History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy

1969–1972
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 January 1971. *Left to right:* Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations; General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, US Army; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, US Marine Corps.
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Foreword

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established in the early days of World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the US armed forces. They continued after the war as military advisers and planners and have played an important role over the years in devising US national policy. An understanding of their relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense provides an essential basis for understanding their current work. Moreover, an account of their activity during peacetime, crises, and limited wars is an important part of the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the Joint Staff, and as a source of background information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of these activities and the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes were originally prepared in classified form. Volume X describes JCS activities during 1969 to 1972, except those for Indochina which are described in a separate series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam*. A number of authors prepared this volume, Dr. Walter S. Poole wrote chapters 1-5, 7-10, the Trust Territory portion of chapter 13, and chapter 14. Dr. Lorna S. Jaffe wrote chapters 6 and 11 and the Korea portion of chapter 13. Mr. Wayne M. Dzwonchyk wrote chapter 12 and the Japan portion of chapter 13. Mr. Willard J. Webb, who was then Division Chief, reviewed all their drafts.

After declassification, Dr. Poole reworked the manuscript for open publication in 2011–2012, taking advantage of the great amount of material that had become available as well as the clearer perspectives afforded by the passage of more than twenty years. Ms. Penny Norman prepared the sanitized manuscript for publication, and Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the index.

The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

JOHN F. SHORTAL  
Director for Joint History
Preface

This volume covers a period in which President Richard M. Nixon sought to replace confrontation between the superpowers with détente, leading to a generation of peace. The Joint Chiefs of Staff adjusted slowly and reluctantly to the changes in policy and strategy that President Nixon imposed, particularly as regards the Far East. They worried most about US conventional capabilities at a time when sizable forces were engaged in Southeast Asia and incidents or crises were occurring in Korea, South Asia, Cuba, and the Middle East. The Soviet Union, they believed, still harbored expansive ambitions and was gaining strategic advantages over the United States. From their perspective, the United States was barely holding its own in the Cold War.

Because President Nixon narrowed the circle of decisionmakers, this volume focuses less on relations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense than did previous volumes and more upon the interplay between Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Readers will note that the footnotes draw upon three primary sources: the Joint Master File (cited in footnotes as “JMF”) covering corporate JCS activities; the Chairman’s file (cited as “CJCS”); and the daily diary kept by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. The last of these three sources often proved to be the most revealing.

A collective effort by the individuals listed in the Foreword produced this volume. However, historians’ research in JCS files was aided immeasurably by the helpful personnel of what were then the Records and Information Research Branch, Documents Division, on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon and of the Relocation and Reconstitution Branch at Fort Ritchie, Maryland. Additionally, Admiral Moorer read and clarified a number of points in the manuscript. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., reviewed and commented upon chapters 1, 4, and 5. Drs. Steven L. Rearden and Edward J. Drea in the Joint History Office critiqued the final version and suggested improvements. In no sense, however, did any of these individuals approve what they read. The authors assume full responsibility for their portions of the text.

Walter S. Poole
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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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1969–1972
Overview: Men and Methods

On 20 January 1969, Richard M. Nixon became President of a nation bitterly divided over the Vietnam War. Steadily, between 1965 and 1968, the number of US military personnel committed there kept rising. As 1968 ended, that number stood at 536,644; major units included 95 Army and 25 Marine maneuver battalions as well as 58 USAF fixed-wing squadrons. By then the American public had turned against what seemed an ever more costly stalemate. According to opinion polls, by January 1969 a majority looked upon intervention as a mistake. President Nixon set about withdrawing US troops in stages, hoping to “Vietnamize” the conflict without suffering a defeat he believed would damage US credibility worldwide. However, because the withdrawal stretched over four years, Vietnam remained a polarizing issue.

In this changed atmosphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves increasingly isolated and even ignored. They wanted to stay the course in South Vietnam, keeping US forces there long enough to assure a favorable outcome. Yet both the President and Congress, responding to swelling anti-Vietnam and anti-military feeling, clamped down on military spending, forcing the Joint Chiefs of Staff into “tradeoffs.” Some of the money spent on air sorties in Southeast Asia, for example, had to be taken from funds programmed elsewhere. Not only had the war in Vietnam reduced the strategic reserve in the United States to practically nil but it had also depleted the US Seventh Army in Germany. While the Nixon administration had plans to strengthen NATO, it had to fend off congressional efforts to bring troops back from Western Europe. Faced with growing pressure for additional troop withdrawals from Japan and Okinawa as well, the President worried that the net effect would be a loss of US credibility, encouraging Soviet adventurism.

Outside Indochina, President Nixon’s first term witnessed a steady stream of crises and confrontations that threatened international stability. North Korea destroyed a US reconnaissance aircraft, killing 31 men. Egypt and Israel dueled along the Suez Canal, with the United States arming the latter and the Soviet Union providing weapons and advisers to the former. Syria, a Soviet client state, invaded Jordan, whose
king cultivated American support. India and Pakistan fought another war. On the superpower plane, the USSR appeared to be aiming for strategic nuclear superiority. Repeatedly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned their superiors that the overall balance seemed to be tilting in Moscow’s favor and that US commitments were dangerously outstripping capabilities.

The Decisionmakers: A Unique Mixture

Unlike his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon viewed the management of foreign policy as his personal forte. His experience derived largely from eight years’ service as Vice President under Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man of vast experience in world affairs. Very broadly, Nixon hoped to replace Cold War confrontations with détente between the superpowers, leading to what he conceived as “a generation of peace.” He reopened relations with mainland China and concluded strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, quickly emerged as Nixon’s chief lieutenant and frequent executor of his policies. A refugee from Nazi Germany, Kissinger became a professor at Harvard, publishing well-received works like *A World Restored*, which analyzed European diplomacy between 1812 and 1822, and *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which criticized US reliance upon threats of nuclear retaliation. Fairly early in the President’s term, Dr. Kissinger became pre-eminent among Nixon’s advisors. The Nixon-Kissinger collaboration is exceptionally well documented thanks largely to the taping system that recorded daily conversations. The picture that emerges from their exchanges is one of cold realism and a coherent vision, mingled with displays of personal insecurity accompanied by distrust and even hostility toward a range of senior officials.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird brought to the Pentagon a large store of political expertise. During eight terms in Congress, he chaired the House Republican Conference and served on the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, forming ties which would help him in tough budget battles. Secretary Laird saw his tasks as: “Vietnamizing” the war and bringing about a full US withdrawal; facilitating the transition from the draft to an all-volunteer force; minimizing budget-cutting by Congress; and easing friction between military and civilian components in the Defense Department. In the budget battles, Laird and his military advisers stood shoulder to shoulder. Over Vietnam, though, they parted company. He pressed for fairly quick withdrawal, while they wanted pullouts keyed to the success of Vietnamization. David Packard, co-founder of Hewlett-Packard, served as Deputy Secretary until December 1971. Kenneth Rush, who as ambassador to West Germany had played a major role negotiating the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, succeeded him.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to recover the influence they lost during Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s tenure. General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, had been
Chairman since July 1964. An able diplomat and conciliator, he prized unity among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believing that divided positions only invited civilian interference. General Wheeler suffered a heart attack in 1967 and his health remained uncertain. Nonetheless, President Johnson extended his tour until mid-1969; President Nixon then prolonged it for another twelve months. But, too often, it was as though the search for unity deteriorated into lowest common-denominator compromises. Moreover, the temper of the times worked against General Wheeler. The Vietnam War had enhanced his importance considerably. Almost always during the Johnson administration, General Wheeler alone went to the White House as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) spokesman. He retained his pre-eminent role under President Nixon. However, General Wheeler’s longevity did not translate into increased influence. Often, during the McNamara years, General Wheeler crossed swords with civilian analysts—and usually lost. Dr. Kissinger likened him to “a wary beagle, his soft dark eyes watchful for the origin of the next blow.” Early in 1970, General Wheeler sadly told a JCS colleague that he was about to retire “with the war still going on and the defense of the country reduced to the danger point.” On 2 July, he left office a frustrated and deeply disappointed man.²

The new Chairman, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, had commanded the Seventh Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and the Atlantic Fleet before becoming Chief of Naval Operations in August 1967. Every day during his Chairmanship, Moorer dictated and compiled a remarkably candid and increasingly detailed diary. The self-portrait that emerges is that of an incisive problem-solver, shrewd and sometimes sardonic in judging the strengths and weaknesses of others but not greatly given to the broader reflections about policy and strategy that were Kissinger’s trademark. Admiral Moorer’s modus operandi differed markedly from General Wheeler’s in that he did not place a premium upon JCS collegiality and was prepared to work by himself with Nixon and Kissinger, particularly during times of crisis.

General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff from July 1968 through June 1972, occupied a peculiar position. No JCS member was better known to the American public, and therein lay his problem. His tenure as Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from June 1964 through June 1968 made him a target for opponents of the war. The surprise Tet offensive, said critics, shattered his claim of progress and cast doubt upon his abilities. Indeed, his Vice Chief of Staff later wrote that the White House “considered Westmoreland a political liability and treated him accordingly.”³ But General Westmoreland found an even harsher critic in Admiral Moorer. Judging by the Chairman’s diary, it is no exaggeration to say that the longer their association continued, the lower Westmoreland sank in Moorer’s estimation.⁴

General Creighton W. Abrams had taken over from General Westmoreland as commander in Vietnam on 2 July 1968 and would succeed him as Chief of Staff. The Senate postponed Abrams’ confirmation, pending an investigation of whether he had been aware that his air deputy, General John Lavelle, had violated the rules of engagement by approving attacks against military targets in North Vietnam and falsely reporting them as “protective reaction strikes.” A full investigation convinced senators that
General Abrams had known nothing about the deception, and he was confirmed on 12 October 1972.\footnote{3}

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., followed Admiral Moorer as Chief of Naval Operations. At the age of 49, he became the youngest officer to hold that post and the youngest four-star admiral in US history. “Bud” Zumwalt was not the choice of Admiral Moorer.\footnote{4} Rather, Zumwalt’s effective performance as Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, impressed Secretary Laird and led to his selection. In the JCS arena, Admiral Zumwalt proved extremely active. Within the Navy, he worked to eliminate “Mickey Mouse” regulations and a legacy of racism. Some of his “Z-Grams,” aimed at these problems, angered traditionalists and inspired jokes about a “mod Navy.” His JCS colleagues worried that, by altering standards of discipline and deportment, Admiral Zumwalt might be feeding the very fires they were trying to control. Too easily, they feared, reform could degenerate into mere permissiveness.\footnote{5}

General John D. Ryan became Chief of Staff, US Air Force, on 1 August 1969. Beginning his career as a bomber pilot, Ryan rose to be Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (1964–67), then Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (1967–68), and finally Vice Chief of Staff (1968–69). Admiral Zumwalt described him as “laconic by temperament or habit, and evidently more at home as an operational commander than engaged in the kind of wide-ranging speculation and analysis that is required of members of the Joint Chiefs.” But the Joint Chiefs of Staff also were involved in choosing targets for air attack, an area where General Ryan had considerable expertise. Air Force officers noted that Zumwalt, a destroyer man, contributed little to planning the air campaign against North Vietnam. Years later, an officer who had been General Ryan’s aide recalled that “the chemistry between Ryan and Zumwalt was not good at all.”\footnote{6}

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., served as Commandant of the Marine Corps during 1968-71, a span in which all Marine combat units departed Vietnam. He seems to have collaborated well with Moorer, Ryan, and Zumwalt. The next Commandant was General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. During 1967-69 as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Cushman controlled the largest combat force ever led by a Marine. During 1969-71, Cushman served as Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Perhaps more noteworthy, though, was his previous tenure from 1957 to 1961 as Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. In that capacity, Cushman so impressed Nixon that in 1970 the President briefly considered elevating General Chapman from Commandant to Chairman so that Cushman could become Commandant eighteen months sooner.\footnote{7}

Decisionmaking: Extreme Centralization

President Nixon’s avowed objective was to restore the National Security Council (NSC) to its former pre-eminence. President Eisenhower had created an elaborate NSC structure with a Planning Board to prepare recommendations and an Operations
Coordinating Board to supervise the implementation of decisions. His successor, President John F. Kennedy, dismantled this apparatus and relied heavily upon informal, ad hoc procedures. Under President Johnson, “Tuesday lunch” sessions had emerged as the crucial forum for settling major issues. General Wheeler attended almost all such luncheons from October 1967 until January 1969. No formal mechanism existed, though, to coordinate and implement “Tuesday lunch” decisions. General Wheeler also served on the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), a body created in 1966 to deal with less urgent matters. Five Interdepartmental Regional Groups, each headed by an Assistant Secretary of State, supported the SIG.

During President Nixon’s first term, the formulation and implementation of national security policy became concentrated in the White House as never before. In the Johnson administration, the State Department bore broad responsibility for directing interdepartmental activities. President Nixon determined, instead, to assign primacy to the staff of the National Security Council. On 20 January 1969, through National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 2, he reorganized the entire structure. At the apex stood the National Security Council, which President Nixon defined as “the principal forum for the consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination.”

Below it Nixon created an NSC Review Group chaired by Dr. Kissinger; its other members were representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, JCS. This Group would assure that issues coming before the NSC truly deserved its attention, that all realistic alternatives had been included, and that the facts accompanied by all agency and interdepartmental views would be fairly and adequately presented.

At the next level down, an Under Secretaries Committee headed by the Under Secretary of State and including the Chairman, JCS, would address (1) matters of an operational nature but excluding substantial policy questions, (2) issues on which the Interdepartmental Groups could not agree or which were of a broader nature, and (3) problems not requiring presidential or NSC attention. Finally, Interdepartmental Regional Groups chaired by Assistant Secretaries of State were reconstituted as part of the NSC system. Interdepartmental Groups would prepare policy and contingency papers for NSC consideration, rendering decisions on such matters as could be settled by Assistant Secretaries.

Very soon, more bodies were added. In May 1969, after the administration appeared to fumble its response to North Korea’s downing of an EC-121, Dr. Kissinger advocated and President Nixon created a Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). Chaired by Dr. Kissinger and including the Chairman, JCS, or his representative, the WSAG would initiate or review contingency plans in times of crisis. In fairly short order, the WSAG emerged as a major forum for reviewing contingency plans and reacting to crises. Admiral Moorer observed to Secretary Laird in July 1970 that if the WSAG did not exist, it would have to be invented!

A statistical summary shows that the WSAG, under Dr. Kissinger’s leadership, became pre-eminent. During 1969, the NSC met 37 times, the Review Group 41 times, and the WSAG 12 times. In 1972, an action-filled
year, there were only three meetings of the NSC and 16 of the Senior Review Group, but the WSAG convened 55 times.\textsuperscript{13}

In July 1969, as strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets were about to open, President Nixon established an interagency Verification Panel. Starting with a review of US ability to monitor agreements,\textsuperscript{14} its duties promptly broadened into a forum through which to appraise alternative negotiating positions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Once again, Dr. Kissinger served as chairman; General Wheeler and then Admiral Moorer often came to its meetings. Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations, almost always attended Panel meetings and provided the Chairman with detailed, insightful accounts.

President Nixon felt strongly that major strategy and program choices must not result from “treaties” between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) or from compromises struck between the services. The President intended to determine policy and not be forced into deciding about program details. Dr. Kissinger suggested that a Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) evaluate the diplomatic, military and political consequences of (1) changes in DOD budgets and programs, (2) changes in overseas deployments, and (3) major issues raised by DOD and BOB or initiated by Congress. For example, once a Five-year Defense Program had been established, the DPRC could review proposals for significant change. An NSC staffer warned that this “may create real problems with Mel Laird, who stands to lose a great deal of his potential power.” Nonetheless, on 11 October 1969, President Nixon created the DPRC. Chaired by Dr. Kissinger, it included the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Director of the Budget Bureau.\textsuperscript{15}

In January 1970, President Nixon ordered a DPRC working group to prepare studies addressing not only broad topics (e.g., reviews of conventional and strategic postures) but also specific issues (manned bombers, aircraft carriers, continental air defense). General Wheeler worried that the DPRC might go beyond what he imagined to be its original concept, infringing upon DOD’s functions and responsibilities. He urged Secretary Laird to seek White House agreement that DOD would assume primary responsibility for studies addressing defense matters.\textsuperscript{16} Secretary Laird did so, further advising Dr. Kissinger that the DPRC’s primary concern should be “the allocation of resources within our economy.” It should not be “distracted,” Mr. Laird argued, by lesser issues like levels for bombers, carriers, and air defense. Dr. Kissinger warned the President that Laird likely would “go to the mat with you” because “we have failed to convince him that certain costly programs must be investigated by the DPRC as the building blocks to the more important discussions on resource allocations at the highest level.” On 2 April, nonetheless, President Nixon directed the DPRC to carry out specific as well as broad studies. As Dr. Kissinger later explained, it should address “the relation between foreign and domestic policies and between different packages of defense programs.”
Secretary Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff engaged in what might be termed passive resistance, never allowing the DPRC to delve into details of the defense budget. In July 1971 President Nixon complained to Dr. Kissinger, “They sit down there . . . and it’s the same old shell game. . . . Henry, we have got to shake those bastards up.” Seven months later, an NSC staffer noted that for “the first time DOD has presented its five-year program to the DPRC. . . . This meeting is a critical first step in our efforts to get better control over the Defense program.” The promise did not materialize. In November 1972, another NSC staffer advised Dr. Kissinger that the DPRC “should be one of the most influential in the entire system. But a review of its activity against its charter suggests that it simply is not working.” Years later, Dr. Kissinger acknowledged that “the White House never achieved the control over defense policy that it did over foreign policy.”

The DPRC was not alone in failing to reach its potential. Rear Admiral Rembrandt Robinson, Assistant to the Chairman for National Security Affairs, advised Admiral Moorer in August 1970 as follows: “It has become increasingly clear that Dr. Kissinger is disenchanted with the Review Group. He considers it a useless stratum of middle-management people who waste his time as well as their own.” On 14 September, at President Nixon’s order, the Review Group metamorphosed into a Senior Review Group (SRG) still chaired by Dr. Kissinger but with the level raised from representatives or Assistant Secretaries to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence. General Wheeler had designated the Director, J-5, to represent him on the Review Group. Now, when SRG meetings occurred, either Admiral Moorer or his three-star Assistant attended them.

President Nixon insisted that policy formulation belonged within the NSC system, where all agencies would have a fair opportunity to present their views. Yet, as Dr. Kissinger emphasized to his subordinates, “NSC staff members cannot be spokesmen of the bureaucracy—they are spokesmen only of the President. . . . The staff must stay conceptually ahead of the bureaucracy, must ask the questions that no one else is asking.” Moreover, even after basic policies had been decided upon, President Nixon began turning away from the formal interdepartmental framework. By late 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers found himself effectively sidelined and his relations with Dr. Kissinger became badly strained. Secretary of Defense Laird fared better. But President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and a small NSC staff handled the most important matters. Thus it was Dr. Kissinger who, secretly, negotiated in Paris with the North Vietnamese and made the first journey to Peking. Similarly, at critical points in the strategic arms limitation talks, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger simply bypassed the regular bureaucracy. Admiral Zumwalt believed that the Nixon-Kissinger approach was to “divide and conquer” by selectively withholding information. To deal with it, Admiral Zumwalt related years later, he resorted to (1) occasional private lunches with Dr. Kissinger, (2) assigning carefully chosen lieutenants to serve as Kissinger’s aides, and (3) frequent meetings with Rear Admiral Robinson and his successor, Rear
Admiral Robert Welander. Admiral Zumwalt believed that Major General Alexander Haig, Dr. Kissinger’s deputy, performed a similar service for General Westmoreland.21

President Nixon’s methods also brought about a major change to the way in which JCS advice was prepared and transmitted. Compared to previous administrations, there were notably fewer Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandums (JCSMs) evolving through a sometimes laborious process of preparing corporate positions. Instead, prior to meetings of the Under Secretaries Committee, Senior Review Group, and WSAG, Admiral Moorer and Secretary Laird would receive “talking papers,” usually proposing which alternatives to support among a menu circulated by the NSC Staff. For instance, prior to an SRG meeting, they would be given a talking paper signed by the Director, J-5, or Director, Joint Staff, and the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs).

This procedure, of course, enhanced the Chairman’s role. In fact, President Nixon deliberately elevated the Chairman at the expense and sometimes to the exclusion of the service chiefs. Admiral Moorer’s diary records how often the President, through Dr. Kissinger, preferred to work with the Chairman rather than the corporate body. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act designated the Chairman alone as principal adviser to the President. It can be said that Admiral Moorer acted as a Goldwater-Nichols type of Chairman well before Goldwater-Nichols codified that authority.22

Since 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had maintained an NSC Liaison Office at the Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House. The Office caused a major embarrassment for Admiral Moorer. On 13-14 December 1971, columnist Jack Anderson published minutes of WSAG discussions about the on-going India-Pakistan war. Investigators identified a Navy yeoman on Rear Admiral Welander’s staff as the “leaker.” Dr. Kissinger and Major General Haig told John Ehrlichmann, counselor to the President, “in very strong terms that Moorer should go. They’re doubly concerned because they’ve been using Moorer’s back channels for all kinds of communications and they’re afraid that they’ve been compromised.” But President Nixon rejected their advice. “I don’t feel that way at all . . . ,” he told Haig. “Moorer’s a good man, and he’s with us.” On 23 December, however, Admiral Welander was ordered to move his Liaison Office back to the Pentagon. He and Moorer agreed that White House officials “appeared to be cutting off their nose to spite their face”; both men considered the move premature “at the very least.” They learned that Secretary Laird also wanted the Liaison Office to cease operation, and in January 1972 it did close.23

The strengths and weaknesses of President Nixon’s style became vividly clear in December 1972 during Linebacker II, the eleven-day bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. President Nixon ordered the attacks when North Vietnam reneged on aspects of the peace accords being negotiated by Dr. Kissinger. President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam also balked at approving the agreement. While President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger worked closely with Admiral Moorer in orchestrating the bombing, their relationship was far from easy. Four days before Linebacker II began, Dr. Kissinger said to the President, “We’ve got this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who is a Navy lobbyist, and who
doesn’t give a goddamn about the war in Vietnam, and we ought to put Haig in charge of it over in the Pentagon.” That of course did not happen; Admiral Moorer in fact completely supported Linebacker II. However, when the number of B-52 sorties declined after the first two days, Dr. Kissinger warned Admiral Moorer that he had never seen the President so angry and exhorted the Chairman, “We have got to get the maximum shock effect now!” This was done; Linebacker II jolted the Hanoi leadership and reassured President Thieu, leading to prompt consummation of a peace agreement. Yet, while intensive bombing provoked bitter criticism in the United States, the President offered no public explanation of his purposes. President Nixon’s conduct of war and diplomacy had grown so complex and secretive that the President could not acknowledge he was bombing adversary Hanoi partly to pressure ally Saigon. The service chiefs were not privy to this strategy, and Admiral Moorer’s diary leaves it unclear whether the Chairman was fully cognizant of all the facets.

Revising the PPBS

Within the Pentagon, Secretary Laird encountered what some called a “cold war” between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During Robert McNamara’s tenure, civilians had steadily encroached upon what military officers saw as their proper prerogatives. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) Alain Enthoven and his “whiz kids,” with their emphasis on cost-effectiveness calculations, became the particular bane of senior officers.

Late in May 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard convened a small group to clarify relationships among Systems Analysis, the Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Wheeler advised Mr. Packard that Systems Analysis “has assumed an ever expanding role in the development of military strategy and the determination of force levels as distinct from accomplishing the analytical evaluation of inputs and recommendations from the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As this evolution has occurred, the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had to bear the burden of proof that their judgments and recommendations were better than recommendations flowing from Systems Analysis.” Accordingly, General Wheeler proposed abolishing the position of Assistant Secretary and putting that function back under the Comptroller’s office, probably with a smaller staff.

Deputy Secretary Packard decided that, in order to recruit a person of sufficient caliber to head the Systems Analysis office, the position must remain that of Assistant Secretary. On 19 June, the Joint Chiefs submitted what amounted to a fallback position. Secretary Laird, they argued, should look to themselves and to the military departments for the initiation of and recommendations about the development of military objectives and strategy, resource management, judgments about military issues, and operational decisions. Therefore, the primary function of an Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) should be to illuminate and present, “in as measured a way as possible,” facts derived
from consultations with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the military departments. Moreover, “the responsibility for initiating and developing any alternatives should rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services.” These views prevailed.27

On 10 July, Deputy Secretary Packard, General Wheeler, and the service secretaries agreed that Secretary Laird should “look to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services in the design of forces.” Secretary Laird readily embraced what he called “participatory management,” restricting the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) to reviewing and analyzing their quantitative requirements.28 This seemed like a triumph for the JCS, but in some respects they were fighting the last war. Throughout 1969-72, budget cutting by a Congress disillusioned with the Vietnam War and determined to increase domestic spending programs emerged as their major problem. For example, when the JCS wanted to increase or even maintain B-52 sortie levels in Southeast Asia, Secretary Laird ruled that the sorties would have to be financed by “tradeoffs” involving cuts of equal dollar amounts elsewhere in the DOD budget.

Secretary Laird inherited a planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) created by Robert McNamara in the early 1960s. Secretary McNamara built a Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), which he revised annually, around “program packages” such as strategic retaliatory forces, general purpose forces, and strategic mobility forces. A cycle would begin by estimating planning requirements; then specific programs were shaped; finally, a budget was prepared. The Secretary built a Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, which he revised annually, around nine program “packages” (e.g., strategic retaliatory forces, general purpose forces). Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs), circulated for comment during the programming phase and consisting of force-level recommendations justified by elaborate rationales, became the centerpieces of McNamara’s system. Mr. McNamara never imposed any fiscal ceilings. Instead, he validated requests—a procedure which, many military leaders felt, amounted to much the same thing. By 1968, there were sixteen DPMs, most of which ran around forty single-spaced pages. Final approval by the Secretary of each DPM, usually in late November or December, marked the culmination of a PPBS cycle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, naturally, wanted to play a major part in the PPBS. During the McNamara years, that did not happen. They were never ignored, but increasingly, the Secretary rejected their advice.

By law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were tasked with preparing strategic plans and providing strategic direction for the armed forces. Their Joint Strategic Planning System contained three major elements: a short-range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); a mid-range Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP); and a Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS). The JLRSS deserves a word—and little more. Prepared every two years, the Study looked twenty years ahead. JLRSS 82-91, approved in September 1971, tried to improve upon its predecessors by being both “analytical and provocative in character.”29 Yet, even so, its forecasts remained too vague to make much impact. Each year, a JSCP translated national policies and goals into near-term military objectives, concepts, and tasks that were commensurate with actual capabilities. Also, it provided unified and
specified commanders with a directive outlining how they should conduct operations. Thus, on 31 December 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved JSCP-70, applicable between 1 July 1969 and 30 June 1970.

A JSCP did not go to the Secretary of Defense; a JSOP did. This bulky plan, also approved annually, consisted of three parts. Volume I of the JSOP, Strategy and Force Planning Guidance, included a statement of national security objectives, appraisals of global and regional trends, and outline concepts of strategy and force employment. Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations, contained six books: a summary and appraisal of major force recommendations, which really constituted the heart of the JSOP; strategic offensive and defensive forces; land forces; tactical air forces; navy forces; and airlift and sealift forces. Volume III, Free World Forces, recommended appropriate levels for friendly countries and assessed each nation’s strategic importance.

JSOP 71-78, the first described in this volume, applied to FYs 1971–1978 (i.e., 1 July 1970 through 30 June 1978). The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Volume I in July 1968, Volume III in January 1969, and Volume II in March 1969. In theory, the JSOP was supposed to play a major part in shaping the Five-Year Defense Program. In practice, they were prepared without reference to fiscal limits, which greatly reduced their value, and their force tabs were marred by inter-service splits—often the same from year to year.

Secretary Laird kept McNamara’s framework largely intact. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to have the JSOP accepted as a foundation for Laird’s strategy and force planning guidance. They tried to ensure that Volume I (Strategy) reached him at the start of a cycle, and worked to make Volume II (Analyses and Force Tabulations) leaner and more meaningful. Instead, sweeping reviews of nuclear and conventional strategy ordered by President Nixon overshadowed all other planning documents. On 21 June 1969, the JCS circulated Volume I of JSOP 72-79 to the CINCs [Commanders in Chief] and the Services. However, because the strategy reviews were in progress, they delayed sending it to Mr. Laird. That delay, in turn, made it difficult for Secretary Laird to issue the Strategy Guidance in time to influence Volume II. Hoping to avoid a recurrence, the JCS on 20 September 1969 proposed to Laird that Volume I of JSOP 73-80 reach him on 1 July 1970, in time to serve as a basis for Strategy Guidance. Quickly, however, their proposal was modified by events, as Nixon scaled the requirement that conventional forces be capable of waging 2½ wars back to 1½ wars. Early in November, it was decided that Volume I of JSOP 72-79 provided statutory advice and should not be withdrawn, even though it reflected the obsolete 2½ war strategy. Instead, by 3 December, the Secretary would provide a short strategy document reflecting the changes imposed by NSDM 27.

In May 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that the next PPBS cycle run as follows:

On 5 January 1970, using Volume I of JSOP 72-79, Secretary Laird would issue a DPM covering the mid-range period and providing strategic concepts for both nuclear and conventional forces. Following receipt of JCS comments, he would issue a final memorandum in mid-February.
On 25 February, the JCS would submit Volume II of JSOP 72-79. On 18 March, the Secretary would circulate fiscal guidance covering the next five years. On 18 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit their first Joint Force Memorandum (JFM). Secretary Laird had asked for a paper recommending the best balance of forces attainable within fiscal constraints, together with an appraisal of associated risks. The JFM was their response. From now on, the JSOP would provide “pure” military advice about force requirements, while the JFM would prescribe what could best be done within the proposed budget ceiling. In fact, Joint Staff officers expected the JFM to replace the JSOP as the Joint Chiefs’ most important contribution to the PPBS. They feared that if the services disagreed about attainable force levels, civilian analysts would take the lead once again.

From June to August, OSD would circulate tentative Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs), consider JCS critiques, and then put the PDMs into final form. Late in November 1969, Secretary Laird did issue a very similar schedule. First would come his Strategy and Fiscal Guidance; then, in February, Volume II of JSOP 72-79; in April, the JFM; finally, over summer, PDMs prescribing changes in the five-year program. By issuing Strategy and Fiscal Guidance early in the cycle, Secretary Laird was fulfilling a long-sought JCS goal. Theoretically, also, the JFM created an opportunity to influence later stages of the PPBS.

One significant change, welcome to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, slipped in almost without notice. McNamara’s DPMs had created considerable friction between OSD and the military. Secretary Laird in 1969 substituted shorter, briefer Major Program Memorandums and did away with those next year. Thus the initiative in force planning shifted from OSD to the services’ Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and the Joint Chiefs’ new JFM.

Budget pressures prevented the PPBS from proceeding as planned. Secretary Laird did issue Strategy Guidance on 28 January 1970, followed by Fiscal Guidance on 24 March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 May, submitted a JFM that was free from interservice splits. But in mid-June, amid fears that the federal deficit might run as high as $20 billion, President Nixon asked for appraisals of defense reductions in FY 1972 running as high as $6 billion. A DPRC interagency working group outlined “illustrative” force levels within various fiscal ceilings. These became a basis for DPRC discussions that ran into mid-December, when final decisions were rendered. Thus the JFM was bypassed and made no serious impact on final decisions.

Volume I of JSOP 73-80 went to Secretary Laird on 22 May 1970. Soon afterward, the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff, completed an examination into the most effective means of presenting Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations. The J-5 concluded that Volume II, as currently organized, tended to derive force requirements and force objectives in isolation from one another. Under the current format, no means existed to appraise force balance and consistency (e.g., between land and naval forces, or between US and allied general purpose forces). Also, repetitious situational
and regional analyses made Volume II a lengthy product. The J-5 proposed several improvements. First, draw together in a single book the underlying rationale, force requirement analysis, and implications for the force structure. Second, reduce the size of books dealing with strategic, land, tactical air, and naval forces. Third, illustrate more clearly the interdependence of US and allied capabilities in supporting the US strategic concept. Fourth, give greater attention to mobilization planning requirements. On 17 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved changes designed to accomplish these things. Henceforth, also, Volume I was to be published in two books—one for Military Strategy and one for Force Planning Guidance, which paralleled the papers issued by Secretary Laird.36

In January 1971, Deputy Secretary Packard circulated a slightly revised PPBS schedule. One point caused some controversy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were supposed to submit their JFM on 14 June; Service POMs would follow two weeks later, treating the same issues in much greater detail. Initially, Joint Staff officers wanted Service POMs submitted prior to the JFM. Otherwise, they argued, Service inputs to the JFM would take place before Service positions had been firmly decided. Finally, though, they agreed that the JFM should precede the POMs. If the POMs appeared first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be obliged to review proposals from the component commanders of each unified command, thus losing the flexibility needed during a JFM's preparation. Without that flexibility, Joint Staff officers foresaw extreme difficulties in reaching agreed positions about major issues.37

Secretary Laird had circulated his Tentative Strategy Guidance on 16 December 1970, followed four months later by a Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) covering FYs 1973–77. The JCS critique, dated 13 May 1971, claimed that a lack of strategic guidance during the early phases of this cycle had injected uncertainty into the orderly progression of force planning. They recommended that, next time, final Strategy Guidance should appear a good deal earlier, around 1 September. Generally, they continued, the PPGM provided options that were supportable at current funding levels, which were much lower than they wanted. Instead, to reflect what they deemed the true level of risk, Volume I of JSOP 73-80 should be used as a baseline for strategic assessments.38

Replying late in June 1971, Laird said that two distinct assessments were required. The first would assess capabilities of US forces, within budgetary limits, to support a specified strategy. The second would assess the adequacy of that strategy to support US foreign policy and to provide adequate national security. When those two assessments became clear, final decisions about a Defense program could follow. Secretary Laird intended to issue a revised PPGM that, together with subsequent studies, would form the basis for a defense program to be put before the NSC. On 23 October 1971, Mr. Laird circulated a new document called Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG), preceding the PPGM and providing a basis for preparing Volume II of JSOP 74-81.39 Thus, on this point, the Secretary met the Joint Chiefs’ wishes.
In August 1972, the JCS ordered the Joint Staff to review how well their Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) contributed to the PPBS and to assess ways of increasing the System’s effectiveness. A working group interviewed users at various levels. At the White House, NSC staffers described the JSOP as very useful but did not know whether President Nixon saw it. In OSD, few seemed to have extensive familiarity with the JSOP and the JFM. But the JSOP’s Executive Summary of Volume I, Strategy, did draw praise from OSD personnel. Only Systems Analysis, though, appeared to make extensive use of Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations. Few of those interviewed considered the JFM necessary, because it seemed simply to compile Service POMs. On the JCS side, however, the JFM was valued because it permitted inter-service exchanges and provided the Chairman with positions that he could use for Congressional testimony and at meetings of the Defense Program Review Committee.

On 11 January 1973, the chairman of the working group forwarded his conclusions to the Director, Joint Staff. He found increasing evidence that JCS contributions had gained utility and credibility. During recent cycles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had become more involved and made more of an impact, largely because their role in the PPBS had grown more active and become better defined. Since the effect of changes was not always evident for one or two cycles, he recommended making them gradual and evolutionary. The JSOP and the JFM were playing significant roles on their own, he believed, since the Joint Staff used them as a basis for JCS positions in interagency deliberations.40

Perhaps these conclusions were unduly optimistic. Admiral Zumwalt spoke for a good many when he wrote, soon after retiring, that the JSOP was “almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions were always in the process of being falsified by events. Others were so tortured by a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal.”41 The JFM, sandwiched between Service POMs and OSD’s PDMs, never lived up to its potential. As a practical matter, a service chief could hardly adopt a position in the JFM that differed from his own service’s POM. Thus “jointness” in determining strategy and force levels remained more a goal than a reality.
Strategies Old and New

Because the United States had assumed global responsibilities, correlating large ends with finite means always posed difficulties. During the late 1960s this problem became particularly acute, as Vietnam dramatized the over-extension of US strategy and commitments. The Johnson administration had adopted a “2½ war” strategy, meaning an ability concurrently to wage one war in Europe and another in Asia while conducting a minor contingency operation somewhere else. By 1968, capabilities fell considerably short of meeting these requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted strategy and commitments to remain unchanged; just provide more forces, they said. But popular feeling ran the other way, as President Nixon well knew. Promptly, Mr. Nixon initiated a thorough review akin to “Project Solarium” carried out in 1953 by President Eisenhower. By 1969, however, President Eisenhower’s reliance on a threat of “massive retaliation” was no longer credible. New solutions had to be crafted.

“Sufficiency”: Old Wine in a New Bottle

Between 1965 and 1968, strong differences emerged over what criteria to apply in creating strategic nuclear forces. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concluded that a capability to accomplish “assured destruction”—meaning the ability to absorb an attack and then retaliate by killing about one-quarter of the USSR’s population and destroying half its industry—would deter a Soviet attack. He opposed “damage limitation,” building ballistic missile defenses strong enough to cope with a Soviet attack, as unattainable, unaffordable, and destabilizing to the strategic balance. Convinced that expensive missile defenses could be overcome at much smaller cost by offensive improvements, he approved only a “light” missile defense able to cope with a Chinese but not a Soviet threat.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed. They wanted US offensive and defensive forces to enjoy clear superiority over all adversaries. According to Volume I of JSOP 71-78, circulated in December 1968, “US strategic offensive and defensive forces must be capable of destroying or neutralizing a comprehensive military target system, limiting damage to the United States and its allies, maintaining continued strategic superiority, conducting selective attacks, and terminating hostilities under conditions of relative advantage to the United States.” This would require, among other things, a “heavy” anti-Soviet missile defense.

On 21 January 1969, through NSSM 3, President Nixon commissioned a study reviewing “our military posture and the balance of power.” On 12 February, the NSC heard a disturbing briefing from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. According to it, the Soviets should come out “ahead or equal” in a nuclear exchange, with 58 to 87 percent of the Soviet population surviving compared to 31 to 64 percent for the United States. The main reasons were that Soviet warheads could deliver more megatonnage and the US population was more concentrated. President Nixon observed that there had been an “astounding change” since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. That came about, said General John P. McConnell, Air Force Chief of Staff, because “[w]e made no effort to keep ahead except [in] quality.” This qualitative edge consisted of US missiles being more accurate, thus allowing smaller yields. Also, with the United States running several years ahead in fielding multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), a growing Soviet lead in numbers of missile launchers would be offset by a US advantage in numbers of warheads. However, when the NSC reconvened on 14 February, attendees worried that a new Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) could be accurate and powerful enough, when outfitted with MIRVs, to destroy the hardened silos housing 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs. “We may have reached a balance of terror . . .,” President Nixon remarked. “We remember our [superiority for] massive retaliation gave us freedom to act. This has changed.”

Meantime, responding to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 3, an interdepartmental steering group had been created. Deputy Secretary Packard served as its chairman; Rear Admiral Frank Vannoy (Deputy Director, J-5) acted as General Wheeler’s representative. But on 24 January, before this group held its first meeting, Mr. Packard provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a “pilot study” prepared by OSD’s Office of Systems Analysis. It listed five alternative strategies for nuclear forces: these ranged from maintaining assured destruction to achieving offensive superiority and mounting a major damage-limiting effort. On 14 March, the JCS sent Secretary Laird their critique of the pilot study. Apparently, they said, the study alluded to no criterion except assured destruction. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cited what struck them as equally important criteria: deter a Soviet nuclear attack and, if war began, inflict severe damage upon the USSR while limiting damage to the United States, in order to end the conflict on relatively advantageous terms. That was the criterion outlined in Joint Strategic Objectives Plan 71-78, yet they failed to find any close correlation between the JSOP and the pilot study. Likewise, they could see no correlation in suggested force
levels; all the pilot study’s variants were “affixed to the assured destruction strategy.” They also criticized the study for considering only fatalities in its mathematical analysis and for placing undue emphasis upon arms limitations. Negotiations and agreements, they argued, should not be seen as ends in themselves. Rather, an arms accord must at least preserve and preferably enhance US security.\(^5\)

Early in April a DOD working group completed what amounted to a refinement of the pilot study. It presented four nuclear strategies and eighteen representative force structures, grouped into five categories roughly corresponding to the four strategies. The alternative strategies read as follows:

**Strategy A:** Provide a strong retaliatory capability, limit damage, and leave the United States in a position of relative advantage, even if the Soviets struck first.  
**Strategy B:** Provide a strong retaliatory capability, but be able to limit damage and secure a relative advantage only if the United States struck first.  
**Strategy C:** Provide only for assured destruction and for damage limitation against small attacks.  
**Strategy D:** Undertake to limit forces through arms control and reduction agreements (e.g., ceilings on offensive weapons).\(^6\)

Upon review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made three basic criticisms. First, they questioned the group’s reliance on a “mirror image” assessment of Moscow’s motives. The Joint Chiefs saw deterrence and equality, which guided US planners, merely as the Soviets’ minimum objectives. In their judgment, the USSR was striving to enhance its relative power position rather than simply responding to US actions. Second, they wanted the analyses of war outcomes to include not only fatalities but also industrial damage, destruction to military forces, and surviving military capabilities. Third, they rejected as inappropriate any attempt to forecast the outcome of arms control negotiations, as Strategy D seemed to do.\(^7\)

Building upon the work of Deputy Secretary Packard’s interagency steering group, the NSC Staff then prepared a “Basic Issues” paper that listed four conditions defining strategic sufficiency: maintain high confidence that our second-strike capability would deter an all-out surprise attack; insure that the USSR would have no incentive to strike first in a crisis; deny the Soviets an ability to cause more deaths and industrial damage than they themselves would suffer; and limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

On 29 May, the Review Group went over the “Basic Issues” paper page by page and reached a “general consensus that doctrinal decisions on how we should shape our strategic forces will heavily influence and guide our decisions on SALT.” The two papers, Dr. Kissinger observed, should be looked at together. In addition to the four conditions that defined strategic sufficiency, the J-5 Director, Lieutenant General F. T. Unger, USA, suggested adding a fifth: “have the capability to ensure relatively favorable outcomes if deterrence fails.” Deaths and industrial destruction, he argued, should not be the
only criteria for defining the outcome of a nuclear exchange; other factors like residual forces were crucial. This condition was added as the JCS position, accompanied by an OSD objection that it did not describe “a specific capability which can be achieved.”

The paper stated that a mix of three objectives—achieving assured destruction, promoting crisis stability by eliminating any Soviet incentive to hit first, and deterring disarming attacks that involved less than all-out strikes—should determine the design of the US strategic posture. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted more damage-limiting capabilities—in General Unger’s words, “present forces appropriately modified.” Still, Deputy Secretary Packard told the Review Group, “there were no real JCS-OSD problems with strategic forces. The principal issues concerned general purpose forces.”

Taking a middle ground, the paper concluded that even though “Soviet strategic capabilities are approaching our own, we are highly confident that the United States can maintain a credible strategic posture with respect to attacks on the US no matter how Soviet strategic programs develop. However, we cannot expect to regain a position that will be seen as markedly superior because the Soviets are unlikely to relinquish the gains they have worked so hard to achieve. Unilateral reductions in the US posture, though they might not jeopardize our deterrent in many respects, would almost certainly raise doubts about US resolve among our allies and involve some important military risks.”

When the NSC met on 13 June, President Nixon emphasized that accepting parity or inferiority would place the United States in a “tough” diplomatic position during times of crisis. “We need sufficiency,” said Secretary of State Rogers, “not parity.” General Wheeler recommended making qualitative offensive improvements, deploying MIRVs, or upgrading missile defenses. Disagreeing with Secretary Rogers, he argued that strategic objectives rather than a theoretical definition of “sufficiency” should guide the President’s decision. Subsequently, however, Dr. Kissinger advised President Nixon to accept the four criteria of sufficiency. During an NSC discussion on 18 June that focused on arms control, President Nixon remarked that the four criteria “add up to massive retaliation, don’t they? This isn’t adequate.” He asked for further study.

On 24 June, through NSDM 16, President Nixon did adopt the four criteria. For planning purposes, strategic sufficiency would be defined as follows:

1. Maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
2. Maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.
3. Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer.
4. Deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

Thus the fifth JCS criterion, aiming at superiority rather than sufficiency, did not survive. It failed because, as Dr. Kissinger noted, decisions about the strategic force
posture had to serve as the theoretical basis for SALT preparations. Obviously, in that context, superiority or even relative advantage were not realistic objectives. In his first Annual Report on US Foreign Policy, issued on 18 February 1970, President Nixon repeated the opening sentences of the “Basic Issues” paper: “Our review produced general agreement that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority.”

What, in programmatic terms, did the President’s decision convey? How would a posture of strategic sufficiency differ from one of assured destruction? Paragraph 3 of NSDM 16 did not set any percentage goals for destroying people and industry. Paragraph 4 rejected the goal of limiting damage from a major Soviet attack. Decisions about force planning provide the real key. As chapter 3 will show, the Nixon administration continued its predecessor’s plans and programs without significant change. So, since the force structure and the Single Integrated Operational Plan remained basically the same, the strategy cannot have been very different.

NSDM 16 invalidated Volume I of JSOP 72-79, which had circulated almost concurrently on 20 June 1969. Accordingly, early in December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird a revised Volume I. As force planning guidance it listed the four criteria above and recommended adding their rejected fifth: “have the capability to ensure relatively favorable outcomes if deterrence fails.” Volume I noted, too, that NSDM 16 considered only all-out attack and either small attacks or accidental launches—nothing in between. Accordingly, JSOP 72-79 contained provisions covering (1) less than all-out attacks and (2) support in the theaters of operation for US allies and for US general purpose forces. Mr. Packard forwarded Volume I to the NSC Staff.

A Strategy Guidance Memorandum, issued by OSD in January 1970, opted against including the fifth criterion. Volume I of JSOP 73-80, submitted in June, once more proposed adding it. In December, the Tentative Strategy Guidance for FYs 1973–77 said nothing about relative advantage. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued again that “deterrence can best be achieved by maintaining a full range of warfighting capabilities and a manifest national determination to use them when necessary.” Consequently, criteria should include (1) ensuring an obvious capability to emerge from a conflict with relative advantage and (2) making credible the US commitment successfully to defend NATO and other allied territories.

Late in February 1971, through his next Annual Report on US Foreign Policy, President Nixon expanded the definition of strategic sufficiency. First, the US posture should not be such that the Soviets would fear a disarming attack. Second, US forces should be adequate to protect allies against coercion. The second point was certainly to the Joint Chiefs’ liking; the first probably was not. A draft Planning and Program Guidance Memorandum for FYs 1973–77, appearing two months later, included these criteria along with the four in NSDM 16. The PPGM also asserted that each leg of the triad—bombers, land-based ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles—possessed “a substantial capability in its own right.” Predictably, the JCS maintained that
force planning should provide “a clear warfighting capability” as well as an obvious capacity to emerge with relative advantage. They also wanted the PPGM to describe the triad as a mix of mutually supporting forces, not as independent systems. A revised PPGM, appearing on 22 June 1971, rejected these recommendations but gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff a minor victory by endorsing the development of warfighting plans that incorporated damage-limiting provisions. Still, no new forces were to be procured specifically for this purpose.¹⁵

The next cycle followed an almost identical course. The Defense Policy and Planning Guidance for FYs 1974–1978, dated 23 October 1971, contained the same language as the PPGM cited above. In this DPPG, the Joint Chiefs of Staff detected an implication that assured destruction of population and industry alone were necessary, while military targets were incidental and secondary. Not so, they told Secretary Laird. The JCS continued to see an ambiguity about Moscow’s goals. The Soviets had demonstrated an apparently serious interest in arms control but, at the same time, were pursuing a military buildup. Therefore, US forces should be structured to hedge against developments leading to Soviet superiority. Also, the criteria for strategic sufficiency must include warfighting capabilities: Since the USSR possessed such a capability, US failure to maintain one “could make deterrence illusory and, should a nuclear exchange take place, put the survival of the United States in jeopardy.”¹⁶ Yet just as in the previous year, and probably because arms limitation talks were showing progress, their arguments made no headway. The PPGM for FYs 1974–1978, issued in March 1972, repeated precisely what the DPPG had said.¹⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated Volume I of JSOP 75–82 on 22 May 1972. Warfighting capability, it emphasized, was “an essential part of deterrence.” Yet the JSOP also quoted a passage from President Nixon’s latest Report on US Foreign Policy: “Capabilities of both the United States and the USSR have reached a point where US programs need not be driven by fear of minor quantitative imbalances. The Soviet Union cannot be permitted, however, to establish a significant numerical advantage in overall offensive and defensive forces.”¹⁸

At every turn, then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been stymied in their pursuit of relative advantage. But the very nature of the nuclear arms race was about to change. In Moscow, on 26 May 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an Interim Offensive Agreement. These documents, described in chapter 5, put ceilings on both countries’ missile launchers and confined each side to only two ballistic missile defense sites. Henceforth, US military planners would concentrate on how to preserve equality, not on how to attain relative advantage.

### Conventional Planning Contracts to “1½ Wars”

National Security Study Memorandum 3 required an analysis of the requirements for general purpose forces. An interagency steering group headed by Deputy
Secretary Packard took up this task. On 24 January 1969, while it was being formed, Systems Analysis circulated a “pilot study” defining nine alternative strategies for conventional forces. These ranged from protecting only the Western Hemisphere to meeting the enemy worldwide.\textsuperscript{19}

In mid-March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird a lengthy commentary. For the most part, their criticisms repeated differences with Systems Analysis dating from the McNamara years. Invariably, the Joint Chiefs believed that more forces were needed for each strategy than Systems Analysis calculated. Generally, they said, the pilot study rated enemy capabilities lower than did current intelligence estimates (e.g., 62 rather than 84 Warsaw Pact divisions). The study also assumed that no US forces would be forward deployed in Asia. Yet, they countered, forward deployments served to deter aggression, demonstrate resolve to honor commitments, permit rapid reaction, and assist the local defense until reinforcements arrived. Six of the nine strategies, moreover, would rely heavily upon mobilization for their success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that reaching a political decision to mobilize would be inherently difficult, except in cases of outright attack on US forces or territory. Here they were recalling President Johnson’s decision to forego reserve call-ups during the Vietnam buildup, instead boosting the draft and drawing upon active units in the continental United States (CONUS) to meet requirements.

The pilot study restricted tactical air forces to providing close air support for ground troops. By JCS thinking, however, the most profitable attacks would be those delivered deep in enemy territory. Likewise, in counter-air operations, the most efficient way to destroy enemy aircraft was to hit them on the ground. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adding their JSOP strategy and force levels as a tenth alternative. Their “2½-war” strategy would require meeting simultaneously, with mobilization, a Warsaw Pact on Western Europe and a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia or South Korea, as well as conducting a minor contingency operation elsewhere. Active forces alone should be capable of successfully carrying out one major contingency operation outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area, directly involving neither the USSR nor China, while retaining the capability to conduct an initial defense of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{20}

The interagency group worked through drafts and redrafts. Early in May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird that its latest effort accommodated some—but far from all—of their objections. They noted, for instance, that differences between the cost of OSD and JCS strategy resulted “not only from differences in force levels and methodology, but also from the quality and consequently the capability of the force.” Retaining obsolete hardware, for example, might render a force structure incapable of coping with the threat.\textsuperscript{21}

On 5 September, Packard circulated a final report outlining five alternatives:

\textit{Worldwide Strategy 1: Conduct an initial defense of Western Europe while simultaneously assisting Asian allies to defend themselves against non-Chinese threats.}
With current forces and deployments, NATO could neither withstand a full-scale surprise attack following concealed mobilization nor conduct a sustained conventional defense. Therefore, if Warsaw Pact forces acted resolutely, they probably could overrun Western Europe even if NATO resorted to tactical nuclear weapons. In Asia, there would be no conventional capability to resist a Chinese invasion, except possibly to defend one mainland enclave; for example, in Korea, South Vietnam, or Thailand. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that its “overall inadequacy” to fulfill commitments in Asia, even without a simultaneous requirement in Europe, “would be evident to all,” probably precipitating some realignments by non-communist countries.

Worldwide Strategy 2: Carry out either an initial defense of NATO Europe or a joint defense in Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia). Forces would be designed so that major operations in one theater must be conducted at the expense of major capability in the other. For example, we could assist Asian allies against a non-Chinese attack while simultaneously providing an initial defense of NATO Europe, but not conduct an initial defense of Western Europe and a joint defense of Asia simultaneously. However, if we fought initially in Asia, disengaging there would create a capability for initial defense of NATO. Some members of the group felt that the Sino-Soviet split meant the likelihood of a closely coordinated attack had “for the present disappeared.” In fact, they argued, deterrence would be enhanced “by the fact that we would have little else except nuclear weapons with which to protect our interests and, therefore, we would be likely to use them.” Some other members, however, thought an aggressor would calculate that, “if we are already heavily engaged, we might be unwilling to engage elsewhere with nuclear forces.”

Worldwide Strategy 3: Conduct an initial defense of NATO Europe as well as a defense of either Korea or Southeast Asia against Chinese invasion. This most nearly approximated the existing strategy.

Worldwide Strategy 4: Carry out a sustained defense of NATO Europe as well as a holding action in Asia, or conduct an initial defense of NATO Europe along with a joint defense of Korea and Southeast Asia. This came closest to JSOP strategy.

Worldwide Strategy 5: Meet simultaneously any aggressions which the Warsaw Pact and China might launch, including an all-out surprise attack against Western Europe following concealed mobilization.

The group also provided “illustrative” force levels to accompany each strategy, the most relevant being:

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<tr>
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<th>Strategy 2</th>
<th>Strategy 3</th>
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Strategies Old and New

The Chairman's representative on the group, Rear Admiral Vannoy, informed General Wheeler that the NSSM-3 exercise had been useful in improving interdepartmental communication and understanding problems as well as in evaluating the implications of a wide range of budget levels. Strategy 2, for example, would require annual outlays of $76 billion; Strategy 3, $81 billion; and Strategy 4, $91 billion. For comparison, outlays in FY 1969 came to $78.6 billion. Admiral Vannoy believed that Strategy 3 approximated the minimum acceptable alternative, while Strategy 4 represented a most desirable goal. But clearly, for the short term, available funds would be inadequate to support either Strategy 3 or Strategy 4 and, at the same time, pay for the Vietnam War. Furthermore, Admiral Vannoy and the Director, Joint Staff, advised General Wheeler that the final report had been weighted toward the lower strategies. Risks had been obscured, they claimed, by emphasizing benign estimates of Sino-Soviet intentions and of foreign reactions to US troop withdrawals.

On 8 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed alternative strategies with Secretaries Laird and Packard. Late the next day, General Wheeler met with President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. An NSC discussion on 10 September settled nothing. President Nixon said that he wanted another meeting one month hence, but none took place. Instead, Dr. Kissinger and the NSC Staff conducted a review during which they discarded Strategies 4 and 5. On 2 October, Dr. Kissinger urged the President to adopt Strategy 2: “I believe that a simultaneous Warsaw Pact attack in Europe and a Chinese conventional attack in Asia is unlikely. In any event, I do not believe that such a simultaneous attack could or should be met with ground forces, which the present strategy, Strategy 3, assumes.” Only three days earlier, Dr. Kissinger informed President Nixon that Sino-Soviet tensions had reached a point where the Soviets were sounding out “numerous American contacts on their attitude toward a possible Soviet air strike against China’s nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions.”

President Nixon accepted Dr. Kissinger's recommendation. On 11 October, through NSDM 27, he directed that Strategy 2 should “constitute the approved strategy for general purpose forces.” He also issued budget guidelines for FYs 1971–75. Assuming that US combat force stayed in Vietnam until mid-1973, annual DOD outlays would total $75-76 billion. Actually, by 1973, active forces included 13 Army and 3 Marine divisions, 21 USAF tactical fighter wings, and 13 carriers. While comparison with “illustrative” force above is difficult, because of its bias toward land-based aircraft, the two seem at least roughly comparable.

What, precisely, did Strategy 2 stipulate? According to the interagency group's report, as interpreted by the Joint Staff, it meant maintaining a capability for:

1. Reinforcing Western Europe, enabling NATO to conduct an initial defense lasting about 90 days, in all cases except a massive surprise attack preceded by concealed mobilization or
Reinforcing Asia for a sustained defense against major aggression in either Korea or Southeast Asia as well as maintaining the long lead-time resources required to equip additional forces for a counteroffensive to recapture lost territory.

2. Being able to provide limited direct assistance to one non-NATO country in meeting non-Soviet, non-Chinese aggression.

3. Maintaining a capability to conduct two minor contingency operations.

4. Providing anti-submarine protection for US naval units as well as austere levels of economic shipping for both European and Asian allies.

5. Maintaining a strategic reserve.

6. Providing logistic and Military Assistance Program support for allies.

Through his first Annual Report on US Foreign Policy, President Nixon described the new “1½ war” strategy:

The stated basis of our conventional posture during the 1960s was the so-called “2½ war” principle. According to it, US forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency—all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached.

In an effort to harmonize doctrine with capability, we chose what is best described as the “1½ war” strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.

This new strategy, in Dr. Kissinger’s view, signaled to China “that we saw its purposes as separable from the Soviet Union’s, that our military policy did not see China as a principal threat. . . . The Chinese had an option to move toward us.”

Just as with the criteria for strategic sufficiency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced major changes—and were reluctant to adapt. Volume I, Strategy, of JSOP 72-79 had been circulated to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) back in June 1969 and went to Secretary Laird on 3 October. It repeated the “2½ war” concept in JSOP 71-78. On 1 November, Deputy Secretary Packard provided them with guidance on how to revise JSOP 72-79. In Western Europe, he said, NATO's conventional forces should be able to conduct an “initial” defense lasting about 90 days, against a full-scale attack launched after a period of political crisis and mobilization by both sides. In Asia, against a non-Soviet or non-Chinese invasion, planning should be for materiel, logistics, intelligence, and back-up tactical air support. There should be only a limited back-up by US ground forces. Deputy Secretary Packard also reaffirmed that the “swing concept” would continue to govern the deployment of US conventional forces: “If we are fighting against the Chinese in Asia, we should retain the capability to curtail operations and withdraw forces from Asia as needed to provide an initial defense against a Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO Europe.”
On 4 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a revised Volume I, accompanied by a memorandum that sharply criticized the “1½ war” strategy. In JCSM-743-69, they highlighted five “major areas of risk.” First, they questioned the assumption that a period of political crisis and military preparation would precede any large-scale assault by the Warsaw Pact. Admittedly, only a change in the current situation would make war likely. Nonetheless, NATO nations recognized the Pact’s ability to mount a surprise attack on a considerable scale, and even though indications of an impending conflict could be available weeks or months beforehand, NATO still might delay its own mobilization decisions. In such circumstances, actions to reinforce Allied Command Europe’s initial defense might be delayed until hostilities actually began, “with probable disastrous results.” Second, limiting a conventional defense of Europe to about 90 days assumed either a political settlement, a stalling of the Soviet offensive, or an escalation to nuclear weapons. But if NATO could defend Western Europe for only 90 days while the Warsaw Pact could fight longer, Moscow would have no incentive to negotiate. Therefore, an inability to defend beyond 90 days could entail “significant military and political risk.” Third, disengaging units from combat against Chinese forces and swinging them to Europe posed major problems. Among other things, disengagement would be slow, complex, and hazardous. Redeploying fighter aircraft would require an extensive use of tankers, removing them from their primary task of refueling strategic bombers. Also, because the USSR was an Asian as well as a European enemy, disengagement would create “a significant threat” to US possessions in the Pacific, Alaska, Hawaii, and even the West Coast. Fourth, China could support simultaneously two land campaigns in contiguous areas, although without prior stockpiling only one of them could be a major campaign. Fifth, the “1½ war” strategy presumed concurrent aggressions in Europe and Asia to be highly unlikely. Disagreeing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that “even if the Sino-Soviet split is not subordinated to a common approach, an attack by one communist nation in one area of the world could act to encourage the other communist nation to move militarily to achieve its own purposes or common goals in a different part of the world. In this event, the United States could be required to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to protect its own interests.” Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the validity of JSOP strategy, summarized as follows:

**Situation A:** Without mobilization, defend those forward deployments which, together with the mobilization and reinforcement base, could either defend Europe for as long as 90 days or hold one location in Asia. Additionally, conduct one major contingency operation against non-Chinese, non-Soviet forces.

**Situation B:** With mobilization, either defend Western Europe for 90 days while remaining able to assist allies against non-Chinese and non-Soviet aggression, or successfully oppose a major Chinese attack in one location. Also, in the latter case, be able to assist allies as above, continue forward deployments in Europe, and swing forces from Asia.

The State Department, after reviewing JCSM-743-69, challenged crucial assumptions about international trends and foreign policy objectives. Writing to General Wheeler in March 1970, Under Secretary Alexis Johnson noted that it forecast simultaneous threats.
in many parts of the world. National Security Decision Memorandum 27, however, suggested that vital US interests and unacceptable threats to them should be defined more narrowly. As for the risk incurred by limiting a defense of Europe to 90 days, State took a different view. Admittedly, the Warsaw Pact would have some incentive to carry a conflict into the 91st day but, as things stood, no NATO nation had come close to achieving a 90-day capability. Why not, then, concentrate on building up stocks to 90-day levels? State also downplayed the danger in disengaging forces from Asia, on grounds that a second war probably would not start until weeks or months after the first. There might well be time to mobilize reserves, train new forces, or withdraw to a defensible perimeter. State rated the probability of China’s launching two land campaigns as very low particularly in light of recent Sino-Soviet border clashes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff neither responded nor altered any of their positions.

The task of translating NSDM 27 into a workable directive began on 28 January 1970, when Deputy Secretary Packard circulated a Strategy Guidance Memorandum applicable to FYs 1972–76. In Europe, it read, NATO forces should be able to conduct an initial defense against a full-scale attack launched “after a reasonable period of identifiable political crisis and military preparations by both sides.” In Asia, to meet non-Chinese and non-Soviet threats, plans should be laid for providing material, logistics, intelligence, and backup tactical air support; there need be only limited backup by US ground forces. Another Vietnam-style involvement would require either the diversion of NATO-oriented forces or the creation of new units. The United States also should be able to help defend against a Chinese attack on either South Korea or Southeast Asia, provided there was no war in Europe. Finally, the Memorandum noted, a question had arisen whether to plan for one “large” contingency using four brigades or for two “small” contingencies simultaneously, using two brigades in each. Answer: Plan for the latter.

Just as JCSM-743-69 left little imprint on OSD’s Strategy Guidance Memorandum, so that Memorandum did not greatly affect Volume I of JSOP 73-80. Volume I, forwarded to Secretary Laird on 13 June 1970, slightly recast the scenarios in JCSM-743-69:

\textit{Situation A:} Without mobilization, maintain those forward deployments which, combined with the reinforcement and mobilization base, could meet aggression either by the Warsaw Pact in Europe or by China against one location in Asia. Also, assist allies in successfully conducting one contingency operation, on a scale specified in the Strategy Guidance Memorandum.

\textit{Situation B1:} With mobilization, conduct a non-nuclear defense of Western Europe for about 90 days, against a major attack preceded by a period of political crisis and military preparations. or

\textit{Situation B2:} With mobilization, oppose Chinese aggression in one location; generate the forces necessary to replace units committed, regain lost territory, and defend NATO Europe; remain able to assist allies against a non-Soviet, non-Chinese attack. If China attacked in two locations, defend one and provide indirect support to the other.
Situation B3: Should concurrent aggressions by China and the Warsaw Pact take place, give priority to defending Europe. As necessary, curtail operations against China and redeploy forces to Europe.

Analyzing areas of significant risk, the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated what they had said in JCSM-743-69: NATO’s time for military preparations might prove too short; inability to fight in Europe beyond 90 days would foreclose vital options; redeploying forces from Asia presented problems of considerable magnitude; concurrent aggressions in Asia and Europe would compel the United States to choose between complete withdrawal, abrogation of commitments, and use of nuclear weapons. Lastly, they asked that the 90-day limitation not apply to strategy, contingency planning, and force employment. Instead, it should be “relevant only for resource allocation and logistics.” On that point, Deputy Secretary Packard agreed.

Sensing stalemate, Secretary Laird put together a new proposal. Domestic politics, particularly the anti-Vietnam backlash that made defense spending unpopular with much of Congress and the public, were much on his mind. Writing to President Nixon on 6 November 1970, Laird outlined how “to make the transition from war to lasting peace and freedom with a restructured US military force” totaling 2.5 million volunteers and requiring 7 percent or less of the gross national product. He would transfer part of the US security burden to allies and devise force structures based on their deterrent rather than on their warfighting capability. Specifically, he wanted to cut deployments in Europe from 323,000 to 100-150,000 personnel, remove additional forces from South Korea, and withdraw all except advisers from Vietnam by mid-1972.

Secretary Laird’s proposal found no favor in the White House. Dr. Kissinger advised President Nixon that he entertained “serious doubts” about it. He detected “a serious definitional mistake. The deterrent value of any force . . . cannot be substantially greater than its warfighting capability. . . . One cannot substitute doctrine and rhetoric for a force that will convince our enemies that an attack would not achieve its objectives.” That was precisely the Joint Chiefs’ argument and President Nixon wrote, “I agree.” To defend Europe, Dr. Kissinger continued, Secretary Laird’s approach suggested relying upon massive retaliation, which would enhance deterrence “only if you are willing to run the risk of nuclear war and our nuclear warfighting capability and willingness to escalate exceeds that of the other side.” President Nixon politely wrote Secretary Laird that his proposal provided “new and useful thinking on the vitally important subject of national security.”

In December 1970, Secretary Laird circulated Tentative Strategy Guidance covering FYs 1973–77. For Europe, the concept remained unchanged: Defend as long as 90 days against a full-scale attack that was preceded by a period of warning and mobilization on both sides. For Asia, though, the concept prescribed by Nixon in his Guam address of July 1969 applied: “Do not plan on [the] US conducting [a] large conventional land war in Asia. Maintain strong naval and air capability. Emphasize forces in being and deployed, support to allies, and indigenous manpower. . . . If a large land war
occurs in Asia, we must plan on using subtheater-oriented conventional forces . . . or those earmarked for NATO.” Perhaps, for long-term planning, Army ground forces and USAF tactical air forces could be oriented increasingly towards NATO Europe, while Navy tactical air would be increasingly oriented to the Mediterranean and Pacific.39

Replying early in February 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that available resources seemed to be pre-determining strategy. Following Secretary Laird’s “new strategy” above, the Guidance established a peacetime goal of 2.5 million volunteers and 7 percent of the gross national product. But, by their thinking, US security interests and the threats to them should be the prime factors in shaping strategy. Next, the requirements of that strategy should be derived. Only after these two basic steps had been completed should fiscal constraints be imposed. Moreover, they disliked a geographical splitting of service responsibilities (Europe for the Army and Air Force, Asia for the Navy and Marine Corps). Actually, they argued, each service complemented the others; crises in Europe or Asia would require forces from all of them. And, they argued, NSDM 27 did call for planning to meet major aggression in Asia. Consequently, the Guidance should be amended to cover major operations there, by ground as well as naval and air forces. Among other things, too, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged more emphasis upon improving air and sealift operations and upon protecting lines of communication.40

These criticisms evidently carried some weight. In April, when Laird distributed his Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum for FYs 1973–77, its ranking of priorities included meeting major aggression in Asia:

*First*, war in Europe against the Warsaw Pact.
*Second*, war in Northeast Asia against China.
*Third*, war in Southeast Asia against China.

For Europe, in a change welcome to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the PPGM spoke of selectively providing long lead-time items, reserves, and training bases needed to “sustain a stabilized military situation” beyond 90 days. For Asia, the PPGM presumed that by FY 1977 no US ground forces would be needed to help allies resist a Chinese attack. Against a non-Chinese threat, the United States would provide only tactical air, naval, and materiel support—except for Korea and Southeast Asia during FYs 1973–74. The PPGM said nothing about a geographical splitting of service responsibilities. It did, however, restate the peacetime goals of 2.5 million volunteers and 7 percent of the gross national product.41

In their critique, dated 13 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff covered a good deal of familiar territory. Broadly, they stressed that “strategic realities must be predominant in US security planning.” The USSR apparently sought military superiority; Soviet military power, supporting Moscow’s foreign policy, could be applied beyond the Eurasian land mass. So, naturally, fixed fiscal and manpower ceilings worried them. As to specifics, they challenged the PPGM’s assumption that a European war would be preceded by 30 days of Warsaw Pact and 23 days of NATO mobilization. A “more logical and prudent”
approach lay in assuming the Pact would hold a two-week lead and then attack when it became apparent that NATO was taking countermeasures, thereby limiting NATO’s mobilization to one week or less. In Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not foreclose a role for US ground forces. Setting specific dates (beyond FY 1974 for a non-Chinese threat, and FY 1977 for a Chinese attack) took insufficient account of the uncertainties involved in funding security assistance programs and improving allied capabilities. Also, the PPGM overlooked the complementary aspects that US forces would play in augmenting the allies, and it would vitiate the deterrent effect those forces provided.42

General Westmoreland vehemently opposed any guidance that would keep the US Army out of Asia. The PPGM, he informed Admiral Moorer, concluded incorrectly that “since we plan to withdraw all of our land-based combat forces from Vietnam, the United States Government has made no provision in its long-range plans for their employment ever again in the Pacific.” Credible deterrence, he said, required balanced capabilities. General Westmoreland cited, as other unrealistic concepts presented by the PPGM, (1) a war with the USSR limited to sea action and (2) naval intervention against limited Soviet naval opposition. But, more importantly, “[w]oven among these issues is the suggestion of a return to isolationism. . . . When . . . the guidance places a heavy reliance on ‘offshore capabilities,’ it must be concluded that what is envisioned is a preservation of our security from within a ‘Fortress America.’ In the Army view, such a turn of events emasculates the United States as a world power.” General Westmoreland asked for the Chairman’s help in forming a “united military front” against this approach.43

Secretary Laird’s final PPGM, dated 22 June, contained no hint of a “Fortress America.” It stated that by FY 1975, rather than FY 1974, US ground forces would no longer be needed to meet non-Chinese threats. Selected long lead-time items and reserves should be retained, however, so that ground forces still could be deployed. And at least two divisions, above the NATO-oriented units, would remain available in FY 1977 to aid Asian allies. The PPGM preserved a scenario for war at sea with the USSR but dropped the idea of naval intervention against limited Soviet naval opposition.44

Volume I of JSOP 74-81, transmitted on 23 June 1971, differed from JSOP 73-80 in two ways. First, Situation B1 was worded more precisely and perhaps more pessimistically. Instead of a “period” of political crisis and military preparations, it assumed that the Pact’s mobilization would lead NATO’s by at least two weeks, and that the Pact would begin hostilities when NATO’s countermeasures became apparent, thus limiting NATO’s preparation time to a few days or weeks. Second, Situation B3 describing concurrent aggressions by the Warsaw Pact and China disappeared. Otherwise, the scenarios and risk evaluations were identical.45

Secretary Laird told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that substantial differences still existed between his views and theirs. Strategy guidance, he stressed, had to reflect fiscal reality: “When budgetary and other policy trends . . . are as clear as they are now, we must give deliberate attention to them.” The “availability”—or, more accurately, the non-availability—of US ground forces for Asian contingencies struck him as a case in
point. During August, Secretary Laird anticipated, NSC decisions would make explicit the planning criteria affecting such issues.\textsuperscript{46}

The Defense Policy and Planning Guidance for FYs 1974–78, appearing in October 1971, repeated that security assistance should aim at making the allies able to counter non-Chinese ground threats by FY 1975 and Chinese threats by FY 1977. This did not preclude the actual use of US ground forces, for which selected reserves and major procurement items should be retained. Nonetheless, a basic “planning principle” stood out: “We have given, and continue to give, billions of dollars in aid to our Asian allies. We expect a return on that investment. We must. It is politically impossible to do otherwise. All concerned parties must understand that we are in earnest in assuming that our Asian allies will do more and sacrifice more in their own defense. And as they do, there must be a visible lightening of the US burden.”\textsuperscript{47}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff still rated the assumption about NATO’s 23-day time for mobilization as too optimistic. However, they endorsed what they chose to define as guidance that “the United States should not foreclose the option of supporting Asian allies with balanced forces, should it be in the national interest to do so.” Interestingly, Dr. Kissinger had more substantive criticisms of the DPPG. Writing to Secretary Laird on 28 February 1972, he said that the President did not envisage Asian allies becoming able to cope with a massive Chinese attack. Trying to make them so by creating larger forces could upset the military balance or impose substantial economic burdens. A recent review had forecast that, even under the most favorable conditions, US ground forces still would have to help resist a Chinese attack. Therefore, the President reasoned, while allies should be made able to defend themselves against North Korea or North Vietnam, US forces must remain ready to help them cope with a Chinese attack.\textsuperscript{48}

The PPGM issued on 9 March 1972 implicitly rejected Dr. Kissinger’s criticisms. Security assistance, it stated, could render Asian allies able to counter Chinese attacks after FY 1978 and earlier if practicable, without requiring US ground forces. Allies should be able to handle non-Chinese attacks without any US combat forces after FY 1977.\textsuperscript{49}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff held to old concepts even as the ground shifted under them, relying on worst-case scenarios (e.g., concurrent aggressions in Europe and Asia, only a few days of mobilization for NATO) to bolster their arguments. In the short term, they did enjoy small successes. Secretary Laird amended his 1971 Guidance so that US forces might “sustain a stabilized military situation” in Europe beyond 90 days of combat. He also stipulated that US ground forces, as well as naval and air units would remain able to help meet a North Korean or North Vietnamese attack. But, as the 1972 PPGM revealed, the trend toward disengagement from the Asian mainland (Korea excepted) proved irresistible.

Summing up, changing perceptions of China justified the shift to a “1½ war” strategy. Clearly, since 1969, the strategic situation in Asia had undergone a radical transformation. In December 1971, the Defense Program Review Committee discussed Asian strategy. The Director, Joint Staff, said that six divisions would be needed to meet a maximum Chinese threat against Korea; more air support, though, could scale that
number back to two. Systems Analysis calculated that, with mobilization, five divisions could be put into Korea with no NATO drawdown. Others brought out a basic point: The Chinese would face “enormous inhibitions against getting involved with us while they have the Soviets on their borders.” Therefore, deterring Chinese intervention in Korea meant being able to defeat whatever they could commit while maintaining adequate defense along the Soviet border.\(^5\) President Nixon’s trip to Peking in February 1972, combined with virtual completion of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, made a war with China practically inconceivable.
Strategic Forces: The Road to Equivalence

Between 1965 and 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff watched with alarm as US superiority in strategic nuclear strength declined into rough parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Repeatedly, they asked Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to approve qualitative enhancements and other measures that would preserve leads in major categories of weapon systems, both offensive and defensive. He refused, convinced that the very concept of nuclear superiority was meaningless and that the ability to achieve “assured destruction,” killing about 20 to 25 percent of the USSR's population and destroying half its industry, would deter an attack. Consequently, he leveled off the number of launchers at 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II ICBMs and 656 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). But Soviet deployments of ICBM and SLBM launchers steadily gained momentum, threatening to surpass those of the United States. The number of US warheads would grow considerably, however, when Poseidon SLBMs and Minuteman IIs outfitted with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) started entering the inventory. With MIRVs, a single re-entry vehicle could put one or more warheads over widely separated targets. The first American MIRVs were flight tested during the summer and autumn of 1968. Since Soviet technology lagged four or five years behind, a balance apparently existed because any Soviet lead in launchers would be offset by a US advantage in warheads.

“Sentinel” Survives as “Safeguard”

By January 1969, many in Congress were ready to oppose steps that could keep the nuclear arms race on an upward spiral. Plans to create anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense became their prime target. In 1967, Secretary McNamara had
authorized development of a “Sentinel” system to protect against a “light” threat from Chinese ICBMs in the mid-1970s. Resolutely, though, McNamara rejected JCS recommendations to build a “heavy” anti-Soviet shield. At much less cost, he argued, a swarm of MIRV warheads, decoys, and penetration aids launched by either side could overwhelm any defense.

During the Nixon administration’s opening months, whether and how to preserve an ABM program emerged as the primary issue in the field of strategic nuclear weaponry. By 1975, Sentinel sites were supposed to provide an area, country-wide defense against 10 to 25 Chinese ICBMs. On 6 February, President Nixon ordered an interagency review of the program. The Army proposed, and on 26 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed, a modified plan that would: give bombers additional warning time against an SLBM attack; furnish some protection against ICBMs and SLBMS; offer an option to shield some of the Minuteman force; defend against a “moderately heavy” attack upon the National Command Authorities in Washington, DC; add an option to protect Strategic Air Command facilities at Omaha and CONAD/NORAD [Continental Air Defense Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command] facilities at Colorado Springs; cover more populous area against either a threat from China or a small number of ICBMs from any source; and create a basis for subsequent improvement.  

Endorsing part of the Army/JCS plan, Deputy Secretary Packard recommended modifying Sentinel to provide: an option to respond promptly against Soviet deployment of accurate multiple warheads by actively defending Minuteman fields; area protection for those strategic bombers that were on alert; and protection of Washington, DC, against moderately heavy attacks from any source. Basically, therefore, the focus would shift from shielding urban populations to protecting retaliatory forces. At an NSC meeting on 5 March, Deputy Secretary Packard presented his case for a modified Sentinel program. Dr. Kissinger urged the President to agree. Afterward, Deputy Secretary Packard told Dr. Kissinger that General Wheeler and Admiral Moorer agreed with him, General Westmoreland wanted expansion to protect cities, and General McConnell “won’t say bombers needed any protection.”

After polling senators, the White House staff concluded that Deputy Secretary Packard’s modified Sentinel plan would be defeated. But President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were preparing for the strategic arms limitation talks. Convinced that pursuing an ABM program “could become the major Soviet incentive for a SALT agreement,” they determined to preserve this critical bargaining chip. The President also worried that statements by some Chinese leaders “indicate relatively little concern for human life and increase in risk of irrational action.” On 14 March, President Nixon approved the revised plan, now named “Safeguard,” which was more politically palatable. By 1973, twelve sites would protect selected Minuteman fields and create an area defense for bomber bases as well as command and control authorities. Safeguard, President Nixon also said, would defend against accidental launches as well as “the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970s.”
Briefing Congressional leaders, President Nixon and Deputy Secretary Packard emphasized that Safeguard was “essentially a defense of the deterrent—it is designed to prevent conflict rather than limit damage” from a nuclear exchange. Dealing with a Democratic House and Senate, the administration prevailed only by the narrowest of margins. On 6 August, by votes of 51-49 and 50-50, the Senate rejected amendments to deny funds for anything except research and development. The FY 1970 budget authorized two sites, protecting the Minuteman wings at Grand Forks and Malmstrom Air Force Bases. Thus, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped, Phase I of Safeguard got under way.

Force Planning in 1969

Through JSOP 71-78, sent to Secretary Laird early in March 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that while “approximate parity” existed now, the Soviets were actually striving for strategic superiority. Therefore, improving both offensive and defensive strategic forces impressed them as imperative. The choice, they said, was not “one of degree within an acceptable level of risk.” Rather, it involved whether the United States would possess “the strategic capabilities necessary to support its national policies effectively.” That meant the ability to emerge from a nuclear war with “relative advantage,” no matter how the conflict started and proceeded.

The Johnson administration had proposed deploying, in mid-1971, the following forces: 285 B-52, 72 supersonic B-58, and 90 medium-range FB-111 bombers; 54 multi-megaton Titan II, 297 Minuteman I, 494 Minuteman II with greater accuracy and retargeting capability, and 150 MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs; 20 on-line Polaris boats carrying 320 SLBMs and four Poseidon boats with 64 MIRVed SLBMs. For mid-1971, JSOP 71-78 differed only in listing 420 B-52s. For follow-on purposes, it recommended introducing an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) and a Trident submarine carrying missiles with much longer range, phasing out single-warhead Minuteman Is and IIs a good deal faster while deploying more MIRVed Minuteman IIIs, retaining fewer B-52s (replaced by AMSA), and producing more than twice as many FB-111s:

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<td>Titan II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman I</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>17/272</td>
<td>6/96</td>
<td>1/16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JSOP 71-78 contained a familiar type of Air Force-Navy split. Admiral Moorer proposed limiting the Advanced ICBM to research and development, pending a determination of whether Tridents alone might satisfy this whole requirement. But General McConnell argued that SLBMs, stationed outside US territory, could be considered provocative because they might stimulate a Soviet-American confrontation when vital US interests were not at stake. So, pending a response to NSSM 3, he wanted the Trident program limited to research and development.\textsuperscript{9}

Through NSSM 3, President Nixon had asked for an analysis of alternative nuclear strategies and force postures. In June 1969, an interagency group reported that it felt “highly confident” the United States could maintain a credible strategic posture, no matter how Soviet programs developed. The group then listed four criteria necessary for “strategic sufficiency.” First, maintain high confidence that US retaliatory forces could deter an all-out surprise attack. Second, ensure the USSR had no incentive to strike first during a crisis. Third, prevent the Soviets from causing more deaths and industrial damage than they would suffer. Fourth, limit damage from smaller accidental attacks to a low level. The group next outlined force planning alternatives:

1. Emphasize the need for improving the US strategic position. This would entail buying forces to counter threats considerably greater than those forecast by the highest intelligence projections—in other words, hedging against threats before they appeared.
2. Make minimum changes in the existing program. This would involve buying forces necessary to cope with what US intelligence forecast as a “high” threat, while maintaining options to deploy new systems if even greater threats did develop.
3. Exercise restraint in new programs, as a means of promoting prospects for SALT. For example, delay MIRV testing and possibly reduce the Safeguard program.

Secretary Laird favored Alternative 2 because it met the four criteria for strategic sufficiency, was most consistent with maintaining a stable Soviet-American relationship, and held open prospects for SALT as well as hedges for improving the US posture. Alternative 1, he believed, would jeopardize SALT by calling US motives into question. It also would require significantly higher budget outlays, to which Laird knew there was growing public and congressional opposition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, predictably, advocated Alternative 1. They attributed past stability to US possession of “a decidedly superior force.” Economic pressures, they argued, might force the Soviets to accept an inferior posture. Also, in SALT, negotiating from a position of relative strength would permit flexibility without jeopardizing basic US objectives.\textsuperscript{10}

On 24 June, through NSDM 16, President Nixon approved the four criteria defining strategic sufficiency. Civilian leaders also decided that these criteria could be fulfilled by minimum changes in the current program—i.e., Alternative 2. Consequently, in the

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
On-Line Poseidon Boats & 11/176 & 25/400 & 22/352 \\
Trident Boats/SLBMs & --- & --- & 9/216 \\
Safeguard Sites & --- & 12 & 12 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
FY 1971 budget, three notable differences emerged between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Laird. A JCS majority favored proceeding with full-scale development of AMSA, an Advanced ICBM, and Trident. The Secretary, however, authorized only: initiation of engineering development for AMSA; advanced development, at a funding level of $6 million, for an Advanced ICBM; and detailed design studies for Trident. Laird also pared FB-111 procurement and accelerated B-58 retirements, mainly as budget-cutting measures, so more B-52s had to stay in service. Thus, as of January 1970, the administration’s program ran as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 72</th>
<th>30 Jun 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB-111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman I</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>8/128</td>
<td>8/128</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Poseidon Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>3/48</td>
<td>10/160</td>
<td>24/384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Figures are taken from JSOP 72-79, Bk. II, Vol. II, JCS 2143/356, JMF 511 (30 Jan 70) sec. 2.

