History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy

1965–1968
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Session, March 1968. *Left to right:* Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army; General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, United States Marine Corps.
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Walter S. Poole

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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of US forces in wartime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the conflict and, as military advisers and planners, have played an important part in the development of national policy and strategy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime as well as times of crisis and limited war provides, moreover, an important chapter in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Volume IX describes activities of the Joint Chiefs during the period 1965-1968, except for activities relating to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. Between 1978 and 1982, Walter S. Poole prepared the manuscript that was published in classified form. He reworked that manuscript during 2009–2010 to prepare it for open publication. By that time, a large amount of new and unclassified material had become available, requiring revision and expansion in every chapter. The passage of decades also provided better perspectives upon events, which are reflected in the text.

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

JOHN F. SHORTAL
Director for Joint History
Preface

This volume covers an unhappy period in US as well as JCS history. As the Vietnam War turned into a bloody stalemate, the strategy of “close-in” containment for the Far East proved to be unbearably costly. After the Six Day War of 1967, the Middle East became increasingly polarized between East and West. NATO had to cope with France’s secession from the integrated command. Across a broad range of issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves at odds with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. They wanted to escalate sharply the air campaign against North Vietnam, preserve superiority in strategic nuclear capability, and restore a US-based reserve of conventional units being drained by Vietnam’s demands. Many times, their recommendations were rejected by President Lyndon B. Johnson who accepted instead those of Secretary McNamara. Indeed, the sidelining of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emerges as the dominant theme of this volume.

The author owes important debts to a number of individuals. Reviews by Robert J. Watson and Kenneth W. Condit, senior historians in what was then the Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, considerably improved the original drafts. Research in JCS files, constituting the core of the volume, was assisted immeasurably by members of what was then the Records Management and Research Branch within the Joint Secretariat. David Humphrey made the author’s visit to the Lyndon B. Johnson Library a rewarding experience. Neal Petersen in the State Department and Henry Schorreck of the National Security Agency made very useful studies available. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, who was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, during these years, read chapters 6 and 7. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., read the portion of chapter 9 dealing with the Dominican intervention. Both officers provided worthwhile insights. As the original manuscript was being revised and updated in 2009-2010, Dr. Steven Rearden and Dr. Edward Drea in the Joint History Office reviewed the chapters and suggested further improvements. In no sense, however, did any of these individuals approve what they had read. The author alone bears responsibility for the entire volume.

Walter S. Poole
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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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1965–1968
Overview: Vietnam’s Impact

The Vietnam War dominated and ultimately consumed Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency. In March 1964, President Johnson set the objective of preserving an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. But as 1965 opened, communist forces—Vie Cong guerrillas supported by North Vietnamese soldiers—were close to victory. During March, the United States started a systematic bombing campaign against the North and began committing large ground forces in the South. Defeat was averted, but steady escalation followed as the communists persevered. By 1968, there were 549,500 US military personnel in South Vietnam.

The commitment in Southeast Asia drained resources when challenges loomed on other fronts. Despite transfers of experienced personnel to Vietnam and serious balance-of-payments deficits, a credible US military presence had to be maintained in Western Europe. Moreover, Allied Command Europe faced massive problems when France withdrew from the integrated command. In the Dominican Republic, perceived danger of a communist takeover triggered US intervention in early 1965. In the Middle East, mounting Arab-Israeli tensions led to the Six Day War in June 1967. Growing tensions on the Korean peninsula, partly a spillover from the Vietnam War, culminated in January 1968 with North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), these became years of frustration and frequent disappointment. They were, by law, the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Increasingly, however, they found themselves marginalized during decisionmaking about strategy, budgets, and force levels. Cost effectiveness, a standard applied by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his systems analysts, often conflicted with judgments derived from military experience. The Joint Chiefs’ disputes with civilian leaders became most acute over waging the Vietnam War, but major differences developed over a range of other issues.

The Joint Chiefs’ participation in the Vietnam War differed substantially from the JCS role in the Korean War. During 1950–1953, unlike Vietnam, the service chiefs
JCS and National Policy, 1965–1968

(and by extension the JCS) were still part of the chain of command. The Chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, had commanded a corps, an army, and an army group during World War II. The Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, acted as the Joint Chiefs’ Executive Agent for the Far East Command. Collins had commanded a division on Guadalcanal and a corps in Western Europe. He visited Korea at crucial moments, and each time he brought back an accurate appraisal of the battlefield situation. The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the chain of command and gave unified and specified commanders greater operational control over the forces assigned them. Generals Earle G. Wheeler and Harold K. Johnson lacked some of the statutory authority vested in the Korea-era chiefs, as well as their predecessors’ depth of operational experience, but their ability to influence Vietnam matters suffered most because they confronted a strong Secretary of Defense.

By 1967, “hawks” in Congress had grown deeply dissatisfied with what they saw as Secretary McNamara’s disregard of military advice. On 28 April Representative Mendel Rivers (D, SC), Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, introduced a bill lengthening the terms of Service Chiefs from two years to four, paralleling existing law for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Chairman’s term would remain at two years, renewable. Only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress after 31 December 1968 could a Chief or Commandant be reappointed. Reporting favorably, Rivers’ Committee stated that “the sole objective . . . is to permit members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Congress, as well as the President and the Secretary of Defense, freely in defense matters.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance countered that this legislation would “restrict the President’s flexibility in choosing military advisers and could confront him with the alternative of losing a significant part of the military counsel provided by law or of subjecting distinguished military officers to the stigma of dismissal.” Nonetheless, the bill passed Congress and President Johnson signed it into law on 5 June.3

A Joint Staff, limited by law to 400 officers, supported the Chiefs. Its directorates were J–1 (Personnel), J–3 (Operations), J–4 (Logistics), J–5 (Plans and Policy), and J–6 (Communications). Since 400 were not nearly enough, new agencies were added to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), a usage that evolved to encompass the entire structure supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By mid-1968, the OJCS numbered 1,438 military and 486 civilian personnel.4

Reputations Tarnish

Few Presidents, perhaps, have stood as high in popular esteem as did Lyndon Johnson on 20 January 1965. His work as Senate Majority Leader had marked him as an achiever and conciliator; his success in assuring a smooth transition after John F. Kennedy’s assassination and in securing passage of landmark social legislation reinforced
that reputation. His electoral victory in November 1964 was overwhelming; his party comfortably controlled both houses of Congress.

Very soon, though, President Johnson found himself torn between what he wanted to do at home and what he felt compelled to do abroad. Building a “Great Society” was his chief ambition, but he was determined not to be the first President to lose a war. Trying to deliver guns and butter, President Johnson fell short on both. The hopes he raised for social uplift were fulfilled only in part, while the limits he put upon mobilizing, funding and prosecuting the war in Southeast Asia helped bring about a stalemate at ever higher cost in lives and treasure. By 1967, President Johnson was under fire from “doves” on the left who had turned against the Vietnam War and “hawks” on the right who claimed that stronger action could bring success.

During the early 1960s, Robert S. McNamara built an enviable reputation as the first Secretary of Defense who truly understood and controlled the Defense Department. He also became pre-eminent among the President’s advisers, overshadowing Secretary of State Dean Rusk. McNamara’s years as wartime Secretary were much less successful. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a swift, hard blow by bombing key targets in North Vietnam. Instead, Secretary McNamara abetted the President’s pursuit of a strategy of graduated pressure. The air campaign, code-named Rolling Thunder, was developed to make the North stop aiding the Viet Cong while minimizing any risk of Chinese intervention. Moreover, Rolling Thunder, as civilians shaped it, failed to shake Hanoi’s determination to persevere. Secretary McNamara’s intrusions into operational matters, particularly selecting the targets for air strikes, galled military men. The Secretary soon lost confidence in a military solution and finally on 1 November 1967 urged President Johnson to stop bombing the North and negotiate a power-sharing solution for the South. Three weeks later, the President announced that Secretary McNamara soon would leave the Pentagon to become president of the World Bank.5

McNamara’s last weeks as Secretary proved traumatic. The administration claimed that its search-and-destroy operations in South Vietnam were making slow but steady progress. Yet on 30 January 1968, as the Tet holiday started, the communists launched a country-wide offensive. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but Tet’s impact upon US public opinion was profound; many Americans could see no end to the war. On 29 February, in a ceremony marred by mishaps but charged with emotion, McNamara left the Pentagon.6 President Johnson now faced strong opposition in the presidential primaries from anti-war Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy. On 31 March, the President restricted the bombing of North Vietnam and announced that he would not seek re-election. Clark M. Clifford, McNamara’s successor, had been Counsel to President Truman and enjoyed a long acquaintance with President Johnson. Secretary Clifford sided with the “doves” in Vietnam debates.7 President Johnson halted bombing of the North completely on 31 October, but his hopes for a negotiated settlement went unfulfilled.

The beginning of 1965, which saw US conventional combat forces enter the Vietnam War, marked something of a milestone in the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 1 February, General John P. McConnell succeeded General Curtis E. LeMay as
Chief of Staff, US Air Force. *Time* magazine recorded the significance of the occasion: “Omar Bradley, Matt Ridgway, and Max Taylor, Nate Twining and Curt LeMay, Arthur Radford and Arleigh Burke—the very names still conjure up images of flaming cannon, of contrails across enemy skies, of destroyers heading into battle at flank speed. It detracts nothing from their successors to say that the names of ‘Bus’ Wheeler, ‘Johnny’ Johnson, ‘Dave’ McDonald, ‘J. P.’ McConnell, and ‘Wally’ Greene are hardly household words.” *Time* observed that Secretary McNamara wanted “planners and thinkers, not heroes . . . team men, not gladiators.”

The Chairman, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, perfectly exemplified *Time*’s description. His combat experience consisted of five months as Chief of Staff, 63rd Infantry Division, in the European Theater during 1944–45. He made a very good impression as Director, Joint Staff, during 1960–62, opening the way to appointment as Army Chief of Staff on 1 October 1962 and as Chairman on 3 July 1964. From the Joint Chiefs’ standpoint, by this time Secretary McNamara and his analysts were intruding ever more frequently into their domain. Wheeler tried to discourage this trend by having the Chiefs present the Secretary with a united front. In this, he had notable success. The number of split JCS recommendations fell from forty in 1965 to seven in 1966 and six in 1967—yet civilian intrusions increased. In 1966, General Wheeler was reappointed Chairman. In the summer of 1967, he suffered a heart attack and suggested to superiors that he take medical retirement. “I can’t afford to lose you,” the President replied. “You have never given me a piece of bad advice.” Since President Johnson had rejected a good deal of his advice about waging the Vietnam War, General Wheeler likely took these words as an expression of sympathy rather than literal truth. On 19 January 1968, Secretary McNamara urged the President to extend Wheeler’s service through mid-1969. President Johnson approved and General Wheeler agreed, evidently impelled by his sense of a soldier’s duty.

The Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, had survived the Bataan Death March and three hard years in Japanese POW camps. Many fellow officers would remark upon the strong religious conviction that emerged from his ordeal. Johnson served successfully as a battalion and regimental commander in the Korean War; he then progressed rapidly through command and staff positions. In June 1964, at the time of his appointment, he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations with three-star rank and 44th in seniority. Among those senior to him was General William C. Westmoreland, who served as Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from January 1964 until June 1968. General Johnson would visit South Vietnam nine times during his tenure, and on several occasions voiced reservations about General Westmoreland’s insight and ability. Yet General Johnson never directly challenged General Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition through search-and-destroy operations. General Wheeler also made periodic visits, and regularly accepted the assessments of field commanders.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral David L. McDonald, was an aviator who in 1963 commanded the Sixth Fleet and had just become Commander in Chief, US Naval
Forces, Europe, when Secretary McNamara unexpectedly offered him the CNO's billet. Admiral McDonald had never aspired to the position and preferred to work on Navy issues. “I couldn't get too interested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff," he said years later. “I didn't see they were really doing very much.” Increasingly, like his colleagues, Admiral McDonald resented the intrusions of Secretary McNamara and his “whiz kids.”

The Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. McConnell, had been in combat briefly as a fighter pilot during World War II before near-sightedness switched him to a staff assignment. He later served as Vice Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, and Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command. In 1964, President Johnson interviewed General McConnell and then selected him to be Vice Chief of Staff, on the understanding that he soon would succeed General LeMay. General McConnell got a dose of the “Johnson treatment” when he was invited to the LBJ Ranch and served breakfast in bed by the Commander in Chief. That may have been General McConnell’s most pleasant moment. Later, disputes with civilian leaders about the conduct of Rolling Thunder left him professionally frustrated and personally troubled.

On 1 August 1967, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer became Chief of Naval Operations. An aviator like his two predecessors, Admiral Moorer had the unique background of having commanded both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. He devoted more time to JCS duties than Admiral McDonald and would succeed General Wheeler as Chairman in 1970. Admiral Moorer’s dealings with Secretary McNamara, however, were relatively brief.

General Wallace M. Greene served as Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1 January 1964 until 31 December 1967. Early on, he sensed that the war was being mishandled. Determined that the military would not bear blame for failure, General Greene kept a daily record focusing upon what he deemed civilian mismanagement of the war. In August 1967, as General Greene’s tour neared an end, he and a majority of Marine generals recommended General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., as successor. Originally an artilleryman, General Chapman had served at Headquarters, Marine Corps, since 1961, rising to be Assistant Commandant. However, General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara proposed Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, who had worked in the JCS Organization as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities and currently commanded the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. In mid-December, the President selected General Chapman.

General Johnson was offered a one-year extension. Convinced that he would accomplish nothing useful by staying, he elected to retire. On 22 March 1968, the President announced that General Westmoreland would become Chief of Staff on 2 July. General Westmoreland’s reputation was clouded by charges that the Tet offensive’s scope and timing had taken him by surprise, and that his search-and-destroy campaigns had resulted only in stalemate at ever-higher troop levels. Some observers viewed his appointment as compensation for loyal service rather than a reward for superior performance. General Wheeler respected him but some other Joint Chiefs, Admiral Moorer particularly, came to less favorable views.
In its approach to formulating and executing national security policy, the Johnson administration fell midway between the highly structured organization used by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the informal, ad hoc methods favored by President John F. Kennedy. The National Security Council met, but its purpose usually was to ratify decisions worked out in other forums. President Kennedy had done away with statements of Basic National Security Policy, and President Johnson did not reestablish them. What might have taken their place were National Policy Papers (NPPs) prepared by interdepartmental working groups under State Department leadership, then circulated for interagency comment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could recommend changes, but of course OSD made the final decisions about what criticisms to send State. As finally approved by Secretary Rusk, NPPs were supposed to provide comprehensive and authoritative statements of policy and lines of action towards countries and, in some cases, regions. In practice, however, NPPs were usually treated as reference documents and made little impact upon decisionmaking.

Early in 1964, President Johnson began “Tuesday Lunch” sessions with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy. These occurred fairly regularly throughout 1964, rather erratically during 1965 and 1966, then nearly every Tuesday from January 1967 until January 1969. Secretary McNamara briefed General Wheeler on the outcomes but not the discussions. McGeorge Bundy resigned in February 1966; Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, succeeded him. Dr. Rostow would check on Monday with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara about what issues merited discussion, then he would prepare an agenda for that evening. From October 1967 onward, General Wheeler and the Director of Central Intelligence became regular attendees. In Dr. Rostow’s view, eating the President’s food in his home encouraged collegiality and candor. According to Clark Clifford, however, the Lunches became “a legend and a bit of a nightmare.” Although a White House note-taker usually attended, Clifford remembered frequent disagreements and misunderstandings when the participants’ senior staff set about reconstructing exactly what had been decided.

There was a recognized need to improve interagency coordination. General Maxwell Taylor, USA (Ret.), a former Chief of Staff and Chairman, drafted an initiative and achieved consensus. On 2 March 1966, President Johnson created a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State. Members included General Wheeler, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The SIG was supported by five Interdepartmental Regional Groups, each headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. Unfortunately, the SIG fell short of expectations, meeting only three times in the last six months of 1966 and twice during the first five months of 1967. It devolved into handling those issues for which top officials had no time, such as aircraft sales to Latin America. In May 1967, General Taylor warned the President that “whatever vitality the
new system had at the outset is apparently in decline.” But President Johnson took no further action. In October, a Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization recommended elevating the Secretary of State into “a Presidential leader and coordinator . . . who can both advise and act for him across the whole range of his international responsibilities.” Although that recommendation was endorsed by Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, among others, nothing tangible came of it.19

Within the Defense Department, relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary grew strained and distant. In autumn 1965, General Wheeler initiated regular Monday sessions with Secretary McNamara. By mid-1967, however, these had become infrequent and rather pro forma. As for the Joint Chiefs collectively, Admiral McDonald recalled that “instead of saying ‘less frequently’ I’d say [McNamara] spent less time with us. Sometimes it seemed that he came down because he was just supposed to show his face.”20

Ultimately, in decisionmaking, personal influence counted more than any organizational arrangements. Secretary McNamara remained the President’s most trusted adviser until well into 1967, when he changed course over Vietnam. After Tet, and with Secretary McNamara gone, the process of policymaking and Vietnam policy itself seemed to lose coherence. During a JCS meeting in April 1968, after Rolling Thunder had been curtailed, General Chapman cited the objective of an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. That was our objective in 1964, General Wheeler replied, but it is not our objective now. Wheeler could not define the administration’s current objective, however. The rest of 1968 witnessed numerous White House meetings about Vietnam, in which the President often leaned toward Secretary Clifford’s dovish views but occasionally sympathized with General Wheeler’s hawkish stance. The decisions that resulted could be likened to half-lunges, halting the bombing of North Vietnam without ensuring that productive peace negotiations would follow.21

The PPBS under Stress

During the early 1960s, Robert McNamara accomplished what some termed a management revolution. He promulgated a planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) that was designed to integrate strategy, force plans, and budgets. The PPBS formed the basis of a Five-Year Defense Program. It also served to centralize detailed decisionmaking about policies and force levels in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The JCS were tasked by law with preparing plans and providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces. Their Joint Strategic Planning System contained three major elements: a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that addressed the forthcoming fiscal year; a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) dealing with the mid-range period; and a Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the JSOP as their main contribution to the PPBS. Broadly, the JSOP provided information and guidance for the services and combatant
commanders pertaining to the mid-range period, intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities, recommendations about allied force objectives, and advice to the Secretary for shaping the budget. JSOP-70 consisted of six parts covering the period between 1 July 1966 and 30 June 1974 (i.e., FYs 1967–74). Parts I–V consisted of a statement of purpose, a strategic appraisal, an outline of military objectives, a strategic concept, and an allocation of basic undertakings among the unified and specified commands. After approving all these in August 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began drafting the crucial and much more contentious Part VI which provided force-level recommendations.

A JSCP translated national policies and goals into near-term military objectives, concepts, and tasks that were commensurate with actual capabilities. Also, it constituted a directive to unified and specified commanders outlining their conduct of operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a JSCP annually, around the end of the calendar year. Thus JSCP-66, approved in December 1964, covered FY 1966 which then was the period between 1 July 1965 and 30 June 1966. Unlike the JSOP, this Plan did not go to the Secretary of Defense. In 1967, action-level planners proposed breaking precedent by sending JSCP-69 to Secretary McNamara. The three-star Operations Deputies decided against doing so, on grounds that OSD had never asked for a JSCP and they saw “no point in gratuitously providing a document when this would result in no foreseeable benefit to either the OSD or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and could very well open a new area of problems.”

A JLRSS forecast future uses of military power and supplied very broad guidance for the preparation of specific policies, plans, and programs. JLRSS-76, approved by the Chiefs in 1965, applied to FYs 1976–1979; JLRSS 77-86 extended to FYs 1977–1986; JLRSS 79-88 covered FYs 1979–1988. But the Studies suffered from a defect inherent in long-range forecasting: vagueness. JLRSS 77-86, for example, predicted that the world's salient features would be: a diffusion of current alliances and ideological groupings; serious population pressures; volatile socio-economic conditions; nuclear proliferation; constraints on the direct, unilateral use of force by major powers; and advanced military technology. How useful were these Studies for planning and programming? Their impact seems to have been slight.

Secretary McNamara planned that a tentative Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) would be distributed to the JCS and the Military Departments in June 1965. The DPMs, running between twenty and forty single-spaced pages each, were laden with cost-effectiveness comparisons of alternative force structures. Growing in number from two in 1961 to sixteen by 1968, they became the centerpiece of Secretary McNamara's PPBS. The ones dealing with force-planning issues were drafted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis), the ones treating regional issues like Western Europe or Asia by the Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs). After reviews by and discussions with the JCS and the Services, final DPMs were supposed to be issued by 30 September.

Instead, the escalating war in Southeast Asia rendered JSOP-70’s appraisals and recommendations obsolete and threw OSD’s budget estimates askew. In January 1965,
Secretary McNamara presented Congress with a request for $48.6 billion in new obligation authority during FY 1966. Six months later, President Johnson announced that US troop levels in South Vietnam would rise from 75,000 to 125,000. The Services priced the cost of this buildup at $12.3 billion; Secretary McNamara advised the President that this figure was high. In a crucial decision, President Johnson rejected recommendations from Secretary McNamara and the JCS to mobilize reserves, raising monthly draft calls instead. He also rejected Secretary McNamara’s advice to ask for a tax increase. By the year’s end, the budget estimates were rendered completely obsolete as Secretary McNamara approved accelerated deployments that increased the buildup to 330,000 troops in Vietnam during 1966.

Amid this rapidly changing environment, the Joint Chiefs looked for ways to make their JSOP more responsive and influential. In July 1965, they approved Parts I–V of JSOP-71. Normally, those were not sent to the Secretary until Part VI had been completed, which in this case would have meant March or April 1966. Instead, in December 1965, Admiral McDonald proposed forwarding Parts I–V immediately and drafting a concise version of Parts I–V, following the style of Secretary McNamara’s DPMs. General McConnell disagreed. Parts I–V, he argued, were meaningful only insofar as they could be related to the force goals presented in Part VI. Therefore, instead of forwarding Parts I–V, the JCS should urge Secretary McNamara to prepare a broad-gauged DPM defining national security objectives. That paper, in turn, could serve as a starting-point for the next series of DPMs.

On 10 January 1966, after further exchanges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that the JSOP was being changed in several ways. First, it would focus on the upcoming budget year and assess goals and risks out to eight years thereafter. JSOP-71, consequently, was renamed JSOP 68-75. Second, Parts I–V would be forwarded to OSD about 1 February and be accompanied by a brief synopsis or “Reader’s Digest” delineating worldwide objectives and strategic concepts. Third, their covering memo transmitting Parts I–V would identify, in broad terms, “tentative major decision issues involving force-level objectives.” They wanted Parts I–V, together with the Reader’s Digest, to become the “principal statement of national military objectives and strategic concepts.” Finally, the rationale supporting force objectives in Part VI would include cost considerations supplied by the Services, alternatives, risk assessments, and options relative to force objectives and major decision issues. But inter-service compromises kept diluting the statements of objectives and concepts, while additional Vietnam deployments left force-level objectives outdated.

In January 1966 President Johnson asked Congress for an FY 1966 supplemental of $12.3 billion, giving assurance that only $4.6 billion of it would be expended during FY 1966. President Johnson decided to repeat this approach for FY 1967, holding the initial budget request around $60 billion and seeking a supplemental later. Again, the tempo of combat operations and the troop buildup outran early projections so that a $12.2 billion supplemental for FY 1967 proved necessary.
Although the PPBS structure remained basically the same, these supplementals rendered it almost useless as an accounting tool, concealing the true cost of the war which by then was running around $22-23 billion annually. The Joint Strategic Planning System did not, and probably could not, adjust to repeated revisions and improvisations.28

A price paid for passage of the FY 1967 supplemental was Secretary McNamara’s promise to Congress that, barring unforeseen circumstances, there would be no such request for FY 1968. In January 1967, the administration asked for $75.5 billion in new obligation authority for FY 1968. In July 1967, Secretary McNamara recommended and President Johnson approved raising the troop level in South Vietnam to 525,000. Late in September, Congress appropriated $73.4 billion for FY 1968. Two months later, as preparation of the FY 1969 budget reached its final stage, Secretary McNamara told the JCS to eliminate or defer anything that did not directly contribute to the war. By separating the “Normal Budget” ($54–$57 billion) from “Southeast Asia” ($25 billion), he offered the President a range of spending options. The Joint Chiefs of Staff filed protests over Secretary McNamara’s decisions about 65 budget items. At a meeting on 4 December 1967, President Johnson told them to “take the lowest priority items and see what you can do to forego everything except the pay increase and the men and material necessary” for the war.29

On 27 January 1968, Secretary McNamara presented Congress with a proposal for $79.576 billion in new obligation authority for FY 1969, with expenditures estimated at $77.1 billion. OSD introduced the device of a “zero supplemental,” which involved shifting money among accounts without having to ask for additional appropriations. About $4.3 billion was reprogrammed, but emergencies—the Tet offensive and seizure of the Pueblo—rendered such devices inadequate. On the one hand, the administration had to request another $3.9 billion in new obligation authority for FY 1968 and, just before leaving office, seek another $3 billion for FY 1969. On the other hand, looming deficits made a tax increase unavoidable. To gain congressional support for a 10 percent income tax surcharge, the President had to accept a $3 billion cut in DOD expenditures for FY 1969. On 17 October, he signed legislation appropriating $71.8 billion for FY 1969. The verdict of the OSD history is that “Defense budgets proved as difficult to control as the South Vietnamese countryside.”30

The “Two-War” Strategy vs. Diminishing Resources

During the mid-1960s, the instruments for articulating national strategy were the DPMs, the JSOPs, and the JSCPs. As Vietnam commitments expanded, however, a gap grew between the requirements described in the DPMs and JSOPs and the resources listed in the JSCPs. Defending Western Europe might enjoy first priority in theory but in practice, as General Johnson observed years later, “you march toward the sound of the guns.”31
The Kennedy administration had expanded conventional forces to the point where they were deemed able to conduct two operations simultaneously. JSOP-70, drafted during the summer of 1964, defined this “two-war” capability as follows:

1. Defend Western Europe against a major assault long enough to force the Soviets to face the risks of escalation.
2. Conduct one major non-NATO operation while retaining the ability to accomplish (1) above. If hostilities erupted in Europe while this operation was underway, the non-NATO effort would be reduced as NATO requirements demanded. If US troops already were fighting in Europe, NATO’s needs would determine the conduct of the non-NATO contingency. Should Chinese or Soviet forces intervene massively in the non-NATO operation, escalation would be required.32

In January 1965, strategic requirements and capabilities appeared to be in balance. The deployable strategic reserve consisted of nine Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, and 48 tactical fighter squadrons.33 But by December 1965, with Vietnam commitments snowballing, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that they foresaw a loss, likely to last several years, in the United States’ ability to meet contingencies and commitments elsewhere.34 In particular deployments to Southeast Asia were being met mainly by drawing upon the Continental United States (CONUS) strategic reserve.

A widening gulf between strategy and resources quickly became evident in the area of logistics. The bombing campaign against North Vietnam soon depleted stocks of air munitions. Early in February 1966, Secretary McNamara told Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze he was worried that many of the unified commanders’ contingency plans no longer could be supported logistically. Paul Nitze relayed this to Admiral McDonald, who replied that he did not know whether work was being done to tailor those plans within current logistic capabilities. Admiral McDonald promptly advised General Wheeler that “we really should take a new look at many of our plans and adjust them to the situation which exists today; otherwise, many of them are quite meaningless.”35

Captain J. P. Weinel, USN, of the Chairman’s Staff Group warned General Wheeler that Vietnam deployments had created shortfalls not only in logistic support but also in units, equipment, personnel, and air and sealift. “The JCS,” Weinel continued, “must be able to translate each new commitment in Southeast Asia into terms that speak to our strategic concept, our worldwide commitments, risks, force levels, and tasks.” Until now, they had tended to assess these shortfalls as separate packages rather than a single entity. When they surveyed the cumulative effect, “I believe it will be a rather frightening picture.”36

General Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with preparing a spread sheet portraying US capabilities to carry out an assortment of contingency plans. The result, made under an assumption that no reserve mobilization would take place, was indeed “rather frightening.” Plans to defend Western Europe appeared infeasible because there would be significant shortfalls in all categories of ground and air reinforcements (e.g., three divisions, fifteen tactical fighter squadrons). Among the plans reviewed, only those for
Haiti and Bolivia, where the requirements were quite modest, continued to be feasible. OSD responded by raising worldwide inventory objectives for critical munitions, but substantial shortfalls remained in 1968.

As of 1 January 1966, there were 184,000 US troops in South Vietnam. The Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), wanted 200,000 more by the year’s end, and Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to examine ways of doing so without mobilizing reserves or extending terms of service. Replying in February, the Joint Chiefs defined the problem as meeting CINCPAC’s request while creating, in the following order of priority, programs that would: reconstitute an adequate strategic reserve and establish an adequate training and rotation base; meet CINCPAC’s non-Vietnam requirements; and maintain and/or restore the US military posture in Europe and the Atlantic. Secretary McNamara approved a JCS plan for deploying 200,000 more troops, but other elements of the problem remained unsolved. Essentially, Vietnam was being accorded priority at the expense of everything else.

Through JSCP-68, approved in December 1966 and applicable between 1 July 1967 and 30 June 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that meeting another emergency would require either mobilization and major allied contributions or curtailing operations in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the forces fighting in Vietnam could not be redeployed as rapidly as had been hoped. Thus an ability to fight two wars successfully, even with mobilization, struck them as questionable. JSCP-68’s strategic concept read as follows:

Without mobilization, continue the Vietnam War at current levels, maintain other deployments, conduct a Dominican-style intervention or stabilization operation, and provide a limited strategic reserve with marginal sustaining capability.

With mobilization, either conduct operations in Europe while fighting defensively in Southeast Asia or carry out a major non-NATO task (e.g., countering Chinese intervention) while maintaining NATO deployments.

But JSOP 69-76, approved by the Joint Chiefs in April 1967, spelled out somewhat more ambitious objectives:

Without mobilization, meet the initial requirements for defending Western Europe while successfully conducting one major operation elsewhere (e.g., Vietnam).

With mobilization, either fulfill the initial requirements for Europe while successfully opposing major Chinese aggression or maintain at least a holding action against Chinese aggression while successfully resisting a major assault in Europe. In addition, conduct specialized counterinsurgency operations or a stabilizing action, as in the Dominican Republic.

This amounted to a “2½-war” strategy, which several DPMs issued later that year also specified as the strategic requirement. By the Joint Chiefs’ calculation, an active force of 26 division-equivalents (ten for Europe, fourteen for the Far East, and two for
a strategic reserve) would provide “a reasonable degree of assurance that the essential elements of the strategic concept can be implemented without mobilization.”41 There were at that point 22 active divisions, 18 Army and four Marine, some of which would have required several months to reach combat readiness.

In July 1967, President Johnson authorized deployments that would raise the Vietnam commitment to 525,000. In August, through Volume I of JSOP 70-77, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted what General Johnson called “the most straight-forward and succinct expression on the subject that we have produced to date”:

Without mobilization, conduct one major contingency operation outside NATO, either nuclear or non-nuclear, directly involving neither Chinese nor Soviet forces, while maintaining the capability for an initial defense of Western Europe. With mobilization, either successfully defend against and terminate a major attack by the Warsaw Pact while conducting a holding action against major Chinese aggression, or successfully conduct and terminate operations against major Chinese aggression, not necessarily limited to one area, while providing forces for the initial defense of Western Europe.

General Johnson recommended holding a “philosophical” conversation on the subject with Secretary McNamara. Such a conversation did take place on 24 November 1967. The Joint Chiefs complained about the inconsistent strategic concepts set forth in various DPMs and proposed either that the JSOP become a common source of strategic guidance or that a separate DPM on worldwide strategy be drafted. Secretary McNamara agreed to study whether available forces could cope with two major, simultaneous contingencies.42

The answer came in January 1968, before any study was completed. On 23 January, off Wonsan harbor, North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo. On 30 January, in South Vietnam, communist forces launched a country-wide offensive. The strategic reserve was almost totally depleted. As of 5 February, according to the Joint Staff, deployable strategic reserves consisted of the 82nd Airborne Division, 1 1/3 Marine division/wing teams, and twelve tactical fighter squadrons, eight of which were second-line aircraft just activated to compensate for the aerial reinforcements that were being rushed to South Korea.43 Launching another war in Asia was simply out of the question.

On 4 December 1967, at the final budget session, President Johnson had cautioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “you must take into account not only what you say but the effects of what you say... We do want the understanding of the [Congressional] committees, but it does not strengthen our system to air our differences.”44 In mid-February 1968, with North Korea unyielding and Tet battles raging, General Wheeler gave Congressional testimony about the FY 1969 program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated that, although the overall force structure proposed for FY 1969 did not include all their recommendations, they were “in agreement that the program will improve the readiness and overall combat effectiveness of our forces.” That was a deliberately ambiguous construction. The JCS statement of December 1961, by contrast, had said that the proposed force structure would “provide powerful forces in a high state of
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readiness.” Representative George Mahon (D, TX), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told General Wheeler that “you do not come to grips with whether or not the budget . . . is reasonably adequate.” General Wheeler replied that it was “reasonably adequate.”

If the Chairman was hoping to quell outside criticism, his assessment actually helped to widen what had become a “credibility gap.” Two weeks later, after a visit to South Vietnam, General Wheeler presented President Johnson with a request for 206,000 more personnel. When that request became public knowledge, anti-war feeling received a large boost. If Tet was ending in a communist defeat, as the administration claimed, why were large reinforcements needed? After an intense month-long debate, President Johnson approved dispatching merely 24,500 more troops, capping the Vietnam commitment at 549,500. Only 22,767 reservists were mobilized.

On 10 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Clifford that “the strategic military options now available to the United States are seriously limited by the reduced combat readiness of military forces worldwide, other than those deployed to Southeast Asia, and by the limited size and reduced combat readiness of our present strategic reserve.” One device used to cover global requirements lay in giving double or even quadruple assignments to the same unit. The 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), slated for commitment to Allied Command Europe by M+30 days in case of war or emergency, was preparing one of its three brigades for service in Vietnam. One brigade of the 82nd Airborne had just been rushed to Vietnam. The 82nd also had been earmarked to reinforce European Command by M+30. Moreover, the 82nd was the sole division available for contingencies in the Western Hemisphere. Dealing with urban riots, such as those following the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, was a further contingency.

The early months of 1968 marked a low point, after which the size and readiness of the strategic reserve slowly improved. But the larger problem of squaring requirements with resources came no nearer to a solution. In May 1968, through a DPM on Asia Strategy and Force Structure, OSD argued that the strategy of “close-in” containment for Asia needed to be reconsidered. The communists could deploy in Southeast Asia larger forces than previously estimated, and China could achieve over time a capability to fight on several fronts simultaneously. Therefore, US policy should shift to stressing military assistance programs, placing maximum reliance on allied capabilities, and not being the first to resort to major escalation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff countered that such a strategy would substantially erode US strength and influence. The Military Assistance Program, they maintained, complemented US forces but could not substitute for them. The JCS noted that 10 2/3 US divisions were committed in South Vietnam even without Chinese intervention, yet OSD claimed that seven US divisions plus indigenous ones could hold Southeast Asia against a Chinese attack. They deemed the option for initiating escalation still necessary. When OSD issued a redraft with many of the same arguments, the Chiefs responded with a biting criticism. Decisive results could be achieved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted, when forces were used as the military wished. Conversely, long and costly wars of
attrition were virtually assured if we lacked adequate strength for swift commitment, unnecessarily restricted the way our forces fought, allowed enemy sanctuaries to exist, and forfeited the escalatory option.\footnote{47}

In December 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided President Johnson with a decidedly downbeat assessment of the budget and forces being proposed for FY 1970. The levels of strategic nuclear forces, compared with growing Soviet capabilities, “represent a declining trend in the US strategic position vis-à-vis the USSR. Additionally, we believe that the existing conventional capability of our general purpose forces provides only a limited choice of options at the present time outside Southeast Asia. It does not provide the capability to reinforce NATO adequately in a timely manner, nor of simultaneously providing a response to other than minor contingencies elsewhere.”\footnote{48} In other words, a two-war strategy was infeasible; the next administration would have to reassess the balance between requirements and capabilities.
Strategic Nuclear Forces: The End of US Superiority

During the mid-1960s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers was changing with the Soviet Union steadily gaining on the United States. In 1961, the Chiefs believed that the United States would emerge from a nuclear exchange with a clear advantage over the Soviet Union, no matter which side struck first. That advantage, in their opinion, deterred communist aggression at every level. Secretary McNamara, in 1963, described deterrence as the ability to accomplish “assured destruction” of the USSR, which he defined as the ability to absorb an attack and then retaliate by destroying 30 percent of the Soviet population, the 150 largest cities in the USSR, and 50 percent of Soviet industrial capacity. Between 1965 and 1968, as the Soviets pressed ahead with a huge buildup of long-range missiles, the Joint Chiefs argued for a very different definition of deterrence: “damage limitation,” requiring that the United States be able to emerge from a nuclear exchange in a stronger position than the USSR. They were unconvinced that the Soviets were creating both “assured destruction” and “damage limitation” capabilities, which ultimately would win the USSR strategic superiority and so create opportunities for nuclear blackmail.

Force Planning in 1965

As 1965 opened, US strategic nuclear forces still well exceeded those of the Soviet Union. The Strategic Air Command controlled 59 Titan II and 698 Minuteman I intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers in hardened underground silos as well as 626 heavy B–52, 391 medium B–47, and 94 B–58 supersonic bombers. By mid-year, the Navy’s Polaris force had grown to 29 fleet ballistic missile submarines, each with 16 launchers. Compared to Minuteman, Polaris had less range, reliability and
accuracy but higher survivability. In October 1965, a National Intelligence Estimate put the Soviet force at 224 ICBM launchers which were mostly unprotected, 120–140 SLBM tubes which were mostly short-range and surface-fired, and about 200 heavy bombers.2

Secretary McNamara planned to level off Minuteman at 1,000 launchers and Polaris at 656 tubes in 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines.3 Even before all these missiles could be deployed, however, qualitative improvements became imperative. When the Soviets put their ICBMs into hardened underground silos, as US intelligence expected them to start doing in the late 1960s, Minuteman would need greater yield and accuracy to remain a counterforce weapon. Minuteman II, first flight tested in September 1964, would meet these requirements and have a capacity to be launched against any of eight pre-programmed targets.4 What could defeat both Polaris and Minuteman I or II, at least theoretically, were anti-ballistic missile systems which the Soviets had begun building around Moscow and Leningrad. The answer to missile defense appeared to lie in multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), able to put one or more re-entry vehicles over several geographically separated targets. Thus the number of warheads could rise dramatically even if the number of launchers remained steady. During 1963, the Air Force started developmental work on a MIRVed ICBM and the Navy on a MIRVed SLBM.5 This was an area of technology in which the United States ran several years ahead of the Soviet Union.

JSOP-70, submitted to Secretary McNamara on 1 March 1965, covered FYs 1967–1974. At the time of submission, several re-entry vehicles were under development: Mark 12, capable of delivering three warheads against three separate targets; Mark 18, small enough to be employed in clusters; and a high-yield Mark 17 designed for precise delivery of a single warhead.6 It was expected that Mark 12s and Mark 17s would be retrofitted into Minuteman IIs and that MIRVed Poseidon missiles could be put aboard Polaris submarines. The Joint Chiefs recommended maintaining Titan II levels, completing the program for 41 submarines carrying 656 Polaris missiles, and replacing all Minuteman Is with 1,200 Minuteman IIs.7 As for bombers, the Chiefs recommended gradually attriting B–58s down to 64, holding B–52s at 600 through FY 1970 then reducing them to 495 by FY 1974, and developing an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), deploying 39 by FY 1974.

Secretary McNamara agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the great value of Poseidon. During 1964, however, he had concluded that MIRVs made more launchers unnecessary and that AMSA failed the test of cost-effectiveness. In rebuttal, JSOP-70 cited claims by General Wheeler’s Special Studies Group that 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs and a sizable AMSA force were needed for either pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes. The Group also measured what an all-missile force could accomplish against what missiles supplemented by AMSA could achieve. With AMSA, the Group calculated, US fatalities could be cut by 13 percent and losses to the US industrial base reduced by 11 percent. All the Chiefs wanted AMSA to proceed with engine and advanced avionics development; General Wheeler excepted, they further recommended moving from concept formulation into the next phase of the acquisition cycle, which was contract definition.8
In mid-July, Secretary McNamara proposed capping the Minuteman force at 1,000 launchers. He noted that by 1970, according to intelligence projections, American superiority would diminish but still remain substantial (for hard-silo ICBMs, 1,054 versus 272–537; for SLBMs, 656 versus 194-249). For Secretary McNamara, numbers alone were not crucial; what mattered was maintaining enough strength to accomplish assured destruction. According to OSD analyses, assured destruction could be accomplished completely with only a fraction of the force programmed through 1970.

Secretary McNamara agreed that the ability to limit damage inflicted by “light” attacks should be improved. At this point, though, he rejected pursuing a “high-confidence” damage-limiting posture. After 1970, the Soviets might deploy MIRVed missiles that were accurate enough to destroy Minuteman silos. MIRVed Poseidons impressed him as the most efficient counters to Soviet offensive or defensive advances; their planned availability could, if necessary, be advanced from 1971 to 1970. If the Soviets emphasized ballistic missile defense, development of an Improved Capability Missile could be accelerated. In JSOP-70, General McConnell had recommended making an Advanced ICBM available by FY 1973.

As in past years, Secretary McNamara disagreed sharply with the Chiefs about the value of manned bombers. He wanted to start mothballing early-model B–52s sooner, bringing the B–52 force down to 255 by mid-1970, and retire all B–58s by then. Most importantly, he disapproved full-scale development of AMSA. By his calculation, dispersing 200 AMSAs would cost three to four times as much as a comparable deployment of Minuteman. He acknowledged that bombers forced the Soviets to split their defensive resources and provided a hedge against unexpectedly poor missile performances. The Secretary settled, however, upon what he deemed a cost–effective alternative to AMSA. Secretary McNamara had been promoting the F–111 fighter-bomber as a showpiece of commonality to be used by the Navy as well as the Air Force. He now added a strategic bomber variant, the FB–111, proposing to deploy 60 by mid-1969 and 210 by mid-1974.

During the give-and-take over the budget, the Joint Chiefs faulted Secretary McNamara’s proposals for failing to maintain “a consistent margin of offensive and defensive superiority vis-à-vis the enemy threat.” They especially objected to what struck them as his emphasis upon “the need to pace our weapons system development and deployment programs with known changes in Soviet posture.” Using that yardstick assumed the availability of extraordinarily accurate US intelligence. Relying upon estimates of Soviet intentions, rather than Soviet capabilities, “increases the risk factor significantly, including the possible loss of US pre-eminence in capability to wage general war.” Safeguarding against a strategic surprise required “sequential decisions which take full advantage of our technological advancements” that should be pursued regardless of how far along the Soviets appeared to be.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked again for 1,200 Minuteman ICBMs. Their main complaint, however, concerned manned bombers. Secretary McNamara wanted to lower B–52 levels from 600 to 465 by mid-1967 and retire B–58s by FY 1970. The Chiefs,
instead, recommended retaining B–58s and keeping early-model B–52s in service until FY 1968. Reducing the bomber force before FB-111s became available—at a time when B–52s were being diverted to conventional missions in Southeast Asia—would make execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) more difficult and reduce the hedge that B–52s provided against any missile vulnerability. The Chiefs also recommended retaining B–58s. As for AMSA, they wanted to proceed with systems studies and developing advanced subsystems, permitting initial availability in FY 1974. Admittedly, these steps would amount to authorizing contract definition. The Chiefs denied, nonetheless, that they amounted to “a commitment, conditional or otherwise, to develop the AMSA as a weapon system.”

Secretary McNamara gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised proposals in mid-October. Accommodating the Mark 12 MIRV by using a maneuvering platform that would release one re-entry vehicle (RV) at a time from different planes required a wider and more powerful third stage of the rocket. Consequently, the MIRVed ICBM was renamed Minuteman III, which Secretary McNamara planned to begin deploying during FY 1969. He also wanted to assure the MIRVed Poseidon’s initial availability by August 1970. Further, Secretary McNamara authorized development of penetration aids for the Mark 11, 12, and 17 RVs intended for Minuteman III and Poseidon. Finally, he slowed B–52 retirements: 465 instead of 405 by mid-1967, 405 instead of 285 by mid-1969. A spur to these changes came from fresh intelligence estimates that the number of Soviet ICBMs in mid-1970 would run between 460 and 650, significantly higher than the July projections.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by repeating their pleas for 555 B–52s in FY 1967 and for 1,200 Minuteman launchers. General McConnell urged the other Chiefs to press for even higher B–52 and FB–111 levels. Ultimately, in mid-December, the OSD Comptroller decided to retain 555 B–52s through mid-1967 but slowed FB–111 procurement to 15 in FY 1967 and 105 by FY 1970. In sum, Secretary McNamara’s program would bring Minuteman III into service during 1969 and Poseidon in 1970. He held the Minuteman force to 1,000 launchers, projecting 700 Minuteman IIs and 300 Minuteman IIIs during 1972–1974. The Secretary refused, however, to approve development of either AMSA or an Advanced ICBM.

Force Planning in 1966

In JSOP 68-75, submitted to the Secretary on 22 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs again urged adding AMSAs and Advanced ICBMs to the inventory but—for the first time—did not challenge the Minuteman ceiling of 1,000 launchers. Comparing their recommendations with Secretary McNamara’s December 1965 levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once more attacked what struck them as the fallacy of basing calculations upon enemy intentions rather than enemy capabilities. They did not believe that US intelligence could make high-confidence predictions about Soviet weapon systems more than three
years ahead. Even medium-confidence forecasts, in their judgment, could not exceed more than four or five years. Since developing US counter-systems would take more than three years, adequate responses “cannot await high confidence warning of Soviet capabilities and often will be marginal even if based upon medium confidence warning.” That was why they urged pressing ahead with full-scale development of AMSA, equipping late-model B–52s with short-range air-to-surface missiles (SRAMs), assuring availability of the first Poseidons in FY 1970, developing small ballistic missiles to complement Poseidon, and deploying an Advanced ICBM by FY 1973.17

Already, in fact, Secretary McNamara was doing some rethinking about Soviet capabilities. He worried particularly that the ICBM force he had projected for FY 1970—250 Minuteman Is, 570 Minuteman IIs, 180 Minuteman IIIs18—might not provide enough warheads and decoys to overcome Soviet missile defenses. Minuteman II carried a Mark 17 consisting of one re-entry vehicle with a large-yield warhead; Minuteman III's Mark 12 RV would contain three warheads. What, Secretary McNamara asked General Wheeler in January 1966, would be the best Minuteman II-Minuteman III mix and how many Mark 12s and Mark 17s should be procured?19 In June, the Chairman's Special Studies Group concluded that more Mark 12s were needed and recommended deploying more Minuteman IIIs than previously projected. Agreeing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that Mark 12 production could be raised without major disruption. The Secretary concurred.20

Secretary McNamara made adjustments in the DPM that he circulated on 28 July 1966. The first Minuteman II squadron had become operational in April. For FY 1975, Secretary McNamara projected more Minuteman IIIs and Poseidons than previously, but he continued deferring decisions about developing an Advanced ICBM and a small ballistic missile. For AMSA, he disapproved its initial availability by FY 1974, believing that late-model B–52s could continue operating effectively even after 1975. He also postponed SRAM procurement, cut B–52 crew-to-aircraft ratios, and reduced the ground alert rate from 53 to 43 percent. Secretary McNamara’s program, which substituted accuracy for throw-weight, would increase the number of weapons in the alert force during the 1970s but decrease the number of megatons.

Intelligence estimates forecast a further diminution of the US advantage in hard-silo ICBM launchers, with the Soviets deploying somewhere between 639 and 900 in 1970. Secretary McNamara remained convinced that the US missile force programmed for 1972 could achieve assured destruction levels. He noted that, as insurance against a higher-than-expected Soviet threat, all 31 Polaris submarines stationed in the Atlantic and Mediterranean could be modified so that the SLBM force could deliver a good deal more than its current payload.21

In their critique, dated 31 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the “fundamental issue” of what struck them as Secretary McNamara's constant underestimate and understatement of the risks being run. The Soviets, they repeated, were building both assured destruction and damage-limiting capabilities—and doing so from a smaller economic base. They cited a study by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha
concluding that, for the first time, Free World casualties would almost equal those of the Communist Bloc even in a US pre-emptive attack. If the Soviets struck first, the casualties in the Free World would “greatly exceed” those of their adversaries. Thus the United States was losing a credible first strike option, thereby giving Moscow growing opportunities for nuclear blackmail. Since the Chiefs’ objections were more philosophical than programmatic, they lodged few objections to Secretary McNamara’s near-term decisions, asking him to delay Titan retirements, obtain firm contractor proposals for AMSA, and maintain B–52 alert rates and crew-to-aircraft ratios. Secretary McNamara made only one change, agreeing to keep the Titans through FY 1975.

When Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with President Johnson for the final budget wrap-up, on 6 December 1966, their main topic was whether to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The Secretary strongly opposed doing so. The Chiefs just as strongly pressed for going ahead, General Wheeler observing that “deterrence was not only technology, it was a state of mind. Our having an ABM system would increase our deterrence capability, no matter what [the Soviets] did.” AMSA also was brought before the President. Apparently trying to anticipate Secretary McNamara’s objections, General McConnell moved the most likely date of AMSA’s initial operational capability back from 1974 to 1976. President Johnson asked General McConnell to compare AMSA with the FB–111. General McConnell said that it would have slightly higher speed, more range, and—most importantly—a substantially greater bomb-carrying capacity. But Secretary McNamara still doubted the need for a new manned bomber, citing difficulties in penetration expected by the mid-1970s, and in any case saw no need to move as fast as the Air Force wanted. Subsequently, the President sided with the Secretary on both ABM and AMSA.

Meantime, in September 1966, General Wheeler had tasked his Special Studies Group with assessing the adequacy of US strategic forces through the early 1970s. This exercise sparked the most detailed exchange yet between the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara over what constituted deterrence. Answering General Wheeler in mid-November 1966, the Group anticipated a Soviet superiority in total megatonnage by 1967. The United States, on the other hand, would retain an advantage in megaton-equivalents delivered and widen its lead in numbers of warheads as MIRVs began entering the inventory. Neither side could prevent the other from inflicting heavy damage; programmed forces would not provide the United States with a first-strike capability. Nonetheless, the appearance of Soviet missile defenses would introduce uncertainties that could profoundly affect US planning and reduce confidence in US retaliatory capability. Those defenses would have to be overcome by still-unproven penetration aids, in which the Group professed “low confidence.” If the Soviets thought that US forces could not carry out a pre-emptive attack without suffering unacceptable damage in return the American deterrent would lose effectiveness, especially in dealing with non-nuclear aggression. And, if the Soviets ever concluded that they could limit damage to the USSR to an acceptable level, they might well consider making a first strike. Thus, to the Group, the value of creating US missile...
defense appeared obvious. In forwarding these “valuable” findings to the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the position enjoyed by the United States since 1945 had been “eroded seriously” by the Soviet buildup. Deploying missile defenses, even on a modest scale along with other offensive and defensive improvements, “would contribute to the US deterrent posture by introducing further uncertainties in Soviet plans and evaluations.”

Secretary McNamara rejected these findings virtually in toto. He deemed it “unfortunate” that the Group concentrated on a comparison of US and Soviet total megatonnage, which he did not consider a good measure of capabilities. Moreover, the Group wrongly included Soviet cruise missiles and medium bombers in its tabulation, while making US bomb loadings too low. With appropriate additions and subtractions, “the US does much better.” And, in the megaton-equivalent category, Secretary McNamara’s calculations showed US superiority to be even greater than the Group supposed. Most of what the Group said about Soviet missile defenses was accurate, he acknowledged, “but the sense is misleading.” Even assuming that Soviet defenses would be perfectly effective and heavily deployed, “we will almost certainly have much more capability for assured destruction than we will require.” Moreover, according to OSD analysts, penetration aids should prove quite effective. The continuing ability to accomplish assured destruction impressed him as the fact worth stressing. In fact, “by any relevant measure of strategic force,” the United States should maintain a position of “significant strategic superiority” through 1975. Since “we cannot hope to erode the USSR’s own assured destruction capability, . . . we would be foolish to count on strategic forces to deter aggression at much lower levels. This, I believe, illustrates the correctness of our emphasis in the past six years on conventional forces to counter conventional aggression.”

Refining the SIOP

Should deterrence fail, and nuclear exchanges begin, a Single Integrated Operational Plan would govern the execution of the US strategy. The first step in SIOP preparation—drafting guidance about tasks, options, and damage criteria—was done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then approved by the Secretary of Defense. Next, this guidance was given to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) in Omaha. The Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), who was a four-star Air Force officer, acted as the Director of Strategic Target Planning; a vice admiral served as his deputy. The JSTPS drew up target lists, grouped targets into categories, and matched weapons against targets. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and approved the resulting plan.

Since the early 1960s the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had been trying to widen the range of options and choices in the SIOP, the aim being a more controlled response and greater discrimination in the selection of
targets. In October 1961, Secretary McNamara had approved the guidance for SIOP-63 that first defined controlled response. The next plan—SIOP-64, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in October 1963 and which took effect on 1 January 1964—derived from this same guidance. SIOP-64 contained three tasks—Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie—with five options that were combinations of those tasks. In December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance for preparing a plan that would supersede SIOP-64. Since its basic philosophy did not depart from what was used in preparing SIOP-64, Secretary McNamara's approval was unnecessary. The three tasks were reworded and a fourth—Delta—added; options were recast to cover changes.

The JSTPS then set about preparing a detailed plan. In the spring of 1966, as a new SIOP neared completion, General John D. Ryan (CINCSAC and Director, JSTPS) submitted an encouraging report. Since January 1964, when SIOP-64 became effective, missile reliability had risen from 35 to 64 percent; the number of missiles on alert status had increased, and their average accuracy had improved. Thus, although the number of Soviet ICBMs in hardened silos had risen from 25 to 229, damage expectancy inflicted by the alert missile force executing one of the tasks had grown significantly higher.28

On 6 May, General Ryan submitted a draft plan for Joint Chiefs of Staff approval. Twelve days later, they approved SIOP-4 (the revision of SIOP-64) and announced that it would become effective on 1 July 1966. The new plan, they assured General Ryan, represented “a significant improvement over SIOP-64, particularly with regard to the targeting of the non-alert force and the increased emphasis given to Communist China.” The Joint Chiefs did make some alterations, telling General Ryan to continue efforts at improving targeting against China.29

On 6 June, Secretary McNamara was given a briefing on SIOP-4. He indicated a desire to inflict more casualties under one option, particularly against China, and to achieve a more favorable ratio of Free World versus Communist casualties under all conditions. General Ryan investigated the Chinese problem and his report was not encouraging. Secretary McNamara also asked whether it was possible, without executing the SIOP, to carry out a small number of strikes against either China or the Soviet Union. The J–3 opposed limited attacks against the USSR because of the possibility that doing so would provoke a major Soviet response. Indeed, the mere existence of such plans might harm the SIOP's credibility.

General McConnell proposed replying that the United States possessed “the most flexible, responsive, and capable force in the world.” General Johnson, apparently less amenable to Secretary McNamara’s idea, argued that small-scale attacks would conflict with “a basic principle of general war,” that the greatest resources should be employed at the earliest time. Doing what Secretary McNamara proposed could provoke major Soviet retaliation under conditions less favorable to the United States. Admiral McDonald suggested replying that, while a capability for small strikes did exist, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “probably would have serious reservations” about exercising it.30 The outcome of these exchanges, however, was a brief and bland memorandum forwarded on 22 September. Procedures were available, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
assured the Secretary, for directing the execution of “individual or small numbers of strikes against enemy countries.” No specific plans of that sort pertaining to the USSR had been prepared.31

In July 1966, just after SIOP-4 became effective, General Ryan asked that Task Delta be eliminated. The small loss of flexibility, he claimed, would be more than offset by decreasing the complexities of targeting, decisionmaking, execution procedure, and maintenance of the plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and, on 15 September, issued appropriate guidance.32 SIOP-4 was still in effect when Lyndon Johnson left office.

Force Planning in 1967

The Joint Chiefs explained to Secretary McNamara how JSOP 69-76, which they sent him on 19 April 1967, differed from the previous year’s JSOP. Rather than hypothesizing what the Soviets might achieve by fully exploiting their technological potential, the document cited actual Soviet capabilities and what war games had shown about US ability to wage general war. That led to an ominous conclusion. By deploying ABMs, improving the quality of their bomber defenses, and accelerating construction of hardened and dispersed missile silos, the Soviets had set in motion an erosion of US strategic power that even the introduction of FB–111s in FY 1969, of Minuteman III in FY 1970, and of Poseidon in FY 1971 would not reverse. After 1971, in fact, adverse trends would accelerate. Accordingly, the Chiefs advocated: proceeding with full-scale development of AMSA; equipping B–52s with SRAMs starting in FY 1970; and proceeding, after the successful completion of contract definition, to make an Advanced ICBM available by FY 1973.33

One month later, findings from the Chairman’s Special Studies Group reinforced the JSOP’s recommendations. Back in autumn 1966, when the issue of increasing Mark 12 production was being debated, Deputy Secretary Vance asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe desirable levels during 1972–74 of (1) MIRVed Mark 3s for Poseidon, (2) Mark 18s for Minuteman II, and (3) SRAMs. In May 1967, the Special Studies Group concluded that equipping all Poseidons with Mark 3s would be the best way to overcome strong Soviet missile defenses. If no such defenses existed, half the Poseidons should have Mark 3s and half should have single-warhead Mark 17s. Since penetration aids seemed so vital to success, the Group recommended acquiring additional RVs by equipping Minuteman IIs with Mark 18s rather than Mark 17s. As for SRAMs, the Group judged that requirements varied widely according to the effectiveness of air defenses. The important thing, therefore, was to create a production base that could be adjusted according to need. On 21 June, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that these findings buttressed the recommendations in JSOP 69-76. His program, by contrast, failed to furnish high assurance that a nuclear war could be concluded on clearly advantageous terms—which, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the essence of deterrence.34
Secretary McNamara, however, saw no reason to make drastic changes. By 1972, according to intelligence projections, the Soviets might take a small lead in hard-silo ICBMs and a large lead in alert force megatons. Even so, he insisted that numbers of launchers and bombers were poor measures of relative capabilities; total megatons were worse. In determining whether forces could accomplish assured destruction and carry out damage-limiting attacks on Soviet forces, factors such as accuracy, reliability, survivability, and control impressed him as “the most decisive” in calculating effectiveness. “Our missiles,” he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “appear to be more reliable than Soviet missiles; they are more than twice as accurate. . . . Therefore, the best way to increase the effectiveness of our forces is by further reducing our large warhead forces . . . while putting MIRVs on Poseidon and Minuteman.” Only against Soviet offensive and defensive forces that exceeded any intelligence forecasts would US retaliatory strength require major additions. Since that eventuality seemed so unlikely, the United States could afford to select options with small initial costs and delay full development until necessary. Consequently, Secretary McNamara kept the AMSA and the Advanced ICBM within the stage of concept formulation by approving only advanced development. He also deferred SRAM production.35

Still hopeful, the Joint Chiefs of Staff renewed their argument that, since major uncertainties probably would remain unresolved a year hence, delaying decisions until precise intelligence appeared would invite unnecessary risk. How could the Secretary be sure that Soviets would think and act “like us,” limiting their forces to “arbitrary and static levels of assured destruction?” Already, they reminded Secretary McNamara, studies had documented the trend toward “significant relative decline” in US capabilities—a trend that was not being recognized and reflected in the Secretary’s decisions. By late 1967, in fact, some areas of target coverage probably would be affected. Specifically, they pressed for: retaining Titan IIs until a new ICBM with large throw-weight entered the inventory; procuring high-yield Mark 17 RVs for Minuteman III; authorizing contract definition for the Advanced ICBM; retrofitting all submarines still carrying A–2 missiles with A–3s that had almost twice the range and delivered a multiple RV in which three warheads separated into a triangular pattern centered at one target; retaining options to employ penetration aids on A–3s, Mark 17s on Poseidon, and more lower-yield Mark 3s on each Poseidon booster; preserving the option of a ballistic missile ship; equipping B–52s with SRAMs; and completing the contract definition phase of AMSA’s development.36

Intelligence now forecast, fairly definitively, a 1972 force of Soviet ICBMs numbering between 950 and 1,369 launchers. Early in October 1967, Secretary McNamara agreed to retain all Titan IIs and approved, as an alternative to the Advanced ICBM, developing super-hardened silos for Minuteman IIIIs. The latter step, he claimed, “removes much of the pressure to develop additional land-based capability.” Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained sufficiently concerned to seek face-to-face discussions with the Secretary. They contrasted his position with theirs in the manner shown as follows:
1. “Assured destruction” versus “a comprehensive approach to the mission and tasks of strategic nuclear forces.”
2. “Population fatality assessments” versus “war-waging and war-termination scenarios.”
4. Foreclosure for Poseidon of the Mark 17 RV versus “preservation of the option pending demonstration of MIRV performance and accuracy.”
5. Fewer versus more Mark 3 warheads for each Poseidon booster.
6. Confining AMSA to advanced development versus moving AMSA into contract definition in FY 1969 and, “dependent upon favorable review, full-scale development to preserve an initial operational capability in FY 1976.”
7. Disapproval of a ballistic missile ship versus proceeding with concept formulation and, “dependent upon favorable review, procurement of prototypes for tests and timing.”

The showdown came on 4 December at a White House meeting attended by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Going into the meeting, in a minor concession to the Joint Chiefs, Secretary McNamara authorized the modification of thirty B–52s to carry SRAMs but, otherwise, he remained firm in opposing the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals. For strategic retaliatory forces, the discussion focused on whether to proceed with AMSA. Secretary McNamara observed that in 1976, under his program, we would have 465 B–52s and FB–111s, 1,542 missile launchers on line, and 8,190 separately targetable bombs or warheads. Should a greater-than-expected threat emerge, possible responses included building more Minuteman silos and missiles, adding point defenses for Minuteman fields, and equipping B–52s with newer missiles. Speaking for the Chiefs, General McConnell replied that acquiring new bombers was better than having to modify the system if a greater-than-expected threat emerged. Procuring 150 AMSAs would cost as much as $7.5 billion, he acknowledged, but in FY 1969 only $40 million was needed for contract definition. Bombers, McConnell claimed, were superior to missiles in achieving “sure destruction.” Secretary McNamara, calling the threat level needed to justify AMSA unrealistic, proposed spending only $25 million for advanced aircraft technology and penetration aids; President Johnson accepted his advice.

**Force Planning in 1968**

SOP 70-77, submitted in April 1968, recited a familiar litany of recommendations (full-scale development of AMSA, SRAM production, contract definition of an Advanced ICBM, funding of a ballistic missile ship prototype, planning more RVs for Poseidon boosters) and added new ones that included: concept formulation for an air-launched missile to defend bombers; contract definition for a subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD); and full-scale development of the powerful Mark 18. Again, too,
it warned that the approved program put worldwide US interests at increasing risk because confidence was decreasing in America’s capability to emerge from a nuclear war in “a position of strategic advantage.”

Even though Secretary McNamara was gone, replaced in March 1968 by former Truman administration advisor Clark M. Clifford, sentiment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for holding the line on strategic nuclear forces remained as strong and determined as ever. Accordingly, in addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze offered little optimism that they would receive a favorable hearing, except for the contract definition of SCAD. Looking to 1972, the latest National Intelligence Estimate forecast a small Soviet lead in ICBMs (1,054 versus 1,020–1,251) and a US advantage of almost two to one in SLBMs (656 versus 267–318). But even with greater megatonnage, according to Secretary Nitze, the Soviets could not take away US ability to accomplish assured destruction, “largely because we will maintain a commanding lead in the number of weapons available and because our forces are relatively invulnerable to a Soviet first strike.” Only if the Soviets spent $20 to $30 billion above the “high” estimate would major additions become necessary and, in that case, “we have many options . . . that do not require a major effort now.” A decision on the least expensive of these options, adding five Poseidon boats and putting terminal decoys on all Poseidons, could be postponed for four years. Secretary Nitze intended to maintain “nuclear superiority” in numbers of warheads but doubted whether that superiority could be “converted into meaningful political power.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rebutted that “we are compromising US strategy to accommodate to the Soviet improved posture.” OSD’s rationale and recommendations implied that the United States had neither the capacity nor the intent to acquire capabilities needed “to pursue effectively a complete military strategy.” A Soviet decision to initiate hostilities, the Chiefs argued, would be influenced by expected US as well as Soviet losses and by estimates of relative surviving military capabilities. “If they sustain 20 percent fatalities as compared to 80 percent for the United States, for example, they might not be deterred from initiating an attack . . . .” Further, judgments about what constituted deterrence should include evaluations of possible Soviet attacks involving “pindown” of Minuteman fields, fractional orbital bombardment systems, submarines launching cruise missiles, and medium bombers. As US superiority eroded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived two principal dangers: first, increasing confidence by the Soviets leading them into high-risk courses; and second, the possibility that such course would escalate into strategic nuclear war. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed as “essential” the proposals set forth in JSOP-70-77.

In his final DPM dated 9 January 1969, Secretary Nitze made minor program changes, modifying all B–52s and FB–111s to carry SRAMs and SCADs, and retaining B–58s in service until SCADs became available for B–52s. Also, he considerably reduced production targets for the FB–111 and slightly raised the number of B–52s staying in service. His supporting rationale was recast to say that “the relationship of ‘nuclear superiority’ as such to our military and political objectives is debatable.
Strategic nuclear forces do not have the capacity to seize territory, even when they are superior in numbers. They can only destroy it. As a consequence, we know of no feasible way of ending a strategic nuclear war, short of the total destruction and exhaustion of both sides, except through mutual control and restraint. Thus, while ‘nuclear superiority’ appears attractive, we do not know how to take advantage of it to achieve our national security objectives.” Here, though, Secretary Nitze was refuting an argument that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had never presented. The Chiefs had justified preserving nuclear superiority in negative terms of what it would prevent, not in positive terms of seizing territory.

As the Johnson administration ended, Strategic Air Command controlled 59 Titan IIs, 967 Minuteman Is and IIs, 579 B–52s, and 76 B–58s. The SLBM force comprised 41 submarines carrying 656 Polaris missiles. On 16 August 1968, at Cape Kennedy, a Minuteman III and a Poseidon C–3 were test-fired successfully from separate pads. The first Polaris-to-Poseidon conversion, USS James Madison, began in February 1969 and finished in March 1971. The Soviets did not successfully test a MIRVed missile until 1973.

Perspectives

Who had the best of these debates over the nature of deterrence and the value of nuclear superiority? Secretary McNamara remained wedded to assured destruction because he did not see how either side could attack the other without suffering massive damage in return. When the Chiefs cited calculations from war games, Secretary McNamara perceived no meaningful difference because the millions killed in any scenario were wholly disastrous. What the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated, in essence, were programs that would preserve commanding leads in all categories. But what that promised, in Secretary McNamara’s view, was an endless upward spiral creating greater danger rather than greater security. He could claim vindication in that the Soviets avoided nuclear adventurism even after US superiority in launchers and megatonnage disappeared.

On other aspects, however, Joint Chiefs of Staff views found a fair measure of vindication. “Clearly,” Secretary McNamara argued in a 1967 speech, “the Soviet buildup is in part a reaction to our own buildup since the beginning of the 1960s. Soviet strategic planners undoubtedly reasoned that if our buildup were to continue at its accelerated pace, we might conceivably reach, in time, a first-strike capability.” In mid-1968, US intelligence estimated that the Soviets would deploy, by mid-1972, 1,020–1,251 hard ICBM and 267–318 SLBM launchers. Actually, by mid-1972, the Soviet inventory included 1,618 ICBM launchers, either operational or under construction, and 950 SLBMs. As the Joint Chiefs had foreseen, the Soviets were not thinking and acting “like us.” Quite possibly, the Soviets always intended to deploy a massive force but, when their
early-model missiles proved so poor, delayed doing so until they developed ICBMs comparable to Minuteman.

Secretary McNamara remained confident that a capability to accomplish assured destruction, using criteria measurable through statistical analysis, constituted deterrence. General Wheeler, by contrast, spoke for the Chiefs in describing deterrence as “a state of mind.” In September 1967, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown articulated this argument perhaps more cogently than the Chiefs had themselves. “My feeling,” Secretary Brown warned Secretary McNamara, “is that we have become too theoretical—that our calculations are too removed from the most likely patterns of admittedly unlikely wars, and hence from the probable Soviet judgments which determine deterrence.” In some future equivalent of the Cuban missile crisis, a capability to inflict 20 percent fatalities on the Soviets might not be enough if US losses would reach 80 percent. In those circumstances, Secretary Brown argued, Soviet leaders might believe that the United States would cease to exist while the USSR could successfully recover, using its surviving nuclear forces to dominate the European industrial complex. Hence Secretary Brown put forward a new criterion: make sure that Soviet losses would be at least as severe as US ones, and that the postwar military balance would not favor the Soviets. Later, as Secretary of Defense in the 1970s Secretary Brown would refine this view and call it the “countervailing strategy,” taking the assured destruction concept a step further in refinement. Thus Secretary McNamara’s assured destruction was eventually supplanted by criteria that drew upon Secretary Brown’s proposal.
Losing the ABM Debate

As 1965 opened, an increasingly acrimonious debate centered upon the feasibility of ballistic missile defense. In 1959, the Army put forward a plan to deploy a Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile system but President Eisenhower refused to move beyond research, development and testing. Nike-Zeus had two main drawbacks. First, the mechanically-steered radar had a limited target-handling capability, rendering defenses vulnerable to a saturation attack. Second, the intercepting missile’s slow speed meant that it had to be fired long before a target re-entered the atmosphere where real warheads could be distinguished from decoys. During 1961–62, the Army worked on an improved system Nike-X. A phased-array radar structure covered with thousands of sensors would remain stationary while an electronic beam rotated a million times faster than a mechanical structure and thus could handle many more incoming objects. A Sprint missile was developed for high-acceleration terminal defense (5,000 to 100,000 feet at a range of 25 miles), able to wait until warheads had penetrated well into the atmosphere and separated from decoys. In the spring of 1965, the Army initiated development of Spartan, an extended-range interceptor supposed to climb 80,000 feet in ten seconds, reach out 400 nautical miles, and hit objects as high as 280 nautical miles.¹

By then, however, Secretary McNamara harbored grave doubts about the feasibility of ballistic missile defense. According to his analysts’ calculations, every defensive deployment could be overcome by offensive improvements costing only a fraction as much. He therefore held Nike-X at the developmental stage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, conversely, rated Nike-X an indispensable element of deterrence and pressed for pre-production funds. They saw “damage limitation” as the essential counterpart of “assured destruction.” Without ballistic missile defenses, they asked, how could the United States emerge advantageously from a nuclear exchange? And in that case, might not the concept of deterrence itself be fatally weakened?
Force Planning in 1965

Through Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-70), forwarded to Secretary McNamara in March 1965, the JCS assessed an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI), a surface-launched Surface-to-Air Missile, Development (SAM-D) capable of downing bombers at all altitudes, and Nike-X. On IMI, General McConnell wanted the 2,000-mph F–12 to begin entering the inventory during FY 1969. General Wheeler also wished to have an IMI by that date, but he was willing to accept whatever aircraft further analyses might favor: the F–12; the dual-purpose F–111 intended to reach Mach 2.2; or the F–4 Phantom designed as a long-range Navy interceptor but being adopted by the Air Force. However, Admiral McDonald, General Greene, and General Johnson wanted to defer a decision, believing the need for IMI was not immediate and noting that development of the F–12 and F–111 was essentially complete. On Nike-X, all except General McConnell favored starting deployment, with the exact scope to be decided later. The lone dissenter supported sufficient funding to permit initial availability in FY 1970 but wanted a deployment decision to await progress on development and testing.

Secretary McNamara saw no point in making a major effort to achieve damage limitation. Existing air defenses, he found, had been created to meet an attack by hundreds of bombers but, since no Soviet force of this size had materialized, available SAMs and interceptors struck him as “quantitatively excessive in relation to their cost and effectiveness.” Therefore, he intended to start retiring F–102s and disapproved F–12 procurement because (1) either F–111s or new SAMs might be equally effective and (2) doing so would make sense only in conjunction with ABM deployment and a fallout shelter program. As to Nike-X, he still found no justification for full-scale deployment. If the United States spent $30 billion on a comprehensive damage limitation program, the USSR could overcome it by spending only $6 billion for improved ICBMs carrying penetration aids. But he acknowledged that China, by exploding its first nuclear device in October 1964, had changed the equation. Whatever ICBMs the Chinese might deploy would be relatively unsophisticated. Tentatively, therefore, he planned a light anti-Chinese defense which would allow him to postpone a deployment decision for at least one year. The JCS replied by repeating their JSOP recommendations—save for Nike-X, where they reserved judgment pending review of the Army’s forthcoming deployment plan.

The Army’s “DEPEX” plan, which appeared soon afterward, was designed to provide high-altitude area protection for the entire United States and short-range or “terminal” defense of high-value targets. Phase I costing $9.5 billion would protect sixteen cities by FY 1973. Phase II costing another $3.5 billion would shield 25 cities by FY 1975. For a further $13.5 billion, Phases III and IV would cover 51 cities by FY 1982. Defenses created during these two final phases would be able to deal with a sophisticated attack.

The President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) approved a report by its Strategic Military Panel that found scant merit in DEPEX. A simple area defense
against Chinese missiles, using off-the-shelf hardware, could be built rapidly for as
little as $1 billion. But the Panel judged that approach “more effective than necessary”
against early Chinese ICBMs, yet inadequate against short-range SLBMs with low tra-
jectories and air-breathing cruise missiles. Surely, in the face of massive US strategic
offensive forces, a few soft and easily located Chinese ICBMs “would not constitute a
very plausible blackmail threat or deterrent capability.”5 The Soviets, seeing DEPEX as
being ultimately directed against them, might respond by deploying full-scale missile
defenses and acquiring enough penetration aids to overcome an area defense—putting
pressure upon the United States to expand its strategic forces again. Consequently, the
Panel opposed making a deployment decision “this year.” Instead, DOD should inten-
sify its study of ways to counter short-range SLBMs and air-breathing missiles, design
and evaluate a cheap and rapidly deployable area defense, and vigorously pursue its
efforts on penetration aids.6

The Joint Chiefs viewed matters quite differently. In their judgment, the need for
an effective ballistic missile defense was “very real and urgent”; DEPEX represented
“a logical approach,” providing a basic defense and permitting controlled growth at
fairly level rates of expenditure. They dismissed off-the-shelf area defense as inade-
quate and disagreed with PSAC’s argument for delaying a deployment decision. The
report, they claimed, had overstressed the limited nature of the Chinese threat and
based its conclusions upon “incomplete military and political considerations that go
beyond the scope of scientific appraisal.”7 The Soviets might see in US failure to deploy
missile defenses an opportunity to redress the strategic balance and would, accord-
ingly, accelerate their offensive and defensive efforts. By targeting their larger missile
payloads against undefended American urban concentrations, they might outdistance
US forces in casualty-causing capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore endorsed
Army plans for protecting 25 cities, and strongly supported allocating $188 million
in pre-production funds so as to preserve the option of starting Nike-X deployments
during FY 1970.8

Already, though, Secretary McNamara had sided with the scientists. His final DPM,
distributed on 1 November, recommended $403 million for Nike-X’s development but
nothing for its deployment. Taking that approach, he argued, still would make possible
a “light” defense against small or unsophisticated attacks during the middle and late
1970s. Previous intelligence had estimated that Soviet ABM systems might become
operational around Leningrad as early as mid-1965 and around Moscow by about mid-
1967. But now, Secretary McNamara noted, numerous indications pointed to Soviet
difficulties, construction at the sites was sporadic, and the Leningrad installation
might prove to be a long-range air defense system.9

The Joint Chiefs made one last bid on Nike-X’s behalf, putting their case before
President Johnson early in December 1965. Soviet attacks, they told him, could kill 40
percent of the US population in 1970 and 50 percent by 1975. DEPEX coverage, however,
could be accelerated so that US survivors in 1975 could total 75 to 90 percent of the
population, 35 to 50 million of whom could be directly attributable to ballistic missile
defenses. “These added survivors could spell the difference between national survival and collapse.”

Their plea changed nothing. In January 1966, Secretary McNamara informed the Secretary of the Army that a procurement decision on Nike-X could be postponed for at least another year. He did, however, award highest priority to developing (1) a short lead-time system to cope with a minimum threat, (2) a defense against more sophisticated attack, (3) a major damage-limiting capability aimed at the Soviet threat, and (4) a “point” defense of Minuteman fields. To sum up, the Secretary’s plan for FYs 1967–1974 retained nearly all Hawk and Nike-Hercules fire units and gradually reduced “Century” interceptors to about 600; it excluded IMI and Nike-X.

Force Planning in 1966

In JSOP 68-75, circulated on 22 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs proposed giving Nike-X the highest priority in order to permit the earliest possible production. In 1966, they estimated a Soviet attack could kill 50 million Americans; by 1975, that figure could reach 100 million. Phase II of DEPEX, covering 25 cities, was attainable by mid-1975 and would allow a “balanced” defense against a light attack, a “reasonably good” protection against a low Soviet threat, and a foundation for expansion. SAM-D, a necessary adjunct, would be effective against all Soviet bombers, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles. All the Chiefs agreed upon the F–12 as the most cost-effective interceptor of high-speed aircraft. But General Wheeler and Admiral McDonald would go no further than buying twelve aircraft in FY 1972, letting further procurement await an accumulation of operational experience and further evaluation of Soviet bomber strength. For the same reason, General Greene confined his recommendation to 24 F–12s by FY 1973. Finally, the Joint Chiefs noted the advent of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. These modified Boeing 707s, loaded with radars and communications equipment, would vastly improve the effectiveness of manned interceptors. They wanted the first 24 AWACS to be available in FY 1972 and that number increased to 42 by FY 1973.

In his tentative DPM, dated 27 July, Secretary McNamara proposed simply continuing the current program. The Soviets, he calculated, could overwhelm DEPEX II by adding 200 missiles to their attacking force. He also deferred a decision on modernizing air defenses. In justification, he cited studies showing that either 32 F–12s or 48 F–111s, both supported by AWACS, could destroy as many bombers as the Century interceptors. Since F–111s already were in production, they obviously would be cheaper than F–12s. Replying one month later, the Joint Chiefs protested that Secretary McNamara’s program would produce an increasingly obsolete defense and ever smaller damage-limiting capabilities. The United States, they insisted, could and should maintain an overall strategic advantage: “Further, because the survival of fundamental US values and institutions are involved, . . . increased priority should be given . . . to military
risks, operational capabilities, and, in particular, means of limiting damage to the United States. They claimed that, according to data in Secretary McNamara’s DPM, adequate damage-limiting measures could result in (1) the survival of 150 to 200 million Americans in a nuclear war and (2) the preservation of industrial potential and material resources superior to those of any other nation. Here, apparently, they were picking particular figures from the DPM’s estimate that US fatalities in 1976 would be: 22 to 45 percent under Secretary McNamara’s program; 5 to 34 percent if ABMs and expanded fallout shelters protected 25 cities; and 3 to 22 percent if ABMs and fallout shelters covered 52 cities.

Late in November, Secretary McNamara circulated a DPM dealing exclusively with Nike-X. He noted that the Soviets had accelerated their ICBM deployments, definitely begun building an ABM system around Moscow and perhaps started a second one, dubbed the Tallinn Line, in the northwestern USSR that featured improved anti-air and perhaps ABM potential. Still, Secretary McNamara opposed deploying an anti-Soviet ABM system “at this time.” An assured destruction capability remained the foundation of US security, and the same held true for the USSR: “It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent that casts such grave doubts on the advisability of deploying the Nike-X system. . . . In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly their defensive expenditures and ours without any gain in real security on either side.” China had launched a 400-mile missile and might be preparing to test an ICBM booster. Even so, Secretary McNamara felt certain that the United States could construct ballistic missile defenses faster than the Chinese could deploy significant ICBM forces. Therefore, he disapproved preparations for production but held open an option for action later. Responding on 2 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary McNamara to bear in mind the need for a “suitable interrelationship” between assured destruction and damage limitation capabilities. Again, they reaffirmed their recommendation to deploy Nike-X, starting in FY 1972.

On 6 December, at the budget wrap-up with President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and the Chiefs debated the merits of a heavy versus a thin defense. General Wheeler disputed Secretary McNamara’s argument that deploying heavy defenses would compel the Soviets to increase their offensive forces. For the Soviets, Wheeler said, the cost of deploying an ABM system would constitute an important diversion of resources. MIRV technology would reduce the kilotonnage of their payloads, so they faced grave uncertainties in targeting against our ABMs. Since deterrence involved not only technology but also a state of mind, he continued, US deployments would increase our deterrent capability no matter what the Soviets did. Conversely, absence of an ABM defense might increase the possibility of war by accident, create a sense of imbalance between the superpowers, suggest that the United States was interested only in offensive missile forces, and indicate that we were unwilling to pay to maintain our current nuclear superiority.

What, President Johnson asked, determined the difference in judgment between the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs? Secretary McNamara replied that it “lay less in
rational calculation than in the inherently emotional nature of the issue.” The Soviets, he contended, had spent two or three times as much as the United States to create defenses that were “not worth a damn.” Following their lead would trigger a costly action-reaction cycle leaving neither side any better off. But Secretary McNamara did see justification for a limited system capable of protecting offensive forces, notably Minuteman, and of defending against a small Soviet blackmail attack, accidental firing of a single missile, and Chinese ICBMs during 1975–85. On the basis of that system, he said, we could explore whether the Soviets were willing to negotiate a freeze on ABM deployments.

Was there, the President asked, “any middle ground in this debate?” Secretary McNamara emphasized that emotionalism surrounding the issue made middle ground hard to find. Wheeler wanted to begin building factories for those ABM components about which we were technically sound; Secretary McNamara countered that many of the system’s parts still had to be tested. When General Johnson argued that ABM defenses cut casualties, Secretary McNamara replied that he completely disagreed. President Johnson wondered whether the conferees could reach consensus to “move ahead” with a limited system while trying to reach agreement with the Soviets. Admiral McDonald replied that the Soviets already were “moving ahead” with offensive and defensive increases. Secretary McNamara repeated that their defensive effort was wasted. Not so, General McConnell retorted; “[t]hey had imposed heavy costs on the US to assure our continued penetration capability.” He added that “we are dealing with the descendants of Genghis Khan. They only understand force.” Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance answered that was why, “at whatever cost,” we must maintain an assured second-strike capability, using Poseidon and other means to penetrate ballistic missile defenses. There the discussion ended.19

Consensus remained out of reach. Through a DPM circulated on 22 December, Secretary McNamara recommended initiating only the “light” Nike-X deployment. Replying one week later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave a highly qualified endorsement. They supported light deployment as a first step while “emphasizing that the ultimate deployment of Nike-X must be predicted on present and future developments in offensive and defensive strategic systems.” On 4 January 1967, President Johnson reviewed options with Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs, and civilian scientists. The President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Donald Hornig, said he would “tend to support” a thin system that helped negotiate an ABM freeze. All the other scientists strongly opposed taking even that first step in deployment. That evening, Secretary McNamara telephoned the President. “So,” President Johnson observed as the conversation ended, “… if you were in my position, you’d do nothing.” Secretary McNamara answered, “I’d go down fighting, and I’m damn sure I’d go down.”20 A main reason was that Congress, for the first time since 1959, had voted appropriations for pre-production.

In his budget message of 24 January, President Johnson proposed continuing “intensive development” of Nike-X but postponing any deployments. He also recommended
opening discussions with the Soviets about an ABM freeze. Against the eventuality that talks would fail, President Johnson wanted $375 million allocated for Nike-X production. Testifying in March before the House Committee on Appropriations, General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara stated their arguments for and against DEPEX II, protecting 25 cities. Most Congressmen found Wheeler’s brief more persuasive.21

Force Planning in 1967

The Joint Chiefs used JSOP 69-76, submitted in April 1967, to reiterate their positions on all the pivotal issues, again giving top priority to building heavy ballistic missile defenses. Very soon, events impelled the administration to announce a decision. On 17 June, China exploded its first thermonuclear device. Over 23–25 June, President Johnson and Chairman Alexei Kosygin conferred at Glassboro, New Jersey. At this summit Secretary McNamara argued that both countries should limit their development of offensive and defensive ballistic missile weapons. The Soviet premier rebuffed President Johnson’s overtures about opening Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. The Soviet Premier told the President he was shocked by a recent speech given by Secretary McNamara in which he claimed that offensive missile systems were much cheaper than defensive ones. He regarded that “as a commercial approach to a moral problem which was by its very nature invalid.” Thus no concrete results came out of Glassboro.22

Llewellyn Thompson, the United States ambassador to the USSR, gave the Joint Chiefs his insight that the Soviets would avoid discussing strategic arms limitations until separate negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty were completed.23 Accordingly, on 27 July, the Chiefs reminded Secretary McNamara that among their recommendations in JSOP 69-76 “no other action is considered more necessary than the deployment of Nike-X.” The USSR was continuing its offensive and defensive buildup; China might field an ICBM as early as 1970. Thus, as matters stood, they suspected that the Soviets enjoyed a “considerable incentive” to engage in protracted and indecisive discussions. In these circumstances, “a Nike-X deployment decision would either stimulate Soviet participation in meaningful negotiations or disclose their lack of serious interest in this matter.”24

In the meantime, OSD, Army Materiel Command, and the Nike-X project office tasked contractors with preparing a model for light or “thin” deployment. The upshot, in July, was “Plan I-67 Area/Hardsite Defense.” Secretary McNamara ordered a quick evaluation of Plan I-67’s ability to cope with the Chinese threat, which determined that it did constitute an adequate basis for proceeding.25 On 2 August, the Secretary circulated a tentative DPM advocating a light Ballistic Missile defense to deal with the Chinese threat. He employed a familiar type of cost-effectiveness calculation to demonstrate that heavy anti-Soviet defenses would be useless. The Secretary estimated that in 1976, if the Soviets struck first but had not reacted to Nike-X deployments that
protected 25 cities, US fatalities would be 20 million. But if the Soviets felt compelled
to respond to Nike-X, they would add 250 ICBMs. This would result in the Soviets
inflicting 90 million fatalities. Turning to air defense, Secretary McNamara proposed a
drastic reduction in the active force, transferring F–102s and F–106s to the Air National
Guard and leaving only 24 F–104s. No AWACS were included.26

Secretary McNamara’s plan, the Joint Chiefs countered, would leave the United
States without effective anti-air and ballistic missile defenses by the early 1970s. While
accepting anti-Chinese deployment as a first step, they insisted upon the essentiality of
DEPEX II. Indeed, “No other single action is more necessary for the defense of the United
States.” They also argued that a premature phase-down of air defenses could tempt the
Soviets to build new bombers and then launch a missile attack aimed at pinning down
Minuteman ICBMs until the bombers could strike them in their silos.27 The right answers,
in their opinion, were F–12 production and expedited AWACS development.28

On 18 September, in a well-publicized speech, Secretary McNamara announced
that “we have decided to go forward with this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment,
and we will begin actual production of such a system at the end of this year.” Then he
added the crucial caveat: “There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the devel-
opment of all new nuclear weaponry. If a system works—and works well—there is
strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all
proportion to the prudent level required. The danger . . . is going to be that pressure
will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet–oriented ABM system. We must resist
that temptation firmly.”29

A consensus about near-term needs did emerge. The JCS supported FY 1969 appro-
priations for “Sentinel,” which the light deployment was now called, as being a sufficient
first step toward heavy anti-Soviet defenses. Beyond that, Secretary McNamara told
President Johnson during the budget review on 4 December, “the Joint Chiefs are say-
ing that they haven’t seen anything to change their views and I certainly have not seen
anything to change mine.” As to bomber defense, Secretary McNamara accepted an
Air Force plan that involved: producing 200 F–106s with advanced air-to-air missile
and fire control systems, 42 AWACS, and two radically new over-the-horizon (OTH)
radars; examining the possibility, during periods of tension, of adding 300 Tactical Air
Command, Navy, and Marine Corps fighters; and retiring other Century interceptors.
OSD discontinued development of the F–12. In mid-1972 there would be 134 F–102s,
26 F–104s, and 398 F–106s; in mid-1976, 238 F–106s, 46 AWACS, and two OTH radars.
Reductions of Hawk and Nike-Hercules would proceed slowly, although keeping
fewer fire units in service than the Chiefs wished. Although this force was estimated
to reduce US fatalities by less than five to eight million, Secretary McNamara listed
other worthwhile purposes: defending against countries other than the USSR; protect-
ing strategic retaliatory forces being withheld during a controlled nuclear conflict;
patrolling air space in peacetime; discouraging the Soviets from building new types
of bombers; and using air defense forces outside the continental United States. This
became the program presented to Congress.30
Force Planning in 1968

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SOP 70-77, early in April 1968, argued for reorienting Sentinel toward “a balanced urban-industrial defense against the Soviet threat.” Through a DPM dated 27 July, Deputy Secretary Nitze prescribed instead a continuation of the program outlined above. That involved obligating procurement funds for one site in FY 1969 while preserving the option for a light defense of Minuteman. He advanced two main arguments against the claim that heavy ABM defenses were an essential element of deterrence. First, even a greater-than-expected Soviet threat could be countered by putting more warheads and penetration aids on Poseidons and raising the bomber alert rate to 60 percent. Second, Deputy Secretary Nitze presented “an important and paradoxical result regarding first strikes.” The calculations of OSD analysts showed that, contrary to common thinking, the number of Americans killed by a Soviet first strike would only equal, and might even fall below, the fatalities resulting from US pre-emption followed by Soviet retaliation. Previously, the country that struck first could expect to achieve some strategic advantage. Now, since both sides possessed relatively invulnerable offensive forces, “the country that strikes second, facing an enemy that has partially disarmed himself, is likely to concentrate on attacking cities with its surviving force because there is little to be gained by firing back at empty missile silos and air bases . . . . This result strengthens our belief that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union stands to benefit by striking first.”31

The Joint Chiefs phrased their rebuttal in general terms, deeming it unlikely that the Soviets “could completely nullify the effectiveness of US defenses or be able to restore completely the confidence they now have in their potential for inflicting major damage upon an undefended United States.” They dismissed, as overly simplistic, Deputy Secretary Nitze’s claim that the side striking first would lose more than it gained. The Chiefs did not, however, try to prove their point through calculations similar to those in the DPM. One reason may have been their hostility to OSD’s cost-effectiveness approach, much of which they had come to regard as advocacy in the guise of objectivity. In any case, Deputy Secretary Nitze’s final recommendations and rationale dated 9 January 1969 remained basically unchanged.32

Aftermath

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ecretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff spent these years talking past each other. The Chiefs’ argument, that creating heavy defenses would reinforce deterrence by lowering Soviet confidence in a successful attack, simply did not address the Secretary’s concerns. At the core of Secretary McNamara’s case was his claim that every extension of missile defense could be offset, at considerably less cost, by improving and enlarging offensive capabilities. As he announced on 18 September 1967, “the money in itself is not the problem; the penetrability of the proposed shield is
the problem.” The Chiefs did not present proofs to the contrary. So, backed by nearly all the scientific community, Secretary McNamara kept President Johnson on his side.

