 6 March, Deputy Secretary Quarles sent the State Department a preliminary assessment registering emphatic disagreement with provisions governing the Special Security Area and objecting that the area itself was the one defined in the Rapacki Plan. He listed the same four risks that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had listed in their memorandum of 11 March 1958 (see p. 118). Mr. Quarles also worried that there would be demands to expand the area and establish similar zones elsewhere in the world. He believed, too, that discussing such proposals in isolation from the general problem of surprise attack and disarmament ran contrary to national policy.23

On 10 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally recorded their full agreement with Secretary Quarles’ view of the serious risks incurred by a Special Security Area. Their comments almost exactly paralleled those they had made one year earlier about the Rapacki Plan. They even opposed involving the United Nations over Berlin, noting that to hold a plebiscite on the status of forces would be to vacate the Western allies’ legal right to remain there. Since reunification appeared unobtainable in the near future, they recommended concentrating upon the immediate problem of maintaining access to West Berlin. The Western allies should seek permanent control over transportation and communications between West Germany and West Berlin in exchange for the following commitments:

1. Reaffirm the US intention to use military force only to defend its vital interests against aggression.
2. Acknowledge the East German regime as a de facto provisional government, pending reunification.
3. Support arrangements to permit free trade between East and West Germany.

The Office of International Security Affairs informed State that “the emphasis placed upon the Berlin problem by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reflected in US efforts to develop proposals for negotiation with the USSR.”24

Before the month was out, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had further occasion to appraise the US position. They did so in preparation for a conference of Western foreign ministers. Since the plan for a Special Security Area had not changed substantially during the interim, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took this opportunity to criticize the European security proposals in more detail than before. They opposed missile restrictions as well as a prohibition upon the production of chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons as impractical because adequate inspection was technically infeasible. The Special Security Area, they also believed, was too small to allow effective protection against surprise attack by aircraft and missiles. Any inspection system developed for the area should deal solely with verification that agreed commitments were being implemented rather than as increased protection against surprise attack. Finally, if any disarmament
measures at all were to be included, then the entire proposal of 29 August 1957 (described in chapter 5) should be included. This point flowed from the JCS belief that regional arrangements were useless as long as the USSR maintained enormous military power within its own borders.

The State Department decided that only some elements of the 29 August 1957 proposal were applicable to German reunification and European security. In particular, a provision tying force cutbacks to general arms reduction was added to the plan. Through a letter to his counterpart in ISA, Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant defended the Special Security Area proposal. While Soviet agreement seemed improbable, "reasonable proposals which would not be disadvantageous if accepted" must be presented for psychological and propaganda reasons. For this purpose, Merchant continued, the most appropriate security measures seemed to be those involving inspection and observation for protection against surprise attack. In formulating the plan, he said, the prime consideration had not been what proposals were most valuable but which ones would be "new" and posed no danger to US security. He asked the Defense Department to estimate, under several conditions, appropriate ceilings in the Special Security Area for the forces of a reunified Germany and for non-German forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 April, criticized such proposals as being too detailed and complex, if they were to be presented for psychological and propaganda reasons alone. The departure from established US policy would be detected and, because it would be taken as an indication of weakness, handicap the United States in future negotiations. They restated their belief that the proposals were framed in too narrow a context and might harm global US interests. Again, they rejected the idea that an inspection system in Europe could help prevent surprise attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it premature and unwise to propose specific force ceilings within the Special Security Area. Since the Soviet threat to NATO remained the same, NATO's current force goals for West Germany represented reasonable ceilings in the Special Security Area for a reunified Germany and for non-German forces.

The Western foreign ministers, meeting in Paris during 29 to 30 April, established final negotiating positions on German reunification, European security, and Berlin. Afterwards the JCS representative, Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, characterized these positions as "satisfactory from a military point of view." West Germany opposed defining the Special Security Area as "Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary" as discriminating against Germany and following the Rapacki Plan too closely. The foreign ministers substituted "a zone comprising areas of comparable size and importance on either side of a line to be determined." The provision for an inspection zone against surprise attack was watered down to a general statement that such measures "could be undertaken in such geographical areas throughout the world" as might be agreed upon by the states concerned. Instead of specific ceilings for indigenous forces, the Western powers would talk about ceilings for a unified Germany similar to the limitations upon West Germany prescribed by the Paris Accord of 23 October 1954. Since the French opposed specific proposals for global numerical ceilings, these too were treated in broad terms. The foreign ministers also rejected proposals,
opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to prohibit the stationing of IRBMs in Central Europe and to conduct a plebiscite in Berlin.28

Thus, in essence, the Western powers stood by the Eden Plan. Unlike the Eden Plan, though, they set up a four-stage schedule for accomplishing objectives, linked with a general reduction of armaments. The new plan still envisaged reunification through free elections, which the Soviets were known to oppose. It also retained another feature known to be particularly objectionable to the USSR: a united Germany could join NATO, although the Soviets would be offered additional security guarantees.

At Geneva, in May 1959, the Western foreign ministers presented these proposals to their Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko. It soon became clear that Gromyko would have nothing to do with them, so Western spokesmen had little choice but to discuss the Berlin issue by itself. Gromyko called upon the Western powers to reduce their garrisons in West Berlin, which numbered around 11,000, to “symbolic” contingents. On 16 June, they replied with an “interim” offer not to increase their forces in West Berlin, not to arm them with nuclear weapons (which they had no intention of doing anyway), and not to countenance subversive activities against East Berlin and East Germany if the USSR gave a corresponding pledge. No agreement proved possible and the meeting recessed for a month.

When the conference resumed in July, Foreign Minister Gromyko chose to link the Berlin question with that of an all-German committee to prepare for a peace treaty. The Western powers then found themselves in the position of having to argue for an agreement about Berlin alone. “We have reached a point,” the French Foreign Minister observed, “where neither side knows what the other is talking about.” The foreign ministers’ conference adjourned on 5 August with nothing accomplished.29

Late in 1959, as the Berlin confrontation eased, preparations for a summit conference began in earnest. Among the materials that received extensive study was a proposal for a European inspection zone to prevent surprise ground attack. General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, had made this suggestion in March 1958. Essentially, a zone in Central Europe would be policed by joint air and ground inspection teams as well as overlapping radar, coupled with a freeze on nonindigenous forces at current levels.

General Norstad, in April 1960, submitted a revised and expanded version of his plan. Past proposals, he pointed out, had contained features that made them militarily unacceptable to the West. The Eden Plan, for instance, envisaged a demilitarized zone too narrow for practical value in the fast-moving situations of modern war. The Rapacki Plan would have deprived NATO of its nuclear shield while leaving the USSR’s massive conventional forces within striking distance of Western Europe. Instead, Norstad argued, a zonal plan must not change basic power relationships and must confine itself to very limited aims. He outlined a system of mobile ground inspection covering as large an area as possible between the Atlantic and the Urals, but as an “irreducible minimum the two Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Benelux, and at least part of Denmark, or the equivalent.” Aerial inspection would cover an area at least as great. In sum, Norstad believed this plan might fill a need “for the West to have in reserve the
possibility of a fresh proposal if we are to emerge from another round of negotiations with the Soviets with unimpaired NATO unity." 

On 27 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Gates what seemed like a qualified approval of the Norstad plan. Against the advantage of eliminating the threat of a surprise ground attack lay a larger consideration that "the threat to NATO is posed by the entire military strength of the USSR and not by any single component thereof." The intelligence gain, of course, would depend upon the zone's size. If it stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals, valuable target intelligence would be gleaned. If the minimum zone was adopted, however, the great majority of strategic targets in the USSR would not be exposed.

The following day, though, Assistant Secretary Irwin recorded his impression that the JCS reply had been shaped by a desire to avoid throwing roadblocks in the way of a political decision to proceed with the Norstad plan. He had been told informally that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would support a Defense position that the risks involved in presenting this plan at the summit conference outweighed any advantages.

As chapter 5 relates, the Paris summit meeting of May 1960 abruptly ended in failure, even before detailed proposals could be tabled. The next month, the United States tabled a general provision for a European inspection zone at the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. By then, however, the Soviets had walked out of that conference too. The remainder of 1960 passed without further talks on European security.

By the end of 1960, West Germany had become fully integrated into NATO's political, economic, and military fabric. The Bundeswehr, nearing its goal of twelve divisions, soon would represent the largest European contingent in NATO. Of course, the problems of German reunification and European security were no nearer solution in 1960 than they had been in 1957. The Soviet Union could not agree to reunification through free elections because this almost certainly would result in a Germany committed to the West. Similarly, the Western powers could not agree to European security measures that would prevent establishment of a free, united Germany, imply acceptance of Soviet domination over the satellites, or compromise NATO's effectiveness.

Neither superpower judged the steps required to achieve German reunification to be compatible with its own security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their recommendations, explicitly recognized this fact. To them, the most important goal in Europe was building a strong NATO. The necessary corollary to this lay in creating a strong West German force committed to defending Western Europe. Thus, in their judgment, measures for disengagement, for regional disarmament or denuclearization, and for inspection zones in Central Europe were digressions from the central concern and usually inimical to US security interests. When negotiations failed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not displeased.
Challenge over Berlin

When World War II ended, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and France divided Berlin as well as Germany into four separate occupation zones. But Berlin lay 110 miles within what became the Soviet satellite state of East Germany. In 1945, the four occupying powers had concluded written agreements about a system of air traffic control, including three air corridors linking Berlin with the Western zones of Germany. Only a verbal understanding, however, allowed the Western powers to use a major highway and a rail line. In June 1948, the USSR blockaded all ground access to West Berlin. The Western powers responded with an airlift that kept their sectors supplied with the necessities of life. The Soviets, in May 1949, ended their blockade and relative calm enveloped Berlin. Berlin now had two separate governments, with a communist regime in East Berlin and a noncommunist one in the three sectors that comprised West Berlin.

The vulnerability of West Berlin compelled US policymakers to keep contingency plans under continuous scrutiny. Abandoning the city, successive US administrations were convinced, would deal a devastating blow to Western unity. NSC 5404/1, approved by the National Security Council in January 1954, declared that if the USSR restricted access it would be "of crucial importance to demonstrate at once the firm intent of the United States not to tolerate such action." If the Soviets persisted in threatening access, the United States and its allies should take immediate and forceful countermeasures, even though they risked general war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff heartily endorsed this statement of purpose.34

These broad policies were translated into specific military plans by USEUCOM Plans (Berlin) 10-55 and 12-55, dated 6 July and 17 November 1955, respectively. In case of blockade or serious restrictions upon access, USCEINCEUR outlined in the 10-55 Plan two courses of action. While the force employed to ascertain Soviet intentions would not exceed one reinforced platoon, the size of forces needed to reopen access could not be determined in advance. The plan, however, would not provide for a progressive commitment. If the initial US thrust met determined Soviet opposition, no additional forces would be sent into action. They would be reserved, instead, for the general war that probably would follow.

Plan 12-55, the air counterpart of Plan 10-55, outlined a strictly limited objective of preventing the depletion of supplies built up in West Berlin since the 1948–1949 blockade. An all-out airlift, it was felt, would be essentially defensive and thereby leave the Western powers open to recurring Soviet pressure. Also, the Soviets now possessed electronic devices to harass airlift radio and radar, thus rendering all-weather flying difficult and costly. On 8 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved both Plans 10-55 and 12-55. Subsequently, they accepted a change in Plan 10–55 deleting armed action by rail as well as by road, because trains could be rerouted or blocked very easily.35

Between 1949 and 1957, the Soviets occasionally resorted to minor pinpricks about access rights but did nothing that caused real alarm. When the administration reviewed US policy toward Germany at the end of 1957, it decided that the portion regarding Berlin in NSC 5404/1 remained valid and needed no change.
Accordingly, that portion was incorporated into the new paper on Germany, NSC 5803, as Supplement 1.  

The comparative quiet enveloping Berlin vanished on 27 November 1958, when the USSR informed the Western powers of its intention to alter the city's basic status. Wartime arrangements had lost their validity, Moscow maintained. In their place, a demilitarized West Berlin would become "an independent political unit—a free city without any state, including both existing German states, interfering in its political life." If such a solution had not been negotiated by 27 May 1959, the USSR would transfer to the East German Government all the occupation and access functions that it had been performing since 1945.  

On 14 December 1958, the Foreign Ministers of France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom joined Secretary Dulles in issuing an unqualified rejection of the Soviet proposals. Two days later, the full North Atlantic Council declared that no member state could approve a solution that jeopardized the three powers' right to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities so required, or any solution that did not assure free access to the city, or one that failed to resolve the German question as a whole. On 31 December, the US Government declared its willingness to discuss, "in an atmosphere free of coercion or threats,... the question of Berlin in the wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the German problem as well as that of European security."  

Combined military planning proved much more difficult to carry out. The Defense Department, with JCS concurrence, proposed on 9 December that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France revise their contingency plans immediately to "eliminate all dealing" with East German rail and highway control officials. Two days later, US officials proposed to the British and French that certain actions be taken jointly if East Germany assumed control over access to Berlin. But neither ally would agree to the portion of the proposal calling for military force to reopen surface access before resorting to an airlift had been considered.  

At a meeting of US, UK, and French representatives on 5 January 1959, allied spokesmen asked to see a statement of the preparations needed to prove determination "on a large scale" to foes and friends alike. Eight days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a list of preparations they deemed necessary to demonstrate allied firmness. Both the Soviet Union and US allies, they emphasized, "must be convinced of our willingness to use whatever degree of force may be necessary to accomplish this objective." To achieve that objective, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an extensive list of preparatory measures, which would start with small steps in January and move to some degree of mobilization late in March. Soon after the 27 May deadline passed, a small motor convoy would move along the autobahn to Berlin. If the convoy was stopped or cut off, an allied force not exceeding one reinforced division would go to its rescue. Should that effort also meet strong resistance, the imminence of general war must be recognized.  

The Secretary of Defense promptly forwarded this memorandum to Secretary Dulles. Mr. McElroy said that he recognized, as did the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that a good many measures could not be carried out at the times proposed "for
political, budgetary, or other reasons.” Nonetheless, he and they believed that a firm political decision should precede detailed military planning. That decision should embody the following principles: First, a stoppage of surface access would be met by necessary military action on the ground, not by the “evasion” of an airlift. Second, a challenge would be met wherever it occurred—in the air, on the ground, or both. Third, initial actions would be followed by an increasing use of force, accepting the risk of general war.41

On 29 January, President Eisenhower reviewed Berlin planning with State and Defense officials. Secretary Dulles challenged the JCS proposal promptly to commit a division, on grounds that allied opinion could not be sufficiently mobilized by 27 May to permit the immediate use of so large a force. He argued, and Secretary McElroy agreed, that time should elapse between the first probe and the use of appreciable force. The Chief Executive also commented that one division was either too much or too little. General Twining made a forceful reply: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff fear that the United States will go halfway and then quit. They feel that if we do not carry through with our resolution to risk general war we might as well get out of Europe.” President Eisenhower pointed out that allied support was essential, and Dulles’ approach was designed to ensure it. Even Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, he added, might not go along with a “Berlin or bust” action. Eisenhower said that US policy must compel the Soviets to use force, rather than merely throw up obstructions,” after which we are in a position to issue an ultimatum prior to initiation of general war.”42

A low-key approach to the Berlin situation, approved by President Eisenhower on 30 January, provided for taking quiet preparatory measures that Soviet intelligence would detect but that would not cause public alarm. If access routes were obstructed and more open measures of readiness failed to make the Soviets draw back, the three powers then should decide whether to apply greater pressure by employing additional forces. General Twining, on 2 February, gave Secretary McElroy and General Norstad a list of possible military actions. The low-key approach was presented to the British and French Governments on 18 February as a basis for further planning.43

During a JCS meeting on 4 March, it was agreed that each Service Chief would submit a list of actions that would improve readiness for general war. Since they all made submissions the next day, Service Staffs obviously had been spending a good deal of time on the matter. Some of their most significant recommendations are listed below:

**Army:** On 27 March, alert ready reserve divisions for active duty and begin sending 10,000 replacements to US Army, Europe. On 17 April, issue a presidential proclamation and call one million men to active duty, effective 17 May.

**Navy:** By 15 April, place thirty destroyers from the reserve fleet in full operational readiness. Early in May, establish an antisubmarine barrier between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom.

**Air Force:** On 27 April, alert selected Air Reserve and Air National Guard for possible callup; place Strategic Air Command on increased alert and readiness status. On 20 May, execute worldwide dispersal programs and place overseas tactical offensive forces on a one-third ground alert.
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Marine Corps: Deploy one-third of a division/wing team to Europe by 20 May and have the rest of the team ready for sea movement.44

The NSC, convening on 5 March, decided to continue the low-key approach. President Eisenhower stated that “there would be nothing worse than for us to mobilize, which would in effect constitute a victory for the Russians.” General Twining presented, and the Chief Executive approved, General Norstad’s request for another 7,000 US Army personnel. But the President added that this should be made public only through a routine announcement. The next day, among themselves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced deep concern. The administration, in their judgment, seemed mainly concerned with avoiding anything that might create public alarm. They believed that “if war comes we will not be in a better position in the future than we are right now.” They did not seek a decision to go to war but, rather, a decision to do what was needed to prepare for one. An informed public, they were convinced, would not take alarm but see such steps as simple prudence.45

President Eisenhower did not believe that a conventional buildup would impress Soviet leaders. Concurrently, in fact, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee asked the President whether he wanted more forces. No, Eisenhower replied; a mobilization adding two or three divisions to counter the USSR’s 175 divisions would make no sense. He did not believe all-out war would come, but added that it it did “we must have the crust to follow through.” On 9 March, General Twining told the President that some Service Chiefs felt the administration was “not going far enough in responding to the berlin crisis.” Significantly, Twining added that he did not share their view. President Eisenhower responded by stressing the necessity to avoid over-reacting because he anticipated continuous Soviet attempts around the world to “throw us off balance.” He remained sure about the adequacy of a defense program based on “deterrence, our air power, our missiles, and our allies.” In his judgment, the proposal to increase US Army, Europe, by 7,000 men was intended “primarily . . . to give General Taylor ammunition for avoiding his programmed cut of 30,000.”46

A JCS memorandum to Secretary McElroy, dated 11 March, listed what they saw as three important defects in the low-key approach. First, it limited measures to quiet, preparatory steps. Second, it did not face up to the vital need for immediate decisions that should be taken in view of the risk of general war. Third, and most serious of all, it failed to make an unqualified assertion of the determination to fight if all other measures were of no avail. In order to convince Soviet leaders that the United States would risk a general war over Berlin, open preparations to fight were necessary. Losing Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff bluntly told Secretary McElroy, “would be a political and military disaster.” Concessions that might lead to such a loss had the potential to prove equally dangerous. Nevertheless, they believed it unlikely that the USSR would risk general war to evict the Western powers. The Soviet leaders, they concluded, probably recognized that the United States could inflict greater damage upon the USSR than it would receive.47

Five days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary another paper that revealed their sense of beleaguered frustration. The USSR, they maintained,
continues to pursue an uncompromisingly aggressive policy designed to achieve its goal of global hegemony. The Soviets have pursued a bold, dynamic, expansive strategy...with demands for changing the world situation in the Soviets' favor. Their final fall-back position is always the status quo. On the side of the Free World there often has been relative passivity and lack of initiative. The Western Powers seem to have developed a standard response to the Soviet-created crisis: "How far can we retreat from the status quo but still not SERIOUSLY jeopardize our security or prestige?" This attitude apparently stimulates the Soviet appetite for ever bolder adventures.

To reverse this psychology, they recommended a "drastic" policy revision and suggested three alternatives for doing it. First, serve notice that if the Soviets turned access control over to East Germany, the Western powers then would recognize West Germany as the sole legal government of all Germany. Second, announce that if a turnover occurred, the Western powers reserved the right to exercise throughout Germany the occupational authority heretofore exercised by the USSR. Third, be prepared to recognize the East German regime as a de facto provisional government in return for granting the Western powers absolute and unconditional control over access routes, guaranteeing against any interference with access, and accepting the continued presence of allied garrisons in West Berlin. Secretary McElroy transmitted this paper to the State Department without comment. In reply, the Acting Secretary of State promised to give it "serious study." He denied, though, that Soviet policy was invariably active and US policy invariably passive. Might not the Soviets be reacting to West Berlin's disruptive influence upon East Germany and to Western initiatives for German unification?

On 4 April 1959, the three powers agreed upon a basic policy for joint planning and action. Drafted by State Department officials in collaboration with representatives from the British and French embassies, it made provision for planning (but not actually carrying out) more elaborate military measures in Europe, which would be generally observable. These would include steps to be taken after the Soviets turned their control functions over to East German authorities as well as measures to be carried out after allied traffic had been forcibly obstructed. Tripartite plans should include an initial probe to determine Soviet and East German intentions, economic and other nonmilitary measures appropriate to the occasion, and measures to maintain air access.

Meantime, pursuant to a State-Defense recommendation, President Eisenhower on 17 March had ordered an interdepartmental analysis of the politico-military implications of undertaking substantial efforts to reopen ground and air access, reprisals in other areas, and general war preparations. A draft report was circulated early in April. Its conclusions, which included two noteworthy reservations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are summarized below:

1. A reinforced battalion seemed enough to constitute a substantial probe. Using up to a reinforced division, with tactical air support, probably would not be enough to reopen and maintain ground access to West Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved judgment about this finding.
2. Air access could be reestablished and maintained, although not without serious risk of combat. If long continued, such a garrison airlift probably would induce the
Soviets to seek a peaceful solution rather than take more drastic action. Again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved judgment.

3. Naval reprisals against Soviet and East German shipping incurred a major risk of retaliation and probably would not alter the Soviet position on Berlin.

4. The full range of general war preparations probably would convince the Soviets of Western determination and lead to concessions by them. However, the risks of miscalculation that might result from such a drastic step were such that the United States should not proceed unless it was prepared to resort to general war at any moment.50

On 18 April, Acting Secretary of State Robert Murphy sent President Eisenhower this report as well as one that appraised non-military countermeasures. Both studies, said Murphy, concluded that a very substantial political effort would be required beforehand to muster public support. Whether these measures achieved their aim would depend on how seriously the Soviets viewed the risk of general war. Influencing the Soviets, in turn, depended upon pressing ahead with convincing preparatory steps. A graduated application of pressures appeared to be the politically desirable course, since it would help retain free world support and avoid prematurely engaging the full prestige of Soviet bloc countries. On the other hand, such an approach would leave the duration of a crisis uncertain, perhaps allow access interference to continue, and possibly create difficulties about securing allied and neutral support for an eventual resort to force. Therefore, to preserve maximum flexibility, Murphy recommended delaying any decision about timing and sequence of actions. On 23 April, the NSC authorized the Defense Department to use the military countermeasures study as a basis for initial planning. Any decisions about actually executing such plans, the President added, would be made “in the light of circumstances as they develop.” General Norstad received both studies, but they were withheld from the allies.51

Meanwhile, machinery for accomplishing tripartite military planning had been established. General Norstad had proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 March that a small staff designated by the name LIVE OAK be attached to USEUCOM headquarters to draft tripartite plans. On 1 April, after receiving French and British approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized USCINCEUR to establish LIVE OAK, which he did two weeks later. President Eisenhower created an interdepartmental Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning, chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Director, J–5, served as JCS representative. It coordinated the political, economic, and military measures contained in the contingency plans and served as the conduit for placing US positions before tripartite planners in Washington.

The LIVE OAK staff quickly enumerated quiet, preparatory measures and followed these with a plan for the initial probe. On 18 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed USCINCEUR that, since the foreign ministers’ conference might collapse and be followed by Soviet provocations, all contingency planning must be completed as soon as possible. By early August, LIVE OAK planners had completed a study of more elaborate military measures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found it generally in consonance with US policy.52
In May 1959, as page 123 has recounted, the four-power conference of foreign ministers opened by discussing German and European security but finally focused upon Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in mid-July, suggested tabling a proposal to scrap existing air and surface access arrangements in favor of a single air and surface corridor. Initially, for bargaining purposes, the Western powers could demand a corridor one hundred miles wide over which the West German Government would have full sovereignty. The minimum position would be a corridor sixty miles wide, in which control over “Western traffic” would be vested in the Western allies. This proposal, they claimed, had the merit of providing a negotiable position without bringing forward the issue of recognizing the East German regime. US negotiators never tabled this proposal.

The Soviets had let the six-month deadline pass, on 27 May, without taking any action. The USSR long had maintained that the Berlin problem could be solved only by a heads of government meeting, and their performance at the foreign ministers’ conference may have been designed to prove this point. On 5 August, two days before the conference ended, President Eisenhower invited Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States. Their talks at Camp David, late in September, were more evocative of spirit than productive of tangible result. The two leaders did agree, though, that while Berlin negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely, no fixed time limit was being set upon them. During the last days of December, the four powers agreed to hold a summit meeting in May 1960.

For some time, the Soviets had been asserting that Western aircraft using the corridor to Berlin were forbidden to fly above 10,000 feet, allegedly for safety reasons. The Western powers denied any right to impose such a restriction. On 26 March 1959, after President Eisenhower had approved a State-Defense recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to start military transport flights above 10,000 feet at once, “openly and in a normal fashion.” Two round-trip flights occurred—the first on 27 March, the second on 15 April—and both were harassed by Soviet planes and protested by the Soviet Government. The State Department decided that these flights had adequately demonstrated the US position. During the remainder of 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unsuccessfully urged that such flights be resumed. The State Department interposed a series of vetoes. First, it was unwilling to give the Soviets an opportunity to jeopardize the foreign ministers’ conference or the Camp David meeting; then it worried lest the matter become an issue in Great Britain’s October elections; later, State did not want to endanger the conclusion of arrangements for the Paris summit meeting.

Even though tension eased, unilateral and tripartite planning went forward. In mid-December 1959, French and British members of the LIVE OAK staff received authority to proceed with the planning outlined in the “more elaborate military measures” of the preceding August. Concurrently, USCINCEUR completed a new unilateral contingency plan, OPLAN 200–10, which consolidated and superseded the four basic Berlin plans, two of which had been in effect since 1955. This new plan was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 February 1960; they approved it, with a few minor changes, on 17 May.

Premier Khrushchev had said in January 1960 that if the heads of state did not reach an agreement about Berlin, he would sign a separate peace treaty with East
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Germany. On 28 March, Acting Secretary Douglas asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether the US military posture in mid-summer would permit contingency plans to be carried out and what additional actions, relative to US military interests in Berlin, should be taken if the Soviets announced their firm intention to sign a separate treaty. Their reply, dated 12 May, assured him that plans could be implemented. Since the execution of these plans carried a risk of general war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again recommended measures to improve the US position and demonstrate readiness to risk such a conflict. Such measures should include an increased alert, dispersal, and some degree of mobilization. As for Berlin itself, they saw no need for additional steps beyond those envisaged by unilateral and tripartite planning.57

The Paris summit meeting ended in a quick and spectacular collapse for reasons explained in chapter 5. Responding to a request from the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a checklist of possible provocations together with military and nonmilitary countermeasures. These included.

1. Increased tension and/or an imminent turnover of access control to East Germany: among the twenty-one measures were flying through the air corridors above 10,000 feet and conducting extensive military exercises in Europe.
2. Actual turnover of control to East Germany: the fourteen options included bringing US forces in Europe to full strength and establishing an antisubmarine barrier patrol along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom line.
3. Imposition of formalities or controls unacceptable to the allies: the thirty-six measures included alerting CONUS-based forces and placing allied forces in Europe on the ready.
4. Interruption or suspension of air or ground traffic: among the twenty-four measures were declaration of a national emergency, initiation of mobilization, deployment of additional forces to Europe, launching of a probe, and initiation of a garrison airlift.
5. Failure of negotiation and continued obstruction of allied traffic: the ten options included execution of electronic and naval countermeasures as well as military operations to reopen access.58

West Berlin's economy depended upon artificial stimuli and outside aid. By autumn, the Soviets seemed to be aiming at a most vulnerable point, the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe. Late in September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced concern that Soviet economic pressures were being carried out with some effectiveness and in a diffuse way, avoiding any identifiably hostile act. After characterizing the Western response as slow and limited, they expressed a fear that West Berlin's economic viability gradually could be destroyed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended urgent consideration of additional and more stringent countermeasures. The United States, they argued, should launch a program of political and military actions "before the continued freedom of West Berlin came into doubt."

In reply, Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant warned against "firing off all of our ammunition at once or too soon." These harassments called for
reaction by West Germany, in his opinion, and that country was instituting economic countermeasures. Bonn, for example, had threatened to cancel a trade agreement with East Germany. The NSC Operations Coordinating Board also expressed concern about West Berlin’s economic prospects over the long run. On 1 December, the National Security Council agreed that the Planning Board should bring the Berlin portion of NSC 5803 up to date. Here, though, President Eisenhower’s stewardship of the Berlin issue ended.59

The Berlin story can be summed up by saying that, during 1959, President Eisenhower prevented a confrontation from escalating into a crisis. He held to a low-key approach, rejecting JCS warnings that sizable, overt military preparations were necessary to deter the USSR. In their memorandum of 16 March 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff condemned what they saw as a policy of “relative passivity and lack of initiative. . . .” But here a defensive success that simply preserved the status quo proved quite sufficient. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with a great many others, did not perceive that time was slowly working in the West’s favor.
The Middle East: Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine

Limitations of the Eisenhower Doctrine

By January 1957, the Middle East had become one of the Cold War's most volatile battlegrounds. The region contained huge petroleum deposits, and the economies of Western Europe depended upon oil imported from the Middle East. The need to keep oil-exporting countries pro-Western in their orientation was obvious, but the difficulties of doing so were equally apparent. The colonial era left a legacy of anti-Western feeling among peoples of the area. Political currents in this unstable region were made more turbulent by the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state. No sooner did Jewish leaders proclaim Israel's existence in May 1948 than the surrounding Arab states launched an attack. Israel won a decisive military success, but the 1949 armistice left larger political issues and enmities unresolved. As early as 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff worried that US support of Israel could alienate the Arabs, endanger access to oil, and spread Soviet influence throughout the area.

In October 1956, after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, Great Britain and France joined with Israel in attacking Egypt. Israeli forces halted after occupying the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza strip, and Sharm al-Shaykh at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. British and French troops seized Port Said and were ready to press on, but strong US pressure led them to accept a cease-fire and then to withdraw. The USSR, which had threatened to intervene on Nasser's behalf, gained political credit with the Arabs. Conversely, the Suez debacle destroyed British and French influence. President Nasser emerged as the Arab world's hero. The Eisenhower administration took no comfort from that, because Nasser's fiery rhetoric suggested an affinity with communism and threatened the conservative, pro-Western monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq.
The US Government felt obliged to cultivate both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab countries had vital oil fields and strategic locations; Israel could invoke a common bond of democracy and appeal to the Jewish community in the United States. Early in 1957, a confrontation between the United States and Israel took place. The Israelis evacuated Sinai proper but remained in Gaza on grounds that it had been a base for guerrilla raids, and in Sharm al-Shaykh because they wanted to end Egypt's blockade of the Persian Gulf. President Eisenhower insisted that Israel comply with UN resolutions calling for complete evacuation. On 1 March, under heavy US pressure, Israel did agree to withdraw. A 5,700-man United Nations Emergency Force took up positions on the Egyptian side of the border.

Planning to Meet Aggression

The spread of Soviet control into the Middle East remained President Eisenhower's uppermost concern. On 5 January 1957, the Chief Executive asked Congress for a joint resolution authorizing him to use US armed forces as he deemed necessary under carefully defined conditions. These were: to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern country requesting help, when faced with overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. The President also sought authority to establish a Military Assistance Program for any country in the area that requested one. Congress passed a resolution that became known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine"; the Chief Executive signed it on 9 March. In Eisenhower's judgment, this resolution provided "the consent of the Congress in proclaiming the administration's resolve to block the Soviet Union's march to the Mediterranean, to the Suez Canal and the pipelines, and to the underground lakes of oil which fuel the homes and factories of Western Europe."1

Although Admiral Radford had been informed of the steps leading to President Eisenhower's statement of 5 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received no opportunity to contribute to its development. While Congress debated the precise form to give to the Eisenhower Doctrine, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were analyzing its military implications and its potential impact upon Military Assistance Programs. Through a memorandum to Secretary Wilson dated 1 February, they recommended increased military aid only to Iraq and Turkey, plus beginning a modest program for Lebanon. Proclaiming a doctrine that provided for US military intervention, they believed, would have greater weight than any prospective increase in the defensive strength of Middle Eastern countries.2

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed their Joint Middle East Planning Committee (JMEPC) to consider several questions. Could the United States cope militarily with an "extreme Soviet reaction" probably resulting in general war? How would the joint resolution affect military planning with Middle Eastern countries? What military commitments should the United States be prepared to undertake in the region?3
Replying on 20 February, the JMEPC noted that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, as well as subsidiary plans, were designed to deal with an extreme Soviet reaction resulting in general war. Existing plans could be modified to deal with communist-inspired limited war. The committee also concluded that planning with Middle Eastern countries could best be accomplished through the Baghdad Pact organization, described in chapter 11, and by bilateral planning. A unified command for the Middle East would provide the necessary centralized control and coordination. Planning objectives ought to include improved facilities for logistical support. Until a general US defense plan for the Middle East won approval, the JMEPC could see no sure basis for determining what military commitments might be required. During peacetime, though, large numbers of combat forces should not be stationed in the area.  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 6 March, referred the JMEPC's report to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC). Already, on 15 February, the JSPC had been directed to examine the prospects for military planning talks with Middle Eastern nations. Country by country, what subjects should US representatives cover in these conversations, what agency should conduct the talks, and at what level of commitment? The JSPC submitted its report on 14 March, two days after President Eisenhower announced that Ambassador James P. Richards, formerly a Democratic Congressman, would tour Middle Eastern countries explaining the Eisenhower Doctrine and receiving reactions to it. The JSPC recommended that, as soon as the Richards mission ended, preliminary talks with Middle East governments should be undertaken by a group composed of a JCS officer as senior member, a member of the JSPC, and either the Deputy Director for Military Assistance Affairs or his representative. Subsequently, another group assisted by officers representing the Services, USCINCEUR, and CINCNELM should visit countries to conduct detailed planning. Activation of a centralized command, while desirable, did not appear necessary to carry out planning negotiations. 

