U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

References: See Enclosure C.

1. **Purpose.** This instruction sets forth policy and provides procedures for the planning and execution of U.S. military support to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as directed by the Secretary of Defense (reference a). When authorized, the U.S. military will support the PSI by conducting activities that support the U.S. Government’s (USG’s) capacity building of PSI partner nations to improve their national operational capabilities and domestic legal authorities to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. These activities include the planning and execution of PSI activities (Enclosure A). This instruction implements references a through j.

2. **Superseded/Cancellation.** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3520.02B, “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program,” 5 March 2015, is hereby superseded.

3. **Applicability.** This instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and Combat Support Agencies, who report to, or through, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Copies are provided to the Secretary of Defense for information and use as appropriate.

4. **Policy**

   a. **History of the PSI.** In May 2003, the United States and 10 other states launched the PSI to address the proliferation of WMD. In September 2003, this group of like-minded states developed and endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOIP), reference b. The PSI SOIP reflects a commitment by the endorsing states “to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.” As of January 2019, 107 states have made the political commitment to endorse the PSI SOIP.
b. **PSI International Framework.** The PSI is a multinational effort intended to complement and support counterproliferation-interdiction operations. It provides a voluntary framework through which PSI partner nations declare their political will to conduct WMD-related interdictions and then work to improve national operational capabilities and domestic legal authorities in order to do so. PSI is not a coordinator of real-world interdiction operations within the USG. However, other governments may organize interdiction activities differently and could refer to counterproliferation-interdiction operations within an operational PSI context.

c. **National Security Strategy.** The President’s National Security Strategy (reference c) establishes national strategy for protecting the American people and American democratic values and principles, and preserving peace through strength by enhancing U.S. counterproliferation measures. “Building on decades of initiatives, we will augment measures to secure, eliminate, and prevent the spread of WMD and related materials, their delivery systems, technologies, and knowledge to reduce the chance that they might fall into the hands of hostile actors.” The President states that “the longer we ignore threats from countries determined to proliferate and develop weapons of mass destruction, the worse such threats become, and the fewer defensive options we have.”

d. **Presidential Policy Directive (PDD) 42.** PPD 42, “Preventing and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Terrorism, and Use,” reference d, emphasizes that the proliferation and use of WMD and their delivery systems is among the most serious threats facing the United States and the international community. It states that the United States will continue to demonstrate leadership in securing, detecting, interdicting, attributing, protecting from and disposing of WMD, WMD delivery systems, and related material, and in helping other countries to do the same.

e. **Department of Defense (DoD) Role in PSI**

(1) The National Defense Strategy (NDS), reference e, articulates the DoD’s strategy to compete, deter, and win in an increasingly complex global security environment characterized by overt challenges. Among the DoD strategic objectives is “Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction.” To achieve this objective, the NDS states that “We will strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships into an extended network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time.”
(2) The National Military Strategy (reference f) states that the “Joint Force may be called upon to counter proliferation in the instances where military action is required to block the transfer of technology or hardware used to build and employ WMD. The Joint Force must be ready to execute the NDS competition mission to degrade...WMD threats.”

(3) A priority objective of the CJCS in support of the Secretary of Defense’s DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), reference g, is to increase barriers to the acquisition, proliferation, and use of WMD.

(4) PSI is an effective tool through which the USG pursues national CWMD priorities and encourages and supports the enhancement of the capacity of our partners to do the same. PSI is an important low-cost effort that leverages our international partnerships and relationships to advance our mutual national security interests. Amid the broad possibility of dual-use technology and resources surreptitiously feeding WMD activities in a world of porous borders, PSI’s global reach expands the depth of the homeland’s defense from WMD attack.

(5) The Office of the Secretary of Defense provides guidance and sets priorities for DoD activities and efforts related to PSI. These priorities are intended to shape DoD support to PSI engagements, exercises, and workshops over a 3-year cycle.

f. PSI Activities. PSI activities demonstrate a collective commitment to act against proliferation-related shipments, send a strong signal of deterrence to would-be proliferators, enhance interdiction capabilities of our partners, increase the political will of PSI-endorsing states to conduct interdictions, and extend outreach to non-endorsing states. PSI activities involve the interaction of representatives with a broad range of disciplines (e.g., military, customs/law enforcement, maritime, CWMD, intelligence, financial, legal, and diplomatic) from U.S. and partner nation organizations. Enclosure A outlines general coordination responsibilities for U.S. military support to the PSI. Enclosure B details specific tasks and responsibilities for PSI activities.

5. Responsibilities. See Enclosure B.

6. Summary of Changes. This revision clarifies the roles of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the Combatant Commands, as a result of the transfer of the CWMD planning synchronization mission from U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to USSOCOM (references h and i) and the corresponding transfer of the PSI
Support Cell mission from USSTRATCOM to DTRA (reference j). It clarifies and prioritizes certain types of activities within the PSI (Enclosure A), updates the position of PSI within the context of strategic guidance (references c through g), and further defines the coordination of activities between the Joint Staff and other entities (Enclosure B).