Subsequently, the ABM story followed a tortuous path. The climate in Congress became much cooler toward ballistic missile defense, which was in good part a spill-over from disillusionment with the Vietnam War. Early in 1969, President Nixon approved a “Safeguard” program confined to protecting Minuteman fields. Strategic arms limitation talks with the USSR opened in 1969 and culminated three years later with an Interim Agreement capping offensive systems and an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty allowing each country to have one site shielding its capital and one protecting a missile field. Essentially, during the 1970s, ballistic missile defense disappeared from the strategic nuclear equation.
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

During the early 1960s, national strategy switched from massive retaliation—reliance on nuclear weapons—to flexible response, which assigned much more importance to conventional capabilities. General purpose forces expanded to a point where, in theory, they could conduct an initial defense of Western Europe while simultaneously carrying out one major operation elsewhere. As 1965 opened, the combat-ready strategic reserve included nine Army divisions, three Marine division/wing teams, and 48 USAF tactical fighter squadrons—a level never before equaled in peacetime.1

The scope of limited war remained undefined, and much of this carefully accumulated capital would be expended in Vietnam, which ultimately required half again as many personnel as the Korean conflict. During the Korean War, the Army grew from 10 divisions to 20, the Marine Corps from 2 division/wing teams to 3, the Air Force from 9 to 23 tactical wings.2 During the Vietnam War, the Army increased only from 16 to 19 divisions, the Marine Corps by one division without its air wing, the Air Force from 22 wings in 1965 to 25 in 1967 and then to 29 in 1968 with the USS Pueblo mobilization. The Truman administration resorted to an extensive mobilization of reserves, calling World War II veterans to the colors and sending a good many into combat.3 During the Vietnam conflict, even small numbers of reserves were not mobilized until 1968 and none saw combat. Instead, the active force met Vietnam's demands by practically denuding the strategic reserve in the continental United States.

Force Planning in 1965: Losing the Slack

During February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan covering 30 June 1967 through 30 June 1974. They forwarded JSOP-70 to
Secretary McNamara on 1 March. This proved to be the last peacetime JSOP because, simultaneously, decisions were taken to start sending ground combat troops to South Vietnam and begin the systematic bombing of North Vietnam. The first strikes of Rolling Thunder, the air campaign, took place on 2 March; the first Marines landed at Da Nang, about 100 miles below the Demilitarized Zone dividing North and South, six days later.

JSOP-70’s force-level recommendations flowed from the two-war strategy described above. All Service Chiefs, except the Air Force Chief of Staff, favored continuing the current level of 16 Army divisions and three Marine division/wing teams; General McConnell proposed cutting the Army to 14 by mid-1968. In Western Europe, according to intelligence estimates, the Warsaw Pact could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. General Wheeler, Admiral McDonald, and General Greene believed that 40 NATO divisions (30 active and 10 reserve), 11 of them American, could conduct a successful initial defense, with each division covering a 30-kilometer front. General McConnell considered that frontage estimate was conservative because NATO divisions were qualitatively superior; on the other hand, General Johnson rated the divisional total inadequate because no allowance was being made for Soviet reinforcement capability. Outside Western Europe, for the second war, danger areas included the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Korea. JSOP-70 calculated that 8 US divisions would be needed in Iran, 6 in Southeast Asia, and 10 1/3 in Korea. Overall, General Wheeler, Admiral McDonald and General Greene believed that a total of 19 active and 7 reserve Army and Marine divisions were “within acceptable limits of risk.” General Johnson judged this overly optimistic because 8 to 14 US divisions fighting outside the NATO area might not be able to disengage and redeploy to Europe fast enough to make a difference. General McConnell, on the contrary, argued that the flexibility and striking power of recently reorganized ROAD divisions justified a reduction to 14.

On 8 July 1965, Secretary McNamara endorsed 16 Army and 3 Marine divisions. Recent Army war games had matched cost-equal US and Soviet forces and concluded that they contained about the same combat power. Since US divisions had twice the manpower and cost twice as much, Secretary McNamara argued, should not one US division be deemed equal with two Soviet ones? Intelligence estimated the Soviet Army to contain 65 divisions at full strength, 41 at two-thirds strength, and 32 at one-fifth strength. Deducing that the Pact could not support many more than 65 divisions in combat, Secretary McNamara saw no reason to increase the 11-division commitment to NATO. In their critique, the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed with Secretary McNamara’s assessment that the enemy’s offensive strength in Europe was limited to 65 divisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the Soviets could deploy more divisions because they were maintaining, at reduced strength, support units for more than 65 divisions—a fact that was more compatible with current intelligence.

Meanwhile, the commitment of ground combat troops into South Vietnam grew steadily. By the end of May, the 3rd Marine Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade had arrived in country. A brigade of the 1st Infantry Division and a brigade from the 101st...
Airborne Division also had been alerted for deployment; their sea movement started during late June and early July. But these were not enough. On 7 June General William Westmoreland (Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) cabled an urgent warning. The armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam stood on the verge of collapse; another 100,000 ground and air personnel were needed promptly, lifting the number of US maneuver battalions to 34 and the personnel total to 175,000. Eleven days later, the President approved deploying the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).  

On 8 July, Secretary McNamara told the Joint Chiefs that President Johnson had approved General Westmoreland’s request. The Marine Corps, Secretary McNamara added, would activate the 4th Marine Division and its air wing; the Army would mobilize 27 reserve battalions, to be replaced eventually by 27 new regular ones. On 20 July, Secretary McNamara—with General Wheeler’s concurrence—sent President Johnson the following recommendations: increase the regular establishment by 375,000 (Army, 250,000; Marine Corps, 75,000; Air Force, 25,000; and Navy, 25,000); ask Congress to authorize the call-up of 235,000 reservists (Army, 125,000; Marine Corps, 75,000; Air Force, 25,000; and Navy, 10,000). General Wheeler later explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw three compelling reasons for a call-up. First, virtually all contingency plans assumed that reserve units would be mobilized to reconstitute the strategic reserve; second, relying entirely upon active forces required much larger draft calls that would expand the training establishment, spreading officers and NCOs thin; and third, calling reservists to the colors would make people aware that the country was truly at war.  

Pushing Great Society legislation through Congress remained President Johnson’s first priority, at least emotionally. Possibly he was encouraged by General Wheeler’s predictions, during White House discussions over 21–22 July, that sending larger bodies of North Vietnamese troops south “will allow us to cream them,” that Hanoi dare not risk moving more than one-quarter of its forces into South Vietnam, and that there would be “definite progress in three years.” President Johnson chose a course designed to hold down “the political noise level” at home, which meant meeting General Westmoreland’s request without mobilizing any reserves or extending terms of service. Conveying this decision to the Chiefs on 23–24 July, Secretary McNamara claimed the 4th Marine Division could be mobilized in two weeks, not the 90 days planned by the Marine Corps. On 28 July, at a televised press conference, President Johnson announced that the Vietnam commitment would rise from 75,000 to 125,000 and more “will be sent as requested.” Subsequently, in a background press briefing, the President said that reserves would need several months of training to become fully effective, whereas the 1st Cavalry Division and units from Okinawa were already combat-ready.  

Years afterward, General Johnson speculated why the President decided against any call-ups. He must have remembered that the last mobilization, during the 1961 Berlin crisis, provoked adverse public reactions. Also, as the law then stood, reservists had no further obligation after completing their tours, so that units reverting to inactive status would have no personnel left and need a long time to rebuild. General Johnson thought, too, that the President hoped to fight in Vietnam without intruding upon the
peacetime life of the nation—and that, he reflected, was the administration’s greatest mistake. Clearly, in any case, July 1965 marked the beginning of what some would term the “erosion” and others the “disintegration” of the US Army.

The 175,000 ceiling proved very short-lived. In August, after General Wheeler conferred with General Westmoreland, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended and Secretary McNamara approved raising it to 210,000. On 24 September, the Joint Chiefs recommended organizing a fourth Marine Expeditionary Force. Instead, in mid-October, Secretary McNamara directed the temporary addition of one Army infantry division, raising the total to 17.

General Westmoreland envisaged a three-phase campaign. Phase I, to “stem the tide,” required 219,000 personnel; Phase II, to “start winning the war,” would raise that figure to 359,000. A final Phase III, destroying the enemy’s remaining forces and base areas, would require even more US and third-country troops. Carrying out the first two phases, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Secretary McNamara on 10 November, would render US forces unable to execute a “2½ war” strategy: maintain a NATO-committed reserve; be able to halt Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia or Korea; and conduct a minor contingency operation, like the Dominican Republic operation, in the Western Hemisphere. As matters stood, CONUS-based Army divisions were being depleted by the demands of Phase I; they might return to combat readiness between March 1966 and March 1967. The Marine Corps also needed another brigade. To fulfill Phase II, the active force must be increased by two infantry divisions and one Marine Expeditionary Force. Mobilizing reserves, the Chiefs added, would accelerate this expansion considerably. Again, however, there was no call-up. On 24 November, Secretary McNamara approved (1) adding the ground elements of a fourth Marine Expeditionary Force and (2) increasing the Army’s personnel ceiling by about 46,000, so divisions that were part of Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) could be made combat-ready without mobilizing reserves. Thus in FY 1967 ground forces would total 21 divisions (17 Army and 4 Marine Corps); thereafter, they would revert to 19 (16 Army and 3 Marine Corps).

Tactical air strength also felt the pinch of Vietnam. As 1965 opened, there were 22 USAF wings and 15 attack carriers. In JSOP-70, a majority of the Chiefs recommended continuing those levels, totaling about 3,200 planes for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Alone again, General McConnell wanted 23 wings in FY 1967 and 34 by FY 1974, while cutting the Navy’s carriers to 13 in FY 1967 and 12 thereafter. Drawing upon World War II and Korean War experiences against the Warsaw Pact, the Joint Staff proposed a 1:2:1 ratio among air superiority, interdiction, and close support missions; however, none of the other Chiefs accepted that rationale. Admiral McDonald, for example, argued that it ignored contributions made by heavy and medium bombers, and overlooked the fact that Navy and Marine Corps aircraft had flown more than one-third of the missions in Korea. General McConnell observed that the number of aircraft needed to gain air superiority depended largely upon the size of the enemy’s inventory. According to Air Force intelligence, the Warsaw Pact possessed between 4,425 and 8,100 tactical aircraft, active and reserve—totals that justified a steady
increase of USAF wings. Turning to the annual debate about land-based versus sea-based air power, which split the Chiefs again on Service prerogatives, General McCon nell argued for fewer attack carriers because they had been withdrawn from the SIOP alert and he believed they were unsuitable for supporting conventional operations in Central Europe. But Generals Johnson and Wheeler cited growing instability in the Third World as a reason for maintaining 15 carriers.\textsuperscript{18}

Through DPMs dated 26 June and 6 July, Secretary McNamara proposed that there be 23 USAF wings in FY 1967 and 24 thereafter; carriers would stay constant at 15. For the Air Force, he planned to procure seven F–111 and 15 F–4 wings, both being high-performance multipurpose aircraft. For the Navy he planned to build three carriers, starting the first in FY 1967, the second in FY 1969, and the third in FY 1971. Relying upon Defense Intelligence Agency estimates, Secretary McNamara anticipated a growing numerical superiority in aircraft over adversaries: in mid-1965, 9,967 for the Free World versus 9,259 for the Sino-Soviet Bloc; in mid-1971, 9,269 versus 7,124.\textsuperscript{19} Using cost-effectiveness comparisons, he calculated that the opposing sides’ inventory values were roughly equal in FY 1965 but in FY 1971 would reach $14 billion for the Free World against $9.7 billion for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Since Mr. McNamara viewed replacement costs as an approximate indication of relative effectiveness, he found in those figures evidence of the Free World’s qualitative edge. In fact, he believed that the number of carrier aircraft—17 wings for 15 ships—could be cut by about 8 percent. Normally, after all, three carriers were in port undergoing overhaul. Additionally, carriers on routine cruises could carry under-strength wings that would be augmented by ground-based naval air units whenever necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by voicing reservations about Secretary McNamara’s cost-effectiveness comparisons, a criticism similar to those of past years. While qualitative advances undoubtedly would occur, even “moderate” improvements by the other side would cancel any gains.\textsuperscript{20}

Inevitably, the Vietnam buildup eroded the premises upon which these force levels were based. General Westmoreland wanted 26 USAF squadrons during Phase I and nine more for Phase II. In July, President Johnson agreed to send 777 tactical aircraft. On 10 November, the Joint Chiefs analyzed for the Secretary of Defense the impact of that deployment. The Navy was running short of pilots, and the Air Force would have in CONUS only three to five tactical fighter squadrons that were combat-ready. The Air Force needed 456 more tactical fighters, while the Navy required 212 A–4 Skyhawks\textsuperscript{21} plus an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carrier modified for an attack role. Rolling Thunder, the air campaign against North Vietnam, required that five attack carriers operate in the Western Pacific. The Joint Chiefs urged that two ASW carriers be brought out of mothballs, one for training and one for NATO reserve.\textsuperscript{22} Those reactivations were disapproved. Early in December, for FY 1967, Secretary McNamara settled upon 23 wings and 15 carriers, with a total of 3,017 aircraft (1,584 Air Force, 990 Navy, and 443 Marine Corps). For later years, he planned 24 USAF wings.\textsuperscript{23}

The prospect of moving divisions and their supplies across the Pacific to Vietnam highlighted the importance of strategic mobility. JSOP-70 analyzed transportation
requirements for contingency plans pertaining to Southeast Asia and Western Europe. The Joint Staff concluded that, with the capabilities available in March 1965, two emergencies occurring together would overtax capabilities. A combination of airlift (swift but costly), sealift (economical although slow), and pre-positioned equipment (cheap but vulnerable and inflexible after being put in place) appeared to be the best solution. General Johnson commented that the Joint Staff, by measuring distances from the center of the United States rather than the coasts, had understated US capabilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, for FY 1974, airlift composed of 256 propeller-driven C–130s, 208 jet C–141s that were just entering production, and either 128 (Air Force) or 48 (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) of the supercargo C–5As still in the developmental stage. The Air Force also wanted 80 CX-VSTOLs able to make very short takeoffs and landings. For sealift in FY 1974, the Chiefs recommended between 110 and 114 ships, including 17 forward floating depots, 12 roll-on/roll-off cargo, and 4 fast deployment logistics (FDL) ships. An FDL's payload would be 8,000 to 10,000 tons, deliverable either at ports or over the beaches.

In his October DPM, Secretary McNamara outlined an FY 1974 force with somewhat more aircraft and fewer ships. He was much impressed with work done by the Chairman's Special Studies Group. It showed that slower deployments to Iran, Korea, and Southeast Asia, trading space for time, ultimately would create greater requirements. Consequently, Secretary McNamara intended to produce 224 C–141s, plan for 96 C–5As, confine the CX-VSTOL to advanced development, and augment airlift manpower by 20,000 to increase utilization rates. Also, he projected an FDL fleet of 18 ships.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported Mr. McNamara's FY 1967 recommendations but not his later ones, because they ran below JSOP-70 levels. His final DPM, showing only minor changes, read as follows:

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<th>FY 1967</th>
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<td>C–130</td>
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<td>Cargo ships</td>
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<td>Forward floating Depot</td>
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<td>Troopships</td>
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Sources: JCSM-748-65 to SecDef, 12 Oct 65, JCS 2458/4-1; Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Nov 65, JCS 2458/4-5; JMF 7000 (4 Oct 65).

Navy submarine and surface warfare forces felt the impact of Vietnam far less. A large and growing Soviet submarine fleet posed the greatest threat to American maritime supremacy. The best way to "kill" Soviet submarines was to create, in the Barents
and Norwegian Seas, the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, and La Perouse Strait in the North Pacific, barriers patrolled by US attack submarines. American submarines, being quieter than Soviet ones, had superior “secure sweep width,” which was the distance at which a searcher could detect a target without being discovered itself. The total number of US submarines needed to assure 25 percent attrition at each barrier came to 26 diesel and 97 nuclear. In JSOP-70, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that the cost of such a force was prohibitive. Instead, all save one favored 40 diesels and 65 nuclears in FY 1967, changing ultimately to 23 diesels and 82 nuclears. General McConnell would endorse only 59 nuclears until the effectiveness of Soviet efforts to silence their own submarines became clear. If the Soviet effort failed, General McConnell argued, fewer submarines would be needed; if it succeeded, the barrier strategy might have to be abandoned. Also, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff majority favored increasing ASW carriers from nine in FY 1967 to 11 in FY 1974, General McConnell wanted to hold steady at nine.26

In his DPM, circulated on 28 June, Secretary McNamara took a more conservative view of ASW capabilities. Navy studies showed to his satisfaction that currently programmed forces would destroy 77 percent of the Soviet submarines trying to cross the Barents and Norwegian Sea barriers, and sink another 18 percent as they attempted to recross them and return to port. In the Pacific, these figures would be 60 percent and 24 percent.27 Since the enemy knew that US forces could kill even more submarines if the Soviets built them, “it does not pay the Soviets to increase their forces.” Given these conditions, Secretary McNamara saw no reason to raise US force levels. He decided, in fact, to reduce ASW carriers to eight in FY 1967 and seven thereafter, on grounds that they were very expensive to operate and their fixed-wing aircraft were relatively ineffective. For new construction, Secretary McNamara intended to start five nuclear attack submarines and 10 destroyer escorts.28

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that this program was “substantially lower than the least” of their recommendations. They particularly objected to the belief that cost-effectiveness considerations precluded either side from increasing its forces. In response, the Secretary raised surface ship levels during FY 1967. He increased the number of destroyer escorts from 29 to 43, adding 11 ships to support Navy operations in Southeast Asia. He also decided to keep nine ASW carriers in service, justifying his change by citing the benefits from improved helicopters, radars, and sonobuoys. As for submarines, Mr. McNamara listed 65 diesels and 40 nuclears in FY 1967, the mix favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff majority, which would change to 37 diesels and 68 nuclears in FY 1974.29

The ASW program had to clear one unexpected hurdle. McGeorge Bundy, Budget Director Charles Schultze, and Donald Hornig, the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, all opposed building ten destroyer escorts because they saw little likelihood of a long war at sea for which these ships were designed. For the same reason, they recommended starting three rather than five nuclear submarines. Mr. Hornig advised the President that “I have seen no evidence . . . to indicate that barriers
cannot . . be penetrated readily [and] successfully by a resourceful enemy." Nonetheless, President Johnson asked Congress to fund construction of five submarines and ten escorts.30

Amphibious assault forces were an area in which JSOP-70 recommendations for FY 1967 proved to be practically identical with those in Secretary McNamara's tentative DPM: 137 amphibious assault and six gunfire support ships. The objective lay in creating by FY 1972 a capability for carrying 1 1/2 Marine divisions at 20 knots, retaining until then enough older ships to keep total capacity as near two divisions as possible. In July, General McConnell urged that all the gunfire support ships, eight-inch gun cruisers, be retired. Secretary McNamara ignored this Service parochialism, labeling as imprudent an exclusive reliance on air support. In September, after the Secretary approved reactivating 12 Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) for use in Southeast Asia, the total reached 154. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now asked that an eight-inch gun cruiser be brought out of mothballs, to compensate for Vietnam diversions, but Secretary McNamara declined.31

All in all, 1965 became a watershed year as the buildup of 1961–64 turned into a drawdown. Early in December the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of a loss, likely to last several years, in ability to meet non-Vietnam contingencies and commitments. Worse was to come, as Secretary McNamara warned the President of “dramatic” changes to the situation in Vietnam. Infiltration from the North had risen sharply, and the communists showed greater willingness to stand and fight, even in large-scale engagements. Secretary McNamara recommended, and General Wheeler endorsed, putting approximately 400,000 personnel into Vietnam by the end of 1966. Another 200,000 or more might be needed in 1967. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe additional deployments could be accomplished without mobilizing reserves, but Secretary McNamara disagreed.32

**Force Planning in 1966: Tautness**

During 1966, the Vietnam commitment approached massive proportions. As of 1 January, there were 184,000 US personnel in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, wanted 79 US battalions, adding about 200,000 Americans by 31 December. President Johnson and Secretary McNamara promised to provide all the battalions but cautioned the commanders that a reserve call-up would be politically impossible.33 On 17 February, Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine ways of meeting the field commanders’ request without mobilization. In reply, the Chiefs recommended stretching out the augmentation through mid-1967. Otherwise, without a reserve call-up, extensive drawdowns would create serious risks. The shortfalls would include four infantry divisions, 15 tactical fighter and six tactical reconnaissance squadrons, one attack and one ASW carrier, one cruiser, and 24 destroyers.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff defined the problem as meeting Vietnam requirements while establishing programs to achieve other critical goals. Their priorities were to reconstitute a strategic reserve as well as create an adequate training and rotation base. The Army had 5 1/3 divisions, none of them immediately deployable, and wanted 9 1/3. Another requirement was to meet Admiral Sharp’s non-Vietnam requirements in the Pacific area. Finally, they had to maintain and/or restore the US posture in Europe and the Atlantic. Although formally, the Europe-first strategic concept did not change; for practical purposes, it did. East Asia, where there was a war, came ahead of Europe, where there was none. Nor did Secretary McNamara, allow a stretch-out. On 11 April, he approved a plan submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would put 376,350 personnel into Vietnam by the year’s end. The 1st Marine Division and the 25th Infantry Division came in the spring, but deployment of the 4th Infantry Division was spread between February and August. The 9th Infantry Division arrived between December 1966 and January 1967.

JSOP 68-75, submitted on 24 March 1966, made a case for maintaining 21 Army and 4 Marine divisions on active service as long as the war lasted. Three of the Army divisions, though, would be mobilized reserves—a solution already rejected by the President. The Joint Staff computed divisional requirements as: 19 for Europe; six (the number then in or deploying to Vietnam) for a second conflict; two in CONUS reserve; four for the Pacific area; and one to deal with a minor contingency. Although the Joint Staff calculated that 32 to 34 divisions were needed to execute this 2½ war strategy, it stated that 30 (21 active and 9 reserve) would fall within “acceptable limits of risk”—provided seven reserve divisions could reach the theater of operations 30 to 60 days after mobilization began. But more than 30 divisions were needed, the Joint Staff believed, as long as the Vietnam War lasted.

In August 1966, Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance circulated a DPM proposing 21 active divisions (17 Army, 4 Marine) in FY 1968 and 19 (16 Army, 3 Marine) thereafter. Uniquely, this DPM contained no supporting rationales for these choices; it offered only tabular comparisons of Free World versus Sino-Soviet Bloc strength. Commenting in mid-September, the Chiefs repeated their JSOP recommendations. They protested, too, that OSD was being premature in dropping temporary augmentations after FY 1968. Substantial commitments, whether for combat or postwar “stabilization,” might continue for some years, and an overly hasty return to the 19-division baseline would risk shortfalls in procurement.

Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland wanted 12 more maneuver battalions during 1967. Early in October 1966, the Joint Chiefs sent Secretary McNamara a “preliminary assessment” that the Army could fulfill their requests, although six to eight months later than the field commanders desired. But doing so would strip the Army’s strategic reserve down to two combat-ready brigades through mid-1968. US Army, Europe, would be hurt by the transfers of skilled officers and NCOs, and reserve units in CONUS would lack about 30 percent of their equipment. All told, the Army needed another 3 2/3 division-equivalents to satisfy its strategic reserve and sustaining base
requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for prompt action to obtain more funds and accelerate procurement authorizations. Selective reserve mobilizations, they observed, would hasten the process.38

Secretary McNamara’s final DPM, issued late in November, contained no concessions: 17 Army and 4 Marine divisions in FY 1968, 16 and 3 after the war. This force structure was a topic at the budget session with President Johnson on 6 December. Mr. McNamara framed the discussion by saying that the Army proposed to add two brigades and possibly another division by equipping them from reserve unit stocks. The effect, he argued, would be merely to substitute the shorter deployment time of active forces for the longer ones of reserve units. General Johnson pointed to certain “bills” that the Army was responsible to fill: a three-division commitment to reinforce Allied Command Europe; 40,000 men to maintain a proposed anti-infiltration barrier in South Vietnam; and a three-division corps for contingencies. Yet only five divisions were available in CONUS to cover these bills. If members of Congress inquired about the adequacy of ground forces, General Johnson continued, he would have to say they were “very thin.”

He wanted to expand the active Army by two divisions now and one brigade later, outfitting them with equipment borrowed from reserve units. Secretary McNamara countered that the only advantage from shifting equipment lay in slightly reducing reaction time. The alternative would be calling reservists to active duty. Yet very recently, the Secretary continued, he and Mr. Vance had polled JCS members and none spoke in favor of mobilization. President Johnson then asked the Chairman and the Service Chiefs whether they wanted to activate reserves; none did. Subsequently, in Congressional testimony, General Johnson stressed that the employment of mobilized reserves must be correlated with the timing of an operation. Some reservists would resent being called to active duty: “So one must, then, weigh . . . the unrest this tends to create within the force . . . against the loss in time that it requires to expand the Active Army.”39

The Air Force experienced a similar drain of active forces to Southeast Asia, as the pace and scope of Rolling Thunder gradually increased. Through JSOP 68-75, appearing in March 1966, all the Chiefs recommended 24 USAF tactical fighter wings in FY 1968. For later years, however, they split: General McConnell favored expansion to 34; Admiral McDonald, to 31; General Wheeler, to 30; Generals Johnson and Greene, to 27. As for attack carriers, they all supported 15 in FY 1968 and 16 thereafter.

The Joint Staff calculated that sustaining 18 divisions in combat for 30 days would require about 5,200 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft, active and reserve. Staff officers justified this total by allocating 100 daily sorties to each division: 25 for air superiority, 50 for interdiction, and 25 for close air support. That was the same 1:2:1 ratio that had caused so much controversy the year before, but it fared a bit better this time. General McConnell and Admiral McDonald agreed with the analysis, but Generals Johnson and Greene believed that 4,600 would be enough.40

Secretary McNamara’s tentative plan, issued in July 1966, ran below even the smallest Service proposal: excluding reserves, there would be 3,165 aircraft in FY 1968 and
2,967 in FY 1975. The comparable JSOP recommendation for FY 1968 was 3,239; for FY 1975, proposals ranged from a low of 3,675 (Army, Marine Corps) to a high of 4,107 (Air Force). Mr. McNamara, however, believed that the Free World enjoyed a “large and growing superiority.” In 1966, inventories would total 13,704 for the Free World versus 11,128 for the Sino-Soviet Bloc; in FY 1975, 12,387 versus 9,927. Qualitatively, the Free World’s payload capabilities were twice as large in 1966 and would be four times as great by 1971.

Analyzing requirements for Europe and the Far East, Mr. McNamara judged his programmed forces entirely adequate. By his reckoning, after 30 days of fighting in Central Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would have 3,500 aircraft and the Warsaw Pact only 1,500. With 3,000 aircraft, Allied Command Europe could mount 1,950 sorties daily over the next 60 days. Even after deducting 750 daily sorties for interdiction, 28.5 still could be flown in support of each division. That was 3.5 above the JSOP number, more than twice the World War II rate, and four times the World War II payload figure. In East Asia, even if half the 2,000 US aircraft were committed to the battle for air supremacy, the remaining 1,000 could fly 250 interdiction sorties daily and still provide 37.5 close air support sorties to each of 14 US divisions as well as 159 to all those of our allies.41

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found no merit in these figures. Tactical air power, they advised the Secretary, was “a highly complex but versatile force . . . ; its role varies in relation to the enemy, the areas of opposition, the strategy, the friendly forces, and the military and political situation.” To compare inventories was to compare resources, not capabilities. The real issue, instead, was “how much tactical air can be applied during specific time periods, for how long, and against what kind of opposition.” The Joint Chiefs believed that qualitative comparisons must also take into account the roles and missions to be performed. American multi-purpose planes, while more expensive than specialized Soviet aircraft, were not necessarily more effective in a given role. Costs rose on account of such things as the need to deploy over greater distances, safety, reliability, and ease of maintenance, none of which necessarily resulted in better performance. General Johnson wanted to sum up by saying that OSD’s “emphasis on cost relationships to the exclusion of comprehensive and professional effectiveness analysis raises serious questions in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the objectivity of the analysis process.” Instead, the conclusion was softened to say that “it would be appropriate to review the analysis process as it is now being conducted [in order] to assess its adequacy and validity.”42

The “analysis process” was not reviewed, probably because Systems Analysis and Joint Staff officers recently had signed an agreed estimate of NATO and Warsaw Pact air power, covering both quantitative and qualitative aspects.43 But Secretary McNamara’s final recommendation did provide modest increases: 24 USAF wings and a total of 3,290 aircraft in FY 1968; 23 wings and 3,139 in FY 1971. He kept the number of attack carriers steady at 15.44

Even so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not satisfied. They warned Secretary McNamara that, if Admiral Sharp’s latest requests were filled, CONUS-based tactical fighter
units would be committed completely to training by late 1967. Yet Strike Command (STRICOM) needed at least 37 squadrons to meet NATO and other contingencies. Even counting replacement training units, STRICOM still would stand 22 squadrons short of requirements. Moreover, Admiral Sharp wanted the Seventh Fleet, which was deeply involved in Rolling Thunder, reinforced with a sixth attack carrier group. Unless one ASW carrier was adapted to an attack role and an ASW carrier reactivated, the Chiefs anticipated that one attack carrier would have to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The Service Chiefs tried again to revisit the subject of mobilizing the reserves. They observed that mobilizing reserve aviators and aircraft would do much to correct deficiencies. Secretary McNamara took no action.

For strategic mobility, the JSOP recommended an FY 1975 force of 105 ships and 592 aircraft, including 240 C–130s, 208 C–141s, and either 144 (Air Force) or 96 (Army, Navy, Marine Corps) C–5As. Secretary McNamara tentatively planned 92 ships and 656 aircraft. During FY 1968, he wanted to initiate the procurement of 18 C-5As and 10 FDL ships. When 96 C–5As, 224 C–141s, 18 FDLs, and 316,000 tons of pre-positioned equipment became available, Secretary McNamara anticipated an ability to reinforce Allied Command Europe and, concurrently, carry out one other contingency operation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, observing that Secretary McNamara had described requirements for two rather than 2½ wars, asked for: additional C–130 procurement to offset Vietnam diversions and attrition; pre-positioning equipment in Europe for another armored division; constructing tankers and cargo ships; and delaying the retirements of troopships. The Secretary’s sole concession involved the indefinite retention of 16 troopships.

Projecting force levels for ASW carriers and attack submarines sharpened differences between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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This time, Mr. McNamara labeled ASW carriers “costly and unproductive” because their aircraft apparently had only one chance in thirty of turning a detection into a kill. If new sensors and processors for surface ships proved ineffective, retired carriers could easily be reactivated. And, since several attack carriers were slated for conversion to ASW roles, the capability of ASW carriers could increase rapidly if necessary. While the Secretary and the Chiefs agreed that the attack submarine force should total 105, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted all to be nuclear-powered while Mr. McNamara stopped at 68. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sought an augmentation of 23 destroyer escorts for Southeast Asia, he allowed only eleven.
The Secretary based his decision upon a Navy study claiming that, during a twelve-month sea war in 1970, the allies would lose 1,000 to 1,200 of their ships out of 15,000 while 90 percent of the Soviet submarine fleet would be sunk. In their commentary, dated 6 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized that study as a “useful first step” but “fundamentally inconclusive for purposes of force planning.” They seized upon several inconsistencies with other Draft Presidential Memorandums. For instance, while the Anti-Submarine Warfare DPM anticipated that NATO allies would protect 1,800 ship arrivals per month, the NATO DPM advocated major reductions among certain of the allies’ ASW forces. Also, while the ASW DPM spoke about possibly curtailing convoys during the early phases of conflict so as to lessen sinking, the DPM on strategic mobility stated that a swift, heavy commitment of forces could reduce losses. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected the Soviets to act more cleverly than the DPM suggested. Why would they try to fight a long sea war, when they knew what enormous losses they must suffer? A better strategy would involve blockading Japan or the Persian Gulf, where the economic payoff was great, and delaying an all-out attack until the requirements for supporting a land campaign left the western powers most vulnerable at sea.

Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that 12 rather than 10 destroyers be started and 9 ASW carriers retained, on grounds that hunter-killer task forces generated “a synergistic effect in which the capability of the group is greater than the sum of its parts.” As to major surface escorts, Secretary McNamara proposed 77, allowing four for every attack carrier, two for each of the four ASW carriers that might operate within range of enemy aircraft, and eleven for other missions. The Chiefs found these numbers too low, since attack carriers probably would be widely separated and hence have little opportunity to provide mutual support.

On 6 December, Admiral McDonald presented his case to President Johnson. Admiral McDonald began by noting that no major fleet escorts had been started since 1962. In 1965 DOD had not supported any nuclear-powered guided missile escort (DLGNs), but Congress authorized one anyway. Believing that each nuclear carrier should have two nuclear escorts, Admiral McDonald sought a second DLGN in FY 1968. Failure to ask for it, he predicted, would lead to another wrangle with Congress. Secretaries McNamara and Vance disagreed on the grounds that one nuclear escort per nuclear carrier was sufficient. Turning to nuclear attack submarines, Admiral McDonald argued for continuing the practice of starting five each year, rather than three as the Secretary proposed. Secretary McNamara replied that, since the Navy hoped to settle upon a new class of submarines in 1968, he favored delaying two until next year, when the Navy would be able to exploit new technology. On both escorts and submarines, the President backed Mr. McNamara.

Choosing objectives for amphibious assault forces raised no controversy. The first in a class of 40,000-ton LHAs (amphibious assault ship (general-purpose)), uniquely able to carry troops, helicopters, cargo and landing craft, would be funded in FY 1968. Mr. McNamara proposed and the Chiefs endorsed accelerating from FY 1972 to FY
1969 a plan for having enough lift to carry 1 1/2 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) at 20 knots, relying on older 13-knot ships to lift as much of the remaining 1/2 MEF as possible.53

Force Planning in 1967: Fraying Faster

Early in March 1967, through JSOP 69-76, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once more recommended maintaining 21 Army and 4 Marine divisions while the war lasted, 18 and 3 thereafter. Without mobilization, essential elements of the 2½-war strategy could be fulfilled by 26 division-equivalents: 10 for Europe; 14 for Asia; and 2 as a strategic reserve.54 Again, though, the field commander’s call for more troops left these calculations outdated. On 18 March, General Westmoreland asked for a “minimum” of 80,000 more personnel (including 2 1/3 divisions and 4 tactical fighter squadrons) and suggested an “optimum” of 199,000 (including 4 2/3 divisions and 10 squadrons).55

Responding on 19 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deploying another 98,000 personnel to Vietnam during FY 1968, adding that this would be impossible without a 24-month reserve call-up and a 12-month involuntary extension of terms of service. Concurrently, the Chiefs broadened their study to address worldwide contingencies. Their findings, forwarded to Secretary McNamara on 20 May, were that meeting General Westmoreland’s “minimum” request would maintain momentum but offered little likelihood of bringing the war to a satisfactory end. Expanded operations, however, could spark Soviet and Chinese countermoves. Yet by mid-1968, as matters now stood, the strategic reserve would be reduced to 2 2/3 Army divisions, two Marine divisions, and nine tactical fighter squadrons, all with “marginal sustaining capability” and unable either to satisfy post-1968 Vietnam requirements or respond to Sino-Soviet pressures. Therefore, they urged prompt action to provide through mobilization a capability for maintaining: (1) FY 1968 Vietnam requests; (2) units already in Europe, pre-positioned stocks in Germany, and initial reinforcements from CONUS; (3) a contingency force of three divisions and 10 squadrons intended primarily for Southeast Asia; and (4) a ready reserve of one division and three squadrons for minor contingencies.56

On 29 May, through a tentative DPM, Secretary McNamara proposed adding one division to the Army, for a wartime total of 18. His calculation of requirements for 2½ wars allocated only 8 divisions to Europe compared to 11 in the DPMs of 1965–66. His justification was that the allies probably would exhaust their munitions before reactivated US reserve divisions reached the battlefield.57 As for Southeast Asia, Secretary McNamara cited findings by the Chairman’s Special Studies Group that the Chinese would enjoy only a 1.2-1.6 to 1 advantage over 7 US divisions, with interdiction making the two sides approximately equal. Admittedly, in South Vietnam, about 1,000,000 allied troops were fighting 280,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. But during a “conventional” war, the Secretary argued, superior US equipment and support would more than offset China’s numerical edge. South Korea could defend itself without American help,
he continued, rejecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff claim that 6 to 15 US divisions would be required. In 1951, he noted, 535,000 United Nations (UN) troops had halted 835,000 Chinese and North Koreans. In 1967, by M-90, 680,000 South Koreans would face 825,000 Chinese and North Koreans. That, plus the fact that US units cost 15 times as much as South Korean counterparts, convinced him that the two American divisions in South Korea should be withdrawn when “political factors” permitted. Throughout East Asia, then, the post-Vietnam requirements would be seven divisions for Southeast Asia and perhaps two for Korea. Lastly, Mr. McNamara provided 1 1/3 divisions for Western Hemisphere contingencies.58

On 24 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Mr. McNamara that his force levels incurred “an excessive degree of risk.” For Europe, 10 divisions rather than 8 more accurately reflected available intelligence and military objectives. As to Southeast Asia, Vietnam had left them chastened enough to conclude that between 13 1/3 and 19 2/3 division-equivalents would be needed if the Chinese chose to concentrate their entire effort in that area. In South Korea, they still saw a need for “substantial” US forces to defend against as many as 58 Chinese and North Korean divisions. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the JSOP position, augmented by their recommendations of 20 May.59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff critique had no impact because Secretary McNamara concluded that, without mobilizing reserves, extending tours, or diverting units earmarked for Europe, the services could supply General Westmoreland with 3 2/3 division-equivalents by 31 December 1968—more than his “minimum” request. In Saigon, during 7–9 July, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, and General Westmoreland settled upon an increase of less than 50,000 personnel, creating a new ceiling of 525,000. The Service Chiefs concurred and President Johnson approved. Major units to be deployed included the 101st Airborne Division (-) and two tactical fighter squadrons, plus a Marine brigade and three USAF squadrons placed in readiness.60

General Johnson worried that, after much of the 101st went to Vietnam, only the 82nd Airborne Division would be promptly available for other contingencies—and the recent Middle East war had shown how quickly crises could erupt. He asked the other Chiefs to join in supporting activation of another division. J–5 prepared a justification for adding one Army division and 1/3 Marine Expeditionary Force, but General McConnell opposed forwarding it to the Secretary on grounds that doing so would amount to a retreat from their recommendations of 20 May. General McConnell suggested, and his colleagues agreed, that discussion with Mr. McNamara was the best approach. In response, the Secretary did agree that the Army needed another division. On 7 September he authorized activation of the 6th Infantry Division, thereby raising the total to 19. Regionally, Secretary McNamara’s allocations now ran as follows: eight for NATO; 10 for Southeast Asia; two for Korea; one for the Western Hemisphere; and two for a strategic reserve.61

In JSOP 69-76, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a united front about USAF tactical fighter wings: 23 in FY 1969, 25 in FY 1970, 29 in FY 1972. Generals Wheeler and
McConnell wanted 16 attack carriers; the other Chiefs favored 17. Active Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft should number 3,416 in FY 1969 and 3,687 in FY 1976. Forces needed to fight in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Korea (singly or in various combinations) totaled 3,700, organized in 32 or 33 tactical fighter and 18 or 19 carrier wings. Since combat losses were not wholly replaceable, those levels would not be reached until FY 1972. The resulting risks stopped short of being “entirely unacceptable” only thanks to the alternative provided by tactical and strategic nuclear forces.

The wartime Air Force now contained 25 wings, but Secretary McNamara had lower postwar goals: 23 by FY 1969, building to 24 in FY 1970 and reducing to 23 thereafter; 16 carriers in FY 1969, 15 thereafter. Active aircraft would total 3,198 in FY 1969, 2,877 in FY 1976. He put forward, as a planning guide, being able to fight indefinitely in the Far East while holding enough forces to fight in Europe for ninety days. The Secretary continued to believe that NATO led the Warsaw Pact in both quantity (11,367 versus 10,697 in 1967; 8,821 versus 7,461 in 1972) and quality (payloads and pilot training). Consequently, “we can deploy 1,511 aircraft to Asia while still holding eight wings and two attack carriers for Europe”—and those 1,511 could deliver thirteen times the payloads of their opponents. With the Air Force and Navy developing a new avionics system for the A-7 designed to double or triple bombing accuracy, “we can reduce from 24 to 23 wings while still increasing our capability.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized Secretary McNamara’s DPM for emphasizing “cost considerations over security requirements.” They called the concepts underlying its analyses “militarily unsound” and concluded that “neither the forces recommended nor the employment portrayed . . . will support, simultaneously, two major contingencies and one minor contingency.” In Europe, NATO’s numerical advantage could fail to materialize because so much depended upon timely arrival of reinforcements from CONUS. Very likely with the shortcomings of Rolling Thunder in mind, they observed that a “piecemeal application” of tactical air power could imperil the attainment of air superiority. Qualitatively, they denied that total payload capability stood out as the key factor. Effectiveness also was “a function of missions, range, employment profiles, types of ordnance, and operational constraints.” All of them, singly or in combination, could offset apparent payload advantages. They also rejected the DPM’s Asian scenario because it assumed a static situation in which the enemy never made full use of his capabilities, China remained a sanctuary, and similar bombing restraints would be imposed. Secretary McNamara’s final program contained no concessions, keeping USAF wings steady at 23 and carriers at 15.

Turning to strategic mobility, JSOP 69-76 analyzed FY 1972 capabilities to support combat in either Vietnam or Korea while reinforcing Europe and conducting a Dominican-scale intervention. The conclusion was that troop requirements would be met but serious shortfalls in cargo deliveries would develop. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended modernizing sealift, making the merchant marine more responsive to military needs, and preserving options to increase C-5A output from 96 to 148 and FDL ships from 30 to 48. These were perennial issues between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

the Secretary. The Chiefs normally asked for more and Mr. McNamara, citing costs and improving technology like the C–5A, decided on less.66

Matched against JSOP 69-76, Secretary McNamara projected slightly lower totals for airlift (816 versus 768 in FY 1972), notably lower ones for sealift (110 versus 73 in FY 1972). But his assessment of lift capabilities was far more optimistic. By D+30, the programmed force could put nine divisions in Europe, five in Southeast Asia, and one in Latin America. C–130Es alone could fulfill the airlift requirements for two contingencies; augmented by C–141s, they could carry out a minor operation as well. Hence, he intended to accelerate C–130A retirements and do away with 19 Forward Floating Depots because FDL ships soon would become available.67

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that C–130A retirements be delayed since so many were committed in Vietnam, that cancellation of Forward Floating Depots await Congressional funding of the FDL program, that 16 rather than 8 troopships stay in active service, and that replacement or modernization of the cargo fleet begin. In response to the Chiefs reclama, the Secretary agreed to slow C–130A retirements, keeping 434 C–130s in service during FY 1969. He also saved three Forward Floating Depots for at least another year and retained 16 troop ships in service.68

This year’s (1967) dispute over ASW force levels also followed a familiar pattern. JSOP 69-76 recommended 49 diesel and 56 nuclear submarines for FY 1969, changing to 21 and 84 by FY 1976. Generals Wheeler and McConnell continued favoring nine ASW carriers, just as in JSOP 68-75, while the other Chiefs proposed eight for the next few years but ultimately eleven. Mr. McNamara again wanted to start three nuclear submarines while the Chiefs favored five. The Secretary cited several studies supporting his contention that his programmed forces would destroy 90 to 100 percent of Soviet submarines over six months. He cited recent intelligence estimates that the total number of Soviet submarines probably would not increase, although the fleet should become one-third nuclear by 1975. While the readiness of Soviet submarines had improved, their relatively high “noise” levels remained about the same. Thus, “unless we are much mistaken about kill probabilities across the board, there is little to be gained from additional increments to our forces.” His cost-effective justification was that it would cost “$11 million or more to save cargoes worth $3 to $9 million.” As for surface escorts, he intended to press on with contract definition for a new “DX” but defer starting any construction. Finally, for ASW carriers, he limited ASW carriers to seven in FY 1969 and six thereafter. Secretary McNamara judged them uncompetitive with new land-based P-3 patrol planes, of which he planned to procure 243.69

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejoinder, on 26 August, questioned the use of selective excerpts to reach overly optimistic conclusions. While ASW capabilities certainly had improved, kill probabilities even as high as .79 could not be substantiated. That alone, they argued, was enough to “impugn” Secretary McNamara’s claim that little could be gained by creating larger ASW forces. Studies by the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group showed various scenarios resulting in “excessive” US losses. As for Mr. McNamara’s cost/benefit analysis, they cautioned that a cargo’s wartime value might bear
little relation to its peacetime cost. Turning to the DX program, they observed that postponing construction until FY 1970 would delay availability until the mid-1970s. By then, modernized World War II destroyers would have reached retirement age and many new escorts must be built, competing with DXs for funds and facilities. Finally, the Chiefs argued that ASW carriers could meet high-sortie requirements on short notice, which land-based aircraft could not do. In January 1968, Secretary McNamara did approve FY 1969 construction of five DXs but cut nuclear submarine starts to two. After FY 1969, he intended to operate only 5 ASW carriers.70

A Navy study, based upon requirements for simultaneous wars in Europe and the Far East, indicated that each attack carrier needed six rather than four escorts, and that planes from attack carriers could not always protect the ASW carriers, which therefore required their own anti-air protection. Secretary McNamara responded by increasing from 79 to 96 the number of anti-air escorts programmed for FY 1976. As soon as contract definition for the DX was completed, he intended to begin contract definition for a conventional “DXG” class of escorts combining ASW with anti-air capability. The Secretary also proposed starting construction of two nuclear-powered guided-missile destroyers, followed by three more later. Added to the four already funded, there would be a total of nine. Nuclear propulsion, he agreed, was definitely superior in speed, reliability, and efficiency. But he projected enough nuclear escorts for only two of the four planned nuclear carriers, thereby saving $546 million.71

The Joint Chiefs wanted to lift one Marine Expeditionary Force at 20 knots in the Pacific and another in the Atlantic. For the near term, that translated into 155 amphibious assault and 10 gunfire support ships in FY 1969, 155 and 10 in FY 1970. Secretary McNamara planned enough new construction, by FY 1970, to carry 1 MEF in the Pacific and 1/2 in the Atlantic at 20 knots. The other 1/2 MEF in the Atlantic would be carried by 37 older, 13-knot ships. Before replacing older ships, however, he wanted to know whether the numbers of new ships could be cut by shifting some equipment from the assault back to the follow-on echelon.72

The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that, over twenty years, the cost of keeping older ships in service was considerably higher than the cost of building and maintaining new ones. Older ships could lift the force, but their ability to put it ashore and then maintain it would be inadequate. The difference in transit time between 13- and 20-knot ships was only six days, which did not impress the Secretary. The Chiefs contended, however, that such a delay “can influence every aspect of assault operations.”73

Secretary McNamara’s final recommendation, dated 10 January 1968, stretched out the shipbuilding program even further, delaying until FY 1971 the attainment 20-knot lift for 1 1/2 MEFs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended activating two battleships for service off the coast of Vietnam. Secretary McNamara agreed to bring the USS New Jersey out of mothballs, so his FY 1969 program amounted to 162 amphibious assault and 9 gunfire support ships.74
The first three months of 1968 saw crisis heaped upon crisis, starting with the North Koreans seizure of the USS *Pueblo*, on 23 January 1968. Almost 200 US aircraft rushed to South Korea; 28 Air Force and Navy reserve units were mobilized. One week later, in South Vietnam, communists launched a country-wide offensive. As February opened, forces available for Southeast Asia amounted to the 82nd Airborne Division, 1 1/3 Marine division/wing teams, five carriers, and 12 tactical fighter squadrons, including eight equipped with older type aircraft activated in response to the *Pueblo* emergency. Sensing that the Vietnam War had reached a critical phase, General Wheeler also concluded that the mobilization issue must be confronted and resolved. At his strong prompting, General Westmoreland on 12 February cabled that he “desperately” needed a Marine regiment and a brigade from the 82nd Division. President Johnson approved immediately, but bringing the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd up to strength stripped the other two brigades almost to cadre level. The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended immediately activating 46,000 reservists, mainly to man two Army infantry brigades and one Marine regiment, and placing 137,000 more in readiness.

Late in February, General Wheeler made a three-day trip to Vietnam. He and General Westmoreland put together a request for 205,000 more men, split into three increments. The first increment of 108,000 should arrive by 1 May. The other two would deploy only if the military situation worsened; otherwise, they would reconstitute the strategic reserve. Meeting the full request would require calling up 250,000 reservists, extending tours of duty as long as six months, and increasing the May draft.

On 4 March a committee headed by the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, recommended deploying only 22,000 personnel to Vietnam immediately while calling up 262,000 reservists, extending tours, and increasing draft quotas. General Wheeler advised General Westmoreland to expect 30,000 reinforcements, but the prospect of a large mobilization quickly evaporated. On 10 March, *The New York Times* published details of the 205,000 request, giving a public already shaken by Tet yet another jolt. The strength of anti-war feeling showed in the New Hampshire Democratic primary, where on 12 March Senator Eugene McCarthy ran almost even against President Johnson. The international monetary system weakened suddenly, in part from the strain of growing war costs and budget deficits. General Wheeler warned General Westmoreland that this combination of troubles had placed the administration in “as difficult a situation as I have seen in the past five years.” The culmination came on 31 March when President Johnson announced the curtailment of Rolling Thunder, limited Vietnam-bound reinforcements to 13,500 support troops over the next five months, and revealed his decision not to seek another term.

On 2 April, the Services recommended calling up 56,887 reservists, including five Army brigades and six USAF tactical fighter squadrons. Warning that Strategic Army Forces had dwindled to four divisions, none immediately deployable and only one suitable for non-NATO contingencies, General Johnson proposed and the Joint Chiefs...
of Staff endorsed adding a fifth division to STRAF. Instead, Secretary Clifford decided upon a modest call-up of 22,767 personnel, involving two brigades and two tactical fighter squadrons. Secretary Clifford’s plan to create a five-division STRAF involved some legerdemain. First, he postponed “Reforger,” a periodic rotation of CONUS units back to West Germany, thereby releasing to STRAF two brigades from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Second, he listed the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as available for use anywhere instead of being solely NATO-committed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff vainly protested that, since Europe still was a first-priority theater, shifting “Reforger” units into STRAF would be contrary to strategy and commitments.

Back in February, as aerial reinforcements were being rushed to South Korea, General Wheeler directed the Joint Staff to collaborate with the Services in preparing a worldwide assessment. When a very detailed draft was completed in March, the Joint Chiefs shortened it considerably. Even so, on 10 April, they provided Secretary Clifford with plenty of specifics about “the limited capability of our military forces to respond rapidly to crisis situations.” No CONUS-based ground forces could be deployed without changing tour/rotation policies and extending terms of service. The Army’s three NATO-committed divisions (two armored and one mechanized) would need about 90 days to reach combat readiness. Although the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were listed as substitutes, the entire 101st and one brigade from the 82nd had been sent to Vietnam. Two Marine division/wing teams were supposed to arrive in Europe between M+30 and M+60, but only 1 1/3 could do so. Of the 37 tactical fighter squadrons supposed to augment European Command by M+30, a mere six were available immediately and four of them were slated for service in Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also took account of “domestic considerations”—namely, urban riots triggered by the murder of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Active and Ready Reserve forces could cope with these threats, as some already were doing, but of course they would be unavailable for duty elsewhere.

In JSOP 70-77, dated 15 March 1968, the Joint Chiefs asked again for 21 Army and 4 Marine divisions as long as the war lasted, 18 and 3 thereafter, with both totals supported by 10 reserve divisions. Their 2½-war scenario differed from JSOP 69-76 in assigning more strength to Europe and less to the Far East: 14 to 16 divisions for an initial defense of NATO; between 10 and 13 2/3 to conduct another major operation; three to maintain Korean and Pacific deployments; 1 1/3 for a minor contingency; and two for the strategic reserve. They deemed 25 wartime and 21 peacetime divisions “sufficient to meet only the minimum requirements for the initial defense of NATO and one non-NATO major contingency.” On 10 April, in the assessment described above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that these levels be swiftly attained, and that “the need to move ahead quickly on re-equipping and modernizing our forces” be assigned “the utmost importance.”

Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze, who was now overseeing all force planning issues, disagreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His DPM, circulated late in May, prescribed 22 wartime divisions and 19 peacetime ones. Currently, he acknowledged, active Army
divisions in CONUS would need between 10 and 17 weeks to become combat-ready, reserves 18 to 40 weeks. The partially organized 6th Infantry Division would be dissolved, freeing its men and materiel to rebuild other STRAF units. By September, Mr. Nitze predicted, STRAF divisions would be able to reach combat readiness in one to three weeks. The overall combat capability of land forces, he claimed, “has been improving markedly.”  

The Joint Chiefs replied by again reiterating their JSOP recommendations and prototyping the 6th Division’s inactivation. Moreover, they saw little likelihood that STRAF units could achieve one to three weeks’ readiness, due to “reduced manning levels (90 percent) for the NATO-oriented division and the high turnover caused by the one-year tour in Vietnam, the 25 months between [Vietnam tours], and the limited rotation base.” Mr. Nitze’s final decisions, in a DPM dated 9 January 1969, however contained no changes. But Army readiness, in his judgment, did show a “significant improvement” over the post-Tet low point. Two STRAF divisions were completely combat-ready, and the other two would become so within six months. During 1969–70, however, reserve divisions would need at least 14 weeks to become deployable.  

Exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD about tactical air power went over a good deal of familiar ground. The Pueblo mobilization temporarily raised USAF wings to a peak of 29. In JSOP 70-77, all the Service Chiefs recommended moving from 23 USAF wings in FY 1970 to 29 in FY 1977, except General McConnell who wanted 31 by then. Generals Wheeler and McConnell asked for 16 attack carriers; the other Chiefs proposed 17. Put differently, Service parochialism remained strong as the Navy sought more ships and the Air Force more air wings. According to the now standard rationale, 3,956 active aircraft could conduct one major non-NATO operation, meet Allied Command Europe’s initial requirement for reinforcements, and fulfill other needs. Dealing successfully with a Warsaw Pact attack while conducting a holding action against major Chinese aggression required 5,126 aircraft; 4,811 could cope with Chinese aggression in one or more areas yet remain able to execute an initial defense of Western Europe. Nonetheless, a force of 3,861 aircraft (a combined USAF, Marine Corps, and Navy total for FY 1977) would be “within acceptable limits of risk”; that figure translated into 17 to 19 attack carriers, 3 1/3 to 4 1/3 Marine wings, and 32 to 34 USAF wings.  

Tentatively, Deputy Secretary Nitze planned to operate a constant 23 wings and 15 carriers. His computations were based upon what would be needed to “fight indefinitely in Asia while holding enough forces to fight in Europe and a third area for 90 days.” Mr. Nitze replaced the old Unit Equipment (“UE”) figures with Authorized Active Inventory (“AAI”) ones, which were larger because they included spares, replacements, and trainers. Translating JSOP levels into AAI showed a growing divergence with OSD’s projections:

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Mr. Nitze desired a “baseline” of 5,455 AAI aircraft (compared to the JCS figure of 6,857) that would support 1,000 daily sorties in Europe, 640 in the Far East, and 250 in a third area. Free World and Sino-Soviet Bloc inventories, he now estimated, would remain approximately equal (13,600 versus 13,357 in 1969; 12,439 versus 12,707 in 1973). But he foresaw no erosion of the US advantage in quality, since new Soviet aircraft designs still seemed to stress homeland defense and nuclear missions.86

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discerned a “basic misunderstanding” about the objectives and concepts of tactical air operations. Mr. Nitze assumed that opposing air forces would concentrate upon the battlefield area, avoiding attacks upon air bases and lines of communication. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff methods of aggregating the aircraft inventories of all communist countries into one gross number was also unrealistic. Even more important, they feared that the US qualitative lead was eroding. While cuts in expenditures compelled Deputy Secretary Nitze to propose slowdowns in production, the Soviets were introducing one fighter prototype every year. The MiG-21 had proved equal to the F–4 in aerial combat over North Vietnam—and by 1973 communist countries should be deploying 4,270 MiG–21s, compared to 1,840 F–4s in the US inventory. This struck them as especially ominous because the Free World's advantage rested almost entirely upon high-payload aircraft (A–6s, A–7s, and F–111s) that required fighter protection when carrying out their attack missions. Not persuaded, Mr. Nitze kept 23 wings and 15 carriers as the core of his final proposals.87

Turning to strategic mobility, JSOP 70-77 rated programmed forces insufficient for a 2½-war strategy and re-argued last year's case for increases. Again, Mr. Nitze disagreed. He recognized that, as measures to reduce the balance-of-payments drain brought more units back to CONUS, strategic mobility would acquire increasing importance. But, seeing no reason why programmed forces should prove inadequate, he delayed moving a tactical transport into the contract definition phase until studies revealed whether its introduction would permit equivalent reductions in helicopters, trucks, and theater stocks. He also planned to phase out five troop ships and quickly modernize the tanker fleet by chartering private ships, cancelling new construction.88

Responding early in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for more C–130s, claiming that Vietnam requirements alone exceeded Mr. Nitze’s projected figures. They reprimed the old argument against delaying a tactical transport and recommended retaining 16 troop ships, denying that FDL ships could serve as substitutes. In January 1969, Deputy Secretary Nitze authorized an additional C–130 squadron during FYs 1970–71 but refused to proceed with the new tactical transport. Spiraling costs also led him to caution that C–5A objectives might have to be cut back, as indeed they would be. The sealift program, meantime, suffered a major blow when Congress deleted funding for FDL ships. Their existence, critics charged, would only make Vietnam-style interventions easier. Senator Richard Russell, a conservative Democrat who chaired the Armed Services Committee, remarked that was like saying “when the sheriff makes too many arrests, don't buy any more squad cars.” Mr. Nitze responded by retaining 11 troop ships in FY 1970 and 10 thereafter. He still projected 15 FDL ships but sug-
gested, as an alternative, a private build-and-charter program of 30 ships. Mr. Nitze’s final proposals for FY 1970 included 275 C–141s, 37 C–5As, 26 tankers, 84 cargo and 3 Forward Floating Depot ships.89

In sizing ASW forces, OSD analysts consistently reached much more optimistic conclusions about US capabilities than the Joint Chiefs thought warranted.90 JSOP 70-77 listed 8 ASW carriers, 58 diesel submarines and 47 nuclear ones in FY 1970, changing to 9 or 10 carriers, 30 diesels, and 75 nuclears by FY 1977. Mr. Nitze proposed maintaining only five carriers and 90 submarines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to start five nuclear submarines each year; Mr. Nitze thought two annually were enough. He also projected 208 escorts in FY 1970 and 135 in FY 1977, compared to JSOP levels of 240 and 174. As justification, Mr. Nitze predicted “dramatic” improvements flowing from the introduction of new technology such as the Mark 46 and Mark 48 torpedoes, a directional sonobuoy system, and two types of sonars. He cited studies that, in FY 1969, the Soviets should lose 93 submarines while passing through barriers in the Barents Sea and the North Pacific. After two sorties, the Soviets would complete 145 attacks but lose 142 of their presumed 160 submarines. By FY 1977, only 44 Soviet submarines would survive to execute 26 attacks, a mere 12 would re-pass the barriers and return to port.91

In their reclama, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that new Soviet submarines (as yet not operational) would be faster, quieter, and carry better sonar; yet, Mr. Nitze’s DPM did not consider how these improvements would affect US capabilities. They also faulted the DPM’s indices of effectiveness. According to those indices, 24 nuclear submarine barrier stations (12 in the Barents Sea, 12 in the North Pacific) were enough. But JSOP analyses, based upon war-gaming, using different parameters, held that 39 would be needed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, too, that mine and submarine barriers might not be in position when war began, that the effectiveness of ASW systems varied with water conditions, and that attrition of US forces should be included in calculations. Thus JSOP 70-77 recommendations represented “minimum” requirements.92

Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, known as the father of the nuclear navy, wanted all large surface combatants as well as submarines to be nuclear-powered and found powerful allies on Capitol Hill. Influential members of Congress, collaborating with Admiral Rickover, brought OSD’s proposals under sharp criticism and Deputy Secretary Nitze reconsidered them. His DPM of January 1969 retained six ASW carriers, and slightly raised escort levels, and increased nuclear submarine starts to three in FY 1970 and four annually during Fys 1971–74. Most importantly, he projected a total of 105 submarines, not 90, exactly following JSOP 70-77’s goal of 30 diesels and 75 nuclears by FY 1977. For FY 1970, he would start three of the new nuclear attack submarines, high-speed SSN-688s, followed by four each year during Fys 1971–74.93

For fleet escorts, JSOP 70-77 listed 106 in FY 1977; the DPM provided 96. Mr. Nitze based his total upon a requirement to escort 12 attack and 4 ASW carriers, 6 amphibious assault echelons, and 10 underway replenishment groups. The Joint Chiefs of Staff countered that: escorts were employed for convoying, gunfire support, and other independent
operations; all carriers, not only those at sea, needed assigned escorts; and seven cruisers slated for retirement should be retained because they provided superior firepower and communications facilities. Mr. Nitze raised from four to five the number of ASW carriers requiring escorts but reduced the FY 1977 total to 94. He planned to begin one nuclear guided-missile DXGN as well as five conventional ASW DXs, but defer starting the first six DXGs (combining anti-air with ASW) from FY 1970 to FY 1971.\textsuperscript{94}

JSOP 70-77's objectives for amphibious assault forces ran fairly close to the currently approved program: 160 amphibious assault and 16 gunfire support ships in FY 1970, 113 and 10 in FY 1977. But Secretary Nitze, in June, decided that only 1 2/3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (one in the Pacific, 2/3 in the Atlantic/Mediterranean) need be transported at 20 knots. By abandoning the long-held objective of carrying two MEFs at 20 knots, he expected to save $1 to $2 billion over the next ten years. Consequently, in FY 1977, Mr. Nitze planned only 93 amphibious and four gunfire support ships. These were not enough to conduct simultaneous assaults in two separate theaters, but the likelihood of having to do so he believed was "very low." Moreover, in a major European war, probably even two MEFs would be insufficient to secure a beachhead on Allied Command Europe's northern or southern flanks.\textsuperscript{95}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff still wanted two MEFs carried at 20 knots. On the northern and southern flanks, they claimed, "a single MEF assault could be decisive in shifting the local military balance." Norway, for example, offered 37 potential landing areas; the enemy could hardly defend all of them. Mr. Nitze finally approved nine gunfire support ships in FY 1970 and eight for several years thereafter. He remained firm, though, about lowering the lift objective, requiring 138 amphibious assault ships in FY 1970, 88 in FY 1977. For FY 1970, he proposed proceeding with construction of two 40,000-ton LHAs and providing advance procurement funds for two more.\textsuperscript{96}

In September 1968, when the Vietnam commitment was at its height and Warsaw Pact divisions had just swept into Czechoslovakia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Clifford a tabulation of world-wide deployments that included:

\begin{verbatim}
CONUS/Atlantic: 4 1/3 Army divisions, 3 attack and 2 ASW carriers, 8/9 Marine division, 10 USAF tactical fighter squadrons.
Europe/Mediterranean: 4 1/3 Army divisions, 1 ASW and 2 attack carriers, 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons.
Southeast Asia: 7 2/3 Army divisions, 2 2/3 Marine divisions, 4 attack and 2 ASW carriers, 34 USAF tactical fighter squadrons.
\end{verbatim}

What if a new emergency erupted? The Army had one brigade available in three weeks, another three in four weeks. Within seven days, the Navy could deploy one attack and one ASW carrier from the Atlantic as well as two ASW carriers from the Pacific. The Marine Corps had one battalion in the Caribbean and one in the Mediterranean immediately available. The Air Force could deploy three squadrons from CONUS in three to seven days, followed by three more in four to six weeks. Yet even these modest figures
The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities

were, in some measure, a façade. Materiel and personnel shortages existed everywhere except Southeast Asia. Reserves could neither reinforce Europe rapidly nor make more than a “marginal response” to emergencies elsewhere. Any additional commitments could not be sustained long because CONUS-based units were providing the training and rotation base for overseas deployments.97

In fact under Secretary Clifford Army readiness was slowly improving. The Secretary hoped, also, to assemble a larger USAF reserve by returning some units from overseas and modifying Southeast Asia rotation policies. He warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though, that budgetary constraints would be even greater in FY 1970 than they had been in FY 1969.98 In sum, no early or easy solution to the problem of over-stretched conventional capabilities seemed in sight.

Afterthoughts

The area of US superiority was air power, land- and sea-based. Witness the rapid response to the Pueblo’s seizure, when nearly 200 aircraft moved to South Korea and two attack carriers steamed into the Sea of Japan. Yet how many Army divisions were combat-ready—“boots on the ground”—remained the clearest measure of US capability and determination. That was why drawdowns of Seventh Army in Germany created such concern among European allies. As the strategic reserve was drained for Vietnam and specialist personnel were transferred from Europe, mobilization offered the best way to maintain a good measure of credibility. Timing was crucial, however. In 1965, a large call-up might have been accomplished. By 1968, when action became unavoidable, support for the war had shrunk so much that only a very modest mobilization in response to TET and the Pueblo crisis was politically feasible. In fairness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they premised their force structure requirements on worst-case scenarios because they were responsible for the security of the nation. Yet, in doing so, they often deferred to their respective Service requirements rather than considering a comprehensive Joint program.

President Johnson never explained his long delay in making a decision on mobilization. Walt Rostow recalled that, in July 1965, President Johnson was extremely anxious to avoid any dramatic step that might trigger either a Hanoi-Moscow or a Hanoi-Peking military pact. During 1967–68, in Mr. Rostow’s opinion, two other factors influenced Johnson’s thinking. First, he was determined not to use large US ground forces outside South Vietnam’s borders. Second, he feared that a substantial force increase might widen the federal deficit, fuel inflation, and thus aggravate the balance-of-payments problem.99 In the end, President Johnson’s action proved to be too little and too late.
## Appendix
### Forces in Being

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<td>26</td>
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<td>206</td>
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*Source: OASD (Compt.), “The Five-Year Defense Program,” 12 May 82. Information about Army divisions came from John Wilson, US Army Center of Military History. Until 1968, the 1st Armored Division was organized and equipped as a mechanized division. In February 1968, McNamara approved converting the 101st Airborne Division into an airmobile division. Information about USAF tactical fighter wings came from Dr. Walton Moody, Office of Air Force History.*
President Johnson had expansive hopes for arms control. Publicly, on 30 December 1964, he appealed to Soviet leaders that “we can and should move to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; to achieve a verified worldwide comprehensive test ban; to make a cutoff of fissionable material production for weapons coupled with measures to safeguard the peaceful uses of nuclear power; and to agree on a verified freeze in existing offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems.” Already he had appointed a task force led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, to study means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Reporting in January 1965, it concluded that “the world is fast approaching the point of no return.” Therefore, “as a matter of great urgency,” the scope and intensity of US efforts must substantially increase. Specifically, the administration should strive for a non-proliferation agreement, a comprehensive test ban, and nuclear-free zones—all to be accomplished through multilateral treaties.¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had long displayed a skeptical, often disapproving attitude toward arms control proposals. The interagency body for assessing such proposals was the Committee of Principals. Chaired by the Secretary of State, its members included the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the President's Special Assistants for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology. Upon reviewing the Gilpatric report, General Wheeler judged it riddled with “major deficiencies and gaps in the analysis” and recommended referring it to the Committee of Principals. Secretary Rusk, in fact, had warned the Committee that the report was “as explosive as a nuclear weapon” and that its premature disclosure “could start the ball rolling in an undesirable manner.” So the report remained under tight wraps. On 28 June, President Johnson directed ACDA to take the initiative in proposing a new arms control program, accompanied by preliminary comments from interested agencies.²
Killing the Comprehensive and Threshold Test Bans

Many people saw the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater as only a beginning. Believing that a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) would do far more to slow the arms race and stop nuclear proliferation, they viewed the failure to conclude such a ban as little less than tragic. It is important, therefore, to explain why the quest for a CTBT went nowhere during 1965–68.

President Johnson, on 30 December 1964, appealed for “a verified worldwide comprehensive test ban.” General Wheeler promptly tasked the Joint Staff with assessing the implications of a CTBT. Answering in February 1965, the Special Assistant for Arms Control, Major General George T. Powers, USA, acknowledged that such a ban would: inhibit nuclear proliferation; slow Soviet weapons development; continue the US advantage in tactical nuclear weapons; promote mutual confidence between the two superpowers; and, if on-site inspections occurred, not only create a desirable precedent but also lead to the acquisition of valuable information. Yet Major General Powers assessment also identified many disadvantages such as: permitting the Soviets to preserve their lead in yield-to-weight ratios for 10- to 100-megaton weapons, in the weapons-effects knowledge derived from these devices, and in the knowledge of nuclear effects drawn from having tested ABM systems; enabling the Soviets to make advances through clandestine testing, and to alter the military balance by capitalizing upon their current advantages; retarding US weapons technology and rendering it difficult to maintain efficient laboratories; and resulting, after 1970, in an ever-increasing challenge from China. Major General Powers stated that US policymakers now knew, as they had not known in 1963, that significant advantages would be gained from testing underground below the detection threshold. On balance, therefore, he judged that a CTBT’s drawbacks outweighed its benefits. The Joint Chiefs agreed to use his study as a basis for any future CTBT considerations, and they sent a copy to Secretary McNamara.3

On 22 April, the Committee of Principals discussed the pros and cons of a CTBT. William C. Foster, the Director of ACDA, observed that the danger of nuclear proliferation gave added importance to achieving a ban. Secretary Rusk, however, saw no point in publishing proposals until the Soviets accepted the principle of verification through international mechanisms. But Secretary McNamara, noting that ACDA simply wanted to indicate willingness to explore an agreement involving less extensive verification procedures, opposed any delay. The Committee accepted his argument and, on 26 April at the UN, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson delivered an appropriate statement.4

In mid-July, answering the President’s call for new approaches, Director Foster circulated three proposals. The first involved a CTBT, providing for inspection when a signatory charged violation and threatened to withdraw. The second, a “threshold” ban without on-site inspection, would prohibit underground explosions producing seismic signals that measured more than 4.5 on the Richter scale. The third described a CTBT with a small quota of on-site inspections.5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed
Arms Control Inches Forward

all three. “Substantial military information,” they advised Secretary McNamara, “can be obtained from tests at yields below the US seismic detection threshold. These tests would be undetected and unknown, and there would be no reason or basis for requesting on-site inspections.” A threshold ban, they continued, would preserve the Soviet lead in high-yield weapons and erode the US lead in low-yield ones. The 4.5 limitation was “not meaningful” because it could represent explosions of five to ten kilotons in hard rock or fifty kilotons in dry alluvium, tuff, and dolomite. Conversely, since yields could not be precisely predicted in advance, US testers would be under great pressure to keep the yield well below the limit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled seismology an imprecise science, “inherently incapable” of proving a violation. That being the case, Washington would come under considerable pressure not to withdraw from a treaty even as indications of Soviet cheating accumulated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff worried particularly that secret testing of high-yield hot X-ray devices, having significantly larger kill radii, could award the Soviets a major advantage in ballistic missile defense.6

Secretary McNamara forwarded these views to ACDA but did not endorse them. A 4.5 threshold ban could be monitored with confidence, he informed the Agency. In the field of nuclear technology, he judged that neither superpower could acquire any significant advantage; the same would hold true under a CTBT. Mr. McNamara believed that a major improvement in verification techniques had occurred, but, until he knew more about US detection capabilities and whether the Soviets as well as potential nuclear powers would support a CTBT, he deemed it unwise to define “a specific new position on verification.”7

In August, OSD circulated its own proposal. It stated that a comprehensive test ban, observed by all signatories, probably would work to the net advantage of the United States, “though not in any decisive way.” Admittedly, Soviet cheating could threaten the effectiveness of US forces, in the “unlikely” event that it continued undetected for some years. Even if the Chinese refused to participate, they probably could not produce new developments that would require additional US tests. As for a 4.5 threshold ban, OSD foresaw no marked advantage accruing to either side.8

The Joint Chiefs believed OSD’s proposal was “unduly optimistic” about prospective US detection and verification capabilities, assessing adequately neither US and Soviet nuclear positions nor the consequences of eroding US superiority, and unjustifiably assuming a serious Soviet intent to abide by treaty terms. Consequently, they again labeled comprehensive and threshold test bans as disadvantageous. The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the importance of ABM testing, particularly to learn whether US missile warheads could be destroyed by hot X-rays. Here underground tests, more powerful than those permitted by a 4.5 threshold ban, probably would be required.9

Meeting on 25 August, the Committee of Principals agreed “to hold to the status quo in nuclear negotiations for the time being.” It did authorize Secretary Rusk and Director Foster to explore terms under which Soviet interest in a CTBT could be probed. Nonetheless, General Wheeler worried that some Committee members were willing to soften their position on a CTBT. Remembering how the Soviets “have in
the past changed policy direction sharply and quickly,” he tasked the Joint Staff with identifying criteria for an acceptable CTBT. In December, the J–5 supplied a rather formidable list. There must be no known areas on the threshold of development that could alter the nuclear balance significantly. The United States must be able to detect, with a high degree of confidence, tests at the lowest yield from which significant gains could be made and to verify suspicious events. Treaty provisions must permit necessary verification and inspection, rapid withdrawal, and explosions for peaceful purposes. A system of US safeguards should include effective monitoring, the “highest state” of nuclear weapons technology, and constant readiness to resume testing. Since these conditions could not be met, a CTBT seemed “disadvantageous now and for the foreseeable future.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved these findings and, in March 1966, distributed them widely among concerned agencies.

Meanwhile, on 3 September 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created a small civilian group to serve as an ad hoc panel to examine technical aspects of the ACDA’s Nuclear Test Ban Proposals. Dr. William G. McMillan, Jr., a UCLA chemist, chaired the panel; its members came mostly from the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. The report, submitted on 14 January 1966, focused on how comprehensive and threshold bans would affect the deterrent. The panel began by warning that the deterrent’s security, a main factor behind US willingness to approve the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, “has been brought into question as a result of the recent discovery of significant vulnerabilities in our strategic missile forces.”11 Uncertainties surrounding the deterrent’s survivability, the nuclear requirements of an ABM system, and the rapidly developing technology of hot X-ray devices all amounted to a strong technical argument against further testing restrictions. Under a CTBT, confident eradication of the deterrent’s weaknesses would be “virtually impossible,” as would the continuation of high competence in weapons development beyond more than a few years. The Soviets had already tested ICBMs large enough to carry about a dozen one-megaton warheads of proven reliability. Thus, from the United States’ standpoint, this was a “particularly disadvantageous” time for a CTBT. What about banning underground tests measuring more than 4.75 on the Richter scale? Development of an optimum ABM warhead and other high-yield devices would be precluded, the panel agreed, but the impact on other areas would be far less serious. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, finding their views reinforced “in many important respects,” again declared themselves “firmly opposed” to comprehensive and threshold bans. Again, too, they gave the panel’s report interagency distribution.

ACDA now proposed pressing for a total ban or, if the Soviets proved unwilling to accept on-site inspection, an uninspected 4.75 threshold ban.13 Disapproving, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found indications that the Soviets were scoring “important gains” in offensive and defensive weaponry; US countermeasures would require underground US testing. Secretary McNamara advised ACDA that he would accept an adequately inspected CTBT—a crucial qualification. As for a threshold ban, he wanted deeper study into problems of verification, the effect upon the military balance, and the impact upon nuclear proliferation.
ACDA next suggested a different approach. The McMillan panel worried that a threshold ban would preclude development of an “optimum” high-yield, high-temperature, clean ABM warhead. Why not, then, try to assess how important an optimum ABM warhead actually was, compared to one that could be developed through existing technology? Subsequent studies showed, at least to ACDA’s satisfaction, (1) that markedly improved ability to identify earthquakes and explosions would allow verification of an uninspected 4.75 ban and (2) that whatever effectiveness ABM warheads lost through a threshold ban could be regained by redesign, albeit at higher cost. Therefore, on 26 May 1966, Director Foster advised the Committee of Principals that a threshold treaty actually would be advantageous to the United States.15

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) lent strong support to the Joint Chiefs’ views. Issued on 25 May 1966, it stated that a threshold ban would place no greater restrictions on most Soviet programs than those already imposed by the Limited Test Ban of 1963. However, because the relationship between underground yields and seismic readings remained “uncertain at best” and could be altered greatly by decoupling, the Soviets might continue testing over a wide range of yields, “depending on how far they were willing to risk violating the treaty and to support the cost and effort of decoupling.”16

On 8 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that they saw a continuing need for on-site inspections. All Soviet detonations, they reminded him, had occurred in well-known test areas where evasion was unnecessary. Consequently, US ability to identify deliberately masked detonations had not been demonstrated or even intensively studied. Then, too, the risk of evasion was bearable when the penalty would be nothing more than an unproved accusation. Thus the Soviets might reap “incalculable benefits” through a very modest program of covert violations. The Joint Chiefs cited the NIE’s judgment that there seemed about an even chance that the Soviets already possessed ABM warheads. Consequently, they could not accept ACDA’s claim that a threshold ban would impede the Soviets more than the United States. Also, according to the Chiefs, ACDA erred in arguing that a threshold ban would not “significantly affect” the vulnerabilities in offensive US systems. Finally, they saw no reason to suppose—as ACDA did—that a threshold ban would inhibit nuclear proliferation. France and China probably would reject a ban and, in any case, a 4.75 ceiling would not seriously hamper the development of low-yield fission weapons.17

Although ACDA made some minor modifications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to oppose a threshold ban, calling much of ACDA’s argument “inaccurate, overstated, and misleading.” The Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission generally aligned themselves with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in opposition. So, when the Committee of Principals met on 17 June, no one except ACDA’s spokesman favored pursuing a threshold ban.18

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also had concerns with verification and inspection. A possibility existed that the US detection capabilities might improve to the point where verification could be made without an on-site inspection. On 1 November 1966, the Air
Force Technical Applications Center reported a “significant improvement” in its ability to identify seismic events in the Kurile Islands and the Kamchatka peninsula, down to 4.5 on the Richter scale. Several days later, the administration endorsed a British proposal for a seismic conference of US, UK, and Soviet specialists. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed this a “most disadvantageous time” to extend testing limitations, outlining in urgent terms the “absolute need” for continued testing to assure stockpile reliability,19 acquire information about weapons effects, and develop ABM warheads and advanced re-entry vehicles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that deployment of missile defenses around Moscow and the Soviets’ test of a one-megaton warhead were an indication that they now possessed a medium hot X-ray warhead. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Committee of Principals develop “a coordinated position . . . which would serve to curtail further effort to achieve a comprehensive treaty, a threshold treaty, or any extension of the present limitations.”20

Secretary McNamara felt much less concern, because the Soviets had shown no interest in talking about test limitations and no discussions were scheduled in any international forums. That, plus the heavy work schedules of senior officials led him to recommend against a Committee review. Secretary Rusk agreed.21

At this point, uncertainty about penetrating Soviet missile defenses rather than uncertainty about adequate verification was the real barrier to expanding the limited test ban. The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were developing a new generation of strategic offensive weapons. Since they comprised the major response to Soviet ABM deployment, assessing their vulnerability to nuclear attack took on vital importance. That required exposing components and assemblies to large fluxes of neutrons, gamma and X-rays, which was feasible only by nuclear detonations.22

Nothing more happened until July 1968, when the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) prepared to reconvene in Geneva. The State Department suggested that President Johnson urge the ENDC to discuss “a comprehensive test ban, based on an agreement providing for adequate on-site inspection.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed doing so. OSD agreed that a comprehensive ban was undesirable but argued that, because of other nations’ sensitivities, “tactically we are better off making a mild statement of support.” On 16 July, President Johnson sent the ENDC a bland expression of hope that it “will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have been the subject of past discussions.”23

At the Tuesday Lunch on 24 July 1968, the CTBT was formally buried. Citing the need to perfect ABM, Minuteman III and Poseidon warheads, Secretary Rusk said that while the administration could not officially disavow its earlier support for a CTBT, he wanted “merely to discuss the subject rather than cling to it as policy.” President Johnson approved that approach.24

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the most determined, consistent opponents of comprehensive and threshold bans, they alone did not prevent positive action. Secretary McNamara recognized that his argument for only a “thin” anti-missile shield rested
upon the assurance that US warheads could penetrate Soviet defenses, which made testing above the threshold level essential. The Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg also saw no alternative to continued testing.

Fissionable Material Production: No Cutoff

During 1963, OSD’s forecast of nuclear stockpiling objectives led the Atomic Energy Commission to decide that six of the fourteen production reactors could be shut down. In April 1964, the United States and the USSR agreed to make cuts in their production of fissionable materials. Without publicity, US officials also let it be known that the United States would transfer 60,000 kilograms of uranium to peaceful purposes if the Soviets would transfer 40,000. Moscow did not respond. On 15 February 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission publicly announced that, between 1966 and 1969, US production of enriched uranium would be reduced again, by one-third. Privately, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency urged resubmitting the offer of transferring uranium to peaceful purposes, adding as well a transfer of plutonium. Such transfers, to be accomplished by destroying nuclear weapons and then extracting their fissionable materials, would be linked to a cessation of production for military purposes.25

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, calculated that a production cutoff coupled with a plutonium transfer would prevent the attainment of an adequate US weapons stockpile. Only 90 percent of the plutonium needed would be available in FY 1966, merely 50 percent by FY 1973. Given the great uncertainties about Soviet production and utilization, they could not say which superpower would be most affected by ACDA’s proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed a large uranium transfer and any plutonium transfer at all. They also asked that Soviet needs for fissionable material receive further study. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also requested that a scheme for destroying the material and verifying destruction be prescribed in detail and thoroughly tested.26

Secretary McNamara saw the matter differently. Forwarding Joint Chiefs of Staff views to Director Foster, he maintained that a production cutoff in the near future “would clearly be advantageous to the United States.” Despite the Joint Chiefs of Staff denials, he felt sure that a wide range of plutonium transfers still would leave the United States with a net advantage. He supported Director Foster’s proposal in principle but opposed any attempt to decide how much plutonium should be involved, given the absence of any Soviet interest and the changes in US and Soviet stockpiles. Still, he endorsed the Joint Chiefs’ caveat about the need to test verification schemes.27

ACDA rewrote its proposal to be less specific. The Joint Chiefs still objected, but ISA concurred as long as no specific ratios and amounts of plutonium were mentioned. In September 1965, at the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg proposed that the United States and the USSR (1) transfer, respectively, 60,000 and 40,000 kilograms of U-235 to peaceful uses; (2) destroy nuclear weapons “of our own choice” in order to make their fissionable material available for non-military purposes; and (3) add to
this transfer “associated plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons in an agreed quantity or ratio.”

This failed to evoke a positive Soviet reply. So, on 19 January 1966, Director Foster suggested either halting military production, under verification, or reducing production on a plant-by-plant basis “with the same type of inspection applicable to all.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended one revision, to specify that on-site inspection must accompany the plant-by-plant cutback. On 27 January, in a message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, President Johnson stated that, if a complete production halt proved unattainable, there should be plant-by-plant reductions under “effective” inspection. The Soviets replied by proposing destruction of all stockpiles “under appropriate international controls”—a very elastic phrase.

Early in July 1968, Director Foster suggested a different approach. For declared production facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency would apply safeguards to verify compliance with a cutoff. For undeclared ones, parties would rely upon their unilateral capabilities. ACDA further suggested a presidential appeal for agreement to halt all military production of fissionable materials. General Wheeler argued, however, that it was “premature to review the current verification arrangements until further analysis proves our capability to be good enough to warrant a change.” An interagency working group, led by ACDA, concluded that US ability to accomplish assured destruction would continue despite a cutoff. In fact, the date of a cutoff should have little effect upon the wartime level of fatalities inflicted.

Upon review, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it “impossible to determine by the systems analysis approach when and if a cutoff would be to the net interest of the United States.” Uncertainties included: a possible error of 30 to 40 percent in the estimates of cumulative Soviet production; the effectiveness and accuracy of Soviet weapons, and the amounts of fissionable material used in them; and attack scenarios. In 1965, the Joint Chiefs had told Secretary McNamara that a cutoff would continue the US advantage “within a reasonable margin of risk.” Yet now, and for the next five to ten years, they concluded that a cutoff “would, at best, be imprudent and could involve major risks to US security.” They would accept a changed position on verification, though, if the United States was willing to abrogate an agreement immediately upon detection of cheating. There the matter rested.

Signing an Outer Space Treaty

In October 1963, by unanimous vote, the UN General Assembly asked all nations “to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” In April 1965, the United States and the USSR published draft treaties prohibiting the orbiting of mass destruction weapons. Late that year, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs for their views about some proposed treaty principles: no claims
of sovereignty over celestial bodies; no weapons of mass destruction stationed on or near them; no military bases, maneuvers, or weapons tests upon them, but no prohibition on using military personnel and equipment for peaceful purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that a “serious disadvantage” could arise if the treaty inspired a feeling that the Soviet threat from this quarter had lessened, thereby leading to a diminution in US military exploitation of space. Therefore, they wanted American negotiators to insist upon: complete symmetry in obligations and responsibilities; freedom to take adequate steps toward verifying compliance; and a right of withdrawal.32

When treaty negotiations began in mid-1966, the US draft article permitting use of “military personnel and equipment” for peaceful purposes aroused controversy. Arguing for deletion of “and equipment,” the Soviets won considerable support in a UN subcommittee. Ambassador Goldberg suggested omitting that sentence (after all other important issues had been settled) and stating “for the record” the US belief that the treaty did not prevent peaceful uses of military personnel and equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, but only to be offered as a final concession.33

As things turned out, the Soviets accepted wording that largely met American wishes. On 8 December, the UN Outer Space Committee agreed upon a draft treaty; President Johnson praised this as “the most important arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963.” Article IV stipulated that the moon and other celestial bodies would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; it obligated parties not to orbit “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” Using military personnel for scientific research and other peaceful purposes would not be prohibited; neither would “any equipment or other facilities necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies.” Article XII authorized inspection of “all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles” following “reasonable advance notice of a projected visit.” Article XV permitted withdrawal after one year of notification.34

President Johnson signed the Outer Space Treaty on 27 January 1967. What it prescribed was not military activities but military action—placing nuclear weapons in full orbit—which neither superpower was planning in any case.35 Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Wheeler backed the treaty but stressed the need to develop verification capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he continued, assigned “crucial significance to . . . the proposition that the United States will not permit the authority of this treaty to become meaningless by diminishing US military efforts in space technology.” Senatorial consent followed on 27 April.36

Negotiating a Non-Proliferation Treaty

Early in January 1965, General Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with studying the security implications of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. Answering in April,
the Staff stated that a basic policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons served the long-term interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The best way of doing this appeared to lie in agreements preventing non-nuclear states from acquiring these weapons, rather than in agreements preventing nuclear states from disseminating them. Yet overseas deployments of nuclear weapons and effective inter-allied nuclear arrangements were essential elements of US strategy. Thus a “soft sell” approach to non-proliferation seemed best, because a “hard sell” could diminish the nuclear deterrent’s credibility and restrict US flexibility. Moreover, “a US nuclear guarantee is a price that may have to be paid to convince a country to forego an independent nuclear capability.” A meaningful guarantee, of course, must involve more than a mere declaration; it would mean a visible US presence on the territory of the country thus guaranteed as well as substantive inter-allied military arrangements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the exception of General McConnell, endorsed these findings. Secretary McNamara forwarded both the study and their endorsement to Secretary Rusk.37

Already, Director Foster had called for discussions with the British and French about seeking an informal understanding with the Soviets to refrain from supplying other states with strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). A multilateral force for NATO would be exempt, Director Foster claimed, because the United States would transfer neither ownership nor control to another state. The Joint Staff raised no objection to Director Foster’s idea, but General Wheeler did. At his initiative, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara that no advantage would flow from such an understanding since they saw “almost no likelihood that the Soviets would disseminate SNDVs in appreciable numbers.” In fact, a non-dissemination agreement might weaken collective security “by demonstrating our readiness to place our own fears above the possible security interests of our allies.” Since the Soviets would repudiate an understanding whenever convenient, the only likely effect of non-dissemination would be to withhold “possibly necessary armament” from Free World nations. But Secretary McNamara, believing that an informal understanding would serve US interests, supported Director Foster’s idea.38

On 22 April 1965, the Committee of Principals debated the wisdom of pressing for a non-proliferation agreement. McGeorge Bundy said that “we should stay as far away from this subject as possible in order to avoid getting ourselves into a box” over the NATO multilateral force. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara agreed that achieving a treaty now was “completely out of the question.” The Committee decided to seek an agreement that would “specifically prohibit transfer of control of nuclear weapons to states not presently nuclear powers, but which would neither explicitly forbid nor permit transfer of control of nuclear weapons to groups of states.”39 This formulation was intended to answer strong Soviet protests that creating a multilateral force would put a German finger on the nuclear trigger.