The JSPC listed five objectives for the preliminary talks. First, explain the Eisenhower Doctrine's military aspects and US readiness to assist independent nations against Soviet aggression. Second, after US concepts for defense of the Middle East had been developed, gain local acceptance of them. Third, assess the magnitude of the area-wide defense problem. Fourth, induce governments to be realistic in their planning by taking full account of the vast contribution the United States could make, by removing obstacles to stationing troops of one Middle East country in another's territory, and by prestocking and preparing defense positions for use by another country's forces. Fifth, stimulate preparation of a common defense plan for the area.  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 22 March, sent Secretary Wilson a memorandum which could serve to inform the State Department of these proposals. They felt that preliminary talks should be confined to the Baghdad Pact's regional members—Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—unless after consultations with Ambassador Richards it appeared beneficial to include other countries visited by him. They also decided that the preliminary planning group should consist of three flag officers, including one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

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Assistant Secretary Sprague forwarded these proposals to the State Department on 28 March. A few days earlier, the administration had announced that the United States would begin actively participating in the work of the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee. General Twining had been chosen to head the preliminary planning group. Since the Military Committee would meet at Karachi early in June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated him to represent the Defense Department at that meeting also.7

By late April, the idea had taken hold that full participation in the Military Committee was a sufficient step for the time being. On 14 May, General Twining and the two officers chosen to assist him met with State Department representatives. All agreed that, at this point, a visit by the preliminary planning group would be premature.8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 13 June, sent Secretary Wilson their assessment of the Eisenhower Doctrine's military implications. This was their contribution to a study ordered three months earlier by the National Security Council. The JCS response specified three situations for which US plans were required. First, in a global war, the JSCP called for a strategic defensive in the Middle East, with US and allied strategic air offensives making the major contribution. Second, for an Arab-Israeli war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and British military planners had exchanged but not finalized contingency plans. These plans aimed primarily at deterring Arab-Israeli hostilities and, if war began, at rapid intervention to localize and terminate them. The Eisenhower Doctrine, of course, would not apply to such situations.

The third situation, the one envisaged by the Eisenhower Doctrine, involved US assistance against armed aggression by a country controlled by international communism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, in the near future, the two countries most likely to fall under communist domination were Egypt and Syria, although Jordan might also succumb if King Hussein were overthrown or assassinated. Syrian aggression, with Soviet assistance in aircraft or technicians, might be directed against Iraq or Jordan, but there were so many other possibilities that contingency plans could not be prepared for all of them. While they would have to appraise each situation as it arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that only small mobile US forces would be required. Certain countries (a draft had mentioned Iraq) might have to prepare bases to receive US forces. Special equipment might have to be prestocked at these locations, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not yet intend to initiate any actions for that purpose. Finally, they believed that changes in the Military Assistance Program should occur over the long term, not the immediate future, and affect MAP's pattern rather than its scope. For FY 1959, in fact, they visualized no changes.9

On 26 June, Secretary Wilson forwarded JCS views to the National Security Council and indicated his general agreement with them. However, subsequent discussion in the NSC Planning Board raised a number of questions. How and to what extent were planning and operations to be coordinated with Middle Eastern governments and armed forces? In the event of overt Soviet aggression, would the United States implement its global war plans or undertake limited counteraction? In the latter case, were there enough small mobile forces? If the Soviets decided to
commit "volunteers," what would be the appropriate US response? The Planning Board concluded that these questions could best be answered within the context of an NSC review of overall policy toward the Middle East.\textsuperscript{10}

During an NSC meeting on 18 July, President Eisenhower voiced concern that the Planning Board might be stepping into the field of contingency planning. He directed Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles, and Admiral Radford, in consultation with the Director, Central Intelligence, and Mr. Cutler, to determine what contingencies the United States should prepare to meet. After the Joint Chiefs of Staff had appraised US capabilities, the NSC then would decide what the Planning Board should do.\textsuperscript{11}

At an interdepartmental meeting five days later, Admiral Radford outlined the JCS concept of operations. If UN sanction proved unobtainable, he listed six unilateral courses of action: deterrent action to prevent hostilities; maritime blockade for the same purpose; direct aerial intervention; air, ground, and naval intervention; maritime blockade and air intervention; and, finally, a combination of maritime blockade plus air, ground, and naval intervention. Prior to intervention in certain areas, the necessary base, landing, and transit rights would have to be obtained.

Admiral Radford related that available naval forces included the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, built around two attack carriers, as well as a destroyer division and command ship operating in the Persian Gulf area. A Marine division/wing team could move from the East Coast to the Middle East in less than a month. The Air Force could quickly deploy one fighter-bomber wing, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one tactical bomber squadron from Europe; one medium bomber wing based in North Africa could deliver backup strikes. The Army immediately could move an advance party of six hundred men with three hundred tons of equipment from Europe; a regimental combat team of eleven thousand men could follow by air and sea. Two infantry divisions from the United States could arrive in less than two months, but Radford believed that small, mobile forces could handle most situations "provided the United States reacts with decision and dispatch." After hearing this presentation, Mr. Cutler decided that a formal submission of JCS views would not be necessary.\textsuperscript{12}

It would be wrong, however, to assume that a family of plans existed in mid-1957. One of the more basic items, Middle East Emergency Defense Plan 1–57, was drafted by the JMEPC and then forwarded to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in the spring of 1957 but did not reach the stage of final JCS consideration until February 1958. Even in its uncompleted state, though, the plan had frequent bearing upon other actions.

In July 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the preparation of guidance for officers of the US Element, Baghdad Pact, and of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The result, which they approved on 23 October, described an optimum defense as one that would (1) prevent an initial Soviet advance from breaching the Elburz Mountain line along Iran's northern border and reaching the Zagros Mountain passes in southern Iran as well as (2) hold the Erzurum-Lake Van line in eastern Turkey and Pakistan's northern frontier. Indigenous defenders would be supported by US strategic air forces and other ground and air forces with special delivery capabilities.\textsuperscript{13}
Meanwhile, the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), continued to discharge planning responsibilities that arose from his duties as Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME). Late in September 1957, Admiral Walter F. Boone submitted his CINCSPECOMME OPLANs 219–57 and 215–58. The former covered general war; the latter provided for US intervention under conditions short of general war. 14

According to OPLAN 219–57, defense during general war would be based upon trying to hold the positions mentioned in the guidance above. Prior to D-day, OPLAN 219–57 continued, the United States would deploy very limited ground forces with special capabilities, rotate a small number of air squadrons for familiarization and training, and expand MAAGs and Misstons. Relatively minor resources would be diverted from other theaters. Admiral Boone was convinced that a small investment of resources prior to hostilities would “bring a greatly magnified return,” affording a reasonable prospect of defending the most critical areas. 15

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Admiral Boone that current plans did not contemplate a buildup of MAAGs and Misstons. Nor did the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan allocate specific D-day forces in general war. No forces, except on a rotational basis, were available to supplement those currently assigned. For planning purposes only, the availability of small ground units with special delivery capabilities could be assumed. But they saw no point, even for planning purposes, in listing post-D-day forces. Subject to these caveats—which went far towards nullifying Admiral Boone’s basic concept—the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted OPLAN 219–57 as a suitable interim basis for planning. 16

Review of OPLAN 215–58 triggered a dispute within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan contemplated using a task force consisting of two airborne battle groups from Europe, the Sixth Fleet’s striking force of two carriers, two heavy cruisers and twenty destroyers, one Marine battalion landing team, one fighter-bomber wing, one tactical bomber squadron, and one tactical reconnaissance squadron. The general concept of operations rested on a naval blockade of the aggressor, as the initial step, in conjunction with air operations to neutralize the aggressor’s air power and destroy his military resources. The next step would be insertion of Army and Marine units. 17

Admiral Burke endorsed OPLAN 215–58, but Generals Taylor and White had major objections to it. Besides noting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not tasked Admiral Boone with preparing a plan to support the Eisenhower Doctrine, General Taylor expressed doubt that the task organizations approved for meeting Arab-Israeli contingencies would prove suitable. Larger forces, he believed, might be necessary for situations covered by the Eisenhower Doctrine. Going further, General White recommended deleting portions that related to operations in support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Instead, each specific situation should be appraised as it arose. He opposed combining such a plan with one for intervening in an Arab-Israeli conflict, since a response to the latter would have nothing to do with the Eisenhower Doctrine. 18
On 3 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCNELM that OPLAN 215–58 had been approved, subject to certain modifications. They deemed the portion responding to the Eisenhower Doctrine suitable as “a basis of departure” for future planning. As a situation arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would furnish CINCNELM with guidance prior to approval of each specific plan. In fact, they intended to provide a directive regarding the detailed planning required in light of the Eisenhower Doctrine. For the time being, however, they approved his using suitable portions of OPLAN 215–58 to plan for intervention in the event of an uprising in Jordan or Lebanon.19

Replying two days later, CINCNELM argued against having a separate plan for Eisenhower Doctrine contingencies, instead of using OPLAN 215–58 for that as well as Arab-Israeli hostilities. A single plan, he said, would not only reduce the workload but also have the virtue of simplicity, since the forces, command relationships, communications, and intelligence and logistics procedures were common to both requirements. Therefore, he wanted OPLAN 215–58 considered responsive for all conditions short of general war. General Norstad, the USCINCEUR, strongly concurred.20

After extended consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to let CINCNELM use OPLAN 215–58 as the basis for a plan outlining the intelligence, logistics, communications, and command arrangements for limited war. Extra tabs would cover specific operations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As revised and distributed by CINCNELM on 17 March 1958, OPLAN 215–58 carried separate tabs for intervening to support the governments of Lebanon and Jordan and for protecting US citizens and interests in Saudi Arabia. Early in April, at JCS direction, another tab was attached to cover intervention in Saudi Arabia in the event of a threatened coup d'état against King Ibn Saud.21

Meanwhile, the Middle East Emergency Defense Plan had at last reached the final stage of consideration. In its early stages, the Services had disagreed over the general concept of operations and the designation of forces to be made available after hostilities began. In May 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the plan should contain a statement that “since the character and duration of the subsequent operations in the Middle East cannot be predicted with any assurance of accuracy, the forces required for these subsequent operations must be determined and deployed in the light of the then existing situation.”22

Admiral Burke interpreted the statement above to mean that, after an initial nuclear exchange, some forces would deploy to the Middle East. General White, conversely, held that planning for general war should not contemplate large-scale ground conflict in the Middle East. Means of surface transportation were extremely limited, terrain features unfavorable, and key targets highly vulnerable to air attack. The Soviets, he argued, needed only to deliver a relatively small number of nuclear weapons in order to accomplish quickly their logical objectives in general war. White defined these objectives as destroying those elements of US and allied military power that were significant for general war operations and denying oil resources and base facilities to the United States and its allies. Soviet success would render the Middle East relatively unimportant, strategically, to either side. But General White also saw the Middle East as a
region where air weapons could achieve US objectives with the least expenditure of resources. Accordingly, he proposed that the plan clearly indicate an intention to rely primarily upon air-delivered weapons, and that large-scale ground operations were not contemplated.23

The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved, late in February 1958, a concept not far from the one General White advocated. They had to ensure the Emergency Defense Plan’s conformity with guidance they had provided to the US Element Baghdad Pact in October 1957, with the JSCP they approved the following month, and with their comments on OPLAN 219-57. Consequently, the plan stated that “the initial defense of the Middle East must depend largely on strategic air operations against targets in the area of the Soviet Union contiguous to the Middle East and on operations of indigenous forces supported by small nuclear delivery forces.” Since the results of a Soviet nuclear attack could not be forecast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would decide whether to employ forces “in the light of the existing world situation.” Under this prescription, major deployments did not appear likely.

The plan recognized, however, that general war might begin as an outgrowth of local or limited war in the Middle East, in which case “the US might have achieved a significant degree of mobilization, deployment and commitment of resources prior to D-day.” While the nature of subsequent operations still would depend on JCS decision, the inference could be drawn that prior commitments might lead to continuing operations, requiring deployments beyond a small scale.

Except in Turkey, a NATO ally, very few US forces would be stationed in the Middle East during peacetime. They consisted mainly of the MAAGs and US Military Missions in Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. The current JSCP did not allocate specific D-day forces to defend the Middle East in general war. For planning purposes, however, a number of small, specialized Army units were listed as available prior to D-day. Four destroyers, one command ship, and one air division containing eight squadrons of various types completed the listing.

According to the plan’s concept of operations, strategic air attacks upon installations and troop concentrations adjacent to the Middle East would so drastically reduce the Soviet threat that indigenous forces might be able to hold either the Elburz Mountains, Azerbaijan, eastern Turkey and northwestern Pakistan or secondary positions in the Zagros Mountains. Indigenous defenders would be supported by “such US ground and air nuclear delivery forces as may be deployed in the area.” All forces would serve under a Commander in Chief, Middle East, designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This unified command would have the following mission:

To conduct a strategic defense of the Middle East in order to hold the approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and the Persian Gulf and to ensure to the maximum extent practicable the continued availability of Middle East bases, oil and other resources; or, if this is not possible, to deny them to the enemy.
On 28 February 1958, the Emergency Defense Plan won JCS approval. Two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted it to CINCNELM accompanied by instructions that he prepare detailed operational plans.24

To sum up, the Eisenhower Doctrine had implications for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in four general areas. First, it raised the possibility of massive increases in the Military Assistance Program, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that no major changes were necessary. Second, it seemed to promote the holding of military planning talks with Middle Eastern nations, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff long had favored. Soon, however, they accepted the administration's judgment that US participation in the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee would meet this need. Third, the doctrine required a review of US capabilities for meeting "an extreme Soviet reaction"—in other words, general war. Fourth, the doctrine raised questions concerning the means for meeting extended US military commitments. Within this area fell preparation of a regional defense plan as well as appropriate contingency plans.

Broadly stated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against adopting any hard and fast course of action. Rather, each situation should be assessed and acted upon according to the circumstances of the moment. Use of forces other than those already in the theater was not expected although not ruled out. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the spread of communist domination could be prevented by military means alone. Underlying conditions that made the Middle East unstable had to be cured. To do so, as will appear below, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged "decisive US political and diplomatic action to solve the present Arab-Israeli dispute."25

**Accenting the Political Dimension**

On 8 August 1957, the NSC directed its Planning Board to prepare a revised statement of US policy toward the Middle East. During this process, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented through their representative on the board. Beyond that, on their own initiative, they gave Secretary Wilson a statement on 4 December which they asked that he pass on to Secretary Dulles and the NSC. In it, they expressed deep concern over "the unsatisfactory politically-military situation in the Middle East, which they consider stems basically from the unresolved Arab-Israeli problem, and which poses a serious threat to the security of the United States and the Free World." They defined three basic issues that had to be resolved before stability could be attained. First, the current boundaries of Israel must be fixed and agreed upon. Second, the Western powers must guarantee that Israel would not thereafter expand territorially. Third, the problem of Palestinian refugees must be settled.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that unresolved problems offered opportunities for Soviet exploitation, leading to a further spread of communist domination and control. Military action alone, they emphasized, could not prevent such a spread. Only immediate, decisive action by the United States to
resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute could preserve the pro-Western orientation of Arab nations. They concluded with a pointed remark: “The threat to US security inherent in failing to take the initiative in solving this problem is so great as to transcend the interests of any minority group within the United States.” Deputy Secretary Quarles informed Secretary Dulles that he supported these views.26

During a State-JCS discussion on 13 December, Admiral Burke said the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw evidence that, if the Arabs were protected against further Israeli expansion, they would accept the 1949 armistice lines as final boundaries. He acknowledged that this would be an “imposed solution,” employing military measures, and spoke about a direct relationship between Israel’s policy of unlimited immigration and Arab fear of further Israeli expansion. To solve the refugee problem, Admiral Burke suggested that Israel might allow some Palestinians to return and buy off the rest through compensation and economic development programs. Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree gave his opinion that there was no prospect of exchanging current boundaries for a guarantee of no Israeli expansion. He deemed it unrealistic to think of imposing a solution. Unless terms of settlement enjoyed Arab support, even regimes friendly to the United States would be overthrown. Admiral Burke remonstrated that waiting until Israel and Egypt were ready to accept a formula would only work to the USSR’s advantage.27

The State-Defense split resurfaced when the Planning Board circulated NSC 5801, a new statement of policy intended to replace NSC 5428, which dated from mid-1954. The “northern tier” concept of collective defense, which had loomed so large in 1954, was nowhere mentioned. NSC 5801 downplayed military assistance in favor of measures to encourage economic development. Likewise, in the event of a renewed Arab-Israeli conflict, military measures against aggression received less prominence than political efforts to achieve a negotiated solution.

Defense representatives recommended developing, as a matter of priority, proposals under which Arabs and Israelis could work toward a peaceful and equitable settlement. State Department spokesmen, on the other hand, thought it sufficient constantly to explore prospects and possibilities of persuading the parties to work toward a settlement along the lines proposed by Secretary Dulles on 26 August 1955. At that time, Dulles had held out the possibility of US participation in an international loan to help Israel compensate refugees and in formal treaty engagements to prevent boundaries from being changed by force.28

Writing to Secretary McElroy on 17 January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed NSC 5801, subject to acceptance of Defense’s position. However, when the NSC met six days later, State’s proposal carried the day. This decision followed a review by Secretary Dulles of past US efforts and particularly of the disappointing Arab and Israeli response to his proposals of August 1955, which he considered the product of his department’s best thinking. President Eisenhower judged that State’s approach offered more flexibility.29

The Chief Executive approved NSC 5801/1 on 24 January 1958. Its statement of “Long-Range US Policy Toward the Near East” set forth four major objectives:
The Middle East: Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine

1. Maintain for the United States and its allies the resources, strategic positions, and passage rights of the area while denying them to the Soviet bloc.
2. Preserve stable, friendly, and progressive governments in the Middle East.
3. Achieve an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
4. Prevent further extension of Soviet influence and reduce its existing sway.

To achieve these objectives, the United States would:

1. Assume major leadership responsibility for the free world
2. Seek to guide revolutionary and nationalistic pressures into orderly channels, not antagonistic to the West.
3. Encourage economic development and be prepared, if necessary, to increase economic aid.
4. Provide military aid to friendly countries.

Specific courses of action defined by NSC 5801/1 included implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine while supporting but not formally joining the Baghdad Pact. If necessary, the United States would accept a neutralist orientation by some nations and assist them in order to develop local noncommunist strength. While supporting the ideal of Arab unity, the United States would seek to counterbalance Egypt's preponderant position of leadership in the Arab world by strengthening more moderate regimes. The administration might also urge Iraq to exercise constructive leadership and discreetly encourage the ultimate federation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq—all, at that point, moderate and pro-Western monarchies. Lebanon's Government would get political support and military assistance for internal security purposes. The United States also would inform and work with the British Government to the extent compatible with US interests but be somewhat more guarded in consulting and informing the French.

Aiding Iraq and Jordan

On 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower asked Congress to appropriate for discretionary use, under the Mutual Security Act, an additional $200 million annually during FYs 1958 and 1959. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 1 February, advised Secretary Wilson that supporting local governments should be an objective of the Military Assistance Program in some cases. As a general rule, however, they felt that such support ought to be undertaken "through emphasis on the announced intentions of the United States rather than on expansion of support for indigenous forces." They recommended immediate increases only for Turkey and Iraq and the addition of only one country, Lebanon.

Most of the additions they recommended for the Turkish and Iraqi programs were ones that they already had proposed and on which starts now could be made. For Turkey, this involved replacing over-age ships and obsolescent airplanes. For Iraq, funds would be used to finance pilot training and to support
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had carefully avoided proposing grant aid to countries where doing so might exacerbate regional tensions, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the case of Lebanon, however, they found overriding factors: the strategic importance of its communications and logistics facilities; the resolutely pro-Western attitude of the Lebanese Government; and the coercive pressures being exerted upon Lebanon by Syria and Egypt. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended what was principally a defense support program, for such purposes as improving port and airfield facilities and providing petroleum storage at Beirut. Deputy Secretary Robertson endorsed these proposals and forwarded them to the State Department, where they could be used in preparing guidance for Ambassador Richards.

The Richards mission, meantime, had toured the Middle East explaining the Eisenhower Doctrine and getting local reactions to it. The mission entered into commitments with six countries totaling more than $57 million: $35.847 million to carry out JCS recommendations for Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon; $2.995 million for the Ethiopian and $8.044 million for the Iranian Armies; and $10.391 million for the Pakistani Army and Air Force. But it was Jordan that provided the first test for US policy. Palace intrigues and popular disturbances engineered by pro-Nasser elements threatened to overthrow the monarchy and set in motion a scramble for Jordan's territory by its more powerful neighbors. On 25 April 1957, the administration announced that the Sixth Fleet had been ordered to the eastern Mediterranean. On that same day, King Hussein began a purge of his government. On 29 April, the United States announced that Jordan would get an emergency grant of $10 million.

Like the movement of the Sixth Fleet, the emergency grant did not hinge upon the Eisenhower Doctrine. The State Department made clear that this grant would come from regular funds and would be used solely for economic development and budget support. On 2 May, however, the US Ambassador in Amman reported that Hussein was now ready to sign an aid agreement; he favored prompt measures of military and financial assistance. Concurrently, the US Military Attaché in Amman reported that Jordan was preparing military aid requests that struck him as excessive. They included equipment for one infantry and one armored division, two AAA gun battalions, eighty-four aircraft (forty of them jets), and twelve motor torpedo boats.

Jordan's armed forces were small, built around a 22,000-man army of one infantry division and one armored brigade. The JCS memorandum of 1 February had stated that Jordan possessed only limited strategic value, that no military assistance should be furnished without obtaining "firm assurances that such aid will be used to further Middle East stability," and that aid should be provided only to maintain existing forces, not to create new ones. Yet advice from the Ambassador and the Attaché so impressed General Taylor with the need for an early decision on providing substantial military support that, on 7 May, he urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study this problem as a matter of urgency. In the meantime, however, conferences between ISA and Joint Staff representatives had produced an agreed Defense position. They acted upon the premise that military assistance should be granted for political reasons. While support for Jordan's
budget constituted the greatest need, deliveries of military equipment should occur as soon as possible. President Eisenhower should be asked to sign a determination that such assistance was important to US security, thus permitting use of $20 million from a special fund authorized by the Mutual Security Act. The President did so and, on 29 June, the two governments exchanged notes stipulating that the United States would provide $10 million in economic assistance and $10 million for procurement of military goods and services. Hussein survived because the Jordanian Army remained loyal to him. He made himself, in effect, a client of the United States.

Early in 1958, President Nasser seemed to take a great stride toward leadership of the Arab world when Egypt and Syria joined to create the United Arab Republic. Immediately afterward, Iraq and Jordan announced their agreement to form a federated Arab Union. Iraq's King Faisal became head of state; Jordan's King Hussein, his cousin, acted as deputy head. The prime mover behind this Union was Nuri Said, a veteran Iraqi politician who became Premier on 3 March 1958. Shortly before becoming Premier, Nuri told the US Ambassador in Baghdad that his acceptance depended upon US willingness to provide combat aircraft—specifically, two jet interceptor squadrons and training personnel. On 11 March, the British Government urged the United States to extend additional aid as quickly as possible, not only by accelerated jet aircraft deliveries but also by economic and financial support. A Defense Department survey team already had been organized; it arrived in Baghdad several days later.

In the autumn of 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended immediate delivery of twenty-five F-86F jet interceptors. The State Department vetoed that proposal as politically unwise. By agreement with the United States, the British bore primary responsibility for training and equipping the Iraqi Air Force and by the beginning of 1958, had re-equipped one of Iraq's five squadrons with fifteen Hawker Hunter M-VI jets. In mid-February 1958, after returning from a meeting of the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee, General Taylor reopened the aircraft issue. Writing to Assistant Secretary Sprague, he pointed out that Britain might not be able to support modernizing the entire Iraqi Air Force and that a combination of US and British aircraft might prove difficult for either country to support.

The US Air Force Survey Team, after returning from Baghdad, reported that the Iraqis wanted six aircraft delivered within a few weeks, followed by a phased expansion to ten fighter-bomber squadrons over the next three and a half years. The team believed that periodically staging US tactical units through Iraq could reduce these requirements. But the team also favored making a decision on the basic question without delay.

At a meeting on 22 April, Assistant Secretary Sprague and Under Secretary of State Herter decided to provide Iraq with fifteen F-86Fs, a small number of which would be sent as soon as possible. Sprague informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff about this decision and asked for their advice about how to implement it. Rather than the crash program they had proposed the previous autumn, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now favored a more routine approach. no doubt because the aircraft available then had since been disposed of. Therefore, in a reply dated 23 May, they advised making deliveries in an orderly manner but with the United
States assuming primary responsibility for training and equipping Iraq's armed forces. The first five F-86Fs reached Iraq on 16 June; another ten were slated for delivery during the next three months.38

Meantime, in mid-March 1958, President Eisenhower had asked the State and Defense Departments to explore ways of supporting Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, writing to Secretary McElroy on 16 May, began by repeating their earlier recommendations for resolving the Arab-Israeli problem: agree upon fixed boundaries for Israel; establish a reasonable guarantee that Israel would not expand territorially thereafter; and solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Then they offered purely military proposals: Provide Iraq with one or two fighter/bomber squadrons, as recorded above. Improve early warning and air control radar capabilities of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Expand the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iraq to deal with Arab Union matters. Provide aid and training support to help Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia coordinate their internal security efforts. Establish a small training mission in Lebanon. By 1 July, the administration approved all these actions; some were implemented in part, while others were postponed for political reasons.

On 14 July, as chapter 10 relates, an army coup overthrew the pro-Western regime in Iraq; King Faisal and Premier Nuri Said were executed. All deliveries of grant aid and military sales materiel halted immediately. The US training mission withdrew in September. The value of military goods and services furnished to Iraq, which had totaled $13.1 million in FY 1957 and $21.3 million in FY 1958, dropped to approximately $100,000 in each of the two succeeding years.39

The shortcomings of the Eisenhower Doctrine now were manifest. Overt communist aggression, against which the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed most of their attention, never materialized. Political instability, heightened by the appeal of President Nasser’s pan-Arab radicalism, posed the immediate danger to US interests and influence. Simply providing pro-Western regimes with equipment and training could do little to diminish that danger. In Lebanon, as the next chapter will relate, direct US intervention became necessary.

Losing Bases in Morocco

In North Africa, the conflicting demands of Arab nationalism and the North Atlantic alliance prevented US objectives from being achieved. The administration’s aims were clear-cut and simple: preserve the US military presence and counter Soviet or other anti-Western penetration. But the Algerian rebellion, which pitted French troops against a largely Arab and Moslem population, tended to unite former colonial peoples against the West.

Under a 1950 agreement with France, the United States operated four strategic bomber bases in Morocco. As a newly independent country, Morocco in 1956 accepted US use of these bases “in principle” but refused to recognize the validity of the Franco-American agreement. President Eisenhower, in October 1956, approved a policy statement that base rights should be maintained by all feasible
means, including reasonable quid pro quos. Responding to a presidential query, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 November advised that it was technically feasible to develop bases in Spain as substitutes. They warned, however, that adequate substitutes could not be completed before 1962. Ability to execute war plans would be significantly reduced if Moroccan bases closed before Spanish ones opened. Moreover, the dispersion afforded by having bases in both Morocco and Spain would afford greater protection and operational flexibility to US forces.40

The United States opened base rights negotiations with Morocco in May 1957, but these proved sporadic and unsuccessful. The failure could be traced to three factors: Moroccan suspicions that the United States was supporting France in the Algerian war; France's scheduling of nuclear tests in the Sahara; and nationalist emotions aroused by the presence of US, French, and Spanish forces in Morocco. By August 1958, nationalist pressures had grown to a point where Deputy Secretary Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reassess the need for Moroccan bases. They replied by reaffirming the position outlined above. Moroccan bases, they noted, provided sites at which bombers could land after striking targets during general war as well as positions from which to mount limited war operations. Fixed installations in Spanish Morocco were needed to carry out effective surveillance of the Gibraltar Strait, and the US Navy had at Port Lyautey essential point-to-point relay, primary fleet, and general broadcasting facilities. Thus Moroccan bases, representing a foothold in Africa, constituted a strategic advantage over the USSR.41

The National Security Council, on 27 August, decided to recognize the principle of eventual evacuation but to seek to remain as long as seven years. The US Government privately informed Moroccan officials of this decision and offered to settle for a five-year tenure. Although King Mohammed and his Prime Minister proved willing to negotiate about the length, both demanded that the United States promptly and publicly accept the principle of evacuation.42

Despite these developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still emphasized the importance of retaining Moroccan bases "until the need for them no longer exists." During meetings with State and ISA representatives on 21 November 1958 and 12 June 1959, they argued that this need would continue "beyond any of the periods now under discussion." Withdrawal under pressure, they warned, would establish a precedent and thus nourish similar resistance to US presence in Libya, the Philippines, and other host countries.43

Concurrently, the NSC ordered its Planning Board to review policy toward North Africa. A majority of board members wanted to maintain Moroccan bases "for the maximum feasible time." A minority, consisting of representatives from OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, preferred a statement acknowledging the principle of eventual evacuation but more accurately a continuing strategic requirement for these bases. The Council accepted the minority's view and NSC 5911/1, approved by President Eisenhower on 4 November 1959, read as follows:

...endeavor, within the limits of feasibility, to maintain access to US bases for as long as they are required, being prepared to this end to offer reasonable quid pro quos, to
reach satisfactory agreement regarding tenure, and to conclude such other arrange­ments with Morocco as may be deemed appropriate and essential to the retention of the bases, including public acknowledgment of the principle of eventual evacuation and the relinquishment of non-essential facilities.41

The language of NSC 5911/1 was elastic enough to convert an apparent JCS victory into a defeat. President Eisenhower had scheduled a mid-December visit to Morocco. On 27 November 1959, after coordination with Defense, the State Department recommended that the President propose to King Mohammed a withdrawal from the air bases by the end of 1963. Communications facilities at Kenitra, however, should be the subject of later agreements. On 22 December, President Eisenhower and King Mohammed announced that one airfield would be released in three months and US forces would leave Morocco by 31 December 1963. Kenitra remained a separate issue.45

Writing to Secretary Gates on 17 February 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended seeking: a guarantee that released air bases would not be made available to powers unfriendly to the United States; an agreement allowing US re-entry if military developments so dictated; and retention of the Kenitra facilities for an indefinite period beyond 1963. Late in July, they warned again that Kenitra was essential. If the sites there could not be held beyond 1963, similar facilities would have to be constructed in Spain or elsewhere at considerable cost. Subsequently, the United States did obtain a guarantee against unfriendly nations gaining access and was able to keep Kenitra facilities operating. But a re­entry agreement proved unattainable.46

By 1963, Moroccan bases mattered less than they had ten years earlier. Through the mid-1950s, when medium-range B–29s, B–50s, and B–47s formed the backbone of Strategic Air Command, plans called for those bombers to move to England and Morocco, then launch sorties against the USSR from those sites. By contrast, intercontinental B–52s could fly directly from the United States and, following an attack, land in Morocco or elsewhere. The B–52 force grew from ninety-seven in December 1956 to 538 by December 1960. What really worried the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not losing Moroccan bases but setting a precedent that would encourage evictions elsewhere. As Admiral Burke argued during a State-Defense meeting late in 1958, “If our position is eroded in Morocco the repercussions will be felt not only in Spain but, for example, in the Philippines, Libya and Japan as well.”47

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The Middle East: Lebanon and After

Prelude to Intervention

Lebanon provided the setting in 1958 for a US military intervention. What the administration did bore no relation to the Eisenhower Doctrine, authorizing the Chief Executive to use US armed forces to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern country requesting help when faced with overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. Instead, behind President Eisenhower's decision to intervene lay the tangled story of a country coming to the verge of dissolution. A National Covenant dating from 1943 provided, among other things, that Lebanon's President should be a Maronite Christian and the Premier a Sunni Moslem; Christians also received a six-to-five advantage in the Chamber of Deputies. By the mid-1950s, Moslems claimed that they had become a majority of the population, deserving more power; Christians refused to allow a census. As 1958 opened, and Syria joined with Egypt to form a United Arab Republic, many Lebanese Moslems felt drawn to the pan-Arabism preached by Egypt's President Gamal Nasser. Christians, including President Camille Chamoun, naturally opposed pan-Arabism and looked upon friendly relations with the West as the only guarantee of Lebanon's independence.

The US Government, meanwhile, was worrying about Lebanon falling into the Soviet orbit. On 7 September 1957, in the President's name, Secretary Dulles issued a statement voicing concern over "the apparently growing Soviet Communist domination of Syria and the large build-up there of Soviet-bloc arms... which could not be justified by purely defensive needs." The previous day, with State Department concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised US commanders in Europe and the Mediterranean that "Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan are most seriously concerned over threat to their own security posed by progressive takeover of Syria by pro-Soviet elements" and were making defensive dispositions that US officials agreed were prudent.1
During September 1957, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to establish a working group in Washington. Its task was to consider threats that would stem from a complete communist domination of Syria. In preparation for a meeting with his British counterpart, Secretary Dulles put a question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: If coups d'état in Lebanon and/or Jordan led local governments to request US intervention, what forces could be made available in 24, 48, and 72 hours? Their reply, dated 17 October, listed the units designated in CINCNELM's OPLAN 215-56 and in his revised and extended plan, then under JCS review but not yet approved. These included: two Army airborne battle groups from Europe; the Sixth Fleet with a Marine battalion landing team embarked; and Air Force units from Europe and North Africa. Under most circumstances, virtually all these forces could reach the Lebanon-Jordan area in 72 hours. Under optimum conditions, most air units could begin operations within 12 hours; some Army units could arrive within 24 hours; the Sixth Fleet could start air operations in 24 hours and start landing Marines in Lebanon within 36 hours. This document was given to the British and an equivalent paper received from them.2

During the first days of November, Egypt and Syria opened a virulent press and radio campaign calling for the assassination of King Hussein—the same fate that had befallen his grandfather only six years earlier. The State Department, on 8 November, recommended urgent preparation of a plan for US-UK intervention "in the event of an imminent or actual coup d'état in Lebanon and/or Jordan." On 14 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff named Major General Verdi B. Barnes, USA, who was chairman of their Joint Middle East Planning Committee, to be JCS spokesman in talks with British representatives.3

A JMEPC plan for unilateral intervention, completed two days earlier, provided the basis for all subsequent planning, both unilateral and combined. It listed the same forces as those described above, and presumed the use of staging bases in Cyprus, Libya, and Turkey as well as staging and overflight rights in Canada, France, Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom.