Continental defense posed some thorny problems. Bomber defenses were being trimmed, again partly because of congressional demands for economy, down to about 250 interceptors and 1,000 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). In December 1969 the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Secretary Laird that, unless modernization with F-15 type interceptors and SAM-Ds began soon, bomber defenses were unlikely to remain even marginally effective. As for Safeguard, Congress had appropriated $892.4 million in FY 1970 for starting two sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom. By June 1969, the threat to both Minuteman fields and bomber forces looked more serious than it had back in January. According to a National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets had 258 SS-9 ICBM launchers operational or under construction. All tests that had been tracked involved multiple re-entry vehicles, meaning that an SS-9’s three warheads were not independently guided after separation from the launch vehicle. Even so, SS-9s had the range, yield, and accuracy to attack Minuteman silos—and MIRVing might follow. A Joint Staff officer advised General Wheeler that the Estimate “supports (but not unanimously) a grim view of the Soviet strategic force growth—in both an absolute sense and relative to the US strategic posture. It would appear that a prudent planner would tend toward the pessimistic alternative.” In December Deputy Secretary Packard recommended starting, during FY 1971, one or two additional Safeguard sites. But, he warned, “we may not be able to keep pace with [the threat] at the funding levels we can afford.” Dr. Kissinger told Deputy Secretary Packard that the President wanted to move into Phase II “if only for bargaining effect” at SALT. Ultimately, the administration requested $1.45 billion
to continue work at Grand Forks and Malmstrom, start a third site at Whiteman Air Force Base, and begin advance work on five additional sites.\textsuperscript{13}

**Force Planning in 1970**

During 1970, Strategic Air Command accepted its first MIRVed Minuteman IIIs. The Soviets still had flight-tested only multiple re-entry vehicles that were not independently targetable. But late in February 1970, through JSOP 72-79, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned again that the USSR apparently sought military superiority. By 1979, according to intelligence projections, the Soviets would deploy between 1,302 and 1,805 ICBM and 659 to 896 SLBM launchers. This ICBM estimate represented a marked increase over the previous year. So they urged, among other things: full-scale development and deployment of the B-1 bomber, as AMSA now was termed, making the first operational B-1 available during FY 1977; moving the Advanced ICBM into engineering development, to preserve an initial operational capability for FY 1977; and proceeding with full-scale development of Trident, bringing the first boat on line during FY 1978.\textsuperscript{14}

The JSOP's force-level proposals for 30 June 1972 were exactly the same as those in the approved program. Lead times being so long, they could hardly have been otherwise. For 30 June 1979, JSOP recommendations ran as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft/Boats</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB-111</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>7/112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Poseidon Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>20/320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Trident Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>3/72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff still favored creating “heavy” anti-Soviet ballistic missile defenses. In 1978, according to Army studies, 28 Safeguard sites would limit US fatalities to 15.4 million and damage to 16.4 percent of US national value. JSOP 72-79 claimed that, after the initial investment, it would cost the USSR more to inflict a high level of damage than it would cost the United States to maintain this defense. To deal with the bomber threat, they called for development of an F-15 type interceptor, with first availability in FY 1976, and of the SAM-D surface-to-air missile, with deployment starting in FY 1979.\textsuperscript{15}

The first Joint Force Memorandum, submitted on 8 May, outlined the best mix attainable within the proposed $79 billion budget. According to it, that amount would allow only a “limited level” of modernization. Suppose the Soviet threat kept increasing at the rate projected by US intelligence. Over the long run, read the JFM, that trend
Strategic Forces

would jeopardize US ability to fulfill the four criteria for strategic sufficiency. Soviet momentum, if not offset, inevitably would encourage Moscow toward a more aggressive attitude. For 30 June 1972, the JFM made only one change from the JSOP: 160, rather than 128, Polaris SLBMs. For 30 June 1979, however, there should be more B-52s and fewer B-1s, more Minuteman IIs and fewer MIRVed Minuteman IIs, more Polaris and Poseidon SLBMs but fewer Tridents. The JFM proposals were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>9/144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Poseidon Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>23/368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Trident Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>1/24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anticipating “very great pressures” to economize, Deputy Secretary Packard asked for a “decremental” alternative, amounting to $1 billion less for each military department in each fiscal year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, for mid-1979, 60 fewer B-52s, one more Polaris and one less Poseidon submarine, and no Trident; Safeguard would drop from 12 sites to eight.16

If anything, Deputy Secretary Packard underestimated the pressure that was building for reductions in the DOD budget. At a DPRC meeting on 17 July, Dr. Kissinger said the administration faced in FY 1972 a deficit of $20 to $26 billion, 3.6 percent inflation, and unemployment over 5 percent. Clearly, he continued, reductions would be necessary even though $79 billion already fell below “what is required to carry out the approved policy according to the JSOP.” Mr. Packard replied that DOD had considered two options for strategic forces: either continue the current program or pare $3 billion, which would eliminate some bombers, many interceptors, small numbers of SAMs, and some Safeguard sites. Admiral Moorer, who had just become Chairman, cautioned that affordability could not be the only basis for strategy: “never before have the Soviets been building up their strategic and general purpose forces at such a rate. In some ways the Soviets determine the strategy we have to follow.” Three weeks later, DPRC members concluded that “the impact of SALT might make it necessary to hold US strategic programs at their current levels.” Dr. Kissinger talked about keeping the visible bomber force at current levels while reducing the number of crews. Admiral Moorer noted that reactivating and retraining released crews would take at least one year.17

On 18 August, a DPRC working group circulated “illustrative” force levels for FY 1972, prepared under assumptions of no reduction, a $600-700 million reduction, and a $2 billion reduction. When the group assessed whether these levels could fulfill the four criteria for strategic sufficiency, numbers of Safeguard sites—12 in the first case, 8 in the second, and 4 in the third—seemed to make the difference. The unreduced force, of course, had been designed to meet all four criteria. With a $600–700 million

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cut, ability to limit damage from small or accidental attacks might be lost. With a $2 billion cut, Minuteman’s survivability would come into question, reducing confidence that the Soviets’ incentive to strike first would remain sufficiently low. On 11 September, through NSDM 84, President Nixon determined that strategic programs for FY 1972 “should reflect no visible reductions from existing levels pending resolution of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.” Cutting outlays to $74.5 billion would involve trimming air defenses and the operating costs for strategic bombers. The main reduction, however, would involve taking $3 billion away from general purpose forces.

For Safeguard in FY 1972, the administration asked for an appropriation of $1.278 billion. These funds would continue construction at Grand Forks and Malmstrom, start a third site at Whiteman Air Force Base, and take steps toward a fourth site at either Warren Air Force Base or the Washington, DC, area. Thus the final program took this form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 72</th>
<th>30 Jun 79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB-111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman I</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>18/288</td>
<td>6/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Poseidon Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>10/160</td>
<td>27/432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Figures in the table are taken from JSOP 73-80, Bk. II, Vol. II, 7 Jan 71, JCS 2143/378, JMF 511 (27 Nov 70).*

**Force Planning in 1971**

The first Poseidon submarine went to sea during the spring of 1970. Poseidons could be designated against targets being currently assigned to Minuteman, so that Minuteman ICBMs with their higher yields could be shifted to target more missile silos. JSOP 73-80, issued in January, proposed the following force levels for 30 June 1980: 255 B-52, 62 FB-111, and 135 B-1 bombers; 45 Titan II, 450 Minuteman II, and 550 Minuteman III ICBMs; 112 On-Line Polaris, 368 On-Line Poseidon, and 72 Trident SLBMs; 54 F-106 and 144 F-15 type interceptors; and 12 Safeguard sites.

Unfortunately, a plethora of service dissents undermined the JSOP’s influence. General Westmoreland wanted 16 Safeguard sites rather than 12, claiming that greater emphasis upon defense would produce a more cost-effective force. Also, he argued, availability of the first B-1s should be postponed from FY 1977 until FY 1980. He maintained also that the Polaris/Poseidon fleet’s vulnerability had not been
“defined” and that design uncertainties about the Trident system could radically affect its cost and availability.

Admiral Zumwalt, on the other hand, wanted an ever-increasing share of resources committed to sea-based systems. He challenged the very concept of a strategic triad, contending that “a point has been reached where attempts to maintain several fully redundant systems are no longer justified.” Major efforts to maintain the survivability of land-based systems, he said, could be offset by relatively minor advances in offensive capabilities. Moreover, according to Admiral Zumwalt, sea-basing a larger proportion of US forces would reduce the enemy’s incentive to strike first; emphasizing land-based systems could have the opposite effect. JSOP 73-80 had listed one Trident boat in FY 1979, three in FY 1980; Admiral Zumwalt wanted one boat in FY 1978 and seven more in FY 1980. But General Ryan proposed adding another 250 Minuteman IIIs by FY 1976, while deferring a decision to deploy Trident.23

Concurrently, the survivability and effectiveness of strategic systems underwent special study. On 20 October 1970, President Nixon ordered the DPCA to analyze this problem. Systems Analysis in OSD prepared what proved to be a controversial preliminary report. Deputy Secretary Packard wanted, as a follow-up, a thorough analysis of current and future US vulnerabilities. Accordingly, on 1 December, he asked Admiral Moorer to convene a study group with Joint Staff, Service, Systems Analysis, and Defense Research and Engineering representatives. To direct this group, Admiral Moorer chose Lieutenant General Arthur W. Oberbeck, USA. An engineer officer, Oberbeck had served with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and headed the Test Command of the Defense Atomic Support Agency before becoming director of the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group. The deputy director of the study group, Rear Admiral James Nance, was chief of the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency. Brigadier General Wendell Bevan, USAF, from J-5 represented the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.23 Thus every service had representation.

Late in January 1971, after reviewing the group’s study plan, Admiral Moorer cautioned General Oberbeck not to focus entirely upon technical aspects. The group, he said, must also consider (1) the influence of geography upon survivability and (2) the duration of survivability as it affected residual forces. On 17 February, General Oberbeck sent Admiral Moorer what he called his own “interpretation” of the group’s consensus. The most severe threat to US survivability, General Oberbeck began, usually appeared as a massive surprise attack, striking each system at its most vulnerable point. For example, SLBMs launched close offshore might destroy alert bombers before they could take off. But, simultaneously, an attacker would have to pin down the Minuteman force using short time-of-flight weapons, negate ABM radars, and disrupt the Polaris/Poseidon force sufficiently so that Soviet defenses could handle the ragged US response with acceptable effectiveness. Thus there must be, on the Soviet side, complete surprise, precise timing, and very tight coordination. General Oberbeck’s “interpretation” of these points was reassuring: “The necessity for a high probability of success in a long series of independent events, and the catastrophic results of failure, suggest
that such a complex, massive surprise attack might never be launched. Certainly, if we can introduce a reasonable doubt of success in Soviet planners’ minds, through prudent attention to obvious vulnerabilities in our forces, we should be able to reduce this worst-case scenario to a negligible risk.” Clearly, he continued, the strategic triad had an important synergistic effect upon overall force survivability; eliminating any one of its three elements would simplify the Soviets’ problems.

The group, according to General Oberbeck, had analyzed the survivability of each element of the strategic triad as follows:

**Bombers:** Currently, the main threat came from Yankee-class Soviet submarines. Soviet SLBMs, with a range of 1,300 nautical miles, could either overfly or end-run existing warning systems. In the future, the main threats appeared to be: the number of Yankee-class submarines deployed; the patrol patterns that they followed; and the possible deployment of a depressed-trajectory SLBM with a very short flight time. However, a US satellite warning system would become operational in December 1971. Other possible countermeasures included doubling the number of emergency bomber bases and providing light ballistic missile defenses for a limited number of SAC bases.

**ICBMs:** Pre-launch survivability posed the most critical problem. The Soviets might deploy a MIRVed SS-9, accurate within .25 nautical miles, as early as 1972. The US experience with developing MIRVs indicated, however, that a later deployment date seemed more likely. Possible responses included adding defenses of hardened silos, building multiple shelters for mobile missiles, and sea-basing Minuteman.

**SLBMs:** US submarines should remain essentially invulnerable through the mid-1970s.

The J-5 drafted a memorandum supporting “the thrust of the general finding of the report” and proposed using it as “a primary reference” to assess force planning, survivability, and arms control proposals. Admiral Zumwalt objected, stressing the “apparent inconsistency” between (1) concern for ICBM survivability, coupled with proposals for substantial expenditures to harden and defend Minuteman silos, and (2) high confidence in SLBM survivability, coupled with lack of support to spend now for a major Trident program.

Ultimately, on 1 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Laird that they found General Oberbeck’s report “responsive” to Mr. Packard’s request and urged that it be used “in consideration of matters” that required assessments of survivability, including arms control. Thus J-5’s approving language had been weakened considerably. They repeated what the report had said about the importance of preserving all elements of the strategic triad. They emphasized that eliminating any one of the three elements would allow the Soviets to concentrate upon effective countermeasures against the remaining two. Then, citing the uncertainties involved in intelligence projections, the possible appearance of threats to major portions of the triad, and the time needed to develop countermeasures, they reaffirmed JSOP recommendations.24 (Of course, considering all the splits that riddled JSOP 73-80, they actually were reaffirming a number of contradictory recommendations.) Apart from justifying the triad, it would seem that General Oberbeck’s report left little imprint.
Interestingly, in a draft PPGM dated 21 April 1971, Secretary Laird recommended that research and development emphasize innovation, diversification, and survivability, rather than maintaining a large retaliatory capability in each leg of the triad. The Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that guidance should focus on a mix of mutually supporting forces, reinforcing one another, rather than emphasize the independent capability of each. But the revised PPGM contained the same language.\(^{25}\)

The strategic triad, at all events, continued unchanged. A Joint Force Memorandum, forwarded to Secretary Laird on 14 June, differed from the majority views in JSOP 73-80 mainly in delaying B-1 and Trident availability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 73</th>
<th>30 Jun 80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>397</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Titan II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minuteman I and II</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>12/192</td>
<td>8/128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Poseidon Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>16/256</td>
<td>22/352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard Sites</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These levels, they advised, would allow US forces to accomplish assured destruction but failed to assure a warfighting capability as well. Over the longer term, they warned, continued delay in modernization would jeopardize the ability to meet the four criteria for strategic sufficiency. In fact, if current trends continued, the US position during the mid-term period would become one of strategic inferiority.\(^{26}\)

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with President Nixon on 10 August, Admiral Moorer said that Secretary Laird’s guidance of $79.6 billion “was just enough for strategic force sufficiency but additional improvements are needed for command and control and accuracy.” But the Chairman and the President were appraising the issue from different vantage points. President Nixon later observed to Dr. Kissinger that “if out of the additional money. . . . [w]e’re going to get some real added strength to our strategic capability, either on the defensive or offensive side, something that we can negotiate with, that to me would make a hell of a lot of sense at this point. But I’ve never seen anything proposed that way. Nobody has ever proposed building more Polaris. Nobody has ever proposed building more Minuteman. Nobody, as I understand, is proposing that we add to our ABM force….”\(^{27}\)

Ultimately, for FY 1973, the administration followed almost all the JFM’s fiscally constrained recommendations. Mr. Packard planned to delay the first Trident until FY 1984, however. To cover the intervening time, he suggested developing a new “Expo” missile for possible installation aboard Poseidon submarines.\(^{28}\) Also, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) outlined an austere concept for continental air defense: Within one day, be able to create a defense against attacks by about ten bombers. That, of course, meant a marked reduction in capabilities—a 50 percent cut in interceptors held on alert status, for instance. Admiral Moorer asked Secretary Laird to reconsider, arguing that the Soviet threat—about 185 long-range bombers—had not diminished. He noted, too, that congressional interest in air defenses had been heightened by the recent intrusion of a Cuban civil aircraft into Louisiana. But the decision stood unchanged. In a conversation with Dr. Kissinger, the President dismissed air defense as “a waste of money. . . . [T]he Soviet Union is not going to attack the United States. Not at this time, when they’re putting all their eggs in the missile basket, with a few bombers coming across the Pole.”

**Force Planning in 1972**

In December 1971, through JSOP 74-81, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended attaining the following force levels by 30 June 1981: 277 B-52, 58 FB-111, and 150 B-1 bombers; 150 Minuteman II, 800 Minuteman III, and 300 Advanced ICBMs; 144 on-line Polaris, 352 on-line Poseidon, and 264 on-line Trident SLBMs. Once again, there were major dissents. General Westmoreland wanted the Trident and the Advanced ICBM limited to development only; instead, 250 Minuteman IIs should be converted into MIRVed Minuteman IIIs. To do more, he said, would go beyond the President’s four criteria for strategic sufficiency. General Ryan also urged deferring a decision about Trident, for the same reasons he had given in JSOP 73-80. Admiral Zumwalt again argued that maintaining several fully redundant systems was “no longer feasible.” He proposed holding the Advanced ICBM at the “research”—not even the “development”—stage. Further, Admiral Zumwalt suggested confining the B-1 to research and development. He felt confident that B-52s would remain effective penetrators during the mid-term, if they were equipped with good-guidance short-range attack missiles and subsonic cruise armed decoys.

The Joint Force Memorandum, forwarded to Secretary Laird on 17 May 1972, represented the last recommendations unrestrained by arms control accords. Only nine days later, strategic arms limitation agreements were signed in Moscow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 74</th>
<th>30 Jun 81</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>B-52</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>270</td>
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<td>FB-111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan II</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman I and II</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>570</td>
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<td>21/336</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Trident Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8/192</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The appraisal of what these forces could accomplish was virtually identical with last year's JFM.\textsuperscript{31} In Moscow, on 26 May, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed an Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. For five years, the Agreement froze fixed, land-based ICBM launchers at the number already operational or under construction: 1,054 for the United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. During modernization and replacement, the dimensions of these launchers could not be increased significantly. The numbers of SLBM launchers also were frozen at 656 US and 740 Soviet; through replacement, however, these totals could rise to 750 and 910 respectively. The ABM Treaty limited each party to two widely separated ballistic missile defense sites, one to shield its capital and the other to protect an ICBM field.\textsuperscript{32} Safeguard had proved a very useful bargaining chip.

What program changes should flow from “SALT ONE”? Promptly, OSD circulated some suggestions: deploy ballistic missile defenses around Washington, DC, using the two missile site radars intended for Malmstrom and Whiteman Air Force Bases; place additional emphasis on bombers’ survivability by accelerating the “satellite” basing program; and initiate development of an improved-payload Minuteman IV as well as a higher-yield re-entry vehicle for Minuteman III or IV.\textsuperscript{33}

Writing to Secretary Laird on 2 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for three “assurances” in the shape of a formalized national program:

\textit{First}, provide a broad range of intelligence capabilities and operations to verify Soviet compliance.

\textit{Second}, conduct aggressive improvement and modernization programs.

\textit{Third}, pursue vigorous research and development programs.

The Soviets already led in megatonnage and delivery vehicles, but the Agreement should limit their momentum. The United States led in warheads and re-entry vehicles, they noted, but this advantage could be reversed if the Soviets with their larger payload capability decided to emphasize MIRVs. They recommended immediate steps to build defenses around Washington and ensure the availability of enough nuclear materials. They urged, also, that the momentum of on-going programs be maintained. That meant giving full support to B-1 and Trident, as well as to prototype development of ABM site defense. In addition, the concept formulation phase for a submarine-launched cruise missile should be accelerated. And they argued “strongly” against accepting any further restrictions, such as a comprehensive test ban treaty. Summing up, they asked Secretary Laird to endorse their recommendations and forward them to President Nixon. Several days later, Secretary Laird requested Congress to fund a $168 million program of “assurances.”\textsuperscript{34}

OSD’s Program Decision Memorandums, circulated in tentative form on 30 August and in final form on 21 September, approved the acceleration of satellite basing for bombers, concept formulation for an improved Minuteman III, and construction of ballistic missile defenses around Grand Forks and Washington, DC. The tentative PDM
had not protected the option of continuing Minuteman III production after FY 1975; a JCS protest changed that. For SLBMs, twelve Trident submarines should be started between FY 1974 and FY 1978, along with enough long lead-time components to begin two per year thereafter. The Navy would initiate development of a cruise missile and of an improved Trident SLBM for deployment beginning in FY 1982. The program put before Congress read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>30 Jun 74</th>
<th>30 Jun 79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB-111</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titan II</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman I</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Polaris Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>9/144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Poseidon Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>21/336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Trident Boats/SLBMs</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* These figures are taken from JSOP 75-82, JCS 2143/417, JMF 511 (29 Nov 72).

**Conclusion: Defining “Relative Advantage”**

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1975, approved in December 1972, described strategic forces as adequate to deter nuclear attack but insufficient either to defend the United States against bombers and missiles or to “gain more than a marginal position of net advantage relative to the Soviet Union.” Consistently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for a force posture that would enable the United States to emerge from nuclear war with “relative advantage.” Admiral Moorer approached SALT from that perspective. As he said during an NSC meeting in March 1971, “Our great concern is that the potential is high for changing the strategic balance by an agreement. . . . We should use the negotiations to determine the sincerity of the Soviets. There is indication that they want to build a superior position while we talk. . . . We should look at the ABM in the broader context—what is the best way of protecting our systems?” President Nixon, by contrast, “placed considerable emphasis on [the] role of forces in supporting diplomacy, indicating repeatedly that diplomacy is what matters.” Consequently, while he exempted strategic forces from budget cuts to avoid weakening the US bargaining position, President Nixon rejected JCS recommendations to do more because the criteria for strategic sufficiency were being fulfilled and he did not see how doing more would buttress diplomacy.

Late in June 1972, according to one of Dr. Kissinger’s assistants, the DPRC convened “to force the bureaucracy to face the consequences of the SALT Agreement for
the kind of strategic objectives and alternative force posture we can realistically plan for.” Here the JCS spokesman, Vice Admiral J. P. Weinel, argued for “relative advantage.” That sparked the following exchange:

Dr. Kissinger: What I would like someone to tell me is what ‘relative advantage’ means . . . . Can anyone give me a definition of that term? . . .

Admiral Weinel: Well, I don’t know that there is a specific definition of that term. The view of the JCS is that after a nuclear exchange some life will continue and that it is important who would have a relative advantage at that time, or how fast one side would recoup vis-à-vis the other . . .

Dr. James Schlesinger (Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission): Of course, the whole idea is deterrence. If we have the ability to recover faster, it helps deter our opponent.

Dr. Kissinger: If I understand the President’s instincts, he would not object to this kind of policy objective, providing you can give it some operational meaning . . . Since the JCS has wanted this point, let’s have the JCS explain it to us, rather than have Jim invent answers for them.  

Over a longer period, relative advantage came to be conceived more in terms of target selections than choices about the force posture.

Clearly, during 1969–1972, continuity in force planning far outweighed change. The Nixon administration decided to continue its predecessor’s policy, leveling off the number of missile launchers but increasing the number of warheads. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated their recommendations to accelerate the development of new bombers and missiles and to prepare for the deployment of heavy ballistic missile defenses. Just as in the mid-1960s, they met with scant success. This time, though, the reasons were different. President Nixon appraised the force posture mainly from the standpoint of how well it would support US positions in SALT. That approach was supported by the Oberbeck report, which indicated that (for some years at least) the strategic triad would remain an effective deterrent.
Conventional Capabilities: How Far to Cut?

As long as it lasted, the Vietnam War blighted efforts to square resources with national security requirements. In the last year of President Johnson’s presidency, US general purpose forces had become badly overextended. In 1968, at the peak of US involvement, 549,000 Americans were serving in South Vietnam. Ten of the 22 Army and Marine divisions were fighting there; 34 of the Air Force’s 74 tactical fighter squadrons and four of the Navy’s 15 attack carriers were carrying out combat operations in Southeast Asia. The CONUS reserve had been so depleted that it could neither reinforce Allied Command Europe rapidly and adequately nor make more than a marginal response to emergencies elsewhere.¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly and repeatedly recommended force expansion and a sizable reserve mobilization, but to no avail.

Between 1969 and 1972, as “Vietnamization” of the war went forward, virtually all US forces were withdrawn. Redeployments from South Vietnam proceeded in fourteen increments, gradually lowering personnel ceilings as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1969</td>
<td>484,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970</td>
<td>344,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1971</td>
<td>184,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1972</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, drawdowns from Vietnam did not restore many of the lost capabilities. A public backlash against the war kept defense spending under tight limits. Unlike the Johnson-McNamara years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not fault their civilian superiors. President Nixon and Secretary Laird, they recognized, were trying to forestall even harsher budget cutting by Congress. The fiscal pinch grew tightest in 1970–71, when sizable forces remained in Vietnam but troubles in the Middle East showed that other
needs remained compelling. Perhaps inevitably, each service put its own interests first. The Army, which was hardest hit, became the most belligerent during force planning debates. “Jointness,” for the time being, took a back seat.

President Nixon and Secretary Laird engineered a drastic change in the sources of military manpower. During the Vietnam buildup, the Johnson administration relied upon larger draft calls rather than reserve activations. Not since the Civil War did the draft prove so unpopular and be so widely criticized as unfair. In his 1968 campaign, President Nixon proposed replacing conscription with an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and created a commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to explore the possibilities. Reporting in February 1970, the Gates Commission recommended achieving an AVF by 1 July 1971. President Nixon endorsed the idea, but not so soon. At his urging, and with the Joint Chiefs concurrence, Congress extended induction authority until 1 July 1973. Draft calls averaged 10,000 per month during 1970, and then declined to 100,000 for all of 1971 and to 50,000 in 1972. On 27 January 1973, the same day that the Paris peace accords were signed, Secretary Laird halted inductions and announced that “the Armed Forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.” By then, active duty personnel had contracted from 3.5 million in 1968 down to 2.5 million. Of course, making the AVF attractive in terms of pay and benefits added several billion annually to an already tight budget.

Force Planning in 1969

The Nixon administration inherited a strategic concept specifying an ability to wage “2½ wars”—a major war in Europe, a major war in Asia, and a small contingency operation somewhere else. Actually, active forces could fight only “1½ wars.” According to JSCP-70, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 December 1968, general purpose forces could accomplish only the following tasks:

I. Without mobilization:
   A. Carry on the war in Southeast Asia at currently approved levels while continuing other forward deployments, meaning those in Western Europe and South Korea.
   B. Preserve the Western Hemisphere’s security. Conduct either counterinsurgency operations or “stability operations” such as the 1965 Dominican intervention, but not a major operation against Cuba.
   C. Maintain an austere strategic reserve.

II. With mobilization, while maintaining hemispheric security as defined in IB, either:
   A. Conduct a forward defense of NATO Europe, while carrying out defensive operations in Southeast Asia and maintaining other deployments, or
   B. Conduct major non-NATO operations, including the countering of Chinese aggression, while maintaining forces in Europe.2
Conventional Capabilities

On 21 January 1969, through NSSM 3, President Nixon launched a sweeping review of national strategy. Early in March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted JSOP 71-78. In it, they warned Secretary Laird about the cumulative “bow-wave effect” of delaying force building and modernization: “If commitments remain unchanged or are increased through political decision and if required fundings are not provided, the deficit will persist or grow.” They called for creation of a “2½ war” capability:

Situation I: Without mobilization, successfully conduct one major operation outside the NATO area, in which neither Soviet nor Chinese forces were involved, while remaining able to carry out an initial defense of NATO Europe. Also continue other deployments, be able to conduct minor contingency operations, and maintain a minimum strategic reserve.

Situation II: With mobilization, either:

IIA. Successfully oppose a major Warsaw Pact attack, while conducting a holding action against Chinese aggression, or

IIB. Successfully oppose major Chinese aggression in Asia, not necessarily limited to one location, and provide the forces needed for an initial defense of NATO Europe.

Early in 1969, active ground forces included 18 Army and four Marine divisions; reserves included nine divisions (eight Army and one Marine). JSOP 71-78 recommended an active force of 21 Army and four Marine divisions in FY 1971, then 18 and three after the Vietnam War ended. In determining the “minimum acceptable” number needed to meet each of the Situations above, the Joint Chiefs calculated according to “Division Force Equivalents” (DFEs), a term that included independent brigades:

Situation I: 8 2/3 DFEs for initial defense of NATO Europe; 7 2/3 for a non-NATO conflict; 2 for Korea and the Pacific area; 1 1/3 for a minor contingency; 2 for a minimum strategic reserve and sustaining base; 21 2/3, total.

Situation IIA: 14 to successfully oppose a Warsaw Pact attack; 7 1/3 for a holding action in Asia; 21 1/3, total.

Situation IIB: 14 to oppose a Pact attack; 4 1/3 for initial defense in Northeast Asia; 1 for Southeast Asia; 19 1/3, total.

For tactical air power, the Nixon administration inherited a plan to keep the Air Force steady at 23 active wings. JSOP 71-78 sought considerably more:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter and Attack Aircraft (UE/AAI)</td>
<td>1943/2843</td>
<td>2092/3019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Aircraft in Attack Carrier Wings (UE/AAI)</td>
<td>1243/1868</td>
<td>1467/1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE/AAI)</td>
<td>566/605</td>
<td>540/563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft (UE/AAI)</td>
<td>3752/5307</td>
<td>4099/5562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UE (Unit Equipment) was usually 72 aircraft per wing; AAI (Authorized Active Inventory) was larger because it included spares, trainers, pipeline, and testing aircraft.
General McConnell wanted 31 wings, basing his case on the supposed cost-effectiveness of land-based over carrier-based air, the requirement to conduct sustained operations, and the need to counter continuing, rapid Soviet modernization.

Using Unit Equipment totals, JSOP 71-78 projected the following tactical air requirements:

**Case A**, fighting indefinitely in Southeast Asia while retaining enough strength to fight in Europe and a third area for 90 days: 1,857 fighter and 1,527 attack aircraft, a total slightly less than what they proposed for 30 Jun 1971.

**Case B**, which was the same as Situation IIA: 3,282 to meet a Warsaw Pact attack, plus 1,087 for an Asian holding action, slightly exceeding even the proposal for 30 Jun 1978.

**Case C**, which was the same as Situation IIB: 1,065 for Southeast Asia, plus 1,281 for Northeast Asia and another 1,708 for an initial defense of NATO Europe, almost exactly equaling the figure for 30 June 1978.

The Johnson administration planned a Navy with 15 attack and seven anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carriers, 105 attack submarines, and by FY 1977 94 anti-air and 145 anti-submarine escorts. JSOP 71-78 outlined more ambitious objectives:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 78</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carrier Wings</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Attack Submarines</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Fleet Escorts</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Escorts</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attack carrier requirements came to 17 for Situation I, 20 for Situation IIA, and 19 for Situation IIB. General McConnell, however, filed several dissents, he wanted to limit ASW carriers to nine, arguing they were only marginally effective against nuclear submarines, and favored stretching out the construction of the 21 costly nuclear escorts designed to protect the five nuclear carriers. General Wheeler joined General McConnell in supporting only 16 attack carriers.

Finally, for strategic mobility, JSOP 71-78 recommended air and sealift sufficient for 2½ wars: simultaneously, by D+30, augment European Command from 4 1/3 to eight divisions, send five divisions to Southeast Asia, and deploy two brigades to Ethiopia. The necessary force levels would be:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-5A Supercargo Aircraft</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141 Aircraft</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conventional Capabilities

However, the C-5A faced sharp criticism because of ballooning costs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted 30 Fast Deployment Logistic (FDL) ships, but Congress had deleted funds because some legislators feared that having FDLs might encourage more Vietnam-style interventions.

Taking their first steps in force planning, Secretary Laird and Mr. Packard circulated draft Major Program Memorandums (MPMs) that fairly closely resembled the Draft Presidential Memorandums of the McNamara era, even emphasizing cost-effectiveness calculations. The MPM dealing with ground forces, issued on 14 May, proposed an active force of 18 Army and four Marine divisions during FYs 1970–71, then 16 and three during FYs 1972–78, bringing the Army and Marine Corps back to pre-war totals. These figures might be revised, though, by either results of the NSSM 3 review or developments in Southeast Asia. Having stated their views during the NSSM 3 review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff withheld detailed comments.

The draft MPM on tactical air forces, issued on 4 June, did trigger controversy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Aircraft (AAI)</td>
<td>2836</td>
<td>2432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Tactical Aircraft (AAI)</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>1360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft (AAI)</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft (AAI)</td>
<td>4765</td>
<td>4378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic justification for paring USAF numbers was budgetary. Replacing the inventory, one for one, with the very expensive and sophisticated aircraft under development would boost costs more than 60 percent by FY 1975. If spending had to be held to current levels, according to the MPM, there could be only 15 USAF wings and 12 attack carriers. Most of the projected increases in cost would buy long-range radar for attack aircraft and long-range air-to-air missiles for fighters. But in a European war, the MPM argued, close air support and battlefield interdiction would enjoy the highest priorities, while most aerial combat would occur under close-in visual conditions. Buying specialized close support aircraft and less complex fighters would provide 1.75 times as many fighters and 2.5 times as much close air support as current plans envisaged.

The MPM suggested some drastic remedies: end production of the Navy’s A-6, a subsonic attack aircraft; and terminate USAF development of the A-X attack aircraft; the F-15 air superiority fighter; and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). It also proposed reducing procurement of the Navy’s A-7E, a light attack aircraft intended to replace the A-4E Skyhawk, as well as the USAF’s multi-mission F-111, the Navy’s F-14 interceptor, the Navy/Marine fighter/attack F-4J, and the reconnaissance RF-4. Conversely, older aircraft that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to transfer into reserve units would remain with the active force.

Responding on 2 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rated qualitative superiority as “imperative” since US forces were unlikely to enjoy an advantage in numbers. They
also charged errors in the MPM’s analysis of tactical air missions. The MPM discounted the value of striking airfields, mainly on grounds that sheltered aircraft would be difficult to destroy. The Joint Chiefs, however, considered such attacks to be “essential elements” of a counter-air campaign. Israel had suffered 7 percent attrition while hitting enemy air bases during the 1967 war, but those attacks had destroyed Arab air forces. They also challenged the MPM’s claim that interdiction was ineffective, arguing that results from COMMANDO HUNT operations in Southeast Asia showed otherwise. They wanted to bring F-15s and A-Xs into the inventory, rather than a low-cost F-XX. The case for the F-XX, they said, rested upon an unsupported premise that visual, daylight dogfighting would predominate. That premise could become self-fulfilling, they warned, abdicating to an enemy the remainder of the tactical air environment. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed “substituting large numbers of less capable aircraft, thus severely limiting our tactical air capabilities.” Ultimately, the JCS/Service viewpoint won out. The A-X (which became the A-10 tank killer), the F-15, and the AWACS all entered into production and proved highly successful.

The draft MPM dealing with naval forces proposed to cut back anti-air and ASW ships but spend more to modernize the old, inefficient support fleet. Looking farther ahead, it also suggested retiring marginally efficient types, such as diesel submarines and older missile ships. For the longer term, the Navy should not plan either to protect the US population against submarine-launched ballistic missiles or to fight a nuclear war at sea. The number of attack carriers remained constant at 15. Otherwise, the MPM suggested force levels much lower than those in JSOP 71-78:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Attack Submarines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Air Escorts</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Escorts</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Buying F-14 interceptors and an Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) would bolster fleet air defenses. Even these, however, probably could not defeat massed attacks by land-based aircraft—and such complex, expensive systems were not needed to deal with smaller attacks. Hence the MPM proposed slowing ASMS installation, accelerating the retirements of five missile cruisers, and cancelling “DXG” missile escorts. As for ASW capabilities, the MPM characterized combined US and allied strength as probably more than sufficient to protect critical military and economic support shipping. Yet all naval forces could not be protected within a realistic budget level, and ships would be vulnerable to air attacks in any case. Consequently, retiring marginally effective forces like the aging ASW carriers ought to be considered.

After studying the MPM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird on 30 July that they saw no reason to change their JSOP recommendations. The Navy’s FY
1971 proposals would cost $10.4 billion. MPM recommendations were tailored around
an $8 billion ceiling, however, and Deputy Secretary Packard had asked the Navy to
re-examine its needs with a view toward staying within that ceiling. Pending a review
of the Navy’s response, the Joint Chiefs withheld specific comments. Ultimately, more
ASW carriers were retired but DXG development moved ahead.

The draft MPM on amphibious forces called for enough lift to carry the assault
elements of one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in the Pacific and two in the
Atlantic. In the Atlantic, if necessary, a division-size Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) could be moved by “swinging” ships from the Pacific. But the MPM rejected
plans to have the entire force consist of 20-knot ships. Instead, seven 13-knot Landing
Ship Tanks (LST) should be kept in the Atlantic and seven new LSTs cancelled. The
MPM also proposed cancelling the construction of Landing Force Support (LFS) ships.
Instead, each of the new DD-963 class of destroyers should carry one eight-inch gun;
two cruisers and one battleship should be kept in high readiness reserve. Counting
everything, there would be 135 amphibious and nine fire support ships in FY 1971, 87
and four in FY 1978.

According to the MPM, amphibious assault forces served primarily to deter or
contain minor crises and to provide an assault option during limited war. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff disagreed, saying that they contributed directly to the overall deterrent
and constituted a principal means of meeting threats at levels below strategic nuclear
war. Repeating the JSOP recommendation, they asked for enough shipping to lift,
simultaneously, one MEF in each ocean. They dismissed a “swing” solution as stra-
tegically unsound and inconsistent with the JSOP’s 2½ war strategy. The Joint Chiefs
also pressed for a 20-knot fleet, on grounds that steaming at 13 knots would increase
response time and render a task force more vulnerable to submarine attack. Furth-
more, they opposed cancelling the LFS. Substituting DD-963s armed with eight-inch
guns would mean less fire support because, among other reasons, destroyers needed
frequent replenishment and might be diverted to ASW duties. The LFS died and DD-
963s were not outfitted with eight-inch guns.

The draft MPM on mobility forces proposed having 76 C-5As, 264 C-141s, and 71
sealift ships in FY 1978. JSOP levels had been based upon meeting, simultaneously,
one minor and two major contingencies. The MPM eliminated the minor contingency,
deeding it unlikely that (1) decisions to fight in three widely separated areas would be
made simultaneously, (2) there would not be a prolonged period of strategic warning
and mobilization, and (3) the United States could spare forces for a minor contingency
when faced with two major wars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stood by their JSOP recom-
mendations, judging the MPM force inadequate and rejecting its assumptions about
slower deployment times and the non-simultaneity of crises. On 1 August, Deputy
Secretary Packard approved a sealift program that included an appeal to fund 15 Fast
Deployment Logistic ships which proved unsuccessful. Early in December, Mr. Packard
ruled that C-5A production would end at 81 aircraft.
Both JSOP and MPM proposals collided against ever lower budget ceilings. Early in 1968, Congress had required DOD to cut FY 1969 expenditures or outlays by $3 billion. In August 1969, Secretary Laird ordered each service to propose $1 billion worth of reductions during FY 1970. He labeled the steps to cut spending by $3 billion as “Project 703.” After reviewing tentative service proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded Secretary Laird that Project 703 combined with previous cuts would raise FY 1970 reductions to $8-9 billion. Using current dollars, the FY 1970 budget was about the same as FY 1966, but well below it in real purchasing power when Vietnam costs were included. Then they assessed what the cuts proposed by each service would entail. The Army was thinking about inactivating one US-based armored division, currently listed as part of Allied Command Europe’s M-Day reserve. Amphibious lift would be limited to two MEBs in the Pacific and 1 2/3 in the Atlantic; Marine units would need 45 days, rather than 30, before becoming available to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Proposed ASW cuts (17 percent of the land-based and 33 percent of the sea-based aircraft, 11 percent of the destroyers, and 6 percent of the submarines) would severely restrict US ability to protect the sea lanes. Thus, if national commitments remained unchanged, these cuts would “degrade to a critical level” US ability to wage war in Vietnam while fulfilling worldwide obligations. So they opposed Project 703, pending either a resolution of the war or a decision changing national strategy.15

Early in September 1969, the Navy and Air Force presented their final responses to Project 703. Once more, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Secretary Laird that taking these steps would seriously impair both Services’ effectiveness. On 15 September, Secretary Laird forwarded their warning to President Nixon. He agreed with their assessment but looked upon cuts as unavoidable, given the tight fiscal situation and US commitments in Vietnam.16

Worse things lay ahead. Secretary Laird felt obliged to consider an additional cut of $2 billion, which he designated Project 705. Alarmed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought a meeting with President Nixon, and Mr. Laird agreed to arrange one. The J-5 recommended telling the Chief Executive that, among other things, cutting $2 billion more would mean inactivating three Army divisions based in CONUS but committed to reinforce Europe. General Wheeler told the Service Chiefs he intended to inform the President that “our ability to provide a desirable range of options in future contingencies would be greatly diminished and the protection of our national security interests would be gravely impaired.” On 24 September, General Wheeler went to the White House for a breakfast meeting. Beforehand, President Nixon wrote Dr. Kissinger that, while Secretary Laird had proposed mostly “shrinking the whole establishment without selectivity, I feel very strongly that we ought to be putting more into the strategic forces and less in the conventional forces.”17 Consequently, General Wheeler’s briefing produced no concrete results.

Soon afterward, the NSSM 3 review reached completion and national strategy changed. Through NSDM 27, issued on 11 October, President Nixon replaced “2½ wars” with a “1½ war” strategy described in chapter 2. By then, when the Army submitted its
“703” plan, two brigades from the 9th Infantry Division had departed Vietnam, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division was about to leave, and planners were assuming that another division would redeploy. General Westmoreland intended to meet “703” goals by inactivating two division-equivalents, bringing the Army down to 17 2/3 DFEs. NSDM 27 notwithstanding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Laird that they saw no justification for such reductions.\textsuperscript{18}

For FY 1970, Congress voted $74.479 billion in budget authority; outlays came to $77.880 billion.\textsuperscript{19} On 11 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird an assessment of what the overall posture would be in mid-1970, after all cutbacks had been completed. Worldwide strengths, dispositions, and readiness would be degraded. From their long list of deficiencies, these stood out:

1. The limited availability of ground combat units, largely because 12 2/3 of the Army’s 17 2/3 DFEs were deployed overseas.
2. The obsolescence of, and reduction in, weapon systems. For example, they stated that the MiG-25 incorporated the latest technology while that of the F-4, the USAF’s tactical mainstay, was fifteen years old.
3. The inadequate size of ASW forces, considering that the Soviets had introduced five new classes of submarines since January 1968.

Highlights of how they assessed regional capabilities appear below:

*Europe:* While Warsaw Pact capabilities kept improving, the readiness of Allied Command Europe remained “at an unacceptably low level.” US European Command lacked a logistical capability to fight for the prescribed goal of 90 days. Its ability to receive and clear reinforcements and to activate wartime lines of communication appeared doubtful. Much pre-positioned equipment was either over-age, unserviceable, or being used by units already in Europe. Two CONUS-based divisions could reinforce Allied Command Europe by M+45 days, a third by M+120.\textsuperscript{20} But, in place of an armored division from CONUS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been obliged to substitute one airborne division by M+15 days and, from Vietnam, one mechanized brigade by M+60. All told, by M-180 days, the Army could send to Europe only 18 2/3 of the required 22 divisions. The Air Force, by M+30, was supposed to provide 58 tactical fighter squadrons.\textsuperscript{21} Twenty-one were immediately available, including four dual-based in CONUS. Of the remaining 37, active CONUS forces could provide only five; the others would have to be drawn from Southeast Asia, Korea, and the less modern Air National Guard.

*Atlantic:* Even with “swing” ships from the Pacific, there were not enough ASW forces to seek out missile submarines and, at the same time, protect reinforcements bound for Europe. There would be hardly any surface escorts for convoys, unless they were taken from carrier and amphibious task forces.

*Pacific:* Inactivating the Army units withdrawn from Vietnam would prevent the theater reserve from being reconstituted at the desired level.\textsuperscript{22}

In sum, this reduced posture would “seriously limit” US ability to execute national military strategy.\textsuperscript{23}
For FY 1971, the President asked Congress to provide $71.3 billion in new obligational authority and $71.8 billion in outlays.\textsuperscript{24} The administration’s program for FYs 1970–72 read as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 70</th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army DFEs</td>
<td>17/2/3</td>
<td>14/2/3</td>
<td>14/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers/Wings</td>
<td>15/14</td>
<td>15/14</td>
<td>15/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Attack Submarines</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Air Escorts</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Surface Escorts</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (UE)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s (UE)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are taken from JSOP 72-79, Vol. II, Bks. III-VI, JCS 2143/356, JMF 511 (31 Jan 70). DepSecDef Packard communicated the main decisions via Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 6 Dec 69, JCS 2458/632-5, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69).

By way of comparison, JSOP 71-78—unconstrained by fiscal limitations—had recommended providing during FY 1971 21 Army and Marine divisions, 27 USAF tactical wings, 17 attack carriers, 109 attack submarines, 113 amphibious assault ships, and 96 C-5As. Early in 1970, General Wheeler gave the Senate Appropriations Committee the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that these force levels reached “the borderline of acceptable military risk.” Any further reductions, he said, would lead to “a substantial lessening in our military ability to meet our current global commitments and defend our deployed forces against enemy attack.”\textsuperscript{25}

**Force Planning in 1970**

The start of 1970 found the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a gloomy, contentious mood—gloomy because more austerity obviously lay ahead and contentious because the services had to compete against each other for ever scarcer dollars. During a JCS meeting on 21 January, Admiral Moorer observed that while the USSR was building up its general purpose forces, the United States was moving back to a “tripwire” strategy. The administration, he concluded, could not buy the forces necessary to implement
Conventional Capabilities

NSDM 27: “We are kidding ourselves and the JCS will get blamed for a situation they didn’t create.” General Wheeler said that he agreed “100 percent.” Poignantly, General Wheeler remarked that he was about to retire “with the war still going on and the defense of the country reduced to the danger point.”

The drafting of JSOP 72-79 provoked heated inter-service exchanges. Admiral Moorer and General Chapman accepted, subject to minor changes, the force levels proposed by the Joint Staff. Generals Ryan and Westmoreland did not. According to Admiral Moorer, General Westmoreland attacked naval forces in general and carriers in particular, going so far as to say that “the carrier is not good for anything.” Admiral Moorer’s private appraisal of the JCS debate and its outcome was caustic:

The JSOP, as finally signed out, is packed full of extreme footnotes not supported by studies or rationale and, unfortunately, will provide good grist for the mill of those who like to operate independently of the Joint Chiefs and highlight their differences. It is clear that the Army is “running scared”... and is grasping in every direction for some means of maintaining their force levels in the face of Vietnam withdrawals and potential withdrawals from Europe and Korea. The rationale set forth by [General Westmoreland] was unsupportable... According to [him], any disagreement with the Army’s suggestions would “fly in the face of studies we have made”—his forces were “well thought out,” etc. He did not give other Services the benefit of such an intellectual approach!

The objectives specified in JSOP 72-79, submitted in February 1970, fitted a 1½ war strategy:

*Situation A:* Without mobilization, maintain essential forward deployments, plus the reinforcement and mobilization base necessary to defend either NATO Europe for as long as 90 days or one location in Asia. (Only with mobilized reinforcements, in Situation B1 below, could a 90-day defense actually be carried out.) Additionally, provide air, naval, and limited ground forces to assist allies in one major non-NATO contingency involving neither Soviet nor Chinese forces. However, this additional task would be superseded by Vietnam requirements as long as that war lasted.

*Situation B1:* With mobilization, defend Europe as long as 90 days and remain able to assist allies against non-Soviet, non-Chinese aggression, or

*Situation B2:* With mobilization, meet major Chinese aggression in one location in Asia. Remain able to assist allies against non-Soviet, non-Chinese aggression, to “swing” forces from Asia to Europe, and to continue European deployments.

The land force proposals in JSOPs 72-79 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>30 Jun 72</th>
<th>30 Jun 79</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army DFEs</td>
<td>17 2/3</td>
<td>16 2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The requirements for Situation A came to 17 for initial defense of NATO Europe, 7 1/3 for Southeast Asia, 1 1/3 for Korea, 1 1/3 for a minor contingency, and 2 for the strategic reserve, bringing the total to 29. The computation for Situation B1 totaled 31 1/9 DFEs; and for Situation B2 totaled 29 7/9. Compared to Situations IIA and IIB in JSOP 71-78, the NATO requirement had risen from 14 to 17 DFEs. Apparently, the switch to 1 1/2 wars would justify only a very modest Army reduction, from 18 to 16 1/3 DFEs.

The tactical air recommendations in JSOP 72-79 did show a notable decrease from those in JSOP 71-78:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 72</th>
<th>30 Jun 79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter and Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carrier Wings/Aircraft</td>
<td>13/1050</td>
<td>16/1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The requirements for Situation A were 716 in Europe, 625 in the western Pacific, 767 to assist an ally, 185 for a minor contingency operation, and 1,084 (plus 874 reserve aircraft) in the CONUS reserve and mobilization base.

A long-standing split over the merits of land- versus sea-based air resurfaced. Admiral Moorer justified 16 carrier wings on grounds that (1) growing nationalism and neutralism would affect base availability and (2) bases in Europe were vulnerable to attack as well as liable to saturation during a buildup. But General Ryan saw no need for more than 13 carrier wings and General Westmoreland for merely 11 by 1976; both deemed carrier inferior to land-based air from the standpoint of cost, survivability, and utility. Instead, General Ryan advocated 28 USAF wings by FY 1978 as the most efficient way to counter Soviet modernization and respond to NATO’s increased importance in US strategy.

The numbers of warships recommended in JSOP 72-79 were:

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<tr>
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<th>30 Jun 72</th>
<th>30 Jun 79</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Attack Submarines</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Air Escorts</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Surface Escorts</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sixteen attack carriers would be allocated as follows: two in the Mediterranean; three in the western Pacific; four to assist allies; one for a minor contingency; and six for reinforcement, training, rotation, overhaul, and repair. General Ryan, wanting fewer, stressed their very limited survivability and utility in a European war. “Though it may not be realistic,” General Westmoreland observed, OSD’s guidance for Situation
Conventional Capabilities

B1 excluded Soviet aggression in Asia. That exclusion, of course, could justify reducing carrier requirements in the western Pacific. Admiral Moorer and General Chapman, citing a rapidly growing submarine threat, wanted 10 ASW carriers by FY 1979; Generals Ryan and Westmoreland discerned a need for only six.

For strategic mobility forces, JSOP 72-79 outlined contingency situations and the deployment objectives to deal with them:

1. Without mobilization, meet two minor contingencies by moving one Marine Expeditionary Force, two-thirds of an airborne division, and 1 1/3 tactical fighter wings.
2. With mobilization, move to Europe two MEFs, five divisions with their equipment as well as two-thirds without, and 11 2/3 tactical fighter wings plus supporting units.
3. With mobilization, move to Southeast Asia two MEFs, 7 1/3 divisions with their equipment as well as one without, 10 2/3 tactical fighter wings, and two heavy bomber groups.
4. With mobilization, disengage and redeploy some forces from Southeast Asia to help defend Europe. The main difference with Situation 2 would be location from which the reinforcing units departed (i.e., Southeast Asia and/or CONUS).

For strategic airlift in FY 1972, the JSOP recommended 64 C-5As and 234 C-141s; in FY 1979, 96 and 234. For sealift, among other things, retain 10 troopships and provide 25 multipurpose cargo ships through a “build and charter” program.

On 15 April 1970, Secretary Laird sent JSOP proposals to the White House. They were obsolete even before they arrived, because on 24 March Deputy Secretary Packard had circulated stringent fiscal guidance for FYs 1972–1976. In it, he stated bluntly that “substantial” changes to the force structure would prove necessary.

Two significant changes to the PPBS occurred in 1970. First, OSD did away with its MPMs, shifting cost-effectiveness analyses to designing a force structure that would buttress diplomacy and, when necessary, crisis management. Second, an innovative Joint Force Memorandum described the best mix attainable within OSD's fiscal guidance.

In the JFM, naturally, nearly all the recommendations in JSOP 72-79 had to be reduced. Land forces were particularly hard hit, dropping to 13 2/3 Army DFEs and three Marine divisions and staying there. Since at least 15 divisions were considered necessary for an initial defense of NATO Europe, active forces alone would not suffice. But, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointedly reminded Laird, the requisite degree of reserve readiness never had been attained in the past and would be difficult to achieve in the future. Moreover, to make reserves available in time, the political authorities must decide upon mobilization as soon as danger signs appeared. Even with 30 days' warning, they cautioned, all the required forces would not reach Europe until D+60 days. And since all the active units would be going to Europe, reserves must be relied upon to meet any non-NATO emergency.

Fiscal constraints cut into JSOP proposals for tactical air power, although not quite so deeply. The JFM specified 22 USAF wings with 1,620 aircraft (Unit Equipment) in FY 1972, 26 wings and 1,872 aircraft in FY 1979. Such a force, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would provide a “marginal capability” to meet total strategy requirements.

The JFM's figures for warships showed larger reductions:
These forces, they concluded, could not control critical sea lanes and simultaneously defend the United States against submarine launched ballistic missiles. Of the 13 attack carriers, in wartime ten would be committed to defending NATO Europe, leaving two for the Pacific and one for everything else. Finally, for strategic mobility, the JFM proposed acquiring in FY 1973 a fleet of 70 C-5As (Unit Equipment), rather than 96, and holding steady thereafter. But with only 70 C-5As, it stated that rapid deployments to Southeast Asia would prove impossible.30

Bad as all these seemed, worse might follow. Deputy Secretary Packard anticipated “very great pressures” to reduce the FY 1972 budget below his fiscal guidance; funding for FYs 1973-76 might be similarly affected. On 23 May, at Mr. Packard’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a “decremental” alternative, designed to accommodate a $1 billion decrease for each service in each fiscal year. A $3 billion cut, they argued, represented only 4 percent of the DOD budget but would reduce force capabilities by a considerably larger percentage. These would be the major changes made necessary by a decremental approach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>30 Jun 72</th>
<th>30 Jun 79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers/Wings</td>
<td>13/12</td>
<td>13/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Air Escorts</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Surface Escorts</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Westmoreland roundly condemned what the decremental approach would do to his service. The Army Staff, he said, had examined “innumerable solutions” for maintaining the 13 1/3 divisions that it deemed essential. Yet, to pay for necessary modernization, there would have to be manpower cuts in the active force that would compel an “unrealistic” reliance on reserves:

Such a cut in personnel, particularly in the early years, would have a traumatic effect on the morale of the Army. It would be contrary to career commitments already made. Promotions in many grades would be virtually stopped. Additional repetitive tours in Vietnam would be required, and the attainment of an all-volunteer Army would be retarded.
Even under ideal conditions of strategic warning and a prompt decision to mobilize, General Westmoreland thought it unlikely that 15 divisions could deploy to Europe “in a timely manner.” Moreover, for any other contingency, the Army would have nothing available except an airborne brigade on Okinawa.

With a decremental cut, the Navy would lose 75 ships during FY 1972, mostly ASW surface combatants dating from World War II. Also, mothballing the two remaining gunfire support cruisers would increase risks during mid- and high-intensity assault landings. All in all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not see how these decremental forces could meet the requirements of national strategy.

Back on 2 April, President Nixon had ordered the Defense Program Review Committee to spend the next six months defining and analyzing, among other things, overall strategy for general purpose forces as well as appraising their capabilities and costs, particularly of the land, tactical air, and ASW forces. In mid-June, amid fears that the FY 1972 federal deficit might run as high as $20 billion, President Nixon further directed the NSC and DPRC to appraise two alternatives, each involving a $6 billion reduction for Defense. One would cut strategic as well as general purpose forces, the other general purpose forces alone.

An interdepartmental working group set about preparing a response. When Admiral Zumwalt read the second draft, he thought it implied that a $6 billion reduction could be accommodated by either making modest changes in strategy or accepting modest increases in risk. That, he told his JCS colleagues, “is clearly not the case.” Late in July, a revised draft was forwarded to President Nixon at San Clemente, California. After reading it, President Nixon decided against issuing fiscal guidance until the DPRC could review alternatives more thoroughly.

The DPRC, meantime, met on 17 July. Mr. Packard explained that the $79 billion projected for FY 1972 was a compromise between the JCS minimum and the OSD minimum. Overall, he argued, cuts should not exceed $4 to $5 billion. Admiral Zumwalt, he reported, said that a $6 billion reduction in general purpose forces would lower the Navy’s ability to maintain control of the seas from 55 to 20 percent. Admiral Moorer, speaking now as Chairman, emphasized that “the driving force is . . . the THREAT, and that any adjustments in strategy or military posture must be made in that context.” He mentioned “massive problems” that could flow from rapid manpower reductions and greatly reduced modernization and procurement programs. Dr. Paul McCracken, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, observed that “basic fiscal pressures may be pushing us too far—that all around the table and all in authority must appreciate what impact these fiscal pressures might have on our national security and national purposes.” Dr. Kissinger concluded by asking for “an assessment of the implications of a $3 billion total cut, a $3 billion general purpose forces cut, and a $6 billion general purpose forces cut.”

At the next DPRC meeting, on 10 August, Dr. Kissinger relayed President Nixon’s concern that he was being shown how various cuts would impact programs but not “what the purpose of the programs was nor what overall effectiveness could be expected.” For example, the number of air wings available for Europe under possible cuts varied
between 23 and 25. What exactly could two more wings do? Admiral Moorer answered that the difference was one of degree; forces had been designed to run no more than a “prudent risk.” Dr. Kissinger claimed that, while US forces had 90 days of supplies for conventional combat, West Germans could fight only for three weeks and Belgians for two days! “We have wrestled with the supply problem in NATO for 15 years,” Admiral Moorer replied, “but NATO just will not face up to it … using our nuclear umbrella as an excuse for their inaction.” Dr. Kissinger reacted, “If we’re going to stumble through the 70s in the same way, we want to know why.” Turning to Navy levels, Mr. Packard expected that carrier totals would fall from 15 to 12. Admiral Moorer called six in the Atlantic and six in the Pacific “absolutely the minimum.” A strategy that involved “swinging” carriers from the Pacific to the Atlantic bothered him, because “[e]ven if we are fighting a NATO war we will have to have a lot of ships in the Pacific,” where there would be a sizable Soviet presence. Unsatisfied by the discussion, Dr. Kissinger insisted that “[t]he President doesn’t want to know what you can buy at different budget levels. He wants to know what the consequences at the various budget levels would be.” Admiral Moorer phrased the issue differently: “What are the objectives of the US? Do we intend to be a world leader, or do we intend to settle for second place?”

On 18 August, the DPRC’s working group circulated a paper outlining “illustrative” force levels for FY 1972, within various fiscal ceilings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reduction (in billions)</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>$2.3</th>
<th>$3</th>
<th>$5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army/Marine Divisions</td>
<td>16 1/3</td>
<td>16 1/3</td>
<td>16 1/3</td>
<td>14 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active/Reserve Fighter/Attack Aircraft (AAI)</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>4,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack/ASW Carriers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escorts</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>172</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Task Forces</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (AAI)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That same day, at the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff put their case before President Nixon. Most of the service chiefs stressed that strategic nuclear parity increased the danger from conventional cutbacks. General Westmoreland believed that the Soviets, undeterred by nuclear threats, would “base their judgments . . . on a realistic assessment of our overall conventional capabilities.” Like his colleagues, General Ryan said that the biggest problem in accommodating budget reductions would come from releasing large numbers of personnel. Admiral Zumwalt warned that more Navy cuts would “reduce below a reasonable margin our confidence in the control of the seas which is essential to . . . our conventional projection of power.” General Chapman stood alone in commenting that “the Marines had gotten too big and were enthusiastically reducing in size.” Summarizing, Admiral Moorer emphasized the need to reverse public attitudes, saying that “if we were unable to do this the Russians would do it for us and that their buildup, while we cut back, had significantly reduced our options.” Afterwards, all the
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Joint Chiefs agreed that the President had been most receptive. Privately, however, Admiral Moorer recorded that President Nixon was “caught in a budget squeeze from which he cannot extricate himself for political and other reasons. I had a feeling that this was a pro forma meeting and the budget cuts, at least to some degree, will take place.”

At an NSC meeting on 19 August, Admiral Moorer discussed Navy modernization. Secretary Rogers cautioned that reducing the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would have “an extensive psychological impact on our foreign policy.” President Nixon said he did not contemplate any further cutbacks for the Navy; two carriers would stay in the Mediterranean. Dr. Kissinger said that, in the future, “General Purpose Forces will be the main support of US foreign policy.”

On 11 September, through NSDM 84, President Nixon issued guidelines for budget outlays:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Billions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$74.5</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$76</td>
<td>$78</td>
<td>$79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, for FY 1972, the reduction would be $4.5, with about $3 billion coming from general purpose forces. NSDM 84 stipulated that priority in making reductions be given to tactical air, ASW and escort forces, and amphibious forces. The Army, however, would maintain at least 16 2/3 DFEs. Dr. Kissinger had drafted it “to ensure that we protect the division forces which make the fundamental contribution to the NSDM 27 strategy.”

The next day, Dr. Kissinger asked Admiral Moorer whether he was “happy” with NSDM 84. Requiring 16 2/3 DFEs, the Chairman replied, could result in an undesirable force mix. On 14 September, Dr. Kissinger informed Admiral Moorer that NSDM was being modified so that several options could be presented. Admiral Moorer observed that freedom from air attack, such as US troops had enjoyed in Vietnam, might not occur in the future. In that case, the Army would require tactical air support and protected sea lanes for resupply. “Further Guidance,” issued by Dr. Kissinger later that day, stated that the priorities cited in NSDM 84 were simply “illustrative”; the President would consider other possibilities.

OSD drafted another paper titled “Defense Planning 1972–1976.” Late in October, Admiral Moorer told Deputy Secretary Packard that he felt “distressed” about the way in which force planning and budget decisions were being made: “We are battling with third and fourth-echelon people with a narrow field of responsibility. The busy people are the ones called upon to make the decision and they are so busy . . . that they cannot dig into any one paper in depth and must accept what the third and fourth echelons feed them.”

On 9 November, the DPRC reconvened. Deputy Secretary Packard explained that 12 2/3 Army DFEs would be “the lowest level in recent history” and that the recent crisis in Jordan had persuaded DOD to keep attack carriers steady at 15. Consequently, reductions “had gone about as far as it was prudent to go at this time.” Admiral Moorer said that $77 billion, not $74.5 billion, was “the rock-bottom figure needed” for FY 1972 outlays. Nonetheless, their argument left Dr. Kissinger dissatisfied. He told them that
with “a spectacular lack of success,” he had been trying “to get an answer to the simple question” of what one set of illustrative forces could do that another could not. What, precisely, was the difference in capabilities between 15 carriers and 13 or between 16 2/3 DFEs and 15 2/3? Until DOD could answer, he predicted, “it would just be cut and cut . . . year after year.” Could US forces, he asked, meet their NATO commitment? Admiral Moorer answered that, although enough forces seemed available for Europe, a NATO war was by definition a worldwide war and there would be nothing left for other global requirements. But, Dr. Kissinger observed, “every analysis that he had seen seemed to show that anything we could do in NATO was too late.” Mr. Packard replied that “we had a considerable lack of policy guidance” about NATO and other areas.” Dr. Kissinger answered that “NSDM 27 was an abstract statement of contingencies . . . What I am suggesting is that there is grave danger in fulfilling commitments in the abstract made 15 or 20 years ago when there is a totally new strategic situation . . . Maybe this is the best we can do this year.”

What guidance, asked Dr. Kissinger, did DOD need now? Replying that $74.5 billion would be sufficient, Mr. Packard promised to provide answers about force readiness, cautioning that “the Services tended to go heavy on forces at the expense of readiness.” Admiral Moorer, defending the Services, remarked that “a bomb could be gotten much faster than an airplane.” Dr. Kissinger, however, did not want the DPRC to examine details of the force structure but rather to “judge whether our force and readiness posture meet our foreign policy needs and are balanced in terms of the national economy.” The President, he said, should be given a budget with a rationale and policy choices. After the meeting, Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson told Admiral Moorer that “he sympathized with the dire straits in which NSDM 84 had put our force structure” and was anxious to help, “but that Defense had not yet put forward a good case.”

On 14 November, Admiral Moorer gave the Service Chiefs a proposed response to Dr. Kissinger’s questions. As he saw it, these were the main things the upper range of forces could do that the lower range of forces could not:

1. Meet the land force requirements for an initial defense of NATO Europe, while remaining able to deploy one division in Korea or elsewhere.
2. Maintain a surge capability to deploy five, rather than four, carriers in each ocean.
3. Provide escorts for an amphibious strike force and for underway replenishment groups as well as for carrier strike forces.
4. Provide NATO with an additional 2,100 tactical air sorties per month.
5. Make a tactical air wing and amphibious forces available for minor contingencies.

The Service Chiefs proposed many changes to Admiral Moorer’s paper. Ultimately, in fact, the Chairman was unable to forward an agreed version. On 18 November, Dr. Kissinger instructed DOD to assess alternative force packages, together with their strategic and military implications. Soon afterward, Dr. Kissinger told Admiral Moorer that, since the Soviet Union’s worldwide strategy seemed to be getting more aggressive, President Nixon might consider an FY 1972 budget as high as $79.5 billion. As a historian, Dr. Kissinger explained, he thought the outlook
very bleak unless the United States possessed enough military strength to influence Soviet decisionmaking.\footnote{45}

The Office of Systems Analysis drafted alternative force packages, on which Service and Joint Staff action officers commented. Finally, on 14 December, Systems Analysis circulated the alternatives listed below for FY 1972:\footnote{46}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“High”</th>
<th>“Planned”</th>
<th>“Low”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army/Marine DFEs</td>
<td>17 2/3</td>
<td>15 2/3</td>
<td>14 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21 1/3</td>
<td>19 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorts</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift (Divisions)</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-5As</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the DPRC’s next meeting, on 15 December, Deputy Secretary Packard and Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) Gardiner Tucker related what the three options above could and could not do. Admiral Moorer observed that “we are still fighting the war in Vietnam, (and) that we have substantial requirements deriving from NSDM 95\footnote{47} that we must meet, that readiness was being severely eroded, and that . . . we could not get there at the $74.5 billion level.” Consequently, “we would wind up non-ready, non-modern, and without options and flexibility for the President.” Agreeing, Mr. Packard promised to show what $76.5 billion would provide.\footnote{48}

The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird that they “viewed with increasing concern the continuing degradation in the strength, disposition, and readiness of the worldwide US military posture.” Recognizing the limitations on resources changed neither the nature of the threat nor the need to counter it. In Europe, they continued, immediately available forces had no more than “marginal” capability, requiring early and large-scale reinforcement. From CONUS, assuming full mobilization, two Army divisions could deploy by M+60, a third between M+60 and M+120. One airborne division, substituted for an unready armored division, could arrive by M+45. Delivering one Marine Amphibious Force to Europe by M+30 would depend upon “the timely arrival and loading of assault shipping from the Pacific Fleet.” In the Mediterranean, the Sixth Fleet’s ability to accomplish its missions was being “challenged” by an increasingly aggressive Soviet presence. There the Soviets were continuously shadowing major US units, which the Sixth Fleet could not do to the Soviets while fulfilling all its other requirements.

The Air Force scheduled 62 tactical fighter squadrons to reinforce Allied Command Europe by M+30. Twenty-one were already in Europe and another four dual-based in CONUS. Fifteen active squadrons were available in CONUS, ten more than a year ago. The other 22 would have to be drawn from Asia and from the Air National Guard, most of the latter still equipped with obsolete F-84s and F-100s. In the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that cutting the Seventh Fleet from four carriers to three was preventing full-time coverage of both the Tonkin Gulf and the Sea of Japan.
All unified commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported, had expressed deep
concern over their readiness and ability to react. As of 30 September, for example, US
Army Europe was 17,000 spaces below its authorized strength. Within the Pacific Fleet,
108 ships and 37 squadrons had significant personnel deficiencies; comparable figures
for the Atlantic Fleet were 144 and 47. Recently, a CONUS-based Army division had
been alerted for possible movement to the Middle East. The division was manned at
81 percent strength. Raising one brigade to 85 percent strength would have required
trimming a second brigade to 70 percent and rendering the third non-deployable. All
in all, the ability to execute national strategy was being seriously impaired.49

Admiral Zumwalt had wanted to say that he held “less than a 50 percent confidence
that the US Navy can defeat the Soviet Navy with FY 1971 forces. This confidence worsens
with further reductions in US naval forces and capability.” General Westmoreland disagreed.
Since US strategy was based upon coalition warfare, he deemed it equally improper to
evaluate the results of pitting 13 1/3 US Army divisions against 80 Soviet divisions. More-
over, General Westmoreland rated the US Navy superior to the Soviet Navy in both quantity
and quality. In rebuttal, Admiral Zumwalt noted that General Westmoreland’s calculations
excluded Soviet long-range aircraft and the US Navy’s requirement to carry forces across
the ocean. Admiral Moorer then suggested dropping Admiral Zumwalt’s statement, pending
a fuller study of strategic requirements, and Admiral Zumwalt agreed. Separately, though,
Admiral Zumwalt did inform the Secretary that he had less than a 50 percent confidence
in success, and Mr. Packard forwarded his warning to the White House.50

On 27 December, Admiral Moorer advised Dr. Kissinger that he looked upon $76 bil-
lion as the “absolute minimum”; $77 billion would be “much better.” Two days later, Admi-
ral Moorer met with Secretary Laird and Budget Director George Shultz. The FY 1972
budget request, they agreed, would be $75.5 billion in outlays plus $300 million for retired
pay and $300 million for military assistance programs. Thus, from the JCS standpoint,
the worst outcome had been averted.51 The final force levels for FY 1972 are as shown:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>13 1/3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter and Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>2,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack and ASW Carriers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Attack Carrier Wings</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Attack Submarines</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorts</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (UE)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s (UE)</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures on force levels are taken from JSOP 73-80. Final figures for FY 1972 were $78 billion in new obliga-
tional authority and $75.9 billion in outlays. Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson’s Annual Defense
Department Report FY 1974, p. 118.
Usually, the outcome of a force planning exercise structure falls somewhere between what the Joint Chiefs of Staff seek from their superiors and what they privately consider to be the bare minimum. In other words, no matter what military officers may state for the record, the force structure usually does contain a cushion of safety. The size of that cushion becomes the focus of debate. During 1969 and 1970, however, the cushion gradually disappeared. Perhaps for the first time since the late 1940s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves facing the irreducible minimum.

**Force Planning in 1971**

As 1970 ended, the prospect of ever leaner budgets was fomenting intense interservice discord. The smaller the pie, the harder the Services fought over how to divide it. JSOP 73-80, sent to Secretary Laird on 23 December 1970, contained the same Situations A, B1, and B2 as had JSOP 72-79. There, however, the similarity ended. Not since the austere days of 1948-49 had there been so many splits, and over so many fundamental issues.

During the drafting of JSOP 73-80, General Westmoreland urged a truly radical change: cut the Marine Corps from three to two divisions. Marines could not wage sustained land combat, he argued, and “very limited requirements will exist for amphibious type forces.” The Marine Corps’ functions—which he defined as seizing or defending advanced naval bases and conducting operations essential for supporting a naval campaign—“do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.” The Director, Joint Staff, advised Admiral Moorer that General Westmoreland was not quarreling with what had been done to his own programs but rather with what had not been done to those of the other Services. Admiral Moorer, in turn, worried that “if the Chiefs go forward with a paper that is chopped up like this one it is meaningless and will be played back to us out of context. . . . We are really dealing with the cohesiveness of the Joint Chiefs and that is what is important.”

Ultimately, a JCS majority, including General Westmoreland, recommended maintaining three Marine and 16 1/3 Army divisions. The Army’s calculation of land requirements ran as follows: for an initial defense of NATO Europe, 19 US divisions; for a combined defense of either South Korea or Southeast Asia, 10 2/3 or 8 2/3; for minor contingencies, 1 1/3; for assistance to allies, 4; for a strategic reserve, 2; for Korea and to reinforce Alaska and Panama, 2 2/3. Predictably, Admiral Zumwalt judged 13 1/3 Army divisions to be enough. He reasoned that since the Warsaw Pact threat remained unchanged, the NATO requirement should remain at 17 rather than 19 divisions. In Situation A, 10 divisions for a NATO reinforcement base, over and above a two-division strategic reserve/sustaining base, struck him as excessive. Admiral Zumwalt also opposed listing four divisions under “assistance to allies.” For certain contingencies, especially in Asia, he would use forward-deployed units; for others, deployed forces
plus the strategic reserve should suffice. Finally, he objected to listing reinforcements
for Alaska and Panama as additional requirements.

JSOP 73-80 listed tactical air requirements for Situation B1 as 37 USAF wings: 31
to defend Western Europe, four to assist allies, one to maintain a deployment in the
Western Pacific, and one for a minor contingency. The overall levels are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 73</th>
<th>30 Jun 80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Admiral Zumwalt wanted 18 carriers but only 20 USAF wings. To the Navy’s familiar
argument that land bases were vulnerable and liable to saturation as augmentation air-
craft arrived, he added that 50 percent of USAF wings would be based in Great Britain
and so would need aerial refueling to perform their missions. General Ryan sought 28
USAF wings but only 13 carriers. His justification once again rested upon requirements
in Central Europe, for which land-based air impressed him as more suitable.

JSOP 73-80’s other recommendations read as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>30 Jun 73</th>
<th>30 Jun 80</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Submarines</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Submarines</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Air Escorts</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Ships</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Capability (Divisions)</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
<td>1 2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (UE)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s (UE)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broadly, Admiral Zumwalt characterized assured sea control as the “sine qua non”
of any overseas strategy. If the levels that he recommended remained unattained,
national strategy “simply cannot be supported.” He and General Chapman wanted
10 ASW carriers during the mid-range period. In justification, Admiral Zumwalt
noted the increased size and deployments of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic
and cruise missiles, along with the Soviets’ transition to a more capable, nuclear-
powered fleet. Unsurprisingly, General Ryan perceived a need for no more than six
ASW carriers. General Westmoreland wanted half of a 15-carrier force dedicated
to ASW missions. There being duplication between land-based and sea-based air,
he reasoned that ASW forces “must be significantly enhanced by tradeoffs from
those naval forces which now contribute to this duplication.” Further, General
Westmoreland urged “intensified efforts to determine the most effective way of deploying a dual-purpose carrier.” General Westmoreland also used the JSOP to challenge Secretary Laird’s Tentative Strategy Guidance that “[a]s US presence in the land areas of Southeast Asia is reduced, US naval power in the area assumes greater significance.” He objected to its implication that land forces were becoming irrelevant: “The prestige of the US is just as fully committed with ships or aircraft as it is with commitment of ground troops; any decisions to commit the former must encompass the possibility of committing the latter if our overall general purpose force capabilities are to remain credible.”

On 10 February 1971, Deputy Secretary Packard issued tentative fiscal guidance: $79.5 billion in outlays for FY 1973. Early in March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Laird that, for the decremental alternative to last year’s JFM, they already had provided views about a force structure somewhat similar to this, concluding that it could not meet the requirements of national strategy and would exceed the “level of prudent risk.” Mr. Packard’s guidance, they claimed, would hurt general purpose forces more severely than last year’s decrement. Since funding for strategic nuclear forces, intelligence, security, and support to other nations could not be cut, general purpose forces would have to bear the brunt of any reductions. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it likely that the Soviets’ willingness to employ conventional forces would increase, as their strategic nuclear position grew stronger.

Just as in 1971, the possibility arose that budgetary pressures might compel a $3 billion reduction in FY 1973 outlays. So again, Admiral Moorer asked each Service Chief to appraise the effect of a $1 billion cut so that rebuttals would be ready. General Westmoreland warned that manpower, modernization, and readiness all would suffer. Admiral Zumwalt said that his confidence in retaining sea control would fall to 20 percent. General Ryan predicted a 15 percent cut in tactical fighter and reconnaissance squadrons assigned to Allied Command Europe. General Chapman forecast that one of the Marine Amphibious Forces would fall to 48 percent of its authorized personnel.

On 26 March, Dr. Kissinger instructed DOD to prepare “illustrative” FY 1973–77 force postures and to assess their implications. On 21 April, in preparation for a DPRC meeting, Systems Analysis circulated postures that were consistent with fiscal guidance.

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<th>30 Jun 73</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasizing Modernization</td>
<td>Emphasizing Force Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army/Marine Divisions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers/Wings</td>
<td>13/10</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escorts</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (AAI)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OSD’s Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum for FYs 1973-77, dated 21 April, repeated the figure of $79.5 billion for FY 1973 outlays and levied these requirements:

1. Plan active and reserve forces sufficient to defend Western Europe for 90 days, while Asia remained quiescent.
2. Additionally, plan a reserve of not more than two divisions, two air wings, and two carrier wings.
3. Forces needed to deal with a Chinese attack or to assist against a non-Chinese threat in Asia, as well as protect a minimum capability for NATO, might exceed those in (1) and (2). If so, they should be added to the extent possible within a balanced program.  

Commenting on 13 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the PPGM understated the true level of risk and that JSOP recommendations remained valid. What they called “strategic realities”—mainly, the increase in Soviet military power relative to that of the United States—must shape US planning. Specifically, they suggested rewording the PPGM guidelines to provide, as a first charge, forces to defend Western Europe. From what remained, JCS judgments could help determine the best balance and mix to satisfy other requirements. But subsequent DPPGs and PPGMs repeated the guidelines above.

At a DPRC session on 26 April, Assistant Secretary Tucker observed that “in many cases we are going to a less demanding strategy.” Yet even then, he noted, funding allowed by the fiscal guidance would be inadequate. Admiral Moorer “emphasized strongly that one essential element in any strategic equation—one which is real and rising—is the enemy threat.” When Dr. Kissinger began discussing the “illustrative” proposals, Admiral Moorer interrupted to say that the last time this adjective was used, supposedly “illustrative” proposals had become part of the administration’s program. Dr. Kissinger admonished that, as a result of the “explosion” in procurement costs, “we may drive ourselves out of business.” Admiral Moorer replied that inflation plus more complex technology inevitably resulted in higher replacement costs. The DPRC agreed to prepare at least two programs for FYs 1973–77, one being a decrement below $79.6 billion.

During a JCS meeting on 3 May, the Service Chiefs voiced differing opinions about the most basic issue of all:

Admiral Zumwalt: Does anyone believe we can win a conventional war with the Soviets today, let alone ’73?
General Ryan: I will not say that we can’t.
General Westmoreland: I am not sure.
Admiral Zumwalt: I don’t believe we could get your forces there, and if we got your forces there we couldn’t support them.
General Ryan: I am not ready to accept that these things couldn’t get there.

The Joint Force Memorandum, sent to Secretary Laird in mid-June, described the best force mix that was fiscally attainable:
Conventional Capabilities

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<tr>
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<th>30 Jun 73</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>1554</td>
<td>1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Ships</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (UE)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s (UE)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corporately, they stated that these forces provided “a limited capability with grave risk” for executing the approved strategy. Two Service Chiefs used harsher words. General Westmoreland stated flatly that he could not support anything less than 13 1/3 Army divisions. Indeed, “there is no way that even 13 1/3 Active Divisions can combine with Reserve components to meet the NATO requirement.” By calling up 215,000 reservists, 15 divisions could be made available for Europe. But “the Reserves have never yet been able to attain this readiness, and therein the risk and peril to an area of the world second only to the United States in strategic importance.” Admiral Zumwalt called JFM naval forces “grossly inadequate.” He calculated as “only about 1 in 5” the odds that the US Navy could maintain sea control during a conventional war with the USSR. While the Navy fought to keep Atlantic sea lanes open, it could neither maintain an effective presence in the Mediterranean nor provide tactical air support to the European battlefront. Moreover, the Navy’s ability to defeat the Soviet Pacific Fleet would be “highly questionable,” and the United States “could not effectively carry out its policies” with respect to Israel, South Korea, and Japan. Finally, and most alarmingly, Admiral Zumwalt believed American naval inadequacies would become so apparent to the Soviets and to US allies that Moscow would embark upon a bolder, more aggressive military and foreign policy, leading to the rapid erosion and neutralization of US alliances.

At the DPRC discussion on 5 August, Dr. Kissinger conveyed the President’s displeasure with DOD’s practice of giving one-third of the funds to each service. Assistant Secretary Tucker described what force levels were available in various situations until Dr. Kissinger complained that it had become “beyond my absorptive capacity to hold any more of this sort of information. . . . Tom, do you have anything to add?” Admiral Moorer certainly did:

No longer can I go to Congress and testify that this [budget] is rock-bottom. I think the risk is unacceptable. I make the plea that rather than devise some magic strategy, we say that we can’t afford an adequate defense, that we are broke, and that we have to pull in our horns and move back to the US.
Dr. Kissinger held that, with a major policy readjustment in Asia under way, the President “doesn’t picture the issues in terms of thirteen or fourteen or fifteen or twelve carriers. He wants to know the role of carriers in the emerging situation where every country is re-examining its position. I frankly don’t think he would understand the presentation we have had here. He wants to know what the implications are for foreign policy and national security.”

The DPRC decided that, prior to consideration by the NSC, the budget must be portrayed in terms of what forces could do and where cuts might be made. An interdepartmental working group took up this task. On 11 August, it submitted three options for NSC discussion:

**Option 1:** Be able to fight simultaneously in Europe and Asia, but assume a mobilization only for Europe. Be capable of countering a moderate Chinese threat while maintaining a major capability to reinforce Europe. The administration’s Five-Year Program, at this point, included 13 1/3 Army divisions, 21 1/3 USAF wings, and 15 attack/ASW carriers. Meeting the demands of two theaters would require another three divisions, four wings, and one carrier; extra costs would run between $2.5 and $3 billion.

**Option 2:** Assume a 60- to 90-day lag between the start of Asian and European conflicts, so that two major contingencies could be met with fewer forces than Option 1. Forces in the Five-Year Program could deal with a high Asian threat and, through mobilization, provide major reinforcements for Allied Command Europe.

**Option 3:** Assume a major Asian conflict to be improbable, and accept the risk of a major degradation in NATO’s capability should one occur. Then forces in the Five-Year Program could be cut by two divisions, four wings and three carriers, saving $2 billion annually.

The J-5 believed that this presentation did not describe realistic options and was an inadequate vehicle for decisionmaking. Nonetheless, J-5 urged Admiral Moorer to tell the NSC that it did generally address the kinds of hard choices the President might have to face, if reductions continued. Meanwhile, at the White House on 10 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed President Nixon. Admiral Moorer said that with $79.6 billion “only one war could be fought—either NATO or Asia.” But since the Soviet Union was also a Pacific power, a conflict in Europe would mean a conflict in Asia as well. Consequently, our commitments should be carefully reconsidered. General Westmoreland argued that “the driving requirement of defense today is for a strong defense in Western Europe.” Even if the Army retained 13 divisions, it still would have only 69 percent of the force structure required. General Ryan asked for an additional $1 billion, mainly to increase sorties and readiness. Admiral Zumwalt said that “our naval capability in NATO started to decline in 1970, became marginal in 1971, [would be] worse in 1972, by 1973 the Navy cannot carry out its missions in the Pacific, Mediterranean or in NATO and there would be no guarantee of victory in a war at sea”—less than a 30 percent chance, he emphasized. General Chapman, alone again in his optimism, declared the Marine Corps to be “in excellent shape . . . out of Vietnam with new modern equipment.”

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Afterward, Admiral Moorer recorded that the “prime accomplishment” appeared to be a recognition that US military strength must be sufficient to assure the allies that negotiations with the USSR could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The President, he believed, had been impressed by Admiral Zumwalt’s presentation and would not reduce outlays below $79.6 billion. That afternoon, at President Nixon’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, whom the President held in high regard. The Chairman advised Connally that “if we cannot afford adequate defense we must reduce commitments and I have concluded that now is the time to start on NATO. However, the President has made a statement of intent that he will not reduce NATO commitments. This causes an imbalance in our strategy and eliminates flexibility.”

When the NSC convened on 13 August, President Nixon reiterated that “[t]he main purpose of our forces is diplomatic wallop. . . . Carriers and ground forces have a psychological effect in areas where nations depend on the US. That’s the reason for NATO strength in Europe.” Admiral Moorer repeated his point that the JSOP figure of $91 billion was based on conducting two operations, one in Europe and one in the Pacific, while the $79.6 billion program was “based on an either/or capability.” President Nixon agreed, at least in principle, that “[w]e have to see Asia now as we saw Europe earlier.”

Twelve days later, OSD circulated tentative Program Decision Memorandums prescribing changes in the Five Year Program. The Army would be allowed 13 divisions,70 the Navy permitted to retain about 55 additional ships in FY 1973 and about 25 more during FYs 1974–77. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made no specific reclamas, simply reiterating “their concern with the grave risk inherent in the limited capability to carry out the strategic guidance.” The final PDMs, circulated in September, contained no changes.71

Subsequently, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Packard, and Budget Director George Shultz met by themselves to settle force and budget problems. In December, Secretary Laird sent President Nixon a recommendation that FY 1973 outlays run between $79.5 and $80 billion. The President decided to seek $82 billion in budget authority and $78.6 billion for outlays, so that force levels would take the following shape:72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Divisions</th>
<th>13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack and Dual-Mission Carriers</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift Capability (Divisions)</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (UE)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s (UE)</td>
<td>234</td>
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</table>
When 1971 ended, the military establishment had been reduced up to and perhaps even a bit beyond what the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered a bare minimum. Yet, compared to one year earlier, the strain particularly upon land force capabilities actually had lessened. This was so because Vietnam no longer claimed a large share of US strength. Between December 1970 and December 1971, personnel levels fell from 344,000 to 158,000. After the thrust into Laos during March–April 1971, US units no longer played any offensive role in ground combat operations. For the Army, at least, the Vietnam War was essentially over.

### Force Planning in 1972

Since Vietnam no longer distorted force planning, the year 1972 passed without any acrimonious debates. Of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still saw a gap between commitments and capabilities. But a comparison of JSOP 74-81 (completed late in December 1971) with the JFM (submitted in mid-May 1972) shows that the near-term gap had narrowed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 74</th>
<th>30 Jun 81</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>JFM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Wings</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft (UE)</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift (Divisions)</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As (UE)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s (UE)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
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</table>

In JSOP 74-81, Admiral Zumwalt wanted 17 carriers but would allow the Air Force only 20 wings. Additionally, he and General Chapman asked for 10 ASW carriers. General Ryan called for 31 wings by FY 1980; he and General Westmoreland saw a need for only 16 multi-mission carriers. Apart from that, notably, General Westmoreland was silent and satisfied.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Laird that the JFM forces provided, “at best, only a marginal capability to execute the strategy.” Seventeen divisions had to reach Europe by M+60. Committing all 12 active divisions plus six reserve brigades
Conventional Capabilities

still would leave a three-division shortfall. By sending all 31 active and reserve tactical wings to Europe, the Air Force could meet its numerical requirement. But a large portion of that force lacked modernization; fiscal constraints had reduced aircrew and support levels so that fewer sorties could be flown. And, of course, nothing would be left for contingencies elsewhere. Naval forces were adequate to protect the Atlantic lifeline but not to conduct sustained operations in the Mediterranean as well. Admiral Zumwalt believed that JFM levels remained “grossly inadequate.” He repeated his prediction in last year’s JFM that the odds on retaining sea control would be “less than 1 in 5.”