In mid-July, Director Foster circulated the draft of a non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Previously, attention had focused upon the meaning of a prohibition against transferring “control” over nuclear weapons. Now, Mr. Foster offered an approach centering
upon obligations neither to “acquire nuclear weapons by manufacturing them or by any other means” nor to assist any other state in doing so. All parties, further, would cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards. As for security assurances to give non-nuclear signatories, Director Foster suggested that nuclear signatories promise to “provide or support immediate assistance” for victims of nuclear aggression. Further, nuclear signatories would pledge not to use their weapons against non-nuclear signatories, “except in defense against an act of aggression in which a State owning nuclear weapons is engaged.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that they still opposed “aggressive pursuit” of an NPT. If political considerations dictated otherwise, provisions must be made for: preserving nuclear flexibility, including multilateral sharing; maintaining nuclear dispersal and delivery arrangements; and clearly defining adequate safeguards for peaceful applications of atomic energy. They preferred on-site inspection but could accept carefully defined international safeguards. As to security guarantees, the Joint Chiefs urged that these be general in nature and granted “only on a case-by-case basis after complete analysis of the full implications, including specific military commitments.” They particularly objected to any limitations upon using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, fearing a loss of strategic flexibility, advancement of ban-the-bomb efforts, and misinterpretation by Hanoi and Peking of US efforts in Southeast Asia.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) asked for a clarification of the Joint Chiefs of Staff views. First, when exactly would a resort to nuclear weapons be necessary or desirable? Second, why would a limitation upon their use fuel the ban-the-bomb campaign? Third, in what way would US actions in Southeast Asia be misinterpreted? The Joint Chiefs of Staff reply was not very illuminating, perhaps because the questions were really unanswerable. To the first, they replied simply that options should remain open. Otherwise, a “major and understandable” shift among non-nuclear US allies could occur; the Soviets might use “this powerful wedge” to pressure them into changing positions. To the second, they noted that outlawing “first use” was a favorite tool of Soviet propaganda and easily could expand to embrace ban-the-bomb. As to the third, they argued that a limitation would strike the communists as evidence of a lack of US determination to oppose aggression by whatever means became necessary.

At Geneva, on 17 August 1965, Director Foster laid before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference a draft NPT in which parties would undertake “not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-member state, either directly or indirectly through a military alliance.” Signatories also would pledge not to increase “the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.” The draft made no mention of security assurances, but Mr. Foster did make clear that the multilateral force was unaffected because the number of nuclear entities would not increase. Unimpressed, the Soviets countered with a draft explicitly forbidding the transfer of “nuclear weapons, or control over them or their use” to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under
joint command. In December 1965, President Johnson and West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard abandoned efforts to create a NATO multilateral force. Since they did not say so explicitly, the Soviets continued acting as if the possibility was still real.

On the issue of great-power guarantees for non-nuclear signatories, Washington and Moscow remained far apart. Early in 1966, Premier Kosygin proposed a provision “prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, signatories to the treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their territory.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed such a pledge “in any form,” warning Secretary McNamara that it was “a shrewd propaganda move” designed to discriminate against and intimidate US allies and to erode collective security arrangements. If assurances seemed necessary, they should be generally worded and take the form of a UN resolution. If a draft NPT did contain specific assurances, the overall advantages of a treaty should be carefully reassessed; the sacrifices necessary to entice non-nuclear states into signing might prove too great.

The Soviets saw West Germany’s physical access to nuclear weapons as the crux of the NPT problem. In June 1966, Secretary Rusk circulated treaty articles worded to answer that concern. Article I stipulated that nuclear signatories would neither grant nor help non-nuclear states to achieve physical access to nuclear weapons. Article II stated that non-nuclear parties would neither manufacture nor achieve physical access to nuclear weapons. In Article III, signatories pledged not to violate the prohibitions in I and II either directly or indirectly, through third parties or groups of states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lodged two objections. First, the draft failed to apply clearly defined, adequate safeguards over presumably peaceful nuclear facilities. Second, it defined proliferation in terms of “physical access” rather than “control.” Secretary McNamara, however, endorsed the new draft in toto. A surprising dissent came from ACDA, whose Acting Director doubted whether Article I could be squared with bilateral arrangements among NATO members. Since European allies not only transported US nuclear weapons but also attached them to their own aircraft and missiles, it would be difficult to argue that they lacked “physical access.” ACDA suggested, instead, language based on the 1954 Atomic Energy Act prohibiting physical access that contributed to a capability to design, develop, or fabricate nuclear weapons.

Late in September, talks between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko led US civilian leaders to believe that Moscow might accept a formula permitting (1) NATO’s two-key arrangement, (2) intensive nuclear consultations among NATO members, and (3) the right of a united Western Europe to succeed France and the United Kingdom as a nuclear power. The State Department drafted and President Johnson approved a no-transfer article effectively foreclosing any multilateral force.

There followed weeks of negotiations with the Soviets and extensive consultations with NATO allies. West Germany, particularly, worried that Article III might be so strictly worded as to preclude peaceful applications of atomic energy. In April 1967, the North Atlantic Council accepted an Article III wherein non-nuclear
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powers would place international safeguards (those of the International Atomic Energy Agency or similar) “on all sources of special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes.” After reviewing the full draft, the Director, Joint Staff, advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: “There do not appear to be any overriding reasons against US efforts to pursue an NPT. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff not address the revised NPT text and that they not provide unsolicited views to the Secretary of Defense at this time.” On 24 August 1967, the United States and the USSR gave the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference separate but identical NPT texts, with Article III left blank.49

Security guarantees raised the last hurdle to agreement. In February 1967, ACDA proposed a UN resolution welcoming the “intention” (1) of nuclear states to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, as well as signatories not engaged in aggressive acts supported by nuclear states, and (2) of states to “provide or support immediate assistance” to any non-nuclear state that became the victim of non-nuclear aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still opposed any public pledge to limit the use of nuclear weapons, on grounds that doing so “could detract from the psychological deterrent effect of US nuclear superiority as well as set a precedent leading to further restrictions on US operations.” They doubted, in any case, whether negative assurances would woo away many supporters of a Soviet alternative. Instead of pursuing a watered-down version, why not strongly oppose a pledge in any form? They were willing to endorse only a positive assurance of “strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail,” such as President Johnson publicly promised after China’s first nuclear explosion in October 1964.50

In November 1967, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara agreed on language expressing an intent to refrain from the threat or use of force against any non-nuclear signatory “that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear weapon state.” (Previous proposals had specified “acts of aggression.”) But then the Soviets expressed willingness, in their own supporting declaration, to delete all references to a non-use obligation. Writing to Secretary McNamara in mid-February 1968, General Wheeler cited heightened international tension, the changed Soviet position, and previous Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations as reasons for rejecting “any form of nuclear non-use commitments other than those required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.”51

On 14 March 1968, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference presented a draft NPT to the UN General Assembly. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union co-sponsored a Security Council resolution providing positive assurances of support for threatened non-nuclear signatories. The Joint Chiefs endorsed this NPT but considered it “almost certain” that the General Assembly would debate negative, non-use assurances which they opposed. A non-use assurance, they observed, might well confine US reaction over North Korea’s seizure of the Pueblo to conventional weapons. They, therefore, repeated General Wheeler’s recommendation to avoid all assurances save those required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.52
Shortly afterward, nonetheless, ACDA proposed that US negotiators adhere to the Rusk-McNamara formula of November 1967. Promptly and strongly, the Joint Chiefs protested against a non-use commitment “in any form,” asking that their views be brought before President Johnson if necessary. Interdepartmental review resulted in an agreement that non-use would receive further consideration “only if and when” it surfaced in the General Assembly. Subsequently, in New York, the US and Soviet delegations agreed that both would attempt to avoid a UN debate over non-use assurances.53

On 12 June 1968, by vote of 95 to 4 (with 21 abstentions), the General Assembly adopted an NPT text summarized below:

**Article I:** Nuclear states pledged not to transfer nuclear devices directly or indirectly “to any recipient whatsoever” and neither assist nor encourage non-nuclear states in acquiring either nuclear weapons or control over them.

**Article II:** Non-nuclear states undertook similarly stringent obligations against either receiving or acquiring nuclear weapons.

**Article III:** Parties without nuclear weapons would accept International Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards over their peaceful nuclear activities.

**Article X:** Parties could, by reason of “extraordinary events,” withdraw upon three months’ notice.

One week later, the Security Council approved an innocuous resolution of assurance that “[w]elcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State Party . . . that is a victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”54 Since nothing was said about non-use commitments, the Joint Chiefs’ objections were fully satisfied.

President Johnson signed the NPT on 1 July 1968. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, General Wheeler said the Joint Chiefs of Staff were “in agreement with the expressed objectives of this treaty and support ratification . . . as not inimical to US security interests.”55 Ratification followed in March 1969. Over the next eight years, 99 countries became signatories. Among the abstainers were India, Pakistan, Israel, China, and Brazil, some of the very countries from whom, in American eyes, nonproliferation commitments were most needed.56

**SALT: Hopes Raised and Blighted**

During 1963, the US Government started giving serious thought to a separate agreement limiting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At this point, the US missile program was running ahead of the Soviet one. On 21 January 1964, President Johnson urged the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference to explore a verified freeze of
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SNDVs. Within the US government, verification was the sticking point. While ACDA proposed relying largely upon US intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted upon “resident and random on-site inspection.” At Geneva, when US spokesmen presented a freeze proposal involving on-site inspection, Soviets dismissed it as “inspection without disarmament.”

Meeting on 22 April 1965, the Committee of Principals discussed whether a freeze proposal should include reductions as well. If it did, Secretary Rusk cautioned, US verification capabilities would have to be reviewed very carefully. After all, if Houston could build an astrodome, the Soviets “no doubt could do the same thing, except that they would not be playing baseball.” A CIA representative said that past camouflage efforts by the Soviets had been failures. Major General Powers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Assistant for Arms Control, countered that US intelligence could not know about Soviet efforts that did succeed.

In mid-July 1965, ACDA circulated a plan to (1) freeze the numbers and characteristics of SNDVs, (2) reduce US and Soviet SNDV inventories by about 700 each, and (3) explore the foregoing possibilities during an 18-month cessation of launcher construction. Since verification of (3) could be accomplished without on-site inspection, ACDA’s plan could answer the Soviet accusation of inspection without disarmament. Director Foster observed that, since US strategic programs were leveling off while Soviet ones gained momentum, a freeze certainly would serve US interests.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed offering any specific numbers. Instead, discussions “should be confined to determining, in private, whether the Soviets are interested in the principle of coupling some reductions with the freeze and, if so, the magnitude of any reductions they would consider.” The danger in reducing was that the Soviets, by scrapping some early-model ICBMs, a portion of their medium bombers (which they were phasing down anyway), and part of their massive IR/MRBM force, could trade about 700 short-range, obsolescent SNDVs for hard-silo Minuteman ICBMs. Thereafter, given the much higher payload of Soviet missiles, they could deploy several times as many warheads as the United States.

The Joint Chiefs did not believe that US intelligence alone could verify a cessation of ICBM launcher construction. As a result, Washington “would find it politically and psychologically difficult to make any meaningful response to a suspected but unproven violation.” Additionally, a moratorium would severely curtail the development of US ballistic missile defenses. All in all, the Joint Chiefs characterized ACDA’s proposal as indicating a weakening of US resolve and thus “incompatible with the deepening US commitment to defend South Vietnam.”

Addressing the UN General Assembly on 23 September, Ambassador Goldberg stated that if there was progress toward freezing offensive and defensive systems, “the United States will also be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these carriers of mass destruction.” His words evoked no Soviet response. Accordingly, early in January 1966, Director Foster wrote directly to the President, proposing that his State of the Union message offer an 18-month halt in
constructing all fixed, land-based offensive and defensive missile launchers, beginning at mid-year. Such a freeze would preserve the US offensive lead, but Mr. Foster saw “just a chance” that the Soviets might agree in order to save money. Also, he argued, the latest National Intelligence Estimate showed that the Soviets had been unable to conceal large-scale deployments.61

The Joint Chiefs opposed any such offer and asked that President Johnson be so advised. The NIE, they pointed out, acknowledged that detection of large-scale violations could not be guaranteed. They believed, in fact, that the Soviets could start and sustain 25 to 40 single-silo sites annually with a low risk of detection.62 But Assistant Secretary (ISA) John McNaughton favored a moratorium mainly because, during the next 18 months, no Minuteman silos would be started anyway. Further, he suggested that a moratorium cover mobile as well as fixed missiles, and that the starting date remain open to allow implementation as soon as possible.63 Yet, in his State of the Union address on 12 January, President Johnson made no mention of any moratorium.

Findings by the Chairman’s Special Studies Group reinforced the Joint Chiefs of Staff objections to a freeze. In March 1965, General Wheeler had tasked the Group with analyzing proposals for freezing offensive and defensive systems. On 1 December, it submitted conclusions based upon the results of 237 war games. Assuming that an offensive freeze took effect in mid-1969 and the Soviets deployed sophisticated defenses, US retaliatory forces would not achieve minimum levels of assured destruction. But the Soviets could inflict well above minimum damage upon the United States, regardless of the level of American defenses. Even if both sides’ offensive and defensive forces were frozen and then reduced symmetrically, losses would not become equal until Soviet forces had been cut by 70 percent. Eliminating bombers would lessen American far more than Soviet capabilities; excluding ICBMs would do the reverse, while removing SLBMs apparently made no difference. Finally, the Group insisted upon the essentiality of on-site inspection.64

Upon reviewing the Group’s conclusions, Admiral McDonald objected to a statement that eliminating submarine-launched ballistic missiles “would appear to be an attractive segment to explore for arms control agreements.” This was rewritten to stress that the large damage potential of bomber-delivered weapons overshadowed the small yield of Polaris. General Johnson at first recommended rejecting the whole report on grounds that, among other things, it made bombers the main casualty causers, failed to examine alternative targeting philosophies, and provided an over-simplified analysis of defensive systems. (He believed, presumably, that ballistic missile defenses could be much more effective than the report indicated.) After General Johnson relented somewhat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that the Group’s findings appeared valid in light of the terms of reference, assumptions, and methodology used—but not in any other context. This was “particularly true in the area of defensive systems.” And, they stressed, the report should not be construed as a Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsement of any specific proposal.65
Assistant Secretary McNaughton now reached several tentative conclusions, and asked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinions of them:

1. Any proposal for significant missile reductions should include the reduction of associated launchers and a freeze on producing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and constructing related launchers.
2. As part of a general agreement on significant strategic reductions, the United States should be prepared to eliminate certain ICBMs if the Soviets removed some of their medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MR/IRBMs) targeting Western Europe.
3. Washington should be prepared to present a list of US and Soviet arms to be destroyed, provided Moscow would do likewise.
4. Significant SNDV reductions would tend to enhance the importance of conventional and tactical nuclear forces.
5. The worldwide political consequences of SNDV reductions deserved study.

The Joint Chiefs’ critique reflected their wariness towards the whole subject of arms control:

1. McNaughton made no mention of verification, yet progress toward a verifiable freeze was a pre-requisite to considering SNDV reductions.
2. MR/IRBM reductions would be helpful, but ICBM cutbacks could prove harmful because the Soviets were hardening their missile sites and increasing their pay-loads. Consequently, detailed analysis must precede firm conclusions.
3. A simple exchange of lists would support the Soviets' propaganda campaign for an uninspected ban on all nuclear weapons.
4. Nuclear and non-nuclear forces alike were essential. Major SNDV reductions might tempt a would-be aggressor into covertly strengthening his strategic forces. Thus the impact of an SNDV cutback could be precisely delineated only in terms of a specific proposal.
5. Again, it would be more productive to examine a specific proposal.

More generally, the Joint Chiefs observed that spreading Soviet ABM deployments cast doubt upon the desirability of any freeze “at this time.” They doubted, also, whether practical solutions could be found for the complex problems inherent in freezes and reductions. After all, substantial differences still remained within the administration. So, in the absence of specific proposals, they could not support Mr. McNaughton’s tentative conclusions “as applying across the board to SNDV freeze and reduction negotiations.”

Meantime, in mid-March 1966, ACDA proposed (1) ascertaining privately whether the Soviets were interested in coupling significant reductions with a freeze while (2) conducting a technical experts’ discussion of guidelines common to a freeze and a reduction. The State Department, the NSC Staff, and the AEC concurred. The Joint Chiefs, however, saw no merit in even considering SNDV reductions without some progress toward a freeze. Without limitations upon replacements and alternative systems, an accelerated Soviet buildup might well change the strategic balance. They
approved a private probe of Soviet intentions but, in view of the sizeable program of hard-silo construction, saw no reason to believe that Moscow would show any interest in an SNDV freeze. Agreeing with the Joint Chiefs, Secretary McNamara asked Director Foster to be “extremely careful to insure that no one gains the impression that we are willing to discuss the possibility of reductions without a freeze.”

In May, ACDA drafted a letter for Premier Kosygin from President Johnson proposing an 18-month moratorium on constructing fixed, land-based offensive and defensive missile launchers, to be verified by “our respective national capabilities.” Mr. McNaughton concurred, and Mr. McNamara agreed to discuss it with the President. But the Joint Chiefs insisted that such a proposal include mobile missiles and provide for on-site inspections. Also, unless broader arrangements were concluded during the moratorium, which seemed unlikely, they anticipated strong pressures to extend the 18-month period. In that case, verification would become even more significant, because the Soviets stood to widen their lead in ballistic missile defense and gain an advantage in developing MIRV warheads. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that President Johnson be apprised of their views. No letter went to Premier Kosygin. At Geneva, on 8 July, the Soviets indicated that they were uninterested in an SNDV freeze.

On 31 July, General Wheeler's Special Studies Group submitted its follow-on analysis of a freeze accompanied by symmetrical and asymmetrical SNDV reductions. The Group concluded that a 1969 freeze would allow both sides to accomplish assured destruction, either in pre-emption or retaliation. Yet reductions as small as 15 percent could prevent the United States from accomplishing assured destruction. At the same time, the Soviets would retain their assured destruction capability even through reductions exceeding 50 percent. A freeze alone would be more advantageous to the United States in 1967 than in 1969, because of the accelerating Soviet buildup, but a freeze-and-reduce combination in 1967 would benefit the USSR. The Joint Chiefs judged these conclusions “valid within the study’s parameters,” telling Secretary McNamara that they revealed “even more clearly the complex and potentially destabilizing nature of arms control proposals having SNDV freeze and reductions as their basis.” Primary consideration, they stressed, must be given not to the quantitative reductions but rather to the residual capabilities.

On 13 January 1967, ACDA circulated a less ambitious plan simply to “level off” strategic offensive and defensive missile forces at approximately current levels (i.e., launchers that were either operational or already under construction). Leveling off impressed ACDA as having the best prospect of success, since lessening the likelihood of ambiguity—the confusion between permitted and prohibited changes—would ease verification problems. As fallback positions, ACDA proposed either freezing ABMs and fixed land-based launchers or freezing ABMs only.

The Joint Chiefs endorsed exploratory discussions about leveling off but accompanied that with their oft-repeated recommendation to deploy heavy ballistic missile defenses. They also voiced “serious reservations” about several points in ACDA's proposal: excluding the ambiguous Tallinn Line in the northwestern USSR, which
appeared to be anti-aircraft but could become anti-missile defenses; relying upon unilateral US intelligence; assuming that full-scale testing by the Soviets, which would be banned, was necessary before MIRVs and penetration aids could be deployed; and apparently believing that ballistic missile defenses would not usefully contribute to “the total US strategic posture” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. They suggested informing the Soviets, early in discussions, that a freeze must be accompanied by appropriate verification procedures. The Joint Chiefs also opposed any discussion of MIRVs, because continuing their development offered the best guarantee against a Soviet surprise. Finally, they deemed it essential that any limitation agreement be formalized as a treaty.72

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), issued in mid-February 1967, reframed the debate over verification by downplaying a need for on-site inspections: “In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program of deception and concealment we believe that we would almost certainly detect any extensive new deployment in strategic forces, although the Soviets probably could effect small-scale increases without our knowledge. . . . We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately the test objectives or even the precise nature of the system being tested.”73

Early in March, after making some minor surgery, ACDA re-circulated its leveling-off plan. By this time, exploratory Soviet-American discussions at a high level had begun. On 14 March, the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary McNamara, the Committee of Principals, and President Johnson that ACDA’s latest version still was “not in the national security interest of the United States.” They acknowledged, however, that the new SNIE described US capabilities as “adequate now for timely detection of increases in fixed ABM-capable launch sites and radars and increases in fixed ICBM and MR/IRBM launch sites of known characteristics.” Consequently, although still advocating on-site inspection, they did not object to a unilaterally verified agreement “confined to a limit on defensive systems (ABMs) and a quantitative freeze on fixed, land-based offensive systems.” The Chiefs attached several “essential” conditions: listing the still-ambiguous Tallinn Line as an ABM system; including a withdrawal clause; refusing to trade any US reductions for a freeze of specific Soviet systems; preserving freedom to deploy ABMs if the Soviets did not dismantle theirs; and putting results in treaty form. Nonetheless, the Chiefs’ acceptance of unilateral verification was a critical step toward SALT.74

On 14 March, the Committee of Principals discussed ACDA’s leveling-off plan. General Wheeler outlined the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, arguing that an agreement “should maintain our strategic superiority.” Secretary McNamara challenged him, claiming that the current US superiority (such as it was) could not be turned to political advantage. He reasoned that the US lead had come about inadvertently, through an over-estimate of Soviet aims. Now, probably, the Soviets were responding to their own overly pessimistic assessment of American intentions. Therefore, Washington and Moscow should strive for a clearer understanding of each other’s intentions; narrowing that
area of uncertainty could dampen down the arms race. A good test, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow observed, would be “whether we can establish what the Tallinn system is”—anti-aircraft or anti-missile. General Wheeler thought it “inconceivable that the Soviets did not know where they were going on ABMs,” but Secretary McNamara believed the odds were “ten to one” that they had not yet decided.75

The Committee decided to open a dialogue rather than offer a specific proposal. Finally, though, ACDA had found a winning formula. On 18 March, Secretary Rusk instructed Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow to tell Soviet leaders that the United States was “prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification. . . . [W]e suggest that measures of agreed limitation on deployment should apply to all strategic offensive missile systems (launchers) and to all strategic defensive missile systems (launcher and radars) having a significant anti-ballistic missile capability.”76

The Johnson-Kosygin meeting, over 23–25 June 1967 at Glassboro, New Jersey, produced nothing of substance. Late in August, while the President was deciding whether to proceed with a light ABM deployment, ACDA proposed that private discussions with the Soviets precede a public announcement. The Joint Chiefs objected. A dialogue about ABM limitations they predicted, would go nowhere and serve no purpose except that of delaying US deployments. They labeled “particularly imprudent,” in the absence of similar Soviet assurances, ACDA’s suggestion that the administration declare its intent to keep further ABM deployments limited. The fielding of Nike-X, in fact, might provide the United States with “powerful leverage” in arms control discussions.77

Early in October 1967, Secretary McNamara solicited the Joint Chiefs of Staff views about NSC and State proposals to (1) limit ICBM, MR/IRBM, and SLBM launchers to those that were operational or under construction, (2) deploy no more than an agreed number of ABM launchers, and (3) accomplish verification by unilateral means. After extensive debate among themselves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that none of these would serve US interests. Since no more American launchers were planned, an agreement would place the United States at a “significant disadvantage” within two years. During time-consuming negotiations, the Soviets probably would continue initiating new construction. They found these proposals objectionable because they covered unverifiable sea-based and mobile land-based systems, excluded the Tallinn line, failed to protect assured destruction and damage-limiting capabilities, and did not provide for continued US strategic superiority.78

In February 1968, amid crises, a persistent President Johnson asked Secretary Rusk to consider steps that would “prod the Soviets into accepting talks.” The State Department and ISA prepared an offer that General Wheeler did not see until after Secretary Rusk and the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, had agreed to it. Basically, construction of offensive land-based launchers would be frozen (although sites already under way could be completed) and each side allowed an agreed number of ABM launchers and radars. After reading it, the Chairman informed Secretary Clifford that handing such a proposal to the Soviets would “expose far too much of the extreme risks which
the US might be willing to accept finally in order to entice the Soviets into commencing negotiations. It seeks no comparable concessions. On 2 May, the President sent Premier Kosygin a letter stripped of such specifics. Mr. Kosygin endorsed an exchange of views, and on 1 July President Johnson announced that discussions about limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons would begin “in the nearest future.”

Opening strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) now topped the arms control agenda. In July, General Wheeler created a small office to serve as the focal point in preparations for these talks and to supply a nucleus of military representation during them. To be Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations (ACSAN), he “temporarily” designated Major General Royal B. Allison, USAF, who had served as deputy chairman of the Special Studies Group during 1964–1967.

Late in July, an interagency working group completed and ACDA circulated a “basic proposal” that included: limiting fixed land-based ICBM launchers to 1,200 per side, forbidding mobile launchers and new construction after 1 September but allowing qualitative improvements to existing launchers and missiles; prohibiting, as of 1 September, the construction of new missile submarines and the placement of additional launchers on existing submarines, although missile improvements and retrofitting would be allowed; and confining ABM deployments to a set and equal number of fixed land-based launchers and associated radars. OSD then prepared a draft presidential memorandum incorporating these provisions, with minimal changes (e.g., assurances that the Tallinn Line would not become an ABM system and that ICBMs would not clandestinely replace MR/IRBMs). Deputy Secretary Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an assessment.

The Joint Chiefs agreed that, “on balance” and with “essential modifications,” these ACDA and OSD papers defined an acceptable framework. On 9 August, they advised Secretary Clifford that US intelligence could verify ABM launchers of known characteristics and, with a reasonable degree of confidence, the number of fixed sites and silos for ICBMs and MR/IRBMs. On-site inspection would be needed, however, to spot the upgrading of anti-air defenses into ABMs and to detect the retrofitting of MR/IRBM launchers into ICBM status. Construction of missile submarines, they continued, could not be discovered until a few (say, 4 to 10) were at sea; a ban on mobile launchers would remain undiscovered prior to substantial deployment. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs proposed three revisions. First, forbid further hardening of MR/IRBM launchers. Second, prohibit the production as well as the deployment of mobile land-based missiles. Third, ban reload missiles for ABMs, since Soviet systems possessed reload capability while US ones would not. Furthermore, no restriction should be placed on ABM radars to avoid a chance of erroneous categorization. And here unanimity among the Joint Chiefs of Staff ended.

Admiral Moorer and General Chapman wanted to let each side, within the overall ceiling, vary its mix of land- and sea-based offensive and defensive launchers. Their justification was that proposed ceilings allowed the Soviets to take advantage of their larger land area, deploying ICBMs to threaten more of the CONUS perimeter.
and positioning ABMs to reduce battle space interference and collateral damage. Freedom to mix, conversely, would capitalize upon superior American ASW and SLBM capabilities, and upon easier US access to the sea.

General Wheeler, however, found compelling arguments against freedom to mix. As he saw it, the Moorer-Chapman approach would simply encourage a Soviet shift to sea-based launchers, thereby gaining for them the advantages now enjoyed by US forces. Also, there would be an “open invitation” to cheating since, if the Soviets announced SLBM construction to offset ICBM retirements, US intelligence could not ascertain whether hard-silo ICBM activations and deactivations actually had occurred. (Yet he also observed, a bit contradictorily, that land-to-sea shifting required such advance planning that the issue probably would not arise during a treaty's ten-year life.) General Wheeler dismissed US geographical advantages as being theoretical at best, since Soviet access to the sea already was “literally unrestricted.” Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, General Wheeler appealed to Admiral Moorer that a split among the Chiefs was “not only regrettable but indeed dangerous. The fact that there is a divergency will permit certain people to exploit this in support of their own views.” But Admiral Moorer held firm, arguing that it was “very much too early to lock ourselves into a fixed combination.” Secretary Clifford sided with General Wheeler. Yet in the early 1970s, when Admiral Moorer was Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to place great value upon freedom to mix.

On 13 August, Secretary Clifford informed President Johnson that “an agreement based upon [ACDA's proposal] would allow the actions necessary to preserve US security.” To an impressive extent, the statements in Mr. Clifford's memorandum were identical with those in JCSM-498-68. He spoke, though, of maintaining an adequate rather than a superior US deterrent. Next day, the Committee of Principals debated whether to eliminate a ban on ABM radars from the US position. General Wheeler wanted to do so, of course, but Secretary Rusk favored retaining it at the outset in order to probe Soviet intentions. Conferees agreed to (1) give the radar issue further study and (2) seek presidential approval of ACDA's proposal, modified to meet the Joint Chiefs' three objections.

By 21 August, the working group completed a basic position paper and an opening statement. But, on that same day, Soviet and satellite forces swept into Czechoslovakia and deposed the reform-minded leadership. The Service Chiefs promptly recorded their objection against proceeding with SALT for the time being. When the Committee of Principals reconvened on 22 August, Secretary Rusk agreed that Soviet action obviously made SALT's future uncertain. Still, he continued, their task was “to give the President the necessary material to go ahead with the talks if and when he desires.” The Committee made one amendment: Seek assurance that the Tallinn Line would not be upgraded to an ABM system. If that proved impossible, Tallinn launchers must be limited and included in the level of Soviet ABMs.

President Johnson “tentatively” approved the amended position and, on 6 September, Rusk suggested approaching NATO allies about proceeding with SALT. General
Arms Control Inches Forward

Wheeler objected that doing so “in the near future . . . could be interpreted as approval of Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia and would be divisive of NATO at a critical time.” Secretary Clifford agreed. However, President Johnson still hoped for a heads-of-state meeting at which to launch the talks. Early in December, he wrote to his national security adviser, “I’m ready—are they?” The Director, Joint Staff, had recommended disbanding General Allison’s office; on 10 December, General Wheeler disapproved. Secretary Clifford now wanted to push ahead, but Johnson’s last hope ended when president-elect Nixon refused to join any negotiations prior to his inauguration.87 On 20 January 1969, a new SALT cycle began.

A Qualified Conclusion

Clearly, arms control was one area in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff still wielded major influence. Since a treaty stood no chance of Senate ratification if they opposed it, the Joint Chiefs appeared to possess an untrammeled veto. That appearance, however, was not entirely accurate. For example, when the intelligence community concluded that the number of offensive launchers could be verified without on-site inspection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff really had no choice but to reverse their position. The evolution of a treaty prohibiting the seabed emplacement of nuclear weapons, described below, showed how changing circumstances could turn a strong “no” from the Joint Chiefs into a grudging “yes.”

In December 1967, the UN General Assembly tasked an ad hoc committee to study (1) demilitarizing the seabed, which was defined as anything beyond the 12-mile limit, (2) reserving the seabed for peaceful purposes, and (3) prohibiting the stationing there of weapons of mass destruction. That kindled interest among many nations. Director Foster favored negotiating a treaty to prohibit nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected, foreseeing “a distinct possibility” of emplacing such weapons there. If “pindown”88 and submarine vulnerability became realities, crippling Minuteman and Polaris/Poseidon, the United States had convenient access to a wide range of seabeds while the USSR did not. Also, the superpowers as well as other nations possessed the technology to emplace weapons of mass destruction on the ocean bottom with “virtually no risk of detection.”89

When the Committee of Principals convened on 14 May 1968, Director Foster asked General Wheeler what kinds of systems DOD was considering. The Chairman listed a submarine mobile platform carrying ICBMs, a bottom crawler or sitter, a three-section submersible, and tunnels for encapsulated missiles. Characterizing ACDA’s paper as “more polemical than analytical,” Deputy Secretary Nitze suggested working out an analysis that would form the basis of a US position. This was done. Two weeks later, the Committee Deputies—General Wheeler’s representative dissenting—submitted an amended proposal. When the Committee of Principals reviewed it on 3 June, Secretary Rusk and Director Foster aligned against Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler. Director
Foster said it was US policy to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world: first Antarctica, then atmospheric testing, next deployment in outer space, and now logically the seabed. Mr. Nitze replied that in 1963 DOD had supported a limited test ban to avoid further contamination of the atmosphere. General Wheeler added that we were paying a penalty for that treaty, because underground tests had to be performed at much greater expense and delay. No one wanted to fight over the Antarctic, he noted, and verification was easier in outer space than in the seabed. Basically, General Wheeler contended, “we are giving up possible future strategic capabilities in return for a small political gain. Further, this might be only the first step toward a strategic straitjacket, particularly in view of US verification capabilities.” But the State Department, noting that the Soviets were pushing a ban on seabed military activities as well as nuclear weapons, described the basic issue as “how we avoid a bloody nose in handling the Soviet initiative.”

In August, after reviewing Secretary Rusk’s draft for the UN ad hoc committee, Secretary Clifford and the Joint Chiefs were willing to endorse only a carefully hedged statement of support (e.g., “examine the question” rather than “undertake negotiations”). Over the next weeks, though, the ad hoc committee made what the State Department considered “appreciable progress . . . in major areas of US concern.” Using the Rusk-Clifford formula, all members affirmed that the deep seabed should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In March 1969, the United States introduced a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. The USSR tabled a draft providing for complete demilitarization. But soon, surprisingly, the Soviets essentially accepted the US draft and added on-site inspection. The General Assembly approved, and a treaty entered into force on 19 May 1972. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsement, provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was notably restrained: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff interpose no objection to the ratification of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. They reitera their concern, however, that any additional constraints on military use of the seabeds beyond the prohibitions contained in the treaty would bear a potential for grave harm to United States national security interests.”
NATO: Surviving Challenges from Within

Among US foreign policy priorities, none had ranked higher over the course of the Cold War than preserving the Atlantic alliance as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. Created in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joined Western Europe with North America in a collective security arrangement. Allied Command Europe came into being, with an American serving as its Supreme Allied Commander and a large US contingent that included five divisions. During the mid-1960s, however, the most serious challenges confronting NATO proved to be internal and basically political in nature. Chafing at American pre-eminence, President Charles de Gaulle withdrew French units from the integrated command and evicted US forces from France, challenging the very idea of trans-Atlantic partnership. The Johnson administration also faced fiscal and congressional pressures to reduce American forces in Europe, which could disrupt security ties with West Germany where the bulk of US personnel were stationed. Greece and Turkey seemed to distrust each other more than their presumed adversary, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

Coping with France’s Secession

Upon becoming president in 1958, Charles de Gaulle pursued his conviction that “France is not really herself unless she is in the front rank.” Promptly, he approached the US and UK governments about forming a triumvirate to deal with global problems. After they declined, he withdrew some naval units from NATO assignments. More importantly, he awarded high priority to creating an independent “force de frappe” composed of Mirage bombers carrying nuclear weapons. In 1960, France exploded its first nuclear device.
Was there some way to foster nuclear cooperation? In April 1964, President Johnson decided not to assist any national nuclear forces save those that were earmarked for assignment to NATO and targeted in accordance with NATO plans. Britain met that condition; France’s force de frappe did not. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had misgivings about denying help to France. Just before President Johnson rendered his decision, they warned of possible French retaliation. For example, restrictions could be placed upon US use of ports, airfields, depots, and headquarters in France. American efforts, they argued, should be directed more towards influencing French nuclear efforts in a way that would benefit the Atlantic Alliance.3

In September 1964, General Curtis LeMay returned to the issue of Franco-American cooperation. If France developed a thermonuclear weapon and an intermediate range ballistic missile, General LeMay warned his fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff, President de Gaulle could offer European allies more advanced weapons than the United States, restricted by the Atomic Energy Act, could make available. Britain, in exchange for being admitted to the Common Market, might join France in establishing a European nuclear force. Alternatively, President de Gaulle might energize the Franco-German relationship or build a “third force” among Common Market countries. At all events, General LeMay argued, the time had come to formulate proposals aimed at preventing France from taking control of NATO’s strategy and future. Agreeing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary McNamara to press for an interdepartmental study of how French nuclear forces could be integrated into the NATO framework. Such a study should recognize that US concessions might be necessary and that the French might try to exploit their nuclear potential “to the detriment of US interests.” Assistant Secretary (ISA) John McNaughton put their proposal before a State-Defense Ad Hoc Group.4

On 4 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again appealed to Secretary McNamara over what they saw as the urgent need for a policy review “at the highest level.” The administration was weighing whether to keep trying to create a multilateral force (MLF) of nuclear-armed ships, which France strongly opposed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted that, unless President de Gaulle could be persuaded to integrate his force de frappe into NATO, he probably would block the US campaign to change NATO’s strategic concept from meeting major aggression with prompt nuclear retaliation into one of flexible response. In that case, the alternatives would be continuing without French participation or promoting the coordination of national nuclear forces. Two weeks later, President Johnson decided not to press for a binding MLF agreement and to avoid public or private quarrels with France, taking the line that “we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France.”5

In April 1965, General McConnell proposed three steps: minimize Franco-American policy conflicts; declare France eligible for assistance in developing nuclear weapons; and give allies more control over and responsibility for nuclear weapons. For example, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), might assume responsibility for targeting 30 US B–58 bombers, even though the aircraft themselves would stay under the control of Strategic Air Command. That arrangement, perhaps, could
set a precedent for France to follow with its force de frappe. Apparently, these proposals were too bold for the other Chiefs to endorse outright. They simply forwarded his paper to Lieutenant General Andrew Goodpaster, Assistant to the Chairman, who was serving on the State-Defense Ad Hoc Group.6

What nuclear assets might the allies share? The SACEUR, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, wanted to control by 1970 Polaris missile submarines and either mobile, land-based medium range ballistic missiles or extended-range Pershing missiles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him. Late in September 1965, they warned Secretary McNamara that NATO's viability might well hinge on solving the nuclear sharing problem. Placing an MRBM force at SACEUR's disposal would: add an option for countering the threat from Soviet intermediate and medium-range missiles; satisfy allied aspirations for a greater role in controlling and using nuclear strike forces; and allay fears that Europeans might face a situation for which there was no suitable nuclear response.7

Meantime, a much more troubling question was coming to the forefront: would France leave NATO? Early in 1964, de Gaulle called for a new system of coordinated planning wherein each ally would be responsible for defending its own national territory. Secretary McNamara reacted by asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume (1) that France either withdrew from NATO or took actions tantamount to withdrawal and (2) that French forces would support the alliance and ports, airfields, and other facilities would be available in wartime. How, he asked, could the damage to NATO be contained and an effective defense maintained? They replied that, without the lines of communication running across central France, a forward defense seemed infeasible. Unless extensive peacetime stockpiling took place, French facilities would possess merely “marginal” value if they became available only in wartime. Nothing except “strong and effective” bilateral arrangements could minimize the damage to NATO and maintain an effective posture.8

By May 1965, as President de Gaulle grew ever more outspoken in his criticisms of US policies worldwide, Secretary McNamara began to anticipate a French secession. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for (1) an emergency plan to remove US forces from France and (2) an examination of how US forces would operate if they were forced completely out of France. In a hasty preliminary answer, they described three logistical arrangements: a base section in Britain, advanced section in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg (Benelux); a base section in Portugal, advanced sections in Benelux and Britain; and a base section in the United States, advanced sections in Benelux and Britain. The cost would be around $1 billion, with a relocation time of 18 to 36 months. Since a complete evacuation would have “extensive repercussions affecting NATO and all of Europe,” the administration should not react to French pressure by unilaterally initiating any large-scale withdrawals. If the French formally requested withdrawal, the US reply should place wholly upon them the onus for fragmenting NATO. Then France would face counter-pressure from all the allies and not the United States alone.9

General Wheeler’s Special Studies Group looked at places where US forces and facilities might move. On 13 August, after reviewing its findings, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff advised Secretary McNamara that “there is no feasible alternative to supporting US commitments to NATO except through the Low Countries.” Protecting a Benelux base would require strengthening defenses in the North German plain. Because the financial and political problems involved in shifting US forces northward appeared sizable, Europeans—preferably Germans—should fill the need. Obviously, US interests would be best served by avoiding or delaying a withdrawal from France. Emphasis should be placed upon “how to stay” rather than “how to leave.”

Soon afterward, President de Gaulle intensified his campaign. During a press conference on 9 September, he declared that “[a]t the expiration of our present commitments—that is to say, in 1969 at the latest—we shall end the subordination which is described as integration and which puts our destiny into the hands of foreigners.” Five weeks later, the French government proposed that the alliance structure be replaced by two separate systems. The first, covering the North Atlantic area, would be “a simple treaty of alliance” in which each member would enjoy “genuine freedom of action.” The second, limited to Europe, would contain a “considerable degree” of integration in the non-nuclear field.

The US government found President de Gaulle’s proposal unacceptable. On 8 October, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, and Under Secretary of State George Ball reviewed the outlook for NATO. Mr. Ball proposed that, if France ceased participating constructively, Article V of the treaty should no longer be considered applicable. Mr. Bundy called that an empty threat, but Secretary McNamara agreed with Mr. Ball. General Wheeler mentioned that his French counterpart, General Charles Ailleret, said France wanted to maintain an integrated command in Germany but abolish the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) sited near Paris, and veto its establishment elsewhere. Secretary McNamara observed, and General Wheeler concurred, that the prospect of fighting a war without France would lead people to accept the likelihood of a “trip-wire situation,” leading quickly to nuclear escalation. The problem, McNamara believed, was that NATO’s conventional strength “would be so substantially weakened in the next two years that it would no longer be reasonable for the US divisions to stay in Europe.” Mr. Bundy disagreed.

President de Gaulle’s proposals, or challenges, stifled any prospect of nuclear cooperation. Early in October, the State-Defense Ad Hoc Group recommended against asking the French to coordinate targets assigned to their Mirage bombers with targets assigned to NATO-committed nuclear forces. For the next few years, the Group reasoned, military advantages from such cooperation would go almost exclusively to France. Also, a bilateral arrangement would appear to reward President de Gaulle’s drive for nuclear independence. If the French did make an overture, the Group suggested replying that coordination could be accomplished most effectively within the SACEUR framework.

Near the year’s end, Defense Minister Pierre Messmer told Secretary McNamara that the French would be willing “very soon now” to talk about target coordination. Following the Ad Hoc Group’s advice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a cautious,
constrained approach. Close consultation with other allies, particularly London and Bonn, should precede any substantive response. The best solution would be to commit the force de frappe to NATO, with SACEUR accomplishing coordination. Since President de Gaulle’s agreement looked extremely unlikely, a fallback was to accomplish coordination through SACEUR’s Liaison Office at Omaha, headquarters of the Strategic Air Command. Quickly, however, events rendered this entire issue obsolete.14

On 21 February 1966, de Gaulle delivered his decisive strokes. He announced, first, that the last French forces committed to NATO—two divisions and supporting aircraft in West Germany—would withdraw from the integrated command and, second, that “every foreign element stationed in France must be under the sole control of French authorities.” Through a subsequent aide-memoire, he made clear that “every foreign element” meant NATO headquarters as well as US bases. A second note set 1 July 1966 as the date for ending French participation in integrated commands, and 1 April 1967 as the deadline for evacuating all “foreign” elements from France.15

Perhaps relieved that France was leaving “the organization but not the alliance,” President Johnson directed Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to articulate a “constructive” US position. “I see no benefit to ourselves or to our allies,” the President told them, “in debating the position of the French government. Our task is to rebuild NATO outside of France as promptly, economically, and effectively as possible.”16

Meanwhile, on 18 March, General Wheeler cautioned General Lemnitzer that whatever reorganizing was done “must be austere in the extreme” because Congress would fund nothing more. In fact, he worried “whether the US will continue to support NATO with US funds and forces in whatever form [the alliance] takes.” He thought the job of rebuilding NATO should proceed along the following lines: “factor” the French out of NATO organs and agencies; reorganize military structures, possibly elevating SACEUR to the status of Supreme Allied Commander, NATO (SACNATO); and reconstitute the US lines of communication in Europe.17

Simultaneously, Deputy Secretary Vance tasked the Joint Chiefs with evaluating alternatives for relocation and adjustments to NATO’s military structure.18 On 13 April, after an extensive interservice debate, they outlined two possibilities. First, establish a SACNATO supported by an International Military Staff. SACNATO’s principal subordinates would be the Commanders in Chief, Allied Forces in Northern Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe, and the Atlantic. That way, the North Atlantic Council would draw advice from a single primary source. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred this solution but only if the SACNATO would be an American. Second, continue SACEUR and the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), held by a US officer but disestablish the Channel Command headed by a British admiral. An International Military Staff would report to NATO’s Military Committee. This would minimize disruption but could prove cumbersome and result in the North Atlantic Council receiving conflicting advice.

As to relocation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered selecting a new site for SHAPE to be the key element. They preferred the vicinity of Brussels; Headquarters,
US European Command (HQ, USEUCOM), should be placed nearby. American forces in France numbered 28,000 personnel with 730,000 tons of removable stores. President de Gaulle’s deadlines did not allow enough time to do everything the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted, in the way they wanted. They proposed a two-phased plan. Phase I would create a new line of communication (LOC) through the Benelux countries, costing about $200 million and emphasizing through-put capacity rather than maintaining reserve stocks. Phase II, building a permanent infrastructure over the next five years, would require perhaps $600 million.

There were six USAF tactical reconnaissance squadrons based in France. Also, in time of crisis, nine French bases were supposed to receive aircraft arriving from CONUS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended shifting the squadrons to Britain and Germany and acquiring replacement airfields in Belgium, Britain, and Germany. Dual-basing, meaning that units would redeploy to the United States but maintain bases in Europe to which they would return periodically, was an option. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed it, “particularly at this time,” on grounds that Europeans would see it simply as a withdrawal and so give credence to President de Gaulle’s allegations about American unreliability. Assuming there would be enough warning time to fly back from US bases amounted to gambling on a correct assessment of the enemy’s intentions instead of his capabilities.

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to relocate a force structure intact, Secretary McNamara saw an opportunity for reduction. His systems analysts spotted what they deemed unnecessary duplications, and the spiraling costs of Vietnam demanded economies elsewhere. In a DPM dated 21 April, he identified solutions that were “far less costly than their JCS counterparts.” First, move SHAPE to London or Brussels and relocate HQ, USEUCOM, from Camp des Loges just outside Paris to Germany and house it in existing facilities. The American element at SHAPE should be large enough, in his judgment, to retain US influence as well as maintain liaison with USEUCOM. Second, transfer war reserve stocks to Germany but build no new depots there. That limitation meant stockpiling only 60 days worth of ammunition. Since allies’ stocks did not exceed 15 to 30 days, he argued, why keep more? Third, dual-base the reconnaissance squadrons, bringing them back to Europe twice a year for two-week periods. Fourth, study whether replacing the nine air bases in France with an equal number was really necessary. Would not a smaller number of well-protected facilities be preferable to a larger number of poorly protected ones?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that his solutions would incur “military risks disproportionate to the savings described,” impress the allies as a “fundamental change” in US policy, and “endanger the survival of US forces on the Continent and significantly lower the capability of SACEUR/USCINCEUR to conduct a successful, sustained forward defense.” They provided a point-by-point critique. First, SHAPE should go to Brussels: “The stigma of the special Anglo-American relationship and the retreat from the Continent would appear to eliminate London from further consideration.” Moreover, HQ, USEUCOM, ought to be in Brussels because, as
USCINCEUR, General Lemnitzer bore responsibilities that required immediate and continuous access to US intelligence data and operational advice. He also had to be able to act unilaterally if necessary. Second, the Joint Chiefs wanted to stockpile a 90-day supply of ammunition in Europe. In most cases, they claimed, allied stocks of combat-essential items did approach 90-day levels. And, in any case, the requirement for war reserves must be based on being able to fight until convoys from US ports reached Europe. Supplies should start arriving in 71 days, but a safety cushion had to be added. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Secretary McNamara’s veto of more depots in Germany, largely on grounds that overcrowding would impede resupply. Again, they argued, “the risk is extremely high for the contemplated savings.”

Third, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed dual-basing. Squadrons should be in place, familiar with the terrain, and ready to undertake operations immediately. Economically, they said, redeployment to CONUS would yield no overall savings. Politically, dual-basing combined with deployments to Vietnam could fan allies’ fears that US withdrawals from Europe were imminent. Fourth, and finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred expanding existing air bases over constructing new ones.

Secretary McNamara offered only minor concessions. While agreeing that SACEUR would need a much larger US liaison staff, he remained convinced that moving HQ, USEUCOM, to Germany was efficient and would save $40 million. As to war reserves, he provided a detailed rationale for storing only 67 combat days of ammunition and 50 to 70 days of other materiel—$200 million cheaper than the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan. Despite his support of the flexible response strategy, the Secretary surprisingly argued that NATO strategy did not envision a large-scale conventional conflict lasting more than 30 to 45 days, which was the longest time that most allied forces could sustain themselves in combat. Even if a conventional battle did go beyond 30 to 45 days, resupply from CONUS should be fully under way within 75 days. Secretary McNamara did not believe that he was seeking “fundamental” policy changes. He simply wanted to be sure that resources were not used in a manner that was “wastefully inconsistent” with NATO strategy and allied capabilities. As to dual-basing aircraft, Secretary McNamara felt sure that doing so would save $50 million without an increase in risk. He believed that the danger of losses in a surprise attack were greater than the hazard of having aircraft unavailable for several days. Politically, he was confident, periodic returns to Europe would calm allied fears. Looking at replacement air bases, Secretary McNamara still found JCS requirements excessive.

On 20 May, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed their differences. Afterward, the Secretary agreed that their objections had merit and discarded his DPM. On 25 May, he sent President Johnson a short memorandum stating that “we are prepared . . . to move out of France as promptly as possible.” The cost would be relatively modest—“somewhere in the tens of millions of dollars.” General Wheeler took charge of studies about relocating personnel, materiel, and HQ, USEUCOM. General McConnell and Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown began preparing recommendations about repositioning reconnaissance squadrons and air base requirements.
Secretary McNamara authorized moving to Germany whatever stocks were needed to support, for 60 days of combat, the US force planned to be in Europe by D+30. General Wheeler wanted two new depots built; Secretary McNamara disapproved. Since President de Gaulle insisted that “not a man, not a kilo” could remain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary McNamara with a plan to transfer 417,000 tons to Germany. But, they elaborated, German depots would be filled to overflowing and practically all combat support stocks would come within range of air and missile attacks. Consequently, at least two new and safer storage sites were needed. They also opposed reducing stock levels from 90 down to 60 combat days. The duration of a conventional war was unpredictable. If nuclear exchanges occurred, residual forces must be able to continue fighting, and stocks must last until resupply from CONUS began. Therefore, unless there was sufficient strategic warning, unless timely decisions were made to deploy forces to Europe and commence automatic resupply, and unless combat losses proved insignificant, “anything less than 90 combat days of war reserve stockage constitutes significant risk.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that (1) planning exclude wartime use of French facilities, (2) efforts begin to develop a British base for 30 days of combat stockage, and (3) an attempt be made to obtain sites for new storage facilities in the Saar region west of the Rhine.25

A skeptical Secretary asked the Joint Chiefs for “a better appraisal” of how adding depots in Germany would reduce vulnerability and increase efficiency. He also questioned the wisdom of creating a logistical base in Britain so that theater stocks could total 90 days. Instead, could not the 75 days calculated to begin bringing supplies from CONUS be cut by assembling convoys while supplies were being brought to US ports? Secretary McNamara also cited studies suggesting that the Benelux complex might be lost within a week or two, in which case supplies from Britain could not reach Germany. A 30-day reserve in Britain would be needed, he believed, only during a large-scale conflict that began with little warning—but under such conditions Allied Command Europe would have great difficulty conducting a prolonged conventional defense.26 Thus Secretary McNamara's position had come almost full circle from the early 1960s, when he insisted that a protracted conventional defense was within reach and constantly pressed the allies to increase their efforts.

On 7 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara a study of places where the 156,000 tons of supplies remaining in France might be relocated. Britain still impressed them as the best solution on grounds of economy, safety, availability, and flexibility. They noted that, even if defenses in Central Europe did collapse, US war plans still envisioned holding strong points on the continent, in Norway, and in the British Isles. In those circumstances, stocks in Britain would prove most useful.27 Secretary McNamara still hoped to reduce the 75-day figure. But a study by OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services apparently persuaded the Secretary that he was wrong. On 12 December 1966, he approved stocking 156,000 tons in Britain. So, with 30 days’ worth there and 60 days in Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff objective of 90 days would be fulfilled.28
Back in August, Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville told Ambassador Charles Bohlen that France would permit re-entry only during a war in which she herself was participating. Secretary McNamara promptly called for plans to withdraw all USAF property and personnel. Relocating USAF forces and facilities went forward with comparatively little friction. Of the six reconnaissance squadrons in France, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended bringing two back to CONUS and keeping four in Europe. McNamara decided to return three and shift three to Britain. How should the nine air bases be replaced? The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed one in Germany, one in Belgium, and seven in Britain. Secretary McNamara approved reopening, in Britain, Sculthorpe and Chelveston as well as expanding Mildenhall. Other augmentation aircraft arriving from CONUS would be accommodated at seven existing bases, one German and six British. Placing so many aircraft in Britain would reduce their payloads and loiter time over the battlefield while increasing their response time. Consequently, Secretary McNamara authorized approaching allies about establishing co-located bases in northern Germany and the Netherlands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied a co-location survey in September 1967 and supported an Air Force proposal to reopen Greenham Common. Secretary McNamara disapproved, but after he left office the decision was reversed.

What about the pipeline carrying petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) through France into Germany? The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that alternatives be developed; Secretary McNamara authorized some actions but preferred peacetime leasing. In December 1966, at General Lemnitzer's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged negotiations to permit wartime use of POL facilities, airfields, hospitals, and depots. Secretary McNamara solicited the State Department's view—and received a polite rebuff. Nine months earlier, Secretary Rusk reminded him, the French had made such an offer. The US response had been to insist on peacetime access plus "an ironclad guarantee" of wartime availability. No new approach should be contemplated, therefore, until relocations had been completed. The French agreed to peacetime leasing of the pipeline but withheld formal approval for its wartime use.

Finally, there was the challenge of revamping NATO's command structure. The most radical solution, creating a SACNATO, went nowhere. Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and SACEUR himself all supported this concept as the simplest, most economical, and most effective means of providing military direction. But the allies balked, feeling that resentment would arise against absolute US control. The British argued that the power already enjoyed by SACEUR was one reason for de Gaulle's defection. By mid-1966, the administration had to admit that the SACNATO idea was "dead."

On 3 May 1966, General Lemnitzer recommended relocating SHAPE to the vicinity of Brussels. The Belgians offered Chievres-Casteau, about 30 miles southwest of Brussels. General Lemnitzer judged that site unacceptable, on grounds of remoteness and inaccessibility. Separating SHAPE from the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, he believed, would seriously harm working relationships. But the State Department, fearing Belgians
might withdraw their offer, opposed any “confrontation.” Casteau became SHAPE’s new home. Concurrently, the US-UK-French Standing Group was abolished and its International Planning Staff expanded into an International Military Staff reporting to the NATO Military Committee, which moved from Washington to Brussels.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while convinced that military considerations mandated co-locating SHAPE with HQ, USEUCOM, recognized that political factors took precedence. HQ, USEUCOM, had to be operating outside of France by 1 April 1967. Relocating it to the Brussels area would impose delays, and Belgium might be reluctant to accept a US as well as a NATO headquarters. Accordingly, on 30 June 1966, the Joint Chiefs agreed to put HQ, USEUCOM, at Stuttgart, 250 miles from SHAPE.

On 14 March 1967, the Stars and Stripes were lowered at USEUCOM’s old headquarters near St.-Germain-en-Laye. On 31 March, SHAPE opened its new facilities at Casteau. As fighter-bombers flew overhead and a British Army band played a regimental march, flags of fourteen allies crackled as they ran up their poles. But NATO’s blue and silver flag remained earth-bound; at the critical moment, the pulley had come off the flagstaff. Happily, that symbolism did not reflect the substance of the occasion. Allied Command Europe, although weaker, remained alive and functioning.

Re-Cementing the German Connection

In March 1966, after President de Gaulle announced France’s secession, General Wheeler counseled SACEUR that keeping West Germany tightly tied to the Atlantic alliance was “probably our highest security interest vis-à-vis NATO.” Two large obstacles loomed. First, as rising Vietnam commitments drained the CONUS reserve, Secretary McNamara started drawing upon US Army, Europe. In April 1966, without informing German officials beforehand, he announced plans to withdraw 15,000 personnel, promising to replace them by the year’s end. Actually, 55,000 were sent to Vietnam and replaced by 40,000 newly-trained men. The decline in combat readiness would continue through 1968. Second, the US balance-of-payments deficit kept rising. A 1964 agreement obligated West Germany to “offset” fully the deficit incurred by stationing US troops there. But the German government, facing budget troubles and a sluggish economy, fell short. In May 1966, Secretary McNamara warned Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel that Washington reserved the right to reduce “proportionally” if German purchases of US arms failed to fully offset troop costs. Some Germans suspected he was using this issue as a pretext to justify transferring divisions to Vietnam. London also threatened to withdraw units from the British Army of the Rhine unless Bonn shouldered the costs of keeping them there.

On Capitol Hill, misgivings about the Vietnam War spilled over into resentment against continuing such a large presence in Europe. In August 1966, the Senate Democratic Policy Committee called for a substantial reduction of the 330,000 personnel deployed there. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D, MT) introduced an implementing
resolution that attracted 31 co-sponsors. Although the measure never came close to passing, it was a harbinger of growing discontent.

Even before the Vietnam buildup, Secretary McNamara had thought seriously about reducing the American presence in Europe. If allies refused to muster enough conventional strength for prolonged resistance, should not the United States follow suit? On 23 August 1966, Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the implications of (1) withdrawing two divisions and 184 tactical fighters, (2) removing four divisions and 368 aircraft, and (3) thinning out US units plus redeploying 108 aircraft. Not surprisingly, the Joint Chiefs opposed any cutbacks. First, they advised, withdrawing two divisions would “jeopardize the integrity of the entire defense,” probably require earlier use of nuclear weapons, force a rapid retreat to the Rhine, and endanger reinforcement capability by quickly losing German bases. Second, taking away four divisions would “negate the concept of a forward defense and probably necessitate the immediate use of nuclear weapons.” Third, thinning out Army units to 70 or 80 percent strength would seriously degrade their combat capability and endurance. Reducing tactical fighter strength would severely degrade NATO's ability to fight the initial air battle. If ground units were withdrawn, in-place reconnaissance and air defense units became much more important. For a trans-Atlantic return, 50 tankers would be needed to refuel 108 aircraft, 90 to refuel 184, and 110 to refuel 316.42

General Wheeler held little hope that Joint Chiefs of Staff arguments would carry weight. On 7 September, he warned General Lemnitzer that “there is already a definite acceptance (and perhaps even a tentative but closely held decision) in OSD and the White House that substantial reductions should be made; I think it is most significant that the Mansfield amendment was not refuted by the administration except from the standpoint of its timeliness, the need for consultations, and the need to distinguish between combat and support troops.” General Wheeler thought it likely that the first steps would preserve “the façade of the magic five divisions . . . until the political ground has been thoroughly plowed for further reductions.”43

On 26 September, President Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard held a frosty meeting. When Mr. Erhard said that Germany could not fulfill all its offset obligations, President Johnson replied that “he did not want to be arbitrary with the Chancellor, but if he could not keep his word it would seriously aggravate his own position, financially and otherwise.” Next day, the two leaders announced a “searching reappraisal” of NATO strategy and force levels, addressing the question of equitable burden-sharing. One week later, Secretary McNamara asked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff advice about the best way to cut US Army, Europe's, strength by 50,000. He told them to apply several assumptions: withdrawals would be completed by the close of 1967; redeployed units would remain committed to NATO; dehumidified storage and pre-stockage would be authorized; and the United States would continue to support a strategy of forward defense.44

Anticipating such a request, General Wheeler already had tasked the Joint Staff with finding the “least bad” answer. On 27 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary a lengthy reply, which opened by denying any military justification for
reductions. The least bad solution would be to bring back the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) plus one brigade and assorted support units. The 24th was USAREUR's reserve division, located in southern Bavaria outside Seventh Army's defense sector. Since an entire complex of installations could be closed, substantial savings would result. Alternatively, they noted, keeping all five division flags in Europe might garner political advantage. In that case, the 24th Division's command and control elements could stay in Germany, but a brigade from another division would have to leave.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff doubted whether dehumidified storage would be available, as Secretary McNamara assumed. Demands of the Vietnam War meant that pre-positioning of stocks might have to wait until FY 1971, in which case equipment would have to be brought back to CONUS along with the personnel. The continuing credibility of the US commitment, they claimed, would revolve in large part around the feasibility of a rapid return. Re-entry times would vary between 43 and 69 days, depending on how much equipment had been pre-positioned. Even under the least bad scheme, US capability for a forward defense would be called into question, since the means for supporting it would be “visibly weakened.” With any other alternative, they claimed, forward defense would become “virtually impossible.”

Secretary McNamara also had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider “dual-basing” between 12 and 15 of the 28 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense squadrons based in Europe. Dual basing would involve bringing squadrons back to bases in CONUS but returning them to Europe periodically for exercises. The Joint Chiefs of Staff identified the least bad solution as bringing back four squadrons and periodically returning one, redeploying 4,245 personnel and saving $16.4 million in the balance of payments. The next most palatable solution would be to bring back ten squadrons and periodically return three, yielding almost twice the savings.45

General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara considered applying a “rotational brigade” approach to the 8th and 24th Divisions. When a division left Europe, one of its brigades plus the command and control elements and all heavy equipment would remain in place. Then each of the division's three brigades would rotate periodically to CONUS and back. But all the Service Chiefs opposed brigade rotation, deeming it “a difficult and expensive way to do business.” Admittedly, it would better demonstrate US will and ability to reinforce Europe as well as make repositioning less sensitive politically. On the other hand, experience indicated that training would be disrupted and morale impaired. Brigade rotation would require manning units at 102 percent strength, pre-positioning equipment for 1.3 divisions, making more transport aircraft available, and providing 3,000 more support personnel as well as an extra $46 million. The Service Chiefs urged that brigade rotation, if ordered, be postponed until all these assets became available.46

In Bonn, meantime, Americans, British, and Germans started trilateral talks about security issues. On 11 October 1966, President Johnson appointed John J. McCloy, who had been High Commissioner for Germany during 1949–52, to serve as US Representative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Mr. McCloy with a support element headed by
Lieutenant General Berton Spivy, USA, who was Director of Plans and Policy (J–5) on the Joint Staff. General Wheeler told Mr. McCloy that, if withdrawals proved inevitable, an “honest” justification must rest on political and financial grounds, not military ones. Late in November, Mr. McCloy advised the President that any “material” reductions probably would trigger allied cutbacks, lower the nuclear threshold, and encourage Soviet pressure tactics. Even with improved air and sealift, he reported, CONUS reinforcements could not reach Europe for at least three weeks. Politically, material US withdrawals would “seriously increase the risks of NATO disintegration and reduction of US influence in Europe.” Consequently, Mr. McCloy opposed withdrawing “significant” forces from Central Europe. In the financial realm, he recommended exploring with Bonn new arrangements to “neutralize” the balance-of-payments problem. After reviewing Mr. McCloy’s report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that it generally reflected their views.47

Through a DPM dated 19 January 1967, Secretary McNamara outlined ways to cut foreign exchange costs by $200 million without “significantly reducing our military effectiveness.” To make that possible, he counted upon (1) several weeks of political warning prior to an attack and (2) faster means of trans-Atlantic movement. Secretary McNamara believed NATO and the Warsaw Pact had reached a state of rough equilibrium in Central Europe. The Soviets seemed to be adopting an increasingly defensive posture in reaction to the split with China and the loosening of their control over Eastern Europe. The Allies no longer feared a Soviet attack, as proved by the slackening of their own efforts. Consequently, they would not be alarmed by a “moderate” US reduction, provided the United States reaffirmed its “solemn commitment” and maintained a credible posture. These factors led Secretary McNamara to propose dual-basing the 8th and 24th Infantry Divisions, always keeping one brigade from each in Germany. Doing so would bring 59,000 personnel back to CONUS and reduce costs. Most equipment would be pre-positioned in Germany, with war reserves providing enough stocks for training in CONUS. He believed the two divisions could return substantially in 15 days, completely in 30. Secretary McNamara further proposed dual-basing 432 tactical aircraft, always keeping at least 108 at German or British bases. Thus totals in Europe would fall by half, from 662 to 338, withdrawing 11,000 to 14,500 USAF personnel and reducing costs. Secretary McNamara cautioned that, even though a serious foreign exchange drain would persist, any further cuts in combat power would be “traumatic, and dangerous, at this time.”48

Responding on 2 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly disagreed with the Secretary’s solution. First, they expected that emergencies would develop too rapidly to allow the return of forces from CONUS. In their judgment, strategic warning of a major assault would be only 11 to 15 days; for a smaller attack, simply a matter of hours. Second, they disagreed that dual-based divisions could return in 15 to 30 days, mainly because they would be competing for transportation with units already scheduled to reach Europe by D+30. Additionally, if dual-based aircraft did not fly back before hostilities began, Allied Command Europe probably could not sustain air superiority.
long enough to permit their safe arrival later. Third, they disputed Mr. McNamara's assertion that a NATO-Warsaw Pact equilibrium existed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cited intelligence estimates that, within 21 to 28 days, the Warsaw Pact could deploy 80 divisions in Central Europe, not 50 to 70 as the Secretary supposed. Fourth, they challenged Mr. McNamara's conclusion that the withdrawals he recommended would neither weaken NATO nor destabilize Europe. Since there would be no compensating Soviet cutbacks and NATO allies might well reduce their own forces, Moscow could be tempted toward a more adventurous course. If there had to be withdrawals, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, limit them to one division and 216 aircraft during FY 1968, adding enough funds to allow brigade rotation and USAF dual-basing.49

President Johnson chose to treat this mainly as a political problem: What was the smallest withdrawal that would disarm Congressional critics without alarming allies? After White House meetings on 24–25 February 1967, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk informed the President that their “preferred outcome” involved rotating not more than one division and three wings, with one brigade and 54 of the 216 aircraft always in Europe. When President Johnson talked with Congressional leaders on 27 February, Senate Democrats favored reductions while Senate Republicans did not; House members of both parties opposed withdrawals.50 President Johnson evidently deduced that Congressional pressure for withdrawal was not as powerful as he had feared.

On 17 March 1967, Secretary McNamara circulated a solution. Return to CONUS two brigades plus support units from the 24th Division, totaling about 30,000 personnel. The entire division would exercise annually in Germany, using pre-positioned equipment. The United States would dual-base 216 tactical aircraft, of which 54 always would be at German bases. The other aircraft and 6,500 personnel would redeploy to CONUS but remain ready to return within seven days. Again, all dual-based aircraft would assemble annually in Germany. Secretary McNamara wanted withdrawals to start on 1 October 1967.51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested several modifications. Keep basing the 24th Division in Germany, rotating its three brigades on six-month cycles.52 Limit Army withdrawals to 28,000, so more support personnel could be retained. Keep redeployed units able to return in 28 days, assuming that pre-positioned equipment and air transportation were available. Return 144 of the dual-based aircraft to CONUS, retaining 72 in Germany. Keep one squadron from each of the three wings affected at bases in Germany, rotating the squadrons every two or three years.53 The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that, because of Vietnam’s demands, only 75 percent of each squadron could return to Europe within seven days. Also, to meet the deadlines of 30 days for Army units and seven for Air Force ones, the services would need a good deal more money and manpower.54

Secretary Rusk pronounced Mr. McNamara’s scheme of 17 March “good” and approved its use in the tripartite talks. These culminated on 28 April when Mr. McCloy, George Thomson for Great Britain, and Georg Duckwitz for West Germany completed a series of agreements. Two of the 24th Division’s brigades with support troops, about
28,000 in all, would leave Germany but remain ready to return in thirty days. Dual-basing of aircraft would involve 216 planes, with 120 staying in Germany and 96 returning to CONUS but ready to return in ten days (five, if possible). As many as 6,500 USAF personnel would redeploy. All 216 aircraft would perform annual exercises in Germany. For both ground and air units, the first movements would not take place before 1 January 1968, “but in no event before the US is ready to meet the criteria described above.” Financially, Germany agreed to purchase significant amounts of US military equipment, buy $500 million worth of US Treasury securities during FY 1968, stop converting dollars into gold, and take other measures to deal with the remaining dollar deficit. Bonn also pledged major purchases from the British, who in turn limited their withdrawals to one brigade and two squadrons.55

Mr. McCloy assured President Johnson that “we have come a considerable distance from the unpromising situation we faced last autumn.” The Germans, he related, had been “particularly pleased” by US willingness to change position and remove only 96 instead of 154 aircraft. General Wheeler thought the Germans had been so apprehensive about rotating nuclear-capable aircraft because they suspected that Washington really wanted to de-nuclearize Europe, and this would be the first step.56 Overall, Mr. McCloy discerned “a distinct improvement in the political atmosphere at the conclusion of the talks.”57

To implement the tripartite agreements, the Army’s REFORGER (“Return of Forces to Germany”) outlined a 28,000-man withdrawal; the Air Force’s HEAVY DRAW prescribed a 3,500-man redeployment. When Secretary McNamara ordered larger packages prepared, the Services complied but the Joint Chiefs of Staff filed an objection. Ultimately, in August, the Secretary ruled that 28,000 Army and 5,300 Air Force personnel would redeploy between January and June 1968. He later delayed their return until April-September 1968, so that costs could be deferred until FY 1969 and—as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished—more pre-positioned equipment would become available.58

Surviving France’s secession and securing the Washington-Bonn connection assured NATO’s continuing vitality, which in turn would prove essential to the Cold War’s outcome. Taken together, therefore, this was a major achievement in foreign policy for the Johnson administration.

Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus

Greece and Turkey presented special problems for NATO. Geographically, they were separated from the other European allies, rendering them more vulnerable to Soviet or satellite attack. Militarily, both suffered from numerous weaknesses and neither could afford thorough-going modernization. Politically, Athens and Ankara deeply distrusted one another. The island of Cyprus, an independent nation, lay less than 50 miles off the Turkish coast. Four-fifths of its inhabitants were Greek and
many of them favored “enosis” or union with Greece, which was anathema to Turkish Cypriots. In August 1964, Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish towns; Turkey responded with bombing sorties. American mediation helped restore a tense, temporary calm.

In December 1964, the Greek Defense Minister told Secretary McNamara that his country had little hope of fulfilling the force goals set by NATO. He voiced particular concern about the possibility of a Bulgarian attack against narrow, exposed Thrace in northeastern Greece. Secretary McNamara was not much worried about a strike from Bulgaria. The two men did agree, however, to make a “completely fresh” evaluation of Greece’s defense problems—meaning, primarily, the prioritizing of missions assigned to Greek forces.59

The Joint Chiefs of Staff created a Hellenic Defense Study Team, with Lieutenant General Charles H. Bonesteel, USA, as its Director.60 Secretary McNamara told the Team to assume that US military assistance would average $65 million annually, plus $5 million from allies. After visiting Greece in March 1965, the Bonesteel Team concluded that, while a Bulgarian attack appeared unlikely, Greece stood “less than a fifty percent chance” of conducting a successful forward defense unless NATO’s alerting procedures and regional defense plans were improved. Prompt Turkish cooperation would be required, as would rapid support from the US Sixth Fleet. The team proposed that Greece give first priority to repelling limited attacks, second priority to dealing with either major aggression or nuclear war. Without such priorities, as matters now stood, the Greek air force’s weakness was accentuated by its need to withhold many modern aircraft for nuclear strike and air defense missions. In sum, Greek forces needed “moderate” improvements to defend Thrace. That, in turn, required the continuation of moderate US aid, augmented by aid from other allies.61

The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a strategy of modified forward defense, but they opposed establishing priorities between limited and general war, mainly because giving first priority to limited war would spark serious opposition from European allies who emphasized prompt nuclear retaliation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found no tradeoffs between Greek and other NATO forces that would enhance overall effectiveness “significantly.” While external reinforcements could offset Greek shortcomings, no adjustments in mission priorities could greatly improve the “austere” combat capability of Greek forces. Still, the number of strike squadrons available for conventional missions could be increased by pre-planning their temporary release from SACEUR’s Scheduled Program for General War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also wanted to plan a unilateral US response as a hedge against slow NATO reaction. Finally, while acknowledging that there might be genuine worry about a Bulgarian land grab, the Joint Chiefs noted that the Greeks themselves were not taking reasonable corrective actions. Perhaps, the Joint Chiefs of Staff speculated, Greeks really were preparing themselves for trouble with Turkey over Cyprus. Finally, the Joint Chiefs judged the Team’s aid recommendations too small. Secretary McNamara had assumed that military assistance would average $65 million annually; the Bonesteel Team proposed $80 million; the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended $131.1 million.62
Anticipating hurt feelings in Ankara, General Wheeler recommended a similar study of Turkish forces and Secretary McNamara agreed. So, during April 1965, General Bonesteel led another team to Turkey. It reported, late in May, that Turkey’s importance actually had increased because of Soviet successes in penetrating the Arab Middle East and extending influence across the North African littoral. But the Team believed that events in Cyprus, where Turks saw US behavior as favoring the Greeks, were creating an emotional wave of anti-Americanism. Efforts by US officials to revise NATO strategy toward a flexible response, combined with talk about sizable reductions in the Military Assistance Program (MAP), were reinforcing Turkish doubts about US dependability. The Team believed that, unless these trends were halted or reversed, Washington might lose a staunch ally within the next few years.

The Team concluded that “locally applicable” Warsaw Pact forces could not only seize and open the Turkish Straits but also achieve major successes in eastern Turkey. As it had for Greece, the Team recommended a strategy of modified forward defense, placing more reliance upon bringing external reinforcements to meet lesser aggressions. Turkish forces already were so austere that no mission tradeoffs with allies appeared possible. Rather, rapid reinforcement capabilities should be improved, along with more NATO planning and exercises. Turks must reorganize their forces, spend more, and improve production facilities. The Team recommended that MAP average between $118 and $130 million annually. In July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they generally concurred with the Team’s assessment but believed MAP should average $219.6 million yearly.

Late in October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the Secretary that current MAP levels would leave major Greek and Turkish weaknesses uncorrected. Yet, as they saw it, the greatest risks were political and psychological. If the Turks became disenchanted with NATO, “we risk the loss of the Turkish Straits and the loss of a substantial complex of communications, intelligence, and transportation capabilities of direct concern to US national security.”

Meanwhile, in September, OSD suggested maximum annual outlays of $60–70 million for Greece and about $120 million for Turkey. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated their recommendation: $131.1 million for Greece ($182.7 million in FY 1967, $119.3 million by FY 1971) and $219.6 million for Turkey ($243.6 million in FY 1967, $185.2 million by FY 1971). In view of the recognized weaknesses on NATO’s flanks and the “continually deteriorating US strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed this “a particularly inopportune time” either to reduce assistance for the two countries or to readjust the proportionate share between them. Conversely, increased aid on the scale they suggested would do much to reverse declining US influence in both countries. Members of Congress, however, were in no mood to vote larger appropriations. In FY 1966, Greece received $77.4 million and Turkey $124.4 million. The figures for FY 1967 were $65 million and $134 million respectively, about what OSD had suggested.
A political upheaval pushed purely military issues aside. In Athens, on 21 April 1967, Army officers ousted the constitutional government, claiming they had acted to prevent a communist takeover. The United States promptly suspended major MAP deliveries. Late in June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended resuming, as soon as possible, normal military relations and MAP deliveries. They noted that the junta had agreed to accommodate Americans evacuated during the recent Middle East war, a gesture that might ease Congressional concern about the new regime’s nature and intent. Small steps toward liberalization had taken place. Continuing the suspension, the Joint Chiefs argued, would seriously delay military modernization and could alienate the regime: “The United States can ill afford these consequences in view of the delicacy of the US presence in other parts of the eastern and central Mediterranean.”

Forwarding Joint Chiefs of Staff views to State, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Townsend Hoopes observed that “our policy was meant to be flexible,” alleviating suspensions if liberalization occurred and tightening them if authoritarianism increased. The junta had ended martial law and released most political prisoners, yet Washington had made no reciprocal gestures, thereby deepening misunderstanding and distrust. Mr. Hoopes also worried that King Constantine’s apparent intention to stage a showdown with the junta probably would lead either to his expulsion or to civil war. Why not then, try to create a climate in which a showdown might be averted? He suggested, among other steps, selling ten helicopters to Greece and transferring one minesweeper.

In mid-July, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) endorsed Mr. Hoopes’ proposal to release equipment. Writing to Secretary McNamara on 7 August, General Wheeler added his strong support. In fact, if any delay developed, General Wheeler urged transferring the minesweeper alone as soon as possible. But, after discussions with State, Mr. McNamara decided to defer all action until Congress completed passage of the MAP. Since the junta was unpopular on Capitol Hill, equipment transfers could jeopardize the worldwide program.

Unfortunately, the passage of time only created more problems. On Cyprus, in mid-November 1967, ethnic clashes erupted. When Greek Cypriots attacked several Turkish villages, Turkey responded by preparing to invade the island. At an NSC meeting General Wheeler said that Turkey, enjoying an advantage in the air and on land, could put several divisions into Cyprus and gain control of the island. A mediation mission by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance secured another temporary settlement. Next, in December, King Constantine tried to oust the junta, failed, and fled into exile.

In mid-April 1968, the SIG again debated whether to ease the MAP embargo against Greece. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach said that, by all evidence, the junta would stay in power for some time to come. Linking MAP to political liberalization seemed sound in theory, he continued, but Washington then became accountable for achieving meaningful liberalization, regardless of whether the junta was willing to move in that direction. SIG members agreed that preserving the US position in Greece.
was “essential” to preserving the US position in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Consequently, the SIG recommended releasing $5 million at once and obligating another $20 million before 1 July. Since the United States could not exert more than marginal influence on political developments, MAP gradually should be dissociated from Greek politics and justified solely from the standpoint of US and NATO interests. Again, though, the administration chose to continue its MAP ban from fear that easing it might irritate Congress and thereby endanger the worldwide program. So in October, after the bill had been passed, Mr. Katzenbach recommended releasing about 40 percent of the equipment (e.g., some tank ammunition and heavy guns but neither tanks nor F-5 interceptors). President Johnson approved.73

With Turkey, there were problems of a different sort. First, Congress cut Turkey’s FY 1969 MAP down to $100 million. Second, the administration began to doubt whether Turkey would make its bases available for non-NATO purposes. In December 1967, Secretary McNamara decided that US visibility within Turkey must be reduced, both to preserve the long-term health of bilateral relations and to reduce US dependence upon Turkish facilities. Accordingly, he ordered plans for reducing US personnel (military, civilian, and dependent) from 25,000 to 10,000 over five years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff complied, although arguing for only a modest cut in FY 1969.74

In May 1968, OSD proposed withdrawing 3,139 people in FY 1969. Calling even that too much, too soon, the Joint Chiefs voiced particular concern about reducing US personnel in two NATO headquarters—Commander, Land Forces, Southeast, and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. The Turks, they warned Secretary Clifford, might perceive a significant weakening of US assurances, particularly in the context of REFORGER, reductions in MAP, and Congressional demands for more US withdrawals from Europe. Instead of acting unilaterally, they wanted to wait for East-West discussions about mutual force reductions. The State Department, however, endorsed OSD’s plan. On 29 June, Deputy Secretary Nitze approved withdrawing 3,098 personnel in FY 1969, to be followed by 3,034 more in FY 1970. Mr. Nitze also endorsed, in principle, reductions over FYs 1971–73 that would lower the total to 10,000. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff did win one point. Withdrawals from the two NATO headquarters, scheduled for FY 1969, were made smaller.75

A major lesson lies in MAP’s ineffectiveness as an instrument for influencing political behavior. By October 1968, Walt Rostow informed President Johnson, the SIG recognized that the time had come “to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics. The colonels have had their constitutional referendum, but they won’t hold elections under it until they’re ready. We can keep prodding them, but we can’t make them. Meantime, it doesn’t make sense to let our security relationships with Greece—NATO role, [communications] facilities, Sixth Fleet support—deteriorate further.”76 Yet, although the Bonsteel Team concentrated on Soviet and satellite threats to Thrace and the Straits to justify MAP, Cyprus remained the focal point of Greek-Turkish tension. In 1974 Turkey would use MAP-furnished equipment to invade the island, protecting Turkish Cypriots and dispossessing a good many Greeks.
According to MC 14/2, a strategic concept which dated from 1957, NATO would meet an attack by employing nuclear weapons—regardless of whether the Soviets did so—in all situations, except incursion, infiltration, or local hostile action. During the early 1960s, Secretary McNamara led a strenuous effort to revise the strategic concept and expand Allied Command Europe’s capabilities to the point where a major attack could be contained, at least initially, by conventional means alone. He met with very limited success, because most Europeans saw a threat of swift nuclear retaliation as constituting the essence of deterrence. During the mid-1960s, a fresh array of complications made change even more difficult. The outcome was so ambiguous that all sides could claim some degree of success.

Cross Currents

In December 1961, the North Atlantic Council approved a 1966 objective of 107 2/3 active and reserve divisions, including 29 2/3 active divisions in Central Europe. By 1963, though, it was apparent that these goals would not be fulfilled. Accordingly, ministers and secretaries who comprised the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) initiated a new exercise. The three Major NATO Commanders (MNCs)—SACEUR, SACLANT, and the Commander in Chief, Channel Command—began preparing 1970 force goals. Since the French insisted upon assessing requirements only in the context of a general nuclear war, the MNCs worked within the confines of MC 14/2. In August 1964, they submitted two sets of goals: ALPHA, which they recommended, called for 66 2/3 active and 23 1/2 reserve divisions; BRAVO stipulated 63 active and 17 1/2 reserve divisions.
When the Military Committee met in December 1964, it did not choose between ALPHA and BRAVO. Instead, it directed MNCs to recommend priorities for improvement. This was christened the “Mountbatten Exercise,” after Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of the UK Defense Staff. Some responses were not encouraging. SACEUR, for example, postulated that after 72 hours’ warning 40 NATO divisions and 1,248 aircraft would be attacked by 83 to 88 Warsaw Pact divisions with about 3,800 tactical aircraft. The SACEUR thought he could “handle” air attacks for one or two days and hold the main forward defense zones for one to three days. Disagreeing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that the SACEUR had overrated Warsaw Pact and underrated NATO capabilities. He ignored, for example, the qualitative superiority of NATO aircraft and the availability of reinforcements from the United States. All in all, these appraisals “should not be used as a basis for revising NATO strategic concepts or for restructuring the major NATO commanders’ forces.” But the MNCs' recommendations for quantitative and qualitative improvements did impress them as being valid and worthy of United States support.

When the Defense Ministers met in Paris, over 31 May–1 June 1965, Secretary McNamara warned that neither the ALPHA nor BRAVO goals appeared attainable. So he advocated a “rolling” five–year force structure and financial plan, updated annually, that would “enable us to move up and down the scale of military power according to changes in the threat we face.” Secretary McNamara wanted to replicate the planning–programming–budgeting system that he had imposed upon the Defense Department.

In September 1965, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum dealing with NATO strategy and force structure. He cited US intelligence estimates that Allied Command Europe would have 11 to 15 days of warning before being struck by a 55–division attack. Secretary McNamara claimed that those 55 divisions, plus 15 more in reserve, had the fighting power of 35 US divisions. That being the case, he believed that only 11 US and 24 allied divisions were needed to match them. Five US divisions were stationed in Europe. With 11 to 15 days of warning, another four or five could be moved from the United States. By 1971, faster means of trans-Atlantic reinforcement could change the mix to 16 US and 19 allied divisions. NATO air forces, in Secretary McNamara’s judgment, probably could achieve a “commanding” superiority over the battlefield, furnishing considerable close air support and interdiction. However, if the allies believed the conclusions of the Mountbatten Exercise, they would grow even more certain that a conventional defense was totally infeasible. “For this reason,” he wrote, “the US should make known in appropriate NATO forums its rejection of the Exercise.”

Turning to nuclear weaponry, Secretary McNamara opposed developing a medium–range ballistic missile for NATO, on grounds that strategic targets could be covered by “external” US and British forces. As for the tactical nuclear stockpile, he proposed (1) improving SACEUR’s capability for selective, controlled use and (2) substituting Pershing missiles for quick-reaction alert aircraft, thereby freeing those planes for conventional missions. Seeing no way to make tactical nuclear forces survive more
than a few days of fighting, he believed a firebreak against escalation had to be built at the conventional level.6

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took issue with Secretary McNamara on many points. They were unsure whether United States and British strategic forces would remain strong enough to render MRBMs redundant. As they had for several years running, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Secretary McNamara that “an equal ground combat capability with the Warsaw Pact will achieve the desired non-nuclear option.” In their judgment, his force-matching gave insufficient attention to air and naval requirements and could not adequately assess factors that eluded quantification. To make force-matching fully reliable, NATO would need “an absolute knowledge of enemy objectives, intentions, tactics, and force capabilities.” Much would depend upon US ability to move divisions to Europe, and Secretary McNamara appeared to ignore requirements beyond M+30. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it unwise to reject the Mountbatten Exercise. Back in June, they recalled, allied leaders had seemed willing to accept the results. Perhaps US interests would be better served simply by “playing down” attention to the Exercise. Late in October, Secretary McNamara issued a revised draft presidential memorandum that showed no substantive changes but did cite the Joint Chiefs’ objections to force-matching.7

European reactions to the Mountbatten Exercise gave no grounds for expecting a conventional buildup. The French insisted upon strict adherence to MC 14/2, in which context BRAVO forces “might be acceptable.” The Germans believed that BRAVO levels, reinforced, could cope with middle and upper levels of aggression. But, as in past years, they strongly urged increasing SACEUR’s nuclear capabilities. The British, facing a sizable balance-of-payments deficit, said they must reduce their military budget. They wanted forces programmed to deal with either local incidents or general war—nothing in between. General Wheeler had no patience with London’s argument that defense spending would hurt Britain’s economic growth. As he wrote to a US official at NATO headquarters, it “reminds me of the fox who lost his tail . . . [and] thereupon tried to persuade all other foxes that lack of a tail was not only chic but actually gave an operational advantage to foxes who lacked that appendage. . . . There are comparisons that could be drawn between foxes and humans, but they would be odious!” Repeatedly, Wheeler had told allied leaders that he “considered the core of the matter to be that the European nations were not scared enough. In other words, what is lacking is not money but political will.”8

Early in September 1965, OSD asked the Joint Chiefs to propose force goals for 1970. A Joint Chiefs of Staff majority recommended accepting BRAVO, except for the northern and southern flanks where increases were needed. General Johnson dissented, calling it illogical to work within the context of MC 14/2, which all members except France had agreed to revise. Why not just extend existing goals for one year, by which time President de Gaulle’s intentions would be clearer? Separately, General Wheeler advised Secretary McNamara that attaining BRAVO goals would constitute a significant gain. Members, he believed, would look upon BRAVO not as a reaffirmation of MC
14/2 but as encouraging evidence of US willingness “to work constructively within the alliance rather than to isolate itself in inflexible positions.” With allies already fearing a French secession, “the imperative . . . today is to get underway with measures to restore life and vitality to the Alliance; to do otherwise may well destroy it.”

Secretary McNamara did endorse BRAVO goals but with several provisos. There was no requirement for land-based MRBMs, and approving BRAVO should not be construed as a commitment to supply the allies with additional nuclear support. Also, US acceptance of BRAVO should be conditioned upon (1) presentation in May 1966 of detailed plans for achieving them and (2) NATO’s agreeing to an annual review of five-year force goals. Finally, forces on the flanks need not be “significantly” above BRAVO levels. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in December, approved these goals and conditions.

Early in 1966, NATO countries submitted their force plans. Altogether, in 1966, there would be 64 2/3 active divisions and 2,831 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense aircraft; by 1970, 68 2/3 and about 2,570. Meanwhile, at Secretary McNamara's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated 1971 goals that would be attainable and consistent with country plans. In May 1966, they presented two alternatives. The first, which they characterized as militarily desirable but probably unattainable, called for a force of 85 active and reserve divisions and 6,338 strike, reconnaissance, and air defense aircraft. At that level, they foresaw “a good probability” of holding east of the Weser-Lech River, along a line running from Bremen and Hannover through Augsburg. Italy could be defended but Greece, Turkey, and northern Norway could not. The second, termed “NAMILPO-71” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Posture) with 76 divisions and 5,691 aircraft, stayed within expected manpower and budget levels but fell somewhat short of BRAVO objectives. In the Center Region, with 15 days' warning, NAMILPO-71 forces stood “a reasonable chance of stabilizing the situation” behind the Weser-Lech. Italy could be defended for a considerable period, but Greece and Turkey would require “rapid external reinforcement.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered improvements—more divisions and tactical aircraft with improved readiness and manning levels, augmented air defenses, strengthened tactical nuclear capabilities—to be necessary and feasible. But they intended to use NAMILPO-71 as a basis for commenting on the adequacy of country programs, and urged Secretary McNamara to do likewise.