The plan itself had three phases. Alerting and assembling of forces would take place in the first phase; CINCNELM, as commander of the prospective operation, would establish his headquarters in the area.4 The second phase would see deployment get under way, with Army troops either flying directly to airfields in Jordan and Beirut or moving to Turkey and preparing there for an airdrop. Marines would land either in the vicinity of Beirut or at a port from which they could be flown to Jordan. The Sixth Fleet would move into position; Air Force combat units would deploy to Turkey or Cyprus and prepare for immediate action. During the third phase, which might overlap the second, Army units supported by Marines would secure airfields, seize communications centers and seats of authority in the capital, and take actions necessary to uphold or re-establish the government's authority. Land-based and carrier-based planes would control the air, provide reconnaissance, and support the ground forces. After CINCNELM had recast OPLAN 215-56 to conform with this concept, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it for emergency use on 27 November 1957. Several days later, they completed their review of OPLAN 215-58, which had been in progress since
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September. With JCS approval on 3 December, OPLAN 215–58 superseded OPLAN 215–56.5

Meanwhile, talks with British representatives resulted in a draft US–UK contingency plan being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 November. In most respects, it simply extended the JMEPC’s plan by adding assignments for available British forces. It differed, though, in having Marines make the initial landing if Lebanon was the objective; Army troops would be employed if the target area was Jordan. In all cases, US and British forces would operate under their own national commands, effecting coordination through liaison arrangements.6

The real obstacles to US–UK planning were political, not military. Admiral Burke, who during the early phases of the 1956 Suez crisis had favored supporting the British militarily, now took a completely different tack. He recommended telling Secretary McElroy that:

... the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the implementation of such a plan would be disastrous to the US position in both the United Nations and with the remainder of the Arab world. This would be a military campaign with political overtones comparable in many respects to the United Kingdom-France-Israeli debacle of 1956 which dropped British-French prestige to an all-time low and contributed greatly to advancing the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Combined US-UK military action without political support and military cooperation from Iraq and Saudi Arabia would place the United States at a most serious disadvantage.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 January 1958, recommended against continued planning with the British for the time being. As justification, they cited a possibility of compromising the plan and thereby jeopardizing the US position in the United Nations and the Arab world. The State Department concurred.7

From the very inception of planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had emphasized the importance of obtaining staging and overflight rights. Through a memorandum dated 27 November 1957, they stressed the importance of base availability in Libya, Cyprus, and especially Adana, Turkey. Assistant Secretary Sprague hand-carried their memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree. The State Department, however, decided against initiating any negotiations. It did so partly in response to a message from USCINCEUR. General Norstad had been directed to prestock certain Army supplies at Adana. Prestocking, he pointed out in reply, could not proceed without the Turks’ becoming aware of its purpose, since the materiel would have to clear Turkish customs inspection. Furthermore, authority to use Adana provided only for US operations in support of NATO. Late in March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary McElroy to urge the State Department to reconsider its decision not to proceed with negotiations.8

Some weeks later, events in Lebanon forced State’s hand.

President Camille Chamoun’s attempt to change the Lebanese constitution in order to secure his re-election precipitated a crisis. On 8 May, following the assassination of a Chamoun opponent, Christian and Moslem factions began fighting in Beirut. Chamoun asked the US, UK, and French Governments whether they would intervene if requested. Following a White House meeting
on 13 May, Secretary Dulles instructed Ambassador Robert McClintock to tell Chamoun that a request should be made only under the most compelling necessity, when Lebanon's integrity was threatened and the country's own forces were insufficient. Dulles listed three further conditions: Lebanon must complain to the UN Security Council about outside interference; some Arab states should publicly support Lebanon's appeal; and President Chamoun would not push his candidacy for re-election if doing so endangered the country's stability and pro-Western orientation. If those conditions were met, the United States would send combat forces with the dual mission of protecting US nationals and property and assisting Lebanon "in its military program." 

On that same day, 13 May, the administration undertook preparatory military measures. At the President's direction, Admiral Burke ordered Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., who was the CINCNELM, to sail amphibious ships with embarked Marines toward the eastern Mediterranean. On 14 May, Admiral Holloway received orders to proceed with detailed US–UK operational planning. Two days later, CINCNELM sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff an outline plan that had won British approval. Christened BLUE BAT, it differed from the US–UK plan drafted in November 1957 by providing for combined operations under a combined commander, Admiral Holloway. Major forces would include two US Army airborne battle groups, two Marine battalion landing teams, and one British infantry brigade group. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also on 16 May, directed USCINCEUR to bring one Army battle group to a state of readiness that would enable it to arrive in Lebanon within twenty-four hours after the order to proceed. Twenty-six C-124 transports flew from the United States to Germany. On 17 May, BLUE BAT won JCS approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff again queried the State Department about obtaining staging and overflight rights. When State indicated its reluctance to approach governments until a decision to intervene actually had been made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 May instructed CINCNELM that, in the absence of such rights, he was nevertheless to proceed with the operation when ordered. A very few days later, State did prepare messages instructing appropriate ambassadors to request overflight and staging rights; they would be dispatched whenever a decision to intervene was reached.

Aided by emergency deliveries of US arms and police equipment, government forces established control over most of Lebanon, except for the northern part along the Syrian border. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders relaxing the readiness of forces in Germany. The Sixth Fleet retained only one attack carrier group and half the amphibious force within twelve hours' steaming from Lebanon's coast; the remainder departed for visits to Greek and Turkish ports.

On 22 May, Lebanon formally complained to the United Nations that the United Arab Republic (UAR) was interfering in its internal affairs. The UN Security Council voted to send an observer group. Iraq and Jordan voiced support for the Lebanese Government.

Even though the immediate crisis eased, the fissures within Lebanese society remained. The regular Lebanese Army, a composite of the religious and political factions that divided the country, was employed mainly to guard
public buildings, major highways, and the Beirut airport. Its Christian commander, General Fuad Chehab, worried that Moslem soldiers might refuse to act against their co-religionists.

A White House meeting on 15 June, attended by General Twining, produced some rather gloomy predictions. Should intervention become necessary, it appeared likely that US forces would find themselves fighting UAR-controlled insurrectionists, besides facing antagonism from large segments of the population who opposed foreign intervention in principle. Substantial US forces might have to be committed for an indefinite period to cope with terrorist activities and to block supplies coming to the insurrectionists from Syria. Secretary Dulles also felt that, under current conditions, intervention would lay the United States open to charges of undermining the UN observation effort. But Dulles asserted, and President Eisenhower agreed, that if Chamoun requested intervention and the United States did not respond, every pro-Western government in the area would disappear.15

Early in July, the UN observer group submitted an inconclusive report. It did not confirm charges that men and supplies were coming over the Syrian border. Often, however, UN teams had found themselves handicapped or entirely frustrated in their efforts to enter areas controlled by insurrectionists. On 9 July, President Chamoun publicly stated that he would leave office when his current term expired. Thus the last of the conditions specified by Secretary Dulles on 13 May had been fulfilled.14

The Marines Go Ashore

In Baghdad during the early hours of 14 July 1958, army officers seized control of the Iraqi Government, executed King Faisal, and swept away every vestige of the pro-Western regime. Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassem led a cabinet of colonels and leftist civilians. President Chamoun immediately summoned Ambassador Robert McClintock and demanded US intervention in Lebanon within forty-eight hours. He already had requested British help and shortly would ask for French assistance as well.15

The administration responded promptly. Senior officials, meeting at 0930, agreed that the consequences of doing nothing would be dire indeed. First, “Nasser would take over the whole area.” Second, the United States would lose influence throughout the Middle East and base rights could be jeopardized. Third, US credibility throughout the world would be “brought into question.” General Twining gave his opinion that “we had no alternative but to go in.” At a White House meeting later that morning, President Eisenhower said “it was clear in his mind that we must act, or get out of the Middle East entirely.” He felt certain that “to lose this area by inaction would be far worse than the loss in China, because of the strategic position and resources of the Middle East.” The President and his principal advisers briefed twenty-two Senators and Congressmen early in the afternoon. Secretary Dulles advocated intervention as the lesser of two evils: “If we go in, our action is likely to accentuate the anti-Western feeling of the
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Arab masses. . . . Our intervention would not therefore be likely to be a quick and easy solution.” However, if the United States failed to act, “the non-Nasser gov­
ernments in the Middle East and adjoining areas would be quickly overthrown.” Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan would trace US inaction to fear of the Soviet Union
and so lose confidence in the United States. Some congressional leaders voiced
reservations and few strongly supported the venture.16

After the congressional briefing, President Eisenhower and a small group of
advisers—again including General Twining—settled upon specific actions. That
morning, Admiral Burke had called CINCNELM’s headquarters in London to
warn that intervention might soon be ordered. Late in the afternoon, Admiral
Burke conveyed the President’s decision by directing CINCNELM and the Com­
mander, Sixth Fleet, to sail the entire fleet eastward as soon as possible and begin
landing Marines on 15 July at 1500 Beirut time (0900 Washington time). Essential­
ly, since the part to be played by the British remained undecided, they were to
execute the US portion of BLUE BAT. During the evening of 14 July, at 2031 Wash­
ington time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered USCINCEUR to have one Army bat­tle group and its airlift ready to land at Beirut airport within twenty-four hours,
or thirty-six hours if an airdrop proved necessary.17

In mid-afternoon on 15 July, a Marine battalion landing team (BLT) went
ashore just south of Beirut. Observed by curious sunbathers and soft drink ven­
dors, their landing was unopposed. Seventy minutes later, at 1610 Beirut time, they
secured the airport. General Twining promptly informed the President that
operations were going well. He reported that two more BLTs would land the next
day and that two Army airborne battle groups could arrive from Germany with­
in twelve hours, providing “a very respectable force in the area.” Twining said
that “he and the Chiefs are strongly of the view that going into Lebanon was the
right thing to do.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored putting the Strategic Air
Command (SAC) on increased alert. Twining worried that moving tankers into
forward areas “could well occasion a good deal of alarm,” but the President
decided to deploy a few of them overseas. Eisenhower also approved a JCS rec­
ommendation to increase Air Defense Command’s readiness. Twining further
noted that two divisions in CONUS, one Army and one Marine, had been alerted
for possible movement to Europe or the Mediterranean. Most of the Marine divi­
sion could move within ten days aboard Navy ships. Deploying the remainder of
it, as well as all the 101st Airborne Division, would require chartered vessels.
Twining proposed, and Eisenhower agreed, to put units on alert and plan for
their deployment but delay any actual chartering.18

Perhaps inevitably, the Marines’ arrival on Lebanese soil generated some fric­
tion between US diplomats and military officers on the scene. General Chehab
had not been told about the landing until just before it was to occur. Fearing that
strongly divergent reactions could lead to disintegration of the Lebanese Army,
he urgently requested that no troops disembark. Ambassador McClintock
responded by asking the Task Force Commander to dock his ships in Beirut with
the Marines remaining aboard. The Commander refused, citing orders from his
military superiors. Chamoun asked the Ambassador for Marines to protect the
presidential palace, but they did not go. Chehab protested against the Marines’
occupation of the airport, without effect. A vexed Ambassador McClintock requested from Washington “immediate instructions to whoever is in command of landing forces that he must get in touch with me and likewise take my judgment on matters of vital political importance.” That evening, he and CINCNELM received a directive affirming that “in case of difference between the military commander and the local US Diplomatic Representative in regard to political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon, the views of the latter shall be controlling.” Admiral Holloway, who had been in Washington when the crisis broke, flew into Beirut airport before dawn on 16 July and then raised his flag aboard the command ship USS Taconic. He and Ambassador McClintock soon developed a fairly smooth working relationship.19

The intervention in Lebanon proved to be a purely American undertaking. France, barely recovered from its own political turmoil, took no part beyond having a cruiser and three destroyers sail into Beirut harbor during 18–19 July.20 The British Government decided to hold its forces in readiness for possible action in Jordan, rather than follow US units into Lebanon as the BLUE BAT plan provided. On 16 July, King Hussein called urgently for US and UK military assistance. “We are already half pregnant,” General White remarked during a JCS meeting. “We should go the whole way and not get an abortion.” Nonetheless, the administration decided against sending US troops to Jordan. Almost three thousand British paratroopers, aided by considerable US logistical and diplomatic support, went to bolster King Hussein.21

Stabilization Achieved

At 0730 on 16 July, a second Marine battalion landing team went ashore. There had been, in fact, three BLTs with the Sixth Fleet when the operation began. The third had only recently arrived, to replace one retained beyond its normal rotation date. In the absence of British participation, this third BLT filled the role assigned to British forces in BLUE BAT and came across a beach north of Beirut on the morning of 18 July. A fourth battalion, airlifted from the United States via Port Lyautey, Morocco, reached the city between 18 and 20 July. It was embarked and held as a reserve afloat.22

The day of 19 July also had been taken up with the arrival of an Army airborne battle group from the 24th Infantry Division, flown from Germany by way of Adana, Turkey. More Army combat and service support units followed. A tank battalion and other service support troops sailed by sea from French and German ports. Their arrival and unloading, between 3 and 5 August, added seventy-two tanks and more than five thousand Army personnel to US strength in Lebanon. On 5 August there were 5,542 Marines and 8,515 Army troops in country, all deployed around the Beirut area. This proved to be the peak figure, since certain service units soon were transferred to Iskenderun, Turkey. Even so, the total of US forces remained approximately twice that of the 7,000-man Lebanese Army.23
In view of the operation's size and complexity, Admiral Holloway had proposed on 21 July that a two- or three-star Army or Marine general immediately be assigned to command land forces as Commander, American Land Forces (COMAMLANFOR). Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his request. Major General Paul D. Adams, USA, was designated COMAMLANFOR. Admiral Holloway retained "overall command and responsibility for major military and policy decisions." General Adams, with an Army and Marine staff, directed all joint aspects of land operations and support planning in the Middle East area; he also assisted Admiral Holloway in maintaining liaison with General Chehab and other commanders. Adams reached Beirut from Germany on 24 July and formally assumed the duties of COMAMLANFOR two days later.24

The availability of overflight and landing rights, which had worried the Joint Chiefs of Staff so much, did pose some problems but never hampered operations. On the evening of 15 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised General Norstad that the State Department was trying to obtain all necessary rights but so far had received approval only from Turkey. If favorable replies were not received before the airlifting of units began, he was authorized "to overfly France, Italy, and Greece and land at Marseilles, Naples, and Athens."25

France and Italy gave their consent; Wheelus Air Base in Libya became available for limited use, provided there was no publicity. But Austria, which had declared its "perpetual neutrality" in 1955, strongly protested when large numbers of US aircraft overflew the country on 16 July. The Austrian Government declared that it was not in a position to permit overflights by "any state whatever." On 19 July, the US Ambassador in Vienna advised that any further overflights would seriously compromise the US moral and propaganda position. Both the State Department and Headquarters, US Air Force, concurred. Since passage over Switzerland also had been denied, aircraft flying from Germany to the Middle East had to take a 300-mile detour by way of France.26

The Greek Government cooperated within carefully circumscribed limits. Concerned about possible reprisals against its nationals in Egypt and elsewhere, Greece on 17 July forbade further landings on its territory. On the following day, however, the US Air Force Attaché in Athens reported that the Greek Air Force was willing to ignore occasional landings, provided they attracted no undue attention. On 19 July, the Greek Government officially modified its position to that extent, with a stipulation that the destination of eastbound planes should be Turkey only.27

The immediate purpose of US military intervention, of course, was to stabilize the political situation in Lebanon. President Eisenhower publicly pledged that US troops would leave as soon as the United Nations took "further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence." But the two superpowers exchanged verbal pyrotechnics and, before the United Nations, blocked each other's initiatives.28 A more productive path began opening when President Eisenhower's special political representative, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, arrived in Beirut on 16 July. The US military presence, complemented by Mr. Murphy's negotiations with factional leaders, restored a good measure of
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calm. On 31 July, the Lebanese Parliament elected General Chehab to succeed Chamoun as President; Chehab's inauguration was set for 23 September.29

On 5 August, Admiral Holloway informed Admiral Burke that he had started preparing plans for a phased withdrawal. General Chehab, he observed, could hardly do otherwise than set the withdrawal of foreign forces as an early objective of his administration. The early departure of some Marine units, Holloway believed, would aid Chehab in resisting extremists. His recommendation arrived just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering the same matter. Later that same day, they directed Admiral Holloway to begin planning an "orderly but prompt" withdrawal. Since the State Department had indicated the political desirability of reducing US personnel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Holloway a further message asking him to propose more immediate reductions.30

Repliesing on 7 August, Admiral Holloway recommended that one Marine BLT be embarked as a floating reserve, that the unloading of all except essential supplies be halted, and that a transport be held at Beirut to take aboard the Army tank battalion if a larger withdrawal was decided upon. Within a few days, Holloway added, he and Ambassador McClintock would be discussing the Marine BLT's embarkation with President-elect Chehab. After consulting the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that approval of the Marines' embarkation must await the outcome of that meeting. They approved the other two recommendations.31

During the meeting on 11 August, President-elect Chehab deemed it important that the Marines' embarkation begin before the UN General Assembly resumed its session on 13 August. A voluntary pullout, made with the Lebanese Government's approval and before the Soviet UN delegation had a chance to speak, would avoid any appearance that the United States had acted under a Soviet threat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly approved.

More embarkations followed. With the last of the Marines scheduled to leave on 30 September and the political and security situation continuing to improve, Admiral Holloway on 14 September recommended the withdrawal of heavy Army equipment and service units as soon as shipping was available. Combat units would be gone completely by 15 October. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized an initial withdrawal of Army service units. As for the remainder of the troops, they advised Holloway that "the best answer we now have" was one given informally by State Department spokesmen. Remaining forces, State hoped, could be withdrawn by 31 October if conditions in Lebanon remained stable. A token force might have to stay, though, until the British left Jordan.

During the next three weeks Marines completed their withdrawal, heavy Army equipment as well as various support units started returning to Europe, and Admiral Holloway submitted timetables for the removal of all remaining forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this latest plan on 7 October. The final elements actually sailed from Beirut on 25 October. The British completed their withdrawal from Jordan on 2 November.

The disengagement from Lebanon took place at the very time, from early August through October, when the Taiwan Straits crisis arose (see chapter 14). Measures to prepare for possible hostilities with China had no direct impact on
scheduled ground withdrawals from Lebanon, but one carrier and four destroyers were transferred from the Mediterranean to the Far East during the last week of August. One further move indicated the rising concern over Taiwan. Admiral Burke, on 17 July, had directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINC-PACFLT), to put one reinforced Marine BLT aboard fast shipping and send it to the Persian Gulf. After passing the tip of India, the task group came under Admiral Holloway’s operational control on 1 August. Two days later, however, Admiral Burke directed the task group to return to Singapore and revert to CINC-PACFLT’s control.

What did the US intervention accomplish? Arguably, US credibility had been bolstered and President Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions somewhat deflated. A relatively stable government was established in Beirut. But the United States had to accept that Lebanon’s new government would be neutralist, not pro-Western. President Chamoun had officially endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine; President Chehab abrogated that endorsement. The country remained fairly peaceful until, in the mid-1970s, long-simmering tensions erupted into a ruinous civil war.

It would be useful to consider why the US intervention of 1958 succeeded while that of 1982–1984 failed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully supported the former but harbored serious reservations about the latter. During the latter intervention, American firepower was used to bolster a minority, sectarian regime, thereby making US forces participants in Lebanon’s civil war. The 1958 intervention, by contrast, never went beyond a “show of force.” As Admiral Holloway reported, “The US military power in Lebanon was applied in the most restrained manner and did not result in death, wounds or property damage to any Lebanese or foreign faction in Lebanon.” Rules of engagement stipulated that “US military forces would not fire unless fired upon, but if fired upon would return fire to the source with the next larger weapon above that used against US forces.” Some US aircraft were damaged by ground fire, and one soldier was killed by sniper fire on Beirut’s outskirts. Yet, as the J-3 observed, no Lebanese faction resorted to “direct or significant hostile action.” Keeping US political aims modest and US weapons unused may have been the keys to success.

War Plans Reworked

In October 1958, the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff undertook to assess “lessons learned” from the intervention. First, the J-3 reported, lack of a formal checklist had led to some confusion within the Joint Staff about responsibilities and procedures immediately after President Eisenhower decided to send in troops. A list for each approved limited war plan ought to include draft messages, alert and deployment measures, the degree of alert and force and force adjustments needed to maintain the general war posture, and mechanisms for coordination with other agencies. Also, the feasibility of a uniform alert system should undergo study. The J-3 further noted that the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense (CINCONAD), the Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL), and the
Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), had neither been provided with Lebanon plans nor informed of the impending operation until after the Marines had landed. That was done because of security factors as well as a belief that intervention was not likely to lead to general war. But, concluding that the possibility of general war was inherent in any limited war operation, J-3 recommended providing every unified and specified command with all limited war plans (except supersensitive ones) and informing them about pending operations and degrees of alert. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved all these proposals on 31 October. On 25 August 1959, they established a uniform alert system with five conditions ranging from normal readiness (DEFCON 5) to the maximum posture (DEFCON 1).33

The Lebanon intervention made only a modest impact upon subsequent war plans. In mid-April 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent unified and specified commanders an assessment of lessons learned that highlighted the problem of staging and overflight rights. The refusal of Austria and Switzerland to permit passage, plus the restrictions imposed by Greece, made alternate routes and staging rights a primary concern of planners. Admiral Holloway applied this lesson when preparing a revision of OPLAN 215-58, the plan for limited war operations in the Middle East. The draft OPLAN 215-59, which he submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 July 1959, listed primary and alternate air routes for specific operations. Also, whereas OPLAN 215-58 had assumed that necessary transit and overflight rights would be obtained before a plan was executed, OPLAN 215-59 specified that such clearances would be obtained when the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually directed execution. Similarly, a determination whether to schedule flights over countries that had not yet granted permission would be made “by higher authority at the time.”34

In general concept, draft OPLAN 215-59 differed little from its predecessor. The separate section distinguishing operations under the Eisenhower Doctrine from other situations disappeared. In addition to Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which had been included in OPLAN 215-58, the new plan provided for military action in Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revision on 31 December 1959, subject to amendments that included a number of changes in terminology applicable throughout it. CINCNELM then rewrote the plan, which ultimately was issued on 14 March 1960 as OPLAN 215-60.35

The British, with scant success, pressed for an extension to the scope of combined US–UK planning. Late in July 1958, a planning group representing CINCNELM and the British Chiefs of Staff began a study of the Persian Gulf area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored this effort but continued to believe that any revival of the US–UK Combined Chiefs of Staff organization of World War II was undesirable. Accordingly, on 1 August, they dispatched tentative guidance to CINCNELM and other commanders, applicable to all US–UK planning discussions. Talks relating to the Middle East could be undertaken at all levels, exchange of information was authorized, and all commands would maintain close liaison with the British. Use of the term “combined planning” would be avoided, however, as would any suggestion of a combined staff arrangement. No
commander could commit either US forces or the US Government in support of any combined plan without specific JCS approval.36

On 23 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent CINCNELM a reaffirmation of their guidance with further elaboration: “In general, US military planning and operations with the UK should be on the basis of coordination as distinguished from combined or joint plans and operations.” They did authorize coordinated planning with respect to Libya and the Sudan. Force requirements could be included in the plans, provided they were realistic and reasonably attainable.37

Under the informal designation “US/UK Planning Group,” the planners in London produced a series of studies over the next several months. In consonance with JCS guidance, they were intended primarily to coordinate existing unilateral plans rather than to devise new combined ones. The first, dealing with the Persian Gulf, was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in September 1958. It explored the effects of simultaneously implementing the British plan for Kuwait and the US plan for intervention in Saudi Arabia, contained in OPLAN 215-58.38 Yet, as time would show, the planning group was kicking the dying embers of Anglo-American collaboration. Soon the United Kingdom would start liquidating its role east of Suez.

A change in the dimensions of CINCNELM’s other planning responsibilities occurred during 1960. This came about, in part, from JCS consideration of a revision to the Middle East Emergency Defense Plan (EDP) for a general war. Review of J-5’s draft9 brought forth divergent views among the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the extent to which CINCNELM should exercise general war responsibilities in the Middle East and whether he or CINCLANT should supervise planning for naval operations in the area. These differences highlighted a need for fundamental decisions regarding CINCNELM’s status.

On 3 February 1960, Secretary Gates issued a series of decisions designed to “insure effective command arrangements in the Middle East, pending the establishment of a Middle East Command.” To strengthen his role as a specified commander, CINCNELM would establish a unified staff, separate from the naval staff that served him in his capacity as Navy component commander to USCINCEUR. In this latter capacity he would henceforth be designated Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). As CINCNELM, he would undertake contingency planning and conduct such operations in the Middle East as the Joint Chiefs of Staff might direct. The title, Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), went out of existence.40

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 March, approved Middle East EDP 1–60. No doubt in recognition of the meagerness of US forces normally stationed in the Middle East, the new plan spelled out a somewhat more modest mission than its predecessor: Assist in conducting a strategic defense of the region during general war, holding the approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and the Persian Gulf “as far forward as possible in the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] area.” Like its predecessor, EDP 1–60 stressed the importance of CENTO rather than US forces; attacks launched by strategic retaliatory forces would constitute the major US contribution.
With the establishment of CINCNELM's unified staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 August assigned CINCNELM the responsibility for general war planning. This planning responsibility had resided in the Joint Staff since February 1956, being discharged first by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee and then by the J-5. The change meant that future EDPs would not originate in the Joint Staff. Rather, they would be drafted in CINCNELM's headquarters and then submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.41

Containing Nasser

The Iraqi revolution, the Lebanon landing, and the British intervention in Jordan set in motion a reappraisal of the basic US policy towards the Middle East. The existing statement, NSC 5801/1, had been adopted in January 1958. It continued, with relatively little change, objectives dating back at least to 1954, although it presented a new approach for dealing with them. In broad terms, these objectives were:

1. Denial of the Middle East to communist domination.
2. Continued availability to the West of essential oil requirements and strategic locations, including bases, communication, and transit rights.
3. Early resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on a basis ensuring the continued independence of Israel.
4. Economic and social development of the area that would not only further the attainment of immediate US political goals but also promote long-term political stability and friendly relations with the West.42

In reappraising these objectives, the NSC Planning Board questioned whether some of them could be reconciled with the rise of "radical Pan-Arab nationalism" and whether certain others were mutually compatible. The board suggested that two objectives—denial of the area to communist domination and continued availability of oil—were of overriding importance, the "bedrock minimum necessary to protect our interests." The remaining objectives were secondary and might be sacrificed, if necessary, to ensure attainment of the "bedrock" ones.43

President Nasser's emergence as "symbol and leader" of pan-Arab nationalism, and the USSR's readiness to further its objectives by encouraging Arab distrust of the West, indicated to a majority of the Planning Board that the United States should accept the fact of pan-Arab nationalism and seek a limited understanding with Nasser. To be cast in the role of Nasser's opponent, they felt, would leave the Soviet Union as his champion. The question was how far to go in accommodating US policy to the apparent reality of Nasser's primacy. Rigid US opposition to Nasser simply did not strike them as a viable policy. However, when the Planning Board's final draft went forward to the NSC on 3 October 1958, Defense and Treasury representatives filed a dissenting opinion.44
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, through a memorandum to Secretary McElroy dated 13 October, also challenged the majority view. On the basic issue, they defined the problem as that of reversing the unfavorable trend in the Arab world, divorcing the pan-Arab movement from Nasser's leadership, and bringing a "legitimate" type of Arab nationalism to the fore. This had been the Defense-Treasury position. The majority's draft, by contrast, had spoken of reaching an "understanding" with Nasser and other radical pan-Arab leaders and establishing a working relationship with them.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that dealings with Nasser be confined to specific problems involving relations with the United Arab Republic, not the Arab world as a whole, and that the United States work more closely with "legitimate" Arab nationalism but not with aggressive types represented by Nasser. In their judgment, . . . the radical elements of Pan Arab nationalism, as symbolized by Nasser, are characterized by many elements inimical to basic US objectives in the Near East, such as: unscrupulous expansionist tendencies; interference, including incitement to violence, in the affairs of neighboring nations; and unfriendly propaganda activities directed against other nations of the Near East, the West in general, and the United States in particular.

A complete accommodation to Nasser, therefore, would "compromise basic US principles."

The Planning Board's draft also contained divergent views on such subjects as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the proper US attitude toward the development of neutralism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated adoption of what they considered the more positive provision, the one calculated to produce an "active program to win the Near Eastern States to the side of the Free World." They still believed, as they had in 1957, that the United States should undertake immediate political initiatives looking toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.45

Noting that Saudi Arabia might curtail US rights at Dhahran Air Base or close US facilities there, the draft declared that the United States should be prepared to reduce or remove its personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to including such a statement. Dhahran was the only sizable military installation available in the area, and there was a valid continuing requirement for its use. Accordingly, barring political or economic blackmail by the Saudis, they opposed giving any serious consideration to reductions or withdrawal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also favored changing a statement that the United States should provide "limited" military aid as a counter to Soviet offers. They would substitute "sufficient military aid to meet the terms of Soviet offers," so that planning and budgeting for this purpose would not fall short of the need. They further recommended deleting a sentence indicating US readiness to continue aiding Iraq. Either asking Iraq to continue programs repudiated by the new regime or offering aid before Iraq requested it could degrade US prestige in the area.46

As finally approved by President Eisenhower on 4 November 1958, NSC 5820/1 contained some modest changes from the initial draft that might be attributed to
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the JCS submission. The United States would “seek opportunities to take the initiative” regarding a broad settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Military aid to Middle Eastern states would be offered in “minimum” rather than “limited” amounts. The only JCS recommendation accepted outright was deletion of the paragraph concerning withdrawal from Dhahran. Conditions regarding military assistance to Iraq had been stiffened and now came considerably closer to the JCS view. Sympathetic consideration would be given to continuing assistance in limited amounts, if the Iraqis were prepared to cooperate in making such continuation fruitful. If not, the administration would take the initiative in terminating aid.

On the basic question of relations with President Nasser, NSC 5820/1 had been shaded somewhat toward the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even to the extent of using some of their phrases. Nonetheless, its main thrust was not the one they had recommended. NSC 5820/1 did not differentiate sharply between “legitimate” Arab nationalism and other brands when it set forth the following guidance:

Endeavor to establish an effective working relationship with Arab nationalism while at the same time seeking constructively to influence and stabilize the movement and to contain its outward thrust, and recognizing that a policy of US accommodation to radical pan-Arab nationalism as symbolized by Nasser would include many elements contrary to US interests.

The United States would seek to normalize relations with the United Arab Republic and to deal with Nasser not as head of the Arab world but “as head of the UAR on specific problems and issues, area-wide as well as local, affecting the UAR’s legitimate interests. . . .” While discreetly encouraging developments that might lessen Nasser’s predominant position, officials implementing this policy must recognize that “too direct efforts” might prove counterproductive.

To sum up, NSC 5820/1 was unequivocal in defining the two primary objectives of US policy: denial of the area to Soviet domination and continued availability of enough oil to meet Western Europe’s requirements. All other objectives, including a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, were subordinate and merely “desirable.”

Over the short term, matters did seem to improve. The NSC OCB, early in 1960, presented a report that called attention to a general lessening of tension in the region. The board took particular note of an improvement in relations between Nasser and the West, exemplified by resumption of diplomatic relations between the UAR and the United Kingdom. The current situation, the OCB continued, did not justify as much emphasis on the aggressive, expansionist tendencies of radical pan-Arabism as NSC 5820/1 had placed on them. Furthermore, the rapid development of new oil fields in North Africa had lessened Western Europe’s need for Middle East oil.

The NSC Planning Board then produced a draft policy statement noting that the dynamism of Arab nationalism had lost a good deal of its radical and unifying appeal. The Arab states in general and Nasser in particular had shown a growing awareness of the communist threat. The prevailing attitude of neutralism did not necessarily pose an insurmountable obstacle to attaining US objectives. For the
United States, the major problem lay in the simple fact that the USSR had achieved a "substantial entry" into the Middle East.

The board cited special problems peculiar to the area: the difficulty of maintaining a demonstrably impartial position in the Arab-Israeli dispute; King Hussein's dependence on the US and UK Governments; retaining friendly relations with the Arab states while appropriately supporting vital British interests in the area; and Western Europe's continued dependence on Middle East oil. The NSC Planning Board was less sanguine than the OCB about the effect of North African oil discoveries. The board's draft drew no distinction between primary and secondary objectives, except to say that continued denial of the area to Soviet domination remained of paramount importance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found this draft statement, NSC 6011, militarily acceptable. The NSC adopted it without change on 15 July, and President Eisenhower approved it a few days later.49

Time would show that JCS fears of pan-Arab radicalism were exaggerated. Arabs outside Egypt applauded President Nasser but would not embrace his pan-Arab aspirations. The Arab-Israeli conflict, however, remained an enormous obstacle to regional peace and to the increase of US influence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could feel justified in arguing that the United States would have to take the initiative in seeking a settlement.
What Role for CENTO?

The system of collective defense that emerged by 1957 presented what appeared to be a globe-girdling wall of containment against communist expansion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the west and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the east, linked by the Baghdad Pact in the middle, seemed to provide a well-ordered design for the free world's defense. Yet the pattern was more apparent than real. Disparate capabilities, dissimilar interests, and differing shades of concern for the threat so separated the three alliances that a common role and single purpose could scarcely be taken for granted. The United States was a pillar of NATO but kept SEATO at arm's length and did not formally join the Baghdad Pact. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly advocated US membership in the Baghdad Pact and later in its successor, the Central Treaty Organization, the State Department blocked their recommendations. Secretary Dulles believed that, in the Middle East, US adherence would be widely interpreted as a move against Arab unity. Also, at home, there might be almost irresistible pressure to extend Israel a security guarantee.1

The Baghdad Pact's Demise

Created in 1955, the Baghdad Pact consisted of Iran, Iraq (its only Arab member), Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In April 1956, the United States did join in the work of the Pact's Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees. Concurrently, the Pact's Military Committee accepted a US offer to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate and comment on its studies. By March 1957, after promulgating the Eisenhower Doctrine, the administration concluded that closer association with the Pact (but not membership in it) had become politically feasible. One month later, after the State Department determined that Pact members fully supported military ties with the United States, Washington publicly announced its willingness to participate in the Pact's military planning activities.2
The United States joined the Military Committee in June 1957. By then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff already had reviewed all strategic studies prepared by the Pact's planners and found them generally compatible with US plans. But they restricted their attention to general war situations resulting from Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did so because the administration judged that participation in limited war planning could lead to US involvement in purely local disputes and thus prove just as politically objectionable as formal membership in the Pact.3

The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed strategic air attacks upon the Soviet Union as the main US contribution to helping Pact members defend the mountain line in eastern Turkey, Azerbaijan, the Elburz Mountains, and the northwestern frontier of Pakistan. If that line was lost, there would be fallback positions in the Zagros Mountain passes. For planning purposes, the US Element, Baghdad Pact (USEBP), and appropriate Military Assistance Advisory Groups were told to assume that small, specialized US units would aid the defenders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear to these commanders, however, that no US forces actually would be committed to protect the Pact area. During global war, defense of the Middle East would depend largely on whether Pact members had succeeded in substantially increasing their strength and subordinating strong national views to the Pact's overall objective.4

A comparison of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans would indicate that, as the United States drew closer to the Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enlarged their estimate of what territory could be defended. JSCP 56-58, approved in December 1956, stated that the allies should hold as a minimum the approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area. One year later, JSCP-59 spoke of holding the approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area as well as the Persian Gulf area.5 A comparison of these JSCPs with the JCS concept for employing Pact forces would lead to the following conclusion: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, if Baghdad Pact forces failed to hold the Elburz and then the Zagros lines, the West would be no worse off than if the Pact had not existed. If Pact forces succeeded in their primary defense missions, however, most of the Middle East might be denied to the Soviets.