On 21 July, through JCSM-336-72, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their assessment of how SALT I, the recently signed Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and an Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, affected conventional capabilities. Strong non-nuclear forces remained essential, they said, to ensure that the Soviets had an incentive to negotiate SALT II as well as mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. They also were needed because, in a time of relative strategic nuclear parity, the Soviets might feel less constrained about challenging the Free World at levels below strategic nuclear warfare. Specifically, in Europe, they recommended adding an Air Cavalry Brigade and building 186 aircraft shelters beyond the 414 already programmed. The Navy, during FYs 1974–76, should operate 13 carriers, rather than the 12 listed in the JFM. (Admiral Zumwalt, however, wanted 15 carriers.) Also, over FYs 1974–81, another four surface combatants should be added to the fleet.

On 30 August, Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush circulated tentative PDMs covering FYs 1974–78. The Army would improve the readiness of selected reserves and increase its procurement of anti-tank weapons for all units scheduled to reach Europe by M+120. Also, during FYs 1974–77, two infantry divisions would be converted into mechanized ones. The Air Force, over FYs 1974–78, would maintain a steady 22 wings, increase its procurement of air-to-ground munitions, and make plans for asking the allies to fund additional 1,062 aircraft shelters. The Navy, however, would be operating only 12 carriers throughout this period; construction of a nuclear-powered carrier (CCVAN-71) was cancelled. As World War II classes retired, the number of ASW escorts would fall to 110 in FY 1974 and 100 in FY 1976, then rise to 117 in FY 1978. Finally, four nuclear attack submarines would be started each year; diesels would drop from 22 in FY 1974 to 16 by FY 1978. The Joint Chiefs of Staff offered no specific reclamas. Instead, on 12 September, they reiterated (1) their JSOP recommendations, (2) their proposals in JCSM-336-72 above, and (3) their belief that JFM forces provided at best a marginal capability for executing the strategy.

The final PDMs, issued on 21 September, changed carrier levels to 15 in FY 1974, 13 in FY 1975, and 12 for FYs 1976–78. Five nuclear submarines would be started annually, rather than four, and diesels would decrease to 12 during FYs 1974–78. Mr. Rush attached provisos to converting infantry into mechanized divisions. Conversion of the first division would be conditioned upon increased commitments by the allies; a
decision about converting the second would be deferred. So, as of 31 December 1972, the administration’s program looked like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 74</th>
<th>30 Jun 78</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Submarines</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combatants</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift Capability (Divisions)</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1 1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summation**

By 31 December 1972, only 24,000 US military personnel remained in Vietnam. The Army had shrunk to 13 divisions, its lowest point since June 1950. The Navy faced block obsolescence of surface combatants, and one-for-one replacement proved far too costly. Only the Marine Corps stayed at, and the Air Force near, their pre-Vietnam levels. According to JSCP-74, approved in December 1972, active forces could: conduct small-scale, short duration contingency operations; maintain forward deployments; and provide limited assistance to allies as well as limited reinforcements to the unified commands. With an effort “up to full mobilization,” the armed forces could undertake one of the following tasks:

1. Conduct an initial defense of NATO Europe, while providing limited assistance to other allies.
2. Defend against Chinese aggression in one area of Asia, while furnishing limited assistance to other Asian allies and preserving a marginal capability to reinforce Europe.
3. Conduct a major contingency operation (e.g., seize Cuba), extend limited help to allies being attacked by non-Soviet, non-Chinese forces, and restore through mobilization a capability to carry out either (1) or (2) above.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned about having “at best, a marginal capability” to execute the strategy. In DPRC discussions, Dr. Kissinger wanted to know how well particular force levels would support foreign policy. Admiral Moorer responded by arguing, more narrowly, that war in Europe inevitably meant war in the Pacific. Therefore, reducing commitments in Europe impressed Admiral Moorer as the only way to harmonize requirements with capabilities—and President Nixon emphatically ruled that out. From the Joint Chiefs’ standpoint, the cuts went too deep and the commitments remained too large. But from President Nixon’s and Dr. Kissinger’s standpoint, which focused on supporting diplomacy and reassuring allies, requirements and capabilities finally were about in balance.
### Conventional Capabilities

#### Forces in Being

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 69</th>
<th>30 Jun 70</th>
<th>30 Jun 71</th>
<th>30 Jun 72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>19 2/3</td>
<td>17 2/3</td>
<td>13 2/3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Divisions/DFEs</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter/Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>1801</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers/Wings</td>
<td>15/15</td>
<td>15/14</td>
<td>14/13</td>
<td>14/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Carriers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Attack Submarines</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-air Escorts</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW Escorts</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ships</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5As</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141s</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: JSOP Force Tabulations*
Competition in strategic nuclear weaponry was the most dangerous, destabilizing aspect of rivalry between Moscow and Washington. President Nixon hoped to replace confrontation between the superpowers with an era of détente. Consequently, an agreement limiting strategic nuclear forces could serve as the centerpiece of détente.

On 1 July 1968, Washington and Moscow had agreed to open discussions about limitations and reductions. Then the Warsaw Pact’s occupation of Czechoslovakia the following month made strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) impossible for the time being. Nonetheless, early in September, President Lyndon Johnson tentatively approved a negotiating position, with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred. It included: limiting ICBM launchers to 1,200 per side, and prohibiting mobile land-based missiles; forbidding new construction of missile submarines or SLBM launchers; and confining ABM deployments to a set and equivalent number of launchers and associated missiles. Verification would be accomplished without on-site inspection, by “national means.”

**Winnowing the Options**

At the outset, President Nixon emphasized “linkage,” telling Secretaries Laird and Rogers that he would decide when and how to proceed with SALT “in light of the prevailing political context and, in particular, in light of progress toward stabilizing the explosive Middle East situation, and in light of the Paris talks” about ending the Vietnam War. On 6 February 1969, the NSC Review Group discussed two questions. First, should arms talks begin before the worldwide strategy review ordered by NSSM 3 had been completed? Second, should US negotiators present the Soviets with a specific proposal or simply set forth objectives and principles? The Group noted that President Nixon was not prepared to go into the details of a proposal until the political climate could be determined. On 12 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to
support postponement. They wanted to establish objectives and principles, though, in case starting the talks did become necessary.2

The next day, Secretary Laird sent Dr. Kissinger an appraisal of the military consequences of delaying arms talks. In terms of launchers the United States still held a small lead over the Soviet Union in ICBMs and larger leads in SLBMs and long-range bombers. Yet, since the American buildup had ended while Soviet expansion continued, the United States lead would steadily erode. Meanwhile, the United States had just begun flight testing MIRVs; the USSR had done no such testing and apparently lagged several years behind. Thus, from a purely military standpoint, it would be better to initiate talks now rather than six months hence.3

On 6 March, President Nixon ordered that a negotiating position be prepared. The task fell to a Steering Committee chaired by Mr. Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); it included representatives from State, OSD, JCS, Central Intelligence, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the White House. The Committee set about developing a range of options—limited as well as comprehensive ones—along with a statement of principles and objectives for each option. General Wheeler designated Major General Royal B. Allison, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations (ACSAN), to be the JCS representative. From July 1968 until July 1969, Allison served as ACSAN only on a part-time basis. Initially, Wheeler ordered him to work with and through the Office of the Director, Joint Staff, and to draw upon the Joint Staff for support and assistance. ACSAN’s duties included: helping the Chairman in his role as a member of the NSC; working with the Joint Staff in SALT preparations; monitoring the activities of other agencies; and preparing studies that would help amplify positions and instruct US negotiators.4

At a Steering Committee meeting on 3 April, Director Smith suggested that Moscow and Washington make a tacit, reciprocal understanding to refrain from MIRV testing during negotiations. Other members objected that trying to control technological advances would prove extremely difficult and contrary to US interests. Nonetheless, two weeks later, Mr. Smith proposed to Dr. Kissinger that the Steering Committee examine whether MIRV testing should be stretched out or deferred. The only realistic way to keep MIRVs out of US and Soviet arsenals, he argued, would be to prohibit tests. Yet US testing was proceeding at such a rapid pace that a commitment to deploy MIRVed Poseidon SLBMs might be made by July 1969. General Wheeler informed Mr. Smith that he opposed any delays, describing MIRV testing as “essential” and seeing no evidence that US testing had lessened the Soviets’ desire for arms talks. Mr. Smith, in turn, informed Dr. Kissinger of General Wheeler’s opposition.5

On 28 April, Dr. Kissinger instructed the Steering Committee to study MIRV problems. At a Steering Committee session late in May, Deputy Secretary Packard said (1) that the MIRV issue was getting more attention than it deserved and (2) that there was no interagency agreement about whether the flight testing of a MIRV warhead could be verified. General Allison added that either banning MIRVs or controlling MIRV testing would be a first step toward control over technology, which he deemed neither desirable
nor verifiable. Deputy Secretary Packard advised Dr. Kissinger that the quid pro quo for a halt to Soviet launcher construction should be a halt to US launcher construction, not a suspension of US MIRV testing. And, since the Soviets had just monitored a successful US test flight, any sudden proposal for a MIRV moratorium would arouse great suspicion in Moscow.

On 30 May, the Steering Committee circulated its report. War gaming techniques had tested how, through 1978, a variety of limitations would affect programmed US and projected Soviet forces. Soviet retaliatory capability would be high in all cases except when area defenses exceeded 500 ABMs. Turning to verification by national means, the number of Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers could be established within acceptable limits, although as many as 200 to 300 mobile ICBMs might be deployed prior to detection. MIRV testing on ICBMs could be spotted, but the chances of detecting MIRV testing of SLBMs was “only about even.” To verify a ban on MIRV deployment, however, there would have to be “highly intrusive inspection of the missile itself.” Finally, the levels of fixed ABM launchers could be monitored with high confidence, provided that limits were placed upon ABM-associated radars.

The Steering Committee then outlined and analyzed seven alternatives:

**Package I:** Ban mobile land-based strategic missiles and freeze the numbers of US and Soviet ICBM launchers, as well as Soviet intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile (IRBM/MRBM) launchers, at those currently operational or under construction. No restrictions would be placed upon MIRVs and other ICBM improvements. Relocating ICBM silos and “super-hardening” them in hard-rock silos would be permitted. The numbers of ABM launchers would be limited, but no restrictions were set upon ABM characteristics. Sea-based offensive missiles would remain unrestricted.

Package I had the advantage of not disrupting US programs. It would promote stability, since both sides could build more survivable systems. On the debit side, Package I might channel the arms race into other areas such as MIRVs, SLBMs (where the Soviets might catch up), larger missiles, and more modern ICBMs. Politically, Package I would not be convincing as an arms control measure. Moreover, because the Soviets would have to limit ABMs, ICBMs, and land-based mobile missiles, it might prove non-negotiable.

**Package II:** Freeze SLBM as well as ICBM levels at those operational or under construction. Mobile land-based ICBMs would be permitted, within the aggregate total of ICBM launchers. MIRVs and qualitative improvements would be allowed, as would silo super-hardening and relocation. Some limits would be placed upon ABM launchers, but none upon the system's characteristics. Sea-based offensive missiles would remain unrestricted.

Package II might produce a quick agreement. It would limit SLBMs, thus preserving the US lead, and might appeal to the Soviets since it permitted land-mobile ICBMs. On the other hand, Package II would slow the arms race only marginally and be less negotiable than other options. It would be hard to verify the number of land mobile missiles and equally difficult to verify the procedure for launcher replacement.

**Package IIA:** Same as II, except for freezing ICBM and SLBM launchers at a combined total, within which each side could vary its mix of mobile or fixed land-based and sea-based launchers. This could promote stability by making retaliatory forces more survivable. However, it would reduce the US lead in SLBMs and the varying land-sea mix would complicate verification.
Package III: Freeze land- and sea-based launchers at current levels, including those being built. Unlike I and II, Package III would cover all categories of strategic launchers. No mobile land-based missiles would be allowed, but MIRVs could be tested and deployed. Existing silos could not be enlarged; the basic external configuration of silos could not be changed, nor could launchers be relocated. After five years, there would be negotiations about replacing submarines. While sea-based and land-mobile ABMs would be banned, there would be no other restrictions on ABM characteristics. Some type of limit would be placed upon the numbers of fixed, land-based ABM launchers. Thus Package III would stop the Soviet buildup while allowing the United States to continue its MIRV program. Nonetheless, since the Soviets could achieve and maintain an adequate strategic posture, Package III might prove acceptable to them. Each side could improve its target coverage and penetration while providing hedges against cheating or abrogation. By allowing MIRVs, however, Package III would create a threat to Minuteman and probably would continue a qualitative arms race. At the higher ABM levels, Soviet retaliatory capability would be degraded. Yet, since MIRVs were allowed, it would be very difficult to keep ABM levels down.

Package IIIA: Identical to Package III, except that silo super-hardening and relocation would be permitted. Package IIIA would make counterforce strike more difficult, and afford a greater opportunity to reduce the Soviets’ advantage in ICBM throw-weight. Conversely, it would allow the Soviets to replace smaller silos with larger ones. Verification procedures for silo replacement would be difficult to negotiate.

Package IIIB: Identical to Package III, except that the combined total of ICBM and SLBM launchers would be frozen at a specified limit. Within the overall ceiling, each side could vary its mix of land-based and sea-based missiles. The pros and cons of Package IIIB were very similar to those of Package IIIA.

Package IV: This, too, was the same as Package III, except that MIRVs would be completely prohibited. Package IV would do more than any other to curb the arms race, particularly the MIRV-ABM cycle of action and reaction. Each side could accept a low ABM level and still be confident about its retaliatory capabilities. However, a MIRV ban would make it more difficult to hedge against Soviet cheating, since US ability to penetrate Soviet defenses would be reduced. Also, banning MIRVs would surrender an important American advantage and prevent US forces from being able to cover all time-urgent targets. Lastly, a MIRV ban would deprive the United States of an important bargaining card, and might prove the first step toward other qualitative controls.

Initially, ACDA had excluded Packages I and II. General Allison was responsible for adding them, as well as the freedom to mix provisions in other Packages. According to ACDA, a “Stop Where We Are” agreement would keep the strategic balance in its currently stable state, where “both sides have a confident second-strike capability, and are far from achieving a first-strike capability.”

On 17 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird their appraisals of the seven packages prepared by the Steering Committee. An acceptable agreement, they began, must be “uncomplicated and easily understood and should be based on confident
verification of compliance." Force modernization had to go forward. Obviously, all seven packages would be affected by the levels permitted for ballistic missile defense—yet the Committee had made only a partial effort to relate those levels to its packages. The number of ABM launchers, for instance, did not necessarily reflect the level of missile defense. That was so because Soviet ABM launchers had a reload capability and could be placed in optimum locations. Also, none of the packages took account of the Soviets' great advantage in offensive throw-weight. That of their SS-9 ICBM was estimated at 13,700 pounds; that of Titan II, by far the largest American ICBM, was only 9,200 pounds.

As for verification, they wanted US negotiators directed at the outset “to explore aggressively with the Soviets the possibility of on-site verification.” Without it, the Soviets might upgrade IR/MRBM silos to hold ICBMs and modify surface-to-air missile systems to provide some capability for ballistic missile defense; radars might be wrongly categorized; and several new missile-launching submarines might escape detection. Also, prior to substantial deployment, a ban on mobile systems might escape detection. By using novel techniques, the Soviets might secretly flight test MIRVs. Even with some form of on-site inspection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw little likelihood of detecting how far qualitative improvements—including MIRVs—were being incorporated into deployed missiles. Therefore, they recommended adhering “stringently to the basic principle of positive and assured verification,” including on-site inspection, and deviating from it “only after the most careful examination....”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rated Package I as the simplest to verify, but they cited some drawbacks. The Soviets could overcome the US advantage in SLBMs and, without being detected for two or three years, deploy a substantial force of mobile, land-based launchers. Package II carried the same drawbacks. Package IIA, permitting a land-sea mix, would seriously complicate verification problems. Package III could be verified through national means with the same confidence as Package I. Again, verifying a ban on mobile, land-based missiles loomed as the most difficult task. Packages IIIA and IIIB were on a par with Package III as far as verification was concerned. In their judgment, whether any of these six Packages were desirable would depend entirely upon the level and effectiveness of whatever ballistic missile defenses were permitted. Still, with appropriate modifications, each package could “provide the basis” for developing a negotiating proposal. What about Package IV? The Joint Chiefs of Staff flatly opposed it. A ban on MIRV development would eliminate the main US advantage over the Soviets and could not be verified by national means.10

General Allison sent General Wheeler a wry summation of the situation. To “stop where we are” would be unacceptable because the United States did not possess a favorable force posture. To “stop where we were,” when the United States held a large lead, would be infinitely preferable. If that could not be arranged, the only recourse lay in adding enough forces to be able to “stop where we ought to be.”11

Agreeing completely with General Allison, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Laird why they judged ACDA’s “Stop Where We Are” unacceptable. It went beyond Package IV, which they flatly opposed, in a number of ways. “Stop” would do
the following: limit technological advances; prohibit improvements to the accuracy and throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs; restrict flight tests to pre-announced confidence firings; prevent the Soviets from completing about 300 ICBM and 250 SLBM launchers, to which they probably would not agree; and freeze the numbers of strategic bombers and surface-to-air missile launchers, as well as prevent the introduction of new types. There would be extra problems of verification. For example, ABM radars might be used to upgrade the Tallinn Line in the northwestern USSR from anti-air into an effective ballistic missile defense system. Soviet medium bombers, excluded from “Stop,” might be used in a strategic role. Could “Stop” serve as the basis for a moratorium? No, because a moratorium “implies trust, in this case of an unpredictable adversary, and foregoes the protection normally afforded by a treaty.” In sum, since “Stop” would incur numerous risks, they recommended eliminating it from further consideration.

An NSC meeting on 18 June gave General Wheeler the opportunity to argue against a moratorium on MIRV testing. With MIRVed Minuteman IIIs, accurate strikes could be delivered against targets that were currently uncovered. One US Spartan ABM missile would kill all three warheads in a Soviet multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV), but one Soviet ABM warhead could not kill a US MIRV cluster. Next day, in the Review Group, General Wheeler made the JCS case against “Stop.” Secretary Laird advised Dr. Kissinger that he supported JCS objections to “Stop” but believed that, during negotiations, a moratorium on MIRV testing as well as offensive and defensive deployments would be useful. Therefore, the administration should not reject outright all features of “Stop.”

On 2 July, through NSSM 62, President Nixon directed that alternatives be further refined. The Steering Committee should delineate proposals “including, in each case, the language that would actually be used with the Soviets and a precise description for internal US use.” He wanted at least two “limited,” one or more “intermediate,” and one or more “comprehensive” proposals. Significantly, Nixon included “Stop Where We Are” as a “comprehensive” proposal.

On 15 July, the Steering Committee circulated five proposals. “Limited” Alternatives I and II were quite similar to Packages I and II; “Intermediate” Alternative III closely resembled Package III; “Comprehensive” Alternative IV paralleled the old Package IV; and “Comprehensive” Alternative V amounted to “Stop Where We Are.” In Alternative I, General Allison opposed putting any limits on ABM-associated radars because categorizing them exactly was difficult. In Alternatives IV and V, he believed that US national means could not, with an acceptable degree of confidence, detect Soviet MIRV testing. Conversely, in his judgment, the United States could deploy its own MIRV system without further testing. General Allison advised Dr. Kissinger that, while he rated IV and V unacceptable, Alternatives I, II, and III contained “features and elements” from which a negotiating position could be developed.

Gerard Smith urged the President to propose a moratorium on testing MRVs as well as MIRVs, if the Soviets would suspend the construction of ICBM and SLBM launchers. On 1 August, General Wheeler sent Secretary Laird a catalogue of objections, repeating old ones and adding a few that were new. The appropriate quid pro quo for
halting Soviet launcher construction would be halting US launcher construction, not halting MIRV testing.\textsuperscript{17} A moratorium on MIRV testing should not be accepted until the implications of a ban on MIRV deployment had been fully considered. Banning MIRV deployment might prove harmful, because MIRVs and penetration aids were needed to maintain high confidence in US ability to penetrate Soviet defenses. Moreover, MIRVs were needed to cover 300 ICBM launchers that the Soviets were building. Also, operational testing of the Polaris A-3 SLBM—a MRV which still comprised the bulk of American SLBMs—would halt. General Wheeler worried that accepting a moratorium early in the negotiations would encourage Soviet stalling. Moreover, if the Soviets concluded that US tests already had proved the elements of MIRV technology, they would greet a moratorium proposal with great suspicion. Further, General Wheeler warned that a moratorium and similar understandings would tend to become de facto treaties. He recalled how in 1961, without warning, the Soviets had abrogated a moratorium on atmospheric testing. Then in rapid succession they had conducted 113 tests, gaining a technical advantage that General Wheeler claimed the United States had not yet overcome.\textsuperscript{18}

Among themselves, on 19 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved positions for General Wheeler to present at NSC meetings. Unsurprisingly, they opposed a MIRV ban. If the President decided to seek one, a quid pro quo should include: destruction by the Soviets of all large-payload ICBM missiles and silos (i.e., SS-9s or equivalent); acceptance by the Soviets of on-site inspection; and restriction of Soviet ballistic missile defenses to the Galosh system that was already operational around Moscow.\textsuperscript{19}

**Preparing for the First Round**

President Nixon had hoped to use the opening of SALT as a lever to move other negotiations forward. He found, however, that pressure from public opinion combined with leaks from State and ACDA made a long delay impossible. Accordingly, on 11 June, Secretary Rogers informed Soviet diplomats that the administration was ready to begin talks. Early in July, President Nixon announced that Mr. Gerard Smith would chair the US delegation and have Ambassadorsial rank. Mr. Paul Nitze, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, joined the delegation as the OSD representative; General Allison also was a member representing the JCS.\textsuperscript{20} No aspect of arms control appeared more vital than verification. So, on 27 July, President Nixon appointed Dr. Kissinger to head a Verification Panel, which would evaluate the complex problems associated with monitoring any agreements. Other members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State, the Directors of ACDA and Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General.\textsuperscript{21} Soon, the Panel’s mandate broadened so that it became the principal forum for reviewing all aspects of SALT.
Late in October 1969, Washington and Moscow announced that negotiators would meet in Helsinki, Finland, for preliminary discussions beginning 17 November. There was, as yet, no definitive US position. During September and October, Packard, Smith and Nitze all suggested modifications to the five Alternatives outlined above. On 27 October, General Allison met with Deputy Secretary Packard and other OSD officials. They reaffirmed that Alternatives I, II and III had elements of a possible negotiating package while Alternatives IV and V did not. According to General Allison, the civilians felt very strongly that, early in the negotiations, President Nixon might need a very comprehensive proposal with which to capture American public and allied support. General Allison told them, initially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred to “digest smaller doses.”

At that point, the NSC Staff had nine options under consideration. Five were the Alternatives described above; two were variations of them; and two had been developed by OSD, then given to President Nixon on 8 October at an NSC meeting. On 7 November, after several days of discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved guidance for General Wheeler at NSC meetings and for General Allison at the Helsinki talks. They were willing to support a short moratorium on the construction of offensive launchers but opposed bans on research and development, qualitative improvements, ABM construction, and MIRV testing and deployment. They endorsed goals of 800-1,000 ABM interceptors but reserved their position about an ultimate requirement. They wanted to ban mobile, land-based ICBM but permit relocating hard silos. As for freedom to mix between land- and sea-based systems, an earlier split persisted. The Navy and Marine Corps favored the concept while the Army and Air Force opposed it. Lastly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against submitting any proposal on their own initiative.

On 12 November, through NSDM 33, President Nixon informed the US delegation that its primary objective was to “develop a work program for the main talks and to acquire information concerning Soviet views in order to aid us in the formulation of future positions.” In order to elicit Soviet thinking, and to illustrate a possible approach, the delegation should draw upon elements in Alternative II—freeze ICBM and SLBM launchers at those already operational, allowing each side to vary its land- and sea-based mix within that ceiling, and place some limit on ABM launchers. Also, “in the interest of exploring Soviet attitudes, the question of MRV/MIRV may be included in a work program.” President Nixon reminded the delegation that, under Safeguard, he was committed to the concept of area defense. Within that guideline, the delegation could explore any defensive limitation. If the Soviets proposed any qualitative or quantitative restrictions (e.g., throw-weight limitations), or any numerical reductions, the delegation could discuss them. However, before talking about moratorium issues or agreeing to their inclusion in a work program, it must seek instructions from Washington.

The Helsinki talks ran from 17 November until 22 December. The US delegation put forward what it labeled “Illustrative Basic Elements” based upon Alternative II. The Soviets acknowledged that, since offensive and defensive systems were closely interrelated, ABMs would be a strong factor in subsequent negotiations. But they also held...
that any weapons capable of striking the other country’s territory were strategic and thus had to be considered in an agreement. By this logic, forward-based US aircraft and missiles had to be counted but Soviet IR/MRBMs did not. Americans, of course, found that position totally unacceptable.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Soviets did not raise the subject of MIRVs. On 10 December, the US delegation informed them that the “component parts” of strategic systems included MRVs and MIRVs. Their verification, replied Ambassador Vladimir Semenov, would require measures which were “unrealistic from a security point of view.” The two sides did agree upon a general work program for the substantive talks, scheduled to open in Vienna during April 1970.26

At the White House, on 29 December, the delegation reported to President Nixon. Members agreed that the Soviets seemed to want “a quantitative agreement covering strategic offensive systems and defenses against ballistic missiles.” Apparently, the Soviets were not interested in any “comprehensive, sweeping proposition” requiring on-site inspection. General Allison remarked that the Soviets “seemed to understand, without alarm or great concern, our illustrative elements—but when we described ‘components’ such as MIRV… the danger signals went up.”27

**Evolution of the “Vienna Option”**

With SALT due to resume on 16 April 1970, the administration had to settle upon specific positions. On 30 December, Dr. Kissinger instructed the Verification Panel to review the alternatives and recommend necessary changes. When the Panel met on 21 January, members agreed that the Soviets wanted some limited agreement probably covering the numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and ABMs. Ambassador Smith observed that, if an agreement did not impose qualitative constraints, the two sides’ relative postures certainly would change within five years. Would a limited agreement, then, serve US interests? At Helsinki, General Allison replied, the Soviets had made it very plain that they would not accept qualitative controls. Verification, for example, would “raise all sorts of red flags.” Summing up, Dr. Kissinger said the President did not want to be “nitpicked with piecemeal decisions”; the Panel should put together two or three packages. General Allison sensed an unwillingness to come to grips with hard issues. Dr. Kissinger, he reported to General Wheeler, “did not have his usual clear incisive approach to problem solving.”26

When the Panel reconvened on 12 March, members debated three issues. First, freedom to mix between land- and sea-based systems: Dr. Kissinger said that he did not understand the JCS position. They supported freedom to mix in principle, General Allison answered, but were reserving final judgment until a specific proposal appeared. Here, actually, he was glossing over the unresolved split within the JCS. Some, including Dr. Kissinger, were considering “one-way” freedom to mix (i.e., allowing only the replacement of ICBM launchers with an equal number of SLBM launchers) which General Allison
opposed as premature. Second, land-mobile missiles: The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to ban them and Dr. Kissinger agreed. Third, qualitative restrictions: Dr. Kissinger asked whether limits could be placed upon the accuracy of re-entry vehicles. No, Deputy Secretary Packard answered; such controls could not be verified. General Allison also opposed limits, adding that such an attempt would be a step toward trying to control technology. Ambassador Smith claimed that accuracy of delivery could be verified by national means alone; General Allison disagreed. Dr. Kissinger ended the discussion by saying that the Panel could do little more than give the President both sides of this argument. As General Allison saw matters, “United States officialdom is clearly and precisely ambivalent on the subject of do we have or do we want [warheads accurate enough to destroy hard silos]—and this ambivalence will hopefully so confuse the Soviets as to be our saving grace.”

On 23 March, Ambassador Smith wrote directly to the President, arguing for a comprehensive agreement that included a MIRV ban, low or zero ABM levels, and perhaps other qualitative controls. The next day, Secretaries Laird and Packard conferred with General Allison and senior OSD officials. Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) Gardiner L. Tucker said the US objective must be to eliminate SS-9 ICBMs, because they gave the Soviets a tremendous advantage in deliverable payload. Otherwise, “we need to deploy more forces.” Dr. Tucker then outlined proposals to freeze, and then reduce, the number of launchers. General Allison, however, thought it unrealistic to suppose that the Soviets would tear down offensive and defensive systems when completion was within their grasp. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, added that Central Intelligence felt “very unsure” about Soviet ABM capabilities.

During an NSC meeting on 25 March, Dr. Kissinger wrote later, “Issues were debated in the abstract and not reduced to discrete negotiating choices.” Ambassador Smith argued that the Soviets would see MIRVing as giving the United States a first strike capability, driving them to a new round in the arms race. General Wheeler disagreed, holding that since over 500 Soviet silos remained untargeted, MIRVs provided counter-force flexibility and not a first-strike option. Two days later, President Nixon ordered that four options be prepared. The first would allow MIRVs and ABMs at the Safeguard level of twelve sites. The second either eliminated ABMs or confined them to protecting the National Command Authorities at Moscow and Washington. The third banned MIRVs and either prohibited or limited ABMs as in the second option. The fourth would allow MIRVs but provide for substantial, phased reductions of delivery systems.

An interagency working group responded with a report burdened by many disagreements. On 6 April, the Verification Panel tried to resolve as many of them as possible. General Allison presented the JCS positions, three of which are noteworthy:

- **ABM levels:** Limit launchers and interceptors to 1,000 for each side, formally prohibit the upgrading of SAMs into ballistic missile defenses, and verify the absence of SAM upgrading primarily through on-site inspection. Alone among agencies, they opposed controls over ABM-associated radars.
- **Freedom to mix:** Standing alone, they favored two-way freedom, substituting ICBMs for SLBMs as well as vice versa.
Air defenses: Alone here too, they held that if heavy bombers were limited, air defenses must have limitations also.

On 8 April, the National Security Council debated four options:

Option A: Limit ICBM and SLBM launchers to 1,710 per side, that being the current US total while the Soviets had about 1,560 operational and approximately 400 more under construction. Freeze bombers at 527 US and 195 Soviet, permit twelve ABM sites per side, and allow MIRVs and one-way freedom to mix.

Option B: Same as A, except that ABMs would be either prohibited or limited to protecting each side’s National Command Authority (NCA).

Option C: Same as B, except for adding bans upon MIRV flight testing and deployment, verified through on-site inspection.

Option D: Begin by limiting ICBM and SLBM launchers to 1,710 per side, with one-way freedom to mix. Next, reduce ICBM launchers by 100 per year for seven years. Limit ABMs to 100 per side. Reduce the US bomber force at a rate of 40 per year for five years, if the Soviets agreed to remove their SS-9 ICBMs before retiring their smaller ICBMs. Allow MIRVs.

Admiral Moorer, as Acting Chairman, advised that the JCS favored Option A. He said that asymmetries between the superpowers, particularly in geography and knowledge about the other side’s capabilities, helped shape their preference. By supporting two-way freedom to mix and mobile ABMs, they were endeavoring to retain maximum flexibility until Soviet intentions became clearer. Option A was simple, primarily quantitative, and suitable as a building block if talks became serious. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer stressed, “had approached this with a conservative outlook, the basic objective being not to jeopardize the security of the United States.” President Nixon tartly replied, “The JCS damn well had better give prime consideration to the security of the United States.” Deputy Secretary Packard also recommended A as a good starting point, with D as a fallback. Secretary Rogers supported the reverse. Ambassador Smith argued for C but was willing to support D. Summing up, President Nixon said that the Soviets “desire superiority and will stop at nothing to get it.” He promised to “take the most forthcoming position possible…. There is nothing we want more than arms control but we don’t want to make the US inferior and thereby bring about a confrontation—political, not military—with the Soviets in the next five years.”

Dr. Kissinger deemed Option B the most realistic and consistent with US interests but urged the President to approve C and D as opening positions. If the Soviets rejected them, as Dr. Kissinger firmly expected, B then could be put forward from a much stronger domestic and bureaucratic position. On 10 April, through NSDM 51, President Nixon ordered the US delegation to begin by presenting Option C, in which ballistic missile defenses were limited to Moscow and Washington—the NCA level. Next, the delegation should present Option D, again employing the NCA approach. In the light of Soviet reactions, President Nixon would judge whether other options ought to be explored. It is noteworthy that Option A, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred, was the only one that President Nixon entirely excluded. One reason, very likely, was that twelve ABM sites had no chance of being funded by Congress.
At Vienna, the US delegation tabled C, then D. The Soviets quickly endorsed an NCA level of ballistic missile defense. Their offensive proposal, however, would place a ceiling upon all systems capable of reaching the other side’s territory—meaning US carrier-based and European-based aircraft but not Soviet IR/MRBMs. Also, the Soviets wanted to allow MIRV flight testing but ban MIRV production and deployment, without on-site inspection. That, of course, would stop the US program but permit the Soviet one to go forward.

Increasingly, the US delegation came to believe that the Soviets sought a limited, primarily quantitative agreement verified solely by national means. That, General Allison cabled General Wheeler, “strikes a familiar chord in JCS circles where such an approach has long been advocated.” On 15 June, the US delegation recommended abandoning C and D, and adopting something like Option B. Offensive systems would be limited to an aggregate of 2,000 (General Allison favored 2,100). There would be sub-ceilings of 1710 upon ICBM and SLBM launchers, and of 250 upon modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMs—i.e., Soviet SS-9s). Full freedom to mix should be allowed. As for ABMs, each side could defend its NCA with 100 launchers and 100 interceptors. All verification would be accomplished strictly by national means without on-site inspections. This proposal became known as the “Vienna Option.”

On 20 June, Deputy Secretary Packard suggested to Dr. Kissinger that the aggregate for ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers run between 1800 and 2000; US ballistic missile defenses would be cut in proportion to Soviet reduction of the SS-9 force. Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the Vienna Option with one modification. They wanted an aggregate of 2,140, in order to allow 410 heavy bombers.

The Soviets offered to sign immediately an agreement limiting ABM systems to Moscow and Washington, but US negotiators insisted upon linking defensive and offensive limitations. On 9 July, through NSDM 69, President Nixon approved “Option E,” which was quite similar to the Vienna Option. Its main features read as follows: Initially, propose 1,900 as the aggregate ceiling for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Within the aggregate, ICBMs and sea-based ballistic missiles would be limited to 1710. Post-1965 modern, large launchers with volumes exceeding 70 cubic meters would be limited to 250. There would be full freedom to mix. For ABMs, two alternatives were acceptable: first, no defenses at all; second, NCA defense limited to 100 fixed launchers and 100 interceptors. On 4 August, the US delegation tabled Option E. Ten days later, the Soviets declared it unacceptable “because it contains provisions aimed at giving unilateral advantage to [the] US side.” Talks then recessed for three months.

Breakthrough

When the US delegation reported to President Nixon on 19 August, Secretary Rogers spoke very optimistically about achieving a treaty. Admiral Moorer and General Allison emphasized, though, that the Soviets’ tactic of talking while continuing their force buildup could not be tolerated indefinitely.
Meantime, Admiral Moorer had tasked the Joint Staff with analyzing how Option E—the 4 August proposal—would affect force planning. A study group looked at what “illustrative” force levels could do and judged that, among other things, adding 250 MLBMs to the US arsenal would enhance effectiveness significantly, in either pre-emptive or retaliatory attacks. Defensively, the group believed that NCA systems would help the Soviet Union more than the United States, although NCA defense would be better for the United States than zero ABMs. On 28 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded these findings to Secretary Laird. The study, they said, indicated that illustrative forces could accomplish assured destruction, albeit at a lower level of confidence than they deemed desirable. However, without an effective warfighting capability, the United States probably would emerge from any “high-level” nuclear conflict in a position of relative disadvantage. The study provided useful background material, they agreed, but had a number of limitations. For example, maximizing the MIRV capability of SS-9 ICBMs had not been considered.

On 2 November 1970—just as talks resumed at Helsinki—President Nixon charged the delegation with eliciting detailed Soviet responses to the 4 August proposal, and avoid volunteering clarifications. The result: Soviet spokesmen proposed a separate agreement limiting ABMs to protecting each country’s NCA. The US side insisted that any agreement cover offensive as well as defensive systems. On 18 December, SALT went into a three-month recess. Ambassador Smith advised the President that Soviet tactics apparently “aimed more at an initial suspension of further deployment of certain strategic weapons of the two countries than at reaching a formal comprehensive strategic arms limitation agreement at this stage.” General Allison added that Soviet tactics seemed aimed specifically at stopping US deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

Briefing the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in January 1971, General Allison stressed the importance of standing firmly behind the proposal of 4 August, Option E. First, he said, a major change would drive the two sides farther apart, possibly even leading to a breakup of SALT. Second, within the administration, a major new proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff “likely would raise a hue and cry that the military were deliberately sabotaging SALT.” Remember, General Allison added, that the 4 August proposal was a firm US position, not merely another option. Therefore, “the JCS should maintain their current above-reproach position.”

On 19 January, Admiral Moorer (who was now Chairman) reviewed alternatives with the Director, Joint Staff. Personally, Admiral Moorer observed, he favored withdrawing the 4 August proposal, completing four Safeguard sites to defend Minuteman fields, and then addressing the NCA question. The next day, during a discussion in the Chairman’s office, General Allison advised Admiral Moorer that withdrawing the 4 August proposal would end US negotiating efforts. The Director, Joint Staff, argued that while the threat to Minuteman silos had increased with the deployment of Soviet MLBMs, the threat to Soviet ICBMs had not because US warhead yields could not knock out hard silos. But General Allison disagreed, noting that when the 4 August proposal
was formulated, projections of the Soviet threat were exactly what the Director just described.\textsuperscript{43}

When the Verification Panel met on 25 January, Deputy Secretary Packard recommended telling the Soviets that, unless an agreement was reached, the United States would have to start protecting its Minuteman force. Mr. Packard wanted to work on the four Safeguard sites at Grand Forks, Malmstrom, Whiteman, and Warren Air Force Bases, start building NCA defense around Washington, and proceed with research and development for hard site defense of Minuteman silos. “What type of program,” Dr. Kissinger asked General Allison, “do you think we should support?” The “really basic question,” General Allison answered, was broader than Minuteman’s survivability. It was, instead, whether the 4 August proposal permitted the United States to deploy the forces and take the actions necessary to protect the United States. He felt that it did. For FY 1972, General Allison recommended continuing Safeguard work at Whiteman at the lowest practical level, diverting resources from Warren to the NCA site, and initiating the Advanced Development phase of hard site defense. He believed that this reduced effort, emphasizing NCA, would suffice to demonstrate US determination.\textsuperscript{44}

An NSC session on 27 January revolved around ABM alternatives. DOD wanted to proceed with four sites; State favored a slowdown; Dr. Kissinger considered continuation “essential to any hopes for Soviet acceptance of offensive limitations.”\textsuperscript{45} Afterward, Admiral Moorer directed the Joint Staff to reappraise the 4 August proposal and state whether any changes appeared necessary. A J-5 draft, in mid-February, recommended moving ahead with four Safeguard sites, NCA protection, and hard site defense. General Allison, unconvinced, advised Admiral Moorer that J-5 had provided no supporting evidence. The J-5, he claimed, had focused unduly on Minuteman’s survivability, failed to draw upon the Oberbeck study,\textsuperscript{46} and did not examine alternatives to ABMs (e.g., hard rock silos, mobile ICBMs, revised employment doctrine, and increased MIRV loads). The Operations Deputies returned the draft to J-5 for revision.\textsuperscript{47}

After a reappraisal, J-5 recommended acceding to “continued use” of the 4 August proposal, subject to certain provisos. General Allison called this “a step in the right direction” but criticized J-5’s new draft as “unnecessarily complicated and obtuse.” It inferred, for instance, that the United States would find itself in a position of inferiority. Actually, General Allison argued, the 4 August proposal did not prohibit actions necessary to meet a developing threat.

On 26 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved J-5’s further revision. They agreed to continue supporting the 4 August proposal, provided that it remained a single entity, that no slowdowns or reductions in approved programs took place, and that during the negotiating period the Soviets did not attempt to increase their advantage. If the Soviets showed interest in defenses above the NCA level, they were willing to consider an agreement that was compatible with US programs.\textsuperscript{48} Almost single-handedly, it would seem, General Allison had persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue supporting the 4 August proposal.
When the Verification Panel met on 2 March, Dr. Kissinger presented three ABM options: zero ABMs; NCA defense for both sides; and an NCA defense for the Soviets balanced against two, three, or four Safeguard sites. Deputy Secretary Packard wanted to stay with the 4 August proposal and NCA for both sides. Admiral Moorer agreed, although he would “place in our own minds a time limit on negotiations based on the 4 August principle.” When Ambassador Smith argued for zero ABMs, Admiral Moorer countered that NCA defense might prove more important to the United States than to the USSR. Very probably, he argued, the United States would not strike first and if attacked would need time for deciding how to retaliate. An NCA defense would provide time for that, as well as time for transmitting a decision to field commanders.49

Writing to Dr. Kissinger on 4 March, Ambassador Smith argued that banning ABMs would serve US security interests better than NCA defense by being advantageous in terms of verifiability, ease of definition, public appeal, economics, and effect upon the strategic arms competition. The next day, General Allison sent Dr. Kissinger the opposing case for creating an NCA defense. SALT, he said, should be viewed as a step-by-step toward establishing a new superpower relationship. Consequently, in the first step, neither side should resort to a “dramatic” measure. Pushing for zero ABMs would “confuse the Soviets and lead them seriously to question US purposes.” Moreover, banning ABMs would end the Soviets’ need to spend considerable resources on countermeasures; even an NCA defense would cause them a good deal of worry. Conversely, an ABM ban could seriously harm US research and development efforts. Even at a zero level, the Soviets could retain early warning and search radars, as well as their air defense system. Thus, for verification, the problems of defining and distinguishing air defense from ABM radars would remain.50

General Allison recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 March approved, positions to be advocated during interagency deliberations. These included opposing any agreement that would limit defensive systems alone, and being willing to delete the sub-ceiling of 1710 launchers if the Soviets offered an appropriate quid pro quo. The latter could prove advantageous, because any increase in the Soviets’ missile force would occur at the expense of their bomber fleet, thereby weakening one leg of their triad.51

At an NSC meeting on 8 March, CIA Director Richard M. Helms reported that the USSR now deployed 2½ to 3 times more missile throw-weight than the United States, was attaining a 20 percent lead in ICBM launchers, and by early 1974 would achieve equality in SLBMs. The administration, Admiral Moorer said, should use this information to press the Soviets into disclosing details of their negotiating position. Proceeding with Safeguard sites, he argued, was the best way to lever them into an agreement limiting MLBMs and total numbers of missiles. Ambassador Smith, on the other hand, denied that the Soviets were racing ahead while Americans were standing still. The USSR had decided to build more missiles; the United States had decided to build more warheads. Now, Ambassador Smith urged that the US position start with NCA defenses and then move toward zero ABMs. President Nixon predicted that, once it became apparent that neither side could score any particular gain, an agreement
would be reached. The United States, he believed, possessed enough strength to defend itself, meet its treaty commitments, and protect its allies. Being “number one” in the world, he continued, was not measured simply by who had the most ICBMs. A force that would be sufficient for one side might not be sufficient for the other. The United States was a sea power; the USSR a land power. Therefore, in his judgment, the United States must do everything that it could to modernize, improve, and stay number one in sea power.

After the NSC meeting, General Allison repeated for Admiral Moorer his reasons for staying with the 4 August proposal. First, major changes probably would go in a militarily undesirable direction. Second, the gates would open for changes “pushed by those principally concerned with arms limitations rather than strategic military considerations.” On 11 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to do so, subject to several provisos. However, if the next round of talks produced no significant movement, they wanted the overall US position to be re-examined.

As Dr. Kissinger saw matters, the President was convinced that “Congress would kill the NCA idea as a means to ban all ABMs.” So on 11 March, through NSDM 102, President Nixon instructed the delegation to make a maximum effort along the lines of the 4 August proposal. The United States would be allowed four Safeguard sites, all protecting Minuteman fields, while the USSR could continue operating its Galosh system around Moscow. The Zero ABM proposal would remain on the table, but the delegation would discuss requirements and constraints in NCA defense of Moscow and Washington alone. For offensive systems, as part of a quid pro quo, the delegation could discuss dropping the 1710 sublimit on missiles and raising the aggregate to 2000. Then, if no progress occurred after four weeks, President Nixon would consider reducing the number of Safeguard sites and increasing the limit on MLBMs. In virtually all respects, NSDM 102 conformed to JCS views.

On 15 March, talks resumed at Vienna. Eight days later, Ambassador Smith presented the substance of NSDM 102, saying that it enjoyed equal status with the 4 August proposal. Astonished, the Soviets replied that both sides already had accepted the NCA option. They rejected a formula that would give the United States four sites to their one.

Back in Washington, ABM options were undergoing further study. When the Verification Panel met on 9 April, Dr. Kissinger asked Admiral Moorer whether he preferred two Safeguard sites and 64 ABM launchers around Moscow, or four Safeguard sites and 100 Soviet launchers. Admiral Moorer preferred four Safeguard sites. Dr. Kissinger then said that “the Safeguard position is our real objective and not NCA for [each side] or Zero ABM.” Accordingly, he tasked the Panel’s working group with assessing two, three and four-site Safeguard options. Five days later, the Director, Joint Staff, approved a talking paper for Admiral Moorer’s use. Its main points were: First, four sites to defend Minuteman fields would be the most desirable level; alternatively, there could be three for Minuteman and one for NCA. Second, three Minuteman sites would be the minimum acceptable; only if there were fewer than three sites would NCA alone become more attractive. Meeting on 16 April, the Verification Panel discussed but did not decide how to instruct Ambassador Smith.
On 20 April Admiral Moorer reviewed new negotiating instructions with Dr. Kissinger’s deputy, Brigadier General Alexander Haig, USA. Admiral Moorer feared that State and ACDA were downgrading the NCA option, so that the only alternatives would be either four Safeguard sites or Zero ABMs. Then the Soviets would dismiss four sites as non-negotiable, backing the United States into Zero ABMs. The President, General Haig assured him, “wants only one thing and that is Safeguard.” The next day, General Haig told Admiral Moorer that the President’s instructions would say: If a specified level of ABMs could be retained, the United States desired a Safeguard/Moscow rather than a Washington/Moscow (NCA) deployment. Also, the offer to ban ABMs still stood. Moorer strongly opposed downgrading the NCA option. The White House, he speculated, had retained Zero ABMs because State and ACDA would have leaked word of its elimination to the press, creating friction between the administration and Congress. Nonetheless, Deputy Secretary Packard endorsed these instructions as they stood. He did so to emphasize the Safeguard/Moscow option, and to avoid reinforcing US support for the NCA option. But, Deputy Secretary Packard informed Dr. Kissinger, he and Admiral Moorer wanted the Verification Panel to discuss and decide about Zero ABMs in the very near future.57

Admiral Moorer informed General Allison, in Vienna, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred having four Safeguard sites. What level, General Allison inquired, would be acceptable for the Soviet side? General Allison received instructions not to be drawn into an extensive discussion of numbers. Instead, he should stress equality of coverage—compared to four Safeguard sites—the Galosh system protected not only a significant portion of the Soviet ICBM force but also much more industrial value.58

On 11 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to keep supporting a Safeguard/Moscow deployment, for the time being. If the Soviets were allowed more components than had been specified in the 4 August proposal, these should be located east of the Urals, well away from the Moscow defenses. And, if the Soviets were granted equality in launchers and sites, several constraints should be applied. For example, only one site with 100 launchers and 100 interceptors should be allowed west of the Urals.59

Meantime, unknown to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, another negotiating channel had opened. President Nixon could see that the talks were leading toward an ABM-only agreement, possibly excluding a deal on offensive systems. Accordingly, on 9 January 1971, Dr. Kissinger told Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that “[w]e were prepared to make an ABM agreement, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and . . . with an undertaking that there would be a freeze on new starts of offensive land-based missiles until there was a formal agreement in limiting offensive weapons.”60

There followed four months of exchanges at the highest level, about which the US delegation in Vienna knew nothing. On 19 May, General Haig told Admiral Moorer that the two governments had agreed to couple offensive and defensive agreements. The Soviets, Admiral Moorer replied, probably had accepted this arrangement “because they do not feel inferior to the US anymore and they want to feel free to devote their
energies to the Chinese and other problems now.” The next day, 20 May, President Nixon publicly announced that the two sides “agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of ABM systems. They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.” At a Cabinet meeting that same day, Admiral Moorer declared the agreement to be generally in accord with JCS positions, since it coupled offensive and defensive systems.61

The Sticking Points: ABMs and SLBMs

Dr. Kissinger wrote afterwards that “the final agreement negotiated a year later reflected in its basic aspects the exchanges leading up to the May 20 agreement.”62 At the time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not see things that way, particularly where ABMs were involved. On 20 May, Admiral Moorer sent the Service Chiefs a “leaned down” version of the 4 August agreement. Even if the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not submit a proposal of their own, they ought at least to be ready with constructive suggestions. Offensively, under the leaned down version, the aggregate would be limited to 1900 or 2000, as of an agreed date. The subtotal of 1710 missiles disappeared, but the ceiling of 250 MLBMs remained. Defensively, as one alternative, the United States would be permitted four Safeguard sites while the USSR would be allowed to augment its Galosh system.63

Admiral Zumwalt and General Chapman supported the leaned down version; so did General Allison. General Westmoreland wanted changes. Offensively, in light of the Soviets’ stated preference for symmetry, they should be offered NCA defense around Moscow and three sites east of the Urals. Offensively, without a construction freeze, the Soviets might gain a “totally unacceptable” advantage. He, therefore, proposed freezing launchers at the current operational levels but permitting the modernization of those launchers and missiles. General Ryan recommended three changes: stay with the overall ceiling of 2140 systems; preserve the option to deploy land-mobile ICBMs; and allow hard site defense of Minuteman.64

The Vienna talks ran from 16 March until 28 May. General Allison advised Admiral Moorer that, in order to negotiate most effectively, the US position should be stripped of options and alternatives. Specifically, “a single, clear-cut ABM position and the method by which it will be linked to offensive limitations will be required for the next round of talks.” If the United States sought more ABM sites than the Soviets, he cautioned, a price would have to be paid in offensive limitations.65

On 24 June, Admiral Moorer circulated a draft JCSM tailored to General Allison’s suggestions. Each side could have four ABM sites totaling 400 launchers/interceptors. The Soviet Union could have one site west of the Urals (NCA defense around Moscow), the United States one site east of the Mississippi (NCA defense around Washington). Offensive limitations should be “as simple as possible consistent with clear
understanding.” Each side would agree not to exceed the aggregate total of offensive strategic missiles available as of 31 December 1971. As a sub-ceiling, MLBMs also would be limited to the numbers that were operational on that date. General Chapman approved this draft. So did Admiral Zumwalt, although his “instincts” were to press for two ABM sites rather than four. General Ryan recommended options allowing land-mobile ICBMs, hard site defense, and an equal number of American MLBMs. The Soviets, warned General Westmoreland, could continue their silo and submarine construction simply by retiring old launchers. Consequently, there should be “an absolute freeze on all ICBM/SLBM launcher construction as of a specified date.”

After a Verification Panel meeting on 15 June, Admiral Moorer told Joint Staff officers that “it looks as though we are headed toward a two-site Safeguard. If we are going to be limited to 1, 2, 3, or 4 sites, our best bet is NCA.” Dr. Kissinger worried about a study showing that a Soviet SLBM could reach Washington in only seven minutes.

On 30 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary Laird with a comprehensive statement. The 20 May announcement, as they recognized, meant that offensive and defensive agreements must take effect simultaneously. Defensively, they again recommended allowing each side four sites with 400 launchers/interceptors. Each country could have one site for NCA defense, the other three being located where they could protect ICBM fields. General Ryan wanted to permit each side to deploy terminal-defense ABMs, defending what he called “point defense of land-based retaliatory missiles” but not urban areas. Offensively, they would allow each side (1) an aggregate total of ICBMs and SLBMs not exceeding the number operational on 8 July and no later than 31 December 1971 and (2) equal numbers of MLBMs, not exceeding the number of Soviet MLBMs operational on 8 July and no later than 31 December. Warning about the “dynamic” pace of Soviet deployments, Generals Ryan and Westmoreland added that construction should stop for the duration of an interim agreement, presumably lasting two years. If no comprehensive agreement followed, the interim agreement should be revised to permit freedom to mix and US development of MLBMs. General Ryan also recommended allowing terminal defense ABMs, dedicated to point defense of ICBMs and clearly incapable of protecting urban areas. Lastly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that both ABM and offensive agreements lapse automatically, should no comprehensive agreement on offensive limitations be completed within two years.

After an NSC meeting, where Admiral Moorer argued for four ABM sites, President Nixon specified what positions US negotiators should present. Offensively, according to NSDM 117, ICBM and SLBM launchers would be limited to “those operational and under active construction” on the day this proposal was formally presented. MLBMs would be frozen at the number externally completed by 31 December 1971. Defensively, each side would be limited to either one mutually-agreed site with 100 launchers/interceptors or three mutually-agreed sites, all at operational ICBM fields, with 300 launchers/interceptors. At his discretion, Ambassador Smith could fall back from three to two ABM sites.

NSDM 117 stipulated that “any system for rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory would be prohibited unless permitted
by this agreement.” That passage, General Allison warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could be interpreted as limiting or prohibiting research and development. He urged them to oppose foreclosing such an effort. They did so on 13 July, telling Secretary Laird that they doubted the wisdom of constraining any future defense, such as a laser system. They considered it highly unlikely that covert Soviet research and development could be detected. Moreover, once an agreement precluding futuristic ABM systems was signed, they thought it most unlikely that Congress would fund any further R&D efforts. Concurrently, Secretary Laird urged President Nixon to amend the offensive provisions of NSDM 117; as written, it could erode the American lead in warheads, “the last frontier of US advantage.” Apparently, these arguments persuaded the President.

NSDM 120, issued on 20 July, rendered a “tentative” decision that an ABM agreement should not prohibit systems other than those employing interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. An offensive provision was tightened to prohibit the completion of new-type silos at operational SS-9 fields.71

Talks had resumed on 8 July at Helsinki. On 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forcefully repeated their opposition to banning futuristic ABM systems, and recommended advancing the ICBM/SLBM cutoff from 31 December to 30 September. The US delegation, on 27 July, presented the proposals in NSDMs 117 and 120. Four days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Laird of their concern about the numerical inferiority that would result if these proposals were accepted (e.g., a 31 December cutoff). The Soviets could complete 600 to 700 additional launchers, about 300 more than under a 30 September deadline. They claimed, in fact, that the US negotiating position steadily had eroded to the point where the United States would be “frozen in a position of serious strategic inferiority.” On 31 December, by their calculation, the USSR would have 1,572-1,592 ICBM and 720-736 SLBM launchers, versus 1,054 and 656 for the United States. Allowing 288 SS-9s would increase the disparity in throw-weight. NSDMs 117 and 120 denied the United States freedom to mix and to deploy an equal number of MLBMs. Admiral Zumwalt very much wanted the agreement to contain a freedom-to-mix provision, taking effect automatically after two years.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged holding firm against Soviet attempts to (1) exclude SLBMs from an offensive agreement, thus perpetuating their superiority in ICBMs while allowing them to catch up in SLBMS, and (2) negotiate an NCA-only defensive agreement. The Galosh system around Moscow, they reiterated, protected 580 ICBMs along with urban and industrial values; a Washington system would cover nothing comparable. They also cautioned that an interim agreement, once entered into, would prove difficult to terminate. Therefore, it should not last longer than two years; anything longer would have “a detrimental effect” upon ongoing and future programs.72

Meantime, the old debate over Zero ABMS had restarted. On 27 July, General Allison reported that he—alone among the US delegation—opposed seeking Zero ABMs. Four days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded Secretary Laird that they saw no merit whatever in Zero ABMs. The Secretary forwarded their views to the White House but, on 2 August, told Admiral Moorer that he made Zero ABMs his first choice because
he could see no military rationale for two Safeguard sites. Admiral Moorer agreed with that, although MIRVs ultimately would make the problem of defending Minuteman fields almost insurmountable. Two Safeguard sites, though, would provide a basis for expanding to the twelve originally planned. Mr. Laird did accept two or three Safeguard sites as a fallback position.\textsuperscript{73}

On 4 August, Dr. Kissinger took Admiral Moorer aside for a revealing conversation. According to the Chairman, Dr. Kissinger “said that he understands that I think I have been getting the run-around on SALT. I indicated that as far as ACDA is concerned the JCS have been getting the run-around and that I am concerned about our offensive forces in the SALT discussions. Kissinger indicated because of the number of dovish people with whom he contends he must propose various alternatives. However, we should not become concerned because some of the papers are apparently dummies. Kissinger said that he had never knowingly disapproved anything that I wanted to do.” Wryly, Admiral Moorer recorded in his diary, “I seem to get caught in the middle between Laird and Kissinger, however that is not all bad because they are both still talking to me.”\textsuperscript{74}

On 6 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated once again that an ABM ban would be unwise. If the administration decided to propose one anyway, they strongly urged that there be a clear provision for “absolute zero” ABMs on both sides, with the Galosh and Safeguard systems being fully dismantled within six months. Also, an ABM should be accompanied by an interim offensive agreement freezing launchers “which have not initially reached operational status as of 30 September 1971.”\textsuperscript{75}

The Verification Panel reviewed ABM options on 9 August. Dr. Kissinger said that, if the US delegation proposed a ban, the 20 May agreement “would go down the drain.” Deputy Secretary Packard suggested presenting a ban later, as part of a long-term proposal involving a substantial reduction of Soviet offensive forces. Let the Soviets propose 200 ABMs, Admiral Moorer added. Mr. Philip Farley, Deputy Director of ACDA, noted that Zero ABMs had first been proposed by the US side. Dr. Kissinger interrupted him: Are we running “the greatest seminar on arms control or are we negotiating the 20 May agreement?” Other members predicted that, if the US delegation offered a Zero ABM proposal, Congress never would vote funds for Safeguard. Would the Soviets, Dr. Kissinger asked, tear down their Galosh system? Director Helms answered, “No.” Admiral Moorer said, “Never.” Dr. Kissinger then turned to futuristic ABM systems. Admiral Moorer suggested that such systems would not appear before 1980 and asked, “How can you ban something not yet invented?” A ban of this type, he believed, was unverifiable and would preclude funding for research and development. Dr. Kissinger and Deputy Secretary Packard inclined toward limiting futuristic deployment but not research, development, and testing.\textsuperscript{76}

On 10 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff put their case against Zero ABMs to the President and found him receptive. Two days later, NSDM 127 conveyed instructions that fully incorporated JCS views. First, no ABM ban would be proposed at this time. A total ban remained the ultimate US objective, however, and would be negotiated after agreements.
had been reached about offensive and defensive limitations. Second, research, development and testing of future ABM systems would be permitted but actual deployment prohibited. Also, before an agreement was initialed, both sides must indicate clearly their choice of where to deploy ABMs. The US choice would be a Safeguard deployment at ICBM fields. Thereafter, neither side could change sites except by mutual consent.  

At Helsinki, meantime, the US delegation had proposed that each side be permitted to defend either its NCA or three ICBM fields. On 20 August, the delegation tabled a fallback position: either two ICBM fields or one NCA (“2-or-1”). The Soviets, on 7 September, tabled a “2-for-2” offer. The Verification Panel rejected it, preferring to stand by “2-for-1.” According to Dr. Kissinger, “2-for-2” was really “3-for-1” because the Soviets would want two sites as equivalent for Grand Forks and Congress would not fund NCA defense. Another issue arose when Ambassador Smith suggested that the preamble to an ABM agreement describe Zero ABMs as the ultimate objective. The Verification Panel opposed doing so. As Admiral Moorer observed, “if Zero gets into the Preamble, we will lose all funding for ABM.” President Nixon reaffirmed his decision, stated in NSDM 127, not to discuss an ABM ban at this point.  

On 24 September, just before the Helsinki talks adjourned, US negotiators “swept the table clean” by rejecting all Soviet proposals while reaffirming their own “2-or-1” offer (two ICBM fields or the NCA). General Allison, however, warned Admiral Moorer that “the US Delegation has established a record indicating a desire on the part of the US neither to have nor to develop futuristic [ABM] systems.” Allison, who opposed such limits, deemed this an important issue that warranted continued close attention.  

On 28 September, Admiral Moorer advised Secretary Laird that developments since 20 May left him troubled. What particularly concerned him was “the undiminished momentum of all Soviet programs—ICBM, SLBM, and ABM—contrasted with an unyielding Soviet negotiating stance.” The Soviets, in his opinion, believed the United States would accede to an ABM agreement on Soviet terms and then an interim freeze on ICBMs only. Under those conditions, he urged “that we hold fast to our basic objectives. . . . [and] require forward movement by the Soviets with respect to offensive constraints prior to signing any defensive agreement.”  

What positions should be adopted for the next round? General Allison recommended remaining “rock-hard” about limiting ICBMs and SLBMs, setting the freeze date at 31 December and allowing each side 200 missiles/launchers for NCA defense. But this time General Allison failed to persuade. On 1 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Mr. Laird that the extent of Soviet missile construction made an offensive freeze militarily unsound. The Soviets had gone well past parity. Currently, an offensive freeze would allow them 600 more missiles than the United States. Recent war games had recorded damage results that consistently favored the Soviet Union. Consequently, they proposed basing an offensive agreement not upon a freeze but upon “equal aggregates” of 2,375 strategic weapons, that being the US estimate of what Soviet strength would be when all launchers under construction were completed. Emphasizing the concept of “equal aggregates” marked a milestone in SALT discussions.
Defensively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended replacing “one-or-two” with “one-and-two” (i.e., NCA plus two ICBM fields). Becoming very specific, they stressed that Galosh protected not only NCA at Moscow but also 586 ICBMs, 18 percent of the USSR’s population, 48 percent of Soviet industry, and 22 command and control centers. So, to provide a semblance of balance, the United States needed three sites rather than two. (Privately, Admiral Moorer predicted to General Allison that “we will end up with a one-and-one balance,” Grand Forks and Moscow.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that US forces might not reach these offensive and defensive levels and that new technology might make doing so unnecessary. Nevertheless, the United States must avoid becoming locked into a position of inferiority. If the Soviets, who had insisted on “equivalency” from the beginning, really wanted an agreement they would treat JCS proposals seriously.

On 6 November, Deputy Secretary Packard forwarded the JCS views to the White House, together with his own. He characterized JCS positions as being more favorable to the United States, but less negotiable, than his own. Deputy Secretary Packard wanted to explore a new option based upon a prior Soviet proposal. Each side could protect its capital with 100 interceptors and also defend as many as 150 ICBM silos. The ABM system around the ICBM fields could contain only short-range radars and interceptors, and it could not contribute to area defense. The United States would not initiate NCA defense, and the Soviet Union would not start building ICBM defenses, without mutual consent, a follow-on agreement, or a time limit expired.

At an NSC meeting on 12 November, President Nixon asked CIA Director Helms when the Soviets would achieve numerical equality in SLBMs. During 1973, Mr. Helms answered. The Soviets could build nine Yankee-class submarines each year while, even under an accelerated program, the first US Trident would not become operational before 1977. President Nixon wondered whether an SLBM freeze would be wise, because this was one area where Congress would support increases. But Secretary Laird strongly favored SLBM limitations since, otherwise, the time lag in Trident construction would give the Soviets a near-term lead. President Nixon directed an investigation into what could be done to improve American SLBM capabilities. There was, he noted, a “head of steam” building in the American public over approaching American inferiority.

On 15 November, through NSDM 140, President Nixon issued instructions for the next round of talks. Initially, the US delegation should concentrate on establishing that there would be an ICMBM freeze, with an MLBM sub-limit and a precise understanding of what would be allowed for modernization and replacement. If it appeared that getting SLBMs included would require changing the US proposal about SLBMs, the delegation should present alternatives for a presidential decision. Defensively, nothing except the “one-or-two” proposal (i.e., protect either the NCA or two ICBM fields) could be explored.

Back on 12 October, President Nixon announced that a summit meeting would take place the following May. Arms talks resumed at Vienna in mid-November. The
Soviets, one month later, proposed trading their defense of Moscow for US defense of one ICBM field plus half the number of Minutemen in that field. In mid-December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated their endorsement of “one and two” ABM sites, each side being limited to 300 launchers/interceptors with no more than 100 at the NCA. On 3 January 1972, through NSDM 145, President Nixon stated that an ABM agreement must be in treaty form, while offensive limitations could be prescribed in an executive agreement. SLBM launchers would be limited to those operational or under construction on the freeze date.

In Washington, everyone still was not singing from the same page. On 18 January, Secretary Laird informed President Nixon that he was “deeply concerned over the status of SALT.” The latest proposal struck him as neither good nor negotiable. Sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom with only 100-200 interceptors could not defend Minuteman fields and would provide only marginal protection for bombers and command centers. Initially, Mr. Laird suggested deployments at Grand Forks and Moscow, followed by protection of Washington and hard site defense at Grand Forks in exchange for hard site defense at one Soviet ICBM field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff generally agreed, although preferring three-for-three initially and hard site defense of two ICBM fields per side.

“Agreement in the Air”

The sixth round of talks at Vienna adjourned on 4 February 1972. General Allison reported that the Soviet side, at US insistence, proceeded reluctantly with parallel negotiations of offensive and defensive agreements. “Although major decisions remain to be taken by both Governments,” he informed Admiral Moorer, “there is the smell of SALT agreement in the air.” General Allison summarized the remaining issues:

**ABMs:** The Soviets remained firmly committed to NCA only, insisting that if the United States was allowed to defend ICBMs they must have that right too. Late in this round, though, they had hinted informally that two sites per side would be acceptable. General Allison asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider what he called a “two-out-of-three” solution. Each side could defend either two ICBM fields or one ICBM field and the NCA, with a right later to exchange the NCA and one ICBM field.

**SLBMs:** The Soviets still argued for their exclusion, Allison reported, “but with firm advocacy on the US side there remains a reasonable possibility for achieving the US goal of inclusion.”

**Date of Freeze:** Provided the Soviets started no ICBM construction between 31 July 1971 and 1 July 1972, the date did not matter. For SLBMs, though, on-going Soviet submarine construction made the date highly significant.

On 6 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary Laird with very familiar proposals for the next round of talks. Defensively, each side should be permitted to
SALT Ends in Success

protect its NCA and two ICBM sites. Offensively, they pressed for equal aggregates with two-way freedom to mix and an equal sublimit on MLBMs. Accepting an unfavorable balance in an interim agreement could set a poor precedent for the follow-on comprehensive agreement. To those who might claim that numerical advantages were insignificant, they rebutted that “[s]uperiority, equality, and inferiority have not only a military but also a political and psychological impact on US security interests.” The continued slippage of freeze deadlines underscored the importance of adopting equal aggregates. And, of course, without SLBM limitations there should be no agreement, either offensive or defensive. In their judgment, an interim agreement should last no longer than thirty months and must not interfere with measures to improve and modernize weapon systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Laird to endorse these views and forward them to the President. Three days later Mr. Laird discussed SALT issues with Dr. Kissinger, who bluntly told the Secretary that “if Moorer can’t line up the Chiefs, then maybe we shouldn’t reappoint him.”

Among themselves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided what position to take if the administration opted for two ABM sites per side. In that case, they preferred defending the ICBM field at Grand Forks and the NCA at Washington. All except Admiral Zumwalt favored including an option for Hard Site Defense of the Minuteman field. General Allison, interestingly, had opposed a selection of sites as premature: “The danger which concerns me most is that . . . we run a risk of not having NCA finally approved and funded—thus possibly winding up with Grand Forks alone while the Soviets have their NCA plus an ICBM silo defense.”

When the Verification Panel met on 9 March, Dr. Kissinger said that the essential decision was whether to have hard site defense. If yes, then each side might be allowed NCA plus one ICBM field. Admiral Moorer insisted that an interim freeze include SLBMs; otherwise, the Soviets would complete 70 or more Yankee-class submarines before the first Trident went to sea. But, Dr. Kissinger countered, the same result would occur if there was no agreement. Why, then, would it be better to have no agreement than one freezing ICBMs alone? Admiral Moorer replied that if the Soviets were permitted to add unlimited SLBMs during an interim freeze, the United States would be at a serious disadvantage in follow-on negotiations. Dr. Kissinger remained unconvinced. On 10 March, when the Panel reconvened, he and Admiral Moorer debated this issue again—with the same result.

At the Panel’s next session, on 15 March, Dr. Kissinger repeated that he did not understand why the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored a short freeze including SLBMs. A freeze lasting 24 or 30 months would not disrupt the Soviets’ production line, and they could prepare to accelerate output when the freeze ended. In reply, Admiral Moorer emphasized that “once we agree on an ABM treaty we will have used our only pressure for offensive limitations.” An offensive freeze had to be short, he said, in case the Soviets refused to include SLBMs. Dr. Kissinger then turned to limitations upon testing radars in an ABM mode. General Allison and Admiral Moorer noted that US agencies
had been unable to agree on precise specifications, and cautioned that greater precision could hurt the United States as much as the Soviet Union.

When the NSC reviewed SALT on 17 March, Dr. Kissinger asked to hear arguments for and against Hard Site Defense. Secretary Laird answered that it would be easier to get money from Congress for a small point defense than for a 4- or 12-site Safeguard. Admiral Moorer said that any agreement should include NCA: “We do not intend to shoot first; thus we must have this protection for reaction time.” Offensively, President Nixon deemed it “imperative” to reach a deal on ICBMs: “We can’t build and they know it. On submarines, it’s in our interest to get a deal but if we can’t, we can get a program [funded by Congress].

NSDM 158, dated 23 March, directed the US delegation to concentrate initially on reaching offensive limitations and press for including SLBMs. The SLBM freeze should take effect on the day that an interim offensive agreement was signed. At an appropriate time, Ambassador Smith could propose that an ICBM freeze begin on that day as well. The interim offensive agreement should last five years, unless replaced sooner by a comprehensive follow-on. Defensively, if the Soviets accepted an SLBM freeze, Smith could offer a two-for-two ABM arrangement. Each country could defend either its NCA and one ICBM field or two ICBM fields, with a right to change the location.

Already, though, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had begun to bypass the US delegation. Adapting Secretary Laird’s proposal of 18 January, Dr. Kissinger put before Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin a solution allowing the Soviets to keep building missiles, provided they dismantled older ICBMs and SLBMs on a one-for-one basis. However, new intelligence made this approach look less appealing to Moscow. According to the latest photography, the Soviets actually were in the midst of a production slowdown as they made extensive modifications to Yankee-class submarines.

During 20-24 April, as a preparation for the May summit, Dr. Kissinger negotiated in Moscow with Soviet leaders. Here General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev made two concessions. First, on ABMs, he would let each side protect its NCA and one ICBM site. Second, on SLBMs, he proposed limits of 950 Soviet and 800 NATO launchers; each side could trade in older ICBMs and SLBMs to stay within these ceilings. The Soviets needed more launchers, he said, to compensate for British and French submarines and for the Polaris/Poseidon bases in Spain and Scotland. Mr. Brezhnev also agreed that the interim agreement should last five years rather than three, as the Soviet delegation at Helsinki was still insisting.

At a White House meeting on 1 May, President Nixon outlined Secretary General Brezhnev’s proposal and Secretary Laird endorsed it. The President then asked Admiral Moorer about SLBM ceilings. He stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed any agreement which would leave the United States permanently inferior. While the USSR could increase its arsenal significantly over the next five years, the United States would not be adding any new weapon systems. Therefore, JCS endorsement of Mr. Brezhnev’s proposal was conditional upon an immediate acceleration of the Trident program. The rationale for supporting an interim agreement, Admiral Moorer related, would be “the
superiority of our bomber force, our technology, and our very superior hand in MIRVs,” meaning that the US lead in warheads would offset the Soviet lead in launchers.\textsuperscript{101}

NSDM 164, issued that same day, outlined a negotiating position quite similar to Secretary General Brezhnev’s proposal. The Soviets could have 62 submarines with 950 launchers, allowing one-for-one replacements. The United States should have an option to replace 54 Titan II ICBMs with as many as three submarines carrying 54 missiles. Defensively, within the context of an SLBM agreement, each side could protect its NCA and one ICBM field, with no more than 100 launchers/interceptors per site.\textsuperscript{102}

On 19 May, Dr. Kissinger briefed “hawkish” congressmen and senators who might oppose the emerging agreements. Admiral Moorer attended. In describing the ABM treaty, Kissinger told them that NCA defense had been included at JCS insistence. But, Admiral Moorer recorded later, that he did not say that this JCS recommendation was based upon a choice between only two options: either Grand Forks and Malmstrom or Grand Forks and NCA. The real JCS preference had been “3-for-3”: Grand Forks, Malmstrom, and Washington, DC. Senator Henry Jackson (D, WA) recalled how he had fought for the ABM program on grounds that less than two Safeguard sites protecting ICBM fields made no military sense. “He’s right,” Admiral Moorer wrote later, but one NCA and one ICBM site were better than two ICBM sites because “they can all be saturated.”

Moving to the interim offensive agreement, Dr. Kissinger emphasized to congressmen and senators that the problem centered on slowing Soviet momentum until the next generation of US weapon systems got under way. Admiral Moorer explained the JCS preference for equal aggregates with freedom to mix. The Soviets, he said, “were rapidly outstripping us in every category with the exception of bombers.” Currently, he believed, “we were not inferior nor were the Soviets superior, but, rather, we had . . . an adequate deterrent.” Unless Congress funded B-1 and Trident, though, “we could not live with this proposed agreement.”\textsuperscript{103}

The Moscow Summit Meeting

The Nixon-Brezhnev meeting opened on 22 May. By this time, only one obstacle remained: how to count SLBMs. It had been agreed that the USSR would be permitted 62 submarines with 950 missiles, the United States 44 submarines and 710 missiles. But which types or models of missiles and submarines should be included in the freeze? And what would be the baseline figure, beyond which a compensatory dismantling of older types must begin? The Soviets proposed excluding their older diesel-powered Golf-class and nuclear-powered Hotel-class submarines from the baseline. On 24 May, at 1332 Washington time, Admiral Moorer informed General Haig that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not support such a solution. At 0600 on 25 May, General Haig telephoned Admiral Moorer to relay a message from Dr. Kissinger in Moscow: the Soviets insisted upon retaining 22 Golf and 9 Hotel submarines. In that case, Admiral Moorer recommended a delay in reaching any agreement; so did Deputy Secretary Rush and CIA
Director Helms. Around 1300, General Haig relayed a new Soviet offer to scrap their Golfs but keep their Hotels. Mr. Rush and Admiral Moorer declared this unacceptable too, on grounds that the Soviets would be retaining 84 boats and 1,020 launchers. For the diary, Admiral Moorer recorded his conviction that “if we maintain a hard line . . . the Soviets will change their position. I do not believe that we can support before Congress any proposal which goes past . . . 950 missiles and 62 submarines.” Simultaneously, apparently suspecting compromise was in the wind, Secretary Laird sent President Nixon a strong recommendation to insist upon 62 and 950.

In the Pentagon, the afternoon and evening of 25 May witnessed furious activity. General Haig telephoned Admiral Moorer to report the President’s and Dr. Kissinger’s “grievous distress” over JCS opposition. Admiral Moorer then arranged a conference call with the Service Chiefs. Their choice, he told them, lay between saying no and saying that compromise was better than no treaty at all. Put that way, General Westmoreland agreed, “we could live with compromise.” Admiral Zumwalt was more outspoken: “I feel like girl who was raped three times and then asked if she will consent.” Finally, at 1854, Admiral Moorer telephoned General Haig to give him the agreed JCS position:

As previously stated, the JCS still favor a limitation on the Soviets of 62 [submarines] and 950 missiles. However, if the Soviet proposal, which also includes the [Golf-class submarines], is the best agreement the President can reach, rather than scuttling the Treaty, the JCS acquiesce provided we accelerate our on-going offensive programs as well as improvements to existing systems. If the proposal to include the [Golf-class submarines] is accepted then an effort should be made to include the [1,300 nm] SS-N-6 and [3,000 nm] SS-N-8 installed in the [Golf]-class in the total 950 and freeze all [Golf]-class in the present missile configuration.

General Haig replied by reading a message he had just received from Moscow. The President, it said, “is unwilling to see some 300-mile SLBMs stand in the way of an agreement that will clearly impose ceilings on Soviets in regard to ICBMs and SLBMs which they could readily exceed in [a] five-year period without [a] freeze—not to mention the retirement of 240 launchers this agreement will bring about.” The President, it continued, expected senior officials to give this proposal their full support. “I think it would be better . . . ,” General Haig tactfully told Admiral Moorer, “if you could get a warmer endorsement.”

At 2047, Admiral Moorer started another conference call with the Service Chiefs: “Gentlemen, same song, second verse.” They discussed how to strengthen their statement, quoted above, that “the JCS acquiesce.” They canvassed possibilities: “concur”; “endorse”; “consent.” General Westmoreland preferred “accept” but General Ryan and Admiral Zumwalt objected to a connotation that they could accept or reject their Commander in Chief’s decision. Ultimately, Admiral Zumwalt struck the right note by proposing “in accord”; they all agreed to that. At 2124, Admiral Moorer read General Haig a statement that differed from the one quoted above by substituting “in accord” for “acquiesce” and
deleting the last sentence. Lightly, Admiral Moorer added, “I have been through every word in the dictionary. . . . I was in the anchor section in the English class.”

Late on 26 May, at St. Vladimir Hall in the Grand Kremlin Palace, President Nixon and Secretary General Brezhnev signed an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. These are summarized below:

The ABM Treaty limited each side to defense of its NCA and one ICBM field. These two sites had to be at least 1,300 kilometers apart; each site could contain no more than 100 launchers/interceptors. The Treaty also specified precisely what types of ABM radars would be permitted at each site. Each party undertook “not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.” Agreed Statement D dealt with the contingency that future ABM systems or components might be “based on other physical principles.” In that case, their deployment—but not their development or testing—would be subject to discussion and agreement. Returning to the Treaty itself, multiple launchers, rapid reloads, and surface-to-air missile upgrading all were banned. Furthermore, in the future, neither side could deploy radars for early warning of a missile attack “except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and pointed outward.” Verification must be accomplished by national means; neither side would interfere with the other’s efforts nor resort to deliberate concealment. Finally, although the Treaty’s duration had no limit, either party could withdraw upon six months’ notice.

The Interim Agreement, which did not require Senatorial consent, prohibited starting the construction of ICBM launchers after 1 July 1972. As of 26 May, the United States had 1,054 launchers operational and none under construction; the USSR had 1,618 launchers either operational or under active construction. For SLBMs, the United States would be limited to 44 submarines and 710 launchers, the USSR to 62 and 950. Beyond a baseline of 656 US and 740 Soviet launchers, new missiles must be traded for equal numbers of older types that had been either deployed prior to 1964 or placed aboard older submarines. Modern SLBMs, regardless of type, must be counted against the total permitted. The Interim Agreement would last five years, unless replaced earlier by a comprehensive agreement. Provisions for verification and withdrawal were the same as those in the ABM Treaty.

On 2 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird what amounted to their conditions for endorsing the outcome of SALT One. They asked for three “assurances” in the shape of “a formalized national program” that would undergo annual review: first, a broad range of intelligence capabilities and operations to verify Soviet compliance; second, aggressive improvement and modernization programs; and third, vigorous research and development. Otherwise, they warned that further negotiations on offensive systems could not be concluded without jeopardizing national security. If the Treaty and/or Interim Agreement should be abrogated or future talks collapsed, a rapid augmentation of US strategic capability would be essential. While Moscow’s adherence to the Agreement would reduce the potential disparity between US and Soviet forces, the US advantage could be reversed if the Soviets emphasized MIRV development and deployment.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged immediate steps to begin deploying ballistic missile defenses around Washington, DC. They also asked for prompt measures to ensure that enough nuclear material became available for new warheads. Moreover, the momentum of ongoing programs (B-1, Trident, and Hard Site Defense of ICBM fields) should be maintained, and the concept formulation of submarine-launched cruise missiles accelerated. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced their strong opposition to a comprehensive test ban, citing the importance of continued testing for US force improvement programs. Such testing was not so important to the Soviets, they believed, thanks to their extended experience in atmospheric testing and their marked advantage in missile throw-weight.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Admiral Moorer repeated the position above. On 3 August, by vote of 88-2, the Senate gave its consent to the ABM Treaty; President Nixon ratified it on 30 September. Even though the Interim Agreement did not need congressional assent, the President decided to seek a joint resolution of approval. The House of Representatives passed one, by 329-7; the Senate approved by 88-2. Senator Henry Jackson (D, WA) claimed to have serious misgivings about the Interim Agreement. He pressed for, and the Senate adopted by 56-35, an amendment that any future treaty should provide for equality in numbers of weapons. This “Jackson Amendment” became Public Law 92-448.

Conclusion

SALT I did not lack critics. Some negotiators whom President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger bypassed during the final round, notably Gerard Smith and Paul Nitze, later argued that better terms could have been obtained. In mid-1973, Admiral Zumwalt learned about an undisclosed “Clarification” signed by Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin on 24 July 1972. Theoretically, by defining a “modern ballistic missile” as one of a type deployed in a nuclear submarine commissioned after 1965, it could allow the Soviets unlimited numbers of SLBMs on diesel boats. The Joint Chiefs pressed hard for a change of definition that would close this loophole. When Senator Jackson made the matter public in 1974, a brief furor ensued. Dr. Kissinger told the press that this Clarification actually was a US “achievement,” because the Soviets could not trade obsolescent missiles on diesel submarines for modern ones. Instead, the 210 replacements would have to be exchanged for either ICBMs or post-1965 SLBMs. Concurrently, US and Soviet negotiators closed the loophole by agreeing that any SLBM flight-tested since 1965 would be counted in the total, regardless of the type of submarine on which it was deployed.

Superficially, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement appear to fall short of JCS requirements—so far short, in fact, that JCS endorsement of them might cause some bafflement. Offensively, after all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked for equal aggregates. Instead, they got a numerically unbalanced freeze. As for new systems,
the first Trident did not become operational until 1981, the first B-1 bomber until 1986. Defensively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sought four sites and stressed the importance of protecting the NCA. Congress appropriated the money to finish Grand Forks, which was 90 percent complete in mid-1972, but did not fund NCA defense around Washington, DC, and in 1975, even Grand Forks was deactivated.

From a wider perspective, though, SALT I accorded fairly well with JCS objectives. As General Allison observed,

We entered SALT I in November 1969 with the overall objective of reaching a simple, verifiable, first-step agreement limiting strategic nuclear arms and within that overall objective we had three subordinate objectives: (1) to place a lid on... both ICBMs and SLBMs; (2) to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems; and (3) to assure that any agreements reached took full account of the inter-relationship of offensive and defensive forces. We have achieved these objectives.

Quantitative Soviet advances, General Allison continued, had been taken fully into account and judged in the light of qualitative US advantages. In sum, the Interim Agreement was preferable to an unrestrained Soviet buildup.113
NATO: Maintaining Troop Commitments

During the mid-1960s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization passed through a series of crises. First, in 1966, France withdrew from the integrated military structure of Allied Command Europe, evicting all foreign forces and headquarters from its soil. Second, in order to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit, the United States during 1967 decided to dual-base two-thirds of a division and 96 tactical aircraft, meaning that they redeployed to CONUS but would return periodically to Europe for exercises. Moreover, growing demands of the Vietnam War compelled the withdrawal of experienced personnel from US Army Europe and greatly depleted the CONUS-based forces earmarked as reinforcements in war or emergency. Third, in August 1968, the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated a ruthless efficiency that jolted the NATO partners.

In December 1968, the US European Command numbered about 320,000 personnel, including 4 1/3 divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and 32 USAF squadrons (21 of them tactical), plus the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean with 25 combatant ships, including two attack carriers. Under a Reduction of Costs in Europe (REDCOSTE) proposal, designed to streamline and consolidate selected headquarters and to bring more units home, a further withdrawal of around 34,000 personnel was under consideration. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed these reductions as militarily unsound, OSD officials viewed them as a way of responding to congressional pressure for reducing defense spending and overseas deployments.

Strategy and Force Posture Reviews

According to Military Committee NATO’s MC 14/3, the strategic concept approved by NATO Defense Ministers in January 1968, “the main deterrence to aggression...
short of full nuclear attack is the threat of escalation which would lead the Warsaw Pact to conclude that the risks involved are not commensurate with their objectives.” To cover the full spectrum of contingencies, NATO must maintain a credible capability to perform three tasks: first, “direct defense to deter the lesser aggressions such as covert actions, incursions, infiltrations, local hostile actions, and limited aggressions”; second, “deliberate escalation to deter more ambitious aggressions”; and third, “conduct a general war response as the ultimate deterrent.”

US spokesmen had pushed for a commitment to flexible response, meaning a capacity for extended conventional combat. The Europeans, however, remained convinced that a threat of swift nuclear escalation offered the surest deterrent; protracted conventional combat could only result in the devastation of Europe. Consequently, MC 14/3 emerged as a compromise strategy susceptible to differing interpretations by Americans and Europeans.