Concurrently, NATO was reviewing the validity of estimates measuring its air strength against that of the Warsaw Pact. Secretary McNamara agreed to give the Germans a comparison that enjoyed JCS and DIA support. In June 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent him their comparison of inventories. According to it, NATO would be slightly behind at M+6 days (4,983 versus 5,727) then draw slightly ahead by M+30 (6,317 versus 5,905). Secretary McNamara's analysts contended, however, that NATO’s resources greatly exceeded those of the Pact, in both quantity and quality. Admittedly, for a few days at the outset, Allied Command Europe might be outnumbered by as much as 1,000 aircraft. Yet, Systems Analysts argued, that was not as bad as it seemed. Most Pact aircraft were designed as interceptors and so could not attack ground targets.
Moreover, because of their generally superior quality, US reinforcing aircraft were worth “about double” their Soviet counterparts. They had greater range and carried greater payloads; a larger proportion were either supersonic or high subsonic.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff spotted errors in the Systems Analysts’ brief. First, many Pact aircraft could perform ground support as well as air defense missions. Second, adding Soviet medium bombers would reduce NATO’s payload-carrying advantage. Third, the assumption that NATO’s higher operating costs resulted in greater capabilities seemed questionable. NATO aircraft, for instance, needed extra range and payload capability to reach their targets; the Soviets relied on theater missiles and medium bombers for these tasks. Hence equally capable Pact planes, requiring less range and payload capacity, could be produced more cheaply. Fourth, the qualitative advantages stressed by Systems Analysis were difficult to measure. NATO’s standard of 23 flying hours per month did exceed that of the Pact—yet many allied pilots were averaging only 13 hours.15

Systems Analysis and Joint Staff officers devoted three weeks to working out their differences. In mid-July, Assistant Secretary Alain Enthoven and the Director, J–5, signed an agreed estimate of air strengths in 1968. According to it, NATO would enjoy a worldwide lead over the Pact: 10,359 compared to 7,762. However, if there was no time to mobilize and deploy, Allied Command Europe would be outnumbered by perhaps 20 percent, and many multi-purpose aircraft would have to be committed to a counter-air battle. Qualitatively, the higher cost of NATO aircraft “appears to result” in equivalent advantages in effectiveness. Similarly, greater training for NATO pilots would produce superiority equal to or larger than its cost. Secretary McNamara forwarded these findings to his German counterpart. When doing so, however, he noted that “NATO’s potential advantage is in danger of being wasted because of deficiencies in logistics, air base defense, and training. . . . These can be remedied for a relatively small cost.”16

In July 1966, Secretary McNamara bluntly told NATO defense ministers that, given the levels of country programs, BRAVO goals appeared “quite unrealistic” and unattainable. He claimed that separating military from political planning had led to BRAVO goals being based upon exaggerated estimates of enemy strength, focusing on the extreme rather than the most likely danger. Country programs needed substantial changes to eliminate weaknesses and correct inequities in contributions. On the ground, either US units were too ready or allied forces were not ready enough. German and Italian defense ministers agreed that increased efforts were in order, but the British minister argued that current plans were adequate for deterrence, as distinct from “battles and campaigns.” The ministers did adopt country programs proposed for 1970, subject to annual reviews under the rolling five-year procedures.17

By this time, the administration was no longer practicing what it preached. In May 1965, the US reply to NATO’s annual Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) had listed two armored divisions, one infantry division, and one brigade as an M-Day strategic reserve, all based in CONUS and earmarked for assignment to Allied Command Europe. In March 1966, the Joint Chiefs made an important revision to the DPQ
response. Since the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions had been drained of manpower to support the Vietnam buildup, the M-Day reserve changed to a weaker mix of one mechanized, one infantry, and one airborne division.\textsuperscript{18} Seventh Army in Germany also was debilitated by transfers of experienced personnel. From this point on, therefore, an artificial air surrounded the listings in DPMs and elsewhere of supposedly combat-ready US divisions.

Secretary McNamara’s DPM of 1 August 1966 stated that NATO had more than enough men under arms to cope with any non-nuclear situation except a full-scale surprise attack, which impressed him as being the least likely. Yet most of the allies’ active ground units lacked adequate equipment and support; their reserves were poorly trained and equipped. Since they could not sustain large-scale combat for even 45 days, Secretary McNamara contemplated reorganizing US ground forces along more austere lines. He proposed withdrawing some support units, lowering combat stocks in Europe from 90- to 60-day levels, and limiting CONUS reinforcements to three instead of six divisions (which were all that would be available in any case). Committing even these would “make sense” only if the allies substantially improved their own capabilities. Secretary McNamara also suggested dual-basing 10 to 15 of the USAF tactical squadrons in Europe, saying there already were enough to maintain air superiority and carry out a good deal of interdiction.\textsuperscript{19}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found little merit in the DPM. Of “paramount importance” was its failure to provide for concluding a conflict successfully. In their judgment, it understated the threat by concentrating on Soviet intentions rather than capabilities, assuming that adequate warning time would precede an attack, slighting the weaknesses on NATO’s flanks, and treating inadequately the implications of US withdrawals. Since US strength was the foundation of Allied Command Europe’s viability, continued reductions could transform it into a mere façade.\textsuperscript{20}

Secretary McNamara modified the final DPM, speaking of possible withdrawals only in general terms and acknowledging that effective warning time would be reduced if NATO failed to act promptly. His assessment of Allied Command Europe’s conventional capability became a bit less sanguine. If NATO had 60 days or more to mobilize and all members used that time effectively, “the resulting force would . . . at least deny any overwhelming Pact superiority and might reasonably be expected to mount a successful forward non-nuclear defense.” In case of a surprise attack by 20 to 36 divisions in the Central Region, “under reasonable (but by no means provable) assumptions present forces might permit stabilization of the battle line at some point East of the Rhine without NATO’s initiating the use of nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{21}

The Secretary’s DPM on theater nuclear forces stated that the Soviets were “approaching essential parity with the US” and neither side could acquire an advantage great enough to upset this equilibrium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with the linkage of “parity” with equality. A controlled, selective response required more than merely an exchange of equivalent megatonnage; there had to be a balanced stockpile with a wide variety of delivery systems. They wanted 5,000 tactical bombs;
the Secretary believed 4,100 was sufficient. The Secretary justified his lower figure by citing the advent of Pershing missiles, the strength of external strategic forces, and the vulnerability of forward-base aircraft carrying the bombs. His final DPM made no changes and simply footnoted Joint Chiefs of Staff criticisms.\(^2\)

Secretary McNamara’s DPM of May 1967 reached the same conclusion about rival conventional capabilities as the previous year’s DPM. And the Joint Chiefs’ critique again demurred. Fundamentally, they disagreed that a state of mutual deterrence existed at the conventional level. In their judgment, recent Soviet restraint flowed from a realization that “an apparent atmosphere of détente” was “contributing much toward the dissolution of NATO.” Once again, they believed NATO’s capabilities were overstated and those of the Pact minimized. Superimposing US criteria on Pact forces, they cautioned, “will produce differences but not necessarily deficiencies.” The draft presidential memorandum presented a combination of concepts but did not unite them in a coherent strategy. If deterrence failed, the Joint Chiefs asked, how was a war to be fought and won? Secretary McNamara, however, found no more merit in their arguments than they had in his. The final DPM, dated 17 November 1967, contained only minor changes and the Joint Chiefs of Staff dissents were footnoted.\(^3\)

Arguments over the utility of theater nuclear weapons persisted. Secretary McNamara’s DPM of June 1967 described the existing stockpile as “more than adequate”: “We should not try to provide forces for a long tactical nuclear war nor should we set aside special theater nuclear forces for a general war.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. Being able to conduct a sustained operation was critical, they claimed, because quick termination of a conflict might hinge upon the ability to threaten further losses. The “damping down” phase could well be characterized by either protracted exchanges at a lower rate of delivery or sporadic bursts of intense delivery. Therefore, “the programmed tactical nuclear capability must provide selective options of discriminate and selective response … and not be limited by a philosophy that theater nuclear wars will be short.” As before, the Secretary did not agree.\(^4\) Seven years of debating this issue had done little to narrow the differences between the JCS and OSD.

Of course, Allied Command Europe could fight only as long as its supplies lasted. Late in 1965, the SACEUR proposed replacing the 90-day objective with one requiring enough supplies to continue combat (1) until resupply was established and (2) for at least 30 days in any case. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred; the Secretary did not. The allies, Mr. McNamara concluded, would consider stockage until resupply began an impossible objective and look upon “30 days in any case” as an upper rather than a lower limit. He favored a goal of 45 days, to be achieved over five years. The Joint Chiefs agreed to 45 days as an “intermediate” objective, reasonable for the near term. But, after it was achieved, they believed each nation should acquire enough additional stocks to keep fighting until resupply began. The final US position, presented to the Military Committee in January 1967, was that 45 days should become an intermediate objective of the first priority, to be followed by a long-term goal of achieving “higher
stock levels as they are clearly desirable.”25 Essentially, each country would be allowed enough leeway to proceed pretty much as it chose.

The Evolution of MC 14/3

During 1963–65, the NATO Military Committee remained deadlocked over MC 100/1, a draft strategic concept for the defense of Europe which rejected the tripwire concept and called for direct defense at the conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear levels. Basically, France would accept no strategy except prompt and massive nuclear retaliation. Thus French withdrawal from the Military Committee removed the one insuperable obstacle to revising MC 14/2, the operative strategic concept for the defense of Europe since 1957. The Germans, though, still had serious doubts about shifting to flexible response. General Wheeler set out to remove them by corresponding with his West German counterpart, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Heinz Trettner. In February 1966, General Wheeler opened the exchange by defining the “fundamental” divergence as a question of whether defending Central Europe without early recourse to nuclear weapons was feasible and desirable. There might be a temporary loss of territory, General Wheeler admitted, but that would be preferable to the devastation caused by firing battlefield nuclear weapons. Americans and Germans, he urged, “must set the military standards for the other NATO nations.” The capabilities of US forces furnished commanders with a wide range of options; those of German units, in his judgment, did not.26

General Trettner replied by describing nuclear weapons as the most significant political instrument available for defending Western Europe. The less either side dreaded escalation, the more likely such escalation would become. Since he saw no convincing proof that conventional capabilities would deter an attack, nuclear weapons—particularly those with lower yields—must be part of operational plans. Extended and extensive use of battlefield nuclear weapons on West German territory was untenable because of the resulting devastation. Consequently, threatening early use of nuclear weapons impressed him as constituting the very nature of a strategy of deterrence.27

Replying on 31 May, General Wheeler told General Trettner that “we now have arrived at the point of essential agreement”—a claim that was hardly self-evident. General Wheeler wanted NATO forces to be able to: identify, at an early stage, the scale and intent of aggression; defeat limited aggression by conventional means; conduct a forward defense against major aggression, using nuclear weapons as necessary; and employ strategic forces when needed. The most credible deterrent, General Wheeler maintained, was one that spanned the full spectrum of warfare. While nuclear weapons should be employed when necessary, the unity of the strategic deterrent must not be fragmented by premature, indecisive, demonstrative use. In fact, General Wheeler felt that demonstrative use of a few nuclear weapons would suggest to the enemy a lack of
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determination to use them in strength, forcing the enemy to choose between complete withdrawal and massive nuclear retaliation.28

General Trettner replied that his concept and General Wheeler’s coincided to 90 percent—leaving what constituted the other 10 percent unstated. He still worried, though, that Allied Command Europe’s conventional forces would be very inferior at the outbreak of war. It was an open question, he thought, whether Americans or Soviets would win the reinforcement race. Thus, if the Soviets thought that NATO would not employ nuclear weapons, they could in all cases count on success. Would it not be wise to show them, by an early demonstrative use of nuclear weapons, that their basic assumption was wrong?29

The International Military Staff (IMS), acting as executive agent for the Military Committee, took the next step. In February 1967, it circulated drafts of a new strategic concept and an appreciation of the military situation. The Joint Chiefs judged both to be generally acceptable, although they thought that (1) adequate warning of an attack was less likely than the IMS believed and (2) the risks incurred by reduced allied efforts should be clearly set forth. Conversely, Deputy Secretary Vance criticized both IMS drafts for being unduly pessimistic. In his opinion, the appreciation wrongly forecast a narrowing gap in the superpowers’ strategic capabilities, overestimated the enemy’s combat readiness, and did not allow for NATO’s mobilization and reinforcement capabilities. He also rejected the Joint Chiefs’ reservation about warning time, stating that any attack was “likely to be preceded by political warning measured in weeks.” Moreover, the IMS appreciation contradicted US positions by indicating that conventional resistance for more than two to six days was impossible and by assuming that NATO would improve its position by initiating tactical nuclear warfare. In a mid-April rebuttal, General Wheeler informed Mr. Vance that he expected the strategic nuclear gap to narrow and endorsed the IMS estimate that three-fourths of all Soviet line divisions could undertake offensive operations immediately or after short preparation. He also rejected Mr. Vance’s position that rising political tension was a meaningful indicator of warning, on which military measures could be based.30

Soon afterward, the Defense Planning Committee convened at Brussels.31 Here, on 7 May 1967, the Defense Ministers approved guidance for the military authorities. Responding to their guidance, the IMS circulated MC 14/3, a draft defining NATO’s “defense concept” as follows:

1. Maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent with a secure retaliatory capability.
2. Sustain a capability for forward defense, so that a potential aggressor would feel that he must contend with an effective and immediate response.
3. Identify the scale of any aggression as quickly as possible.
4. Prevent an aggressor from seizing and holding NATO territory and counter limited aggression without necessarily resorting to nuclear warfare. If an aggressor persisted, confront him with such resistance that he must either withdraw or risk further escalation.
5. Meet major aggression with whatever conventional and nuclear power proved necessary.
Therefore, “the main deterrence to aggression short of full nuclear attack is the threat of escalation which would lead the Warsaw Pact to conclude that the risks involved are not commensurate with their objectives.” To cover “a full spectrum,” NATO must maintain a credible capability: first, “for direct defense to deter the lesser aggressions such as covert actions, incursions, infiltrations, local hostile actions, and limited aggressions”; second, “for deliberate escalation to deter more ambitious aggression”; and third, “to conduct a general war response as the ultimate deterrent.”

In June 1967, the US representative on the Military Committee, Admiral A. G. Ward, gave his superiors the glad news that a general consensus had been achieved over MC 14/3. Any attempts at radical revision, he cautioned, would preclude approval of the new strategic concept during 1967. The Joint Chiefs in turn advised Secretary McNamara that MC 14/3 generally reflected US positions taken at the May meeting of the DPC. In their judgment, it accommodated allies' views and yet preserved “the primary US position of flexible response to meet any aggression, while keeping the level of conflict as low as possible.” They also agreed with Admiral Ward about the inadvisability of seeking major changes. As General Wheeler stressed in a separate memorandum, “a raft of national comments” could prevent MC 14/3’s adoption and thereby “slow the momentum NATO has been gathering since the low point of the French defection.”

On 18 August, Secretary McNamara authorized Admiral Ward to help finalize MC 14/3. Mr. McNamara stipulated, however, “that the IMS draft substantially changes the tone and intent of the Ministerial guidance and I want to make it clear that, to the extent this influences the force recommendations of the NATO Military Authorities, I shall take exception to them.” When NATO chiefs of staff met on 16 September, they not only approved MC 14/3 but also adopted Secretary McNamara’s proviso that the wording of the Ministerial guidance should be controlling. On 12 December, the Defense Planning Committee accepted MC 14/3 under the same conditions.

MC 14/3’s impact proved to be nowhere as great as Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped. Its wording was sufficiently ambiguous to allow a range of interpretations; otherwise, most of the other allies would not have accepted it. The Wheeler-Trettner exchanges papered over critical differences without resolving them; the Germans refused to countenance more than a very few weeks of conventional combat in their homeland. Indeed, Europeans were wont to describe MC 14/3 as “the nuclear strategy.”

Conventional Capabilities Start to Dwindle

In May 1967, while approving guidance for what became MC 14/3, the Defense Planning Committee asked Major NATO Commanders to propose force levels covering 1968–1972. Their responses fell below BRAVO’s 1970 goals: from 63 active divisions and 3,232 aircraft for 1970 down to 60 and 2,676 for 1972. SACEUR stated that his own proposals, although inadequate, would effect as much improvement as possible within
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limits set by the May Ministerial guidance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that, if 1968–1972 proposals were implemented and the Pact launched a surprise attack using only its 35 to 45 active divisions, Allied Command Europe “could not provide high confidence of a successful forward defense without improvements in quality . . . or the early use of tactical nuclear weapons.” Should the Pact mobilize beforehand, its 80 divisions could penetrate defending forces before enough reinforcements arrived, “unless NATO initiated the use of nuclear weapons.” In December, the Defense Ministers “reluctantly” adopted MNCs’ proposals for 1968–1972, on the understanding that they would be revised to conform with May guidance and force proposals covering 1969–1973. Addressing his fellow ministers for the last time, Secretary McNamara reiterated that a good non-nuclear option “clearly” was within reach. He advocated returning to “the tested European tradition” of maintaining (1) active forces adequate to deal with a surprise attack and (2) a mobilization base capable of keeping pace with the enemy’s buildup.

For 1969–1973, the MNCs recommended 61 1/3 active divisions and 2,641 aircraft. SACEUR intended to shift eleven squadrons to non-nuclear missions and provide all tactical aircraft with dual capability. Nonetheless, in January 1968, the Joint Chiefs advised that MNC proposals would fail to provide “the full range of options” outlined in the May 1967 guidance and MC 14/3. They suggested instructing Admiral Ward that, since “stringent” fiscal constraints would continue, recommendations should be drafted to achieve improvements (e.g., dual capability for tactical aircraft) through trade-offs. Instead, Deputy Secretary Nitze decided Admiral Ward should say that MNCs had exaggerated the Pact’s capabilities by neglecting the qualitative superiority of NATO aircraft, the larger size of NATO divisions, and growing US strategic mobility. Also, the endorsement of dual-capable aircraft should not be blunted by mentions of high cost and possible tradeoffs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe the allies could be prodded into greater efforts by being told that the enemy’s conventional capabilities were less than previously estimated. So, at General Wheeler’s urging, Admiral Ward advised the Military Committee “that there is a high degree of skepticism both in the civilian elements of DOD and the JCS that the détente is anything more than a façade.” Consequently, “even though the Soviet military strengths may not be as strong as once thought,” NATO still needed powerful forces.

No longer, though, would powerful forces be coming from CONUS. In August 1967, when a response to NATO’s Defense Planning Questionnaire was being prepared, Secretary McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to list one mechanized and two armored divisions in the NATO-committed strategic reserve. If those divisions could not be made available by M+30 days—and the Joint Chiefs concluded that they could not—then 1 1/3 airborne division must be substituted for them. Six months later, with the USS Pueblo’s seizure and the Tet offensive, the strategic reserve virtually disappeared. Moreover, as of 31 March 1968, General Lemnitzer rated all five US divisions in Germany as being in the lowest readiness category. By July, the Joint Chiefs reported
that CONUS-based ground units committed to NATO amounted only of two airborne brigades available by M+30 and one airborne, one mechanized, and two infantry brigades by M+60.\textsuperscript{39}

Perhaps even more troubling was a seismic shift in US public opinion, as opposition to the Vietnam War broadened into what seemed like a revulsion against all overseas commitments. Late in 1967, NATO began studying the possibility of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).\textsuperscript{40} Secretary Rusk decided that the United States should proceed with “high caution,” leaving initiatives to others. But by the spring of 1968 “high caution” no longer appeared possible. Senator Stuart Symington (D, MO) prepared an amendment to fund no more than 50,000 US military personnel in Western Europe. Reacting swiftly, Secretaries Clifford and Rusk drafted a NATO Ministerial resolution endorsing MBFR and inviting early talks with the Soviets.

On 27 May 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary Clifford that MBFR was acquiring a life of its own, one that could propel the United States prematurely into a major withdrawal. The JCS were willing to accept “carefully calculated, truly mutual, and fully verifiable” reductions. Admittedly, quick diplomatic progress might ease the pressure for unilateral United States withdrawals. But, General Wheeler cautioned in a separate memorandum, “I really believe we are getting ahead of ourselves in our efforts to placate Congress.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed approaching Moscow until NATO had fully examined all of MBFR’s ramifications. They feared that current trends toward détente, disarmament, and disengagement could “dismantle the Alliance before its members have reasoned out another way to defend themselves with reduced forces.”\textsuperscript{41} On 25 June, the North Atlantic Council agreed to “make all necessary preparations” for talks but affirmed that “the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing.”\textsuperscript{42}

Congressional critics were not satisfied. Senator Symington, whom the White House had persuaded to withdraw his amendment, reintroduced it on 25 June. Speaking on the Senate floor, he dismissed hopes for MBFR as unfounded and argued that US troops “are not there to meet an immediate military threat, at least in European eyes, but rather for psychological assurance purposes, and the financial benefit of the countries in question.” Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D, MT) voiced a hope that, if the administration failed to act, “Congress itself will face up this responsibility, and do it before too long.” Senator Richard Russell (D, GA), influential chairman of the Armed Services Committee, reportedly favored Senator Symington’s amendment.\textsuperscript{43}

Even before Senator Symington’s speech of 25 June, OSD had begun drafting a “save the teeth” program to cut spending by $200 million without sacrificing major combat units. Steps included: merging and reducing higher headquarters; returning to CONUS one reconnaissance squadron from Germany and three quick-reaction alert (QRA) squadrons from Spain, Italy, and Turkey; and consolidating air and naval bases, particularly those around the Mediterranean littoral. Deputy Secretary Nitze suggested more steps that might induce Senator Russell to oppose Senator Symington’s
amendment: in FY 1969, completely withdraw the 24th Division and its air support; in FY 1970, if no satisfactory offset agreement with Bonn had been reached, withdraw another division along with its air support.44

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 26 June, they began talking about what hitherto had been unthinkable—a total withdrawal from Western Europe. General Wheeler said that, if Seventh Army was cut to three divisions, “we had better get out of Europe.” Without a large force, General Johnson agreed, Europe would become a big Bataan. Admiral Moorer, General Chapman, and General McConnell expressed similar opinions.45

After venting their frustrations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 July sent Secretary Clifford advice that was a good deal less drastic. They warned that the consequences of OSD’s “save the teeth” program (apart from deputy Secretary Nitze’s additions) would include: “severe atrophy” of the Mediterranean base posture and impairment of normal operations in that area; additional degradation of air defenses in Central Europe; and a “significant degradation and/or elimination” of command and control facilities. They recommended keeping the QRA squadrons in Spain, Italy, and Turkey as well as preserving one air and naval base in each of these countries. Means could be found to cut costs yet keep the 24th Division’s 3rd Brigade in Germany. As a last resort, which they strongly opposed, tactical reconnaissance aircraft in Britain could be brought home. The State Department supported most of their recommendations.46

On 23 July, General Wheeler began looking at the task of maintaining a long-term, substantial US contribution at bearable cost. He directed the Joint Staff to examine ways of providing “a well-balanced three-division force,” buttressed by “reception facilities to provide for a rapid build-up in times of tension.”47 Thus he was willing to study a solution that, one month earlier, had struck him as obliging the United States to “get out of Europe.”

Until Czechoslovakia Compels a Turnabout

At this point, Europe’s political climate changed radically. In Czechoslovakia, during the spring, Stalinists had lost power to reformers led by Alexander Dubcek. Soviet leaders decided that the Czech push for liberalization was becoming dangerous. So, on 20–21 August, seventeen Soviet and four Polish divisions (along with Bulgarian, Hungarian, and East German contingents) occupied Czechoslovakia.48 They met virtually no resistance. Mr. Dubcek was promptly deposed; Gustav Husak, reputedly a hard-liner, replaced him.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia left West Europeans deeply shocked; members of Congress stopped calling for major US withdrawals. On 27 August, General Wheeler tasked the Joint Staff with assessing the effect on NATO. He believed détente to be “at least for the moment, dead” and MBFR negotiations impossible “for some time to come.” General Wheeler detected a “real fear” among the allies about future
Soviet actions; several of them suggested steps to improve NATO’s capabilities. For the moment, Washington was taking care to do nothing that would lend credence to Moscow’s charges that western machinations had compelled Soviet intervention. Perhaps, General Wheeler believed, the time had come to pursue a more active policy.49

The Joint Staff completed its work quickly. On 7 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Clifford that “the basic US objective of a secure, peaceful, self-reliant and cooperative Europe is now more remote than at any time during the past several years.” NATO’s posture had been shaped by a number of beliefs: that Europe was achieving stability; that the USSR posed a diminishing threat to peace; that the Soviets “think and act like us,” and would seek to avoid a direct resort to force; that a surprise attack was unlikely; that ample warning time and increased mobility permitted troop withdrawals; and that arms control and MBFR agreements would permit further economies without undue risk. The Soviets’ speed and ruthlessness in Czechoslovakia called each of those beliefs into question. By all accounts, Europeans were looking to the United States for leadership. The Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined measures designed to lower risks and improve NATO’s cohesion and stability “in a situation which should be neither ignored nor intensified.” These included:

- Holding an early Ministerial meeting to demonstrate unity and reassess policy.
- Suspending redeployments and reductions, and urging the allies to do likewise.
- Raising all NATO-committed US forces to high levels of readiness, and pressing allies to take equivalent steps.
- Returning dual-based units to Germany early in 1969 for annual exercises.

The Secretary assured them that most of these steps were either being implemented or under study.50

On 14 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Clifford a list of “immediate and visible military actions” to bolster NATO. First, cancel most “save the teeth” measures and strongly support the Military Committee’s proposal that members promise to make no force reductions. Second, press for immediate improvements to the US posture in Europe. Promptly deploying to Germany an armored battalion from the 24th Division, for instance, would symbolize American resolve to return dual-based units regularly. At the very least, Washington would gain leverage in dealing with the allies. “In particular, the United States should insist that all of its NATO allies improve their mobilization capabilities and build up adequate war reserve stocks.” Additionally, the administration should initiate expensive, long-term measures to remedy the debilitating effects of Vietnam draw-downs.51

Concurrently, the Soviets made threats against independent-minded Romania and alleged that Austria had not acted neutrally. At the State Department’s urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed possible counter-moves against further Soviet aggression. They concluded that, apart from unconventional warfare units, available US forces were “inadequate to support major contingency operations” in Yugoslavia, Austria, or Romania. Therefore, the United States should act with “extreme caution” in these areas.52
Late in September, General Wheeler toured Western Europe and came away convinced that more economizing would not merely trim fat but cut away muscle. All the allied chiefs of staff, he found, appreciated the need to effect force improvements. SACEUR said, and General Wheeler agreed, that Czechoslovakia represented a turning-point for NATO. Positive action could revitalize the alliance, while hesitation would simply continue the downward spiral.53

Meanwhile, on 18 September, Secretary Clifford circulated a new “save the teeth” solution. “Largely due to your efforts,” he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “this plan is substantially superior to our first one.” He proposed actions that would reduce US personnel by 55,000 and save $425 million annually. No withdrawals would occur, however, until occupation forces began leaving Czechoslovakia.54 The Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that even these measures “would place USCINCEUR in an unsound military posture from which it would be impossible to respond immediately and effectively in a crisis situation.” The final plan that was approved in December eliminated 33,897 military and 2,205 civilian spaces. Total budgetary savings would be $428.8 million, including $158.4 million in balance-of-payments savings.55

State, Defense, and Treasury officials considered sending a high-level team to European capitals where they would “take soundings” on what extra steps the allies might carry out. As a corollary, on 2 October, Deputy Secretary Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to say what would constitute appropriate contributions. For an inducement, he added, the United States might increase its own effort by $50 million in budgetary along with $50 million in balance-of-payments expenditures.56 The very modesty of these figures illustrated how tight the overall fiscal situation had become.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff called a $50 million budget hike inadequate, allowing only superficial, short-term improvements. The sudden injection of a small sum could not eliminate major weaknesses that had accumulated over the past several years; indeed, “our deteriorating readiness will not even be slowed.” What, then, ought to be done? The “indispensable first step,” they argued, was a moratorium upon force reductions. Measures within the $50 million proposal ought to include returning dual-based Army and Air Force units to Europe during January or February 1969 and keeping them there until mid-year. As for allied actions, they suggested that West Germany activate two additional brigades. Most importantly, implementing a $50 million package should mark only the beginning of a long-term effort.57

Tentatively, Secretary Clifford decided to raise the budget allocation by $49 million and raise balance-of-payments spending by $18 million. These amounts would make possible the return of dual-based units and the construction of aircraft shelters in Germany and the Netherlands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, instead, assuming the amount for aircraft shelters was NATO-reimbursable and applying money thus saved to: retaining dual-based USAF units in Europe for 90 days (Army units could not stay so long because their billets had been released to the Germans); returning an EB–66 squadron to Europe earlier than planned; improving aerial port facilities; and keeping a maritime patrol squadron in the Mediterranean. But they argued again that “this
effort does not go far enough, especially if [it] is to signify US leadership in improving NATO’s posture in the post-Czech situation.”

Secretary Clifford decided to defer near-term US responses until allied intentions became clearer. He noted, also, that Joint Chiefs of Staff plans for long-term improvements would cost $5.1 billion during FYs 1969–1971. Secretary Clifford asked them to reconsider carefully and then submit detailed justifications for those steps that they still thought necessary. In mid-December, the J–5 completed a response. General William Westmoreland, the new Army Chief of Staff, told his colleagues that the paper was “untimely” and would not make them “look good” in Mr. Clifford’s eyes. Specifics, he believed, were to be avoided when they conferred with civilian superiors. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed simply to “note” J–5’s submission.

Early in November, the NATO chiefs of staff concluded that, despite some withdrawals from Czechoslovakia, the Soviets’ capability to launch a surprise attack had been enhanced and their options increased. They, therefore, assessed risks as “markedly higher” than those used in 1969–1973 force planning, and urged members to act with “utmost vigor” in meeting goals and raising active forces to the required standard of readiness.

The Defense Planning Committee advanced its semi-annual meeting from December to November. There Secretary Clifford outlined US actions, all of them either proposed or endorsed by the Joint Chiefs, which were conditional upon similar allied efforts:

- Raise US Army Europe to its full peacetime strength, and make NATO-committed divisions in CONUS available by M+30 days. The 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) should reach that status by 31 December 1968, the 2nd Armored by 31 March 1969, and the 1st Armored several months thereafter.
- Earmark for SACEUR the USAF Rapid Reaction Force in CONUS. It consisted of 14 squadrons totaling about 300 aircraft.
- Eliminate rotation of the 24th Division’s brigades, keeping one permanently in Germany.
- Advance the return of dual-based units to January-February, and temporarily retain four fighter squadrons in Europe.
- Pre-finance, with US funds, the construction of aircraft shelters in Germany and the Netherlands.
- Accelerate the return of an EB-66 squadron, and greatly increase the number of jamming pods for fighters.
- Augment aerial port facilities.
- Suspend the inactivation of a maritime patrol squadron operating in the Mediterranean.

This signaled a beginning; how to continue rebuilding was left to the Nixon administration.

The 1968 DPM debate took on a curious air, with OSD repeating its positions of earlier years while virtually ignoring the Seventh Army’s low readiness and the near disappearance of a CONUS reserve. On 1 May, Deputy Secretary Nitze circulated a draft claiming that active conventional forces in Central Europe were roughly balanced: 45 divisions and 577,000 personnel for the Pact versus 28 2/3 and 610,000 for NATO. The Pact led in tanks, was about equal in artillery, and fell behind in vehicles and logistic
support. However, the Pact’s impressive armored capability could be countered by the
greater accuracy and reliability of NATO tanks, the defenders’ advantages of choos-
ing terrain and firing first, and an array of anti-tank weapons. Without great expense,
NATO could shelter aircraft, increase ammunition stocks, correct maldeployments,
and improve reserves’ readiness.62

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded with familiar objections and a few new ones. As
before, they rejected OSD’s assumption that there would be a period of political warn-
ing, speculating that NATO’s slow decisionmaking process would allow the Pact an
initial advantage in mobilization and deployment. As before, they argued that the DPM
did not deal with the most dangerous kind of attack, in which limited, concealed rein-
fforcement could achieve an optimum balance between surprise and weight of assault.
According to the latest National Intelligence Estimate, 35 divisions were available for
a surprise attack rather than “some part” of 20 as the DPM claimed. Such a force, said
the Joint Chiefs, could seize considerable portions of NATO territory.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had some additional criticisms. In comparing armor
capabilities, the DPM matched NATO’s newest models not against comparable T–62s
but older T–54s and T–55s. Additionally, it ignored important advantages enjoyed by
an attacker: surprise; choice of whether to engage; and ability to mass and maneuver.
The DPM assumed that NATO’s tactical air strength was superior, most Pact aircraft
being interceptors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. In their opinion recent analy-
ses showed that, MiG–19s and MiG–21s were multipurpose and thus able to support
ground troops.63

Mr. Nitze’s final DPM, circulated on 7 January 1969, offered no substantive conces-
sions but did add rebuttals. The appearance of US tanks carrying Shillelagh missiles
should “more than offset” the introduction of T–62s. (Actually, Shillelaghs never lived
up to expectations.) As for political warning, Deputy Secretary Nitze cited statements
by SHAPE and the NATO Military Committee stated that the Czech invasion had
been preceded by a three-week period of political warning.64 The DPM’s section on
rival reinforcement capabilities was recast, but its conclusions remained the same.
According to US intelligence, the Soviets could assemble 84 divisions (1,260,000 men)
in seven days. Yet, unlike their NATO counterparts, Soviet reservists would move to
the front immediately, without undergoing unit refresher training. Thus, by M+30, the
Pact would have more men with less training. Mr. Nitze’s deduction: “If we thought
the Pact would gain a major advantage with its temporarily larger forces, we could
change our pre-deployment training times.”65 In sum, OSD believed flexible response
to be almost a reality while the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it was mostly a mirage.
Phasing Out the Military Assistance Program

By 1965, the Military Assistance Program was at a crossroads. In the early 1950s, MAP concentrated on nations of Western Europe. As those countries revived, MAP’s focus shifted to the most vulnerable and least self-sufficient countries around the Sino-Soviet periphery: Greece; Turkey; Taiwan; South Korea; Thailand; Laos; and South Vietnam. But MAP became a favorite target of congressional budget-cutters. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which provided the statutory basis for MAP, sought to shift as much grant aid as possible to sales and credits. In FY 1964, sales agreements with Near East and South Asian countries amounted only to $5.3 million. By FY 1968, that figure had climbed to $452 million.  

Organizationally, the State Department supplied supervision and general direction of all assistance programs. The Defense Department bore responsibility for MAP’s logistics and supervised recipients’ use of equipment. Within the Office of International Security Affairs, a flag officer serving as Director of Military Assistance administered the program. Early every year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted Annex J of their Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, listing those Free World forces that they considered “strategically desirable” although perhaps not “reasonably attainable.” Next, the Director of Military Assistance prepared dollar guidelines for each country. Then unified commanders submitted recommendations based on Annex J and the dollar guidelines. Beginning with FY 1967, the Secretary of Defense circulated a draft presidential memorandum detailing and justifying his proposals. After a review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State’s Agency for International Development forwarded their recommendations through the Budget Bureau to the White House. The annual appropriation, plus any legislative changes, would be voted by Congress as an amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.
The FY 1966 Program

Between FY 1962 and FY 1965, MAP appropriations shrank from $1.6 to $1.055 billion. Recognizing fiscal reality, but hoping to keep further reductions small and gradual, Secretary McNamara in December 1964 proposed $1.17 billion for FY 1966 and $1.15 billion in FY 1967, declining to $800 million by FY 1971. He intended to allocate the bulk of FY 1966 funds as follows: Greece, $75 million; Turkey, $119.3 million; Taiwan, $104.3 million; South Korea, $150 million; and South Vietnam, $230 million. The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented that, while those amounts would permit minor force improvements, a decreasing availability of dollars together with increasing requirements was harming friendly nations’ ability to meet Annex J objectives and so play their part in US strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged three significant changes. First, Congress’ $55 million ceiling on material aid to Latin America should be either removed or raised to $75 million. Second, the amount for neutral India should be reduced and the savings assigned to Greece and Thailand, both US allies. Third, embattled South Vietnam might need $100 million more. If so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed either making comparable cuts in other country programs or shifting MAP costs to the services' budgets. In the latter case, United States and allied requirements would be competing against each other. They proposed, instead, asking for special congressional authority to support countries engaged in “open warfare”: South Vietnam, Laos, and the Congo.2

In January 1965, President Johnson asked Congress for a $1.17 billion appropriation plus “a special standby authorization for use if necessary in Vietnam only.” Passage through Congress proved remarkable: not a single dollar was deleted, although Congress retained the ceiling on aid to Latin America. On 20 October, President Johnson signed a $1.17 appropriation bill. Early in November, Secretary McNamara recommended that funding for allied forces in Vietnam shift from MAP to the regular DOD budget. This would follow a Korean War precedent, in which service budgets funded the Army’s consolidated supply system for US, Korean, and United Nations forces. A $375 million supplemental for Southeast Asia, in March 1966, marked the end of funding through MAP. Thereafter, South Vietnam came under Military Assistance, Service Funded (MASF), in the regular DOD budget. Final FY 1966 MAP allocations for key countries were: Greece, $77.4 million; Turkey, $124.4 million; Taiwan, $94 million; South Korea, $157 million; and South Vietnam, $540 million.3 Never again would final allocations come so close to, let alone slightly exceed, the original recommendations.

The FY 1967 Program

Annex J of JSOP-70, provided to Secretary McNamara on 22 April 1965, proposed a total of $1.299 billion for FY 1967, compared to OSD’s preliminary guidance of $1.15 billion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide more money to Latin America than OSD proposed ($98 versus $74.9 million) and a good deal more to the Near East/South Asia
region ($539.6 versus $325.5 million), but less to the Far East. The Director of Military Assistance drew up country plans that stayed within a $1.15 billion ceiling. The Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that these plans would lead to “quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in the activation and equipping of major combat units in key allied countries.” The allies’ role in mid-range strategy would have to be modified, their force objectives revised, and selected programs either drastically reduced or eliminated. Therefore, they reaffirmed their recommendation for $1.299 billion, minus Vietnam and Laos. Their recommendations for the most critical “forward defense” countries were: Greece, $182.7 million; Turkey, $243.6 million; Taiwan, $156.4 million; and South Korea, $231.4 million.4

On 26 October, Secretary McNamara circulated a draft presidential memorandum proposing $897 million in new obligational authority, Vietnam and Laos excepted. Here he articulated a new strategic framework for MAP. While overt Soviet aggression seemed increasingly unlikely, the Chinese threat was growing. Therefore, “the center of gravity of the US defense problem has . . . shifted perceptibly eastward,” meaning that countries located “eastward from Kashmir” had assumed greater relative importance.5 However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against forwarding this DPM to the President “in its present form.” A limit of $897 million would incur “substantial risks to US security,” certainly cause adverse allied reactions, “significantly lower” deterrent capabilities in certain critical areas, and cast doubt upon the credibility of US intentions and assurances. Even $1.15 billion barely sufficed to maintain the status quo; qualitative improvements in the Sino-Soviet camp would render deferrals of allied force improvements all the more hazardous. And, as American units streamed into Vietnam, US ability to help other friends became “highly questionable.”6

Secretary McNamara went ahead anyway, keeping country programs well below what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended. He proposed $68.7 million for Greece, $143 million for Turkey, $96 million for Taiwan, and $160 million for South Korea. On 1 February 1966, President Johnson asked Congress for $917 million in new obligational authority, including $70 million for Laos. This year, however, MAP met with a rough passage as liberals, opposed to escalation in Vietnam, joined conservatives who were always dubious about foreign aid. Ultimately, Congress voted $792 million. But, since Congress disapproved $57 million for India and Pakistan after those two countries started fighting over Kashmir, the cuts for all other recipients amounted only to $68 million. After President Johnson visited Bangkok in October 1966, he raised Thailand’s share of MAP from $35 to $60 million in recognition of her role in supporting the Vietnam War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued against offsetting the $68 million reduction by cutting other country programs. Instead, they wanted to recoup money allocated to India and Pakistan, recover spare parts credits given to the services and shift $4.6 million away from Latin American programs to stay within an $85 million limit imposed by the Fulbright Amendment. The Mundt Amendment, limiting to forty the total number of nations receiving grant aid, worried the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it limited flexibility and might prevent responses to emergencies. The former amendment was named for Senator J. William Fulbright (D, AR), Chairman of the Foreign Relations

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Committee, the latter for Senator Karl Mundt (R, SD). Senator Fulbright had become a prominent critic of the Vietnam War while Senator Mundt was a staunch conservative, showing that MAP was under attack from both sides of the political spectrum.7

In November 1966, Secretary McNamara approved a figure of $951.6 in total obligational authority for the FY 1967 MAP. He expanded Laotian aid from $70 to $106.6 million in order to replace combat losses, and raised from $23 to $32.3 million the US share of relocating NATO headquarters to Belgium. As offsets, he withdrew $43 million from the India-Pakistan pipeline, $54 million worth of Service credits, and $5.5 million from the Portuguese program. Even so, Secretary McNamara had to pare Greece from $68.7 to $65 million and Turkey from $143 to $134 million—a stark contrast to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations of $182.7 and $243.6 million.8

The FY 1968 Program

This cycle, too, started with a gap between the force levels recommended in Annex J of JSOP 68-75 and the dollar guidelines issued by OSD. The unified commanders’ country plans, which kept within OSD’s ceiling, reached the Pentagon during the summer of 1966. After reviewing them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they contained “serious deficiencies in major combat units of key allied countries.” For Greece and Turkey, particularly, the consequences could be serious. The United States wanted both countries to concentrate upon improving their ground forces, relying in an emergency upon US air and naval reinforcements. Now, however, heavy commitments in Southeast Asia rendered an adequate US response questionable. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that annually, for the next five years, MAP average $131.3 million for Greece and $219.6 million for Turkey. They also opposed reducing allocations for Africa and Latin America, recommended reinstuting MAP for India and Pakistan, and urged efforts to repeal both the Mundt and Fulbright amendments.9

MAP was battered by fiscal and political fallout from the Vietnam War. Aware of growing hostility on Capitol Hill, Secretary McNamara contemplated drastic revisions that would end grant aid to all countries except those facing a serious threat from external aggression, transferring all other assistance into the regular DOD budget. In mid-September 1966, General McConnell suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff try to redefine MAP priorities, but his colleagues decided the review had progressed so far that no study could be completed in time to influence OSD’s deliberations. Here perhaps they forfeited an opportunity, since MAP unavoidably faced major changes. On 5 November, Secretary McNamara circulated a DPM recommending $606 million in new obligational authority for FY 1968. He would put Laotian and Thai programs, intimately associated with the Vietnam War, into the DOD budget. India and Pakistan would get moderate sales credits instead of grants. Africa would receive $31.2 million, Latin America $45.5 million. Over the next four years, Secretary McNamara planned upon phasing out grant aid for Latin America, except for training. In most Latin countries, he said, the US intelligence
community could see neither a current threat of widespread insurgency nor a likelihood of insurrections within the next five years. As in past years, major recipients would be Greece ($65 million), Turkey ($134 million), Taiwan ($90 million), and South Korea ($160 million). Korean MAP had become, in good part, compensation for the two divisions that Seoul had deployed to South Vietnam. Recognizing Congressional realities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adding only $14 million to MAP. They opposed ending grant aid to Latin America and asked that the DPM include a footnote that Greece and Turkey required annual averages, over the next five years, of $131.3 million and $219.6 million respectively. President Johnson requested an appropriation of $596 million for FY 1968. What followed was a reduction of unprecedented severity, at least proportionately, as the House and Senate appropriated only $400 million. This time, legerdemain could not cover such a large cutback and all programs except one suffered substantial reductions. Regionally, Africa received $20.6 million and Latin America $27.4 million. Greece received $41.7 million, Turkey $87 million, and Taiwan $44 million. South Korea kept its full $160 million, a result of North Korea’s stepped up infiltration and an increase in fighting along the Demilitarized Zone.

The FY 1969 Program

In March 1967, through Annex J of JSOP 69-76, the Joint Chiefs listed their top five MAP priorities: Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. Three were directly involved in the Vietnam War. A fourth, the Philippines, received only $20 to $30 million annually in grant aid, but the availability of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay was deemed vital to operations in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a total of $794 million in grant aid for FY 1969, warning Secretary McNamara that his preliminary estimate of $630 million would leave allied forces $1.216 billion short of MAP goals for the five-year period. Field commanders submitted proposals that, as Secretary McNamara directed, stayed within OSD's ceiling of $630 million. In September, after reviewing them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted that “deficiencies in major combat units and increasing obsolescence of equipment in key allied countries will continue and even accelerate.” They outlined five areas of “major strategic concern.” First, by FY 1973, cumulative shortfalls for Greece and Turkey would reach $165.3 million and $77.9 million respectively. Yet the importance of those two countries had been accentuated by the reduction of ready forces in Central Europe, the denial to Allied Command Europe of French territory and air space, and growing Soviet involvement in Mediterranean affairs. Second, reductions in Taiwanese and South Korean forces, by 145,000 and 87,000 personnel respectively, could not be justified. Third, the $85 million ceiling for grants and credit sales to Latin America was too low. Grant aid should continue beyond FY 1970, when Secretary McNamara wanted to end it. Fourth, MAP shipments to selected Arab countries, which had been suspended in June during the Six Day War, should resume. Fifth, MAP-funded war
reserves were insufficient. In South Korea, for example, ammunition stocks amounted to less than thirty days of consumption at US combat rates.\(^\text{12}\)

Through a DPM dated 18 December 1967, Secretary McNamara proposed $420 million in grant aid plus a $120 million credit authorization to support a $280 million sales program. The key grant programs would be $40 million for Greece, $110.5 million for Turkey, and $30.4 million for Taiwan, and $160 million again for South Korea. Secretary McNamara planned to minimize the fallout from Congressional budget-cutting by (1) incorporating within the regular DOD budget all training, “forward defense,” and “base rights” country programs, (2) shifting internal security and civic action projects to the Agency for International Development, and (3) dealing with foreign military sales through separate legislation and special appropriations. He planned to offset most grant reductions through increased cash and credit sales. Where such sales proved infeasible, Secretary McNamara admitted, greater risks must be incurred—but Congressional acceptance of his restructuring proposals should prevent these risks from becoming excessive. He acknowledged, though, that the “crux of our difficulties” lay in the sizeable reductions imposed upon Greek, Turkish, and Taiwanese programs, where some delays in modernization and decreases in capabilities should be anticipated.\(^\text{13}\)

Commenting early in January 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that a $420 million ceiling would impose “serious risks” that were “disproportionate to the funds involved.” They recommended $109.9 million for Greece, $181.8 million for Turkey, $120.3 million for Taiwan, and $233 million for South Korea. They feared that the size of past reductions, plus the probability that FY 1969 would establish an upper limit for future years, would not “substantially delay”—as Secretary McNamara claimed—but actually prevent US objectives in many countries from being achieved. Inadequate investment funds for Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and South Korea meant that obsolete equipment could not be replaced. If allies could not conduct a successful initial defense, the consequences would include less time for decisionmaking, a probable need for earlier and larger US troop commitments, and possibly a quicker resort to nuclear weapons. As for restructuring MAP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed Secretary McNamara’s plan. They recommended, instead, “transferring all grant military assistance from the Foreign Assistance Act to the DOD budget as a separate program . . . package.” General Wheeler initially had supported Secretary McNamara’s plan, but the Service Chiefs apparently changed his mind. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that substituting sales for grants did not always produce comparable progress toward US objectives. Recipients might not proceed with the programs desired and, even if they did, might press for purchases that did not conform to US strategic priorities.\(^\text{14}\)

Ultimately, Secretary McNamara recommended and President Johnson agreed to seek $420 million in grant aid plus $120 million worth of credits to support a $280 million sales program. Confronted by objections from the State Department, the Budget Bureau, and influential members of Congress as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary McNamara narrowed his reorganization plan to a proposal that sales be authorized by separate legislation. On Capitol Hill, by March 1968, attitudes toward foreign assistance had grown even
more hostile. MAP became an element in complex negotiations that traded Congressional approval of a tax increase for the administration's acceptance of budget cuts. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, signed by President Johnson on 9 October, appropriated $375 million in grant aid. Major programs were recast as follows: $35 million for Greece, $100 million for Turkey, $36 million for Taiwan, and $127.9 million for South Korea. A Foreign Military Sales Act authorized $296 million worth of credits, the jump from $120 million caused mainly by Congress' objections to financing sales through the Export-Import Bank. To illustrate the shift of emphasis, Latin America would get $22.7 million in grants and $45 million in sales credits.\(^{15}\)

Congress further complicated matters by passing both the Conte-Long and Symington amendments. The Conte-Long Amendment required that economic aid be withheld from any under-developed country that used military assistance to acquire sophisticated weapons. A number of nations were exempted (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, South Korea) and the President could exempt any country on grounds of national security. The Symington Amendment required termination of development loans and surplus food shipments to any country whose military expenditures “materially interferes with its development.” The administration threatened to invoke the Symington amendment to stop Peru from purchasing French Mirage jets instead of cheaper US F-5s, but it did nothing when Peru's president refused to back down.\(^{16}\)

### Preparing the FY 1970 Program

Annex J to JSOP 70-77 was completed early in 1968. Since Laos and Thailand had been transferred to the regular DOD budget, it listed the top five MAP priorities as South Korea, the Philippines, Turkey, Greece, and Taiwan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that OSD's preliminary ceiling of $422.8 million in FY 1970 would leave allied forces with $1.727 billion worth of accumulated shortages.\(^{17}\) Late in October, Deputy Secretary Nitze proposed $400 million in grants and $325 million in sales credits. Reacting to the Vietnam War's growing unpopularity, he stressed how aid to “forward defense” countries would lessen the need to use US forces. Deputy Secretary Nitze also recommended transferring, from MAP to Service budgets, grant aid to countries that provided the United States with base rights.\(^{18}\)

Once again, the Joint Chiefs urged a considerably larger effort:

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<th>(Millions)</th>
<th>Nitze</th>
<th>JCS</th>
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<td>Greece (grants and sales)</td>
<td>$76.0</td>
<td>$129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (grants and sales)</td>
<td>$144.5</td>
<td>$202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (grants and sales)</td>
<td>$80.0</td>
<td>$121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea (grant aid only)</td>
<td>$166.6</td>
<td>$234</td>
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They stressed, also, that effective Greek, Turkish, and South Korean forces provided deterrents of a type for which US forces were not fully equivalent. Stationing more American forces in those countries would tie down US strength, restrict decisionmakers’ flexibility, and create all the economic and political problems associated with foreign troops in sovereign nations. On the matter of transferring programs for countries that provided base rights from MAP to Service funding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that careful study precede any action, since aid to those nations usually included other justifications. In his final recommendations, dated 28 December, Mr. Nitze added the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments about the value of indigenous over US forces. But he pared the FY 1970 program even further, down to $375 million in grants and $275 million in sales credits. He would allow Greece $66.5 million, Turkey $120 million, Taiwan $44 million, each of them in both grants and sales. South Korea would receive $164 million in grant aid only. Together these four totaled $394.5 million, compared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff request for $668 million.

**Conclusion**

When Johnson’s presidency ended, MAP had ceased to be a significant instrument of US policy. Some of that was inevitable, even without the anti-Vietnam backlash. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not prove themselves adept defenders of grant aid. Secretary McNamara tried to provide aid through administrative reorganizations, but the Joint Chiefs joined with his bureaucratic and Congressional opponents in blocking most of them. The Greek and Turkish programs, for example, might have been presented more persuasively in a DOD or NATO context rather than as line items in MAP. As it was, the Joint Chiefs’ appraisals and reclamas had a rote quality, their memoranda for any one year being much the same as those before and after it, regardless of how much the political circumstances had changed.
Latin America: The Instruments of Influence

In Central America, stopping the spread of Fidel Castro’s influence remained an overriding US concern. This chapter examines US interventions in the Caribbean basin: a new one in the Dominican Republic, conducted during 1965–66; and an old one dating from 1903, in Panama. Why was the new one launched? And why were the Joint Chiefs of Staff so wary about undoing the results of the old one? The answer lay in Fidel Castro’s Cuba, which Washington saw as a springboard for communist subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere. Weak governments could be toppled; insurgencies could be channeled into pro-communist courses.

In South America, a different problem existed after Castro’s lieutenant, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, was defeated and killed trying to spark a revolution in Bolivia. The new challenge came from Latin governments eager to buy weapons, jet aircraft especially, and European governments eager to sell them. The Johnson administration tried to select arms sales that would preserve US ties to South American military establishments without diverting resources away from economic development.

The Dominican Imbroglio

A Special National Intelligence Estimate in 1964 described the Dominican Republic, occupying the eastern half of Hispaniola Island and with a population of 3.3 million, as “one of the Latin American countries least prepared for representative government. Its past has been characterized by a succession of foreign occupations, coups, and despotic administrations.” Between 1916 and 1924, anarchy and insolvency reached a point where the country came under US military government. From 1930 until his assassination in May 1961, General Rafael Trujillo ran a home-grown regime
that was staunchly anti-communist and brutally authoritarian. After his death, Joaquin Balaguer briefly served as president. In February 1963, Juan Bosch took office with a popular mandate but soon alienated influential elements. After a military junta ousted Bosch in September, Donald Reid Cabral headed a civilian triumvirate that proved equally transitory.2

On 25 April 1965, a revolt by key army units forced Reid’s resignation. An interim junta rapidly fell apart as the Dominican military broke into two groups. One, an Army group headed by Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin plus the Air Force, called itself “Loyalists” in that they professed loyalty to the interim junta arrangement. The other, a large part of the Army joined by the Navy, declared a “Constitutionalist” government; that term referred to the constitution in force during Bosch’s tenure. Rafael Molina Urena, their nominal leader, in 1963 had been next in the line of succession to the presidency. Fighting spread through the capital of Santo Domingo.

Worried about the appearance of “extreme leftist elements” in Constitutionalist demonstrations, the State Department instructed the US Embassy3 to urge that all Dominican military leaders unite in forming a provisional government that would restore order and prevent a communist takeover. Secretary Rusk also asked DOD to position ships for a possible evacuation of US citizens. At 0930 on 25 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), to take appropriate action. CINCLANT deployed six ships of Task Group 44.9, carrying the 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and able to take on 3,600 evacuees. His contingency plan, OPLAN 373-64, covered situations ranging from a show of force through intervention by three battalions.4

During 26 April, full-scale civil war engulfed Santo Domingo. Loyalists tried to advance into the capital and Constitutionalis distributed weapons to thousands of civilians. To assist the evacuation of Americans, the Constitutionalis agreed that US helicopters could land at the Embajador Hotel and US ships could dock at nearby Haina. Americans began assembling at the Embajador. That evening, as a preparatory step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT to alert two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, along with airlift and tactical air support.5

On the morning of 27 April, Secretary Rusk cabled instructions to the US Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett that his primary objectives were “restoration of law and order, prevention of possible Communist takeover, and protection of American lives.” A Constitutionalist mob burst into the Embajador Hotel, firing their automatic weapons in the air but not harming Americans. President Johnson immediately ordered that Haina be used for an evacuation, which was carried out the next day. A “nervous and dejected” Molina Urena, fearing that leftists in his own party would kill him, appeared at the US Embassy. Although sympathetic to Molina’s plight, Ambassador Bennett’s only recommendation was for both sides to negotiate a settlement. The Ambassador was clearly disturbed by the Castroism spouted on local TV by Molina’s party and bluntly told him that “he could not deny serious Communist infiltration and influence in recent events.”6
By morning on 28 April, Constitutionalists controlled downtown Santo Domingo; the Loyalists appealed for 50 radio sets to coordinate their scattered forces. Ambassador Bennett strongly endorsed their request, but State Department officials approved only moving the sets to the USS Boxer offshore. He repeated the request early that afternoon, warning that “delivery could well mean [the] difference” in a situation where the fighting was between “Castro-type elements” and those who opposed them. Loyalists now pleaded for immediate and unlimited assistance; Ambassador Bennett sent a cable urging that Marines land forthwith. That evening, transmitting President Johnson’s decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered CINCLANT to land all Marines aboard USS Boxer and have two flights of tactical aircraft overfly the capital when the ambassador requested them. Also, the two airborne battalions would prepare for immediate departure. President Johnson also approved providing radios to the Loyalists, and Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann passed the word to General Wheeler. Fifty sets arrived late that night.7

At 1930 on 28 April, President Johnson with senior officials (but not General Wheeler) briefed Congressional leaders. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral William Raborn, reported “positive identification of three ring-leaders of the Rebels,” which US officials now labeled the Constitutionalists, as being “Castro-trained agents.” Secretary McNamara said that 2,000 Marines were ready to land and two airborne divisions at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were on alert. President Johnson told congressmen and senators that—on the unanimous advice of Ambassador Bennett and his country team, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Marines were landing to protect and escort US citizens to safety. Members extended their full support. Speaker of the House John McCormack thought it “obvious” that the situation was developing contrary to US interests and asked, “Can we afford another Castro situation . . . ?” At 2040, President Johnson went on television to say that US troops were entering the Dominican Republic “to protect American lives.” By midnight, 536 Marines secured the area around the Embajador Hotel. Also, at JCS instruction, the readiness of four airborne battalions was advanced to Defense Condition 3. General Wheeler asked Secretary Rusk to ascertain whether Ambassador Bennett wanted more Marines. Secretary Rusk suggested that, next day, mechanized units might land “to link up with Marines ashore, protect evacuees, and rescue endangered Americans.”8

“All indications,” Ambassador Bennett cabled late on 28 April, “point to the fact that if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist Party.” In that eventuality, “we should intervene to prevent another Cuba.” During 29 April, rebels seized the initiative and captured several police stations. General Wessin had grown inert, and the Loyalists appeared to be near collapse. That afternoon, at President Johnson’s order, CINCLANT put more Marines ashore. They landed at Haina, then linked up with the Marine perimeter around the Embajador. Vice Admiral K. S. Masterson took control of operations as commander of Joint Task Force 122, reporting directly to CINCLANT.
At the United States’ request, the Organization of American States (OAS) convened in special session but Latin members required time to consult their governments. The State Department, at 1326 on 29 April, asked Ambassador Bennett whether direct US intervention in the civil war appeared necessary: “We cannot afford [to] permit the situation [to] deteriorate to point where Communist takeover occurs.” Around the same time, General Wheeler notified CINCLANT that the “basic objective . . . is not only to protect American lives but also to insure that there is no Communist takeover.” While the sole mission at this point was protecting American lives, he should “recommend immediately the expansion of your mission should the situation demand.” From the standpoint of command relations, this was an awkward moment. The CINCLANT, Admiral H. P. Smith, was due to retire on 30 April, when Admiral Thomas Moorer, previously the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, would succeed him. Thus during the changeover Vice Admiral Masterson assumed a key operational role.

The pace of events accelerated. In mid-afternoon on 29 April, carrying out presidential decisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered (1) that the rest of the 6th MEU land immediately and (2) that two airborne battalions be flown from Fort Bragg to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico, where they would prepare to drop the next morning on San Isidro airfield, several miles east of the capital. But early that night, when troop-carrying C–130s were already in the air, it was decided that they would head directly to San Isidro and land there during the night. President Johnson made the decision, General Wheeler said later, from fear that “the whole thing was going to fold up unless we got some troops in. If we were to wait until dawn, we might not have anything to support.” This change of plan proved fortunate, because later inspection revealed the projected drop zone to be rock-studded and quite hazardous. The two battalions began landing at 0230.

Meanwhile, early in the evening of 29 April, senior State and Defense Department officials—General Wheeler among them—conducted a teleconference with Ambassador Bennett. Secretary Rusk proposed sealing off the downtown section where most of the Constitutionalist operated, thereby enforcing a cease-fire; the OAS then would be asked to negotiate a political settlement. Ambassador Bennett agreed, warning that “we are dealing with mad dogs now, as regards leftist forces.” At 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Admiral Masterson to prepare a plan for isolating the Constitutionals in the southeastern corner of Santo Domingo. At 0108 on 30 April, Admiral Masterson sent CINCLANT an operational concept in which paratroopers would secure San Isidro airfield, then advance to secure bridges over the Ozama River, and create a cordon along the river’s east bank. Marines would establish a north-south line running about a block east of the US Embassy. Loyalists would patrol the gap between paratroopers and Marines.

During the morning of 30 April, the OAS foreign ministers voted to create an International Security Zone in Santo Domingo’s diplomatic quarter which US Marines had secured. The diplomats were outpaced by actions in Washington. At a meeting attended by Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and General Wheeler, among others, President
Johnson spoke bluntly: “I am not willing to let this island go to Castro. OAS is a phantom—they are taking a siesta while this is on fire.” He ordered Secretary McNamara to “find out what we need to take that island” and Secretary Rusk to “determine what it takes to make this take on the right color.” Insisting upon swift action, President Johnson approved committing the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the entire 82nd Airborne Division, with the 101st Airborne Division ready in reserve.

After the meeting adjourned, General Wheeler briefed the Service Chiefs, reviewed Admiral Masterson’s plan, and concluded that the assigned forces, especially the ground elements, were too weak for the task. He alerted the MEB and the airborne divisions and, with Secretary McNamara’s approval, directed that some amphibious shipping move from Virginia to North Carolina, near the Marine base at Camp Lejeune. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, should proceed to Santo Domingo and take command, under CINCLANT, of all US ground forces in the Dominican Republic. General Palmer was then the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, under orders to become Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps in June. At 1130, General Wheeler gave him an oral briefing. General Palmer then flew to Fort Bragg, where he assembled a staff, and reached San Isidro airfield around midnight. The next morning, General Wheeler cabled instructions to Palmer: “Your announced mission is to save US lives. Your unannounced mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going Communist. . . . You will be given sufficient forces to do the job.”

On 1 May, General Palmer requested four more airborne battalions and a third battalion of Marines: “We should not send a boy to do a man’s job.” With their superiors’ approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized landing one Marine battalion aboard USS Okinawa, committing the remainder of the 4th MEB, and deploying two more battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division. In Santo Domingo, paratroopers secured the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River, while Marines established a line east of the US Embassy. However, Loyalists did not fill the gap between paratroopers and Marines, as Admiral Masterson had hoped. Their failure to do so was dangerous, because rebels might escape through that gap and spread over the countryside. At 1840 on 1 May, General Wheeler asked CINCLANT, Admiral Masterson, and General Palmer to assess three perimeters “designed to confine rebel activity to the southern and eastern portions of the city.” Plan A specified a close-in perimeter, sealing off southern Santo Domingo. Plan B would create a direct corridor from the Duarte Bridge to the Marines’ easternmost position. Plan C envisioned a longer perimeter located farther north. Replying at 0214 on 2 May, Admiral Masterson advised that Plan A would take 18 battalions and seven days to establish at “prohibitive” cost and risk; Plan B, 15 battalions and 24 hours with unknown casualties; and Plan C, 12 battalions over three to five days with the fewest casualties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose Plan B and, at 1303 on 2 May, issued orders to create a corridor at dawn on 3 May.

Those orders already were outdated. Because an earlier reconnaissance met no resistance, General Palmer decided that a cordon could be imposed quite easily. This
was entirely his own conclusion; because of a misdirected transmission, he had seen neither General Wheeler's query nor Admiral Masterson's reply. When General Palmer telephoned General Wheeler and outlined his link-up proposal, the Chairman expressed serious doubts based on Admiral Masterson's appraisal. However, General Wheeler finally agreed to General Palmer's plan. After speaking directly to General Palmer by telephone, President Johnson gave his approval. General Palmer proved right. Shortly after midnight on 2–3 May, three airborne battalions closed the cordon without loss in little more than an hour. Thus 80 percent of the rebel forces were confined within Santo Domingo's southeastern corner.17

The US buildup continued. General Palmer wanted enough strength to deal with an all-out attack on Santo Domingo combined with uprisings across the countryside. Accordingly, during 2 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved deploying another Marine battalion and all five uncommitted battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division. When these units arrived in Santo Domingo, during 3–4 May, US strength ashore stood at 12 maneuver battalions and about 21,000 personnel.18

One further step was taken to meet any direct challenge by Castro. Cuban MiG-17s, -19s, and -21s had enough range to cover US air transport routes and even reach Santo Domingo. Accordingly, on 6 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to augment the F–100s at Ramey Air Force Base with faster F–104s.19

A Political Quagmire?

The administration faced large difficulties in justifying intervention to the American public and throughout Latin America. In a televised speech on 2 May, President Johnson said that what began as a popular democratic revolution had been taken over by “a band of Communist conspirators . . . trained outside of the Dominican Republic in guerrilla warfare and (who) came there to . . . have a Communist seizure of that country.” Several days later, the Central Intelligence Agency claimed that “the time of US intervention clearly was one in which a movement increasingly under the influence of Castroites and other Communists was threatening to gain the ascendancy.” When the CIA released a list of 58 supposed communists, however, journalists quickly found a run of errors.20 President Johnson remained convinced the danger of a communist takeover had become real, as did General Palmer, Ambassador Bennett, and most US officials on the scene, but critics in Congress and the media were not persuaded.

Finding acceptable leaders in the Dominican Republic proved a daunting job. On the right, General Antonio Imbert-Barrera, one of Trujillo’s assassins, looked like “the best of a sorry lot.”21 On the left, former president Juan Bosch—living in exile in Puerto Rico—struck US officials as an unheroic, impractical intellectual whom communists easily could manipulate. In Santo Domingo, Bosch’s mantle was worn by Colonel Francisco Caamano-Deno. He possessed some charismatic qualities, but US officers concluded that his boyhood nickname of “Caamano loco” was still apt.22
Hoping to enlist Latin support, the administration turned to the OAS. On 1 May, OAS foreign ministers empowered a five-member commission to investigate “all aspects of the situation.” Two days later, the United States asked OAS members to send military contingents that would assist in re-establishing peace. On 6 May, the foreign ministers voted to organize an Inter-American Force.23

When Argentina and Brazil asked what types of forces they should send, Assistant Secretary McNaughton asked for JCS recommendations. Endorsing the Inter-American Force as a demonstration of hemispheric solidarity, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested small, lightly-equipped companies trained in riot control and counter-guerrilla tactics. They did not want tactical air contributions; any naval contributions should consist of coastal patrol ships and be limited to one or two ships per country. If Argentina and Brazil decided to send battalions, they should be infantry units. Wherever possible, the Latins should rely on their own transportation. Logistically, units should be as self-sufficient as possible, capable of receiving and distributing bulk supplies from US sources. If donors could not bear all the materiel and training costs, funds might be furnished by the OAS, the Agency for International Development, or the President’s Special Contingency Fund. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed designating General Palmer as Force commander, with a Latin officer as his deputy. They were willing to accept a Latin commander, though, provided he had a US deputy. Subsequently, they recommended (among other things) that the Force’s political guidance come from the OAS foreign ministers, that its combined staff be organized along US lines, and that its combined component commanders be US officers. The administration agreed to adopt JCS views “so far as politically possible.”24

On 6 May, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy raised the possibility of pulling out some US troops. Secretary McNamara replied that one battalion could withdraw immediately; a second could follow as soon as some Latin units arrived. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted more cautiously. First, they agreed, the recommendations of General Palmer, Ambassador Bennett, and Ambassador to the OAS Ellsworth Bunker should be taken into account. (Palmer, in fact, advised that possibly three or four battalions might leave after an effective stable government began functioning.) Second, a sudden large withdrawal would be militarily and psychologically harmful. Third, no redeployments should occur until adequate OAS forces were in place. President Johnson ruled against even a token reduction for the time being.25

The situation in Santo Domingo remained unstable. On 30 April, President Johnson had dispatched John Bartlow Martin, ambassador during 1962–63, to assess the situation. On 5 May, the Constitutionalists announced creation of a government headed by Colonel Caamano. Next day, under US pressure, the Loyalist junta resigned in favor of a Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) headed by General Imbert. However, Martin reported that the Constitutionalists, who controlled Radio Santo Domingo, were winning the “propaganda political war” by successfully linking “constitutionality” with jobs and food. On 13 May, with Ambassador Bennett’s support, General Palmer suggested widening the corridor or cordon in order to seize the radio facility. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff disapproved but did authorize him to prepare a plan to destroy the radio station using US Special Forces. Since there were many transmitting sites outside the rebel zone, seizing one would have little effect. While this was being debated, a GNR strafing and rocketing attack took Radio Santo Domingo temporarily off the air.26

Washington deemed it “essential” that Santo Domingo’s northern industrial sector, paralyzed by civil strife, resume normal activities as soon as possible. On 12 May, State and Defense instructed the US Embassy to prepare a plan for clearing armed rebels from the area. The next day witnessed widespread cease-fire violations. On 14 May, General Palmer advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “the rebels are stalling for time and have no serious intention to negotiate. How long we will put up with this before calling their hand is beyond my purview. I do warn you, however, that this country could slip away from us while we dance on the head of the needle.” Also on 14 May, the Constitutionals attacked GNR troops in northwestern Santo Domingo—unsuccesfully. General Imbert thereupon gave the OAS Commission his plan for clearing Constitutionals from the industrial areas. According to General Imbert, the Commission did not object. As a further complication, the UN Security Council voted to send a fact-finding mission. Ambassador Bennett cabled Secretary Rusk that Colonel Caamano and his associates, “feeling oats” because of this action, had treated the OAS Commission “with arrogance and disrespect.”27

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended strong, swift action, advising Secretary McNamara on 15 May that the Constitutionals almost certainly would oppose creation of a new security zone. Ambassador Bennett had submitted the plan to clean out the rebel areas as requested by State and Defense back on 12 May. Consequently, “immediately following Caamano’s refusal to agree,” Bennett and Palmer should be authorized to execute that plan. The OAS Commission should be informed and its support solicited, but also told that the United States intended to act unilaterally if necessary.28

The administration did not act upon that proposal because, without having informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was launching a new mediation effort. On 15 May, McGeorge Bundy and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance flew to Puerto Rico and conferred with Bosch and Sylvestre Antonio Guzman, whom Bosch endorsed for the post of president. Bosch and Guzman proposed that a new cabinet include an armed forces minister acceptable to both factions; they further agreed to intern or deport communists and Trujillistas. Next day, in Santo Domingo, Bundy and Vance conferred with General Imbert. Simultaneously, President Johnson ordered General Palmer to neutralize the Loyalist navy and air force and to prevent Loyalists from attacking the rebel zone.29

On 17 May—the day US strength peaked at 23,889 personnel—the Joint Chiefs of Staff again urged immediate, unilateral action to reduce the rebel stronghold. Then the Inter-American Force (IAF) could take charge at a time when the rebels were either eradicated or forced to negotiate from weakness. Otherwise, “we may be placed in a position whereby future US unilateral action would seriously impair the functioning of
the IAF.” Next day, instead, Bundy, Vance, Bennett, and Martin proposed that (assuming acceptance by the OAS, General Imbert, and Colonel Caamano) US forces place themselves between the advancing Loyalists and the retreating Constitutionalists, thus demonstrating impartiality, enforcing a cease-fire, and reducing pressure for UN involvement. Admiral Moorer and General Palmer expressed grave reservations. General Wheeler also was dubious, although he advised Admiral Moorer and General Palmer that “the governing factors in this chaotic situation are largely political rather than military.” Very quickly, however, military and civilian proposals alike became superfluous. General Imbert evidently sensed the rebels’ weakness. On 19 May, Loyalist troops breached the intended line of interposition, drove into the rebels’ northern sector, and captured Radio Santo Domingo. An informal cease-fire then took hold.30

Nonetheless, US efforts to build a broadly based, anti-communist coalition failed. Neither General Imbert nor Colonel Caamano would make meaningful concessions; Guzman dismayed US mediators by reversing himself and insisting that the 1963 constitution forbade deporting communists. Ambassador Bennett characterized the Caamano group as “a bunch of hoodlums infiltrated and fortified by Communists.” As for General Imbert, “the gangster side of his nature has surged rapidly to [the] fore.” When May ended, so did the Bundy-Vance mission.31

Internationalizing the Occupation

Washington turned negotiating initiatives over to the OAS, whose foreign ministers entrusted mediation efforts to a committee consisting of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Ilmar Pennha Marinho of Brazil, and Ramon de Clairmont Duenas of El Salvador. Ambassador Bunker soon concluded that a political formula acceptable to Washington and the warring factions was beyond reach. The only solution lay in forming a provisional administration of technicians that would serve until the Dominican people, in an OAS-supervised election, chose a permanent government.32

Meantime, a multinational peace-keeping force was taking shape. A Honduran contingent, 250 strong, arrived on 14 May; 166 Nicaraguans and 21 Costa Ricans came the next day; 1,129 Brazilians arrived by 29 May; and 184 Paraguayans landed on 26 June. The act creating an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was signed on 23 May by OAS Secretary General José Mora as well as the US and Latin contingent commanders.33 A Brazilian, General Hugo Panasco Alvim, became the IAPF’s commander.34 Argentina refused to put its troops under a Brazilian, and so made no contribution. Brazilians excepted, the Latin contingents reached Santo Domingo in poor condition; their governments evidently expected the United States to clothe and equip them.35

The United States placed all its forces in the Dominican Republic under OAS control, and designated General Palmer to be deputy commander. Admiral Moorer and General Palmer vigorously protested against putting the entire US contingent into the IAPF. General Wheeler replied that the administration could hardly do otherwise,
since “we devised the IAPF concept for the purpose of giving an international cover to American involvement in the Dominican Republic and to legitimize our activities in world opinion by identifying them with the OAS.”

General Alvim’s political guidance, approved by the OAS foreign ministers, tasked him with “co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.” To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that was a political announcement rather than a military mission. US officials, they suggested to Secretary McNamara, should influence General Alvim to translate the ministers’ resolution into military terms. An example would be: “employ assigned forces to establish and maintain a condition of law and order in the Dominican Republic.” They urged, also, that General Palmer in his capacity as deputy be empowered to act unilaterally when necessary. Their rationale was that a nation such as Venezuela, which had sharply criticized US intervention, might contribute forces in order to influence what the IAPF did. Also, they asked that no US forces withdraw until General Alvim could accomplish his mission without them.

Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA), replied that General Alvim probably could not restate his mission without raising questions about whether he was modifying the ministers’ resolution. Possibly, however, greater precision could be achieved through mission statements issued to the IAPF’s subordinate elements. As for unilateral action, he reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such a step would require a presidential decision. But he pointed out that, since US forces comprised most of the IAPF, Washington’s views could not easily be ignored. Lastly, Solbert drew attention to US public statements that withdrawals would occur only as Latin replacements arrived and General Alvim judged residual forces adequate.

As the dangers of chaos and communism subsided, and Santo Domingo stayed quiet, the pressure for US withdrawals mounted. On 22 May, General Palmer and Deputy Secretary Vance informed General Wheeler that, once Brazilian troops began arriving, a Marine battalion could be shifted to ships offshore. Other units could be thinned out and a Marine battalion afloat freed for employment elsewhere. Two days later, General Wheeler informed field commanders that “highest authorities” hoped for “a substantial withdrawal . . . in order to place problems associated with governmental control squarely in hands of OAS.” That could mean withdrawing as many as 10,000 men over the next ten to fourteen days. General Wheeler asked for a timetable and for criteria permitting withdrawals at minimum risk.

General Palmer replied that, contingent upon continued progress toward “normalcy,” US strength could fall from twelve to seven battalions over fourteen days. Residual forces should be capable of: physically separating Loyalists and Constitutionalists; reducing rebel resistance in southeastern Santo Domingo; protecting US and other foreigners; and providing a balanced contribution to, and logistical support for, the IAPF. General Palmer submitted a three-phase plan. Phase I, immediate departure,
would remove two Marine battalions (one ashore and one afloat) plus 1,700 Army and Air Force personnel. Phase II would withdraw all remaining Marines over a period of seven days. Phase III would remove two airborne battalions and 2,000 support troops within fourteen days.40

The administration acted immediately. On 26 May, at Mr. McNamara's instruction (relayed through Deputy Secretary Vance, who was still in Santo Domingo), a Marine battalion ashore began embarking. The battalion afloat also received release orders. On 27 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed General Palmer's three-phase plan. Next day, they authorized the withdrawal of 1,700 Army and Air Force personnel. Thus, by 30 May, Phase I was finished.41

Phase II involving 4,100 Marines was completed on 6 June, leaving 12,832 US troops in the Dominican Republic.42 On 8 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended (1) authorizing General Palmer to discuss additional withdrawals with General Alvim—which was promptly authorized—and (2) starting a somewhat smaller Phase III on or about 13 June. On 10 June, General Palmer talked with General Alvim about removing two airborne battalions, which General Alvim proved "somewhat reluctant" to accept. Instead, Alvim suggested temporarily redeploying the airborne battalions to Puerto Rico rather than CONUS and discussing US-Latin force ratios within the OAS forum.43

General Palmer planned to discuss Phase III again with General Alvim on 15 June. But, on that day, rebels began shooting at IAPF troops all around the perimeter in southeastern Santo Domingo. Major General Robert York, commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, had authority to respond with fire and maneuver. Accordingly, US paratroopers counterattacked and won control of a thirty-block area. On 18 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary McNamara that the Palmer-Alvim talks resume “at an appropriate time” but advise against redeploying two battalions to Puerto Rico and discussing US-Latin force ratios before the OAS.44

Soon after the flare-up on 15 June, at Alvim’s insistence, General Palmer asked that a US tank platoon be deployed to Santo Domingo. CINCLANT agreed. At the Pentagon, the J–3 drafted a memorandum endorsing the commitment of a reinforced platoon (seven tanks). However, State and ISA opposed the deployment as not only politically and psychologically disadvantageous but also possibly at cross-purposes with the stated goals of peace-keeping. US Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson also opposed this step as unnecessary and likely to hamper negotiations, exposing the United States to international condemnation, and perhaps provoking retaliation. On 23 and 25 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the problem and deferred a decision. There, for more than a month, the matter rested.45

Meantime, on 22 June, Colonel Caamano tried to inspire a general strike. He failed almost completely, and his star waned. Two days later, General Palmer received permission to renew discussions with General Alvim. Next day, these two officers agreed to announce a two-battalion withdrawal on 3 July. The first battalion returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 11 July; the second did so eight days later.46 That brought the US contingent down to about 10,250; the Latin contribution totaled around 1,750.
Resolution and Extrication

Thanks in good part to the talents of Ambassador Bunker, all parties signed or accepted an “Act of Reconciliation.”47 Entering into force on 31 August, it provided for: installing a provisional government; liquidating the Constitutionalist zone; reintegrating rebel officers into the armed forces; holding presidential elections within nine months; and negotiating with the OAS over the manner and timing of the IAPF’s withdrawal. Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy, a businessman who had served as foreign minister during Bosch’s tenure, accepted the post of provisional president. Garcia Godoy emphasized to Bennett and Bunker that he would be “aligned with [the] United States in opposing communism in all facets.”48

In July, Admiral Moorer and General Palmer recommended a residual IAPF totaling 8,650 with the US contingent, 6,744 strong, including three airborne battalions, one tank company, and one artillery battalion. Were the tanks now politically palatable? By late August, with a settlement imminent, Bennett and Bunker were willing to accept them. General Alvim agreed to the early release of an airborne battalion, contingent upon subsequent arrival of the tank company. Through memoranda dated 2 and 4 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested—and later that month received—approval to (1) continue stationing 7,137 US personnel and (2) send in the tank company and take out an airborne battalion. Also, at General Johnson’s instigation, they cautioned that withdrawing the IAPF prematurely could have “serious effects” upon Dominican stability. The four-month stalemate had allowed communists to regroup and prepare for future efforts. Once the entire IAPF departed, any attempt to reintroduce it would encounter “severe complications.”49

A problem arose when, on 29 September, State and OSD reversed themselves and disapproved including an artillery battalion within the residual force structure. At the Joint Chiefs’ request, Admiral Moorer and General Palmer furnished a rationale for retaining the battalion. First, it would ensure force balance and obviate the need for a hasty introduction of additional units that might prove politically unpopular. Second, in a show of force, artillery would be highly effective without evoking the emotional protests aroused by air attacks. Third, General Alvim wanted the battalion available to support Latin training and operational missions. Fourth, reversing the decision could result in US loss of face and erode the shaky status of Garcia Godoy. General Wheeler advised Secretary McNamara that he agreed with their assessment. Subsequently, State and OSD withdrew their objection.50

The ensuing months witnessed slow but steady progress toward “normalcy.” Provisional President Garcia Godoy returned the country to relative calm by placating left and right through a series of exiles (both Wessin and Caamano51 were posted abroad), appointments, recalls, and promotions. At crucial moments, he was prodded into action by the IAPF and then relied upon that Force to cow Loyalists or Constitutionals, as circumstances warranted.52
A rift developed between Ambassador Bunker and the intensely conservative General Alvim. On 6 January 1966, General Alvim refused to act upon a request by Garcia Godoy and an OAS committee that the IAPF evict right-wing soldiers who had just occupied Radio Santo Domingo. When Bunker threatened to use US troops without his sanction, Alvim allowed American paratroopers to seize the station. To smooth over matters, the Brazilian government agreed to bring General Alvim back home if General Palmer left also. Accordingly, on 17 January, Brigadier General Alvaro Braga of Brazil took command of the IAPF; Brigadier General Robert Linvill, USA, who had been Palmer’s chief of staff, became his deputy.53

Late in 1965, Secretary McNamara decided to replace airborne units with the 196th Infantry Brigade, a new unit scheduled for activation by mid-1966. In April 1966, however, Ambassador Bunker and Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon asked McNamara to keep the paratroopers there until sometime in July. The presidential election was scheduled for mid-June, and they evidently worried that troop movements might affect the outcome. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff readily agreed.54 Instead, the 196th Infantry Brigade went to Vietnam.

In May, Garcia Godoy pushed for an OAS decision to withdraw the IAPF before an elected government took office. Secretary Rusk recommended, instead, seeking passage of a resolution that the IAPF withdraw during June—unless, before 15 June, the newly-elected government asked it to stay longer. The Operations Directorate (J–3), Joint Staff, favored more flexible wording, seeking an OAS resolution “at the earliest possible date” and calling for withdrawal to begin “at the earliest practicable date after the election.” General Johnson suggested, instead, that the resolution call for initiating negotiations among the OAS, the provisional government, and the president-elect. Otherwise, he feared, Washington would seem to be washing its hands of the Dominican Republic. On 9 May, after amending J–3’s paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended seeking an OAS resolution “at the earliest possible date” to commence withdrawal of the IAPF “at the earliest practicable date following the election of 1 June.” A withdrawal schedule should be set through consultations involving the OAS, Garcia Godoy, and the president–elect. Deputy Secretary Vance endorsed their idea and forwarded it to State. On 28 May, the United States and other IAPF contributors asked OAS foreign ministers to authorize negotiations between Garcia Godoy, the president-elect, and the three OAS mediators.55

On 1 June, much to Washington’s relief, conservative Joaquin Balaguer defeated leftist Juan Bosch by 57 to 39 percent in what appeared to be a reasonably free election.56 Three weeks later, OAS foreign ministers resolved that the IAPF’s withdrawal should begin on 1 July. The last unit—115 US airmen—departed on 21 September.57 They left behind a fairly stable anti-communist government with some claim to democratic legitimacy. The unpromising political landscape in which Americans worked made this outcome all the more remarkable. Garcia Godoy proved a fortunate find, although the IAPF acted as ultimate arbiter.
The administration had achieved its major objectives quickly and at modest cost, a rare accomplishment. Special circumstances applied in the Dominican Republic, but General Palmer drew conclusions that had wider applicability. What happened in Santo Domingo convinced him that intervention must be (1) timely and in strength, (2) supported by US domestic as well as international opinion, and (3) executed with speed, determination, and finesse, seeking to complete the mission and withdraw as rapidly as possible. General Palmer was particularly impressed by the fact that intervention required four times the force (twelve battalions instead of three) that contingency planners had projected. Yet “the country is relatively small and readily containable because of its island location. Moreover, he who controls the capital city, Santo Domingo, controls the country.” Therefore, “if the situation has been allowed to deteriorate, we had better think twice before we commit our forces to a larger country—it may be a bottomless pit. . . . The secret of successful counter-insurgency is to nip it in the bud; once it has taken root, it may, as often as not, be too late.”

Panama: Toward a New Canal Treaty

The events of 1903 still dominated US-Panamanian relations. After the Spanish-American War vividly demonstrated the importance of being able to shift warships rapidly between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Washington determined to build and control an isthmian canal, running across what then was Colombian territory. When Colombia rejected a canal treaty, US action helped ensure the success of a rebellion, and Panama became an independent country. Through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, Panama permitted the United States to build, operate, and defend an inter-oceanic canal as well as to control a Canal Zone in perpetuity, enjoying “all the rights, power, and authority . . . which the United States would possess and exercise as if it were the Sovereign . . . to the entire exclusion of Panama.” A lock canal, 40.27 statute miles long, opened in 1914. A Canal Zone approximately ten miles wide along most of its length, garrisoned by US troops and inhabited by US civilians who operated the Canal, divided the country. The Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1936 gave the United States a right to defend the Canal by unilateral intervention, in case of an international threat or conflict. President Eisenhower acknowledged Panama’s “titular” sovereignty over the Zone and allowed the simultaneous raising of US and Panamanian flags in certain areas but made no fundamental changes.

In 1961, after President Roberto Chiari pressed for renegotiation of the 1903 treaty, the Kennedy administration began studying whether a sea-level canal should be built. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored doing so, because mobility of forces and economical movement of materiel remained essential. The lock canal, they forecast, would be “approaching inadequacy within ten years.” A sea-level canal, by contrast, would prove far less vulnerable to sabotage and much more adaptable to modification.”
In April 1962, President Kennedy decided against renegotiating the 1903 treaty but recognized that the issue might have to be faced before a sea-level canal could be completed. He also directed DOD to review the requirements for military facilities in the isthmian region. The Department of the Army, which administered the Canal Zone, produced a list of lands that might be returned to Panama; but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in August 1963, opposed releasing any of them. They recalled how, only one year after British troops evacuated the Suez Canal Zone, Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Taking account of "extremely nationalistic elements in Panama, the Castro-communist influence in Latin America, and the traditional instability of Panamanian politics, continued exercise by the United States of its legal rights" remained necessary. Concessions would only encourage more demands. Washington ought to make a liberal interpretation of existing treaties, and nothing more. However, the administration should be willing (without letting Panama know) to consider reversions on a case-by-case basis, adding whatever provisions seemed necessary to assure continued US defense of the canal. Secretary McNamara agreed.

The events of 9–12 January 1964 forced some fundamental rethinking in Washington. Trouble started when Panamanian students entered the Zone, raised their flag at a high school, and then tried to lower the US flag at an administration building. As police were escorting them out of the Zone, rock-throwing began. Around nightfall, several thousand Panamanians stormed into the Zone, starting a rampage. When the disorders ended, on 13 January, four US soldiers and perhaps twenty Panamanians lay dead. Panama severed diplomatic relations, charging "unjustifiable aggression" and insisting upon a basic revision of the 1903 treaty.

Panama was in turmoil, with its presidential election approaching. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann warned President Chiari that communists had penetrated high positions in his government and that Castro soon would try to bring weapons into Panama. On 17 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that (1) eight F–102s, then in the Zone for an air defense exercise, should stay there until further notice and (2) one Marine battalion landing team (BLT) should remain within twelve hours' sailing time from Panama.

Deputy Secretary Vance ordered the development of plans to intervene in case the Panamanian government asked for help in preventing its overthrow by Communist/Castro-oriented groups or Washington decided to remove a Communist regime from power. On 23 January, the Director of Operations (J–3), Joint Staff, flew to Panama for a discussion with General Andrew O’Meara, USA, who was the Commander in Chief, Southern Command. Two days later, General O’Meara advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that fast reaction was most important. If he could act within one hour, instead of waiting 14 hours for reinforcements to arrive by air from CONUS, intervention probably would encounter considerably less opposition. There were, in the Canal Zone, three US Army battalions: one airborne; one mechanized; and one infantry. General O’Meara asked for another infantry battalion and one mechanized infantry company that would bring the mechanized battalion up to full strength. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved
his quick-reaction plan. They also recommended, and Deputy Secretary Vance authorized, raising the mechanized battalion to full strength and keeping a Marine BLT in the Zone.\textsuperscript{61}

On 2 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that access to a canal remained “vital” to US economic, military, and political interests. They wanted the administration to make an early, public decision in favor of constructing a sea-level canal. Also, perhaps in exchange for returning non-essential land, Washington should insist upon Panamanian recognition (1) that the US military presence in Panama was important to and in furtherance of hemispheric security and (2) that concluding an agreement covering base rights and status of forces outside the Zone would be “an appropriate and important contribution” by Panama to the inter-American system.\textsuperscript{62}

On 3 April, the two governments re-established diplomatic relations and appointed special ambassadors “with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between the two countries.” Robert B. Anderson, who had been Deputy Secretary of Defense and then Secretary of the Treasury under President Eisenhower, accepted the post of Special US Representative. Three weeks later, President Johnson created a Panama Review Group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; it served as the principal point of focus for the formulation and execution of policy. The Secretary of the Army, who was the Group’s only Defense member, served as executive agent for DOD in canal negotiations. In May, after Marco Robles won the presidential election, US forces began easing the alert that had been in effect since January.\textsuperscript{63}

Meanwhile, early in April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended trying to acquire training areas outside the Zone, reasoning that they could serve as a quid pro quo in negotiations to revise the basic treaties. Deputy Secretary Vance asked which areas, inside and outside the Zone, to retain and which to relinquish. The governor of the Zone and General O’Meara advised that there should be a buffer area 3,000 yards wide on each side of the lock canal. Nearly all requirements outside the Zone were justified solely on grounds of hemispheric security rather than canal defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 June, reminded Secretary McNamara that Panama had not yet accepted hemispheric security as a legitimate reason for the US military presence. Why not, then, use land as a bargaining chip? The United States might release extensive areas within the Zone if Panama (1) recognized that a US military presence was important to hemispheric security and (2) accepted base rights and status of forces agreements covering areas outside the Zone as well as areas released within it.\textsuperscript{64}

General O’Meara, it turned out, wanted to retain all properties inside the Zone and almost all those proposed for acquisition inside and outside it. In mid-October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they concurred. Explaining their change, they cited a Special National Intelligence Estimate indicating an on-going need not only to deter communist penetration but also to ensure local stability. SNIE 84-64 stated that “from a negligible factor in Panamanian life, the Communists and the Castroists have become a significant one. Their short-run prospects have been
 sharply improved, and the longer the treaty issue remains agitated, the more lasting their gains are likely to be.”65 Since Panama's National Guard probably could not control large-scale urban violence combined with insurgency, “the only real security the Panamanians enjoy is that provided by the US military presence.” They argued, in fact, that “Panamanians do not resent the US military presence per se.” This being so, returning lands would win the United States “little or no advantage.”66

By December 1964, with the anniversary of the riots approaching, some kind of US initiative seemed imperative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed a draft statement by President Johnson expressing willingness to move forward with planning a new sea-level canal and negotiating a new treaty for the lock canal. They urged two changes. First, clearly enunciate a US responsibility for defense of the lock canal and for hemispheric security. Second, state no preference as to whether control over the operations of a sea-level canal should be multinational or bilateral. (They, in fact, disagreed among themselves about this.)67 Additionally, and more important, they stressed the need for a classified statement of US policy and objectives.68

President Johnson's public announcement, on 18 December, fully incorporated their wishes. On 8 January 1965, Johnson issued an equally agreeable classified statement. According to NSAM No. 323, sovereignty over a sea-level canal would reside with the country (Panama, Colombia, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica) through which it passed; the issue of bilateral versus international control would be decided later. The United States and the host nation would be responsible for defense; Washington should seek terms leaving the United States free to ensure the canal's security, regardless of other countries’ actions. A new lock canal treaty would recognize Panama's sovereignty and, when a sea-level canal opened, terminate rights retained by the United States. However, a new treaty should: ensure the continuation of US bases and activities for the lock canal's lifetime; draw no distinction between using those bases for canal defense and for hemispheric security; and acknowledge Panama's contribution to hemispheric security under these arrangements.69 Thus NSAM No. 323 precisely reflected the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The objectives in NSAM No. 323 had to be translated into a negotiable draft. State and Defense prepared a draft sea-level canal treaty that, in February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and judged generally acceptable. They cautioned, though, that Panama should not be allowed to gain concessions through piecemeal negotiations and that no lock canal treaty be signed without assurances that a favorable sea-level canal treaty was attainable. The latter objective could best be attained by a single treaty covering both canals, with annexes for base rights and status of forces agreements. A sea-level canal treaty, in any case, had to distinguish between canal defense and hemispheric security. Moreover, such a treaty must “ensure without qualification that the United States has specified authority to determine defense missions and full use of the canal in performing the defense mission, including priority for use.” Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff split again over bilateral versus multinational control, Deputy Secretary Vance decided to support the multinational concept.70
In May 1965, Panamanian and US diplomats began negotiating lock and sea-level canal treaties, along with base rights and status of forces agreements. Soon afterward, the Joint Chiefs of Staff softened their opposition to relinquishing military facilities. Instead of a buffer area, some locations adjacent to the Canal should become “access and surveillance” areas under Panamanian sovereignty, with security forces retaining a right of access for defense purposes.71

On 24 September 1965, Presidents Johnson and Robles announced that a new lock canal treaty would “effectively recognize” Panama’s sovereignty over the Zone and establish joint administration over the canal. The treaty would terminate either on a specified date or when a sea-level canal opened, “whichever occurs first.” The original draft lacked “whichever occurs first”; the words were added because the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected that a lock canal treaty might expire before a sea-level canal treaty had been ratified. Both treaties would contain provisions for canal defense, US forces being maintained under base rights and status of forces agreements.72

Early in December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed draft treaties and concluded that they failed to protect “essential” defense and security interests. First, the United States should have a right to act unilaterally, not only in actual defense of the canals but also “in situations threatening the continuity of operation of either canal.” Second, joint defense of a sea-level canal would be acceptable only if it was understood to include “defense of Panama against communist domination.” Third, US negotiators should seek positive control, through a majority voice, over the multinational authority operating a sea-level canal.73

Paragraphs were added to each draft stipulating a US right to intervene unilaterally in order to safeguard the canals’ security and continuity of operation. As to the multinational authority, weighted voting would virtually assure a US majority until amortization occurred sixty years hence. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to win their argument against restricting a right of intervention to protect US security interests. Instead, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor recommended relying on the 1903 treaty’s statement that the canal “shall be neutral,” which repeated language in the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. Taking account of World War II experience, the broad defense rights already embodied in the drafts, and the dimensions of US regional power, Resor concluded that security requirements could be met without sacrificing the political advantages of a neutrality provision.74

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted explicit permission for the United States and Panama to employ “all means at their disposal to maintain the neutrality of the Canal.” Secretary Resor countered, though, that the Hay-Pauncefote language never had impaired US ability to act. Indeed, since the 1901 treaty referred to old-fashioned methods of warfare, it might allow the United States greater freedom than would a commitment phased in more general terms. Unlike the JCS proposal, a simple declaration that the canal’s neutrality “shall be maintained” would leave the choice of means entirely at Washington’s discretion. They agreed, and on 30 December 1965 the State Department was so advised.75
One final barrier remained: would the treaties allow US bases to be used for hemispheric security? In mid-1966, Panamanian negotiators said that their National Assembly would not accept any such provisions. They added, though, that separate agreements covering missions apart from canal defense might be attainable. Secretary Resor asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe how this might be done and to state whether there were acceptable alternatives to the bases in Panama. Answering on 6 October, they recommended against removing any forces or missions. Relocating the headquarters of Southern Command would harm prestige and “hearten” anti-US forces, because it would be seen as a weakening of US power. Again, they claimed that curtailing US activities in the Canal Zone was “not one of the expressed aspirations of the Panamanian people.” Foreign Minister Fernando Eleta and negotiator Diogenes de la Rosa stood almost alone, they argued, in opposing provisions for hemispheric security—probably because the two men had a vested interest in driving the hardest possible bargain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, as an alternative, offering a long-term mutual defense and assistance pact. But they opposed seeking separate agreements for each individual mission, believing that doing so would subject Washington to demands for more concessions “as well as to the continuing emotionalism and opportunism inherent in Panamanian politics.”