Unfortunately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff encountered extreme difficulty in reconciling defense concepts they deemed militarily sound with what the State Department judged politically acceptable. In January 1958, for example, Pakistan wanted the Military Committee to discuss its study, "The Afghanistan Threat to West Pakistan." The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended instructing the US representative to the Military Committee to regard tribal warfare as a form of limited warfare and endorse, for planning purposes, consideration of the Afghan threat. The State Department objected that doing so would broaden the Pact's objectives into combating aggression from all quarters. Actually, State observed, Soviet arms deliveries had not materially increased Afghan capabilities, and Afghan claims that these arms were used mostly to maintain internal order deserved some credence. State suspected that the Baghdad Pact had employed the phrase "Communist-inspired and aided aggression" in order to give the study enough respectability to elicit US approval.6

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Subsequent State-Defense meetings led to a conclusion that the US representa­
tive should disassociate himself from any discussion of the Afghan problem. General Taylor, who acted as US representative when the Military Committee met, induced the Pakistanis to delay placing their Afghan study before the committee. But six months later both Pakistan and Iraq called for deliberations on the Afghan menace, whereupon the United States formally disassociated itself from this planning activity.7

Another interdepartmental dispute erupted in September 1957, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended appointing a US Military Representative for the Middle East (USMILREPME), who would coordinate programs supporting the region’s defense. They saw no immediate need to create a US unified command in the Middle East, because no US forces would be in the Pact area (Turkey excepted) until hostilities began.x

Informal State–JCS conferences during November and December 1957 led the State Department to conclude that such an appointment was politically infeasible, because the USMILREPME “would inevitably become the target of Communist and hostile Arab nationalist propaganda, and as such would increase tensions within the area.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff raised this issue again with Secretary McElroy in May 1958. But, since the Secretary opposed taking action until the State Department changed its position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminated their consideration of this subject.9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned priority to endorsing and aiding the develop­ment of an integrated command system for Pact forces. In their judgment, creating the nucleus of a command structure—including an operational head­quarters and communications system—was essential not only for mounting an effective regional defense but also for overcoming an impression of US reluctance to participate in the Pact’s expansion of its planning activities.10

During negotiations leading to US participation in the Military Committee, the administration had raised objections to a proposal by the Pact’s Ministerial Council to establish a command system. Laying that proposal aside, the Pact instead set up a Combined Military Planning Staff (CMPS), authorized to develop defense plans but not to exercise either command or training functions. But the State Department deemed establishment of a command structure premature. First, State held, such an addition was not needed immediately; the CMPS should be developed further before an even more ambitious structure replaced it. Second, doubt existed as to whether all Pact members—and particularly Iraq—favored a command system. Third, the United States would face pressure to increase its financial and military commitments. The State and Defense Depart­ments should estimate what this increase might be; a full appraisal of the command proposal then could follow.11

The dovetailing of US and Baghdad Pact strategy depended significantly upon the Pact’s appreciation of the effects and value of nuclear operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found that a study of the Pact’s ground force requirements, undertaken by the CMPS in 1957, did not sufficiently recognize how strategic nuclear strikes would affect operations by Soviet ground forces. US officials gave Pact planners estimates of the anticipated results from nuclear strikes. Nonetheless, in
mid-1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still were disturbed by the planners' tendency to minimize the consequences and military value of nuclear attacks.12

CENTO Inherits Seemingly Insoluble Problems

The Baghdad Pact’s Council of Ministers, joined by Secretary Dulles but without any Iraqis, met in London during 28–29 July 1958. Participants signed a declaration stating that “the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever,” and noting that the United States had agreed to cooperate with members “for their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation.” General Lyman Lemnitzer, Army Vice Chief of Staff and a member of the US delegation, felt that the United States had assumed most if not all the obligations of full membership. The State Department, however, affirmed the primacy of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which avoided any specific commitments.13

On 8 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered their Joint Middle East Planning Committee to look again at the question of US participation and membership in the Pact. Simultaneously, they advised Secretary McElroy that the Iraqi revolution “made it more necessary than ever that the US demonstrate in a concrete manner its active support of the Pact.” They envisaged a “peacetime nuclear headquarters” evolving along “classic J-type lines.” Eventually, a command system would prepare regional defense plans, coordinate and direct training and combined exercises, provide the basis for establishing a wartime command post, and plan for creation of subordinate headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that establishment of an integrated command system “would probably have to be followed at some future date by the earmarking of forces.”14

Coping with the Iraqi revolution's military consequences led to still another State-JCS dispute. If Soviet forces invaded Iran's northern province of Azerbaijan, four Iraqi divisions had been slated to defend the Zagros passes in northeastern Iraq, adjacent to Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplated possibly having Turkish divisions violate Iraq's neutrality in order to secure the Zagros passes; Iranian divisions might supplement this effort. The State Department, seeing many obstacles to such a strategy, countered by asking: If Turkey violated the sovereignty of a neutral Iraq which then joined forces with the Soviet Union, would not Iraq invoke the United Arab Republic's obligations under the Arab Collective Security Pact and the new United Arab Republic-Iraq alliance of 19 July 1958? Such a development would certainly influence Lebanese, Saudi Arabian, and even Jordanian reactions.15

On 15 November, President Eisenhower approved a statement of policy toward the Middle East. According to NSC 5820/1, which is more fully described in chapter 10, the administration would “avoid for the present any active efforts to enlist Arab nations in regional collective security arrangements” and “acquiesce in but not actively encourage Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.” Ten days earlier, General Twining had attended a meeting of the Pact's Military Committee.
On 18 November, the Chairman circulated among his JCS colleagues a memorandum that challenged NSC 5820/1:

US participation in the Military Committee without full membership in the Pact is creating uncertainties and difficulties which will not further US interests in the area. Some of the Pakistanis and the Iranians, in particular, seem to have three major reservations as to intentions and attitudes of the US.

a. They believe that US positions taken in military planning are influenced too much by State Department guidance, and that we are not capable of participation in pure military requirements planning. For example, the Turks, Paks and Iranians have definitely written off Iraq as hostile and read them out of the party, while our political echelons are still attempting to “wean” Iraq away from the Communists.

b. They do not understand our political motives in staying out of the Pact. In the eyes of some of the planners, we wish to dictate military policy with no accompanying political responsibility. Our recognition of Iraq, our delicate handling of those who murdered the pro-western regime, and our lack of position on the trials of the remaining pro-western Iraqi leaders contribute to this uncertainty in their minds.

c. Our aid to India is considered reward for neutrality; whereas our proven friends, who are willing to stand up and be counted, are receiving less assistance than required.

I am convinced that our problems in this part of the world, like many others, are more political and economic than military. Therefore, I believe that the JCS may have to take the leadership in formulating specific recommendations for the Department of State with respect to the political and economic factors which are slowly but surely defeating military efforts in the Near and Middle East and in Africa.

On 2 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to end the JMEPC’s study of US participation in the Pact and to make a fresh start. General Twining did not wait for completion of the new study. On 23 December, he sent Secretary McElroy an analysis that paralleled the one quoted above. He recommended, as a matter of urgency, that the United States:

1. Become a full member of the treaty organization.
2. Support a strengthened staff structure that required, in the immediate future, neither a supreme commander nor commitment of national forces.
3. Accept the Pact’s force goals for planning purposes only, without promising military aid for their realization.

On 7 January 1959, Secretary McElroy forwarded General Twining’s paper to the Secretary of State, together with his own endorsement. Shortly thereafter, the Joint Staff completed its study of US association with the Pact. On 15 January 1959, just before the Pact’s Council and Military Committee opened a meeting in Karachi, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a memorandum that supported and largely duplicated the one submitted by General Twining. Additionally, though, they suggested measures that would enable the United States to exercise more initiative in Pact affairs until US
membership became politically feasible. The most important of these included expediting the establishment of a command system, participating more actively in the Pact's training exercises, and encouraging senior US military officers to visit the treaty area under Pact auspices. 18

On 16 January, just as OSD officials were starting to evaluate the JCS memorandum, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy delivered a critique of the analysis prepared by General Twining and endorsed by Secretary McElroy. Murphy stated that US diplomats attending the Pact's Council sessions had not encountered the criticisms cited by General Twining in his memorandum of 18 November. The State Department still firmly opposed US membership in the Pact. Membership, Murphy wrote,

would reduce our capability to exercise a moderating influence in the Middle East as a whole, and... we doubt that Senate consent to ratification could be obtained... In our judgment, the Pact members understand fully our reasons for not adhering to the Pact, and while perhaps preferring full adherence, are not unduly concerned over our unwillingness to do so.

Assistant Secretary Sprague informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the State Department's view constituted the US position. 19

Aided by warnings from the US Ambassadors to Turkey and Iran, who emphasized the necessity of convincing regional members that "the US seriously intends to support the Pact," the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1959 reopened the issue of US membership. The Pact's collapse, they cautioned Secretary McElroy, would be a serious blow to US interests and have repercussions extending far beyond the Middle East. Soviet pressure upon Iran might become overpowering, and the likelihood of Soviet domination over both Iran and Iraq would greatly increase. "A wedge could thus be driven between NATO and SEATO that would weaken the collective security system of the whole Free World." Besides affirming that "it is militarily desirable that the US join the Pact now," the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested initiating a number of efforts to enhance the Pact's standing. One of these was immediate establishment of a Permanent Military Deputies Group (PMDG), whose Chief of Staff always would be a US officer. Agreeing with most of these suggestions, including the PMDG, Assistant Secretary Irwin advised the State Department that a thorough review of US policy was urgently required. The JCS recommendation that a military representative to the PMDG be appointed won Secretary McElroy's endorsement and, on 5 September, President Eisenhower's approval. This was a three-star position, rotating among the Services. Lieutenant General Elmer J. Rogers, USAF, became US Representative effective 1 January 1960. 20

During July 1959, three months after Iraq's formal withdrawal from the Pact, the name Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) came into common usage. The need to mesh US with CENTO planning seemed, if anything, greater than under the Baghdad Pact. Increasingly, for instance, the activities of the Combined Military Planning Staff clashed with major aspects of the administration's national security concept. CENTO's members clung to their desire to prepare for contingencies
What Role for CENTO?

arising from limited aggression and local insurrections as well as from general war. Further planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, likely would revive such problems as sharing US nuclear weapons and establishing a command system as well as reveal the inadequacies of regional forces, leading to calls for US reinforcements when in fact none would be available. Hence, in June and again in October 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated having CENTO prepare an emergency defense plan, lay down a program for future studies, and set about creating a command system. Such steps could create political difficulties, they admitted, but failure to improve CENTO's capabilities and to build up members' confidence also would be costly to US security interests. 

These recommendations drew from the State Department either reformulated rejections or carefully qualified acceptances. State persisted in opposing US membership. It agreed to the principle of US leadership in CENTO affairs, if US aid programs and political-military commitments were not increased thereby. State also sanctioned what it called a "practical" plan for the organization and conduct of war, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had drafted in August. Written so as to overcome political objections against full-scale contingency planning, the JCS draft had split the CENTO area into Eastern, Central, and Western sectors, defended respectively by Pakistani, Iranian, and Turkish forces. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey each would defend its own soil, without sending forces to other members' territory. Coordination could be effected through the PMDG, with CENTO's Council, Deputies, and Military Committee formulating overall guidance. Of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not regard such arrangements as satisfactory substitutes for contingency planning and a command system. 

The year 1960 witnessed restatements of old arguments without any resolution of them. The United States would not and perhaps could not deny unequivocally that CENTO eventually might obtain low-yield nuclear weapons. CENTO members therefore continued to assume the availability of such weapons in their defense studies. So long as CENTO did this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had little choice but to object that this aspect of planning was unrealistic. 

Judging between CENTO's need for a command structure and its craving for nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff probably assigned more importance to the former. In March 1960, they again advocated creating a command system, even though they admitted that doing so could lead to pressure for activating a US Middle East Command, stationing forces in the area, and providing more aid through the Military Assistance Program. The OSD reacted favorably at first but, after learning that the State Department remained opposed, decided to accept State's view. 

The State Department did soften its position enough to favor contingency planning for a command system that would be available "on a standby basis" should the CENTO Ministerial Council decide such a structure was necessary and politically desirable. Yet State still doubted whether, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, US opposition to a formal command structure would create a crisis of confidence within CENTO. 

Ground defense of the treaty area also proved a contentious issue. The United States hoped, as an essential minimum in general war, to prevent a Soviet
advance to the Mediterranean and the head of the Persian Gulf. By 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were giving more attention to the Persian Gulf, because NATO planning already dealt with a Soviet thrust through Turkey to the Mediterranean. Predictably, however, Iran and Pakistan refused to turn defense of the Persian Gulf into a primary objective rather than a last resort. To them, that meant surrendering large parts of their territories without a fight. The Military Committee's planning assumption read that CENTO's ground defenses should ensure the integrity of the region “as a whole.” Iran and Pakistan interpreted that as requiring preparations for a determined defense as close to the Soviet border as possible. A desire by the Shah to become CENTO's commander, if only in a titular capacity, added another complication. Would the JCS concept for emphasizing protection of the Persian Gulf be implemented by a commander who harbored serious reservations about it?25

In September 1960, the PMDG endorsed a plan to delineate CENTO's defense and command zones according to national boundaries. This was substantially the “practical” plan outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the State Department. Yet CENTO's incomplete structure allowed regional members to give special if not overriding consideration to local problems and interests. Pakistan, for instance, rated the threat from India greater than any other, including the USSR. Consequently, Pakistan deployed 5½ US-supported divisions to meet that threat and considered them unavailable for CENTO's plans. The Pakistanis listed only twenty thousand border guards as being available for CENTO planning.26

Military planning, then, remained ineffective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that many of CENTO's deficiencies flowed from one source: an insufficiently positive US approach to the treaty organization, its weaknesses, and its development. Accordingly, in October 1960, they sent Secretary Gates a “systematic” analysis of CENTO's military importance. They began by saying that, after five years of existence, CENTO still had no command organization, no agreed military plans, no effective liaison with NATO and SEATO, no arrangements for tactical nuclear support, and no modern air defense equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that three considerations largely defined US interests in the Middle East. These were:

1. CENTO's regional members formed a land barrier to Soviet expansion into the Middle East and Africa as well as to Soviet efforts to “reach the warm seas.”
2. By land, sea, and air the Middle East served as a crossroads linking three continents.
3. Middle East oil would remain significant to Western Europe for many years to come.

Thus a strong CENTO would make up a vital strand in the chain of containment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rated a moderately improved defensive posture for CENTO to be both feasible and desirable. Such an effort, they added, need not require the United States either to invest a disproportionate share of its resources nor to shoulder unacceptable political burdens. What would be required of the United States was a more positive approach to CENTO. After describing Iran as “the soft spot in the CENTO defense line,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff listed a number of specific steps that could improve CENTO's effectiveness. Besides the
familiar ones of US membership and a command structure, they mentioned pro­gramming Hawk surface-to-air missiles for Iran and Pakistan, arranging formal liaison with NATO and SEATO, and allocating very limited numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, controlled by US personnel, in support of all CENTO forces. Deputy Secretary Douglas forwarded the JCS views to Secretary Herter on 31 October and asked for urgent State-Defense consultations about it. But the national election occurred only eight days later, and nothing more transpired before the new president took office.

Reflections

The United States never joined CENTO, and CENTO never reached anything like a robust state. Yet the wisdom of hindsight casts doubt upon JCS claims that full US membership would have generated among regional members both confidence in and willingness to sacrifice for an anti-Soviet defense policy. Could anything, for instance, have persuaded Pakistan’s leaders to put aside their fear of an attack by India? Moreover, the State Department was probably right when it found the same major flaw in almost every JCS proposal for nourishing CENTO’s viability: CENTO’s military posture might well be improved but at the expense of US interests in the Middle East as a whole. The State Department believed that a policy of strengthening CENTO would only accentuate the differences between CENTO’s regional members and their Middle Eastern neighbors. The result, State felt, would undercut attempts to demonstrate that friendly relations with the United States were not incompatible with either Arab nationalism or nonalignment. These considerations, plus a reluctance to assume greater commitments that might inescapably follow joining CENTO, led the administration to reject most JCS recommendations. Thus CENTO fell between two stools, neither doing much to enhance US objectives in the Middle East nor creating a strong barrier against the spread of Soviet influence.
Cuba Becomes a Communist State

After a left-leaning government in Guatemala was toppled during 1954, the Eisenhower administration relegated Latin America to a low priority. The Cuban revolution changed that. In January 1959, Fidel Castro took power and soon led Cuba into a virtual alliance with the Soviet Union. Thus communism gained a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Many Latin American governments were either dictatorships or oligarchies with little popular support; Cuba might be a harbinger of more leftist revolutions. By the summer of 1960, the National Security Council was discussing Cuba practically every week.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the forefront of those urging strong action against Cuba. Even before Castro came to power, they warned their superiors against undercutting the existing government because they suspected that Castro harbored communist inclinations. By early 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that Castro's regime had become such a serious threat to US security that multilateral or even unilateral military intervention would be justified. The Eisenhower administration decided that anticommunist exiles would be organized and trained to invade Cuba.

The Fall of Batista

Fidel Castro first tried and failed to overthrow the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1953. Three years later, he and a handful of followers landed in eastern Cuba and began battling government forces from the remote fastness of the Sierra Maestra Mountains. Batista resorted to ever harsher repression, thereby driving more Cubans into Castro's camp. Slowly but steadily, Castro's guerrillas gained strength.

The United States could not avoid at least the appearance of taking sides in Cuba's civil war. Between FY 1953 and FY 1958, Cuba received $9.8 million in grant military aid. The objective of this aid program, like those for other Latin
American nations, was to provide military assistance “essential to the continued and increased effectiveness of those forces which are a necessary contribution to the defense of the hemisphere.” The State and Defense Departments put a broader interpretation on this guidance by ranking the results to be sought from Latin aid programs in the following order: first, protect the military investment that already had been made, giving emphasis to maintenance and training; second, strengthen hemisphere defense through internal security and local protective measures; third, encourage political stability and a pro-US orientation. Thus internal security and political stability were considered elements of hemisphere defense.

In 1958, the Defense Department listed Cuban forces required for hemisphere defense as three infantry battalions, three destroyer escorts, three patrol vessels, eight minesweepers, nine anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, and one transport and one fighter-bomber squadron. One infantry battalion as well as all naval and air forces except the minesweepers and one patrol vessel were eligible for MAP support by grant aid. Of course, to contend with Castro’s guerrillas and other dissidents, Batista was maintaining a considerably larger force. This raised the issue of whether the United States was soiling its image through identification, albeit indirectly, with a dictator. Much of the grant aid had been devoted to training Cuban officers in the United States. By June 1958, for example, 75 percent of the air force’s pilots and almost all its technicians had attended US courses.

Under the provisions of a 1952 bilateral agreement, Cuba could not use military aid for purposes other than those for which it was given, without prior approval by the United States. Of course, Batista would have been extremely hard put to fight the insurgents without employing either equipment obtained from the United States or personnel trained there. On 14 March 1958, the State Department decided that Batista was violating the 1952 agreement; it suspended action on all Cuban arms requests and shipments.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted about this decision. On 19 April, Admiral Burke informed his JCS colleagues that he viewed the suspension as inconsistent with national policy. The Cuban Government, he thought, could well construe it as an unfriendly act or at least as “an unwarranted adjudication by the US Government of actions taken by a friendly government to suppress elements of rebellion.” He wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a resumption of deliveries. After a JCS discussion, during which General White recommended waiting until State’s views became better known, Admiral Burke withdrew his recommendation.

On 15 June, at the State Department’s instruction, the US Ambassador asked the Cuban Government to withdraw all MAP equipment and MAP-trained personnel from operations against the insurgents. Although the Office of International Security Affairs had agreed to State’s instruction “in substance,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff again had been neither consulted nor informed beforehand. Admiral Burke cautioned his colleagues against endorsing a policy that MAP forces could be used only as permitted by the United States. If such a policy was applied universally, he argued, countries like Cuba where revolutions were “a normal political gambit” would be increasingly reluctant to accept US aid and would look elsewhere for training and equipment. “The importance of keeping
these countries in the Western orbit," he continued, "transcends the importance of insisting upon a literal interpretation of the MDA agreement." At a State-JCS meeting on 27 June, Admiral Burke argued that "we were trying to tell a sovereign nation what to do." Batista's army, he said, was "fighting elements allied with communism." By requiring withdrawal of MAP equipment and MAP-trained personnel, the United States in effect would be aiding the insurgents. General Taylor also voiced surprise at State's action, since internal stability was a major objective of the Mutual Security Program. In response, State and Defense agreed to restudy this issue.5

Before a decision was reached, Castro found a way to strike at Batista through the United States. Near the US naval base at Guantanamo, on the evening of 27 June 1958, his guerrillas seized a bus and abducted the thirty Navy and Marine Corps enlisted men aboard. Two weeks later, they were still being held hostage and US prestige was beginning to suffer. On 12 July, at Admiral Burke's instigation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary McElroy that the administration remove all restrictions on military aid to the Batista government, request that government to obtain the hostages' release within seventy-two hours, offer any assistance necessary to that end, and start moving a Marine Regimental Landing Team to Guantanamo. Concurrently, the Cuban Government should be asked to let US forces help recover the hostages if they were not released within seventy-two hours, and the guerrillas warned accordingly. No action resulted, though, because on 18 July the guerrillas unexpectedly released all hostages. Castro probably felt that he had achieved his objectives of demonstrating Batista's impotence and embarrassing the United States as well.6

Congress, meantime, had displayed increasing concern about instability in Latin America and the possible misuse of military aid. As a result, the Mutual Security Act signed by President Eisenhower on 30 June 1958 stipulated that "internal security requirements shall not normally be the basis for military assistance programs to the American Republics." The Defense Department's Programming Guidance dated 15 July incorporated this guidance word for word, although "political stability" remained a major objective of the Mutual Security Program.7

The administration did approve selling very small amounts of noncombat equipment to Batista's government. By the beginning of December 1958, however, Castro's insurgents were rapidly gaining ground. General White, on 9 December, told his JCS colleagues that he believed the arms embargo was doing a considerable amount of harm. Goodwill between the two governments was being dissipated, he maintained. Moreover, the effectiveness of US military missions had been reduced and the Batista government's efforts to end the insurgency obstructed. The insurgents, according to General White, were "in league with communism." The Batista government's efforts, on the other hand, were being directed toward protecting lives and property (including US investments) as well as maintaining law and order. He noted that an election had just taken place. Nonetheless, the rebels continued to oppose "the duly elected government by armed violence."8 In these circumstances, withholding support was contrary to "official broad US policy toward Latin America." General White favored a JCS recommendation to end the embargo, reemphasize the importance of adhering to "agreed US policy
toward Latin America,” and strengthen relationships and goodwill between the US and Cuban Governments.9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation on 23 December, after amending General White’s reference to the insurgents’ link with communism to read that Castro’s organization had “undoubtedly been penetrated by Communists.” By 30 December, when they forwarded this paper to Secretary McElroy, Batista’s days in power were clearly numbered. At an interdepartmental meeting held on New Year’s Eve, discussion centered upon what the successor regime might look like. Admiral Burke remarked that “even though we grant Castro is not a Communist the situation appears to be very good for a Communist take-over.”10

Confrontation with Castro

On 1 January 1959, Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba. After Castro took power, the question of communist influence within his regime quickly became the central one for US policymakers. Condemnations of Yankee imperialism became a staple of Castro’s rhetoric; expropriations of US-owned businesses occurred at an accelerating pace. In July 1959, Secretary of State Christian Herter decided that “we could no longer work with the Cuban government.” But the administration delayed definitive action until, late in October, Castro purged “moderates” from his government and bitterly denounced the United States. Accordingly, early in November, President Eisenhower decided that “all actions and policies of the United States government should be designed to encourage within Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America opposition to the extremist, anti-American course of the Castro regime...."11

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 6 November 1959, directed CINCLANT to prepare plans for (1) the protection of US nationals as well as US equipment and property and (2) armed intervention in Cuba, either unilaterally or sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS). Then, on 13 February 1960, the Cuban and Soviet Governments signed agreements whereby the USSR undertook to supply $100 million in credits, provide technical assistance for constructing industrial facilities, and purchase five million tons of sugar over five years. Castro was making his course clear to the world.

Admiral Burke emerged once more as the advocate of a forceful policy. On 19 February, he warned his JCS colleagues that little time remained “to stem the Kremlin’s incursion into this hemisphere.” Consequently, Admiral Burke advocated initiating measures that would lead to “the establishment of a stable, friendly, non-communist government in Cuba.” He circulated a study that outlined three alternatives: multilateral action through the Organization of American States, unilateral overt action by the United States, and covert unilateral US action. Burke recommended a sequence of steps. He suggested immediately documenting and publicizing the fact of a communist takeover, covertly supporting the Cuban opposition, and being prepared to use force in safeguarding and evacuating US nationals.12 After gaining sufficient support among members, the
United States should have the Organization of American States call upon Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices. If that failed, forcible intervention by the OAS would be the next step. As a last resort, or if time did not permit multilateral action, the United States should be ready to act militarily by itself.13

On 2 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy that the Cuban Government "appears to be following the path of International Communism." Since such a regime would pose "a direct threat to the security of the United States" and provide a base for spreading communist influence in the Western Hemisphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored "positive action" to reestablish a friendly government. To further that end, they recommended bringing Admiral Burke's study to the attention of the National Security Council. Five days earlier, in fact, Admiral Burke had sent copies of it to State and ISA.14

On 10 March, the NSC discussed policy options. Admiral Burke, who attended as Acting Chairman, had an opportunity to mention the study's alternatives. That same day, Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant assured Admiral Burke by letter that most of the actions mentioned in the study "were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified." Merchant defined the primary US objective as creating "an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles...."

At a State-JCS meeting on 11 March, it was brought out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved plans for multilateral or unilateral intervention, which could be put into effect on a few hours' notice. A State Department representative said that anti-Castro activities were proceeding slowly, in part because the current National Intelligence Estimate stated that Cuba was not Communist dominated. Admiral Burke replied that "if the Cuban Government was not communist nevertheless it was still acting like a communist government." In closing, Burke emphasized "how disturbed he and the Chiefs were over the Cuban situation and asked that Mr. Merchant let them know what they could do about it." Subsequently, Admiral Burke decided against forwarding the JCS memorandum of 2 March to the NSC. Instead, he gave copies of the correspondence between himself and Under Secretary Merchant to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.15

Much more was afoot. The "5412 Committee," an NSC subcommittee which reviewed covert action proposals, produced a plan for toppling Castro. The first step would be to form a moderate opposition group in exile. Then, over perhaps eight months, a paramilitary force of exiles would be organized and trained outside the United States. Cadres then would reenter Cuba to organize and lead resistance forces. On 17 March, at a White House conference attended by Admiral Burke, President Eisenhower decided to go ahead with this plan, saying that he knew of none better for dealing with the situation.16 This was the genesis of what became the landing at the Bay of Pigs.

Any doubts about Fidel Castro's intentions disappeared during the summer of 1960. When US-owned refineries refused to accept Soviet oil, Castro nationalized them. After the Eisenhower administration drastically reduced Cuba's sugar quota, Castro appealed to the UN Security Council for protection against "reprisals and aggressive acts" by the United States. Moscow offered protection.
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On 9 July Premier Khrushchev declared that, "Figuratively speaking, in case of need Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to launch an intervention against Cuba." 17

Castro promptly began acquiring an arsenal. Early in September, the first major arms shipment from the Soviet bloc reached Cuba; it included ten tanks and one hundred antiaircraft guns. At an NSC meeting later that month, the Director, Central Intelligence, gave his judgment that Cuba had become "virtually a member of the Communist Bloc." When Castro addressed the UN General Assembly on 26 September, Admiral Burke found in his speech indications that Castro might declare null and void the treaty under which the United States maintained Guantanamo Naval Base. At Admiral Burke's urging, on 29 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Gates that they assumed Guantanamo would remain a US base even if Castro denounced the treaty, and that it would be defended against all forms of pressure including military attack. They wanted him to obtain State's formal concurrence that this was indeed US policy. 18

During a State-JCS meeting on 30 September, Under Secretary Merchant raised the subject of Guantanamo. He doubted whether the Cuban leader would do more than talk because US retention of Guantanamo had much value for Castro as an emotional propaganda issue. General White, in a humorous vein, inquired "whether it was time to turn Cuba back to Spain." General Twining asked what State's position would be if Castro did attack. Should Cubans fire the first shot, Merchant replied, "then all bets are off for in effect we are at war with the Castro regime." 19

The administration evidently pinned its hopes upon what the paramilitary force of exiles would do. Central Intelligence organized and directed this force. But efforts to launch guerrilla operations in the Escambray Mountains did not fare well. Accordingly, early in December, the concept of operations underwent a major change. After preliminary air strikes, 600-750 heavily armed men would land in Cuba. This force would hold a beachhead with the aim of attracting dissidents and, ultimately, triggering a general uprising. 20 Preparations would not be completed, though, until some time after the next President took office. Crucial decisions would await the new administration.

Conclusion

viewed solely from the JCS perspective, Cuban policymaking seems to be the story of Admiral Burke and not that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is hard to find another instance where one member—who was not the Chairman, but a Service Chief—took such a dominant position. Admiral Burke detected a communist danger very early and was among the first to contemplate military intervention. No doubt the fact that Cuba lay within CINCLANT's area of responsibility helped account for his high profile. Beyond that, personal conviction and a forceful personality must also have contributed. Consequently, in this case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed his lead and the corporate body became an extension of one individual.
The Cold War Comes to Africa

Defining a More Active Policy

The ending of European colonial rule over much of sub-Saharan Africa compelled US policymakers to deal with a part of the world which, until now, they had been able to ignore. In 1957, Great Britain's Gold Coast colony became the independent nation of Ghana; Nigeria won its sovereignty in 1960. Guinea, in 1958, severed all ties with France; Togoland and the Cameroons gained their independence two years later. In 1960, Italy and Great Britain relinquished Somalia while Belgium ended its rule over the Congo. Thus, during President Eisenhower's second term, the political face of sub-Saharan Africa changed beyond recognition.

The NSC Planning Board, in July 1957, circulated a draft statement proposing what policy should be during the next three years. Sub-Saharan Africa, the draft noted, was a primary source of several strategic materials and potentially a major market for US goods. The region offered alternative air and sea routes to the Far East which, in communist hands, would pose a strategic threat to the West. Finally, serious disorders might cause a military drain on several NATO partners and weaken Western Europe's economy.

The draft outlined a series of diplomatic, scientific, economic, cultural, and psychological activities designed to convince the emerging African states that their interests lay in close association with the West. No military action or assistance programs were contemplated, and the draft merely called for periodic surveys to determine any changes in US strategic requirements. On 16 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this approach. One week later, President Eisenhower approved the draft as NSC 5719/1, after the National Security Council added a phrase that indicated "growing concern" about potential communist influence. The Council also noted remarks by General Twining about the strategic importance of sub-Saharan Africa.1

Almost one year later, the NSC Planning Board decided to revise the military and strategic portions of NSC 5719/1. It eliminated a description of the region's
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strategic value as "limited." A statement about the importance of denying the area to communist control became instead a positive assertion that "it is essential that the United States take the necessary steps to ensure denial of this potentially critical area to the Communists." The NSC Planners repeated their earlier conclusion that no immediate action seemed necessary, apart from keeping the area under periodic survey. They also added a recommendation that the administration pursue "political accommodation that would promote assurance of early success if base rights are needed in the future."2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a still more radical revision. Writing to Secretary McElroy on 1 August 1958, they noted that communist efforts to infiltrate Africa likely would intensify and that recent events in the Middle East had put US lines of communication at greater risk, thus enhancing the strategic importance of sub-Sahara Africa. Therefore, they took issue with the Planning Board's conclusion that "no immediate action appears called for." They favored deleting that statement and adding language that "the United States should now develop political accommodation that would promote assurance of early success."

Through a paragraph added at Admiral Burke's behest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that US policy reflect "the increasing strategic significance of the area from the military aspects, particularly in light of the dangers inherent in any further Communist penetration." They stressed the need for "vigorous" implementation of policy and used the adjective again in calling for "a modest but vigorous national program employing all instruments of national power to create a strong US position in Central Africa, an area in which the United States should exert much more interest than it has in the past." These views went to the NSC on 5 August.3

During an NSC discussion on 7 August, General White suggested that the Services could prepare the way for establishing naval bases, air routes, and guided missile sites. President Eisenhower disagreed, saying that education and cultural relations should come first: "We must win Africa, but we can't win it by military activity." The Planning Board then developed a new version of the policy paper, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed on 20 August. The NSC accepted it and, with President Eisenhower's approval, on 26 August promulgated the new policy as NSC 5818. Paragraph 11 of NSC 5719/1 had warned that the African people, uncommitted as yet, would in the long run shape their course according to their own best interests. Therefore, US policies must convince them that their goals could be best and most advantageously achieved by association with the West. These policies could not be effective "if the African feels he is merely a pawn in a power struggle." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended revision to reflect "a positive and timely approach." The NSC decided merely to substitute wording that US policies must "be designed to convince the African that the United States wants to help him achieve his economic, political and cultural goals without insisting that he align himself in the East-West power struggle." The new guidelines were, if anything, less assertive than the old.

The other relevant paragraphs in NSC 5818 read as follows:
19. The military and strategic value of the area arises from its strategic materials and geographic location, especially with reference to sea and air routes alternate to those through the Middle East.

20. **Policy Guidance:** The area should be kept under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements. Moreover, the United States should, through economic, political, and cultural means, develop a political climate which would facilitate early success if base rights are needed in the future.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed two changes in paragraph 20. One—that the disavowal of a need for immediate action be eliminated—won adoption. The other—that the United States should “now” develop political accommodation—lost out to language that was a shade more specific but struck no note of urgency. All told, NSC 5818 did not point the way to a “modest but vigorous national program” as advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In September 1959, as the rush toward independence accelerated across Africa, the NSC OCB proposed that a policy review take place. The Planning Board prepared two draft statements as the OCB recommended, one covering South, Central, and East Africa, the other dealing with West Africa. The policy proposed for South, Central, and East Africa differed from NSC 5818 mainly in emphasis, as the following quotations from the new draft demonstrate:

7. In the event of war or loss of Western access to air and sea routes through the Middle East, control of sea and air communications in this area of Africa would be extremely important. Under these circumstances, our primary strategic military interest is to deny the area to Communist control. In the future, moreover, there may be more significant requirements (military and other) for US use of rights and facilities in the area. Installations in this area are already becoming increasingly important to US research and development in, and exploitation of, the fields of outer space, missile weaponry, and world-wide communications.

24. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the US appraisal of its strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that the United States may, in the future, require bases or facilities.

25. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any nation which desires it. As countries in the area become independent, encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security forces. In those cases where external assistance is required for this purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole to provide such assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve US objectives, consider providing US assistance to meet minimum legitimate security requirements, including technical training in US military institutions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found this statement acceptable and so informed Secretary Gates on 8 January 1960. The NSC adopted it six days later. After receiving President Eisenhower’s approval, it was circulated for implementation as NSC 6001 on 19 January.

The policy paper for West Africa corresponded closely with NSC 6001. Here, too, the dislocations and disruption likely to attend the first stages of independence would provide opportunities for communist penetration and exploitation.
An additional guideline was inserted, however, upon the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In order to keep adequately informed of regional military developments, they said, the presence of “technically competent observers” appeared mandatory. On 7 April 1960, the NSC accepted this addition, with the proviso that each case of establishing military observers would be subject to the Secretary of State's approval. Two days later President Eisenhower approved the amended policy statement, and it was issued as NSC 6005/1.7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff bore responsibility for periodically surveying Africa’s strategic importance and for helping the Assistant Secretary (ISA) support the State Department’s efforts to project US influence into the area. They sought State Department approval for establishing military attaché offices in some states as soon as they achieved independence and augmenting other offices already in being. The State Department, concerned lest the presence of additional attachés provoke an arms race or be viewed by the former colonial powers as a US attempt to supplant their influence, was unwilling to approve these requests in full. On 20 June 1960, State and Defense representatives agreed that full attaché offices would be created in Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria. In the Belgian Congo, then on the verge of independence, a two-man office was to be created. A decision about requirements for the Mali Federation, Guinea, and Kenya would be deferred.*

The time-honored practice of “showing the flag” offered another way for the military to help advance foreign policy objectives. In 1958 and again in 1959, naval units of the South Atlantic Force made goodwill cruises to African ports. During the summer of 1960, as troubles in the Congo worsened, the Navy informally proposed to the State Department and the Joint Staff that a small task force sail to southern African waters. Admiral Burke advised his JCS colleagues that maintaining a presence, for four or five months, of two destroyers and two landing ships with one Marine company embarked would foster goodwill through port visits, publicize US capabilities to assist local governments, and be prepared for evacuation missions as well as unilateral action.*

The Army doubted whether Admiral Burke’s proposal met current conditions in Africa; the Air Force deplored its failure to recognize the United Nations’ interest. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 28 September, decided that they need take no action. Such cruises, they indicated, were within the scope of CINC-LANT’s discretionary authority. Accordingly, during the winter of 1960-1961, the Commander, South Atlantic Force, sent a small number of ships to cruise and visit ports.10

Meantime, in April 1960, the NSC had initiated a review of US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. In July the State Department circulated a discussion paper noting that, between 1960 and 1962, at least twenty African states, many of them lacking stable political and administrative systems, would become independent. Most disturbing for US policy, according to State, was the probability that withdrawal of European control would provide “an unparalleled opportunity” for Soviet bloc penetration.

The State Department saw no alternative to relying upon the former colonial powers, or metropoles, as aid providers. However, Africans’ suspicions toward their former rulers and the Europeans’ declining political influence lent
increasing importance to the United Nations as a vehicle for economic and technical assistance. The United States should simplify, or be prepared to waive, some of its more cumbersome aid formalities, in order to respond quickly when crises arose. Furthermore, the United States must identify itself with Africans’ legitimate aspirations, even though doing so would strain US ties with Europe. As for military assistance, the State Department defined the problem as preventing new states from dissipating resources on establishments that were beyond their needs, while still encouraging them to look to the West for their legitimate needs. The answer, State seemed to suggest, might lie in some sort of international control over arms shipments.\textsuperscript{11}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, through a critique dated 28 July, characterized the Department of State’s treatment of military assistance as “hesitant and timid,” particularly in comparison with the approach taken toward technical and economic aid. The State Department, they said, seemed “acutely preoccupied with efforts to avoid an arms race in Africa.” This was a desirable objective, but overemphasizing it might jeopardize US security interests at critical moments when prompt action became necessary. A timely, effective Military Assistance Program should derive from an assessment of how much each new state mattered to US interests, early knowledge of whether the metropole intended to extend aid, and evaluation of how a new state would respond to aid from the metropole.\textsuperscript{12}

The NSC Planning Board produced a revised paper with some minor revisions (e.g., placing more stress on Chinese Communist activities). The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered their criticisms equally applicable to it, and their views were made known to the NSC on 16 August. Two days later, the National Security Council directed its planners to review NSC 6001 and 6005/1. When the year ended, though, no changes had occurred.\textsuperscript{13}

The difficulties of prescribing one general policy for a mosaic of states were all too clear. In particular, the legacy of colonialism militated against attaining the basic US objective, to prevent communist powers from gaining a foothold in the region. Communism and its pitfalls were quite remote from the Africans’ experience. Conversely, the rallying cry of nationalism, sometimes reinforced by racial appeals, struck responsive chords. Wherever the interests of the metropole and the aspirations of the local populace failed to coincide, the United States found itself caught between the two. The Congo crisis, described below, provides a case study of such a dilemma.

The Congo: UN or US Intervention?

On 30 June 1960, the Belgian Congo became the Republic of the Congo, with Patrice Lumumba as its Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu as Head of State.\textsuperscript{14} Lumumba’s fiery personality, coupled with his party’s emergence as the largest single bloc in the Chamber of Representatives, won him far more prominence than any other Congolese leader. Hardly had independence celebrations ended when the new nation began dissolving in anarchy. Congolese
soldiers in a provincial town mutinied on 5 July. Other units broke apart and chaos spread rapidly across the country. By 7 July, terrified Europeans were pouring into the capital of Leopoldville and across the river to Brazzaville in the French Congo. The Belgian Government, which still had 2,500 troops in the Congo, sent 1,200 reinforcements to protect its citizens. These troops went into action against Congolese on 10 July and, during the next week, intervened in more than twenty localities.

Meanwhile, on 8 July, the State Department decided that US citizens must be evacuated. Rear Admiral Frank O’Beirne, who was the Director, J-3, established a small task force in the Pentagon’s Joint War Room (JWR) to serve as an information center and coordinate requests for assistance. The task force began with two officers and rose to five, including representatives of the Logistics Directorate, J-4. Helicopters and C-124 transports were brought from Germany and Libya into Brazzaville. Admiral O’Beirne instructed the European Command to place two rifle companies in readiness. As further insurance, the carrier USS Wasp in the Caribbean took on one Marine company with eight helicopters and six light transport planes, then steamed toward the Congo River’s mouth.15

The issue soon changed from how to take US civilians out into whether US troops should be sent in. On 10 July, Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu appealed for a United Nations military force to help restore order. The next day, perhaps with Belgian encouragement, Moise Tshombe declared the independence of mineral-rich Katanga province. Albert Kalonji followed suit in adjacent Kasai. On 12 July, a group of cabinet officers led by Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko presented US Ambassador Clare Timberlake with a request for two thousand US troops “to insure the maintenance of order in the lower Congo and Leopoldville.” The Ambassador replied that, unless there was enough food in Leopoldville to forestall riots, he would oppose bringing in US troops. Timberlake then telephoned the State Department. He preferred sending troops under the aegis of the United Nations, but whatever the decision, he believed that moving two infantry companies from Germany to Brazzaville would have a “very desirable effect.” Timberlake also reported an urgent need for one hundred tons of flour.16

The J-3 already had compiled a list of available forces. Two companies from Germany could reach Leopoldville in 24 hours. A full battle group (1,425 men) could arrive from Europe in 40 hours; one company from the Strategic Army Command in the continental United States (CONUS) could get there in 43 hours, one battle group in 50; two Marine battalions (2,500 men) could be moved to the Congo in 52 hours. Later on 12 July, at a meeting that Admiral Burke attended as Acting Chairman, Secretary Herter stated President Eisenhower’s position that no US troops should be sent “unless they were absolutely essential to save lives.” The United Nations, Herter continued, should provide troops and military advisers, preferably French-speaking Africans. Conferees discussed the possibility of a temporary combined command. Admiral Burke felt that it should be a United Nations Command and that no US forces should be placed under either Belgian or Congolese command. At this point, he
agreed, the “most logical” course lay in providing logistical support for African contingents rather than committing US troops.17

President Eisenhower was vacationing at Newport, Rhode Island. When Secretary Herter telephoned him at noon on 12 July, the President said that “we are always willing to do our duty through the UN but we are not going to unilaterally get into this.” During that afternoon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed Ambassador Timberlake’s recommendation. They considered a J-3 draft that listed a number of political factors to be weighed prior to any decision about sending US forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed the inclusion of political factors unnecessary or inappropriate, with one exception: if a United Nations command was organized, the possibility of a Soviet demand for representation equal to that of the United States would have to be considered. The JCS memorandum forwarded to Secretary Gates that same day described action by the United Nations as “the more prudent and desirable course.” However, should the UN fail to take “appropriate” or “effective” steps, the administration should “consider unilateral action in order to preclude Communist exploitation of the situation.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff also included J-3’s list of available units. Deputy Secretary Douglas promptly sent this memorandum to Secretary Herter, adding that he shared their views about the desirability of UN action.18

On 13 July, conferees from the State Department, the Joint Staff, ISA, and the Services considered a number of requests. USCINCEUR had raised a question of whether aviation gasoline should be sent to Congolese airfields and reported that the Belgians intended to request logistical support for the airlift of their troops. Ambassador Timberlake wanted Air Force personnel and equipment dispatched to Kamina Airfield in Katanga. The Defense Department reopened the issue of sending military attaches to the Congo. Conferences decided that logistical support should be limited to that required to help evacuate US citizens; none would be given the Belgians except as part of a UN effort. Soon afterward, decisions were taken that no aviation gasoline would be shipped for the time being, that three attaches would be appointed, and that Air Force technicians and communications equipment could be sent to Kamina.19

That same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to urge reconsideration of logistical support for Belgian troops. They advised Secretary Gates that European Command had the necessary aircraft and equipment, and that aviation fuel was on hand at Dakar in Senegal and Accra in Ghana. They deemed prompt action to restore order in the Congo to be “mandatory and in the best interests of the United States.” While furnishing assistance through the United Nations remained the desirable course, the United States “should be prepared to provide the requested assistance unilaterally in order to preclude Communist exploitation of the situation leading, eventually, to the Republic of Congo falling under Communist domination.”20

During the early morning hours of 14 July, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to take the steps necessary to provide military aid until such time as Congolese national security forces could fully meet their tasks. Creation of a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) followed promptly. Hours after
the resolution passed, ISA officials asked the J-3 Battle Staff to start planning the transportation of 1,000 to 1,200 Tunisian soldiers to the Congo. The J-3 Battle Staff, in turn, directed EUCOM’s Operations Division to undertake this task. During 15-16 June, C-124s carrying the first contingent of Tunisian troops landed at Leopoldville. By 21 July, US aircraft had brought to Leopoldville a force exceeding 3,000 soldiers (1,073 from Tunisia, 637 from Ghana, nearly 900 from Morocco, and about 560 from Sweden) with more than two hundred tons of equipment. By this time, the UNEF totaled approximately 5,200 men, of whom about 850 had been transported by the British and around 500 by the Soviets; Ethiopia provided the airlift for 617 men of its own contingent. Air deliveries of foodstuffs (mostly flour) had begun on 15 July. Moreover, US European Command provided the UNEF with ten C-47 transports, 4,000 helmet liners painted UN blue, and 300,000 “C” rations. To carry out these tasks, four C-124 squadrons were sent to Europe.

The UNEF’s arrival did not seem to damp the fires of crisis. On the evening of 17 July, Lumumba and Kasavubu threatened to ask for Soviet intervention unless the UN secured removal of all Belgian troops by midnight on 19 July. At an NSC meeting two days later, the Director, Central Intelligence, characterized Lumumba as “a Castro or worse” and stated his assumption that “Lumumba has been bought by the Communists.”

Belgian forces now had grown to approximately 7,400 men (including one battalion in neighboring Rwanda-Urundi), most of whom were in Leopoldville province. On 19 July, the Belgian commander and UN representatives agreed that UN forces would relieve all Belgian troops in the Leopoldville area by 23 July. The UN Security Council, on 22 July, called upon Belgium “to implement speedily” the 14 July resolution calling for withdrawal. The word “speedily” represented a compromise between the Soviet preference for “immediately” and the US desire for “as soon as possible.” By the beginning of August, Belgians had withdrawn either to the port of Kitona or into Katanga province as UN contingents replaced them. During the next month, Belgian tactical units departed Katanga as well.

The prospect of communist intervention, raised by Prime Minister Lumumba’s threat to call in Soviet troops unless the Belgians left immediately, prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider strong countermeasures. Writing to Secretary Gates on 22 July, they recommended inducing the United Nations to:

1. Declare an embargo on arms shipments to the Congo and a blockade against further introduction of troops other than those belonging to the UNEF.
2. Earnestly caution the Soviet Union not to interfere in the Congo.
3. Close all Congolese airports to Soviet military airlifts and be ready to block runways.
4. Prepare to prevent ships from entering the mouth of the lower Congo.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also believed that, working both directly and through the United Nations, the US Government should bring pressure upon countries along the air route to deny the Soviets overflight privileges and staging rights. If the Sino-Soviet bloc either intervened or attempted to do so, the United States
should take such steps within the UN as would lead to early withdrawal of
Belgian as well as Sino-Soviet forces. Acting unilaterally, if necessary, the United
States should be prepared to take whatever military action appeared necessary to
prevent or defeat Soviet intervention. On 23 July, these views were forwarded to
Secretary Herter. Eight days later, at an NSC meeting, General Twining voiced
concern that Belgian bases at Katona and Kamina might fall into Soviet hands.
Fully accepting JCS advice, the Council decided to be prepared “at any time to
take appropriate military action to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention
in the Congo.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 August, directed J-5 to prepare a
suitable contingency plan. 24

By early August, 115 USAF transport aircraft were allocated to Congo opera­tions. 25 Slightly more than one hundred Air Force and Army personnel were sta­tioned in the Congo itself. Although aviation fuel supplies were scarce during the
airlift’s early days, corrective steps eased the situation. When stocks at the stag­ing point of Lano in Nigeria ran short after the first three or four days, planes
were diverted to Accra in Ghana. A similar shortage developed there too, but
when the carrier USS Wasp arrived off the coast, on 26 July, it delivered some
200,000 gallons. A Swedish port unit moved into Matadi, near the Congo’s
mouth, and reopened the pipeline to Leopoldville. After commercial as well as
US Navy tankers reached Matadi, Lagos, and Dakar, adequate reserves appeared
to be assured. 26

On 4 August, the Air Force became Executive Agent for the Secretary of
Defense, with authority to perform all fiscal functions associated with Congo
operations. The State Department was supposed to pass all UN requirements to
the Air Force, which in turn would transmit to the J-3 Battle Staff whatever called
for air or sealift. The Air Force directly handled all transfers of parts or equip­
ment from CONUS. Yet although the Air Force had replaced ISA as intermediary,
in practice requests and information involving EUCOM’s resources still went
from the Department of State directly to the Battle Staff. 27

The UNEF could not avoid becoming a participant in Congolese politics. On
12 August, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld flew to secessionist Katanga and
arranged with Moïse Tshombe for a transfer of duties from Belgian to UN forces.
Prime Minister Lumumba, who saw the agreement as prolonging a secession that
he very much wanted to end, bitterly denounced Hammarskjöld. The Congolese
Government and people, he declared on 15 August, had lost confidence in the
Secretary-General. His denunciation sent shock waves through Washington. At
an NSC meeting on 18 August, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon warned
that the UNEF’s elimination would be a “disaster,” perhaps leading to Soviet
intervention. He characterized Lumumba as “working to serve the purposes of
the Soviets”; the Director, Central Intelligence, added that Lumumba was “in
Soviet pay.” President Eisenhower said that “we were talking of one man forcing
us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets.” He thought “the
possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We
should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to
do it. We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for
starting a fight.” 28

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Meantime, on 6 August, Admiral Burke cautioned his JCS colleagues about a possibility that the Soviet bloc might gain control over Kitona and the neighboring naval base at Banana, at the Congo's mouth. To assure their continued availability to the Western powers and their denial to Soviet forces, he recommended: starting action to ensure that the UN assumed "timely control"; providing adequate maintenance and operation of the facilities through Military Assistance Programs offered by the United States and other friendly governments, coupled with training for Congolese personnel; and, finally, taking covert action in all of the above to assure a "pro-Western orientation."29

After reviewing Admiral Burke's recommendations, General Lemnitzer observed that the same considerations applied to Kamina base in Katanga, which also could serve as a staging area. Since potential trouble spots existed in the Middle and Far East as well as Africa, he argued, overflight privileges and staging facilities were growing ever more important. General Lemnitzer therefore favored including Kamina in the recommendations concerning Kitona and Banana. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Admiral Burke's recommendations, with this amendment, on 18 August and asked Secretary Gates to present their views to the Secretary of State.30

The State Department fully supported keeping bases in the Congo out of Soviet hands but endorsed only the proposal to help the UN assume timely control over facilities. Acting Secretary Dillon also noted that NSC 6001, described earlier in this chapter, expressed US strategic interest in sub-Sahara Africa only in most general terms. This was, to his knowledge, the first time that Defense had indicated any specific strategic interest in the region. He suggested that the Defense Department define US strategic interest more precisely, so that it could be written into a revised NSC paper.31

Assistant Secretary (ISA) John Irwin believed that the JCS recommendations just rejected by the State Department warranted further consideration. The "fluid" situation, he told Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon on 23 September, offered excellent opportunities for their successful implementation, "which the passage of time may remove." Consequently, JCS proposals would be placed before the State-Defense-CIA Congo Contingency Planning Group.32

The Congo situation was more than fluid; it was chaotic. As August ended, the UNEF totaled 19,341 personnel; its main contingents came from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Ireland, Morocco, and Tunisia. The map on page 193 shows how these units were deployed. By 3 September, all Belgian tactical units had departed the Congo; there remained only 1,500 support personnel and technicians at Kamina and Kitona, plus a few advisers retained by Tshombe.

Lumumba evidently decided to rely on Soviet military aid to crush the secessions in Kasai and Katanga. By late August, more than one hundred Soviet and Czech "technicians" were in the Congo; ten Iluyshin transports arrived at Stanleyville in Oriental province; the Soviets made available to Lumumba one hundred trucks which they had just landed at Matadi in response to a UN request. But Lumumba's campaign in Kasai failed and, on 5 September, President Kasavubu dismissed him from office. Lumumba fought back and won support from the Congolese Chamber of Representatives. Then, on 14 September, the Chief of Staff
of the Congolese Army, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, assumed power and “neutralized” all politicians until the year’s end. The US Government was delighted when Colonel Mobutu promptly closed the Czech and Soviet embassies.33

Pitfalls of Planning

The NSC, on 1 August, had directed that military plans be prepared to counter possible Soviet intervention. Progress was long delayed, however, by disagreement among the Services over which agency ought to bear responsibility for planning. The J-5, on 20 August, recommended that overall responsibility be
assigned to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, Admiral Robert L. Dennison. In part, this choice seems to have been reached through a process of elimination. The Joint Staff, according to J-5, should not be responsible for preparing either command level or detailed theater level plans. To do so would be inconsistent with the primary JCS responsibility of providing strategic guidance to commanders, require a more adequate technical staff and library, and compel the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review their own plans (instead of resorting to an outside appraisal) and coordinate annexes with those of their subordinates.

Having narrowed the choice to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, or CINCNELM, J-5 listed the advantages and disadvantages of each. But it would appear unlikely that J-5 based its recommendations on these pros and cons, since CINCLANT lacked important advantages listed for USCINCEUR and CINCNELM, such as an experienced, fully manned contingency planning staff, conveniently located for coordination with associated nations. CINCLANT also lacked USCINCEUR's advantage of controlling sizeable forces from all Services, readily available for deployment. Only one of the four advantages listed for CINCLANT—that it was least likely to be simultaneously involved in other large-scale contingency operations—could be considered absolute, and there would be subsequent disagreement about its accuracy. Similarly, the disadvantages listed by J-5 provided little basis for rational choice. Probably the deciding factors were "additional considerations," which to J-5 indicated the desirability of establishing a new unified command responsible for sub-Sahara Africa. If that occurred, J-5 suggested, it would be better not to assign contingency planning to either USCINCEUR or CINCNELM.4

As a guideline for planning, J-5 considered that under ideal conditions and assuming limited or ineffective resistance, the USSR had a marginal capability of putting one airborne division (8,500–9,000 men) into the Congo by D+4. About 1,600 men, flying from the southern Caucasus, could land in the Stanleyville area in twenty-four to thirty-six hours. Another 6,000 men could follow no earlier than D+2, and the remainder not before D+3. The J-5 rated a landing from the sea very unlikely.

The most probable scenario for US action, J-5 believed, would involve an initial Soviet air and sea movement into an area in which UN forces still were operating. The United States immediately would provide UN troops with tactical air support, deny sea and air lanes to Soviet forces, and introduce US ground units at an early stage. To minimize the danger of general war, initial operations should be limited as far as practicable to the general area of the Congo.

Both the Army and the Air Force opposed designating CINCLANT to prepare contingency plans for the Congo. General Lemnitzer argued that CINCLANT had no plans that either covered the employment of large Air Force and Army units or ones that could be modified to apply to the Congo. CINCLANT also lacked Army and Air Force component commanders who could prepare detailed plans. The Army further claimed, contrary to J-5, that CINCLANT was the commander most likely to be involved simultaneously in other contingency operations, and that his headquarters in Norfolk was remote from the nations having an interest in the Congo. The initial forces were most readily available from Europe and, until seaborne forces arrived, USCINCEUR would have to furnish logistical support.
The Army, therefore, considered USCINCEUR better qualified to perform the planning. (Although the European Command had an Army preponderance, USCINCEUR in 1960 was an Air Force officer, General Lauris Norstad.)

For similar reasons, General White also favored designating USCINCEUR. On another plane, he took exception to J-S's proposed guidance which envisaged limited military action between the United States and the USSR. NSC 5906/1, the current statement of Basic National Security Policy, did not allow for limited war with the Soviet Union, the Air Force noted. Consequently, Soviet intervention in the Congo should be construed as an indication that the USSR was willing to risk a general war in order to achieve its objectives.

Although basic differences narrowed during the next two months, agreement seemed no nearer. A draft plan accepting the risk of general war and skirting the issue of command responsibility nevertheless ran afoul of the latter issue and failed to win approval. Generals Lemnitzer and Shoup found an overriding objection in USCINCEUR's supporting relationship to NATO. They proposed, as an interim measure, that a Joint Task Force commanded by an Army officer be established to draft detailed plans. Admiral Burke immediately countered that CINCLANT should be directed to proceed with theater level planning and a Joint Task Force established under CINCLANT to prepare supporting plans. General Shoup proposed simply extending CINCLANT's responsibilities to include sub-Sahara Africa. On 24 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their divided views to the Secretary of Defense.

After a discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 September, Secretary Gates said that he favored establishing a new specified command with planning responsibilities for sub-Sahara Africa. On 6 October, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the feasibility and desirability of such an arrangement. General White objected that the situation was moving too fast to permit the loss of time entailed in obtaining presidential approval for a specified command. Subsequently, he joined General Decker in recommending establishment of an interim joint task force, which eventually should become the specified command's headquarters. General Shoup, unconvinced that a new command was necessary, reiterated his position, stated above. Admiral Burke still preferred giving planning responsibility to CINCLANT. Finally, though, he endorsed a specified command, provided that CINCLANT retained control of operations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, including those supporting ground and air operations in the specified command's area. General Lemnitzer, who was now Chairman, supported Generals White and Decker.

Reversing himself, Secretary Gates decided on 21 November that CINCLANT should bear responsibility for developing and maintaining operational plans. He directed that there be established, under CINCLANT, a Joint Task Force commanded by an Army lieutenant general, comprising a modest permanent planning staff and such forces as might be made available to conduct operations.

On 9 December, and on two succeeding occasions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed but failed to resolve whether Secretary Gates intended CINCLANT to have operational as well as planning responsibilities. At a meeting on 29 December, Gates told them that he intended CINCLANT to bear overall responsibility for
both planning and operations until he and they took "affirmative steps" to change matters. Once the Joint Task Force Commander became established ashore in a large-scale operation, for example, he might relieve CINCLANT of overall operational command. If the undertaking was large enough, Gates continued, the Joint Task Force Commander might become head of a unified command.39

This clarification removed the last hurdle, for on 9 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the nomination of Lieutenant General Paul L. Freeman, Jr., USA, to command the Joint Task Force. On 4 January 1961, CINCLANT received official notification that he now carried responsibility for planning and operations with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.40

Conclusion

Autumn 1960 brought the Congo's travail no closer to resolution. On 27 November, Patrice Lumumba slipped past the UN and Congolese troops guarding his Leopoldville home and headed toward Stanleyville in Oriental province. He was captured and, on 2 December, came back to Leopoldville as a prisoner. From there, he was taken to a town ninety miles away. Antoine Gizenga assumed Lumumba's mantle, announcing that he now represented the Congo's lawful government and that Stanleyville had become the legal capital. By mid-January 1961, pro-Lumumba forces apparently controlled almost half the country. In Katanga, Moise Tshombe's secessionist regime still survived. All too clearly, the UNEF had not brought order out of chaos.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff looked at the Congo strictly in terms of Cold War competition. To them, Soviet support for Lumumba (and, after his arrest, for Gizenga) marked the first round of an East-West struggle for Africa. They preferred to work through the United Nations but favored unilateral action, if necessary, to prevent the establishment of a Soviet military beachhead. Evidence suggesting a CIA role in schemes to assassinate Lumumba shows how deeply a crisis atmosphere permeated the administration. Even President Eisenhower, who usually was the reverse of an alarmist, remarked that "in the last twelve months the world has developed a...ferment greater than he could remember in recent times."41 With hindsight, it can be said that these fears were exaggerated. But that was not how matters looked in 1960.
The Far East: Holding the Line

Defining a Defense Perimeter

During the early 1950s the United States created a defensive cordon along China's eastern and southern borders. This came about through military action and by a series of alliances and mutual defense treaties. Containment was the essential element in NSC 5429/5, a policy statement approved by President Eisenhower in December 1954 and still current in 1957. It defined the primary problem in the Far East as being the serious threat to US interests posed by "the spread of hostile Communist power on the continent of Asia over all of Mainland China, North Korea and, more recently, over the northern part of Viet Nam." The United States should be "clear and strong in its resolve to defend vital interests," ready to risk a war without trying to provoke one. Protecting the security of the offshore island chain—Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand—constituted "an element essential to US security." As for the Asian mainland, in the event of an unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea, US armed forces would be employed against the aggressor. If necessary and feasible, US forces also would oppose any attack in the area covered by the Manila Pact, which is described in chapter 15. Either an attack or a threat of one against any country not covered by a security treaty would signify a renewal of aggressive purposes, creating a menace so grave as to justify the President in asking for congressional authority to take action, including the use of armed forces.¹

A Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1 July 1956–30 June 1958 translated policy objectives into military tasks. The JSCP prescribed that in a general war the Commander in Chief, Pacific, would conduct a strategic defense and prepare for offensive operations along a line running from the Malay Peninsula's Kra Isthmus through the South China Sea, Taiwan, the East China and Japan Seas, up to the Bering Strait. CINCPAC's tasks included: tying down the maximum number of Sino-Soviet bloc forces and neutralizing support bases; defending the Republic of Korea, but not to the prejudice of his primary duty of protecting Japan and Okinawa; providing naval and air support to facilitate operations by Chinese
Nationalist forces against the mainland; and assisting in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. If compelled by enemy pressure, he would evacuate US, UN, and if possible Republic of Korea (ROK) forces from Korea, as well as help the British to evacuate Hong Kong.2

The “New Look” called for relying on strategic nuclear retaliation and strengthening “indigenous security efforts” to defend against local aggression. Yet, during the first Eisenhower administration, the application of New Look principles had resulted in only minor adjustments to US overseas deployments. Demands for more drastic changes followed the promulgation of what some called the “new New Look.” President Eisenhower’s 1956 decision to hold the line on defense spending. Several key officials, particularly Secretary Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, were convinced that even greater reliance could be placed upon nuclear retaliation. They pressed for substantial reductions in overseas deployments and military assistance. According to the JCS representative on the NSC Planning Board, these men considered the high cost of defense to be “the root of the evil.”3 Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to balance the requirements of containment against the demands for economy. How they did so provides the major theme of this chapter.

Modernizing Forces in South Korea

Four years after the armistice, the United States still maintained in the Republic of Korea under a United Nations Command about 50,000 troops, including two conventionally-equipped Army divisions and one fighter-bomber wing. The Military Assistance Program supported a 700,000-man ROK force, including an army of twenty active and ten reserve divisions, a 71-ship navy, and a 225-plane air force. Late in October 1956, President Eisenhower ordered the NSC Planning Board to review the scope and allocation of aid to Korea, as well as other nations, and recommend revisions.4

Already, on 11 October 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended maintaining a minimum US force of two infantry divisions and one fighter-bomber wing, together with an ROK force of seventeen active and fourteen reserve divisions, sixty-one ships, and six fighter-bomber squadrons. However, they predicated this recommendation upon a modernization of US forces and equipment, which should include nuclear weapons. Such a modernization, they declared, was mandatory before a realistic assessment of minimum force levels could be made. Regardless of the numerical ratio between opposing forces, the United Nations Command could not deter a renewal of hostilities unless its obsolete and obsolescent equipment was replaced. Paragraph 13d of the 1953 Armistice Agreement forbade the introduction of new weapons and equipment into Korea, except to replace destroyed, damaged, or worn-out weapons “on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.” While the communists consistently had been violating this provision, the UN Command had respected it.5
On 14 January 1957, the NSC Planning Board circulated an evaluation of four alternative military programs. These are summarized below:

A. Continue the existing program. US forces would include two divisions and three jet fighter-bomber squadrons, all conventionally armed; ROK units would contain twenty active divisions and ten reserve divisions, as well as three jet fighter-bomber squadrons, with three more planned.

B. Convert four active ROK divisions into reserve ones and convert three piston-engine fighter-bomber squadrons into jet ones. Keep US forces at current levels but equip them with dual-capable weapons able to fire nuclear as well as conventional warheads.

C. Cut the ROK Army to ten active and twenty reserve divisions while maintaining US forces at current levels. All six ROK fighter-bomber squadrons would be jet-equipped. ROK units would acquire nuclear-capable weapons of such types as were already in Korea but not more advanced ones such as the 280-mm gun, Honest John, Corporal, or Redstone tactical surface-to-surface missiles. US units, remaining at current levels, also would gain only limited numbers of dual-capable weapons.

D. The ROK Army would have ten active and twenty reserve divisions but no dual-capable weapons. The ROK Air Force would consist of twelve fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons, enough to offset North Korean air strength. US forces would be organized as under alternative B.

None of these alternatives provided for the storage of nuclear weapons in Korea.

Admiral Radford's Special Assistant for NSC Affairs told the Chairman that alternatives C and D were "essentially straw men." Although both would permit cuts in spending, neither would likely be supported by any member of the NSC. The Defense Department would reject C because it failed to provide for US force modernization; the State Department probably would not want to urge upon President Rhee reductions of the size called for in alternative C. State also would condemn alternative D because it violated the Armistice Agreement and would be unsatisfactory to Rhee. The basic military issue, therefore, was whether the Department of State "will accept the fact that sooner or later Paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement must be disregarded."  

Writing to Secretary McElroy on 24 January 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adopting alternative B, even though they wanted to end the policy of storing only conventional munitions. Through another memorandum, submitted two weeks later, they urged the Secretary to change storage policies for Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The administration postponed a decision about Korea, pending completion of the current policy review.

On 31 January 1957, the National Security Council reviewed these alternatives. Admiral Burke, who was Acting Chairman, added an argument to support alternative B. When the aged Synghman Rhee died, South Korea might fall into chaos and the communists could make another bid for conquest. Consequently, US forces in Korea had to be ready for any contingency. Secretary Wilson saw no danger of war and wanted the United States to start "untangling" itself from Korea. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey argued that continuing the worldwide military
assistance program on its current scale would prove “suicidal.” Sole reliance upon massive retaliatory capability struck him as the only solution. Secretary Dulles, in rebuttal, foresaw very great difficulty in persuading friends and allies to accept such a strategy. Admiral Burke argued that alternative B might convince the South Koreans “that the United States had the military power on hand in South Korea to defend them” and so serve as the first step in a series of reductions.9

The NSC directed its Planning Board to prepare a new policy statement incorporating a military program based on alternative B and to plan ROK force reductions over the longer range.10 Thus the JCS alternative won approval, but the argument over modernization remained unresolved. When the Board drafted a revision, JCS and OSD representatives found themselves at odds with State’s spokesman. The State Department wanted US forces provided with nuclear-capable weapons only if the Secretaries of State and Defense became convinced that such action was essential to bring about reductions in ROK forces and military assistance expenses. Even then, no nuclear warheads actually would be stored in Korea. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the underlying issue was whether the United States should continue to accept the risk of adhering to paragraph 13d while communist violations continued. On 1 March, they forwarded evidence of violations that the State Department could use when this problem was brought before the United Nations.11

When the NSC met on 4 April, the Department of State and Defense remained split over whether to put dual-capable Honest Johns and 280-mm guns in Korea. Secretary Dulles doubted whether “it was really worthwhile to be regarded by our friends and allies as violators of a solemn international agreement simply in order to get these two weapons in the hands of our forces in Korea.” Admiral Radford replied that the Armistice Agreement’s strict wording would put the United States “into just as much hot water” if it introduced any new weapons at all. Therefore, “we might just as well go the whole hog and introduce the entire list, . . .” Radford claimed that weapons like the 280-mm guns, which he deemed vital for defending cities such as Seoul which lay close to the border, were more important than nuclear-capable jet aircraft. In fact, he maintained that Honest Johns and 280-mm guns mattered more to the Defense Department than all the other modernization items put together. The NSC reached no decision. When the Board circulated a slightly revised paper on 10 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it unacceptable and reaffirmed their position. Approval of State’s position, they added, would only “sanction continued delays and postponement in implementing a required security program.”12

On 13 June, after another NSC debate, President Eisenhower decided against deploying Honest Johns and 280-mm guns for the time being. Eisenhower also concluded that, in light of rising defense costs and the deterrent provided by US retaliatory capability, ROK forces should be substantially reduced. He ordered the US Ambassador and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), to negotiate reductions with President Syngman Rhee, offering in return to modernize US forces and convert three ROK squadrons to jet aircraft.13

The United Nations Command, on 21 June, announced the temporary suspension of compliance with paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement. On that same
day, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Ambassador Walter Dowling and the CINCUNC, spoke with President Rhee. But Rhee resisted the idea of reductions, particularly in regard to the ROK Army. The approved list of new equipment included F–86 and F–100 fighters as well as B–57 tactical bombers; the State Department had vetoed Honest John missiles and 280 mm artillery. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 17 July, again urged Secretary Wilson to obtain the President’s approval for immediate introduction of 280 mm guns and Honest Johns and for changing storage policies. Once again, the administration disapproved. On 6 August, the Planning Board circulated a draft that incorporated the substance of President Eisenhower’s 13 June decisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff naturally objected to continuing the same storage policy. Nonetheless, on 8 August, the Council adopted the Board’s draft, which became NSC 5702/2.