In February 1969, as part of the preparations for President Nixon’s visit to Western Europe, the Defense Department assessed NATO issues. This review demonstrated that the disagreements between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dating from the McNamara years, about the force posture required to support NATO strategy still persisted. While OSD maintained that there was a rough balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that the Pact enjoyed a distinct and potentially decisive overall edge in conventional capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also rejected OSD’s argument that the United States bore a disproportionate share of the European defense burden. In their view, the Pact’s advantage necessitated not only an increase in the allies’ conventional contributions but also the maintenance and improvement of the US forces stationed in Europe. In a 13 March 1969 memorandum which Secretary Laird sent to the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended reviewing the concept of dual-basing, arguing that there was no substitute for units being forward deployed, in place, and ready.

During his February trip, President Nixon assured European allies of his intention to keep US forces in Europe at their current levels. Addressing the North Atlantic Council on 10 April, he stressed the need for a strong conventional capability. Subsequently, as part of an overall strategy review, President Nixon ordered two studies of US policy on NATO’s strategy and force posture. In the first of these—NSSM 65, dated 8 July—he directed Secretary Laird to analyze the relationship among US strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional postures in responding to both conventional and nuclear attacks on NATO.

Mr. Laird, in turn, tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff with preparing a response for the NSC Review Group. General Wheeler’s Special Studies Group, assisted by Joint Staff and Service representatives, prepared a reply but State and the NSC Staff raised objections. Consequently, under International Security Affair’s (ISA) supervision and in close coordination with the NSC Staff, a “redirected” study with State participation was produced. On 23 October 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent it to Secretary Laird.

The revised study focused on what should be the US strategy for Western Europe and the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed
that, since the US lead in strategic nuclear capabilities had vanished, the ability of such forces to deter a Pact attack seemed increasingly problematical. They rated Allied Command Europe as being ill prepared to respond to a full theater nuclear attack and, except with the most favorable pre-attack preparation, incapable of conducting a successful forward defense against a determined conventional attack. Moreover, during a conventional Warsaw Pact attack, NATO's nuclear-capable general purpose forces might suffer such severe losses in materiel, operating facilities, and support structures as to put them at a disadvantage in the event of escalation to nuclear war. On 24 January 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard sent the redirected study to Dr. Kissinger, along with his own assessment that it inadequately analyzed (1) the relative capabilities of the opposing sides' strategic and nuclear-capable general purpose forces and (2) the weaknesses of NATO's conventional forces as well as the cost of improving them.6

Meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that Secretary Laird postpone or limit implementation of REDCOSTE cuts of 34,000 troops deferred from the previous administration. They particularly objected to plans for reductions at air bases and for either transferring US Hawk and Nike surface-to-air missile battalions to Germany and Italy or withdrawing these units from Europe. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed dealing with the balance-of-payments drain through long-term offset arrangements, in which the allies would defray costs in exchange for continuing the current US troop levels. If “over-riding considerations” compelled proceeding with REDCOSTE, they recommended scaling back the troop cuts by 7,484. On 28 March 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard reaffirmed the decision to implement REDCOSTE, reducing the 34,000 cut only by 2,916.7

On 14 April, through NSDM 12, President Nixon ordered that previously agreed REDCOSTE reductions proceed; the Under Secretaries Committee would examine on a case-by-case basis those that were either deferred or agreed in principle but subject to negotiation.8 Late in May, with Joint Staff concurrence, the Under Secretaries Committee proposed reducing US personnel as well as streamlining and consolidating facilities in Spain, Germany, Turkey, Greece, and Italy, contingent upon those governments taking over some facilities and tactical missions. The Committee recommended offering four Hawk and four Nike battalions to Germany and one Sergeant missile battalion to Italy. It warned that, while these steps would not markedly reduce US combat capability, the approach to implementation could affect inter-allied relations. Therefore, it recommended not informing the allies about REDCOSTE as a program and pursuing the transfer of combat functions and facilities to host countries in the context of burden-sharing rather than force reduction. On 5 June, the President approved these recommendations. Full implementation would result in a reduction of 27,000 troops and a $128 million saving in the balance of payments. Italy accepted the Sergeant battalion, but Germany declined the Hawks and Nikes.9

Efforts to augment conventional capabilities ran along two inter-related yet geographically separate tracks: first, measures to improve the US and allied forces deployed in Western Europe; second, steps to bolster units in CONUS that would
reinforce Allied Command Europe in the event of war. Between 1965 and 1968, Vietnam’s demands had drastically reduced the availability of Army reinforcements from CONUS. When 1969 opened, one mechanized infantry division and two airborne brigades would be available by M+30 days, followed with one airborne, one infantry, and one mechanized brigade by M+60. The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated that, over the next six months, one armored and one airborne division would also become available by M+30 and another armored division by M+90. Instead, by July 1969, readiness of the mechanized division declined to M+45; by September it stood at M+90. The readiness of one armored division dropped from M+45 in July 1969 to M+75 at the end of September 1970, while that of the other division declined from M+75 to M+120. In July 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended reducing naval commitments for 1969-70 by one attack carrier, six anti-submarine warfare carriers, and 48 destroyers. These recommendations resulted not only from budget pressures and force drawdowns but also from a belief that the growing threat from Soviet submarines in the Pacific required a redisposition of ASW carriers. Secretary Laird agreed that the naval commitment to NATO was “unrealistic,” and President Nixon approved the JCS recommendations on 20 October 1969.

By this time, President Nixon had chosen the “1½ war” strategy described in chapter 2. His decision led to National Security Study Memorandum 84, which on 21 November 1969 directed a study of alternative US force deployments in Europe, their political and budgetary implications, and their consequences for NATO strategy. Deputy Secretary Packard recommended folding work on NSSM 65 into the NSSM 84 study, and Dr. Kissinger agreed. Shortly afterward, at the 3 December meeting of NATO’s Defense Planning Committee, Secretary Laird stated that the administration intended to fund the current level of combat units in Europe through 30 June 1971.

The NSSM 84 exercise became a forum for on-going rivalry between the Joint Staff and what one flag officer described as “the bright young people” in Systems Analysis and the NSC Staff “with no military experience.” This rivalry, which had poisoned relations between DOD military and civilian leaderships during the previous administration, continued to thwart the formulation of a unified Defense position and to complicate adoption of a national policy. While both parties agreed that NATO should adhere to flexible response, as defined in MC 14/3, they disagreed about the number of forces needed to support that strategy and in their perception of the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. Within OSD, moreover, ISA’s views came closer to the views of the Joint Staff than to those of Systems Analysis. These disagreements, together with differences in outlook between State and OSD plus congressional pressure for reductions, prolonged the debate. But in contrast to the outcomes of similar debates during the Johnson years, President Nixon’s decisions mostly coincided with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NSSM 84 directed that a steering committee chaired by an OSD representative supervise the study of NATO strategy. Citing the study’s emphasis on “complex military matters,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to gain principal responsibility for its prepara-
tion. Secretary Laird rejected their request, countering that the study was to address political as well as military problems. Rear Admiral Vannoy, Deputy Director of J-5, became the JCS representative, just as he had for the exercise that resulted in “1½ wars.” Of the seven interagency working groups created to prepare the study, Joint Staff officers served on six. Yet, despite this level of involvement at the working group level, the report itself was largely the work of OSD’s Systems Analysis office and the NSC Staff.\textsuperscript{14}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with both the analytical basis and the substance of the two drafts of the NSSM 84 report produced in May and August 1970. They expressed “grave reservations” about basing national security decisions on the work done on NSSM 84 which, in their opinion, ignored the deterrent effects of US force commitments to NATO, underestimated the Pact threat, contradicted “fundamental military logic,” and supported “preposterous alternative force levels.” According to the first draft, United States personnel in Allied Command Europe could be cut by as many as 30,000 without affecting the deterrent posture or war-fighting capabilities. Current force levels, in the Joint Chiefs’ judgment, provided not only a balanced but also a minimal combat capability. Consequently, any reduction would raise the risk of having to escalate to nuclear war. So long as the threat remained undiminished and US national security objectives relating to Europe were to deter both conventional or nuclear aggression and, failing that, to assure a favorable war outcome, the force levels required were those recommended in JSOP 72-79. To reduce without obtaining a quid pro quo from the Soviets would be unsound policy. If the President still opted for withdrawals, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted their JSOP recommendations to be the basis for those reductions. And they found no merit in the argument that any units returning home should be inactivated to save money.

One option in the drafts involved planning for 30 or 60 rather than 90 days of conventional combat, cutting back material support and force levels accordingly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rated a 30- or 60-day defense as militarily and politically unrealistic, likely to increase the resort to a nuclear response. Even if a decision was made to start nuclear war, a sustained support capability would be essential for maintaining battlefield forces. Failure to provide it would greatly increase the risk of a defeat. Just as they had when reacting to interpretations of the “1½ war” decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed even a 90-day objective as inconsistent with MC 14/3, unduly restrictive and quite risky.\textsuperscript{15}

On 31 August 1970, Dr. Kissinger opened an SRG discussion by saying that the study responding to NSSM 84 presented capabilities, strategies, and options in “a most encouraging way.” Admiral Moorer replied that it contained “considerable shortcomings.” He emphasized that, although flexible response was best for the United States, the study instead pushed toward a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Faulty assumptions and analysis rendered the study unsuitable as a basis for decisions about force levels. Agreeing, a State Department spokesman pointed out that it was the United States which had persuaded Europeans to accept the doctrine of flexible response as defined in MC 14/3 and, furthermore, that conventional deterrence had worked.
Dr. Kissinger commented that he did not favor US troop cuts, reiterating this in a private conversation with Admiral Moorer afterward. But he raised the question of whether troops in Europe were deployed in the best way possible, with the US Seventh Army mostly in Bavaria and the Northern Army Group comparatively weak. Admiral Moorer conceded that changes would enhance the defense posture but argued that it would be extremely expensive. Unconvinced, Deputy Secretary Packard argued that the United States was not getting “maximum mileage” for its money and redeployments would strengthen Allied Command Europe. In his view, an opportunity existed to persuade the allies to improve their own forces and shoulder a greater share of the NATO defense burden.\footnote{16}

On 22 September, as the President prepared to visit NATO’s Southern Command Headquarters in Naples and ships of the Sixth Fleet, Secretary Rogers advised him that a “delicate and fluid political situation” in Europe made this the wrong time for any US cutbacks. Negotiations with the Soviets about mutual and balanced force reductions looked possible, and European allies were considering ways to ease the US burden. On 1 October, the allies adopted a minute recognizing the need for a burden-sharing agreement. President Nixon let them know that he preferred having them build up their own forces rather than subsidize a US presence. Publicly, though, he stated “under no circumstances” would the United States unilaterally reduce its commitments to NATO.\footnote{17}

There still might be cutbacks, though, that did not remove boots on the ground. General Wheeler, who was trying to slow the pace of troop withdrawals from South Vietnam, thought that “if necessary, we must go after the sacred cow of NATO.”\footnote{18} Since Project 703, Secretary Laird’s program to find $3 billion in reductions, necessitated further pruning in 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended cutting allocations to NATO—mainly, one submarine and 15 destroyers—rather than to the Pacific Fleet. On 19 February, Secretary Laird submitted these proposals to the White House. The State Department feared that announcing cuts could erode US credibility with allies, but Mr. Laird argued that budgetary constraints and military arguments should override political considerations. President Nixon authorized consultations with the Europeans and on 17 August 1970, after these had been completed, Laird authorized the reductions.\footnote{19}

On 14 October, Secretary Laird asked the President to consider moderate reductions during FY 1972, principally in support units and overhead. He wanted a substantial US commitment through FY 1976 to be made conditional upon equitable burden-sharing. Further, he said, a commitment to maintain the alliance’s collective defense capability (which he supported) should not necessarily bind the administration to continue a specific, NATO-committed force level or mix in either Europe or the United States. What he proposed, Secretary Laird argued, would show Congress and our allies that the administration truly intended to shift the NATO defense burden and reduce expenditures over the long term. The Secretary had given testimony that the allies were making improvements but, he privately admitted, that was “just not true.”\footnote{20}
President Nixon decided against linking US force levels to allied financial support. The United States, he insisted, must not let its allies believe that “if they provide the finances we will provide the forces.” NSDM 88, issued on 15 October, formally gave allied force improvements preference over burden-sharing. When Secretary Laird met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 October, Admiral Moorer emphasized to him the importance of keeping force levels in Europe stable during negotiations over burden-sharing and mutual and balanced force reductions.21

The Navy wanted to reduce its Mediterranean deployments during FY 1972. But the President, on 27 October 1970, ruled out withdrawals of US forces stationed in or near Europe. Seeking “immediate relief” from NATO commitments in order to meet even the most optimistic budget projection for FY 1972, the Navy next proposed reducing the Atlantic Fleet by 34 warships, beginning as soon as possible after 1 January 1972. While total cuts ultimately would be balanced between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, Admiral Zumwalt argued that near-term drawdowns should come from the Atlantic Fleet. Although the threat was about equal in both oceans, Soviet submarines could sortie more easily into the Pacific than they could pass through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom barrier. General Westmoreland objected that Admiral Zumwalt’s proposal ran counter to national strategy, failing to give the Atlantic area its customary priority and reducing SACLANT’s ability to control the sea lines of communication. Westmoreland predicted that, if the President kept his promise to maintain maritime supremacy, he would not mothball ships but take money from the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps and give it to the Navy. Nevertheless, other service chiefs concurred in the proposed reductions. Secretary Laird thought that a 34-ship reduction would impress upon allies the necessity of burden-sharing, but State recommended postponing any announcement.22

Meanwhile, answering Dr. Kissinger’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied “illustrative” force requirements responsive to NSSM 84. The steering committee accepted their warning against basing any policy decisions on illustrative figures, and a redrafted study forwarded to Dr. Kissinger on 17 October 1970 did include most JCS reservations. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to criticize the study. At their meeting with Mr. Laird on 26 October, Admiral Moorer explained how JCS views still differed from those of OSD’s Systems Analysis. The study did not consider the worst case of a Pact attack without warning; its use of 90-day war as a strategy was invalid; it relied too heavily on arbitrary factors; and it implied that tactical nuclear weapons were useful only as a deterrent, not because they provided a military capability short of strategic exchange.23

In mid-November 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed options. They preferred one which assumed that a conventional war might last longer than 90 days, in which case NATO must be able to continue fighting without being compelled to either use nuclear weapons or seek a settlement. General Chapman believed the budget would sustain this option, although if the amount was cut a new strategy must be developed. At least, Admiral Moorer commented, they would have to make the President aware of
the problem. General Bruce Palmer, representing General Westmoreland, urged that current troop levels continue because there was “no more fat” in US forces in Europe and reductions would be destabilizing. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that they would oppose: paring the capability for conventional combat to 60 days; cutting back forward-deployed US strength; making a major shift of force burdens to the allies; and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons.\(^{24}\)

On 19 November, in what Admiral Moorer characterized at the time as “a non-decisive bull session” but Dr. Kissinger later described as “unusually serious and substantive,” the NSC looked over responses to NSSM 84. War reserve stocks were reported as sufficient only to supply the allies through M+30 days,\(^{25}\) so planning for conventional defense beyond that time would be purely theoretical. But the primary US objective was to give the President another choice beyond losing Western Europe or resorting to nuclear escalation. Therefore, all the allies must accept measures that would permit conventional defense to continue beyond a few days. Mr. Nixon emphasized that deterrence depended upon having a credible conventional capability. Secretary Laird did not press his case for reducing forces, although Mr. Packard observed that current strength could not be maintained without an adequate budget. There was a consensus that European allies should contribute more to NATO defense, but, according to Admiral Moorer, the only clear decision reached at the NSC meeting was the determination to maintain the US conventional presence in Europe.\(^{26}\)

Very likely, the NSC meeting was a formality and President Nixon already had decided upon the guidance that he issued through NSDM 95, dated 25 November 1970. It stated four guiding principles. First, preserve a credible posture to deter and, if necessary, defend against non-nuclear attack. Second, place increased emphasis on conventional defense. Third, maintain a strong and credible initial non-nuclear defense against full-scale attack that was preceded by a period of warning and mobilization on both sides. Fourth, enhance the capability for immediate combat, providing greater assurance of defending against an attack delivered after the Warsaw Pact had gained a lead in mobilization.\(^{27}\) These coincided with JCS recommendations, though in all likelihood President Nixon needed no persuading.

In December 1970, at the NATO Defense Planning Committee’s semi-annual session, Secretary Laird conveyed the essence of NSDM 95, emphasizing the importance of allied force improvements in winning congressional support for the President’s policy. Mr. Laird voiced particular concern about the need to increase war reserve stocks. In conversations with his West German counterpart, Admiral Moorer stressed the importance of raising supply levels. The Bundeswehr, Admiral Moorer was told, had stocks for 30 days and intended to boost that figure to 45 but would have difficulty going further. Although the Defense Planning Committee approved five-year plans for burden-sharing and force improvement, Admiral Moorer remained skeptical about whether they would be fulfilled, privately noting that “feet will have to be held to the fire.”\(^{28}\)
Trying to Implement NSDM 95

Through NSDM 95, President Nixon issued specific guidance about force planning. He directed that the size and structure of NATO-committed forces should be consistent with a 90-day conventional defense against full-scale attack, assuming a period of warning and mobilization by both sides. Through FY 1971, the authorized level of US forces in Europe would remain at 319,000, keeping the actual strength as close to this figure as possible. President Nixon tasked the Defense Program Review Committee with preparing a program of measures necessary to achieve NSDM 95’s objectives, along with a five-year program of US and allied force improvements. He also directed the DPRC to examine alternative doctrines and force structures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in view of the increased emphasis on conventional defense, but DPRC discussions and the subsequent presidential decision on its recommendation focused on conventional improvements.29

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to pre-empt Systems Analysis from receiving the responsibility for preparing DOD’s response to NSDM 95. Just as with NSSM 84, they failed. A basic disagreement about 90-day initial conventional defense of Europe against a full-scale Pact attack emerged. Although Deputy Secretary Packard had endorsed the JCS view that the 90-day concept applied only to resource allocation and logistical planning, Systems Analysis believed that it covered the force structure as well. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that NATO forces should be able to achieve the MC 14/3 objective to preserve or restore the integrity of NATO territory after the 90-day period. They interpreted NSDM 95 to mean that forward-deployed forces must be sufficient to withstand the initial attack, and reinforcements must be adequate for any subsequent phases of conflict. By contrast, Systems Analysis focused only on the first 90 days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff mustered two arguments against this approach. First, it required that forward-deployed forces be sufficient to achieve MC 14/3’s objectives in 90 days, and NATO clearly would not provide these force levels. Second, it might eliminate the combat and support forces which could not be readied in time to contribute to a 90-day war, but which were necessary as reinforcements.30

Disagreement between the JCS and Systems Analysis over 90-day initial defense led to differing emphases in the force improvement proposals mandated by NSDM 95. On 30 January 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided Secretary Laird with proposals about the “clearly critical items” addressed in the NSSM 84 exercise as well as NATO’s AD-70 study.31 The JCS recommendations included improving the anti-tank arsenal to offset the Pact’s advantage of more than two to one in armor, building aircraft shelters to reduce vulnerability, increasing the levels of war reserve stocks, accelerating the pace of mobilization and the arrival of reinforcements, and correcting maldeployments between the Central and Northern Army Groups, the latter being weaker yet defending a more likely area of major attack. In the Joint Chiefs’ view, Systems Analysis over-emphasized the Central Region and land force improvements to the neglect of sea-air lines of communication and NATO’s flanks. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff viewed improvements in command, control and communications as critical to Allied Command Europe’s operations. Although Systems Analysis did not meet all their objections, a revised paper submitted to the DPRC did address what they considered to be the most important areas cited in AD-70: antitank weapons; aircraft shelters; mobilization and reinforcement; and maldeployment. On 31 July 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Laird that Systems Analysis still over-rated NATO and under-rated Warsaw Pact capabilities, and slighted the difficulties of defending NATO’s flanks and protecting air-sea lanes.\(^32\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Systems Analysis had consumed seven months debating their interpretations of strategy guidance. Finally, at a DPRC meeting on 4 August 1971, Admiral Moorer asked whether the 90-day figure applied to logistic or strategic guidance. Dr. Kissinger replied that “there never was any thought about us pulling out in 90 days.” But he worried that “we can’t get to 40 days, let alone 90” because war reserve stocks were inadequate. Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he regarded 90 days as roughly the time needed to establish resupply from the United States and sustain combat beyond that time. The DPRC elected to concentrate on improving active, in-place forces without prejudicing long-term efforts. Dr. Kissinger cautioned that mutual and balanced force reductions could not serve as a substitute for improvements.\(^33\)

NSDM 133, dated 22 September 1971, stated that if the allies proceeded with force improvements, the United States would do likewise with its combat units. Cutbacks should take place only in the context of a mutual and balanced reduction with the Warsaw Pact. In specific force and resource planning, the first 30 days of combat would receive priority. To correct “conspicuous deficiencies in NATO’s immediate combat capabilities” which would persist even with planned improvements, the United States would urge its allies to join in committing at least $2 billion over the next five years, as AD-70 had recommended. Subsequently, NSDMs 134 and 142 declared allied force improvements essential if current US force levels in Europe were to be maintained.\(^34\) Thus President Nixon accepted the JCS view that force improvements were essential for a credible non-nuclear defense. But by linking the maintenance of US troop levels to allied improvements, he was rejecting JCS advice. Without that linkage, President Nixon feared that Congress might mandate a major unilateral withdrawal.

The notable improvements occurred among US-based units earmarked for Allied Command Europe, when drawdowns from Vietnam made possible a rebuilding of the strategic reserve. In May 1971, one mechanized division would be available by M+30 days, another by M+45 along with one armored division, and an experimental “tricap” division by M+120. By December 1972, the reserve would improve to one mechanized division available within 30 days of warning, one mechanized and one armored division by M+30, and a newly-organized cavalry division at M+90.\(^35\) This would approximate, in strength and availability, the pre-1965 reserve.

Summing up, both General Wheeler and Admiral Moorer were ready to re-examine the NATO commitment; Secretary Laird urged moderate cuts. What stands out, therefore, is President Nixon’s determination to avoid reducing US troop levels in Europe.
His bedrock position was that military power should buttress diplomacy, and without adequate forces there could be no possibility of achieving negotiating objectives. President Nixon also gave allied force improvements priority over burden-sharing, so that Europeans could not substitute payments for troops. Yet those improvements proved modest at best, and what the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed as serious weaknesses persisted. Bolstering the CONUS reserve and keeping US strength in Europe roughly constant did not inspire noticeably greater efforts by the allies.

**Postponing MBFR and CSCE**

In June 1968, NATO foreign ministers announced their willingness to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) with the Warsaw Pact. Then the occupation of Czechoslovakia made any movement impossible. Pact countries, in March 1969, issued a communique expressing their willingness to discuss reductions at a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Nixon administration responded slowly and warily. NSSM 92, issued on 13 April 1970, directed the Verification Panel to develop options for a US position.

The Verification Panel established a working group to develop options on MBFR. Major General Marvin C. Demler, USA, Special Assistant for Arms Control (SAAC), represented the Joint Staff, and JCS representatives served on interdepartmental teams that prepared preliminary studies. These studies formed the basis for an evaluation report prepared by the NSC Staff, late in August, for the Verification Panel.

The evaluation report raised the question of whether NATO should settle upon a position of its own before initiating MBFR negotiations. It also delineated factors which would limit the scope of any MBFR proposals and agreements. These included allies' concern about MBFR being more a political gesture than a significant arms control measure, the existence of critical military imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and whether nuclear weapons should be a topic. The report offered four basic approaches, the first two being political and the second two military in nature. The first option, a freeze or a token reduction of perhaps as much as 10 percent by each side, was deliberately designed not to affect the military situation. The second, a substantial symmetrical reduction of perhaps 30 percent for NATO and the Pact, would not correct imbalances. As increasingly large cuts of equal percentages occurred, NATO's defenses in the Central Region would be stretched thinner, enhancing the Pact's advantage in armor and increasing the danger of an early breakthrough. The third option was an asymmetrical or corrective approach, intended to redress current imbalances by imposing disproportionate cuts upon one side. The fourth, a European equivalent of SALT, would cover theater and/or tactical nuclear systems.

On 28 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the position which Admiral Moorer should take at the Verification Panel meeting. State and ACDA, favoring a political approach, probably would try to sidetrack a military approach. While the Chairman
should support a thorough analysis of all the options, he should emphasize the need for a realistic and expeditious examination of the military approach. Admiral Moorer should make clear, moreover, that until Defense was further along in its study of MBFR, it could not adequately assess the relationship of MBFR to the general problem of European security policy. Personally, Admiral Moorer thought that the administration must settle principles before proposing force reductions.\textsuperscript{40}

Three days later, at the Verification Panel meeting, Admiral Moorer advocated waiting for the situation to clarify before acting on MBFR. Dr. Kissinger commented that, while one could conclude from the report that the administration should not pursue MBFR, political pressures for negotiations could not be ignored. Panel members agreed to follow the same procedures used in preparing for SALT, first analyzing the implications of the specific components of MBFR before presenting negotiating options.\textsuperscript{41}

The resulting revised report, circulated on 16 October, raised questions about whether the United States should actively pursue MBFR. In presenting basic approaches to reductions, it changed the alternatives outlined in the initial report to political, arms control, and corrective or asymmetrical. The corrective approach would attempt not only to achieve the objectives of the first two but also to improve NATO’s relative military position through disproportionate reductions by the Pact or “mixed package tradeoffs,” such as reducing Pact tanks in exchange for cuts in NATO’s tactical aircraft.\textsuperscript{42}

Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ISA agreed that the report, in its current form, contained serious flaws and was not suitable for NATO’s consideration. They criticized the report for failing to address the relationship between MBFR and burden-sharing, and for not thoroughly examining how issues in the alternate approaches were interrelated, their political and economic implications, and the major arguments for and against each option.

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the report ignored the security aspects of force reductions, highlighting instead the political and arms control advantages. Moreover, questionable analysis underlay its assessment of MBFR’s effect on the military balance. In their view, MBFR must be analyzed within the context of current warfighting capabilities possessed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But inadequacies of the NSSM 84 study, described above, made it difficult to determine the likely effects of MBFR on NATO’s security. Before the administration made any policy decisions, it should study whether pursuing MBFR would serve US interests. Also, “competent military authorities” should carry out a risk assessment of post-reduction force capabilities. On 26 October Admiral Moorer advised the Service Chiefs that, among the options presented, they should support asymmetrical reductions.\textsuperscript{43}

Unlike the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Laird regarded MBFR as a means for achieving NATO’s policy objectives over the next five years. He and ISA argued, in fact, that MBFR must not prevent the United States from reducing its forces in Europe. They wanted to maintain NATO’s overall capability but believed that budgetary constraints and congressional pressures would necessitate a reduction in US troops assigned to
NATO. Thus, although they agreed that the revised report was unacceptable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ISA fundamentally disagreed about the wisdom of troop reductions, which was the basic issue of US policy toward MBFR.\(^4\)

Of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred cuts within the context of MBFR to the unilateral reductions being sought by some members of Congress. In a special meeting on 17 November, they agreed that if the NSC discussed approaches to MBFR, Admiral Moorer should support only a corrective approach that would seek to enhance NATO’s relative capabilities, redress current imbalances favoring the Pact, and offset any advantages which the Pact might realize after reductions. They were particularly concerned about pressure from the State Department for symmetrical reductions, which they emphatically opposed.\(^4\)

At an NSC meeting on 19 November, Dr. Kissinger summarized the controversial report, conveying its “tentative” conclusion that “we should look at asymmetrical reductions.” Secretary Rogers agreed to the extent that “balanced” did not mean “symmetrical.” However, Secretary Laird did not think the report “faces up to the manpower, fiscal, and political problems . . . in the United States.” Four days later, the SRG authorized studies focusing on verification, asymmetrical reduction packages, and how well NATO’s mobilization procedures would respond on receipt of warning. On 25 November, through NSDM 95, President Nixon called for studies emphasizing asymmetrical reductions, postponing any decision about specific elements of MBFR until they had been completed.\(^4\)

Meeting on 23 April 1971, the Verification Panel discussed how, as mobilization progressed, symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions might affect NATO/Warsaw Pact force ratios. Members voiced considerable concern about the imbalance in the Pact’s favor. According to the new study, both symmetrical and asymmetrical cuts ultimately would favor the Pact. For example, a 10 percent reduction of all ground forces in a “NATO Guidelines Area” covering East and West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would reduce NATO forces by 75,600 and Pact troops by 80,600. However, after 21 days of mobilization the Pact could return all its forces while NATO would have 239 fewer tanks. Perhaps surprisingly, an asymmetrical cut of 10 percent for NATO versus 30 percent for the Pact would have the same outcome at M+21 days.

Admiral Moorer’s assistant, Lieutenant General Richard T. Knowles, USA, presented the Panel with a JCS assessment that at current ratios NATO was “just barely holding on.” Contradicting the study’s finding, the Joint Staff believed that symmetrical reductions would not improve Allied Command Europe’s position on M-Day. Furthermore, those forces would be in “tough shape” from M+10 to M+45 days, when US reinforcements would arrive. In the dynamic context of war, rather than the static situation of the study’s analyses, the lag between NATO and Pact reinforcements would have a significant impact on the ability to resist Pact aggression. Dr. Kissinger responded that even if Pact forces were cut by 30 percent and NATO’s by only 10 percent, the situ-
ation on both M-Day and M+21 still would be “hopeless.” He directed the preparation of options addressing these problems.\(^{47}\)

At the same time that the Soviets were demonstrating interest in negotiations, there was renewed pressure in Congress for the unilateral reduction of US forces. The danger foreseen by Secretary Laird materialized early in May 1971. Senator Mike Mansfield (D, MT), the Majority Leader, brought forward legislation requiring a 50 percent reduction of US forces in Europe. Senator Mansfield's legislation had been beaten before, but now the administration worried that what Dr. Kissinger called “a coalition of frustrations” might prevail. Then General Secretary Brezhnev announced Soviet readiness to begin MBFR negotiations, without mentioning a previous condition that MBFR must be tied to the CSCE. To President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, it was as though Mr. Brezhnev had thrown them a life preserver. Why act unilaterally, the White House reasoned with senators, when mutual withdrawals suddenly looked possible? On 19 May, Senator Mansfield's resolution lost by 61-36.\(^{48}\) Two days later, through NSDM 108, President Nixon promulgated general policy principles. The allies should be urged to accelerate substantive preparations. The United States, while willing to pursue “diplomatic explorations,” would enter formal negotiations only after consultations within NATO had produced agreement on substantive issues and procedures. In any case, MBFR must remain separated from the CSCE.\(^{49}\)

On 17 June, responding to the requirement for accelerating MBFR preparations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated their position to Secretary Laird. In their view, force reductions must not weaken deterrence by aggravating the current imbalance, degrading the relative capabilities for both conventional and nuclear defense of Europe, or violating the practice of maintaining balanced forces. Moreover, as Admiral Moorer had emphasized to the Verification Panel on 11 June, MBFR should not preclude continuing force improvements by the allies. A decision to proceed with MBFR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, would present the United States with two alternatives, either of which could result in an increased reliance on nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe: reduce the US force commitment to NATO, or maintain the current commitment at increased cost.

Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff counseled that any agreement must be consistent with the strategy and objectives of MC 14/3. It should include both a reliable verification system and collateral constraints to restrain the Pact’s mobilization and reinforcement capability while preserving NATO’s flexibility. All conventional and nuclear forces should be candidates for phased reduction to a common ceiling. At the Verification Panel meeting, Admiral Moorer had rejected including the three western military districts of the Soviet Union in the geographic area to be covered by an agreement. He reasoned that, from a military point of view, adding these regions would “greatly complicate” the MBFR problem and waste negotiating time. Assistant Secretary Nutter, however, had thought that including them would give the United States its strongest negotiating position about what the geographic area should be. Now, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated an initial position of applying MBFR to both
“indigenous” and “stationed” forces in those three western military districts as well as in the NATO Guidelines Area. “Stationed” forces were defined as those foreign to the country in which they were deployed, such as US forces in West Germany and Soviet forces in East Germany. This reversal of Admiral Moorer’s position apparently resulted from the Army’s insistence that if MBFR was to include nuclear-capable forces, then inclusion of the western military districts was essential to increase the likelihood of early warning about Soviet offensive intentions. In mid-July, OSD transmitted these views to the State Department and the White House.50

The NSC reviewed basic issues on 17 June, and eleven days later President Nixon issued NSDM 116 outlining the objectives of US MBFR policy. Within NATO, the US goal was to achieve a consensus governing the substantive elements. In MBFR negotiations themselves, the objectives were to seek to maximize the reduction of Soviet forces and establish constraints on their reintroduction into areas from which they withdrew. Therefore, NATO should emphasize proportionately large reductions of US and Soviet forces, enlarging the Guidelines Area to include Czechoslovakia and Poland as well as East and West Germany. The President directed the Verification Panel would prepare a range of options to advance these objectives.51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense about the area to be covered by MBFR. Despite Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) G. Warren Nutter’s earlier support for including western military districts of the Soviet Union, when the Verification Panel met on 21 September and Admiral Moorer proposed including them, Deputy Secretary Packard demurred. Secretary Laird’s subsequent recommendations to Dr. Kissinger excluded them. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept pressing for their inclusion. When the Panel met on 30 September, General Westmoreland as Acting Chairman said that considering nuclear forces as part of MBFR required the districts’ inclusion. The Panel, however, rejected the JCS position; and when President Nixon issued guidance for consultation with NATO allies, he endorsed OSD’s position. NSDM 134 of 2 October did not include the western military districts of the Soviet Union. Rather, the US order of preference for the zone of reductions ran as follows: first, East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; second, the NATO Guidelines Area described above plus Hungary; third, the NATO Guidelines area alone.

On the question of whether to emphasize stationed or indigenous forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed—albeit with some reservations—to OSD’s preference for proportionately larger reductions in stationed forces. Both the Verification Panel and the President endorsed this position. Mr. Nixon rejected the Joint Chiefs’ common ceiling approach, but his guidance on other issues corresponded with their views. Like them, Mr. Nixon insisted that improvements in NATO’s conventional forces were essential to successful MBFR negotiations. He also wanted all types of forces to be considered as candidates for reduction. As to verification, he endorsed at least a temporary need for inspection.52

Answering NSDM 134’s call for a full range of MBFR options plus an assessment of their implications, OSD produced a study which included the option of symmetrical
ground force reductions. Believing that such reductions would enhance the Pact’s offensive advantages, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to endorse significant asymmetrical reductions under a common ceiling as the only approach both compatible with NATO’s security interests and militarily disadvantageous to neither side. Writing to Secretary Laird on 11 November, they stressed, moreover, that without the inactivation of affected Pact forces and effective verification, even asymmetrical reductions could work to NATO’s disadvantage. They further objected to OSD’s proposals about forward-based systems and nuclear weapons, being reluctant to include consideration of nuclear elements in NATO discussions about MBFR.53

During the summer and autumn of 1971, Soviet interest in negotiations waned, so US consideration of MBFR assumed a more leisurely pace. According to NSDM 142 of 2 December 1971, issued the day after an NSC discussion, the United States was not ready to adopt a definite position but would move slowly to develop a NATO consensus on options that would maintain Western military security.54

As preparations for exploratory talks with the Warsaw Pact proceeded through 1972, basic JCS-OSD disagreements remained. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to advocate asymmetrical reductions and preferred them to include a balance of stationed indigenous forces, OSD wished to propose initially a symmetrical 10 percent reduction of stationed forces. Speaking as Acting Chairman, General Westmoreland had told the Verification Panel that a 10 percent cut “would, in effect, wipe out our reserves.”55 Pact countries could bring their reserves on line in 16 days, but NATO would need between 60 and 90 days. Perhaps fortunately, OSD stood alone among the agencies in endorsing this position. Another JCS-OSD disagreement concerned which force elements to include, the JCS view being that there should be a balance between ground and air forces while OSD wished to emphasize ground elements.56

The year ended without an agreed US or even DOD position about the specific elements of MBFR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw promise as well as peril. “If we can get more Soviet forces out of the Pact countries,” Admiral Moorer told the SRG, “they will have a better chance to gain greater independence.” But he also reminded the Verification Panel that, as far as the Soviets were concerned, “their basic objective is to weaken NATO.”57 Although the Joint Chiefs did not succeed in persuading either Secretary Laird or President Nixon to adopt many of their recommendations, the glacial movement toward MBFR meant that their primary objective of postponing—if not preventing—further US and allied force reductions had been achieved.
Controlling the Mediterranean Basin

The Mediterranean Sea linked two strategically disparate sets of problems: those of NATO's southern flank and those of the Middle East. Western leaders had tried, without success, to create a mechanism which would encompass both. During 1951-52, the US and UK governments explored the possibility of appointing a Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, whose responsibilities might include the Middle East. For different reasons, however, the Egyptians, Greeks, and Turks all lodged strong objections and the concept remained stillborn.¹

In 1953, a British admiral was appointed NATO's Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, but no command mechanism linking the Mediterranean with the Middle East came into being. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged formal US adherence to the Baghdad Pact (composed of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) and then to its successor, the Central Treaty Organization (same members, minus Iraq). President Eisenhower rejected their request, authorizing only military liaison missions and observers’ attendance at meetings. But the underlying idea did not die. Late in 1969, during a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson voiced interest in a regional security arrangement for countries bordering the western Mediterranean. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found no merit in such an approach. Their conclusion, which they reached on 23 January 1970, was that many Mediterranean nations feared their neighbors more than the Soviet Union. Consequently, they saw no indications that proposed participants would enter into or actively support such an arrangement. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that efforts to achieve selective regional security would polarize non-members, thereby creating the very situation which it had been designed to prevent.²
Strategic Requirements Outrun Base Availability

The Mediterranean was becoming an arena for super-power competition. The US Sixth Fleet, with two attack carriers constantly on station, still had no rival in combat power, but NATO’s near-monopoly of naval strength in the Mediterranean had vanished. The number of ship-days during which a Soviet naval squadron operated there jumped from 4,162 in 1965 to 15,298 during 1969. After the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron expanded rapidly into a well-balanced mix of surface combatants, submarines, and support ships. By early 1970, the Soviets had acquired base, overflight, and landing rights in Egypt as well as overflight and landing rights in Algeria. Additionally, in Libya, a revolution had put that country on a leftward course. Soon Muammar Kadaffi would become perhaps the most radical of all regional leaders.

According to OSD’s tentative Strategy Guidance, issued late in January 1970, the Sixth Fleet would “continue to support NATO as its primary mission, but NATO will have to reckon with Soviet flanking maneuvers in North Africa and the Middle East. As the Soviet Union expands its naval presence and activities in the Mediterranean, greater attention should be paid to the Fleet’s role in support of US interests in North Africa, the Middle East, and (should the Suez Canal reopen) South Asia.”

Against this backdrop, on 26 February, President Nixon commissioned a study outlining US interests in and policy toward the whole Mediterranean area. He directed an ad hoc group, working under State Department chairmanship and without JCS representation, to prepare the study. The result, circulated on 1 April, drew heavy fire from the Pentagon. A critique by the Deputy Director, J-5, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) charged that State had written the study all by itself and then failed to ensure adequate coordination with Defense. Moreover, they found major faults with the study’s substance. As a “rhetorical piece,” it gave the impression that a strong US presence and influence might have become unnecessary and ineffective. The “fact” that Soviet influence was waxing and US influence waning received insufficient attention. Accordingly, they opposed forwarding this study for NSC consideration. In its place, a broader paper analyzing, among other things, strategies and force requirements as well as threats to US interests and objectives should be presented.

The Review Group ordered a reworking, and a new paper appeared early in June. Much altered and expanded, it mentioned two “extreme” viewpoints: first, the situation required a very strong US policy to exercise control over the region; second, a posture aiming only at denial of Soviet control would suffice. Between these extremes, the paper explored four “approaches” that promised to be of particular relevance:

1. Prepare for a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, in order to stem the erosion of the US position.
2. Seek a modus vivendi with the Soviets to limit superpower involvement.
3. Urge regional powers to assume substantially more responsibility for the Mediterranean area.
4. Since neither the United States nor the USSR seemed likely to win dominance, substantially reduce US involvement in Mediterranean affairs.

Where did the Joint Chiefs of Staff stand? The new paper included a threat assessment prepared by them. Its conclusion, excerpted as follows, showed clearly that they favored approach 1: “Present US policy in the Mediterranean would appear to offer little hope of curtailing Soviet expansion. . . . The Soviets are clearly out to challenge the US in the Mediterranean. . . . Given the inaction on the part of NATO, the increasing Soviet commitment, and the continued escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a confrontation between the US and the USSR becomes a distinct possibility.”

When the NSC met on 17 June 1970 to discuss Mediterranean matters, Dr. Kissinger observed that recent changes had been “all bad.” Secretary Rogers warned that “any move toward weakening the Mediterranean would shake all of NATO.” President Nixon interrupted him to say that the Sixth Fleet had to remain there, even if it consisted only of Civil War ironclads. The issue, to him, was whether the United States was “ready to get out” or whether it would “continue to be a leading world power.” Beyond that, though, Mr. Nixon rendered no specific decisions.

Meanwhile, on 13 March 1970, Secretary Laird had commissioned a separate study of military strategies and force structures. The JCS response, dated 30 October, dealt in concepts rather than specifics. They portrayed three strategies—containment, neutralization, and accommodation—along with options for implementing each. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored containment through forward defense which, they said, could be accomplished with “relatively modest improvements and/or changes in force capabilities and deployments.” Any radical departures struck them as unattractive. Accordingly, they reaffirmed the strategic concept recently set forth in Volume I of JSOP 73-80: “ensure continued freedom of access to and operations in the Mediterranean and North African areas. US forces are required in the region to support US diplomatic initiatives, to help counter Soviet influence, and to provide support to the southern flank of NATO.”

A forward defense, of course, required a supporting array of base, overflight, and landing rights. The Jordanian crisis of September 1970 starkly revealed critical deficiencies. At a point when US intervention seemed possible, available bases proved so scarce that the Washington Special Actions Group decided to rely entirely upon carrier-based aircraft. Only a few days after the crisis ended, President Nixon, accompanied by Admiral Moorer as well as Secretaries Laird and Rogers, toured the Mediterranean area. On 29 September, during a conference aboard the guided missile cruiser USS Springfield, Admiral Moorer told the President that the Sixth Fleet constituted “the main source of US strength . . . for unilateral actions.” Mr. Nixon agreed about the importance of sea power but stressed the need for a land base. Participants discussed sites in Spain, Sigonella off Sicily, and Malta, as well as Greek and Turkish facilities.

Early in August 1971, Secretary Laird asked Admiral Moorer whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made a “complete and thorough” review of base availability. Sigonella was being improved, the Chairman replied; surveys and technical discussions
about sites in Crete and mainland Greece had begun. The State Department believed, however, that efforts to obtain prior approval for base and overflight rights would prove counterproductive. Instead, State favored seeking consent on a case-by-case basis.12

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, likewise, saw little chance of gaining “carte blanche” approval from host countries beforehand. Writing to Secretary Laird on 12 November, they cautioned that governments which did grant prior approval probably would require a significant quid pro quo. “In the final analysis,” they advised, “countries will grant or deny access based on an assessment of their self-interest at the time of the contingency.” So the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a more modest suggestion. State and Defense, working through field agencies, should inform and condition appropriate governments about the necessity for granting rights on short notice. At the Joint Chiefs’ prompting, Mr. Laird urged the State Department to follow this approach. But Secretary Rogers opposed going even that far. Since most of these countries had little sympathy for US policy in the Middle East, he observed, even abstract discussions could generate firm opposition. Rather, the pressure of a developing crisis would create a better chance to obtain the necessary rights.13 Secretary Rogers’ logic seemed sound, yet it proved wrong. When the next crisis erupted in October 1973, the United States would encounter extreme difficulty in obtaining the base and overflight rights necessary to support Israel.

Greece: Resuming Military Aid

In Greece, US military requirements collided with political obstacles. The administration—and especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff—wanted to provide military assistance and keep using bases there, but Congress balked at dealing with an authoritarian military regime. The trouble began in April 1967, when conservative army officers overthrew the constitutional government. Colonel George Papadopoulos became prime minister and ruled by martial law. The Johnson administration promptly suspended deliveries of major military equipment. In June 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for resumption, citing particularly “the delicacy of the US presence in other parts of the eastern and central Mediterranean.” Facilities being made available by the Greek government included: on the mainland, Athenai (Hellenikon) air base and several communications stations; on Crete, air and naval facilities at Souda Bay.14

Congress’ strong antipathy toward the military junta helped keep the embargo in force. The words of the North Atlantic Treaty, after all, declared NATO governments to be “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” But after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the administration approved shipping those items that were closely related to NATO’s needs. About 40 percent of the equipment that had been withheld went forward—interceptors, trainers, and transport aircraft but not tanks and heavy artillery.15
On 26 April 1969, President Nixon asked the Interdepartmental Group for the Near East to present the arguments for and against resuming full military assistance. In mid-June, before a response appeared, Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Nixon that there was a possibility of selling $20 million of equipment outside the list of suspended items. The 1968 Reuss Amendment prohibited sales that would have the effect of arming “military dictators who are denying social progress to their people.” The President could waive this limitation if he determined that doing so would be important to US security. Consequently, Dr. Kissinger presented President Nixon with options for the direction in which military aid should move. Going beyond what Dr. Kissinger recommended, the President opted for a resumption of full military aid.

Late in September, the Interdepartmental Group reported that the junta was supported by a minority and strongly opposed by another minority, while a large middle group remained passive. The colonels’ behavior, though, did not suggest that they had embarked on a course which would attract more adherents. How might arms supply be made to serve political ends? The Group listed five options. At one extreme, intervene more directly to spur political reforms and cut off military assistance to underline US determination. At the other, normalize relations and lift the embargo. One middling option outlined a quid pro quo, lifting the embargo by stages as steps toward constitutional government took place. Finally, the Group cautioned that relocating facilities from Greece would prove difficult. Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and particularly the Soviet naval thrust into the Mediterranean, made access to Greek ports and airfields all the more necessary. The Deputy Director, J-5, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) concluded that the Group had presented a reasonable range of alternatives, which took Joint Staff and ISA views into consideration. According to General Wheeler, ISA stood “firmly on the side of lifting the suspension.”

Meeting on 2 October, the Review Group reached a consensus that US security interests required the resumption of deliveries. Dr. Kissinger advised President Nixon that “the main US interest in Greece lies in maintaining unrestricted access to bases for US staging into the Mid-East.” NSDM 34, dated 14 November 1969, instructed US Ambassador Henry J. Tasca to inform Prime Minister Papadopoulos that the administration was prepared to resume normal shipments, making clear that movement toward a “constitutional situation” would speed the release of suspended military equipment. This linkage, though, did not constitute a “condition.” Rather, it would help ease Congressional criticism and thus speed the release of equipment. After reviewing the Greek government’s response, the United States would begin shipping arms gradually, starting with the less dramatic items.

In April 1970, the junta published a timetable for returning to parliamentary democracy, albeit slowly and conditionally. Concurrently, Ambassador to Greece Henry J. Tasca reported that he could see “no feasible alternative . . . to pursuing the dual track of supporting Greece militarily and pressing it politically . . . to return to constitutional government.” He believed that simply to continue the current partial restriction, coupled with “quixotic public criticism,” was a self-defeating approach.
The NSC Under Secretaries Committee, which included Admiral Moorer as Acting JCS Chairman, accepted this assessment and so advised President Nixon, who readily agreed. “The US is responsible for Greece,” Mr. Nixon told the NSC on 17 June. “If you give them arms they will change” back to constitutional rule. Through NSDM 67, circulated on 25 June, he decided to let the Greek government know that arms shipments would resume around 1 September, provided there was no danger of a congressional backlash. Mr. Papadopoulos also should be informed that Washington anticipated specific steps being taken toward full constitutional government; the administration accepted “without reservation” his assurances about moving toward parliamentary democracy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could hardly have asked for more. President Nixon was providing arms without conditioning their delivery upon prior political reforms.19

The administration, meantime, had altered its objectives for the Greek armed forces. The “McNaughton goals,” promulgated in 1966 by Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton, had projected $325 million worth of US military assistance during FYs 1967–1971 and emphasized the development of Greek ground forces. But congressional budget cuts, followed by the arms embargo, left these goals far out of reach. Accordingly, through a Strategy Guidance Memorandum issued January 1970, Secretary Laird abandoned the McNaughton goals. In their place, he substituted objectives from JSOP 72-79 which shifted priority to naval and air forces. The JSOP projected, by 1976-79, an air force that included four squadrons of F-4E fighter-bombers and one squadron of advanced fighters. In Athens, on 4 October, President Nixon, Secretary Laird, Ambassador Tasca, and Admirals Moorer and Zumwalt held a meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos that was “quite cordial and quite frank.” Mr. Papadopoulos said that “friends would have to be content . . . with evidence of liberalizing measures as they were taken.” Admiral Moorer mentioned to him the “importance of Sixth Fleet facilities in Greece to our common interests.” Soon afterward, State and Defense approved the sale of one F-4E squadron.20

Politically, the Greek picture remained cloudy. The junta announced some steps toward a transition, but martial law remained in force. Prime Minister Papadopoulos announced that, during 1971, no further changes would take place. Late in January 1971, President Nixon asked the Interdepartmental Group to review progress and assess options. The Group responded by listing four options:

1. Take all feasible steps, short of sanctions affecting the Military Assistance Program (MAP), to hasten the restoration of constitutional government.
2. Select areas where the administration could exert more pressure without jeopardizing US strategic interests.
3. Continue the current, essentially passive attitude.
4. Adopt a policy of strict non-interference in Greece’s internal affairs.

Practically, the Group saw only two alternatives: do somewhat more or somewhat less. The Director, Joint Staff, and Assistant Secretary Nutter urged their superiors to adopt option 2. When the Senior Review Group met on 31 March, Dr. Kissinger asked
whether it was correct to say that “we want to prod them without any public show of pressure.” Conferees concurred. The President, Dr. Kissinger added, was “not inclined to press the regime very hard.”

Some members of Congress did seem inclined to press the regime hard. Admiral Zumwalt heard a report that, if Congress blocked military aid, the Sixth Fleet’s ships would be barred from Greek ports. Taking alarm, Admiral Zumwalt on 30 July urged Secretary Laird to emphasize for Congress’ benefit the “vital importance” of continued access there. During the past six months, he related, 52 percent of all the Sixth Fleet’s visits had been paid to Greek ports. If the recent Jordanian crisis had led to US involvement, Admiral Zumwalt added, the State Department believed that Greece would have been alone among NATO nations in opening its bases to US forces.

Early in 1972, military collaboration between Greece and the United States took a stride forward. President Nixon, in February, authorized negotiations to make Athens the home port for a US carrier task group. By year’s end, the two governments completed Phase I, to home port a US destroyer squadron and establish a fleet support office in Athens. Secretary Laird also approved the Navy’s plan for Phase II, home porting the aircraft carrier, USS Independence, in Athens. Apparently, Greece would become the major staging area from which to project US military power around the Mediterranean.

The Turkish government, according to some evidence, was less willing to allow a greater US military presence. On 3 July 1969, Washington and Ankara signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement designed to establish, within Turkish law, a firm basis for US base rights and other privileges. Secret minutes spelled out exceptions and other implementing details that gave the United States such guarantees and freedom of action as it might deem necessary.

The new Agreement required the United States to provide advance notice and consultation for any changes to American forces and missions. Some changes became necessary when the 1969 coup d’etat in Libya led to the loss of Wheelus Air Base, where the European Command had conducted most of its air combat training. Efforts to gain greater use of a Turkish training range, coming at the same time as a proposal that USAF detachments in Turkey convert from F-100s to F-4s, led Turkish negotiators to grow “increasingly difficult and inordinately precise.” Accordingly, in February 1970, General Wheeler asked field commanders for their assessment of the situation.

General David Burchinal, USAF, the Deputy USCINCEUR, believed that Turkish intransigence was more apparent than real. The ruling party, in the last election, had won only a plurality of the popular vote; its opponents catered to a strong current of xenophobia. In these circumstances, he believed, any appearance of yielding to foreign interests could be political suicide. General Andrew Goodpaster, USA, the SACEUR and USCINCEUR, mentioned other factors which might have made the Turks approach US initiatives with caution. First, Jupiter IRBMs had been withdrawn after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, even though the Turks had opposed such a move. Second, Turks in 1966 had gained an impression that the US government was firmly committed to provide funding for their own “McNaughton goals”—a promise that remained unfulfilled.
Third, during the Cyprus imbroglio of 1967, Turks were deeply disturbed by US failure to support them in what they strongly believed was a righteous cause.\textsuperscript{27}

All too soon, events would prove that problems with Turkey were real. During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Turkey refused to allow overflights by US resupply aircraft bound for Israel. In 1974, Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus triggered a suspension of US military assistance.

**Spanish Bases Preserved**

Spain was neither a member of NATO nor a formal ally of the United States, yet it supported the US strategic posture by housing an important complex of facilities. Rota provided a base for nine Polaris submarines as well as logistic support for US surface ships steaming through the area. Three USAF fighter squadrons were stationed at Torrejon air base, which also handled 400 monthly flights by the Military Airlift Command, representing 75 percent of the cargoes formerly flown to Chateauroux, France. In support of a contingency, Torrejon, Moron, and Zaragoza (the last in standby condition) would receive fighters, tankers and bombers deploying from CONUS. A number of communications sites also served as major components in the world-wide US network.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1968, the US-Spanish Defense Agreement signed five years earlier came due for renewal. Through JCSM-35-68, dated 18 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended seeking an extension and retaining the use of all facilities. They cited a number of factors which, in their judgment, were making Spanish facilities even more important: the limited availability of sites elsewhere in the area; the difficulty of establishing new bases; and the curbs upon NATO’s use of French territory and air pace. Creating alternatives to the Spanish complex (where possible) would prove time-consuming, expensive, and less satisfactory both strategically and politically. If Spanish bases were lost and not replaced, they believed that US strategic mobility would suffer and the unified commands’ ability to accomplish their mission would be seriously reduced.

What would the Spanish want in return for renewal? Political assistance primarily, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with military and economic aid coming only secondarily. Spain’s admission to NATO remained impossible as long as Francisco Franco ruled; Britain and France particularly refused to accept a fascist dictator as their ally. Substitutes for NATO membership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, might include a security guarantee from the United States or Spanish membership in some international organizations (e.g., observer status with NATO’s Iberian Atlantic Command). As to military aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that Spanish requests would total $279.5 million over five years.\textsuperscript{29}

The Defense Department proposed and, in September 1968 President Johnson approved, offering $100 million in grant aid and $100 million in credits over five years. Spanish negotiators countered with a $700 million request but said they were willing to
extend the Agreement. During 18–20 November, General Wheeler conferred in Madrid with Lieutenant General Manuel Diez-Alegria, Director of the Spanish Advanced Military Studies Group. General Wheeler concluded that, although the Spanish did want a more explicit security guarantee, they assigned higher priority to equipping a field force capable of protecting their interests in North Africa. General Wheeler was convinced, moreover, that simply standing by the September offer would result in a substantial reduction of US base rights. A leak about Spain’s seeking $700 million had triggered some “jeering” stories in the American press which, he told Secretary Laird, “greatly angered and embarrassed” the Spaniards. General Wheeler felt certain that, “if we are to continue to enjoy the full use of the bases in Spain, this regrettable affair will cost the United States on the order of $100 million above what might have been agreed.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 20 December, recommended delaying a final decision about how much aid to offer Spain. To serve as an initial position, though, they provided a list of items costing $209.66 million. General McConnell, speaking as Acting Chairman, suggested establishing a purely military consultative committee to “coordinate defense matters of mutual interests and such sharing of tasks and missions as may be agreed upon with the Spanish.”

Very soon after President Nixon took office, the Under Secretaries Committee reviewed base rights negotiations. In February 1969, the Interdepartmental Group for Europe reported that it saw little chance for a successful outcome unless the US government increased its September offer of grant aid. The Committee commissioned further studies, covering such topics as possible constraints upon the use of bases and the terms of reference for a military consultative committee. Early in March, the Interdepartmental Group responded with a troubling prediction about possible constraints: use of Spanish bases during an Arab-Israeli crisis “almost certainly” would be denied. In case of an Indo-Pakistani, Greek-Turkish, or Arab-Iranian crisis, “unrestricted use would be at least dubious.” The State Department decided against creating a military consultative committee but did endorse periodic meetings between US and Spanish officers.

In April 1969, through NSSM 46, President Nixon called for an appraisal of policy options, looking ahead to the post-Franco period. Two months later, the US and Spanish governments extended the Defense Agreement until 26 September 1970; during that interval, Spain would receive $50 million in grants and $35 million in credits. Work on a reply to NSSM 46, which had been suspended throughout the final negotiations, then resumed.

On 17 September, responding to ISA’s request for an assessment of base requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views in JCSM-35-68. They cited a number of reasons why, during the 1970s, these requirements would stay “virtually undiminished.” Rota remained necessary, because Poseidon submarines would follow patrol procedures identical with Polaris boats. An ability to refuel and to break down cargoes at Spanish air bases would increase the supercargo C-5A’s effectiveness. Communications satellites would be replacing some, but not all, ground-based systems.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then listed negotiating options, in order of preference:

1. Continue all existing arrangements, the solution which they strongly preferred.
2. Same as 1, but heighten the visibility of Spanish control.
3. Same as 1 and 2, but increase Spanish participation in using these facilities.
4. In addition to 1, 2, and 3, relinquish Moron or Zaragoza, although retaining re-entry rights.\(^{35}\)

The Interdepartmental Group gave JCS views a prominent place in its proposed response to NSSM 46. By January 1970, as far as facilities were concerned, the State and Defense Departments had agreed upon an order of ranking:

- **High Priority:** Emergency or wartime re-entry rights; peacetime transit rights; storage depots for war reserve materiel; communications and navigation facilities.
- **Very Important:** Training range and ammunition storage at Zaragoza; missile submarine tender and anti-submarine warfare squadron at Rota.
- **Desirable:** Intelligence facilities and Sixth Fleet supply at Rota; Military Airlift Command at Torrejon.
- **Convenient:** Tactical fighter wing and Strategic Air Command base at Torrejon.
- **Least important:** Strategic Air Command base at Moron.\(^{36}\)

The Senior Review Group decided against sending this response to the White House. Instead, on 26 January, a neutrally-worded memorandum went to President Nixon that simply set forth military options and quid pro quo considerations. Two days later, Secretary Rogers recommended accepting a reduction in the US presence. General Wheeler, not surprisingly, criticized the memorandum of 26 January because it failed to make a strong case for retaining all rights and facilities. The ISA drafted a very different paper for the President; General Wheeler urged the Secretary of Defense to sign it. Secretary Laird did so on 30 January. The paper read in part: “There are compelling reasons for retaining as much of our current arrangement with Spain as we can. . . . We have concluded that, given our existing strategies for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the supporting role of our facilities in Spain is vital.”\(^{37}\)

President Nixon accepted Defense’s argument. Through NSDM 43, dated 20 February 1970, he set an objective of retaining as many rights and facilities as possible, “within the limits of a sustainable quid pro quo.” Prompt decisions should be made, he directed, about what quid pro quo to offer, and about what priority to award each facility. For the longer term, President Nixon envisioned a general treaty of cooperation as well as renewed efforts to develop a Spanish link with NATO.\(^{38}\)

In response, the Under Secretaries Committee recommended paying up to $25 million per year from the DOD budget and offering up to $85 million annually in Export-Import Bank credits. Secretary Rogers decided to seek a general cooperation agreement, not a treaty. On 11 March, the Defense Program Review Committee came to a decision about priorities. A partial listing, which reflected the JCS view that facilities should be considered in groups rather than in isolation, ran as follows:
Controlling the Mediterranean Basin

_Militarily Essential:_ Peacetime use for logistic, refueling, and routine operations; overflight and wartime re-entry rights; fuel and ammunition storage sites; communications stations and facilities.

_Militarily Cost Effective:_ Missile submarine and ASW operations at Rota; a tactical fighter wing at Torrejón; an Air Force training range near Zaragoza.

_Militarily Convenient:_ Headquarters, 6th Air Force at Torrejón.

On 6 August 1970, Washington and Madrid signed an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. It went into effect on 26 September and would run for five years. Leasing of facilities gave way to full Spanish ownership, but the United States retained all base and access rights. Spain would receive, among other things, $35 million in grant aid to modernize its aircraft control and warning system as well as credits to buy 36 F-4C fighter-bombers. A Joint Committee—which consisted of the US ambassador and the Spanish foreign minister, with General Goodpaster and the Spanish Chief, High General Staff, as their military advisers—would resolve matters concerned with mutual defense support.

The Spanish hoped that their US tie might help end Spain’s isolation from the rest of Western Europe. Accordingly, during base negotiations, they placed great emphasis upon establishing some sort of multilateral defense arrangements. Assistant Secretary Nutter wanted to involve the Spanish in Mediterranean defense problems “by all feasible means.” He suggested, for example, association with NATO short of full membership, attaching Spanish liaison teams to subordinate NATO commands, and conducting regular high-level consultations between Spanish and NATO military officers. In January 1971, Mr. Nutter solicited advice from Admiral Moorer, who was now Chairman.

Admiral Moorer saw more problems than opportunities. Naturally, the Chairman replied in mid-February, he favored integrating Spain into NATO and wanted the US government to exploit every opportunity for promoting multilateral ties between Spain and Western Europe. Admiral Moorer doubted, however, whether much progress could be made toward even a limited NATO partnership as long as General Franco lived. Among the better possibilities, in his judgment, were (1) association, perhaps through a permanent military mission, with NATO’s Iberian Command and (2) participation or at least observer status in the next conference about defense of the Gibraltar Strait. The latter idea had to be dropped; Spain’s resentment over British occupation of Gibraltar made the matter too sensitive politically. On 31 May, after consulting General Goodpaster, Admiral Moorer recommended encouraging bilateral cooperation between Spain and NATO’s Mediterranean members. For the immediate future, Admiral Moorer advised Assistant Secretary Nutter, cooperation in ASW and air defense offered the most promise of success. But first, since the Spanish insisted upon entering NATO “through the front door,” their willingness to proceed with bilateral steps should be confirmed.

In August 1971, President Nixon ordered the Under Secretaries Committee to develop a program aimed at linking Spain with NATO. Its major recommendations,
mostly familiar ones which had JCS concurrence, are listed in order of priority: continue high-level efforts to gain NATO governments’ support for closer military relations with Spain; encourage closer linkage between Spanish and NATO air defense systems and use of Spanish ASW forces for ocean surveillance; increase Spanish liaison with US and NATO military commands; and invite Spanish observation of, and eventual participation in, NATO military exercises. President Nixon authorized the Committee to proceed with these efforts, but little came of them.

Unquestionably, from the JCS standpoint, Spanish negotiations proved to be a success story. President Nixon accepted their assessment that the whole complex of facilities should be preserved. The Spanish government consented, at a price that certainly was “sustainable.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff very much wanted to see Spain enter NATO, but they knew that could not happen until General Franco left the scene.

Malta: A Minor Tempest

The island of Malta, lying about 75 miles south of Sicily, had become an independent nation in 1964. It harbored a British naval base and a pro-western government. In February 1971, as an election approached, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended using NATO’s infrastructure funds to improve Luqa air strip. Doing so, they hoped, would help the pro-western party. Secretary Laird, however, deferred action until the election was past. On 12 June, Malta’s Labor Party led by Dom Mintoff gained a one-seat majority in Parliament. During the campaign, Mr. Mintoff had spoken of taking a more neutral position in world politics and opening Malta’s ports to Soviet warships. Upon entering office, he denounced existing defense and financial agreements with the United Kingdom, suspended visits by the Sixth Fleet, and called upon NATO to remove the headquarters of Allied Forces, Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH). Mr. Mintoff also sought aid and investment from the radical government of Libya.

On 12 June 1971, Admiral Zumwalt asked his JCS colleagues to join in urging Secretaries Laird and Rogers to develop a plan of action that would keep Malta “on the side of NATO and the United States.” They did so on 25 June, recommending that an interdepartmental assessment be made and that a coordinated course of action be promptly prepared. The Acting Secretaries of State and Defense agreed to establish an ad hoc working group.

Since NAVSOUTH had to leave Malta, OSD saw an opportunity for combining it with the Atlantic Iberian Command’s headquarters (IBERLANT) in Portugal. Such a step might appease those, particularly in Congress, who were criticizing the proliferation of NATO headquarters. But Admiral Moorer, on 19 August 1971, told Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John H. Morse that this “was the wildest idea I had ever heard and that his boys had slipped one past him.” Admiral Moorer explained that moving NAVSOUTH, a SACEUR command, into SACLANT’s area of responsibility would be “like mixing oil and water.” Coincidentally, on that same day, NATO’s Defense Planning
Committee (DPC) recommended that NAVSOUTH go to Naples. Through a memorandum dated 23 August, Admiral Moorer formally urged Deputy Secretary Packard to support the DPC’s proposal. Judging by Soviet naval operations, he argued, the USSR’s main interest lay east of the Sicilian Straits and grew even greater east of Crete. This was a good reason to keep NAVSOUTH as a separate command. Politically, Admiral Moorer continued, shifting NAVSOUTH to Portugal probably would prove unacceptable to Italians, Greeks, and Turks. A prerequisite for increasing Italy’s contribution to NATO was that the NAVSOUTH commander be an Italian. Also, moving NAVSOUTH to Portugal might bring about realignment between commands, causing Greeks and Turks to reopen their long-running feud over where boundaries should run in the Aegean Sea. On 20 August, NATO decided that NAVSOUTH should move to Naples.46

Meanwhile, in mid-July, President Nixon commissioned a review of US policy toward Malta. An ad hoc group quickly drafted six options. These ranged from a total US abstention, letting Europeans solve the problem, to a total US “move-in,” either buying Mr. Mintoff’s agreement or trying “to topple him in some manner.” Members defined the major US interest as a negative one: denying base facilities to the Soviets. Assistant Secretary Nutter and the Acting Director, Joint Staff, endorsed an option that involved helping to pay the cost of renewing the UK-Malta agreement. Already, though, the White House had decided to offer financial aid. Through NSDM 138, issued on 13 October 1971, President Nixon defined successful negotiation of the UK-Malta agreement as the principal US objective. At his direction, the Under Secretaries Committee developed ways of accomplishing this. With Admiral Moorer’s concurrence, the Committee recommended going beyond the latest US-UK offer of ten million pounds sterling per year. The United States and other NATO members would match whatever further increase the British offered to Mr. Mintoff. President Nixon approved.47

In March 1972, the British and Maltese governments signed a lease agreement costing about 14 million pounds per year, triple that specified in the previous accord; the United States agreed to contribute 25 percent. Both US and Warsaw Pact naval vessels were barred from Malta’s shipyards.48 Mr. Mintoff extracted more money from the NATO nations’ treasuries, but the Nixon administration attained its major objective: keeping the British in Malta, and the Soviets out.

Conclusion

During 1969-1972, arms flowed again to Greece; steps were taken to preserve the complex of US facilities in Spain as well as British bases in Malta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended doing these things, of course, but President Nixon needed no urging. The United States, he believed, had to maintain a high profile in the Mediterranean. But in what circumstances could these bases be used? The events of October 1973 would show that, to borrow Admiral Moorer’s simile, mixing NATO and Mediterranean affairs with Middle Eastern matters was like “mixing oil and water.”
Latin America: A Mixed Record

As Lyndon Johnson’s presidency wore on, US policies and initiatives toward Latin America seemed to become progressively less fruitful and successful. During 1965-66, military intervention in the Dominican Republic did result in the political solution favored by Washington. Negotiations over the Panama Canal, which started in 1965, had a less favorable outcome. By 1967, US and Panamanian diplomats had drafted new treaties covering the existing lock canal, a possible sea-level canal, and the lock canal’s defense and neutrality. These texts won JCS approval. Then turmoil in Panama blocked any further movement; the treaties were in limbo when President Johnson left office. On another issue, supplying arms to Latin America, the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced frustration. Congress, wanting Latin American governments to spend less on weapons and more on economic development, put tight restrictions on the sale of expensive, sophisticated military equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1967, warned that these restrictions were undermining US influence and recommended going much further toward meeting Latin American requests. South American governments did begin buying more arms—particularly aircraft—from Western Europe.

The Overall Approach: Problems of “Mature Partnership”

When Richard Nixon became President, US relations with Latin America could be characterized as crisis-free but rank with mutual disillusionment. The Alliance for Progress, created in 1961 to promote democracy and raise living standards, had scored some economic and social advances. Nonetheless, poverty and dictatorship remained all too common in Central and South America. Among Latin Americans, resentment against North America’s wealth and sometimes overbearing influence festered. On the US side, irritation grew over the slow pace of change. This was the
backdrop against which, on 3 February 1969, President Nixon commissioned a broad review of policy toward Latin America.\textsuperscript{2}

In March, an Interdepartmental Group circulated a study which described the US position as one of “uneasy hegemony” and warned of possible erosion in Washington’s position of leadership. In assessing military matters, the Group reported that US assistance had markedly improved Latin American capabilities for internal security. Poorer countries, however, could not meet all of their training requirements without outside help. Also, sixteen nations would continue to need modest technical assistance for their civil police. Among Latin American military men, a large reservoir of pro-US sentiment still existed. Yet, the Group noted, congressional restrictions on arms sales had created much dissatisfaction among them.\textsuperscript{3} Congress worried about a Latin American arms race, but past efforts to promote multilateral curbs upon arms acquisitions had failed dismally.\textsuperscript{4}

At an NSC meeting on 9 July, President Nixon said the US government should avoid doing too much, recognizing that it had an ability to influence the region but not control it. He also stated that military assistance should either promote stability or be cut. Members reached a consensus about broad policy concepts. Among other things, the United States should not only avoid paternalistic and tutorial posturing but also respect and encourage constructive nationalism.\textsuperscript{5}

Meantime, at the President’s request, a fact-finding mission headed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller (R, NY) toured Latin America. The Governor’s long association with Latin America led to his selection. The mission’s findings disputed those of the Interdepartmental Group by giving more weight to a threat of subversion. The mission also recommended easing restrictions upon arms sales but called for the elimination of military missions, on grounds they were too large and visible. Instead, temporary missions of limited duration should be sufficient.\textsuperscript{6}

On 15 October, the NSC discussed what to do. President Nixon believed that “we face a different kind of military leader in Latin America,” men who were “nationalistic, revolutionary, anti-American.” Nonetheless, he continued, influence must be exerted through close contact between US and Latin military officers. General Wheeler observed that Rockefeller’s report made contradictory recommendations, wanting to abolish military missions while increasing grants for training. When President Nixon remarked that those missions might be an outdated legacy from World War II, General Wheeler replied that they emphasized internal security and could assist police. He cited Venezuela as a good example: “There was an incipient insurgency nipped by the police and the military. We set up the command post, and we got the Navy to speak to the Army and Air Force.” President Nixon commented: “It is a question of revolution versus stability. The latter are not always wrong. . . . Don’t be overwhelmed by popular and fashionable arguments that the military in Latin America are bad. . . . They shore up the government.” Afterwards, General Wheeler told the Service Chiefs that any recommendations about the size of military missions would have to be quite conservative. Trying to keep missions at their current size, he warned, would prove useless.\textsuperscript{7}
After the NSC meeting, President Nixon ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a country-by-country analysis of Latin American military establishments. A J-5 draft, which the Interdepartmental Group approved in November 1969, highlighted one “paramount” point: “It is inescapably clear that military establishments will continue throughout the foreseeable future to play a very important political role—in power or out—in practically every country.”

Already, General Wheeler had begun looking for ways to maintain friendly contacts with key individuals. On 10 July, he asked the Service Chiefs to review procedures for keeping in touch with Latin American graduates from US service schools and colleges, and with other former associates. General Ryan’s answer made some interesting points. The Air Force, in his judgment, enjoyed the singular benefit of being identified with what Latin Americans perceived as rapid technological development. Yet US influence was declining, General Ryan maintained, because of limited US responses to Latin American arms requests as well as a recent tendency to associate Service MAP missions with declining MAP grants. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 30 October, recommended that more emphasis be given to improving personal relationships with the Latin American military. Each service, for example, could make fuller use of centralized biographical data when implementing its individual program. In February 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard endorsed their recommendation.

Even so, the administration set about sharply reducing the US military presence. In January 1968, personnel authorized for military missions in Latin America had numbered 781. By November 1970, the actual total had fallen to 456; plans had been laid for a reduction to 236. But the election of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as President of Chile changed matters. During an NSC meeting on 6 November 1970, President Nixon stressed the need for increasing US contacts throughout Latin America. The Latin American military, he insisted, must not be downgraded; they constituted power centers that were subject to US influence. General Westmoreland, who attended the meeting as Acting Chairman, capitalized upon the President’s words. Afterwards, he told Secretary Laird that many current actions and attitudes seemed inconsistent with this new guidance. One month later, Deputy Secretary Packard did call a halt to the reductions in military groups. He even proposed to President Nixon and Secretary Rogers the development of a plan for selectively increasing them.

On 1 December 1970, the Senior Review Group ordered a study of the US military presence in Latin America. The Interdepartmental Group’s draft reply recommended, among other things, approving a new level of not more than 290 spaces for military missions, continuing grant materiel aid for some countries, and urging Congress to repeal some of the restrictions upon arms sales. Concurrently, through NSSM 108, Nixon asked for an overall reappraisal of US policies and programs.

According to the Interdepartmental Group’s report, circulated in April 1971, the United States had moved from a policy of “uneasy hegemony” to one of “mature partnership” and “low profile.” Since 1969, the Group admitted, US interests probably had suffered some impairment. The damage did not seem serious, however, “and such
prejudice as we have suffered was almost certainly inevitable as a product of the basic forces operating in Latin America.” After appraising “harder” and “softer” alternatives, the Group concluded that “the basic policy direction established in 1969 was, is, and will continue to be sound in its essentials. . . . Adjustments, refinements, and fuller implementation are thus all that are needed now.” Finally, on the subject of how large a US military presence should be, the Group reaffirmed its recommendations cited above. On 17 August 1971, the Senior Review Group approved these recommendations. During FY 1972, it also ruled, approximately $9.2 million in grant MAP materiel would be made available for Latin America. A

**Aircraft Sales Stay Small**

To the Latin American military, and a good many civilian leaders as well, arms sales provided the surest proof of whether the United States truly wanted a “mature partnership.” What right had Washington, they asked, to decide which weapons they should be allowed to acquire? In 1965, Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Venezuela had sought permission to buy F-5 interceptors. The Johnson administration agreed in principle. Subsequently, though, legislative restrictions and other factors led Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to buy aircraft in Western Europe. In July 1969, the Under Secretaries Committee approved selling reasonable numbers of F-5s and A-4s, which were subsonic attack aircraft. But when Congress denied Colombia the necessary credits, that country purchased 18 supersonic Mirages from France. In January 1970, the Committee decided against selling much more advanced F-4 fighter-bombers to Latin American countries. Six months later, Venezuela asked for permission to buy ten F-4s and 15 F-5s. State and Defense opposed selling any F-4s; President Nixon concurred. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted. General George Mather, USA, the Commander in Chief of Southern Command, took a step that put aircraft sales on the JCS agenda. In July 1971, he informed Admiral Moorer that Venezuela reportedly had signed a letter of intent to buy 15 Mirages from France. So, General Mather argued, current policy had succeeded only in driving Latin governments to buy elsewhere. The US share of the Latin American arms market had fallen from 45 percent in 1967 to 9 percent in 1970. General Mather urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend (1) liberalizing statutory restriction to allow F-4 sales, when buyers appeared likely to turn elsewhere, and (2) changing Executive Branch policies to permit limited sales of first-line fighters, when Latin American markets were in danger of being lost. On 11 September 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird that current policy had not only degraded US influence in Latin America but also harmed overall national security interests and objectives. At the very time when Latin Americans were trying to buy more weapons, the United States had decided to sell them less. Moreover, as matters stood, the administration was losing the bargaining potential that arms
sales could give to other negotiations. Also, they observed, arms sales would generate requirements for extensive training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, too, that President Nixon was seeking ways to improve relations with the Latin American military. Attempts to dictate and regulate the plans of sovereign nations did not square with the President's philosophy of "mature partnership." They pointed out that US policies, no matter how well-intentioned, had failed to stem the influx of modern arms to the region. When the United States refused requests, Latin Americans simply bought elsewhere. And, as Latin American arsenals grew more obsolescent and disparate, the more difficult it would become to integrate units into combined forces, such as the Inter-American force which had been employed in the Dominican Republic during 1965–66 or which might complement US units during a general war. Accordingly, they recommended revising policies and statutory restrictions, so that the United States could become "more responsive to legitimate military modernization requirements of Latin American countries." Secretary Laird supported these views. During a discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1972, President Nixon allowed that permitting and even inviting France and others to re-enter the arms market had been a serious error. He wanted to bring back US programs. Admiral Moorer agreed, noting that arms sales had given the Europeans additional economic leverage throughout Latin America.

All things considered, the promise of a "mature partnership" never even approached fruition. In March 1973, President Nixon ordered yet another overall review. Through a draft circulated in June, the Interdepartmental Group offered a rather bleak assessment of the last four years:

Much of our focus on Latin America was negative in effect. Sanctions on US economic assistance were broadened as a reaction to the threat of uncompensated expropriation of American investment. Military relations continued to be weakened by the restrictions on our military sales efforts, Congressional sanctions, and the erratic general course of security assistance policy toward Latin America. . . .

At the same time, the Latin American response to our policy shift was not as full or as positive as one might have expected. . . . Under these circumstances, and with little in the way of US programs to reinforce it, the less intrusive style and posture adopted in 1969 could not be and was not as effective as we had expected. . . . While the damage to our influence and interests in Latin America has not been irreparable, failure to arrest if not reverse the trend toward political alienation could risk our position in the Hemisphere.

Broadly, the Group favored a strategy that would give more attention to US-Latin American relations, place greater emphasis on the positive, continue the long-standing "special relationship" in some degree, and imply allocating more resources to Latin America. What about military policies and programs? Minor adjustments, the Group concluded, had failed to remedy a growing malaise in military relations. Programs must become flexible, particularly since other countries had captured so much of the
Latin American arms market. Overall, in fact, the US military position continued to erode. An indispensable step, the Group said, lay in re-establishing the United States as a dependable arms supplier. Concurrently, on 21 May, President Nixon signed a Determination that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela be given credits to facilitate F-5 purchases. Yet only Chile, in FY 1974, agreed to buy 18 F-5Es for $44.9 million.

Panama: Obstacles to New Canal Treaties

Probably, in Latin America, no country wanted a “mature partnership” with the United States more than Panama. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 permitted the United States to build, operate, and defend an inter-oceanic canal and to control a Canal Zone in perpetuity with “all the rights, power, and authority . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the Sovereign . . . to the entire exclusion” of Panama. A lock canal opened in 1914; a Canal Zone approximately ten miles wide divided the country. Fifty years later, Panamanians’ long-standing resentment over their unequal status erupted into riots. President Johnson reacted by planning for a sea-level canal and deciding to negotiate an entirely new treaty for the existing lock canal. Robert B. Anderson, who had held high posts under President Eisenhower, became US representative in the ensuing talks.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for provisions stipulating a unilateral right of intervention to safeguard the canal’s security and continuity of operation, and to assure de facto US control over canal operations. In July 1967, US and Panamanian negotiators completed three documents. Each had undergone enough changes to win JCS endorsement:

1. A lock canal treaty would terminate on 31 December 1999—sooner if a sea-level canal opened, but no later than 2009 if one was being built during 1999. Panama would be sovereign over a Canal Area smaller than the Zone, subject to jurisdiction vested in a joint administration of five Americans and four Panamanians.
2. A sea-level canal treaty would give the United States a 20-year option to build such a canal, with the treaty’s termination occurring not later than 2067. Operating authority would be vested, again, in a commission consisting of five Americans and four Panamanians.
3. A defense treaty would allow the United States to provide for the defense, security, and continuity of operation of the lock canal, its related facilities, and the Canal Area. Bases would be available for Canal defense as well as for “related security purposes,” which the United States interpreted to mean hemispheric defense.

Unfortunately, treaty texts were leaked to the press, causing outcry in both countries that stopped further movement. Then, in 1968, a junta led by Lieutenant Colonel (soon
Latin America

to be Brigadier General) Omar Torrijos overthrew the recently elected government and took power. Talks were suspended.20

Early in September 1969, President Nixon asked for a brief review of US interests, objectives, and options. Replying four months later, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs outlined two basic options. First, defer talks about key issues; instead, negotiate interim measures which would ease the Panamanians’ impatience. This option presumed that the United States would neither abrogate the existing treaty nor terminate its operation of the lock canal at any fixed date. Second, pursue the general course outlined in the 1967 drafts, together with any significant revisions needed to deal with developments since then. This option presumed that deeply rooted causes of friction must be dealt with now, and that the 1967 drafts formed a proper basis for action. On 13 March 1970 the Review Group commissioned a study that would spell out negotiating choices, isolating those principles which the US side deemed non-negotiable.21

The Interdepartmental Group’s expanded response appeared in April. At Dr. Kissinger’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed it. Panama had asked to resume discussions, and the Group saw “no realistic choice but to do so.” Their lists of options, and the JCS appraisals of them, appear below:

Expanding canal capacity: An Interoceanic Canal Study Commission headed by Ambassador Robert Anderson tentatively favored building a sea-level canal, but did not consider such a step essential. The Interdepartmental Group perceived two options: (1) defer negotiations until the administration decided what to do; (2) negotiate now for definitive rights to construct either a sea-level canal or a third lane of locks on the existing canal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred Option 1, deferral, since the Commission would be making its report in December. They rated Option 2 as acceptable, although disagreeing with its implication that adding a third lane of locks to the existing canal equated to building a sea-level canal. Negotiations, they believed, should cover rights to build both.

Control of canal operations: The Group listed three options: (1) exclusive US control; (2) joint US-Panamanian administration controlled by a US majority; and (3) multilateral control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored Option 1, describing Option 2 as less desirable because it risked repeated US-Panamanian splits. They rejected Option 3 as infeasible; the inducements for minor users to participate were not great, and other nations probably would not want to become entangled in US-Panamanian relations.

Defense of the canal system: The Group presented two options: (1) maximum US control over defense areas, with a unilateral US right to defend the canal; (2) Panamanian participation in the canal’s defense, with a combined command structure under US control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred Option 1. Should any other option be considered, they wanted Panama’s role limited to routine security and protection measures, which
would not affect US ability to carry out the essential defense task. They did not want Panamanians participating in a combined command.

Hemispheric defense arrangements: The Group proposed (1) asking for specific treaty rights to conduct such activities, (2) obtaining a “non-specific but understood permissive clause,” or (3) seeking agreements separate from the canal treaty.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored Option 1, labeling Option 2 undesirable and Option 3 dangerous.

Sovereignty and jurisdiction: The Group offered three options: (1) cede non-essential lands and facilities to Panama and negotiate concessions over commercial activities and non-essential governmental functions; (2) abolish the Canal Zone and set up a joint administration controlled by a US majority, allowing Panama to exercise jurisdiction over matters not directly related to canal operations; and (3) relinquish all US jurisdiction over Panamanian territory, except for the Canal itself and related defense areas, and obtain treaty guarantees against Panamanian interference with canal operations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rated Option 1 as being preferable, Option 2 as acceptable, although less desirable, and Option 3 as undesirable because it would jeopardize US control over canal operations and defense.

Duration: How long a treaty should last remained a highly contentious issue between the two governments. The Group defined only two alternatives: (1) negotiate an open-ended arrangement, allowing a new treaty to run indefinitely; (2) negotiate specific but varying dates for terminating US control over canal operations, defense, and territory.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred Option 1. Why try to negotiate specific termination dates, they reasoned, when General Torrijos had suggested that they might not be necessary?

Broadly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff restated their 1967 position that new treaties were “highly desirable.” Panama wanted to resume discussions, and they could see “no reasonable alternative” to starting talks in the near future. When negotiations began, flexibility should be their keynote.22

On 4 May 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard forwarded JCS views to the White House. The Panamanians, he warned Dr. Kissinger, would try to renegotiate whatever treaty provisions might be reached, in the hope of winning more concessions. Therefore, Mr. Packard asked that certain points be considered non-negotiable: effective US control over canal operation and defense, and continuation of those controls for the indefinite future. As for the options outlined above, Mr. Packard voiced views identical to those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.23

On 5 June, through NSDM 64, President Nixon ruled in favor of negotiating a new treaty. First, purely exploratory talks would help the administration decide whether mutually satisfactory arrangements were attainable. President Nixon preferred to postpone formal negotiations until early 1971, after the Commission on a sea-level canal completed its work and congressional attitudes became clearer. He agreed that the
points listed by Mr. Packard were non-negotiable. For the exploratory talks, President Nixon provided the following guidance for Ambassador Anderson:

*Expanding canal capacity:* Indicate that the administration expected to negotiate definitive rights to build a sea-level canal and/or enlarge the lock canal.

*Control of canal operations:* Test the Panamanians’ receptivity to Option 1 above, exclusive US control. If they clearly rejected it, proceed to explore Option 2, joint administration controlled by a US majority.