A consummation seemed at hand in June 1967, when US and Panamanian negotiators presented their governments with three finished treaties covering the lock canal, a sea-level canal, and the lock canal’s defense and neutrality. The 1903 treaty would be abrogated and Panama’s sovereignty over the Zone recognized. A new lock canal treaty would terminate in 1999—or one year after a sea-level canal opened, up to a date as late as 2009. Within the Zone, re-designated the “Area,” land and water sites no longer necessary for the canal’s operation would be returned to Panama. A Joint Administration would assume control over the Canal and the Area; provisions in each of the canal treaties assured US majorities on the governing bodies. Through a defense treaty, the United States would acquire clear right to provide for defense, security, neutrality, and continuity of operation. If the lock canal treaty terminated without a sea-level canal having been built, the defense treaty would continue for five years thereafter, during which time the two countries would conclude appropriate arrangements. In the Isthmus, the existing US base structure would remain essentially intact. Negotiators understood the defense treaty, together with its associated exchange of notes, as permitting the continuation of all current activities not strictly associated with canal defense.

After reviewing these drafts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary of the Army Resor to support several changes. First, relocating facilities that were on lands being transferred to Panama would cost $10 million, yet no funds had been programmed for this purpose. Second, US payments for a sea-level canal should be settled prior to the formal signing of a treaty. Otherwise, US negotiators would have nothing tangible to trade for relinquishing perpetual sovereignty over the Zone and a monopoly on inter-oceanic canal construction. Third, and most important, the authority for conducting
hemispheric security activities should not lie simply in a reference to “related security purposes.” When General Wheeler raised these points, however, a senior US negotiator told him there was not the slightest chance that Panamanians would agree. Accordingly, on 20 July 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Resor that, while they still preferred a specific written understanding, the treaties “should not be rejected” if one proved unattainable. State and Defense both recommended that President Johnson approve these drafts.

At this point, treaty texts were leaked to the press, apparently by a Panamanian. On Capitol Hill, protests were raised against the apparent ending of US control. In the eyes of many Panamanians, however, US privileges remained too great. With feelings inflamed by an approaching Panamanian election, President Robles decided against moving toward ratification.

What the Joint Chiefs of Staff had called “the continuing emotionalism and opportunism inherent in Panamanian politics” intervened. In 1968, the National Assembly deposed President Robles, but the Panamanian Supreme Court ruled that action unconstitutional and the National Guard put Robles back in office. Dr. Arnulfo Arias won a tumultuous presidential election, and promptly launched a purge of the National Guard. Instead, the Guard purged him—the third time that Arias had been ejected from the Presidential Palace. A coup then put Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos in control.

Thus in 1968 treaty negotiations reached a dead end, and for Panamanians that proved an unexpected benefit. The passage of time—almost ten years would pass before a new treaty was completed—worked to their advantage. By the final terms, the United States conceded more than the 1967 draft would have allowed.

Aircraft Sales: Pro and Con

In South America, where Castro posed no serious threat after Che Guevara’s death in October 1967, US policymakers traditionally faced other problems. They wanted to preserve US influence over Latin military establishments but, at the same time, persuade South American governments to spend less on arms and more on economic development. Sometimes, however, these objectives proved mutually exclusive.

In 1947, the Secretaries of State and War debated the wisdom and propriety of selling US arms to Latin nations. The former argued that spending on weapons, instead of improving living standards, “would perpetuate and aggravate conditions of economic and political instability. . . . These conditions are the soil in which the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured.” The latter replied that most of those countries “will insist upon maintaining such military establishments as they, not we, feel they require and which they, not we, feel they can support financially.” Thus the question was not, “Shall they have arms?” but rather, “Shall they have United States or foreign arms?” Almost twenty years later, that question still resonated.
NSAM No. 297, issued by President Johnson in April 1964, required that military spending by Latin countries receiving US aid be “consistent with and proportionate to expenditures for social and economic development.” Grants and sales programs should avoid providing “sophisticated and expensive prestige equipment . . . except where specifically justified.” Moreover, Washington ought actively to discourage Latin purchases from other nations of non-essential prestige items.82

Very quickly, this policy was put to the test. In July 1964, Argentina sought permission to buy the A–4 Skyhawk, a subsonic attack aircraft used by the Navy and Marine Corps since 1956. France, reportedly, was offering to sell Argentina supersonic Mirage fighters. ISA asked the Joint Staff to look as far ahead as 1970 and assess whether more modern aircraft appeared necessary.83

In September 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves answered and addressed the problem from a far wider perspective. They found no strictly military need for supersonic aircraft; most countries could satisfy their needs with armed T–28 and T–33 trainers. What those countries needed most were versatile, multipurpose aircraft for counterinsurgency missions. Regardless, some countries might persist in trying to acquire modern, high-performance fighters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw a potential requirement to provide 150 such aircraft. They deemed it “fundamental” that US military influence remain predominant throughout Latin America; indeed, a selective and vigorous sales program struck them as “imperative.” Washington must be prepared to offer aircraft “on an ascending scale from the T–28 through the F–5A,” a supersonic interceptor designed specifically for sale to allies and friendly nations.84

In January 1965, Argentines did approach the US government about buying 36 F–5s, asking that deliveries start in 1968. Their inventory, at this point, included aging F–86s and British Meteors. Secretary McNamara wanted to delay Argentina’s acquisition of advanced aircraft but keep open the possibility of “pre-emptive” US action. Consequently, he considered offering an immediate sale of one more F–86 squadron, priced low enough to avoid interfering with Argentina’s long-range plans. As to F–5s, Argentine representatives should be invited to Washington and asked, pending that visit, to postpone a decision about buying French Mirage IIIs.85

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to do a good deal more. Argentina’s F–5 bid impressed them as “a sincere effort to assure a reasonable degree of modernization.” They did not rate the F–5 as highly sophisticated by current standards; in fact, it was designed expressly for sale to countries with limited technical and financial means. Argentines were bound to learn that F–5s had been offered to Ethiopia and Morocco, whose resources were no greater than theirs. Besides, F–5s would be less likely to trigger a serious arms race than would the more sophisticated Mirage IIIs. The decision facing the US government, they stressed, was “essentially a political one.” The need to keep US influence predominant in the region remained fundamental. Therefore, they strongly favored “a prompt and clear statement” of willingness to provide Argentina the F–5s by 1969, or even sooner.86
On 31 March, Secretary McNamara informed the Argentine defense minister that F-86s could be delivered quickly and A-4s made available at an early date. He suggested consultations during April and May about an F-5 sale. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had called an A-4 offer inadvisable, since the Argentines preferred to keep their F-86s flying if F-5 deliveries could be assured “within a reasonable period.” For the US ambassador’s eyes alone, Secretary McNamara cabled that sales of A-4Es and F-5s could be considered about five years hence. Washington would make no commitment now, though, because the F-5 might be superseded by a better airplane.87

In May 1965, after learning that the Argentines were considering Mirage bids, Secretary McNamara decided to offer 50 A-4A and A-4B Skyhawks, for delivery during 1966–67. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered this, too, an inadequate response. They noted that efforts to lure Brazil and Venezuela away from F-5s by offering A-4s and other interim aircraft had failed. Even if the Argentines were persuaded to purchase A-4s, other major Latin American countries would insist upon equal treatment. In that case, the sales requirements for A-4Bs would exceed 100, just at a time when Skyhawks were being sent to Southeast Asia. So, yet again, they recommended selling F-5s to Argentina, and to Brazil and Venezuela as well.88

Argentina agreed to buy 50 A-4Bs during 1966–67 and indicated willingness to procure between 18 and 24 F-5s starting in 1970. The State and Defense Departments decided to negotiate with Brazil and Venezuela about selling F-5s that would be delivered during 1969. Chile and Peru also would be offered F-5s with deliveries beginning in 1970–72, if doing so was necessary to forestall purchases elsewhere. The State Department believed, and Secretary McNamara agreed, that Venezuela was the only country that might try to buy aircraft elsewhere—and US interests would not be seriously harmed if only one country did so. Postponing F-5 purchases beyond 1966–67, McNamara argued, actually would help Latin American governments by: allowing them to improve their foreign exchange positions; possibly permitting better counterinsurgency aircraft to become available; and providing them time to consider purchasing transport aircraft and other equipment “that all of us consider of much higher military priority.” As to the possible shortage of A-4s, Secretary McNamara calculated that Latin American needs during 1966–67 would not exceed 70 to 80 aircraft. If difficulties did develop, he foresaw a number of solutions.89

A related matter, small in itself but symptomatic of larger difficulties, deserves mention. ISA proposed deleting two C-130s—one for Peru and one for Chile—from grant aid and reassigning funds to higher-priority programs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff countered that the C-130’s great flexibility and special cargo capabilities “uniquely qualify it for internal security and civic action missions in Latin American countries, where the terrain and weather often present insurmountable obstacles to other types of transport aircraft.” This problem was particularly acute in Peru, where supplies for civic action programs had to be flown across the Andes.90

Disagreeing, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Alvin Friedman advised cancellation of the C-130 grants. When the Director, Joint Staff, learned of this, he urged
General Wheeler to plead the case personally: “More is at stake . . . than the question of the . . . aircraft. The real issue is whether Mr. Friedman is to be permitted to fragment the Latin American MAP piecemeal . . . by red-lining individual items which he considers to be too expensive. His action disregards the considerable judgment and experience that goes into the refinement and preparation of the military assistance program.” Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara sided with Friedman. Peru, the Secretary ruled, must purchase her C–130 through the Military Sales Program; otherwise, he foresaw pressure from other Latin countries for similar grant aid. The MAP funds thus released would meet more pressing needs outside Latin America.

Whether to sell F–5s remained a sensitive topic. Chile asked for them, was put off, and proceeded to buy British Hawker-Hunters. Peru, unsatisfied by a US offer to sell F–86s, began negotiating for French Mirages. Argentina, denied M–41 light tanks, also looked to Paris. Brazil wavered between contracting for F–5s or Mirages. In July 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that administration policies were undermining the structure of US military influence, “which has been decades in the making.” Were not aid and advice “basic, essential, and integral” parts of what Washington sought to achieve through the Alliance for Progress? If the United States did not support selective modernization, an arms race and the displacement of US influence might result. Then peace, political stability, economic and social development all would stand in serious jeopardy. Therefore, they urged that “legitimate demands” for modernization be met—specifically, M–41 tanks for Argentina and F–5 aircraft for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. In June 1967, the Peruvian government was reported ready to purchase Mirages. Washington threatened to deny much-needed financial assistance and declined to promise F–5 deliveries: “We could not agree to be party to transaction which diverted substantial Peruvian resources from economic to military purposes when the latter purposes are of low priority.” This threat failing, Washington offered to loan and subsequently sell cheaper F–5s. The switch came too late. In October 1967, President Terry Belaunde declared the Mirage deal “a closed issue.”

Another debate involved how much help to give Latin anti-submarine warfare forces. This was the one form of external defense that the Kennedy administration had supported. In February 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that US firms be encouraged to bid upon building four submarines for the Brazilian navy. Deputy Secretary Nitze reacted by posing broader questions. Reportedly, Argentina, Chile, and Peru planned to acquire two submarines each. Brazil also planned to add ten destroyer escorts; Argentina and Peru had inquired about buying two destroyers each. The JSOP recommended that these four nations possess a total of 47 destroyers and escorts. They had only 32, some of which were old; full replacement would cost between $225 and $375 million. What ASW forces, Nitze asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did Latins actually need? How could sizable requirements be reconciled with the US objective of reducing their military spending?

They replied that Latin navies, which during general war would bear the whole ASW burden in contiguous waters, could not protect shipping routes. The Soviets
probably would deploy between six and ten diesel submarines in the South Atlantic. Supercargo ships, too wide to pass through locks in the Panama Canal, would be sailing around Cape Horn. That being the situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still wanted their JSOP goals fulfilled; the cost of doing so would total $380.8 million through FY 1977.96

Deputy Secretary Nitze dismissed those arguments. Even under optimum conditions, larger ASW forces could not prevent “substantial” shipping losses. But the danger of losing enough shipping to impair US war production struck him as remote, “when one considers the substantial levels of essential materials that are stockpiled against possible wartime needs.” Consequently, he saw no reason to encourage spending for ASW forces. US policy would continue emphasizing internal security, just as it had been doing since 1961.97

Meanwhile, in September 1967, an Inter-departmental Regional Group (IRG) circulated a draft prescribing policy toward Latin American security forces. Among other things, it proposed (1) limiting grant aid to internal security programs as a general rule and (2) carrying out sales commitments with larger countries to replace their obsolescent jets with F–5s. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged this draft generally acceptable and naturally endorsed a continuation of selective grant aid. Still, they objected to several things: an apparent overstressing of internal security; an emphasis upon restrictive policies rather than constructive, cooperative ventures; insufficient recognition of national aspirations; and failure to note that Latin American defense expenditures were low and falling. The IRG produced a revision that incorporated some of their minor reservations but not their larger ones. Nonetheless, in mid-1968, the Senior Interdepartmental Group approved it as policy guidance.98

In May 1968, Secretary Rusk suggested arranging an informal meeting with Latin defense ministers to strengthen hemispheric understanding of security matters. State also recommended that grant aid continue after the cutoff scheduled for FY 1970. General Johnson urged his JCS colleagues to back both proposals. He warned of “steady erosion” in US-Latin military relations, as South American governments sought arms elsewhere. Argentina, for example, had reacted to political pressures and sales restrictions by refusing MAP credits and buying minesweepers from Britain and tanks from France. General McConnell, however, considered the idea of a ministerial meeting too nebulous to warrant their unsolicited consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a study but then, in August, decided against approving a report that stated concern over deteriorating US-Latin military relations and recommended preparations for a ministerial meeting. No such gathering occurred.99

It is impossible to generalize about whether or how far aircraft sales helped preserve US influence. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued in January 1968, most Latins would consider refusal to sell F–5s an affront to their national pride and unwarranted US interference in their internal affairs.100 As things turned out, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela contracted for Mirage IIIs. Brazil and Venezuela—but not Argentina—also acquired F–5s. Brazil continued along the conservative, pro-US path begun in 1964 by a military takeover. The Peruvian military
outstretched President Belaunde in October 1968. The new regime promptly displayed its independence by reversing Belaunde's settlement and nationalizing the International Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Argentina went its own way, veering politically between left and right. During its 1982 war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands, A–4B Skyhawks proved to be the most effective weapons in Argentina's arsenal.
Upheaval in the Middle East

The Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were also manifested in the Middle East. Arabs and Israelis had been at war—always formally, sometimes literally—since 1948, when the state of Israel came into being. Israel proved unbeatable on the battlefield, but Arab governments would neither recognize nor make peace with her. The United States and some nations of Western Europe supplied Israel with modest amounts of weaponry; they also preserved influence with the conservative, pro-Western monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia by providing them with some military equipment. The Soviet Union gave large-scale economic and military assistance to the radical regimes of Egypt and Syria. Egypt’s fiery President Gamal Abdul Nasser, a heroic figure for many Arabs, became something of a Soviet protégé. US economic aid to Egypt, in the form of sizable “Food for Peace” disbursements, yielded puny political dividends. Nasser appeared to follow Moscow’s lead in opposing US policies, going as far afield as the Congo to do so.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, from the standpoint of US security interests, Arab countries possessed more strategic assets than Israel. Back in 1947, they had opposed the partitioning of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Alienated Arabs would turn to the USSR, they predicted, and access to vital oil supplies would be endangered. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not overtly hostile to Israel, by any means. In 1962, they supported the sale to Israel of a Hawk surface-to-air missile battalion. In 1964, they recommended selling 300 M-48 tanks. Repeatedly, however, they warned about the dangers of close military collaboration with Israel.

Israel and Jordan: An Unattainable “Balance”

As 1965 opened, US policymakers faced challenges from several quarters. First, regional tensions rose as Syria and Jordan (reacting to Israel’s diversion of water...
from Lake Tiberias) started projects that would siphon water from the Jordan River’s tributaries. Second, Israelis were angered by West Germany’s sudden abrogation of an agreement to sell 150 M–48 tanks. Their unhappiness increased when a Tel Aviv newspaper revealed that the United States was about to sell Jordan almost $50 million worth of equipment, including some M–48s. The United Arab Command, a unified military command composed of 13 states of the Arab League, had been pressing Jordan to pursue an arms buildup, as part of a larger Arab effort to achieve military parity with Israel.

The Joint Chiefs, OSD, and Central Intelligence recommended completing the tank sale to Jordan, fearing that otherwise King Hussein would seek Soviet weaponry. But Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent President Johnson a letter recording his strong objections. On 9 February, the President decided that National Security Council (NSC) staff member Robert Komer and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman would go to Israel. Their task was to forestall Israeli lobbying on Capitol Hill against US assistance to friendly Arab governments. Komer and Harriman could offer an assurance that, “when Israel has a demonstrable need which cannot be satisfactorily filled elsewhere,” the United States would “consider direct sales on credit terms.” Israel, in return, would be asked actively to support US aid for Jordan and to refrain from premature preemptive action against Arab water-diversion projects. “Never,” McGeorge Bundy wryly cabled Komer, “has so much been done by so many for so few.”

Prime Minister Eshkol proved unwilling to endorse US aid for Jordan unless Israel received similar help. Any other solution, Mr. Komer reported, would precipitate “a major crisis in our relations.” Under Secretary Harriman proposed saying that the United States was “willing to consider favorably” aircraft and tank sales. President Johnson instructed him to say, instead, that the administration was “prepared to consider sympathetically” Israel’s needs. This, too, proved inadequate. Finally, on 3 March, President Johnson authorized a promise that the United States would—without setting a precedent—sell Israel equipment comparable in quantity and kind to that given Jordan. Israel, in return, must neither oppose the offer to Jordan nor reveal any aspects of the agreement until Washington was ready to do so. That, of course, represented a considerable retreat from the original US position.

On 10 March 1965, the two governments concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in which the United States undertook to (1) sell Israel “at least the same number and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan,” (2) provide, if West Germany backed away, the rest of 150 tanks under the German-Israel deal of 1964, and (3) “ensure for Israel an opportunity to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western sources, then from the United States.” Although not specified in the Agreement, the maximum number was understood to be 24. Eight days later, United States and Jordanian officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for cash sales along the lines of an “illustrative list” that included 100 M–48s. King Hussein promised to keep those tanks on the East Bank of the Jordan River.
Meantime, ISA had asked the Joint Staff to assess how sales to Jordan would affect the Arab-Israeli balance, to appraise the impact of Jordan's purchasing supersonic Mirage IIIs from France, and to identify Israeli deficiencies that, during the next five years, must be remedied by outside sources. Answering on 12 March, the Director, Joint Staff, found no reason to believe that Israel's superiority would erode. Combat-ready tank inventories (1,600 Arab versus 756 Israeli) would not change significantly, and Israel's qualitative advantage should remain intact. Aircraft inventories stood at 543 Arab against 231 Israeli. Mere numbers of planes were deceiving, however, because combat readiness ran about 80 percent for Israel versus 60 percent for Arabs. Israel's qualitative lead actually would increase, despite the Mirage sale to Jordan, because Israel would be buying 49 French Ouragons and Mysteres. Consequently, the Director could detect no deficiencies requiring correction through foreign procurement.8

In April, Israel sought permission to purchase 210 M-48A2C tanks with 90-mm guns, 75 combat aircraft, and 60 self-propelled 155-mm howitzers. ISA asked the Joint Staff to assess the effect of providing 310 M-48A2Cs (100 to equalize the sale to Jordan, 110 to make good the aborted German delivery, and perhaps an additional 100 to offset a later sale to Jordan), 25 to 75 aircraft (probably light bombers), and 60 howitzers. The Joint Chiefs themselves answered on 6 May and addressed their reply to Secretary McNamara—a measure of the importance they attached to this issue. Fundamentally, they began, “every effort should be made to avoid a polarization . . . whereby the United States becomes increasingly identified with Israel and the USSR with the Arab world.” Such a situation probably would promote anti-American Arab unity under Nasser's leadership. As to armor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that selling M-48A2Cs would “significantly increase Israeli qualitative superiority” but reduce the US Army’s inventory. The British intended to sell Israel 250 Centurions outfitted with 105-mm guns. Therefore, to reduce adverse Arab reaction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended selling only 100 earlier model M-48A1s, balancing the Jordanian sale. As for aircraft, they urged that every effort be made to persuade Israel to keep buying from Western Europe sources. If a US sale became necessary, the F–5 interceptor offered “the best available compromise on the basis of performance, cost, political considerations, and impact on US military posture.” The arrival of Hawk missiles would offset Arab superiority in offensive aircraft, and adding 75 bombers to Israel's inventory would “drastically” change the military balance. As to howitzers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would approve only if the tank sale was correspondingly reduced. The Chiefs summarized: “If the Israelis were to acquire . . . 310 M–48 type tanks, 60 self-propelled 155-mm weapons, and 250 Centurion tanks, the Arab-Israeli arms balance would be tipped in favor of Israel to a significant degree by the end of 1967.”9

By an agreement reached on 29 July, Israel received (1) 110 M-48A2Cs to replace the German sale, with 105-mm conversion kits for those and for the 40 that Bonn had delivered, and (2) 100 M–48 A1s to match those being sold to Jordan. No self-propelled artillery was included, except as substitutes for tanks, and Israel must exhaust European sources before seeking US aircraft. Originally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had jus-
tified furnishing M–48s as necessary to modernize Israel's inventory. But, as M–48s arrived, the Israelis did not retire their World War II Shermans. Instead, they improved them and upgraded their guns.\textsuperscript{10}

In October 1965, Brigadier General Ezer Weizman came to Washington with a request to purchase 210 aircraft (45 supersonic multipurpose F–4s or subsonic A–6 attack aircraft, 165 subsonic A–4 attack aircraft). He said the Israeli Air Force operated according to a concept of absorbing the first blow, surviving, and then striking back. For the initial retaliatory attack against Egypt, a wave of 360 aircraft would be required. Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Townsend Hoopes read the US reply: “We cannot stress too strongly our view that the French are the natural suppliers of the Israeli Air Force.” Subsequently, the Joint Staff advised Mr. Hoopes that General Weizman's aircraft requirements were invalid, and that the Israelis probably would consider launching a pre-emptive strike.\textsuperscript{11}

After the Israelis alleged that no suitable European planes were available, President Johnson allowed them to purchase US aircraft. In February 1966, McNamara and Foreign Minister Abba Eban discussed the conditions for a sale. McNamara said the United States would not act as a major arms provider for either Israel or the Arabs, sell sophisticated aircraft like the A–6\textsuperscript{12} to any Middle Eastern country, or supply supersonic planes to Jordan without Israel's approval. Washington was, however, prepared to supply Israel with 24 A–4 Skyhawks and extend an option to buy 24 more. Sales terms would involve low-interest payments over ten years. Israelis, for their part, should continue looking to Europe for the bulk of their aircraft purchases, reiterate their undertaking not to be the first Middle East power to manufacture nuclear weapons, accept periodic inspection of the Dimona reactor, agree not to use US-supplied aircraft as nuclear weapons carriers, and keep all agreements secret until Washington decided otherwise. Secretary McNamara stressed that he wanted no repetition of the 1965 furor over the tank sale to Jordan. Eban assured him that Israel would maintain its French connection and did not intend to build nuclear weapons. If publicity or non-publicity about Israel and Jordan was “symmetrical,” he anticipated no serious problems.\textsuperscript{13}

Under a sales agreement signed in March 1966, the United States contracted to deliver 48 A–4Fs between September 1967 and December 1968. Israel agreed to the conditions specified above, although stating the nuclear provisos simply as affirmations of existing policy. Simultaneously, the United States sold Jordan 12 F–104 interceptors, for delivery between September 1967 and April 1968, along with an option to buy 24 more. Washington publicized the Jordanian arrangement in April 1966, the Israeli deal about a month later.

An unpleasant epilogue occurred in May, when France agreed to sell Israel 50 supersonic Mirage IIIIs. US officials were upset, particularly because General Weizman had told them in great detail why the Mirage III was unsuited to Israel's needs. Nonetheless, the administration did not reconsider its A–4 sale.\textsuperscript{14}

Late in 1966, US efforts to nurture ties with Jordan nearly came to grief. The tempo of Palestinian raids into Israel steadily increased; the attackers came from Jordan but
probably were spurred by Syria. On 13 November, Israel resorted to massive reprisal. An Israeli brigade devastated the border village of Es Samu, reputedly a terrorist haven, and routed Jordan Arab Legion soldiers who tried to stop them. King Hussein’s standing was severely shaken. Since the King had barred United Arab Command and Palestine Liberation Organization troops from Jordan, his inability to resist Israel’s incursion was humiliating. Palestinians rioted in Jerusalem, and Hussein’s Bedouin soldiers were incensed. The King told the US ambassador that “a point may come when he would rather go down fighting his enemies rather than his own people.”

On 17 November, after discussions between OSD and Joint Staff officers, Acting Assistant Secretary Hoopes recommended to Secretary McNamara that arms deliveries to Israel be temporarily suspended. The State Department decided against doing so, fearing congressional counter-pressure for an area-wide ban. Moreover, the State Department could find no evidence that US equipment had been used in the Es Samu attack. On 20 November, the State Department rejected a Jordanian request for massive military aid. The next day, at President Johnson’s direction, Secretary Rusk warned the Israeli ambassador that “further punitive forays . . . could bring about a reassessment of the premises” on which supply decisions were based. Three days later, the administration decided to airlift six howitzers and 15 recoilless rifles to Jordan, and also to accelerate F–104 deliveries. On 25 November, with US approval, the UN Security Council censured Israel. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg explained that Arab losses at Es Samu “far surpass the cumulative total of the various acts of terrorism conducted against the frontiers of Israel.”

These actions left King Hussein unsatisfied, and he sent the President a letter saying so very bluntly. On 28 November, the State Department, ISA, and Joint Staff officers discussed “the real price we have to pay to preserve a moderate, pro-Western Jordan.” The best answer, they agreed, lay in providing some items that were “defensive, inexpensive, manpower conserving, and readily available.” Simultaneously, King Hussein’s chief of staff, Brigadier General Amer Khammash, arrived in Washington uninvited. Presenting US officials with a huge shopping list, Khammash said that failure to fulfill it would compel King Hussein to abdicate, seek Soviet aid, or attack Israel and die fighting.

Mr. Hoopes asked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations about ways to assist Jordan. The J–5 proposed an immediate suspension of arms shipments to Israel. General Johnson suggested suspension as a “minimum” and diversion of those same shipments to Jordan as a “maximum.” General McConnell argued, however, that too much time had elapsed since Es Samu for suspension to be politically effective. Accordingly, on 5 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that if another incident similar to Es Samu occurred, “the United States should suspend the sale and deliveries of military equipment to Israel.” They further proposed providing Jordan with $12.8 million worth of equipment, including 105-mm guns to upgrade 50 M–48s, 90 armored personnel carriers (APC), 36 howitzers, and 27 106-mm recoilless rifles.

At that point, FY 1967 aid for Jordan amounted to $3.7 million. On 6 December, interdepartmental representatives discussed options. Worried about Israel’s reaction
and wondering whether King Hussein could survive even with massive help, the State Department suggested providing only $2 to $3 million over the next two or three years. ISA’s spokesman presented $5, $8, and $12 million alternatives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff representative reaffirmed support of a $12.8 million supplemental. Ambassador William Macomber, Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), recommended an additional $1 to $2 million over the next two years.20

Mr. Hoopes asked the Joint Staff to review a proposed $4.75 million supplemental and a letter from President Johnson to King Hussein. On 9 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves sent a reply to Secretary McNamara. In it, they “strongly” reaffirmed that $12.8 million was the minimum necessary to achieve significant impact. An offer of $4.75 million, being merely a token, probably would lead King Hussein to seek arms elsewhere. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended changes in the President’s letter, removing admonitions against over-arming and an implication that additional aid might be forthcoming. Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara supported $4.75 million.21

An interagency meeting on 12 December added tanks to the supplemental package and accelerated delivery schedules. However, President Johnson did not send the letter to King Hussein because he wanted to be able to tell members of Congress, who might oppose Jordanian aid, that “nothing is jelled.” The next day, Secretary McNamara presented the $4.75 million package to General Khammash, who was “very obviously, very completely disappointed.” Bitterly, King Hussein revealed to US officials that he had been secretly in contact with Israeli leaders during the past three years and so regarded Es Samu as a complete betrayal of his efforts in the interest of peace and stability.22

President Johnson sent Ambassador Macomber to Amman, with instructions to “hold [the king] down but don’t lose him.” On 21 December, King Hussein and Ambassador Macomber agreed that the United States would furnish $9 million in aid. Six F–104s accompanied by American instructors came to Jordan in January 1967. By late February, air and sea lift had delivered to Jordan ground equipment which included 60 armored personnel carriers, 42 recoilless rifles, and 18 155-mm howitzers. Nonetheless, the damage was done. Recognizing that King Hussein provided “a significant, albeit weak, barrier between Israel and more radical Arab regimes,” the administration had tried to nurture moderation. However, Es Samu “shattered the delicate confidence that existed between Israel and Jordan.”23

**Countdown**

In January 1967, as incidents along the Israel-Syria border increased, Israel asked the United States for 200 M–113 armored personnel carriers and $2 million worth of spare parts for tanks, all as grant aid rather than sales. On 2 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled grant aid unjustified, whether for economic, military, or political reasons. Israel already could defend itself against “any individual or collective Arab attack.” In the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, additional sales of major items would: negate the effect of
warnings issued after Es Samu; aggravate instability in Jordan; further establish the United States as Israel's principal arms supplier; provoke adverse Arab reactions; and further fuel the Arab-Israeli arms race, with Washington supplying both sides. They even wanted to discourage Israel from acquiring M–113s from European sources. Secretary McNamara agreed, and the administration deferred action.

Regional tensions mounted steadily. Palestinian guerrillas operating from Syria and Jordan struck at Israel. On 7 April, Syrians fired at Israeli tractors in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the border. Fighting intensified, first on the ground and then in the air, where Israeli Mirages shot down two MiG–21s over Quneitra and four more over Damascus.

Matters took a fateful turn on 13 May, when Moscow warned Cairo—incorrectly—that an Israeli invasion of Syria was imminent. Nasser reacted by moving troops into the Sinai, presumably to deter an Israeli attack. Since 1957, when Israel withdrew from Egyptian territory under US pressure, a 3,400-man United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) had patrolled the Egyptian side of the armistice line in the Sinai. A UNEF detachment stationed at Sharm al-Shaykh assured that Israeli ships could pass the Strait of Tiran, through the Red Sea up to the Gulf of Aqaba and the port of Eilat at its head. On 16 May, Egypt demanded the UNEF's immediate withdrawal. UN Secretary General U Thant chose to comply immediately and totally. Six days later, Nasser ordered the occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh and closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping as well as vessels carrying "strategic materials" to Israel. He placed Egypt on a war footing and started massing forces in the Sinai Desert. By then, Israel had begun a general mobilization.

In 1957, the US government had declared that "no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage" in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. On 23 May 1967, President Johnson publicly described a blockade of Israeli shipping as "illegal" and the right of free, innocent passage through an international waterway as "a vital interest of the international community." Simultaneously, the administration approved (1) cash sales of 100 APCs, preferably M–113s produced under license in Italy but directly from the United States if necessary; (2) cash sale of $2 million in tank spare parts; and (3) credit sales of $4 million in Hawk spares and another $10 million in tank spares. The US intelligence community judged Israeli ground forces to be capable of defending against Arab assaults on all fronts, launching limited counterattacks on all fronts, or holding on three fronts while mounting a major successful offensive on the fourth. In the air, Israelis probably could defeat Egyptians if their own air facilities were not damaged beyond repair.

A new Middle East Control Group, headed by Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow and including Deputy Secretary Vance, examined options. A contingency planning group, subordinate to it, had among its members Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes and Brigadier General Thomas Sibley, USA, from the J–5.

The National Security Council reviewed matters on 24 May. General Wheeler cautioned that opening the Gulf of Aqaba might prove harder than first believed. Two
Egyptian submarines were in the Red Sea; the nearest anti-submarine warfare unit would need two weeks to steam from Singapore, since sending one through the Suez Canal looked too risky. General Wheeler suggested backing Israelis “down the line,” relying upon Arabs’ inefficiency and lack of homogeneity to weaken their cause. In a long war, he continued, we would have to decide whether to commit US forces and confront Nasser directly. Could the Soviets, President Johnson asked, avoid directly committing themselves? General Wheeler thought the USSR “might just cut its losses and back out.” More pessimistically, Secretary McNamara foresaw a fierce air battle in which Arabs and Israelis depleted their inventories and turned to the superpowers for help.29

Later that day a British mission led by George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Washington. Meeting with the Rostow group, Mr. Thomson conveyed the Cabinet’s belief that strong measures to reopen the Strait were necessary because Israel could be restrained only for a matter of days. London’s plan involved: a declaration by maritime powers affirming their determination to uphold the right of free passage; prompt creation of a US-UK task force in the Red Sea, backed by larger forces in the Mediterranean; and armed escort of each ship bound for Eilat. Rear Admiral Józef Bartosik of the Royal Navy outlined a three-tiered scheme involving: a “probe force” of one US cruiser, one or two US destroyers, and one or two UK frigates to test Egyptian intentions and shepherd merchantmen through the straits; a “covering force” including one British carrier in the Red Sea; and a powerful “deterrent force” including the Sixth Fleet and two UK carriers in the eastern Mediterranean. If the Egyptians chose to resist, their airfields would be hit at once.30

General Sibley responded with a preliminary proposal in which three escorts would be backed up by one ASW carrier, six destroyers, minesweepers, and aircraft from either Israel or the US and UK Mediterranean fleets. Assembly time would be longer but the risk lower. Indeed, when General Wheeler and the Director, Joint Staff, reviewed Bartosik’s plan that evening, both men were alarmed by the absence of adequate aerial, ASW, and minesweeping protection. Were the British, perhaps, trying to trigger an incident and take revenge for their humiliation over the aborted invasion of 1956? If an incident was wanted, General Wheeler observed, one could be arranged without sacrificing an American destroyer.31

Anglo-American talks resulted in tentative agreement, “on a staffing basis,” to press for UN action to guarantee free passage, seek support from maritime powers for a declaration asserting the right of free passage through the Strait of Tiran, and explore necessary military actions. The British wanted probe, covering, and deterrent forces all put under US command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred that any such force “be designed as a protective presence—not for escort duty—and be capable of defending itself.”32 Meanwhile, Eugene Rostow instructed the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv to tell the Israelis about Minister Thomson’s plan.

With the crisis showing signs of worsening, Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban flew to Washington for consultations. On the morning of 26 May, Eban told Secretary
McNamara and General Wheeler that “the balloon would go up” unless he could take home definite assurances of US action of keep the Strait open. Eban also reported “knowledge” that an attack by Egypt and Syria was imminent. Early that afternoon, President Johnson polled his senior advisers. Wheeler described Egyptian deployments in the Sinai as basically defensive. Israel, the Chairman said, should be able to resist or undertake aggression and prevail “in the long term.” He believed Nasser would back down “if the maritime powers were able to muster an impressive enough force.” General Wheeler proposed first sending a non-Israeli flag cargo ship into the Strait, followed by a cargo ship with military escort. If they were attacked, “the least we could do” would be to strike the air and naval bases from which the attackers came. If you were in Eban’s place, President Johnson asked General Wheeler, would you be satisfied with relying on the UN and a group of maritime powers? General Wheeler replied that he would “drive a harder bargain” involving a US guarantee to back Israel if these efforts failed. Secretary McNamara suggested telling Mr. Eban that if Israel struck first, it would stand alone. But if a UN effort failed, and subject to Congressional approval, the President would work with other nations to ensure that the Gulf stayed open. That evening, President Johnson assured Mr. Eban that “our best efforts and our best influence” would be used—but support from Congress and the American people were essential. The President stressed that “all our intelligence people are unanimous” in believing no attack was imminent, and that if it did occur “you will whip hell out of them.”

The US Embassy in Cairo cabled a grim assessment: “We believe [Egyptians] will militarily contest any attempt by anyone to break Aqaba blockade unless faced by overwhelming military force and that they have little or nothing to lose by such confrontation.” On 27 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary McNamara with an appraisal of blockade-breaking measures:

Course I: Unilateral execution by the 2 US destroyers and 1 tactical command ship already east of Suez, ready within four days.

Course II: Combined US and UK action by forces already east of Suez, which would add the British carrier Hermes with 2 destroyers and be ready to execute in about eight days.

Course III: Unilateral US execution with reinforcements from the Mediterranean (1 cruiser, 3 or 4 destroyers, and the carrier USS Intrepid with 53 A–1 and A–4 attack aircraft aboard), ready in three days.

Course IV: Combined US and UK action with Mediterranean augmentations, ready eight days hence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed Course I too risky. They rejected Courses III and IV because of: the provocation involved in sending a carrier, cruisers, and destroyers through the Suez Canal, and the threat of their being blocked and trapped during transit; the danger incurred by operating a carrier in the Red Sea’s restricted waters; and the probability that a US-Egyptian incident would spark an Israeli reaction followed by escalation. Consequently, Course II offered “the best chance of success” and ran fewer risks. Even so, they foresaw “a high probability” that the Egyptians would attack and
damage the probing destroyers. Retaliatory strikes from carrier aircraft would spread the fighting and defeat the probe’s purpose, which was to confine the issue to assuring free passage through the Strait of Tiran. Therefore, since all courses easily could escalate into either a full-scale Arab-Israeli war or a US-Egyptian confrontation, “US action should not be undertaken unless the US Government is prepared to respond appropriately.” Acting Assistant Secretary Hoopes told Secretary McNamara that he considered the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper “unduly pessimistic with respect to the chances of success and the attendant risks.”

Premier Kosygin sent the President an urgent message that Israel “evidently intends to carry out armed aggression,” in which case the Soviets would “give aid to the countries attacked.” President Johnson quickly cabled Prime Minister Eshkol that “Israel just must not take any pre-emptive military action.” The Israeli Cabinet, almost evenly divided, resolved to wait as long as three weeks for Washington to act upon its promise of an international effort to reopen the Strait.

On 29 May, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk drafted “marching orders” that involved positioning a larger force in the Red Sea, seeking a declaration by maritime nations, and approaching several countries about contributing to what was dubbed a “Red Sea Regatta.” Anglo-American military planning should not resume, however, until diplomatic efforts had been exhausted. So when the Chairman, British Joint Services Mission, raised that question with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the American replied that political initiatives should precede more naval conversations. Secretaries McNamara and Rusk also recommended that the carrier USS *Intrepid*, en route to Southeast Asia and held in the eastern Mediterranean since 20 May, sail through the Suez Canal. President Johnson approved, and *Intrepid* made the transit on 31 May without incident.

On 30 May, Nasser and Hussein concluded a mutual defense treaty. In Israel, pressure for action kept growing. “It is crucial,” Eshkol informed President Johnson the same day, “that the international naval escort should move through the straits within a week or two.” That evening, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk submitted to the President their proposed “marching orders.” An international task force, keeping the Strait open for all flags, should consist of two parts: a “protective” force in the northern Red Sea and a “reinforcing” one in the eastern Mediterranean. They proposed to begin testing the blockade’s limits quite soon, perhaps encouraging passage to Eilat by an Israeli-owned but non-Israeli flag ship carrying non-strategic cargo. But the probe itself should not proceed for 25 to 30 days, allowing time to assemble a strong force augmented primarily by naval units from CONUS. Politically, a congressional resolution must precede the use of US forces. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara wanted to delay seeking one until diplomacy’s failure was plain and prompt support on Capitol Hill seemed certain. Although many Vietnam “doves” might convert to Middle East “hawks,” they warned that “the problem of ‘Tonkin Gulfitis’ remains serious.”

At mid-day on 2 June, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk conferred with British officials who included Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend and Admiral Nigel Henderson. Secretary McNamara said the Israelis believed they could win in three or four days,
first destroying the Egyptian air force; his own estimate was seven to ten days. The Israelis claimed their capabilities were perishable, but Secretary McNamara believed Israel could delay two to four weeks and still accomplish its objective. According to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, intensive consultations with congressional leaders had revealed “a passionate aversion” to any unilateral US action. British and Americans agreed to put off joint military planning, the danger of leaks being too great.

On 2 June, also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McNamara another appraisal of blockade-breaking schemes. Caution was their watchword, probably because just then they were enmeshed in a debate about expanding the war in Southeast Asia. In 31 days, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported, a balanced naval force could be assembled in the Red Sea. That course impressed the Joint Chiefs as operationally unsound, however, since it meant splitting forces between the Red and Mediterranean Seas, operating in a confined area, depending upon extended lines of communication, and requiring rotation that would degrade readiness elsewhere. A probe launched in less than 31 days would have to employ whatever forces already were east of Suez, and their ability to defeat Egyptian attacks appeared doubtful. If the President decided to wait and employ larger forces, the task of assembling them should start soon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined a concept of operations. First, concentrate a naval force in the Red Sea off the Strait of Tiran; position US and UK naval units in the eastern Mediterranean, putting carrier- and land-based air within striking distance of Egyptian targets. Then, send merchant ships through the Strait in the following order: non-Israeli-owned and/or non-Israeli flag; Israeli owned but non-Israeli flag; Israeli owned and Israeli flag. If the Egyptians resorted to force, countermeasures would be directed at “the immediate perpetrators.” Should these fail, more wide-ranging attacks would follow.

At this point, Washington and Tel Aviv were moving along entirely different time lines. Garnering support for a maritime declaration and a Red Sea Regatta, followed by passage of a congressional resolution, would take a few weeks. Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes informed Secretary McNamara that the basic difficulty about organizing probes was “the general unavailability of appropriate shipping.” Mr. Hoopes and Deputy Secretary Vance wanted to seek “a political settlement based on compromise.” In Israel, however, Prime Minister Eshkol's plea for more patience had worn very thin. Facing intense pressure, Mr. Eshkol appointed Moshe Dayan to be Defense Minister. General Dayan was an acclaimed war hero known to favor action.

On 2 June, National Security Adviser Walt Rostow asked the Israeli Chargé how much time remained to solve the crisis. Israel, the Chargé replied, had made “a commitment to hold steady for about two weeks,” but there was “nothing ironclad” about that figure. The next day, President Johnson informed Prime Minister Eshkol that the administration was “moving ahead” with diplomatic efforts and exploring “on an urgent basis” the creation of an international naval presence near the Strait of Tiran. His words failed to reassure Israeli leaders. “There's no reason to wait,” Prime Minister Eshkol told his military secretary. “They can't help us.” On 4 June, the Israeli Cabinet approved a pre-emptive strike against Egypt.
The Six Day War

Early on 5 June, the Israeli air force delivered devastating blows. Taking off en masse and staying low to avoid radar detection, most planes flew out over the Mediterranean then banked toward targets deep in Egypt’s interior. The first wave achieved complete surprise, cratering runways and trapping aircraft. By mid-morning, a second wave had completed the destruction of Egypt’s air power at minimal cost. Jordan and Syria immediately joined the war, and their air forces met similar fates. Supreme in the air, Israeli ground forces occupied all Jerusalem on 6 June and reached the West Bank of the Jordan next day. By 8 June, they had seized the port city of Sharm al-Shaykh, on the approach to the Strait of Tiran, routed Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and advanced to the east bank of the Suez Canal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found their proposals and recommendations outmoded by onrushing events. On 6 June, they recommended seeking “a means of reversing Nasser’s rising stature and control of the Arab world”—but, in so doing, avoid seriously damaging American interests and denying the Soviets an opening through which to increase their influence over the Arabs. Specifically, participate in no military actions that would tend to identify the United States with either Israel or the Arabs, continue to work for the termination of hostilities, and suspend logistic support for all belligerents “at this time.” But that same day Nasser charged that US and UK carrier planes had joined the Israeli attackers and were replacing Israel’s losses. Vigorous denials by Washington and London left the Arab world unconvinced. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Mauretania, the Sudan, and Yemen severed diplomatic relations with the United States; Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also suspended oil shipments. Anti-American riots erupted in Libya. When mobs ringed Wheelus Air Base there, 50 F–4s and 9 of 47 F–100s withdrew.

On 8 June, Secretary McNamara stopped all military sales and grant aid shipments to Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia. He also suspended “all supply actions of either a grant or sales character” pertaining to Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Mauretania, Syria, the Sudan, and Yemen. The following day, the White House extended that embargo to Jordan and Lebanon.

In its final spasm, the Six Day War almost created a superpower confrontation. On the evening of 8 June, the belligerents accepted a UN-sponsored cease-fire. However, on the next day, Israel accused Syria of violating the cease-fire and as a result attacked the Golan Heights, from which Syrian guns often had shelled Israeli settlements. Early on 10 June, the Israeli Army successfully cleared the Heights and seemed poised to drive on to Damascus.

Exchanges between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin over the “hot line” had begun on 5 June. At 0905 Washington time on 10 June, Premier Kosygin warned that “a very crucial moment” had arrived. Unless Israel unconditionally halted operations within the next few hours, the Soviets would take “necessary actions, including military.” Secretary McNamara asked whether the Sixth Fleet should turn around and
sail toward the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet submarines monitoring its operations would report immediately to Moscow. “Yes,” said the President, “go ahead and do it.” At 0939, President Johnson informed Premier Kosygin that the Israelis said “the firing has stopped as of this moment.”

At General Wheeler’s direction, the J–3 drafted an order for the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to begin generating an airborne alert. He also told the J–3 to recommend a series of responses against possible Soviet actions. Two hours later four colonels submitted a list that included: offering Syria a UN force to assist in ending hostilities; asking Turkey and Iran to refuse Soviet overflight requests; sending equipment to Israel, if Soviet military units moved into Syria; and as a last resort, intervening militarily on Israel’s behalf. At 1128, General Wheeler arranged a conference call with the Service Chiefs. He described the “rather low-key preparatory moves” already undertaken; adding that he thought proceeding with an airborne alert would be unwise. All agreed with General Wheeler that the best policy was to “sit tight.” At 1230 (1830 Middle East time), a new cease-fire began. This time, the armistice held and the Six Day War was truly over.

**Attack on the USS Liberty**

On 23 May, just as the crisis began, a Joint Chiefs of Staff message drafted by the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) directed the electronic intelligence ship USS *Liberty* to sail from the Ivory Coast to the eastern Mediterranean. Further orders on 1 June specified that, beginning 9 June, *Liberty* would operate no closer than 6.5 nautical miles from Israel’s and 12.5 nautical miles from Egypt’s coast. On 7 June, as *Liberty* neared the battle area, Admiral McDonald worried about her safety. By then, Egypt’s air force had been destroyed and Egypt’s army routed; Nasser had charged that US forces were aiding Israel. Consequently, the JRC sent the US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), a message changing *Liberty*’s closest approach to 15 nautical miles from Israel and 20 from Egypt. This message went out at 1830 Washington time on 7 June. Erroneously, the Army Communications Center sent it to a naval communications station in the Pacific.

Admiral McDonald wanted to keep *Liberty* 100 nautical miles from any coast; General Wheeler wanted to buttress denials about any US complicity with Israel. Accordingly, a decision was made to have *Liberty* stay 100 nautical miles offshore. A JRC officer promptly informed the Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR) staff, but the Deputy Chief of Staff, NAVEUR, decided to follow procedure and wait for a confirming message. This message, JCS 7347, reached USCINCEUR at 0411 local time on 8 June, then NAVEUR and Sixth Fleet at 0655.

In the early hours of 8 June, *Liberty* reached a point about 15 miles from El Arish on the Sinai coast; steaming there at “best possible speed” had brought her there one day early. At 0850 local time, three jets circled her and departed. Meanwhile, Sixth Fleet staff drafted a message to *Liberty* conveying the substance of JCS 7347. The Commander,
Sixth Fleet, who was preparing himself for a press conference ordered by Secretary McNamara to refute charges that carrier planes had joined the Israeli attack, did not release this message until 1113. After a delay for higher priority traffic, it finally went forward. Something like a tragicomedy of errors followed. The message was misrouted to a relay station in Morocco, then to one in Ethiopia, then to Greece, then back to Ethiopia.52

Liberty’s crew, who knew nothing about their changed orders, now paid a terrible price for other men’s errors. Israeli Naval Headquarters had been informed of the ship’s presence, including its name, ship type, and hull number. But at 1100 on 8 June, Liberty’s identification was inadvertently erased from the Headquarters plot table, apparently because her exact location after 0900 was unknown. Subsequently, when Israeli Naval Headquarters received reports of El Arish being shelled from the sea, three torpedo boats were dispatched; aircraft soon followed.

Israeli aircraft began strafing runs around 1400; motor torpedo boats opened fire and launched torpedoes about thirty minutes later. Liberty called Sixth Fleet for help, and at 1450 the Commander, Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT), ordered aircraft from the USS Saratoga and the USS America to her rescue. Since the carriers were south of Crete, about 500 miles from the action, their aircraft could not arrive over Liberty until 1715. But at 1614, the US Defense Attaché in Tel Aviv flashed word to the White House that Israel had admitted and “abjectly” apologized for the attack. COMSIXTHFLT recalled his aircraft. By then, 34 Americans lay dead and 171 wounded. The battered Liberty made its way to Malta for repairs.

Had Israelis deliberately attacked what they knew to be an American ship? No, if the audiotape recordings of radio transmissions made by Israeli air force pilots are a reliable guide.53 Possibly the Israeli navy, eager to prove its prowess, believed that Liberty was really an Egyptian ship. The State Department, on 10 June, formally condemned the attack as “an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life.” Under US pressure, the Israelis convened a court of inquiry; the presiding judge found no justification for any courts-martial. However, the Deputy Director, National Security Agency, privately labeled that inquiry “a nice whitewash.”54

Liberty had suffered such extensive damage that the Navy decommissioned her. In May 1968 Israel paid $3,323,500, the amount claimed by the US government on behalf of families of those who had been killed. In April 1969, after litigation, Israel paid another $3,452,275 as compensation for injuries and property losses. In December 1980, the US government accepted $6,000,000 as the final settlement for damage to the Liberty. But there has been no finality to a debate, often intensely and understandably emotional, over whether the attack was mistaken or intentional.55

The War’s Aftermath: US Alignment with Israel

Humiliating defeat left the Arabs amenable to Soviet wooing, which threatened an East-West polarization of the region. On 16 June, Secretary McNamara asked for
a Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment of how such an outcome would affect US military interests in the Middle East. He speculated, also, that polarization might lead Iran and Turkey to restrict US access rights and re-examine their roles in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and NATO. What, Secretary McNamara asked, would be the effect upon our ability to execute regional contingency plans, worldwide military communications, logistic capabilities in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and the US military posture in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean?56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered that “the most significant impact” of East-West polarization would be creation of conditions in which renewed Arab-Israeli fighting became “almost certain.” When that happened, the United States would have to choose between abandoning Israel and directly supporting her.57 Inevitably, the danger of a superpower confrontation would increase. If Soviet influence among the Arab states rose, moderate Arabs would lose their freedom of action and ability to restrain their radical brethren. The United States then would have to supply Israel with military aid, in order to counter the greater threat from a more united Arab world.

If polarization did occur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw ominous outcomes: an increase of Soviet and a decrease of US influence; loss of US bases, communications facilities, and intelligence collection sources; lengthening of the sea line of communication to Southeast Asia; probable denial of Arab oil; loss of supporting facilities for the small naval Middle East Force; and forfeiture of Libyan and Moroccan co-operation. Reassessments by Iran and Turkey might lead to denial of base and overflight rights, requests for additional aid, Turkish reappraisal of its NATO role, divisive pressures within CENTO, and the possible loss of intelligence and electronics-communications facilities. The impact upon neighboring areas might include losing the Kagnew communications relay station in Ethiopia, a greater need for bases in the Indian Ocean and facilities in South Africa, and opportunities for the Soviets to expand their influence in Africa. Admittedly, if polarization did take place, Israel probably would grant the United States base and overflight rights.58 Nonetheless, “[i]n view of the serious military implications which would probably result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should make every effort to avoid such a polarization.”59

Meantime, a Special State-Defense Study Group completed a reassessment of regional policy. The Group, which worked from March until July 1967, was directed by retired Ambassador Julius Holmes; Brigadier General Stephen W. Henry, USAF, acted as his deputy. It proposed principles for US strategy that included:

- Strengthening the northern tier of Greece, Turkey, and Iran.
- Lessening the US public role in Arab-Israeli relations, thereby reducing the abrasion in US relations with the Arabs and the opportunities for Soviet aggrandizement.
- Rebuilding relations with Arabs, concentrating on the moderate states.
- Centering US interest in the Horn of Africa upon Ethiopia, where the retention of Kagnew communications station was an overriding concern—but planning for its eventual relocation.
- Improving US military ability to operate in the area, establishing an on-call force and seeking Indian Ocean bases.
Supplying conventional arms pragmatically and flexibly, and dissuading Arabs and Israelis from acquiring nuclear weapons.60

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the Holmes study generally sound and authorized General Wheeler to say, in interdepartmental discussions, that it constituted a good starting point. They applauded its realism in recognizing that, “from a strictly objective point of view, the costs of close US association with Israel outweigh any conceivable advantages.” However, they took issue with several of the Group’s recommendations including that Kagnew station should stay open as long as possible.61

In mid-September, when the Senior Interdepartmental Group reviewed the Holmes study, some members wondered whether the strength of indigenous resistance against Soviet encroachment was being slighted. The State Department responded with a paper defining local and regional nationalisms as the greatest long-term deterrent to Soviet incursions, and economic ties with the West as next most important. But no indigenous factors, by themselves, were effective guarantees. On 30 November, the SIG accepted this assessment.62

What should be done about arms supply? On 30 June, President Johnson authorized several exceptions to the embargo: for Saudi Arabia, a $15 million sale of four C–130 transports and a $9 million weapons maintenance and repair program; for Morocco, a $14 million arms credit. Israel wanted US weapons, particularly A–4 Skyhawks, tanks, and helicopters. Secretary Rusk was sympathetic because, as he wrote Secretary McNamara on 22 July, “I do not believe we can completely rule out the possibility of an early military strike against Israel by one or a combination of radical Arab states.” He warned that the Algerians and Syrians also might launch guerrilla attacks. Secretary Rusk recommended receiving a high-level Israeli military mission, and asked for a Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate of the Arab-Israeli military balance.63

On 25 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they could find no justification for Israeli anxiety. Admittedly, a massive Soviet resupply effort had made good many Arab losses, and might replace all of the lost equipment within a year. A numerical comparison of current inventories appeared to give the Arabs a clear advantage (621 versus 209 in jet fighters, 2,505 versus 1,123 in tanks). Israel, however, possessed battle-tested personnel, a qualitatively superior air force, an excellent intelligence organization, and more defensible borders. Arab states, on the other hand, would need a minimum of eighteen months to re-create combat-worthy forces. Consequently, in the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, Israel “can defend itself in the near future against both conventional and guerrilla threats” and needed no additional equipment.64

In September, an Israeli military mission came to Washington. At the Pentagon, General Weizman argued that by January 1969 Israel would need between 225 and 250 modern aircraft, adding to its inventory 27 A–4s (beyond the 48 already scheduled for delivery) and either 50 supersonic F–4 Phantoms or 50 subsonic A–6 Intruders. Without them, he claimed, 168 Israeli planes would face about 700 Arab aircraft in 1970. Perhaps the French would sell or license Mirage IIIIs; if not, General Weizman stressed that “he
would be back again.” Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes delivered the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment that Israel could defeat any Arab attack for the next eighteen months, but he promised a speedy examination of General Weizman’s request.65

Secretaries McNamara and Rusk had recommended to the President some more easings of the regional arms embargo (e.g., release to Israel less than $1 million worth of items, resume MAP shipments to Jordan, move toward completing the cash sale of ten F–5 interceptors to Libya). President Johnson postponed these decisions, however, because Congressional debate over the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act stood at a delicate stage.66 General McConnell worried that a selective resumption of arms shipments, such as $3 million in spare parts just released to Israel, might harm efforts to renew US rights at Wheelus Air Base. If A–4s arrived in Israel before F–5s reached Libya, those negotiations could be jeopardized. He urged, therefore, that a public announcement of the F–5 sale either precede or exactly coincide with publicity about A–4 deliveries. On 22 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff so advised Secretary McNamara.67

Early in October, as Congress was completing action on foreign aid legislation, the State Department recommended delivering the 48 A–4s already sold to Israel and approving $30 million in other sales, while deferring a decision about selling the 100 APCs authorized in May. The State Department believed this would ease Israeli pressure on the administration and could encourage the French to proceed with the Mirage III deliveries. For Jordan, though, the State Department recommended deferring action on all shipments, since King Hussein’s participation in the Six Day War and his recent visit to Moscow posed major policy and public relations problems.68 President Johnson approved these recommendations on 24 October. Ambassador David Newsom was authorized to assure the Libyan government that Washington would go forward with the F–5 sale.69

Concurrently, the Senior Interdepartmental Group tasked an interdepartmental regional group with drafting guidance for regional arms supply “against the backdrop of our broadest objectives for the area.” Replying on 9 November, the group suggested an “interim” approach. First, “entice Moscow into at least a tacit agreement” on limiting arms shipments. Second, give “a minimum of equipment to our Arab friends.” Third, supply Israel with 27 A–4s (beyond the 48 already sold) “as an extra margin of safety.” All these things should be accomplished “with an eye particularly to maintaining the momentum toward an Arab-Israeli political accommodation.” The group acknowledged, however, that “we should not overestimate the leverage we gain through decisions on arms supply to Israel.”70

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged selling more A–4s to Israel unnecessary and wanted the Jordanian embargo ended before King Hussein turned to either the Soviets or radical Arab states for arms. ISA, on the other hand, argued that providing A-4s would make Israel’s request for F–4s less pressing, minimize Arab anger, and make the smallest impact upon Soviet supply decisions. As to Jordan, ISA saw little likelihood that King Hussein would seek Soviet aid while he still enjoyed US economic and political support. Congress would not permit significant sales to Jordan, and even a modest
amount of grant aid might affect worldwide MAP. Consequently, ISA recommended that arms aid should await consummation of an Israel-Jordan political agreement.\textsuperscript{71}

What political objectives were arms sales supposed to be promoting? On 19 June, President Johnson publicly described “a peace that is based on five principles”: the recognized right of national life; justice for the refugees; innocent maritime passage; limits on the arms race; and political independence and territorial integrity for all.\textsuperscript{72} Simultaneously, Secretary McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe, without regard to political factors, the minimum territory that Israel might justifiably retain as added protection against conventional and terrorist attacks. In reply, they listed: the Golan Heights; a strip of the West Bank running 10 to 15 miles west of the Jordan River; the Gaza Strip; El Auja on the Israel-Egypt border; a buffer strip around the port of Eilat; and Sharm al-Shaykh by the Strait of Tiran.\textsuperscript{73}

During July, Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin worked out two versions of a Security Council resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal in return for peace treaties and other guarantees. But in mid-September Foreign Minister Eban advised Ambassador Goldberg of more ambitious Israeli “thinking”: with Syria, some territorial adjustments; in Jerusalem, possible Muslim control over their Holy Quarter; on the West Bank, demilitarization with UN inspection and some form of economic, customs, or travel arrangements. Late in October, Mr. Eban told Secretary Rusk that Israel needed “security frontiers.” Secretary Rusk reminded him that Prime Minister Eshkol, early in June, had said that Israel held no territorial ambitions. “That,” Eban replied, “was before Syria and Jordan entered the war.”\textsuperscript{74}

The US Government would not support a United Nations resolution requiring complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. The British circulated a compromise calling more ambiguously for “withdrawal.” This was grudgingly accepted by all parties and, on 22 November, the Security Council adopted Resolution 242. After emphasizing “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” it asserted that a “just and lasting peace” should be built upon the following principles:

- Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

It further affirmed the necessity of guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways, achieving a just solution to the refugee problem, and every State’s territorial inviolability and political independence “through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.” Resolution 242 authorized the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative who would try to promote a settlement; U Thant selected Gunnar Jarring of Sweden.\textsuperscript{75}
On 30 November the Senior Interdepartmental Group concluded that, while Israel did not need any F–4s, the administration should retain an option to provide 27 more A–4s. Subsequently, after receiving an Israeli analysis, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara advised President Johnson that there was “a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.” Israel might, therefore, be informed of US willingness “to divert F–4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need.” Doing so, they hoped, would dampen Israeli opposition to Jordanian sales.76

According to the Israelis, the Arabs' inventory of 660 aircraft would grow to 924 by 1970. The Defense Intelligence Agency produced a different forecast, assuming that Israel received no additional aircraft:

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<th>1967</th>
<th>1970</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>High Performance Aircraft</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>536</td>
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<td><strong>Total Aircraft</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>160</td>
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<td>Arabs</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>788</td>
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But, just as before the war, numbers alone were misleading. DIA did not expect that Arab efforts to improve pilot training, maintenance, command and control, and air-ground cooperation would prove “markedly successful.” Furthermore, the Agency did not believe that Soviet aid was aimed at supporting another round of hostilities. Most post-war deliveries were of older MiG–17 interceptors; the number of Su–7 fighter-bombers remained below pre-war levels.77

On 15 December, during a meeting with General Wheeler, the Israeli Chief of Staff made a case for supplying more aircraft. Wheeler was not convinced. Four days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary McNamara that Israel certainly could prevail, even if France decided against delivering Mirages, for “at least the next 18 months.” Nothing, they stressed, should be done to endanger Ambassador Jarring’s mission chances for success. Increasing Israel’s inventory at this point, particularly with sophisticated F–4s, would cause the Arabs to harden their position, probably open a new round in the arms race, and possibly make the Israelis more confident and thus more intransigent. Still, the Chiefs were willing to reconsider Israeli requests in mid-1968, or even earlier if circumstances warranted, “with a view toward assuring an adequate quantitative and qualitative balance in the area.” Secretary McNamara supported selling 27 more A–4s, but he recommended against making any commitment about F–4s. These views went to the State Department and the White House.78

On 7 January 1968, President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol along with their senior advisers reviewed matters at the LBJ Ranch. Eshkol asked for 50 F–4s “as rapidly as possible.” President Johnson replied that “Phantoms won’t determine
security. . . . The big problem is how 2½ million Jews can live in a sea of Arabs.” He reminded Prime Minister Eshkol that, after the 1966 sale of 48 A–4s, Israel had agreed to look elsewhere for additional equipment. Israelis would be delighted to do so, Eshkol responded, if Americans would “give them an address.” Secretary Rusk suggested that the Israelis allow a UN force at Sharm al-Shaykh, with clear understanding that the Strait was an international waterway. Doing so would cost nothing and show that Israel did not intend to hold the occupied territories. Perhaps, Mr. Eshkol answered, but he could not return to the pre-war borders. Israelis wanted a peace treaty; they “cannot live with bazooka shots into villages and houses demolished. This is a last stand for the spirit of a nation—the Jewish spirit. This we believe in. It is our history.” Mr. Eshkol asserted that Israel felt “weaker than before the war.” General Wheeler commented that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prediction about the June war’s outcome had been accurate to within half a day, which lent “a certain support” to their view that Israel’s air force would remain superior for the next eighteen months. What the Israelis really had destroyed was Arab morale, motivation, and confidence, which could not be quickly recovered. Secretary McNamara added that selling F–4s would greatly reduce the chance of concluding a Mirage deal and might increase the flow of Soviet aircraft. Secretary Rusk suggested that a comfortable position at the UN might give Israel greater security than 50 F–4s.

At the final session, on 8 January, President Johnson stated emphatically that he was not yet prepared to make a decision about F–4s. However, he was willing to sell either 27 or 30 A–4s—and perhaps another ten if needed. Additionally, he agreed to the crash training of Israeli pilots on F–4s, so that there need be no gap between delivery and ability to operate. Three times, Prime Minister Eshkol asked that a few F–4s be delivered during 1968. President Johnson refused, saying “the Soviets and Arabs must prove the Israelis are right” before he would make a decision. But he did want to know when a decision must be made, so that planes and pilots could be available on 1 January 1970. A month later, Secretary McNamara informed the President that he could delay the F–4 decision until 31 December 1968 and still start deliveries early in 1970.79

The Israelis wanted delivery of the 30 A–4s advanced from June to January 1969. When OSD asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff how that would affect Navy capabilities in Southeast Asia, they opposed any diversions from already allocated production. Instead, deliveries of the 48 A–4s sold in 1966 should be stretched from December 1968 to May 1969, and deliveries of the 30 new planes added between June and December 1969. Otherwise, the Navy would have to send two inferior squadrons of A–4Cs to Southeast Asia and keep them there until 1970, when the diverted A–4Fs could be replaced. Secretary McNamara approved the stretch-out schedule; the Israelis evidently traded acceptance of it for an increase of the sale to 40 A–4s.80

What to do about Jordan? Of the Arab armies, King Hussein’s alone had not been rearmed. Early in November 1967, General Wheeler advised Secretary McNamara that the administration “must” promise King Hussein, during the King’s forthcoming visit, “at least a token resumption of military assistance.” The Senior Interdepartmental Group
recommended meeting Jordan's minimum requirements, but nothing more was done. On 30 December, King Hussein promised President Johnson that he would not acquire Soviet arms if he received prompt assurance that US weapons would be forthcoming. At the King's strong urging, General Khammash was invited to Washington. On 17 January, Khammash told General Wheeler that the invitation “came at the eleventh hour” because King Hussein had agreed to receive a Soviet delegation. Jordanians wanted $200 million worth of equipment, including 200 M–48A3 tanks with 105-mm guns (like Israel's) and 36 multi-purpose jets. General Khammash related how, when he and King Hussein had visited Moscow a few months earlier, a Soviet marshal handed him a pad, asked him to list all his wishes, and promised a prompt and full response. In his presentation, General Khammash cautioned repeatedly that time was running out; General Wheeler, who generally agreed with Jordanian estimates of their needs, got the “strong impression” that Khammash “is a very worried soldier.” The Director, CIA, also concluded that Hussein and Khammash, “in a mood of desperation, have for the first time engaged in a serious consideration of Soviet arms as an alternative to their destruction.”

On 6 February 1968, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk asked the President to approve an $82 million package extending over 2½ fiscal years. It would involve: shipping $10.8 million of undelivered or suspended equipment; replacing $38.3 million worth of ground force losses, including 88 M–48A1 tanks with 90-mm guns but excluding (on grounds of political sensitivity) 155-mm heavy artillery; and providing 18 F–104 interceptors followed perhaps by ten more later. The two secretaries voiced “little doubt” that, otherwise, King Hussein would accept Soviet arms. President Johnson agreed and, on 28 March, the two governments concluded a Memorandum of Understanding embodying these arrangements. So Jordan stayed on the US side.

Meanwhile, Gunnar Jarring’s peace mission made hardly any progress. Arab commandos still entered Israel from Syria and Jordan. On 21 March, Israel launched a retaliatory raid into Jordan so heavy that the Security Council, with US support, passed a condemnatory resolution. Ambassador Jarring believed that Israeli policy included territorial expansion. Soon afterward, Israel incorporated the occupied sector of Jerusalem. The Security Council, with a US abstention, censured this action.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group commissioned a new study of regional policy. In July, the Interdepartmental Regional Group circulated a draft stating that the threat of expanded Soviet influence should be countered primarily by the indigenous forces of independence and modernization. In dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, “the United States should avoid identification with the aims and policies of one side alone and should be prepared to bring pressure to bear on either or both parties as means of moving the dispute toward settlement.” Military aid policy should conform to general political strategy. Oil was important, but not even a pro-Soviet government would willingly forego its main source of income in order to serve Moscow’s strategy. Supply interruptions had rarely been permanent; coordinated actions by the Arab states and Iran appeared most unlikely.
The Joint Chiefs approved a position for General Wheeler to use at SIG meetings. Broadly, they wanted the United States to try and gain influence among Arabs (1) by bringing greater pressure upon Israel to be forthcoming in seeking a political settlement and (2) by re-establishing diplomatic relations as soon as conditions allowed. They had several specific suggestions. If the thrust or pace of Soviet efforts changed significantly, US strategy should be re-examined. Since the United States was “already over-identified with Israel,” action should be taken to improve standing with the Arabs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also predicted that American interest in access to oil could produce a situation requiring either potential or actual use of military power.

When an effort was made to have this study formally approved as policy guidance, General Wheeler and Deputy Secretary Nitze recommended merely distributing it for information. First, they argued, it did not fully analyze issues and alternatives. Second, it omitted important problems: how to deal with the USSR; the continuing arms race; growing instability in Jordan and Lebanon; and the role of military forces, particularly the Sixth Fleet. Ultimately, the study was simply circulated to posts abroad and passed along to the Nixon administration.

Early in May, at the White House’s request, General Wheeler had assessed the Arab-Israeli balance and concluded once again that Israel could defend itself for the next 18 months. A decision about furnishing high-performance aircraft, he advised President Johnson, could be deferred until late in the year. But, only a few weeks later, intelligence appraisals evidently changed the Chairman's mind. Consequently, in mid-June, General Wheeler warned Secretary Clifford that Arab capabilities could become threatening by mid-1970. Israel still could gain and retain the initiative, but not as easily as in 1967 because Arabs’ training and air defenses had improved. Thus the next Arab-Israeli air war might become a battle of attrition. General Wheeler even foresaw “an outside possibility” of the Arabs launching a successful pre-emptive attack. In either case, Israel might appeal for US assistance. “I can see a possible danger period, early in 1970, during which Israel could be under direct air threat. Therefore, a logical case can be made that there is a legitimate military need for more high-performance aircraft.”

The Foreign Assistance Act, signed by President Johnson on 8 October, contained a section stating “the sense of the Congress that the President . . . as soon as practicable . . . negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale . . . of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression.” The President promptly ordered Secretary Rusk to begin negotiations. He then told Foreign Minister Eban that back in January he had rendered a decision “in principle” to sell F–4s and planned to move ahead if Israel was helpful in seeking peace and accepted the NPT. President Johnson said that, while he was not making NPT ratification a formal condition, Mr. Eban should know “the very strong feelings in the American government on this matter.”

Nonetheless, when Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul C. Warnke presented these conditions in a series of meetings with Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin, the Israelis gave no ground. “We have not come here,” Ambassador Rabin said, “to mortgage the
soverignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 Phantoms.” When Mr. Warnke put them forward again, Ambassador Rabin “flatly and rather brutally” refused to give further assurances, claiming that the President had promised F–4s without any conditions. Finally, on 27 November, the administration settled for an assurance that Israel “reaffirms its longstanding policy...that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.”

As F–4 negotiations neared their end, Israelis started pressing for accelerated deliveries—in response, they said, to a faster buildup of Syrian and Egyptian air power. From the Arabs’ standpoint, Ambassador Rabin told General Wheeler, the summer of 1969 would be the best time for “another adventure” against Israel, since no F–4s and only a few A–4s would have arrived. Israel wanted to receive two F–4s per month, beginning in April 1969 rather than January 1970, together with a small number of US technicians. Ambassador Rabin asked for another assessment of the Arab-Israeli balance, and General Wheeler agreed to do one.

The request for faster deliveries found no favor in DOD. As an OSD official explained to the Israelis, “we are already robbing the Air Force by promising delivery starting in January 1970; we have spent money for long lead-time items, we have given tough orders, and we cannot cut the lead-time again.” General Mordechai Hod, Weizman’s successor, replied that “the aircraft would be there not to fight but simply to fly around, be seen, and thus serve as ‘deterrents.’”

On 11 December, General Wheeler supplied Secretary Clifford with his evaluation of Israel’s F–4 requirements. He could find no evidence to support Israel’s allegations of accelerated Soviet aircraft shipments. He noted, also, the US Air Force’s finding that advancing the first deliveries to April 1969 would cause an “unacceptable drawdown” of US F–4 reserves. A September start, by contrast, would have no adverse effects. Still, General Wheeler did discern an Israeli disadvantage in high-performance aircraft. In terms of combat readiness, Arab-Israeli ratios would reach 4.4 to 1 by June 1969, 5.3 to 1 by December 1969, and 4.8 to 1 in June 1970 (assuming F–4 arrivals began in January). All these exceeded what General Wheeler considered the “maximum safety level” of 4 to 1. He was willing, therefore, to begin deliveries in September 1969.

The issues involved, of course, were as much or more political than military. As General Wheeler observed, delivery even of “a few noncombat-ready, US-maintained F–4 aircraft in the spring of 1969” would be a powerful deterrent mainly because it would demonstrate the depth of US interest in Israel. But, since some Israeli leaders were calling for a US commitment to defend Israel, “we must be prudent in undertaking any action which could be construed as movement in this direction.” He anticipated, also, that sending US training teams to Israel would increase East-West polarization, inflame Arab moderates, and possibly harm chances for a political settlement. And, if Americans became involved in incidents or terrorist attacks, “the United States could become embroiled in Middle East affairs to a degree unexpected and unwanted.” At least, General Wheeler urged, send contract civilians rather than US servicemen.
The F–4 sale marked a watershed, moving the United States toward becoming Israel’s main and ultimately sole source of foreign weapons. The United States was acting openly as Israel’s patron and protector. Militarily, US sales commitments totaled 50 F–4s and 100 A–4s. Politically, President Johnson supported the Israeli position on peace negotiations. He said in a September speech that, while “boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest,” it was “clear . . . that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace.” Administration policies ran contrary to what the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly had proposed, but the consequences were precisely what they had predicted. American arms were flowing to Israel, Soviet arms to Egypt and Syria; and the Middle East stood “polarized” as never before.

Iran: Satisfying the Shah

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi stood out as America’s firmest friend in the entire area, Israel apart. But the Shah could be a prickly ally, whose regional ambition and appetite for arms grew ever greater. In 1962, Washington and Tehran agreed upon a five-year program of grant aid that included 52 F–5 interceptors. In July 1964, recognizing Iran’s improved financial condition, a Memorandum of Understanding arranged for Iran to procure $250 million worth of equipment ($50 million in cash, $200 million through sales credits) during FYs 1965–1969, including 26 more F–5s, M–60 tanks, and one battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. In 1965, the Shah conveyed his desire for up-to-date hardware, such as F–111 aircraft and Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles, both still under development. He also let Ambassador Armin Meyer know he was “increasingly unhappy with his virtually complete dependence on [the] US for military supplies. He considers there have been intolerable delays, too much back-seat driving . . . , undesirable gaps such as in air defense, and discrimination in the sense that Iran . . . is forced to pay for its supplies on virtually commercial basis while other less friendly nations receive . . . more generous terms.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended selling (1) 26 multi-purpose F–4s in lieu of the F–5s, with deliveries perhaps delayed until FY 1973, and (2) a second Hawk battalion that would become operational in 1970. In January 1966, the Shah asked that US experts carry out a study of air defense requirements. State and Defense favored sending a tri-Service team and ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to activate one; its terms of reference centered upon “maintaining the primacy of the US presence in Iran at a moderate cost to Iranian resources.” After touring Iran from 16 February until 3 March, a team headed by Brigadier General Chesley Peterson, USAF, recommended providing equipment costing $192 million. The major items are shown below:

Army: 209 M–60s to complete the approved program; 130 Sheridans to replace aging M–47s; two Vulcan battalions for short-range air defense; and a 90-day level of war reserve materiel.
Navy: 8 patrol boats and one destroyer.
Air Force: 16 F–4s, two mobile radars, and one Hawk battalion for medium-range air defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with this report. On 23 May, President Johnson approved a $200 million package of sales and credits, extending the 1964 agreement through 1970. “Most of us,” Walt Rostow warned President Johnson, “believe the Shah is foolish to spend his money this way. . . . But since he is determined to buy arms somewhere, the best we can do is put on the brakes.” The President directed that annual $50 million slices not be approved without a “searching review of Iran’s economic position.”

Soon, however, the Shah voiced dissatisfaction with some of the numbers, costs, and delivery dates. He wanted, for example, 32 instead of 16 F–4s. In fact, allegedly because of high costs, he approached the Soviets about arms purchases and professed interest in acquiring their surface-to-air missiles. That was worrisome, because Soviet SAMs would be sited at bases from which F–4s and F–5s would be operating. Communications tie-ins, involving all the elements of an air defense system, could allow the Soviets to gain extensive knowledge about US weapon systems.

How far should the Shah be accommodated? The State Department saw no need to accede completely. Yet, since the Shah publicly had committed himself to an independent procurement policy, he could not retract without some face-saving gesture. “In light of all this,” the State Department informed DOD, “we have concluded that present political hazards are great enough to call for a little ‘give’ in our military proposal. On 8 July, the United States offered to “consider” selling 32 F–4s; the Shah replied that he could not reverse his Moscow initiative without being labeled a “US puppet.”

The F–4 issue caused a split within the administration. The State Department and some officials in ISA wanted to offer 32 F–4Cs for $70 million, instead of the latest F–4Ds costing $100 million. Secretary McNamara opposed offering 32 rather than 16, apparently because the Air Force then would have to ask Congress for additional appropriations. The State Department asked Ambassador Meyer for his opinion about selling 32 F–4s, with deliveries from new production beginning in 1969. Meyer replied that, unless an “extraordinary” offer was forthcoming, the way would be opened for increased Soviet influence. The Ambassador also appealed directly to the President, asking for a generous offer to forestall a “triumph for Soviet policy in Mideast and serious setback for our interests in this area.” It would be wrong, he added, “to think Persians will not cut off their noses to spite face.”

On 1 August 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that “it is essential to maintain the primacy of US military interests in Iran and that every effort should be made to prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold through the introduction of military equipment and technicians into Iran.” They recommended waiving all research and development (R&D) costs and offering 32 F–4Cs at reduced prices, with deliveries beginning in 1968. Next day, at the Tuesday Luncheon, President Johnson decided to (1) offer 32 F–4Ds at full cost and (2) waive R&D costs for two Hawk battalions, perhaps doing the same for other weapon systems. If necessary, some items
would be taken out of inventories. Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes conveyed these decisions to the Shah, with the caveat that F-4s and other “sensitive” equipment might be withheld if Iran acquired “sophisticated” Soviet equipment. The Shah consented but wrote President Johnson that a $200 million credit, “I must say, still falls short of meeting Iran’s needs.”

In January 1967, the Shah concluded an agreement with the USSR whereby Iran exchanged quantities of natural gas for $110 million worth of armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, jeeps, and trucks. American pressure, apparently, dissuaded him from acquiring Soviet SAMs. Concurrently, the State Department issued a National Policy Paper (NPP) stating that the Shah was “openly seeking to build an ‘independent’ foreign policy posture while maintaining the fundamentals of his security relationship with us.” The NPP recommended shifting from grants to credit sales “on fairly hard terms.” The Shah's rationale for expanding military strength was “based in part on the threat of radical Arab nationalism and worry over the shift in relative power positions after the withdrawal of Britain from the Persian Gulf.” Barring an economic downturn or unexpectedly effective internal dissidence, “the Shah's confidence in his own ability to rule and manage his nation is not likely to be shaken by advice and admonition from even the friendliest of critics.”

In mid-April 1968, President Johnson prepared to receive a visit from His Imperial Majesty. Anticipating that the Shah would ask for $500 million in credits during FYs 1969–73, Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommended offering only $75 to $100 million for FY 1968. In lieu of a long-term commitment, President Johnson should promise to seek from Congress the annual credit authorizations and appropriations permitting orderly achievement of a five-year program. The President agreed and so advised the Shah, proposing $100 million in FY 1968.

Concerned about how the Persian Gulf could be protected after the British departed, the Shah suggested that US surface-to-surface missiles under Iranian control be stationed on islands in the Strait of Hormuz. The Director, Joint Staff, judged either F-4s or missile boats more suitable, advising ISA that Iranian control of the Strait would neither keep peace in the Persian Gulf nor assure its pro-western orientation. After all, if the Soviets decided to move into the Gulf, the mere presence of Iranian missiles would not deter them from doing so.

President Johnson promised the Shah a comprehensive study of this problem. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Strike Command to organize a survey team. It was headed by Major General Luther Richmond, USAF, who was the Director of Plans at STRICOM. In September 1968, the team reported that Iranian forces did need additional equipment, including two fast missile-equipped patrol ships, four shipboard ASW sonars, three shore-based radars, and aircraft identification systems aboard four ships. Aerial surveillance could be accomplished effectively and economically by C-130s which Iran already possessed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these findings which, in revised form, were forwarded to the Iranian government in January 1969.
Early in December 1968, Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda asked US officials to lift the ceiling on credit sales from $100 to $191.2 million; the increase would cover, among other things, 32 additional F–4s (raising the total to 64) and 100 more Sheridans. DOD opposed doing so, believing that Iran had overstated foreign threats and lacked the technical personnel to service extra F–4s and Sheridans. But the President did let Iran acquire 11 F–5 fighters. Circumstances—notably the huge demands of the Vietnam War and Britain's imminent withdrawal east of Suez—compelled Washington to treat the Shah as policeman of the Persian Gulf.

A Senescent CENTO

The Central Treaty Organization, intended as a buffer against Soviet expansion into the Middle East and Southwest Asia, remained hamstrung by dissension. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were treaty signatories; the United States, which was not, sent representatives to CENTO's organizations and observers to its meetings. Washington, London, and Ankara saw the Organization as an anti-Soviet alliance. Pakistan, however, hoped to align CENTO against her arch-enemy India; Iran worried about Arab subversion at least as much as Soviet aggression.

More and more, Pakistan acted as the spoke in CENTO's wheel. In July 1964, President Mohammed Ayub Khan secured his Cabinet's approval for withdrawing from CENTO; the State Department expected him to use that threat as a tactic to restrict US arms aid for India. Consequently, ISA asked the Joint Staff to assess the military implications of a Pakistani withdrawal. The Director, Joint Staff, replied that it “undoubtedly” would bring about CENTO's dissolution. As matters stood, the Organization's military effectiveness was “marginal,” but it still possessed political and psychological value. If Pakistan left CENTO, the fate of US facilities would hinge upon what kind of bilateral agreement could be negotiated. Probably, Pakistan would not press for the evacuation of intelligence facilities “as long as we are willing to pay the price through continued economic and military assistance.” While the immediate military implications of CENTO's collapse would not be “catastrophic,” a break-up could have “far-reaching implications” because “the military base which offers the best long-term possibility for collective, multilateral co-operation would be destroyed.”

The centrifugal tendencies within CENTO increased. In February 1965, the Shah told Ambassador Julius Holmes that he and President Ayub had decided to press for a decision about whether CENTO would be a true alliance with a command structure or merely a paper facade. Subsequently, the Shah went so far as to say that he and Ayub might discard CENTO and organize a regional defense grouping composed of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The annual meeting of CENTO's Military Committee was scheduled for 30–31 March in London; the Council of Foreign Ministers would convene in Tehran one week later. In anticipation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that they
saw “nothing new on the horizon this year to engage the zeal of the CENTO Military Committee in a positive way. An atmosphere of futility may, therefore, prevail . . . unless the United Kingdom and the United States can get the regional members to appreciate and acknowledge the positive values of CENTO, limited instrument though it is.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it “improbable” that Iran and Pakistan seriously contemplated secession. Steps should be taken, however, to prevent further deterioration of CENTO and to advance US interests. These included: agreeing in principle to support the need for a command structure, including a Supreme Commander; planning and conducting exercises in the area “with a more distinct CENTO flavor”; and continuing the US-sponsored Professional Military Development Program. Secretaries McNamara and Rusk supported these suggestions.113

Admiral McDonald acted as US representative at the Military Committee meeting. All members except Turkey joined in urging the Council of Ministers to agree that a command structure with a Supreme Commander was “a military necessity.” But a decision about the terms of reference (TOR) for a five-year program to develop Iranian and Pakistani ground and naval forces proved more difficult. Admiral McDonald was willing to endorse the TOR but added that his endorsement should not be interpreted as agreement to support actual implementation. His words displeased Pakistan’s representative, General Mohammed Musa, who replied that such a reservation nullified the TOR’s purpose. General Musa asserted, also, that US military assistance was a bilateral program that had no connection with CENTO. Admiral McDonald answered “rather forcefully” that CENTO’s purpose and plans were carefully considered in the shaping of US decisions about bilateral support. Thereafter, according to Admiral McDonald, General Musa refrained from “harassing” remarks and became more moderate in his views. Finally, the Military Committee referred this problem to the Permanent Military Deputies Group. Afterwards, Admiral McDonald advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “any significant progress in CENTO is contingent upon resolution of political differences which exist within the alliance and between certain members of the alliance and the United States.”114

Political differences soon intensified. September 1965 witnessed a full-scale, albeit short-lived, war between India and Pakistan; Britain and the United States suspended aid to both belligerents. When the CENTO Military Committee reconvened in April 1966, General Wheeler represented the United States. Lieutenant General Altaf Qadir of Pakistan repeatedly tried to make other members agree that the threat Pakistan faced from India properly fell under CENTO’s purview. He pointedly remarked upon “the undue haste” with which, after the 1962 Sino-Indian border clashes, “India had been rearmed by our Western Allies against the so-called Chinese threat.” The British representative, Field Marshal Sir Richard Hull, took him to task, insisting that the Chinese threat was real and dangerous. Iran’s spokesman, concerned about an Iraqi threat to his country, gave the Pakistani “lukewarm” backing. But General Tural of Turkey unwaveringly supported the US-UK position that the Sino-Soviet threat remained predominant. Still, Pakistan’s insistence that CENTO’s “Estimate of the Enemy Threat”
embraced India precluded a compromise and compelled the Military Committee to refer this problem to the Council of Ministers. The Committee also asked the Ministers to review their “political guidance,” unchanged since 1959, and then provide planners with basic assumptions for global war and lesser contingencies. But the Council of Ministers, unable to resolve either of these issues, referred both to their Deputies, who in turn became deadlocked.115

The Military Committee’s next meeting in April 1967 proved to be “one of the smoothest and least contentious to date”—and, perhaps for that very reason, not one of the more productive. Pakistan’s General Qadir argued that, since détente had reduced the danger of general war, CENTO should reorient its planning toward regional threats (i.e., India). General Wheeler answered that CENTO supplied “the protective umbrella under which the regional CENTO nations have been able to work individually toward achieving their national aspirations.” The Soviets’ capabilities were increasing, he warned, and their intention could change overnight; hence an apparent détente “can prove to be very evanescent and lead to an extremely dangerous relaxation of vigilance.” Just like last year, the Committee referred “Political Guidance” and “Estimate of the Enemy Threat” to the Council of Ministers. As to the “Co-ordination of Military Forces–Iran/Pakistan,” Iranian and Pakistani spokesmen remained “elusive” about when and whether they would report the results of their bilateral arrangements. Finally, during drafting of the press communiqué, General Qadir wanted to highlight Pakistan’s non-participation in CENTO exercises. General Wheeler and Field Marshal Hull, seeing this as “a sop for the Chinese and for home consumption,” lodged strong objections and General Qadir retreated.116

At the 1968 meeting, where Lieutenant General Stanley Donovan, USAF, as Chief, US Element, CENTO, represented the United States, nothing noteworthy occurred.117 CENTO meetings had come to serve mainly as forums at which to air grievances and delineate the differences among presumed allies.