During the NSC meeting, Secretary Dulles said that new weapons should not be introduced until President Rhee gave a firm commitment to reduce his forces. Rhee, he warned, would be a hard bargainer. The United States, Dulles added, could not continue providing Korea with $600 million annually in military and economic aid. If the NSC did not cut these costs, Congress would. Secretary Wilson observed that introducing 280 mm guns and Honest Johns would allow reductions of 8,000 US personnel and four ROK divisions.

President Rhee did prove to be a hard bargainer. NSC 5707/2 called for reducing the active ROK Army by at least four divisions. Not until 5 November did Rhee agree to inactivate two divisions by 31 May 1958, in return for enough jets to equip three squadrons. After many months of negotiations, the Korean Government agreed to reduce the authorized strength of ROK forces from 720,000 to 630,000 men during FY 1959. On 17 January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a long-sought authorization to change storage policy; the Air Force soon deployed the Matador-equipped 588th Tactical Missile Group. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff had achieved all their policy objectives.

A revised statement of national policy, approved by the NSC in August 1958, contemplated further gradual reductions in ROK forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred but reversed themselves in June 1959 when a new policy review took place. In their judgment, difficulties in negotiating renewal of the US Japan Security Treaty made doubtful the future availability of Japanese bases from which US forces could support Korean operations. Consequently, more ROK reductions would incur unacceptable military risks. The National Security Council accepted the JCS position and NSC 5907, the new statement approved by President Eisenhower on 1 July 1959, contained nothing about future ROK reductions.

A postscript must be added. By the end of 1959, octogenarian President Syngman Rhee had become isolated and unpopular with his people. Elections in 1960 occasioned widespread fraud and violence. Protests led to bloody repression that only triggered more demonstrations. Finally, on 27 April, Rhee resigned and left the country, ushering in a short-lived democracy. Soon afterward, the number of US troops in Korea rose somewhat. Because of manpower and budgetary limitations, Korean nationals comprised 25 percent of the personnel in the two US divisions. Beginning in mid-July, 3,000 US Army troops arrived to replace most of them.
Reducing the US Presence in Japan

In 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had predicated some of their "New Look" force levels upon substantial progress in Japanese rearmament. By 1957, they assumed, US forces would have redeployed from Japan and become part of a mobile strategic reserve. Things did not work out that way. Steadily, during the 1950s, Japan increased its political influence and economic strength but shied away from a corresponding expansion of its military power. The original JCS goals were a 15-division army, a navy with 300,000 tons of shipping, and a 36 squadron air force. Instead, early in 1957, Japanese Self-Defense Forces totaled only six army divisions, a navy of 62,000 tons, and four air force squadrons.19

The current statement of US policy, NSC 5516/1, dated from April 1955. Taking note of growing nationalist and neutralist sentiment among Japanese, NSC 5516/1 concluded that the US-Japan relationship should change from dependency into partnership. The United States would help Japan's Self-Defense Forces grow to the point where they could assume primary responsibility for protecting the home islands, allowing a corollary withdrawal of US forces. Reversion of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and Volcano Islands from US control back to Japanese sovereignty could not come about as long as tensions in East Asia persisted. The administration, however, would try to placate the Japanese by considering their request for "fuller relations" with the islands 20.

When 1957 opened, there were very nearly 100,000 US military personnel still in Japan. In February, nonetheless, the NSC Operations Coordinating Board concluded that any attempt by a Japanese Cabinet to initiate a substantial rearmament program or promote participation in a collective security system probably would fail. The strength of popular opposition might be lessened, though, if the United States responded favorably to desires that arose from strong national feeling. The Japanese wanted to share more equally in decisions affecting their territory and to reduce the level of US forces. They particularly wanted to regain control of Okinawa—the 1951 peace treaty had acknowledged Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus—and to repatriate several thousand Bonin islanders 21.

Preparations for Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's visit to Washington, scheduled for June 1957, helped spur major US decisions. The 1951 security treaty had recognized the US right to "dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan." Dissatisfied with what they considered a subordinate position, the Japanese urged a number of changes. Make disposition and use of US forces in Japan a matter for joint agreement. Limit the treaty to five years' duration, after which it would run indefinitely unless terminated by either party at one year's notice. Build up the Self-Defense Force, allowing as many US forces as possible (including all ground combat units) to leave Japan. Release some US bases to alleviate "inconveniences and hardships" on the local population. Announce a US decision to relinquish control over the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Volcanos after ten years or even sooner if circumstances permitted. Meantime, allow former islanders to return home and grant some autonomy to the Ryukyus. From Tokyo, US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II warned that a turning point in US-Japanese relations was at hand. Unless the United States moved promptly to place the
relationship on a "really equal basis," Prime Minister Kishi easily could tap a strong vein of neutralist sentiment and lead Japan down that path.\textsuperscript{22}

In Washington, during the spring of 1957, a State-Defense working group started preparing positions for the Kishi visit. Drawing upon views submitted by General Lemnitzer and Admiral Felix Stump (CINCFE and CINCPAC), the group prepared a draft that described Japan's "miniscule" forces as "inadequate...to justify a claim of equality of contribution within capabilities." The group opposed either making any changes to the security treaty or accepting any degree of control over the use of US forces outside Japan, such as in the Bonins or Ryukyus. The current treaty should remain in force pending the establishment of "other satisfactory arrangements." An adequate Japanese defense force, the group held, was essential to such arrangements. In the way of concessions, the group recommended abrogating the US right to intervene against internal disturbances. Suitable arrangements also could be made for joint use of facilities. More importantly, the group proposed establishing a high-level group in Tokyo to consult about defense problems, especially strategy, force goals, deployments, weapons systems, and logistics.\textsuperscript{23}

In their commentary, dated 11 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that organizing a high-level group would "place the US in an untenable position" by creating an official body at a level above CINCFE and the US Ambassador. They argued, too, that the mention of "strategy" implied that US war plans would be made available to the Japanese. Instead, they suggested that informal high-level groups confer in Tokyo on an ad hoc basis about "Communist strength and intentions in the Far East; countermeasures to be taken by Japan, the US and other free nations; and, Japan's defense planning and US military assistance."\textsuperscript{24}

On 15 June, the group circulated a revised draft that incorporated at least a semblance of the JCS recommendation. The new paper, while still rejecting immediate revision of the security treaty, suggested working toward "some form of long-term mutual security relationship" that would "be responsive to the various strategic, political and economic considerations involved." After the Washington visit, Prime Minister Kishi and Ambassador MacArthur could work out basic principles for a new treaty relationship and then consider establishing an ad hoc high-level group to implement the understandings achieved.\textsuperscript{25}

Concurrently, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appraise the long-range implications of changing Japanese attitudes outlined above by Ambassador MacArthur. Replying on 13 June, they remained convinced that Japan was capable of a greater defense effort. Once Japan achieved the capability and assumed responsibility for its own defense, US forces would no longer be required. Phasing down US forces before Japan attained its goals would weaken that nation's defenses, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that other considerations might justify accepting this risk. They insisted, however, that the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Volcanos must remain under US control because bases there were essential to forward deployments.\textsuperscript{26}

Just how far the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to go in adjusting to changed conditions became clear when the Armed Forces Policy Council convened the next day. Admiral Radford raised the possibility of a total US withdrawal from
Japan, if the Japanese wished it. The Council agreed, subject to certain conditions. First, the Japanese must initiate the request. Second, the fact that this was a Japanese initiative must be made clear to the world and, particularly, to the SEATO countries. Third, withdrawal should be phased to avoid an abrupt weakening of the US posture in the Far East. Council members discussed whether such an offer might induce the Japanese to speed their own rearmament. Obviously, the total withdrawal offer was genuine and not designed merely as a negotiating device.

The Council also discussed an immediate partial withdrawal, which President Eisenhower had authorized during a conversation with Secretary Wilson on 6 June. The Secretary, in turn, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study 40 and 50 percent reductions, including redeployment of all Army and Marine combat units by 1 January 1958 with remaining cuts to be completed six months later. On 18 June, they presented a preliminary study to the Armed Forces Policy Council. Members concluded that the study proved President Eisenhower’s objective of a substantial cut could be carried out.

High-level talks with Prime Minister Kishi took place during 19–21 June. During a discussion with Kishi on 20 June, Admiral Radford stressed the growing cost of US efforts and the need for allies to bear a larger burden. Budget limitations, said the Chairman, were dictating a major reduction of US forces in Japan. If Japan deemed it necessary, he continued, there could be a total withdrawal. Such a step, Radford told Kishi, might induce Japan to do more for itself. Secretary Dulles spoke in support of JCS views, particularly about retaining US control over the Bonins and Ryukyus. The next day, Radford advised Secretary Dulles that at least 50 percent of US forces, including all ground combat elements, would be withdrawn over the next twelve months. As will be seen, the Chairman somewhat overstated the pace of the US pullout.

On 21 June, when the visit ended, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi issued a joint communiqué announcing that Japan was planning a defense buildup, that the United States was substantially reducing its forces in Japan, including a total withdrawal of ground combat forces; and that further US reductions were planned as Japanese capabilities grew. The United States reaffirmed its intention to maintain control over the Bonins and Ryukyus “so long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.” The two leaders also announced establishment of an intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the security treaty and to consider adjusting defense arrangements. The 1951 security treaty, they affirmed, was designed to be transitional in character and should not keep its current form in perpetuity.

On 10 July 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson a study detailing withdrawals of 36,683 men (the 40 percent alternative) and 46,508 men (the 50 percent alternative). The proposed cuts were not mathematically exact, so as to preserve a proper balance in the remaining force structure. After some revisions required by Secretary Wilson had been made, withdrawals began on 2 August. On 15 October, the Army’s 1st Cavalry Division completed its relocation to Korea. By mid-1959, the number of US personnel in Japan stood 49 percent below the 1957 figure.
Revising the Japanese Security Treaty

Withdrawing ground combat troops and forming a Japanese-American Committee on security eased the immediate pressure for revision of the security treaty. But the Japanese still had other concerns. On 8 August 1958, in preparation for a visit by the Japanese foreign Minister, Deputy Secretary Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether they favored retaining the old treaty, modifying it, or negotiating a new one. Before they could reply, the State Department recommended discussing a new treaty. General Twining, on 9 September, informed Secretary McElroy that he opposed “throwing out” the treaty and its accompanying Administrative Agreement at the start of discussions. The administration should merely say that it was prepared to discuss a re-examination of security relations. Japan, the Chairman acknowledged, might be justified in asking for some changes. But “with no practical capability for self-defense, now or in the next few years, Japan is not in a position to demand that the United States guarantee her security while hobbling the United States means to do so.”

On 10 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy that they preferred modifying the treaty through an exchange of diplomatic notes that would not require senatorial consent. They saw no overriding military objection to a new treaty, if an adequate quid pro quo could be obtained. The United States, they agreed, could consult with Japan before employing forces either based in or operating from Japan and could pledge that any such employment would be consistent with the principles of the UN Charter. In no event, though, should Japan be given a veto over the employment of US forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also insisted that US forces remain in Japan, that these forces be free to operate against communist disturbances elsewhere in Asia, and that rights conferred by the Administrative Agreement remain unimpaired. Finally, recognizing the deeply emotional nature of Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons, they deemed it inadvisable to seek any change regarding nuclear storage.

The administration decided to negotiate a new security treaty. The State Department prepared a draft but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a commentary dated 23 September, found that it contained only one of the elements they considered essential—a reaffirmation of the Administrative Agreement. Secretary McElroy, convinced that the Japanese never would accept consultation limited to emergency operations only, decided to accept the State Department’s broader wording. As for naval visits and freedom to operate outside Japan, he suggested raising these issues during negotiations so that the record would reflect US interest in these matters. The State Department agreed, and on 29 September Ambassador MacArthur received a modified draft for presentation to the Japanese. The Ambassador also received instructions to forestall any attempt at renegotiating the Administrative Agreement and to seek acceptance of the matters raised by Secretary McElroy.

The Japanese presented their formal response in April 1959. During the ensuing negotiations, four issues proved to have particular concern for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the geographic scope of the treaty, the Administrative Agreement, consultation about US deployments, and support for the UN Command in Korea.
Some modest changes, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the Administrative Agreement more palatable to the Japanese public. These included elimination of a financial contribution to support US forces in Japan, allowing the Japanese greater authority in conducting customs examinations, and giving Japanese employed by the United States the same rights granted them by Japanese law.36

The question of what territory the treaty ought to cover was not as simple as it might seem. The US draft had the treaty area cover all US territories and trust islands around Japan (i.e., the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall archipelagoes). To accord with their own constitution, the Japanese were unwilling to include anything except the home islands, Bonins, Volcanos, and Ryukyus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 1 December 1958, reminded Secretary McElroy that the United States would gain nothing from including the Bonins, Volcanos, and Ryukyus. The Japanese would provide at least passive support in their defense anyway, and including those islands would give Japan a political lever toward re-establishing administrative control. If Japan was unwilling to consider an attack on US forces outside the home islands as a treaty violation, the United States should not allow the Bonins, Ryukyus, and Volcanos to be included. The State and Defense Departments agreed. Japan, nonetheless, kept pressing for inclusion. That did not come about, but an agreed minute to the new treaty did recognize Japan’s concern for their welfare and safety as well as its desire to consult with the United States in the event of an attack against them.37

For the Japanese, a consultation formula about the use of US forces in Japan constituted the heart of any new treaty. In final form, the new treaty called for a public exchange of notes providing for prior consultation with respect to “major changes” in the deployment of US forces, their equipment, and the use of bases and facilities. A further understanding, not made public at the time, gave the United States latitude over visits to Japan by certain categories of warships and aircraft, logistics operations from bases in Japan during peace or war, rotation or minor augmentation of US units, and total withdrawal of US forces. In a communiqué accompanying announcement of the new treaty, President Eisenhower assured Prime Minister Kishi that the United States had no intention of acting “in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to matters involving prior consultation. . . .” Admiral Harry D. Felt, the CINCPAC, had strongly objected that such language would allow a later Japanese contention that consultation really meant agreement or consent in all cases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assured him that the communiqué, which President Eisenhower already had approved, was general enough to preserve freedom of action.38

In Washington, on 19 January 1960, Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary Herter signed the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. With only slight modifications, it contained all the provisions considered essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The United States moved closer to an equal military partnership with Japan. Base rights and privileges would continue, although subject to a fuller exercise of Japanese sovereignty. Any increased burdens imposed under the new Administrative Agreement were far outweighed by the political advantages of the new treaty.
In Japan, though, the aftermath was raucous. If anything, Ambassador MacArthur may have underestimated the power of neutralist and pacifist feeling. Protests, fueled by charges that U-2 spy planes might fly from Japanese bases, grew into mass demonstrations. Kishi’s resort to questionable parliamentary tactics in getting the Diet’s approval brought passions nearly to a fever pitch. On 16 June, after 20,000 protesters occupied part of the Diet building, Kishi asked President Eisenhower to cancel an impending “good will” visit. The treaty formally went into effect on 23 June; Kishi resigned less than a month later. Still, the ruling pro-US party won a November election; security ties between the two nations would stay firm.

Meanwhile, on 11 June, President Eisenhower had approved a fresh statement of US policy towards Japan. While NSC 6008/1 was being drafted by the NSC Planning Board, disagreements arose about four points in its military guidance. First, JCS and OSD spokesmen wanted the United States to take the initiative in making “discreet efforts” to induce Japan to extend its defense mission beyond the home islands. The Board’s majority favored responding to Japanese initiatives but not stimulating them, and the NSC agreed. Second, the State and Defense Departments felt that, while a lessening of US assistance remained the ultimate goal, substantially reducing the military assistance program during the next few years would have seriously adverse effects. The Departments of the Treasury and Commerce and the Budget Bureau wanted a prompt start for consultations about an orderly reduction and early elimination of new commitments for grant aid. The NSC compromised, saying that such consultations would begin “as soon as deemed feasible by the President.” Third, JCS and OSD spokesmen wanted US control over the Bonins, Volcanos, and Ryukyus to remain undiminished “for the duration of international tensions in the Far East.” The Board’s majority supported doing so merely “as long as it is essential to our vital national security interests.” The Council took the problem out of a time frame, deciding simply to “maintain the degree of control... deemed by the President to be essential to our vital security interests.” Lastly, the State Department asked that Japanese requests for closer ties with the Ryukyus be “acceded to whenever reasonable and not inconsistent” with US security interests. The JCS and OSD spokesmen, repeating the position outlined in NSC 5516/1, wanted such requests “considered sympathetically” consistent with US interests. This time, the NSC adopted Defense’s position. During the 1960s, Okinawa would prove a major irritant in US-Japanese relations.

Defining Taiwan’s Role

Taiwan, seat of Chiang Kai-shek's refugee Government of the Republic of China (GRC), remained a vital link in the offshore island chain of containment. A Mutual Defense Treaty dating from 1954 committed the United States to defend Taiwan and the nearby Penghu (or Pescadores) Islands. In January 1955, the communist regime on mainland China seemed to be preparing an assault
Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to use US forces “as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories . . . as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.”

According to NSC 5503, approved by President Eisenhower at the same time, it was also US policy to avoid “any appearance of an obligation” to guarantee Chiang’s return to power on the mainland. Moreover, the United States would not agree to offensive actions against mainland China, except under circumstances approved by the President. The sole exception lay in permitting prompt and clear retaliation against US-approved military targets, chosen in part to minimize the possibility of provoking further Chinese reaction.

Chiang’s regime could not have survived without US subsidies and support. In 1956, the United States was funding more than 60 percent of Chiang’s military establishment, at an annual cost running above $200 million. Accordingly, just as in the case of Korea, President Eisenhower ordered the NSC Planning Board to review the scope and allocation of economic and military aid.

The Planning Board reviewed NSC 5503 and, on 9 September 1957, submitted a report that contained split views about critical issues. The Budget Bureau’s spokesman wanted the mission of Chiang’s Nationalist forces limited to defending Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. State Department and JCS representatives, by contrast, interpreted NSC 5503 as providing for a Nationalist role in collective defense of the Far East, including preparations for offensive operations. Restrictions imposed upon Chiang during the Taiwan Straits confrontation of 1954–1955, and spelled out in NSC 5503, were not intended to eliminate forever the offensive use of Nationalist troops. As a standing threat to China’s flank, Nationalists could reduce the likelihood of Chinese aggression elsewhere. They were more valuable than other noncommunist Asian forces because, if used against the mainland, they would have a powerful political as well as military effect. The Budget Bureau dismissed this position as unrealistic. Despite substantial US aid, the Nationalists still were incapable of self-defense without US intervention. Therefore, assigning a mission beyond self-defense would divert US resources into programs “running counter to prudent US advice” and inhibit the attainment of other objectives. On 17 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally endorsed the position taken by State and JCS representatives.

When the NSC debated these differences on 2 October, Secretary Dulles said that only the hope of returning to the mainland sustained Nationalist morale. In his judgment, all the offshore island and peninsular nations were maintaining their will to freedom because they hoped “that Communist China will one day blow up.” President Eisenhower agreed “heartily” and emphatically rejected the Budget Bureau’s position. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, replied that he sought to guard against a Nationalist buildup rather than bring about a reduction of Chiang’s forces. The new policy statement—NSC 5723, which President Eisenhower approved on 4 October—stated that military assistance should enable the Nationalists to contribute to collective noncommunist strength in the Far East, and to take other mutually-agreed upon actions directed primarily
Practicing Brinkmanship over Quemoy and Matsu

At the beginning of August 1958, just when US intervention in Lebanon was reaching its peak strength, China brought strong military pressure against the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Quemoy, with a land area of thirty-seven square miles, lies less than five miles off the mainland port of Amoy. Matsu, not even five square miles in area, lies east of the mainland port of Foochow. The Nationalist government was maintaining an army of 450,000 men, one Marine division, a modest navy, and an air force that included 450 jet fighters. About 13 percent of Taiwan's gross national product was being devoted to defense—one of the highest figures in the noncommunist world. Over a number of months, contrary to US advice, Chiang steadily had enlarged the Quemoy and Matsu garrisons until seven divisions and more than 100,000 men were stationed there. Since the GRC was proclaiming its determination to hold the offshore islands at all costs, failure to do so might well shatter Nationalist morale.

The new confrontation began shortly after consultations took place between Soviet and Chinese leaders and was accompanied by communist pronouncements that Taiwan's "liberation" lay close at hand. Nonetheless, on 2 August, the State Department informed Ambassador Everett Drumright in Taipei that the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no evidence suggesting that offensive action was imminent. The Ambassador was instructed to allay the GRC's sense of alarm and remind the Nationalists of their obligation to consult the US Government before taking offensive action against the mainland. Within a few days, two Air Force units were scheduled to land in Taiwan for a previously scheduled visit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 1 August, had decided that their arrival would meet the needs of the moment.

Very soon, the Nationalist government submitted more requests. The administration moved to strengthen Nationalist air capabilities and particularly to preserve qualitative air superiority. Senior State Department officials met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August; everyone agreed that losing the offshore islands almost inevitably would lead to attacks on Taiwan "in which the free world has such a vital stake." All considerations moved to a new level of intensity on 23 August, because on that day the Chinese communists opened a heavy bombardment of Quemoy. Secretary Dulles immediately issued a public statement that "it would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to... attack and seek to conquer these islands, that could be a limited operation." Ambassador Drumright promptly cabled Washington that Chiang was determined to hold the offshore islands and would feel forced to retaliate if the shelling continued. The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCPAC that US policy almost certainly would be "to make sure that neither ChiNats nor our-
selves can be labeled aggressors” as the result of a premature attack against the mainland. But they also notified commanders of all unified and specified commands that US forces might become involved “if military activity of the Chinese Communists against the offshore islands increases to the point of seriously endangering these islands.”

On 25 August, as Nationalist resupply ships enroute to the offshore islands came under attack, President Eisenhower met with his senior advisers, among whom were General Twining and Admiral Burke. Eisenhower remarked that Chiang had tied his whole regime to the offshore islands’ fate, but the Chief Executive “did not wish to put ourselves on the line with a full commitment. The Orientals can be very devious; they would then call the tune.” Consequently, he preferred to stand on the language of the 1955 congressional resolution and Secretary Dulles’ statement of 23 August. General Twining presented, and President Eisenhower approved, a message directing CINCPAC to:

1. Reinforce US air defenses on Taiwan at his discretion and prepare to assume responsibility for Taiwan’s air defense, using US forces to the extent practicable.
2. Prepare to escort and protect Nationalist supply ships steaming to the offshore islands.
3. Augment the Seventh Fleet as practicable, sailing the attack carrier USS Midway and other units from Pearl Harbor. The carrier USS Essex and four destroyers also were on route from the Mediterranean.
4. Prepare to assist the Nationalists in countering any major attack against the principal offshore islands.

Although conventional weapons alone probably would be authorized for initial attacks, CINCPAC should be prepared to strike targets deeper inside China with other weapons. (In his memoirs, Eisenhower stated that he and Secretary Dulles were willing to contemplate using nuclear weapons, against strictly military targets and with techniques that would limit fallout and civilian casualties.) The President made one important deletion to General Twining’s draft. Admiral Felt would not inform GRC officials that he had been directed to prepare to escort their supply ships and to join in action against the mainland if a major attack occurred. CINCPAC promptly endorsed this deletion, saying he deemed it desirable to keep both Nationalists and communists uncertain about what actions the United States would take.

General Twining also gave the President a draft statement of US policy accompanied by a supporting rationale. According to the statement, loss of the offshore islands could not be permitted. Otherwise, encroachments would continue until Taiwan had been lost and the GRC destroyed. If major air or amphibious attacks seriously endangered Quemoy and Matsu, the US Government should approve Nationalist retaliation against nearby mainland bases. The United States also would reinforce defenders to the extent necessary and might join in attacking land bases, perhaps even employing nuclear weapons to attain military objectives. Hostilities would have to be brought to a rapid conclusion, since “a major involvement or prolonged operations would seriously diminish
our military capabilities in other areas or for general war.” But world opinion must recognize China as the aggressor. Unless US and Nationalist forces rigorously avoided any move that would cloud this issue, “our Allies, particularly Japan and the Philippines, will not loyally support us and may deny us use of bases for our forces.” President Eisenhower did not approve the policy statement. Presumably, he wanted to preserve flexibility by avoiding any predetermined courses of action.50

By 28 August, resupplying the offshore islands had emerged as the critical issue. Vice Admiral A.K. Doyle asked for authority to escort and protect supply ships and to authorize Nationalist air attacks on artillery positions. The JCS reply, sent after a White House discussion the next day, outlined a three-phased concept. In phase one, where matters now stood, the United States would furnish material and logistic assistance, including convoy protection. In phase two, initiated by an assault “with evident intent to capture one or more of the principal Offshore Islands,” US forces would directly assist in defending the islands, including attacks on artillery positions and local airfields. Hostile action in the international waters around Taiwan and the Penghu Islands or an invasion of them would touch off phase three, during which US forces would “extend action as appropriate.” In no phase, however, could nuclear weapons be used until specifically authorized by the President.

The JCS reply further directed Admirals Felt and Doyle to:

1. Give convoy escort and protection as far as the three-mile limit, to the extent militarily necessary.
2. Maintain freedom of the seas in the Taiwan Strait “by action confined to international waters.”
3. Assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, at Admiral Doyle’s discretion and after consultation with Nationalist authorities, thus releasing Chiang’s air force to defend the offshore islands and provide air cover for the supply convoys.

Although the reply did not authorize Nationalist air action against communist artillery positions, it did state that the shipment of twelve eight-inch howitzers was being expedited to improve counterbattery fire. Moreover, if Nationalist planes met communist aircraft that were attacking Quemoy and Matsu, the United States would consider that the inherent right of self-defense permitted pursuit back to mainland bases. Admiral Felt also was authorized to turn over to the GRC as many as eight Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCMs) and twenty-eight Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVPs) that were en route to the Seventh Fleet.51

By 13 August, local US commanders concluded—and Admiral Felt agreed—that Quemoy’s defenders “can be strangled if we do not take more positive action.” So CINCPAC proposed providing air cover and escorts up to the beaches; he would interpret such orders as allowing him to neutralize any interference. Two days later, Secretaries Dulles and Herter held a very revealing discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Twining said that, if intervention became necessary, all Defense studies had shown that using small nuclear weapons
against mainland airfields and shore batteries was "the only way to do the job;" the Chinese Communists, he and his colleagues believed, "should be told that this was our intention." Admiral Burke commented that "the argument that nothing is worth a world war was the reason why the Communists had been winning all along." Secretary Dulles said that, if we initiated the use of nuclear weapons, the Japanese Government might be forced to demand withdrawal of US forces from Japan, or at least cessation of Japan-based support for US operations. If reactions were so hostile as to inhibit using nuclear weapons except to defend Western Europe or retaliate against a Soviet attack, Dulles asked, "was our reliance on their use correct and productive?" Admiral Burke considered this simply part of a Communist-inspired war of nerves. General Taylor, however, felt that this "vividly pointed up the need for flexibility of forces" and advocated a carefully orchestrated military response. General Twining responded that the United States could not afford enough divisions to meet Communist conventional forces. General White argued that a World War II-size air force was financially out of reach. Admiral Burke commented that heavy losses in naval aircraft would be hard to replace. General Twining said that "he could not understand the public horror at the idea of using nuclear weapons and insisted that we must get used to the idea that such weapons had to be used." Summing up, Secretary Dulles asserted that "if we shrink from using nuclear weapons when military circumstances so require, then we will have to reconsider our whole defense posture."

Through a memorandum to Secretary McElroy four days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed broader aspects of the situation. They asserted that measures taken to meet the offshore islands emergency, added to the Lebanon operation and other commitments around the world, had spread US forces "dangerously thin." Uncertainty about whether nuclear weapons would be used aggravated this condition. This spreading of US strength struck them as an integral part of communist strategy and, therefore, a matter of grave concern. If yet another demand upon already dispersed US forces arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it probable that a partial mobilization would be required.

Moving away from military matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced anxiety over the "apparent apathy or lack of information or understanding on the part of the US public and the allied world at large." The free world seemed to them emotionally and psychologically unprepared for a deep involvement of US forces that might occur at any time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a series of steps to marshal US and allied support. They also proposed delivering a statement of the US position, through diplomatic channels, to the Nationalists, the Chinese communists, and the USSR. At that point, in fact, a good part of US opinion was not backing the administration. On 6 September, for example, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly declared that "We seem to be drifting, either dazed or indifferent, toward war with China, a war without friends or allies, and over issues which the administration has not presented to the American people, and which are not worth a single American life." Meantime, on 29 August, the Commander, Seventh Fleet. warned that artillery batteries must be silenced if the offshore islands were to be supplied and defended. Two days later, CINCPAC cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Quemoy's
defenders could be “strangled” unless US forces took “more positive action.” He recommended extending the US air and naval escort up to Quemoy’s eastern beaches, with instructions to ensure that supplies landed, and that the communists be so informed. Admiral Felt would interpret such orders as allowing him to neutralize any Chinese communist interference.

At the White House on 6 September, General Twining handed President Eisenhower a proposal for meeting a major amphibious attack upon the offshore islands. Twining recommended giving the Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to approve US air support for Nationalist planes that were striking enemy forces and mainland targets. An unsympathetic President pointedly recalled a JCS estimate that US air support would not be required unless Chinese aircraft made massive air attacks to assist a landing. If such a situation developed, there would be time to reach a decision.

Once again, President Eisenhower decided to preserve as much freedom of action as possible. If the Chinese communists launched a major landing operation solely against the offshore islands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could approve Nationalist air action against mainland targets and order US forces to strike against invaders actually moving to the islands. However, Eisenhower reserved to himself the decision to launch US air attacks against the mainland. If an attack against Taiwan as well as the offshore islands moved so rapidly as to preclude consultation with the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could alert US forces worldwide, order CINCPAC to augment the US forces defending Taiwan, and approve strikes at mainland bases with all the forces that CINCPAC could bring to bear. Under all circumstances, though, Eisenhower reserved to himself the decision to use nuclear weapons.54

A small cooling of the crisis atmosphere occurred when China’s Foreign Minister Chou En-lai proposed, on 6 September, that there be talks between the United States and China. Chou proposed that the two countries’ Ambassadors in Warsaw, who had met intermittently to discuss various issues, take up this problem. Five days later, President Eisenhower reviewed matters with Secretary McElroy. The Secretary said it was clear that, if military factors alone were to be considered, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the offshore islands should be vacated. Eisenhower observed that he was trying “to find a way in which a strong country can conciliate. It is not adequate simply to say that we will stand on Quemoy and Matsu. We must move beyond that.” Hours later, in a nationwide address, the President said that “no American boy will be asked by me to fight just for Quemoy.” But the bombardment formed “part of what is indeed an ambitious plan of armed conquest” which “would liquidate all of the free world positions in the Western Pacific area…. ” Even so, he stressed that “diplomacy can and should find a way out.”55

On 15 September, ambassadorial talks began in Warsaw.

Admiral Felt, on 11 September, renewed his recommendation for US air and naval escort to go as far as Quemoy’s beaches. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, considered it possible that the Nationalists were being “deliberately inept” so as to draw the United States into hostilities. Consequently, they informed CINCPAC the next day, the administration had to be certain that Quemoy would fall “despite all (the) GRC can and should do” before considering direct action.
against Chinese installations. The Nationalists must be made to understand that, before US forces would assume greater responsibility, they must demonstrate real determination about bringing convoys to the beaches under fire.56

The Nationalists quickly improved their performance in convoying and unloading supplies under fire. During August, 424 Sidewinders had been shipped to Taiwan. Consequently, in the air, Sidewinder-equipped Nationalist planes outfought China's MiG-17s. On the morning of 29 September, General Twining told President Eisenhower that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the supply crisis had been "broken." Nonetheless, Eisenhower remarked that "something must be done to make Chiang more flexible in his approach"; the President "did not like to wage a fight on the ground of someone else's choosing...." General Twining replied that Defense officials would start thinking about how to get Chiang out of Quemoy and Matsu.57

During a press conference on 30 September, Secretary Dulles struck conciliatory notes. The United States, he emphasized, had no legal or treaty commitments either to defend the offshore islands or to help the Nationalists return to the mainland. He also remarked that the stationing of large forces on Quemoy and Matsu had been "rather foolish." If a dependable cease-fire could be arranged, he added, it would not be prudent to keep them there.58

On 5 October, China announced a one-week cease-fire starting the next day, on condition that the United States stop convoying supply ships. Obviously, this was a face-saving formula to cover retreat. Admiral Felt, on 6 October, received the following instructions: unless the GRC raised strenuous objections, stop using US ships and aircraft to escort convoys as long as the Chinese withheld their fire; encourage the Nationalists to make a maximum resupply effort during the lull; order the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, to survey the offshore islands; and maintain current readiness for action.59

On 12 October, Communist China extended the cease-fire for two weeks and began talking about "peaceful liberation." The next day, General Twining told President Eisenhower that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Dulles had reached a consensus that at least two-thirds of the troops on Quemoy should withdraw after Chinese artillery fire had "quieted." Dulles also would explore the possibility of demilitarizing the offshore islands. Twining said that, in exchange for evacuation, the United States could offer to modernize Chiang's army and part of his air force (although the latter would be very expensive) and to provide some shipping and amphibious lift. Finally, Twining informed Eisenhower that the MAAG had found morale in Quemoy to be quite high, damage from the bombardment slight, and the command in very good shape.60

The GRC, on 14 October, hinted that it would reduce offshore garrisons if the United States supplied newer weapons and stronger fortifications for defense of the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles flew to Taipei and started negotiations that ultimately traded a 15,000-man reduction for additional US tanks and artillery. After delivering artillery barrages timed for Dulles' visit, China announced on 25 October a policy that it would bombard the offshore islands during odd-numbered days only. The Nationalists sent resupply ships on even-numbered days;
US ships and planes never resumed escort operations. By 1 December, US forces in the Taiwan area had returned to normal strengths and operating procedures.\textsuperscript{61}

The offshore islands constituted a potential time bomb that never exploded. A good deal was risked but nothing was lost. Whether this outcome was the result of skill or luck may long be debated. The administration did not enjoy the bipartisan support evident during the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1954–1955 or the Berlin confrontation and the Lebanon intervention of 1958–1959. Partly because of this, perhaps, President Eisenhower took the utmost care to preserve US freedom of action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff naturally wanted to have clear-cut plans ready for every contingency. The President kept them, along with Chiang Kai-shek, on a fairly tight leash.
The Far East: Fissures in Containment

In Southeast Asia during the late 1950s, the dike of containment began leaking badly. Here, ultimately, US foreign policy would suffer its greatest failure during the Cold War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proved ready to embrace every alliance except one: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Only very limited integration of US planning and force requirements with multilateral efforts took place. Since a separate series describes developments in Indochina, this chapter will address a narrower question: Why did collective security, which was so successful in Western Europe and even in Northeast Asia, prove unworkable in Southeast Asia?