*Defense of the canal system:* Indicate that the United States would seek rights for unilateral defense of the canal and canal areas (i.e. Option 1). Defer discussion about hemispheric defense, until the President decided whether to retain or abolish Southern Command.

*Sovereignty and jurisdiction:* Test Panamanian receptivity to Option 1, ceding non-essential lands and facilities. If pursuing this course appeared unfruitful, then explore Option 2, replacing the Canal Zone with a joint administration controlled by a US majority.

*Duration:* Seek an open-ended arrangement, but consider specific provisions for periodic review.\(^{24}\)

Late in January 1971, Panamanians presented Ambassador Anderson with their treaty objectives. Although they did not include a sea-level canal, he judged them an acceptable basis for pursuing discussions. Writing to the President on 10 February, Ambassador Anderson said he assumed that the treaty should be presented to the Senate early in 1972. That being so, time constraints and negotiating intricacies were such that he would need a great deal of procedural flexibility. Consequently, Ambassador Anderson did not intend to seek the President’s approval for treaty provisions “until we are sure they have become acceptable on both sides of the negotiating table.”\(^{25}\)

Both ISA and the Joint Staff held strong misgivings about what they saw as Ambassador Anderson’s bid for “carte blanche” authority. The Assistant Secretary (ISA) drafted, and the Director, Joint Staff, endorsed, memorandums urging adherence to NSDM 64 and addition of a military representative to the negotiating team. However, during a mid-February meeting, Ambassador Anderson adamantly opposed adding a military observer and intimated that he might resign if one was forced upon him. In justification, Mr. Anderson argued that Panamanians felt extremely sensitive about a US military presence at the talks. Supporting him, Secretary Rogers suggested that the Defense Department permanently assign a military liaison officer. In August, Secretary Laird established the Panama Canal Negotiations Working Group to provide support for Mr. Anderson and his team; a J-5 officer served on it as the JCS representative.\(^{26}\)

President Nixon chose not to extend “carte blanche” authority. He directed Ambassador Anderson, after exploratory talks ended, to recommend specific negotiating objectives. Accordingly on 12 April, Mr. Anderson submitted the proposals shown below:

*Control of canal operations:* Ensure US control or presence and access to essential areas. Try to revive the concept of joint administration.

*Defense of the canal system:* Obtain a unilateral right to defend current and future canals, as well as delimited operating and defense areas. Be flexible about how to
obtain rights for regional defense activities (e.g., expressly stated, by implication in a new treaty, or in a separate exchange of notes).

**Jurisdiction:** Insist upon retaining those rights necessary for operation and security of the canal as well as for the protection of, and viable working conditions among, US personnel.

**Duration:** Try to avoid fixing a date for the termination of US control. Should an open-ended treaty prove unobtainable, insist upon controlling the lock canal until 1999 and into the next century if possible. Should the United States build either additional locks or a sea-level canal, preserve US control for an extended period into the next century.

Reviewing Ambassador Anderson’s proposals, an interdepartmental working group split over a critical issue: duration. State’s spokesman favored a lock canal treaty lasting approximately fifty years. Defense representatives pressed for an open-ended treaty. After Panama had gained jurisdiction, there would be joint consideration of a termination date, contingent upon the completion of a sea-level canal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 14 May, informed Secretary Laird that they agreed with what the Defense representatives said. Indeed, they emphasized that the US presence must last indefinitely, regardless of whether the canal was lock or sea level. Also, they said that the “swing strategy,” which involved transferring forces from the Far East in the event of aggression against NATO Europe, highlighted the need for assured transit between the oceans. Two weeks later, at a meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee, Deputy Secretary Packard and Lieutenant General Richard T. Knowles, Assistant to the Chairman, staunchly opposed a fixed-term treaty.

The Under Secretaries Committee perceived a reasonable chance for a successful outcome, if differences over the duration of a lock canal treaty and the time period during which US jurisdiction in the Canal Zone should phase out could be resolved. On 10 June, the chairman of the Committee put these two issues before President Nixon. On jurisdiction, both State and Defense favored a 20-year phase-out. If Panama refused to agree, State wanted Ambassador Anderson to settle for the longest period attainable. Defense, however, held firmly to 20 years. As for duration, if an open-ended treaty proved beyond reach, State favored one that would continue US control and defense rights either until a sea-level canal opened or last approximately 50 years. In exchange for an earlier end to US jurisdiction, State hoped to gain Panamanian agreement to a longer-lived treaty than the one drafted in 1967. Disagreeing, Defense opposed fixing a termination date until either the canal lost its commercial and strategic importance or Panama gained the political responsibility necessary to ensure that the waterway would remain open. The Panamanians, Defense believed, cared more about jurisdiction than about fixed termination.

President Nixon sided with the State Department. Through NSDM 115, dated 24 June 1971, he directed Ambassador Anderson to seek a 20-year phase-out of jurisdiction, while protecting non-negotiable rights for US control over canal operations and defense of the canal during the treaty’s duration. President Nixon could accept a shorter
time than 20 years, though, if that seemed the only way to achieve objectives that the United States considered to be non-negotiable. As for duration, efforts to attain an open-ended treaty should continue. Yet, if Ambassador Anderson came to consider a fixed term necessary, the President promptly would consider such a change.\footnote{30}

Panamanians threatened to quit the talks if US negotiators insisted upon an open-ended treaty. Ambassador Anderson, taking their threat seriously, urged the President to consider either a termination formula or a fixed-term treaty. Agency comments were sought. The J-5 circulated a draft repeating JCS opposition to such a formula or treaty. However, on 13 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to discard J-5’s draft and endorse instead a paper written in ISA. It made, at much greater length, the case for open-ended defense and operating rights:

With our already announced agreement to phase out jurisdiction, Panama sees before it the achievement of negotiating objectives which it has been unable to attain for several decades. This achievement in itself would be sufficient to secure Torrijos his place in history. . . . We cannot yet be sure that Torrijos is willing to sacrifice all of this for achievement of the relatively meaningless right to have the US terminate its canal operation and defense rights at a distant time beyond the tenure of his own control.\footnote{31}

Postponing a decision, President Nixon sought more information about congressional as well as Panamanian attitudes. On 20 August, Ambassador Anderson again gave the President his judgment that the time had come to seek a fixed-term treaty. Secretary Rogers agreed with him. But Secretary Laird still opposed setting a date, telling the President on 3 September that “any termination treaty would bring with it no assurance of peace. Panama’s history is one of endemic instability. . . . It is unrealistic to expect that [Torrijos] or any near-term Panamanian leader will respect treaty obligations after the United States has removed itself from the area. I do not recommend an inflexible position, but under current conditions cannot justify this essential change in our rights.”\footnote{32}

Dr. Kissinger counseled President Nixon that Ambassador Anderson likely would resign if his request was denied, which by itself might be “enough to torpedo the negotiations.” Refusal to accept the principle of termination, Dr. Kissinger continued, probably would lead to “a confrontation with Panama perhaps including violence and a decision by Panama to take the issue to the United Nations. . . . The objections raised by Defense are primarily tactical and I see no reason to run the above risks for the sake of marginal gains on the tactical plane.”\footnote{33}

Consequently, on 13 September, the President authorized Ambassador Anderson to seek a treaty with a termination formula, provided that the duration and other provisions proved satisfactory. Also, there should be a US-Panamanian guarantee that, after the treaty terminated, the canal still would remain open to all shipping. If a termination formula proved unobtainable, Mr. Anderson should agree to one with a fixed term. In either case, “the US negotiating objective should be a duration of at least fifty years, with provision for an additional 30–50 years if Canal capacity is expanded.”\footnote{34} President
Nixon’s decision to stop seeking an open-ended treaty, and accept a fixed-term one, stands as a landmark in the negotiations.

At this point, the construction of a sea-level canal still seemed possible. In December 1970, the Interoceanic Canal Study Commission had recommended doing so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff looked upon a sea-level canal as “a major defense asset,” far superior to adding a third lane of locks along the existing canal. American negotiators sought Panama’s agreement to operate both canals as a single system. Responding to a request from the chairman of the Panama Canal Negotiations Working Group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined what they considered an appropriate defense concept. But the Panamanians flatly rejected the idea of operating both canals as a single system. Instead, they asked the United States to develop a defense concept for a sea-level canal alone. The JCS recommendation, dated 15 December 1971, called for a canal defense area extending approximately 3,000 to 6,000 meters on each side of the canal, within which the United States would have sole authority for military actions to defend the canal. There would also be a “US control area,” approximately 2,000 to 3,000 meters on each side, within which the United States would control the land and water used for the canal’s operation and defense.35

The chairman of the Working Group found serious flaws in this concept. As he noted, “we are asking Panamanians to give us rights which we do not now enjoy and which conflict with some of Panama’s basic objectives in any new arrangement.” Assistant Secretary Nutter added another new arrangement. Besides a local defense concept, reflecting only those rights required by Southern Command, there should be air and sea rights needed for defense in depth. In January 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird an expanded defense concept. They still focused on local defense, though, because no rights were required to act over the international waters of air and sea approaches. Within the canal defense area, they claimed, Panamanians “would be able to live and work, for all practical purposes, without restrictions.”36 Subsequently, ballooning cost estimates killed the idea of a sea-level canal and made this whole issue moot.

How to assure the canal’s neutrality remained a sensitive point. The State Department circulated a draft designed to guarantee neutrality. But ISA deemed it insufficient, standing alone, to ensure that enemies of the United States could not use the canal during a war in which Panama remained neutral. An exchange of diplomatic notes, ISA believed, would provide the essential assurances. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. They wanted to make clear, though, that the exchange of notes should take place concurrently with the negotiation of a treaty article. Secretary Laird so informed the State Department. Yet the Acting Secretary of State, replying on 21 December 1971, voiced confidence that Ambassador Anderson would obtain the most comprehensive assurance negotiable: “In time of war will not the Navy be strong enough to deal with enemy vessels in the vicinity of the Canal? The critical point of course, is to ensure access of US vessels to the Canal.”37 Here, for reasons explained below, the discussion ended.
On 29 December 1971, at Contadora Island off Panama, General Westmoreland reviewed matters with General Torrijos. Here, General Westmoreland said that the US government already had made greater concessions than he expected. Congress might not accept the treaty as it stood; more US concessions would make ratification impossible. “We have to have a high level of security,” said General Westmoreland, “and we cannot delegate that defense to another sovereign power.” During the 1964 riots in the Canal Zone, he recalled, the Panamanian National Guard had not left their barracks. That would not happen again, General Torrijos replied, “if conditions of that time were taken out of the treaty.”

Sad to say, all this effort went for naught. Throughout 1972, Panamanians showed no disposition to compromise differences. When they finally tabled a draft in December, Ambassador Anderson advised that it “wiped out almost all of the progress of 1971.” Among other things, Panamanians wanted the Canal Zone to disappear within five years and US control over the lock canal to terminate in 1994. That, of course, went well beyond what President Nixon—let alone the Joint Chiefs of Staff—could accept. In sum, success seemed no nearer in 1972 than it had in 1969.

Above all else, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to preserve US ability to defend and operate the canal. For the indefinite future, they emphasized, a US military presence would be necessary. President Nixon decided to seek a fixed-term treaty, despite JCS objections, but he insisted that a treaty last at least 50 years, and that the two governments guarantee the canal’s availability to all shipping thereafter.

Cuba: Another Confrontation

Cuba, where Fidel Castro had held power since 1959, contained a solidly entrenched communist government and a Soviet military presence. Thus, in this hemisphere, Cuba obviously posed the greatest threat to US security. In fact, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 had created the Cold War’s only direct Soviet-American confrontation. The discovery of intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile sites on the island led President Kennedy to impose an arms quarantine. When military action seemed near, President Kennedy offered not to invade Cuba and remove US missiles from Turkey if the Soviets would withdraw their missiles, under UN supervision. Premier Khrushchev agreed to remove “the arms which you described as offensive,” but Castro prohibited any on-site inspection. Consequently, President Kennedy withheld his no-invasion pledge. On 20 November 1962, he publicly stated that “if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future . . . there will be peace in the Caribbean.”

The 1962 understandings sheltered some ambiguities. Which weapon systems, precisely, could be classified as “offensive”? During 1970, the Soviets tested how far this definition might be stretched. Seven Soviet ships, including three submarines, visited Cuba during July 1969. Again, in April 1970, seven ships spent two weeks at the port of
Cienfuegos. The US government took no action. On 26 August, a U-2 photographed new construction at Cienfuegos. Simultaneously, another Soviet flotilla steamed toward Cuba; it included ships that normally were used to service nuclear submarines. The next U-2 mission, on 14 September, aborted when a MiG-21 tried to intercept the spy plane—but not before the U-2 had photographed Cienfuegos. The “40 Committee,” a high-level body which considered covert actions, met that same day. Admiral Moorer, who was a Committee member, outlined his suspicions about the purpose of Soviet ships at Cienfuegos. The Committee approved overflying Cienfuegos the next day, provided the U-2 stayed about 15 miles away from surface-to-air missile sites. This mission proceeded without incident. Accordingly, on 15 September, Admiral Moorer authorized the next day’s flight to ignore the 15-mile restriction.41

Photographs of Cienfuegos showed that, in less than three weeks, a fairly significant installation had come into being. More importantly, as Dr. Kissinger later wrote, a submarine tender lay moored to four buoys; alongside the tender were two support barges. “What we saw, in short, had all the earmarks of a permanent Soviet naval base.”42

On 17 September, Admiral Zumwalt warned his JCS colleagues that, once a support facility had been established, the introduction of offensive missiles could follow. Consequently, the United States should make every effort to prevent the USSR from using Cuba “as a support base for submarines capable of launching offensive missiles.” Admiral Zumwalt wanted this issue brought before the NSC as soon as possible.43

At this point, the Washington Special Actions Group was meeting daily to deal with a crisis over Jordan. On 19 September, the WSAG discussed Cuba. Dr. Kissinger asked each agency to submit its assessment and recommendations; work was done on a very close-hold basis. Admiral Moorer’s response—Chairman’s Memorandum (CM)-237-70, dated 21 September—stated that “if Cienfuegos emerges as an active submarine base, it would reinforce significantly Soviet capabilities in the Western Hemisphere . . . and appropriate countermeasures should be employed to force removal.” Today, Admiral Moorer reported, the Soviets possessed 13 Yankee-class ballistic missile submarines and could keep three of them stationed off the East Coast. But, with a base at Cienfuegos, that deployment could increase by one-third. Moreover, if the Soviets kept building submarines at their current rate, they would exceed the US level of 41 Polaris/Poseidon boats by 1974. Thus, in 1974, basing some submarines at Cienfuegos would give them the equivalent of 55 or 56 boats operating from the Kola Peninsula by the Barents Sea.44

President Nixon preferred to postpone any confrontation over Cuba until after the November election. A public weary of Vietnam would, he feared, react cynically to claims of a new Cuban missile crisis. The President did ask, though, for a report on “what actions we can take, covert or overt, to put missiles in Turkey—or a sub base in the Black Seas—anything which will give us some trading stock.” On 22 September, Admiral Moorer talked with staff officers about the White House’s reaction to CM-237-70. He observed that, while some people talked about forcing a withdrawal like 1962, “things are different now. We do not have the superiority now that we had then.
The President’s reaction is to increase our presence in Greece and Turkey, and move into the Soviets’ back yard in a manner similar to their moving into ours. However, their base in Cuba represents an order-of-magnitude increase from zero to one. Additional basing for the US in Greece and Turkey would represent merely an incremental increase . . . and the impact would be far less than . . . the Soviet move in Cuba.” Later that day, Admiral Moorer agreed that U-2s should overfly Cuba every third day, as long as Soviet ships remained in port.45

The NSC, meeting on 23 September, heard conflicting predictions about how soon the submarine base might become operational. President Nixon asked for contingency plans, such as mining Cienfuegos and blockading Cuba, and about retaliatory action if U-2s were attacked. President Nixon commented that the new base would constitute a “marginal strategic advantage.” He wanted to be “very tough” in private negotiations, but to avoid doing so in public and risk a “great public clamor.” Two days later, Admiral Moorer asked the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, to propose actions for countering the base construction at Cienfuegos.46

President Nixon’s effort to downplay the situation ended abruptly on 25 September, when The New York Times published a story about Cienfuegos. A Pentagon spokesman, misinterpreting high-level guidance, then filled in every detail. Consequently, at 1730 that day, Kissinger informed Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that “we would view it with the utmost gravity if construction continued and the base remained . . . To us, Cuba is a place of extreme sensitivity. We considered the installation to have been completed with maximum deception and we could not agree to its continuation.” Whatever the phraseology of the 1962 understanding, its intent clearly was not to replace land-based missiles with sea-based ones. Now, he said, Moscow must choose between conciliation and confrontation; the United States was prepared to go either way. According to Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Dobrynin left the meeting “ashen-faced.”47

On 6 October, just after President Nixon returned from a European trip, Ambassador Dobrynin delivered Moscow’s answer. Briefly, the Soviets disavowed any intention to build a base at Cienfuegos; no submarine would call there “in an operational capacity.” Seeing some ambiguities in this reply, Dr. Kissinger decided to respond with a very precise interpretation of what constituted unacceptable activity. He asked Rear Admiral R. C. Robinson, who headed the JCS Liaison Office at the White House, to draft a reply. Dr. Kissinger told Admiral Robinson that he could consult Admiral Zumwalt and Captain Robert Hilton, USN, of the Chairman’s Staff Group—but no one else. (Admiral Moorer was in Europe on an official visit.) Captain Hilton drafted a note, and Admiral Zumwalt made minor changes. On 9 October, Dr. Kissinger used the following points in a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin:

The US Government understands that the USSR will not establish, utilize, or permit the establishment of any facility in Cuba that can be employed to support or repair Soviet naval ships capable of carrying offensive weapons; i.e., submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-
surface missiles. The US Government further understands that the following specific actions will not be undertaken:
—Construction of facilities for the handling and storing of nuclear weapons and components in Cuba.
—Removal of nuclear weapons from, or transfer of nuclear weapons to, Soviet ships in Cuban ports or operating therefrom.
—Construction of submarine or surface ship repair facilities ashore in Cuba.
—Basing or extended deployment of tender or other repair ships in Cuban ports that are capable of supporting or repairing submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles.
—Construction of communications support facilities for Soviet submarines.

The United States, Dr. Kissinger summarized, would strictly observe the 1962 understandings as long as the Soviet Union did likewise.48

On 12 October, staff officers briefed Admiral Moorer about contingency planning. Two options had been formulated:

1. Forty land- or sea-based aircraft would carry out a limited attack upon special targets in Cienfuegos. Reaction time: 72 hours.
2. Five or six carrier-based aircraft would plant 30 mines in the Cienfuegos channel. Reaction time: Four to thirteen days.

Admiral Moorer appraised option 2 as being “by far the best … and, politically, perhaps the only option.”49

The next day, the news agency Tass stated that “the Soviet Union has not built and is not building its military base in Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the Soviet and US Governments in 1962.” Soon afterward, Ambassador Dobrynin confirmed that the prohibition upon submarines and surface ships capable of carrying offensive weapons, as specified by Dr. Kissinger on 9 October, had become part of the 1962 understanding.50

Still, Soviet probing continued. On 22 February 1971, Dr. Kissinger gave Ambassador Dobrynin a note calling the presence of a tender at Cienfuegos for 125 of the last 166 days inconsistent with the new understanding. The tender left. But in May a tender and a cruise-missile submarine stopped for a “brief rest.” Another US protest led to another departure. As Dr. Kissinger wrote later, “Every conceivable combination was being tried—except the most important one, the presence of a tender in conjunction with a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.” On 29 April 1972, a Golf-class submarine entered Nipe Bay, Cuba. Secretary Laird asked for military options that would show “US resolve not to allow deployment of ballistic missile submarines.” Answering on 2 May, Admiral Moorer listed (in ascending order of severity) increased surveillance, a greater US military presence, harassment of Soviet and Cuban naval units, blockade of selected ports, quarantine, sabotage operations, aerial mining of selected ports, and air strikes. Nothing more was done because the submarine soon departed.51
The JCS role in this confrontation was relatively small. They took a hard line, though, and the administration did achieve the objectives they sought. As Dr. Kissinger wrote afterwards, “without shore facilities, port calls are strategically ineffective.”

Chile: Opposing Salvador Allende

On 4 September 1970, just as the Cuban situation began to look serious, a plurality of the Chilean people voted for a communist to be their head of state. Salvador Allende, an avowed Marxist, led a three-way presidential race with 36.2 percent of the vote. “In any circumstances,” Dr. Kissinger wrote later, “Allende’s election was a challenge to our national interest. . . . We were persuaded that [he] would soon be inciting anti-American policies, attacking hemispheric solidarity, making common cause with Cuba, and sooner or later establish close relations with the Soviet Union.”

On 14 September, the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Moorer a bluntly worded memorandum. Evidently, Admiral Zumwalt began, the consensus among policymakers favored a “restrained, deliberate posture” toward Mr. Allende. But he disputed the CIA’s judgment that, in Chile, an enlarged Soviet presence would not threaten any vital US strategic interests. Admiral Zumwalt rated as “about even” the odds that, by 1972, the USSR would establish air and naval bases in Cuba. By 1974, he believed, the chances would become much greater. Accordingly, Admiral Zumwalt asked that the administration view “with great alarm and urgency” the need for finding ways to prevent Mr. Allende from taking office and that it “initiate actions to get this done which have moderately high political risk.” Admiral Moorer, calling Admiral Zumwalt’s memorandum “most timely, and right to the point,” sent copies to Dr. Kissinger and Deputy Secretary Packard.

The Chilean Congress had to choose between the two top candidates, Salvador Allende and conservative Jorge Alessandri. Here, perhaps, lay a last chance to prevent Mr. Allende from becoming president. Mr. Alessandri said that, if elected, he would resign and force a new election. Then outgoing President Eduardo Frei, no longer barred from succeeding himself, could run against Mr. Allende. The “40 Committee” considered this gambit. Meeting on 14 September, the Committee heard reports of a Soviet naval base being built at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Admiral Moorer emphasized the similarity between what was happening in Cuba and what could happen in Chile “now that the communists have achieved a foothold.” The Committee set aside $250,000 to support Mr. Alessandri’s idea. The next day, President Nixon told the Director of Central Intelligence that he wanted “a major effort to see what could be done to prevent Allende’s accession to power.”

In Chile, President Frei refused to pursue any scheme leading to his own re-election. The Army’s Commander in Chief, General Rene Schneider, preferred to keep the military out of politics. Consequently, the 40 Committee authorized approaches to other officers. On 12 October, Admiral Moorer met with the Director, Defense Inte-
ligence Agency, “regarding plans to prevent Allende from taking power in Chile.” The next day, the two men conferred briefly “regarding contacts through whom pressure might be exerted to prevent Allende from taking power.” However, on 15 October, Dr. Kissinger concluded that efforts to promote a coup by the Chilean military looked “hopeless.” Accordingly, he halted further approaches; President Nixon concurred. But a group of plotters, who at one time had been armed by the CIA, tried to kidnap General Schneider on 22 October. General Schneider resisted and was killed. The Chilean Congress elected Mr. Allende on 24 October; he took office nine days later.

Back in July, President Nixon had commissioned a study of what policy and strategy to pursue if Mr. Allende won. After several revisions, the Interdepartmental Group circulated a draft on 3 November. Mr. Allende, it predicted, would “seek to establish as soon as possible an authoritarian system following Marxist principles.” His government, moreover, would display “a profound anti-American bias” and work to eliminate US influence in Chile. The Group then outlined four options:

A. Treat Chile as a nation that, over the longer run, might become less hostile to US interests.
B. Maintain an outwardly correct posture, refrain from initiatives that Mr. Allende could turn to his political advantage, and act quietly to limit Mr. Allende’s freedom of action.
C. Maintain an outwardly correct posture, but make clear US opposition to the emergence of a communist government and act positively to retain the initiative vis-à-vis Mr. Allende. Option C assumed that, ultimately, a satisfactory modus vivendi would prove impossible and confrontations were inevitable.
D. In addition to the steps of Option C, adopt without delay economic, political, and military measures designed to prevent Mr. Allende from consolidating his position.

The Director, Joint Staff, and Assistant Secretary Nutter recommended adopting option C.

When the NSC convened on 6 November, a few days after Mr. Allende took office, President Nixon warned that “the danger lies in an impression that communism isn’t too bad—that Allende doesn’t have horns and is doing a good job. . . . The stakes are high.” Three days later, through NSDM 93, he ruled that Option C would form the basis of US policy. The administration’s public posture should be “correct but cool,” to avoid giving Mr. Allende a basis for rallying domestic and international support. Additionally, the United States would seek to put maximum pressure upon Mr. Allende’s regime, “to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to US interests.” Among other things, President Nixon called for close consultation with Latin American governments—particularly Argentina and Brazil—in coordinating opposition to Chilean moves “which may be contrary to our mutual interests.” Toward that end, he wanted greater efforts “to establish and maintain close relations with friendly military leaders in the hemisphere.”

One way of embarrassing President Allende might be to oust Chile from the Inter-American Defense Board, but the Director, Joint Staff, opposed such an effort. Writing to Admiral Moorer on 25 November, he saw no evidence that Chile’s new
government was trying to subvert the armed forces. Moreover, NSDM 93 called for maintaining close relations with friendly military leaders. In all probability, too, the United States could not muster the majority necessary to exclude Chile from the Board. Many Latin Americans sympathized with the Chilean military’s continuing support for a democratic system of government. Therefore, attempting to oust Chile without demonstrating a danger to hemispheric security would alienate most Latin Americans, Chileans included, and severely damage US leadership on the Board. The administration took no action.

Admiral Zumwalt sought a policy that could deal with Cuba as well as Chile. Late in October, he proposed putting the threat posed by communist bases on the NSC agenda. Among themselves, on 30 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed reports that the Soviets might be planning to establish a merchant marine base in Chile. They decided to prepare an evaluation of the threat and formulate countermeasures. The final memorandum, which they sent to Secretary Laird on 28 December, stated that the Soviets had increased both their strategic power and their ability to project it. Concurrently, the hemisphere had witnessed significant political changes—particularly in Chile, which President Allende was rapidly transforming into “a Marxist-socialist state.” Over the longer term, they warned, nationalistic appeals for greater economic and political independence from the United States seemed likely to increase. These, in turn, could lead to expanded contacts between communist and Latin American states.

Continuing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rated subversion and intelligence activities as the most likely threats. Potentially, of course, the most dangerous threat would come from bases supporting Soviet military forces. They recommended bringing this whole matter before the NSC, in order to formulate a more definitive policy for the hemisphere, and to determine ways of dealing with the threat. Countermeasures might include political, economic, psychological, and military actions. If military force was chosen, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored proceeding under the auspices of the Organization of American States. Deputy Secretary Packard replied that their views would be considered during the policy review directed by NSSM 108, described earlier.

In mid-February 1971, when Admiral Zumwalt made an official visit to Chile, President Allende suggested to him that the carrier Enterprise pay a port call at Valparaiso. Admiral Zumwalt spoke with his Chilean counterpart, who argued that a visit would strengthen the Chilean military’s prestige as well as its reputation for being non-political. A visit also would help slow the erosion of democratic institutions. On 25 February, President Allende issued a formal invitation. Admiral Zumwalt told Admiral Moorer that he favored acceptance. Admiral Moorer advised Dr. Kissinger’s deputy that he too favored a port call, “but I would not fall on my sword if it did not come to pass.” An Enterprise visit, he thought, might boost morale among the Chilean military. On the other hand, Admiral Moorer cautioned, President Allende might say, “See how well I am getting along with Americans. All your fears about a confrontation are unfounded.” Secretary Rogers and Director Helms opposed a port call, and President Nixon disapproved the visit.
President Allende did pursue anti-American policies. He travelled to Moscow and Havana and nationalized US-owned copper mines without compensation. Unusually, in August 1971, Admiral Moorer received a group of Anaconda Copper executives, who explained that “Chile is the largest source of non-ferrous metals in the world and it would be unwise for the United States to lose all interests in the area.” Domestically, President Allende’s efforts to impose radical changes by extraordinary means polarized his country. On 11 September 1973, military leaders carried out a coup. President Allende died in the presidential palace—whether by execution or suicide is still debated.

Summation

Clearly, the autumn of 1970 marked a turning point. Construction of a submarine base in Cuba and Salvador Allende’s election in Chile moved President Nixon toward more active, if not directly confrontational policies. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished, the administration won from Moscow an understanding severely limiting Cienfuegos’ use by Soviet ships. Also, as they wished, Southern Command was preserved and reductions in US military missions ended. But approvals of aircraft sales, to which they attached great importance, hardly increased at all. Towards Mr. Allende, President Nixon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw eye to eye. Towards Panama, however, a major difference developed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued strongly for an open-ended treaty. Yet, in 1971, President Nixon agreed to accept a fixed termination date. Probably, from the standpoint of long-term importance, that was his most important decision about Latin America.
The Arab-Israeli Impasse

Seeking a “Balanced” Approach

The Nixon administration inherited a dangerous situation in the Middle East. There, since Israel’s creation in 1948, the Arab-Israeli confrontation had overshadowed everything else. During the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel won a smashing victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israeli forces quickly overran the entire Sinai and the Gaza Strip, reaching the east bank of the Suez Canal; they captured the Arab sector of Jerusalem as well as the whole West Bank with its large Palestinian population; and they seized the Golan Heights from Syria. Egypt and Syria severed diplomatic relations with the United States, due to their perception of US military collusion with Israel.

How might a peace settlement be achieved? On 22 November 1967, through Resolution 242, the United Nations Security Council affirmed that

a just and lasting peace . . . should include the application of both the following principles:
1. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,
2. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.¹

The UN Secretary General appointed a Swedish diplomat, Gunnar V. Jarring, to act as mediator. Yet, during the next twelve months, peace efforts went nowhere. Israeli officials said that they would not withdraw from Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and that Israeli troops must continue to be stationed along the Jordan River and at Sharm
as-Shaykh, facing the Strait of Tiran. The Arab position demanded a total Israeli withdrawal in return for diplomatic recognition and declarations of non-belligerency—but not a peace treaty.

Diplomatically and militarily, between 1965 and 1968, the Johnson administration had aligned itself ever more closely with Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, conversely, supported a more neutral approach to the region. In 1965, when Israel wanted to purchase US tanks, aircraft, and artillery, they recommended that “every attempt . . . be made to avoid a polarization . . . whereby the United States would become identified with Israel and the USSR with the Arab World.” Similarly, after the Six Day War, they maintained that “from a strictly objective point of view, the costs of close US association with Israel outweigh any conceivable advantages.” Late in 1967, Israel began pressing for permission to purchase 50 supersonic F-4 fighter-bombers. General Wheeler advised that, on purely military grounds, “a logical case” could be made for providing them. But the introduction of an advanced fighter bomber into the region would alter the balance of power decisively in Israel’s favor. ISA stubbornly opposed any F-4 sales to Israel until the President made clear that Israel would receive the aircraft. On 27 December 1968, the two governments concluded a 50-plane sales agreement. Also, commitments had been made to supply 100 A-4 subsonic attack aircraft. These sales were not linked to progress in peace negotiations.

The new Nixon administration faced a fundamental choice. After the 1967 war, France refused to sell military aircraft or equipment to Israel. For all practical purposes, the French decision left the United States as Israel’s sole arms supplier. There was opportunity and danger in that role. Suppose that Washington filled Tel Aviv’s arms requests without attaching any political conditions. Would a strong Israel, confident of US support, be ready to run risks for peace? Suppose, instead, that the United States tied arms supply to diplomatic progress. Could Israel be pressured into concessions, and the Arabs induced to moderate their aims?

On 21 January 1969, President Nixon ordered two studies prepared for NSC consideration. The first would analyze alternative approaches to a peace settlement; the second would assess basic US interests in the Middle East. Just nine days later, the Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Near East and South Asia completed both drafts. In its first study, the Group advocated actively seeking an early Arab-Israeli settlement. Without one, it warned, the US position in the Middle East would gradually deteriorate. The Group suggested a combination of UN mediation efforts, US-USSR negotiations, and four-power discussions involving the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. In its second study, the Group attributed deep US involvement to two causes: first, “because we wish to assure the survival of Israel”; and second, “because, in terms of our global strategic interests, we do not wish the land mass, population, and resources of the eastern Arab world to fall under Soviet domination.” The Group listed US interests, in descending order of importance, as follows: avoiding a Soviet-American military confrontation; preventing the introduction of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons; avoiding any situation that would require US
forces to intervene in an Arab-Israeli conflict; averting another full-scale war between the protagonists; continuing the US interest in Israel's ability to defend herself against any Arab combination; and assuring access to Arab oil as well as transit through the area.

The Soviet Union, the Group believed, was still a long way from dominating this region. The US position appeared strong because both Arabs and Soviets recognized that only the United States could effectively influence Israel, while Israel knew that US support was essential to her long-run survival. “However, if the Arabs lose hope that we will use our influence, or if the Israelis conclude that we will not use it no matter what they do, these elements of strength will rapidly become wasting assets.” Consequently, the Group recommended pursuing a general Arab-Israeli settlement. ISA’s representative, who was less optimistic, favored concentrating on an agreement between Israel and Jordan, ruled by the moderate pro-western King Hussein.3

During an NSC meeting on 1 February, a State Department representative argued that “the United States would have to deliver Israeli agreement” on a peace settlement. But Dr. Kissinger feared that an all-out peace effort probably would fail. He recommended, and President Nixon approved, pursuing US-USSR as well as four-power talks. Soviet-American exchanges began during March; four-power discussions started in April. The State Department prepared a draft of general principles, involving a binding contractual agreement between Israel and the Arab nations. There could be minimal changes from the pre-war borders, according to State’s draft, but these should not reflect the weight of conquest.4

Meanwhile, as part of a wide-ranging “inventory” required by NSSM 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appraised the Arab-Israeli military balance. Except for aircraft, they reported in February, Israel possessed more equipment than when the Six Day War began. And, during 1969-70, Israel would be receiving 44 F-4 Phantoms as well as 64 A-4 Skyhawks. The Arabs had good weapons but would need years to effect fundamental improvements in leadership and morale. Thus, barring the loss of external support, Israel could maintain a clear qualitative superiority during the next ten years. Secretary Laird promptly forwarded these findings to the White House.5

Whether to provide weapons was an urgent issue because the 1967 cease-fire had broken down. There were frequent militant Palestinian “Fedayeen” raids from Jordan and sharp Israeli counterblows. Along the Suez Canal, Israeli and Egyptian forces dueled almost daily. Early in July 1969, Israelis let General Wheeler know that they wished to purchase 25 F-4s and 10 A-4s, beyond the 50 F-4s and 100 A-4s which the US government already had agreed to sell. General Wheeler, in turn, asked the Joint Staff (in collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Agency) to assess the Arab-Israeli balance. This was done. On 6 September, General Wheeler advised Secretary Laird that, in ground equipment, ratios were essentially those that had existed just before the Six Day War. But in high-performance aircraft (F-4s versus MiG-21s), Israel would be at its greatest disadvantage from late 1969 until early 1970. Previously, according to US estimates, Israel could have prevailed even over a 4 to 1 Arab advantage in
this category. Now, the Egyptians had not only built more than 400 hangars but also were dispersing and rotating their Soviet-supplied aircraft. Consequently, the Israelis could not gain air superiority as easily as in 1967. Instead of destroying planes on the ground, they probably would have to win supremacy through air-to-air combat. General Wheeler concluded, therefore, that a lower ratio of 3 or 3.5 to 1 might be militarily more justifiable.

The administration had agreed to deliver eight F-4s in September and four per month thereafter. General Wheeler recommended giving “serious consideration” to selling an additional 25 F-4s, with the final decision depending upon political and military developments. As for A-4s, Wheeler found that Israel’s request for 100 more had considerable merit. If another 100 were delivered, the Arab-Israeli ratio in medium-performance aircraft would continue unchanged at 1.7 to 1. He added, though, that additional A-4s should be sold only on condition that they replaced older French aircraft, approximately on a one-for-one basis.6

During the remainder of 1969, two-power and four-power talks accomplished nothing. On 9 December, Secretary of State Rogers publicly outlined what he called a “balanced” US policy. He stressed the need for reliable security arrangements. However, any changes in the pre-war borders “should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security.”7

Israel Gets Aircraft without Political Conditions

Along the Suez Canal, over the winter months, the Israeli-Egyptian duel escalated. Meanwhile, the first F-4s had reached Israel in September 1969, and four months later the Israelis began employing them to hit military targets around Cairo and in the Nile delta. Humiliated, Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser flew to Moscow and persuaded the Soviets to provide a full air defense umbrella: new SA-3 and improved SA-2 surface-to-air missiles plus MiG-21s. By the end of March 1970, there were between 6,500 and 8,000 Soviet personnel in Egypt, including 4,000 missile crewmen and 60 to 80 pilots. Their numbers grew steadily. Israelis continued deep-penetration raids and struck at SAM emplacements being built west of the Canal.8

Arguing that United States and Israeli interests were not the same, the Defense Department opposed meeting all of Israel’s September 1969 arms requests. As the Director, Joint Staff, and the Acting Assistant Secretary (ISA) put it:

It is important that we not get stampeded into ad hoc arms decisions on the grounds of maintaining our ‘special relationship’ with Israel for purposes of ‘bringing them along’ on a settlement. To give in to Israeli requests at a time when they are significantly expanding their offensive operations . . . is likely to make Israel more intransigent. Past failure to insist on trade-offs has in no way softened Israeli policies, nor is continued one-sided support likely to pave the way for future use of US pressure tactics.
On 2 March, President Nixon decided to defer consideration of requests for more F-4s and A-4s. Yet the administration also was pressing Israel to accept a cease-fire along the Canal. Accordingly, as an inducement, the President agreed to replace Israeli losses with as many as eight F-4s and 20 A-4s during 1970. Dr. Kissinger so informed the Israeli ambassador on 12 March. President Nixon then ordered DOD to prepare a plan for speedy aircraft deliveries, should the necessity arise. In an interim reply, dated 6 April, Secretary Laird advised that as many as 20 F-4s could be furnished on short notice. But substantial numbers of aircraft might not always be available. Also, knowledge that a reserve existed might encourage the Israelis to carry out high-risk attacks. One month later, through a detailed study, ISA concluded that no further action appeared necessary to ensure the availability of F-4s and A-4s. On 21 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird that they endorsed these findings, with minor modifications.

Meantime, Israel ended deep penetration raids and shifted the focus of strikes to the Delta, which still was clear of a Soviet presence. Egypt, in turn, escalated incidents along the Canal, and in response, on 23 April, Israel asked for deliveries of 28 F-4s and 56 A-4s during 1970. By early June, according to firm intelligence, the Soviet presence in Egypt included four to five regiments of SA-3 SAMs and three to five MiG-21 squadrons. At this point, the administration authorized a broad review of US policy. General Wheeler promptly provided Assistant Secretary (ISA) Warren Nutter with a proposed peace initiative:

1. Arabs would end the state of belligerency and recognize Israel as an independent state, although formal recognition was not a necessity.
2. Arab governments would stop supporting Palestinian guerrillas and deny them any base of operations.
3. Israel would withdraw from the territories of states agreeing to (1) and (2) above.
4. Arabs and Israelis would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons.
5. Jerusalem would be declared a demilitarized and open city, possibly under tripartite administration (UN, Arabs, and Israel).
6. UN forces would be stationed at Sharm as-Shaykh and on both sides of Israel’s borders.
7. The Gaza Strip would be part of Israel but acquire special status and a UN-supervised Arab administration.
8. Egypt would guarantee free transit for ships of all nations through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.
9. Palestinian refugees would be resettled under UN auspices, with Israel bearing a fixed portion of the costs.
10. Arab governments would allow their Jewish citizens to emigrate to Israel.
11. The United Nations would guarantee all states’ territorial integrity, punishing violators by force if necessary.
The “Big Four” (US, UK, USSR, and France) would sign a protocol to guarantee the terms of settlement, limit the supply of arms, and refrain from intervening with their own forces.

If the Arabs rejected these terms, General Wheeler reasoned, any subsequent sale of US equipment to Israel could be justified. Should the Israelis reject these terms, they would be put on notice that the implicit US guarantee of Israel's security had become contingent upon their actions being consistent with US national interests.

On 5 June, Secretary Laird sent President Nixon a lengthy memorandum with which General Wheeler concurred. Mr. Laird began by stressing the need for a major peace initiative. Israel's acceptance of a phased withdrawal, conditioned upon reciprocal Arab moves, would “unstop the bottle.” While this diplomatic effort was being mounted, the United States should not sell any more aircraft to Israel: “against the Arabs they are unnecessary, and against the Soviets they would be insufficient.” Providing more F-4s, aircraft which had come to symbolize Israel's power and her identification with the United States, would darken the American image in Arab eyes and strengthen Soviet influence. Secretary Laird argued that “expanding our commitment to Israel, by proposing or implying that US forces would be used directly to support Israel under any circumstances, is unacceptable. We cannot overstate the importance of this reservation.” Israel's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty deepened Mr. Laird's conviction that the Arab-Israeli conflict contained a very real potential for Soviet-American nuclear confrontation. His conclusion about how to react if either Arabs or Israelis refused to cooperate with a peace initiative paralleled precisely the words of General Wheeler's memorandum.

Four days later, Secretary Rogers gave the President a significantly different set of recommendations. He too advocated a peace initiative. But, in his judgment, direct Soviet involvement had changed the Arab-Israeli balance. Secretary Rogers cited an intelligence forecast that Israel, facing a prolonged war of attrition, would be forced either to abandon the Suez Canal or to attempt major pre-emptive strikes. Secretly, therefore, Israel should be advised that the United States would:

1. Accelerate delivery of the last six of the fifty F-4s sold in 1968 from early 1971 to July and August 1970.
2. Deliver monthly, between September and December 1970, four F-4s and four A-4s to replace past and projected Israeli losses. These aircraft might be withheld if negotiations showed signs of progress.
3. Complete contingency plans for quick deliveries.
4. Respond affirmatively to other Israeli requests (e.g., Hawk surface-to-air missiles, tanks, radar equipment, and aircraft spare parts).

Through talking papers prepared for Admiral Moorer, who was Acting Chairman, ISA and the Joint Staff sharply criticized Secretary Rogers' arguments. His approach, they said, ignored the proven ineffectiveness of supplying aircraft in hopes of softening
Israel's political stand. Also, Secretary Rogers failed to indicate what action the United States would take if Israel refused to make negotiating concessions, and he based US policy upon Israel's interests. Moreover, according to intelligence appraisals, Israel could sustain her current rate of attrition and needed no more aircraft. Finally, they argued, Mr. Rogers' strategy would commit the United States to a major confrontation with the USSR, if necessary, in support not only of Israel's right to exist but also of her right to refuse to leave the occupied territories, except in exchange for total peace:

Incredibly, the decision on whether we are to carry such a confrontation through to an actual nuclear exchange or to a major conventional war . . . is nowhere considered. Equally incredibly, it is Israel which in the final analysis will make this life-or-death decision for us, by giving or [withholding] negotiating concessions, or by restricting or expanding its own military operations. We are committed to providing Israel's needs first and asking questions later.15

The Senior Review Group met on 8 June, with Admiral Moorer in attendance. “If the US won't make commitments to Israel,” Dr. Kissinger asked, “then how can Israel afford to reduce her boundaries?” Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson said that “we should be prepared to go as far as we can to defend Israel within her old [pre-1967] borders.” The Acting Assistant Secretary (ISA) countered that “the stakes are simply not high enough for the US to risk a confrontation with the Soviets.” The Group concluded—wrongly, as it turned out—that “a settlement is the only solution and that the Israelis cannot tolerate an attritional war.”16

The next day, in preparation for an NSC meeting, Assistant Secretary Nutter and the Director, Joint Staff, urged Deputy Secretary Packard and Admiral Moorer to seek decisions, among other things,

- against a policy of confrontation, or implied confrontation, with the Soviets in the absence of meaningful Israeli concessions;
- for clear recognition of the principle of quid pro quo, recognizing that our best hope of gaining Israel's cooperation is by using our leverage rather than giving it away in advance;
- against a decision at this time to supply additional F-4s . . . ;
- for insisting on greater Israeli flexibility in its approach to a settlement. . . .17

In the NSC meeting on 10 June, Secretary Rogers said that “the US has no alternative other than to sell aircraft to Israel.” Dr. Kissinger focused on the significance of Soviet intervention. Could the United States, while still embroiled in Vietnam, afford a confrontation in the Middle East? From that perspective, Dr. Kissinger argued, the US problem lay in providing Israelis with enough to make them feel secure but not enough to make them feel overly aggressive. Militarily, Mr. Packard cautioned, US intervention would be difficult: “We have long supply lines and it is doubtful whether our allies in the Mediterranean will assist.” The Defense Department, Mr. Packard continued, saw this as the last opportunity for negotiations; providing Israel with aircraft too soon would jeopardize the chances of success. President Nixon leaned toward earmarking
aircraft for later delivery. At bottom, however, the NSC discussion was not about Arabs versus Israelis. President Nixon described the “fundamental issue” as a power struggle between the United States and the USSR. Historically, he explained, the Soviets had started slowly and surged forward later. Therefore, “the US must convince the Soviets that they face confrontation at some point and then we must work out a political settlement.” No such settlement could come about, he emphasized, unless the great powers imposed one.

On 18 June, through NSDM 66, President Nixon essentially approved Secretary Rogers’ recommendations. First, increase from four to five the number of F-4s scheduled for delivery during September and October 1970. Second, inform Israel that five F-4s would be delivered in September, unless their arrival would jeopardize negotiations then in progress. Third, respond “promptly and affirmatively” to other Israeli arms requests. In all, Israel would receive 24 F-4s and 16 A-4s between July and December 1970. The President chose numbers that would replace past and projected Israeli losses, without increasing Israel’s aircraft inventory. President Nixon saw the issue primarily in terms of superpower rivalry, and acted accordingly. In Dr. Kissinger’s words, “we were experiencing for the first time in the Nixon administration the Soviet technique of using a military presence to enhance geopolitical influence.”

On 25 June, Secretary Rogers publicly announced what he called “a major political initiative, the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking.” Privately, the United States asked all parties to agree upon a three-month cease-fire and a military standstill within 50 kilometers of the Canal. During the cease-fire, there should be negotiations centering upon: Arab acknowledgement of Israel’s right to exist; Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; pledges to implement UN Resolution 242, including free passage through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran; and settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem.

In Egypt, however, fighting continued. Soviet and Egyptian technicians set about establishing three SA-3 and eleven SA-2 sites within 20 to 30 nautical miles of the Canal. Striking with F-4s supported by A-4s that carried jamming equipment, Israel contained the missile sites’ eastward advance, but aircraft were lost and crews neared exhaustion. Loses on both sides led Egypt and Israel to agree to a cease-fire and standstill within zones extending 50 miles east and west of the Canal, taking effect on 7 August.

Few agreements have produced such short-lived euphoria. On 10 August, Israel charged that Egypt was continuing to deploy SAMs within the standstill zone. Already, Israel had asked Washington for military aid, and especially for weapons that would suppress the SAMs. Through NSSM 98, President Nixon ordered State, Defense and Central Intelligence to study a range of options. On 12 August, the Senior Review Group agreed on a $7 million “assurance” package for Israel that included cluster bomb units, Shrike anti-radar air-to-surface missiles, and electronic intelligence gear. Two days later, Deputy Secretary Packard showed this proposal to the Israeli ambassador, General Yitzhak Rabin. This equipment, said Mr. Packard, could be used only if the
cease-fire collapsed and then only within the standstill zone. President Nixon then approved the rapid delivery of air-to-surface missiles for use against SA-3 complexes.24

Concurrently, responding to NSSM 98, the NSC Staff developed several alternatives, ranging from the provision of monitoring equipment to pre-emptive Israeli strikes and full-scale US intervention. On 19 August, U-2 flights brought confirmation of standstill violations by Egypt. The next day, Admiral Moorer reviewed options with Mr. Packard and other OSD officials. Suppose, said one official, that the Egyptians exerted pressure, the Israelis exhausted their weapons in a “surge” response, and the Egyptians exerted pressure again a week later. Theoretically, Admiral Moorer answered, that might happen; realistically, the Egyptians could not keep exerting pressure week after week. Conferees decided to charge DOD’s newly-created Middle East Task Group with studying a possible “war of technology” and developing a strategy to defend along the Suez Canal.25 On 26 August, during a JCS meeting, Admiral Moorer posed the basic question: “How can we give [the Israelis] enough to make them feel secure, but not enough so that they will ‘charge off in an attack’?”26

On 29 August, Secretary Laird wrote Dr. Kissinger that starting discussions with the Israelis about a strategy for defending the Canal would be counter-productive. Israel should not be encouraged to seek some military alternative to a peace settlement: “In reality, there is no longer a cheap way to defend the Canal. . . . I am convinced that both we and the Israelis should be bending our efforts to strategies and equipment needed to ensure Israel’s security after it signs a treaty.”27

Publicly, on 3 September, the State Department revealed Egyptian violations of the standstill agreement. The next day, at a JCS meeting, Admiral Moorer said that

the real question was what would the United States do if cease-fire negotiations broke down. When one looks at our overall capabilities—the situation in Turkey and Greece, our base and overflight rights in that area—we are in bad shape [and] we should be very cautious about getting ourselves committed. . . . We don’t have contingency plans in a military sense.

Israel, on 6 September, withdrew from peace talks until Egyptian violations had been rectified.28 Efforts at creating a climate more conducive to peace negotiations collapsed, creating an even more explosive situation.

Crisis over Jordan

An explosion did occur. But it occurred in Jordan, not along the Suez Canal. During the Six Day War, King Hussein had lost the West Bank of the Jordan. Palestinian refugees crowded into his country; fedayeen guerrillas used Jordan as a base for raids against Israel. Yet the King remained pro-Western and relied upon the United States to fill his arsenal. In 1968, the Johnson administration agreed to provide $86 million worth of equipment over 2½ fiscal years. Early in April 1969, Hussein’s chief
of staff arrived in Washington with a sizable shopping list: $50 million worth of ground equipment to be delivered during 1969 and F-4s that would cost $90 million. The Johnson administration had promised to sell 18 F-104 interceptors and consider selling another 18 later. As yet, though, no planes had been delivered. After reviewing the Jordanian requests of April 1969, General Wheeler recommended being “as forthcoming as possible,” making some deliveries during 1969. On 24 April, the US and Jordanian governments announced a sale of equipment costing $30 million plus agreement in principle to sell 18 more F-104s. Deliveries of the 18 F-104s promised earlier took place between June and November 1969.29

As 1970 opened, King Hussein faced a major challenge from Palestinian dissidents. In the streets of Amman, his capital, fedayeen openly carried weapons and attempted to enforce their own regulations. The opening round of fighting between the Palestinians and Hussein's army, recruited largely from Bedouins, occurred in June. On 7 August, King Hussein joined President Nasser in agreeing to a cease-fire with Israel. Palestinians denounced the King's decision as a betrayal of their cause. On 1 September, some Palestinians tried to assassinate King Hussein and failed. Clashes between the fedayeen and Hussein's army followed immediately.30

On 6 September, fedayeen hijackers seized a TWA and a Swissair jetliner, forcing both to land at Dawson Field, a remote desert airstrip 30 miles west of Amman. The taking of American hostages directly involved the United States in Jordan's turmoil. That evening, President Nixon ordered the carrier USS Independence to sail to the eastern Mediterranean. He also directed that land-based aircraft begin deploying forward; six C-130 transports flew to Incirlik, Turkey. President Nixon was particularly concerned that unless Hussein allowed his Bedouin soldiers to move against the fedayeen, the king might face an army revolt. If Hussein did act, the President wanted to assure him of active US support. There were Iraqi soldiers in Jordan, and Syrian troops might join them in supporting the fedayeen. President Nixon inclined toward a heavy use of US air power but did not rule out committing ground forces. He ordered the immediate plans for: evacuating US citizens from Jordan; conducting a quick, punitive action if the hostages were killed; and US intervention at Hussein's request if civil war erupted. Jordan's instability, Mr. Nixon believed, prevented any real peace in the Middle East.31

The Washington Special Actions Group convened at 1130 on 9 September. Admiral Moorer reported that contingency plans were complete and forces available. Reaction time, he emphasized, depended upon how much warning was received. Initially, if King Hussein's army needed help, one brigade from Europe could reach Jordan in 48 hours; brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, could arrive in 72 hours. But the whole combat-ready strategic reserve then would be committed, and sustained operations would be difficult. “In short,” said Admiral Moorer, “I do not think it wise to commit US ground forces to the Middle East in such a manner.”32 On this day, a British airliner was hijacked and brought to Dawson Field.

On 10 September, Admiral Moorer advised the WSAG that, by raising the condition of readiness of US forces in Europe, their reaction time had been halved. Dr. Kissinger
called for a study of whether and how the United States could conduct sustained military operations in Jordan. The next day, State Department officials met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review military alternatives. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, cautioned that “if the King asks for [US] help it is the kiss of death” for him. Admiral Moorer agreed: “I want to make it clear that not a man present would recommend that we get involved.” Afterward, in a JCS meeting, General Westmoreland proposed moving one Army brigade to Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus. Admiral Zumwalt disagreed: “We can’t feed you in that area. Unless we struck first, and I rule that out, we can’t keep the [lines of communication] open.”

Their exchange continued: General Westmoreland: “You don’t think you could confront and overwhelm the Soviets in the Med?” Admiral Zumwalt: “Not against the Soviet Navy and their air. . . .” Admiral Moorer: “You could block the Straits of Gibraltar. If we got control of the subs in the Med then the Soviets would turn to an area outside the Med. . . . I have trouble visualizing the US and Soviets fighting a limited war.”

On 12 September, the fedayeen blew up three empty airliners and released some of the hostages. Three days later, King Hussein informed the US ambassador that he intended to re-establish “law and order” in his capital—in other words, to crush the fedayeen. The WSAG convened at 0730 on 17 September, just after hearing that the King’s army had moved into Amman. Dr. Kissinger asked, “Are we all agreed that victory for Hussein is essential from our point of view?” Everyone did agree, emphatically. Dr. Kissinger then asked, “What is our military situation?” That very afternoon, Admiral Moorer replied, two carriers—Saratoga and Independence—would rendezvous south of Cyprus; the carrier John F. Kennedy could join them by 25 September. An amphibious task force, carrying one Marine battalion but no helicopters, could reach the coast in 36 hours.

The WSAG debated whether to employ US or Israeli air power. Dr. Kissinger said that the President leaned toward using US aircraft. However, if King Hussein seemed near collapse, an Israeli move appeared highly probable. “It is important,” Admiral Moorer warned, “that we don’t use both US and Israeli air.” All those present opposed a joint operation. President Nixon decided to send a third carrier, the John F. Kennedy, from the East Coast into the Mediterranean, probably as far east as Crete. Also, the LPH Guam with Marines and helicopters aboard would sail from the East Coast on 19 September. Finally, the WSAG decided to pull back five of the six C-130s at Incirlik, and not ask Turkey for base or overflight rights unless the Egyptian government publicly supported Hussein.

On 19 September, Admiral Moorer briefed the WSAG about a JCS study of land-based air operations. Only from Turkey, he reported, could operations commence on short notice—at once, with 18 F-4s; after seven days, with 54. But, Dr. Kissinger said, the WSAG had judged that there was no chance of winning Turkish approval. Then, Admiral Moorer replied, “We are left with Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete, and Athens. All of these would require refueling by tanker.” Subsequently, the WSAG decided that planners should rely entirely on carrier-based aircraft.
King Hussein's army gained ground steadily in Amman. Then Syria, a radical state and a Soviet client, intervened to save the fedayeen. At 0600 on 20 September, Hussein informed Ambassador Dean Brown that that two major incursions by Syrian tanks had taken place. The King requested US, UK, or Israeli air strikes.

When the WSAG assembled at 1910, Dr. Kissinger asked about King Hussein's military prospects. “It’s nip and tuck,” Admiral Moorer answered, “whether the Jordanian forces in the North can handle the Syrians.” Overall, King Hussein's forces had about 500 tanks, Syria around 700. Qualitatively, though, the King's armor was superior. After meeting with President Nixon, the WSAG decided to pass King Hussein's request for an air strike along to Israel. It also recommended placing the 82nd Airborne Division on alert, raising an airborne brigade already in Europe to an advanced state of readiness, and sending a carrier plane to Tel Aviv where it would collect the latest Israeli intelligence. The President immediately approved these steps, saying that he was determined to stop Syria's attack.

Syrian troops occupied the city of Irbid, ten miles inside Jordan. Around 2200, Hussein appealed to President Nixon for “immediate physical intervention both air and land . . . to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Jordan.” Dr. Kissinger promptly informed Ambassador Rabin that, if Israel reconnaissance indicated significant Syrian advances, the US government would look favorably upon an Israeli air strike, make good any of Israel's material needs, and—insofar as possible—protect Israel from Soviet reprisals.

The WSAG reconvened at midnight on 20–21 September. Dr. Kissinger asked whether Israel could deal with 200 Syrian tanks by air strikes alone. Admiral Moorer replied, “With a combination of Jordanian and Israeli forces, probably yes. . . . [However,] I wouldn't rule out Israeli ground movement.” The WSAG decided on steps that included: checking the existing arms packages for Israel, to be sure Israel had everything needed to protect its borders; preparing an aid package for Israel that would replace materiel expended against the Syrians; and drafting contingency plans for a possible Soviet response.36

The Israelis advised that ground as well as air action would be necessary. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger conferred at 0530 on 21 September. The President outlined "imperative" principles to control Israeli actions. The operation must succeed, diplomatically as well as militarily. Air strikes alone would be preferable, but if necessary, ground action by Israel would have US support. Any Israeli ground action, however, must be strictly limited to Jordan.37

When the NSC met at 0845, Admiral Moorer reported that a spearhead of 40 Syrian tanks apparently was heading south. Secretary Rogers argued that “Hussein has no future if he calls on Israel.” The President, however, was willing to run that risk. President Nixon preferred to rely on air strikes alone, but “if our military judgment is that success depends on ground action the Israelis must take ground action.” Secretary Laird argued against giving Israel a go-ahead just yet; President Nixon replied that...
“[t]he worst thing the US could do would be to delay too long in deference to either the Soviets or the King’s own inhibitions.”

King Hussein sent word that he would accept Israeli ground forces attacking the Syrians, but only if they engaged the Syrians outside Jordanian territory. When the WSAG gathered late that afternoon, Dr. Kissinger revealed that

The President has ordered that we explore with Rabin the possibility of encouraging the Israelis to move into Syria after all. . . . I realize we were all united against this yesterday on political grounds, but I would like to present some of the President’s reasoning. Israeli ground intervention will be very tough on Hussein. An attack on Syria will be less dangerous to him. . . . Also, it would be easier to get Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory than from Jordanian territory.38

By the WSAG’s next meeting at 0830 on 22 September, things looked brighter. The Soviets, in their diplomatic notes, seemed much less truculent. According to the latest intelligence, Syria had lost 120 tanks—between 60 and 90 in combat against the Jordanians, the rest to technical malfunctions. Dr. Kissinger asked whether any further readiness measures were needed. “Within our fiscal and political constraints,” Admiral Moorer reported, “we have done about everything we can now.” Dr. Kissinger asked for a list of measures to take in the Mediterranean and worldwide, if Israel intervened and the Soviets made threatening moves. “We are not trying to second-guess your contingency planning,” he assured Admiral Moorer, “we are trying to see what we could do in the form of signals to the other side.” Late that afternoon, Admiral Zumwalt proposed moving a carrier from the Pacific into the Red Sea; Admiral Moorer disapproved.39

Abruptly and unexpectedly, on 23 September, the crisis ended as Syrian armor pulled back across the border. American officials attributed this outcome to the presence of the Sixth Fleet off Lebanon’s coast, the massing of Israeli forces, and the performance of Hussein’s army. All these factors apparently, led Moscow to pressure the Syrians into a withdrawal.40 So King Hussein survived, and his army went on to defeat the fedayeen in Amman. A meeting of Arab leaders had convened in Cairo where on 27 September King Hussein and Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed a cease-fire agreement. Between 26 and 29 September, also, fedayeen released their hostages in exchange for comrades imprisoned in Western Europe.

King Hussein asked for US help in treating casualties and replenishing his army’s ammunition stockpile. General Westmoreland, as Acting Chairman, recommended on 29 September that 876,268 rounds of rifle ammunition be airlifted to Jordan, with more following by sea. Twenty C-141 flights took place between 4 and 15 October. Meanwhile, during 28–29 September, two mobile hospitals with their personnel were flown into Amman. To protect them, General Westmoreland proposed (1) keeping a carrier task group, plus the LPH Guam with embarked Marines, 100 miles off Israel’s coast and (2) maintaining in Europe the readiness posture of one composite airborne/infantry brigade with associated airlift. Those things were done. The State Department wanted to keep the two hospitals operating until 31 December, but OSD and the Joint
Staff cited their unsuitability for treating convalescents and the harm to US training and readiness. Under a compromise, US medical operations ended on 31 October, at which time hospital equipment was turned over to the Jordanians.\textsuperscript{41}

King Hussein wanted $9.7 million worth of equipment to replace battle losses; President Nixon authorized a $9.1 million shipment. The King also sought $186.6 million for a longer term modernization and mechanization program. To deal with threats from Iraq and Syria, he especially wanted F-5E interceptors and a combination of M-60 and upgraded M-48 tanks. Secretary Laird authorized the delivery of 28 M-60s.

In December 1970, the Senior Review Group agreed to support a $120 million program extending over three years. President Nixon gave his approval on 1 March 1971. The Defense Department preferred sending M-48s, but King Hussein apparently insisted upon M-60s. Accordingly, on 7 June 1971, Secretary Laird notified the King that 72 M-60s would be delivered between 1972 and 1974. Further, on 1 November 1972, President Nixon signed a certification that qualified Jordan as a recipient of “sophisticated weapon systems” such as the F-5E interceptor.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, in regional arms supply policy, Jordan still enjoyed a position second only to Israel.

\textbf{Israel Rejects Trading Territory for a Peace Treaty}

Success in Jordan did not move the Arab-Israeli impasse any closer to a solution. On 28 September, Egypt’s President Nasser suffered a fatal heart attack. Anwar Sadat succeeded him. Although US officials could not know it, this proved to be a transforming event. President Sadat would discard Mr. Nasser’s bellicose rhetoric and his radical pan-Arabism, slowly shifting away from Moscow and towards Washington.

The immediate problem lay in restoring talks between Egypt and Israel, which had been broken because of Egypt’s “standstill” violations. All parties continued observing the cease-fire. Could US arms deliveries bring Israel back to the negotiating table? On 23 September, President Nixon instructed Secretaries Laird and Rogers to discuss with Israeli representatives (1) what equipment would be needed to offset the advantages Egypt had gained through its standstill violations and (2) recommendations about Israel’s needs during FYs 1971–72. Nixon wanted Israeli requests to receive “sympathetic consideration.”\textsuperscript{43}

During 28–30 September, Deputy Secretary Packard conducted discussions with Israeli spokesmen. Apparently, Mr. Packard did not find their arguments very persuasive. On 3 October, he advised the President that Egypt had gained no important advantages. Even before the cease-fire, he concluded, Egypt had established effective air defenses almost up to the Suez Canal. Now, Mr. Packard concluded, Israel wanted enough equipment to attack and destroy practically every missile site. An all-out attack, though, could lead the Soviets to escalate hostilities, heightening the danger of a great power confrontation. Moreover, the United States did not espouse a policy of destroying all defenses when conducting its own operations, and so lacked sufficient stocks.
to support one by Israel. Therefore, Mr. Packard proposed providing a smaller list of items, in return for Israeli promises (1) to scale back their strategy and (2) to resume peace talks without a total SAM rollback.\cite{44}

Concurrently, President Nixon asked for an analysis of policy options before negotiations resumed. The State Department circulated a draft that covered possibilities ranging from extending the cease-fire to exploring an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian settlement. Assistant Secretary Nutter and the Director, Joint Staff, judged this draft to be seriously flawed. At some point, they advised Deputy Secretary Packard and Admiral Moorer, the administration must recognize that one of the greatest obstacles to a settlement probably would be Israel’s hardening position over what a peace map should look like. Israel wanted to acquire much more than the “insubstantial” adjustments suggested by Secretary Rogers in December, 1969:

> Specifically, we are opposed to further grant or sale of US equipment (particularly aircraft) except in the context of Israel’s agreement to accept the substance of UN Resolution 242 to which it has so far paid only lip service. …
> It is increasingly clear that no lasting peace will be possible which does not do something about creation of a Palestinian homeland. We suggest considering the West Bank for this purpose.

Therefore, they recommended supporting a US initiative to restart the momentum toward peace: “We have already provided more than enough to offset the violations, and it is now Israel’s turn to be forthcoming.”\cite{45}

President Nixon decided against demanding a quid pro quo. Through NSDM 87, on 15 October, he approved the items recommended by Mr. Packard but attached no political conditions to their sale. He did insist, though, that Israel neither break the cease-fire unilaterally with this equipment nor employ any of it beyond the standstill zone.\cite{46}

Already, Israel had submitted larger requests: 54 F-4s and 120 A-4s, each type to be delivered at a rate of three per month beginning in January 1971. Israelis claimed that, by 1973, Egypt and Syria would have 1,150 fighter aircraft. They wished, therefore, to have at least 350 of their own: 120 F-4s, 227 A-4s, 42 Mirages, and 21 Super Mysteres, less attrition of 50 to 60 aircraft.\cite{47}

Dr. Kissinger, supported by the State Department, believed that Israel should be promised new financial and military assistance prior to a resumption of peace negotiations. Israel, he argued, could negotiate only from a position of strength and confidence; the administration always could threaten a cutoff if peace talks began collapsing. On 18 November, Secretary Rogers assured Foreign Minister Abba Eban that the United States would not pressure Israel while peace talks were in progress. Secretary Laird argued, again, that he saw no justification for additional aircraft sales. On 2 December, Prime Minister Golda Meir\cite{48} reminded President Nixon that no decision had been made about continuing aircraft deliveries after 1970. She also sought assurances that Israel would be free to negotiate without reference to Secretary Rogers’ territorial proposals of December 1969.\cite{49}
On 15 December 1970, President Nixon gave Mrs. Meir an assurance that he was determined to keep the military balance from turning against Israel. Accordingly, he agreed to sell an additional 12 F-4s and 20 A-4s between January and June 1971. The President seems to have calculated that limiting sales commitments to short-term periods, and keeping the delivery rate lower than requested, would constitute an implicit reminder of Israel's dependence on the United States.50

The Israeli Cabinet, on 28 December, agreed to re-enter peace negotiations. The US government now faced some hard choices. On 11 January 1971, the Senior Review Group commissioned several studies. These were: what options to pursue if the talks became deadlocked, including a description of the kind of settlement that Washington could support; proposals for providing international guarantees of a settlement; measures to preserve or restore a cease-fire; and ways to minimize the lead time in aircraft procurement, should a decision be made to supply Israel with more planes.51

Meantime, US officials urged Gunnar Jarring, the UN mediator, to resume his mission by proposing something akin to Secretary Rogers' plan of December 1969. The Israelis gave Jarring terms that, implicitly, would allow Israel to keep some occupied territory. The Egyptians replied by requiring a total withdrawal. Next, on 8 February 1971, Ambassador Jarring proposed that Israel and Egypt simultaneously make the following commitments:

Israel would withdraw to the pre-war boundary, on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements would be made to establish demilitarized zones and guarantee freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal.

Egypt would enter into a peace agreement containing these features: terminate the state of belligerency; acknowledge Israel's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; recognize Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders; ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility did not originate within their respective territories; and avoid interference in each other's affairs.52

This was, in essence, Secretary Rogers' plan of December 1969.

Would a strategy of using arms sales to wean Israel away from an inflexible negotiating position prove workable? At a meeting on 8 February, the Senior Review Group reached a number of understandings:

1. Allow Israel to begin negotiations for the purchase of 18 additional A-4s, to be delivered during late 1972 and early 1973.
2. Postpone a decision on whether to sell more F-4s, but initiate the procurement of long-lead items.
3. State would develop a scenario describing ways in which the United States could, if necessary, press Israel to modify its position on borders and withdrawal.53

On 15 February, Egypt declared itself willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel, subject to Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and a just settlement of the
Palestinian refugee problem. Thus, to all appearances, President Sadat had accepted Jarring’s peace plan. On 21 February, however, Israel stated that a total withdrawal was unacceptable: “The Government reiterates . . . that Israel will not withdraw to the armistice lines of 4 June 1967.”

What to do next? Responding to the SRG’s “understanding” of 8 February, the State Department circulated an analysis of ways to bring about Israeli agreement. State discounted the effect of further inducements; so many already had been given that more would have only a minimal impact. The Department then indicated what coercive measures seemed most feasible. At the outset, the United States could inform Israel that, while no action would be taken to imperil her security, the acceptance of Jarring’s proposal was a matter of the highest US national interest. If Israel remained adamant, the administration might re-examine critical aspects of the US-Israeli relationship and inform Congress and the American public of its conviction that Israel had become the main stumbling block to peace. Additionally, the administration could slow down arms shipments to Israel and remain unresponsive to new requests.

State saw many pitfalls in trying to apply pressure. A coercive policy could engender bad feeling between the United States and Israel, strengthen Israeli “hawks,” encourage Arab intransigence, lead the Soviet Union to suspect that the US commitment to Israel had weakened, and create confusion among the American public as to the true purpose of US policy. In any event, the Israelis would not rapidly reverse themselves, since current policy stemmed from a Cabinet decision and was supported by a broad national consensus. Moreover, if and when talks took place, there would be long negotiations over many other matters (e.g., Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the refugee problem). How might the United States keep peace talks moving but avoid “shooting our wad” with Israel at the very outset? State suggested seeking an agreement to reopen the Suez Canal, thus buying time and preserving the momentum toward a peace settlement.

In a talking paper prepared for Admiral Moorer and Deputy Secretary Packard, Assistant Secretary Nutter and the Director, Joint Staff, delivered a powerfully worded critique of State’s position that recommended support for “any action needed” to win Israeli acceptance of Ambassador Jarring’s formula. Admittedly, some of the pressures they had in mind might be counter-productive in the short run. However, the extent of US support should be determined by Israel’s answer to Ambassador Jarring. For example, if Israel remained unyielding, the United States should not assist her in defending the occupied territories. The Assistant Secretary and the Director presented detailed rejoinders to State’s arguments against a coercive policy:

1. Creates US-Israeli tension: Such an approach awarded too much weight to the fact that “Israel won’t like it,” which was considerably less important than the need to win Israeli acceptance of Ambassador Jarring’s proposal. If peace resulted, the United States would win lasting Israeli gratitude. Most observers believed that the Israeli public was willing to trade territory for a permanent peace.
2. Encourages Arab intransigence: More probably, it would create a wave of pro-American and pro-peace sentiment. Conversely, failure to exert pressure on Israel would utterly destroy US standing in the Arab world.

3. Leads the Soviets to think the US commitment to Israel had weakened: There was no reason to believe this, and it was not vitally important in any case.

4. Confuses the American public: The opposite was true. Failure to exert pressure would appear to be a rejection of the administration’s entire prior position.

They concluded with the prediction:

The “moment of truth,” for the United States as well as Israel, has come and we must now recognize that we must deliver the Israelis, or face the full blame and consequences (up to and including renewed and expanded warfare and great-power confrontation) for a failure to do so.\textsuperscript{56}

The Israelis remained obdurate, refusing an Egyptian proposal to re-open the Suez Canal in exchange for a partial withdrawal. When the Senior Review Group met in mid-April, Assistant Secretary Sisco reported that “the Israelis are stonewalling us on the whole Jarring process,” rejecting every concept of international guarantees. A mutual defense treaty between Israel and the United States, he now believed, was “probably the one thing that may induce the Israelis to trade territory.” The conversation continued:

Dr. Kissinger: What kind of treaty do you mean?
Mr. Sisco: We would commit ourselves to support them whenever aggression was committed. We would agree to consult immediately at the time of aggression. There could be various formulas, but probably we would need a Presidential letter to Golda [Meir], followed by Congressional resolutions.

Egypt had proposed that forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union police the Sinai and Sharm as-Shaykh. These troops would act as observers, possess the right of self-defense, and be equipped with small arms and helicopters. However, as Sisco observed, “the problem is not the guarantees but proceeding to gain acceptance.” This led to the following exchange:

Deputy Secretary Packard: We need to know how far we are willing to go.
Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we are going to conclude that imposing a solution from the outside is the only way.
Mr. Sisco: We believe that the application of maximum pressure by the United States will be the only way.
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t believe the Israelis will accept the 1967 frontiers, and I have never believed this. I don’t see how we can obtain movement.\textsuperscript{57}

On 29 April, responding to a request from ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird their views about what a peacekeeping or observer force would require. The
essential element of peace, they said, lay in a “highly definitive” agreement negotiated by the parties themselves. Although a peacekeeping force of 12,000 would be preferable, the signatories might insist on a larger number, perhaps 24,000. The troops should come from neutral nations. However, if achieving an agreement depended on Four Power or US-USSR participation, then forces from those countries could be used, preferably in a support or advisory role. 58

The Suez Canal Stays Closed

A reopening of the Suez Canal, coupled with a partial Israeli withdrawal, offered hope of progress. In December 1970, Admiral Zumwalt urged his colleagues to establish a JCS position. The result, which they submitted to Secretary Laird on 1 May 1971, concluded that the Soviet Union would benefit more from reopening the Canal than would the United States. The Soviets recently had sent a naval force into the Indian Ocean, using ships based at Pacific ports. With the Canal open, however, that force could be augmented by the Black Sea fleet. A comparison of distances involved showed what the Soviets would gain: the south coast of Arabia was over 6,100 nautical miles from the nearest Pacific port but only 3,200 nautical miles from the Black Sea. For the United States, the Canal’s strategic value would be limited by constraints on using NATO-committed forces outside the NATO area, and by the fact that the largest aircraft carriers could not pass through the Canal.

Despite this relative disadvantage, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored reopening the Canal “in the interest of promoting peace and stability.” An interim agreement to reopen it might demonstrate good faith and facilitate progress toward a final settlement. Economically, a reopening would benefit the NATO allies, Japan, countries along the Indian Ocean littoral, and indirectly the United States. Moreover, to oppose its reopening would be to depart from the traditional US position that international waterways should be open to all shipping. For all these reasons, reopening “would be in the best interest of the United States.” They suggested, further, using US support for reopening as a means of inducing Egypt to reduce the Soviet military presence there. 59

Deputy Secretary Packard rejected the very last JCS suggestion as injudicious and ineffective. Since Israel already possessed a significant military superiority over Egypt, a Soviet withdrawal meant that Egypt and the USSR would have to accept an increase in Israel’s superiority without any compensating advantage. Moreover, the administration already had expressed support for reopening as part of an interim settlement. Attaching a condition now would be interpreted as a major change in the US position, intended to encourage Israeli intransigence. Further, Mr. Packard thought that the Joint Chiefs had underestimated the advantages that a reopening would bestow upon the United States. Besides facilitating US naval access to the Indian Ocean, and lessening the threat to NATO’s southern flank, reopening would increase Egypt’s revenue and enhance that country’s economic and political independence. Improving
US-Arab relations would provide greater assurance that Arab oil kept flowing. Moreover, “maritime rates would drop, the tanker shortage would ease, and the economic position of certain Indian Ocean states would be improved, enhancing their stability and reducing opportunities for Soviet exploitation.”

Secretary Laird, on 21 June, urged President Nixon to discard the policy of maintaining what was called a “military balance” in the region. Israel, he began, possessed overwhelming superiority. In such circumstances, new US commitments fostered overconfidence among Israelis, “which translates into today’s rigid posture” and provoked greater Soviet penetration of Egypt. As things stood, the commitment to preserving a “military balance” robbed the United States of any initiative and ignored “the very real differences between US and Israeli interests.” Secretary Laird advocated, instead, a policy of assuring “only an appropriate Israeli capability to defend its legitimate borders against Arab attack.” Nothing came of his recommendation.

On 4 October, Secretary Rogers stood before the UN General Assembly and described the US plan to reopen the Suez Canal. There would be a formal cease-fire with supervisory arrangements, a zone of withdrawal, an Egyptian presence east of the Canal, and reopening of the Canal to vessels of all nations. By taking these steps, the right climate would be created for further steps toward peace. Israel’s response was unfavorable. Besides other reservations, Israel particularly opposed an Egyptian presence on the east bank.

Secretary Rogers’ latest proposal received no effective support within the United Nations. Instead, on 13 December 1971, the General Assembly reaffirmed the principles of Resolution 242 and called on Israel to respond favorably to the Jarring initiative, it being considered that Egypt already had given a “positive reply.”

US Arms Keep Flowing to Israel

The administration had to consider whether to keep filling Israel’s arms requests. To do so would, in effect, reward Israel for rejecting US peace proposals. In mid-1971, the status of major Israeli requests stood as follows: 54 F-4s requested, 12 sold in accordance with the President’s decision of 15 December 1970; 120 A-4s requested, 20 sold in accordance with the President’s decision of 15 December 1970 and 18 more under the February 1971 agreement.

On 24 June, Ambassador Rabin discussed with Deputy Secretary Packard the possibility of acquiring 42 F-4s during FYs 1971–1972. Such a decision, Mr. Packard observed, would be easier if the Israelis could get serious peace negotiations started. Israel, Ambassador Rabin replied, could make no greater efforts in that direction. When Mr. Packard insisted that the Israelis could do more if they wished, Ambassador Rabin replied that Israel actually was willing to reopen the Canal and conduct a limited withdrawal. In light of Egyptian violations, however, Israel needed reassurance that Egypt would not use this as a screen behind which to prepare for new hostilities. In particular,
no Egyptians could be stationed on the east bank. Also, Ambassador Rabin added, there were certain bases which the Israelis “would be fools to give up.” He claimed that the Egyptians “have no real military option,” and closed with an observation that “sometimes it is best to do nothing and just stand still.”

On 16 July, Admiral Moorer flew to California for an NSC meeting at the Western White House. President Nixon asked him to assess the military balance between Israel and Egypt. Admiral Moorer replied that, while Egypt held a 4 to 1 edge in fighter aircraft, Israel still enjoyed qualitative superiority. If extensive hostilities occurred, Egypt might suffer heavy losses during the first days, but Israel would face a problem after that, as the Egyptians gained combat experience. Secretary Laird again proposed redefining “military balance,” to assure only that Israel could defend its legitimate interests. There was much discussion but no decision.

The administration had intended to decide about an A-4 sale by 1 September and about an F-4 sale by 1 October. Instead, on 17 August, Secretary Rogers asked the Secretary of Defense to extend these deadlines until 1 January 1972. Secretary Rogers believed a delay was necessary to avoid any action “at this critical juncture in our Middle East peace efforts that would foreclose any of the options open to the President in deciding where we go from here.” Secretary Laird agreed to an extension. The Defense Department had for some time argued that, since US A-4 and F-4 inventories were below desirable levels, further sales should come from new production. During September, Secretary Laird directed the Navy to start procuring 18 A-4s, and the Air Force to continue procuring 18 F-4s.

Pressure to approve aircraft sales increased after President Sadat visited Moscow in October and obtained a Soviet pledge of further assistance. Ambassador Rabin immediately renewed Israel’s appeal for F-4s. On 15 October, the Senate Minority Leader, Hugh Scott (R, PA), introduced a resolution calling on the administration to resume F-4 sales “without further delay.” Seventy-eight senators co-sponsored the resolution.

On 30 November 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Laird their appreciation of Israel's aircraft requirements. Israelis no longer could operate over Egyptian territory with impunity, but they still could defend themselves against Arab attack. This being so, the Joint Chiefs opposed selling aircraft at the rate requested by Israel (i.e., 82 A-4s and 42 F-4s, nearly all to be delivered before the end of 1972). In fact, they said, such deliveries could create a military imbalance and further escalate the arms race.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that their JSOP for FYs 1973-1980 recommended an Israeli air force of approximately 350 to 375 modern jet aircraft by the mid-1970s. The current Israeli inventory of 333 was only slightly below that range, but it included a number of outmoded French models. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a sales program that took the following factors into account: a 3 percent attrition rate for A-4s and F-4s; the need to replace French models with a mix of A-4s and F-4s; and a requirement for 10 additional F-4s, to bring the number of supersonic aircraft up to the JSOP level.
Their proposal, shown below, would schedule deliveries as much as three years later than the Israelis wished:

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that non-military considerations were likely to affect the timing of deliveries, but they believed their program would prove “sufficiently forthcoming to satisfy the Government of Israel.” In a crisis, F-4s and A-4s would be drawn from the US inventory. Absent an emergency, however, they said that their proposal had one virtue particularly worth stressing. It would permit an orderly production program, and so preclude further diversions from US inventories or programmed output.68

At a White House meeting on 2 December 1971, President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir agreed, for the time being, to stop seeking a comprehensive peace settlement. Instead, they would explore an interim agreement with Egypt. Mrs. Meir asked for deliveries of three F-4s per month during 1972 and 1973, 40 A-4Es and 10 A-4T trainers during 1972, and 34 A-4Ns, beyond the 18 already provided. On 28 December, Nixon directed that US-Israeli discussions about rates of delivery begin immediately. A disgruntled Admiral Moorer told the Director, Joint Staff, that “we can give the Israelis all the arms and money they need yet we cannot seem to save Laos... that is really politics.”69

On 2 January 1972, the President publicly announced his decision, in principle, to provide Israel with more aircraft. He approved selling and delivering 42 F-4s by December 1973 and 72 A-4s by June 1974.70 Since 10 A-4 trainers were being supplied through a separate action, Israel’s entire request for 42 F-4s and 82 A-4s would be filled. Delivery schedules fell about midway between Israel’s proposals and JCS recommendations.

On 1 February, Admiral Moorer answered Deputy Secretary Packard’s request for an updated appraisal of the Arab-Israeli military balance. Recently, the Soviets had stationed in Egypt between 8 and 10 Tu-16 strike aircraft, which normally carried air-to-surface missiles. Israel’s military superiority had eroded. Nonetheless, Admiral Moorer repeated, Israel still held a definite edge in attack capability and could defeat Arab attacks without unacceptable losses.71

The next major development was unexpected but proved highly beneficial to the United States. At Moscow, in May 1972, Dr. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed upon the “general working principles” for an overall regional settlement. These principles proved to be weaker than Security Council Resolution 242, stating only that “any border rectifications... should result from voluntary agreement among the parties involved.” President Sadat, shocked that the Soviets seemed to give him so little support, resolved upon a bold step. On 18 July, he terminated the mission
of Soviet military advisers and experts; Soviet installations and equipment were to become Egyptian property. All but about 500 Soviet personnel soon departed. Yet the Nixon administration, preoccupied by Vietnam and a Presidential election, made no overtures to Egypt and the year ended without further movement.\textsuperscript{72}

In conclusion: Hopes that a militarily superior Israel would become a diplomatically flexible Israel proved vain. Aircraft sales did not smooth the path toward a compromise settlement. Clearly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff exerted very little influence on the President; time and again, Mr. Nixon rejected their recommendations. Clearly, too, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerned with the Soviet Union, disliked the direction that US policy was taking. Through their talking papers, ISA and the Joint Staff did not mince words. In June 1970, they cautioned that “[w]e are committed to providing Israel’s needs first and asking questions later.” In February 1971, they bluntly warned that “we must deliver the Israelis, or face the full blame and consequences . . . up to and including renewed and expanded warfare and great power confrontation.” In October 1973, their prediction came to pass.
Problems around the Persian Gulf

The oil embargo of 1973–74 and the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 drove the United States to become a major player in Southwest Asia. From that perspective, the years 1969–72 seem like so much wasted opportunity. Top US officials, who included the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saw no immediate threat to the availability of oil supplies and remained relatively passive about that problem. Knowing that the US public would not support another major commitment and finding only a feeble mechanism for collective security in Southwest Asia, President Nixon decided to rely upon the Shah of Iran to provide regional stability. Very modest steps were taken toward securing base facilities at Bahrain and Diego Garcia.

Oil Availability: Not a Near-Term Problem

Countries bordering on the Persian Gulf—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Gulf Emirates—contained more than half of all proven oil reserves and produced perhaps one-third of the world’s crude oil. In March 1969, President Nixon created a Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control and charged it with reviewing the system of import quotas. Oil imports, which came mainly from Canada and Venezuela, were limited to 20 percent of US consumption. A barrel of oil, consisting of 42 gallons, cost $3.30. Import control was justified on national security grounds, the fear being that freer trade would lead to excessive dependence on lower-priced foreign oil.