**Summation**

The Six Day War transformed the Middle East, creating issues and problems that would long outlast those of the Vietnam War. Washington found itself unable to create effective mechanisms for promoting collective security in the region. CENTO did little more than exist, and the Shah had his own agenda. Strengthening security ties between the United States and Israel further polarized the region, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw, drawing Egypt and Syria closer to the Soviets.
Africa: Avoiding Direct Intervention

Africa ranked last on the list of regional strategic priorities during the Johnson administration. The most important US military facility was Kagnew station in Ethiopia, used for communications and intelligence collection, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to retain as long as possible. In sub-Sahara Africa, though, they could see no justification for direct military involvement. Matching the promotion of human rights against the preservation of strategic assets (e.g., space tracking stations in South Africa), the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw it as their duty to emphasize the latter. Pressuring the white government of South Africa to change its repugnant racial policies, they argued, should stop well short of enforcing sanctions through a blockade. Talk of invading Rhodesia to topple white supremacy prompted them to recommend strongly against committing US forces. Even in the Congo, where a communist-supported insurgency briefly flourished, they stressed the Europeans’ role and looked upon overt US intervention as a last resort.

Southern Africa: White Supremacy under Siege

The years 1964–65, which witnessed notable civil rights victories for African Americans in the United States, saw a sharpening of racial barriers in southern Africa. Colonial rule was ending rapidly, save for Portugal’s empire in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, but white minorities in South Africa and Rhodesia refused to relinquish their privileged status. In South Africa, whites not only repressed that country’s black majority through the rigid segregation of apartheid but also prepared to create separate “homelands” for blacks in South West Africa, which they held as a United Nations mandate. A suit to revoke that mandate had been brought before the
International Court of Justice. If the Court so ruled and South Africa refused to comply, the UN Security Council might impose sanctions.

What should the US government be prepared to do? A draft National Policy Paper, prepared by the State Department and circulated in July 1964, listed objectives in the following order of importance: avert a clash between the UN and South Africa, preferably by securing Pretoria's compliance even with a strongly unfavorable Court ruling; seek alternatives to apartheid; prevent communist infiltration; continue to operate facilities that tracked missiles, satellites, and deep space probes, even while preparing alternative sites; and maintain, as long as possible, the availability of air and naval facilities.2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who favored friendly persuasion rather than outright pressure, told Secretary McNamara that they harbored “serious reservations” about emphasizing South West Africa in the NPP. They listed US objectives in a very different order: continue South Africa’s pro-western alignment; preserve the deep space and missile tracking facilities; and sell weapons designed for defense against external aggression. The NPP, they said, should be revised to avoid implications either that the United States would support UN sanctions or that US forces might be employed to enforce Security Council resolutions. If the administration opted for graduated pressure, rather than a “dialogue of persuasion” as they preferred, the consequences could include loss of important facilities, severe degradation of South Africa’s value as a potential ally, and internal violence with opportunities for communist penetration. The draft NPP, by contrast, denied that South Africa could be of “real help” and pointedly observed that its current leaders had opposed going to war against Hitler.3

Deferring to State’s judgment, ISA concurred in giving first priority to South West Africa. Also, ISA rejected the Joint Chiefs’ argument against sanctions and intervention by concluding that the draft “does not imply any decision now.” But in November 1964, “to avoid misunderstanding and to clarify their position,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a statement that they considered the draft NPP inconsistent with their views. Beyond the objections outlined above, they took issue with its statements that South Africa had become “a major burden to the West,” that political considerations might eventually “require us to discourage, possibly even prohibit, further American investment” there, and that the United States should furnish long-term financial support to political refugees, perhaps even those with previous communist contacts. Nonetheless, in January 1965, Secretary Rusk approved an NPP that differed from the draft version only in minor details.4

The NPP tasked the Defense Department with determining the feasibility of using US forces to enforce either a decision by the International Court of Justice ending the South West Africa mandate or a UN imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. Accordingly, in April 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that liberating South West Africa would require a UN force of four divisions, three air wings, and three carrier task forces. To enforce sanctions by blockading South Africa, there might have to be 4 carriers, 24 destroyers, and 8 submarines—treble that
force to allow for rotation, if the operation continued indefinitely. In the Joint Chiefs' judgment, those operations would prove “extremely costly,” strain relations with allies, offer opportunities for communist influence to intrude, forfeit important installations and base rights (including the Azores, since Portugal would support South Africa), and produce “potential chaos throughout southern Africa.” The need to divert so much military power away from more important tasks made US participation infeasible and inconsistent with US security interests. A proper position, they contended, would be one that stood “clearly” against employing force and sanctions and “clearly” in favor of non-violent solutions. They concluded by asking Secretary McNamara to discuss the problem with Secretary Rusk and President Johnson. He, in turn, advised the State Department and the White House (1) that “formidable” difficulties would surround the mounting of any military operation and (2) that “it is at least questionable” whether any NATO allies would participate.

Actually, the possibility of intervening against white rule became most acute not over South West Africa but in Rhodesia. This British colony contained 225,000 whites (many of whom had arrived in the 1940s) and 4,100,000 blacks. When the British pressed their presumed countrymen to accept majority rule, Prime Minister Ian Smith led the fight to save white supremacy. On 11 November 1965, he declared Rhodesia independent but with continuing loyalty to the British Crown. Nine days later, the UN Security Council called upon members to sever economic relations with Rhodesia. Black African states, deeply angered by Smith’s action, demanded British military intervention.

In Washington, on 3 December, an interdepartmental group reviewed the Rhodesian situation; Brigadier General Thomas Sibley, J–5, acted as JCS representative. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said that relying on sanctions alone would likely lead to an economic morass in Central Africa, with indeterminable but certainly high costs for the United States. Instead, he argued timely use of even limited force stood a much better chance of rapid results at a much lower cost. Mr. Williams conceded that, in view of Vietnam commitments, the US contribution would be limited to providing transport aircraft. Even so, General Sibley detected within the group “a growing movement . . . to argue for US military involvement.” Assistant Secretary Williams apparently believed that US military support for British military intervention would pay tremendous political dividends, far out of proportion to the costs and risks. General Sibley disagreed.

ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess Rhodesian defense capabilities, calculate what forces were needed to overcome white resistance, and describe the military problems that might arise. Answering on 16 December 1965, they examined a British invasion from neighboring Zambia. Occupying Kariba Dam on the border and Wankie coal fields near the border would require one airborne/infantry division and three tactical fighter squadrons. Ending resistance and restoring “lawful government” would require two divisions, five squadrons, and necessary airlift. While urban whites eventually should accept British authority, rural whites probably would resort to resistance and harassment. The British would have difficulty assembling adequate forces; if they asked for US airlift,
three troop carrier squadrons could be detached from other duties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, however, that major commitments elsewhere did not permit another intervention “wherein the depth of involvement is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy.” Accordingly, they “strongly” opposed any such commitment. That possibility disappeared because London, believing that sanctions soon would succeed, refused to countenance armed intervention. The Senior Interdepartmental Group decided (1) against military involvement “in any way” and (2) that economic sanctions had reached a level beyond which further escalation would be unprofitable.9

In January 1966, Secretary Rusk warned Secretary McNamara that looming difficulties over South West Africa “may be both accelerated and aggravated” if Portugal and South Africa tried to thwart efforts at ending Ian Smith’s rebellion. Since retaining rights in the Azores and tracking stations in South Africa were major considerations in US relations with Lisbon and Pretoria, Secretary Rusk asked for an assessment of how important the Azores still were and how soon alternatives to the tracking stations could be found.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that, despite the advent of long-range transports in the 1970s and the possibility of alternative arrangements, the Azores would “continue to be of major strategic importance for the foreseeable future.” Uses included “sea and air routing, staging and support, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, communications, and intelligence.” As for South Africa, the growing emphasis on contingency planning for countries bordering the Indian Ocean enhanced her importance, because South Africa contained airfields, logistical and ship repair facilities, and a level of technical competence that could not be duplicated elsewhere in Africa. Closure of the Suez Canal would make ready access to South Africa a valuable asset. In summary, “the United States currently enjoys a certain rapport with the South African armed forces and has a continuing need to deny the communists access to this strategic location.” Again, therefore, they advocated a “firm, patient, and diplomatic dialogue” with Pretoria.10

When Secretary McNamara forwarded these views to Secretary Rusk, he added his own opinion that the Azores were neither indispensable nor merely convenient. During 1966–1970 their loss would decrease US strategic mobility by about 10 percent—although that could be offset by spending $75 million for additional aircraft and pre-positioned equipment. By 1971-80, when C–5As and Fast Deployment Logistic ships became available, offsetting costs would be only $10 million. But the Azores’ mid-Atlantic location did ensure its importance for anti-submarine warfare even after 1970. As to South African tracking facilities, Secretary McNamara claimed that all their functions could be replaced, except for intelligence collection during the atmospheric re-entry of Soviet space vehicles.11

The issue of South West Africa continued to smolder but did not ignite. Surprisingly, in July 1966, the International Court of Justice defused that powder keg by ruling that plaintiff countries had not established a legal interest entitling them to bring the case. In October, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to terminate South
Africa’s mandate. A fourteen-member committee then tried, unsuccessfully, to decide how the UN should proceed to assume direct responsibility. In December 1966 the UN Security Council imposed mandatory selective sanctions upon Rhodesia, but the CIA did not expect them to drive Ian Smith into an accommodation.\textsuperscript{12} As things turned out, Smith’s regime had thirteen more years of life.

Ship stops at South African ports might foster collaboration, but civil rights groups protested that black sailors going ashore would face racial restrictions. In 1965, the South African government would not allow racially mixed aircrews from the USS Independence to land at their bases, so a port visit was cancelled. In mid-1966 the Navy wanted the USS \textit{Franklin D. Roosevelt}, en route to the South China Sea, to put in at Cape Town for refueling and shore leave; President Johnson ruled that the carrier would stop at Rio de Janeiro instead. When the Roosevelt was returning from war duties, early in 1967, the Navy directed that sailors “go ashore at Cape Town only in connection with integrated activities of any type.” Even so, anti-apartheid protests in the United States led DOD to cancel further Port Calls in South Africa.\textsuperscript{13}

Meanwhile, early in 1967, Deputy Secretary Vance asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, to assess the minimum requirements for military facilities in South Africa and analyze alternatives. Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze replied that, while the ports were “extremely useful but not indispensable,” South Africa’s strategic location and potential wartime value had “even greater importance … than its obvious short-term utility.” Should the Suez Canal be denied (as it would be during and after the Six Day War), South African facilities would become “essential to control of vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and Far East.” Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown stated that, although tracking and testing activities would be “substantially degraded” by losing South African facilities, additional ships and aircraft could compensate for their absence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, noting the essentiality of South African facilities in wartime. Deputy Secretary Vance forwarded all their views to the State Department.\textsuperscript{14}

The NSC discussed South African issues on 13 September 1967. UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg endorsed a policy of “disengagement”—or so, at least, the JCS representative believed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reacted by advising Secretary McNamara, two weeks later, why they viewed disengagement with “serious concern.” South Africa’s domestic policies, however repugnant, were not exportable and did not directly threaten the United States. Disengagement that included self-denial of air space, ports, and repair facilities, curtailment of trade and investments, and the elimination of range and tracking sites used by NASA and DOD “would be militarily disadvantageous to the United States and would probably result in counter actions without altering basic South African policies.” They also recommended relaxing the prohibition against operational and maintenance port visits. The Roosevelt episode seemed to have set “a precedent for US disengagement from South Africa.” By contrast, since the Six Day War closed the Suez Canal, the British Navy’s use of Simonstown had risen from an average of one to ten ships monthly. Furthermore, the travel restrictions placed on US personnel were
impeding intelligence collection; a disengagement policy would aggravate that problem. They asked OSD to raise all these points with the State Department.\textsuperscript{15}

On 19 October, Paul Nitze as Deputy Secretary did transmit JCS views to State. He suggested that, since a regional reassessment was moving slowly, they might review immediately the interim policy on ship stops. In reply, Under Secretary Katzenbach expressed doubt that this single issue could usefully be separated from “the full spectrum of our policy.” If a specific issue required decision, the Senior Interdepartmental Group could deal with it. Such an issue was brought before the SIG in June 1968, when General Johnson presented General Wheeler’s recommendation that the carrier \textit{Intrepid}, en route from the Atlantic to the Pacific, stop for refueling at a South African port without allowing crew liberty. Otherwise, an oiler would have to make a 42-day round trip costing $338,000.\textsuperscript{16} Katzenbach refused, mainly on grounds that there would be “serious repercussions for us at home.”\textsuperscript{17}

At last, in November 1968, State circulated the draft of a new National Policy Paper on Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{18} Generally, it recommended pursuing a measured approach, bringing flexible pressure to bear upon white regimes, setting clear limits on US activities with them, and encouraging long-term constructive forces for change. The governing principles of US policy should include progress toward self-determination, majority rule, and equal rights for all. Specifically, for South Africa, that meant: totally embargoing sales of military equipment; avoiding “conspicuous military association,” such as visits by high-ranking officers; exchanging intelligence as long as the work could be done “discretely and without creating the impression of US collaboration”; making a resumption of routine naval calls contingent upon the ability to do so inconspicuously and with assurance that US personnel would undergo neither segregation nor discrimination; and maintaining range and tracking stations with the same assurances for US personnel, while developing alternative facilities. As for black-ruled states, “the US should be prepared to entertain requests for defensive arms if such requests cannot be met through traditional UK channels.”\textsuperscript{19}

In their critique, dated 12 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called some of these proposals unrealistic. Several, in their judgment, were not fully developed, would unnecessarily limit military activities, and could either contradict US objectives or prove counter-productive. Why, for example, would visits by high-ranking officers automatically create undesirable publicity? Such contacts served to develop intelligence collection channels, maintain a military rapport, and “exert a moderating influence whenever possible.” Therefore, they “should not be restricted as a matter of principle but considered in relation to the conditions which prevail at the time proposals are made.” As for naval visits, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it highly unlikely that South Africa would make official exceptions to apartheid. Consequently, a more flexible provision for shore leave should be made. Where alternatives were not available, aircraft carriers should be allowed to refuel at South African ports. Otherwise, a fleet oiler would have to be diverted for 45 to 50 days. Soviet naval activity in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, they continued, underscored the need for a more flexible
approach. Finally, as to the advisability of arming black-ruled nations, they warned that “defensive” weapons could fall into insurgents' hands, placing the United States in a position of seeming to support insurgencies and operations across national borders. The result could be retaliation and escalation. They urged, therefore, that such requests be considered “not as policy but on a case-by-case basis.”

Forwarding their views to State, on 24 December, ISA added criticism of its own that cut even deeper. The draft, for example, emphasized a policy of pressing for majority rule but it also recognized how slight the chances of success were. Thus State had proposed “essentially a declaratory policy”; ISA wanted to know the disadvantages as well as the advantages of it. Was the United States weakening its ability to achieve limited progress by insisting upon absolute majority rule, which was anathema to most whites? Also, since black Africans would want more than a declaratory policy, the draft should say plainly what the United States was not prepared to do, such as employing either military force or mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Moreover, while averting a racial war was identified as a major objective, no courses of action had been laid out to achieve that goal: “We should consider whether there is anything meaningful that the United States can do in this regard, or whether we should focus our efforts on avoiding US involvement in the event racial strife occurs.” When President Johnson left office, the draft NPP remained unapproved.

**Another Congo Crisis**

The Congo gained independence from Belgium in June 1960 and promptly descended into chaos. Washington worked to keep the new nation unified and non-communist, giving strong support to peacekeeping by a United Nations Expeditionary Force. The Kennedy administration backed a UN military campaign against the secessionist regime of Moise Tshombe, which controlled copper-rich Katanga province. In January 1963, Tshombe capitulated to UN unifiers.

Sadly, Robert Southey's verse about the battle of Blenheim—“But what good came of it at last?” . . . “Why that I cannot tell,” said he, “But 'twas a famous victory”—fit the Congo equally well. Victory over Tshombe brought neither peace nor unity. American officials wondered “whether the wholesale buying of political leaders is a sound basis for establishing a stable government. In the Congo there appears to have been no feasible alternative.” Early in 1964, a rebellion against the central government erupted in northern Kivu province. There was some evidence of rebels receiving Chinese communist weapons. By 30 June, when the last UN peacekeepers left the Congo, insurgents of the “Popular Army” controlled about one-fifth of the country as the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) melted away. Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula resigned in disgrace. As his successor, President Joseph Kasavubu named the once-despised Moise Tshombe. Outside the Congo, practically all black African leaders viewed Tshombe as a tool of the former colonial powers.
Washington now had to do an about-face and bolster Tshombe. Quietly, the United States encouraged Israel to train a para-commando battalion, Italy to provide aircraft and train pilots, and Belgium to train and advise all echelons of the ANC. American civilians, soon replaced by anti-Castro Cubans recruited by and under contract to the CIA, flew six T–28s. These were not enough. On 5 August, just after insurgents occupied Stanleyville, Ambassador McMurtrie Godley cabled that they might very soon control enough territory to organize a “People’s Government” which communist and radical African regimes would recognize. Next day, Secretary Rusk appealed to Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak that “you and we and all European friends must move immediately and vigorously to prevent total collapse. . . . [C]hronic instability provides fertile ground for communist infiltration, prevention of which has been cornerstone [of] our Congo policy [for the] last four years.”

In Brussels, on 7 August, Spaak and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman agreed upon steps short of open intervention. Belgium dispatched advisors and small arms. The United States sent four C–130 transports and three CH–34 cargo helicopters to the capital of Leopoldville and lent three B–26 light bombers.

The State Department solicited suggestions from DOD. On 1 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that while the Congo had little strategic value, its political worth was great since this “communist-inspired” rebellion could spread communist influence throughout central Africa. They recommended: providing materiel and financial assistance to supplement Belgian and other Western support; urging the Belgians to increase their efforts “and to assume responsibility for the effective performance of Congolese security forces, including mercenaries”; backing the Belgians with limited numbers of US advisers; encouraging “the concept of intervention by a Western and African coalition,” if Belgium failed to assume responsibility for effective performance by the Congolese; and accelerating psychological operations and exerting diplomatic pressure.

Should these steps fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, Washington must choose between pursuing US objectives and avoiding increased involvement. Direct US military intervention could preserve a pro-Western government but would provoke severe international reactions and might lead to long-term American involvement. Putting tactical advisers in the field might succeed at less cost but risk what they called “another Vietnam.” (At that moment, there were nearly 20,000 US advisers in South Vietnam) So, at this point, they opposed committing any US combat forces. But, if intervention did become necessary, “it should be executed without hesitation and with adequate forces to ensure rapid success.” A permanent solution for the Congo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff added, required effective diplomatic action to deny the rebels safe havens in neighboring countries.

Already, though, the military tide had started turning in Tshombe’s favor. Colonel Frederic Van de Waele, a Belgian officer acting as Tshombe’s military adviser, planned to attack Stanleyville with four separate columns. On 30 August, Tshombe’s mercenaries recaptured Albertville to the south.
As the mercenaries advanced, rebels in Stanleyville announced that the Europeans and Americans there would be held hostage until Tshombe stopped using mercenaries. On 4 September, at State’s request, Deputy Secretary Vance asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a plan for rescuing about two dozen Americans in Stanleyville. They in turn contacted General Paul D. Adams, USA, who as Commander in Chief, Strike Command, bore the responsibility for planning operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. The JCS recommendation of 12 September, based upon General Adams’ reply, outlined an overt course of action and a covert one. In the overt operation, two rifle companies supported by eight fighters would seize Stanleyville airfield in a parachute/air-landing assault, rescue the hostages, and withdraw. In the covert operation, 100 soldiers carried in two C–46s and four helicopters would make secret night landings, infiltrate to the hostage sites, overpower the guards, and bring liberated hostages to a pre-selected aerial evacuation point. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that either plan offered “a reasonable chance of successfully rescuing the personnel unharmed” provided that: the hostages’ precise location was known beforehand; complete surprise was obtained; and the commander was authorized to use whatever force proved necessary. A covert operation appeared to offer the best chance, but it should be backed up by pre-positioning the overt force.28

Early in October, rebel broadcasts threatened death to American hostages. The Joint Staff instructed General Adams to alert a rescue force—two battalions were now proposed—and plan upon using either British-owned Ascension Island in the South Atlantic or Wheelus Air Base in Libya as the forward staging area. Monrovia, Liberia, could be either the alternative site or used in conjunction with them. However, on 13 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Adams that inadequate facilities at Ascension and Monrovia made them last resorts. Yet, since basing and overflight rights in Africa might prove unobtainable, he should prepare a plan using Ascension alone.29

Meantime, the United States loaned Tshombe seven B–26 light bombers. Rebels reacted by threatening to execute one hostage for every Congolese killed by air attacks. Accordingly, on 15 October, Washington ordered a suspension of US-supported air operations. Eight days later, the State Department authorized resumption but banned (1) flights within 25 miles of Stanleyville and (2) air strikes closer than five miles from the outskirts of any large or sensitive urban area or within two miles of any other urban area.30

On 27 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that State’s restrictions were “militarily unwise,” establishing a political precedent in which they saw “inherent dangers” for giving adequate support to US policies and objectives world-wide.31 Succumbing to threats of reprisals might endanger the safety of Americans around the world. In their judgment, these restrictions would preclude effective air operations. To exempt an area from attack merely because it was urban—a position that went beyond the requirements in the Law of Land Warfare—“would impose a crippling degradation upon one of the vital components of national military strength.” In the Congo, cities and towns were “the keys to population and resource control”; effective
use of US-supported air power was “vital” for operations aimed at ending the rebellion. Restricting urban attacks, in their judgment, “will result in a prolonged period of warfare with an uncertain outcome and will aggravate a broad spectrum of related factors inimical to US national interests.” Moreover, since Tshombe had a T–6 squadron flown by mercenaries, full enforcement of any restrictions seemed doubtful. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that their views be provided to President Johnson. However, on that very same day, the Congo Country Team advised that these restrictions were “acceptable operationally.” Consequently, they remained in force.

Early in November, as mercenaries approached Stanleyville, the rebels announced that hostages’ lives could no longer be guaranteed. On 8 November, Foreign Minister Spaak came to Washington with a proposal to rescue the hostages by using Belgian paratroopers flown in US transports. The administration agreed. Since, from this point forward, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned mostly as a communications channel, the rest of the story can be quickly told.

Officers from Headquarters, US European Command, collaborated with Belgians in planning a rescue mission. A Joint Staff officer flew to Brussels and monitored their work. Operation DRAGON ROUGE was promulgated by General Lyman Lemnitzer, USCINCEUR, on 14 November. Three days later, US C–130s began moving a Belgian paratroop battalion to Ascension Island. On 24 November, at 0600 local time, twelve C–130s brought the Belgians over Stanleyville airfield. After seizing it, paratroopers moved toward the Victoria Hotel where some 300 people (including 17 Americans) were held. Rebels began shooting the hostages, killing 33—two of them Americans—before being driven away. About 1,500 foreign nationals were evacuated from Stanleyville; mercenaries entered the city on 26 November. A similar mission to Paulis over 26–27 November, DRAGON NOIR, evacuated 375 people—although 22 hostages were killed before the paratroopers arrived.

At the United Nations, spokesmen for black African states denounced the rescue missions as propping up Tshombe and colonialism. In mid-December, they began pressing a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of mercenaries. The State Department, fearing that Tshombe’s situation would worsen, favored an immediate cease-fire. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 December, objected that withdrawing mercenaries would work to the rebels’ advantage—an advantage that would be compounded if radical African states continued supplying the rebels with arms and advisers. Eventually, under such conditions, the United States would either have to accept a communist victory or resort to “extensive US military involvement.” They worried, too, that a cease-fire agreement might give the rebels recognition and legitimacy. They recalled, also, how radicals and communists had taken advantage of cease-fires in Laos, Vietnam, and Yemen. Negotiations, therefore, should be undertaken “against a backdrop of military advantage.” That meant strengthening the Tshombe government’s military base, making enough force available to end “any serious rebel activity,” stopping arms traffic to the rebels, closing cross-border sanctuaries, establishing effective inspection machinery in the Congo and surrounding countries, and coordinating
political strategy with Brussels and Leopoldville. ISA agreed and so advised the State Department. Yet, on 30 December, the UN Security Council adopted by vote of 10-0 a resolution requesting a cease-fire, withdrawal of mercenaries, and an end to foreign intervention.36

Concurrently, General Adams sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff what he called “clear-cut proof” that communists were trying to overthrow the Congolese government, “which is the key to the economic and political situation in Central Africa.” He rated Central Africa as “a Cold War battleground second in intensity only to Vietnam.” Unless changed, the trend of events “will inexorably lead to a Communist-dominated Central Africa within the next few years.” General Adams offered a series of vigorous countermeasures.37

On 31 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded General Adams’ appraisal to Secretary McNamara. They cautioned, though, that the actions he proposed would conflict with the administration’s aims of limiting US involvement in the Congo, keeping the Cold War out of Africa, and placing principal reliance upon the former colonial powers. However, they continued, General Adams’ proposals called for answers to important questions. First, should the United States concentrate its resources to support pro-Western governments? Second, in dealing with key countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, and South Africa, what policies and actions should be changed to protect US interests in Africa generally and the Congo particularly?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an urgent, intensive high-level review of strategy and policy toward all of Africa. As a “point of departure,” they put forward several propositions. First, since Southeast Asia and Latin America deserved higher Cold War priorities, other Western governments must be enlisted to assist African nations. Second, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa should be offered political and economic inducements to moderate their racial policies. Third, Western assistance should gradually be concentrated in friendly countries. Fourth, Western powers should be prepared to support insurgencies within radical states that interfered in other countries’ affairs. Fifth, the feasibility and desirability of blocking the Congo’s borders should be studied. In one area, though, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unwilling to wait for a review. Immediate action should be taken to arrest the deterioration of Tshombe’s air capabilities.38

On 14 January 1965, Ambassador Godley asked that Tshombe’s US-supported aircraft be allowed to attack clearly identified targets of military importance, except where hostages might be held. The Defense Department strongly supported him. The State Department lifted restrictions on 19 February but ordered that “great care” be taken to avoid strafing villages within ten miles of the Ugandan border, so that British efforts to persuade Uganda to seal her border would not be jeopardized. Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded Secretary McNamara that restrictions had been imposed to protect hostages who were now free; continuing them could jeopardize Tshombe’s success and spread the conflict into other countries.39
In mid-February, the Congolese Army started using napalm. Then Tshombe, under strong US pressure, promised to prohibit its use. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 March, criticized restrictions upon “conventional air support weapons” as militarily unwise and claimed that napalm could give Tshombe’s government “an element of superiority” over the rebels. But the State Department kept the napalm restriction in force. According to Under Secretary Harriman, reactions among black African governments would favor the rebel cause and lead radical states to harden their support for the insurgents.40

General Adams proposed creating a Central Government force that included 20 Congolese battalions, a mercenary special brigade, two tactical and air transport squadrons, and 75 river patrol boats. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended using General Adams’ plan as a framework. Meantime, they said, Belgium and other European powers ought to “shoulder the burden” because of their vested interest in Africa and the growing US commitment in Vietnam. The United States should refuse responsibility for additional tasks in the Congo but consider providing “minimum materiel requirements which exceed Belgian capabilities.”41

At Brussels, on 26 March 1965, Foreign Minister Spaak and Under Secretary Harriman agreed upon an allotment of responsibilities. The United States would make available aircraft, vehicles, and communications equipment. Additionally, in Leopoldville, a US-Belgian-Congolese logistics group would oversee the purchase and utilization of military supplies. First priority for training and equipment support would go to units operating in the rebellious northeastern Congo.42

After the Stanleyville operation, Moscow decided to give the rebels more direct military aid. Fidel Castro sent a small group of volunteers led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, a dedicated revolutionary. But by mid-1965, in the northeast, mercenaries had cut off the rebels from their sanctuaries and supply sources in Sudan and Uganda. Guevara and his Cubans reached the last area held by the rebels, Fizi-Baraka along the western shore of Lake Tanganyika, which also was the Congo-Tanzania border. In October 1965, mercenaries began a final push against Fizi-Baraka. Guevara and his Cubans withdrew to Tanzania in November, effectively marking the insurgency’s end.43

In November, also, General Joseph Mobutu took control of the Central Government by a bloodless coup. The next crisis began during July 1967. Tshombe, now an exile under sentence of death, was kidnapped and held in Algeria; the remaining 230 white mercenaries rebelled and 1,000 disgruntled Congolese soldiers joined them. Mobutu appealed for US military support. “We must keep Mobutu in power,” Under Secretary Katzenbach told the NSC, “because there is no acceptable alternative to him.” The United States dispatched three C–130s which flew 180 missions ferrying troops and supplies. The last C–130 left in December, after the mercenaries had retreated into Rwanda and Mobutu regained full control.44 There followed in the Congo a long run of notoriously bad government.

In appraising the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what stands out is the near-irrelevance of conventional military advice. Their recommendation about how to rescue
hostages, for example, was adopted without having a well of experience upon which
to draw. The Congo became a theater of para-military operations, where mercenary
activities provided the margin of victory.

What Price Kagnew?

Ethiopia mattered to the United States mainly because Kagnew station, near Asmara
in Eritrea, served as an important communications and intelligence collection
facility. It enjoyed unique climatic and topographical advantages. Washington had to
decide how much “rent,” in the form of grant aid, Kagnew was worth. Matters were
complicated by border clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia, and by Somalia's turn-
ing to the USSR for arms. In the Horn of Africa, Soviet-American competition became
a real possibility.

In 1953, the United States acquired a 25-year lease to operate Kagnew station; in
exchange Ethiopia began receiving $5 million annually in grant aid. Late in 1963, as
border clashes between Ethiopia and Somalia intensified, the Johnson administration
raised the MAP ceiling to $10 million. In July 1964, after consulting General Adams
and Ambassador Edward Korry, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara
that a “prompt and substantial” aid increase was justified by (1) Ethiopia's importance
to US politico-military interests, (2) a recent deterioration in US-Ethiopian relations,
and (3) Sino-Soviet progress in influencing East African countries. They recommended
approving in principle a six-year aid plan averaging $15 million annually, aiming for a
40,000-man army plus a “minimum but effective” air force.

Evidently, Somalia would be receiving MiG-15/17 fighters from the Soviets. To
offset this advantage, Washington had promised to provide Ethiopia with twelve F–5
interceptors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while labeling the MiG threat “more psycho-
political than military,” urged an acceleration of deliveries so that eight would be
delivered during 1966 and the remaining four in 1967. On 18 December 1964, Secretary
McNamara approved a $15 million MAP for FY 1966 so that seven F–5s would arrive
in CY 1966. Because of demands elsewhere, though, he decided against approving a
six-year aid plan.

A National Policy Paper on Ethiopia, circulated by the State Department early in
March 1965, incorporated JCS views. Previously, the primary aim had been retaining
Kagnew at the lowest possible cost. Now, the NPP said, wider interests should be taken
into account: Ethiopia's moderating role in Africa, and her willingness to participate
in collective security (e.g., the Korean War and Congo peacekeeping); the importance
of retaining the Ethiopian military's confidence, by helping build effective forces; and
the threat to Ethiopia's stability, stemming from military shortcomings shown during
recent clashes with Somalia. So, instead of waiting until Addis Ababa pressured
Washington into action, the administration would be willing to meet its military com-
imtments at a rate determined by Ethiopia's ability to use and maintain equipment.
The Soviets provided Somalia with five MiG–15s, 60 T–34 tanks, between 130 and 150 armored personnel carriers, 126 pieces of antiaircraft artillery. Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, who had only 40 light tanks, between 26 and 39 APCs, and nine antiaircraft guns, told Ambassador Korry that he “wonders what US-Ethiopian relationships are when, after 13 years of US aid, he observes what the Somalis receive from the Soviets in a few months.” Ambassador Korry, in turn, warned Washington of a “gloomy outlook” for US-Ethiopian ties. The administration decided that, for “over-riding political reasons,” Ethiopia’s claim to 14 rebuilt M–41 light tanks would come ahead of all other MAP recipients except Vietnam.49

On 24 May 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara of developments that gave rise to “considerable concern.” Communist China, reportedly, had offered Ethiopia $25 million worth of grants and credits in return for diplomatic recognition. As anti-western influence increased, US interests would come under “increasing jeopardy.” Kagnew’s availability, already “tenuous,” might well be endangered unless Ethiopia’s confidence could be restored “through expeditious and forthright demonstrations of US sincerity.” They proposed, among other things, increasing MAP levels and accelerating efforts to determine and initiate remedial actions. ISA communicated this concern to the State Department. A few days earlier, in fact, Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman had an audience with Haile Selassie that focused on postponing recognition of China.50

Concurrently, General Adams suggested that a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding, similar to one concluded with Iran in July 1964, would stabilize MAP and eliminate much Ethiopian dissatisfaction. The J–5 disagreed, noting that the Understanding with Iran had not eliminated MAP’s “open-ended” aspects, because the Shah later sought “massive” changes. Nonetheless, writing to Secretary McNamara on 30 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that General Adams’ proposal receive consideration. While recognizing its disadvantages, they noted the importance of MAP in US-Ethiopian relations. The State Department, though, saw a serious danger of increased Ethiopian demands. It recommended, as the NPP specified, making deliveries contingent upon Ethiopians’ ability to use and maintain the equipment involved.51

Early in 1966, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa proposed keeping annual MAP at $15 million, limiting the Ethiopian army to 36,000 men (reorganized into eight brigades of improved efficiency), and providing transport aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff generally agreed, adding that selection of a transport (either C–130s or C–119s with jet pods) should await further tests. In February 1967, with Haile Selassie about to arrive in Washington, Assistant Secretary (ISA) John McNaughton described the US objective as saying “no” to the Emperor’s demands while preserving good relations with him. Haile Selassie highlighted the “massive” Somalia buildup and asked for $16.7 million in military aid. For FY 1967, MAP did rise to $16.5 million, providing four helicopters52 and 17 light tanks along with expedited deliveries of trucks, APCs, and F–5s. Then moderates came to power in Somalia and the tensions with Ethiopia eased. Consequently, during FYs 1968–1969, annual MAP declined to $12 million.53
During 1965–66, the Kagnew staff grew from 2,500 to 3,000 personnel; Defense asked State to approve acquiring another 100 acres. However, Under Secretary Katzenbach worried that Ethiopians interpreted growth as an index of Kagnew’s importance to the United States. That being so he asked, can “the price of our tenure involve us more deeply in the Horn of Africa than our vital interests warrant.” He questioned if visible expansion could be avoided, and perhaps some of our personnel be withdrawn? After consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary McNamara replied that he saw no way to make substantial reductions without sacrificing “some significant capabilities and products.” For a number of the most important missions, relocations were technically possible. Such moves, however, would incur operational and other costs without making Kagnew much less conspicuous. He added, though, that 100 acres would be DOD’s last request, and that manning levels should not increase more than 300 during the next five years.54

Under Secretary Katzenbach reopened the issue in May 1967 because, he advised Secretary McNamara, estimates about stability in the Horn of Africa over the next few years had become “considerably more pessimistic.”55 Ambassador Korry doubted whether the Ethiopian government could maintain “some semblance of order” in newly rebellious Eritrea for more than five years. Haile Selassie’s death, which could not be far distant, would provoke “severe disturbances throughout the Empire.” Accordingly, Mr. Katzenbach favored freezing the US presence at Kagnew and planning for an orderly, phased withdrawal as soon as possible. Deputy Secretary Vance asked for opinions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency.56

Answering on 13 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a withdrawal plan should be prepared but warned that reducing, relocating, or eliminating missions at Kagnew “would seriously prejudice US security interests and would seriously reduce US military capability in the Middle East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean areas.” The Director, National Security Agency, also recommended retaining Kagnew “as long as possible.”57 Still, work upon a relocation plan did begin.

In August 1967, the Eritrean situation grew so uncertain that all construction at Kagnew stopped. A Special National Intelligence Estimate, issued in April 1968, predicted that the insurgency would persist but the government probably could keep it “from getting out of hand” during Haile Selassie’s lifetime. The Emperor’s death, however, would “usher in a period of great uncertainty in Addis Abba, which could be prolonged and violent.” A relocation plan circulated for review. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 23 July 1968, advised Secretary McNamara that the political situation appeared “favorable to continued US use of Kagnew Station.” They also observed that recent developments—the pending loss of facilities in Pakistan, restraints against additions in Iran, probable major cutbacks in Turkey, proposals to consolidate signal intelligence sites, and general reductions in overseas expenditures—restricted the alternatives to Kagnew and so required revisions to the relocation proposals. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would agree to abandon Kagnew only under strong pressure from Ethiopia “or
if other severe contingencies arise.” A unilateral withdrawal, in their judgment, would be imprudent and present “significant political, financial, and technical problems.”

Deputy Secretary Nitze informed General Wheeler and Under Secretary Katzenbach that duplicating Kagnew’s facilities would cost $116 million and take four years. The difficulties of relocation would have to be weighed against the uncertain political situation in Ethiopia. When the Defense Communications Satellite System became operational in 1971—an overly optimistic forecast, as it turned out—a substantial reduction of Kagnew’s staff and acreage should become possible. In the meantime, DOD intended to eliminate non-essential construction projects and personnel.

In retrospect, $15 or $16.5 million for annual “rent” made Kagnew a bargain that could not last. Haile Selassie’s ouster in a coup by left-wing officers, in 1974, hastened the American exit from Kagnew station and allowed the Soviets entrée. The Horn of Africa had become another area of Cold War competition.
Statesmen face few tasks more difficult than that of maintaining close ties with two nations that look upon each other as deadly enemies and press claims over the same territory. Yet, in the Indian subcontinent, this was precisely what US policymakers were trying to do. The 1947 partition of British India into a Hindu India and a Moslem Pakistan produced scenes of expulsion and massacre that left enduring enmity on both sides. The subsequent partition of predominantly Moslem Kashmir in 1949 gave India most of the territory and created an apparently insuperable barrier against reconciliation. Predictably, US military assistance to Pakistan, begun in 1954, annoyed the Indians. Then US military aid to India, begun after the Sino-Indian border battles of 1962, infuriated the Pakistanis. Why, they asked, was Washington treating neutral India the same way as ally Pakistan? After all, Pakistan belonged to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO); it acted as a link in the chain of containment around the Soviet Union and China; and it permitted an important intelligence collection facility to operate at Peshawar. US officials sought, with scant success, to persuade Indians and Pakistanis that communist expansion constituted the real threat to their security.

**War over Kashmir**

In May 1964, the State Department circulated National Policy Papers for India and Pakistan that listed the “most compelling” requirements for US policy as follows: expand influence with India, aiming to bolster Indian resistance to Chinese pressure while increasing US ability to affect Indian behavior; maintain a “sufficiently amicable” relationship with Pakistan, in order to preserve strategically important military ties;
prevent Indo-Pakistani hostilities; and finally, contain communist efforts—by Moscow towards India and by Peking towards Pakistan—to establish greater influence in the subcontinent. An “even-handed” approach offered the best chance of achieving these aims. Broadly, military assistance for both countries must continue, balancing India’s increasing military and economic strength by additional assurances to Pakistan. Specifically, India and Pakistan each should be offered grant aid programs involving about $50 million annually. Also, the United States should participate with Pakistan in planning against all contingencies, including the threat from India—and offer to join with India in anti-Pakistani planning.¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff lodged three major objections. First, they wanted to include an objective of “promoting India’s acceptance of interdependence among Free World nations,” as opposed to her current policy of non-alignment. Second, references to US participation with Pakistan in anti-Indian planning and vice versa should be deleted. Third, Pakistan should be offered long-term sales credits, thus balancing a recent offer to India. The final National Policy Papers, approved in November 1964, rejected their first suggestion but accepted their second and to some extent their third. The Pakistan NPP recommended providing about $40 million in annual grants and considering additional credit sales. The India NPP stated that the administration should be ready to provide $50 million in grants and $50 million in credits annually during FYs 1965–69, provided that India’s arms purchases from other countries did not exceed about $285 million yearly.²

In September 1964, India decided to purchase MiG-21s from the USSR and to develop her own MiG production lines. In January 1965, India’s Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan asked for US assistance in acquiring between three and six squadrons of F–5 interceptors. Sensing an opportunity to limit MiG acquisitions and restructure India’s air force, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. Answering in April, they noted that India hoped to deploy 45 squadrons while JSOP-70 proposed only 33. They outlined a plan, staying within JSOP-70’s guidelines, by which India would acquire 304 aircraft between FY 1965 and FY 1970. It included 64 F–5s and 64 MiG–21s. Before any F–5s were made available, however, India would have to accept this plan in principle.

Concurrently, from New Delhi, US Ambassador Chester Bowles urged efforts to bring about “a more intimate but highly confidential relationship” between the United States and India, which would include a study of ways to contain a Chinese attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no merit in his suggestion. As they advised Secretary McNamara, a decision to initiate either US staff studies or discussions with the Indians “would have to be based on over-riding political considerations since there is no pressing military need for them at present.” Until an opportunity appeared for altering the existing situation “markedly in favor of the United States,” they recommended avoiding any broadening of defense commitments to India and adhering to the current guidelines on military assistance.³

By this time, Indo-Pakistani tensions were nearing the flash point. Kashmir provided the combustibles for an explosion. Late in 1964, Indian Prime Minister Lal B. Shastri
precipitated a confrontation when he declared Kashmir’s annexation to be “complete, final, and irrevocable,” a position totally unacceptable to Pakistan. Beginning in February 1965, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed in the Rann of Kutch, bordering the Arabian Sea. On 30 June, they stopped fighting and agreed to binding UN arbitration. In mid-July, without publicity, Secretary McNamara deferred all remaining portions of FY 1966 MAP for India and Pakistan. Believing that Pakistan had done much to provoke fighting in the Rann, President Johnson began an “orchestrated” campaign to convince Pakistan of US dissatisfaction with its behavior. Further, on 10 August, he directed that alternatives to the intelligence facilities in Pakistan be developed “as a matter of urgency.”

Starting on 5 August, large numbers of Pakistani guerrillas entered Kashmir, trying to incite a Moslem revolt. India retaliated with cross-border raids. Early in September, a Pakistani armored brigade equipped with MAP-supplied M–47 tanks entered Kashmir. India bombed targets in Pakistan and struck back in the Punjab; a full-scale war began. Consequently, on 7 September, the United States suspended military assistance shipments to both countries.

Assistant Secretary McNaughton asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess the relative strategic importance of India and Pakistan and to appraise the implications of possible Chinese intervention against India. Answering on 18 September, they said that the whole subcontinent, not India or Pakistan alone, possessed major strategic importance because: it offered possible sites for bases that would be useful in a war against China and, to a lesser degree, against the Soviet Union; its loss would jeopardize control over air and sea lanes through the Indian Ocean; and the potential strength of India and Pakistan “could offer a meaningful deterrent against communist aggression” in the subcontinent. Throwing support to either nation would harm US objectives “in all of the forward defense countries.”

As for possible Chinese efforts to help Pakistan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suspected that these would be limited to “aggressive patrols or small-unit border incursions.” They stipulated that, as a condition for aiding India against China, the United States should insist upon India (1) accepting a cease-fire with Pakistan as preliminary to a return to the situation existing before the war and (2) agreeing to resolve the long-standing Kashmir dispute through self-determination. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated an even-handed approach. To side with Pakistan would drive India firmly into the Soviet camp; to support India would prompt Pakistan to seek closer ties with China and probably to withdraw from CENTO and SEATO. Continuation of the war would erode both countries’ power and prejudice the US objective of a strong, healthy subcontinent. Consequently, the administration should develop “a carefully calculated balance of military and economic sanctions and/or inducements in order to persuade both India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire.”

The war, meanwhile, was not going well for the Pakistanis, who lost a fair part of their tank force. So, on 16 September, China took a hand. Charging India with repeated “military aggression and provocation,” including the heinous crime of yak-stealing,
China demanded that Indians withdraw within three days from certain disputed border areas of Sikkim. The next day, President Johnson decided to give strong backing for UN cease-fire efforts and to develop contingency plans but avoid preparatory military moves. Ambassador Bowles passed along an Indian request for covert military consultations; he was advised that the administration was not prepared to do so. On 18 September, though, ISA asked the Joint Staff to examine possible responses. Five days later, when General Wheeler provided a preliminary reply, the crisis atmosphere had dissipated.\(^9\) China first extended its deadline, then announced that India had complied with its demands—something the Indians denied having done. More important, on 22 September, India and Pakistan accepted a UN cease-fire resolution. Assistant Secretary McNaughton advised the State Department that, while he favored an even-handed approach, a cease-fire that did not lead to an India-Pakistan détente might force the United States to choose between the two countries. General Wheeler, in his preliminary reply, also restated the Joint Chiefs’ concern about giving aid without getting compensating actions by India that would promote unity and harmony on the subcontinent.\(^10\)

ISA actually was moving away from an even-handed approach, proposing that annual MAP for Pakistan be cut to about $25 million while India would continue receiving $50 million in grant aid and up to $50 million more for sales credits.\(^11\) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposing any such change, “strongly” reaffirmed their view that the two countries’ relative importance could not be considered apart from US security interests in the subcontinent and adjacent areas. On 12 October, for Secretary McNamara’s edification, they laid out some “important factors” that merited consideration:

1. “Possible reactions throughout the Moslem world, particularly in Iran and Turkey, should Pakistan be forced into the communist camp by US support of India.”
2. “The extreme importance to US national security of US facilities extending from Pakistan through Iran, Turkey, and Cyprus.”
3. “The improbability that India will agree to the same degree of cooperation with the United States which Pakistan until recently has provided.”
4. The probable adverse adjustments in “Eurasian political/military orientation” should Pakistan be “lost to the West.”\(^12\)

Pakistan Slips Away

The Soviets hosted a summit meeting between Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan and India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. At Tashkent, on 10 January 1966, the two leaders agreed to withdraw to pre-hostilities positions and abjure the use of force over Kashmir. Hours after signing the Tashkent agreement, Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.\(^13\) Indira Gandhi, who was the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, became prime minister.
In February, President Johnson authorized cash and credit sales of non-lethal equipment to both countries, on a case-by-case basis. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow asked State and Defense to analyze alternative approaches. In June, ISA circulated a paper suggesting that, under certain conditions, the United States should be prepared to pursue “discriminatory” aid programs. Upon review, J–5 was disturbed to find “the thread of a new US pro-India policy woven throughout” ISA’s paper. Accordingly, on 15 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that they rejected the thrust of ISA’s argument. Policymakers, they said, must recognize that “what the United States may consider as illogical or irrational attitudes and policies on the part of India and Pakistan are, in fact, the controlling elements upon which US actions will have to be predicated.” These attitudes and policies included: Pakistan’s fear that India’s fundamental goal was the conquest of Pakistan; India’s intransigence over Kashmir, fearing to lose face before the world; Indian and Pakistani maintenance of armed forces that exceeded their legitimate defensive needs and which neither country could afford; and refusal by both nations to recognize the great advantages of cooperation.

Again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that US actions in the subcontinent would affect US efforts elsewhere. Aid for India that drew Pakistan closer to China would be “self-defeating,” they said, because there would be a concomitant weakening of SEATO and CENTO and loss of US special facilities in Pakistan. Such setbacks would outweigh any gains for Washington and New Delhi, particularly if India became encircled by an alliance between Pakistan and China dominated by Peiping. Accordingly, they proposed: allowing cash and credit sales, to both countries, of spare parts for lethal as well as non-lethal items; offering grant aid training programs to both nations; and resuming grant aid selectively, for projects that served US security interests. Also, India and Pakistan should be urged to minimize their force structures and military spending. Once agreement was achieved, the United States should be prepared to discuss force modernization with both governments.14

The arms race, however, continued with India moving to acquire Soviet and British weapons while Pakistan turned to China. In February 1967, the Senior Interdepartmental Group recommended a policy aimed at limiting arms purchases by both nations, restraining military confrontation, and encouraging the highest priority for agricultural and economic development. The main steps suggested by SIG were: withdrawing the Military Assistance Advisory Group-Pakistan and the US Military Supply Mission India, arranging limited alternatives; preventing sales by third countries of US-produced equipment, except when so doing would contribute to arms limitation; and considering, case-by-case, selling spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment where there was a “clearly established critical need” and where such sales would contribute to arms limitation and maintenance of a “reasonable military balance between the two nations.” On 30 March, President Johnson approved these recommendations.15

Unfortunately, that approach to limiting arms acquisitions did not work. In June 1967, Washington endorsed Britain’s sale to India of 24 Hawker-Hunter aircraft, after New Delhi gave explicit assurances that India would not buy any aircraft from the Soviets.
Instead, India did contract for 200 Soviet Su-7s; Pakistanis then went to Moscow and tried to arrange a sale.\textsuperscript{16}

The Pakistanis were also badly in need of tanks to replace their 1965 losses. In April 1967, they approached West Germany about buying 100 M–47s. Since those tanks were MAP-supplied, Washington's permission was needed. Six months later, Pakistanis raised their requirement to 200. A small complication lay in US suspicion that Pakistanis also were ordering tanks from China. A large complication lay in Pakistan's implicit effort to link the approval of tank purchases with renewal of the lease on the US facility at Peshawar. The administration decided not to recognize any linkage, fearing “intolerable pressures . . . for more and more hardware.” With US blessing, Pakistan approached Italy, Belgium, and Iran about acquiring M-47s.\textsuperscript{17}

On 22 December 1967, during a brief meeting with President Ayub at Karachi airport, President Johnson promised to look into the possibility of replacing Pakistan's M–4s of World War II vintage with M–47s. On 28 February 1968, Johnson agreed to notify Italy of US approval for selling 200 M–47s. Ayub was informed, but to no avail. On 6 April, the Government of Pakistan communicated its decision to terminate the Peshawar agreement, requiring that the facility close by 17 July 1969. Significantly, Foreign Minister Yusuf told the US ambassador that Pakistan was “now normalizing friendly relations with all major powers,” and that Peshawar “has been and continues to be a serious liability” in relations with China and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18}

On 27 June 1968, the SIG again reviewed arms supply policy. General Wheeler joined the Ambassador to Pakistan, Benjamin Oehlert, in arguing that US credibility with Pakistan hinged on consummating a tank sale. Conversely, Ambassador Bowles pressed the case for suspending both direct and third-country sales of lethal weapons. Finally, the SIG agreed to continue the policy of selling spares only but encourage Belgium to sell tanks to Pakistan. The Belgian deal fell through, however, and Turkey refused to sell 100 M-47s unless the United States would replace them with refurbished M–48s. Thus the whole problem was left to the next administration.\textsuperscript{19}

To sum up: The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected repeatedly to a policy that they deemed too pro-Indian. Denying that the relative importance of India and Pakistan could be assessed apart from US security interests in the subcontinent as a whole, they argued for an even-handed approach. Their view did not prevail, and might have proved infeasible in any case. Washington's refusal to assist Pakistan during the 1965 war left a great residue of bitterness. When India's courting of the USSR intensified, Pakistan predictably turned to China as a counterweight. Termination of the Peshawar lease marked the end of a special relationship dating from 1954.

**Will India Join the Nuclear Club?**

Nothing could alter the military balance in South Asia more drastically than the advent of nuclear weapons. According to the draft National Policy Papers circulated
in May 1964, “no single Indian act” could disturb her neighbors and disrupt US non-proliferation efforts world-wide more than the building of an atomic bomb. Yet China was very close to becoming a nuclear power, and Indian memories of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war were quite fresh. India thus had an obvious motive for building her own bomb. Perhaps, the NPP continued, the United States could discourage India from becoming a nuclear power by: emphasizing the great cost of creating an effective anti-Chinese deterrent and the probability of regional proliferation; offering an “explicit assurance” that the United States would react in appropriate ways to an unprovoked nuclear threat or attack; and allowing Indians to see and appreciate the strength of US installations in the Far East. Commenting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called such a detailed description of anti-proliferation measures “undesirable and inappropriate.” In the final NPP, approved on 3 November, the passage about how to discourage India’s nuclear development became briefer and vaguer; the reference to “explicit assurances” disappeared.20

On 16 October 1964, China exploded its first nuclear device. Two days later, President Johnson announced that countries not seeking nuclear weapons “can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.” In December, Assistant Secretary McNaughton solicited opinions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff about ways to meet the threat of nuclear blackmail around Asia’s periphery. Replying on 16 January 1965, they perceived no military need to modify US commitments “at this time.” Difficult problems would arise later, however, as China’s nuclear arsenal grew. They foresaw pressures from threatened states for more definitive security guarantees, and they did not exclude the possibility of nuclear sharing (e.g., providing selected nations with delivery vehicles while retaining weapons under US custody). Therefore, they recommended an interdepartmental study of ways to (1) improve the alliance system and (2) increase nuclear support for Asian allies, nuclear sharing included. An interdepartmental Committee on Non-Proliferation, chaired by Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, took up this task. Central Intelligence believed that, “unless the Indian Government considers that it has international guarantees which adequately protect its security, the chances are better than even that within the next several years India will decide to develop nuclear weapons.”21

The Thompson Committee suggested the Indian government say publicly that it did not intend to build nuclear weapons, and President Johnson replying that his assurance of 18 October “will apply to all non-nuclear countries in free Asia who want our backing in resisting the threat from Peiping.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 11 March 1965, recommended some rewording to expunge any implication that the United States would furnish nuclear support for all who wanted it. Such judgments, instead, should be made on a case-by-case basis after a careful analysis of all implications. Assistant Secretary McNaughton told Ambassador Thompson that he agreed with their views, but “[i]f you believe that the inclusion of the specific references in a Presidential statement may have important political significance . . . , let me know and I shall press the issue to decision here.”22
Ambassador Thompson, meantime, had assured ISA that the proposed assurance would not commit the United States to any particular course of military action. Nonetheless, on 24 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated to Secretary McNamara their concern that the assurance already given by President Johnson could be construed more broadly than the State Department intended. Any more statements might prompt requests for “additional and substantial military commitments.” Again, therefore, they asked that further assurances to India be considered on a case-by-case basis.23

Late in April, Ambassador Thompson circulated two “preliminary” suggestions aimed at obviating any need for an Indian nuclear weapons program. First, the British could provide India with between 12 and 24 Canberra jet bombers. Second, the United States could supply A–4 Skyhawks, which Indians could fly from US or UK carriers.24

On 14 May—the same day China exploded its second nuclear device25—the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that both suggestions struck them as “unduly restrictive.” Once committed to such arrangements, the United States might have to furnish hardware, advisers, logistic support, and perhaps combat forces. They saw no need to make specific arrangements. If the United States did accept a nuclear-support obligation, a formal US-Indian alliance would be necessary, as would the positioning of US and/or UK forces on Indian soil. So, before proceeding further, there would have to be preliminary discussions about these issues with the British, Indians, and Pakistanis. Agreeing, Secretary McNamara wrote Ambassador Thompson that options needed to be more deeply explored.26

In January 1966, with Prime Minister Gandhi about to visit Washington, the State Department circulated a study of ways to “head off an Indian decision to produce nuclear weapons.”27 It discerned no need for President Johnson to propose specific arrangements at this point. Instead, he should simply invite consultations about arrangements to ensure India’s security against a Chinese nuclear threat, should that threat become sufficiently serious for Indians to find them necessary as an alternative to developing and acquiring their own nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged this study “overly optimistic” about the chances of avoiding or delaying an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons. They believed, also, that it underestimated (1) the adverse impact upon allied and other governments of US-Indian nuclear sharing arrangements and (2) the disadvantages that would be incurred by pursuing several possible courses. They evaluated three courses, each unfavorably:

1. The study stated that a complete cutoff of economic, political, and military aid probably would turn India toward the Soviet Union. Instead, US representatives should drive harder bargains with the Indians, showing them that the cost of going nuclear would well exceed direct outlay for weapons development and production. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the Soviet Union would assume the US role in India, mainly because the USSR could not furnish all the emergency wheat shipments that India was getting from North America.

2. The study claimed that a unilateral US guarantee might offer “at least an
interim solution.” They opposed giving a guarantee, largely for the reasons mentioned above. It would have to be specific, they pointed out, thus binding the United States but not allowing Washington to control New Delhi’s actions.

3. Some sort of sharing would do no more than delay a pro-nuclear decision. India could acquire valuable training and delivery systems, continue her own secret development, and then abrogate a nuclear-sharing arrangement. The United States would be left facing an alienated Pakistan, increased West German pressure for nuclear weapons, and severe criticism from world opinion.28

On 18 February, Secretary McNamara informed Secretary Rusk that he agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except in two areas. First, a specific estimate should be made about how much time was available to influence an Indian decision. Second, “we should indicate that we are ready to try to work out with the other nuclear powers appropriate arrangements to guarantee non-nuclear states against nuclear attack.” However, he opposed any nuclear-sharing plan “at this time.” A small deterrent would be inadequate against China, probably enrage the Pakistanis, and almost certainly would bring the United States into any war involving nuclear weapons.29

Secretary Rusk forwarded State’s study to President Johnson, calling it merely “illustrative” and requiring no decision. Rusk opposed offering any bilateral nuclear assurances. The President should suggest to Prime Minister Gandhi, instead, examining together how to meet a Chinese threat “without nuclear proliferation and without Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear weapons program.”30 However, in President Johnson’s conversation with Prime Minister Gandhi on 28 March, the subject never surfaced. The next day, she told Secretary Rusk that “we are sure we don’t want to go into the manufacture of nuclear devices or bombs.”31

In May 1966, China exploded a thermonuclear device. On 10 June, after an NSC discussion, President Johnson ordered another examination into ways of discouraging India from developing nuclear weapons. An interagency group responded; ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comments and then withdrew its request. After being slightly amended by the SIG, major recommendations were approved by the President on 1 August. These can be summarized as follows: Avoid direct threats to eliminate US economic aid, but continue such indirect efforts as describing the cost and difficulties of a nuclear program. Show Indian leaders information about the difficulties still confronting China’s nuclear efforts. After ascertaining the Soviet Union’s attitude toward a UN resolution offering security assurances for non-nuclear countries, address the question of offering India a private US assurance. As Secretary Rusk acknowledged to President Johnson, “we have been unable to devise anything dramatic which would not cost us more than any anticipated gain.”32

In December 1966, the State Department concluded that existing US assurances against nuclear blackmail probably would not dissuade India from developing nuclear weapons. Consequently, State outlined and evaluated several approaches “which might be used in private bilateral discussions with India’s leaders if and as the situation requires”:
Course A: Privately reiterate previous assurances of support, a solution
that seemed inadequate.

Course B: Seek specific understandings with Indian leaders on ways of imple-
menting US policy against nuclear blackmail. That would involve advance consul-
tations about various contingencies and arrangements to ensure further prompt
consultations when the necessity arose. This was the course that State preferred.

Course C: Privately offer a unilateral security guarantee. Since the US Govern-
ment could not commit itself to a single response “under any and all circumstances,”
there would have to be joint contingency planning, which would pose major prob-
lems for both countries. Probably, then, the odds on India’s accepting such an offer
were “considerably less than even.”

Course D: Explore ways in which India might play a nuclear role without seek-
ing a national nuclear capability.33

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Course A, which State considered inade-
quate, “most nearly” reflected their own views. American willingness to help contain
communist aggression in Vietnam, they argued, should provide considerable reassur-
ance about the identity of US and Indian interests in meeting the Chinese threat. They
opposed Course B on grounds that US-Indian consultations could not long remain
private; their disclosure would impair US relations with Pakistan and lead other nations
to increase their demands for assurances of American protection. As for Courses C and
D, they recommended rejection. The National Intelligence Community, they reminded
Secretary McNamara, had concluded that India “will probably detonate a nuclear
device within the next few years despite any guarantees which might be proffered
by the nuclear powers.” Admittedly, nuclear proliferation would be detrimental to the
Free World’s security interests. But they deemed it imprudent for the United States,
“in its attempts to forestall such a decision, to incur risks which would compound the
overall US security problem.”34

The issue of guarantees resurfaced when, in April 1967, India’s Cabinet Secretary
L. K. Jha came to Washington. According to Jha, the Soviets had agreed to offer—pro-
vided the United States did likewise—an assurance that nuclear attack or blackmail
against a non-nuclear state would not go unpunished. General Wheeler reminded
Secretary McNamara that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed such guarantees; he also
expressed doubt that Jha had accurately reported the Soviet offer. Nonetheless, Sec-
retary McNamara signed a memorandum for the President saying that Jha should be
told the US government “accepts in principle the desirability” of such declarations.
Secretary Rusk softened this to read that the administration “is much interested in
the possibility…” Meeting Mr. Jha on 19 April, President Johnson said merely that the
Soviet proposal about security assurances “looked very interesting.” Next day, Johnson,
Rusk, and McNamara agreed to take a cautious approach until they learned the exact
wording of the Soviet offer.35

Ultimately, Washington and Moscow worked out vaguely worded assurances which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed. In June 1968, shortly after the United Nations General
Assembly approved the text of a Non-Proliferation Treaty, the UN Security Council
passed a resolution welcoming “the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the [UN] Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State party . . . that is a victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence community predicted, the Indian portion of Washington’s campaign against nuclear proliferation came to naught. India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, another India-Pakistan war spurred the Indian government to press forward with nuclear weapons development. In May 1974, India exploded a 10- to 15-kiloton device.

Seeking an Indian Ocean Base

The early 1960s, which witnessed a steady reduction in British strength east of Suez, saw a budding of US interest in Indian Ocean bases. Worrying about a power vacuum in that area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 suggested negotiating agreements with London for using strategically located islands. They recommended giving first priority to Diego Garcia, in the Chagos Archipelago, where they wanted to build communications facilities.

In London, during 25–27 February 1964, US and UK officials agreed upon preliminary steps. The British would (1) favorably consider developing, at US expense, facilities that would become jointly available, (2) move as rapidly as possible to shift Diego Garcia and the Agalega Islands away from Mauritius over to British control, and (3) facilitate a joint survey of those islands that the United States might require. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this approach but reminded Secretary McNamara that their only construction plan for the area involved a communications station at Diego Garcia.

In August 1964, as a UN investigation into the administration of colonial territories drew near, the State Department wanted to press London into taking direct control over desirable islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended informing London immediately about the US desire to obtain continuous access rights at Diego Garcia. In October, after the joint survey had been completed, they listed seven places to which they wished access, putting Diego Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago first on the list. Potential uses included air, logistic, and staging bases, radar installations covering all extended-range ballistic missile launch sites within the USSR and thereby filling a gap in the space tracking system, and installations that would support space programs, atomic energy detection systems, and communications.

The State Department, however, expressed “serious doubts” about whether those possibilities provided a “sufficiently persuasive basis” for London to risk the Third World’s wrath by detaching islands and making them direct dependencies of the United Kingdom. As the US Embassy advised, the British government would be very reluctant to act unless the United States was prepared to follow through with construction or actual use. At this point, though, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed only building
communications facilities on Diego Garcia. Perhaps, State suggested, the best approach would be to seek detachment of Aldabra and the Chagos archipelago from the Mauritius and Seychelles governments, while reassessing long-range US objectives and requirements in the area. On 10 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their October recommendations, also advising Secretary McNamara of “an increasing need for politically secure and lasting access to Africa south of the Sahara.” For that purpose, they favored construction of a jet-capable airstrip on Aldabra Island. Probably, the recent rescue of hostages in the Congo had focused their attention on sub-Saharan Africa.

In May 1965, the British began detaching the Chagos archipelago, Aldabra, Farquahr, and Ile des Roches from the Mauritius and Seychelles governments. Should the United States, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, share the costs of detachment and of airfield construction on Aldabra? They promptly answered yes, adding that continuing British involvement in using these islands could help reverse London’s efforts to make the United States shoulder more burdens east of Suez. “In this sense alone,” they argued, “these islands may prove to be of strategic value far in excess of the estimated detachment costs.” Secretary McNamara endorsed the idea of cost-sharing. Later that year, London did create a British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) that included the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquahr, and Isle des Roches.

Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed their minds on one point. They told the Secretary, in December 1965, that they saw no requirement warranting the expenditure needed to build a communications station on Diego Garcia. Other programs could fulfill the functions originally intended for that island. They assured Secretary McNamara, though, that their October 1964 list of “potential uses” remained valid.

On 30 December 1966, the US and UK governments concluded an agreement outlining the conditions for joint base development in the BIOT. The United States agreed to the costs of creating the BIOT, on the understanding that its territory would be used to meet both nations’ defense needs. Secretly, the British undertook to establish a base on Diego Garcia; the Americans arranged to share costs by cutting $14 million from the sale price of Polaris missiles.

In February 1967, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze urged that a start be made upon an “austere” $26 million support facility at Diego Garcia, even if the British decided against substantial cost-sharing. As explained previously, US Navy ships no longer stopped at South African ports, but a refueling base at Diego Garcia would allow aircraft carriers to sail from the China Sea to the US East Coast. Diego Garcia, in fact, “is ideal for our ships transiting the Indian Ocean to and from Vietnam and its political visibility is very low.”

After reviewing this problem at ISA’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McNamara that construction of such a facility “is fully warranted. US strategic interests in the area are important and will increase in importance in the future.” Their catalogue of US interests included: continued access to Middle East oil; protection of US nationals; free access to and transit of the Indian Ocean, now used by aircraft car-
riers moving between the Atlantic and the Vietnam war zone; CENTO and SEATO commitments; and support for such countries as Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. They predicted that political instability would continue and Sino-Soviet pressures increase. By using Diego Garcia, the United States could support a “graduated and flexible response” yet avoid becoming embroiled in local problems. So they recommended creating a support facility and paying half its operating and maintenance costs; British personnel should constitute half of Diego Garcia’s permanent garrison.47

Nonetheless, late in October, Secretary McNamara informed the Navy that he saw no clear requirement for such a base, because it failed his test of cost-effectiveness. The value of carrier days lost by diverting to Diego Garcia, he calculated, was much greater than the value of oiler days saved by using it. Moreover, Diego Garcia would start paying for itself only after a carrier task group stayed in the Indian Ocean more than fifteen days—a highly unlikely eventuality, the Secretary believed. He, therefore, disapproved any investment “at this time” but would reconsider after the British had decided whether to share the cost of building an airfield on Aldabra Island. The US Air Force wanted an austere facility there, to support contingency operations in East Africa.48

Late in 1967, the British decided that they could not afford to help develop a staging airfield at Aldabra, ending that project. Moreover, in January 1968, London announced that practically all UK forces would leave the Far East and the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that Moscow and Peiping would move to fill this vacuum. Accordingly, in April 1968, they recommended the immediate establishment of a base on Diego Garcia. The cost would total $43 million, mainly for POL storage, a 12,500-foot runway, and harbor improvement. On 15 June, Paul Nitze—who was now Deputy Secretary of Defense—approved in principle a more modest facility costing about $26 million.49

In December 1968, the British approved US base development on Diego Garcia. Budgetary stringencies led the Nixon administration, in 1969, to decide against seeking any funds from Congress.50 Yet, by the mid-1970s, the Persian Gulf’s growing importance would make a base at Diego Garcia look like a sound investment indeed.
The Far East: The Climax of Containment

China, Vietnam, and “Close-In” Containment

When communists won control of mainland China in 1949, US policymakers began devising strategies to stop the spread of communist power in the Far East. In January 1950, the Truman administration publicly committed itself to defending an offshore island chain running from the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus down to the Philippines. Then North Korea’s invasion added South Korea and Taiwan to the US defense perimeter. In 1954, after French defeats in Indochina led to the partitioning of Vietnam, the United States helped create a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Although South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were not SEATO signatories, the “treaty area” was defined as including Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split, occurring between 1958 and 1960, brought no immediate comfort to Washington because the People’s Republic of China behaved more militantly than the USSR.

South Vietnam, where an anti-communist government faced a growing insurgency aided by the communist regime in North Vietnam, proved the weakest link in the containment chain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the entire Pacific basin as a single strategic entity, where defeat in one area would have repercussions everywhere. They were among many policymakers who subscribed to a belief that the fall of one “domino” would topple others as well. When South Vietnam approached collapse, the Johnson administration decided upon direct intervention. Sustained bombing of North Vietnam started on 2 March 1965; US Marines landed in South Vietnam six days later.

At that point, US decisionmakers had to consider the possibility of Chinese intervention. China might do in Vietnam what it had done so effectively in Korea, fifteen
years before. Accordingly, during the spring of 1965, a Special State-Defense Study Group headed by Lieutenant General Berton Spivy, USA, Director, J–5, analyzed possible Sino-American confrontations and speculated what courses each side might adopt. The Group worked under the general supervision of Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, General Wheeler, and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson.

Early in May, the Group circulated a “short-range” report assessing four possible confrontations:

Under *Situation A*, the bombing of North Vietnam would continue for six to eight weeks, broadening to include peripheral industrial targets such as power plants. The Chinese might be sufficiently patient to avoid any overt action. A massive land invasion of Southeast Asia was possible, but it would mark a drastic shift from tactics that had served Peiping well in the past.

In *Situation B*, the bombing of North Vietnam would intensify considerably, and three US divisions would deploy to South Vietnam by October. Objectives for the Far East would have to be reassessed, since a large US presence in Southeast Asia would shape Sino-American relations for years to come and mould the character of US commitments to Asian allies. China probably would react by moving equipment and technical personnel into North Vietnam. (That was an accurate forecast of what occurred.) A greater danger lay in the likelihood of US pilots confronting “volunteer” Soviet antiaircraft crews.

*Situation C* was more explosive. Chinese aircraft, operating from home bases, would defend North Vietnam and Chinese “volunteers” would enter North Vietnam. The US response—bombing Hanoi, striking air and naval bases in South China—should be prompt, limited, and effective. Since Peking might respond with a massive invasion of Southeast Asia, US actions against South China should stop if the Chinese ceased attacking US ships and aircraft. The Soviets probably would feel compelled to supply North Vietnam with surface-to-air missiles and MiG aircraft, thereby gaining a voice in deciding the communists’ next move.

*Situation D* envisioned a full-scale Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. American counter-efforts should concentrate upon military and logistical targets throughout Southeast Asia and South China. It was “quite likely that the US would be faced with the decision to use nuclear weapons . . . perhaps the second or third day of the invasion.” However, using nuclear weapons would produce “overwhelmingly adverse reactions from US allies as well as the Communist world and the uncommitted powers,” and “lasting resentment against the US might be generated.” Thus “[t]he progressively increasing costs of achieving larger objectives would tend to place a ceiling on US objectives well below the upper limit.” Washington should assure Moscow that US objectives would be confined to the minimum considered necessary.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made some criticisms (e.g., the Group might be underestimating the extent of Sino-Soviet cooperation during a major Sino-American confrontation) but advised Secretary McNamara that they saw no need to revise current planning because of the report.²

On 27 August, senior officials including Generals Wheeler and Spivy discussed the report. Secretary Rusk said that recent events, such as France’s diplomatic recognition
of China, Indonesia’s friendly attitude towards Peking, and fighting between India and Pakistan, might encourage Chinese leaders to believe they were pursuing wise courses. In that case, the United States faced serious risks pursuing its policies. Agreeing about the risks, Secretary McNamara cautioned against taking a firm stand unless the necessary power was available. Secretary Rusk observed that NATO had spent $1 trillion to convince Soviet rulers about the wisdom of peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, Moscow had provoked the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban missile crises. Secretary McNamara observed that the United States could not contain China alone; others, particularly Japan and India, must be persuaded to help.3

Militancy remained the watchword for Mao Tse-tung in domestic and foreign policy. China was convulsed by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as he launched young Red Guards against a wide range of class or ideological enemies. In 1964, Mao began preparing his country for US attacks, even attempting to create an alternate industrial base in remote provinces. Starting in June 1965, Chinese surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, railroad, engineer, and minesweeping units deployed into North Vietnam. Between June 1965 and March 1968, more than 320,000 Chinese troops served there, the peak number being 170,000 in 1967. During this period, Peking strongly opposed peace talks between Hanoi and Washington, rejecting a number of international initiatives. Mao believed that the war in Vietnam, if successful, would vindicate his militant approach; the drain on American resources would make it difficult for the United States to suppress liberation movements elsewhere.4

The Study Group’s “long-range” report, completed in June 1966, stated that Peking’s objectives of “regional hegemony and world revolution clash with our own fundamental interests.” The preferred US strategy should consist of “close-in” containment, involving a significant US military presence on the Asian mainland. Abandoning close-in containment was impossible while the Vietnam War lasted. The United States could withdraw to offshore containment only if: the likelihood of overt communist aggression diminished because there was “a clear downgrading of expansionist aims” in Peking, Hanoi, and Pyongyang; the ability of threatened non-communist areas to cope with insurgency and the first shock of overt aggression increased substantially; and US strategic mobility markedly improved. In the Group’s judgment, “conditions in all mainland areas concerned are not likely to satisfy the above requirements for many years, and possibly not within the decade [1966–76] under study.” In mid-October 1966, the Far East Interdepartmental Regional Group approved these basic concepts as policy guidelines.5 Then the Study was circulated to agencies “for information and general guidance, but not as a directive for specific action.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully embraced close-in containment. In February 1966, General Johnson told Secretary McNamara that there appeared to be no clear governmental position on how to deal with aggression along China’s extensive southern border. Acknowledging the omission, Secretary McNamara requested JCS recommendations. Their reply, delayed until December 1966, repeated the concepts outlined in the long-range Study. Containing China would require some form of a forward strategy,
even after the Vietnam War ended. To prevent China from dominating Asia, the United States and its allies must be prepared to “deter or defeat all forms of Chinese aggression.” South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand comprised “key elements of the overall US posture in the Far East.” Assistance against large-scale aggression would remain necessary until indigenous capabilities improved. Of course, the United States should try to reduce dependence upon US forces by encouraging greater Asian participation in regional security arrangements. But, above all, “[t]he Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to stress that the present situation in Southeast Asia is the initial testing ground for the containment policy. The viability of this policy will be essentially dependent on a successful resolution there—a resolution satisfactory not only in the US view but also in the eyes of the countries presently or potentially threatened by China.” Therefore, the United States should “use whatever resources may be needed to contain China, consistent with security requirements in Western Europe.”

Concurrently, at General Wheeler’s urging the Special Studies Group examined ways to deal with a Chinese invasion, looking at three strategies, each aimed at achieving a cessation of hostilities and a Chinese withdrawal. In “Alpha,” ground troops would conduct holding operations in Southeast Asia while aircraft conducted intensive strikes against South China and selective strikes north of the Yangtze River. “Bravo,” requiring 14 US divisions, involved an air-sea-land campaign against South China. “Charlie,” for which eight US and allied divisions would be needed, contemplated an invasion of North Vietnam and an air-sea effort against South China. All these strategies seemed feasible, said the Group, provided that they were preceded by a mobilization of men and resources.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the Group’s conclusions “reasonable” but added several reservations. First, possible Soviet reactions deserved further study. Second, mobilization requirements might be greater than what the Group indicated. Third, shortages caused by the Vietnam War would restrict the availability of materiel; decisions to begin producing some items “should have been made from six months to a year ago.”

By the spring of 1968, more than 500,000 US troops had been committed to Vietnam and there was no end in sight. So in May, when OSD circulated a draft presidential memorandum addressing a strategy and force structure for Asia, the chastening effect of Vietnam was clearly visible. If the United States wished to continue close-in containment and commit large conventional forces, “we must reconsider the premises of our military strategy in Asia and redefine the functions that US forces should perform there.” Communists could project into Southeast Asia much larger forces than previously believed, and China could achieve over time a capability to fight concurrently on several fronts. Thus, in waging and winning a war with China, the United States would face “indeterminate and open-ended requirements.” That being the case, maximum reliance should be placed upon Asian allies’ ability to defend themselves, and US policy should stress the Military Assistance Program.
Initially, according to the draft presidential memorandum, Southeast Asia might be defended against a Chinese attack by allies plus the seven US divisions already there, which would be reinforced by more US divisions as the conflict developed. South Korea could cope with a combined Chinese-North Korean attack initially, although not for any sustained period. However, if South Korea could mobilize and equip seven rear-area divisions by M+90 days, the need for US reinforcements would be reduced. In Taiwan, the Nationalist forces were more than adequate to defeat an amphibious attack.  

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who still strongly supported close-in containment, protested that adopting such policies would lead to a “substantial erosion” of US strength and influence. There would be greater likelihood of miscalculation by the communists, and US motives probably would be misinterpreted. Self-help, the DPM suggested, was receiving insufficient emphasis. Yet US allies might not oppose communist expansion unless they were convinced that the United States was “prepared to provide a great deal more than meager support.” The Military Assistance Program effectively complemented US forces but could not substitute for them. Moreover, the option for first use of nuclear weapons constituted a necessary element of deterrence, and so should be retained.

Area requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued, had been underestimated. Seven US divisions hardly seemed enough for a holding action in Southeast Asia, since 10 2/3 division-equivalents already were needed in Vietnam even without Chinese intervention. In South Korea, between 5 1/3 and 7 US divisions would be required even for the initial defense against a combined Chinese-North Korean attack. As to Taiwan, any reduction of Nationalist force levels might tempt China to invade the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. These and other criticisms led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pronounce the DPM unsatisfactory and recommend that it be withdrawn.

Late in the year, OSD circulated a revised DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed it, found their comments reflected “only superficially,” and again urged rejection. They added one stinging criticism. According to the DPM, efforts to formulate an Asian strategy were complicated by the fact that the United States was “geared to fight relatively short, intense wars.” That, it would seem, caused their frustration about the conduct of the Vietnam War to boil over. Decisive results could be achieved, they countered, when forces were used as the military wished. Conversely, long and costly wars of attrition were “virtually assured” if the United States lacked adequate strength for swift commitment, unnecessarily restricted the way its forces fought, and allowed enemy sanctuaries to exist. However, the final DPM dated 2 January 1969 contained only one concession. Thus the Johnson administration left office with close-in containment facing serious criticisms but still formally intact.

**Taiwan: On Hold**

Taiwan was still considered a “vital” link in the containment chain. Since June 1950, the United States had protected Chiang Kai-shek’s refugee regime and continued to
recognize it as the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). In contrast to the violent confrontations that characterized the 1950s, the 1960s proved to be nearly crisis-free. Indeed, during 1965–68, modernization of GRC military forces was the main issue requiring attention from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In January 1965, the GRC asked Washington to approve in principle a sale of eleven high-speed transports from the US reserve fleet, to replace obsolete ships patrolling the Taiwan Strait. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported a sale, although urging that only two ships be sold at this point. ISA agreed, but the administration approved a six-ship sale.14 “Back to the Mainland” had been the mantra of Nationalist leaders since June 1950. President Chiang’s son, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-Kuo, came to Washington in September 1965. He presented an invasion “concept” that would require massive US naval, air and logistical support plus large-scale popular uprisings and defections. Upon review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled Chiang’s concept of limiting US air and naval forces to a covering role, without striking mainland targets, as “militarily unsound.” Since available intelligence furnished no evidence that the population would rise to support invaders, a successful invasion looked to be impossible. In fact, Chiang’s concept struck them as being not an operational proposal but rather “a vehicle for increasing the scope and volume of US-GRC discussions.” They recommended that the existing “Blue Lion” committee, comprised of the US Ambassador and Minister Chiang, examine concepts and strategies for dealing with the threat in Southeast Asia, endeavor to reach agreed intelligence assessments of the mainland situation, and critique GRC plans—all without committing the United States to involvement in planning, encouraging, or supporting a GRC invasion.15

When General Wheeler visited Taipei in December 1965, President Chiang pleaded for the United States to land its men on the mainland so they could re-conquer five southwestern provinces. Meeting Minister Chiang and his senior officers, however, General Wheeler “gained the distinct impression that the [invasion] presentation was pro forma.” Upon returning to Washington, the Chairman recommended “frankly” telling President Chiang that an invasion was out of the question, “although it would have to be done tactfully and perhaps sweetened by some addition of military assistance to assuage his pride.”16

Back in September, Minister Chiang gave Secretary McNamara a fairly sizable shopping list: nine squadrons of F-5 interceptors to replace aging F–86s; two submarines and twelve PT boats; ground force equipment; and possible deployment, for psychological effect, of one Mace missile squadron. Late in November, Congressional budget cutting led Secretary McNamara to reduce FY 1966 grant aid for Taiwan from $104 to $94.5 million. General McConnell made a special plea to restore those funds, noting that the cut would not only preclude an acceleration of F–5 deliveries (the first nine had arrived on 26 November) but also compel the GRC to retire its F–104 squadron. Secretary McNamara refused to restore any funds, reminding General McConnell that there had been “many extraordinary demands” for MAP appropriations. One week earlier, in fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised Secretary McNamara that some
of Minister Chiang’s September requests exceeded their own JSOP recommendations. Thus, unless MAP dollar guidelines were raised, meeting Chiang’s requests would disrupt the flow of higher-priority items already programmed for delivery.

Early in 1966, Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy talked with President Chiang, who this time emphasized defensive requirements. Claiming that Chinese Communists were capable of attacking Taiwan, he stressed a need for radars and F-5s. (According to CINCPAC, “President Chiang obviously feels the need to compete with South Vietnam for US attention.”) Reviewing the situation in mid-April, at ISA’s request, the Joint Staff found no indication of an impending invasion. Moreover, Taiwan’s air defenses most needed improvement not in weaponry but in management, training, discipline, and delegation of authority. In mid-April, Chiang wrote directly to President Johnson about what he described as an immediate threat of air attack against Taiwan. The administration found no supporting evidence but did temporarily deploy F–100s and F–4s there.

Concurrently, the GRC asked permission to purchase five more transports. General Wheeler was willing, provided that enough ships remained in the reserve fleet. A sale, he observed, “might well take some of the sting” out of Chiang’s having to retire his F–104s. Admiral McDonald reported, however, that various MAP recipients had requested 21 transports and only 16 were available. Consequently, he would support nothing more than a one-ship sale. The Joint Staff agreed, and on 20 May Assistant Secretary McNaughton passed this one-ship recommendation to the State Department. But counter-pressures soon developed. On 20 June, Assistant Secretary Bundy telephoned McNaughton to say he was “fully convinced that cogent political reasons” required a two-ship sale. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review. After discovering that other MAP recipients had reduced their requests by five, they endorsed a two-ship sale. McNaughton agreed and so advised the State Department; a two-ship sale followed.

President Chiang’s practice of keeping large numbers of men under arms had long concerned Washington. The 1967 and 1968 Military Assistance Manuals called for gradually reducing the GRC’s Army and Marine Corps from 452,000 to 307,000. In February 1968, OSD Systems Analysis reported that ground and tactical air forces could be cut substantially with only a minimum increase in risk. Thus, for FY 1973, Systems Analysis proposed cutting Army divisions from 22 to 13 and F-86s from 125 to 25, while increasing the F-5 inventory from 54 to 72. During FYs 1969–1973, annual grant aid need average only $34.8 million. In fact, if the GRC carried out the suggested cuts, it would have enough money to buy all the items now being provided through MAP.
threatened with insurgencies. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw a need for greater MAP funding and higher 1973 objectives (e.g., 16 instead of 13 Army divisions and 198 rather than 151 attack aircraft). Therefore, they recommended rejecting the study.21

In August 1968, Defense Minister Chiang indicated that Army cutbacks might be desirable if modernization could keep GRC combat capability at its current level. As one aspect of modernization, the GRC was keenly interested in co-producing UH–1H utility helicopters. ISA solicited the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thereby triggered a debate within the JCS organization. The Joint Staff endorsed a requirement for 236 helicopters. General Wheeler disagreed. Success or failure of a communist invasion would depend upon aerial supremacy, and if the defenders failed to attain control of the air quickly, GRC reliance on helicopters for troop reinforcement “could be disastrous.” In other words, GRC concepts seemed to be diverging from approaches that were “strategically sound, militarily necessary, and economically feasible.” At a time when the United States faced “contracting budgets and increasing worldwide commitments,” Chiang’s insistence upon helicopters as the top priority indicated that an overall review of GRC planning might be in order.22

The Director, Joint Staff, suggested saying that, while there was no “high priority military requirement” for UH-1Hs, helicopters could be used effectively if political or economic reasons ruled in favor of co-production. At a JCS meeting late in October, General Wheeler voiced concern over the expense involved. General Westmoreland, on the other hand, considered co-production “most desirable.” Finally, on 7 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Clifford that “a valid military requirement” for helicopters did exist, since GRC troops depended almost completely upon ground lines of communication. Also, in the post-Vietnam era, there could be “potential value” in having a helicopter rebuilding and distribution point offshore. Since President Chiang was reported to be considering relegating two divisions to reserve status, a co-production program might serve to bring about force reductions that the administration desired, without displacing higher priority air defense and naval improvements. In April 1969, the Nixon administration did authorize co-production.23 Yet Chiang, at that time, made no force reductions.

Taiwan constituted a strategic asset only in its being denied to the communists. In 1966, at General Greene’s urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff looked into sending a GRC Marine brigade to Vietnam. CINCPAC called such a move militarily desirable but warned about political ramifications. The Embassy in Saigon voiced serious reservations, noting particularly the strong anti-Chinese sentiment among Vietnamese. The Joint Staff then recommended against seeking a GRC contribution. In 1967, the State Department opposed even increasing the few dozen Taiwanese personnel in South Vietnam.24

**Indonesia Changes Course**

A bloody revolution in Indonesia, a nation with almost 100,000,000 people, profoundly affected the future of Southeast Asia. When 1965 opened, President Sukarno was
pursuing a pro-communist, stridently anti-American course. His “Crush Malaysia” campaign raised a real possibility of armed confrontation with Washington and London. Britain dispatched troops and warships to bolster Malaysia. In March 1965, President Johnson told the British Foreign Secretary that “he would be ready for major war against Indonesia if she raises the stakes too high.”

Under Secretary of State George Ball warned President Johnson that “[o]ur relations with Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart.” Mobs threatened US consulates and USIA libraries; the administration suspended what by then was a very small program of grant military aid. In July 1965, the administration approved a commercial sale of $3 million worth of communications equipment, after Indonesian Army personnel said privately that they needed some secure means of internal communication. However, according to a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued on 1 September, “Sukarno's Indonesia already acts in important respects like a Communist state and is more openly hostile to the US than most Communist nations.”

Upheaval began on 1 October, when a group led by an officer in Sukarno's bodyguard kidnapped and murdered six Army generals. The Defense Minister, General Abdul Haris Nasution, narrowly escaped although his daughter was killed. General Suharto, who headed the Army's Strategic Reserve, directed a counterattack that broadened into a country-wide purge with wholesale killings. The once-powerful Indonesian Communist Party was exterminated.

An immediate issue facing US policymakers involved the possibility of a communist insurgency. Indonesian Army officers asked for the rapid, covert provision of secure communications equipment. A “303 Committee” that included General Wheeler was charged with reviewing proposals for covert action. In mid-November, it recommended approval; the CIA located and purchased equipment that solved the problem of attribution.

Judging by advice they tendered to Secretary McNamara on 30 December 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approached aid for Indonesia very cautiously. They speculated that, if the Army took power from Sukarno, there might follow substantial requests for economic aid and modest ones for military materiel (e.g., ammunition, man-portable radios, light automatic weapons, vehicles, and perhaps C–47 and C–30 spares). The Army, although the strongest anti-communist force in the country, eventually would call for civilian leadership “which, in turn, probably will represent a nationalist-religious-communist coalition” that would follow a neutralist course. The Joint Chiefs of Staff listed several factors that “impinged” upon the advisability of providing military aid immediately and overtly: Sukarno and his supporters could charge the Army with being a tool of US imperialism; the United States could find itself subsidizing Indonesian aggression, until Indonesia discontinued its “Crush Malaysia” campaign; problems flowing from the expropriation of US property and recognition of a legal right of free passage through the Sunda Strait required resolution; and the logistics implications of aid to Indonesia must be evaluated in light of US commitments in Southeast Asia. Also, “In view of Indonesia's past tendency to export aggression, the impact on neighboring
countries...should be considered." Since the Army's campaign against the Indonesian Communist Party "appears to be progressing according to plan," the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no current need for overt US military aid. They did recommend supplying "a limited quantity of foodstuffs/medicines." The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended supplying "a limited quantity of foodstuffs/medicines."30

Suddenly, in February 1966, President Sukarno ousted General Nasution and appointed seven leftists to be cabinet ministers. The Army then staged a coup that reduced Sukarno to a figurehead; General Suharto assumed executive power and the Communist Party was officially outlawed.31 In June, Suharto sought US help in conducting an aerial survey of Indonesia's outer islands and in furnishing training and equipment for civic action programs. Late in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended: approving civic action and other non-combatant training at CONUS schools; sending a team to survey civic action programs and providing some spare parts to support them; and, pending survey results, using US military personnel to support a modest civic action program. Progress, they noted, was being made toward solving the Malaysian, Sunda Strait, and expropriation issues. Secretary McNamara, however, supported only non-combatant training of Army officers in US Service schools. An aerial survey struck him as unwise, unless the United States was prepared to follow up with substantial support. Civic action programs, he believed, should be funded by AID rather than MAP. On 1 September, President Johnson authorized spare parts and replacements, as well as civic action training for the Indonesian military on a modest scale.32

The State Department proposed allocating $6 million from the FY 1968 MAP to help rehabilitate Indonesia's communications and transportation systems. State reasoned that, since the Army now dominated Indonesia's life, "there is probably no other place in Asia where such a small investment can produce more significant long-range results." Wholly agreeing, General Wheeler on 1 November urged that funding be advanced to FY 1967. Secretary McNamara, nonetheless, decided that FY 1968 was the earliest date at which funds could be made available.33

Suharto, who became Acting President in March 1967, followed a pro-western course. He ended the "confrontation" with Malaysia, which contributed to London's announcement in January 1968 that all UK forces east of Suez would depart by the end of 1971. Subsequently, a draft National Policy Paper covering Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore stated that the "preferred" US strategy would be to "decline to assume any direct military responsibilities in the sub-region, but demonstrate an active interest in its security and a willingness to increase...economic or military aid should serious instability threaten." This approach assumed that British Commonwealth states, particularly Australia and New Zealand, would devise a satisfactory substitute for the UK presence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended some minor changes (e.g., noting the loss of British nuclear capability). Burned by Vietnam, ISA urged a cautionary note about avoiding direct involvement in any Indonesian insurgency (through combat advisors and the like) and providing no additional equipment "unless there was an agreed estimate that its delivery would have an extensive influence on the government's ability..."
to control the insurgency.” The final NPP, approved in September 1968, did incorporate JCS and ISA comments.