Failure To Mesh Planning: ANZUS and SEATO

The year 1954 witnessed France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Indochina. That victory by the communist-led Viet Minh was quickly followed by the Geneva agreements that created Laos, Cambodia, and the two Vietnams—a communist North and a noncommunist South—as independent states. Fearing further communist expansion into Southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in creating a regional defense system. The Manila Pact, signed in September 1954, joined the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand in what came to be called the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO). Its central provision stipulated that members would, in case of armed attack upon any of them, act to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. A separate protocol designated Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as additional areas where the occurrence of armed aggression would be recognized as a threat calling for action under the treaty. The basic statement of US policy toward mainland Southeast Asia was NSC 5612/1, approved by President Eisenhower on 5 September 1956. With modest revisions, it remained in force throughout the second Eisenhower
administration. NSC 5612/1 recognized that the United States, as the “only major outside source of power,” would have to provide the basic shield against a “Russian-Chinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia.” If aggression occurred, “the provisions of the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty should be invoked, but the United States should not forgo necessary action...because of the possibility that other allies might be loath to participate or to furnish more than token military forces.”

Among SEATO members who seemed disposed toward an active role were Australia and New Zealand, with whom the United States had additional ties through the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Through NSC 5713/2, which President Eisenhower approved in August 1957, the administration defined its long-range interests towards Australia and New Zealand. Significantly, NSC 5713/2 viewed the importance of ANZUS largely in terms of its relationship to SEATO. ANZUS, which the NSC paper described as the “strategic core of SEATO planning,” permitted the coordination of national defense plans that had been worked out unilaterally by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. This coordination was held to be particularly important because ANZUS might be able to act in some areas, such as Indonesia, that SEATO could not or would not protect. ANZUS also facilitated discussion of many defense problems that could not be aired within the larger and less homogeneous SEATO organization. Indeed, preliminary discussion within ANZUS helped to generate the support that Australia and New Zealand gave “almost without exception” to US policies during SEATO meetings.

Even collectively, the Far Eastern members of ANZUS and SEATO possessed only modest military strength. According to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1 July 1956 through 30 June 1958, ANZUS and SEATO ground forces would have to carry on limited initial resistance until the mobile striking power of the United States could be brought into action. Nonetheless, the administration imposed important restrictions upon the development of the two treaty organizations and their military planning. These restrictions, in whose formulation the Joint Chiefs of Staff had played a leading part, can be summarized as follows:

1. ANZUS and SEATO should duplicate neither NATO’s organizational structure nor its major “standing” military forces. Creating such ANZUS–SEATO forces would require the designation and positioning of US units for defense of Southeast Asia, contravening the policy of keeping US forces free to respond anywhere in the Far East.

2. ANZUS and SEATO should not make plans to defend Southeast Asia during a global war, since the area then would become a tertiary theater of operations. In a global war, the Kra Isthmus on the Malay peninsula would become the line of defense.

Thus, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to mesh ANZUS and SEATO with US defense policy, they faced a fundamental problem: developing any really effective SEATO plans would breach the restrictions imposed by US policy, but the continuation of these restrictions could threaten SEATO’s viability as an instrument of collective defense and an aid to US security.
By 1957, SEATO had gained—theoretically at least—the ability to complement US planning for situations short of general war. The labors of the SEATO Military Advisers, the advisers' own Planning Staff, and a variety of ad hoc committees set up by the advisers paved the way for creation of a SEATO Military Planning Office (SMPO), which began operations in Bangkok on 1 March 1957. Over the next two years, the advisers and the SMPO worked on plans for such contingencies as: defense of Southeast Asia, including East Pakistan, against a Chinese-North Vietnamese attack, overt aggression against the Philippines, measures to counter communist insurgency; and creation of a SEATO force to help the government of Laos combat the communist-led Pathet Lao. Also, steps were taken toward agreeing upon a command structure for a SEATO force.

With minor exceptions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found these plans to be compatible with US defense concepts and with CINCPAC's operational plans. Such compatibility was achieved with relative ease because CINCPAC served as the US Military Adviser to SEATO and because the advisers received their directives from political-military authorities in their own governments, not from SEATO itself.

In one sense, however, the SMPO's planning activities were too successful. As plans became more refined, pressures began to build within SEATO for more detailed information concerning the availability of US forces to support them. Repeatedly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had warned the Secretary of Defense that such a development could lead eventually to the earmarking of US forces for defense of Southeast Asia. But by early 1959, these pressures had increased to the point where, if no adequate response was made, it seemed likely that Southeast Asian members' confidence in collective security would erode.

Within ANZUS, Australia wanted more information about US intentions and capabilities in order to facilitate Australian—not ANZUS—planning. In May 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to continue the policy of opposing any combined requirements planning by ANZUS and SEATO because such planning would result in the commitment of US forces to defend Southeast Asia. Without jeopardizing this policy, they suggested, US spokesmen could discuss in broad terms the "capabilities and methods of providing support to the ANZUS–SEATO nations," thereby drawing a background for Australian planning. Information that could be given to Australia included the major US forces deployed in the Western Pacific and the forces available to CINCPAC for his contingency planning.6

Basically the same policy was applied to SEATO. In 1959, as the next section explains in some detail, CINCPAC asked permission to give the SEATO Military Advisers detailed estimates of what US forces might be available to implement an SMPO plan for sending a SEATO force to assist the Laotian Government in countering communist insurgency. Yet CINCPAC specifically excluded major US combat forces from these estimates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after receiving a J-3 report that SMPO and US plans were compatible, endorsed CINCPAC's recommendation. In ratifying this position, State and Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make certain that CINCPAC's disclosure to the Military Advisers left no doubt as to the US position on two points. First, insofar as possible, the SEATO force should be composed of forces from Southeast Asian nations. Second, the US contribution
should be primarily logistical. In effect, CINCPAC won authority to discuss US capabilities and methods of providing essentially logistical support for a SEATO plan that accorded with one worked out unilaterally by the United States.

For different reasons, the administration moved gingerly in dealing with the question of how to defend the SEATO area during a general war. Clearly, the allies could not be told that US forces would defend nothing north of the Kra Isthmus. Yet several Asian members were pressing for development of a SEATO general war plan. Pakistan led this movement. As a member of the Baghdad Pact and then of CENTO, Pakistanis knew that a study on defending the Baghdad Pact area had been completed. Parallel planning by SEATO seemed to them a reasonable goal.

When the ANZUS Council met in 1956, Australia and New Zealand had promised to join the United States in opposing a SEATO study of general war. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that a flat “No” would not suffice. In January 1957, they advised Secretary Wilson that a SEATO study of general war should be turned aside only “if it can be done without seriously undermining the confidence of the Asian members…. If the Asians proved unwilling to abandon such a study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to see it done on three conditions. First, limit the study to broad general terms. Second, reach agreement about assumptions on the effects of Soviet nuclear weapons. Third, reach agreement on assumptions regarding plans and forces of free world nations and defense organizations outside the SEATO area. Planners would employ such assumptions in lieu of seeking disclosures from the nations and organizations concerned.

While OSD officials approved the JCS position as a last line of resistance, they hoped to avoid even a tightly circumscribed global war study. Further State-Defense review of SEATO members’ sentiments led the administration to take the following position: Try to convince members that “planning for a war limited to the treaty area would be adequate for defense in a global war…. Such a course of action would appear a diplomatic means of disposing of this study and would still offer a route for graceful retirement should the Asian members indicate strongly held opposition.”

At their sixth meeting, held in March 1957, SEATO’s Military Advisers decided that their limited war studies would be adaptable for global considerations because “the residual threat to the mainland of South East Asia in global war would be no greater, and may be less, than in limited war.” Pakistan’s adviser, seeking political approval of a global war study, dissented. In the fall of 1958, he again argued for such a study. The advisers formally took note of these views but also “noted that the greatest danger to the Treaty Area was subversion, followed by limited war, and that the work of the Military Planning Office should be directed to first things first.” Thus the US objective was achieved.

Subsequently, without SEATO’s knowledge, US general war plans were changed in the way that Asian members desired. JSCP 59, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1957, repeated that the United States and its allies should hold along the Kra Isthmus, abandoning the bulk of Southeast Asia. In January 1959, CINCPAC warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a growing feeling in several countries that the United States would not help them meet all types of
aggression. To stem this disillusionment, he proposed having the JSCP lay down a more flexible line of resistance located as far forward as possible. Hence he proposed the following change:

The defense of Southeast Asia, undertaken in conjunction with our Allies, will occur as far forward as possible, holding strong points in Burma and the area south of central Thailand-Pakse-Tourane. Should this concept fail... the US with its remaining allies should hold the Malay Peninsula and either hold or neutralize Indonesia.13

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did expand their objectives. JSCP–61, which they approved in April 1960, stated that “the United States and its Allies will hold in Southeast Asia as far forward as possible...” during general war. However, “holding action in the area will have to be accomplished by allied forces unless US forces have been previously deployed.”14 Yet, since the allies were not informed of this change, their morale and determination cannot have been improved by it. Moreover, by 1960, crises in Indonesia and Laos had revealed weaknesses in both ANZUS and SEATO that overshadowed issues of general war strategy.

Two alliance systems—SEATO and CENTO, described in chapter 11—suffered from crippling weaknesses. Yet, from the standpoint of military planning, their problems were quite different. The Joint Chiefs of Staff restricted SEATO’s development but called for strong measures to build up CENTO. In large part, this approach reflected a conviction at all levels of the administration that SEATO should endeavor to cope with limited war threats while CENTO should concern itself with direct Soviet aggression. Thus, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CENTO required a sound global war plan whereas SEATO needed several different limited war plans. Defending the CENTO area would require using at least some nuclear weapons, whereas defending the SEATO area very likely would not. CENTO also needed a formally established command to implement its global war plan, while SEATO would need a variety of commands and commanders depending upon the contingency in question. US forces eventually might be earmarked for CENTO but definitely not for SEATO. Ultimately, of course, CENTO never had to face a decision about military action while SEATO did. The next section sheds some light on why SEATO failed this test.

Failure of Collective Action: Indonesia and Laos

Indonesia, under President Sukarno, appeared to be turning into an authoritarian state with an adventurist, pro-communist foreign policy. That, at least, was the opinion among US policymakers. In 1957, antigovernment risings occurred on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that Indonesia’s loss to the Communist Bloc would do irreparable and catastrophic damage to the position of the US and its allies in the Far East. Therefore, they recommended starting a token military assistance program immediately and preparing to give “timely and effective support to, and if necessary assist in the
creation of, a non-Communist nationalist government when the inevitable crisis in Java comes to pass.” On 15 February 1958, the rebels announced formation of a rival government. The resulting civil war lasted three months, and for a time it seemed that the United States and the USSR would be supporting opposite sides, in a manner resembling the Spanish civil war of the 1930s.

NSC 5713/2 had stated that ANZUS planning facilities might prove more appropriate for “certain phases of the problem posed by the possibility of Communist subversion of all or part of Indonesia.” The ANZUS powers judged that SEATO, because of hesitancy among some members, would hinder rather than facilitate any military efforts to keep communists from gaining control over Indonesia. By early March 1958, the ANZUS Military Staff Planners had prepared recommendations for aiding the rebel government with measures including financial, technical, and logistical support. The planners also drew up an operational planning study outlining ANZUS military action, but they made clear that it constituted only a basis for possible future operations and not a commitment to act.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 April, asked Secretary McElroy to approve the Staff Planners’ report and to seek State Department concurrence. The Office of the Secretary of Defense did so but State delayed a decision. Sukarno’s forces, meantime, had landed on the rebel-held island of Sumatra. Military supplies in modest amounts were reaching the rebels by air and sea. Although the administration wanted the rebels to win, it would not countenance the only sure way to success: overt action.

On 8 April, when Sukarno’s forces were about to make another landing on Sumatra to capture the town of Padang, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a warning. The Soviets were increasing their influence over Sukarno’s government by introducing merchant ships, crews, and supplies; Soviet aircraft soon would arrive as well. In these circumstances, the rebels’ defeat “would almost certainly lead to Communist domination of Indonesia.” Such a turn of events would cause serious reactions in Malaya and Thailand, probable trouble in Laos, and possible trouble in Cambodia. SEATO could disappear as a viable pact. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended relaxing restrictions on US policy and accelerating efforts to prevent Indonesia’s loss to communism.

Some things were done but not enough to turn the tide. The rebels lost Padang on 18 April. When their capital in Sumatra fell on 4 May, the back of the rebellion was broken. At that time, the ANZUS Council still had not approved the planners’ report. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia continued on a leftward course until the revolution of 1965.

In Laos, after the 1954 Geneva conference, long negotiations had led to creation of a coalition government that included the communist Pathet Lao. In 1959, this Government of National Union fell apart and a communist insurgency quickly gathered strength. Writing to Secretary McElroy on 4 September 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced grave concern over what they called “the increasingly strong Communist invasion of Laos.” According to their information, the Pathet Lao were receiving powerful outside support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that measures taken and those contemplated would ensure the defense of northern or even southern Laos. The necessary steps might well lead
to US military intervention, for which SEATO provided a legal basis. They recommended, as a matter of urgency, recasting policy to eliminate all restrictions upon US actions, whether taken unilaterally or in conjunction with allies. Diplomatic efforts should be initiated to provide military assistance and learn what support the non-SEATO allies of the United States could supply. At a State-Defense meeting that same day, Admiral Burke stated his belief that “someone may have to move in fast.”

The Royal Lao Government was reluctant to invoke SEATO’s assistance; Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United Kingdom reportedly were reluctant to have SEATO intervene. The administration decided unilaterally to make standby deployments, so that US forces could respond to an emergency or backstop a decision by the Government of Thailand to send its own troops into Laos. But fighting tapered off, perhaps due to the prompt arrival of United Nations observers, and the immediate crisis eased.

Under SEATO auspices, a plan for intervening to assist the Laotian Government against a communist insurgency was being written. During a White House meeting on 11 September, President Eisenhower said “he assumed that it was our policy to do whatever was necessary militarily under SEATO and that we would not do anything completely by ourselves. If we acted unilaterally, then he did not see why we should have Collective Security Pacts.” One week later, with State and Defense concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCPAC that SEATO’s plan should be designed to involve as many members as possible, avoiding “any impression that we can swing the whole thing alone.” The United States already was prepared to make logistic and supporting units available. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State and Defense concurrence, now added two battalion landing teams and a composite air strike force.

Early in May 1960, CINCPAC informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that SEATO Planners had to know the details of force contributions in order to refine their plan. Admiral Felt calculated that about 12,000 US personnel would be provided, including 5,000 for logistics support, 5,120 for a composite brigade (one Army battle group and one Marine battalion landing team with its own air and logistic elements), and 780 for an air component built around one tactical fighter squadron. Initially, Admiral Felt said that he intended to let SEATO Planners know only the “general magnitude” of personnel and units, hoping to encourage headquarters and support contributions from other nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed decisions about logistics support and about revealing the details of a US contribution.

Laos reclaimed the world’s attention when, on 9 August 1960, paratroop Captain Kong Le and his men seized the country’s administrative capital of Vientiane, promising to establish a truly neutral government. The United States responded by providing support to General Phoumi Nosavan, who represented himself as being strongly anticommunist. The United States limited its efforts, though. Among other reasons, the Departments of State and Defense feared that all-out backing for Phoumi would risk a sharp break with the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand, quite conceivably leading to SEATO’s eventual collapse. Phoumi’s troops retook Vientiane in mid-December. A pro-Western
government was organized with Prince Boun Oum as Premier and Phoumi as his deputy. Kong Le then joined with the Pathet Lao, who were getting substantial help from a Soviet airlift. During a White House meeting on 31 December, President Eisenhower emphasized "that we must not allow Laos to fall to the Communists, even if it involves war in which the US acts with allies or unilaterally."\textsuperscript{23}

Meantime, SEATO's Military Advisers had agreed upon "assumptions" that, if intervention occurred, Thailand would provide the Force Commander and the United States a Vice Commander. During the first few days of January 1961, a new round of fighting in Laos gave the Pathet Lao control over the crucial Plaine des Jarres. On 13 January, the US Representative to SEATO, U. Alexis Johnson, warned Secretary Gates that SEATO's morale was at a low ebb. Unless steps were taken to persuade Asian members that SEATO could play a useful role in Laos, he believed that the organization might be fatally discredited.\textsuperscript{24}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the next day, sent Secretary Gates their conclusion that the United States "must take immediate and decisive actions to defeat the aggressors in Laos or face the possibility of a neutral or Communist-dominated Southeast Asia." At an appropriate time, SEATO's agreement should be sought for sending a force into Laos. But there was considerable doubt that France and the United Kingdom would go along. If unanimity proved unattainable and SEATO could not act, they continued, the United States should press for agreement by as many members as possible to intervene in accordance with the principles prescribed by the Treaty. Only after this approach had been tried and failed should consideration be given to unilateral intervention, either by the United States or by a country such as Thailand. Secretary Gates endorsed these views and so informed the Secretary of State. He added that, if the pace of events precluded political action, unilateral US intervention might be necessary to help spur a multilateral response. During a State-Defense meeting, however, Gates voiced "grave concern" that SEATO appeared to be a "paper tiger" dominated by the French and British. On 19 January, his last full day in office, President Eisenhower told his successor that intervention through SEATO would be "far better" than formation of a government with communist participation. Eisenhower looked upon unilateral US intervention as "a last desperate effort." Loss of Laos, he said, would be "the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East."\textsuperscript{25}

The feasibility of SEATO intervention was promptly put to the test. On 22 January, Premier Boun Oum asked SEATO to send, "as a preliminary measure preceding any direct intervention," a commission that would investigate the extent of interference by communist powers. When SEATO's Council of Representatives gathered the next day, all members agreed that any reply must reject the implication that sending a mission would be "preliminary" to direct intervention. The United States continued seeking ways to send SEATO investigators but some allies, particularly the French, opposed even that step and nothing was done.\textsuperscript{26}

Early in March, the Pathet Lao scored such military successes against the Boun Oum/Phoumi forces that a complete communist victory in fairly short order seemed possible. The SEATO Council of Ministers met during 27–29 March. The United States tabled a draft resolution declaring SEATO's
firm resolve...not to acquiesce in the overthrow of the Royal Lao Government by these Communist-supported rebels or to countenance the destruction of the territorial integrity of that kingdom. Accordingly, SEATO and its member countries will if necessary take whatever action may be necessary appropriate in the circumstances.

What the Council approved, however, was a milder statement that if diplomatic efforts failed, "and there continues to be an active military attempt to gain control of Laos, members of SEATO are prepared, within the terms of the treaty, to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances."27

The Laotian crisis peaked late in April as the Pathet Lao kept advancing and the Boun Oum/Phoumi forces came near collapse. Military intervention became a very real possibility. On 28 April, the US member urged SEATO's Council of Representatives to seek approval for a "Charter Yellow" alert warning that would precede military action.28

During the next week, intensive efforts by the United States and other governments culminated in an announcement of a cease-fire to be followed by a peace conference. On 4 May, the US spokesman told SEATO Representatives that a decision about Charter Yellow could be postponed. This bypassing of SEATO probably dealt a fatal blow to any lingering hope for collective action. Asian and Pacific members had expected strong US leadership that would overcome French and British reluctance to act. They saw no evidence of it and were deeply disappointed. One member bluntly described SEATO as "a dead horse."29 In fact, from this point forward, SEATO played virtually no part in a steadily escalating war for Indochina.

Twice, the United States deliberately bypassed SEATO. In both cases, unanimity appeared unattainable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shied away from detailed multilateral planning. Politically as well as militarily, the obstacles to collective action should have alerted US policymakers to the fact that erroneous assumptions underlay some of their basic purposes and objectives in the area. In Western Europe, shared values and stable governments solidified NATO. In Northeast Asia, Japan had a nascent democracy and the benefit of geographic isolation; South Korea also enjoyed the protection afforded by a peninsula. The fragile governments in Laos and South Vietnam enjoyed none of these advantages. Consequently, countries that readily joined the United States in other collective security enterprises shied away from this one.
Conclusion

The late 1950s stand out as an unusual period because the fear and pessimism that became fairly widespread among the American public proved to have little foundation. Sputnik seemed to show that the Soviets had won a crucial technological advantage. Cuba became a communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere; the Congo appeared ripe for plucking by Moscow or Peking, the governments of Laos and South Vietnam looked more shaky every day. Yet the missile gap quickly disappeared and the communist surge into the Third World slowly petered out. Bracketed between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the Eisenhower years seem almost like an oasis of calm and safety. What many contemporaries labeled passivity came, with the passage of years, to look more often like prudence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff faced situations that tested their commitment to "jointness" as well as their skill in crisis management. President Eisenhower clearly was disappointed by their performance in the joint arena. He had placed his old service, the Army, at the bottom of the priority list and expected the Service Chiefs to be equally broad-minded. That, of course, did not happen. Chapters 3 and 4 recount the recurring splits over conventional, ICBM, SLBM, and Nike-Zeus levels. What becomes clear, however, is the Chairman's emergence as pre-eminent adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In 1957, Secretary Wilson accepted Admiral Radford's force-level proposals virtually without change. General Twining usually stood with the President even to the point of breaking with his old service, the Air Force. It seems plain that the Single Integrated Operational Plan reflected the preferences of General Twining more than that of any Service Chief. General White appeared preoccupied with aggrandizing the Air Force, General Taylor with preventing major cutbacks in the Army, and Admiral Burke with protecting the Navy against any encroachments.

Although collective security stood as the centerpiece of US foreign policy, the problem posed by managing assorted alliances varied widely. For NATO, nuclear sharing became the premier issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sought a solution that would bring all national nuclear forces, except that of the United States, under
NATO control. They wanted to help France become a nuclear power, but only so that power could be subsumed within a NATO nuclear force. Not surprisingly, President Charles de Gaulle found that approach unacceptable. As for CENTO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that nothing less than full US membership could give it vitality. The State Department blocked their recommendations, judging that political alienation of the Arab states would more than offset any improvements to regional military planning. When the US-Japan Security Treaty underwent revision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensured that Japanese bases would remain available to support UN operations in any new Korean war. For SEATO, however, a very different story unfolded. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that combined planning could lead to a commitment of US forces to defend Southeast Asia. When the test of collective action came in Laos, they inclined toward unilateral measures.

Frequently, in times of crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were more pro-active, more ready to "lean forward" than was the President. When Quemoy and Matsu were being bombarded, they asked the Chief Executive to give advance approval for air strikes against the mainland under certain conditions; he refused. Early in 1959, when a confrontation over Berlin seemed possible, the Service Chiefs pressed for major mobilization. General Twining told President Eisenhower that he did not share their view. All JCS members joined, though, in criticizing the President's low-key approach as inadequate. When the Congo fell into chaos, the administration pursued its objectives by working through a United Nations Emergency Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, going further, were willing to take whatever unilateral action appeared necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet intervention. In Laos, too, they were ready to step in alone while the President clung to a hope of collective action. Lebanon, on the other hand, stands as a textbook case of civil-military accord. At every step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff understood and fully agreed with what the President was doing. Military plans and political objectives were meshed; the pitfalls in anything other than a tightly circumscribed intervention were recognized.

Finally, in very broad terms, how accurate was the Joint Chiefs' appraisal of overall US capabilities? In December 1958, General Twining told the Cabinet that he felt US forces were sufficient to deter general war and meet limited aggression. Eleven months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the margin of US superiority to be "so thin" that any reductions unmatched by corresponding Soviet cutbacks would "place the United States in a vulnerable position"—carefully hedged words that bore the mark of interservice compromise. In September 1960, General Twining advised the Armed Forces Policy Council that, while US capability to deliver nuclear weapons had increased, the growth of similar Soviet capabilities meant that "our relative posture may have weakened during the past year." US forces could counter one limited aggression, he said, but would be hard pressed to carry out two operations simultaneously. The crucial point of these assessments lay in their tacit acknowledgment that US superiority, however thin or circumscribed it might be, did exist. Turning to Soviet and Chinese leaders, one can infer from their behavior (as distinct from their often belligerent rhetoric) that the men in Moscow and Peiping saw matters about the same way. The Chinese backed away from a confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu. Even
Conclusion

around Berlin, where their conventional advantage was overwhelming, the Soviets did not mount a military challenge. Thus, whatever problems US policymakers may have faced, military inferiority was not one of them.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>anti-ICBM</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, and United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>anti-submarine warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>battalion landing team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNSP</td>
<td>Basic National Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCAL</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCARIB</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCHAN</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Channel Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCELM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSPECOMME</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUSNAVEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPS</td>
<td>Combined Military Planning Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMAMLANFOR</td>
<td>Commander, American Land Forces</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEFREPNAMA</td>
<td>Defense Representative to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGM</td>
<td>Director of Guided Missiles</td>
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<td>ECM</td>
<td>electronic countermeasures</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>Emergency Defense Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Acronym/Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JIOA</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency</td>
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<td>JLRSE</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate</td>
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<td>JMEPC</td>
<td>Joint Middle East Planning Committee</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<td>JSPC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans Committee</td>
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<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Survey Council</td>
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<td>JWR</td>
<td>Joint War Room</td>
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<td>MAAGs</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Groups</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missile</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<td>NOA</td>
<td>new obligational authority</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSTL</td>
<td>National Strategic Target List</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCB</td>
<td>Operations Coordinating Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCDM</td>
<td>Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>Office of Defense Mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMDG</td>
<td>Permanent Military Deputies Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMPO</td>
<td>SEATO Military Planning Office</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>US Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEBI</td>
<td>US Element, Baghdad Pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMILREPME</td>
<td>US Military Representative for the Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSEG</td>
<td>Weapons Systems Evaluation Group</td>
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# Principal Civilian and Military Officers

**President and Commander in Chief**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>20 Jan 53–20 Jan 61</td>
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**Secretary of State**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
<td>21 Jan 53–18 Apr 59</td>
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<td>Christian A. Herter</td>
<td>22 Apr 59–20 Jan 61</td>
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**Secretary of Defense**

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<tr>
<td>Charles E. Wilson</td>
<td>28 Jan 53–08 Oct 57</td>
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<td>Neil H. McElroy</td>
<td>09 Oct 57–01 Dec 59</td>
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<td>Thomas S. Gates, Jr.</td>
<td>02 Dec 59–20 Jan 61</td>
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**Deputy Secretary of Defense**

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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.</td>
<td>05 Aug 55–23 Apr 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald A. Quarles</td>
<td>01 May 57–08 May 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas S. Gates, Jr.</td>
<td>08 Jun 59–01 Dec 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James H. Douglas, Jr</td>
<td>11 Dec 59–20 Jan 61</td>
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**Assistant Secretary of Defense**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gordon Gray</td>
<td>14 Jul 55–27 Feb 57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mansfield D. Sprague</td>
<td>28 Feb 57–03 Sep 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>John N. Irwin II</td>
<td>26 Sep 58–20 Jan 61</td>
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**Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Nathan F. Twining, USAF</td>
<td>15 Aug 57–30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 60–30 Sep 62</td>
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**Chief of Staff, US Army**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Maxwell D. Taylor</td>
<td>30 Jun 55–01 Jul 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Lyman L. Lemnitzer</td>
<td>01 Jul 59–30 Sep 60</td>
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<tr>
<td>General George H. Decker</td>
<td>01 Oct 60–30 Sep 67</td>
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**Chief of Naval Operations**

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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Arleigh A. Burke</td>
<td>17 Aug 55–01 Aug 61</td>
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</table>

**Chief of Staff, US Air Force**

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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Nathan F. Twining</td>
<td>30 Jun 53–30 Jun 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Thomas D. White</td>
<td>01 Jul 57–30 Jun 61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Principal Civilian and Military Officers

#### Commandant, US Marine Corps
- General Randolph McC. Pate
- General David M. Shoup
  - 01 Jan 56–31 Dec 59
  - 01 Jan 60–31 Dec 63

#### Director, Joint Staff
- Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin
- Lieutenant General Oliver S. Picher, USAF
- Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, USA
  - 01 Apr 58–31 Mar 60
  - 01 Apr 60–24 Feb 62

#### Commander in Chief, Atlantic
- Admiral Jerauld Wright
- Admiral Robert L. Dennison
  - 12 Apr 54–28 Feb 60
  - 29 Feb 60–29 Apr 63

#### Commander in Chief, European Command
- General Lauris Norstad, USAF
  - 20 Nov 56–31 Oct 62

#### Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
- Admiral Walter F. Boone
- Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr.
- Admiral Robert L. Dennison
- Admiral Harold P. Smith
  - 01 May 56–20 Feb 58
  - 21 Feb 58–31 Mar 59
  - 01 Apr 59–17 Feb 60
  - 18 Feb 60–08 Apr 63

#### Commander in Chief, Pacific
- Admiral Felix B. Stump
- Admiral Harry D. Felt
  - 10 Jul 53–30 Jul 58
  - 31 Jul 58–29 Jun 64

#### Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
- General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF
- General Thomas S. Power, USAF
  - 19 Oct 48–30 Jun 57
  - 01 Jul 57–30 Nov 64
Bibliographic Note

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the master record files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and agencies of the Joint Staff. The volumes published by the Department of State in its Foreign Relations of the United States series have been used extensively.

During 1957–1958, the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized under a case file system that had been in use since 1942. This system is identified by the prefix CCS (for the Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder title. An example would be CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 24. In 1959, a Joint Master File system was introduced. Under the old system, documents usually were filed chronologically so that a directive from the Secretary of Defense and the JCS response to it often appeared in different sections. In the new system, each file or folder contained the records of a single action from its beginning until its end. Footnote citations from the new system contain the prefix JMF, as in JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) sec 1, or JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (21 Sep 60). Also, beginning in 1959, memorandums addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and occasionally to other heads of departments or agencies, bore the designation “JCSM” with a serial number applied chronologically, as in JCSM–1–59, 6 January 1959, or JCSM–408–59, 1 October 1959. Within each footnote, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are cited, all those contained in a footnote “sentence,” closed by a period, are located in the file cited at the end of that sentence. “Same file” rather than “Ibid.” is used for repeated, successive references to the same file.

Some documents, usually those that were widely distributed and locatable without reference to JCS records, are cited without a file number. From the great volume of military and diplomatic messages, only those directly related to subjects under JCS consideration became part of the permanent JCS file.
Chapter 1. Working the Machinery of Government


6. MFR by BG Goodpaster, “Meeting at the Pentagon, Saturday, 25 January 1958,” 30 Jan 58, WHO, Ofc of Staff Secy, DOD Sub sec, Box 1, Folder DOD vol. 2 (4) (Jan 58); MFR by Bryce Harlow, 30 Jan 58, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


17. JCSM–3–60 to SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCS 2143/86, JMF 3130 (9 Sep 59).

18. JCS 2143/102, 8 Apr 60, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60).

19. JCSM–410–60 to SecDef, 20 Sep 60, JCS 2143/105, JMF 3130 (30 Apr 60) sec. 6. Memo, CNO to JCS, 14 Sep 59, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60).

20. JCS 1920/10 and 1920/11, 13 Oct 60, JMF 3110 (19 Jan 60).


Chapter 2. Backing Away from “Massive Retaliation”


7. NSC 5707, 14 May 57, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec. 70.
21. NSC 5810, 15 Apr 58, TS, CJCS File NSC 5810.
22. NSC Actions No. 1842(g), 16 Jan 58, No. 1844, 22 Jan 58, TS.
23. Memo, Mr. Cutler to Plng Board, 15 Apr 58, TS, CJCS File 5810.
29. “Statement by General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the National Security Council on Basic National Security Policy, 1 May 1958,” TS, CJCS File NSC 5810. At a later NSC session, General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General Pate challenged the Chairman’s claim that the changes they recommended could be accomplished under the existing BNSP: “The fact remains that these objectives have not been achieved in the past and that the current text has been read, or perhaps misread, to support the overriding importance of a policy of massive retaliation.” CM–152–58 to NSC, 23 Jul 58, JCS 2101/323, TS, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec. 79.
Chapter 3. Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

1. DOD Semiannual Reports, January 1 to June 30, 1956, pp. 2–5; January 1 to June 30, 1957, pp. 4.
3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Mar 57, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec. 33.
4. Memo, DepSecDef to SecDef, 25 Apr 57, TS, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec. 33.
5. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Jul 59, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec. 33.
7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Jan 61, TS, CCS 381 (11–29–49) sec. 33.
Notes to Pages 35–44

6. "Presentation to the President and National Security Council by the Department of Defense on the Military Programs for Fiscal Years '58, '59, '60, & '61, July 25, 57," U, CJCS File 111, 1957. The meeting is fully described in Foreign Relations: 1955–1957, vol. 19, pp. 553–565. NSC Action No. 1755. The preliminary draft of NSC Action No. 1755 included the last sentence above. President Eisenhower deleted it before publication but instructed Mr. Cutler to tell the Secretary that his warning must constantly be kept in mind. Memo, SpecAsst for NSA to SecDef, 31 Jul 57, CJCS File Ill, 1957.


8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Oct 57, JCS 1800/258, U, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec. 59. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 1 Nov 57, JCS 1800/261, U, same file, sec. 60.


15. Joint Secys Advice of Action, 2 Jul 59, JCS 1800/320, U; Memo, C. A. Randall (MilAsst to SecDef) to DJS, 2 Jul 59, Encl to JCS 1800/294, U, JMF 7000 (2 Jul 59).


17. CM–240–59 to CNO et al., 10 Nov 59, U.


22. CM–65–61 to McNamara, 17 Jan 61, U, JMF 7000 (16 Jan 61). No Minuteman ICBMs would be operational in mid-1962, but by mid-1963, 150 missiles would be.

23. “Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 14, 1959,” by BG Goodpaster, 15 Jul 59, Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes, July 59 (3). “Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 30, 1959,” 2 Jul 59, Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes, June 16–30 ’59 (2). In 1956, Admiral Radford’s proposal to make major cuts in ground forces had been leaked to the press, apparently by Army officers.

Chapter 4. Closing the “Missile Gap”


Office. Most National Intelligence Estimates, for example, are described in the Chronology but do not appear in JCS files.

4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee," 4 Dec 57, JCS 2101/284, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 74. On 16 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Mr. McElroy that they could not reach agreement about whether ABMs deserved the same overriding priority as that awarded to ICBM development. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Development," 16 Dec 57, JCS 1899/377, U, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec. 90.