Late in October 1969, a working group circulated a summary draft. Its members did so, among other reasons, to be sure that they understood the JCS position on national security. A section entitled “Risks to Security” included the following passage: “It is
possible that the Arab states . . . might band together to deny their oil and thus ‘punish’ those they regard as Israel’s western supporters . . . Denial for a few weeks or even a few months can be imagined; but anything like three years seems highly improbable.” Therefore, it did not seem worthwhile to expend very much effort insuring against an Arab boycott of more than twelve months’ duration. As for military contingencies, the group observed that devastation in a nuclear war would reduce oil consumption more than oil supplies. During limited wars—Korea and Vietnam thus far—there had been no difficulty about obtaining oil. How would a prolonged conventional war affect demand for petroleum? The group reasoned that, since the US economy was operating near full employment, wartime requirements would tend to affect the output’s mix more than the aggregate volume.\footnote{1}

In a critique dated 30 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that the group’s views diverged from theirs in three areas. First, the oil requirements of US allies had to be taken into account. If supplies from the Middle East and North Africa were cut off, the Europeans and Japanese would greatly increase their demands upon US and other Western Hemisphere sources. Second, in a large-scale conventional war, the ability to continue tanker operations would be a critical factor, and one that was difficult to assess. Third, they thought it reasonable, “given the irrational behavior of Middle Eastern countries,” to plan for a supply interruption lasting at least 24 months.\footnote{2} In February 1970, the cabinet task force recommended—but Nixon for the time being rejected—replacing import quotas with a system of tariffs. The task force predicted that the United States in 1980 would be importing 27 percent of its oil and that no substantial price rise would take place.\footnote{3} Actually, by 1979, the United States imported 40 percent of its oil and world prices had risen ten-fold.

Libya, led by Muammar Kadaffi, took the lead in extracting larger revenues from western-owned oil companies. Consequently, in December 1970, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)\footnote{4} demanded changes that could cost the companies as much as $2 billion annually. Soon afterward, President Nixon ordered an inter-agency task force to review the world oil situation. For example, he asked, should domestic oil rationing be used to help withstand OPEC’s demands? Should other oil-consuming countries be urged to take the lead?\footnote{5}

Answering nine days later, the task force delineated two very different views about the threat to national security. The first view perceived a serious potential threat, since the United States could not provide its allies with enough oil to offset major stoppages. DOD representatives did not believe that a Libyan or Persian Gulf shutdown would seriously endanger US combat operations in Southeast Asia. Those oil requirements could be filled by sources in the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico, although at considerably greater cost. However, a severe or prolonged crisis would damage the credibility of NATO’s non-nuclear deterrent. The second view was much more optimistic. According to it, producers needed revenue and had nowhere else to sell; consumers needed oil and had nowhere else to buy. Both parties needed the oil companies as middlemen. Therefore, mutual interests should lead to agreements that
Problems around the Persian Gulf

would keep the oil flowing. The task force split over how to deal with the Europeans. Some favored a low US profile, while others wanted to foster a sense of solidarity among consumers. President Nixon decided against involving the US government in the details of commercial negotiations.6

In February 1971, six Persian Gulf states won an agreement from the oil companies giving them nearly $12 billion in payments over the next five years. Libya, in April, gained even better terms; OPEC then began seeking even more concessions from the companies. Admiral Arleigh Burke, who had been Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 until he retired in 1961, worried that the United States might lose control over its oil supply. Writing to Admiral Moorer, he suggested a separate JCS study of the problem. The Director, Joint Staff, opposed doing so, noting that the interagency task force could reconvene if a need arose.7 Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not undertake a study. On 4 June 1971, through a special message to Congress, President Nixon warned that “the assumption that sufficient energy will always be readily available has been brought sharply into question.”8 But his proposals fell far short of what, only a few years later, would seem imperative.

On 11 April 1972, the Logistics Directorate (J-4) in the Joint Staff recommended a major initiative: The State, Defense, and Interior Departments should propose that President Nixon establish the goal of achieving, by 1980, a “reasonable degree” of self-sufficiency in energy. That proposal failed to gain support. Instead, on 22 April, Admiral Moorer provided Dr. Kissinger with advice about how President Nixon might speak to the Shah of Iran during his impending visit to Tehran. Currently, OPEC nations—of which Iran was one—controlled 75 percent of the non-communist world’s known oil reserves. Anything, Moorer argued, that could slow the rate at which OPEC was escalating its demands and “seizing control of the world’s supply of petroleum” would be useful. Therefore, when speaking to the Shah, President Nixon should express hope that Iran would continue to play a moderating role among the oil-exporting countries. The US government, President Nixon might tell the Shah, “is confident that Iran will grasp her great opportunity to set a pattern that will stabilize energy relationships for years to come.” Instead, during his May visit, President Nixon chose not to raise any oil issues with the Shah.9

Empowering the Shah of Iran

The Persian Gulf needed a new policeman because the old one was leaving. Between 1968 and 1971, the United Kingdom shed its historic burden by withdrawing British military forces from “east of Suez.” The United States could not fill this vacuum. Vietnam had so influenced the American public that, for the time being, another US military commitment was politically impossible.

From Washington’s perspective, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi seemed an obvious choice for policeman. He was pro-western and presided over an apparently stable
regime. To help modernize Iran's armed forces, President Lyndon B. Johnson had agreed to provide $100 million for credit purchases in 1968, and to seek congressional approval for similar amounts every year during FYs 1969–73. But the Shah's ambitions began outpacing US plans. In March 1970, during an interview with Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, the Shah asked for almost $900 million in credits over the next five years. By 1976, the Shah hoped to have 14 squadrons of supersonic F-4 fighter-bombers. “Who else in the area,” he lectured the ambassador, “can supply a credible military deterrent in the Gulf? Pakistan? Saudi Arabia? The small weak Gulf states? Of course not.” Ambassador MacArthur warned his superiors that, unless a solution could be found, “we are on our way to a crisis with the Shah.”

In Tehran, on 8 April 1970, General Wheeler spoke with the Shah, who again argued his case for extensive military modernization. Iran, he said, must be able to handle local conflicts by itself and also protect the Gulf. Afterwards, General Wheeler advised President Nixon as follows:

My overall impression is this: His Imperial Majesty is determined to create the military forces which he is convinced the security of Iran requires. He wants to buy the necessary equipment from the US, but he will get it reluctantly elsewhere if he has to.

On 14 April, General Wheeler reviewed Iran's requirements with Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson. General Wheeler believed the Iranians would have trouble “digesting” so much equipment within the time they desired, particularly training pilots to man another four F-4 squadrons. General Wheeler preferred furnishing two F-4 squadrons and two squadrons of some successor to the F-5 interceptor, but he cautioned that the Shah held “very firm ideas on this subject.” The Shah also wanted 36 C-130s, General Wheeler deduced, so that he would be able to transport one or two battalions for a defense of Saudi Arabia. Mr. Richardson and General Wheeler agreed that “we have no real option but to bank on Iran.”

The President, meanwhile, had commissioned a review of US policy toward the Persian Gulf. In March 1970, an interdepartmental group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco presented the Senior Review Group with six options:

1. Have the United States assume the role formerly played by the British, which involved maintaining a meaningful presence in the Gulf and establishing a position of special influence.
2. Give Iran political support, making that country responsible for preserving security and stability in the area.
3. Promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation, in the hope of insulating Gulf states from outside pressures.
4. Develop significant bilateral contacts with and a presence in the small new states of the lower Gulf, without shouldering responsibilities which the British had shed.
5. Continue the current policy of dealing with small states indirectly, through the US Consul General in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

6. Sponsor a security pact in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Trucial States, singly or collectively, would become responsible for regional security.

The J-5 and ISA favored a combination of options 3 and 4. They also recommended that Middle East Forces’ (MIDEASTFOR’s) three ships keep operating from Bahrain, continuing a US naval presence that dated back to 1948. They wanted arms requests limited to those that the British could not fill and to instances where there was a clear requirement for either internal security or external defense. Subsequently, the Senior Review Group also judged options 3 and 4 to be “the most logical guidelines for future US policy in the Gulf.”

On 7 November, through NSDM 92, President Nixon promulgated “a general strategy of promoting cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the desirable basis for stability in the Persian Gulf while recognizing the preponderance of Iranian power and developing a direct US relationship with the separate political entities of the area.” Also, he decided that MIDEASTFOR would not be reduced for the time being.

How well could the Shah perform a policeman’s role? In August 1970, the Acting Assistant Secretary (ISA) asked the Joint Staff to analyze Iran’s requirements and capabilities. His request had been prompted by Iran’s bid to buy 73 F-4Es (the latest model) and 30 C-130 transports. The Director’s reply, dated 12 September, stated that Iran’s air force, the country’s most capable service, contained one squadron of aging F-86s, five squadrons of F-5 interceptors, and two squadrons of F-4s. The air force could provide enough tactical air support to maintain internal security and defend against any external aggressor except the Soviet Union. The Director recommended that Iran create, during FYs 1973–80, a force of six F-5 squadrons with 96 aircraft and eight F-4 squadrons with 128 aircraft. The Iranian army, while capable of stopping an Iraqi attack, could not delay a Soviet invasion for more than one week. The navy could patrol Iran’s coastline but not defend it. Secretary Laird supported selling only 39 F-4s, believing that more were militarily unnecessary, would overtax Iran’s technical capability, and seriously impact the arms balance in the Gulf. In December, under strong pressure from State, Secretary Laird agreed to support the full sale. The Shah then was informed that, in principle, his request to buy 73 F-4Es had been approved.

American-Iranian military cooperation had a long history. An Army Mission (ARMISH), created after Iran declared war on Nazi Germany, dated back to November 1943. A larger Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) began functioning in mid-1950, when Iran started receiving grant aid under the Military Assistance Program. In 1970, the ARMISH-MAAG numbered 272 US and 153 Iranian personnel. Now, though, Assistant Secretary Nutter proposed reducing it to 115 Americans and 65 Iranians by mid-1973. Iran, he argued, had become wealthy enough to pay for military advice and materiel. As a general principle, President Nixon wanted to reduce this type of US military activity abroad. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff protested that, as the British
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... withdrew, Iran's role “as a stabilizing influence and as a strong and trusted ally in an area where few such allies exist takes on additional meaning. It is important that the United States minimize those actions which could lead to a diminution of trust and support which characterizes the relationship between the two countries.” Already, between mid-1967 and mid-1970, the ARMISH-MAAG had been cut 39 percent. The Joint Chiefs recommended maintaining, in mid-1972, an advisory group with 170 personnel and a support element with 238. Overruling their advice, Deputy Secretary Packard decided that the ARMISH-MAAG must fall to 187 US and 14 Iranian personnel in FY 1973. In addition, though, he approved establishing a separate support element.16

During the early 1970s, Iran's oil revenues increased substantially. The Shah now had enough money to begin realizing greater ambitions, which dovetailed with President Nixon's stress upon regional self-reliance. According to the Nixon Doctrine, the United States “will participate in the defense and development of friends and allies, but . . . cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the nations of the world.” In practice, President Nixon moved beyond NSDM 92's emphasis on Saudi-Iranian cooperation to rely on the Shah alone. As things stood in 1972, Dr. Kissinger later wrote, the Soviets stationed 15,000 military personnel in Egypt, concluded friendship treaties with Egypt and Iraq, and were arming Syria and Iraq: “Our friends—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Emirates—were being encircled.”17

Visiting Tehran on 30–31 May 1972, President Nixon put policy into practice. As well as two more squadrons of F-4Es and two of F-5Es, the Shah wanted Maverick air-to-ground missiles, laser-guided bombs (LGBs), and three squadrons of F-15s plus a few F-14s carrying long-range Phoenix air-to-air missiles. Mavericks were still completing their operational tests; LGBs were being used against North Vietnam; Navy F-14s and Air Force F-15s were barely out of the research and development stage, with the F-15's first test flight scheduled for September. Defense recommended: providing Mavericks, F-4Es, and F-5Es; approving in principle the sale of LGBs; providing selective military technical assistance; but holding in abeyance action about F-14s and F-15s “until the programs become more stable and predictable.” President Nixon went further, agreeing in principle to sell F-14s and F-15s along with Mavericks, LGBs, F-4Es and F-5Es, and to assign more military technicians. In fact, he stipulated that future requests from the Shah were not to be “second-guessed.”18

After returning to Washington, President Nixon approved a policy statement for the lower Persian Gulf states. Dated 18 August, NSDM 186 placed primary responsibility for maintaining stability upon the Gulf nations themselves, with the United States encouraging cooperation among them. The British would be urged to keep playing a part, with the US Government taking an “active and imaginative direct role.”19

In August 1972, the Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, forwarded an Iranian request for 873 more US technicians who would help operate F-4Es, F-5Es, C-130s, a logistics command, and a communications/electronics program. Assistant Secretary Nutter asked for a JCS appraisal. Replying on 15 September, they opposed sending military techni-
For one thing, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 limited MAAGs, missions, and military groups to 2,800 personnel worldwide. Moreover, meeting Iran's request could harm US readiness and create personnel management problems. Most of the technicians suitable for assignment to Iran recently had completed remote tours; many had been sent twice to Southeast Asia. Thus, at the very time when the administration was moving toward an all-volunteer force, efforts to retain highly skilled personnel could suffer. In any case, the language barrier loomed as a problem of paramount importance; learning Farsi would require at least 18 months. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested sending civilians instead. Already, they noted, many former military men were in Iran, working for civilian contractors. The administration decided to send military personnel anyway. During 1973, it authorized the introduction of 17 Technical Assistance Field Teams with 401 technicians and 92 support personnel.

Iran sought US assistance in deciding whether to build a naval base at Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman. In March 1972, Assistant Secretary Nutter asked Admiral Moorer to have a team of experts evaluate the proposed facility and its strategic value. Team members, however, should not imply to the Iranians that any further US assistance would be forthcoming. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, ordered the US Commander in Chief, Europe, to dispatch experts and then forward their report.

The experts advised that developing Chah Bahar would give depth to Iran's defensive structure and improve surveillance operations in the Arabian Sea. Building a naval base with full support and repair facilities would cost $77 million. An air base complex that included Hawk surface-to-air missile launchers and radar installations would cost an additional $95 million; facilities for an armored brigade would add another $48 million. By an accelerated effort, construction could be completed in three years.

On 2 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deleting several passages in the report which might be interpreted as constituting US agreement with and support for these projects. A sanitized report, they advised Secretary Laird, should go to the Chief, ARMISH-MAAG, who would transmit it to the government of Iran. OSD accepted their recommendation.

Iran soon began turning Chah Bahar into a major facility.

President Nixon's decision to rely on the Shah as a regional policeman marked the major change that occurred during these years. The policeman, of course, had to be well armed. Unusually, the President at times went further than the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished in making available weapons and technical support. Thus JSOP 74-81, circulated in December 1971, recommended that Iran acquire six F-5 and eight F-4 squadrons. But JSOP 75-82, appearing in November 1972, raised these levels to take account of Mr. Nixon's agreement in principle to sell F-14s and F-15s along with his directive to avoid second-guessing Iranian requests. The JSOP's new objectives were eight F-4 squadrons, eight F-5 squadrons, and three squadrons of either F-14s or F-15s.
No Help from CENTO

The Central Treaty Organization, originally intended to strengthen “northern tier” states against Soviet pressure and thus extend the chain of containment, never became more than a marginal force for regional stability. Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom were treaty signatories; the United States, which was not, placed representatives on CENTO’s committees and sent observers to its meetings. Washington and London looked upon CENTO as an anti-Soviet alliance. But Tehran, Ankara, and Islamabad each conceived the threats to their security quite differently. Consequently, each of them sought to use CENTO for a different purpose, and without a common purpose, the Organization floundered.

Early in March 1969, shortly before CENTO’s Military Committee held its annual meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted guidance for US representatives. They observed that, despite recurring criticism, regional members evidently wished to maintain the security insurance represented by CENTO. The Organization’s fundamental problem arose from members’ drastically different views about where the military threat lay. The United States and the United Kingdom insisted that CENTO’s planning be confined to meeting a Soviet attack upon the northern tier states. Pakistan, however, badly wanted to include threat from India; Iran kept stressing the danger posed by radical Arab states. Under the current documents that provided “political guidance” and “basic assumptions,” CENTO planning covered only the contingency of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs expected members of the Military Committee to avoid contentious issues, and to seek compromise if differences arose. CENTO, they advised Secretary Laird, was certainly worth preserving: “Despite its increasing anachronism, CENTO still represents a significant psychological link between the United States and regional members of the organization. The demise of CENTO would be a blow to US prestige and would be interpreted as a sign of weakening US influence in the area.” With State’s concurrence, Secretary Laird approved this guidance. In 1970, for the next such meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested very similar guidance, which again won approval. Both times, the Military Committee skirted controversial issues.

As in years past, Pakistan presented CENTO with its greatest problems. Pakistan held elections in December 1970. Two men who gained overwhelming support, Mujibur Rahman and Ali Bhutto, declared that Pakistan should leave CENTO. So in March 1971, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted guidance for the annual meeting, they felt obliged to address that possibility. They wanted CENTO to continue without Pakistan, if Iran and Turkey were willing. While they did not want the US delegation to discuss the possibility of Pakistan’s withdrawal, informal contacts with the British could provide an avenue for exchanging views and perhaps creating a consensus. But Secretary Laird, supported by the State Department, disapproved. Even informally, Mr. Laird ruled, the US delegation should not discuss the possibility of CENTO without
Pakistan. Growing civil disturbances in East Pakistan made it impossible to predict how either the Pakistani or other delegations would act.27

When the Military Committee convened, on 6–7 April 1971, the Pakistani government had just imposed martial law upon the bitterly disaffected population of East Pakistan. In those circumstances, the Pakistanis did not force any divisive issues—such as the threat from India—upon the Committee. Admiral Moorer, who attended as US representative, recorded in his diary that “[b]y mutual and unspoken consent, the governments involved are willing to let this matter rest without causing embarrassment or possible fracturing of the Alliance which could be associated with a determined effort to publish this political guidance paper. The future of CENTO in the event that Pakistan withdraws was not discussed either officially or informally with the other delegates at the meeting.” In fact, Admiral Moorer concluded, the conference “was extremely successful in re-establishing relationships with the senior military and diplomatic people of the various countries, acknowledging that one major goal of US support of CENTO is to retain close and personal ties with the Iranian Government and military.”28

After the Indo-Pakistani War of November and December 1971, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.29 Pakistan’s new president, Ali Bhutto, threatened to leave CENTO but then drew back. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, preparing guidance for the 1972 meeting, doubted that the Pakistanis would say anything about withdrawing. As before, they recommended avoiding that topic officially but making informal contacts with the British, perhaps even agreeing upon a joint approach. Deputy Secretary Rush, however, saw indications that Pakistan intended to play a more active role in CENTO. Consequently, he felt, JCS guidance gave unwarranted prominence to the possibility of withdrawal.30 Pakistan stayed in CENTO, and the Organization kept functioning. That, really, was the extent of CENTO’s achievement.

A Demilitarized Indian Ocean?

Only recently had the Indian Ocean become a region of some strategic interest. Early in 1964, President Johnson authorized periodic naval cruises through the area. In January 1968, the British decided to withdraw virtually all their forces east of Suez by the end of 1971. The United Kingdom exercised sovereignty over Diego Garcia, an island in the Chagos archipelago. In December 1966, the US and UK governments agreed upon conditions for joint base development. Two years later, the British accepted a US plan. The Nixon administration included modest funds in its FY 1970 budget, but Congress deleted them.31

On 9 November 1970, through NSSM 104, President Nixon commissioned a study that, among other things, would specify US interests in the Indian Ocean area, survey current as well as projected Soviet involvement there, and develop alternative force
and basing arrangements, giving special attention to the roles of British, Australian and other friendly naval forces and joint housing arrangements.32

Answering on 3 December, an interdepartmental group concluded that US interests would “remain of a substantially lower order” than in either the Atlantic or Pacific basins. Considering the small degree of Soviet and Chinese involvement, “there appears to be no requirement for us to control or even decisively influence any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral.” In fact, genuine neutralization of the region would serve nearly all US interests. However, if hostile powers controlled either the Indian Ocean or a small part of its littoral, “the costs to us could be substantial.” Some group members saw the Indian Ocean as a “backwater,” while others described US interests there as “substantial” and called for “a major effort to assert ourselves.”

The group described Soviet activity as “cautious probing.” The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean numbered between two and four combatants. Probably, that figure would rise gradually, reaching about five to seven. The British could be counted upon, the group believed, for close naval cooperation and for joint basing and logistic support—but not for significantly greater force or spending levels.

The group then outlined naval force and basing alternatives to meet the Soviet challenge:

**Alternative A**: Continue essentially the current low-key course. Retain the three-ship MIDEASTFOR, have other US Navy ships make occasional transit and port calls, conduct air surveillance operations from time to time, and try to ensure Bahrain’s continued availability. Use existing port facilities and, in concert with the British, seek joint development of a base on Diego Garcia.

**Alternative B**: Carry out combined allied naval operations, coordinated maritime surveillance, and moderately increase US visibility. Among other things, there would be qualitative improvement of MIDEASTFOR as well as limited petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage and logistics facilities on Diego Garcia.

**Alternative C**: Raise the level of combined naval operations and exercises, and increase the permanent US presence. Major steps would include sending two destroyers, drawn from the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific, to sail the eastern Indian Ocean; a small US unit, perhaps including nuclear-powered warships, would make occasional cruises.

**Alternative D**: Conduct periodic extended cruises with US and allied task groups; increase US and allied maritime air surveillance.33

ISA wanted to delay selecting an alternative until discussions with the British had been completed and non-military measures for containing Soviet influence had been explored. The Joint Staff, however, held that US interests in the Indian Ocean possessed “considerable significance.” The Soviet naval threat recently had escalated and could be expected to increase. Therefore, the Joint Staff recommended selecting steps within Alternative C. When the Senior Review Group met on 9 December, conferees agreed that the Soviets were using their navy as a tool of political strategy. Consequently, the Group decided that the study should become broader based and look at the longer term.34
Problems around the Persian Gulf

Through NSSM 110, issued on 22 December, President Nixon commissioned a follow-on study intended to provide a political framework for any naval response. How would a Soviet naval presence affect the behavior of states in the region? What significance should be given to Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, when viewed in the context of the USSR’s global naval strategy and overseas deployments? What were the US options: move quickly to pre-empt a Soviet buildup or simply keep pace with it?35

Answering in February 1971, an ad hoc group defined two objectives. First, inhibit Soviet-American military competition while remaining able to exert military influence when necessary. Second, encourage economic development and political progress in the littoral countries. The group presented two “policy packages” designed to achieve these objectives:

1. Through an arms limitation agreement, emphasize the inhibition of great-power competition.
2. Pursue a balanced strategy, designed to de-emphasize superpower military competition but maintain a reasonable capability to assert military influence when the need arose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adopting policy package 2, which would draw upon some of the elements in Alternative C. This time, ISA took the same position.36

During an SRG meeting on 22 April, Dr. Kissinger defined the issue as either seeking an arms limiting agreement with the Soviets or increasing the US naval presence. Admiral Moorer thought that US security “would be damaged if we deny ourselves access to the oceans in any way . . . . I consider this the height of imprudence for a maritime nation.” Citing his recent experience at a CENTO meeting, Admiral Moorer said that MIDEASTFOR, while small in numbers, made a large political impact and should be upgraded with newer ships. Why not, asked Dr. Kissinger, increase our naval presence while working for an arms limitation agreement? Admiral Moorer drew an important distinction between SALT and arms limitations in a particular area, the latter striking him as unwise. He argued that the United States stood to lose more than the USSR by accepting restrictions upon freedom of movement. Calling the two policy packages “rather abstract,” Dr. Kissinger suggested an even deeper study.37

On 4 May, Dr. Kissinger commissioned two interagency studies. The first, co-chaired by Defense and ACDA, would explore arms control arrangements. The second, chaired by Defense alone, would propose what the US naval presence ought to be during FY 1972. The first group responded by outlining seven options. Option 1, at one end, called for an informal, generalized understanding to avoid conflict and to limit military—and particularly naval—deployments. Option 7, at the other extreme, would exclude warships from the area, except for the direct and immediate transit of naval ships and combatant aircraft. The second group recommended a level of US naval activity similar to that of 1963–64, just before the massive intervention in Vietnam. Its
basic elements should include: giving MIDEASTFOR modern ships; randomly scheduling operations by small task units, about twice yearly; making more use of Singapore; continuing with plans to develop an austere communications facility at Diego Garcia; and deploying, periodically, maritime patrol aircraft based in Thailand for coordinated surveillance activities.\textsuperscript{38}

The J-5 endorsed these proposals for a naval presence in FY 1972. But, said J-5, efforts at arms limitation should begin by informal, exploratory discussions with the Soviets. If these went well, more substantive discussions along the lines of option 1 ought to follow. Admiral Zumwalt opposed going even that far. He wanted to approach exploratory discussions with caution, “recognizing that the path of arms control is fraught with danger and a convincing case has yet to be made for the Indian Ocean area.” If substantive discussions did follow, he wanted submarine deployments excluded from any negotiations. On 2 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted his advice. So, more than a month later, did Assistant Secretary Nutter.\textsuperscript{39}

When the SRG reconvened on 6 October, Admiral Moorer outlined the working group’s proposals for a US naval presence. Were these, Dr. Kissinger asked, an adequate response to Soviet activities? When Admiral Moorer answered yes, Dr. Kissinger accepted them as constituting the US program for FY 1972. Moving to arms limitations, Admiral Moorer repeated his objection to any measures inhibiting the exercise of US naval capabilities. Would you, Dr. Kissinger asked, oppose such limitations everywhere? Admiral Moorer replied that he would. Next, Dr. Kissinger asked whether banning ballistic missile submarines from the Indian Ocean would make any sense. Admiral Moorer thought not. A ban, he said, would simplify Soviet surveillance and missile defense problems: “We want them to have to look 360 degrees.” Dr. Kissinger agreed that all such options should be dropped from further consideration.

Finally, the SRG discussed a Ceylonese resolution, placed before the UN General Assembly, declaring the Indian Ocean to be a “zone of peace.” No one favored it; Admiral Moorer pressed for “an unequivocal approach which would terminate any prospect of further US consideration.” Everyone agreed. Subsequently, though, the General Assembly did pass Ceylon’s resolution, with both the United States and the USSR abstaining.\textsuperscript{40}

Without bases, there could be no serious naval presence. The British were about to leave Bahrain, which had been MIDEASTFOR’s home port since 1949. The Navy wanted to start negotiating with newly independent Bahrain about building austere facilities there. On 12 August 1971, Admiral Moorer telephoned Secretary Laird. “The British are bugging out fast,” Admiral Moorer warned, “and we have to get agreements soon. . . . The Russians are putting us to shame with their new ships.” Secretary Laird promptly agreed that negotiations should begin. Next, Admiral Moorer called Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson and gained State’s endorsement. “We will end up with less than one-tenth of what the British have there now,” Admiral Moorer assured Mr. Johnson. The Chairman then contacted Dr. Kissinger, who told him to “go right ahead.” Early in
1972, Bahrain agreed to lease the necessary facilities. Also, that year, an amphibious ship dock (LPD) replaced the aging USS Valcour as MIDEASTFOR's flagship.\textsuperscript{41}

Meanwhile, in October 1971, Dr. Kissinger requested an analysis of non-strategic limitations in the Indian Ocean. Yet, by February 1972, an interdepartmental group found itself unable to reach a consensus. Spokesmen for State, ACDA, and Central Intelligence favored an agreement that would limit permanent US and Soviet naval deployments. A temporary surge, such as the USS Enterprise and her escorts had made during the Indo-Pakistani War, still could take place.\textsuperscript{42} According to JCS and OSD spokesmen, however, the war and its aftermath made a US-Soviet dialogue inadvisable, at least for the time being. In their judgment, neither a specifically worded agreement nor a general understanding would serve US interests. The issue of non-strategic naval limitations appeared on the SRG's agenda for 17 April 1972, but the Group never discussed it.\textsuperscript{43} The JCS position—in essence, do nothing that would promote arms limitations—became administration policy.

During these years, the extent of US activity in the Indian Ocean remained unsettled. In 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed establishing air and naval bases at a cost of $43.9 million. Secretary Laird, in 1970, approved spending $19 million for an austere communications facility on Diego Garcia. On 24 October 1972, the US and UK governments signed an agreement about its joint operation.\textsuperscript{44} However, plans for periodic cruises had to be set aside. Responding to North Vietnam’s 1972 offensive required such an assemblage of strength that nothing could be spared for the Indian Ocean. Instead, the oil embargo of 1973 would serve as the catalyst for a growing US presence.
The Indo-Pakistani War

During the 1960s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained dissatisfied with what they perceived as a policy of treating neutral India and quasi-ally Pakistan on equal terms. In September 1965, when India and Pakistan briefly fought each other, President Johnson suspended military deliveries to both nations. Pakistanis were bitterly disappointed by US behavior; only China appeared willing to help them. Early in 1966, after peace returned, President Johnson authorized sales of non-lethal equipment to India and Pakistan on a case-by-case basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended selling spare parts for lethal equipment as well. On 30 March 1967, President Johnson approved selling spare parts for previously supplied equipment, if certain conditions could be met. These were the existence of a “clearly established critical need” and the likelihood that sales would contribute either to arms limitation or to reduced military expenditures and the maintenance of a “reasonable military balance” between India and Pakistan. The President rejected a JCS recommendation to resume grant aid but did permit case-by-case consideration of sales by third countries of US-controlled equipment. During a 1968 review, General Wheeler supported sales of US tanks by third countries. However, an effort to arrange Pakistani purchases through Turkey or Belgium became mired in complications. By this time, Pakistan decided to terminate a lease allowing the United States to operate communications and intelligence facilities at Peshawar.

Small Shifts in Arms Supply

Within days of President Nixon’s entering office, General Theodore J. Conway, US Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support a reconsideration of supply policy allowing the direct sale of lethal end-items on a case-by-case basis to either India or Pakistan. In his view, a revised policy was crucial to thwarting Sino-Soviet penetration and re-establishing declining
US influence in a region “critical to future US military strategy.” Agreeing, the Joint Chiefs on 10 February advised Secretary Laird that existing policy had proved “counterproductive and detrimental to US interests in the subcontinent.” The influence of the United States had “diminished substantially,” they claimed, while that of China over Pakistan and the Soviet Union over India had increased. Moreover, neither Indian nor Pakistani arms expenditures had decreased. Not only had the policy proved “minimally effective,” but it was “on balance prejudicial to Pakistan.” They wanted the National Security Council to conduct a priority review of supply policy.

In August 1968, Turkey had agreed to sell 100 M-47 tanks to Pakistan, with the understanding that the United States would replace those tanks with better M-48A1s. However, Turkey refused to release its M-47s until the M-48s were in place, and the latter could not be readied for delivery until funds had been obligated for that purpose. General Conway estimated that, because of unavoidable delays, the first M-47 would not reach Pakistan until fifteen months after an agreement had been reached. A report from a British advisor that Pakistan would buy 200 Soviet T-55 medium tanks led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that Pakistan likely would buy Soviet tanks if none was available elsewhere. Accordingly, writing to Secretary Laird on 14 February, they recommended (1) immediately obligating funds to ready the M-48s for delivery; (2) approving a direct M-48 sale if Turkey and Pakistan did not soon agree about an M-47 sale; and (3) proceeding with the NSC review proposed above.

Secretary Laird declined to endorse the JCS recommendations of either 10 or 14 February. By early March, when he responded to the initial request for an NSC review, President Nixon already had initiated such action through NSSM 26. Further, Secretary Laird opposed a direct sale of M-48s to Pakistan because doing so would prejudge the outcome of a policy review. Since MAP funds were scarce, he also rejected spending the $100,000 required to prepare M-48s for shipment to Turkey, when Pakistan and Turkey still had not yet reached firm agreement about a tank sale.

Implementing NSSM 26, an interdepartmental group spent November 1969 through February 1970 assessing the alternatives for a military supply policy. Unlike General Conway, the group did not believe that the issue involved global security interests. The current policy, it agreed, had produced only mixed results in terms of discouraging an arms race, maintaining some influence with the Indian and Pakistani military establishments, and providing an alternative to complete dependence upon communist sources of supply. The group articulated four options: (1) continue current policy; (2) end the practice of selling lethal materiel through third countries; (3) allow some selective sales of lethal equipment to Pakistan; and (4) permit limited sales of lethal weapons directly to both India and Pakistan.

Joint Staff officers endorsed adopting option (4), emphasizing the following points: both countries had legitimate military requirements, which they would seek to fill from any available source; the United States possessed a bilateral defense agreement with Pakistan but not with India; a policy of selected sales to both nations could permit the application of leverage to reduce the arms race and curb defense spending.
When the NSC Review Group discussed supply policy on 25 November 1969, Dr. Kissinger noted that “the Indians do not want to buy arms from us as long as they can, by denying themselves this opportunity, keep arms from Pakistan.” The Director, J-5, commented that keeping India away from a complete reliance on communist sources served US interests. What, Dr. Kissinger asked, were the arguments for resuming military aid to Pakistan? Make Pakistan less reliant on communist sources, replied Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Van Hollen, increase US influence with the Pakistani military, and demonstrate general US good will. The Director, J-5, thought that India made a better counterweight against China than did Pakistan; Dr. Kissinger replied that he did not think it possible, under current circumstances, to push India toward China. Finally, at Dr. Kissinger’s urging, conferees agreed to prepare a paper addressing two questions. First, where should the United States put its weight in the subcontinent? Second, should military assistance to Pakistan resume?9

Days later, Turkey declared itself willing to sell Pakistan 100 M-47s, if MAP would provide M-48 replacements. President Nixon, who wanted to “do something for Pakistan,” agreed but then backed away when the State Department strongly opposed lifting the embargo against lethal weapons. Finally, in June 1970, Secretary Rogers recommended and President Nixon approved a one-time sale that would include 6 F-104 or 12 F-5 interceptors, 300 armored personnel carriers, 4 ASW patrol aircraft, 100 M-47 tanks, and 7 B-57 light bombers. According to Dr. Kissinger, it was a gesture of thanks for Pakistan’s role as an intermediary in secret US-Chinese negotiations and the fulfillment of a promise made by President Johnson.10

East Pakistan Wants to Secede

Events overwhelmed any nuanced approach to changes in supply policy. In March 1969, General Aga Mohammed Yahya Khan, commander in chief of the Pakistani army, had assumed the presidency and declared martial law. General Yahya Khan promised the gradual restoration of a parliamentary federal form of government under civilian control. In December 1970, however, elections to the National Assembly accelerated a polarization of political forces, exacerbating the long-standing tensions between East and West Pakistan, which were separated from each other by a thousand miles of Indian territory. In East Pakistan (also known as the East Wing or East Bengal), the nationalist Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, secured an overwhelming victory. In West Bengal, the Pakistan People’s Party led by Zulkifar Ali Bhutto and running a strongly nationalist and leftist platform, attained a majority. Unable to negotiate an accommodation between Mujibur’s separatism and Bhutto’s insistence on unity, President Yahya on 1 March 1971 dissolved his civilian cabinet and postponed convening the National Assembly. These measures triggered a violent reaction in East Pakistan, with strikes, demonstrations, and civil disobedience amounting to open revolt. The Awami League’s action arm, the Mukhi Bahini (Liberation Army)
began guerrilla activities, at first seeking provincial autonomy but soon aiming for independence. Concurrently in India, a functioning democracy, the party led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi won an overwhelming electoral victory.

President Nixon had ordered the preparation of a long-range study on South Asia. Before the Joint Staff could produce or receive for comment any contributions to it, the upheaval described above prompted the White House to supplement—and, as events developed, to supersede—this request with NSSM 118, calling for an immediate contingency study on Pakistan.\textsuperscript{11}

Responding to NSSM 118, an interdepartmental group judged that US ability to influence events was very limited. While agreeing that US interests would be better served by a unified Pakistan than by division into two independent nations, nonetheless, it concluded that the creation of an independent East Pakistan would not seriously damage US interests. The group therefore advocated both recognizing a new state in East Pakistan, regardless of the means by which it separated, and continuing relations with the remaining state of West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12}

When the Senior Review Group met on 6 March, the transformation of East Pakistan into the independent state of Bangladesh (land or home of Bengalis) seemed imminent. Vice Admiral John P. Weinel, the Director, J-5, and James S. Noyes, the Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) attended, but neither took part in the discussion. Other principals agreed that the US position should be one of “massive inaction,” awaiting developments.\textsuperscript{13}

On the night of 25–26 March, between 20,000 and 30,000 troops from West Pakistan entered East Pakistan via Ceylon. Sheikh Mujibur, who responded by proclaiming the existence of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, was arrested. Fierce fighting, tantamount to civil war, broke out in major cities of the East. Nonetheless, the Washington Special Actions Group meeting on 26 March favored continued inaction. Dr. Kissinger voiced a consensus that it was “only a question of time and circumstances as to how [East and West] will split.” But he and the President felt they had to preserve decent relations with Mr. Yahya as the intermediary at a crucial stage in the negotiations with China. Although the White House wished to remain aloof, reports of army atrocities in East Pakistan provoked condemnations from US diplomats on the scene, members of Congress, and the media. The State Department imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan, suspending the issuance of new licenses and the renewal of old ones, halting deliveries from DOD stocks, and temporarily setting aside the one-time sales package.\textsuperscript{14}

At a Senior Review Group meeting on 9 April, the Central Intelligence Agency advised that the army’s behavior had made a break-up more certain. Admiral Moorer reported upon long conversations with Pakistani and Iranian officers during a recent Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) meeting: “There is no question in their minds that the Indians would like to see an independent East Pakistan. The Pakistanis are very bitter about the arms supply.” After this meeting adjourned, a smaller group debated a request that the CIA provide unmarked small arms to the “freedom fighters.” Admiral Moorer deemed it “very wrong” for the United States to work both sides
of the East Pakistan issue at once. Dr. Kissinger believed the President never would approve the request.\(^{15}\)

Reconvening on 19 April, the Senior Review Group decided to take no action about loans or military shipments until the President could review matters. Nine days later, Mr. Nixon authorized an effort to help President Yahya achieve a negotiated settlement and added: “To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time.”\(^{16}\)

A WSAG discussion on 26 May focused upon the rising risk of another Indo-Pakistani war. According to intelligence reports, Prime Minister Gandhi had ordered her army to plan a rapid takeover of East Pakistan. General Westmoreland, as Acting Chairman, advised that “in a showdown” India could defeat the Pakistani army. He related his recent meeting with the Indian army’s chief of staff, who indicated that the military had recommended against intervening at least until the rainy season passed. The US intelligence community reached a consensus that war was likely after late October, when the weather would make Chinese intervention against India extremely difficult.\(^{17}\)

Early in July, Dr. Kissinger made his secret breakthrough trip to China. He conferred with Yahya and Gandhi en route, judging the former unrealistically rigid and the latter “bent on a showdown . . . only waiting for the right moment.” The NSC met on 16 July in the Western White House at San Clemente, three days after Dr. Kissinger’s return. President Nixon opened the discussion by warning that there were “enormous risks in the situation in South Asia for our China policy.” Characterizing Indians (or at least their leaders) as “a slippery, treacherous people,” he said they would like nothing better than to use this tragedy to destroy Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger contended that “if there is an international war and China does get involved, everything we have done [with China] will go down the drain.” Admiral Moorer believed that President Nixon’s views coincided with his own, although their underlying reasons may have been somewhat different. Admiral Moorer pointed to the close relationship between Pakistan and Iran, and the US relationship with both through CENTO. In his view, ending aid to Pakistan might affect the US relationship with Iran, which had become the pillar of security in the Persian Gulf. When President Nixon asked for his assessment of Indian versus Pakistani capabilities, Admiral Moorer replied that India held a four-to-one advantage, Pakistani capabilities being limited to border raids. Dr. Kissinger countered that Admiral Moorer was wrong, President Yahya having said that he planned to move in on India. The Chairman replied that, regardless of Mr. Yahya’s intentions, on an assessment of capabilities Pakistan would be defeated.\(^{18}\)

At a JCS meeting on 23 July, Admiral Moorer gloomily forecast that the best outcome in South Asia would be an Indo-Pakistani war while the worst would be Chinese intervention in that war. Discussions by the Senior Review Group on 23 and 30 July focused on bringing food aid to Bengali refugees who, fleeing the brutality of President Yahya’s soldiers, had begun pouring into India by the hundreds of thousands. At the latter meeting, Admiral Zumwalt (as Acting Chairman) and Assistant Secretary Nutter emphasized the interdependence between the relief effort and military supply. DOD was holding spares for military transportation, without which the distribution of aid
and thus the achievement of stability in East Pakistan would be impossible. The Group postponed any action about military supply. By mid-August, nearly all of the $34 million under licenses to Pakistan had been used, meaning that a de facto embargo existed.\textsuperscript{19}

By August, border clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces became frequent; US efforts to dissuade India from supporting cross-border guerrilla activities failed. And on 9 August, in New Delhi, the Indian and Soviet foreign ministers signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This assured Soviet neutrality in the event of hostilities in South Asia. Dr. Kissinger advised President Nixon that, while there was no specific obligation, “the impression is left that the Soviets would, if necessary, join in on India’s side in a conflict involving Pakistan and/or Communist China.”\textsuperscript{20}

On 11 August, President Nixon gave clear guidance to members of the Senior Review Group, Admiral Moorer included: “We will have to do anything—anything—to avoid war,” in which US interests would be “severely jeopardized.” Under no circumstances could India be allowed to use the refugees as a springboard to break up Pakistan. The United States must therefore develop the most massive relief program possible, and it must continue aid to Pakistan. The Foreign Service, he continued, must dampen its enthusiasm for India. If India started a war, then all aid to India would have to stop. As to the treaty, President Nixon believed the Soviets did not want a war but could not control events.\textsuperscript{21}

Preparing Admiral Moorer for a WSAG meeting on 17 August, Joint Staff officers emphasized the need to plan what to do if war broke out. There was, they concluded, only one option: End the war before the great powers became directly involved. They recommended that the Chairman have two major objectives at the meeting. First, give more detailed consideration to both the regional consequences and the ramifications for the US position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Second, intensify the collection of intelligence.\textsuperscript{22}

When the WSAG convened, Dr. Kissinger took the same position as the Joint Staff, saying that the only viable option in case of war was to play an active political role. He, too, voiced a concern about intelligence collection. Admiral Moorer did not press the Joint Staff’s position, perhaps feeling that there was no need. The WSAG assumed that any war would result from Indian action. Admiral Moorer and Director Helms reported no signs that China planned for an intervention. The Group recommended that scenarios be drafted for diplomatic approaches to Moscow and Peking, both before and after an outbreak of hostilities.\textsuperscript{23}

By 7 October, the WSAG believed that the situation was approaching a climax. Dr. Kissinger asked how long a war could last. Admiral Moorer replied, “The main factor here is that neither side can fight a war of attrition. They should begin running out of supplies in four to six weeks, and India will prevail because of superior numbers.” During 4–6 November, in Washington, Prime Minister Gandhi met with the President. Their conversations accomplished nothing, only deepening President Nixon’s perception that India desired to go to war.\textsuperscript{24}
India Chooses War

When the WSAG gathered on 12 November, all indicators pointed to imminent hostilities by India. The Group elected to wait to assess Mrs. Gandhi’s actions after her return to India on 15 November before settling upon a course of action. Concurrently, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, recommended designating a carrier task group that could sail into the Indian Ocean on 48 hours’ notice. On 13 November, General Ryan as Acting Chairman gave approval for planning purposes only. On 22 November, Pakistan charged that Indian armed forces had entered East Pakistan. The next day at the WSAG, Admiral Moorer thought there was “no question that Indian regular forces are involved.” India, he believed, was trying to provoke an attack from West Pakistan. Should military aid to India—about $5.2 million in the pipeline—be stopped? State and AID officials doubted whether a cutoff would exercise a restraining effect. “We’re in a helluva fix,” Admiral Moorer replied. “We’re scattering aid all over the world where it isn’t doing us any good, then when we try to cut it off we’re told it would be counterproductive.”

On 22 November, Pakistan charged that Indian armed forces had entered East Pakistan. The next day at the WSAG, Admiral Moorer gave his opinion that Indian units were trying to prevent the Pakistani army from defeating the guerrillas, not mounting a deep drive into East Pakistan. Both Deputy Secretary Packard and a State Department representative argued that the extensive involvement of indigenous guerrillas made it difficult to build a strong case against India. Dr. Kissinger, who believed that India was “trying to separate East Pakistan in the most traumatic way possible,” stood alone in calling for immediate action against the Gandhi government. Waiting for enough hard evidence, he feared, might make effective action impossible. In contrast, Mr. Packard advocated monitoring the situation to detect any Indian attempts at further penetration before taking action.

Immediately after the meeting, Admiral Moorer telephoned Dr. Kissinger to say he thought the President was “absolutely right” about how to deal with India. Admiral Moorer did not expect a cutoff of military aid to have adverse long-term consequences because India, in any case, would be unlikely to support US policies worldwide. After the war, Admiral Moorer continued, the United States would be in a better position to disengage from India. From this perspective, the crisis provided an opportunity to advance the long-standing objective of changing what they regarded as the misguidedly pro-Indian slant of US policy. In his conversation with Dr. Kissinger, Admiral Moorer went further. He discounted the geopolitical implications of a war in which the Soviet Union and China became involved, dismissing such a conflict as a “squabble” and expressing willingness to “let the Russians have India and fight the Chinese over them [the Indians].” At no other time did the Chairman articulate that view so bluntly. Interestingly, Admiral Moorer’s view ran counter to the position adopted by the Joint Staff back in August, that the United States would have to take an active political approach to end the war before any great power intervened.
On 1 December, the administration suspended issuance to India of new licenses for military sales as well as renewals of existing ones. The Chairman's Staff Group advised Admiral Moorer against asking further steps because doing so might enable the Soviet Union to consolidate its position within India. Concurrently, Admiral Moorer advised the WSAG that Pakistani forces were “running out of steam” and could hold out in the East for only two or three more weeks. On 3 December, perhaps grown desperate, Pakistanis in the West carried out air and artillery attacks against Indian forces across their border. The next day, India launched what it publicly described as a “no-holds-barred” offensive into East Pakistan. In Washington, on 9 December, two notable meetings occurred. First, at a morning WSAG session, Admiral Moorer predicted that serious fighting in the East probably would end in ten to fourteen days, while in the West, India enjoyed a two-to-one numerical superiority. What, Dr. Kissinger asked, would be the deterrent effect on India of resuming supplies to Pakistan? Admiral Moorer replied that “we probably made our own problem when we stopped delivering arms to the Paks.” Dr. Kissinger riposted that “no one told us that then,” prompting the Chairman to note in his diary that the politicians had “closed the door on military support.” Dr. Kissinger’s chief concern was that if the United States did nothing it would be perceived in the Middle East and elsewhere as an unreliable ally. The President, he said, “wants India to understand very clearly that we would not look with indifference on an Indian onslaught against West Pakistan.”

President Nixon called a second WSAG for that same afternoon. Shortly before the Group convened, Mr. Nixon received information he regarded as “completely reliable” that Prime Minister Gandhi in a cabinet meeting had ordered an attack against West Pakistan. At Dr. Kissinger’s request, the Joint Staff had outlined options for a show of force in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Moorer went to the meeting prepared to recommend dispatching a carrier task force, ostensibly to evacuate US citizens from Dacca if necessary. The President entered the Cabinet Room “with a very stern look on his face” and forcefully expounded his policy:

If the US stands by and does nothing and allows the destruction of West Pakistan the repercussions will be worldwide. Many think we should just let the dust settle so we can’t see the graves. However, I feel that internal problems existing in the country do not warrant outside aggression as has taken place against East Pakistan. We must make a strong effort to impress the Indians with the fact that they are guilty of aggression against East and West Pakistan and we cannot stand by.

Without giving Admiral Moorer an opportunity to present his recommendation, the President directed him to move a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal. President Nixon further instructed the Acting Secretary of State to summon the Indian ambassador and emphasize that the United States had obligations and must have complete assurances that India would not annex territory in West Pakistan. He then told Director
Helms to have the CIA prepare to leak word of the task force’s movement overseas. Before leaving, Mr. Nixon ordered that the State Department stop leaks and give indications that the administration was not divided. He then “rose and left the Conference Room without requesting comments from anyone.” Admiral Moorer recorded in his diary that “this meeting climaxed an extended and running battle between the White House and the State Department as to the US policy with respect to India/Pakistan.”

On 10 December, also, President Nixon warned General Secretary Brezhnev that, unless a cease-fire in the East was followed immediately by one in the West, “we would have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country toward which we have obligations.” Two days later, fighting continued and India neared victory in the East. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger considered whether, if China intervened to help Pakistan, the United States should confront the Soviets with force in support of China. Mr. Brezhnev informed President Nixon that contacts with Prime Minister Gandhi “testify to the fact that the Government of India has no intention to take any military actions against West Pakistan.” Replying via the hot line to Moscow—its first use in four years—President Nixon noted that “the Indian assurances still lack any concreteness. . . . I cannot emphasize too strongly that time is of the essence to avoid consequences neither of us want.” When Admiral Moorer took this message to the transmission room, he ordered the transmission team not to notify the State Department or the National Indications Center. If the President wished them to be notified, it would be done by other means.

There was much wavering, apparently linked to negotiations with the Soviets, that involved the issuing, rescinding, and reissuing of orders regarding the task force’s movements. Finally on 13 December, on Secretary Laird’s instruction, Admiral Moorer ordered the task force, built around the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise, to proceed through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean.

Aftermath

Fighting ended on 17 December, as Pakistani forces in the East surrendered to the Indians and India agreed to a cease-fire in the West. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger considered that they had saved West Pakistan, satisfied the Pakistanis and the Chinese, and pressured the Soviets to curb Prime Minister Gandhi’s ambitions. Yet their pro-Pakistan course attracted hardly any support among the US public, which sided overwhelmingly with India. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger were weaving a tapestry so complex that hardly anyone else, even in the highest circles of government, seems to have comprehended it. In Dr. Kissinger’s words, “if the outcome of this is that Pakistan is swallowed by India, China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated by the Soviet Union, it will be a change in the world balance of power of such magnitude” that the security of the United States would be damaged “certainly for decades—we will have a ghastly war in the Middle East.” Admiral Moorer did not see the stakes in anything
like those terms. He focused on preserving Pakistan’s ties with Iran and the survival of CENTO. All in all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised only limited influence over presidential decisions.

The war’s outcome ratified India’s primacy on the subcontinent, but President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger attached only limited geostrategic importance to South Asia. What mattered to them was how events there might affect the interplay among Washington, Moscow, and Peking. Not without reason, they viewed Indira Gandhi as viscerally anti-American and saw no hope of a fruitful relationship as long as she held power. Conversely, Pakistan’s role in promoting the opening to China earned the gratitude of the President and Dr. Kissinger, determining US policy throughout the crisis.
The Great Change: China and Taiwan

China: Opportunity Beckons

President Nixon entered office hoping to change US policy toward the People’s Republic of China. At the outset, in Henry Kissinger’s words, relations between Washington and Peking remained “essentially frozen in the same hostility of mutual incomprehension and distrust that had characterized them for twenty years.” Large-scale US intervention in Vietnam, a legacy of the long-standing policy of close-in containment, had resulted in no small part from the perception of Hanoi as a willing agent of Chinese expansionism. The violence and anarchy stemming from Mao Tse-tung’s “Cultural Revolution” cast doubt on the ability of the Chinese leadership to participate responsibly in international affairs. Furthermore, China’s small but growing nuclear capability was confined to targets in the Far East but raised the specter of a future threat to the continental United States. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations invoked a Chinese threat to help justify their ballistic missile defense programs.

Yet the worsening Sino-Soviet split opened an opportunity for American statecraft. Creating a triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China would offer strategic advantages for Washington. President Nixon was determined to end the US combat role in Vietnam and restructure US policy in the Far East. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, still advocating close-in containment, proved to be reluctant participants in the evolution of a fresh approach.

National Security Study Memorandum 14, issued on 5 February 1969, directed the NSC interdepartmental group for the Far East to examine the current status of relations with China and Taiwan, the nature of the Chinese threat to US interests in Asia,
the possible range of US options along with their costs and risks, and the interaction between US policies and those of other major interested countries.⁴

In mid-May, when the Senior Review Group discussed a draft response to NSSM 5, Dr. Kissinger cited three choices: continue the current course; intensify containment; and reduce tension. The JCS representative, Lieutenant General F. T. Unger, USA, recommended staying with current policy because it was “working so well.” The interdepartmental group's draft, he said, emphasized that easing the existing policy would “bring us little in return in the near future because of the present Chinese leadership.” Conferees agreed to redo the draft and saw no urgent need for decisions. However, Kissinger mentioned that his staff appeared to prefer the option for reducing tensions. This also was the State Department’s preference.⁵

On 8 August, the interdepartmental group completed a revised report, which predicted that Peking's policies toward the United States would mellow and become more pragmatic after Mao's death. The group noted China's cautious attitude toward the use of force, the primarily defensive orientation of its military forces, and its apparent desire to avoid armed conflict with the United States. Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek's refugee regime survived under US protection, remained the principal obstacle to improved relations. On balance, there seemed “little reason” for US-Chinese antagonism to endure indefinitely.

The group defined two alternatives. First, intensify deterrence and isolation of China by continuing current policies and deployments. Second, which the group preferred, reduce China's isolation and points of Sino-American conflict. Short-term measures would include ending spy plane surveillance over the mainland and reducing US naval and air activity close to Chinese territory, coupled with an ambivalent stance on defending the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. For the longer term, either bring the US military presence on Taiwan down to the lowest level commensurate with treaty obligations or propose to remove all US forces from Taiwan and the Straits area, contingent upon agreement with China upon a mutual renunciation of force.

Disagreeing, ISA and the Joint Staff found insufficient evidence to warrant such a fundamental change. They still preferred close-in containment, although deterrence from an offshore position could be considered once the Vietnam conflict ended. They took issue with the group's judgment “that pragmatic actions on Peking's part are synonymous with moderation in basic policy. US policy should not make such an assumption since a pragmatic response could be aggressive (and, hence, even more dangerous).” No further review of NSSM 14 took place, because Dr. Kissinger announced that it would serve only as background for discussions.⁶

A dramatic worsening of Sino-Soviet relations provided the impetus for a Sino-American thaw. Early in March 1969, along the Ussuri River that demarcated the Sino-Soviet border, a serious clash between Chinese and Soviet troops occurred. Over the spring and summer, armed clashes spread to the western border regions, the Chinese declared their expectation of war, and the Soviets proposed forming a collective security system to contain China. On 3 July, through NSSM 63, the President requested a
study of the US policy choices resulting from this intensifying conflict. Soon afterward, through NSSM 69, he commissioned a study of the US strategic nuclear capability against China and the US theater nuclear capability in the Pacific.⁷

At an NSC meeting on 14 August, President Nixon surprised members by saying that “the Soviet Union was the more aggressive party and it was against our interests to let China be ‘smashed’ in a Sino-Soviet war.” Four days later, a Soviet embassy officer asked a State Department official “point blank what the US would do if the Soviet Union attacked and destroyed China’s military installations.” Writing to the President on 29 August, Dr. Kissinger cautioned that the Soviets might be trying “to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.” He recommended making clear that “we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets.” President Nixon approved doing so.⁸

At the same time, responding to NSSM 63, an ad hoc group examined the possible evolution of the triangular relationship under two circumstances: first, the dispute continued to be largely non-military; second, the dispute blew up into a major war. Early in September 1969, the group circulated for consideration four strategies: (A) support China against the Soviet Union by collaborating with Peking in its efforts to avoid a Soviet-imposed political and economic isolation; (B) collaborate with the Soviets in isolating China; (C) adopt a hands-off attitude to avoid the appearance of tilting towards either side; and (D) assert an interest in improving relations with both countries, gaining leverage where possible in furthering US interests. The group’s analysis clearly favored (D), which appeared to coincide with President Nixon’s preference.

The group believed that the Sino-Soviet rivalry, by placing a heavy burden on both parties, limited their pursuit of policies antagonistic to the United States, an important benefit. Yet there seemed to be no “deals” immediately negotiable as a result of their quarrel. Nevertheless, Soviet concern over a Sino-American detente might encourage less abrasive relations. Therefore, “the US should not relieve the Soviet Union of this concern,” which might facilitate limited agreements where vital interests intersected, like Berlin and SALT. Washington had limited capability to influence Sino-American relations, but keeping the door open could encourage more positive developments in the long run, while exerting useful pressure on the Soviets in the short run. Hence it was necessary to assume a conciliatory stance toward China even if unreciprocated.⁹

The Defense Department believed that two possible outcomes of Sino-Soviet hostilities—creation of Soviet-sponsored puppet regimes, and the downfall of Mao’s government—required more attention. Accordingly, the J-5 and ISA submitted a supplementary paper. If the Soviets resorted to politico-military action, the two most enticing targets for incursions and support of local uprisings were the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and the Manchurian provinces. The former had uranium deposits as well as nuclear and missile test sites, while the latter contained much of China’s heavy industry. DOD’s supplement projected three possible outcomes from Soviet actions: (1) the consolidation of Maoism, resulting in a dangerous and unstable situation in East
Asia analogous to Europe in the 1930s and 1940s; (2) reinstitution of “regular communism” with either renewed cooperation between Peking and Moscow—a disaster for the West—or a Titoist regime in China not hostile to the USSR; and (3) an independent, non-communist China, strengthening Western interests in Asia. Both ISA and the J-5 wanted this supplementary paper attached to the main report. They further recommended that contingency studies be prepared for two situations: Soviet takeover of major portions of the mainland; and either a civil war or a protracted Sino-Soviet war.10

The result of a Senior Review Group meeting on 25 September 1969 was an instruction to spell out the consequences of three situations: continued Sino-Soviet tension but no hostilities; active US efforts to avert armed conflict; and hostilities involving either a one-time strike or protracted conflict. The revised paper outlined three broad options: first, support China with various unreciprocated gestures, while displaying reluctance to enter into negotiations with the Soviets; second, support the USSR and continue the frigid posture toward China while adopting a softer line toward Moscow; and third, maintain overt neutrality, perhaps aiming for satisfactory relations with both sides. Again, J-5 and ISA objected. They submitted another supplementary paper proposing, among other things, to maximize initiatives to drive China away from détente with the Soviets, foster either a neutralist or an anti-Soviet non-communist regime in China, and minimize US commitments and avoid guarantees in exchange for Chinese concessions. In the event of a protracted Sino-Soviet war, the US should support any trend toward Chinese independence, attempting to gain major concessions from both sides while encouraging the emergence of a non-communist or neutral regime. Before allowing China to fall into disunity, the United States might wish to exert “a major effort simultaneously to alter and to save the new regime.” The Senior Review Group discussed the new submissions on 20 November and there, essentially, the debate over NSSM 63 ended.11

Chinese leaders, facing hostility from both superpowers, concluded that they had to reach out toward one of them. But the change came slowly. Steps by the President Nixon administration to ease travel and trade restrictions elicited no response. Talks in Warsaw at the ambassadorial level proved a dead end. In November 1970, through NSSM 106, President Nixon ordered another study of China policy. These studies served purposes beyond simply providing the President with a range of options. As Dr. Kissinger wrote later, “the NSC system . . . enabled the President and me to obtain agency views and ideas without revealing our tactical plans.”12

Late in February 1971, an interagency response to NSSM 106 stated that it was “obviously undesirable, as well as potentially dangerous,” for Sino-American hostility to continue. The Cultural Revolution apparently had ended, and a growing number of governments appeared willing to support China at the expense of Taiwan, soon perhaps leading to Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations. China was pursuing a low-risk, low-cost policy where insurgencies were concerned, avoiding direct confrontations with a superior power. Consequently, close-in containment and isolation of China seemed neither appropriate nor feasible. The emerging US strategy involved
economic and political steps that would encourage China to lower its level of hostility, open channels of communication, and accommodate wider Chinese participation in the international community. However, unless the Taiwan issue could be resolved, the group feared that efforts to reduce Peking’s hostility could achieve limited results at best. In considering options, however, JCS and OSD representatives argued for the continued basing of US forces on Taiwan. Of prime concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the danger that the US military presence there might be dismantled as an inducement to China. At a Senior Review Group meeting on 12 March 1971, Dr. Kissinger focused on removal of the US military presence, except for a small liaison group, contingent upon a renunciation of force agreement that preserved US re-entry rights and defense commitments. General Westmoreland, in his capacity as Acting Chairman, replied that as long as China was a threat, Taiwan would be “an important piece of real estate.” Also, he cautioned, removing or reducing the US military presence there “may require backtracking in our phasedown in Japan and Okinawa.”

At this point, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger took personal control over the China policy. Bypassing the bureaucracy, they opened a channel to Peking through Pakistani President Yahya Khan and his ambassador in Washington. On 2 April 1971, the Chinese secretly sent word that they were willing to receive and negotiate with a high-level US emissary. Confirmation followed and, on 1 July, Dr. Kissinger left Washington for what he called the “most momentous journey” of his life. Ostensibly on a tour of Asian capitals, his true mission was known only to the President and a handful of others. Admiral Moorer became aware of it because President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger used a special Navy communications network to which the Chairman had access. Feigning illness to escape press scrutiny, Dr. Kissinger extended a stop-over in Pakistan, flying from there to Peking. In two days of talks with Premier Chou En-lai, he concentrated on fundamentals of the international situation, laying the groundwork for a veritable diplomatic and strategic revolution. The announcement of Dr. Kissinger’s successful trip and the invitation for a presidential visit to China made headlines around the world.

Writing to Dr. Kissinger on 13 August, Secretary Laird offered his Department’s support in normalizing relations with China. He also stressed the importance of keeping the Defense Department informed, citing among DOD concerns the US military presence on Taiwan and alternative means for accomplishing essential military functions which adjustments in the US strategic posture might require. He requested that the JCS have the opportunity to provide views on these issues.

Admiral Zumwalt reacted first, recommending to his JCS colleagues that they prepare a memorandum for the President “on the military factors contributing to the Asia equation.” He voiced concern about the impact of “any steps yielding to the expressed [Chinese] goal of removing the US military presence and influence from Asia.” On 9 September, the Director, J-5, advised Admiral Moorer that JCS advice already was available to the President in the most recent JSOP as well as through extensive studies in the NSC and interagency systems. The Joint Chiefs’ views had received full
consideration in DPRC, SRG, and NSC meetings. A comprehensive memorandum to the President could be counterproductive, if misinterpreted to imply that they thought he was uninformed or unappreciative about the security implications of his overtures to China. The Director believed that JCS advice would have more impact if applied selectively to specific issues attuned to the presidential "game plan."  

On 6 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Laird that they concurred with his views. Assuaging the concerns raised by Admiral Zumwalt, they also emphasized the need for full DOD participation in formulating the plans and policies incident to normalizing relations with China. They warned against mounting pressure to reduce the US presence in Asia in return for political and economic concessions. The nature of the Chinese threat and the basic conflict of Chinese objectives with US interests, they argued, would "require continued emphasis to counter the euphoria which would ensue as a result of apparent progress in lessening tensions." They also cautioned against a growing attitude that US military activities in Asia should be reduced significantly to avoid provoking China. Certain sensitive activities would have to be curtailed before and during the President's visit, but they wanted to continue normal activities such as exercises, port calls and exchange visits that symbolized US power, interest and influence in Asia.  

Dr. Kissinger paid a second visit to Peking between 20 and 26 October, arranging details of President Nixon's approaching visit and working out with Chou En-lai what became the Shanghai Communique. Concurrently, at the United Nations, American diplomats tried to arrange for seating China without ousting Taiwan. Their effort failed and Taiwan was expelled on 25 October.  

Early in February 1972, with the President's trip to Peking only days away, Admiral Zumwalt again urged his JCS colleagues to send the President a comprehensive memorandum that would explain the importance of the Western Pacific to US security interests and contain a rationale for continuing a forward US military presence, especially in Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Again, the Director, J-5, considered such a report unnecessary. However, the J-5 did draft a memorandum for Secretary Laird that the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised, approved, and forwarded on 16 February. Incorporating most of Admiral Zumwalt's concerns, they suggested that informing allies of US deployments planned for FY 1973 would be a good way of reassuring them of continued US participation in Asian security affairs. Before President Nixon left for China on 21 February, he approved informing US allies about the planned deployments. Three days later, Deputy Secretary Packard assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "the President is fully aware of the military considerations discussed in your memorandum."  

In a banquet toast to his hosts shortly after he arrived in Peking, President Nixon invited Chinese leaders to "start a long march together." His quest for improved relations clearly succeeded. In a joint communique issued at Shanghai on 27 February, the United States acknowledged that

All Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does
not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this perspective in mind,
it reaffirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and mil-
itary installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its
forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area subsides.

The United States and China acknowledged conflicting views about Vietnam, Korea
and Japan, as well as Taiwan. But the Communique also stated that both countries
opposed efforts by any other nation to establish “hegemony” in the Asia-Pacific region
as well as efforts by major powers “to divide up the world into spheres of interest”—
thinly disguised slaps at the Soviet Union.20

As he prepared to leave Shanghai, President Nixon described his visit as “the week
that changed the world.” That week marked the culmination of his bid to realign the
global balance of power, enlisting China as a counterweight against the Soviet Union.21

In crafting the opening to China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played little part. They
defended the status quo, which had declining relevance as US forces withdrew from
Vietnam and China became less overtly hostile. Although they managed to postpone
major revisions in military strategy for Asia, large changes obviously were at hand.

Taiwan: Prelude to Disengagement

The Joint Chiefs of Staff still looked upon Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek took ref-
uge in 1949 after being driven from the mainland, as an essential link in the Pacific
defense perimeter. The island provided bases and staging areas essential to control of
the Taiwan Strait and in maintaining lines of communication in the East China, South
China, and Philippine Seas. Bases housed regional support and communications opera-
tions and intelligence facilities. The island’s size allowed ample room to expand basing
and staging areas for ground troops. The complex of air bases could accommodate
a rapid deployment of Air Force units, while port and harbor facilities could furnish
limited support for US naval forces operating in contiguous waters.22 Consequently,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed little enthusiasm for the drastic changes toward China
and Taiwan that President Nixon was about to impose.

Late in January 1969, the State Department circulated a paper that proposed
publicly acknowledging Mao’s regime as a firmly established government with which
the United States could deal on matters of mutual concern. The Director, Joint Staff,
advised General Wheeler that such a step would appear to the Taiwanese as an “out-
right betrayal.” The Director also opposed the State Department’s suggestion that the
Nationalists abandon Quemoy and Matsu. Not only were the offshore islands invalu-
able intelligence-gathering posts, but abandoning them might inflame the communists’
appetite for aggression. He also described, as unnecessarily ambitious and potentially
disruptive, proposals to bring about a formal separation of Taiwan from the mainland, and to consider letting both Peking and Taipei be represented in the United Nations.  

Early in February, through NSSM 5, President Nixon commissioned a review of the China policy. The interdepartmental study produced in response identified Taiwan as the primary obstacle to improving relations with Peking. Four options were presented on Taiwan's future as a military base: (1) seek formal agreement to develop permanent US bases; (2) contemplate a reduced US military presence; (3) carry out a complete withdrawal; and (4) increase the use of Taiwan bases under an existing joint use arrangement. ISA and the Joint Staff supported (4). The Joint Staff also favored continuing the ambiguous, flexible policy regarding defense of the offshore islands as well as the current policy of opposing the substitution of Peking for Taipei at the United Nations. In August, Dr. Kissinger announced that the NSSM 14 study would be used as background material, and not brought before the NSC for a decision.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff focused on modernizing Taiwan's military forces. Late in 1968, responding to feelers from Taiwan's Ministry of Defense, a State-Defense working group recommended urging Taipei to reorganize and reduce its forces. In June 1969, President Chiang did approve a 60,000-man cut. State-Defense guidance to Ambassador Walter McConaughy and the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, emphasized pressing President Chiang to set the goal of a defense budget that would not exceed 50 percent of the government's total budget, down from the current 67 percent.

Encouraged by the transfer of F-4 fighter-bombers to South Korea, President Chiang in August 1968 made a formal and urgent request for one F-4 squadron, outside the Military Assistance Program. The United States tepid response was to agree to an intermittent, temporary rotation of four to eight high-performance fighters for training purposes. In April 1969, President Nixon approved the co-production of UH-1H helicopters. Concurrently, ISA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed CINCPAC’s proposal to form a second Taiwanese Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalion, using surplus assets removed from France. In August 1969, President Chiang complained to Secretary Rogers, then visiting Taiwan, that his request for F-4s remained unfilled.

Meanwhile, cuts in the DOD budget for FY 1970 reduced considerably the number of ships available in the Western Pacific. The Taiwan Strait patrol, initiated in 1950 to prevent a Chinese invasion and deter Taiwanese moves against the mainland, had become the least productive use of limited destroyer assets. In September 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird that eliminating the Taiwan patrol was preferable to reducing more critical naval forces. Dr. Kissinger and Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson persuaded President Nixon to withdraw the patrol as a gesture removing an irritant, the meaning of which would be conveyed secretly by the Pakistanis to Premier Chou En-lai. President Chiang’s government was informed that, as of 15 November 1969, patrol duties would be performed by ships transiting the area in the course of normal operations.

Writing to President Nixon on 19 November, President Chiang lamented his inferiority to Chinese air and naval strength. Recently, he noted, F-4Cs had been provided
to South Vietnam, South Korea, and Israel. The administration had discouraged providing Taiwan with F-4s because: they cost twice as much to operate and maintain as the F-5s recently added to Taiwan's air force; would give Taiwan undesirable offensive capabilities; and neither MAP funds nor US Air Force resources sufficed to provide an F-4 squadron. In JSOP 72-79, the Joint Chiefs of Staff projected replacing F-5As and F-100s with an unspecified improved fighter. In early December, President Nixon asked the State Department how he might answer President Chiang. Without contacting DOD, Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson proposed improving air defenses by providing another Hawk and another Nike-Hercules battalion as well as modernizing Taiwan's aircraft control and warning system. Upset by the lack of coordination, Assistant Secretary Nutter agreed that these actions warranted a high priority but rejected State's cost estimate as too low. The entire issue became entangled in congressional maneuverings. Efforts by Taiwan's friends in the House of Representatives to add $54.4 million in MAP appropriations for an F-4 squadron resulted in an impasse, preventing passage of any appropriations before Congress adjourned in December 1969.28

Chiang Kai-shek also wanted submarines since his navy no longer had access to a US Navy target submarine to train ASW units. State and Defense previously had advised against a transfer, on the grounds that Taiwan could not operate, maintain, or afford submarines, and because possessing them might encourage high-risk adventures in the Taiwan Strait. CINCPAC, impressed by an “undercurrent of genuine concern” among Taiwanese about the depth of the US commitment, urged reconsideration, but Secretary Laird reiterated the original refusal.

The issue resurfaced in February 1970, when Representative Mendel Rivers (D, SC), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, added three submarines to a Ship Loan Bill. Responding to an inquiry from Senator John Stennis (D, MS), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy supported a loan because of the urgency of other items in the bill. In May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the Navy's position, in part because the legislative was permissive and did not require the President to loan the submarines. In December 1970, the Senate deleted the submarines from its version of the bill and the House accepted that change.29

By this time, signs of a cooling in US-Taiwanese relations had grown more evident. In February 1970, a State Department official articulated US policy as follows: “no new US facilities of any kind are to be contemplated for Taiwan. The policy is set and firm that the US is going to do everything possible to improve Chicom-US relations.” Henceforth, Taiwan “would no longer be in the center of the stage, but would be in the wings.” In April, the State Department requested discussions with Defense about terminating an annual unconventional warfare exercise, FORMER PIONEER, due to changes in the political climate. The exercise, in State's view, gave the appearance of a US sanction to Taiwan's unconventional warfare operations against the mainland. CINCPAC wanted it to continue; citing opportunities to evaluate Taiwan's conventional forces and police structures, as well as access to maneuver areas for US units from
Okinawa. However, on 27 October 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved any further FORMER PIONEER exercises.\textsuperscript{30}

On 4 November 1970, Deputy Secretary Packard requested a JCS review of MAP and modernization programs for Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. The purpose was to ensure that air defense systems were appropriately balanced between aircraft, ground control, and surface-to-air missile systems. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council’s (DASRC) assessment and recommended proceeding with an International Fighter Program, justified by the need for equipment that would support the Nixon Doctrine of increasing allied self-sufficiency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred. The International Fighter Program resulted in deliveries of the F-5E Freedom Fighter to allies beginning in August 1972 and later production under license in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{31}

On 31 December 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary Laird that Taiwan, like South Korea, would have only short warning of air attack, a weakness aggravated by inadequate low-level radar coverage. COMMANDO-EDGE, approved but not funded, was designed to correct this vulnerability. The International Fighter would replace obsolescent F-100s and F-104s, satisfying a major portion of Taiwan’s requirement for an improved air defense fighter capability. They recommended providing 196 F-5Es by 1976, noting the need for an all-weather fighter. With these additions, they believed Taiwan would have a reasonably balanced air defense system, except for a lack of aircraft shelters.\textsuperscript{32}

In November 1970, President Nixon ordered new National Security Study Memorandums to review the policy toward China and Taiwan. All members of the interdepartmental group agreed that the United States must maintain ready access to bases on Taiwan, regardless of the actual level of US presence. Despite reductions in MAAG personnel and redeployment of a KC-135 tanker squadron from Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, around 9,000 personnel remained on Taiwan. Over half had been deployed since 1965 in support of Vietnam operations. Most units had advisory or contingency responsibilities, or else were concerned with theater communications, logistical and intelligence requirements.

Most of the study group believed the size and composition of US forces on Taiwan would have an important bearing on Peking’s willingness to set aside the Taiwan issue and permit an improvement of relations. Here OSD and JCS representatives dissented. Some military functions on Taiwan, they argued, would continue irrespective of other developments and actually could increase with the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and the evolution of the US base structure in the Western Pacific. They suggested that tensions with Peking were the reason for, and not the result of, a US military presence. Recalling past experiences with Asian communists, they stressed the necessity for a strict and enforceable quid pro quo. Dismantling the US presence on Taiwan would tend to concede the validity of Peking’s assertions that the United States bore responsibility for the tensions.\textsuperscript{33}

On 12 March 1971, Dr. Kissinger led the Senior Review Group in discussing a mutual renunciation of force agreement with China over Taiwan, with the United States retain-
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ing re-entry rights and its commitments under the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954. He asked for information about force levels on Taiwan, including alternative locations for those forces performing strategic roles in the Western Pacific not directly related to Taiwan's defense. He observed that previous reductions enforced for budgetary reasons had not been used to achieve political leverage. General Westmoreland, as Acting Chairman, noted that Taiwan remained a crucial link in the defense perimeter running along the Pacific's western rim and its importance was increased by phasedowns elsewhere. The State Department's representative replied that removing or reducing US forces was the only really significant means available to signal a reduction in tensions.34

Early in July, Deputy Secretary Packard queried the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the implications of removing or reducing the US military presence on Taiwan. He pointed to recent studies within the NSC system disclosing the views prevalent outside DOD that the US military presence there was the principal obstacle to significant improvements in relations with China, that troop strength could be cut at least to pre-Vietnam levels, and that a US presence was more convenient than essential as long as access was assured for contingency purposes.35 The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that withdrawal would have "a severe impact on US security interests," dealing a setback to deterrence, to the alliance structure, and to the confidence of Chiang's government. It would cause problems in fulfilling the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty and could increase the difficulties of executing contingency and general war plans. It might even drive Taiwan to seek a rapprochement with the Soviets, as a counter to recent warming between Washington and Peking.

The Taiwanese government now endured a series of traumas. First, the long US effort to exclude China from the United Nations was nearing collapse. Kissinger's trips to Peking in July and October 1971 set off a virtual stampede among other UN members toward admitting China. During Dr. Kissinger's second visit, the General Assembly voted to expel the Taiwan government and admitted the Peking regime to the UN. Second came President Nixon's trip in February 1972 and the Shanghai Communique, which accepted the view that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China" and promised to reduce US forces and installations on Taiwan as tension subsided, with total withdrawal being the ultimate objective.

Of course, tension had not subsided enough to justify stopping the flow of arms sales and credits. In June 1971, Taiwan renewed its plea for F-4s and submarines, adding a request for M-48 tanks that were excess to the US inventory. In September came a follow-up request for 130,000 M-14 rifles, 24 Nike-Hercules launchers with 130 missiles, shipboard Sea Sparrow missiles, and $65 million in Foreign Military Sales credits. The Army declared 200 M-48A1s to be surplus, with 200 more projected to be available by the year's end. Assistant Secretary Nutter asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a plan for distributing the surplus M-48s. Based on recommendations from the unified commands, they proposed a time-phased allocation of 610 tanks to Turkey, 284 to Greece, and 281 to Taiwan, in that order of priority. The surplus M-48s, priced at $10.3 million, were offered to Taiwan in January 1972. The Defense Department crafted
a pilot program involving the sale of 60 tanks, but no action had been taken by the year's end. The Defense Department also kept pressing for approval to transfer two submarines and train Taiwanese crews. The State Department and the White House vetoed the action during 1971, but the State Department reversed itself early in 1972. Finally, in December, President Nixon approved transferring two diesel submarines scheduled for de-commissioning. Clearly, however, the ties with Taipei were loosening. The opening with China made the strategy of preserving a defense perimeter as close to the mainland as possible look outdated.
Korea, Japan, and the Trust Territory

Ending the “close-in” containment of China led to the withdrawals of forward-deployed forces from South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant executors of the Nixon Doctrine emphasizing self-reliance on the part of US allies. They believed that civilian leaders were moving too fast in removing a division from South Korea and agreeing to the reversion of Okinawa. As disengagement from the Asian mainland proceeded, however, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands took on new strategic importance.

Korea: The EC-121 Shootdown

When President Nixon took office, tensions on the divided Korean peninsula ran high. In January 1968, North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, an intelligence collection ship steaming in international waters. The ship’s crew was released from a brutal captivity in December, after the United States tendered and then disclaimed an apology. Throughout the year, firefights occurred along the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas; there were commando raids by North and South. The US military presence in South Korea totaled around 50,000 personnel, including two infantry divisions and about 150 combat aircraft rushed there after the Pueblo’s seizure.

The Nixon administration faced its first test when North Korean fighters destroyed a US aircraft flying over international waters. On 15 April at 0054 Washington time, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) received a message reporting the possible downing over the Sea of Japan of a Navy EC-121 Airborne Early Warning Radar Surveillance reconnaissance aircraft with a 31-man crew. The White House Situation Room received the same message four minutes earlier. The EC-121 had disappeared
from radar tracking screens at 2347 EST on 14 April, crashing about 90 nautical miles off North Korea’s coast.¹

Unlike the Pueblo, loss of the EC-121 and the presumed deaths of 31 men did not create a crisis atmosphere in Washington. The NMCC notified General Wheeler at 0128. Dr. Kissinger, who had been notified at 0110, did not inform the President until around 0700. General Wheeler arrived at the Pentagon around his usual time and held meetings on other subjects before an 0845 session about the EC-121. Throughout the day, his discussions with Joint Staff officers about the downed aircraft were worked around his trips to Capitol Hill to testify before the House Armed Services Committee. In mid-afternoon, President Nixon conferred with Dr. Kissinger, General Wheeler, and Secretaries Laird and Rogers. At 1735, the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened to discuss the issue. They recommended moving three carrier task groups north from Vietnam duty and redeploying some Fifth Air Force tactical units from Japan and Okinawa to Korea. Later that evening, President Nixon approved moving the carriers. At Secretary Laird’s direction, Admiral John S. McCain, Commander in Chief, Pacific, cancelled reconnaissance flights into the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Yellow Sea north of 33 degrees latitude.²

A Joint Staff paper, forwarded to the White House on the evening of 15 April, defined US objectives as receiving appropriate redress, acting to prevent further incidents, avoiding escalation into a larger conflict, and causing minimum disruption to other worldwide operations. Among the steps that could be implemented promptly were high altitude/high speed reconnaissance over North Korea, escorted reconnaissance flights over the same area, and destruction of North Korean aircraft off the coast. Steps requiring more preparation were a show of force, feints against air defenses, selective air strikes, and a blockade.³

Because the Pueblo’s seizure had seemed partially intended to confront the United States with a crisis on the eve of the Tet offensive in Vietnam, a member of the Chairman’s Staff Group suggested that the EC-121’s downing might be the prelude to a new communist offensive in Vietnam. Responding to a request from General Wheeler, the Defense Intelligence Agency advised that the information available was insufficient to determine whether there was such a link. Correctly, the intelligence community saw little likelihood of a major offensive in Vietnam.⁴

The NSC met to hear informational briefings on the morning of 16 April. General Wheeler reviewed military options: “We have the capability of an infinite permutation of air attacks—one, two, or many airfields. . . . We’ll need between 24 and 250 aircraft. We would use Guam, Okinawa, or carriers. The chances of success are excellent. The loss rate would vary with the tactics—2% to 8% losses.”⁵ The next day, President Nixon decided that carriers would be the instruments for launching any retaliation. Using tactical aircraft based in Japan would require unwanted consultations with the Japanese government, and Mr. Nixon thought that using Guam-based B-52 would be an over-reaction. Unaware of the President’s decision to rely on carrier aircraft, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff held meetings on 17 and 18 April to review scenarios employing either B-52s or carriers. By 18 April, the range of military responses under consideration had narrowed down to air strikes against two airfields. Secretary Laird advised the President against such action. The public, he believed, was “supporting and even applauding the Administration's present reasoned, calm posture.” Moreover, he doubted whether the capability existed to cope with a major confrontation. The Joint Staff had informed him that ground force stocks existed for about one week of hostilities, after which ammunition and equipment would have to be diverted from Southeast Asia. Naval and air force stocks would last 30 to 45 days, after which diversions from Southeast Asia would become necessary. Secretary Laird argued that, if the United States became “involved in a more extended fracas at a time when the public is not heavily in favor of things military, the impact against the administration on a wide front could be damaging to a high degree.”

President Nixon decided against taking any military action. Carriers would steam into the Sea of Japan, but responses to the EC-121 downing should not significantly reduce combat capability in Southeast Asia. Intending to impress Hanoi with US resolve, Nixon ordered new bombing raids against North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia.

On 18 April, the President directed that reconnaissance flights resume with armed escorts. At 1045, General Wheeler conferred with the Director, J-3, and his deputy for reconnaissance about implementing the decision. At 1308, the JCS directed CINCPAC to resume appropriately escorted flights in the Sea of Japan and the Korean area as soon as possible. At the same time, Secretary Laird intervened and told the Chairman that he would authorize resumption only after receiving a JCS plan for protecting the reconnaissance aircraft. Accordingly, at 1551, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rescinded their earlier order and told CINCPAC to provide a plan for their approval. They also temporarily suspended C-130 communications intelligence (COMMANDO ROYAL) flights over South Korea. On 19 April, they authorized the resumption of COMMANDO ROYAL operations closely monitored by friendly radar and protected by fighters on strip alert.

On 23 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved CINCPAC's plan with minor modifications. Because providing fighter escorts for all missions would deplete forces in Southeast Asia, they proposed alternative means. By augmenting ground control intercept radar, using combat air patrols rather than accompanying escorts, and adjusting mission schedules and routes would meet intelligence collection needs and provide fighter protection for all reconnaissance flights in the North Korean area. On 25 April, Secretary Laird authorized a continuation of scheduled flights over South Korea but postponed others until completion of a review and evaluation into other means of collecting electronic intelligence. Four days later, however, President Nixon ordered the immediate resumption of regularly scheduled reconnaissance operations in the Pacific area, providing combat air patrols within the area of a North Korean threat.
Task Force 71, built around three carriers, entered the Sea of Japan on 19 April and reached its intended position two days later. To continue meeting its commitments in Southeast Asia, the Seventh Fleet had to intensify its tempo of operations. To alleviate this situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the task force units should revert to normal operations on 26 April. The United States could then continue a limited naval presence in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea by scheduling carrier maintenance in Japanese ports and conducting limited air operations in conjunction with these visits. To support the escorted reconnaissance missions, CINCPAC also would maintain a surface ship with ground control intercept capability in the Sea of Japan.  

Secretary Laird proposed that one task group remain in the Sea of Japan for ten days, pending a decision about longer-term deployment. President Nixon approved, so on 25 April Secretary Laird authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed with redeployment. Accordingly, the next day, all but one carrier group departed the Sea of Japan.  

On 3 May, President Nixon decided that one carrier task group with A-6 all-weather attack aircraft would remain in the area until about 25 May. Secretary Laird advised that this short-term retention would not adversely affect Vietnam operations. The President also requested recommendations about permanently retaining a carrier group there. The Joint Chiefs opposed doing so, on grounds that Pacific Command’s capability in Southeast Asia would be seriously reduced. Instead, on 9 May, they proposed a rotation plan that would provide one task group (not necessarily with A-6s) in the area for 20 to 30 days a month. On 11 June, President Nixon approved their plan.  

With hindsight, Dr. Kissinger rated the administration’s management of its first crisis as “weak, indecisive, and disorganized . . . . The result nevertheless was to confirm Nixon in his isolated decisionmaking. In future crises he knew what he wanted and got it even if the maneuvers to reach that point were frequently convoluted."

The JCS was initially overruled on retention of an aircraft carrier task group in the Korean area. However, with the subsiding of the crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations on protracted reconnaissance flights and Seventh Fleet operations were eventually adopted as presidential policy.

Korea: Withdrawing One Division

During 1968, the Johnson administration reached a consensus that both US divisions stationed in South Korea should withdraw, the crucial question being when to start.  