Strategically, the consequences of Indonesia’s revolution can hardly be exaggerated. The influence of Moscow and Peking in much of Southeast Asia shrank drastically. No dominoes would fall beyond Indochina, which meant that a crucial justification for the massive US intervention in Vietnam had become obsolete.

South Korea Becomes a Second Front

Since the North Korean invasion in June 1950, the United States had acted as South Korea’s protector in order to: retain a forward position on the Asian mainland; preserve a buffer between Japan and China; prove the advantages of a non-communist approach to nationbuilding; and demonstrate the dependability of US alliance and support. The Eighth Army’s two infantry divisions constituted the main US military presence in South Korea. The American general who was Commander, US Forces, Korea, also acted as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). As CINCUNC, he exercised operational control over Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.

Increasingly, during 1965–68, developments in South Korea and South Vietnam became intertwined. In March 1965, as the first US ground combat units arrived in Vietnam, the administration started considering whether it should press Seoul to send one ROK division there. If a division did go, would the military balance change? There were 21 divisions (2 US, 19 ROK) in South Korea; air strength included one US tactical, two ROK interceptor, and five ROK tactical squadrons. In an attack, North Korea and China could commit as many as 59 divisions (25 North Korean, 34 Chinese) and about 1,200 aircraft. According to J-3, the allies could successfully resist a North Korean attack by conventional means alone, and sending one ROK division to Vietnam would not change that situation. On 23 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that conclusion. On 13 August, the Korean National Assembly authorized sending combat troops to Vietnam; the ROK Army’s Tiger Division and one ROK Marine brigade arrived there between September and November. In exchange, President Johnson assured the South Koreans that the US would maintain two US divisions in Korea and would provide economic aid and assistance.

Meanwhile, US strength in South Korea underwent a small reduction. The Johnson administration, facing a growing balance of payments deficit, looked for ways to reduce military spending overseas. Eighth Army had grown from 48,700 in December 1963 to 58,000 by the beginning of 1965. So, in February 1965, Secretary McNamara directed a cutback to 48,700 by mid-year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 19 May, protested that doing so would increase risks and reduce combat potential. Therefore, they recommended either rescinding the cut or holding it in abeyance until US commitments in the Far East decreased. Nonetheless, Secretary McNamara asked the Army to prepare a plan for paring Eighth Army to 48,700 personnel.
Early in August 1965, the Army proposed and Deputy Secretary Vance approved a smaller reduction to 53,000; withdrawals would involve individual soldiers rather than complete combat units. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff reopened this issue in October, advising Secretary McNamara that “recent developments in the Far East militate against any force reductions along China’s periphery.” Since “severe tensions and Chinese Communist challenges continue to increase,” reductions could be seen as a sign of US weakness. The threat to South Korea actually could grow, as the communists contemplated countermoves against allied actions in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, US ability to reinforce Eighth Army was declining. The 173rd Airborne Brigade, listed as the earliest reinforcement, had moved from Okinawa to South Vietnam. “As a result, the need for a high state of combat readiness in Korea is as critical today as at any time since the Korean War.” Political and psychological reasons, they continued, also argued against reductions. Reassurance about the US commitment seemed essential to South Korea’s stability and development. President Johnson had promised the ROK government that no US withdrawals would occur without prior consultation; another assurance had been given during discussions about sending the Tiger Division to Vietnam. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended postponing reductions “until the situation in the Far East improves.” Nonetheless, on 31 January 1966, Secretary McNamara ruled that a reduction to 53,000 must be achieved by 30 June. In fact, when June came, Eighth Army’s authorized figure was 50,782 and its strength on the ground only 43,351. As with the Seventh Army in Germany, shortages of well-trained personnel further reduced combat effectiveness.39

The administration also hoped to reduce South Korea’s military establishment. According to the US-ROK Agreed Minute of December 1960, Washington would support an ROK establishment as large as 600,000 men. When 21,000 ROK troops left for Vietnam, the total number in South Korea would fall to 580,000. But Secretary McNamara saw no reason to replace the 21,000. As he told his Korean counterpart in May 1965, “we do not need two fists when one fist will do.”40

According to a National Policy Paper approved in November 1965, ready ROK forces plus US augmentations would be able to hold a line north of Seoul. South Korea might be forced, because of its economic problems and inadequate MAP support, to reduce its establishment as low as 500,000. (The original draft implied that a reduction actually was preferable to maintaining current levels. In response to JCS and OSD protests, that passage was rewritten and the implication removed.) But no cuts should be carried out, the NPP stipulated, while ROK troops were serving in Vietnam. Also, US force levels should remain unchanged about a year after any ROK reductions began. The 25th Infantry Division, which had been the theater reserve, was deploying from Hawaii to Vietnam. To replace it, a division in Korea might be designated as the strategic reserve for the Far East.41

The administration wanted even more ROK troops in Vietnam, as proof that the war enjoyed Asian support. In February 1966, the ROK government agreed to send its White Horse division along with another brigade and support troops—about 24,000
men, all told. The US government agreed to “equip, train, and finance complete replacement” of those 24,000, but not of the 21,000 deployed to Vietnam earlier. The US Embassy proposed temporarily raising the Agreed Minute's ceiling of 600,000. In mid-April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended replacing the Vietnam-bound 24,000 and providing for a “reconstitution and support” force of 14,500 in South Korea. Since the ROK military establishment actually numbered 585,000, the new ceiling would be 623,000. Subsequently, the South Koreans proposed using 11,000 civilians to serve logistic depots and fill non-combatant billets, eliminating a need for the 14,500-man reconstitution and support force. Accordingly, on 27 May 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary McNamara to support a 608,000-man establishment (564,000 in South Korea and 44,000 in Vietnam). The administration adopted this position with Secretary McNamara's agreement to postpone any drawdowns of the ROK Army so long as the war in Vietnam required their presence.

The Military Assistance Manual for FYs 1968–1972, published in 1967, stated that MAP planning should be based upon reducing the ROK Army from 18 divisions to 15 modernized ones. According to the Manual, Vietnam made this too sensitive a matter to bring up in the near future. But, beginning in FY 1969, plans should be limited to investment items for modernizing 15 divisions. General Charles Bonesteel, USA, as the Commander of both US Forces, Korea, and the United Nations Command, and Ambassador Winthrop Brown warned that such planning soon would become known to the South Koreans, thereby triggering military and political repercussions. On 6 July 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned Secretary McNamara that, if the Korean public ever learned about such a plan, the ROK government “would find it difficult for domestic reasons to maintain its forces in Vietnam.” They therefore pressed for deletion of the statement that 15-division planning should begin in FY 1969. OSD altered the Manual accordingly, but the administration still intended to bring about an eventual reduction in active ROK ground forces.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Korean peninsula were rising rapidly. On 2 November 1966, North Korean soldiers infiltrated through the Demilitarized Zone, ambushed a US patrol, and killed six Americans. South Koreans had been making and continued to make raids northward; in one of these, each side lost about twenty killed. During 1967, North Korea launched a sizable effort at subversive war. The number of serious incidents rose from 50 in 1966 to 566 in 1967, bringing the death total to 228 North Koreans and to 131 Americans and South Koreans. Along the DMZ, fire fights occurred almost nightly. Over the summer, 25 teams of seven or eight each entered South Korea to test the feasibility of guerrilla operations. In the course of killing or capturing these men, 63 South Koreans died. According to captured agents, Pyongyang believed the United States had become so over-extended by Vietnam that it could not adequately reinforce South Korea in case of war.

North Korea probably hoped that chaos and disruption in the South would force President Park Chung Hee to recall some troops from Vietnam or at least prevent him from sending more. Politically, South Korea remained tense but stable. In May 1967,
President Park won re-election in orderly voting. His party subsequently gained a large legislative majority, although there were well-founded charges of fraud and abuse.\textsuperscript{46}

In September, General Johnson proposed that the Joint Staff appraise US military adequacy in Korea “as a matter of urgency.” He posed several questions. Should US forces be awarded higher priority for resourcing and modernization? Should US manning levels be increased? Should there be more military assistance, with greater emphasis on providing essential equipment to the South Koreans? Should counter-infiltration efforts intensify, particularly in and around the DMZ? And, if none of those things could be accomplished? On 27 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized such a study.\textsuperscript{47}

Some modest measures improved US and ROK capabilities. Early in November, at the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Secretary Nitze directed that ten UH-1D helicopters slated for Vietnam be diverted to Korea.\textsuperscript{48} On 27 November, CINCPAC endorsed and forwarded a Counter-Infiltration Plan prepared by General Bonesteel. In mid-December, the ROK government stated willingness to send a light division to Vietnam if, among other things, Washington became firmly committed to the Counter-Infiltration Plan. The administration accepted in principle a $32 million counter-infiltration package, which the Services would fund as Vietnam-related costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, and in March 1968 Deputy Secretary Nitze approved, an additional $11 million worth of materiel for US forces (e.g., Starlight scopes, barrier fencing, floodlights, and flares).\textsuperscript{49}

The \textit{Pueblo} Humiliation

On 23 December 1967, CINCPAC asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve a mission by the USS \textit{Pueblo}, a refitted light auxiliary cargo ship similar to the USS \textit{Liberty}. The mission would include determining the nature and extent of North Korean naval activity, conducting surveillance of Soviet naval units on the Tsushima Strait, determining Soviet and North Korean reaction to an overt intelligence collector, and reporting the deployments of North Korean and Soviet units. The procedure for reviewing mission recommendations ran as follows: First, the Joint Reconnaissance Center coordinated and evaluated proposals. Then, each Service as well as the DIA made a formal recommendation. Next, the JRC consolidated mission proposals into a monthly reconnaissance schedule. When the \textit{Pueblo} proposal reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 23 December, Generals Wheeler and Greene were on leave and General Johnson was in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{50} On 27 December, the Operations Deputies reviewed the January schedule. Normally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have met two days later for final action. This time, each Service Chief or Vice Chief gave permission to his Operations Deputy to release the schedule when the Deputies met on 29 December. This was done.

\textit{Pueblo}’s operational plan had been prepared by the staff of Rear Admiral Frank Johnson, Commander Naval Forces, Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN). Admiral Johnson evaluated the risk of sailing along the east coast of North Korea to be “minimal.” On
17 December, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), concurred; six days later, so did the CINCPAC, Admiral Sharp. On 29 December, the National Security Agency sent the JRC a message stating that, while the North Korean navy reacted when any South Korean ship came near its coastline, signal intelligence had given no evidence of provocative or harassing activities beyond the twelve-mile limit. However, the message did warn of a possible attack and suggested that “ship protective measures” receive serious consideration. Admiral Moorer was supposed to get an information copy but did not because forwarding instructions were misinterpreted. The message went to CINCPAC headquarters where staff officers did not bring it to Admiral Sharp’s attention because they saw nothing that would change CINCPACFLT’s risk evaluation. Meanwhile, on 29 December, an interdepartmental Special Committee approved all January missions. So, on 2 January 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized CINCPAC to proceed with Pueblo’s mission.51

The USS Pueblo left Japan on 8 January. Required to maintain radio silence until taken under surveillance, the ship’s first transmission to the US Navy Security Group at Kamiseya, Japan, did not occur until a North Korean subchaser appeared on 22 January. The previous day had been a grim one in South Korea. A 31-man team of North Korean commandos, under orders “to chop off President Park Chung Hee’s head and to shoot to death his key subordinates,” tunneled under the DMZ but then ran into woodcutters who alerted security forces. Nearly all the would-be assassins were killed or captured, although not before some penetrated within 800 meters of the Presidential Blue House in Seoul.

As 23 January dawned, Pueblo was steaming near the North Korean port of Wonsan. Around noon, a subchaser approached and signaled, “Heave to or I will fire!” Pueblo’s captain, Commander Lloyd Bucher, ascertained that his ship stood 15.8 miles offshore, 3.8 miles beyond what North Korea claimed as its territorial waters. He therefore replied, “I am in international waters.” At 1252 local time, Pueblo reported this challenge to COMNAVFORJAPAN at Kamiseya. Because a sister ship, USS Banner, had undergone similar experiences at Chinese and Soviet hands, this seemed like routine harassment.

The situation changed drastically when two MiGs and four torpedo boats appeared. One boat neared Pueblo and tried to put a landing party aboard; Commander Bucher ignored a heave-to signal and headed for the open sea. At 1329 Pueblo radioed, “They plan to open fire on us now.” Moments later, Pueblo’s bridge was strafed by cannon and machine gun fire. Several men sustained minor wounds and Pueblo came to a stop. “Follow me,” the subchaser signaled. “Have pilot aboard.”

At Kamiseya, meanwhile, Pueblo’s 1329 message galvanized the staff of COMNAVFORJAPAN into action. (Rear Admiral Johnson was in Tokyo attending a weather conference.) By 1350, the staff of Fifth Air Force knew about Pueblo’s predicament. The Commander, Lieutenant General Seth McKee, was informed at 1415. He in turn contacted General John Ryan, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces. There were six F–4s at Osan and Kunsan in South Korea, 25 F–105s on Okinawa, and 77
combat aircraft in Japan. At 1448, General McKee directed that F–105s on Okinawa to fly to South Korea. The attack carrier USS Enterprise was in the East China Sea, 470 nautical miles from Wonsan. At 1506, the Commander, Seventh Fleet, ordered the Enterprise and her escorts to reverse course and sail toward the Korean Strait. The carrier’s 35 operationally ready strike aircraft would need approximately three hours to reach Wonsan.

Off Wonsan, however, the tempo of events ran much more rapidly. Trying to gain time in which to destroy sensitive documents and devices, Commander Bucher sailed slowly toward shore and then brought Pueblo to a full stop. That provoked more volleys upon the helpless ship; several men were wounded, one fatally. A boarding party took control before destruction could be completed. Pueblo reported being boarded at 1425, and sent her final message at 1432.

The captured crew waited for rescue, but none came. Six F–105s left Okinawa at 1611. Flight time to Wonsan was 93 minutes, and darkness would occur at 1736, only 85 minutes hence. That ruled out a rescue from Enterprise as well. Moreover, the Okinawa-based F–105s would have to land in South Korea for arming and servicing. General McKee spoke with General Ryan’s Operations Deputy, who granted authority to arm the F–4s at Osan and Kunsan with 3,000-pound bombs. Then it became clear that they, too, could not reach Wonsan before dark. Consequently, Generals Ryan and McKee decided against any rescue attempt. They knew, too, that about 80 MiGs were based at Wonsan.

Although the ROK air force had 84 F–86s and 44 F–5s that were combat-ready, General Bonesteel decided against using them. He considered the “minimal” chance of a successful rescue to be “far outweighed” by the danger of escalation. If ROK planes were lost trying to rescue Americans while the Blue House raid went unpunished, US-ROK relations would suffer and the likelihood of South Korean retaliation against the North would be “gravely enhanced.”

In Washington, on the other side of the International Date Line, it was late evening on 22 January when the Pueblo crisis began. The National Military Command Center received the Pueblo’s warning, “They plan to open fire on us now,” only ten minutes after its dispatch, at 2346 Washington time. General Wheeler was notified fifteen minutes later. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow called General Wheeler at 0051 to ask what could be done. General Wheeler, in turn, asked J–3 whether any units were available. Rear Admiral William McClendon, Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, talked to General Bonesteel by secure telephone around 0240. Intercepted messages, said Bonesteel, indicated that the crew had been transferred to small boats while the Pueblo was being towed to Wonsan. (The ship probably was inside the twelve-mile limit claimed by North Korea and close to the three-mile limit recognized by the United States.) General Bonesteel had, therefore, decided against sending any US aircraft to the area because their attacks might kill Americans. The J–3 then sent a summary of the situation to General Wheeler, who found it “very disturbing.” Walt Rostow, meanwhile, called CINCPAC
headquarters to ask about *Enterprise*'s distance from Wonsan and her efforts to assist *Pueblo*. He was told that aircraft could not arrive in time.\(^{54}\)

Why was no rescue available? Rear Admiral Johnson informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had not asked Fifth Air Force to put any planes on the runway or strip alert because (1) there had been no reaction to *Pueblo*'s ten-day sweep along the North Korean coast and (2) policy concerning Sea of Japan missions, unlike those in the East China Sea where the USS *Banner* had been harassed, did not call for specific strip alerts. President Johnson appointed a committee headed by former Under Secretary of State George Ball to assess “the *Pueblo* incident.” Secretary McNamara told the committee that providing either naval escort or air cover would have (1) been inconsistent with the *Pueblo*'s mission, (2) constituted a complete departure from previous practice by the United States and other nations, and (3) increased the possibility of misunderstanding, resentment, and international incidents. For the past twelve years, Soviet trawlers had operated just beyond the US three-mile limit. If Soviet warships had accompanied them, the American reaction would have been “strong and negative.” A week after the incident, General Wheeler sent the President his judgment that on 23 January “aircraft would have been of little use in aiding the *Pueblo*. Their use could have been more harmful than helpful.”\(^{55}\)

What next? On the afternoon of 23 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the J–3 to draft an analysis of the situation and prescribed in unusual detail what it should contain:

1. Compare the balance of forces within Korea, and state what the Soviets and the Chinese could and might do.
2. After reviewing the “meager” US force posture, “particularly in the air,” propose actions to improve those capabilities and establish when they should be carried out.
3. Ascertain what air and naval forces were available for a contingency operation, and determine what additional forces might be furnished.
4. Consider such steps as destroying or seizing North Korean shipping even in territorial waters, making hit-and-run strikes, retaking the *Pueblo*, mining or blockading one or more North Korean ports, and raiding across the DMZ.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed US air and naval units to stay at least 80 nautical miles from North Korea's coast, and instructed *Enterprise* and her escorts to remain south of the 38th parallel.\(^{56}\)

The next day, 24 January, the J–3 replied that the balance of forces within Korea was such that, in a conventional confrontation, neither side would enjoy a clear advantage. No overt Sino-Soviet reaction to such a confrontation seemed likely. By the J–3’s reckoning, the arrival times of possible reinforcements ran as follows:

**Ground:** 82nd Airborne Division within seven days, 6/9th of a Marine division/wing team in 40 days, and another 7/9th in 55 days.

**Naval:** Two attack carriers in the Sea of Japan within five days, followed by two more within 30 days.
Air: Seven tactical air squadrons in two days, followed within three days by one more to South Korea and three to Okinawa.

The J–3 cautioned, however, that these figures were somewhat misleading because the logistical establishment could not provide adequate support during the early period of hostilities. The J–3 then set out a sequence of actions:

1. Demand return of the ship and crew through talks at Panmunjom, where the Military Armistice Commission met.
2. Send an unarmed tug to Wonsan, where it could accept the Pueblo.
3. Conduct an air and naval show of force at Wonsan.
4. Carry out selective air strikes against military and industrial targets.

It was “paramount,” though, that Action No. 4 be agreed upon before embarking upon Action Nos. 2 and 3. The J–3 characterized other possibilities (e.g., seizing ships at sea) as offering “small chance of success, half measures, and less worthiness than should be expected of a great power.” That afternoon, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the J–3’s report, their attention centered upon what air and naval reinforcements could be provided without affecting operations in Vietnam.

Meantime, late that morning, a group that included Secretary McNamara, Secretary-designate Clifford, and General Wheeler had taken the first look at North Korea’s motives and US options. CIA Director Richard Helms speculated that Pyongyang wanted “to create the appearance of a second front;” Under Secretary Katzenbach described taking the Pueblo as “a calculated attack on a target of opportunity.” General Wheeler said that, while he was not ready to recommend specific actions, “we could do any or all of the following”: seizing or sinking North Korean ships at sea; mining selected harbors; punitive activities against coastal ocean-going traffic; carrying out air and naval strikes against selected targets (Wonsan, he noted, was well defended); raiding an isolated DMZ outpost, which Wheeler did not favor; and conducting photo reconnaissance prior to any other action. Secretary McNamara suggested two general types of responses: first, military movements into Korea; second, a buildup which could include mobilizing reserves and seeking authority from Congress to extend terms of service.

An imbalance in air strengths, heavily favoring the North over the South, had to be redressed. DOD prepared a plan to deploy about 300 aircraft and activate an equal number to replace them in CONUS. At a luncheon meeting with the President on 25 January, Secretary McNamara recommended immediately seeking authority to call up reservists but delaying deployments to avoid damaging diplomatic efforts at the UN. Conversely, General Wheeler wanted to reinforce South Korea promptly with 170 land-based aircraft and to station the USS Kitty Hawk off North Korea: “This would give us ample aircraft to protect ourselves against any eventuality . . . . It would be four or five days before all the units are operationally ready” in the area. Disputing Secretary McNamara, he maintained that military moves would demonstrate US determination “to do everything it can on both the diplomatic and the military front if necessary.”
Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg agreed that “military actions will create a sense of urgency for the UN to act.” Secretary-designate Clifford supported McNamara, arguing that deployments would only heighten tension: “I am deeply sorry about the ship and the 83 men but I do not think it is worth a resumption of the Korean War.”

Next morning, though, a consensus formed; McNamara and Clifford agreed about alerting units “today” for movement to Korea. President Johnson approved the activation of 28 Air Force and Navy units, involving 14,787 personnel and 372 planes. Between 28 January and 2 February, 182 aircraft (72 F–4s, 14 RF–4s, 34 F–104s, 38 F–102s, 18 F–100s, and 6 EB–66s) arrived in South Korea; the carriers *Yorktown* and *Ranger* entered the Sea of Japan. During 3–6 February, 26 B–52s flew to Guam and Okinawa; soon afterward, 18 F–106s deployed to South Korea.

Noting that there were still only 427 tactical aircraft in South Korea compared to 530 in the North, General McConnell on 29 January urged that another 150 planes be shifted to the western Pacific. Admiral Sharp demurred, perceiving some danger of air bases becoming overcrowded and a real need for only one F–106 air defense squadron. He proposed, instead, either conducting an air mobility exercise with a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division or dispatching a sizeable reconnaissance party to South Korea. The J–3 recommended a battalion-scale exercise but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 31 January, disapproved. In South Vietnam, the Tet offensive had begun and the 82nd Airborne was the Army’s only combat-ready division in CONUS.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to improve other facets of the US military posture in Korea. On 25 January, they proposed and Secretary McNamara promptly agreed that 10,000 tons of aerial munitions en route to Southeast Asia be diverted to Korea and replaced later. They also recommended increasing Eighth Army by 8,500 personnel, from 79 to 90 percent of strength in the tables of organization. But the Secretary saw no justification for an across-the-board increase. Rather, as Systems Analysis maintained, any increase would have to be justified by auditing each unit’s task and status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that the US sector of the DMZ needed to be more fully and actively manned, and that Army installations required better protection. Nonetheless, the Secretary deferred a decision and no increase came about. In mid-February, though, Secretary McNamara did approve a JCS proposal that enough ammunition be pre-positioned to support 18 ROK divisions in combat for 30 days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also advised the Secretary that two Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions in CONUS were available for transfer to Korea. General Bonesteel and Admiral Sharp believed that Hawks were needed there. On 30 January, General Wheeler recommended airlifting those units over the next two weeks, but Secretary McNamara took no action.

Why had Pyongyang resorted to such a brazen provocation? On 24 January, General McConnell advised all major Air Force commands that, since North Korea was perhaps the world’s most security-conscious nation, Pyongyang probably viewed as an aggressive act the presence of any intelligence collector near its border. Hence “we believe the seizing of the *Pueblo* was an opportunistic act to silence a US intelligence
collector, embarrass the US, and improve North Korea’s image.” Nothing indicated that the incident was “part on overall plan to initiate hostilities.” However, when the Tet offensive erupted only a week later, most policymakers concluded that “[t]hey were trying to divert US military resources from Vietnam and to pressure the South Koreans into recalling their two divisions.”

In any case, even before Tet, the administration opted for a diplomatic solution; the aerial buildup was a precautionary move rather than a preparation for war. General Wheeler advised Admiral Sharp on 25 January, the President wanted to avoid confronting Moscow and Pyongyang with either “an ultimatum or with military actions that could be construed as a prelude to an ultimatum.” And, he added, the President also had to take account of domestic divisions spawned by the Vietnam War. Three days later, Secretary Rusk sent the US Ambassador in Seoul an appraisal that had been approved by Secretary McNamara and President Johnson.

It is apparent that North Koreans now realize full possible consequences of their actions and that [the] Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse situation. . . . It is imperative . . . that we make it as easy as possible for them to get off hook. . . .

The North Koreans will probably talk tough and try to humiliate the US and ROK. If they do we should let them rant and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the best, for there is a steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it . . .

We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew.

At a White House meeting on 31 January, Secretary Rusk estimated that chances of liberating the crew in a “reasonable time” by diplomatic means were “about fifty-fifty.” He observed, and General Wheeler agreed, that no military plan put forward thus far offered any promise of returning the crew alive.

The conviction that the Soviets would act to defuse the situation proved wrong. Although Pyongyang had not coordinated with Moscow and Hanoi beforehand, the Soviets saw no reason why they should pull American chestnuts out of the fire. Hence, in talks at Panmunjom, hopes for a rapid resolution faded. The North Koreans, obviously not awed by the “steel fist,” adamantly insisted upon admission of and apology for Pueblo’s acts of espionage and intrusion into territorial waters. The United States refused.

There also was a crisis of confidence between Washington and Seoul. President Park resented that the United States, after virtually ignoring the Blue House raid, reacted forcefully over the Pueblo. On 28 January he received assurances that, when the crew was freed if release was long delayed, the administration would: announce its intention to keep augmented forces in the area; consider additional MAP funding; supply the ROK with two destroyers; and airlift counter-infiltration equipment on the same priority as Vietnam. But what President Park really wanted was joint retaliatory action if provocations continued. His suspicion sharpened when, on 2 February, US and North Korean members of the Military Armistice Commission began bilateral discussions about the
Pueblo. Several days later, General Bonesteel warned his superiors that President Park had become “almost irrationally obsessed with need to strike now at North Koreans.” The Chief of Staff, ROK Air Force, even feared that he might receive orders to launch unilateral air strikes against the North.68

President Johnson sent former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to Seoul as his Special Envoy. Arriving on 11 February, Vance found Park in a “highly emotional state,” doubting US commitment and resolve. In the ensuing discussions, Mr. Vance rejected any automatic US response to further incidents; President Park agreed to consult Washington before taking action but would not guarantee to heed US advice. Nonetheless, Vance reported that US objectives had been “essentially achieved.” After returning to Washington, he recommended that annual MAP appropriations rise from $160 to $200–210 million, and that an interagency group assess current policy and identify objectives for the next several years.69

On 5 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a $100 million MAP increase for FY 1968. Major items included 18 F–4Ds, 300,000 M–1 rifles for Homeland Reserve Forces, and a $13 million counter-infiltration package.70 In July, Congress completed passage of the $100 million addition.

Concurrently, an interagency group reviewed near-term alternatives. The chairman, Winthrop Brown, had been ambassador to South Korea during 1964–67 and currently was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Major General George Pickett, USA, Vice Director of J–3, served as JCS representative. On 13 March, the group advised Under Secretary of State Katzenbach that “diplomatic alternatives appear to have the best chance of freeing the crew.” An improved military capability, particularly for the ROK, would enhance these efforts. If the situation grew markedly worse, “sharp military action might be required.” North Korea’s air force was vulnerable to speedy destruction, and its loss might decisively weaken enemy capabilities. North Korea knew the air power to do this was available, but Pyongyang also knew that the lack of US ground reserves might deter Washington from taking action that risked full-scale war. The group therefore concluded that:

1. For the immediate future, it would be wisest to continue diplomatic pressure, complemented by a rapid buildup of US/ROK capabilities and the continued stationing in South Korea of US air augmentations.
2. The United States should avoid small-scale actions and pressure tactics, because these might either weaken the US/ROK legal position as victims of aggression or spark retaliation and escalation.
3. The US would be in a better position to deal with its problems in Korea if it were to improve its overall strategic posture. General Pickett had sought a stronger statement about the need for worldwide improvements, particularly in ground forces; ISA’s spokesman had opposed any mention of this subject whatever.71

Meanwhile, from Seoul, Ambassador William Porter in mid-February suggested ways of increasing pressure that included blacklisting ships that used North Korean ports and conducting an aerial demonstration well inside South Korea. General Johnson, who
was Acting Chairman, asked the Joint Staff to analyze Ambassador Porter’s proposals and develop a preferred course of action. He believed that, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be confronted with proposals for action, they should develop some sense of what they preferred. General Johnson wanted the Joint Staff to work under an assumption that diplomacy alone would be pursued for “a reasonable time.”

Replying on 28 February, the J–3 recommended (1) improving world-wide readiness, as well as the US politico-military posture in South Korea, and (2) continuing the necessary global surveillance and intelligence operations. Then, if diplomacy failed, launch “an all-out attack to neutralize the North Korean Air Force and its bases.” Since such an attack probably would trigger North Korean counter-action, the J–3 would consider only a strike that was damaging enough to alter the military balance significantly.

On 1 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the J–3’s report. General Wheeler wanted the J-3 to develop its study further, under an assumption that diplomacy alone would not succeed. He and the Service Chiefs agreed upon the following scenario: Strengthen the US/ROK military posture to a point that would permit the delivery of an ultimatum. Wait about three weeks before beginning reprisals, so that the North Koreans would be worn down by continuous alerts. Then submarines would start sinking ships and continue, if necessary, until the North Korean navy had been eliminated.

On 21 March, the J–3 replied with a report that was far from encouraging. In its judgment, the destruction of North Korea’s entire navy and merchant marine required attacks on ports and harbors that would incur a “high risk of reopening full-scale hostilities.” If only a limited number of ships were sunk, there would be less hazard of full-scale fighting. In both cases, however, the risks outweighed the gains. Covert sinking of a North Korean submarine by a US submarine, while not so dangerous, courted retaliation in kind. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a review, decided that the J–3 had overstated the risks. They ordered yet another paper, based upon the scenario outlined on 1 March. Instead of merely noting the result, as the J–3 had recommended, they anticipated sending it to Secretary Clifford.

Early in April, the J–3 submitted its response. Forces would be strengthened over a six-month period and aerial reconnaissance increased; then the United States would deliver an ultimatum. If the Pueblo’s crew was not returned in three weeks, a US submarine would destroy a North Korean submarine. Thereafter, US forces would either sink more ships or launch other military measures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted this paper, but neither approved it nor sent it to Secretary Clifford.

By this time, public protests against the war in Vietnam had grown so great that starting a second war in Asia was simply unthinkable. When Presidents Johnson and Park met in Honolulu, on 17 April, Vietnam and not the Pueblo was their prime topic of conversation. About two weeks earlier, President Johnson had restricted the bombing of North Vietnam and announced only a small increase to US strength in the South. President Johnson still wanted an ROK light division sent to South Vietnam, and in December Park tentatively had agreed to send it. Now, though, President Park saw no
reason to increase South Korea's commitment just after the United States had decided against increasing its own. So, at the morning meeting with Johnson, Park said that the threat from the North precluded sending a light division. President Park claimed, in fact, that South Korea was militarily inferior to the North in every category. General Wheeler attended the meeting. In the afternoon, after getting Wheeler's opinion, President Johnson answered Park by citing the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the ROK Army was superior. The arrival of air reinforcements, President Johnson continued, had created aerial superiority as well. North Korea, he argued, had "provoked the Pueblo incident to prevent South Korea from sending more troops to Vietnam." But President Park remained immovable, and no more troops were sent.

Even though Pueblo's crew remained in captivity, the sense of crisis began to abate. Around mid-year, a Special National Intelligence Estimate concluded that North Korea would neither invade the South nor—at least for the next year or so—take actions that carried a high risk of provoking war. No further reinforcements went to Korea. Early in July, 72 F–4s returned to CONUS, replaced by 50 of the older, recently activated F–100s. Deputy Secretary Nitze deferred action on General Wheeler's request for more Hawk battalions, believing that (1) enough Hawk and Nike-Hercules batteries already were in place and (2) an aircraft shelter program would reduce vulnerability "very significantly." Under pressure from Congress, the administration initiated a worldwide cost-cutting program. Late in July, General Wheeler told the Director, Joint Staff, that some of the reinforcements might have to return from Korea. In September, the Director suggested that withdrawals be so arranged as to retain the F–100s and F–106s as long as possible. Since the Pueblo impasse continued, however, no more aircraft left Korea during 1968.

Actually, the Pueblo buildup was a temporary aberration. That became evident through the results of a long-range reassessment completed in mid-June. Originally proposed by Mr. Vance, it was prepared under the direction of Joseph Yager, vice chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council. According to it, continuing the status quo was "simply not sustainable beyond the next few years" and "probably was not desirable for even that brief period." The two US divisions should be withdrawn for strategic and financial reasons; the case for keeping them would become much weaker after ROK divisions returned from Vietnam. Furthermore, the state of American public opinion indicated the fragility of a "protectorate" relationship when the need for US protection clearly was declining. Rapid disengagement, however, "could pull the props from under much of what our blood and treasure have helped to build." The United States "must long retain a real though diminishing role in support of the ROK." The paper outlined a "preferred strategy" that would "in a few years' time all but eliminate the risk that US combat forces would have to be committed to help the ROK repel a new North Korean attack." The major steps might run as follows: during FYs 1970–71, return the ROK divisions from Vietnam; during FYs 1972–73, withdraw the US 2nd and 7th Divisions; and by FY 1975, substantially complete the modernization of the ROK military structure.
The East Asia and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group endorsed this study. While agreeing upon the wisdom of withdrawing US ground forces at least, it inclined to plan in terms of a “sequence of events” rather than specific dates. On 21 August, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Clifford that they found the preferred strategy “unrealistic in the time frame proposed.” It assumed a favorable outcome in the 1971 ROK presidential election, after which US actions apparently would proceed in “a generally rigid sequence.” Yet they judged ROK political stability to be still fragile, a prey to factionalism, corruption, and extremism. Therefore, they preferred delaying implementation of the preferred strategy until many of the current variables and assumptions could be clarified. Also, any proposals to change had to be related to a coherent regional strategy. Until they saw substantial evidence of moderation by North Korea, the outcome of the Vietnam War could be foreseen more clearly, and the likelihood of achieving desired ROK force goals became more nearly a reality, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not endorse the preferred strategy. They did agree to limited participation by JCS representatives in interagency discussions “at [the] present slow pace.” On 26 September, the SIG directed that interagency deliberations continue, with full-time participation by a representative from each Service and from the Joint Staff. But the pace was slow enough for the Johnson administration to leave office without reaching any decisions about Korean policy.

Returning to immediate problems, firefights along the DMZ cost the United States 12 killed and 41 wounded during 1968. In July, General Bonesteel and Admiral McCain reported that another 29,592 personnel were needed to “round out and modernize” Eighth Army and to permit sustained operations. On 17 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated to Secretary Clifford their recommendation for an 8,500-man increase “as soon as possible.” They acknowledged, though, that Eighth Army’s need had to be considered within the context of meeting Vietnam requirements, increasing Allied Command Europe’s readiness, improving the strategic reserve, and adjusting to budgetary and balance-of-payments restrictions. Once again, Deputy Secretary Nitze deferred action.

At last, after long and acrimonious negotiations, the Pueblo’s crew won release. This was done through an arrangement in which the United States simultaneously tendered and repudiated an apology. At Panmunjom, on 23 December 1968, Major General Gilbert Woodward, USA, read the following statement:

The position of the United States Government . . . has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship intruded at any time into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. . . . I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.

Then he signed a statement that the Pueblo had “illegally intruded” into North Korea’s territorial waters and conducted “grave acts of espionage” for which the US Government
“solemnly apologizes.” That done, Commander Bucher and his crew were released from a brutal captivity and returned to American hands.

Japan: Burden-Sharing and the Reversion Issue

During the 1960s, Japan emerged as an economic powerhouse but remained a military mini-power. In January 1965, Secretary McNamara told Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that he believed Japan’s military and foreign aid budgets should be increased “four or five times in the next five, ten, fifteen years.” Japan, he continued, should consider sending substantial amounts of military and economic aid to the Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea. Sato replied that, while he was personally amenable, public support still had to be developed.

At that point, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) contained 13 divisions, each equivalent at most to a US brigade, enough warships to escort coastal and intra-island convoys, and 16 squadrons of F–86 and F–104 fighter interceptors. ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend priorities among Japanese defense missions and functions. Replying early in July, they said that neither the USSR nor China seemed likely to assault Japan except during general war, in which case the main dangers would be air and naval attacks. Hence Japan’s military priorities ought to be, in descending order: air defense, emphasizing all-weather capability; anti-submarine warfare; minesweeping; ground defense and supporting tactical fighters, reconnaissance, and airlift.

In August 1965, the State Department circulated a draft proposing how the US government should proceed. Since the limit upon Japan’s defense effort would be determined by what the Japanese themselves thought they needed, “our ability to affect the issue will remain minimal.” The administration should, therefore, acquiesce in Tokyo’s apparent decision to defer expanding its ground forces from 140,000 to 171,000 men, until Japanese public opinion seemed ready to support that step. Washington should even accept a reduction to 120,000 men, provided the savings were applied to force modernization. In fact, by adopting a laissez-faire attitude on defense policy, the United States might even gain greater leverage in encouraging the Japanese to increase economic aid to other nations. The Director, Joint Staff, commented that, while US pressure for greater defense efforts might prove counter-productive, “a policy of ‘acquiescence and no objection’ could be inimical to US and Japanese defense interests.”

From Tokyo, at Secretary McNamara’s suggestion, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer submitted an assessment of US-Japanese relations. The “violent popular reaction” to US intervention in Vietnam, he reported, meant the United States could not simply assume that the Security Treaty would be renewed routinely in 1970. Reischauer suggested taking account of Japanese reactions when making decisions about Vietnam, redefining the US-Japanese defense relationship, and encouraging Japan to undertake regional economic and political leadership. At Secretary Rusk’s suggestion, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed, the Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Far East
started studying the overall US-Japan strategic relationship as well as the JSDF’s size and missions. Its assessment of the overall relationship proved surprisingly optimistic. As for the JSDF, the Group recommended expanding its surveillance capability, improving anti-submarine warfare, harbor defense, minesweeping, and air defense forces, as well as modernizing (at a lower priority) ground and tactical air power. In May 1966, the Senior Interdepartmental Group approved these studies.89

Secretary McNamara wanted to reduce the US military presence in Japan. The last US F–102s left during 1965, making air defense a wholly Japanese responsibility.90 “We should now plan the next series of moves,” he told General Wheeler in June 1966. In preparation, Secretary McNamara asked for a list of all US units in Japan and an indication of which ones acted primarily as area defense forces.91 Unfortunately, the Secretary’s expectations proved to be exaggerated. No major units, General Wheeler replied, could be considered as directly and primarily concerned with the defense of Japan. Most were service support units, important in the context of contingency and general war plans. Their value, he claimed, had been reaffirmed in the Vietnam conflict.92 That assessment ended the Secretary’s hopes.

During 1967, the military balance-of-payments deficit with Japan totaled $473 million, a figure which special financial transactions reduced to $230 million. For 1968, the Japanese proposed cooperative actions amounting to $350 million. In July 1968, as part of an urgent effort to reduce that deficit, the State and Defense Departments launched a review of US base requirements in Japan. At State’s suggestion, Admiral McCain and Alexis Johnson, who had succeeded Edwin Reischauer as ambassador in Tokyo, oversaw this review. Late in September, they recommended releasing or relocating 54 installations, for a $2.6 million saving. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred.93

Meantime, however, General Wheeler discovered that Systems Analysis was considering cuts in bases and forces that would go far beyond the McCain-Johnson proposals. On 25 October 1968, he protested to Secretary Clifford that a study by Systems Analysis alone simply complicated interdepartmental work in progress and clouded the value of judgments being made about basic issues. Once again, as he saw it, Systems Analysis was proposing wide-ranging actions based on logic that was inconsistent with national strategy. Early in December, nonetheless, the Secretary circulated “tentative” proposals involving major cutbacks that included: closing Tachikawa, Atsugi, and Yamato air bases; reducing operations at Itazuki air base; returning Sasebo naval base to Japanese control; withdrawing three of eight Hawk missile battalions; and moving Marine support units from Okinawa back to CONUS. Annual savings should come to $181 million in budgetary and $72 million in balance-of-payments expenditures. But no major decisions resulted because, on 7 December, President Johnson communicated his concern that “in this last month we do not diminish our contribution by rash, eleventh-hour actions which have not been carefully considered at all levels of the government.”94

There remained one truly sore spot in US-Japanese relations: what to do about the Ryukyu and Bonin-Volcano Islands—basically, Okinawa and Iwo Jima? The 1951
Peace Treaty had awarded administering authority to the United States, with Japan retaining residual sovereignty. In July 1965, Ambassador Reischauer warned that the Okinawa issue “cannot be held on present terms for more than two years.” Secretary Rusk suggested, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported, a study of requirements in the Ryukyus. The Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Far East began work.95

In December 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Secretary McNamara their judgment that exclusive US control over the Ryukyus would remain essential for the foreseeable future. Reversion to Japan would “seriously impair the US military posture in the Far East.” Recent problems with Tokyo about using bases in Okinawa to support operations in Vietnam indicated what difficulties would arise if Japan regained administrative control. Taking account of China’s growing militancy, her growing nuclear capability, and the volatile situation in Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it “premature and unrealistic” to draft a timetable for reversion of the Ryukyus. They said, in fact, that Japanese officials recently had “gone out of their way” to give public assurances that they acquiesced in the continuation of full US control.96

In mid-1966, the Senior Interdepartmental Group tasked a working group with examining the problems of US base rights in the Ryukyus. It reported that, while Japanese pressure for reversion was rising, so was Japanese recognition of the longer-term value of US bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a set of recommendations which, on 13 September, the SIG approved as policy guidance.97

Early in 1967, the US High Commissioner in the Ryukyus recommended looking at other Ryukyu islands besides Okinawa. CINCPAC proposed, instead, giving attention to Guam and other islands in the Marianas which would remain under US control. At General Johnson’s urging, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a study of where (besides the Ryukyus) unrestricted base rights could be found. On 20 July, they advised Secretary McNamara that unrestricted access to Ryukyu bases remained “essential if US security interests in the Far East are to be protected through the foreseeable future.” They assessed the alternatives bleakly:

1. An orderly transfer of civil administration, in return for an agreement allowing the free deployment and employment of US forces, would be the least disruptive arrangement.
3. A base structure consisting of enclaves would be impractical, except as a last resort.
4. Relocation to other sites in the western Pacific would “seriously undermine” US capabilities. More significantly, $1 billion worth of assets on Okinawa would be lost, and $600 million would have to be spent on new construction.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the administration to press for continued exclusive control over the Ryukyus, as the price of US defense commitments to Japan. Back in September 1966, the SIG had ordered an assessment of fallback and alternative positions.
on the Ryukyus, such as partially or totally transferring administrative authority. The working group, in July 1967, reported that “special arrangements” between the two governments (i.e., exceptions to restrictions imposed by the Security Treaty) seemed “by far the preferred course.”98

Some kind of change looked unavoidable. During the spring of 1967, Japanese officials made clear that they wanted to begin discussions leading to (1) reversion of the Ryukyus perhaps by 1970 and (2) early return of the Bonin and Volcano Islands. Washington agreed to a joint study of the Bonin-Volcanoes’ military utility. Secretary McNamara asked for JCS views. Answering in June 1967, they said the Bonin-Volcanoes represented “an important strategic asset which should be retained by the United States.” Their value, while not readily apparent, became more evident as the political restrictions upon US forward bases increased. If satisfactory base rights in Japan and the Ryukyus failed to endure, retaining rights in the Bonin-Volcanoes would “salvage a measure of flexibility in the western Pacific.” Consequently, changes in status should be deferred until the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, embracing most of Micronesia, came under full US sovereignty.99 Meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored preserving US control, either by continuing the current arrangements or by resorting to outright purchase or long-term lease.100

With Prime Minister Sato due in Washington for a state visit, reversion of the Ryukyus and Bonin-Volcanoes became a prime topic. A State-Defense position paper, drafted in mid-August, outlined three options. One of them prescribed negotiations leading to early reversion of the Bonin-Volcanoes and, subsequently, of the Ryukyus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that another option, conducting exploratory discussions about reversion of the Ryukyus and adopting interim measures, most closely approximated their views.101

Late in October, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked President Johnson to approve early negotiations for returning the Bonin-Volcanoes but permitting US retention of Iwo Jima as a military base.102 The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred to maintain administrative rights for contingency purposes. As a fallback, however, they would agree to return all the Bonin-Volcanoes except Iwo and Chichi Jima, where the Service Chiefs wanted to preserve an option for storing nuclear weapons. Yielding those rights in the Bonin-Volcanoes, they feared, would make the Japanese more likely to refuse nuclear storage in Okinawa. After a White House meeting on 4 November, at which General Wheeler presented the Service Chiefs’ views, President Johnson approved negotiating an early return of the Bonin-Volcanoes, without an explicit exception for basing nuclear weapons.103

After discussions on 14–15 November 1967, President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato announced that their governments would “enter immediately into consultations … for accomplishing the early restoration of [the Bonin and Volcano] islands to Japan,” with the United States retaining those bases deemed mutually necessary. The reversion ceremony took place on 26 June 1968, with the United States retaining a Loran station on Iwo Jima.104
In their communiqué, the President and the Prime Minister agreed to keep the Ryukyus’ status “under continuing review, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over these islands to Japan.” Washington and Tokyo, Sato emphasized, should agree “within a few years” upon the date for complete reversion. But that date, as far as the administration was concerned, would depend upon developments in Vietnam. At Blair House, on 18 November, Secretary McNamara told Sato that reversion was “certain, but what was uncertain was the role of bases. We could not leave US forces exposed and unable to operate effectively.” With Tokyo’s support, the Ryukyuan legislature passed resolutions opposing the stationing of B-52s at Kadena Air Base. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended keeping them there, so that a rate of 1,800 sorties per month in Southeast Asia could be sustained. When Ambassador Johnson warned that US-Japanese relations might be souring, the President responded that “if our relationship was to survive in the long run, the Japanese would have to overcome their one-sided view of that relationship.” For Japanese, though, prompt reversion of Okinawa had become the overriding issue.

Catalysts of Change

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rightly saw Vietnam as the testing ground for close-in containment. As they wished, the war also froze deployments in Korea, the status of Taiwan, and the disposition of Okinawa. Essentially, the test of close-in containment failed when its cost proved much higher than the American public was willing to pay. President Nixon soon announced a lower military profile in Asia, started withdrawing troops from Vietnam and Korea, agreed to the reversion of Okinawa, and stressed self-reliance by US allies. Concurrently, armed clashes along the Sino-Soviet border led Mao Tse-tung to fear an encirclement of China. He acted to thaw Sino-American relations and President Nixon readily reciprocated. Practicing “triangular diplomacy” with Moscow and Peking, President Nixon created a new strategic environment in the Far East.
Conclusion

The years 1965–1968 marked a low point in the influence exercised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In *Dereliction of Duty*, H. R. McMaster characterized General Wheeler, General Johnson, Admiral McDonald, General McConnell, and General Greene as “five silent men.” Though not literally silent, their words carried little weight. General Johnson later described JCS influence as “minimal” and likened his own role to that of a frustrated spectator. While the air war against North Vietnam provided the most conspicuous example of minimal influence, there were a good many others. How did that situation come about, and what were the consequences?

Early in his tenure, President Johnson invited the Joint Chiefs of Staff to luncheon discussions. Vietnam changed their relationship, as the President decided that Secretary McNamara's strategy of applying graduated pressure offered the best hope of achieving limited objectives without risking major escalation. But the Service Chiefs began seeing the President less and less, leaving General Wheeler as the conduit for conveying their advice and receiving decisions.

According to one well-placed officer, President Eisenhower hoped the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 would strengthen the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and clarify that of the Secretary of Defense; instead, Secretary McNamara strengthened his role and clarified theirs. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for undiluted military requirements which inevitably exceeded the bounds of fiscal feasibility. The Secretary liked to say that he dealt with requirements rather than arbitrary budget ceilings—but, he added, he himself would have to validate those requirements. So, military men concluded, he did operate under a budget ceiling. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, not knowing what it was, had to probe for the underlying assumptions that would reveal it. For them, this constituted a crippling handicap. Without knowing the Secretary's limit, the services submitted inflated budget requests, which McNamara in turn cut in the name of cost-effectiveness.

The McNamara methodology, centering upon cost-effectiveness calculations, brought important benefits. In its early years, systems analysis obliged the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the services to become more rigorous about examining their own assumptions and conclusions. For military officers, however, Vietnam did much to discredit the entire approach. Civilians believed they could “program” the enemy because, logically, the leadership in Hanoi should have responded in certain ways to particular military pressures. But, military men countered, OSD excluded from its calculations the impact upon human lives; to them, that made all such analyses woefully incomplete. The failure of ROLLING THUNDER appeared to prove their point.

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, many DPMs seemed designed more to justify force levels pre-selected by OSD than to provide objective analyses. Admiral McDonald learned “not to raise the issue of experience before certain individuals because . . . that just made you parochial.” Senior Air Force officers became particularly alienated. As one general put it, “Our program is cost-effective no matter what the cost.” While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services adopted Secretary McNamara’s methodology, they often did so by creating categories into which they could fit whatever data would support their pre-determined goals.

Could the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recovered through Congress some of the clout they no longer wielded within the administration? In January 1965, President Johnson assured Congress that American military strength was “greater now than that of any combination of adversaries . . . assuring an indisputable margin of superiority for our defenses.” That December, with the Vietnam buildup well under way, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary McNamara that the program proposed for FY 1967 appeared “inadequate” to support operations in Southeast Asia as well as worldwide commitments and strategic concepts. Several days later, after learning that there would be a sizable FY 1966 supplemental request, they advised that “the programs supported by these budgets will improve our overall combat effectiveness and the readiness of our forces to safeguard the vital security interests of the United States.” However, actual and forecast drawdowns for Vietnam would “reduce our abilities to meet additional contingencies and commitments . . . to a serious but as yet undetermined extent in terms of time, size, and quality of response.” They reminded Secretary McNamara that failure to mobilize reserves and/or extend terms of service, which they always had assumed would occur in the event of protracted hostilities, was draining the strategic reserve, creating “substantial inadequacies” in the training and rotation base, and leaving some forces in Vietnam and elsewhere with less than the required rates of supply support.

Very likely, members of Congress did not deduce the extent of JCS unease. In February 1966, during hearings before the Armed Services Committee, Senator Richard Russell asked whether the proposed FY 1967 budget would provide adequately for the security of the United States “in the face of the threats as we now see them.” General Wheeler answered that it would. How could his answer be reconciled with the assessments above? Presumably, the statements were delivered on different planes. Volume I of JSOP 69-76, approved in July 1966, stated that the overall strategic balance “favors” the Free World. The J–5’s draft had said only “appears to favor.” The Joint Chiefs of
Conclusion

Staff changed this to "favors" because, as Admiral McDonald emphasized, "It is the consensus of the intelligence community that the Soviet Union is in an inferior position to the United States and the Free World in the matter of strategic military power."10

In November 1966, as the FY 1968 budget cycle neared completion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send Secretary McNamara a "wrap-up" memorandum, stating that his force-level decisions reflected "a greater degree of risk than is considered warranted." Secretary McNamara made only a few minor concessions. In March 1967, during hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, Representative George Mahon asked whether the administration’s requests were adequate to assure the nation’s security. "My answer," General Wheeler responded, "is generally 'yes.'"11

In February 1968, confronting the Tet offensive and the USS Pueblo provocation when there was hardly any strategic reserve, Mahon questioned General Wheeler about the FY 1969 budget's adequacy. The Chairman called it "reasonably adequate," amplifying that "although it does not contain all the forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the individual members thereof, we are in agreement that this program will improve the readiness and overall combat effectiveness of our forces." He added that they wanted "somewhat larger" ground and tactical air forces.12

In open sessions before congressional committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear that they disagreed with their civilian superiors about the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, the deployment of ballistic missile defenses, and the role of civilian systems analysts. What General Wheeler did not make clear publicly was how far the budget and force levels chosen by Secretary McNamara and approved by President Johnson fell short of what they desired. Taken at face value, his congressional testimony on those issues was not alarmist. When the Chairman testified, however, he chose to discuss what could be done within the limits imposed by the civilian leadership. President Johnson had decided to wage the Vietnam War without moving the country toward a wartime footing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed, repeatedly but vainly, for substantial reserve mobilization and for greater expansion of the active forces. In fact, military versus civilian differences were large and persisting.

Resignation—more precisely, requesting retirement in mid-tour—offered the final recourse. In July 1965, the President’s refusal to mobilize reserves so upset General Johnson that he considered resigning. Several times, Admiral McDonald said to his executive assistant, "I think I'll just turn in my suit. I just don't think I can do this any longer." Ultimately, both men reasoned that their resignations would not compel changes in policy, and that they could do more good by staying in their jobs than by leaving them. Years later, though, General Johnson deemed himself guilty of a "lapse in moral courage."13

To sum up, even after excluding Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff lost more bureaucratic battles than they won. Strategic nuclear forces no longer could be considered "superior" to those of the Soviet Union, being sized instead to meet Secretary McNamara's criterion of "assured destruction." Conventional forces clearly were incapable of waging two wars. Arms control, though, stands as an area where the Joint Chiefs of
Staff continued to exercise significant influence. Without their endorsement, no treaty was likely to win Senate approval. Thus they along with AEC played an important part in blocking threshold and comprehensive test bans; the non-proliferation treaty accommodated their objections.

On NATO matters, the administration stood united in opposing major withdrawals of US forces from Western Europe. A debate over dual-basing air and ground units ended with decisions that were closer to JCS than to OSD recommendations, although the differences in any case were not great. The Joint Chiefs of Staff persuaded Secretary McNamara to approve 90-day stockpiling objectives, yet that goal remained out of reach and far exceeded what the allies were willing to support. Whether Allied Command Europe could conduct a successful initial conventional defense remained debatable. The JCS appraisal was rather pessimistic, the OSD appraisal much more optimistic.

In the Middle East, after the Six Day War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew increasingly concerned about US over-identification with Israel. The costs of a close association with Israel, they felt, would outweigh any conceivable advantages. But the President, perhaps with domestic political considerations in mind, proved willing to accept these costs. In East Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wholeheartedly supported “close-in” containment of China. Thus they opposed reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, largely because they viewed bases on Okinawa as a keystone of the effort in Southeast Asia. Their role in Korean events is more complex. While they wanted a stronger military posture than the administration would allow, the Pueblo was not lost for lack of aircraft to attempt a rescue. Rather, the Pueblo was captured because the danger had been misjudged and no aircraft were on strip alert. Having approved Pueblo’s mission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not avoid some responsibility for the result.

Vietnam ultimately shattered the Cold War consensus, blighting many reputations. As the anti-war groundswell grew, so did resentment against all those deemed responsible for launching such a horrible misadventure. A fair part of the American public took the Tet offensive to be final proof of military incompetence. Pentagon debates became irrelevant, in a sense, because a disillusioned Congress started imposing increasingly strict limits upon defense spending. The era that had opened with President Kennedy’s promise that Americans would “pay any price, bear any burden . . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty” closed with President Johnson’s poignant appeal for an end to the Vietnam-spawned “division in the American house.” But disarray and distrust, within the government as well as without, were among the main legacies of that troubled time. From that perspective, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ranked among the many losers.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAI</td>
<td>Authorized Active Inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>anti-ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSAN</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMSA</td>
<td>Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Congolaise</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>anti-submarine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIOT</td>
<td>British Indian Ocean Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>battalion landing team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Strike Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVFORJAPAN</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSIXTHFLT</td>
<td>Commander, Sixth Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>comprehensive test ban treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLGN</td>
<td>nuclear-powered guided-missile destroyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defense Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPM</td>
<td>Draft Presidential Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPQ</td>
<td>Defense Planning Questionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENDC</td>
<td>Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDL</td>
<td>fast deployment logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNR</td>
<td>Government of National Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, USEUCOM</td>
<td>Headquarters, US European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Inter-American Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAPF</td>
<td>Inter-American Peace Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>Improved Manned Interceptor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRG</td>
<td>Inter-departmental Regional Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLRSS</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Reconnaissance Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (general-purpose)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>landing ship, tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAM</td>
<td>Military Assistance Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASF</td>
<td>Military Assistance, Service Funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBFR</td>
<td>mutual and balanced force reductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLF</td>
<td>multilateral force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Major NATO Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMILPO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Posture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVEUR</td>
<td>Naval Forces, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFZ</td>
<td>nuclear-free zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Policy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>non-proliferation treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJCS</td>
<td>Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTH</td>
<td>over-the-horizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oil, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>planning-programming-budgeting system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAC</td>
<td>President's Science Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRA</td>
<td>quick-reaction alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFORGER</td>
<td>Return of Forces to Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAD</td>
<td>Reorganization Objective, Army Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Re-entry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACNATO</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM-D</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile, Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAD</td>
<td>subsonic cruise armed decoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>Senior Interdepartmental Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNDV</td>
<td>strategic nuclear delivery vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNIE</td>
<td>Special National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAM</td>
<td>short-range air-to-surface missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRAF</td>
<td>Strategic Army Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRICOM</td>
<td>Strike Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>terms of reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>Unit Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>US Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSTOL</td>
<td>very short takeoffs and landing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief
Lyndon B. Johnson 22 Nov 63–20 Jan 69

Assistant to the President for
(National Security Affairs)
McGeorge Bundy 20 Jan 61–27 Feb 66
Walt W. Rostow 01 Apr 66–20 Jan 69

Secretary of State
Dean Rusk 20 Jan 61–20 Jan 69

Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara 20 Jan 61–29 Feb 68
Clark M. Clifford 01 Mar 68–20 Jan 69

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Cyrus R. Vance 28 Jan 64–30 Jun 67
Paul Nitze 01 Jul 67–20 Jan 69

Assistant Secretary of Defense for
(International Security Affairs)
Paul H. Nitze 20 Jan 61–29 Nov 63
William P. Bundy 29 Nov 63–14 Mar 64
John T. McNaughton 01 Jul 64–19 Jul 67
Paul C. Warnke 01 Aug 67–15 Feb 69

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 01 Oct 62–01 Jul 64
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA 03 Jul 64–02 Jul 70

Chief of Staff, US Army
General Earle G. Wheeler 01 Oct 62–02 Jul 64
General Harold K. Johnson 03 Jul 64–02 Jul 68
General William C. Westmoreland 03 Jul 68–30 Jun 72
JCS and National Policy

Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral George W. Anderson 0 Aug 61–01 Aug 63
Admiral David L. McDonald 01 Aug 63–01 Aug 67
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 01 Aug 67–01 Jul 70

Chief of Staff, US Air Force
General Curtis E. LeMay 30 Jun 61–31 Jun 65
General John P. McConnell 01 Feb 65–01 Aug 69

Commandant, US Marine Corps
General David M. Shoup 01 Jan 60–31 Dec 63
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. 01 Jan 64–31 Dec 67
General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. 01 Jan 68–31 Dec 71
Notes

Chapter 1. Overview: Vietnam’s Impact


6. Rain and sleet forced the cancellation of a fly-over; Johnson and McNamara were briefly stuck in a Pentagon elevator; and the public address system failed to amplify dignitaries’ tributes. But as McNamara walked through a crown of applauding well-wishers, tears filled his eyes. NY Times, 1 Mar 68, p. 1.

7. Clifford focused on Vietnam, leaving most other issues to Deputy Secretary Paul H. Nitze, who had been Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) during 1961–64 and Secretary of the Navy during 1964–67.

8. Time, 22 Feb 65, p. 22.


10. When Wheeler advanced from Chief of Staff to Chairman, Gen. Barksdale Hamlett who was Vice Chief of Staff would have been a logical choice to replace Wheeler. However, Hamlett suffered a heart attack and retired.


17. Back at the Pentagon, Wheeler quipped that they were served tough liver.


23. JCSM-514-66 to SecDef, 16 Aug 66, JCS 1920/18, JMF 3110 (27 Jul 66).

24. The sixteen included: Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces; General Purpose Forces; Land Forces; Tactical Air Forces; Antisubmarine Warfare Forces; Escort Ship Forces; Amphibious Forces; Mobility Forces; NATO Strategy and Force Structure; and Asia Strategy and Force Structure.

25. New obligational authority refers to the amount appropriated by Congress, including cash and new contract authorizations, minus appropriations to meet commitments such as previously unfinanced contract authorizations falling due during the current fiscal year. Expenditure or outlay means payment of bills or cash withdrawals from the Treasury.

26. CNOM-293-65 to JCS, 10 Dec 65, JCS 2143/268; CSAFM-T-57-65 to JCS, 22 Dec 65; JMF 3130 (10 Dec 65) sec. 1.

27. Note to Control Div., “JCS 2143/268,” 22 Dec 65; JCSM-15-66 to SecDef, 10 Jan 66, JCS 2143/268-1; JMF 3130 (10 Dec 65) sec. 1. In 1967, for JSOP 69-76, Parts I-V were presented as “Volume I”; Part VI became “Volume II.”


32. The second and third sentences in para (2) were added at Gen. Wheeler’s instigation. JCS 2143/233, 15 Jul 64; Chairman’s Flimsy 13-64 to JCS, 22 Jul 64; JMF 3130 (15 Jul 64) sec. 1. CF-17-64 to JCS, 30 Jul 64; Note to Control Div., Jt. Secretariat, “JCS 2143/233 (JSOP-70 Parts I-V),” 5 Aug 64; Decision On JCS 2143/233, Parts I-V of JSOP-70, 5 Aug 64; same file, sec. 2.

33. Cited in JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/540-2, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 2.

34. JCSM-866-65 to SecDef, 8 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-8, JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 2.


Notes to Pages 12–19

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Feb 66, JCS 2343/760-1, JMF 9155.3 (24 Jan 66) sec. 1. JCSM-130-66 to SecDef, 1 Mar 66, JCS 2343/760-5, same file, sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Apr 66, JCS 2343/760-13, same file, sec. 8.

39. Chapter 9 describes the US intervention in the Dominican Republic.

40. JSCP-68, circulated via SM-998-66 to CSA et al., 22 Dec 66, JMF 3120 (17 Dec 66).

41. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, book 3, transmitted via JCSM-167-67 to SecDef, 1 Apr 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1C.


47. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 May 68, JCS 2458/401; JCSM-369-68 to SecDef, 14 Jun 68, JCS 2458/401-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 68, JCS 2458/401-4; JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1. JCSM-649-68 to SecDef to CJCS, 1 Nov 68, JCS 2458/401-5, same file, sec. 2.


Chapter 2. Strategic Nuclear Forces: The End of US Superiority


3. These figures are cited in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, pp. 177, 192, 199, and 288.


7. The 1,200 figure is cited in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, p. 192. All 41 boats were scheduled to be in commission by 1967. Ibid, p. 354.

8. SM-175-65 to CINCAI et al., 24 Feb 65, JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65) sec. 1A. JCSM-131-65 to SecDef, 1 Mar 65, JCS 2143/248; CM-461-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65, same file, sec. 1.

10. The methodology underlying these calculations is explained in Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Enthoven was Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) from September 1965 until January 1969. His office prepared the DPMs dealing with strategic offensive and defensive forces.


12. JCSM-626-665 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 1800/961-1, JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 1. DOD Directive 3200.9, issued in July 1965, broke the acquisition process into three phases: first, “concept formulation” beginning with validation of the requirement, moving next from exploratory development into advanced development covering all components and subsystem hardware that were undergoing experimental tests, then culminating with preparation of a technical development plan; second, “contract definition,” in which approval of the plan would be followed by engineering development; and third, “development,” meaning that following approval for production and deployment, the operational development of systems, support programs, vehicles, and weapons would begin.


14. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 Oct 65, JCS 1800/961-4; Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Nov 65, JCS 1800/961-7; JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 2. Intelligence estimates are printed in *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 10, p. 288.


17. JCSM-167-66 and CM-1279-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JCS 2143/277, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 1. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, same file, sec. 1B.


20. CJCS Special Studies Group, “Alternative Strategic Force Applications,” 15 Jun 66, JMF 3340 (22 Jan 66) sec. 1A. CM-1547-66 to SecDef, 20 Jun 66, JCS 2056/437-2; JCSM-461-66 to SecDef, 13 Jul 66, JCS 2056/437-7; same file, sec. 1. OSD concurrence was given in Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 24 Sep 66, JCS 2056/437-8, same file, sec. 1.

21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 27 Jul 66, JCS 2458/115, JMF 7130 (27 Jul 66) sec. 1. The number of SLBMs actually online would not reach 656 because submarines would have to be put in drydock for lengthy conversions.

22. In a recent war game, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha and the Joint War Games Agency in Washington had calculated fatalities under conditions of US pre-emption to be 85 to 87 million Americans and 103 to 105 million Soviets. If the Soviets struck first, fatalities would be 98 to 103 million for the US and 83 to 99 million for the USSR. “Briefing of the Report of the SIOP-4 War Game,” 2 Jul 66, JMF 386 (27 Feb 67) sec. 1A.
23. JCSM-555-66 to SecDef, 31 Aug 66, JCS 2458/115-2, JMF 7130 (27 Jul 66) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 Nov 66, JCS 2458/115-7; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 10 Feb 67, JCS 2458/115-17; same file, sec. 3.

24. Chapter 3 fully covers the ABM debate.


27. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Jan 67, JCS 2101/534-7, JMF 4610 (15 Sep 66) sec. 1.

28. Ltr, DSTP to DJS, 5 Apr 66, JMF 3105 (23 Mar 66).


31. JCSM-599-66 to SecDef, 22 Sep 66, JCS 2056/451-1, JMF 3340 (4 Aug 66). Available records indicate that McNamara did not pursue the matter any further.

32. Encl C to JCS 2056/446-2, 7 Sep 66; SM-754-66 to DSTP, 15 Sep 66, JCS 2056/442-2; JMF 3105 (21 Jun 66) sec. 1.


35. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Aug 67, JCS 2458/272, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1 (IR 1952).


38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 67, JCS 2458/309, JMF 560 (2 Aug 67) sec. 2. CM-2789-67 to SecDef, 27 Nov 67, JCS 2458/312-2, JMF 570 (6 Nov 67).

39. Minuteman and Polaris-to-Poseidon conversions would take some ICBMs and SLBMs offline.


41. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 1, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1. Transmitted via JCSM-196-68 to SecDef, 2 Apr 68, same file, sec. 1A.


43. OSD analysts had reduced the criteria for assured destruction from 30 percent down to 20-25 percent of the Soviet population. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 10, p. 283.

45. JCSM-520-68 to SecDef, 26 Aug 68, JCS 2458/428-1, JMF 560 (29 Jul 68). Printed in *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 10, pp. 734–737. Concurrently, in vol. 1 of JSOP 71-78, the Joint Chiefs stated that the Soviets were “attempting to achieve a superior posture.” The J–5 draft had said simply that the Soviets were “attempting to improve their strategic posture.” The change in language came about at Gen. McConnell’s urging. Interestingly, during the drafting of JSOP 70-77, McConnell had tried and failed to add a statement that “the Soviets could be seeking, over the long term, . . . a credible first strike capability against the United States.” JSOP 71-78, vol. 1, circulated via SM-456-68 to CSA et al., 26 Jul 68; CSAFM-28-68 to JCS, 26 Jun 68; JMF 511 (13 Jun 68) sec. 1. CSAFM-B-26-67 to JCS, 8 Aug 67, JMF 511 (27 Jul 67) sec. 1.

46. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Jan 69, JCS 2458/428-7, JMF 560 (28 Jul 68) sec. 4.

47. *Development of Strategic Air Command: 1946–1986*, p. 151. In 1969, the first FB–111A entered service but the program was pared back to 60. The last B–58 was retired in 1970 and SCAD was terminated in 1973.


**Chapter 3. Losing the ABM Debate**


2. JCSM-131-65 to SecDef, 1 Mar 65, JCS 2143/248; CM-461-65 to SecDef, 3 Mar 65; JMF 3130 (1 Feb 65).

3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jul 65, JCS 1800/961; JCSM-626-65 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 1800/961-1; JMF 7000 (14 Jul 65) sec. 1.

4. DEPEX is described in Encl E to JCS 2012/257-2, JMF 4714 (1 Oct 65).

5. In fact, the Chinese deployed their missiles in mountainous areas where they were hard to detect and destroy.


7. The report stated that it “attempted to focus on the technical aspects of the problem” but “recognizes . . . that some of the broader issues . . . must weigh heavily in any final decision on deployment.” *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 10, p. 275.


12. JCSM-167-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JCS 2143/277, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 1. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, 22 Mar 66, same file, sec. 1B.
23. Negotiation of the NPT is described in chap. 5.
27. The pin-down phenomenon made missiles liable to destruction if they were launched into an atmosphere filled with debris created by high-altitude nuclear explosions. The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff developed a “control time launch” concept designed to minimize this vulnerability. It was hoped that, by 1972, most ICBMs could be hardened against pin-down effects. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Nov 67, JCS 2056/470, JCSM-652-67 to SecDef, 22 Nov 67, JCS 2056/470-1; JMF 480 (1 Nov 67) sec.1.
32. JCSM-520-68 to SecDef, 26 Aug 68, JCS 2458/428-1, JMF 560 (29 Jul 68) sec. 1. Memo, Dep-SecDef to CJCS, 9 Jan 69, JCS 2458/428-7, same file, sec. 1, pt. 4. On 1 December 1968, continental defense forces included 304 manned interceptors in seventeen squadrons (six of F–101s, one of
F–102, one of F–104s, and nine of F–106s), plus substantial numbers of Hawks and Nike-Hercules SAMs. *CONAD Command History: 1968*, pp. xv, xvi.


**Chapter 4. The Overstretching of Conventional Capabilities**

1. Figures are from JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/540-2, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 2. Usually, three USAF tactical fighter squadrons comprised a wing.


3. During July and August 1950, the Army called up 93,586 officers and enlisted men from reserve components, including four National Guard divisions, for 21 months. The Air Force activated 49,672 reservists. By the end of 1950, 167,000 veterans enrolled in the Army’s inactive reserve had been mobilized. Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950–1951* (University Press of Kansas, 2010), pp. 204, 155.


6. ROAD (Reorganization Objective, Army Division) with three brigades and six to fifteen battalions had replaced the smaller and less powerful “pentomic” division built tailored for tactical nuclear combat and built around five battle groups of 1,350 men each.

7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 Jul 65, JCS 1800/954; JCSM-596-65 to SecDef, 31 Jul 65, JCS 1800/954-1; JMF 7000 (8 Jul 65).


10. Emphasis on Marine Corps issues derives from the fact that General Greene kept a detailed daily record while General Johnson did not.


12. General Johnson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 3 May 79, JHO.


14. A Marine division/wing team usually came under the operational control of a Marine Expeditionary Force. In Vietnam, MEF was changed to Marine Amphibious Force to avoid any association with the French Expeditionary Force of the earlier war. Thus the 3rd Marine Division was under operational control of III MAF. Definitions provided by Dr. Graham Cosmas.

16. Chapter 9 describes the Dominican intervention.


19. These figures, taken from the November DPM, are a bit higher than those in the June paper. Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 1800/953-5, 2 Nov 65, JMF 7000 (6 Jul 65) sec. 2.

20. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 26 Jun 65, JCS 1800/949, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Jul 65, JCS 1800/953, JMF 7000 (6 Jul 65) sec. 1. JCSM-595-65 to SecDef, 31 Jul 65, JCS 1800/953-1, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 1. JCSM-570-65 to SecDef, 23 Jul 65, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 1. The Navy advocated, and the JCS supported, having nuclear-powered rather than oil-fired carriers. OSD balked at first, citing higher initial costs. McNamara began relenting when it appeared possible to run a carrier with two nuclear reactors rather than four with shorter-lived nuclear fuel cores. He finally accepted nuclear-powered carriers only after tough bargaining with the JCS that involved other issues. Francis Duncan, *Rickover and the Nuclear Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 133–146. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 65, JCS 1800/949-3, JMF 7000 (26 Jun 65) sec. 2. Information from Dr. Edward Drea.

21. The A–4 was a subsonic attack aircraft.

22. JCSM-814-65 to SecDef, 10 Nov 65, JCS 2343/640-2, JMF 9155.3 (23 Jul 65) sec. 2.

23. Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 2458/42-7, 7 Dec 65, JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 2.

24. JSOP-70, pt. 6, sec. B, 1 Mar 65, JMF 3130 (1 Mar 65) sec. 1A.

25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 65, JCS 2458/4, JMF 7000 (4 Oct 65).


27. In the final DPM, these figures became 80 percent and 16 percent for the Barents barriers, 55 percent and 25 percent for the Pacific ones.

28. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jun 65, JCS 1800/950, JMF 7000 (28 Jun 65) sec. 1.


31. JSOP-70, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, JMF 3130 (1 Mar 65) sec. 1A. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jun 65, JCS 1800/937; JCSM-531-65 to SecDef, 6 Jul 65, JCS 1800/937-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Sep 65, JCS 1800/937-1; Draft Memo, SecDef to Pres, n.d., JCS 1800/937-3; JMF 7000 (3 Nov 65). JCSM-814-65 to SecDef, 10 Nov 65, JCS 2343/640-2, JMF 9155.3 (23 Jul 65) sec. 3.


34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Feb 66, JCS 2343/760-1, JMF 9155.3 (24 Jan 66) sec.1. JCSM-130-66 to SecDef, 1 Mar 66, JCS 2343/760-5, same file, sec. 3.

35. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Apr 66, JCS 2343/760-13, JMF 9155.3 (24 Jan 66) sec. 8.


37. JCSM-590-66 to SecDef, 15 Sep 66, JCS 2458/127, JMF 7130 (19 Aug 66) sec. 1.
38. JCSM-646-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2343/887-2, JMF 9155 (24 Aug 66) sec. 2. In October, on its own initiative, Congress passed legislation authorizing the President to call up reserves without declaring a state of national emergency.


41. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Jul 66, JCS 2458/112, JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 1.

42. CSAM-375-66 to JCS, 18 Aug 66; JCSM-534-66 to SecDef, 24 Aug 66, JCS 2458/112-1; JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 1.

43. This is described in chap. 7.

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Jul 66, JCS 2458/112-4, JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 3.

45. JCSM-646-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2343/887-2, JMF 9155 (24 Aug 66) sec. 2.

46. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, vol. 2, sec. B, App F, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 1C. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Aug 66, JCS 2458/120, JMF 7130 (5 Aug 66) sec. 1. In FY 1968, according to OSD calculations, two divisions and 596,000 tons of supplies could be moved to Europe within thirty days; in FY 1972, 5 1/3 divisions and 964,000 tons.

47. JSOP 68-75, pt. 6, vol. 2, transmitted via JCSM-167-66 to SecDef, 22 Mar 66, JMF 3130 (10 Feb 66) sec. 2. JCSM-565-66 to SecDef, 8 Sep 66, JCS 2458/120-1, JMF 7130 (5 Aug 66) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 1 Oct 66, JCS 2458/120-5, same file, sec. 5.


49. In April, the ASW Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee had contradicted Navy and OSD assessments by concluding that “our overall ASW capability is very poor in relation to what we should expect from a program which costs the nation approximately $3 billion per year. The principal reason seems to us to be an inability to take full advantage of the technical opportunities available to us, which is directly traceable to management policy which in effect gives excessive emphasis to quantity, to the relative neglect of quality … in force development.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 10, pp. 378, 385.

50. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Jul 66, JCS 2458/112; JCSM-534-66 to SecDef, 24 Aug 66, JCS 2458/112-1; JMF 7130 (22 Jul 66) sec. 1.

51. These ships would have ASW plus anti-air capability along with enough speed to accompany fast carriers, as distinct from smaller ASW destroyers designed mainly to protect slower convoys.


53. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jun 66, JCS 2458/102; JCSM-485-66 to SecDef, 29 Jul 66, JCS 2458/102-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 22 Aug 66, JCS 2458/102-3; JMF 7130 (28 Jun 66). In FY 1968, there would be 165 amphibious assault and six gunfire support ships; in FY 1969, dropping the Southeast Asia augmentation, 138 and six.

54. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 3, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec 1C. The Army had enough independent brigades to allow 26 division-equivalents.


57. Yet the NATO DPM circulated almost simultaneously claimed that prompt mobilization could keep Allied Command Europe abreast of the Warsaw Pact, and it listed three US reserve divisions among the available reinforcements. The discrepancy went undetected, probably because the DPMs were drafted by different offices in OSD and reviewed by different offices in the Joint Staff.

58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 May 67, JCS 2458/243, JMF 560 (29 May 67) sec. 1.

59. JCSM-368-67 to SecDef, 24 Jun 67, JCS 2458/243-7, JMF 560 (29 May 67) sec. 2.


61. CSAM-261-67 to SecDef, 31 Jul 67, JCS 2101/539; JCS 2101/539-2, 14 Aug 67; CSAFM-B-41-67 to JCS, 15 Aug 67; Notes to Control Div., “JCS 2101/539-2, Strategic Reserve Reconstitution,” 15, 16, and 18 Aug 67; JMF 373 (31 Jul 67). The date of decision to activate the 6th Division was provided by John Wilson, Center of Military History. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 9 Jan 68, JCS 2458/248-23, JMF 560 (29 May 67) sec. 6.

62. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bks. 4 and 5, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) secs. 1D and 1E.

63. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Jun 67, JCS 2458/256, JMF 560 (23 Jun 67) sec. 1.

64. JCSM-417-67 to SecDef, 22 Jul 67, JCS 2458/265-5, JMF 560 (23 Jun 67) sec. 2.

65. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jan 68, JCS 2458/252-5, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).

66. JSOP 69-76, vol. 2, bk. 5, 7 Mar 67, JMF 511 (7 Mar 67) sec. 1F.

67. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jul 67, JCS 2458/263, JMF 560 (14 Jul 67) sec. 1.

68. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 3 Jan 68, JCS 2458/263-8, JMF 560 (14 Jul 67) sec. 3.


70. JCSM-479-67 to SecDef, 26 Aug 67, JCS 2458/273, JMF 567 (2 Aug 67) sec. 1.

71. Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 26 Aug 67, JCS 2458/279; “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 5 Jan 68, JCS 2458/279-7, JMF 465 (24 Aug 67).


73. JCSM-396-67 to SecDef, 13 Jul 67, JCS 2458/252-1, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).

74. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jan 68, JCS 2458/252-2, JMF 560 (16 Jun 67).


79. The origin and execution of “Reforger” are described in chap. 6.
80. DJSM-380-68 to JCS, 2 Apr 68. CSAM-173-68 to JCS, 3 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542; Note to Control, “Strategic Army Forces,” 3 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542-2; JCSM-215-68 to SecDef, 6 Apr 68, JCS 2101/542-1; JMF 379 (3 Apr 68).

81. MFR by SJCS, “Possible Actions to Increase Worldwide US and Allied Military Strength,” 5 Feb 68, JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 1. JCS 2101/540-1, 12 Mar 68; Note to Control, “JCS 2101/540-1,” 14 Mar 68; JCSM-221-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2101/540-2; JMF 372 (6 Feb 68) sec. 2. Subsequently, Clifford inquired what further forces could be sent to Vietnam if the enemy launched another major offensive. The JCS listed four Army brigades, none sustainable on a permanent basis. The Marine Corps could make 1 1/9 division/wing teams available by revising rotation policies and extending tours of duty. For a 30-day surge, the Navy could furnish two attack carriers, two cruisers, and six destroyers. The Air Force’s capability was limited to two F–100 squadrons. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 May 68, JCS 2472/291; JCSM-315-68 to SecDef, 21 May 68, JCS 2472/291-1; JMF 911/372 (13 May 68). The enemy did launch offensives in May and August, each weaker than the last. By the end of August, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were pulling back while US and allied forces prepared to take the initiative. Cosmas, JCS and the War in Vietnam: 1960–1968, pt. 3, p. 203.

82. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 3, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2143/324, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1C.


84. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Jan 69, JCS 2458/406-10, JMF 560 (28 May 68) sec. 3.

85. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bks. 4 and 5, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2143.324, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) secs. 1D and 1E.

86. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2458/426, JMF 560 (23 Jul 68) sec. 1.

87. JCSM-510-68 to SecDef, 21 Aug 68, JCS 2458/426-3, JMF 560 (23 Jul 68) sec. 2. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 13 Jan 69, JCS 2458/426-7, same file, sec. 3.

88. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 6, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1F. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2458/426-7, same file, sec. 3.

89. JCSM-578-68 to SecDef, 24 Aug 68, JCS 2458/429-1, JMF 560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 1. JSOP and DPM airlift figures cannot be compared because the former used UE and the latter AAI.

90. The OSD methodology is described in Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, pp. 225–234.

91. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 5, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1E. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Jul 68, JCS 2458/429, JMF 560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 1. JSOP levels included a Southeast Asia augmentation of 15 escorts for FYs 1970-73. Because Nitze’s DPM listed only FY 1970 additions, the JSOP levels cited above have been similarly restricted. The same formula applies to amphibious assault forces below.

92. JCSM-578-68 to SecDef, 24 Aug 68, JCS 2458/429-1, JMF 560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 1.

93. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 15 Jan 69, JCS 2458/429-5, JMF 560 (30 Jul 68) sec. 3.

94. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 5, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1E. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 6 May 68, JCS 2458/396; JCSM-337-68 to SecDef, 29 May 68, JCS 2458/396-1; “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Jan 69, JCS 2458/396-4; JMF 560 (6 May 68).
95. JSOP 70-77, vol. 2, bk. 5, 15 Mar 68, JMF 511 (15 Mar 68) sec. 1E. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 12 Jun 68, JCS 2458/413, JMF 560 (12 Jun 68) sec. 1.

96. JCSM-434-68 to SecDef, 10 Jul 68, JCS 2458/413-2, JMF 560 (12 Jun 68) sec. 1. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jan 69, JCS 2458/413-6, same file, sec. 2. LHA funding, originally programmed for FY 1968, had been postponed by Congress.

97. JCSM-548-68 to SecDef, 14 Sep 68, JCS 2147/475-1, JMF 372 (5 Sep 68).

98. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 Oct 68, JCS 2147/475-2, JMF 372 (5 Oct 68).

99. Ltr, Walt W. Rostow to Willard J. Webb, 13 Sep 84, JHO. Comparing Rostow’s speculation with General Johnson’s above shows the difficulty of identifying the President’s motives.

Chapter 5. Arms Control Inches Forward


2. CM-450-65 to McGeorge Bundy, 24 Feb 65, copy from Lyndon B. Johnson Library in OSD Historical Office. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 216-217. Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 143–145. The arms control agenda stayed crowded enough that, in February 1966, Gen. Wheeler proposed to McNamara (1) raising the minimum time for JCS review from seven to fourteen days, except in unusual circumstances, and (2) placing all position papers before Committee members or their deputies for discussion and approval. OSD asked ACDA to put any new proposals formally before the Committee, thereby ensuring adequate time for review. Note to Control, “JCS Consideration of ACDA Proposals,” 14 Jan 66; CM-1183-66 to SecDef, 15 Feb 66, JCS 1731/916-1; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to Acting Dir, ACDA, 10 Feb 66, JCS 1731/916; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 22 Feb 66, JCS 1731/916-1; JMF 3050 (10 Feb 66).

3. CM-350-64 to DJS, 31 Dec 64, JCS 1731/851; JCS 1731/851-1, 15 Feb 65, and Decision On, 24 Feb 65, JCS 1731/851-1; JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64). JCSM-348-65 to SecDef, 11 May 65, JCS 1731/851-1, JMF 3050 (24 Feb 65) sec. (A).


6. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Jul 65, JCS 1731/879-2; JCSM-601-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, JCS 1731/879-3; JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec. 1.

7. Ltr, SecDef to Acting Dir, ACDA, 7 Aug 65, JCS 1731/879-4, JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec. 1.


9. JCSM-645-65 to SecDef, 21 Aug 65, JCS 1731/886-1, JMF 3050 (11 Aug 65). Gen. Johnson wanted to protest “the gross violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty by the Soviets on 15 January 1965.” US monitors had detected “a certain amount of venting” caused by an underground test, but there were enough complicating factors for the administration to accept this as a miscalculation or, at least, lacking major significance. CSAM-393-65 to JCS, 20 Aug 65, same file. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, pp. 220–225.

and Spec Assts to Pres for Natl. Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, 16 Mar 66; same file, sec. 2.

11. These were: in-silo vulnerability to blast, shock, and possibly electro-magnetic pulses; launch phase vulnerability to gamma and X-rays; and vulnerability of re-entry vehicles. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 11, p. 313.

12. Rpt of the Ad Hoc Panel to the JCS through the CSAF, “Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals,” 14 Jan 66, CSAPM-4-34-66 to JCS, 14 Jan 66, JCS 1731/890-6, JMF 3050 (13 Sep 65) sec. 2. Subsequently, two panel members decried a tendency in the report to take a “most pessimistic” view of US and a “most optimistic” view of Soviet capabilities. JCSM-77-66 to SecDef, 3 Feb 6, JCS 1731/890-7; JCSM-78-66 to Dir, ACDA, et al., 3 Feb 66, JCS 1731-8907; JMF 3050 (13 Sep 65) sec. 1.

13. According to ACDA, a 4.75 reading equated to yields of 5 to 20 kilotons in hard rock and tuff and to more than 20 kilotons in dry alluvium.


15. Ltr, Actg Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 17 Feb 66, JCS 1731/905-6; Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 26 May 66, JCS 1731/932; JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec. 2.


17. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 May 66, JCS 1731/932-1; JCSM-379-66 to SecDef, 8 Jun 66, JCS 1731/932-3; JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec. 3.


19. They were referring to a recently discovered effect in the Polaris warhead’s nuclear safing system.


21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Mar 67, JCS 1731/960-1; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 27 Feb 67, JCS 1731/960-2; JMF 730 (18 Feb 67) sec. 1.


26. JCSM-66-65 to SecDef, 29 Jan 65, JCS 1731/852-2, JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64) (1).
27. Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 23 Feb 65, N/H of JCS 1731/852-2, 25 Feb 65, JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64) (1).


32. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Nov 65, JCS 1731/900; JCSM-839-65 to SecDef, 24 Nov 65, JCS 1731/900-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 Nov 65, JCS 1731/900-2; JMF 9000 (16 Nov 65) sec. 1.

33. JCS 1731/900-3, 25 Jul 66; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Jul 66, JCS 1731/940; JCSM-494-66 to SecDef, 1 Aug 66, JCS 1731/940; JMF 9000 (17 Nov 65).


35. The treaty would not have prohibited a fractional orbital bombardment system, which the Soviets were pursuing but later abandoned.


38. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 19 Jan 65, JCS 1731/855; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Jan 65, JCS 1731/855-1; JCS 1731/855-2, 6 Feb 65; CF-84-65 (Rev.), 11 Feb 65; JCSM-105-65 to SecDef, 13 Feb 65, JCS 1731/855-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Apr 65, JCS 1731/855-3; JMF 3050 (10 Jan 65).


41. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Jul 65, JCS 1731/878-1; JCSM-602-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, JCS 1731/878-2; JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) sec. 1.

42. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Aug 65, JCS 1731/878-4; JCSM-677-65 to SecDef, 10 Sep 65, JCS 1731/878-5; JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) sec. 1.

43. Dept. of State Bulletin, 20 Sep 65, pp. 474–475. On 8 November, the UN General Assembly passed without dissent a resolution urging that the NPT (1) “be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear
weapons in any form" and (2) "embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." Ibid., 20 Nov 65, p. 884.

44. Kosygin’s claim that plans for providing West Germany with access to nuclear weapons constituted “the main difference” between US and Soviet positions on non-proliferation, and Johnson’s rebuttal, are printed in *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 11, pp. 277–281, 297–300.

45. ACDA, *Documents on Disarmament: 1966*, pp. 5–8. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 18 Feb 66, JCS 1731/918; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Feb 66, JCS 1731/918-1; JCSM-138-66 to SecDef, 4 Mar 66, JCS 1731/918-2; JMF 3050 (18 Feb 66).

46. Memo, SecState to Cmte of Principals, 24 Jun 66, JCS 1731/938; JCSM-437-66 to SecDef, 29 Jun 66, JCS 1731/938-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 5 Jul 66, JCS 1731/938-2; Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to SecState, 8 Jul 66, JCS 1731/938-3; JMF 3050 (24 Jun 66).

47. Tactical aircraft and missiles were owned by the nation that bought them (e.g., West German F-104s); nuclear weapons, however, lay under the dual control of that country and the United States. Thus the US president held a veto power.


51. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 25 Nov 67, JCS 1731/989; CM-3023-68 to SecDef, 19 Feb 68, JCS 1731/989-1; JMF 750 (2 Feb 67). Curiously, a draft CM by the Director, Joint Staff, spoke of a Soviet-American “impasse” over negative assurances. DJSM-173-68 to CJCS, 14 Feb 68, same file.

52. JCSM-230-68 to SecDef, 11 Apr 68, JCS 1731/994, JMF 731 (2 Apr 68).

53. Memo, PDASD(ISA) to CJCS, 16 Apr 68, JCS 1731/994-1; JCSM-249-68 to SecDef, 17 Apr 68, JCS 1731/994-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Jun 68, JCS 1731/994-2; JMF 731 (2 Apr 68).


56. France did not sign the treaty but promised to honor it.

57. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 6 Feb 64, JCS 1731/790-1; JCSM-148-64 to SecDef, 22 Feb 64, JCS 1731/790-4; JMF 3050 (23 Jan 64)(A). Dept. of State *Bulletin*, 21 Sep 64, pp. 413–417.


60. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Aug 65, JCS 1731/880-1; JCSM-633-65 to SecDef, 14 Aug 65, JCS 1731/880-2; JMF 3050 (20 Jul 65) sec. 1.