7. **Releasability.** UNRESTRICTED. This directive is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. All DoD Components, other Federal Agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this directive through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at <http://www.jcs.mil/library>. Joint Staff activities may also obtain access via the SIQRNET Directives Electronic Library Web sites.

8. **Effective Date.** This INSTRUCTION is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

![Signature]

GLEN D. VANHERCK, Maj Gen, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:
A—Framework for U.S. Military Support to the Proliferation Security Initiative
B—Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Military Support to the Proliferation Security Initiative
C—References
D—Glossary
DISTRIBUTION

Distribution A, B, and C plus the following:

Copies

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security)......... 2
FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

1. **Responsibilities.** Specific responsibilities are outlined in Enclosure B.

2. **General.** This enclosure provides guidance for U.S. military support to PSI. States participating in the PSI have committed to improving national operational capabilities to interdict WMD and WMD-related materials, and are working to prevent WDM proliferation by developing solutions to national and international policy and legal barriers. PSI activities demonstrate a collective commitment to act against proliferation-related shipments, send a strong signal of deterrence to would-be proliferators, increase the political will of PSI-endorsing nations to interdict WMD and WMD-related materials, and extend outreach to non-endorsing nations that observe the activity. These activities offer an opportunity to provide technical and legal exchanges to PSI partners, bolster political will and resolve to undertake interdiction efforts, and practice national decision-making processes and authorities.

3. **PSI Activity Categories.** There are three categories of PSI activities: stand-alone PSI activities, embedded PSI activities, and operational and political oversight meetings. Combatant Commands normally conduct stand-alone or embedded PSI activities. Stand-alone PSI activities are preferred over embedding a PSI activity in a broader military exercise. Combatant Commanders conducting PSI activities should do so consistent with specific guidance provided in reference j, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) (ASD(HD&GS)) memorandum titled “Proliferation Security Initiative Priorities for FY 2018–2020” (including subsequent issuances), and the principles in this instruction.

   a. **Stand-Alone PSI Activities.** Stand-alone PSI activities include exercises, academic workshops, scenario-based tabletop discussions, gaming, interdiction-related capacity building tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) exchanges, and interdiction-related capabilities demonstrations. A stand-alone activity should include PSI as its major topic and be consistent with the principles in the PSI SOIP and this instruction. In addition, stand-alone PSI activities should include interagency participation and primarily feature a strategic/operational emphasis. Operational/tactical activities may be conducted as supporting elements (e.g., capacity building training or capabilities demonstrations). The activity may cover any combination of maritime, air, or land-border environments and may have bilateral or multilateral participation, with a local, regional, or global focus.
(1) Coordination with other CWMD Programs. Although stand-alone PSI activities are preferred, this should not preclude the inclusion of presentations on other CWMD programs or the participation by representatives of these programs. PSI activities should be coordinated with other CWMD programs to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in building counterproliferation interdiction capacity with partner countries. Where appropriate and beneficial, a PSI presentation can be included in an activity of another CWMD program, with the aim of following up with the partner nation to hold a stand-alone PSI activity at some future date or to seek endorsement of the SOIP.

(2) Tone and Design. PSI activities should convey an appropriate strategic message that accurately portrays PSI objectives to participating states and the public. The activities should clearly emphasize that all PSI and counterproliferation-interdiction activities are legal and consistent with participating states’ national legal authorities and international legal frameworks. PSI activities should be whole of government in approach and participation. An activity that is too focused on the use of military force (as opposed to broader interagency tools including diplomacy, customs/law enforcement, and financial and legal tools), is inconsistent with the strategic direction of PSI. Often, the most substantive learning among PSI activity participants occurs in a tabletop discussion where interagency participants practice strategic and operational rapid decision making and coordination in a scenario-based environment.

(3) Live Demonstration of Capabilities. The live demonstration of PSI and counterproliferation-interdiction capabilities is often the most visible aspect of a PSI activity and can tangibly portray the multinational commitment to the PSI SOIP. Live demonstrations can include the LIVEX (live exercise), an at-sea demonstration of visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) capabilities or air tracking, surveillance, and hail and query capabilities; or the PORTEX (port exercise), an in-port demonstration of TTP and equipment for customs inspections and interdictions; or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response unit identification, mitigation, and decontamination TTP and equipment. Although more of an operational/tactical activity, live demonstrations gain strategic value, if appropriately publicized, by sending a deterrent message to would-be proliferators. If possible, live demonstrations should incorporate a more formal exchange of interdiction-related TTP between the participating nations, followed by a capability demonstration. The underlying skills that pertain to counterproliferation-interdiction and are shared within a PSI activity tend to be basic and unclassified. Participants may have foundational capabilities in terms of manpower and equipment but not necessarily apply the best practices. PSI activities can build on current capabilities and improve interoperability.
b. **Embedded PSI Activities.** These activities involve a PSI or counterproliferation-interdiction TTP capability demonstration (LIVEX or PORTEX) embedded in a broader military exercise. Embedded PSI activities are useful ways to introduce PSI to new or underengaged partners, but they should not be a habitual means of engagement to meet a Combatant Command’s basic level of commitment to supporting PSI. Embeds should be reserved for inclusion in (1) exercises with non-PSI-endorsing states in order to introduce the basic tenets of PSI and to provide a platform to invite them to stand-alone PSI activities; or (2) exercises with PSI-endorsing states as a strategic step toward a bilateral or multilateral PSI stand-alone activity. Department of State (DOS) coordination is required for any PSI engagement with non-PSI endorsees, and DOS should be included in all PSI outreach activities.

c. **Operational and Political Oversight Meetings.** Oversight of PSI occurs through Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings, Mid-Level Political Meetings (MLPMs), and High-Level Political Meetings (HLPMs). Because Combatant Command participation in these meetings is generally limited, meeting minutes will be distributed to the Combatant Commands for situational awareness.