In February 1969, through NSSM 27, President Nixon directed that a policy reassessment initiated under President Johnson should continue. On 14 August, the NSC reviewed Korean issues. Secretary Laird said that Republic of Korea (ROK) forces—18 divisions in South Korea plus 2 1/3 in South Vietnam—could defend against a North Korean attack with US air, sea, and logistic support. Against what Mr. Laird deemed an unlikely combined Chinese/North Korean offensive, ROK forces could hold until US reinforcements arrived. General Wheeler described the ROK army as well
trained and moderately well equipped. But he rated the ROK air force, numbering 150 aircraft, as inferior and vulnerable; North Korea had 250 aircraft, with “top notch” pilots and more modern aircraft. President Nixon wanted to strengthen ROK air and naval forces—especially through the development of fast patrol boats—to counter North Korean infiltration. He observed that “we aren’t going to have 50,000 troops there five years from now” but still must maintain a substantial presence, particularly air and navy. As for the two US divisions, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson argued that one division would have the same deterrent value as two. In conclusion, President Nixon called for the preparation of a five-year program covering both military and economic aspects.15

Knowing from the NSC discussion that the State Department favored a reduced US presence, General Wheeler asked Admiral McCain to provide reasons for opposing relocation of the 7th Infantry Division. Admiral McCain complied and, on 9 September, General Wheeler sent Secretary Laird a proposed memorandum for Secretary Rogers containing the objection. Chief among these were that the 7th Division’s deployment along the Demilitarized Zone underscored the US commitment to South Korea, maintained United Nations control over the area where the Military Armistice Commission met, preserved UN operational control over ROK forces, and hence acted as a restraining influence on South Korea. In a mid-October memorandum, the Chairman emphasized that US bases in South Korea supported main battle positions and that current personnel shortages already adversely affected the capability for sustained combat.16

Secretary Laird did forward Admiral McCain’s views to Secretary Rogers. But he did so under a covering letter which disclaimed there being a formal DOD position, thereby undercutting CINCPAC and JCS arguments. In response, Secretary Rogers indicated his “extreme interest” in relocating the 7th Division and his intention to keep the issue alive in the State Department’s response to NSSM 27.17 Thus General Wheeler’s attempt to strengthen his position backfired, and he had an early indication of a divergence between JCS and OSD positions on the issue of reducing US strength in Korea.

By late November, the JCS views were made clear in the study responding to NSSM 27, and it was obvious that OSD did not support the JCS position. For example, a revised summary prepared for interagency review did not address JCS objections, the OSD response to the JCS position on nuclear posture being simply to note the JCS exception rather than alter the discussion. Unswayed by JCS arguments, the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) was preparing a memorandum advocating withdrawal and deactivation of a division as a money-saving measure.

The Joint Staff remained convinced that withdrawals must be related to the overall situation in the Far East and not, as the NSSM 27 summary argued, to the attractiveness of projected budgetary savings, the need to demonstrate movement toward South Korea’s taking responsibility for its own defense, and the desirability of further reducing the possibility of US-North Korean incidents. Nevertheless, the Director, Joint Staff, recognized that OSD probably would propose withdrawing a division over the next 12 to 18 months.18
On 24 November, through instructions to Dr. Kissinger, the President made his position clear:

I think the time has come to reduce our Korean presence. We could not do so because of the EC-121 at any earlier date but I do not want us to continue to temporize with this problem. What I have in mind is to maintain the air and sea presence at whatever level is necessary for the kind of retaliatory strike which we have planned. On the other hand, I think it is time to cut the number of Americans there in half and I want to see a plan which will implement this laid before the end of this year.19

President Nixon’s deadline had to be pushed back. On 2 December, the Acting Assistant Secretary (ISA) asked the Joint Staff to prepare a plan for withdrawing one or both divisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to recommend postponing a decision. Accordingly, on 29 January 1970, the Director, Joint Staff, replied that a decision should await the return of ROK forces from Vietnam, reconstitution of an adequate reserve in the Pacific Command, and sufficient funding for ROK force modernization. Should a withdrawal be decided upon, the Director proposed removing most but not all of a division (keeping one brigade and two maneuver battalions in place) together with selected support units. There should be augmentation of the remaining forces, resulting in a net reduction of 10,000 rather than the 25,000 of a division force, and leaving 1 1/3 divisions in place. The decision to respond through a Director’s memorandum resulted from disagreement among JCS members. General Ryan considered the J-5’s draft reply unresponsive to ISA’s request, “inconsistent, redundant, and incomplete,” and refused to approve it as a JCS memorandum to Secretary Laird.20

The JCS-OSD divergence persisted through revisions of the response to NSSM 27. In preparing for a meeting of the Senior Review Group, the Joint Staff advocated a total of 19 ROK and two US divisions for the defense of South Korea. ISA maintained that 16 active and 5 ready reserve ROK divisions, supplemented by one US division with adequate support, would be sufficient.21

At the SRG meeting on 6 February, Lieutenant General F. T. Unger (Director, J-5) said that, while there had been military participation throughout the drafting of the study, many statements were based on figures of which he had been unable to determine. The JCS position (19 ROK and two US divisions) was based on what would be needed to resist a combined Chinese/North Korean attack. General Unger noted that during the Korean War 17 divisions had held back one million Chinese and North Koreans, but half the divisions were American and “we had complete air supremacy.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, had not really analyzed the meaning and effect of modernized equipment which would cost $800 million versus present equipment for 18 ROK divisions. Dr. Kissinger asked for a JCS reassessment of how many divisions were needed to cope with a combined attack, assuming there would be increases either for military assistance funding or for modernization.22

On 17 February, General Unger informed Kissinger that the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the minimum posture necessary for deterrence to be 1 1/3 US and 18 modern-
ized ROK divisions, improved ROK air and naval forces, and continued US tactical air support. However, General Unger advised, the type of modernization required (high densities of ground and air mobility resources, advanced communications equipment) would be not only prohibitively expensive to acquire and maintain but also limited by the time available for delivery and ROK technical capabilities. Therefore, given the situation in Korea (uneasy alliance, difficult terrain, and proximity of Seoul to the Demilitarized Zone) any reduction below 18 ROK divisions should not be considered. Dr. Kissinger was unimpressed, telling the ambassador to South Korea, William Porter, that “the reasoning of the Joint Chiefs eluded him”—18 ROK divisions could hold a combined Chinese/North Korean attack but 1 US and 16 ROK divisions could not.

Subsequently, a JCS-OSD consensus over several issues emerged. Additional MAP funding was needed for rear area equipment. President Nixon’s preferred option of fast boats was deemed unsuitable because of high costs and operational limitations. OSD accepted the JCS fallback position that the long-range threat required a US Army division and a brigade force; South Korea needed 18 modernized divisions along with improved air and naval forces. For the short term, though, OSD advocated withdrawing a full US division in FY 1971, offsetting this loss of combat power by returning the ROK Marine brigade from Vietnam.

When the NSC convened on 4 March, the only questions were how large a US withdrawal should be and how soon it should begin. Admiral Moorer, as Acting Chairman, presented the JCS position: 1 1/3 US and 18 improved ROK divisions, plus modernized ROK air and naval forces along with continued US tactical air support, represented the minimum posture. Secretary Rogers favored a two-phase drawdown, the first starting immediately and the second after the ROK divisions returned from Vietnam. Deputy Secretary Packard worried whether Congress would fund 18 or 19 modernized ROK divisions, unless about 20,000 US troops were withdrawn. Secretary Rogers agreed with the 20,000 figure. Admiral Moorer said that in order to realize any savings, a drawdown must occur early in the fiscal year. President Nixon explained that faced with increased domestic spending, “we have to find a way to continue playing a role by drawing down our strength somewhat or Congress will refuse to support anything.”

On 20 March, through NSDM 48, the President conveyed his decision to withdraw 20,000 US personnel by the end of FY 1971. During FY 1971-75, the administration would attempt to provide South Korea with grant military assistance of $200 million per year. Further withdrawals might be considered either when substantial numbers of ROK soldiers returned from Vietnam or when compensating improvements to ROK forces were well under way. DOD should develop a five-year force structure, resource, and personnel plan for US forces in or clearly related to Korea.

On 27 March, Deputy Secretary Packard asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a plan that included withdrawing and deactivating one division with supporting elements. They in turn instructed CINCPAC to plan upon removing approximately 1,600 Air Force and 18,400 Army personnel. Withdrawing most of them early, they pointed out, could help offset an FY 1971 funding shortfall in Southeast Asia.
On 27 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their plan: replace I Corps (Group) Headquarters, artillery units, and the 7th Infantry Division along the Demilitarized Zone with ROK units; retain US control over a 500-meter sector at Panmunjom where the Military Armistice Commission met; end the temporary deployment of three USAF squadrons, one of which had departed early in May; and turn over US equipment to the Koreans. CINCPAC estimated that withdrawals would require about a year, three months for planning and nine for execution. To offset US reductions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adding about 5,500 MAP-supported spaces for the ROK army. President Nixon approved the plan on 17 July.\(^{27}\)

The president of South Korea, Park Chung Hee, rejected Mr. Nixon’s wish that he request the withdrawal. Instead, he proposed filling spaces in the US divisions with Koreans and having ROK modernization precede a US withdrawal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized modification of the phasing, but reaffirmed that the withdrawal must be completed by 30 June 1971. On 1 April 1971 the last elements of the 7th Infantry Division departed South Korea.\(^{28}\)

Meanwhile, in August 1970, the Under Secretaries Committee forwarded the Defense Department’s recommendation about ROK modernization to the President. According to the Committee’s understanding, NSDM 48 envisaged a $1 billion MAP directed almost entirely toward ground improvements, leaving South Korea to rely upon US air and naval reinforcements. However, Deputy Secretary Packard endorsed the JCS argument, presented in September 1969, that ROK air and navy units also required modernization. He, therefore, proposed allocating 60 percent of MAP funding for ground, 26 percent for air, and 14 percent for naval forces. To underwrite air and naval improvements, Deputy Secretary Packard proposed raising the five-year program to $1.5 billion. The Under Secretaries Committee accepted his advice. On 5 September, President Nixon approved a $1.5 billion balanced modernization program. The maximum funding authority sought from Congress would be $1.25 billion, with the remainder provided through equipment transfers.\(^{29}\)

In response to a 16 September directive from the Under Secretaries Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended supporting 17 infantry divisions, one Marine brigade, 14 air squadrons (five of them F-5s and two of them F-4Ds), and five destroyers and smaller craft. OSD agreed about the need for increased artillery but not for two destroyers and five Vulcan antiaircraft battalions. Provision of an F-4D squadron had to be dropped, since no excess aircraft were available. Thus modified, the Under Secretaries Committee—with JCS concurrence—endorsed the program and President Nixon approved it in principle on 2 September 1971.\(^{30}\)

Clearly, withdrawing the 7th Division was not a step that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered militarily prudent. But, as President Nixon explained, “what we are looking for is . . . a way to be able to stay in [Korea] by means of a long-range, viable posture.”\(^{31}\)

From that vantage point, the withdrawal proved a success.
Korea: Reducing the *Pueblo* Air Augmentation

How long should the 150 aircraft rushed to South Korea after the *Pueblo*’s seizure remain there? As the Johnson administration ended, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze concluded that two Air National Guard squadrons with 50 aircraft should depart in June 1969. Admiral McCain objected, believing North Korea still posed a significant threat to the South. Writing to Secretary Laird on 13 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended retaining an option to replace those F-100 squadrons, if on 15 April the situation so warranted. On 2 April, General McConnell told his JCS colleagues that he preferred not to replace the squadrons, but the EC-121’s downing on 15 April temporarily ended that prospect.  

On 1 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended temporarily replacing the departing F-100 squadrons with two USAF F-4 squadrons equipped with 36 aircraft, cutting the augmentation to 137. After consulting the White House, Deputy Secretary Packard on 29 May approved deploying the replacement squadrons, making clear to South Koreans that this would not be a permanent condition. The squadrons arrived in June and remained until December 1969, when they were replaced by another two F-4 squadrons scheduled to stay in Korea until June 1970.

Since August 1968, the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, had been pressing for return of the F-106 squadron which his command had contributed to the augmentation. Admiral McCain opposed its withdrawal; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President endorsed continuing the deployment. By 31 December 1969, however, the ROK air force had received a full squadron of F-4s. Accordingly, on 26 March 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended returning the squadron to the United States. Among other justifications, they cited a need to fill gaps in CONAD’s already thin peripheral defense, decreased tactical requirements resulting from a reduction in reconnaissance missions, and a lessening of regional tensions. Secretary Laird agreed. Despite Secretary Rogers’ protest that an abrupt departure would affect delicate negotiations with the Korean government over the 20,000-man American withdrawal, the squadron returned to the United States on 1 May 1970, paring the augmentation to 119 aircraft.

With the tour of two replacement F-4 squadrons scheduled to end in June 1970, General John D. Ryan (who had succeeded General McConnell as the Air Force Chief of Staff), recommended their return without replacement. Concerned over the “tendency toward . . . permanency” of a supposedly temporary posture, he argued that continued rotation increasingly strained tactical resources, response capability elsewhere, and ability to adjust to fiscal constraints. Reducing US fighter strength in Korea to 83, he contended, would create substantial savings and contribute to carrying out NSDM 48. Nevertheless, on 8 May, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended replacing the F-4 squadrons with a deployment that would continue until 1 September 1970. Doing so would extend the troop withdrawal throughout the year, facilitating consultations with South Korea as well as lessening the likelihood of undermining the
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deterrent posture in Korea and the credibility of US commitments to assist in Asian defense. Secretary Laird and President Nixon approved and, on 1 September, the squadrons returned home. Even so, more than 40 percent of the original augmentation (83 aircraft) remained in South Korea. Moreover, on 22 July Secretary Laird approved the transfer of an F-4 wing from Japan to Korea, and later in 1970 the Air Force was directed to send additional small units to Korea. These deployments totaled approximately 2,400 personnel, so that by the end of 1971 Air Force strength in Korea had risen by almost 800, despite the administration’s intention to reduce numbers there.  

Japan: The Reversion of Okinawa

Japan stood as the cornerstone of US security policy in the western Pacific. The Nixon Doctrine, with its stress on strengthening regional powers, gave renewed emphasis to encouraging a greater Japanese role in East Asia. At the same time, budgetary constraints and changes in the political climate of Japan altered the character of that relationship.

The US military presence dated from the post-World War II occupation and the use of Japan as a logistical support base for UN forces in the Korean War. Despite cutbacks in 1969, 40,000 US servicemen and a slightly larger number of dependents and DOD civilians were stationed at 149 facilities in Japan, including two major naval bases, six major air bases, and a number of large depots, communications facilities, housing areas and hospitals. Among Japanese, burgeoning economic growth fostered a growing spirit of nationalism and independence. Disenchantment with US policies in Vietnam, competition for scarce real estate, and resentment at a perception of subservience to the United States in world affairs all converged in pressures to reduce this base structure.

Okinawa, largest of the Ryukyu Islands, emerged as the crucial issue in US-Japanese relations. The 1952 peace treaty had awarded the United States sole legal jurisdiction, which the Japanese interpreted to mean they would eventually revert to Japan when conditions in the Western Pacific permitted. Bases in Okinawa provided staging and crucial support for US operations in Southeast Asia. But Japanese pressure for reversion kept growing. In November 1967, President Johnson agreed to relinquish the Bonin and Volcano islands and keep the Ryukyus’ status under “continuing review, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over these islands to Japan.”

Late in 1968, following his re-election as prime minister, Eisaku Sato vowed to press for reversion of the Ryukyus. President Nixon believed that reversion and loss of unrestricted military use of the Ryukyus would be an acceptable price to pay for cementing good relations with Japan. On 21 January 1969, through NSSM 5, he called for examination of the Ryukyus issue, US bases in Japan, the future of the Mutual Security Treaty, and US economic policy toward Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to postpone reversion as long as possible. NSSM 5 overtook the J-5’s review of the Okinawa issue and alternatives to the status quo, which
concluded that the United States should insist upon retaining its freedom of action. If the Japanese accepted that point, reversion could go forward. However, the price should include Japanese assumption of responsibility for the local defense of Okinawa, a larger Japanese defense effort in general, and commitments to assist friendly Asian countries, including assisting in the modernization of aging aircraft inventories and air defense facilities in Taiwan and South Korea.\textsuperscript{40}

Numerous omens suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff stood alone. Experts in the RAND Corporation warned Lieutenant General James B. Lampert, USA, newly appointed High Commissioner for the Ryukyus, that the United States might soon be forced to choose between a friendly Japan and continued US control over Okinawa. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.), who had been JCS Chairman during 1962-64, examined the matter and advised President Nixon to move ahead with reversion. The Director, Joint Staff, advised General Wheeler that General Taylor's report tended to reinforce “the increasingly accepted view that the momentum of events was beyond US control and is leading inevitably to the reversion of Okinawa regardless of the military implications.” Time appeared to be running out, the Director cautioned, and alternatives “must be examined and ready.”\textsuperscript{41}

Meeting with Secretary Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 January, President Nixon posed a series of questions. General McConnell, as Acting Chairman, forwarded proposed answers to Secretary Laird on 12 February. A wide range of contingency and general war plans depended upon availability of the Okinawa bases. After reversion, launching conventional combat operations directly from Okinawa would require, under existing formulas applicable to Japan proper, prior consultation with the Japanese government. “The US,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed telling President Nixon, “appears to be running low on its supply of possible concessions. We do not have much left to offer in order to continue a local acquiescence to a base status which would not negate, or at least partially erode, the purpose of our being in Okinawa and Japan.” Given sufficient time and funds, most functions could be conducted outside the Ryukyus, but greater dependence on Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Philippines and Thailand might raise new problems. Therefore, reversion should seriously be considered only if and when the Japanese gave assurances that US military operations could continue unimpaired. On 20 February, Secretary Laird forwarded these views to the White House.\textsuperscript{42}

Dr. Kissinger forwarded the JCS position to President Nixon on 8 March. Ten days later, he gave President Nixon his own insights. Dr. Kissinger saw early reversion as the only realistic option, warning that popular agitation not only posed a physical danger to the bases but also constituted a political threat to Prime Minister Sato and his governing Liberal Democratic Party. Failure to reach an agreement could well lead to complete loss of the bases.\textsuperscript{43} This viewpoint dominated discussions of Okinawa within the NSC system.

Bowing to the “considerable body of opinion in the Departments of State and Defense to the effect that the United States has reached the point in time where its
policymakers must ask whether we want Okinawa or a friendly and cooperative Japan," the J-5 concluded late in March 1969 that it was best to begin negotiating immediately, in order to obtain the best terms possible from the conservative government. Writing to Secretary Laird on 24 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended negotiating a special base rights agreement with Japan, separate from any reversion accord, that would ensure the continued use of military facilities, with current rights and privileges unimpaired "at least until such time as free world Asia interests are not threatened." Such an agreement would be "a reasonable Japanese concession" in return for early reversion and continued US protection. Furthermore, it should carry a high "price tag," compelling Japanese assumption of defense responsibilities for the Ryukyus and surrounding waters, as well as accelerated modernization of Japanese defense forces and increased grants of economic and military assistance to Korea and Taiwan.44

The interdepartmental group's response to NSSM 5, circulated late in March and revised in April, gave little encouragement to the JCS position. After NSC discussions early in May, President Nixon laid down policy guidelines for the immediate future. The main points of NSDM 13 read as follows: continue to pursue relations with Japan as America's major Asian partner; allow the Mutual Security Treaty to continue without amendment after 1970; make gradual alterations in base structure and utilization in Japan aimed at reducing irritants while retaining essential functions; and encourage moderate increases and qualitative improvements in Japanese defense efforts, while avoiding pressure to develop substantially larger forces or play a substantially large role in regional security. As to Okinawa, NSDM 13 directed an interdepartmental group to prepare a strategy paper that included the following elements. First, accept reversion in 1972, provided agreement could be reached during 1969 governing US military use and that detailed negotiations could be completed by that time. Second, seek maximum free conventional use of bases, particularly with respect to the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam.45

Early in June, Japan's Foreign Minister Kiichi Kiichi set formal negotiations in motion by bringing to Washington a draft joint communique to be issued after the Nixon-Sato talks set for November. It stipulated that, upon reversion, US forces would be granted use of facilities and areas on Okinawa in accordance with the Security Treaty and related arrangements. Recognition that an attack on South Korea would seriously affect Japan's security would "form the basis on which the Government of Japan would determine its position vis-à-vis prior consultation under the exchange of notes concerning the implementation of Article 6 of the Security Treaty on the use by the United States armed forces of facilities in Japan as bases for military combat operations from Japan to meet armed attack against the Republic of Korea."46

The Under Secretaries Committee, disturbed by the draft's reference to a confidential 1960 minute to the Security Treaty granting use of Japanese bases in a Korean contingency, required "assurance that in the event of armed attack on South Korea prior consultation would be waived or a mere formality." Ambassador Armin Meyer in Tokyo should seek clarification of ambiguities in the draft. He also should determine
whether Japan would support free use of US bases in Japan and Okinawa in response to attacks on US forces in the Far East. Further, the Committee sought special provisions dealing with attacks against Taiwan.\textsuperscript{47}

From this point forward, negotiations focused on developing an agreed joint communique. At the end of June, Mr. Richard Sneider of the NSC Staff left for Tokyo to act as Special Assistant to Ambassador Meyer in reversion negotiations and as Senior Advisor on Ryukyuan Affairs. To ensure that OSD and JCS views were adequately considered, Secretary Laird on 27 August named Rear Admiral W. L. Curtis, Jr., as SecDef-JCS Representative and Senior Military Representative on the US-Okinawa Negotiating Team (USMILRONT).\textsuperscript{48}

General Wheeler had followed the development of a strategy paper and the trend of negotiations with mounting concern. Anthony J. Jurich, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, wrote to General Wheeler on 10 July, pointing out that the strategy paper nowhere defined essential US military needs. Mr. Jurich feared that the script proposed by the State Department would lead to serious diminution of base usage rights. The Treasury Department, he wrote, favored “putting the onus on the Japanese to specify what they want us to be able to do in respect of the defense of East Asia, and what they can deliver by way of a contribution to Okinawan defense and base rights to make that possible,” thus forcing the Japanese to make hard political decisions. Mr. Jurich proposed to reserve hard bargaining for the financial aspects of negotiations, wherein the Japanese should be presented with a “reasonable bill” for the value of US-built assets in the Ryukyus, for US expenditures over the past 25 years, and for the costs of transfer.\textsuperscript{49}

Replying on 24 July, General Wheeler agreed about the need to strengthen negotiating strategy based on a quid pro quo approach. For too long, he agreed, Japan had been the beneficiary of one-sided economic and security arrangements. The time had come for Japan to accept the responsibilities as well as the benefits of full membership in Free World nations. If Okinawa’s reversion, the Security Treaty, and trade were approached and resolved separately, the best opportunities to influence Japan over the next decade would be lost. A number of points, the Chairman felt, could be used for leverage. Since reversion would weaken US capability for deterrence and hence weaken Japanese security, the United States might—in view of developments in Southeast Asia and North Korea—take the position that the security situation precluded reversion. This, in turn, could lead to a US decision to withstand Japanese pressures on nuclear and conventional use forces by making use of fears among the Koreans and Taiwanese that the reversion of Okinawa would weaken US ability to defend those nations. American public and Congressional opinion could be mobilized because many members of Congress felt that the Japanese were “getting a free ride on the treaty.” Washington could also demand tradeoffs on a vital issue of Tokyo’s restrictions on US trade and investment in Japan. General Wheeler suggested that Mr. Jurich forward his memorandum to the chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee and promised to raise the issue with Deputy Secretary Packard.\textsuperscript{50}
General Wheeler referred to his communication with the Treasury Department when, on 24 July, he told Deputy Secretary Packard that he worried about the manner in which the United States seemed to be “backing into negotiations” without an agreed strategy, “rushing precipitously to meet deadlines . . . largely set by the Japanese.” He reminded Mr. Packard of the many concessions made over the years in building Japan up to “a position of Free World strength in Asia,” and pointed to the “basically one-sided security treaty” which allowed Japan to prosper while maintaining “strict restrictions on US trade and capital investment in their country.” Current strategy might lead to agreement on reversion without detailed understandings on implementation. Once a date was set, moreover, there would be very little leverage left to gain specific commitments. General Wheeler insisted that US concessions about military requirements in Okinawa be met by equivalent Japanese concerns on defense commitments, financial agreements, and liberalization of trade or investment. He urged that Defense “immediately raise the question whether it is really in US interests to rush into these negotiations with hastily prepared positions,” and recommended postponing the Nixon-Sato meetings at least six months, stretching out the negotiations to provide a cooling-off period.\(^{31}\)

General Wheeler’s views had no impact whatever on the course of negotiations. Not until early September did Deputy Secretary Packard respond to the Chairman and then only to acknowledge, in the most general of terms, that he shared General Wheeler’s concerns and assured him of the importance of active DOD participation in the negotiating process. A member of the Chairman’s Staff Group, in forwarding Packard’s reply, noted that it “completely avoids the issues and does not respond to any of the specific recommendations which you made in your 24 July memorandum. It is apparent from the abnormal length of time it has taken to gain a reply, and the failure to address your suggestions, that we cannot expect any support in this direction from OSD.” General Wheeler agreed.\(^{52}\)

From Tokyo, Ambassador Meyer and Mr. Sneider sent encouraging reports about the progress of reversion negotiations. Vice Admiral Nels Johnson, Director of the Joint Staff, felt otherwise. Writing to General Wheeler on 11 September, he credited Japan with giving ground only on some issues, and then merely in the form of general assurances and vague indications. A number of basic requirements specified in NSDM 13 remained unmet. No agreement had been reached on the essential elements governing military use of military bases in Japan. The Japanese government remained adamant that the security treaty and accompanying arrangements be applied to Okinawa intact. Neither in the draft communique nor in confidential understandings had maximum unrestricted conventional military use been assured, especially with regard to Vietnam. Assurances about using US forces on Okinawa to defend South Korea and Taiwan were “ambiguous and weak.” Attempts to use the issue for leverage in other areas had proved futile. Financial and civil/administrative issues remained unresolved. Admiral Johnson recommended that General Wheeler enlist Secretary Laird’s assistance in influencing Secretary Rogers toward a harder line with Mr. Aiichi. In addition, Secre-
military Rogers should ensure that positions or agreements to be addressed in the Nixon-Sato meeting were coordinated beforehand with interested agencies and considered by the Under Secretaries Committee or the NSC.

By mid-October, Vice Admiral Curtis reported no significant progress over unresolved issues of primary military importance. The Japanese, he warned General Wheeler, appeared bent on a public statement about Japan’s willingness to let US bases be used for the defense of Korea, subject to prior consultation. Replying for General Wheeler, the Director, Joint Staff, reminded Admiral Curtis of numerous JCS attempts to address reversion problems. According to the Director, a basic difference in negotiating philosophy divided civilians and military. Disparaging “the rather vague diplomatic language” in the draft joint communique and unilateral statement, which the State Department thought sufficient, the military held that definite planning requirements made specific written assurances essential. At this late date, said the Director, only three alternatives remained: (1) make a final effort to obtain confidential written assurances on the use of Okinawa bases for conventional combat operations, good for at least five years; (2) bring the issue before the NSC; or (3) seek postponement of the Nixon-Sato summit.  

On 8 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again warned Secretary Laird of the “adverse consequences of Okinawa’s reversion under conditions which fail to provide adequate safeguards for military requirements.” They asked that, prior to the summit, the NSC consider language for the joint communique to be issued by the two leaders and the US position as evolved in negotiations. Secretary Laird forwarded their views to Dr. Kissinger on 18 November, two days before the summit began.

President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington from 19 to 21 November 1969. The script for their discussions and the language in the published communique had, for the most part, been settled in advance during negotiations between Dr. Kissinger and emissaries from Mr. Sato. Prime Minister Sato confirmed that his party and government wanted the security treaty extended for a “considerably longer period.” He acknowledged the importance to Japan’s stability and security of US bases on Okinawa, assuring the President that reversion could take place without subsequent embarrassment to the United States. The prime minister confirmed that Japan intended to strengthen its defense capabilities, while noting the impediment to significant increases posed by Japan’s constitution and the Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons.

The two leaders issued a joint communique on 21 November, announcing that talks on reversion would begin immediately, with a view to accomplishing Okinawa’s return to Japanese administrative control in 1972. Gradually, Japan would assume responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa. Upon the return of administrative rights, the security treaty and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification. The United States would retain “such military facilities and areas” as were required for mutual security. Prime Minister Sato recognized the importance of Korea and Taiwan to Japan’s security and affirmed that reversion “should not hinder
the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East." The communique thus gave vague assurance that Japan would look favorably, after prior consultation, on the use of Okinawa to defend South Korea and Taiwan. The two governments also agreed to consult on the use of bases to support South Vietnam, should the war continue after reversion.

The most deliberately ambiguous paragraph in the communique dealt with nuclear weapons. Mr. Sato “described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting that sentiment. The President . . . assured the Prime Minister that . . . with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.”

Speaking before the National Press Club on 21 November, Prime Minister Sato implied in somewhat stronger terms an affirmative Japanese response to prior consultation regarding the use of Okinawa bases to defend Korea and Taiwan. He also expressed understanding of the US position and efforts in Vietnam. At General Wheeler’s request, the Joint Staff prepared an analysis of the joint communique and Mr. Sato’s speech. Although finding it “somewhat disconcerting that the Japanese would choose to make their strongest assurances unilaterally, the Joint Staff acknowledged that the communique and speech were “probably the best the US could have done” in the negotiations. In some ways, these constituted the “most forthcoming” public recognition by Japan of Okinawa’s importance to the security of the Far East and were therefore “a significant commitment” and “a progressive step in obtaining public recognition of Japan’s security involvement in a broader regional context.”

There followed lengthy and complex negotiations to determine the military, financial, civil, and administrative details of reversion. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these involved strategic adjustments to minimize the impact of reversion of US military capabilities, Japanese assumption of local defense responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and compensation for the release or relocation of US facilities and operations.

CINCPAC’s recommendations about Japan’s assuming defense responsibilities, submitted in July 1969, formed the basis for a Joint Staff-Service report to an interagency working group. In October, the group recommended that there be Japanese control over Okinawa’s ground and air defense systems as well as the extension to Okinawa of US-Japanese cooperative arrangements about air defense. Japan should modernize the Ryukyus air defense warning system, integrating it with those of Japan’s home islands and South Korea, and deploy a jet fighter squadron and a brigade to provide internal security. On 6 February 1970, the Deputy Director, Joint Staff, provided ISA with proposals to transfer air and harbor defense, inshore patrol, maritime surveillance, and air-sea rescue missions to the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Assistant Secretary Nutter approved the paper on 18 March.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1971, Admiral Moorer confirmed the Joint Chiefs’ grudging acceptance of the inevitable. He noted
the negative military implications of reversion, the prospect of increased local political pressure on US facilities, and the costs associated with relocation. Yet, he told the committee, Japan's acknowledgement of a security interest in Korea and Taiwan, together with its assumption of local defense of Okinawa (which reduced US operations and maintenance costs) pointed toward a more equal partnership in northeast Asia.

Under the final US-Japanese agreement on reversion, signed simultaneously in Washington and Tokyo on 17 June 1971, the United States relinquished its rights and interests with respect to the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, while Japan granted the United States use of Okinawa military facilities in accordance with Security Treaty arrangements and the Status of Forces Agreement prevailing in mainland Japan. The government of Japan agreed to pay the United States $320 million in reimbursement or compensation for the transfer of public utilities, real property, and relocation expenses. Eighty-eight military installations would remain under US control, while 34 excess ones would be turned over to Japan at or prior to reversion, and another 12 released within the next year. Naha Air Base would be released and naval aviation activities moved to Kadena. Major US Air Force activities at Kadena, the US Army 2nd Logistical Command, and the 3rd Marine Division would remain. By July 1973, Japan would take over responsibility for the close-in defense of Okinawa (including aircraft alert), maritime patrol, ground defense, and search and rescue missions. The US Senate approved the reversion accord on 10 November 1971; the Japanese Diet completed ratification by early January 1972. The final transfer of authority occurred on 15 May 1972. Symbolically, for Japan, that marked the end of World War II.

**Japan: Reductions in Forces and Bases**

In 1969, budgetary pressures were what drove base and force reductions. The Defense Department's Project 703 called for cutting overall expenditures by $3 billion during FY 1970. On 5 September, Deputy Secretary Packard asked for JCS comment on proposals to impose major reductions upon US forces in the Pacific. These would involve base closings or transfers and personnel reductions in Japan and Okinawa affecting all services. OSD projected withdrawing 24,766 US citizens, military and civilian, for a $329 million annual reduction in budget and $125.8 million in balance of payments savings.59

Responding on 15 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in some closures, transfers and consolidations but objected to most of the proposals. They heaped scorn on OSD's underlying assumption that there was an overabundance of support personnel in Pacific Command's forward bases, a conclusion reached by applying to all the services an Air Force model modified by OSD. In the Joint Chiefs' judgment, only on-site appraisal of facilities, missions, functions, and organization could arrive at valid manpower requirements. Their major concern was to minimize the net impact on US readiness and capability worldwide. If budgetary considerations made base and force
closings necessary, they believed that the services, as managers of military resources, should be given the latitude to recommend where and how to make reductions.\textsuperscript{60}

Implacable pressures to cut defense spending compelled substantial reductions. In April 1970, the Secretary of Defense required all services and certain overseas commanders to submit recommendations for a worldwide base realignment, reduction and closure plan to be prepared by January 1971.\textsuperscript{61}

By mid-1970, the lack of coordination among service plans, the negative effects of unilateral service base closures on the other services, and the overall strategic implications of drastic and rapid cuts led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to shift their position. As early as February, Japanese military officials had expressed their concerns to Admiral McCain, concerns which they repeated in August to Admiral Moorer, the newly appointed Chairman. From Tokyo, on 11 August, Ambassador Meyer advised the State Department of his fear that an “indiscriminate meat axe is being hastily swung against US military installations.” Such “seemingly pell-mell moves,” he warned, would shock the Japanese government and give the impression of US disengagement “if not rout” from the Far East.\textsuperscript{62}

Already alert to the problem, Admiral Moorer advised Secretary Laird on 3 August that budget pressures should not compel a service to close a base without first clearing that action with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and without having it reviewed in the total context of the overseas base structure. Secretary Laird agreed. On 14 August, the Director, J-5, again cautioned the Chairman that budget pressures were forcing the services into extensive closures without a joint assessment of overall strategic implications and possible ways of minimizing adverse impacts. The Japanese defense agency director was expected to raise the subject during a forthcoming visit with Laird. The Director, J-5, recommended that, at the next JCS meeting, Admiral Moorer urge a joint review of reductions previously proposed separately by the services. On 24 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that such a review should concentrate on Japan and areas affected by the base situation there. The Director, J-5, would obtain the services’ plans for possible reductions and prepare a study of base requirements in Japan.\textsuperscript{63}

Echoing this concern for “a very careful job” in planning base reductions, Deputy Secretary Packard established a working group chaired by the Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics) with service and JCS representation. The Army proposed phasing out most of its activities and installations in Japan, except for certain storage areas of war reserve ammunition and standby medical facilities. Headquarters, US Army, Japan, would be reduced to a small detachment and a single advance depot on Okinawa would support WESTPAC. The Navy proposed retaining Sasebo as the home port and sole support base in Japan for the Seventh Fleet, while relocating or disestablishing all other fleet units stationed at Yokosuka. The Naval Air Station at Atsugi would be reduced to a Naval Air Facility, cutting support operations to the minimum possible. The Air Force proposed to relocate tactical fighter wings at Misawa and Yokota, and by moving an RF-4C tactical reconnaissance squadron from Misawa, reduce it to an
air station. Air Force plans to reduce Misawa to an air station conflicted with Navy plans to relocate a VQ-1 detachment there, and returning Itazuke to Japanese control impacted Navy plans to relocate at Sasebo. EC-121s would relocate from Itazuke, which would be returned to Japanese control.

The J-5 identified areas of conflict or concern that seemed likely to have significant effects on strategic capabilities. Closing Army hospitals would reduce contingency support to a low level, the Navy and Air Force not having agreed to accept the increased workloads that might result. The Navy’s plans for Atsugi affected the Air Force’s plans for Misawa. Besides losing a naval hospital, closing Yokosuka meant forfeiting the only dry dock west of Hawaii, under US military control, which could accommodate attack carriers. It also meant losing a skilled, loyal, Navy-experienced work force as well as a substantial electronics and fire control repair capability.64

On 4 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the services to review their plans mutually and concurrently, resolving any conflicts or differences prior to consideration by Defense and State. This was done and, on 9 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the results, finding that most areas of conflict or adverse impact had been either resolved or reduced. The Army would end most of its logistics activities. The Navy would phase out most activities at Yokosuka and Atsugi, leaving Sasebo as the Seventh Fleet’s single support base in Japan. The Air Force would terminate its tactical fighter and reconnaissance operations on mainland Japan, shifting the F-4 squadrons at Misawa and Yokota to Okinawa and South Korea.65

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the reconciled service plans to Secretary Laird on 21 October 1970 and recommended that reductions commence without delay. It was important, they reminded the Secretary, that certain facilities scheduled for closure or reduced use remain available for re-entry by US forces in case of Northeast Asia contingencies. Since joint US-Japanese use of other facilities would generate significant savings, they urged that negotiations with the Japanese begin as soon as possible. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced concern that reductions of such magnitude had to be considered due to their impact on the defense of the Western Pacific, they believed that the revised plans represented the best balance that could be achieved. On 6 November, State and Defense authorized consultations with Japan about the base closings. By the year’s end, the two departments had approved many of the reductions for implementation.66

Yokosuka remained a sensitive issue. The Navy confronted a severe decline in the retention rate of junior officers and enlisted men, resulting from lengthy overseas deployments with short turnaround times in CONUS. Homeporting overseas might alleviate that problem. Plans for WESTPAC envisioned homeporting a carrier task group at Sasebo, while closing out most activities at Yokosuka. When Admiral Moorer visited Japan, however, Japanese officials expressed a strong preference for retaining Yokosuka as the primary US Navy complex in Japan. On 30 March 1971, US and Japanese officials announced agreement to continue the US Navy’s presence there. In May, the Navy proposed homeporting a carrier with its air wing plus a destroyer squadron
at Yokosuka. Deputy Secretary Packard approved initiating negotiations to homeport the destroyer squadron but delayed a decision about the carrier and its air wing. Homeporting a carrier depended on US retention of two dry docks previously scheduled for release to the Japanese. The Japanese government, under heavy pressure to turn the dry docks over to commercial interests, balked at this reversal. The matter remained under discussion for most of 1972, but the Japanese finally accepted continued US control over the dry docks. The carrier USS *Midway* arrived at Yokosuka for its first extended deployment in October 1973, to the accompaniment of massive protest demonstrations.

### A Loosening of Ties?

Japan remained a linchpin of the US military structure in the western Pacific. The United States retained the Army’s IX Corps Headquarters, a Special Forces Group, a psychological warfare operations group, an artillery brigade, and small Army units, together with the III Marine Amphibious Force. Seventh Fleet and other US Navy air and ship units, along with 5th Air Force Headquarters and the 313th Air Division and subordinate units, also remained. A Joint Staff study, completed in November 1972, indicated that “without the bases in Japan the US cannot maintain its long-range policies of defense of Korea and Taiwan and worldwide forward basing concepts for containment” of the Soviet Union and China. Yet nagging doubts about their future availability persisted. The Joint Staff wondered whether CINCPAC ought to prepare contingency plans based on the assumption that the Security Treaty had been abrogated, requiring the removal of US bases from Japan.

Beneath the US defense umbrella, but unwilling to abandon it, Japan struggled with the growing urge to take a more independent stance, commensurate with its new economic stature. Yet the Japanese government carefully limited the pace of security commitments and military expenditures, so as to place no impediment in the way of their country’s drive for economic growth. While the Japanese government pressed for the release of US facilities and curtailment of unpopular US military activities at various locations in Japan and Okinawa, it reacted with distress to massive US base closures and force reductions in the Far East, making particular efforts to gain reassurance that the Seventh Fleet would remain based in Japan. Observers at the US embassy in Tokyo and at PACOM noted increased Japanese receptiveness to substantive discussions of mutual military security interests in the Western Pacific.

A degree of ambivalence also beset US policy. NSSM 122, issued on 15 April 1971, directed a survey of developments since the May 1969 NSDM 13. The 1971 study would consider Japan’s changing attitude toward its international role, the effects of the Nixon doctrine and the opening to China, and changes to the US defense posture and in relations with Japan.
Reporting early in August 1971, an interdepartmental group observed that the military potential of Japan, the second largest and most dynamic industrial power in the free world, if freed from current inhibitions could be formidable. For the most part, the policy prescriptions of NSDM 13 had been implemented successfully. Long-range threats to the US-Japan relationship arose from sources of tension not anticipated or dealt with by NSDM 13. Growing Japanese assertiveness was “exacerbating problems already caused by Japan's continuing explosive growth, aggressive export drive, and rising concern in the United States over the resulting sectorial dislocations in the US economy.” Important segments of the American public had become “increasingly suspicious of Japan's international role and rapid economic growth at a time of rising US international and economic difficulties.” The study identified as fundamental to US interests and not to be endangered: political stability and a reduction of tensions in Asia; favorable trade relations; nuclear non-proliferation; burden sharing; and continued use of Japanese facilities to meet US security commitments in East Asia.

The group articulated four policy options. Option one would continue the current relationship, treating Japan as the major ally and economic partner in Asia, encouraging conventional force modernization while avoiding pressure for larger forces or a larger regional role. Option two, which the group seemed to prefer, added encouragement of a greater Japanese political and developmental role in Asia, support for Japan's aspirations as a “non-military great power,” and selected adjustments to Japan's security posture. Option three would push Japan toward a regional military role in support of South Korea and Taiwan. Option four would encourage Japan to assume some or all of the US security role in Asia.

Apart from these broad options, the study group suggested a number of steps, such as enhanced US-Japanese defense cooperation, expanded Japanese grants-in-aid of at least non-lethal military equipment to friendly governments, and closer cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan on air defense. Incentives included retention of adequate US forces in the area, increased joint planning and exercises, and maximum consultation prior to any further redeployments from northeast Asia. Within the group, sharp divergences emerged over how to alleviate the US balance of payments and trade deficits, Japanese import restrictions, and the impact—if any—that these matters had on defense issues. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the direct impact of economic problems on defense issues to be minimal. The Commerce and Treasury Departments, as well as the President's Economic Adviser, favored linking the two and taking a hard line toward Japan.72

At a Senior Review Group meeting on 6 August, Dr. Kissinger made known his dissatisfaction with these options and the diffuse character of the incentives. He prodded the drafters to focus more clearly on what kind of Japan would best serve US interests, how Japan could be induced to go in the preferred direction, and what the costs might be. He also wanted to address the possibility of looser ties, rather than closer ones.

In an addendum addressing the first group of issues, the State Department repeated that US interests would be best served by a Japan that continued close and friendly
cooperation with the United States and sought great-power status through non-military means, eschewing a destabilizing military capability or nuclear weapons, while providing the United States with essential bases and facilities. The addendum pointed to serious incompatibility between US and Japanese economic policies and objectives, particularly over the balance of payments and trade deficits, which was rapidly evolving into a “crisis of the utmost gravity.” It acknowledged, however that US leverage was limited, especially in terms of negative incentives.73

By a second addendum, State rejected the possibility of loosening ties, despite the greater freedom the United States would gain with regard to Japan’s commercial aggressiveness and détente with China. Such a course would raise a host of frightening possibilities, including: the polarization of Japan’s domestic political scene; the emergence of a nationalistic, authoritarian government; abrogation of the Security Treaty and loss of US bases; and the development of larger, more destabilizing Japanese armed forces, perhaps equipped with nuclear weapons. Therefore, “on balance it seems advisable to deal with the devil we know and to influence him from the basis of a close alliance rather than to cast him loose.”74

In their critique of State’s addendums, ISA and the Joint Staff highlighted the neglect of one issue important to the Defense Department—supporting Japan’s effort to improve its air defense and anti-submarine warfare forces. They criticized other aspects as well. The addendums overstated the inertia of Japanese foreign policy as well as the strength and importance of economic motives and concerns relative to political and security ones. Admittedly, the geopolitical context had changed “gradually but fundamentally.” Mutual self-interest offered the best incentive to guide an increasingly independent Japan toward policies consistent with US interests. The Director, Joint Staff, noted that the addendum on loosening ties raised possibilities but then wished them away “as too horrible to contemplate.” The Joint Staff rejected State’s basic assumption that any loosening of ties rested in US hands: “The facts of life indicate loosening whether we like it or not, at our initiative or not.”75

When the Senior Review Group met on 27 August, Dr. Kissinger also expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed policy guidance. Much of his concern revolved around balancing Japan and China. He agreed with Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson that “under any likely hypothesis” Japan could be expected to become more autonomous and less cooperative, even in the military sphere. “Where,” he asked, “is the carrot and stick?” There clearly existed a correlation between security, defense, and economic matters, but it was not clear how to tackle the economic problem without affecting defense issues. Were there any economic objectives so important that the United States was willing to antagonize Japan over them? Could the United States seriously threaten to remove the nuclear umbrella under which Japan flourished? How could considerable US economic leverage be exerted without damaging the American economy or driving Japan onto an independent or neutralist course? Japan’s orientation might depend on factors other than US policy. In the end, it seemed likely that
the relationship would continue but the United States at times would exercise only marginal influence on Japan.76

NSDM 130, issued on 7 September 1971, dealt only with economic issues pertaining to an upcoming meeting of the US-Japan Joint Economic Committee. Consideration of the larger issues raised by NSDM 122 dwindled to an inconclusive denouement with the circulation in early October of a third addendum reiterating previously agreed objectives as steps to ameliorate the “crisis of confidence.”77

Inevitably, the post-Vietnam era would bring some retraction of US military power in the western Pacific. For their part, the Japanese took steps toward modest increases in military strength, particularly their newly assumed responsibility for defense of Okinawa. The Japanese Self-Defense Agency in 1970 formulated the “4th Defense Build-up,” calling for an expenditure of $16 billion between 1972 and 1976, primarily on air defense and increased naval strength in the immediately adjacent seas and straits. Japanese defense officials spoke of maintaining the Security Treaty on a “semi-permanent” basis, taking as their goal eventual self-sufficiency against conventional attack while depending on the United States for nuclear protection. US officials, including Admiral Moorer and Secretary Laird, applauded these plans but assumed that for the next few years Japan would continue to require major US air and naval contributions, with Japanese forces playing at most a supporting role.78

On 2 September 1971, Assistant Secretary Nutter asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to analyze how well the Japanese Self-Defense Force could provide for the conventional defense of Japan. The Joint Staff solicited views from Admiral McCain and Major General Gordon Graham, USAF (Commander, US Forces Japan). Both judged Japanese forces as probably incapable of executing assigned missions, even with the proposed buildup. Admiral McCain believed that Japan’s economic expansion ultimately would lead to recognition of the need for sufficient military power to ensure continued access to raw materials and open markets. He worried, though, about a possible upsurge of latent nationalism. General Graham thought that Japan’s careful development of a cadre-sized professional force, along with a domestic military technology and an arms industry, would enable it rapidly to create “a large, combat-effective force armed with modern weapons of domestic production when necessary or if desired.” He and Admiral McCain agreed that Japanese defense expenditures should go toward air defense systems, fighter, reconnaissance and transport aircraft, helicopters, anti-tank weapons, and ASW systems.79

Admiral Moorer agreed with Admiral McCain and General Graham and forwarded their comments to Assistant Secretary Nutter. The United States, Admiral Moorer added, must remain firm in its commitment to Japan and reinforce confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, “for it is within this context that the US can best maximize its influence with regard to future military capabilities.”80

However, long-term uncertainties remained. Perhaps these were best exemplified by how Vice Admiral J. P. Weinel, Assistant to the Chairman, reacted to a DIA assessment circulated in February 1973 that predicted a gradual weakening of ties and a more
independent Japan: “More sobering is the possibility that: 1. Japan will deny us bases. 2. Japan will develop her armed forces including nucs [nuclear weapons] to match her economic power. 3. Japan with great economic power, military power, and political power will probably be at odds with the USA.”

**New Status for the Trust Territory**

As US forces began redeploying from forward positions on Asia’s mainland, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands acquired a new prominence in military planning. These islands, covering more than three million square miles of Micronesia in the western Pacific, consisted of the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Archipelagos. In 1947, the United States placed all this territory under United Nations trusteeship. The UN Security Council then designated it a “strategic area,” thereby allowing the United States to establish military bases and close all or part of the territory for security reasons.

In October 1968, through JCSM-643-68, the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the Trust Territory’s importance in compelling language: “Our base system in the Pacific is a single strategic entity which facilitates full exploitation of the great mobility of US forces. Control of any portion of the area must be denied to potential enemies. The cost of lives, time, and resources paid by the United States in World War II to secure control of the Pacific is a direct measure of the vital need to establish and maintain unquestioned US control of this area.” Since the course of events was accentuating the Trust Territory’s importance, developing new initiatives struck them as a matter of urgency.

On 26 March 1969, the Under Secretaries Committee decided that, since delay seemed unlikely to favor US interests, a plan for the Trust Territory’s future status should be developed promptly. An interagency task force, working under State Department chairmanship, defined possibilities that ran the gamut from trusteeship to independence, either as a sovereign or in “free” (i.e., revocable) association with another state. Assistant Secretary Nutter and the Director, Joint Staff, concluded that, from the standpoint of long-term US strategic interests, independence was unacceptable. They supported, in order of preference, offering inhabitants a choice between (1) becoming an unincorporated US territory like Guam or continuing the status quo and (2) becoming a self-governing US territory or continuing the status quo. Agreeing with them, the Under Secretaries Committee recommended bringing the Trust Territory under US sovereignty at an early date. On 28 April, President Nixon approved that approach. The inhabitants would be offered neither independence nor a unilaterally terminable “free association.”

Late in August 1969, the Under Secretaries Committee decided to offer the Micronesians an Organic Act, under which the Trust Territory would become a self-governing, unincorporated US territory. Exploratory talks with them made it clear, however, that this offer stood no chance of acceptance. Micronesians wanted to call their own constitutional convention. Worried that the US might invoke the right of eminent domain,
the Micronesians also insisted on retaining final decisions about land ownership. At the next round of talks, in May 1970, US negotiators proposed a permanent association with the United States as a “commonwealth.” The Micronesian Congress rejected that solution. Their spokesmen argued for a compact of free association, revocable by either side.\(^{85}\)

What next? An interdepartmental group formulated four possibilities. Option 1 sought Micronesian acceptance of the commonwealth proposal. Option 2, endorsed by the Joint Staff and ISA, offered commonwealth status plus several cosmetic concessions. US sovereignty would be maintained, but the actual exercise of federal rights would be voluntarily circumscribed. Similarly, the right of eminent domain would not be exercised, provided that the use of needed land could be assured. Even a unilateral right of termination appeared acceptable, if it was carefully hedged. Options 3 and 4 would allow independence, albeit with treaties preserving US bases and barring foreign powers.

On 4 December 1970, the Under Secretaries Committee reviewed these proposals. Vice Admiral Weinel, the J-5 Director, attended as the JCS representative. Most participants favored either Option 2 or a combination of 1 and 2; Admiral Weinel said the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not support any steps beyond Option 2. The Committee decided to develop more options and refine the existing ones.\(^{86}\)

With redrafting, the group's four options expanded into six. The Interior Department, which administered the Trust Territory, formulated a new Option 1, self-governement under trusteeship. ISA and the Joint Staff doubted its practicality. As before, the Joint Chiefs favored a modified commonwealth solution (the old Option 2, now Option 3) since it made the fewest significant concessions. After reviewing matters on 4 February 1970, the Under Secretaries Committee concluded that “the United States currently has most of the chips—whatever we give the Micronesians should be an improvement (from their view) over what they have now.” Members agreed to split the new Option 3 into two parts, one with unilateral termination and one without it. Also, supporting analyses should reflect the fact that no option could fully satisfy the Micronesians' latest position while still assuring US base rights.\(^{87}\)

On 31 March 1971, the Under Secretaries Committee forwarded its conclusions to President Nixon. Members took note of a growing alienation between the Marianas, where pro-US sentiment ran strong, and the other districts, which wanted some looser form of association, making a single solution for the whole Trust Territory seem impossible. The Interior Department favored, as the initial negotiating step, proposing self-government under trusteeship. Conversely, State and Defense wanted to start by seeking a commonwealth relationship, foregoing the exercise of eminent domain and limiting the exercise of federal sovereignty where practicable. On 20 July, President Nixon approved a negotiating sequence that adopted the State-Defense approach. It would start with the modified commonwealth offer and offer three fallbacks, if necessary. The final proposal would be a compact of free association, with exclusive US control over defense and foreign relations, terminable only with both parties' consent.
Dr. F. Haydn Williams, formerly a deputy assistant secretary of defense, became President Nixon's Personal Representative in the ensuing negotiations.  

By this time, the task of defining military requirements in the Trust Territory was well advanced. In July 1969, just as the first withdrawals from Vietnam began, the Navy Department circulated preliminary plans. Broadly, these involved: on Guam, expanding a wide range of facilities; in the Palaus, building a naval base as well as facilities for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade; and in the Marianas, creating a Marine Corps complex. Their early development, Admiral Moorer advised his JCS colleagues, “could be a significant bargaining device with the Japanese and Philippine governments during base problems bound to arise in the future.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a Service and Joint Staff planning group to prepare an overall scheme, using not only the Navy’s plan but also CINCPAC’s study of how to offset a loss of Japanese and Okinawan bases.

Writing to Secretary Laird on 24 November 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed what they had said about the Trust Territory’s importance in JCSM-643-68 and provided him with a study that sketched five possible basing patterns:

A: Retain bases in the Philippines, Ryukyus and Japan to the extent permitted; continue using facilities in Korea, Taiwan, and mainland Southeast Asia. This would be the solution most advantageous to the United States, resulting in the lowest requirements for bases in Guam and the Trust Territory.

B: Same as A, except that bases in Southeast Asia would be relinquished, creating a limited requirement for bases in Guam and the Trust Territory.

C: Same as B, but build no further facilities in Korea and Taiwan.

D: Withdraw from Japan and the Ryukyus, retain as many facilities in the Philippines as possible, and build more facilities in Korea and Taiwan. Naturally, basing requirements in Guam and the Trust Territory would increase substantially.

E: Withdraw from Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines without expanding Korean and Taiwanese facilities. This outcome, of course, would create the greatest need for bases in Guam and the Trust Territory.

Late in April 1971, as the next round of Micronesian negotiations began, Deputy Secretary Packard asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify requirements for real estate. Taking two months to formulate a reply, they proposed partially implementing a modified version of Pattern A. Essential needs for some of the more likely contingencies in Patterns D and E also could be accommodated. Most of the land that would be needed lay in the Marianas and Palaus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt confident that the Marianas' inhabitants were willing to meet military needs. They were less sure what people of the Palaus would do, and suggested ways to make acceptance more likely.

Admiral Moorer, who was now Chairman, wanted immediate action. Writing to Secretary Laird on 24 July 1971, he claimed that “we are reaching a watershed in our military posture in the Far East.” As justification, he cited the cumulative effect of Okinawa’s approaching reversion, Dr. Kissinger’s trip to Peking and an unstable situation in the Philippines. Clearly, therefore, “our only recourse is to move into the Trust Territory . . . with dispatch and certainly before the Chinese Communists gain any sort
of foothold in the United Nations …. Losing a popularity contest with the inhabitants of the [Trust Territory] creates a very minor problem compared with what will happen if we are pushed all the way back to Hawaii.” Secretary Laird readily agreed about a need to preserve basing options; his staff judged JCS views about land requirements to be reasonable.92

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made base development on Tinian in the Marianas their first priority, and they advised Secretary Laird in mid-October that the United States “must now move ahead with dispatch and certainty to establish a visible military presence.” They sought funds to carry out master planning and construction during FY 1972. Ambassador Williams worried, however, that unfriendly individuals might seize upon leaks about base-building plans to charge the US government with bad faith. Talks would resume in March 1972 and US negotiators had promised to discuss “land transfers” with the proper authorities prior to a final agreement. Consequently, Secretary Laird decided that programming actions should await the completion of negotiations. In February 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised him that postponement until FY 1974 would not create any significant difficulties.93

US-Micronesian talks now took a new direction. For one thing, splitting off negotiations with the Marianas from those with the rest of the Trust Territory seemed likely. More importantly, Micronesians very much wanted an acknowledgement that sovereignty resided with them. Ambassador Williams was willing to meet their demand. Early in February 1972, he asked for authority to negotiate a compact of “free association,” on condition that it clearly recognized full US authority over defense and foreign affairs. Also, the compact would have to contain provisions granting access to the United States and denying it to third countries, along with basing agreements which would survive termination of the political relationship.

Assistant Secretary Nutter asked for a JCS appraisal of “free association.” Replying on 24 February 1972, they readily accepted these modifications. To them, substituting “free association” for “modified commonwealth” would be basically a change of form rather than substance. Of course, “those essential elements of sovereignty involving foreign affairs, defense, access, and denial must be firmly retained by the United States.” Mr. Nutter agreed and so informed Ambassador Williams.94

In April 1972, another round of talks led to a preliminary US-Micronesian agreement about the principles defining a future relationship. The US government would control defense and foreign affairs. Either side could terminate the compact after a specified period, but US authority and responsibility for defense would endure, along with any land leases and options. At the Marianas representatives’ request, steps were taken to start separate talks aimed at a close, permanent political tie with the United States. Unfortunately, a complication arose during the October round of negotiations when the Micronesians asked that “independence” and “free association” be discussed concurrently. Since US negotiators had no authority to discuss independence, the talks recessed to allow a reassessment.
Meantime, drawing upon submissions from CINCPAC and CINCSAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary Laird to approve near-term projects on Tinian costing $114 million. There would be facilities to handle B-52 bombers and cargo aircraft, port and logistics complexes, and a maneuver area. On 1 June, Secretary Laird authorized the services to proceed with FY 1974 programming actions. At this point, though, he was not ready to approve any individual projects.

All in all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could feel well satisfied with the course of events. Not once had the administration gone against their wishes. The basic US position, whether presented as commonwealth or free association, met their requirement that “essential elements of sovereignty involving foreign affairs, defense, access, and denial must be firmly retained by the United States.”
SUMMATION

During President Nixon’s first term, nothing worried the Joint Chiefs of Staff more than what they saw as a shift of the military balance in the Soviet Union’s favor. The advent of strategic nuclear parity, they feared, was only a phase in the Soviet quest for superiority. By the spring of 1970, General Wheeler believed that US defenses had been reduced to the danger point. Admiral Moorer, as Chairman, used every opportunity to warn his civilian superiors that the Soviet threat was real and rising. He viewed the issue in stark terms: “Do we intend to be a world power, or do we intend to settle for second place?”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not wield the influence that a tense international situation might seem to dictate. A combination of factors worked against them. Although JCS differences with the Office of the Secretary of Defense were muted compared to 1965–68, they still existed, particularly over the pace of US withdrawals from South Vietnam. More important, widespread disillusionment over the Vietnam War led to a loss of public confidence in the military leadership. Defense budgets were constantly being pared, as President Nixon and Secretary Laird imposed tight fiscal ceilings in order to forestall even larger cuts by Congress. Growing fiscal pressures, in turn, provoked sharper inter-service squabbling. As Admiral Moorer recorded in his diary, “We are dealing with the cohesiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that is what is important.” Unanimity might not have won more budget battles, but divisions obviously weakened JCS efforts.

Because decisionmaking became so concentrated in the White House, the most important relationship was that between President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger on the one hand and the Chairman on the other. General Wheeler garnered sympathy but only sporadic support from the civilian leadership. Judging by Admiral Moorer’s diary, the Nixon-Moorer relationship was one of mutual respect and frequently of shared outlooks. In the conduct of day-to-day business, however, the Moorer-Kissinger relationship was crucial, and their conversations often conveyed undertones of wariness and mistrust.
The Nixon White House became notorious for its frequency of bypassing the regular bureaucracy. In Paris, for example, Dr. Kissinger conducted a series of secret talks with the Vietnamese, about which Secretary Laird was never formally told. Clearly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played no part in the opening of China, which was the most celebrated achievement of those years. At crucial points during arms control negotiations, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger resorted to special negotiating channels. They went a bit beyond the established JCS positions but rightly judged that JCS concurrence would be forthcoming.

Overall, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger rejected JCS advice more often than they accepted it. In the field of strategic nuclear weaponry, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to maintain a “relative advantage” over the Soviets, but when Dr. Kissinger asked them to define exactly what the term entailed they could not do so. President Nixon emphasized that general purpose forces existed to support diplomacy, meaning that the United States must never negotiate from a position of weakness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not prescribe precisely what force levels would be necessary for that purpose, at least to the satisfaction of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.

President Nixon saw strategic arms limitation as the centerpiece of his quest for US-Soviet détente. Negotiating the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms proved a tortuous process. The outcomes (offsetting offensive asymmetries and two ABM sites per side) bore hardly any resemblance to JCS preferences (equal offensive aggregates and four ABM sites per side). They endorsed these outcomes because putting a lid on the arms race, in a manner that did not endanger US security, seemed preferable to pressing ahead with an unrestrained buildup that might well work to the Soviets’ advantage.

Turning to regional issues, sweeping changes occurred in the Far East and the Joint Chiefs of Staff accommodated to them quite reluctantly. The reversion of Okinawa and the withdrawal of a division from South Korea took place a good deal earlier than they wished. In the Middle East, they failed totally in their pursuit of a “balanced” policy tying aircraft sales to Israel’s diplomatic flexibility. In Latin America, President Nixon overrode strong JCS pleas that a new Panama Canal treaty, and thus a US military presence, last indefinitely. Instead, he was willing to accept a treaty lasting only fifty years. For NATO, the outcome was more complicated. As budgets tightened, General Wheeler concluded that it was time “to go after the sacred cow of NATO.” Admiral Moorer also believed the time had come to consider reducing NATO commitments. Since the Soviet Union was a Pacific power, he reasoned, war in Europe would mean war in Asia as well. Nonetheless, President Nixon ruled out any reductions in US troop levels. To offset the impression created by withdrawals from the Far East, he determined to provide proof that the US commitment to defend Western Europe remained unshaken.

Even when presidential decisions accorded with JCS recommendations, one cannot assume cause and effect. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for an end to the arms embargo against Greece, without requiring the military junta to introduce political reforms. President Nixon did adopt that approach, but it was consistent with a
general policy that he applied worldwide. To cite another case; When the Chief Executive tilted toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger did so, however, because they saw a serious threat to the global balance of power; Admiral Moorer believed the stakes to be much smaller. There were occasions, though, when a JCS imprint was clearly visible. In August 1970, through NSDM 84, President Nixon directed that the Army should stay at 16 1/3 divisions during FY 1972, with tactical air, ASW, and amphibious forces bearing the brunt of reductions. When Admiral Moorer protested that requiring 16 1/3 divisions could result in an undesirable force mix, the President promptly agreed to consider other possibilities and the Army shrank to 13 1/3 divisions.

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned their superiors so pointedly about a loss of flexibility and responsiveness, it is fair to ask whether the administration wanted to do anything which military factors alone rendered impossible. Defined that way, the answer is no. During the Jordanian crisis of September 1970, Admiral Moorer warned the Washington Special Actions Group that intervention would be extremely difficult. He characterized a commitment of US ground forces as unwise, because sustained operations would deplete the strategic reserve. For air strikes, the planes were available but not the bases; planners had to rely entirely upon carrier-based aircraft. This situation came about largely because many NATO allies, unsympathetic to US policies in the Middle East, would not cooperate. Nonetheless, a combination of Jordanian capabilities plus US and Israeli potentialities produced a successful outcome. Thus, fortunately, JCS fears that general purpose forces might prove too weak to support foreign policy objectives were not realized.

Nevertheless, JCS influence on national policy decisions continued to wane because of the statutory requirement to provide a consensus opinion. This in turn resulted in the Joint Staff providing recommendations to the Chiefs that were service parochial, failed to adjust to new political and international realities, and in many cases arrived too late to matter. This system reinforced the status quo and mitigated against the development of innovative policy and strategy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This trend would continue into the next administration.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>anti-ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSAN</td>
<td>Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMSA</td>
<td>Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMISH</td>
<td>Army Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASMS</td>
<td>Advanced Surface Missile System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>anti-submarine warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOB</td>
<td>Bureau of the Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEVENTHFLT</td>
<td>Commander, Seventh Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DASRC</td>
<td>Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFE</td>
<td>Division Force Equivalent</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPM</td>
<td>Draft Presidential Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPPG</td>
<td>Defense Policy and Planning Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRC</td>
<td>Defense Program Review Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDL</td>
<td>fast deployment logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Five-Year Defense Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBERLANT</td>
<td>Atlantic Iberian Command Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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</table>
JCSM Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JFM Joint Force Memorandum
JLRSS Joint Long-Range Strategic Study
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System

LFS Landing Force Support
LGB laser-guided bomb
LPD amphibious ship dock
LPH amphibious assault ship (helicopter)
LST landing ship, tank

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP Military Assistance Program
MBFR mutual and balanced force reductions
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
METG Middle East Task Group
MIDEASTFOR Middle East Forces
MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
MLBM modern large ballistic missile
MPM Major Program Memorandum
MRBM medium-range ballistic missiles
MRV multiple re-entry vehicle

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA National Command Authority
NMCC National Military Command Center
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSC National Security Council
NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM National Security Study Memorandum

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PACOM Pacific Command
PDM Program Decision Memorandum
POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PPBS planning-programming-budgeting system
PPGM Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>REDCOSTE</td>
<td>Reduction of Costs in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAC</td>
<td>Special Assistant for Arms Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>surface-to-air missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>Senior Interdepartmental Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRG</td>
<td>Senior Review Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMILRONT</td>
<td>Military Representative on the US-Okinawa Negotiating Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific (USN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSAG</td>
<td>Washington Special Actions Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief
Richard M. Nixon 20 Jan 69 – 09 Aug 74

Assistant to the President for
(National Security Affairs)
Henry A. Kissinger 20 Jan 69 – 03 Nov 75

Secretary of State
William P. Rogers 22 Jan 69 – 03 Sep 73

Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird 22 Jan 69 – 29 Jan 73

Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard 24 Jan 69 – 23 Feb 72
Kenneth Rush 23 Feb 72 – 29 Jan 73

Assistant Secretary of Defense for
(International Security Affairs)
G. Warren Nutter 04 Mar 69 – 30 Jan 73

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA 03 Jul 64 – 02 Jul 70
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 02 Jul 70 – 01 Jul 74

Director, Joint Staff
Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson 01 Aug 68 – 19 Jul 70
Lieutenant General John W. Vogt, USAF 20 Jul 70 – 07 Apr 72

Chief of Staff, US Army
General William C. Westmoreland 03 Jul 68 – 30 Jun 72
General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (Acting) 01 Jul 72 – 11 Oct 72
General Creighton W. Abrams 12 Oct 72 – 04 Sep 74

Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer 01 Aug 67 – 01 Jul 70
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. 01 Jul 70 – 01 Jul 74

*Chief of Staff, US Air Force*
General John P. McConnell 01 Feb 65 – 01 Aug 69
General John D. Ryan 01 Aug 69 – 31 Jul 73

*Commandant, US Marine Corps*
General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. 01 Jan 68 – 31 Dec 71
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. 01 Jan 72 – 30 Jun 75
Notes

1. Overview: Men and Methods


4. Examples include MFR by CNO (M-39-70), “Meeting Concerning JSOP 72-76 [sic],” para. 6, 21 Feb 70, “Admiral Moorer’s Memos M-1 thru M-53-70,” Moorer Papers. TelCon, CJCS with CNO, 1220 hours, 16 Dec 70; Diary Entries for 25 Feb 71; MFR by CJCS, (M-68-72), 16 Dec 70; MFR by CJCS (M-68-73), “Meeting with the President, Thursday, 30 November 1972, The White House,” para. 2, 1 Dec 72; Admiral Moorer Diary, NARA II.

5. Wayne Thompson, *To Hanoi and Back* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 2000), pp. 201-210. From 1 July until 11 October, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, served as Acting Chief of Staff.


7. Memo, Lieutenant General Michael P. C. Carns, USAF, to W. J. Webb, 1 Aug 90, JHO. Then a major, Carns was serving as aide to the Chief of Staff, Air Force.


9. Mr. Laird mentioned this during an interview with W. S. Poole.

10. Statutory members of the NSC were the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. By law, the JCS were principal military advisors to the Council. National Security Study Memorandums (NSSMs), usually signed by Kissinger, identified tasks and assigned them to specific agencies. National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs) transmitted President Nixon’s decisions.


Notes to Pages 6–12


21. Written comments by Admiral Zumwalt on a draft manuscript, 12 Apr 90, JHO.

22. When the legislation was being debated, Moorer took the position that no statutory change was necessary because personalities, not organizational diagrams, were what mattered.

23. Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, Vol. II, pp. 334–337. Entries for 23 Dec 71 and 7 Jan 72, Moorer Diary. In 1974, Admiral Moorer provided members of the House Appropriations Committee with a defense of his conduct: “I never had the feeling of isolation from information. . . . These papers did not stimulate close attention by me because they contained no new information. . . . I did not scrutinize the papers as to their precise contents or origin but handed them back to RADM WELANDER.” Printed in Hrgs., House Cmte on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., Pt. 1, pp. 371–377; the quoted passages are on pp. 372 and 375.


26. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCJS et al., 28 May 69, JCS 1977/285; CM-4305-69 to DepSecDef, 9 Jun 69, JCS 1977/285; JMF 010 (28 May 69); RG 218, NARA II.

27. JCSM-382-69 to SecDef, 18 Jun 69, JCS 1977/285-4, JMF 010 (28 May 69). Dr. Gardiner Tucker, who had been Director of Research at IBM during 1963-67 and Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering since 1967, took the post of Assistant Secretary.

28. Memo for Record by DepSecDef, CJCJS, and SveSecys, 10 Jul 69, JCS 1977/285-5, JMF 010 (28 May 69).

29. JLRSS 82-91, transmitted via SM-406-71 to SecDef, 8 Sep 71, JCS 1920/22, JMF 512 (23 Aug 71).

30. JCSM-582-69 to SecDef, 20 Sep 69, JCS 2458/568-2, JMF 550 (2 May 69).

31. DJSM-1714-69 to Dirs and Heads of Agencies, OJCS, 7 Nov 69, 1st N/H of JCS 2458/632, 12 Nov 69, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69).

32. Some previous JSOP had separately listed “preferred,” “austere,” and “risk” forces.

33. JCSM-320-69 to SecDef, 22 May 69, JCS 2458/541, JMF 550 (2 May 69).

34. Memo, ASD(Compt.) to CJCJS et al., 7 Jul 69, JCS 2458/568, JMF 550 (2 May 69). Memo, SecDef to CJCJS, 20 Nov 69, JCS 2458/642, JMF 570 (19 Sep 69).

35. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCJS et al., 28 Jan 70, JCS 2101/570, JMF 502 (28 Jan 70). Memo, DepSecDef to CJCJS et al., 24 Mar 70, JCS 2458/677-18, JMF 555 (15 Jan 70) sec. 3. JCSM-223-70 to SecDef, 8 May 70, JCS 2458/673-3, JMF 557 (8 Jan 70) sec. 3. Memo, Kissinger to SecDef et al., 13
2. Strategies Old and New

1. JCSM-713-68 to SecDef, 5 Dec 68, JCS 2143/331-1, JMF 511 (13 Jun 68). Vol. I was distributed to State by JCSM-714-68, to the White House by JCSM-715-68, to Central Intelligence by JCSM-716-68, and to the Service Chiefs by SM-793-68, all 5 Dec 68, same file.

2. Working in Omaha, headquarters of Strategic Air Command, the JSTPS was charged with developing the Single Integrated Operational Plan for waging nuclear war.


5. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 24 Jan 69, JCS 2458/501, JMF 557 (24 Jan 69) sec. 1. JCSM-144-69 to SecDef, 14 Mar 69, JCS 2458/501-7, same file, sec. 3.

6. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 2 Apr 69, JCS 2101/554-14, JMF 373 (21 Jan 69) sec. 3.

7. JCSM-210-69 to SecDef, 9 Apr 69, JCS 2101/554-15, JMF 373 (21 Jan 69) sec. 4.

8. Most of the steering group had not endorsed the third criterion, on grounds that less than all-out attacks had no precedent in Soviet military doctrine.


13. JCSM-743-69 to SecDef, 4 Dec 69, JCS 2458/632-5; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 6 Feb 70, N/H of JCS 2458/632-4, 10 Feb 70; JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 2.

14. “Strategy Guidance Memorandum,” 28 Jan 70, Encl to Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 28 Jan 70, JCS 2101/570, JMF 502 (28 Jan 70). JCSM-281-70 to SecDef, 13 Jun 70, JCS 2143/367, JMF 511
(22 May 70). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 16 Dec 70, JCS 2101/578; JCSM-57-71 to SecDef, 9 Feb 71, JCS 2101/578-1; JMF 502 (16 Dec 70).


16. This passage was added to J-5’s draft at General Ryan’s request. AF Flimsy 412-71, 17 Nov 71, JMF 550 (23 Oct 71).

17. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Oct 71, JCS 2458/802; JCSM-508-71 to SecDef, 22 Nov 71, JCS 2458/802-1; JMF 550 (23 Oct 71). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Mar 72, JCS 2458/825, JMF 555 (9 Mar 72).

18. JCSM-230-72 to SecDef, 22 May 72, JCS 2143/406, JMF 511 (12 May 72).

19. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Jan 69, JCS 2458/501, JMF 557 (24 Jan 69) sec. 1.

20. JCSM-141-69 to SecDef, 13 Mar 69, JCS 2458/501-8, JMF 557 (24 Jan 69) sec. 4. Subsequently, the JCS sent Laird a study of their own refining the nine strategies and adding the JSOP alternative as a tenth. Their purpose was to highlight what they saw as the pilot study’s inadequacies. JCSM-209-69 to SecDef, 9 Apr 69, JCS 2101/554-13, JMF 373 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1. JSOP 71-78, Vol. I, circulated via SM-456-68 to CSA et al., 6 Jul 68, JCS 2143/331, JMF 511 (13 Jun 68).


22. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 5 Sep 69, JCS 2101/554-54, JMF 373 (21 Jan 69). Most of this memo, force levels excepted, is printed in Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 174–193. The “illustrative” aircraft figures placed a heavy emphasis on land-based tactical aircraft. Other designs, the group noted, could have put more stress on carrier-based aircraft.


24. J-5 PP 8-69, 3 Sep 69; Supplemental to PP 8-69, 4 Sep 69, Encl to DJSM-1395-69 to CJCS, 6 Sep 69; JMF 373 (21 Jan 69) sec. 16.


27. DJSM-1612 to CJCS, 16 Oct 69, JMF 001 (CY 69) NSDMs.


29. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 1 Nov 69, JCS 2458/632-1, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 1.

30. J-5’s draft said this “entails both political and military risk.” General Ryan recommended deletion, on grounds that “the European members of NATO do not view planning for a limited duration war as risky; on the contrary, they believe planning for a sustained war on European soil is most risky militarily and politically,” CSAFM L-1-69 to JCS, 2 Dec 69, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 2.

31. Unsuccessfully, Admiral Moorer suggested adding a situation involving limited mobilization: Meet a full-scale Chinese invasion of either Korea or Southeast Asia, and assist allies in successfully opposing a non-Chinese attack elsewhere, while remaining able to carry out an initial defense of Europe. CNOM-310-69 to JCS, 2 Dec 69, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 2.
32. JCSM-743-69 to SecDef, 4 Dec 69, JCS 2458/632-4, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 2. Packard forwarded JCSM-743-69 to the White House via Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 6 Feb 70, N/H of JCS 2458/632-4, same file.

33. Ltr, USecState to CJCS, 19 Mar 70, JCS 2143/362, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 3.

34. “Strategy Guidance Memorandum,” 28 Jan 70, Encl to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 28 Jan 70, JCS 2101/570, JMF 502 (28 Jan 70).

35. JCSM-281-70 to SecDef, 13 Jun 70, JCS 2143/367; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Aug 70, JCS 2143/367-1; JMF 511 (22 May 70). Packard forwarded Volume I to the White House.


38. At Guam, Nixon said “the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy which will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam.” Public Papers of the Presidents: Nixon, 1969, p. 548.

39. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Dec 70, JCS 2101/578, JMF 502 (16 Dec 70).

40. JCSM-57-71 to SecDef, 9 Feb 71, JCS 2101/578-1, JMF 502 (16 Dec 70).

41. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Apr 71, JCS 2458/780, JMF 555 (21 Apr 71) sec. 1.

42. JCSM-226-71 to SecDef, 13 May 71, JCS 2458/780-1, JMF 555 (21 Apr 71) sec. 1.

43. Memo, CSA to CJCS, 17 Jun 71, JCS 2458/780-8, JMF 555 (21 Apr 71) sec. 2. The record shows no response by other Chiefs.

44. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Jun 71, JCS 2458/780-7, JMF 555 (21 Apr 71) sec. 2.

45. JCSM-291-71 to SecDef, 23 Jun 71, JCS 2143/388, JMF 511 (14 Jun 71). It went to the White House via Memo, SecDef to Pres, 4 Aug 71, JCS 2143/388-2, same file.

46. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 4 Aug 71, JCS 2143/388-1, JMF 511 (14 Jun 71).

47. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Oct 71, JCS 2458/802, JMF 550 (23 Oct 71).

48. JCSM-508-71 to SecDef, 22 Nov 71, JCS 2458/802-1; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 28 Feb 72, JCS 2458/802-2; JMF 550 (23 Oct 71).

49. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Mar 72, JCS 2458/825, JMF 555 (9 Mar 72).


Chapter 3. Strategic Forces: The Road to Equivalence

1. Titan II was unique in carrying a multi-megaton warhead.


6. Between 1968 and 1978, according to US intelligence, Soviet missile forces would grow from about 1,014 ICBM and SLBM launchers to 1,100-1,500 ICBM and 650 to 850 SLBM launchers. Generals McConnell and Westmoreland believed that, if the Soviets did not deploy a sizable
Notes to Pages 35–42

number of MIRVed ICBMs, their ICBM force would considerably exceed 1,500 launchers by the late 1970s.

7. The FB-111 derived from the swing-wing F-111, conceived by Secretary McNamara as a multi-service, multi-mission aircraft. SAC accepted it basically as an interim or stop-gap bomber.

8. Until 1972, Trident was described as the “Undersea Long-Range Missile System” (ULMS). “Trident” is used throughout this chapter for convenience’s sake.


12. JCSM-760-69 to SecDef, 11 Dec 69, JCS 2101/566, JMF 372 (4 Dec 69).


14. Generals Ryan and Westmoreland reserved judgment about Trident’s phasing and deployment levels. At this point, they believed Tridents should be planned as one-for-one replacements of Polaris boats.


16. JCSM-223-70 to SecDef, 8 May 70, JCS 2458/673-3, JMF 557 (8 Jan 70) sec. 3. JCSM-251-70 to SecDef, 23 May 70, JCS 2458/673-5, same file, sec. 5.


19. NSDM 84, 11 Sep 70, JMF 001 (CY 1970) NSDMs. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 596–597. The JCS noted that, between 1962 and 1969, the number of interceptors (USAF and Air National Guard) had fallen from 1,700 to 550. But, since the beginning of 1969, 500 Soviet bomber and reconnaissance flights had been picked up by radars covering Alaska and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. The closing of radar installations had reduced overlap radar coverage, the very type of coverage that would be essential if Soviet bombers attacked ground environment targets. JCSM-572-70 to SecDef, 16 Dec 70, JCS 2101/576, JMF 327 (3 Dec 70).


23. Memo, ATP(NSA) to CJCS et l., 30 Oct 70, JCS 2101, JMF 373 (30 Oct 70). Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 1 Dec 70, JCS 2101/577; CM-465-71 to Dir, WSEG, 24 Dec 70, JCS 2101/577-1; JMF 373 (1 Dec 70).

24. JCS 2101/577-4, 24 Feb 71; CNOM-74-71 to JCS, n.d., N/H of JCS 2101/577-4, 26 Feb 74; JCSM-89-71 to SecDef, 1 Mar 71, JCS 2101/577-4; JMF 373 (1 Dec 70) sec. 1. The JCS were not
commenting upon General Oberbeck’s “interpretation” but upon the full report which carried special security classification and so is not in the regular file.

25. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Apr 71, JCS 2458/780; JCSM-226-71 to SecDef, 13 May 71, JCS 2458/780-1; JMF 555 (21 Apr 71) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Jun 71, JCS 2458/780-7, same file, sec. 2.

26. JCSM-276-71 to SecDef, 14 Jun 71, JCS 2458/785, JMF 557 (31 Mar 71) sec. 2.


28. Memo, ASD(SA) to SecNav, 25 Aug 71, JCS 2458/797-1; Memo, DepSecDef to SecNav, 16 Sep 71, JCS 2458/797-1; JMF (25 Aug 71). The administration’s FY 1973 objectives are listed in JSOP 74-81, Vol. II, Bk. II, JMF 511 (29 Nov 71) sec. 1.


31. JCSM-226-72 to SecDef, 17 May 72, JCS 2458/818-3, JMF 557 (24 Jan 72).

32. The Agreement and the Treaty are fully described in chap. 5.

33. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 31 May 72, JCS 2482/153, JMF 557 (24 Jan 72) sec. 3.

34. JCSM-330-72 to SecDef, 17 Jul 72, JCS 2458/818-2, JMF 557 (24 Jan 72) sec. 2.

35. Memos, DepSecDef to SecArmy, SecAF and SecNav, 30 Aug 72, JCS 2458/843, 836 and 837; Memos, DepSecDef to SecArmy, SecAF and SecNav, 21 Sep 72, JCS 2458/834-1, 836-1 and 837-1; JMF 556 (CY 1972). JCSM-412-72 to SecDef, 12 Sep 72, JCS 2458/818-9, JMF 557 (24 Jan 72) sec. 3.


Chapter 4. Conventional Capabilities

1. JCSM-548-68 to SecDef, 14 Sep 68, JCS 2147/475-1, JMF 372 (5 Sep 68).

2. JSCP-70, 31 Dec 68, circulated via SM-827-68 to CINCAL et al., 31 Dec 68, JCS 1844/507, JMF 510 (7 Dec 68).


4. The ASW carriers were Essex class, built during World War II and unable to handle jets.

5. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 14 May 69, JCS 2458/542; JCSM-361-69 to SecDef, 10 Jun 69, JCS 2458/542-1; JMF 560 (14 May 69) sec. 1. JCS contributions to the NSSM 3 review are in chap. 2.

6. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Jun 69, JCS 2458/552, JMF 560 (4 Jun 69) sec. 1.


8. COMMANDO HUNT in the Laotian panhandle involved round-the-clock attacks by B-52s, tactical aircraft, and gunships.
9. ASMS had been initiated because shipboard Tartar, Terrier and Talos missiles all had shortcomings.

10. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 27 Jun 69, JCS 2458/563, JMF 560 (26 Jun 69) sec. 1.


12. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 May 69, JCS 2458/549, JMF 560 (28 May 69).

13. JCSM-393-69 to SecDef, 25 Jun 69, JCS 2458/549-1, JMF 560 (28 May 69).

14. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 11 Jun 69, JCS 2458/554; JCSM-426-69 to SecDef, 9 Jul 69, JCS 2458/554-1; JMF 560 (11 Jun 69) sec. 1. Memo, Actg ASD(SA) to CJCS et al., 14 Aug 69, JCS 2458/554-7, same file, sec. 3. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 6 Dec 69, JCS 2458/632-5, JMF 511 (29 Oct 69) sec. 3.

15. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 5 Aug 69, JCS 2458/582; Memo, ASD (Compt) to CJCS, 6 Aug 69, JCS 2458/582-1; JCSM-511-69 to SecDef, 16 Aug 69, JCS 2458/582-4; JMF 580 (5 Aug 69).

16. JCSM-570-69 to SecDef, 12 Sep 69, JCS 2458/597-1; JCSM-559-69 to SecDef, 8 Sep 69, JCS 2458/598-1; Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 15 Sep 69, JCS 2458/598-2; JMF 580 (5 Sep 69).


20. For planning purposes, M-Day was the day on which mobilization would begin; D-Day was the day on which hostilities started.

21. Usually, a squadron had 24 aircraft, with three squadrons in a wing.

22. Additionally, military personnel overseas would be reduced by 14,900 spaces. Since Southeast Asia, Korea, and Europe were exempted, the rest of Pacific Command had to bear the brunt, losing 10,416 spaces. Memo, ATP(NSA) to USecState, 21 Jul 69, JMF 101 (21 Jul 69) sec. 1. JCSM-660-69 to SecDef, 18 Oct 69, JCS 2458/576-9; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Nov 69, JCS 2458/576-13; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Jan 70, JCS 2458/576-16; same file, sec. 3.

23. JCSM-760-69 to SecDef, 11 Dec 69, JCS 2101/566, JMF 372 (4 Dec 69).


29. Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 15 Apr 70, JCS 2143/356-1, JMF 511 (31 Jan 70) sec. 6. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Mar 70, JCS 2458/677-18, JMF 555 (15 Jan 670) sec. 3.

30. JCSM-223-70 to SecDef, 8 May 70, JCS 2458/673-3, JMF 557 (8 Jan 70) sec. 3. The Authorized Active Inventory figure for the C-5A fleet would be 80.

31. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Mar 70, JCS 2458/677-18, JMF 555 (15 Jan 70) sec. 3. JCSM-251-70 to SecDef, 23 May 70, JCS 2458/673-5, JMF 557 (8 Jan 70) sec. 5.

32. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Mar 70, JCS 2458/677-18, JMF 555 (15 Jan 70) sec. 3. JCSM-251-70 to SecDef, 23 May 70, JCS 2458/673-5, JMF 557 (8 Jan 70) sec. 5.


41. Entry for 24 Oct 70, Moorer Diary.

42. This is described in chap. 9.


44. CM-365-70 to JCS, 14 Nov 70, JMF 555 (18 Nov 70). The same file contains numerous Service memos proposing revisions to CM-365-70.

45. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 18 Nov 70, JCS 2458/755, JMF 555 (18 Nov 70). MFR by Rear Admiral Robinson, “Budget Planning,” 27 Nov 70, Moorer Diary.

47. NSDM 95, issued in November 1970 and described in chap. 6, required the capability for a strong and credible initial conventional defense against a full-scale attack.


49. JCSM-572-70 to SecDef, 16 Dec 70, JCS 2101/576, JMF 327 (3 Dec 70).

50. CNOF-377-70 to JCS, 10 Dec 70, JMF 327 (3 Dec 70). MFR by Lieutenant General Knowles, “JCS Meeting, 1530 Friday, 11 December,” 11 Dec 70, Moorer Diary. Comment by Admiral Zumwalt on draft chapter, 12 Apr 90.

51. MemCon by Rear Admiral Robinson, 22 Dec 70; Entry for 24 Dec 70; Moorer Diary.

52. JSOP 73-80, Vol. II, Bks. III-VI, forwarded via JCSM-583-70 to SecDef, 23 Dec 70, JCS 2143/378, JMF 511 (27 Nov 70).

53. CSAMs 351 and 356-70 to JCS, 9 and 10 Dec 70, JMF 511 (27 Nov 70). Entries for 16 Dec 70, Moorer Diary.


55. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Feb 71, JCS 2458/769; JCSM-95-71 to SecDef, 3 Mar 71, JCS 2458/769-1; JMF 550 (10 Feb 71).


57. Memo, Kissinger to SecDef et al., 26 Mar 71, JCS 2458/774-1; Memo, ASD(SA) to CJCS et al., 21 Apr 71, JCS 2458/774-3; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Apr 71, JCS 2458/774-2; JMF 570 (8 Mar 71) sec. 1. The services outlined the shortcomings of these “illustrative” proposals in Tab G to J-5 BP 356-71, 22 Apr 71, same file.

58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Apr 71, JCS 2458/780, JMF 551 (21 Apr 71).

59. JCSM-226-71 to SecDef, 13 May 71, JCS 2458/780-1, JMF 555 (21 Apr 71) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Jun 71, JCS 2458/780-7, same file, sec. 2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Oct 71, JCS 2458/802, JMF 550 (23 Oct 71). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Mar 72, JCS 2458/825, JMF 555 (9 Mar 72).


62. In mid-October, the JCS sent Laird a study of reserve forces prepared by the Joint Staff in collaboration with the Services. Making minimal reductions in other requirements, it said, could render Army reserves adequate to meet a major NATO contingency (Situation B1). But Air Force reserves would prove “only marginal,” with a shortfall in tactical air wings, and Navy reserves would be insufficient. As to readiness, Army divisions and brigades could not meet deployment deadlines. Readiness in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps seemed generally satisfactory. Ending the draft, however, would severely affect all the services’ ability to maintain reserve strengths at or near current levels. JCSM-449-71 to SecDef, 14 Oct 71, JCS 2477/573-2, JMF 379 (19 Mar 71).
63. JCSM-276-71 to SecDef, 14 Jun 71, JCS 2458/785, JMF 557 (31 Mar 71) sec. 2.


67. NSDM 95, described in chap. 6.

68. Entry for 10 Aug 71, Moorer Diary.


70. The Army, during its Vietnam buildup, had bought equipment for 16 divisions. Reducing to 13 meant that it had three divisions’ worth of surplus equipment. The Vice Chief of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, stated that recruiting personnel, particularly for the reserves, now constituted the Army’s main problem. MFR by BG Bratton, “JCS Meeting with Senior Officials . . . ,” 19 Aug 71, p. 6, Moorer Diary.

71. Memos, ASD(SA) to SecNav, SecAF, and SecArmy, 25 Aug 71, JCS 2458/797-1; JCSM-402-71 to SecDef, 2 Sep 71, JCS 2458/786-3; Memos, DepSecDef to SecNav, SecAF, and SecArmy, 16 Sep 71, JCS 2458/797-4, 797-5, and 797-6; JMF 555 (25 Aug 71).


73. JSOP 74-81, Vol. II, Bks. III-VI, transmitted via JCSM-562-71 to SecDef, 22 Dec 71, JCS 2458/397, JMF 511 (3 Dec 71). The JFM was transmitted via JCSM-226-71 to SecDef, 17 May 72, JCS 2458/818-3; JMF 557 (24 Jan 72).

74. JCSM-336-72 to SecDef, 21 Jul 72, Encl C to JCS 2458/818-7; JMF 557 (24 Jun 72) sec. 3. chap. 5 lists the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

75. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy, SecAF, and SecNav, 30 Aug 72, JCS 2458/834, 836, and 837, JMF 556 (CY 72). JCSM-412-72 to SecDef, 12 Sep 72, JCS 2458/818-9, JMF 557 (24 Jan 72) sec. 3.

76. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy, SecAF, and SecNav, 21 Sep 72, JCS 2458/834-1, 836-1, and 837-1, JMF 556 (CY 72).

77. These figures are taken from JSOP 75-82, JCS 2143/417, JMF 511 (29 Nov 72).

78. JSOP-74, Vol. I, pp. 7–9, JCS 1844/575, JMF 510 (8 Dec 72) sec. 1.

Chapter 5. SALT Ends in Success


2. SAAC TP-1-69, 11 Feb 69, JCS 2482/23, and Decision On, 12 Feb 69, JMF 750 (11 Feb 69).

4. CM-3464-68 to DJS, 11 Jul 68, JCS 2482/12, JMF 021 (11 Jul 68). According to journalist John Newhouse (Cold Dawn, pp. 113-114), Wheeler bypassed his two-star Special Assistant for Arms Control because SAAC and his staff “could be relied upon to take the line least likely to upset any of the Chiefs.” In August 1971, the Chairman disestablished SAAC, making him the Deputy Director, J-5, for International Negotiations, a position that became the focal point for supporting talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. SM-1150-71 to DJS and ACSAN, 22 Aug 71, JCS 1977/331, JMF 028 (27 Mar 70).

5. ACSAN-7-69 to CJCS, 3 Apr 69, CJCS 388.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (Jan-Jun 69). Memo, Dir ACDA to ATP(NSA), 16 Apr 69, JCS 2482/28-5, JMF 751 (6 May 69) sec. 1. Ltr, CJCS to Dir ACDA, 17 Apr 69; Ltr, Ambassador Smith to ATP(NSA), 17 Apr 69; CJCS 388.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (Jan–Jun 69).

6. Unlike the Soviets, the United States had no launchers under construction and no plans to add any.

7. Memo, ATP(NSA) to Dir ACDA, 28 Apr 69, JCS 2482/28-5, JMF 751 (6 Mar 69) sec. 1. ACSAN-23-69 to CJCS, 29 May 69, JCS 2482/28-8; TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to DepSecDef and ACSAN, “NSSM 28,” n.d., JCS 2482/28-11, same file, sec. 4.


11. ACSAN-33-69 to CJCS, 17 Jun 69, CJCS 388.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (Jan-Jun 69).

12. JCSM-390-69 to SecDef, 23 Jun 69, JCS 2458/35-2, JMF 751 (16 Jun 69). The MRV, which the Soviets had flight-tested, could deliver several warheads but only against a single target.


15. Memo, Dir ACDA to ATP(NSA), 14 Jul 69, Att to Memo, Staff Secy, NSC to Lieutenant General Unger et al., 15 Jul 69, JCS 2482/37-1, JMF 751 (2 Jul 69) sec. 1. ACSAN-41-69 to ATP(NSA), 8 Jul 69, JCS 2482/37-5, same file, sec. 2. At a Review Group meeting on 17 July, Allison reported that the JCS were “focusing” on II and III. Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, pp. 93–94.


17. At this point, the United States had no launchers under construction.


19. JCS 2482/42-1, 19 Aug 69, JMF 756 (29 Jul 69).

20. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 137–138. Dept of State Bulletin, 28 Jul 69, p. 66. At this point, General Allison was permanently assigned to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Previously, he had performed his ACSAN duties on a part-time basis.


22. Memo, Paul Nitze to Dir ACDA, 3 Sep 69, JCS 2482/50-1; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 17 Oct 69, JCS 2482/37-7; Memo, Dir ACDA to ATP(NSA), 27 Oct 69, JCS 2482/37-8; JMF 751 (2
Notes to Pages 88–93


23. ACSAN-123-69 to CJCS, 3 Nov 69, JCS 2482/58, JMF 752 (3 Nov 69). The NSC meeting of 8 October is in Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, pp. 132-139. According to Packard, one of OSD's new options "would be a reduction of Soviet numbers, plus throw-weight and a MIRV ban"; the other "would be to reduce the total number [of land- and sea-based missiles] and throw-weight of both." Ibid., p. 137.

24. SM-766-69 to CJCS and ACSAN, 10 Nov 69, JCS 2482/58, JMF 752 (3 Nov 69).


27. ACSAN-147-69 to CJCS, 31 Dec 69, CJCS 38.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (Jan-Jun 70). In November, Allison was promoted to lieutenant general.

28. Memo, ACSAN to CJCS, 22 Jan 70, CJCS 388.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (Jan-Jun 70).

29. ACSAN-56-70 to CJCS, 14 Mar 70, JCS 2482/74, JMF 752 (14 Mar 70).

30. Ltr, Dir ACDA to Pres, 23 Mar 70; ACSAN-58-70 to CJCS, 25 Mar 70; CJCS 388.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (Jan70-) Bulky Package.


35. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 545.

36. Msg, Lieutenant General Allison to CJCS, 16 Jun 70, SAL 295; DJSM-836-70 to CJCS, 17 Jun 70; CJCS 388.3 US/Soviet Missile Talks (1 Jan 70) BP.


38. The wording in NSDMs was “sea-based ballistic missiles,” defined as ballistic missiles with launchers on submarines or surface ships, regardless of the propulsion plant of the vessel. “SLBM” is used here for convenience.


42. ACSAN-3-71 to CJCS, 8 Jan 71, JCS 2482/104, JMF 752 (8 Jan 71).

43. Entries for 19 and 20 Jan 71, Moorer Diary.

44. ACSAN-16-71 to CJCS, 26 Jan 71, Att to CM-538-71 to JCS, 1 Feb 71, JMF 751 (1 Feb 71).


46. General Oberbeck’s report is described in chap. 3.

47. CM-543-71 to DJs, 31 Jan 71, JCS 2482/107, JMF 752 (31 Jan 71). ACSAN-44-71 to CJCS, 20 Feb 71, JCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Jun 71).

48. ACSAN-52-71 to CJCS, 26 Feb 71, JCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Jun 71). Dec On JCS 2482/107-2, 26 Feb 71, JMF 752 (31 Jan 71).

49. ACSAN-65-71 to CJCS, 3 Mar 71, JCS 2482/106-3, JMF 752 (4 Jan 71).

50. Memo, Ambassador Smith to Kissinger, 4 Mar 71, JCS 2482/106-4; ACSAN-69-71 to Kissinger, 5 Mar 71; JMF 752 (4 Jan 71).

51. ACSAN-64-71 to CJCS, 2 Mar 71, JCS 2482/114; SM-128-71 to CJCS, 6 Mar 71, JCS 2482/114-1; JMF 752 (2 Mar 71).


57. Entries for 20 and 21 Apr 71; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), “SALT Guidance,” 22 Apr 71; Moorer Diary.

58. DJSM-814-71 to Dir, J-5, 29 Apr 71, JCS 2482/122, JMF 750 (29 Apr 71).

59. JCS 2482/122, 7 May 71, and Dec On, 11 May 71, JMF 750 (29 Apr 71).


63. CM-916-71 to JCS, 20 May 71, JCS 388.1 SALT (Jan-Jun 71).

65. ACSAN-114-71 to CJCS, 14 Jun 71, Att to CM-979-71 to JCS, 16 Jun 71, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan-Jun 71).

66. CM-1001-71 to JCS, 24 Jun 71, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan–Jun 71).

67. Memos, CMC and CNO to CJCS, “US Position for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,” 28 Jun 71; CSAFM-247-71 to CJCS, 28 Jun 71; Memo, CSA to CJCS, same subj., 28 Jun 71; CM-1018-71 to JCS, 29 Jun 71; CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan–Jun 71).

68. ACSAN-124-71 to CJCS, 15 Jun 71; Entry for 15 Jun 71; Moorer Diary.


73. JCSM-361-71 to SecDef, 31 Jul 71, JCS 2482/130, JMF 752 (30 Jul 71). Entries for 2 and 3 Aug 71, Moorer Diary.


75. JCSM-366-71 to SecDef, 6 Aug 71, JCS 2482/133, JMF 752 (6 Aug 71).

76. MFR, 10 Aug 71, Att to CM-1120-71 to JCS, 11 Aug 71, JCS 2482/133-1, JMF 752 (6 Aug 71).


78. ACSAN M/R 64-71 by Col. Von Ins, 16 Sep 71; Memo, ATP(NSA) to CJCS et al., “An ABM Ban,” 17 Sep 71; Moorer Diary.

79. ACSAN-166-71 to CJCS, 1 Oct 71, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jul-Dec 71).


82. The JCS agreed that there was “nothing magic” about 2,375; the actual number would depend on the cutoff date and the numbers deployed. MFR by Lieutenant General Knowles, “Special JCS Meeting, 0945, 30 October,” 3 Nov 71, Moorer Diary.

83. Entry for 1 Nov 71, Moorer Diary.

84. JCSM-484-71 to SecDef, 1 Nov 71, JCS 2482/139-5, JMF 752 (27 Oct 71).

85. Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 6 Nov 71, JCS 2482/139-4, JMF 752 (27 Oct 71).

86. A nuclear-powered Yankee-class submarine carried 16 missiles, each capable of traveling 1,300 nautical miles.

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90. For each side, hard site defense would include at least 1,000 short-range interceptors and many short-range ABM radars.


92. ACSAN-21-72 to CJCS, 17 Feb 72, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan–Dec 72).


94. SM-110-72 to CJCS, 8 Mar 72, JMF 752 (1 Mar 72). ACSAN-30-72 to DJS, 6 Mar 72, Att to ACSAN-33-72 to CJCS, 9 Mar 72, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan–Dec 72).

95. ACSAN-32-72 to CJCS, 9 Mar 72; ACSAN-35-72 to CJCS, 11 Mar 72; Moorer Diary.

96. ACSAN-39-72 to CJCS, 16 Mar 72, Moorer Diary.


103. MFR by CJCS (M-35-72), “White House Meeting with Congressional Hawks regarding proposed SALT Agreement, Friday, 19 May 1972, 1500, the White House,” 19 May 72, Moorer Diary.


105. Actually, according to Admiral Moorer, most had a range of 700 nm.

106. Entries, TelCons, and Drafts for 25 May 72, Moorer Diary. Developments in Moscow are covered in Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 1216–1222, 1229–1242.

107. General Allison considered that the “emphasis on specificity of radar limitations was not warranted and diverted attention from earlier resolution of more important issues of force levels and deployment. The end result of the lengthy radar negotiations is a set of radar limitations which are not significantly more meaningful than simple geographical constraints which
could have been negotiated with relative ease." ACSAN-108-72 to CJCS, 5 Jul 72, CJCS 388.3 SALT (Jan–Dec 72).


109. JCSM-258-72 to SecDef, 2 Jun 72, JCS 2458/152, JMF 751 (29 May 72).

110. Hearings, *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements*, S. Com on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 69–70. During the hearings, General Allison rebutted a number of criticisms leveled by Sen. Jackson. As the next volume will show, Jackson used his influence with the President to bring about Allison’s replacement and retirement.


113. ACSAN-108-72 to CJCS, 5 Jul 72, CJCS388.3 SALT (Jan–Dec 72).

Chapter 6. NATO

1. JCSM-136-69 to SecDef, 12 Mar 69, JCS 2450/583-6, JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec. 4. DJSM-259-69 to ASD(ISA), 18 Feb 69; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 20 Feb 69, JCS 2450/695; JMF 806/301 (18 Feb 69), Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 10 Dec 68, JCS 2458/410-28, JMF 785 (6 Jun 68) sec. 8. Dept of State (DOS) Papers, “NATO Policy Review,” 7 Apr and 18 Mar 69, JCS 2450/676-4 and 676-1; TP, DASD(ISA) and DepDir, J-5, “NSC Review Group Meeting, 24 Mar 69, on Response to NSSM 6,” and Tab D, JCS 2450/676-2, 26 Mar 69; JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1.


3. DJSM-259-69 to ASD(ISA), 18 Feb 69; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 20 Feb 69; JMF 806/301 (18 Feb 69). JCSM-128-69 to SecDef, 13 Mar 69, JCS 2450/698; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 1 Apr 69, JCS 2450/698-1; JMF 806/307 (3 Mar 69).


5. JSM-1552-69 to DJJS, 17 Jul 69, JMF 806/373 (8 Jul 69) sec. 1. JCS 2101/561-1, 21 Oct 69, same file, sec. 1A. JCS files do not indicate what were the OSD, State, and NSC Staff objections.

6. DJSM-1644-69 to SecDef, 23 Oct 69, JCS 2101/561-1, JMF 806/373 (8 Jul 69) sec. 1A. Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJJS, 3 Dec 69, JCS 2101/561-2, 4 Dec 69; Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(ISA), 24 Jan 70, JCS 2101/561-4; same file, sec. 1.

7. JCSM-74-69 to SecDef, 10 Feb 69, JCS 2458/410-37, JMF 785 (6 Jun 68) sec. 9. Dept of State, “NATO Policy Review,” 11 Mar 69, JCS 2450/676-1; TP, DASD(ISA) and DepDir, J-5, for ASD(ISA) and DJJS, “NSC Review Group Meeting, 24 Mar 69, on Response to NSSM 6, JCS 2450/676-2; JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 28 Mar 69, JCS 2458/410-42, JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 10.

8. NSDM 12, 14 Apr 69, JCS 2450/676-6, JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1. Nixon also directed that offset discussions go forward but that US negotiators neither raise the subject of support costs, seek any substantial increase in the amount of military equipment which West Germany would buy from the United States, nor press the procurement issue to the point of risking a confrontation with Bonn.
9. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS (USecysCmte Mtg of 15 May 69), JCS 2450/676-10, 16 May 69; JCS 2450/676-11, 10 Jun 69; JMF 806 (21 Jan 69) sec. 2. Annual Historical Report, HQ, USAEUR and Seventh Army: 1970, pp. 181, 206.

10. These figures were provided as responses for NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire, prepared annually and designed to establish each ally's force contribution.

11. JCSM-136-69 to SecDef, 12 Mar 69, JCS 2450/583-6, JMF 806 (5 Jun 68) sec. 4. JCSM-428-69 to SecDef, 10 Jul 69, JCS 2450/765-1, JMF 806 (27 Jun 69) sec. 1. Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 5 Sep 69, JCS 2450/799, JMF 806/370 (5 Sep 69), Memo, ATP(NSA) to Chm, USecysCmte, 20 Oct 69, Encl C to JCS 2450/765-4, JMF 806 (27 Jun 69) sec. 3.


13. The quotation is by Rear Admiral David Bagley, Deputy Chairman of General Wheeler's Special Studies Group. Entry for 29 Aug 70, Moorer Diary.

14. JCSM-736-69 to SecDef, 29 Nov 69, JCS 2450/840-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 11 Dec 69, JCS 2450/840-2; DJSM-1910-69 to SecDef, 18 Dec 69; J-5P 2513D, 24 Dec 69; JMF 806/520 (21 Nov 69) sec. 1. Rear Admiral Bagley served as Vannoy's alternate. On 25 May 1970, Major General Richard Shaefer, USA, the new Deputy Director, J-5, replaced Vannoy on the interagency steering committee. DJSM-726-70 to SecDef, 25 May 70, same file. Entry for 29 Aug 70, Moorer Diary.


16. MFR by Col. Wickham, “SRG and Verification Panel Mtg, 31 Aug 70, NSSMs 84, 92, 83,” 2 Sep 70, Moorer Diary.

17. Memo, SecState to Pres, 22 Sep 70, Tab J to DJS and ASD(ISA) TP for DepSecDef and CJCS, JCS 2450/908-6, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 3. Public Papers of the Presidents: Nixon, 1970, p. 806.


19. JCS 2450/765-4, 20 Nov 69, JMF 806 (27 Jun 69) sec. 3. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 19 Feb 70, JCS 2450/765-9; Memo, ATOP(NSA) to SecDef, 14 Mar 70, JCS 2450/765-10; Memo, CJCS, 17 Aug 70, JCS 2450/765-13; same file, sec. 4.


22. Memo, ATOP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 27 Oct 70, JCS 2101/574, JMF 374 (27 Oct 70). CNOM 220-70 to JCS, 7 Jul 70, JCS 2450/942; CNOM-311-70 to JCS, 2 Nov 70, and JCSM-531-70 to SecDef, 18 Nov 70, JCS 2502, CSAM-325-70 to 13 Nov 70; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 27 Nov 70, JCS 2502/10; Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, 1 Dec 70, JCS 2502/10-1; JMF 806/378 (7 Jul 70). Announcement of the 34-ship reduction was postponed. Subsequently, the JCS recommended and in September 1971 Nixon approved withdrawing 26 ships from the DPQ commitment. Deactivations would occur before the end of 1972. JCS 2502/67-2, 17 May 71, JMF 806 (6 Apr 71) sec. 1. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, “US Commitments to NATO,” 5 Aug 71, same file, sec. 2. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 17 Sep 71, JCS 2502/67-6, same file, sec. 3.


25. During a DPRC meeting on 9 November, Kissinger said “[w]e found out that in Europe there is only a 37-day supply of ammunition.” Moorer replied, “The reason is that you can always get more ammunition,” meaning that aerial munitions in the pipeline for Vietnam could be diverted to Europe. Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, vol. XXXIV, p. 615.


27. NSDM 95, 25 Nov 70, JMF 001 (CY 1970).

28. CJCS Memo M-212-70 [4 Dec 70], Admiral Moorer’s Memos M-54 thru M-220-70, Moorer Papers.

29. NSDM 95, 25 Nov 70, JMF 001 (CY 1970). Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., “A Five-Year NATO Program,” 9 Dec 70, JCS 2502/13-1, JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 1. Nixon also directed the DPRC to examine alternative doctrines and force structures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but DPRC discussions and the subsequent presidential decision focused on conventional improvements.

30. DJSM-182-70 to CJCS, 7 Dec 70; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 5 Dec 70, JCS 2502/13; J-5 BP 2-71 for DJs, 14 Jan 71; JCS 2502/13-4, 23 Jan 71; JCSM-40-71 to SecDef, 30 Jan 71, JCS 2502/13-4; JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 1. J-5 BP 9-71 for CJCS, “A Five-Year NATO Program for Conventional Forces,” 4 Feb 71, Att to DJSM-192-71 for CJCS, same file, sec. 2.


32. JCSM-40-71 to SecDef, 30 Jan 71, JCS 2502/13-4, JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 1. The JCS estimated that the annual costs of their recommended improvements for US forces would be $1.2 to $5.5 billion, for allied forces $1.2 to $3.1 billion. Memo, DASD(SA) to DJs, “NSDM 95—Improvements to US and Allied Conventional Forces in NATO,” 11 May 71, JCS 2502/13-8, JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 5. Note by Col. Wickham, Chm’s Staff Group on Cover Sheet to Memo, ATP(NSA) to CJCS et al., “Follow-on Work on NATO (NSDM 95),” 31 May 71, JCS 092.2 NATO (Jul 70-Jun 71). J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS on a report to be considered at the JCS mtg 4 Jun 71, 3 Jun 71; JCSM-264-71 to SecDef, 4 Jun 71, JCS 2502/13-10; JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 6. JCSM-357-71 to SecDef, JCS 2502/13-14; J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS for mtg with DPRC 5 Aug 71, 29 Jul 71; same file, sec. 9. In August, the JCS submitted a detailed analysis, based upon elaborate war-gaming, of how much improvement might result from their recommendations. JCSM-374-71 to SecDef, 12 Aug 71, JCS 2502/13-11, same file, sec. 7.

33. CM-1108-71 to CSA et al., 5 Aug 71, JCS 2502/13-15, JMF 806/373 (5 Dec 70) sec. 9. Entry for 4 Aug 71, Moorer Diary. Back on 26 April, according to Admiral Moorer’s account, the DPRC had
concluded that NATO forces could not support the requirements of either NSDM 95 or NSDM 16, described in chap. 2. CJCS Memo M-38-71, 27 Apr 71, Moorer Diary.

34. NSDM 133, 22 Sep 71, JMF 001 (CY 71). NSDMs 134 and 142 are described in the next section.

35. JCSM-248-71 to SecDef, 25 May 71, JCS 2502/67-2, JMF 806 (6 Apr 71) sec. 1. JCSM-268-72 to SecDef, 10 Jun 72, JCS 2502/27-1, JMF 806 (13 Apr 72) sec. 1. In May 1971, the JCS also recommended changing the NATO commitment from 34 Polaris to 31 Poseidon submarines—fewer boats but many more warheads. Laird and Rogers supported them, and through NSDM 132 of 13 September 1971 the President approved. JCS 2450/953-2, 12 May 71; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 27 Aug 71, JCS 2450/953-5; JMF 806/468 (15 Jul 70). NSDM 132, 13 Sep 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971).

36. The original term was “European Security Conference,” but CSCE is used here for clarity and convenience.

37. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 413–414. NSSM 92, 13 Apr 70, JCS 2450/908, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 1. *Foreign Relations: 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIX, pp. 18–19, 59–60. In May, NATO Ministers publicly stated their willingness to explore the possibility of reductions in Central Europe. Late in June, their Warsaw Pact counterparts reciprocated. NATO also took the position that a four-power agreement regularizing the status of, and access to Berlin, must precede exploratory talks about a CSCE.

38. SAAC 2450/908/D/1, 18 May 70, JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 1.


41. MFR by Col. Wickham, “SRG and Verification Panel Mtg, 31 Aug 70, NSSMs 84, 92, 83,” 2 Sep 70, Moorer Diary.


43. Dec On SAAC TP, “NSSM 92, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” 21 Oct 70; TP, DJs and ASD(ISA) for DepSecDef and CJCS, n.d., JCS 2450/908-6; 1st N/H of JCS 2450/908-6, 4 Nov 70; JMF 757 (13 Apr 70) sec. 3. MFR by Lieutenant General Knowles, “JCS Mtg 26 Oct 70 (Mtg with LTG Allison and Discussion of NSSMs 84 & 92),” 28 Oct 70, Moorer Diary.

44. Draft Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, “US Force Levels in NATO-Europe,” 10 Nov 70, Att to Tab D to J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS on a CNOM to be considered at JCS Mtg on 13 Nov 70, JMF 806/378 (7 Jul 70).


47. “Evaluation Report, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” 12 Apr 71, JCS 2482/119; SAAC MFR, “Verification Panel Mtg on MBFR, 23 Apr 71,” 23 Apr 71. Encl to CM-853-71 to JCS, JCS 2482/119-1; MFR by ASD(ISA), same subj., 29 Apr 71, JCS 2482/119-3; Memo, ATP(NSA) to CJCS et al., 29 Apr 71, JCS 2482/119-2; JMF 757 (30 Nov 70) sec. 2.
50. JCSM-283-71 to SecDef, 17 Jun 71, JCS 2502/91; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 17 Jul 71, JCS 2502/91-1; JMF 806/757 (12 Jun 71). CM-974-71 to CSA et al., 12 Jun 71, JCS 2482/119-4; MFR by ASD(ISA) “MBFR Verification Panel Mtg,” 14 Jun 71, JCS 2482/119-7; JMF 757 (30 Nov 70) sec. 2. J-5 TP for CJCS for Mtg with SecDef 25 Sep 71, “Preparation for Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting on MBFR,” 24 Sep 71; JMF 806/757 (13 Sep 71).
51. CJCS Memo M-47-71, 18 Jun 71, Att to Entry for 17 Jun 71 in Moorer Diary. NSDM 116, 28 Jun 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, pp. 170–175, 177–178. Prior to the NSC meeting, Kissinger advised Nixon that “most MBFR agreements considered do improve NATO’s relative capabilities prior to reinforcement by either side” and that “the most advantageous form of an MBFR agreement would appear to be one limited to or heavily weighted toward redeployment of stationed forces in Central Europe though political considerations may dictate that indigenous forces also be included.” Ibid., pp. 162–163.
52. CM-1225-71 to DJS, 22 Sep 71, JCS 2502/136; J-5 TP for CJCS Mtg with SecDef 25 Sep 71, “Preparation for Deputy Foreign Ministers Mtg on MBFR, 24 Sep 71; JMF 806/757 (13 Sep 71). CM-1226-71 to CAS et al., 23 Sep 71, JCS 2502/87-14; MFR by ASD(ISA) “VP Mtg on MBFR,” 22 Sep 71, JCS 2502/87-17; JMF 806/757 (29 May 71) sec. 3. CM-1238-71 to CSA et al., 5 Oct 71, JCS 2502/133-3, JMF 806/757 (13 Sep 71). NSDM 134, 2 Oct 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971). Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, pp. 186–196, 200–210. The signing on 3 September of a quadripartite agreement on Berlin removed that obstacle to a CSCE. Although they were willing to keep MBFR separate, the Soviets wanted a CSCE agenda to include, inter alia, the renunciation of force and respect for borders. Ibid., p. 239.
53. Memo, SecDef to CJCS 23 Oct 71, JCS 2502/146; JCS 2502/146-2, 8 Nov 71; JCSM-501-71 to SecDef, 11 Nov 71, JCS 2502/146-2; JMF 806/757 (23 Oct 71).
56. JCSM-419-72 to SecDef, 15 Sep 72, JCS 2482/161-1, JMF 757 (21 Aug 72). Note, Col. Nutting, Chm's Staff Group to CJCS, 15 Sep 72; Cover Sheet to SecDef Memo to CJCS, “MBFR,” 13 Sep 72; Note, Col. Nutting to CJCS, 14 Oct 72; Cover Sheet to SecDef Memo to CJCS, “Views on MBFR,” 14 Oct 72; JCS 092.2 (MBFR thru Dec 72) Bulky Package.

Chapter 7. Controlling the Mediterranean Basin

2. DJSM-1821-69 to Dir, J-5, 2 Dec 69, JCS 2499; JCS 2499/1, 14 Jan 70, and Dec On, 23 Jan 70; JMF 960 (2 Dec 69).
3. Ltr, USCINCEUR to Dir, J-5, 19 Aug 70, JCS 2499/3-3, JMF 960 (4 Mar 70).
4. “Strategy Guidance Memorandum,” 28 Jan 70, Encl to Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 28 Jan 70, JCS 2101/570, JMF 502 (28 Jan 70).
5. NSSM 90, 26 Feb 70, JCS 1887/775; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to Lieutenant General Unger et al., 1 Apr 70, JCS 1887/775-1; TP, DepDir, J-5, and PDASD(ISA) to DJs and ASD(ISA) for NSC RG Mtg on 30 Apr 70, n.d., JCS 1887/775-2; JMF 898/632 (26 Feb 70). NSSM 90 is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1969–1976, vol. XXIV (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian Dept of State, 2008), pp. 59–60.


8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 13 Mar 70, JCS 2499/3; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJs et al, 25 Mar 70, JCS 2499/3-1; JCSM-502-70 to SecDef, 30 Oct 70, JCS 2499/3-4; JMF 960 (4 Mar 70). JCSM-281-70 to SecDef, 13 Jun 70, p. 16, JCS 2143/367, JMF 511 (22 May 70).

9. In September 1970 Jordan's King Hussein quashed the militant Palestinian organization operating in Jordan and restored his rule over the nation. The internal fighting is often referred to as “Black September.”

10. See chap. 9.


12. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Aug 71, JCS 2499/7; CM-135-71 to SecDef, 17 Aug 71, JCS 2499/7; CM-135-712 to SecDef, 17 Aug 71, JCS 2499/7; JMF 960/470 (3 Aug 71).

13. JCSM-499-71 to SecDef, 12 Nov 71, JCS 2499/7-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 3 Dec 71, JCS 2499/7-2; Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 13 Jan 72, JCS 2499/7-3; JMF 960/470 (3 Aug 71).


21. Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, vol. XXIX, pp. 737–739. Plans to improve the Navy are described in Memo, CNO to SecDef, 16 Oct 70, Att to Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 11 Dec 70, JCS 2315/506-1; JCSM-112-70 to SecDef, 12 Mar 71, JCS 2315/506-3; JMF 495 (3 Nov 70).

22. CM-1095-71 to SecDef, 30 Jul 71, CJS 091 Greece. Also printed in Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 354.


25. In September 1969, the pro-western King Idris was ousted by a clique led by Muammar Kadafi.

26. US European Command Historical Report: 1969, pp. 172-176. DJSM-262-70 to CJCS, 20 Feb 70; Msg, JCS 2747 to Dep USCINCEUR et al., 21 Feb 70; CJS 091 Turkey.

27. Msg, Vaihingen 755 to CJCS, 271710Z Feb 70; Msg, SHAPE 647 to CJCS, 041610Z Mar 70; CJS 091 Turkey.


29. JCSM-35-68 to SecDef, 18 Jan 68, JCS 1821/203, JMF 967/470 (8 Jan 68) sec. 1. Later refinements are JCSM-139-68 to SecDef, 7 Mar 68, JCS 1821/203-2 and JCSM-247-68 to SecDef, JCS 1821/203-4; same file. These were forwarded to the State Department via Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 19 Jun 68, JCS 1821/203-6, same file, sec. 2.

30. CM-3782-68 to SecDef, 21 Nov 68, JCS 1821/210-2, JMF 967/472 (24 Apr 68) sec. 1.

31. JCSM-760-68 to SecDef, 20 Dec 68, JCS 1821/210-5, JMF 967/472 (24 Apr 68) sec. 3. CM-3855-68 to SecDef, 6 Jan 69, JCS 1821/213-4, JMF 967/472 (2 Jan 69) sec. 1. Joint Consultative Committee, which did not specifically address military matters, had been established in 1963.

32. Memo, Chm, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 7 Feb 69, JCS 1821/213; Rpt by NSC IG (Eur), “Spanish Base Rights Negotiations,” Att to Memo, Staff Dir, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 14 Feb 69, JCS 1821/213-2; TP, DJS and ASD(ISA) to DJJS and DepSecDef for USecys Mtg on 20 Feb 69, n.d., JCS 1821/213-4; Memo, Chm, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 20 Feb 69, JCS 1821/213-3; Memo, Staff Dir, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 5 Mar 69, JCS 1821/213-5; JMF 967/472 (2 Jan 69) sec. 1. Memo, DepSecDef to CICS, 5 Apr 69, JCS 1821/214, same file, sec. 2.


34. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 8 Jul 69, JCS 1821/218-1; Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, JCS 1821/218-2; JMF 967/532 (21 Apr 69) sec. 1.

35. JCSM-576-69 to SecDef, 17 Sep 69, JCS 1821/218-3; JMF 967/532 (21 Apr 69) sec. 1. In May, the JCS had ranked facilities as follows: First, Rota, Torrejon, and the entire communications
system; second, Moron; third, Zaragoza. JCSM-305-69 to SecDef, 2 May 69, JCS 1821/220-1, JMF 967/472 (2 May 69).


37. DJSM-139-70 to CJCS, 29 Jan 70; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to Lieutenant General Unger et al., 27 Jan 70, JCS 1821/218-8; CM-4869-70 to SecDef, 29 Jan 70, JCS 1821/218-8; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 30 Jan 70, JCS 1821/218-9; JMF 367/532 (21 Apr 69) sec. 2.

38. NSDM 43, 20 Feb 70, JMF 001 (CY 170) NSDMs.

39. Memo, ATP(NSA) to USecState, 20 Feb 70, JCS 1821/228; Memo, Chm, USEcysCmte to Pres, 7 Mar 70, JCS 1821/228-4; JMF 967/472 (25 Feb 70). Memo, PDASD(IS) to CJCS, 27 Feb 70, JCS 1821/229; DJSM-296-70 to CJCS, 2 Mar 70, JCS 1821/229-9; Memo, DepSecDef to Chm, DPRC, 10 Mar 70, JCS 1821/229-9; Memo, ATP(NSA) to USEcState (Pol Aff), 23 Mar 70, JCS 1821/229-3; JMF 967/472 (27 Feb 70).


41. Memo, ASD(IS) to CJCS, 16 Jan 71, JCS 1821/233, JMF 967/395 (16 Jan 71).

42. CM-577-71 to SecDef, 13 Feb 71; Memo, ActgASD(IS) to CJCS, 13 Mar 71, JCS 1821/233; CM-936-71 to ASD(IS), 31 May 71, JCS 1821/233-1; JMF 967/395 (16 Jan 71).

43. Memo, ATP(NSA) to Chm, USEcysCmte, 17 Aug 71, JCS 1821/236; Memo, Staff Dir, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 29 Oct 71, JCS 1821/236-1; JCSM-498-71 to SecDef, 10 Nov 71, JCS 1821/236-2; Memo, ActgASD(IS) to DepSecDef, 11 Nov 71, JCS 1821/236-3; Memo, Chm, USEcysCmte, to Pres, 22 Nov 71, JCS 1821/236-4; Memo, ATP(NSA) to Chm, USEcysCmte, 15 Jan 72, JCS 1821/236-5; JMF 967/472 (20 Aug 71).

44. JCSM-51-71 to SecDef, 3 Feb 71, JCS 2502/39; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Feb 71, JCS 2502/39-1; JMF 806/551 (26 Jan 71). Memo, Staff Secy, NSC, to CJCS et al., 4 Aug 71, JCS 2473/6-1, JMF 960/532 (17 Jul 71).

45. CNOM-209-71 to JCS, 21 Jun 71, JCS 1950/167; JCSM-305-71 to SecDef, 25 Jun 71, JCS 1950/167-1; Ltr, ActgSecDef to SecState, 2 Jul 71, JCS 1950/167-2; Ltr, ActgSecState to ActgSecDef, 10 Jul 71, JCS 1950/267-3; JMF 956 (21 Jun 71).


48. Zumwalt, On Watch, pp. 355–356. In dollars, the lease cost about $37 million—triple the previous sum—with the United States paying around $9 million.
Chapter 8. Latin America


2. NSSM 15, 3 Feb 69, JCS 1976/576, JMF 976/532 (3 Feb 69).

3. The Reuss amendment barred sales which would arm regimes run by military dictators. The Fulbright Amendment limited military assistance to Latin America, less training, to $75 million annually. The Conte Amendment prohibited underdeveloped countries from receiving credits with which to buy sophisticated weapon systems. The Symington Amendment forbade sales when the President determined that a country was diverting its resources to unnecessary military expenditures. However, provisions of the Reuss, Fulbright, and Conte Amendments could be waived if the President signed a determination that a waiver would serve the national interest.


9. CM-4419-69 to CSA, CSAF, CNO, and CMC, 10 Jul 69, JCS 1976/584; Memo, CSAF to CJCS, 8 Sep 69, JCS 1976/584-3; JCSM-680-69 to SecDef, 30 Oct 69, JCS 1976/584-5; JMF 976/540 (20 Jul 69). Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 8 Feb 70, JCS 1976/589, JMF 976 (3 Feb 70).

10. MFR by General Westmoreland, “National Security Council Meeting 0930-1100, 6 November 1970 on NSSM 97—Chile,” 6 Nov 70, Moorer Diary. CM-352-70 to SecDef, 6 Nov 70, JCS 1976/594-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 10 Dec 70, JCS 1976/594-2, JMF 976/540 (7 Nov 70).


15. Ltr, USCINCSO to CJCS, 14 Jul 71, JCS 1976/602, JMF 976/499 (14 Jul 70).
16. JCSM-414-71 to SecDef, 11 Sep 71, JCS 1976/602-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Sep 71, JCS 1976/602-3; JMF 976/499 (14 Jul 71). J-5’s draft explicitly recommended selling F-4s. General Ryan argued successfully against doing so, on grounds that it would be inappropriate for the JCS to recommend a specific weapon system. JCS 1976/602-1, 26 Aug 71; CSAPM-324-71 to JCS, 1 Sep 71; JMF 976/499 (14 Jul 71).


19. Memo, Pres to SecState, 21 May 73, JCS 2315/580, JMF 984/595 (21 May 73). The Defense Security Assistance Agency provided the author with information about F-5 sales to Chile.


22. Memo, ExecChm, NSC IG(ARA), to ATP(NSA), 6 Apr 70, JCS 1778/203-3; Memo, ATP(NSA) to CJCS et al., 14 Apr 70, JCS 1778/203-4; JCSM-185-70 to SecDef, 23 Apr 70, JCS 1778/203-5; JMF 933 (3 Sep 69).

23. Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NSA), 4 May 70, JCS 1778/203-6, JMF 933 (3 Sep 69).

24. NSDM 64, 5 Jun 70, JMF 001 NSDMs (1970).

25. Ltr, Ambassador Anderson to Pres, 10 Feb 71, JMF 479 (22 Jan 71) sec. 1.

26. DJSM-293-71 to CJCS, 20 Feb 71; Draft Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, “Treaty Negotiations with Panama,” Att to DJSM-357-71 to CJCS, 27 Feb 71; JMF 479 (22 Jan 71) sec. 1. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 1 Mar 71, JCS 1778/210, JMF 933 (CY 1971). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 10 Aug 71, JCS 1778/219, JMF 933 (10 Aug 71).


28. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 11 May 71, JCS 1778/206-4; JCSM-231-71 to SecDef, 14 May 71, JCS 1778/206-5; MFR by Major General Belser, 28 May 71, JCS 1778/206-9; JMF 479 (22 Jan 71) sec. 2.

29. Memo, Chm, USecysCmte, to Pres, 10 Jun 71, Att to Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 15 Jun 71, JCS 1778/206-12, JMF 479 (22 Jan 71) sec. 3.


34. NSDM 131, 13 Sep 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971) NSDMs.

35. NY Times, 1 Dec 70, p. 92. JCSM-373-70 to SecArmy, 4 Aug 70, JCS 1778/204-1, JMF 579 (4 Jul 70) sec. 1. Memo, Major General Belser to Charles A. Meyer, “Panama Canal,” 1 Apr 71, CJCS 091 Panama. Memo, DepUSecArmy to Brigadier General Hartman, 17 Sep 71, JCS 1778/221;
36. Memo, DepUSecArmy to Major General Kendall, 22 Oct 71, JCS 1778/221-3; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Dec 71, JCS 1778/221-3; JCSM-15-72 to SecDef, 11 Jan 72, JCS 1778/221-4; JMF 933 (17 Sep 71).

37. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to CJCS, 13 Oct 71, JCS 1778/222; JCSM-468-71 to SecDef, 18 Oct 71, JCS 1778/222-1; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 22 Oct 71, JCS 1778/222-2; Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 21 Dec 71, JCS 178/222-3; JMF 933/533 (13 Oct 71).

38. MemCon by CSA, “Army Chief of Staff Visit with BG Torrijos, 29 December 1971,” 3 Jan 72, Att to Memo, CSA to CJCS, 3 Jan 72, Moorer Papers.

39. Ltr, Ambassador Anderson to Pres, 12 Mar 73, JCS 1778/226, JMF 933 (12 Mar 73). According to an Intelligence Memorandum circulated in November 1972, “Torrijos has approached the negotiations with ambivalence and apprehension. Panama’s position as he perceives it is one of moral superiority, but material and tactical inferiority. . . . Because Torrijos does not approach the negotiations as an equal with equivalent points to concede, he seems deeply suspicious of the normal negotiating process.” Foreign Relations: 1969–1976, vol. E-10, Doc. 563.


41. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 636–638. MFR by CJCS (M-187-70), “40 Committee Meeting, Monday, 14 September 1970,” 15 Sep 70, “Admiral Moorer’s Memos M-54 thru M-220-70,” Moorer Papers. Entries for 14 and 15 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. The 40 Committee, which supervised covert actions, consisted of Dr. Kissinger as Chairman, the Deputy Secretaries of State and the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General.


43. CNOM-262-70 to JCS, 17 Sep 70, JCS 2304/276, JMF 925 (17 Sep 70).


45. Entries for 22 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 642


49. Entry for 12 Oct 70, Moorer Diary.


51. CM-1803-72 to SecDef, 2 May 72; DIA Spot Report, “Ballistic Missile Submarine Probably En Route Cuba,” 24 Apr 74, CJCS 091 Cuba. The last visit by a nuclear-powered submarine occurred in 1973, the last visit by a diesel submarine capable of carrying nuclear weapons in 1974. DJSM-709-81 to CJCS, 16 Apr 81, CJCS 820 Cuba (Mar 81–Jun 82).
54. Memo, CNO to CJCS, “Chile,” 14 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. CM-220-70 to CNO, 14 Sep 70, CJCS 091 Chile. On 15 September, Zumwalt sent Moorer a revised version that eliminated references to the consensus among policymakers and to the CIA’s judgment. Memo, CNO to CJCS, “Chile,” 15 Sep 70, CJCS 091 Chile.
56. Entries for 12 and 13 Oct 70, Moorer Diary. The first meeting lasted for fifteen minutes, the second for five.
58. NSSM 97, 24 Jul 70, JCS 2385/12; Memo, Staff Secy, NSC, to SecDef et al., 3 Nov 70, JCS 2385/12-4; JMF 988/530 (24 Jul 70). A representative of Admiral Moorer served on the Interdepartmental Group. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS to SecDef and CJCS for NSC Mtg of 6 Nov 70, JCS 2385/12-6, same file.
60. DJSM-1767-70 to CJCS, 25 Nov 70, JMF 810 (CY 1970).
61. CNOM-285-70 to JCS, 26 Oct 70, JCS 1976/593; JCSM-580-70 to SecDef, 28 Dec 70, JCS 1976/593-3; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 14 Jan 71, JCS 1976/593-5; JMF 976 (26 Oct 70). DJSM-1792-70 to Dir, J-5, 3 Dec 70, JCS 2385/18, JMF 988 (3 Dec 70).
63. Entry for 11 Aug 71, Moorer Diary.

Chapter 9. The Arab-Israeli Impasse

3. NSSM 2, 21 Jan 69, JCS 1887/759; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., with Atts, 30 Jan 69, JCS 1887/759-3; JMF 988/532 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1. NSSM 2 is printed in *Foreign Relations: 1969–1976*, vol. XXIV, pp. 1–2.
5. NSSM 9, 23 Jan 69, JCS 2101/552, JMF 530 (23 Jan 69). JCS 1887/761, 12 Feb 69; JCS 1887/761-1, 25 Feb 69; JMF 988/552 (12 Feb 69). Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 27 Feb 69, N/H of JCS 2101/552-2, JMF 530 (23 Jan 69).
9. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 564–568. TP, ActgASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS at SRG Mtg on 26 Jan 70, n.d., JCS 2369/35-2, JMF 889/532 (2 Jan 70). Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 23 Mar 70, JCS 2369/38-1; Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 6 Apr 70, JCS 2369/38-1; Memo,
DASD(ISA) to DJJS, 15 May 70, JCS 2369/38; JCSM-244-70 to SecDef, 21 May 70, JCS 2369/38-1; JMF 889/460 (15 May 70).


12. Memo, SecDef to Pres, 5 Jun 70, JCS 2369/37-1, JMF889/535 (13 Apr 70).

13. Memo, SecState to Pres, 9 Jun 70, JCS 2369/37-1, JMF 889/535 (13 Apr 70).


15. TP for PDASD(ISA) and ActgCJCS at SRG Mtg of 8 Jun 70, “Response to NSSM 93”; PP for CJCS for 10 Jun Mtg of the NSC on NSSMs 81/82/93, “Peace Initiatives in the Middle East,” JMF 077 (CY 1970).


17. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJJS for DepSecDef and ActgCJCS at NSC Mtg on 10 Jun 70, 9 Jun 70, JCS 2369/37-1, JMF 889/535 (13 Apr 70).


19. NSDM 66, 18 Jun 70, JMF 001 (CY 1970) NSDMs, sec. 2.


23. On 9 August, Egyptians were given a US-Israeli “understanding” of “illustrative” activities which would violate the standstill agreement. These included prohibitions against introducing, moving forward, constructing, or otherwise installing missiles in the standstill zone. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 585–586.

24. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 10 Aug 70, JCS 2369/42; TP for SecDef and CJCS at SRG Mtg of 19 Aug 70, “NSSM 98,” n.d., JCS 2369/42-1; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, 14 Aug 70, JCS 2369/43; JMF 889/499 (10 Aug 70). Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 584–587.

25. Nixon had asked Laird to assume responsibility for the initial review of all Israeli arms requests. Laird then established, under ISA's direction, the METG. Memo, SecDef to SecState et al., 18 Jul 70, JCS 2369/40, JMF 889/499 (18 Jul 70).


28. Dept. of State Bulletin, 21 Sep 70, p. 326. MFR by Lieutenant General Knowles, “JCS Meeting, 1400 hours, Friday, 4 September,” 11 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. U-2 photos showed that the number of SAM launchers within the standstill zone had risen from 95 on 10 August to 125 by 3 September. “Surface-to-air Missiles in the Egyptian Standstill Zone,” 5 Nov 70, JMF 077 (CY 1970).


31. Memo, Rear Admiral Robinson to CJCS, “Middle East Actions,” 8 Sep 70; Entry for 8 Sep 70; Moorer Diary. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 601–602.

32. MFR by CJCS (M-184-70), “WSAG Meeting on the Middle East, Wednesday, 9 September,” 9 Sep 70, “Admiral Moorer’s Memos M-54 thru M-220-70,” Moorer Papers. According to the account in Foreign Relations: 1969–1972, vol. XXIV, p. 627, Moorer’s words about US intervention were: “I am not recommending such action. . . . [I]t would be a very tenuous situation with no end in sight.”

33. MFR by Lieutenant General Knowles, “State/JCS Meeting, 11 September, 1400 hours; JCS Meeting Following,” 15 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. Also Zumwalt, On Watch, pp. 296–298.


40. Entry for 23 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. On 26 September, the President authorized putting the airborne brigade in Europe on 24-hour alert status and returning the 82nd Airborne Division to its normal posture. Entry for 26 Sep 70, Moorer Diary. On 27 October, Moorer recommended and Laird approved returning all alerted forces to a normal posture. CM-333-70 to SecDef, 27 Oct 70, Moorer Papers.


42. TP for DepSecDef and CJCS at SRG Mtg of 3 Dec 70, JCS 2461/11-1, JMF 891/499 (9 Oct 70). MFR by Rear Admiral St. George. “SRG Mtg, 1520, 17 Dec 70,” JCS 1857/788-1, JMF 898 (18 Dec 70). NSDM 100, 1 Mar 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971) NSDMs. BP for DJS, “Military Assistance to
Notes to Pages 176–182

Jordan,” 28 May 71, JMF 891/495 (CY 1971). Ltr, SecDef to King Hussein, 7 Jun 71, JCS 2461/1-6, JMF 891/499 (9 Oct 70). Memo, Pres to SecState, “Presidential Determination—The Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Jordan,” 1 Nov 72, JMF 499 (1 Nov 72). During 1971-72, the administration moved from a policy of cash sales toward one of credit and grant aid. Memo, Pres to SecState, 19 May 71, JCS 2461/15, JMF 891/460 (19 May 71). Memo, Pres to SecState, 19 May 72, JCS 2461/17, JMF 891/495 (19 May 72).

43. Memo, Pres to SecDef and SecState, “Follow-up Actions with Israel,” 23 Sep 70, JMF 077 (CY 1970).


45. NSSM 105, 26 Sep 70, JCS 1887/782; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to JCS, 12 Oct 70, JCS 1887/782-1; TP for DepSecDef and CJCJS at SRG Mtg of 15 Oct 70, JCS 1887/782-2; JMF 898/532 (26 Sep 70) sec. 1.

46. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef and SecState, “Military and Financial Assistance to Israel (NSDM 87),” 15 Oct 70, JMF 898/532 (26 Sep 70) sec. 1.

47. Summary MFR by METG, 18 Nov 70, Encl E to JCS 2369/46, JMF 889/460 (24 Nov 71).

48. Mrs. Meir had become prime minister in March 1969, following the death of Levi Eshkol.

49. Summary MFR by METG, 18 Nov 70, Encl E to JCS 2369/46, JMF 889/460 (24 Nov 71). Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 30 Nov 70, Tab C to JCS 1887/782-10; TP, ASD(ISA) and CJCJS for DepSecDef and CJCJS at SRG Mtg of 3 Dec 70, n.d., JCS 1887/782-10; JMF 898/532 (26 Sep 70) sec. 2. Msg, State 195884 to Tel Aviv, 2 Dec 70, JCS IN 73576.

50. The President’s decision and his possible rationale are explained in Memo, State Dept. to SRG, “Strategy for Assistance to Israel and Mid-East Peace Negotiations,” 8 Jan 71, JCS 1887/782-12, JMF 898/532 (26 Sep 70) sec. 2.

51. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef et al., 18 Jan 71, JCS 1887/790, JMF 898/520 (18 Jan 71) sec. 1.

52. Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1277–1278. “Jarring Aide Memoire to UAR and GOI,” 8 Feb 71, JCS 1887/790-9, JMF 898/520 (18 Jan 71) sec. 2. Formally, Egypt was still the United Arab Republic.

53. Memo, ATP(NSA) to DepSecDef, 11 Feb 71, JCS 1887/790-7, JMF 898/520 (18 Jan 71) sec. 2.

54. NY Times, 22 Feb 71, p. 3.

55. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to CJCJS et al., 19 Feb 71, JCS 1887/790-9, JMF 898/520 (18 Jan 71) sec. 3.

56. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCJS for SRG Mtg of 25 Feb 71, JCS 1887/790-10, JMF 898/520 (18 Jan 71) sec. 3. The Assistant Secretary and the Director also observed that DOD was not on the distribution list for most of the key message traffic (e.g., Egypt’s response to Jarring), and thus could neither comment nor play a constructive role in decisionmaking.


58. JCSM-193-71 to SecDef, 29 Apr 71, JCS 1887/792-2, JMF 898/543 (23 Feb 71) sec. 1A.

59. JCSM-206-71 to SecDef, 1 May 71, JCS 1887/789-3, JMF 898 (28 Dec 70).

60. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCJS, 24 May 71, JCS 1887/789-4, JMF 898 (28 Dec 70).


63. Dept. of State Bulletin, 17 Jan 72, pp. 72–75.
65. Entry for 16 Jul 71, Moorer Diary.
66. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 20 Sep 71, Encl G to JCS 2369/46, JMF 898/460 (24 Nov 71).
67. NY Times, 16 Oct 71, p. 3.
68. JCSM-521-71 to SecDef, 30 Nov 71, JCS 2369/46, JMF 889/460 (24 Nov 71). The Israeli request involved three A-4 models: A-4E; TA-4F; and A-4N. The JCS plan listed all 60 as A-4Ns.
69. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1289. Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecState, “Provision of Aircraft to the Government of Israel,” 28 Dec 71; Entry for 10 Jan 72; Moorer Diary.
70. NY Times, 3 Jan 72, p. 3; 14 Mar 73, p. 13.
71. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 7 Dec 71, JCS 2369/46-1; CM-1505-72 to DepSecDef, 1 Feb 72, N/H of JCS 2369/46-1; JMF 889/460 (24 Nov 71).

Chapter 10. Problems around the Persian Gulf

2. Actually, the embargo triggered by war in the Middle East would run from October 1973 until March 1974.
4. Founded in 1960, OPEC’s members at this time were Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Venezuela, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, and Algeria.
5. NSSM 114, 15 Jan 71, JCS 1741/182, JMF 452 (17 Jan 71) sec. 2.
7. Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 23 Feb 71, JCS 1741/182-4; Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 5 May 71, JCS 1741/182-6; DJSM-1905-71 to CJCS, 15 Oct 71; JMF 452 (17 Jan 71) sec. 2.
9. J-4 BP-5-72, 11 Apr 72, Att to Ltr, CJCS to ATP(NSA), 22 Apr 72, Correspondence Section of Moorer Papers.
11. CM-5307-70 to Pres, 10 Apr 70, JCS 091 Iran. General Wheeler had gone to Iran to attend a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization.

16. Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 29 Jul 70, JCS 2315/498; JCSM-525-70 to SecDef, 10 Nov 70, JCS 2315/498-2; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 70, JCS 2315/498-3; JMF 037 (29 Jul 70) sec. 1.


21. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Mar 72, JCS 1714/200, JMF 887/052 (17 Mar 72).

22. HQ, USEUCOM, “Feasibility Study for the Development of Iranian Military Installations in the Vicinity of Chah Bahar (Iran),” May 72, Encl to Ltr, C/S USEUCOM to CJCS, 12 Jun 72, JCS 1714/200-1, JMF 887/052 (17 Mar 72).

23. JCSM-359-72 to SecDef, 2 Aug 72, JCS 1714/200-2; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Aug 72, JCS 1714/200-3, JMF 887/052 (17 Mar 72).


25. It was originally called the Baghdad Pact until a 1958 revolution overthrew the Hashemite monarchy and Iraq withdrew from the alliance.

26. JCSM-139-69 to SecDef, 1 Mar 69, JCS 2273/475-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 25 Mar 69, JCS 2273/475-2; JMF 804/075 (8 Jan 69). JCSM-135-70 to SecDef, 27 Mar 70, JCS 2273/478-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Apr 70, 1st N/H of JCS 2273/478-1; JMF 804/075 (12 Jan 70).

27. JCSM-134-71 to SecDef, 23 Mar 71, JCS 2273/490; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 31 Mar 71, JCS 2273/490-1, JMF 804/075 (16 Mar 71).


29. The war’s causes and consequences are described in chap. 11.

30. JCSM-115-72 to SecDef, 15 Mar 72, JCS 2273/504; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 25 Mar 72, JCS 2273/504-2; JMF 804/075 (10 Mar 72) sec. 2.


37. MFR by Rear Admiral St. George, “Senior Review Group Meeting, 1430, 22 Apr 71,” 23 Apr 71, JCS 2294/74-4, JMF 982/520 (9 Nov 70) sec. 3.

38. Memo, ATP(NSA) to CICs et al., 4 May 71, JCS 2294/74-6; Rpt by Interagency Gp, “Proposals for a US Navy Presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 1972,” 9 Jun 71, Att to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to CICs et al., 17 Jun 71, JCS 2294/74-7; JMF 982/520 (9 Nov 70) sec. 3. Admiral Zumwalt provided his views via Memo, CNO to CICs, “US Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean,” 22 May 71, CICs 091 India. Among other things, he was investigating the possibility of replacing MIDEASTFOR’s aging flagship, USS Valcour, a converted seaplane tender, with a modern LPD (amphibious transport dock). For the time being, though, Zumwalt concluded that MIDEASTFOR’s two destroyers of World War II vintage could not be replaced.

39. J-5 BP-49-71, 24 Jun 71; CNOM-220-71 to JCS, n.d.; Note to Control, “J-5 BP-49-71,” 2 Jul 71; JMF 982/520 (9 Nov 70) sec. 3. TP, ASD(IS) and DJS for DepSecDef and CICs for SRG Mtg on 11 Aug 71, JCS 2294/74-9, same file, sec. 4.


42. During the war, Washington and Moscow supported opposite sides; Enterprise’s sortie evoked fierce criticism from India.

43. Memo, ATP(NSA) to CICs et al., 28 Oct 71, JCS 2294/76; Rpt by Interagency Working Gp, “Non-Strategic Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean,” 15 Feb 72, JCS 2294/76-1; Memo, Col. Hanson to Mr. Howard, same subj., 20 Apr 72; JMF 982/520 (9 Nov 70) sec. 4.

44. JCSM-226-68 to SecDef, 10 Apr 68, JCS 2294/61-1, JMF 971/472 (24 Feb 67) sec. 2.


Chapter 11. The Indo-Pakistani War

1. A 1959 executive agreement stated that in case of aggression against Pakistan, the United States in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, would take such appropriate action, including the use of armed force, as may be mutually agreed upon.


3. Msg, USCINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA to JCS, 28 Jan 69, JMF 906/499 (28 Jan 69). USSTRICOM, Command History, 1969, p. 111. General Conway served as USCINCSTRIKE and USCINC-MEAFSA. From Islamabad, Ambassador Benjamin Oehlert urged “by every word at my command” liberalizing policy to allow the sale of lethal equipment to Pakistan. From New Delhi, Ambassador Chester Bowles cabled that escalating an arms buildup “at the very moment when an unstable and unpredictable Pakistani government is teetering on the verge of collapse would be folly.” State Department analysts described the situation within Pakistan as “one of chaos, approaching anarchy.” Foreign Relations of the United States: 1969–1976, vol. E-7, Docs. 7, 8, 9.
4. DJSM-167-69 to CJCS, 3 Feb 69; Dec On JCS 2271/124, 7 Feb 69; CM-3917-69 to SecDef, 10 Feb 69, JCS 2271/124; JMF 906/499 (28 Jan 69). As Acting Chairman, with JCS approval, General McConnell signed CM-3917-69.

5. JCSM-96-69 to SecDef, 14 Feb 69, JCS 2347/56, JMF 902/456 (14 Feb 69).


8. Tab C and TP for ASD(ISA) and Dir, J-5, (NSC RG Mtg 25 Nov 69), n.d., JCS 2491/19-2, 25 Nov 69, JMF 875/430 (21 Feb 69).


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32. CJCS Memo M-82-71, “Mtg in the White House (India/Pakistan),” 9 Dec 71, Moorer Diary. The Chairman learned that Secretary Laird had sent Packard to the White House in an unsuccessful bid to cancel the task force’s movement. Entry for 10 Dec 71, Moorer Diary.


34. Entries for 10-14 Dec 71, Moorer Diary. Chronology by Asst to CJCS (NSA) to ATP(NSA), “Military Contingency Planning and Operations,” [16 Dec 71]; Memo, SecDef to Pres, “Carrier Task Force Deployments,” 29 Dec 71; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, “Carrier Task Force Deployments,” 6 Jan 72; Moorer Diary.


37. In 1972, Gandhi publicly charged the CIA with conducting improper activities in India, saying she did not have to prove such activities but that it was up to the CIA to disprove them. The Soviet KGB was plying her with disinformation. *Foreign Relations: 1969–1976*, vol. E-7, Doc. 304. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 317–327.
Chapter 12. The Great Change: China and Taiwan

1. In this volume, the People’s Republic of China on the mainland is referred to as China; the government of the Republic of China, offshore, is referred to as Taiwan.

2. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 171.


10. DOD Supplementary Paper, 2 Sep 69, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to Mr. Pedersen et al., 18 Sep 69, JCS 1924/220-1; TP for ASD(ISA) and Dir, J-5, for NSC Review Group Mtg on 25 Sep 69, n.d., JCS 1924/220-2, JMF 966/532 (3 Jul 69) sec. 1.


14. Admiral Moorer interviewed by Wayne M. Dzwonchyk, 29 Jun 90, JHO.


17. J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 9 Sep 71, JMF 883/080 (13 Aug 71).

18. JCSM-446-71 to SecDef, 6 Oct 71, JCS 2270/44-1, JMF 883/080 (13 Aug 71).
19. CNOM-18-72 to JCS, 3 Feb 72, JCS 2270/47; J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 9 Feb 72; JCSM-58-72 to SecDef, 16 Feb 72, JCS 2270/47-1; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 24 Feb 72, JCS 2270/47-2; JMF 883/080 (13 Aug 71).


22. JSOP 72-79, JCS 2143/358, JMF 511 (10 Dec 69).

23. DJSM-129-69 to CJCS, 28 Jan 69; Cover Sheet 0256 to DJSM-129-69, 29 Jan 69; CJCS 091 China (Comm) Apr 65.


25. J-5 BP 88-69 for CJCS with Ambassador to Republic of China, 5 Nov 69, JMF 882/078 (CY 1969). Msg, State 019013 to CINCPAC and Taipei, 6 Feb 69; Msg, Taipei 0643 to State, 5 Mar 69; Msg, CINCPAC to CJCS, 060005Z Mar 69; Msg, Taipei 708 to State, 11 Mar 69; CJCS 091 China (Rep).


27. CM-4733-69 to SecDef, 18 Nov 69; Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 160245Z Nov 69; Msg, DepSecDef to SecDef, 151015Z Nov 69; Msgs, CINCPAC to CJCS, 161010Z, 160225Z Nov 69; Msg, DepSecDef to CJCS, 160145Z Nov 69; Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 9 Dec 69; CJCS 091 China (Rep). CM-4764-69 to SecDef, 6 Dec 69, JCS 1966/173, JMF 882/325 (3 Dec 69). J-5 BP 88-69 for CJCS Mtg with Ambassador to ROC, 5 Nov 69, JMF 882/078 (CY 1969). Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 186–187. CINCPAC Command History, 1969, vol. I, pp. 141–144.


30. Msg, CINCPAC to CJCS, 282246Z Feb 70; Msg, JCS 05494 to CoFS, CINCPAC, 1 CoFS, CINCPAC to JCS, 262310Z Apr 70; CJCS 091 China (Rep). CINCPAC Command History: 1969, vol. II, pp. 111–118; 1970, vol. I, pp. 115, 178; 1971, pp. 228–230. In July 1970, as a cost-cutting measure, General Westmoreland recommended consolidating the functions of Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan. CINCPAC began work on a detailed proposal but backed away when there was an extremely negative reaction from Chiang’s government. Memo T-19-70, ExecAsst, CJCS, to DJS, 26 Aug 70; DJSM-1289-70 to CJCS, 3 Sep 70;
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31. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Nov 70, JCS 2315/505; JCS 2315/505-1, 14 Nov 70; N/H of JCS 2315/505-1, 15 Nov 70; Msg, JCS 5922 to CINCPAC, 15 Nov 70; Msg, JCS 6160 to CINCPAC, 18 Nov 70; DJSM-1718-70 to Dir, J-5, 18 Nov 70, JCS 2315/505—2; Memo, DSARC to DepSecDef, 20 Nov 70, JCS 2315/505-3; Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 7 Dec 70, JCS 2315/505-4; JMF 907/323 (4 Nov 70).

32. JCSM-591-70 to SecDef, 31 Dec 70, JMF 907/323 (4 Nov 70).


35. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Jul 71, JCS 1966/183, JMF 882 (3 Jul 71).


Chapter 13. Korea, Japan, and the Trust Territory


4. Memo, LTC Lemnitzer to CJCS, 16 Apr 69; Memo, AsstDir (Intel Production), DIA, to CJCS, “DIA Comments on Memorandum for General Wheeler from Colonel Lemnitzer,” 21 Apr 69, CJCS 091 Korea EC-121 Shootdown.


6. Note to Control by Col. Donaldson, DepSecy, JCS, “Military Alert and Deployment Scenario,” 17 Apr 69; Note to Control by Col. Donaldson, 18 Apr 69; SM-262-69 to DJs with Atts, 18 Apr
69; J-3 M-741 to Ops Deps, 18 Apr 69; Unsigned notes, “Task—Develop a military scenario . . .”, n.d.; JMF 892/325 (15 Apr 69).


12. Memo, ATP(NA) to SecDef, 3 May 69, and Memo, SecDef to ATP(NA), 1 May 69, Atts to JCS 1776/818, 5 May 69; J-3 Bfg Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1776/818—Seven Fleet Operations and Deployment of Carriers in Korean Area,” 8 May 69; JCSM-286-69 to SecDef, 9 May 69, JCS 1776/818-1; Memo, ATP(NA) to SecDef, 6 Jun 69, JCS 1776/818-2; JMF 892/325 (1 May 69). Memo, DepSecDef to ATP(NA), 26 May 69, CINCPAC 091 Korea (1 May–31 Aug 69).


16. CM-4511-69 to DJS, 19 Aug 69, JCS 1776-807-3, JMF 892/520 (22 Feb 69) sec. 1. CM-4553-69 to SecDef, 9 Sep 69; CM-46441-69 to SecDef, 16 Oct 69; CINCPAC 091 Korea (1 Sep 69).

17. Note by Col. Pauly, Chm’s Staff Group, on cover sheet to Memo for SecState Rogers from SecDef Laird, 10 Oct 69; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 25 Sep 69; CINCPAC 091 Korea (1 Sep 69).

18. Msg, DJS 14958 to CofS, CINCPAC, “NSSM 27,” 28 Nov 69, CINCPAC 091 Korea (1 Sep 69).


20. Memo, ActgASD(ISA) to DJS, 2 Dec 69, JCS 1776/847; JCS 1776/847-3, 24 Jan 70; DJSM 136-70 to ASD(ISA), 29 Jan 70; CSAFM A-12-70 to JCS, 28 Jan 70; JMF 892 (2 Dec 69).

21. “US Policy on Korea: Issues Paper,” n.d., Att to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to Dir, J-5, 3 Feb 70, JCS 1776/807-7; TP, DASD(ISA) and DepDir, J-5, for ASD(ISA) and Dir, J-5, at NSC Review Group on 6 Feb 70, “NSSM 27, Program Memorandum, Korea,” with Tabs 1, 2, D, JCS 1776/807-8; JMF 892/520 (22 Feb 69) sec. 3.


24. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS for SecDef and CJCS, NSC Mtg, 4 Mar 70, JCS 1776/807-14; Korea Issues Paper (NSSM 27), n.d., Att to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to OSD et al., 28 Feb 70, JCS 1776/807-13; JMF 892/520 (22 Feb 69) sec. 4. In December 1969, there were 48,869 South Korean troops in South Vietnam.


26. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 27 Mar 70, JCS 1776/858-2, 2 Apr 70 (Revised 4 Apr 70); JMF 892/372 (24 Mar 70) sec. 1.


30. JCSM-488-70 to SecDef, 23 Oct 70, JCS 1776/879-1; Memo, DSAD(ISA) to CJCS 2 Nov 70, JCS 1776/879-2 JMF 892/372 (16 Sep 70) sec. 1. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Dec 70, JCS 1776/879-3; MJCS 3-71 to ASD(ISA), 15 Jan 71, 1st N/H JCS 1776/879-3; Memo, DASD(ISA) to ActgChm, NSDM 48 Interagency Steering Gp, 15 Mar 71, JCS 1776/879-6; JCS 1776/879-7, 25 May 71; DSM-1024 to CJCS, 2 Jun 71, and Memo, Dir, J-5, and DASD(ISA) to ASD(ISA), 5 Jun 71, JCS 1776/879-8; Memo, Staff Dir, USC, to CJCS et al., 28 Jun 71, JCS 1776/879-9; same file, sec. 2. NSDM 129, 2 Sep 71, JMF 001 (CY 1971). Printed in *Foreign Relations: 1969–1976*, vol. XIX, pt. I, pp. 277–278. Approval of the force modernization plan was delayed by efforts of the Office of Management and Budget to include foreign military sales items as part of the $1.5 billion. DJSM 1833-71 to CJCS, 2 Oct 71, JMF 892/372 (16 Sep 70) sec. 2. Since OSD projected further withdrawals in FY 1973, the JCS program would consolidate Army camps and installations into three principal complexes by the end of FY 1975: Yongsan in Seoul; Camp Humphreys near Pyongtaek; and Camp Walker in Taegu. To retain dispersal and re-entry capability, the Air Force would continue support elements in Kwangju, Taegu, and Suwon in addition to operating major installations at Osan and Kunsan.


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35. CSAFM D-18-70 to JCS, 17 Apr 70, JCS 1776/862, JMF 892/376 (17 Apr 70).

36. JCSM-217-70 to SecDef, 8 May 70, JCS 1776/862-1, JMF 892/376 (17 Apr 70). SecDef Approval of Memo, ASD(SA) to SecDef, 15 May 70, JCS 1776/862-2; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 May 70, JCS 1776/862-2; JMF 892/376 (17 Apr 70). JCSM-359-70 to SecDef, 27 Jul 70, JCS 1776/874; AF Flimsy on USAF Program for Korea, J-12-70, 28 Oct 70, JMF 892/460 (21 Jul 70).


38. NSSM 5, 21 Jan 69, JMF 890/479 (21 Jan 69).

39. NSSM 5, 21 Jan 69, JMF 890/479 (21 Jan 69).


42. CM-3935-69 to SecDef, 12 Feb 69, CJS 091 Okinawa. Admiral McCain seconded these views. Msgs, CINCPAC to CJCS, R230319Z, 23 Mar 69, and R050523Z, 5 Apr 69, CJS 091 Japan.

43. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 327.

44. Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 28 Mar 69; JCS 1280/233-1, 24 Mar 69; JCSM-184-69 to SecDef, 24 Mar 69, JCS 2180/233-1; JMF 890/472 (21 Jan 69) sec. 1.

45. NSDM 13, 22 May 69, JMF 001 (CY 1969) NSDMs.


47. Draft Msg, State to Tokyo, Tab C to Memo, Chm, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 29 Jun 69, JCS 2180/236-1, JMF 904/472 (29 Jun 69).

48. DJSM-1808-69 to CJCS, 29 Nov 69, JMF 890/075 (5 Nov 69). Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 15 Jul 69, JCS 2180/239-1; CM-4577-69 to SecDef, 17 Sep 69, JCS 2180/239-2; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 30 Sep 69, JCS 2180/239-3; JMF 904/472 (30 Jun 69).

49. Memo, SpecAsst to SecTreas(NSA) to CJCS, 10 Jul 69, w/att paper “Okinawa Reversion Strategy,” Att to DJSM-1133-69 to CJCS, 19 Jul 69, CJS 091 Korea.

50. CM-4448-69 to SpecAsst to SecTreas(NSA), 24 Jul 69, CJS 091 Okinawa.

51. CM-4447-69 to SecDef, 24 Jul 69, CJS 091 Okinawa.

52. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Sep 69, JCS 2180/240-1, JMF 904/473 (29 Jun 69). Covering Memo, Col. Pauly to CJCS, 6 Sep 69, CJS 091 Okinawa.
53. Msg, Tokyo 288 to SecDef and CJCS, 17 Oct 69; Msg, JCS 13261 to USMILRONT and COMUSJ, 23 Oct 69; CJCS 091 Okinawa.

54. JCSM-708-69 to SecDef, 8 Nov 69, JCS 2180/245; Memo, SecDef to ATP(NSA), 18 Nov 69, JCS 2180/245-1; JMF 890/075 (5 Nov 9). On 3 December, two weeks after the summit, Kissinger briefly informed Laird that "the considerations outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given careful weight in the discussions with Prime Minister Sato regarding the reversion of Okinawa." Memo, ATP(NSA) to SecDef, 3 Dec 69, JCS 2180/245-2, JMF 890/075 (5 Nov 69).

55. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to MilAsst to SecDef, 28 Nov 69, w/att President’s MemCon with PM Sato, JCS 2180/247-2, JMF 890/075 (19 Nov 69).

56. The communique is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents: Nixon, 1969, pp. 953–957.

57. Speech by PM Sato at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 21 Nov 69, JCS 2180/247-1; Analysis of Joint Communique and Sato Speech, Att to DJSM-1808-69 to CJCS, 29 Nov 69; Fact Sheet Att to DJSM-1808-69, 29 Nov 69; JMF 890/075 (5 Nov 69).

58. Memo, USMILRONT to DJS, 29 Nov 69, JCS 2180/248; JCS 2180/248-1, 30 Jan 70; Memo, Asst to SecDef to DJS, 18 Mar 70, JCS 2180/248-2; JMF 904/470 (29 Nov 69) sec. 1. Rpt, J-5 to JCS, “JSDF Assumption of Defense Responsibilities for Okinawa,” 10 Jun 70, JCS 2180/252-1, same file, sec. 2. In June, the JCS provided Secretary Laird with CINCPAC’s amended plan, aimed at preserving the integrity of regionally oriented US combat-ready forces with the required logistical base, while accommodating relatively small Japanese forces with minimum new construction and no acquisition of additional real estate. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 15 May 70, JCS 2180/252; JCSM-297-70 to SecDef, 18 Jun 70, JCS 2180/252-1; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 7 Jul 70, 1st NH of JCS 2180/252-1, 8 Jul 70; JMF 904/470 (29 Nov 69) sec. 2.

59. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 5 Sep 69, JCS 2458/599, JMF 580 (5 Sep 69) sec. 1. App A to JCS 2458/599-1, same file, sec. 2.

60. JCSM-635-69 to SecDef, 15 Oct 69, JCS 2458/599-1, JMF 580 (5 Sep 69) sec. 2.

61. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 24 Mar 70, JCS 2458/677-18, JMF 555 (15 Jan 70) sec. 2.


67. CNOM-41-71 to JCS, 23 Jan 71, JCS 570/617; Memo, SecNav to ASD(ISA), 8 Jan 71, JCS 570/617-1; Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 25 Jan 71, JCS 570/617-1; CNOM-131-71 to JCS, 4 May 71, JCS 570/617-2; Memo, DepSecDef to SecNav, 28 May 71, JCS 570/617-4; Memo, DCNO to DJS, 17 Jun 71, JCS 570/617-5; CNOM- 246-71 to JCS, 4 Aug 71, JCS 570/617-6; Memo, SecNav to SecDef, 24 Sep 71, JCS 570/617-6; JMF 476 (23 Jan 71).

69. **CINCPAC Command History: 1972**, vol. I, pp. 11–21. Memo for VADM Weinel, 15 Nov 72, CJCS 091 Japan. Recent events contributing to the sense of unease included massive and violent demonstrations around US installations supporting the war in Vietnam, particularly the Sagami Army Depot. CM-2171-72 to SecDef, 7 Sep 72; DJSM-1733-72 to CJCS, 8 Sep 72; J-5M-1340-72 to DJS, 8 Sep 72; CM-2180-72 to DJS, 13 Sep 72; CJCS 091 Japan.

70. ASD(ISA) MemCon with Security Division Chief Matsuda, 6 Dec 72, and attached cover sheet #4213, 8 Dec 72; Msg, Tokyo 453 to State, 18 Jan 71; DJSM-179-71 to CJCS, 4 Feb 71; DJSM-517-71 to CJCS, 22 Mar 71; CJCS 091 Japan. Trip Report, Visit by CJCS to France, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Japan, 15–17 Jan 71, CM-525-71, 21 Jan 71; Entries for 16 and 18 Jan 71, Moorer Diary.

71. NSSM 122, 15 Apr 71, JCS 2180/268; JMF 890/520 (15 Apr 71).

72. Brig. General Foster Smith, USAF, Chief of the Far East Division, J-5, represented the Joint Staff. DJSM-740-71 thru ASD(ISA) to ATP(NSA), 20 Apr 71 “NSSM 122—Policy Toward Japan: Summary,” 2 Aug 71, Att to TP from ASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS (SRG Mtg of 6 Aug 71), n.d., JCS 2180/268-1, JMF 890/520 (15 Apr 71).

73. “NSSM 122—Addendum II,” Att to Memo, ExecSecy, State Dept., to ATP(NSA), 24 Jul 71, JCS 2180/268-3, JMF 890/520 (15 Apr 71) sec. 2.


75. TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS (SRG Mtg, Friday, Aug 27, 1971), n.d., JCS 2180/268-4, JMF 890/520 (15 Apr 71) sec. 2.

76. MFR by Col. Hite, 9 Aug 71, Att to CM-1171-71 to CSA et al., 10 Aug 71, JCS 1280/268-2; MFR by Rear Admiral Welander, 31 Aug 71, Att to CM-1181-71 to CSA et al., 3 Sep 71, JCS 2180/286-6; JMF 8790/520 (15 Apr 71) sec. 2.

77. Addendum III—NSSM 122, Att to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to CJCS et al., 5 Oct 71, JCS 2180/268-9, JMF 890/520 (15 Apr 71) sec. 2.

78. OASD MemCon, JCS 2180/256-1, 1 Oct 70, JMF 890/081 (31 Jul 70). DJSM-1640-71 to CJCS, 31 Aug 71, w/att Ltr, Admiral Moorer to Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.), CJCS 091 Japan. Bfg Book for SecDef Management Conference, Airlie House, 18–19 Sep 70, Moorer Diary.

79. Memo ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 23 Sep 71; CM-1362-71 to ASD(ISA), 10 Dec 71, JCS 091 Japan. In 1972, Japanese asked for and received some details about US plans for defending South Korea. JCSM-459-72 to SecDef, 31 Oct 72, JCS 2180/282; Memo, ASD(ISA) to DJS, 15 Nov 72, 1st N/H of JCS 2180/282; JMF 890/301 (28 Sep 72).

80. CM-1362-71 to ASD(ISA), 10 Dec 71, CJCS 091 Japan.

81. Cover Sheet 598, 28 Feb 73, to DIEM 4-73, “Security Prospects for Japan,” CJCS 091 Japan. Weinel was Director, J-5, from August 1970 through July 1972, becoming Assistant to the Chairman on 1 August 1972.

82. Guam, in the Marianas, held a separate status as an unincorporated US territory.

83. JCSM-643-68 to SecDef, 31 Oct 68, JCS 2326/44-1, JMF 998/532 (19 Mar 69). The President’s decision is described in Memo, Chm, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 9 Sep 69, JCS 2326/53-2; Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 15 Nov 72, 1st N/H of JCS 2326/53-2; JMF 998/532 (20 Jun 69).

84. Memo, Chm, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 24 Mar 69, JCS 2326/49-3; Memo, Staff Dir, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 29 Apr 69, JCS 2326/49-4; TP, PDASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS at USC Mtg on 26 Apr 69, n.d., JCS 2326/49-5; JMF 998/532 (29 Jun 69). The President’s decision is described in Memo, Chm, USecysCmte, to CJCS et al., 10 Sep 70, JCS 2326/58-1; JMF 998/532 (27 Jun 69) sec. 2. Memo,
Chm, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 29 Apr 70, JCS 2326/58-7, same file, sec. 3. Memo, ActgChm, USEcysCmte, to Pres, 10 Sep 70, JCS 2326/58-8, same file, sec. 4

86. TP, PDASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS at USC Mtg on 3 Dec 70, n.d., JCS 2326/58-11; MFR by Brig. General F. L. Smith, 4 Dec 70, Att to CM-436-70 to CSA et al., 15 Dec 70, JCS 2326/77; JMF 998/534 (27 Jun 69) sec. 4.

87. Memo, Staff Dir, USEcysCmte, to CJCS et al., 29 Jan 71, JCS 2326/58-14; TP, ASD(ISA) and DJS for DepSecDef and CJCS at USC Mtg on 3 Feb 71, n.d., JCS 2326/58-15; MFR by BG Smith, 4 Feb 71, JCS 2326/58-16; JMF 998/534 (27 Jun 69) sec. 4.

88. Memo, Chm, USEcysCmte, to Pres, 31 Mar 71, Att to Memo, Staff Dir, USEcysCmte to CJCS et al., 2 Apr 71, JCS 2326/58-20; Memo, Chm, USEcysCmte, to Pres, 28 Jul 71, JCS 2326/58-21; JMF 998/534 (27 Jun 69) sec. 5. CAPT William J. Crowe, USN, a future JCS Chairman, became Williams' Deputy.


90. JCSM-541-70 to SecDef, 24 Nov 70, JCS 2326/62-7, JMF 998/476 (14 Jul 69) sec. 3.

91. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Apr 71, JCS 2326/62-8; JCSM-301-71 to SecDef, 24 Jun 71, JCS 2326/62-10; JMF 998/476 (14 Jul 71) sec. 4.

92. CM-1082-71 to SecDef, 24 Jul 71, JCS 2326/84; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Aug 71, JCS 2326/84-1; JMF 998/470 (24 Jul 71). On 9 September, Laird sent Ambassador Williams a list of Defense's real estate requirements. In the Marianas, acquiring the whole island of Tinian would be highly desirable, but obtaining the northern part with its harbor and airfields was essential. In the Palaus, Laird listed an anchorage in Malakai harbor and possibly an airfield on Garreru Island. In the Marshall Islands, Laird listed an instrument site on Bikini. Williams responded that, according to the Under Secretaries Committee, basing in the Palaus might be relinquished as a last resort. Ltr, SecDef to Ambassador Williams, 9 Sep 71, JCS 2326/58-24; Ltr, Ambassador Williams to SecDef, 10 Sep 71, JCS 2326/58-25; JMF 998/534 (27 Jun 69) sec. 5.

93. JCSM-456-71 to SecDef, JCS 2326/88; Memos, Ambassador Williams to PDASD(ISA), 30 Nov 71, and SecDef to CJCS, 13 Dec 71, JCS 2326/88-2; JCSM-78-72 to SecDef, 28 Feb 72, JCS 2326/88-8; JMF 998/476 (5 Oct 71).

94. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 10 Feb 72, JCS 2326/92; JCSM-77-72 to SecDef, 24 Feb 72, JCS 2326/92-1; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to Ambassador Williams, 2 Mar 72, JCS 2326/92-2; JMF 998/530 (10 Feb 72).

95. JCSM-126-72 to SecDef, 2 Mar 72, JCS 2326/88-7; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 1 Jun 72, JCS 2326/88-8; JMF 998/476 (5 Oct 71).

Chapter 14. Summation

1. MFR by Lieutenant General Knowles, “JCS Meeting, 1615 hours, 10 August,” 10 Aug 70, Moorer Diary.

2. Entry for 16 Dec 70, Moorer Diary.

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