9. NSIE 11–10–57, 10 Dec 57, TS. NSC Actions 1842 and 1846, 16 and 22 Jan 58, TS.


14. NSC Actions 1994 and 2013, approved by President on 16 Oct 58 and 6 Dec 58, TS, respectively.


16. Rpt, OSD Ballistic Missile Defense Steering Group to SecDef, "Considerations and Recommendations Concerning a Production Decision for Nike-Zeus," 7 Nov 58, JCS 1620/201, S, CCS 471.6 (5-31-44) sec. 24. Dr. Skifter was a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Guided Missile Systems," 24 Nov 58, JCS 1620/204, S, same file, sec. 25.


19. NSC Action 2168, 7 Jan 60, approved by the President on 13 Jan 60, TS.


23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Sep 59, JCS 1899/509, U; Memo, SecAF(FM) to ASD(C), 25 Sep 59, JCS 1099/522, U; JCSTM–444–59 and CM–410–59 to SecDef, 26 Oct 59, JCS 1099/527, U, JMF 3340 (10 Sep 59).

24. JCS 1899/588, 18 Jul 60, U; Memo, CINCASAC to JCS, 23 Jun 60, JCS 1899/588, U; Msg, JCS 981899 to CANLASC, 21 Jul 60, JCS 1899/591, U; Msg, JCS 981918 to CANLASC, 25 Aug 60, JCS 1899/597, U, JMF 3340 (23 Jun 60).


26. NSC Action 2207, 1 Apr 60, approved by the President on 6 Apr 60, TS.

27. NIE 11–4–60, 16 Aug 60, TS.
Chapter 5. Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

1. DOS, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 720-729.


4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 21 May 57, JCS 1731/228, S. CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 73.


25. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, "Revision of US Position on First Phase of Disarmament as Proposed by Department of State (14 August 1958)," 15 Aug 58, JCS 1731/261, S, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec. 77.
30. Lit, SecState to Pres, 16 Nov 58, Encl A CM-235-58 to JCS, 24 Nov 58, S, CCS 092 (4–14–45) sec. 77.
47. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Feb 60, JCS 1731/342, TS; JCSM–74–60 to SecDef, 2 Mar 60, JCS 1731/346, TS, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3.

48. SM–181–60 to JCS, 25 Feb 60, S; JCSM–117–60 to SecDef, 23 Mar 60, JCS 1731/362, S; 1st N/H of JCS 1731/362, 11 Apr 60, S; JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3. In mid-March, Secretary Gates made ISA the focal point for Defense's contacts with other departments and agencies about arms control matters. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Mar 60, JCS 1731/363, U, same file.

49. SM–181–60 to JCS, 25 Feb 60, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3. DOS Bulletin, 4 Apr 60, pp. 511–513.

50. Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 299–302. Defense's position is summarized in Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 28 Apr 60, JCS 1731/374, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 6.


53. JCSM–25–60 to SecDef, 10 Jun 60, JCS 1731/392, S; N/H of JCS 1731/392, 21 Jun 60, S; JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 10.


56. JCSM–236–60 to SecDef, 13 Jun 60, JCS 1731/389, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 10. JCSM–236–60 to SecDef, 26 Aug 60, JCS 2179/221, TS; N/H of JCS 2179/221, 19 Sep 60, TS; JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60).

57. JCSM–236–60 to SecDef, 26 Aug 60, JCS 2179/221, TS; N/H of JCS 2179/221, 19 Sep 60, TS; JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60). Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (1965), p. 481. The Geneva negotiations on test suspension had remained in session, even though talks appeared stalemated.

Chapter 6. Maintaining the Military Assistance Program


3. NSC 5517/1, 13 Jul 55, U, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) sec. 13.

4. JCS 2099/703, 12 Feb 57, TS, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) sec. 39. Memo, DepSecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, 6 Sep 56, TS, Big Sheet for SecDef, NSC 5717.


6. Memo, LGEN F. W. Farrell to CJCS, 6 Sep 57, TS, CJCS File “NSC 5717.” General Farrell, who was Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NSC Affairs, believed that State had become “congenitally distrustful” of JCS proposals brought before the Planning Board, particularly those applicable to NATO.


8. JCS 2099/706, 18 Feb 57, TS, CCS 092 (8–22–46) BP pt. 16.


21. JCS 2099/767, 6 Feb 58, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Priorities Relative to Pre-D-Day Allocations of Military Equipment,” 28 Feb 58, JCS 2099/770, TS; CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) sec. 49.

22. Msg, ASD(ISA) DEF 0476256 to CINCPAC and Mil Depts, 5 Sep 58, S, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) sec. 56. Msg, DEF 947973 to CINCPAC et al., 12 Sep 58, S, same file, sec. 58.


25. JCS 2099/813, 15 Sep 58, S, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) sec. 57.


32. OASD(ISA), “Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, World-Wide,” 31 Mar 60, S, JMF 4060 (31 Mar 60). One JCS proposal was adopted. Supply Operations funds, previously included in the allocations to unified command areas, now were separately listed and earmarked to be administered in Washington.

33. JCSM-54-60 to SecDef, 17 Feb 60, JCS 2099/974, S, JMF 4060 (17 Sep 59) sec. 3. The fate of the remaining 4 percent cannot be determined conclusively from available records.

34. JCS 2099/999, 12 Jul 60, S; JCSM-299-60 to SecDef, 15 Jul 60. JCS 2099/999, S, JMF 4060 (30 Jun 60) sec. 3.


Chapter 7. NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities


5. USM 4–37 to JCS, 10 Jan 57, JCS 2073/1350, U, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) (2) sec. 72.

6. Memo, CSAFM-33-57 to JCS, 10 Feb 57, U; CSAM-30-57 to JCS, 9 Feb 57 (apparently misplaced for 7 Feb), U; Memo, CNO to JCS, “JCS 2073/1333 . . . .,” 4 Feb 57, U; SM-111-57 to US Rep to NAMC and Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Over-all Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area,” 11 Feb 57, JCS 2073/1353, U, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec. 73.


17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 27 Feb 58, JCS 2073/1526, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 100.


25. Memo, VCSAF and CSAF to SecAF, 9 Sep 59, JCS 1800/304, U, JMF 7000 (15 Sep 59). Msg, DEF 966521 to USNMR, Paris, 8 Ott 59, S; Msg, USNMR, Paris, AL0 145 to OSD, 10 Ott 59, DA IN 253234, S; JMF 9050/3410 (8 Ott 59).


27. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Feb 58, and Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Feb 58, JCS 2073/1532, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.

28. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Mar 58, JCS 2073/1535, U; AFPC Advice of Action, 11 Mar 58, S; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.


32. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Feb 58, and Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Feb 58, JCS 2073/1532, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.


34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reduction of US Army Commitments to NATO,” 18 Sep 57, JCS 2073/1436, TS, same file, sec. 86.


36. Memo, VCSAF and CSAF to SecAF, 9 Sep 59, JCS 1800/304, U, JMF 7000 (15 Sep 59). Msg, DEF 966521 to USNMR, Paris, 8 Ott 59, S; Msg, USNMR, Paris, AL0 145 to OSD, 10 Ott 59, DA IN 253234, S; JMF 9050/3410 (8 Ott 59).

37. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Feb 58, and Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Feb 58, JCS 2073/1532, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.

38. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Mar 58, JCS 2073/1535, U; AFPC Advice of Action, 11 Mar 58, S; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.


41. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Feb 58, and Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Feb 58, JCS 2073/1532, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.

42. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Mar 58, JCS 2073/1535, U; AFPC Advice of Action, 11 Mar 58, S; CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48)(2) sec. 101.


Chapter 8. Germany and Berlin


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4. NSC 5803, 7 Feb 58, JCS 2124/190, TS, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35.

5. OCB Progress Report on NSC 5803, 3 Sep 58, N/H of JCS 2124/190, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35.

6. NSC 5524/1, 13 Jul 55, JCS 2249/3, U; N/H of JCS 2249/3, 4 Jan 56, U; CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec. 14.


8. JCS 2124/179, 16 Nov 56, U; JCS 2124/181, 12 Dec 56, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 32.


10. JCS 1731/220, 14 Mar 57, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 67.

11. Rpt of the Four Power Working Group on German Reunification in Relation to European Security, 4-15 Mar 57, Washington, DC; S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 33. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, same subj, 26 Mar 57, JCS 2249/17, S, same file.

12. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Apr 57, JCS 2249/18, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 33.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “US Military Position on European Security and German Reunification,” 15 Apr 57, JCS 2249/19, U; Msg, Bonn 4392 to SecState, 13 May 57, U; CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 33. Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 244-245.

14. JCS 1731/250, 4 Mar 58, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 74.

15. Msg, State TOPOL 2486 to Paris et al., 21 Jan 58, S; Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 1 Mar 58, JCS 1731/250, S; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 74.

16. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Establishment of a Denuclearized Zone in Central Europe,” 11 Mar 58, JCS 1731/253, U; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 75.


18. Lt. SecState to SecDef, 11 Feb 58, JCS 2124/191, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 21 Feb 58, JCS 2116/20, S, CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec. 18.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “European Security and German Reunification,” 27 Mar 58, JCS 2124/192, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt. 3. The JCS also directed the JSSC to appraise all policy issues likely to come up at a summit conference. The committee reported that existing JCS positions constituted adequate guidance for developing any positions. JCS 2116/15, 15 Jul 58, S, CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec. 19.

20. N/H of JCS 2124/192, 16 Apr 58, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt. 3.


22. DOS Working Paper on European Security and German Reunification, 6 Mar 59, JCS 2124/200, JMF 9172/100 (10 Mar 59).

23. Ltr, DepSecDef to ActgSecState, 6 Mar 59, App C to JCS 2124/200, S, JMF 9172/100 (10 Mar 59).

24. JCSM-81-59 to SecDef, 10 Mar 59, JCS 2124/201, S; N/H of JCS 2124/201, 7 Apr 59, S, JMF 9172/100 (10 Mar 59).

25. Memo, ASD(ISA) to JCS, 28 Mar 59, JCS 2124/206, S; JCSM-115-59 to SecDef, 30 Mar 59, JCS 2124/207, S; JMF 9172/105 (30 Mar 59).

26. Memo, AsstSecState for European Affairs to ASD(ISA), 9 Apr 59, JCS 2124/208, S; JMF 9172/105 (10 Apr 59).

27. JCSM-134-59 to SecDef, 10 Apr 59, JCS 2124/210, S, JMF 9172/105 (10 Apr 59).

28. MFR by RADM Paul L. Dudley, “Quadripartite Meeting (US, UK, France, and Germany) on Tuesday, 31 March,” Encl to SM-352-59 to JCS, 2 Apr 59, JCS 2124/212, S, JMF 5400 (59).


30. Msg, Paris 4800 to S&State, 15 Apr 60, S; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Apr 60, JCS 1731/369, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 6.

31. JCSM-179-60 to SecDef, 27 Apr 60, JCS 1731/372, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 7.

32. 1st N/H of JCS 1731/372, 6 Jun 60, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 7.

33. OCB Progress Rpt on Germany, 4 Sep 56-2 Nov 60, 4th N/H of JCS 2124/190, 14 Nov 60, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35.

34. NSC 5404/1, 25 Jan 54; Memo, JCS to SecDef, “NSC 5404—United States Policy on Berlin,” 19 Jan 54, JCS 1907/103, U; CCS 381 (8-20-43) sec. 33.

35. USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55, 6 Jul 55 (forwarded to JCS, 11 Aug 55), TS; USEUCOM Plan 12-55, 17 Nov 55 (forwarded to JCS, 1 Jan 56), TS; CCS 381 (8-20-43) BP pt. 1. SM-356-56 to USINCEUR, 8 May 56, JCS 1907/137, U, N/H of JCS 1907/120, 25 Mar 57, TS, same file, sec. 36.
the Joint Chiefs' request, USCINCEUR prepared an annex covering psychological warfare operations; it won JCS approval on 30 April 1957. SM-334-57 to USCINCEUR, 30 Apr 57, JCS 1907/148, U, same file, sec. 39.

36. Memo, Dir of Coordinating Secretariat to NSC Planning Board, 14 Oct 57. Note: By ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "US Policy Toward Germany," 7 Feb 58, TS; CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35. Late in 1956, the Soviets began demanding to see the identification cards of enlisted men in military convoys traveling the autobahn. General H. I. Hodes, the CINCUSAREUR, urged firm measures of resistance. The State and Defense Departments disapproved, noting among other things that British and French personnel always had shown their cards upon request. Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 2 Feb 57, DA IN 292771, U; CCS 381 (8-29-43) sec. 39. Msg, CSA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Feb 57, DA 917643, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 32.

37. DOS Bulletin, 29 Dec 58, pp. 1041–1042; 5 Jan 59, p. 4. For the US reply to the Soviets, dated 31 December, see ibid., 19 Jan 59, pp. 79–81.

38. DOS Bulletin, 29 Dec 58, pp. 1041–1042; 5 Jan 59, p. 4. For the US reply to the Soviets, dated 31 December, see ibid., 19 Jan 59, pp. 79–81.

39. "Memo of Conf with the President, March 6, 1959—5:00 PM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 7 Mar 59, U; "Memo of Conf with the President, March 9, 1959—10:30 AM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 9 Mar 59, U; Staff Notes 1–15 Nov 59, DDE Diary Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

40. JCSM-16-59 to SecDef, 13 Jan 59, JCS 1907/162, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (12 Jan 59).

41. JCSM-355-59 to SecDef, 31 Aug 59, JCS 1907/237, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (26 Jun 59).


43. "Memo of Conf with the President, March 6, 1959—5:00 PM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 7 Mar 59, U; "Memo of Conf with the President, March 9, 1959—10:30 AM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 9 Mar 59, U; Staff Notes 1–15 Nov 59, DDE Diary Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

44. JCSM-202-59 to SecDef, 12 May 59, JCS 1907/266, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (28 Mar 59).

45. This paragraph is based upon annotations made on the Navy copy of JCS 1907/165.

46. "Memo of Conf with the President, March 6, 1959—5:00 PM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 7 Mar 59, U; "Memo of Conf with the President, March 9, 1959—10:30 AM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 9 Mar 59, U; Staff Notes 1–15 Nov 59, DDE Diary Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

47. JCSM-8259 to SecDef, 11 Mar 59, JCS 1907/175, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (6 Mar 59).

48. JCSM-1085-59 to SecDef, 26 Mar 59, JCS 1907/185, TS; Encl C to JCSM-128-59 to SecDef, 9 Apr 59, JCS 1907/189, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (23 Apr 59).

49. JCSM-338-59 to SecDef, 19 Aug 59, JCS 1907/232, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (23 Sep 59), TS; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Oct 59, JCS 1907/242, S; JCSM-500-59 to SecDef, 27 Nov 59, JCS 1907/252, TS; JCSM-547-59 to SecDef, 31 Dec 59, JCS 1907/255, TS; JMF Berlin/9105 (7 Aug 59).


51. DOS Bulletin, 29 Dec 58, pp. 1041–1042; 5 Jan 59, p. 4. For the US reply to the Soviets, dated 31 December, see ibid., 19 Jan 59, pp. 79–81.


55. Memo, Dir of Coordinating Secretariat to NSC Planning Board, 14 Oct 57. Note: By ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "US Policy Toward Germany," 7 Feb 58, TS; CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35. Late in 1956, the Soviets began demanding to see the identification cards of enlisted men in military convoys traveling the autobahn. General H. I. Hodes, the CINCUSAREUR, urged firm measures of resistance. The State and Defense Departments disapproved, noting among other things that British and French personnel always had shown their cards upon request. Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 2 Feb 57, DA IN 292771, U; CCS 381 (8-29-43) sec. 39. Msg, CSA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Feb 57, DA 917643, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 32.
Chapter 9. The Middle East: Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine


3. SM-65–57 to JMEPC, 22 Jan 57, S, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 54. The JMEPC then consisted of three one-star officers, supported by a staff of nine field-grade officers. Soon afterward, in an organizational change, the three general officers were replaced by a single two-star officer, Major General Verdi Barnes, USA.


5. N/H of JCS 1887/342, 7 Mar 57, U; JCS 1887/343, 1 Mar 57, U; DM–73–57 to JMEPC and DepDir for Strategic Plans, 15 Feb 57, U; CCS 381 EMMEA (11 19–47) sec. 55. JCS 1887/347, 14 Mar 57, U, same file, sec. 56.


7. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 28 Mar 57, JCS 1887/349, U; JCS 1887/351, 23 Apr 57, U; CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 56. DOS Bulletin, 8 Apr 57, p. 561.


9. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Mar 57, JCS 1887/345, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11 19–47) sec. 55. NSC Action No. 2338, 1 Dee 60, TS.


11. NSC Action No. 1753, 18 Jul 57, TS.


13. SM-558–57 to JMEPC, 26 Jul 57, U; CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 3. JCS 2268/6, 18 Oct 57, and Dec On, 23 Oct 57, TS, CCS 301 (9–14–57) sec. 5.

14. JCS 2034/30, 7 Oct 57, U; JCS 2034/31, 9 Oct 57, U; CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 4 and BP pt. 5. Pending activation of a Middle East Command, CINCNELM had taken the added title of CINCSPECOMME.

15. CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 219–57 (Draft), 27 Aug 57, CCS 381 (3–14–49) BP pt. 5. Ltr, CINC-NF to JCS et al., 27 Sep 57, TS, same file, sec. 3.


17. CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215–57 (Draft), 27 Sep 57, TS, CCS 381 (3–14–49) BP pt. 5.

18. JCS 2034/34, 12 Nov 57, JCS 2034/36, 19 Nov 57, TS; CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 4.

19. Msg, JCS 933492 to CINCNELM, 3 Dec 57, TS; SM–847–57 to CINCNELM, 29 Nov 57, TS; both in JCS 2034/39, CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 5.

20. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 051611Z Dec 57, TS; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 6 Dec 57, DA IN 76447, TS; CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 5.

21. SM-126–57 to CINCNELM, 21 Feb 58, JCS 1887/433, U; CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 68.

22. JCS 2268, 8 May 58, U, CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 3.

23. JCS 2268/7, 21 Oct 57, TS; JCS 2268/8, 29 Oct 57, TS; CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 4.

25. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Resolution of the Middle East Question," 4 Dec 57, JCS 1887/409, U, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 4.


29. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 17 Jan 58, JCS 1887/429, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 67. NSC Action No. 1845, 23 Jan 58, TS.

30. NSC 5801/l, 24 Jan 58, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) BP pt. 7.


33. Msg, Amman 1501 to SecState, 3 May 57, S; Msg, USARMA, Amman C-40 to ACSI, 4 May 57, S; CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 58.


35. Msg, Baghdad 1327 to SecState, 12 Feb 58, TS; Msg, Manila SECT0 12 to Sec&ate, 11 Mar 58, TS; CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 68.

36. JCS 1887/456, 12 May 58, TS, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) sec. 51.


44. NSC Action No. 2088, 21 May 59, U; NSC 5911, 3 Aug 59, U; Memo, ExecSecretary, NSC to NSC, "Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," 13 Aug 59, S; NSC 5911/1, 4 Nov 59, U, JMF 9110/9105 (3 Aug 59). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958–1960, vol. 13, pp. 615–625. On 16 September, French President Charles de Gaulle announced a program that promised self-determination for Algeria, based on a referendum to be held after the cessation of hostilities. NSC 5911/1 spoke of supporting and discreetly encouraging a settlement along those lines but did not specify how the US Government might do so.

45. JCS 570/502, 17 Feb 60, TS, JMF 9118.2/4920 (23 Apr 59) GP 2. DOS Bulletin, 11 Jan 60, p. 57.

46. JCSM–52–60 to SecDef, 17 Feb 60, JCS 570/502, JMF 9118.2/4920 (23 Apr 59) GP 2. JCSM 317–60 to SecDef, 23 Jul 60, JCS 570/513, S; SM–702–60 to CINCUSAC, 25 Jul 60, S; same file, sec. 3. JCS 570/332, 17 Apr 61, S, JMF 9118.3/4920 (13 Apr 61).

Chapter 10. The Middle East—Lebanon and After


3. Ltr. Depl SecState to JCS, 8 Nov 57, TS; Msg, JCS 932741 to USCINCEUR et al., 15 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 2.

4. The Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), used the title Commander in Chief, US Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), when planning or conducting operations in the Middle East. However, in the interest of simplicity, the title CINCNELM has been employed throughout this chapter.

5. Memo, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 22 Nov 57, JCS 2034/40, U; Msg, JCS 933332 to CINC-SPECOMME, 27 Nov 57, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 5. The JCS formally approved the JMEPC’s plan through Dee ON JCS 1887/410, 27 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 2. Msg, JCS 933492 to CINCNELM, 3 Dec 57, JCS 2034/39, TS, CCS 381 (3–14–49) sec. 5. Chapter 9 treats approval of OPLAN 215–58 in more detail.

6. JCS 1887/419, 29 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 4.

7. JCS 1887/419, 29 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Contingency Plan for USUK Military Action,” 10 Jan 58, JCS 1887/427, TS; N/H of JCS 1887/427, 8 Apr 58, TS; same file, sec. 5. Early in April, the JCS informed the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that they saw no need for detailed combined planning. SM–252–58 to BCS Reps, 7 Apr 58, JCS 1887/427, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 6. As will be seen, though, such planning did start in mid–May.


11. Msg, JCS 941855 to CINCNELM, 16 May 58, TS; Memo, COL D. J. Decker, JMEPC, to CNO, “Meeting at Department of State, 1115 Monday, 19 May 58,” 19 May 58, TS; CCS 381 Lebanon (5–13–58) sec. 1. By 20 June, the State Department was contemplating asking Turkey to permit pre­stocking several hundred tons of Army ammunition, to be followed later by moderate amounts of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. If intervention occurred, State anticipated no difficulty about obtaining staging rights. Msg, JCS 942263 to USCINCEUR et al., 23 May 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5–13–58) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958–1960, vol. 11 (1992), pp. 60–62.


14. Msg, Beirut 358 to SecState, 14 Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5–13–58) sec. 3. Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, arguing that Lebanese Moslems were being helped by Syria, which had received arms from the Soviet Union. However, no US spokesman described the US intervention that followed as an action taken pursuant to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Rather, President Eisenhower several times cited the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.


21. Late on the morning of 16 July, the Ambassador and the Admiral personally led a Marine column through a Lebanese Army roadblock of tanks and recoilless rifles. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 1606442 Jul 58, TS; same file. 

22. This was probably just as well because, prior to 14 July, President Chamoun had been advised that the United States would object strongly to participation by French forces in any intervention. Lebanese Moslems sympathized with their fellow Moslems in Algeria who were rebelling against French rule. Msg, SecState 4390 to Beirut, 18 May 58, TS; Msgs, Beirut 4773 and 4774 to SecState, 16 Jun 58, TS. 


25. Msg, JCS 944826 to USCINCEUR, 1523392 Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. 


27. See Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (1964), chap. 27. 


30. More assessments may be found in JCS 2295/3, 9 Feb 59, U; JMF 3203 (6 Feb 59) and JCS 2295/5, 3 Apr 59, U; JMF 3203 (14 Apr 59). 

31. JCS 2293/1, 23 Oct 58, U; SM-833-59 to CSA et al., 25 Aug 59, JCS 1968/50, U; JMF 3180 (20 Apr 59) sec. 1.
employ three Marine BLTs, the number actually landed during the intervention, rather than the two listed in OPLAN 215-58.


36. SM-365-58 to CINCNELM, 1 Oct 58, JCS 1887/485, TS; CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 7.

37. Msg, JCS 946999 to CINCSCP, 23 Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 8.

38. JCS 1887/494, 2 Sep 58, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 8. CINCNELM Annual Historical Report: 1959, TS.


40. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS, 3 Feb 60, JCS 1259/500, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 28. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Apr 56, JCS 1887/197, TS, same file, sec. 35.

41. JCS 1987/42, 14 May 57, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 58.

42. JCS 1887/470, 18 Jul 58, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec. 71. JCS 2273/47, 21 Jan 58, TS, CCS 381 (8–14–47) sec. 8.


44. NSC 5820/l, 4 Nov 58, CCS 381 (8–23–57) BP pt. 3.


46. JCS 2273/6, 23 Ott 57, TS, CCS 381 (8–14–57) sec. 5. JCS 2273/44, 3 Dec 57, TS, same file, sec. 7.


50. Mem, USEPB to OSD and JCS, 11 Jun 58, DA IN 123873, CCS 381 (8–14–57) sec. 8.


52. N/H of JCS 2273/105, 6 Jun 58, TS, CCS 381 (8–14–57) sec. 12. JCS 1887/454, 6 May 58, TS, CCS 81 (8–14–57) sec. 13. JCS 2273/72, 1 May 58, TS, same file, sec. 11.


55. NSC 5820/l, 1 Nov 58, JCS 1887/511, TS, CCS 381 (8–23–57) sec. 11 and BP; CM-229–58 to JCS, 18 Nov 58, JCS 2273/100, TS, CCS 381 (8–14–57) sec. 16.

56. CM-253–58 to SecDef, 23 Dec 58, JCS 2273/105, S; N/H of JCS 2273/105, 9 Jan 59, S; CCS 381 (8–14–57) sec. 17.

57. JCSM–20–59 to SecDef, 15 Jan 59, JCS 2273/113, TS, JMF 9070 (15 Jan 59).
Chapter 12. Cuba Becomes a Communist State

6. JCS 1976/251, 10 Jul 58, U, Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Cuba,” 11 Jul 58, JCS 1976/251, U, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3–22–48) sec. 38. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958–1960, vol. 6, pp. 140, 145. On 12 July, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, concluded that failure to win the hostages’ release was “unspectacularly but seriously eroding our national prestige not only in Latin America but also in other areas of the world.” Ibid., p. 148.
8. According to documents cited in Foreign Relations: 1958–1960, vol. 6, pp. 249–250, the November election occurred in an atmosphere of intimidation created by both Batista and Castro and only a small part of the electorate went to the polls.
12. “Should Castro fall or be assassinated,” according to the study, “mob action . . . would probably . . . jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba.”
15. Foreign Relations: 1958–1960, vol. 6, pp. 832–845. On 22 March, a new NIE dated 22 March concluded that Castro and his government were not, and would not soon become, “demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement.” Ibid., p. 871. N/H of JCS 2304/2, 23 Mar 60, U, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Feb 60).
17. Ibid., pp. 979–982, 996.
18. Foreign Relations: 1958–1960, vol. 6, pp. 1074, 1076–77. JCSM–442–60 to SecDef, 29 Sep 60, JCS 2304/9, U, JMF 9123/9420 (22 Sep 60). The Guantanamo base agreement of 1903 had been amended and reaffirmed through a 1934 treaty which stipulated that changes could be made only by mutual consent. Thus, in effect, the United States held a lease in perpetuity.
Chapter 13. The Cold War Comes to Africa


2. NSC Action No. 2219(b), 14 Apr 60, U. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 12 Jul 60, JCS 2262/24, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1. Entries for 8, 9, and 12 Jul 60, U, Joint War Room Congo Log. JWR Sitreps 2-60, 17 Jul 60; 3-60, 18 Jul 60; 4-60, 19 Jul 60; 5-60, 21 Jul 60; 6-60, 22 Jul 60; 7-60, 25 Jul 1960.
Notes to Pages 190–197

60; 11–60, 26 Jul 60; JMF 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60) sec. 1. The pork content of “C” rations would make them unsuitable for Moslem troops, but USCINCEUR protested that removal would require 35,000 man-hours. Because of pressing need, the UNEF decided to separate pork contents after delivery. Msg, JCS 980155 to CSAF, 16 Jul 60, U; Memo, Dir, J-3 to DJJS, “EUCOM Air Lift Status,” 19 Jul 60, U; Note by SCS, “Decision on Deployment of C-124 Aircraft,” 19 Jul 60, U; JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1.


23. DOS Bulletin, 8 Aug 60, pp. 221–223. On 21 July, to speed the Belgian exodus, Ambassador Timberlake and the USCINCEUR representative in the Congo agreed that US aircraft would move troops to the port of Kitona. The J-3 Battle Staff postponed any movement, citing lack of authorization for intra-Congo troop airlifts. State granted such authority next morning, but by then US representatives had worked out an arrangement with Belgium’s Sabena Airlines. Entries for 21 (1025, 1255, 1310, 1645, 1935, and 2045) and 22 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log. JWR Sitrep 860, 23 Jul 60, U, JMF 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60) sec. 1.


25. The fleet consisted of forty-seven C-130s and sixty-eight C-124s, and included EUCOM’s entire complement of C-130s. Entry for 8 Aug 60 (1417), JWR Congo Log.


Chapter 14. The Far East: Holding the Line

2. JSCP 56–58, 21 Dec 56, JCS 1844/210, TS, CCS 381 (11–29–49) BP pt. 16D. The tasks assigned to CINCPAC included most of those formerly allotted to the Commander in Chief, Far East, a post that was disestablished on 1 July 1957.


19. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Jan 58, JCS 1776/571, U; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec. 12.


22. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Jan 58, JCS 1776/571, U; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec. 12.

23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Jan 58, JCS 1776/571, U; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2) sec. 12.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 13 Jun 57, JCS 2180/97, U; CCS 383.21 Korea (3–12–50) sec. 23.

25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Jun 57, JCS 2180/97, U, same file, sec. 23A. The JCS maintained that allowing...
former residents to return to the Bonin Islands would "largely negate" their potential usefulness. *Foreign Relations: 1955-1957*, vol. 23, p. 376.


31. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 10 Sep 58, JCS 2180/127, U; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to As&ee&ate, 24 Sep 58, S; CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 28. *Foreign Relations: 1955-1957*, vol. 3, pp. 611-623. For a list of Nationalist offensive actions that did and did not require US endorsement, see ibid., pp. 645-648.


33. NSC Actions No. 2072, 30 Apr 59, and 2219, 15 Apr 60, TS; NSC 6008, 20 May 60, TS; NSC 6008/1, 11 Jun 60, TS; JCSM-226-60 to SecDef, 27 May 60, JCS 2180/149, C; 1st N/H of JCS 2180/150, 28 Jun 60, S; JMF 9143/910B (20 May 61).


38. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 0219472 Aug 58, S; Msg, State 81 to Taipei, 2 Aug 58, S; CCS 381 Formosa (11-9-48) sec. 37.


40. Msg, Taipei 212 to SecState, 23 Aug 58, TS; Msg, JCS 947007 to CINCPAC, 24 Aug 58, TS; Msg, JCS 247006 to CINCAL et al., 24 Aug 58, TS; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 37.
48. The “principal” offshore islands were defined as Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the five larger islands of the Matsu group. Msg, SecState 138 to Taipei, 25 Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11 & 848) sec. 37.

49. Msg, JCS 947046 to CINCPAC and COMTAIMANDEFCOM, 25 Aug 58, TS; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 26 Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 37. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 295, 691-693. The JCS also advised CINCPAC that augmentations to the Military Assistance Program authorized on 22 August would be implemented immediately. Overall, the value of grant military assistance deliveries rose from $162.2 million in FY 1958 to $239.5 million in FY 1959, then fell back to $139.9 million in FY 1960. Rpt by House Foreign Affairs Com, US Overseas Loans and Grants: July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1960, p. 61.


51. “Memo of Conf with the President, August 29, 1958, 9:00 AM” by BG Goodpaster, 29 Aug 58, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Aug 58-Staff Notes (1), U, Eisenhower Library. Msg, JCS 947298 to CINCPAC and COMTAIMANDEFCOM, 29 Aug 58, TS, CSAM-258-58 to JCS, 3 Sep 58, TS; CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 38. On 5 September, CINCPAC submitted a plan for phased conventional defense against limited aggression. The JCS approved it five days later. SM-647-58 to CINCPAC, 10 Sep 58, TS; CCS 381 (11&848) sec. 7. This was Annex H to CINCPAC OPLAN 25-58, 16 May 58, TS, same file, BP, pt. 7.


53. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 6 Sep 58, JCS 2118/10, U, CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 38A. Note to Control Div, “Attached Memorandum… Taiwan Straits Situation,” 2 Sep 58, CJCS File 901 China. NY Times, 7 Sep 58, p. 3.

54. “Memo of Conference with the President, September 6, 1958—1:30 Luncheon at the Mansion” by BG Goodpaster, 8 Sep 58, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes-Sep 58, Eisenhower Library. CM-169 58 to SecState, 8 Sep 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 38A. SM 177 58 to JCS, 15 Sep 58, same file, sec. 39.

55. “Memo of Conference with the President, September 11, 1958—3:15 PM” by BG Goodpaster, 15 Sep 58, U, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes-Sep 58, Eisenhower Library. CM-169 58 to SecState, 8 Sep 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 38A. SM 177 58 to JCS, 15 Sep 58, same file, sec. 39.

56. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 11245Z Sep 58, TS; Msg, JCS 94731 to COMNAVPHIL for CINCPAC, 12 Sep 58, TS; CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 39. Concurrently, Gen. Twining stated his feeling that “the real danger is that the GRC will start some sort of adventure on its own which will have the effect of drawing the US in.” Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 19, p. 197.


58. NY Times, 6 Ott 58, p. 1. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 060435Z Ott 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11&848) sec. 40.

59. “Memo of Conference with the President, October 13, 1958, 8:30 AM” by BG Goodpaster, 15 Ott 58, U, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes—Oct 58, Eisenhower Library.


Chapter 15. The Far East: Fissures in Containment


5. See, for example, Memo, JCS to SecDef, 16 Nov 56, JCS 1992/5/6, U, CCS 092 Asia (6-25&848) sec. 27A.
13. JCS 1992/691, 2 Feb 59, TS; Msg JCS 394064 to CINCPAC, 27 Feb 59, U; JMF 3120 (26 Jan 59).
14. JSCP–61, 21 Apr 60, JCS 1944/273, TS, JMF 3120 (21 Apr 60).
17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 8 Apr 58, JCS 1992/651, TS; CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec. 38.
22. Lit CINCPAC to JCS, 7 May 60, JCS 1992/802, U; Msg JCS 977269 to CINCPAC, 16 May 60, JCS 1992/805, U; JMF 9060/3100 (26 Aug 59).
24. JCS 1992/860, 2 Nov 60, U, JMF 9060/3100 (2 Nov 60). Msg, Bangkok 1240 to SecState, 13 Jan 61, S.
26. Msgs, Bangkok 1287 and 1288 to SecState, 23 Jan 61, C. Msgs, Bangkok 1439 and 1440, 14 Feb 61, S.
27. Msgs, Bangkok to State, SECTOs 17, 25, and 29, dated 27, 28, and 30 Mar 61, S. Msg, SecState Circular 1489, 29 Mar 61, C.
28. Msgs, Bangkok 1925 and 1956, 27 and 28 April 61, S.
29. Msg, Bangkok 1984 to SecState, 5 May 61, S. Msg, Bangkok 1994 to SecState, 8 May 61, S.

Chapter 16. Conclusion

3. “Remarks by the CJCS at the AFPC Meeting Week of 29 August 1960,” Box 6, AFPC Folder, OASD (Comptroller) File. The meeting took place on 2 September.
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