62. NIE 11-6-65 stated, “Even in the face of determined Soviet concealment efforts, there is a good chance that violations involving large-scale testing or deployment would be detected, but this cannot be guaranteed. In view of our limited capabilities to detect the early phases of weapons programs, we cannot assure detection sufficiently timely to preclude attainment by

63. JCSM-14-66 to SecDef, 7 Jan 66, JCS 1731/907-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to Joseph Califano, 7 Jan 66, JCS 1731/907-2; JMF 3050 (5 Jan 66) sec. 2.

64. CM-442-66 to JCS, 2 Mar 65; SM-214-65 to Chmn, Special Studies Group, 10 Mar 65; JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 1. Rpt by CJCS Special Studies Group, “The Security Implications of a Freeze on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems,” 1 Dec 65, same file, sec. 1A.

65. CNOM-14-66 to JCS, n.d.; CSAM-35-66 to JCS, 22 Jan 66; “Dec On JCS 1731/862-5,” 2 Feb 66; JCSM-79-66 to SecDef, 4 Feb 66, JCS 1731/862-5; JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 1. OSD was provided with a sanitized version of the report via JCSM-128-66 to SecDef, 28 Feb 66, JCS 1731/862-9, same file, sec. 2A.

66. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 66, JCS 1731/862-6; JCSM-202-66 to SecDef, 1 Apr 66, JCS 1731/862-8; JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 2.

67. Memo, Dir, ACDA, to SecDef, 10 Mar 66, JCS 1731/880-8; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Mar 66, JCS 1731/880-9; CM-1270-66 to SecDef, 17 Mar 66, 1st N/H of JCS 1731/880-9, 18 Mar 66; Ltr, SecDef to Dir, ACDA, 31 Mar 66, JCS 1731/880-11; JMF 3050 (20 Jul 65) sec. 2.


70. JCSM-574-66 to SecDef, 10 Sep 66, JCS 1731/862-13, JMF 3050 (10 Mar 65) sec. 2.


74. Memo, Actg Dir, ACDA, to Cmte of Principals, 3 Mar 67, JCS 1731/966, JMF 755 (13 Jan 67), sec. 1. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 7 Mar 67, JCS 1731/966-1; JCSM-143-67 to SecDef, 14 Mar 67, JCS 1731/966-2; same file, sec. 2. Distribution of JCSM-143-67 to the White House and the Committee of Principals is recorded in Memo, M. W. Roche to CJCS, 24 Mar 67, N/H of JCS 1731/966-2, 28 Mar 67, same file.


78. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 67, JCS 1731/983; Notes to Control, “JCS 1731/983,” 25 and 30 Oct 67; JCSM-598-67 to SecDef, 2 Nov 67, JCS 1731/983-1; JMF 755 (13 Jan 67) sec. 2.


83. JCSM-498-68 and CM-3572-68 to SecDef, 9 Aug 68, JCS 2482/9-4, JMF 750 (29 Jul 68) sec. 2. Memo, CJCS to COMNAVPHIL for CNO, 10 Aug 68; JCS 2482/9-4; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Aug 68, JCS 388.3 US/Sov Msl Talks.


87. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 11, pp. 599–700. Msg, Draft Msg, SecState to US Mission NATO, 6 Sep 68; CM-3642-68 to SecDef, 10 Sep 68; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Sep 68, JCS 2482/920; JMF 750 (29 Jun 68) sec. 5. DJSM-1405-68 to CJCS, 18 Nov 68; CM-3822-68 to DJS, 10 Dec 68; JMF 021 (11 Jul 68). Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 12.

88. The term is described in chap. 4.


Chapter 6. NATO: Surviving Challenges from Within

1. Signatories were Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (i.e., West Germany), Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The heart of the treaty, Article V, stated that “an attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all.”


Notes to Pages 92–97

4. CSAFM-789-64 to JCS, 21 Sep 64, JCS 2278/78; JCSM-853-64 to SecDef, 8 Oct 64, JCS 2278/-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Nov 64, JCS 2278/78-2; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 21 Nov 64, JCS 2278/78-3; JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec. 1.


6. CSAFM-R-32-65 to JCS, 7 Apr 65, JCS 2278/78-5; Bfg Sheets for CJCS, “2278/78-5,” 16 and 20 Apr 65; SM-379-65 to LTG Goodpaster, 23 Apr 65, JCS 2278/78-5; JMF 9164 (21 Sep 64) sec. 2.

7. Ltr, SACEUR to JCS, 18 Aug 65, JCS 2450/68; JCS 2450/68-1, 17 Sep 65; JCSM-722-65 to SecDef, 27 Sep 65, JCS 2450/68-1; JMF 9050 (18 Aug 65). In November, the Army submitted a technical plan for developing an MRBM, but final abandonment of the MLF in December killed further action. Memo, LTG Mock to DJS, 30 Nov 65, JCS 2450/68-2, same file.

8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 May 64, JCS 2421/792; JCSM-523-64 to SecDef, 27 Jun 64, JCS 2421/792-1; JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec. 1. JCSM-402-65 to SecDef, 22 May 65, JCS 2278/83, JMF 9164 (13 May 65).


10. JCSM-627-65 to SecDef, 13 Aug 65, JCS 2278/84-5, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec. 2. OSD acknowledgement is in Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 25 Aug 65, JCS 2278/84-6, same file.


14. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 Jan 66, JCS 2278/91-1; JCSM-68-66 to SecDef, 1 Feb 66, JCS 2278/91-3; JMF 9164 (30 Dec 65). In December 1966, the North Atlantic Council created a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee to propose general policy and a smaller Nuclear Planning Group to “handle the detailed work.” Dept. of State *Bulletin*, 9 Jan 67, pp. 50–51. Creation of the NDAC and NPG is described in Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, chap. 14.


17. Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 18 Mar 66, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

18. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 18 Mar 66, JCS 2278/84, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 1.

19. These figures come from JCSM-886-65 to SecDef, 15 Dec 65, JCS 2278/84-12, JMF 9164 (21 May 65) sec. 1.

20. JCSM-234-66 to SecDef, 13 Apr 66, JCS 2278/94-3, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 1B.


22. JCSM-291-66 to SecDef, 3 May 66, JCS 2278/94-9, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 2. The 71-day figure comes from JCSM-255-66 to SecDef, 23 Apr 66, JCS 2278/94-7, same file, sec. 1B.

23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 May 66, JCS 2278/98-11, JMF 9050.3 (18 Mar 66) sec. 3.

25. JCSM-497-66 to SecDef, 1 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-25; JCSM-522-66 to SecDef, 19 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104/28, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 5. A detailed justification of 90-day levels was provided in Msg, CINCUSAREUR to CJCS, HBG 1583, 071442Z Jul 66, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

26. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Sep 66, JCS 2278/104-33, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 6.

27. JCSM-643-66 to SecDef, 7 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-44, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 8.

28. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-57, JCSM-705-66 to SecDef, 3 Nov 66, derived from CM-1882-66; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Nov 66, JCS 2278/104-60; JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Dec 66, JCS 2278/104-85; same file, sec. 14.

29. JCSM-432-66 to SecDef, 28 Jun 66, JCS 2278/104-15; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Jul 66, JCS 2278/104-20; JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 3. Most of the redeployed aircraft moved on to Vietnam.

30. Memo, SecDef to SecAF, 5 Aug 66, JCS 2278/109; JCS 2278/109-1, 22 Aug 66, and Dec On, 30 Aug 66; Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 7 Sep 66, JCS 278/109-2; JCSM-666-66 to SecDef, 14 Oct 66, JCS 2278/109-5; JMF 9050.3 (15 Jul 66) sec. 1. The Air Force prepared, and the JCS supported, plans to relocate equipment at Chelveston, Sculthorpe, and Greenham Common in Britain. In December 1966, McNamara agreed to reopen Greenham Common for temporary storage only, and to negotiate base rights at the other two sites. Memo, SecDef to CJCS and SecAF, 16 Feb 67, JCS 2278/114-6; Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 18 Jul 67, JCS 2278/114-10; JCSM-508-67 to SecDef, JCS 2278/114-11; Memo, SecDef to SecAF, “European Air Bases,” 7 Dec 67, JMF 9050.3 (15 Nov 66) sec. 2. There is a handwritten note on the last document: “See SecAF memo to SecDef, 13 Feb 68 for reconsideration . . . and DepSecDef approval 16 Mar 68.”

31. JCSM-657-66 to SecDef, 12 Oct 66, JCS 2278/104-47, JMF 9050.3 (20 May 66) sec. 9. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Nov 66, JCS 2278/104-58, same file, sec. 10. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 220950Z Nov 66; JCSM-800-66 to SecDef, 29 Dec 66, JCS 2278/118; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Feb 67, JCS 2278/118-1; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 5 Mar 67, JCS 2278/118-2; JMF 9164 (27 Sep 66).

32. Msg, CJCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 2365-66, 30 Apr 66; Msg, General Lemnitzer to CJCS, PRS 1075, 241756Z Apr 66; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation). Ltr, Dean Acheson to SecDef, 25 Mar 66, JCS 2450/189, JMF 9050 (25 Mar 66).

33. USN-85-66 to DJS, 13 Apr 66; Msg, CJCS to USCINCEUR, JCS 2727-66, 17 May 66; CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).


35. JCSM-440-66 to SecDef, 30 Jun 66, JCS 2278/104-16, JMF 9050.3 (20 Mar 66) sec. 3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Aug 66, JCS 2278/104-30, same file, sec. 5.


37. Msg, CJCS to SACEUR, 18 Mar 66, CJCS 092.2 NATO (Relocation).

38. Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, chap. 15.

39. Military expenditures in Germany, which had averaged $650 to $700 million in 1960-66, were expected to reach $850 to $900 million. Bonn was falling about $600 million short of its commitment to order $1.35 billion worth of US military equipment during 1965-66. Since Germans were meeting their FY 1966–67 offset commitment by making advance payments for future orders, none of the $850–900 million US expenses anticipated between 30 June 1967 and 31 December 1968 would be offset by new German payments. This information comes from Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jan 67, JCS 2450/294-8, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 4. For a thorough account of these problems and their resolution, see Hubert Zimmermann, Money and Security (Cambridge Univ. Press: German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, 2002), pp. 171–233.
Notes to Pages 100–105


41. *NY Times*, 16 Sep 66, p. 1.

42. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Aug 66, JCS 1731/936-3; JCSM-605-66 to SecDef, 27 Sep 66, JCS 1731/936-5; JMF 3050 (13 Jun 66) sec. 1.

43. Msg, JCS 5279-66 to US CINC EUR, 071423Z Sep 66, JCS 323.3 SACEUR.


45. JCSM-693-66 to SecDef, 27 Oct 66, JCS 2450/294-1, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 2. In both dual-basing solutions, most of the squadrons brought back home would be reconnaissance units.


49. JCSM-50-67 to SecDef, 2 Feb 67, JCS 2450/294-10, JMF 9050 (4 Oct 66) sec. 5.


51. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381-1; JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec. 1.

52. The J–5 suggested stationing one brigade permanently in Germany to save money and ease the strain on personnel. But the Joint Chiefs decided that frequent rotation would demonstrate US ability and intent to reinforce the Seventh Army in time of crisis.

53. The J–5 recommended wing rotation as being cheaper and more efficient. The Joint Chiefs opted for squadron rotation and then claimed the same advantages for that approach.

54. JCSM-180-67 to SecDef, 30 Mar 67, JCS 2450/381-3, JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec. 1. By JCS estimates, the Army would require $121–148 million and 3,900 to 7,500 personnel to handle prepositioned equipment and storage. The Air Force would need $107 million and 1,700 personnel for basing facilities, air crews, and equipment.


56. CM-2276-67 to SecDef, 27 Apr 67, JCS 2450/402, JMF 808/701 (27 Apr 67).

57. Ltr, McCloy to Pres Johnson, 17 May 67, JCS 2450/413, JMF 806/541 (CY 67).

58. CSAFM-61-67 to JCS, 18 Apr 67, JCS 2450/381-4; “HEAVY DRAW,” 15 May 67, JCS 2450/381-8; JMF 806/374 (17 Mar 67) sec. 2. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 19 May 67, JCS 2450/381-11; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 31 May 67, JCS 2450/381-14; Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 6 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-15; same file, sec. 3. Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 15 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-20; JCSM-358-67 to SecDef, 22 Jun 67, JCS 2450/381-21; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Aug 67, JCS 2450/381-22; same file, sec. 4. Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 11 Oct 67, JCS 2450/381-24; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Oct 67, JCS 2450/381-25; same file, sec. 5.
59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Dec 64, JCS 2445, JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64).

60. Bonesteel was Director of Special Studies in the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army.


62. JCSM-317-65 to SecDef, 30 Apr 65, JCS 2445/5, JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec. 2. A resumé of the Bonesteel Report was forwarded to the Greeks via Ltr, SecDef to Greek Min of Defense, 7 Dec 65, JCS 2445-8, same file.

63. CM-401-65 to SecDef, 27 Jan 65, 1st N/H of JCS 2445, 28 Jan 65; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Feb 65, JCS 2445/2; JMF 9173 (23 Dec 64) sec. 1.

64. Current general war plans called for making three USAF squadrons available by D+30; one Marine division/wing team could arrive by D+30, with perhaps another following by D+60.


66. The deficiencies that MAP, at current levels, could and could not set right are detailed in Encl B to JCS 2315/346-2, JMF 4060 (5 Dec 64).


69. JCS 2445/10, 19 Jun 67, JCSM-359-67 to SecDef, 22 Jun 67, JCS 2445/10; JMF 954/495 (12 Jun 67).

70. Memo, PDASD(ISA) Hoopes to AsstSecState Lucius Battle, 28 Jun 67, JCS 2445/10-1, JMF 954/495 (12 Jun 67).

71. CM-2557-67 to SecDef, 7 Aug 67, JCS 2445/12; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 14 Aug 67, JCS 2445/12-1; JMF 954/495 (7 Aug 67).


74. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 11 Dec 67, JCS 1704/173; JCSM-164-68 to SecDef, 16 Mar 68, JCS 1704/173-3; JMF 970/101 (11 Dec 67).

75. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 16 May 68, JCS 1704/173-5; JCSM-356-68 to SecDef, 5 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-6; Ltr, DepUSecState to DepSecDef, 3 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-7; Memo, PDASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 27 Jun 68, JCS 1704/173-9; JMF 970/101 (11 Dec 67).


Chapter 7. NATO’s Flexible Response: Reality or Mirage?


3. SACEUR’s assumptions about warning times and opposing forces are in Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1.
4. JCSM-454-65 to SecDef, 11 Jun 65, JCS 2450/32-1, JMF (2 Jun 65).
6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1.
7. JCSM-713-65 to SecDef, 24 Sep 65, JCS 2450/77-1, JMF 9050 (11 Sep 65) sec. 1. Memo SecDef to CJCS, 29 Oct 65, JCS 2450/77-6, same file, sec. 2.
8. USM-246-65 to CJCS, 17 Sep 65, JCS 2450/80, JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65). Ltr, CJCS to DEFREP-NAMA, 7 Jun 65, CJCS 902.2 NATO.
9. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Sep 65, JCS 2450/80; JCSM-752-65 to SecDef, 15 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-1; CM-911-65 to SecDef, 15 Oct 65; JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65).
10. MRBM development was cancelled in November.
11. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-3; SM-1002-65 to US Rep to MC/SGN, 21 Oct 65, JCS 2450/80-3; JMF 9050 (9 Sep 65). JCS 2450/143-8, 4 May 66, JMF 9050 (7 Jun 66) sec. 2.
17. “Remarks by Secretary McNamara, Defense Ministerial Meeting, Paris, France, 25 July 1966,” JCS 2450/274, JMF 9050 (12 Jul 66). Subsequently, the Joint Staff reviewed allied efforts and rated improvements as ranging from marginal (Greece and Turkey) to very substantial (Germany, Italy, and Norway). DJSM-340-67 to CJCS, 17 Mar 67, CJCS 092.2 NATO (misfiled in the Mar–Jul 68 folder).
18. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Apr 65, JCS 2450/3; JCSM-420-65 to SecDef, 29 May 65, JCS 2450/3-1; JMF 9150 (15 Apr 65) sec. 1. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Feb 66, JCS 2450/170; JCSM-159-66 to SecDef, 12 Mar 66, JCS 2450/170-4; JMF 9050 (23 Feb 66) sec. 1.
19. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Aug 66, JCS 2458/118, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec. 1. Dual basing was part of the effort, described in chap. 6, to reduce the balance of payments drain.
20. JCSM-560-66 to SecDef, 1 Sep 66, JCS 2458/118-2, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec. 1.
21. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Sep 66, JCS 2458/118-5, JMF 7130 (1 Aug 66) sec. 3.
22. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Jul 66, JCS 2458/104; JCSM-505-66 to SecDef, 4 Aug 66, JCS 2458/104-1; JMF 7130 (2 Jul 66) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 66, JCS 2458/104-5; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Jan 67, JCS 2458/104-6; same file, sec. 3.
23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 May 67, JCS 2458/237; JCSM-313-67 to SecDef, 2 Jun 67, JCS 2458/237-1; JMF 560 (10 May 67) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Nov 67, JCS 2458/237-8, same file, sec. 3.

24. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Jun 67, JCS 2458/257; JCSM-421-67 to SecDef, pp. 2-3 of Appendix, JCS 2458/257-2; JMF 560 (29 Jun 67) sec. 1. The JCS still wanted the tactical bomb inventory increased to 5,000; McNamara now planned a reduction to 3,700 by FY 1971. “Record of Decision” Memo, SecDef to Pres, 11 Jan 68, JCS 2458/257-7, same file, sec. 2.

25. JCSM-860-65 to SecDef, 7 Dec 65, JCS 2450/95-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS 20 Jul 66, JCS 2450/95-3; JCSM-521-66 to SecDef, 18 Aug 66, JCS 2450/95-4; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Sep 66, JCS 2450/95-5; JCSM-712-66 to SecDef, 14 Nov 66, JCS 2450/95-6; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Dec 66, JCS 2450/95-7; SM-63-67 to US Rep to MC, 23 Jan 67, JCS 2450/95-8; JMF 9050 (1 Oct 65).

26. Ltr, CJCS to General Trettner, 2 Feb 66, JCS 091 Germany.

27. Ltr, General Trettner to CJCS, 13 May 66, JCS 2124/370, JMF 9165 (13 May 66).

28. Ltr, CJCS to General Trettner, 31 May 66, JCS 091 Germany.

29. Ltr, General Trettner to CJCS, 29 Jul 66, JCS 091 Germany.

30. USM-52-67 to CJCS, 17 Feb 67, JCS 2450/367; USM-50-67 to CJCS, 17 Feb 67, JCS 2450/68; JCSM-128-67 to SecDef, 10 Mar 67, JCS 2450/368-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Mar 67, JCS 2450/368-2; CM-208-67 to DepSecDef, 12 Apr 67, JCS 2450/368-3; JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

31. The DPC, to which the Military Committee was subordinate, stood in permanent session and normally comprised representatives of the Chiefs of Staff. Several times a year—and this was one such time—the DPC met at either the Chiefs of Staff or the ministerial level.


33. JCSM-377-67 and CM-2486-67 to SecDef, 1 Jul 67, JCS 2450/420-1, JMF 806 (17 Feb 67).

34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Aug 67; SM-571-67 to US Rep to MC, 19 Aug 67, JCS 2450/420-1; JMF 806 (17 Feb 67). Msg, USDEL MC to JCS, 17057Z Sep 67, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

35. USM-175-67 to CJCS, 8 Jun 67, JCS 2450/419, JMF 806/372 (8 Jun 67).


37. USM-355-67 to DJS, 16 Nov 67, JCS 2450/490; JCSM-18-68 to SecDef, 13 Jan 68, JCS 2450/490-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 9 Feb 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2450/490-1, 14 Feb 68; SM-98-68 to US Rep to MC, 14 Feb 68, JCS 2450/490-1; JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839.

38. USM-93-68 to CJCS, 27 Feb 68, JCS 2450/540, JMF 806 (16 Nov 67) IR 2839. Memo, CJCS to ASD(SA), 12 Mar 68, JCS 092.2 NATO.

39. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Aug 67, JCS 2450/459; JCSM-522-67 to SecDef, 23 Sep 67, JCS 2450/459-1; JMF 806 (31 Aug 67) sec. 1. EUCOM Annual Historical Report: 1968, pp. 2–4. JCSM-443-68 to SecDef, 12 Jul 68, JCS 2450/483-1; JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec. 1. JSCP-68, approved in December 1966 and applicable from 1 July 1967 until 30 June 1968, retained the concept of a forward defense despite a reduced reinforcement capability and forthcoming redeployments from Germany. However, “these realities, combined with the ambiguous position of France within NATO, increase the possibility that early employment of nuclear weapons would be necessary to maintain a successful forward defense.” JSCP-69 took the same position. JSCP-68, circulated via SM-998-66 to CINCAP et al., 22 Dec 66, JCS 1844/469, JMF 3120 (17 Dec 66). JSCP-69, 23 Dec 67, circulated via SM-868-67 to CINCAP et al., 23 Dec 67, JCS 1844/488, JMF 510 (4 Dec 67).
40. In mid-December, the North Atlantic Council approved the Harmel Report, a key document defining future tasks of the alliance as defense and détente.

41. DJSM-415-68 to CJCS, 11 Apr 68; DJSM-610-68 to CJCS, 18 May 68; Msg, State 167504 to all NATO capitals, 21 May 68; JCSM-341-68 to SecDef and Memo, CJCS to SecDef, 27 May 68, JCS 2450/580; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 20 Jun 68, JCS 2450/580-1; JMF 806/372 (22 May 68).

42. Dept. of State Bulletin, 15 Jul 68, p. 77.

43. NY Times, 26 Jun 68, p. 17.

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 68, JCS 2458/410; CM-3440-68 to JCS, 26 Jun 68, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 1.


46. JCSM-449-68 to SecDef, 12 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-4, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 1. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 22 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-7, same file, sec. 5.

47. CM-3485-68 to DJS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2458/410-8, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 5.

48. Figures are cited in Msg, DIA to US Mission, Brussels, 13 Sep 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO. Politburo debates, and Brezhnev’s initial hesitation, are described in Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 207-209.


50. JCSM-538-68 to SecDef, 7 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-4; JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1.

51. JCSM-547-68 to SecDef, 14 Sep 68, JCS 2450/609-3, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1.

52. Ltr, USecState to DepSecDef, 21 Sep 68, Att to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Sep 68, JCS 2066/74, JMF 948/532 (21 Sep 68) sec. 1. JCSM-667-68 to SecDef, 7 Nov 68, JCS 2066/74-1, same file, sec. 3.

53. CM-3702-68 to SecDef, 4 Oct 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

54. The number of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe had risen from 22 to 36. Msg, DIA to US Mission, Brussels, 13 Sep 68, CJCS 092.2 NATO.

55. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Sep 68, JCS 2458/410-10, JMF 585 (6 Jun 68) sec. 5. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 20 Sep 68, JCS 2458/410-11; JCSM-580-68 to SecDef, 2 Oct 68, JCS 2458/410-13; same file, sec. 6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Dec 68, JCS 2458/410-28, same file, sec. 8.

56. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620, JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

57. JCSM-594-68 to SecDef, 8 Oct 68, JCS 2450/609-3, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1.

58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-2; JCSM-651-68 to SecDef, 31 Oct 68, JCS 2450/620-3; JMF 806/543 (2 Oct 68).

59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Nov 68, JCS 2450/609-5, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 1. JCS 2450/609-6, 13 Dec 68; Note to Control, “JCS 2450/609-6,” 20 Dec 68; same file, sec. 2.

60. Msg, USDEL MC to JCS, 051142Z Nov 68, JMF 946/309 (27 Aug 68) sec. 2. US approval is in JCSM-672-68 to SecDef, 8 Nov 68, JCS 2450/636; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 68, 1st N/H of JCS 2450/636, 12 Nov 68; Msg, JCS to USDEL MC, 10 Nov 68; same file.


62. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 May 68, JCS 2458/394, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec. 1.

63. JCSM-334-68 to SecDef, 29 May 68, JCS 2458/394-1, JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec. 1. A separate DPM again downplayed the role of tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., enhance the conventional option by moving atomic demolition munitions in Germany back from the border to rear defensive positions) and proposed cutbacks in the stockpile. Escalating their rhetoric, the Joint Chiefs criticized the DPM as being "obfuscated and inconsistent to the point that it
is not possible, in most instances, to determine ... the basis upon which force level recommendations ... have been derived.” It “implies that theater nuclear forces can somehow deter without, at the same time, being needed to wage war successfully should deterrence fail.” The final DPM postponed cutbacks and a repositioning of atomic demolition munitions. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Aug 68, JCS 2458/436; JCSM-534-68 to SecDef, 7 Sep 68, JCS 2458/436-1; JMF 560 (10 Aug 68) sec. 1. “Tentative Record of Decision” Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 15 Jan 69, JCS 2458/436-8, same file, sec. 3.


65. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Jan 69, JCS 2458/394-5; JMF 560 (30 Apr 68) sec. 2.

Chapter 8. Phasing Out the Military Assistance Program


2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Dec 64, JCS 2315/346; JCSM-1082-64 to SecDef, 29 Dec 64, JCS 2315/346-1; JMF 4060 (5 Dec 64).


4. Memo, Gen. R. J. Wood to DJS, 16 Jun 65, JCS 2315/358; JCSM-632-65 to SecDef, 14 Aug 65, JCS 2315/358-2; JMF 4060 (16 Jun 65). Individual countries’ deficiencies were specified in JCSM-755-65 to SecDef, 14 Oct 65, JCS 2315/358-4; same file.

5. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 26 Oct 65, JCS 2315/375; JMF 4060 (26 Oct 65). Back in April, Annex J of JSOP-70 had awarded comparatively more importance to the Near East and South Asia, less to the Far East. Escalating US involvement in Vietnam evidently accounted for the DPM’s different emphasis.

6. JCSM-802-65 to SecDef, 3 Nov 65, JCS 2315/375-1; JMF 4060 (26 Oct 65).


8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 8 Nov 66, JCS 2315/388-3; JMF 4060 (25 Jul 66).


12. Ann J to JSOP 69-76, Part I; JMF 511 (14 Feb 67) sec. 1A. Memo, Actg Dir. of Mil Assistance to DJS, 4 Aug 67, JCS 2315/419; Encl C to JCS 2315/419, 7 Sep 67; JCSM-503-67 to SecDef, 13 Sep 67, JCS 2315/419-1; JMF 495 (4 Aug 67). Major MAP deliveries to Greece were suspended after the military takeover in April 1967. As explained in chap. 6, the JCS recommended a prompt resumption.

13. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 67, JCS 2315/432; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 1.

14. JCSM-8-68 to SecDef, 4 Jan 68, JCS 2315/432-1; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 1. CM-2447-67 to JCS, 20 Nov 67; Memo, Gen. Brown to CJCS, “Military Assistance Program,” 21 Nov 67; CJCS 091.3 MAP


18. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Oct 68, JCS 2458/463; JMF 560 (29 Oct 68).

19. JCSM-674-68 to SecDef, 9 Nov 68, JCS 2458/463-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Dec 68, JCS 2458/463-2; JMF 560 (29 Oct 68). President Nixon, in May 1969, asked Congress for $375 million in grants and $275 million worth of sales credits.

Chapter 9. Latin America: The Instruments of Influence


2. An account of the intervention emphasizing OSD’s role is in Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, pp. 289–315.

3. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, who had been called to Washington for consultations, returned to Santo Domingo at 1240 on 27 April. Until then, Deputy Chief of Mission William B. Connett was in charge of the Embassy.


5. Msg, JCS 9802 to CINCLANT, 26 Apr 65, CJCS 091 Dominican Republic.


7. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 32, p. 71 and fn. 3 on p. 73. Msgs, Santo Domingo 1136, 1146, 1149 and 1151 to State, 28 Apr 65; Msgs, State 657 and 660 to Santo Domingo, 28 Apr 65; JHO. Msg, Santo Domingo to DIRNSA, 282015Z and 282040Z Apr 65, summarized in “Chronology of the Crisis in the Dominican Republic,” JHO. Hereafter, all messages not otherwise sourced are drawn from this “Chronology.”


10. About 150 C–130s were employed, 60 being in the air at any one time. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., *Intervention in the Caribbean* (Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1989), p. 33.

11. WSEG Critical Incident Study, “The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965,” p. 90. Msgs, JCS 1089 and 1095 to CINCLANT, 30 Apr 65, CJC 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Missions of DOD). A US officer had photographed the drop zone from the road, so his pictures showed apparently flat ground. *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, p. 6, JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1A.

12. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 32, pp. 95–99. The Embassy estimated that Constitutionals numbered between 3,500 and 6,500, of whom 1,500 were believed to be under the direct leadership of communist-trained fighters. Loyalist strength amounted to 2,400 men of wavering allegiance. Msg, Santo Domingo 1173 to State, 29 Apr 65, JCS IN 35777; Msg, CIA to JCS et al., 291757Z Apr 65; JHO.

13. Msg, JCS to CJTF 122, 300056Z Apr 65; Msg, CJTF to CINCLANT, 300608Z Apr 65.


15. Msg, JCS 1113 to CINCLANT, 30 Apr 65, CJC 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). *Stability Operations, Dominican Republic*, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, p. 1; JMF 9128.4 (4 May 65) sec. 1A. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84, JHO. On 7 May, Palmer formally assumed command of all Army, Marine, and Air Force units ashore. When he became Commander, US Forces in the Dominican Republic (USCOMDOMREP), JTF 122 was dissolved.

16. Msgs, JCS 1218, 1219, and 1220 to CINCLANT, 1 May 65, CJC 091 Dominican Republic.

17. WSEG Study, “The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965,” pp. 179–186. Msg, JCS 1237 and 1251 to CINCLANT et al., 2 May 65; Msg, JCS 1261 to CINCLANT and CJTF 120, 2 May 65; CJC 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). Msg, CJTF 122 to JCS, 020714Z May 65; CJC 091 Dominican Republic. Msg, LTG Palmer to CJCS, 022145Z May 65. *Stability Operations, Dominican Republic*, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, pp. 9–10; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1A. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84. Palmer talked with Wheeler and Johnson on open telephone lines which ran through an exchange manned by some rebels, who evidently did not pass on whatever information they overheard.

18. Msg, CJTF 120 to CINCLANT, 021328Z May 65. Msgs, JCS 1250 to CINCLANT, 021758Z May 65; JCS 1252 to CINCLANT, 021826Z May 65; JCS 1255 to CSA et al., 021958Z May 65; JCS 1258 to CINCLANT, 022258Z May 65; and JCS 1262 to CINCLANT, 030153Z May 65; CJC 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD). At first, Palmer sent back-channel messages directly to Wheeler, with CINCLANT as information addressee. When Moorer strongly objected, Wheeler reversed that procedure, although Palmer still considered CINCLANT as being “in effect a relay station.” Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, pp. 43–44. Throughout his tour in Santo Domingo, General Palmer displayed considerable initiative and was allowed a good deal of latitude.

19. JCS 2338/15, 5 May 65; Msg, JCS 1595 to CINCLANT and CINCNOAD, 6 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (5 May 65).


23. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 3 May 65, JCS 2338/12; JCSM-344-65 to SecDef, 8 May 65, JCS 2338/12-1; JCSM-307-65 to SecDef, 20 May 65, JCS 2338/18; JMF 9128.4 (3 May 65). JCSM-363-65 to SecDef, 14 May 65, JCS 2338/12-3; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Jun 65, N/H of JCS 2338/12-3, 21 Jun 65; same file.


30. On 4 June, the OAS re-designated the IAF as the IAPF.

31. In April 1964, the Brazilian military had ousted leftist President Goulart. On 15 May 1965, the State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Sao Paulo to propose that a Brazilian be the commander. JCS 2338/19, 18 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65).

33. General Palmer interviewed by W. S. Poole on 4 Sep 84.

35. Memos, USCOMMANDREP to JCS, 271832Z May 65; JCS 2338/19; JCS 091 Dominican Republic. Palmer, of course, remained USCOMMANDREP.

37. JCSM-393-65 to SecDef, 20 May 65, JCS 2338/19; JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65).

38. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Jun 65, JCS 2338/19-1; JMF 9128.4 (18 May 65).

39. App B to JCS 2338/12-4, 26 May 65; Msg, JCS 2703 to CINCLANT, 24 May 65; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65).

40. Memos, USCOMMANDREP to JCS, 250530Z and 252040Z May 65; JCS 091 Dominican Republic.
41. JCSM-414-65 to SecDef, 27 May 65, JCS 2338/14; JMF 9128.3 (25 May 65). Msg, JCS 2893 to CINCLANT, 26 May 65; Msg, JCS 3045 to CINCLANT et al., 28 May 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic (Data Concerning Roles and Actions of DOD).

42. JCSM-423-65 to SecDef, 1 Jun 65, JCS 2338/22; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Jun 65; Msg, JCS 3183 to CINCLANT, 1 Jun 65; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1965, p. 609.

43. JCSM-443-65 to SecDef, 8 Jun 65; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65). Msg, JCS 3646 to USCOMDOMREP et al., 9 Jun 65; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to JCS, 102205Z Jun 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic.

44. Msgs, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 150530Z Jun 65, 160725Z Jun 65, and 170650Z Jun 65; JCM-476-65 to SecDef, 18 Jun 65, JCS 2338/24; JMF 9128.4 (25 May 65).


46. Msg, JCS 4502 to USCOMDOMREP, 24 Jun 65; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to JCS, 252330Z Jun 65; CJCS 091 Dominican Republic.

47. Stability Operations, Dominican Republic, vol. 1, pt. 2, chap. 1, p. 5; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1E.


49. Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 26 Jul 65, JCS 2338/32; Msg, USCOMDOMREP to CINCLANT, 301550Z Aug 65; Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 311600Z Aug 65; JCSM-672-65 to SecDef, 2 Sep 65, JCS 2338/33; Msg, JCS 2215 to CINCLANT, 22 Sep 65; JMF 9128.4 (18 Jun 65). JCSM-674-65 to SecDef, 4 Sep 65, JCS 2338/32-3; Memo, DASD(Compt.) to CJCS, 25 Sep 65, N/H of JCS 2338/32-3, 29 Sep 65; JMF 9128.4 (26 Jul 65) sec. 1. General Alvim proposed that IAPF headquarters contain 79 US and 73 Latin personnel. At JCS urging, the US contribution was cut to 72, so that Latins would be in the majority. JCSM-697-65 to SecDef, 17 Sep 65, JCS 2338/32-4; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepAsst SecState, 23 Sep 65; same file. Msg, JCS 3975 to CINCLANT et al., 13 Oct 65; same file, sec. 2.

50. J3M-1537-65 to DJS, 6 Oct 65; Msg, JCS 2937 to CINCLANT, 29 Sep 65; Msgs, CINCLANT to JCS, 042036Z and 042040Z Oct 65; CM-892-65 to SecDef, 7 Oct 65, JCS 2338/32-6; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Oct 65, JCS 2338/32-8; JMF 9128.4 (28 Jul 65) sec. 2.


54. CSAM-529-65 to JCS, 6 Dec 65, JCS 2338/32-10; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Apr 66, JCS 2338/32-11; CM-1299-66 to SecDef, 9 Apr 66, JCS 2338/32-13; JMF 9128.4 (28 Jul 65) sec. 2.


58. *Stability Operations, Dominican Republic*, vol. 1, pt. 1, chap. 2, pp. 2, 3, 19; JMF 9128.4 (14 May 65) sec. 1A. Palmer of course had in mind South Vietnam, where he and Ambassador Bunker soon were assigned.

59. NSAM No. 95 to SecState, 15 Sep 61, JCS 1778/96; JMF 9125/9105 (15 Sep 61) sec. 1. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS, 17 Nov 61, JCS 1778/98; JCSM-825-61 to SecDef, 29 Nov 61, JCS 1778/99; JMF 9125/9220 (17 Nov 61) sec. 1. JCSM-825 was forwarded to State; N/H of JCS 1778/99, 14 Dec 61; same file.

60. NSAM No. 152 to SecDef et al., 30 Apr 62, JCS 1778/108; JMF 9125/9105 (15 Sep 61) sec. 1. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Jul 63, JCS 1778/134-2; JCSM-627-63 to SecDef, 29 Aug 63, JCS 1778/134-3; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 21 Sep 63, JCS 1778/1343; same file, sec. 3.

61. *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1964–1968*, vol. 31 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2004), pp. 792-800, 808-809. Memo, Actg DepSecDef to CJCS, 22 Jan 64, JCS 1778/143; Msg, JCS 4506 to USCINCSO, 22 Jan 64; Msg, USCINCSO to JCS, 250641Z Jan 64; JCSM-66-64 to SecDef, 29 Jan 64, JCS 1778/143-5; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, “Contingency Plans for Panama,” 29 Jan 64; JMF 9125/3100 (10 Jan 64) sec. 1. A draft JCSM in sec. 2 indicates that sending another infantry battalion was rejected because doing so might harm negotiations to resume diplomatic relations. General O’Meara’s quick-reaction plan called for occupying centers of power within Panama City, securing the installations and borders of the Canal Zone, and then sealing the “Communist stronghold” of Colon. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 31, ftnt. 4 on p. 809.


63. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1963–64*, p. 436. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 31, pp. 863, 869-870. The Army was the administering authority for the Canal Zone. JCSM-289-64 to SecDef, 7 Apr 64, JCS 1778/148-3; JMF 9125/3100 (10 Jan 64) (A). J-3 TP 96-64 for CJCS, 13 May 64; Note to Control Div., “J-3 TP 96-64,” 13 May 64; same file, sec. 2.

64. JCSM-293-64 to SecDef, 7 Apr 64, JCS 1778/145-2; Memo, DepSecDef, to CJCS et al., 20 Apr 64, JCS 1778/145-3; JCSM-487-64 to SecDef, 8 Jun 64, JCS 1778/145-4, same file, sec. 3.


66. JCSM-657-64 to SecDef, 31 Jul 64, JCS 1778/145-9; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS 21 Sep 64, JCS 1778/145-10; JCSM-881-64 to SecDef, 17 Oct 64, JCS 1778/145-11; JMF 9125/9105 (2 Dec 63) sec. 4. SNIE 84-64 appeared to contradict JCS claims about Panamanians’ attitude toward the US military presence.

67. General LeMay, Admiral McDonald, and General Shoup favored bilateral control, believing that US influence in an international commission would be “too flexible, speculative, and varying to provide the measure of certainty needed.” Generals Wheeler and Johnson disagreed. The Chairman worried that bilateral control “could expose the US to being blocked, frustrated, or even blackmailed in an unending series of debates.” But control over an international commission could be assured, Wheeler thought, if US nationals represented all the creditors holding the
funded debt that would be incurred in building a sea-level canal. JCSM-1012-64 and CM-285-64 to SecDef, 2 Dec 64, JCS 1778/157-2; JMF 9125 (24 Nov 64) sec. 1.

68. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 14 Dec 64, JCS 1778/159; JCS 1778/159-1, 15 Dec 64; JCSM-1052-64 to SecDef, 17 Dec 64, JCS 1778/159-1; JMF 9125 (14 Dec 64).


70. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 17 Feb 65, JCS 1778/157-5; JCSM-133-65 to SecDef, 26 Feb 65, JCS 1778/157-6; Memo, SecArmy to USecState, 8 Mar 65, N/H of JCS 1778/157-6, 10 Mar 65; JMF 9125 (24 Nov 64) sec. 2.

71. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS and ASD(ISA), 21 May 65, JCS 1778/145-13; JCSM-470-65 to SecDef, 16 Jun 65, JCS 1778/145-14; JMF 9125/9105 (2 Dec 63) sec. 4.

72. JCS 1778/167, 15 Sep 65; JCSM-703-65 to SecDef, 18 Sep 65, JCS 1778/167-1; JMF 9125 (15 Sep 65). *Public Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1965*, pp. 1020–1021.

73. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 13 Nov 65, JCS 1778/169; JCSM-848-65 to SecDef, 3 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-1; JMF 9125 (13 Nov 65) sec. 1.

74. Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 13 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-2; JMF 9125 (13 Nov 65).

75. JCSM-892-65 to SecDef, 17 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-3; Memo, SecArmy to CJCS, 28 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-4; JMF 9125 (13 Nov 65) sec. 1. JCSM-515-65 to SecDef, 30 Dec 65, JCS 1778/169-5; Memo, SecArmy to Ambassador Irwin, 30 Dec 65, N/H of JCS 1778/169-5, 30 Dec 65; same file, sec. 2.


78. John N. Irwin II, who since 1965 had been serving as Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations.

79. JCSM-395-67 to SecArmy, 13 Jul 67, JCS 1778/185-3; MemCon by CJCS, “Panama Canal Treaties,” 19 Jul 67; JCSM-410-67 to SecArmy, 20 Jul 67, JCS 1778/185-4; Ltr, DepSecDef to SecState, 28 Jul 67, JCS 1778/187-5; JMF 933/533 (26 May 67) sec. 3.


83. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 20 Aug 64, JCS 1976/540; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 1.

84. JCSM-825-64 to SecDef, 24 Sep 64, JCS 1976/540-1; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 1.

85. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Feb 65, JCS 1976/540-4; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

86. JCSM-138-65 to SecDef, 27 Feb 65, JCS 1976/540-5; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

87. Msg, Def 8122 to Buenos Aires, 31 Mar 65; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.


89. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Jun 65, JCS 1976/540-12; JMF 9122 (20 Aug 64) sec. 2.

90. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Mar 65, JCS 2315/355; JCSM-244-65 to SecDef, 1 Apr 65, JCS 2315/355-1; JMF 4060 (4 Mar 65).
91. DJSM-434-65 to CJCS, 9 Apr 65; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 May 65, JCS 2315/355-2; JMF 4060 (4 Mar 65).


95. JCSM-110-68 to SecDef, 23 Feb 68, JCS 2399/12; JMF 987/467 (18 Jan 68). Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 19 Mar 68, JCS 1976/570; JMF 976/330 (19 Mar 68) sec. 1.

96. JCSM-318-68 to SecDef, 21 May 68, JCS 1976/570-1; JMF 976/330 (19 Mar 68) sec. 1.

97. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 23 Jul 68, JCS 1976/570-2; JCSM-564-68 to SecDef, 21 Sep 68, JCS 1976/570-3; JMF 976/330 (19 Mar 68) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Dec 68, JCS 1976/540-4; same file, sec. 2.

98. Memo by Staff Dir, SIG, 27 Sep 67, JCS 2464/45; JCSM-561-67 to SecDef, 20 Oct 67, JCS 2464/45-2; JCSM-679-67 to SecDef, 6 Dec 67, JCS 2464/45-4; Memo, VADM Blouin to DJS, 16 Oct 68; JMF 537 (30 Jan 67) sec. 2.


100. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 31, pp. 159–161. Recent legislation added potential complications. The Conte-Long amendment required the President to withhold economic assistance to any “under-developed country” using military assistance funds to acquire “sophisticated weapon systems.” The Symington amendment stipulated that the President terminate economic development loans and PL–480 assistance to any country engaging in military expenditures “to a degree which materially interferes with its development.”

Chapter 10. Upheaval in the Middle East

1. “Egypt” is used here for convenience, although after dissolution of its union with Syria the country formally remained the “United Arab Republic.”


3. In 1964, Washington persuaded Bonn to make a secret tank sale, on condition that West Germany could stop shipments if the arrangement became public knowledge. Nasser learned of the deal, publicly denounced it, and embarrassed Bonn by entering into economic arrangements with East Germany. Msg, Bonn 3050 to SecState, 15 Feb 65; CJCS 091 Jordan (Arms for Jordan).


5. Msgs, SecState 446 to Amman, 9 Feb 65; SecState 727 to Tel Aviv, 10 Feb 65; and SecState 736 to Tel Aviv, 11 Feb 65; CJCS 091 Jordan (Arms for Jordan). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 18, pp. 288–289, 305–306, 308, 313, 321.

7. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 18, pp. 398–399, 404–405. Israel also reaffirmed that it “will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons” into the area. The United States made clear to Hussein that there would be no sales if he purchased arms from the Soviets.

8. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 26 Feb 65; DJSM-306-65 to DASD(ISA), 12 Mar 65, JCS 2369/12; JMF 9183 (26 Apr 65) sec. 1.

9. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 26 Apr 65, with Israeli Aide Memoire of 19 Apr attached as Tab B, JCS 2369/12; JCSM-337-65 to SecDef, 6 May 65, JCS 2369/12-2; JMF 9183 (26 Apr 65) sec. 1. The quoted summary was added to J–5’s draft at General Johnson’s initiative. CSAM-250-65 to JCS, 4 May 65; same file. JCSM-337 is printed in *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 18, pp. 448–450.


21. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 8 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-6; JCSM-765-66 to SecDef, 9 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-7; Memo, DASD(ISA) to SecDef, 9 Dec 66, JCS 1887/703-9; JMF 9184 (28 Nov 66) sec. 2.


25. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 46–47.


27. Dept. of State Bulletin, 11 Mar 57, p. 393. But Secretary of State Dulles also said, during a press conference, “I do not think that the United States, in the absence at least of a treaty or congressional action, has authority to defend ships of another registry.” Ibid., p. 402.


33. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 118–122, 127–136, 140–146. The CIA concluded that Israel “almost certainly” could win air superiority over the Sinai in 24 hours if it struck first, and in two or three days even if Egypt hit first, and that Israel could breach Egypt’s double defense line in the Sinai within several days, while containing attacks from Syria or Jordan. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

34. Msg, Cairo 8007 to SecState, 26 May 67, “Middle East Crisis, vol. 1, Cables, 5/67,” Box 104, Doc. 15-b, National Security Files, Johnson Library.

35. In its draft JCSM, J-5 had favored Course IV. At Admiral McDonald’s urging, the Joint Chiefs chose Course II instead. JCS 1887/712, 25 May 67; CNOM-141-67 to JCS, 26 May 67; JMF 898/329 (25 May 67).


39. Foreign Relations: 1964–68, vol. 19, pp. 187–194. In August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution authorized the President to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” Johnson used this as authority to bomb North Vietnam and send ever larger ground forces into South Vietnam.

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40. The Director, Joint Staff, had just reported that Israel could continue its current state of readiness indefinitely without foreign help. Full and prolonged mobilization, however, would prove increasingly harmful to the civilian economy. The Director further advised that Israeli stockpiles were sufficient to support sustained combat for 30 days. Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to DJS et al., “Israeli Military Requirements During Protracted Mobilization or Hostilities,” 26 May 67; DJSM-688-67 to ASD(I&L), 1 Jun 67; JMF 898/434 (26 May 67).


43. JCSM-310-67 to SecDef, 2 Jun 67, JCS 1887/713; JMF 889/329 (25 May 67).


46. Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 170-277. In June 1967, Israel's combat aircraft were of French manufacture; Egypt's were Soviet-supplied.

47. Back on 1 June, Israel asked permission to purchase one Hawk battery and for loans of 140 M-60 tanks with 105-mm guns and 48 A-4s. On 5 June, the Director, Joint Staff, recommended rejection. Since Israel was militarily superior to Egypt and Syria, he surmised that Israel saw a “desperate need for immediate visible indication of US military support.” At the moment, however, an “evenhanded” approach seemed wise. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, “Israeli military Requests, 1 June 1967,” 2 Jun 67; DJSM-709-67 to ASD(I&L), 5 Jun 67; JMF 898/434 (26 May 67).


49. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 8 Jun 67; Memo, McGeorge Bundy to Special Cmte, 9 Jun 67, JCS 1887/718; JMF 898/499 (CY 67).


52. A post-mortem attributed this mishandling to (1) human error, (2) the high volume of traffic, and (3) failure to appreciate the urgency surrounding Liberty's situation. JCSM-379-67 to SecDef, 1 Jul 67; JMF 898/392 (8 Jun 67) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 19, pp. 596–597.


56. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Jun 67, JCS 1887/719; JMF 898 (16 Jun 67).
57. J–5’s draft had said simply that polarization would create an environment in which
the “possibility” of further Arab-Israeli conflict “would be increased.” The JCS adopted more
forceful wording at General Johnson’s urging. JCS 1887/720-1, 26 Jun 67; CSAM-232-67 to JCS,
26 Jun 67; JMF 898 (16 Jun 67). In October 1973, the Chiefs’ forecast about a new war in which
the United States would have to choose sides was fulfilled to the letter.

58. General Johnson wanted to say, instead, that Israel “has very little to offer,” and that
base and overflight rights would be “extremely tenuous.” CSAM-232-67 to JCS, 26 Jun 67; JMF
898 (16 Jun 67).

59. JCSM-374-67 to SecDef, 29 Jun 67, JCS 1887/720-1; JMF 898 (16 Jun 67). OSD acknowledge-
ment is in Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Jul 67, N/H of JCS 1887/721, 26 Jul 67; JMF 898 (19
Jun 67).

60. Special State-Defense Study Group, “Near East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa: A
Recommended American Strategy,” Jul 67, JMF 821/520 (17 Jul 67) sec. 1A.


62. DJSM-1191-67 to Dir DIA, 29 Sep 67; IRG/NEA 45-67 to SIG, 14 Nov 67; JSSM-2105-67 to
Secy, JCS, 21 Dec 67; JMF 821/520 (17 Jul 67).

63. Memo, McGeorge Bundy to Special Cmte., “Exceptions to Interim Military Aid Policy in
the Middle East,” 11 Jul 67, JCS 1887/730; JMF 898 (CY 67). Memo of Conv by Col. A. A. Jordan,
“Israeli Arms Requests,” 19 Jul 67, JCS 2369/22-1; JMF 889 (29 Jul 67). Ltr, SecState to SecDef,

64. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 29 Jul 67, JCS 2369/22; JCSM-474-67 to SecDef, 25 Aug 67, JCS
2369/22-1; JMF 898 (19 Jul 67).

65. Memo for Record by Col. J. E. Murphy, “DOD Discussions with General Weizman,” 13 Aug
[actually Sep] 67; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 67) sec. 1. Verbatim transcripts are in secs. 1A, 1B, and 1C.


67. CSAFM-I-10-67 to JCS, 15 Sep 67; JCSM-523-67 to SecDef, 22 Sep 67, JCS 1887/737; JMF
898/495 (15 Sep 67).

68. Many in Congress held that Jordan had attacked Israel in the face of (1) legal conditions
providing US equipment for defensive purposes only and (2) Israel’s appeal to Hussein for mutual

69. Memo, Exec Secy, State Dept. to SecDef, n.d., JCS 1887/738; JMF 898/430 (CY 67) Misc. JCS
1887/741-3, 13 Nov 67; JMF 898 (27 Oct 67). Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Nov 67, JCS 1887/737-1;
JMF 898/495 (15 Sep 67). Dept. of State Bulletin, p. 652. Subsequently, the Israelis said they no
longer wanted APCs. TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (SIG Mtg of 22 Nov 67), “US Arms Policy for

70. “SIG Record of Discussion and Agreement of 21st Meeting of 14 September 1967,” 18 Sep
67, JCS 2464/44; JMF 537 (30 Jan 67). Memo, Staff Dir to IRG/NEA, 9 Nov 67, JCS 1887/741-2;
JMF 898 (27 Oct 67).

71. SM-771-67 to CJCS, 16 Nov 67, JCS 1887/741-3; TP for DepSecDef and CJCS (SIG Mtg of 22


73. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jun 67, JCS 1887/721; JCSM-373-67 to SecDef, 29 Jun 67, JCS
1887/721-1; JMF 898 (19 Jun 67). OSD acknowledgement is Memo, Actg ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Jul
67, N/H of JCS 1887/721-1, 26 Jul 67, same file. Israel secretly informed the US government that it
would withdraw from the Golan Heights and the Sinai in return for direct negotiations about a
peace treaty. Nothing came of this initiative, which did not mention the West Bank, Jerusalem, or Gaza. Segev, 1967, pp. 500–501.


77. Apps A and B to JCSM-700-67 to SecDef, 19 Dec 67, JCS 2369/24-1; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 67) sec. 1.


80. Memo, ASD(I&L) to CJCS, 24 Jan 68, JCS 2369/25; JCSM-57-68 to SecDef, 26 Jan 68, JCS 2369/25-1; Memo, ASD(I&L) to SecDef, 27 Jan 68, JCS 2369/25-2; JMF 889/460 (6 Nov 67) sec. 1. Subsequently, the administration agreed to sell 12 more A-4s as replacements for normal attrition, raising the total to 100 Skyhawks. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, n.d. [c. 19 Sep 68], CJCS 091 Israel.


82. Memo, SecState and SecDef to Pres, 6 Feb 68, JCS 2461/5; JMF 891 (21 Jan 68). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 20, pp. 143-146, 248. Subsequently, Jordanians again sought 155-mm guns—and were again rebuffed. J5M-1258-68 to DJS, 30 Jul 68; DJSM-961-68 to CJCS, 1 Aug 68; same file.


86. SM-604-68 to CJCS, 6 Sep 68, JCS 1887/753-2; JMF 898/530 (19 Jul 68) sec. 1.

87. Memo, DepSecDef to USecState, 26 Nov 68, JCS 2464/143; Memo, USecState to DepSecDef, 5 Dec 68, JCS 2464/143-1; Memo, Staff Dir, SIG, to all SIG Members, 17 Jan 69, JCS 2464/153; JMF 898/530 (19 Jul 68) sec. 2.

88. During April and May, five studies of the Arab-Israeli military balance and its relation to an F-4 decision led to the conclusion that, if France decided not to deliver Mirages (and de Gaulle did so decide), "Israel beginning sometime in the last half of 1969 will at least face an
Notes to Pages 184–188


89. CM-3275-68 to Pres, 3 May 68, JCS 1887/749; CM-3411-68 to SecDef, 18 Jun 68; JMF 898/292 (3 May 68). The Director of the Joint Staff’s draft of CM-3411 stated less equivocally that “there is a legitimate military need for the early delivery of F–4 aircraft.” DJSM-740-68 to CJCS, 17 Jun 68; same file. It is noteworthy, also, that the corporate JCS did not provide an opinion.


91. Until December 1967, Rabin had been Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces.


93. Memo, SecAF to ASD(ISA), 21 Nov 68; Memo of Conv. by CAPT R. P. Hilton, “Meeting of Ambassador Rabin with General Wheeler on 22 November 1968,” 23 Nov 68; CJCS 091 Israel.

94. Memo of Conversation, “Israeli F-4 Aircraft and US Intelligence Requirements,” 25 Nov 68, CJCS 091 Israel.

95. CM-3824-68 to SecDef, 11 Dec 68, JCS 1887/756; JMF 898/530 (19 Jul 68) and CJCS 091 Israel.


98. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Aug 65, JCS 2315/367-1; JCSM-712-65 to SecDef, 23 Sep 65, JCS 2315/367-2; JMF 4060 (12 Aug 65) sec. 1.


102. Memo, SecAF to DepSecDef, 12 Jul 66, JCS 1714/181; JMF 9181 (12 Jul 66). Msg, Tehran 451 to Pres, 29 Jul 66, CJCS 091 Iran.


States. JCSM-588-66 to SecDef, 15 Sep 66, JCS 1714/183-1; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to J. A. Yager (State Dept.), 23 Nov 66; same file.


107. DJSM-790-68 to ASD(ISA), 25 Jun 68; JMF 887/081 (CY 68).

108. STRICOM bore geographic responsibilities for the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

109. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Aug 68, JCS 1887/754; JCSM-513-68 to SecDef, 21 Aug 68, JCS 1887/754-1; SM-581-68 to USCINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, 21 Aug 68, JCS 1887/754-1; JMF 887/520 (9 Aug 68) sec. 1. “Report of the US Military Survey Team to Iran, Sep 68,” same file, sec. 1A. Ltr, USCINCSTRIKE to JCS, 30 Sep 68, JCS 1887/754-2; JCSM-615-68 to SecDef, 18 Oct 68, JCS 1887/754-3; Memo, Capt R. D. Pace to Joint Staff et al., 16 Jan 69; same file, sec. 1.


111. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, “Pakistan,” 1 Jul 64; DJSM-1145-64 to ASD(ISA), 8 Jul 64; JMF 9070 (13 Feb 65).

112. Msg, Tehran 852 to SecState, 13 Feb 65, JCS IN 27011; Msg, Ankara 1219 to SecState, 17 Feb 65; JMF 9070 (13 Feb 65).

113. JCSM-209-65 to SecDef, 24 Mar 65, JCS 2273/413; JMF 9070/5410 (20 Mar 65). JCSM-201-65 to SecDef, 20 Mar 65, JCS 2273/412; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 31 Mar 65, JCS 2273/412-1; JMF 9070 (13 Feb 65).

114. Memo, CNO to CJCS, 5 Apr 65, JCS 2273/415; JMF 9070/5410 (5 Apr 65).


116. CM-2251-67 to JCS, 19 Apr 67, JCS 2273/439-4; JMF 9070 (19 Dec 66) sec. 2. Since the 1965 war, Pakistan had been drawing closer to China. Subsequently, Pakistan compelled an indefinite postponement of the Council of ministers meeting.

117. JCSM-153-68 to SecDef, 15 Mar 68, JCS 2273/4463; JMF 804/075 (9 Mar 68).

Chapter 11. Africa: Avoiding Direct Intervention

1. South Africa’s population consisted of 3 million whites, 12 million blacks, 1.5 million mulattoes, and 500,000 Asians.


3. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Aug 64, JCS 2121/183; JCSM-716-64 to SecDef, 18 Aug 64, JCS 2121/183-1; JMF 9110.1 (5 Aug 64) sec. 1.


5. Figures are taken from Ltr, Cinclant to JCS 24 Mar 65, JCS 2121/189-1; JMF 9110 (24 Feb 65).

6. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 24 Feb 65, JCS 2121/189; JCSM-268-65 to SecDef, 13 Apr 65, JCS 2121/189-2; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 3 May 65, JCS 2121/189-3; JMF 910 (24 Feb 65). The last of these is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1025–1026. During the drafting
of JCSM-268-65, General Johnson observed that “the South African problem is being exploited by liberal and left-wing groups and threatens to assume within the next year the proportions of a major US domestic political issue.” CSAM-186-65 to JCS, 8 Apr 65; same file.


10. JCSM-44-66 to SecDef, 19 Jan 66, JCS 2125/28-2; JMF 9166.2 (7 Jan 66).


14. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Feb 67, JCS 2121/205; Memo, SecNav to DepSecDef, 4 Mar 67, JCS 2121/205-1; Memo, SecAF to DepSecDef, 16 Mar 67, JCS 2121/205-2; JCSM-191-67 to SecDef, 5 Apr 67, JCS 2121/205-3; JMF 855/470 (21 Feb 67). All but the SecAF memo are printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 1070–1072. Ltr, DepSecDef to USecState, 6 Jun 67, JCS 2121/205-4; same file.

15. JCSM-525-67 to SecDef, 26 Sep 67, JCS 2121/206; JMF 855/532 (21 Sep 67).

16. In August 1967, when USS Forrestal and four destroyers sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, they had been refueled by British oilers. This time, British oilers were unavailable.


20. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 18 Nov 68, JCS 2121/211-1; JMF 821/532 (5 Nov 68) sec. 1. JCS 2121/211-2, 26 Nov 68; JCSM-739-68 to SecDef, 12 Dec 68, JCS 2121/211-3; same file, sec. 2. The draft that the JCS reviewed had been slightly amended by the IRG and SIG. While JCSM-739-68 was being written, J–5 observed that US military interests would be better served by a policy that ignored apartheid, but acknowledged that such an approach would not receive “serious consideration.” Encl B to JCS 2121/211-3, 6 Dec 68; same file.


23. Fred E. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge (Washington, DC; National Defense University, 1980), pp. 15, 29. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 Jan 64, JCS 2262/141; JCSM-63-64 to SecDef, 30 Jan 64, JCS 2262/141-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Feb 64, JCS 2262/141-3; JMF 9111/4060 (11 Jan 64).

24. Quoted in App to JCSM-756-64 to SecDef, 1 Sep 64, JCS 2262/150; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64).

25. App to JCSM-756-64 to SecDef, 1 Sep 64, JCS 2262/150; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64). Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC:
26. JCSM-756-64 to SecDef, 1 Sep 64, JCS 2262/150; JMF 9111 (25 Aug 64).


28. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Sep 64, JCS 2262/151; JCSM-788-64 to SecDef, 12 Sep 64, JCS 2262/151-1; JMF 9111 (4 Sep 64). Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge*, pp. 54–56.

29. Msg, JCS 9807 to CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, 14 Oct 64; JCS 2363/38-1, 4 Nov 64; Msg, JCS 1825 to CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, 13 Nov 64, JCS 2363/38-1; JMF 3149 (14 Oct 64) sec. 1.


31. This mirrored a crucial debate over whether the air campaign being planned against North Vietnam should consist of a hard knock advocated by the JCS or graduated pressure favored by OSD and State.

32. JCSM-903-64 to SecDef, 27 Oct 64, JCS 262/155; Memo, DASD(ISA) to M. W. Roche, 15 Jan 65, Att to N/H of JCS 2262/155, 26 Jan 65; JMF 9111 (25 Oct 64).


35. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, rescue missions planned for Bunia and Watsa were cancelled.

36. Msg, USUN New York 2313 to SecState, 22 Dec 64; Msg, SecState 1372 to Brussels, 22 Dec 64; JCSM-1071-64 to SecDef, 24 Dec 64, JCS 2262/160; Memo, DASD(ISA) to USecState, 30 Dec 64, N/H of JCS 2262/160, JMF 9111 (22 Dec 64). Dept. of State *Bulletin*, 25 Jan 65, p. 120.

37. Ltr, General Adams to JCS, 18 Dec 64, JCS 2262/154; JMF 9111 (18 Dec 64).

38. JCSM-1090-64 to SecDef, 31 Dec 64, JCS 2262/159-1; JMF 9111 (18 Dec 64).

39. Memo, DASD(ISA) to M. W. Roche, 15 Jan 65, N/H of JCS 2262/155; Msg, SecState 1831 to Leopoldville, 19 Jan 65; JCSM-48-65 to SecDef, 21 Jan 65, JCS 2262/155-1; JMF 9111 (25 Oct 64).

40. JCS 2262/163, 5 Mar 65; JCSM-185-64 to SecDef, 16 Mar 65, JCS 2262/163; Memo, Dep-SecDef to CJCS, 20 Mar 65, JCS 2262/163-1; JMF 9111 (18 Feb 65).

41. Ltr, General Adams to SecDef, 14 Feb 65, JCS 2262/162; JCSM-198-65 to SecDef, 19 Mar 65, JCS 2262/162-1; JMF 9111 (14 Feb 65).

42. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 12 Apr 65, JCS 2262/162-2; Airgram, Brussels A-805 to SecState, 14 Apr 65, JCS 2262/162-3; JMF 9111 (14 Feb 65) sec. 1. Since Tshombe’s fortunes improved, no high-level review took place. J–5 M 2250-65 to SJC, 7 Dec 65; JMF 9111 (18 Dec 64).


45. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CHMAAG, Addis Ababa, 31 Dec 63, JCS 2262/140-2; JMF 9111/4060 (29 Oct 63).


47. JCSM-1009-64 to SecDef, 3 Dec 64, JCS 2315/343; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 64, JCS 2315/343-1; JMF 9114 (22 Oct 64).

49. Memo of Conv, “Ambassador Korry’s Discussion with SecDef McNamara on Military Assistance to Ethiopia,” 27 Mar 65, JCS 2449; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 May 65, JCS 2449/2; JMF 9114 (17 May 65). CSAM-259-65 to JCS, 11 May 65, JCS 2449/1; JMF 9114 (11 May 65).

50. JCSM-400-65 to SecDef, 24 May 65, JCS 2449/1-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Jun 65, JCS 2449/1-2; JMF 9114 (11 May 65). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 527–529.

51. Ltr, General Adams to JCS, 22 May 65, JCS 2262/136-5; Encl to JCS 2449/3, 22 Jun 65; JCSM-509-65 to SecDef, 30 Jun 65, JCS 2449/3; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 9 Jul 65, JCS 2449/3-1; JMF 9114 (22 May 65).

52. General Johnson had opposed providing the four UH-1Ds, recommending that all current and future production be held as a reserve for Southeast Asia requirements. OSD overruled him. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, p. 559.

53. Ltr, General Adams to JCS 21 Sep 65, JCS 2449/11; JCSM-134-66 to SecDef, 2 Mar 66, JCS 2449/5-4; Msg, SecState 877 to Addis Ababa, 1 Apr 66; Msg, SecState 878 to Addis Ababa, 2 Apr 66; JMF 9110 (23 Jul 64) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Feb 68, JCS 2315/532-3; JMF 495 (18 Dec 67) sec. 2. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Oct 68, JCS 2458/463; JMF 560 (29 Oct 68). Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 558, 564–571, 586–588.

54. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 2 Nov 66, JCS 2449/11; Memo, SecDef to DDR&E and CJCS, 14 Nov 66, JCS 2449/11-1; Memo, Dep DDR&E to CJCS, 25 Nov 66, JCS 2449/11-2; Ltr, SecDef to USecState, 13 Jan 67, JCS 2449/11-5; JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66). The first and last documents are printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 576–577. According to the Briefing Sheet cited below, a draft JCSM emphasized Kagnew’s unique location and lack of acceptable alternatives. The final paper, JCSM-770-66, is not in the regular files. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 2449/11-4,” 7 Dec 66; JMF 9114 (2 Nov 66).

55. The conclusions of NIE 75-76/67, which formed the basis of Katzenbach’s memo, are in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 24, pp. 572–573.


58. Memo, DASD(I&L) to ASD(ISA), 28 Mar 68, JCS 2449/11-11; Encl B to JCS 2449/11-13, 18 Jul 68; JCSM-464-68 to SecDef, 23 Jul 68, JCS 2449/11-13; JMF 832/630 (28 Mar 68) sec. 1.


Chapter 12. South Asia: US Influence Shrinks


2. JCSM-555-64 to SecDef, 26 Jun 64, JCS 2271/88-1; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 64) (India and Pakistan) sec. 2. State Dept. NPP, “Pakistan,” 3 Nov 64, JCS 2271/88-3; JMF 9150/9105 (25 May 64) (India and Pakistan) sec. 2.
64) (Pakistan) sec. 1. State Dept. NPP, “India,” 3 Nov 64, JCS 2271/88-2; JMF 9105/9105 (25 May 64) (India).


7. Central Intelligence believed there was “some secret understanding” between China and Pakistan which, however loosely worded, gave the Pakistanis something they considered an “ace in the hole.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, pp. 359–360.

8. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Sep 65, JCS 2347/37; JCSM-704-65 to SecDef, 18 Sep 65, JCS 2347/37-1; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65) sec. 1. Secretary Rusk’s advice to the President was similar: “If at the end of the day we are forced to choose between them, India with its much larger population, industrial base, rudimentary democracy, and other potentials would probably be a better bet. However, we could never fully support policy goals of either India or Pakistan. The best protection of American interests rests in maintaining adequate, though probably not intimate, links with both.” Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 25, p. 377.

9. Air defense plans, General Wheeler reported, involved deploying four Hawk missile battalions and four tactical fighter squadrons to Amballa and Calcutta. Aircraft could arrive in one week, Hawks in four to six weeks. The Chief, US Military Supply Mission, in India reported that responding to minor Chinese incursions would require airlifting between 350 and 900 tons daily. CM-859-65 to DJS, 18 Sep 65, JCS 2271/100; JMF 9154 (2 Feb 65). CM-870-65 to SecDef, 23 Sep 65, JCS 2271/100-1; JMF 9154 (18 Sep 65). The full, final JCS report is JCSM-803-65 to SecDef, 5 Nov 65, JCS 2271/100-2; same file.


11. OASD(ISA), “Draft Report on India and Pakistan,” Sep 65; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65) sec. 1A.

12. JCSM-745-65 to SecDef, 12 Oct 65, JCS 2347/37-2; JMF 9150 (10 Sep 65) sec. 2. Forwarded to State via Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState (NESA), 20 Oct 65, N/H of JCS 2347/37-2, 25 Oct 65; same file.


19. “Chmn’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 40th SIG Mtg on June 27, 1968,” JCS 2464/106; JMF 537 (CY 68) sec. 5. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 25, pp. 988, ftnt. 3, and 1030. The tank tale became almost impossibly tangled. West Germany had insisted upon selling tanks to Pakistan through a third country, which the United States would not approve. Likewise, Washington vetoed an M–47 sale by Iran. An arrangement to sell German tanks to Italy and thence to Pakistan looked possible, but the Italians had no M-47s of their own, would not proceed until they had customers for all 750 they contemplated buying, and demanded outrageous prices. Germans insisted upon a clause in the German-Italian contract prohibiting resale to Pakistan. Belgium was willing to proceed with a sale to Pakistan, on condition that Brussels could inform New Delhi that Belgium was prepared to sell tanks to India on similar terms. Ibid., pp. 1000–1001.


22. Memo, ActgDepUSecState to Non-Proliferation Cmte, 25 Feb 65, JCS 1731/858; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 5 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-1; JCSM-173-65 to SecDef, 11 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-2; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to ActgDepUSecState, 24 Mar 65, N/H of JCS 1731/858-2, 29 Mar 65; JMF 3030 (25 Feb 65).

23. Ltr, ActgDepUSecState to ASD(ISA), 5 Mar 65, and Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-3; JCSM-213-65 to SecDef, 24 Mar 65, JCS 1731/858-4; JMF 3030 (25 Feb 65).

24. Ltr, Ambassador Thompson to SecDef, 29 Apr 65, JCS 2271/97; JMF 9154 (29 Apr 65).

25. US intelligence estimated that China could stockpile about ten bombs during 1965–67 and possibly have a few medium range ballistic missiles ready for deployment during 1967–68. J–5 T 41-65; JCS 3050 (1 Mar 65).

26. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 May 65, JCS 2271/97-1; JCSM-358-65 to SecDef, 14 May 65, JCS 2271/97-2; Ltr, SecDef to Ambassador Thompson, 21 Jun 65, JCS 2271/97-5; JMF 9154 (29 Apr 65).

27. According to a Special National Intelligence Estimate issued in October 1965, “within the next few years India probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear weapons.” *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 25, p. 451.

28. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 26 Jan 66, JCS 2271/104; JCSM-80-66 to SecDef, 4 Feb 66, JCS 2271/104-1; JMF 9154 (26 Jan 66).

29. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 18 Feb 66, JCS 2271/104-2; JMF 9154 (26 Jan 66).


34. JCSM-1-67 to SecDef, 4 Jan 67, JCS 2271/107-9; JMF 9154 (4 Jun 66) sec. 2. JCSM-1 was forwarded to State; see Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Jan 67, JCS 2271/107-10; same file.


36. Dept. of State Bulletin, 1 Jul 68, pp. 8–11, and 8 Jul 68, pp. 58–59. Evolution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the long debate over security assurances are described in chap. 5.

37. JCSM-26-62 to SecDef, 11 Jan 62, JCS 570/548; JCSM-592-62 to SecDef, 3 Aug 62, JCS 570/560; JMF 9150.1 (14 Aug 64). JCSM-26-62 was sent to the State Dept. and from there to the London Embassy. 1st N/H of JCS 2294/30-7, 26 Jan 65, same file. The Congo rescue is described in chap. 11.

38. The US delegation included Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Frank Sloan and Capt. Walter Stencil, USN, from the Joint Staff.

39. Memo, DepAsstSecState J. C. Kitchen to SecDef et al., 2 Mar 64, JCS 2294/27-5; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Mar 64, JCS 2294/28-2; JCSM-312-64 to SecDef, 11 Apr 64, JCS 2294/28-3; JMF 91050.1/9105 (11 Nov 63) sec. 2.

40. The other sites, in descending order of importance, were Coetivy, Aldabra, Agalega, Farquhar, Ile des Roches, and the Cosmoledos Islands.

41. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 14 Aug 64, JCS 2294/30; JCSM-705-64 to SecDef, 15 Aug 64, JCS 2294/30-1; “Report of Indian Ocean Islands Survey,” 15 Sep 64; JCSM-871-64 to SecDef, 14 Oct 64, JCS 2294/30-4; JMF 9150.1 (14 Aug 64). JCSM-871 was forwarded to State via Ltr, DASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState J. C. Kitchen, 19 Oct 64, JCS 2294/30-5; same file.

42. Encl B to JCS 2294/30-7, para 14, 1 Dec 64; Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 21 Nov 64, JCS 2294/30-6; JCSM-1028-64 to SecDef, 10 Dec 64, JCS 2294/30-7; JMF 910 (14 Aug 64). JCSM-1028 was sent to the State Dept. and from there to the London Embassy. 1st N/H of JCS 2294/30-7, 26 Jan 65, same file. The Congo rescue is described in chap. 11.

43. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 May 65, JCS 2294/30-8; JCSM-392-65 to SecDef, 20 May 65, JCS 2294/30-9; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 14 Jun 65, JCS 2294/30-10; JMF 9150.1 (14 Aug 64). Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 17 Aug 66, JCS 2294/47; JMF 9163 (1966) IR 6925.

44. JCSM-885-65 to SecDef, 15 Dec 65, JCS 1800/977-2; JMF 7000.1 (8 Sep 65) sec. 2.

45. The text of the 30 Dec 66 agreement is in JCS 2294/52, 17 Feb 67, JMF 971/537 (14 Feb 67) and also in United States Treaties and Other International Obligations 28. The agreement would last fifty years, and twenty more if neither party objected. The secret arrangement, revealed in 1975, appeared in NY Times, 17 Oct 75, p. 3.

46. Memo, SecNav to SecDef, 24 Feb 67, JCS 2294/53; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 1.

47. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Jun 67, JCS 2294/55; JCSM-420-67 to SecDef, 25 Jul 67, JCS 2294/55-1; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 1.

48. Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 27 Oct 67, JCS 2294/60; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 1.

49. JCSM-226-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2294/61-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 15 Jun 68, JCS 2294/61-2; JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 2.

Chapter 13. The Far East: The Climax of Containment


2. "Communist China (Short-Range Report), Att to Memo, CJCS, DepSecDef, and ActgDepU-SecState to DJS et al., 4 May 65, JCS 2118/230; JMF 9141 (30 Apr 65) sec. 1. The four situations are fully summarized in *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 30, pp. 188–190. Copies were sent to the White House and the CIA. JCSM-437-65 to SecDef, 7 Jun 65, JCS 2118/230-2; same file.


5. Senior officials had decided not to submit this Study to the Senior Interdepartmental Group.


7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 12 Feb 66, JCS 2118/235; JCSM-744-66 to SecDef, 19 Dec 66, JCS 2118/235-5; JMF 9141 (12 Feb 66) sec. 1.


9. JCSM-744-66 to SecDef, 7 Dec 66, JCS 2118/234-7; JMF 9141 (11 Jan 66) sec. 1.

10. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 May 68, JCS 2458/401; JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1. Systems Analysis, rather than ISA, drafted this DPM.

11. JCSM-369-68 to SecDef, 14 Jun 68, JCS 2458/401-1; JMF 560 (16 May 68).

12. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Oct 68, JCS 2458/401-4; JMF 560 (16 May 68) sec. 1. JCSM-649-68 to SecDef, 1 Nov 68, JCS 2458/401-5; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 2 Jan 69, JCS 2458/401-9; same file, sec. 2.


14. JCSM-99-65 to SecDef, 11 Feb 65, JCS 1966/145; Memo, DASD(ISA) to AsstSecState R. P. Bundy, 2 Mar 65, N/H of JCS 1966/145, 25 Mar 45; JMF 9142 (16 Jan 65). The six-ship sale can be inferred from later documents on this subject.


17. MemCon, “Call on the Secretary of Defense by the Chinese Minister of Defense,” 23 Sep 65, JCS 2118/231; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Oct 65, JCS 2118/231-3; JMF 9141 (23 Sep 65). Memos, CSAF to SecDef, 23 Nov 65, and SecDef to CSAF, 8 Dec 65, JCS 1966/153; JMF 9142 (23 Nov 65). JCSM-851-65 to SecDef, 1 Dec 65, JCS 2118/231-5; JMF 9141 (23 Sep 65). By December 1967, 53 F-5s had been delivered to Taiwan. *CINCPAC Command History: 1967*, vol. 1, pp. 374-375.

19. Memo, RADM Blouin to DJS, “GRC Request to Purchase Five Additional APDs,” 12 May 66; JMF 9142 (16 Jan 65). CM-1440-66 to CNO, 17 May 66; Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 191919Z May 66; CJCS 091 China (Rep). DJSM-673-66 to ASD(ISA), 20 May 66; Memo, ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState Bundy, 28 May 66, JCS 1966/158; Memo, RADM Blouin to DJS, 20 Jun 66, JCS 1966/158, 27 Jun 66; JCSM-439-66 to SecDef, 29 Jun 66, JCS 1966/158; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepAsstSecState Samuel Berger, 1 Jul 66, JCS 1966/158-1; JMF 9142 (16 Jun 65). *CINCPAC Command History, 1966*, vol. 1, p. 239. Congress also authorized five-year loans of one destroyer and one destroyer escort, which the JCS certified as being in the national interest. JCSM-276-66 to SecDef, 29 Apr 66, JCS 2118/238, JMF 9142 (28 Apr 66).

20. *Draft Administrative History of the Department of Defense*, vol. 1, p. 205. Memo, ASD(IDSA) to CJCS, 9 Feb 68, JCS 1966/166; JMF 882/495 (9 Feb 68). In September 1967, the administration had agreed to supply the GRC on a grant basis, with 253 M-41 light tanks. Ltr, SecDef to DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo, 15 Sep 67, JCS 1966/164; JMF 9142 (28 Apr 66).

21. JCSM-190-68 to SecDef, 29 Mar 68, JCS 1966/166-1; JMF 882/495 (9 Feb 68).

22. Msg, Def 4575 to JCS, 112308Z Jul 68; JCS 1966/167-1, 4 Oct 68; CM-3716-68 to DJS, 19 Oct 68; JMF 82/461 (11 Jul 68). Although the Assistant to the Chairman drafted and signed CM-3716, the memo expressed Wheeler’s views.


29. Here they were following a CIA estimate: “Whatever the outcome of the current scramble for power, it is unlikely there will be a major change in Indonesian foreign policy. Should the army emerge on top, Indonesian policies would probably be more genuinely neutral in balancing East and West, and the tendency to follow Peking’s lead in international affairs certainly would be reduced. However, no break with Moscow is in the cards. . . . ” *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 26, p. 378. Hindsight shows this estimate to have been wrong.


35. Some claimed that the Indonesian army’s willingness to fight the communists was a result of the firm US stand in Vietnam, but no clear evidence for this has been found. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 26, p. 430.


38. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 17 Feb 65, JCS 1800/932; JCSM-832-65 to SecDef, 19 May 65, JCS 1800/932-6; Memo, SecDef to SecArmy, 29 May 65, JCS 1800/932-7; JMF 1100 (17 Feb 65).


41. JCSM-411-65 to SecDef, 27 May 65, JCS 1776/704-3; Ltr, DASD(ISA) to W. W. Rostow, 6 Jul 65; State Dept., “National Policy Paper: The Republic of Korea,” 9 Nov 65, JCS 1776/704-4; JMF 9144 (6 Feb 65) sec. 2.


43. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 9 Apr 66, JCS 1776/720; JCSM-245-66 to SecDef, 16 Apr 66, JCS 1776/720-1; Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 27 May 66, JCS 1776/720-2; Msg, Joint State/AID/Defense to Seoul, 4 Jun 66; JMF 9144 (1 Apr 66). In return for the additional ROK deployment, the United States provided about $70 million worth of extra equipment and payments. *Foreign Relations: 1964–1968*, vol. 39, fnnt. 5 on p. 148.

44. JCSM-386-67 to SecDef, 6 Jul 67, JCS 1776/737-1; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 19 Jul 67, N/H of JCS 1776/737-1; JMF 892/495 (19 May 67). Presumably, the MAM’s mention of FY 1969 was based on an assumption that the Vietnam War would be ending by then.


48. JCSM-570-67 to SecDef, 21 Oct 67, JCS 1776/744; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Nov 67, JCS 1776/744-1; JMF 892/461 (29 Aug 67).
49. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1776/748,” 28 Dec 67; JCSM-14-68 to SecDef, 6 Jan 68, JCS 1776/748-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Mar 68, JCS 1776/748-3; JMF 892/372 (22 Dec 67). On 29 December, the JCS cancelled the study they had requested back on 27 September. Instead, they asked for a paper dealing only with dollar and manpower requirements for US forces; this became JCSM-14-68. Note to Control, “JCS 1776/748,” 29 Dec 67; same file.

50. The Joint Chiefs’ responsibilities for reviewing and overseeing missions were delineated in SM-676-66 to CSA et al., 19 Aug 66, JCS 2150/214-2; JMF 2400 (13 Aug 65), and SM-24-68 to CSA et al., 11 Jan 68, JCS 2150/251-3; JMF 322 (22 Nov 67).


52. Aircraft dispositions and distances from Wonsan were as follows: Osan, 3 F–4s at 214 nautical miles; Kunsan, 3 F–4s at 272 nm; Okinawa, 25 F–105s at 804 nm; Iwakuni, Japan, 17 F–4s and 20 A–4s at 378 nm; Yokota, Japan, 20 F–4s and 8 F–105s at 502 nm; and Misawa, Japan, 12 F–4s at 632 nm. CM-2948-68 to Pres, 30 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) BP. In subsequent Congressional testimony, though, Gen. Wheeler stated that only eight USMC and 16 USAF aircraft in Japan plus 18 USAF aircraft on Okinawa could have responded. H. Com. On Armed Services, Hearings on the USS Pueblo and EC–121 Plane Incidents, 91st Cong., 1st sess., p. 886.

53. This was wrong; the crew remained aboard the USS Pueblo until the ship docked.

54. The above paragraphs are based upon: Henry Millington’s Pueblo monograph prepared for the National Security Agency; Statement by SecDef, “The Pueblo Incident,” n.d., Tab 3 to “Ball Committee Briefing Book”; Msg, Pueblo to AIG 7623, 230352Z Jan 68, JCS IN 52575; Msg, Pueblo to AIG 7623, 230415Z Jan 68, JCS IN 52545; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 240435Z Jan 68, JCS IN 55456; JHO; CM-2948-68 to Pres, 30 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) BP; Memo for Record by BG Shedd, “Chronological listing of times the CJCS was called on the PUEBLO incident . . . ,” 30 Jan 68; Memo, BG Shedd to CJCS, “FONECON, RADM McClendon and General Bonesteel, 230240 EST,” 0345, 23 Jan 68; Msg, CINCUNC to CJCS, KRA 214, 242314Z Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Pueblo Incident); Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story (New York: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 174–217; and H. Com. On Armed Services, Report of the Special Subcommittee on the USS Pueblo, 91st Cong., 1st sess., passim.

55. Msg, COMNAVFORJAPAN to JCS et al., 231610Z Jan 68; Statement of SecDef, “The Pueblo Incident,” Tab 3 to “Ball Committee Briefing Book,” JHO. CM-2948-68 to Pres, 30 Jan 68; CJCS 091 Korea (Re: Pueblo Incident, Jan 68) BP. The Ball Committee’s terms of reference and summary conclusions are in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 590–591, 613–615.

56. Note to Control, 23 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 7989 to CINCPAC et al., 23 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1.


60. CM-2937-68 to SecDef, 25 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1. CM-2941-68 to SecDef, 26 Jan 68, JCS 1776/753; JMF 893/376 (26 Jan 68). Msg, JCS 8361 to CINCPAC et al., 26 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 8344 to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 26 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 8344 to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 26 Jan 68; Msg, JCS 8343 to AIG 936, 27 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1. NY Times, 26 Jan 68, p. 1. Of the 182 aircraft sent to South Korea, the F–4s and F–100s came from CONUS, most
of the others from Okinawa. JCSM-82-68 to SecDef, 3 Feb 68, JCS 2147/455; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Feb 68, JCS 2147/455-1; JMF 376 (1 Feb 68).

61. CSAFM-A-29-68 to JCS, 29 Jan 68, JCS 1776/755; Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 050612Z Feb 68; JMF 892/460 (29 Jan 68). Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270156Z Jan 68, JCS IN 61821; JCS 1776/758, 30 Jan 68, and Dec On, 31 Jan 68; JMF 893/375 (25 Jan 68). The JCS did approve Gen. McConnell’s proposal that CINCPAC and CINCSAC develop a plan for delivering a coordinated attack against the entire North Korean air order of battle. Msg, JCS 8654 to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, 31 Jan 68, JCS 1776/754-1; same file.

62. Memo for Record by DepSJCS, “Korean Situation (Pueblo Incident),” 25 Jan 68; JCSM-53-68 to SecDef, 25 Jan 68; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 Feb 68, JCS 1776/752-2; JCSM-112-68 to SecDef, 21 Feb 68, JCS 1776/752-4; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 2. CM-2992-68 to SecDef, 10 Feb 68; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Feb 68; JCS 091 Korea. Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 318–320, 501. JCSM-53-68 to SecDef, 25 Jan 68; CM-2947-68 to SecDef, 30 Jan 68, JCS 1776/752-1; JMF 893/544 (22 Jan 68) sec. 1.


64. Msg, CJCS 8177 to CINCPAC, 25 Jan 68; JMF 893/375 (25 Jan 68).


66. Msg, CJCS 1116 to CINCPAC, 31 Jan 68, JCS 091 Korea (Pueblo Incident, vol. 1). Adm. Sharp supported a diplomatic approach accompanied by a buildup. If diplomacy failed, he suggested positioning the USS Banner with escorts off Wonsan. Harbor mining, he added, could be accomplished without great difficulty and should have a “salutary effect.” Msg, CINCPAC to CJCS, 310706Z Jan 68, same file.


70. JCSM-136-68 to SecDef, 5 Mar 68, JCS 1776/766-1; “FY 1968 Korea MAP Supplemental,” n.d.; JMF 892/495 (20 Feb 68).


72. Gen. Wheeler was in Vietnam making a post-Tet assessment.
74. JCS 1776/768, 28 Feb 68; JMF 892/396 (28 Feb 68).
77. JCS 1776/768-2, 8 Apr 68, and Dec On, 10 Apr 68; JMF 892/396(28 Feb 68).
78. Memo of Conv, Johnson-Park Meeting in Honolulu, 17 Apr 68, Country File, Korea, Box 256, vol. 6, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
80. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 5 Apr 68, JCS 2339/273; JCSM-255-68 to SecDef, 22 Apr 68, JCS 2339/273-2; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 22 May 68, JCS 2339/273-3; JMF 907/374 (4 Apr 68). Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Jul 68, JCS 2472/372; JMF 911/374 (6 May 68). US Strike Command History, 1968, p. 29. CM-3518-68 to DJS, 27 Jul 68; DJSM-1129-68 to CJCS, 12 Sep 68; CJCS 091 Korea.
81. She and her community, having so little, embrace life with a mind-set of abundance, thankful for the simple things they do have. In contrast, we Americans and the elite of El Salvador seem to operate with a mind-set of scarcity, seeking what we don't have and building walls to protect what we might lose. Dept. of State Policy Planning Council, “US Policy Toward Korea,” 15 Jun 68, Att to Memo, Staff Director to SIG, 26 Jun 68, JCS 2464/104; JMF 892 (26 Jun 68) sec. 1. While preparing this report, State officials consulted OSD, Joint Staff, CIA, AID, and Budget Bureau specialists. The abstract is printed in Foreign Relations: 1964–1968, vol. 29, pp. 433–436.
83. JCSM-612-68 to SecDef, 17 Oct 68, JCS 1776/759-9; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 30 Nov 68, JCS 1776/759-10; JMF 893/374 (30 Jan 68) sec. 4A. The most serious post-Pueblo incident occurred in November, when about 120 seaborne commandos landed on the central east coast of South Korea, inflicting considerable civilian and military casualties before being killed or captured.
85. Memo of Conv, “Conversation, Prime Min Sato—SecDef McNamara,” 21 Jan 65, JCS 2180/198; JMF 9143 (13 Jan 65). Japan's postwar constitution renounced the right to wage war and to maintain standing armed forces.
86. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 1 Jun 65, JCS 2180/201; JMF 9143 (12 Jun 65).
2180/207-4; JMF 9143 (16 Mar 66). Memo, ActgStaffDir, IRG for Far East to AsstSecState Bundy et al., 11 Jun 66, JCS 2463/3-5; JMF 9082 (15 Apr 66).

90. The decision to withdraw air defense units had been taken in 1963 as part of an effort to stanch the balance of payments drain.

91. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Jun 66; CJCS 091 Japan.

92. CM-1572-66 to SecDef, 25 Jun 66; CJCS 091 Japan.


100. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Aug 67, JCS 2326/33; JCSM-491-67 to SecDef, 6 Sep 67, JCS 2326/33-2; JMF 904 (29 Aug 67) sec. 1.

101. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Apr 67, JCS 2326/33; JCSM-491-67 to SecDef, 6 Sep 67, JCS 2326/33-2; JMF 904 (29 Aug 67) sec. 1.


Chapter 14. Conclusion


2. General Harold K. Johnson interviewed by W. S. Poole on 3 May 79, JHO.

3. Admiral McDonald Interview, pp. 409–410.

4. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, interviewed by W. S. Poole on 17 May 79, JHO. General Goodpaster served as Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower during 1954–61, Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, during 1962–66, and Director, Joint Staff, during 1966–67.

5. Ibid.

6. Admiral McDonald Interview, p. 360.

7. E-mail, J. Ronald Fox to Walter S. Poole, 17 March 2004. Fox served as Deputy Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) in the Department of the Air Force. In 1967, after Israel's spectacular victory in the Six Day War, Air Force officers could not resist applying the systems analysis methodology and caustically concluding that “the Israeli Air Force, because of its extremely limited damage-causing capability, could not influence the outcome of the land battle with the Arab States.” Their point, of course, was that “surprise, well-defined objectives, air-ground cooperation, strategy and tactics, precise plans, and imaginative leadership greatly affect the effectiveness of tactical air.” Memo, VCSAF to SAF-0S, 12 Jun 67; CJCS 091 Israel.


9. JCSM-856-65 to SecDef, 3 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-1; JMF 7000 (24 Nov 65) sec. 1. JCSM-867-65 to SecDef, 8 Dec 65, JCS 2458/42-8; same file, sec. 2. McNamara had asked the JCS to say that the force structure proposed for FY 1967 would further increase overall combat effectiveness and “provide the forces which we require, in a high state of readiness, to defend the vital interests of the United States.” Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Nov 65, JCS 2458/42; same file, sec. 1.


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