   (1) **Operational Oversight Meetings.** OEG meetings involve a select group of endorsing states and are designed to provide operational oversight to the PSI. As a general course of action, OEG members should be invited to multilateral PSI activities in their region and should be called upon to participate through demonstrations, academic presentations, TTP exchanges, and the facilitation of tabletop discussions. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction) (DASD(CWMD)) heads the U.S. delegation to the OEG and determines DoD and interagency participation. In conjunction with the OEG, one or more OEG Interagency Working Group (IWG) meetings may occur each year. The IWG may be of limited recurrence and specifically focus on an operational issue of interest. DASD(CWMD), as the OEG lead, designates U.S. DoD and interagency participation in the IWG.

   (2) **Political Oversight Meetings.** MLPMs and HLPMs are designed to provide political oversight and renew political support to the PSI. MLPMs include executive director/assistant secretary-level representatives from all endorsing states. HLPMs include vice minister/undersecretary-level representatives from all endorsing states. DOS is the U.S. head of delegation for MLPMs and HLPMs and determines U.S. participation. DASD(CWMD) determines DoD support to DOS for MLPMs and HLPMs.
4. **Coordination**

   a. The Joint Staff, in consultation with DASD(CWMD), will coordinate with Combatant Commands for participation in PSI operational and political oversight meetings. Combatant Commands will normally attend only when required to report on a specific PSI activity or when requested to host or support the meeting.

   b. Unless otherwise directed or noted here, each Combatant Command is responsible for planning and conducting all DoD PSI activities within its area of responsibility (AOR). The Joint Staff, DASD(CWMD), and DTRA will support planning for PSI activities. All requests by Combatant Commands for non-DoD interagency participation will be coordinated by DASD(CWMD) through the Joint Staff. In most cases, the Combatant Command can coordinate directly with the DTRA PSI Support Cell to facilitate the request.

   c. All PSI activities shall be placed on the Joint Staff PSI Activities calendar. DTRA, in cooperation with the Joint Staff, shall be responsible for maintaining and distributing the PSI Activities calendar to Combatant Commands, including USSOCOM as the CWMD Coordinating Authority, and the U.S. interagency. Combatant Commands shall update DTRA and the Joint Staff regarding all PSI activities within their AORs.

5. **Funding**

   a. PSI activities will be supported through Combatant Command operation and maintenance (O&M) funding whenever possible. Combatant Commands should budget for and program funds for a minimum of one multilateral PSI or one bilateral PSI activity per calendar year.

   b. Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement funds may be used to support strategic lift requirements for PSI activities conducted by Combatant Commanders as part of their approved Joint Exercise Program (JEP). Additionally, Cooperative Defense Initiative funds could be used for bilateral and multilateral exercises and symposiums and to fund temporary duty for U.S. military members, government personnel, and foreign military members of developing countries.

   c. Service Components will normally utilize existing O&M funding for the deployment, employment, and redeployment of personnel and assets in support of PSI activities, unless other arrangements are made.
d. Through the Joint Staff or DASD(CWMD), other appropriations may be available to fund discrete aspects of PSI activities.

e. Funds to support PSI activities may also be available through the DTRA PSI Support Cell.
ENCLOSURE B

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

1. Joint Staff
   a. Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J-2)
      (1) Supports Joint Staff-level PSI activity planning and execution as required. This support may include assistance with CJCS-level scenario development or outreach to subject-matter experts across the Intelligence Community.
      (2) Supports the Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Joint Staff (J-5) and DASD(CWMD) with requests for intelligence products during PSI strategy development.
   b. Directorate for Operations, Joint Staff (J-3)
      (1) Provides military representation to PSI oversight meetings and activities when requested.
      (2) Supports PSI activity planning and execution when requested.
      (3) Coordinates with operational elements of other USG departments and agencies as required.
   c. Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Joint Staff (J-5)
      (1) Serves as the Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for coordination of PSI activities.
      (2) Coordinates with DASD(CWMD) in providing policy guidance to the Combatant Commands for PSI activities, including guidance on applicable international agreements related to WMD and counterproliferation.
      (3) Provides military representation to PSI oversight meetings and activities as appropriate.
      (4) Coordinates with Combatant Commands for participation of U.S. military forces in PSI activities as required.
(5) Supports PSI activity planning and execution as appropriate.

(6) Coordinates with other U.S. departments and agencies as appropriate.

d. Directorate for Joint Force Development, Joint Staff (J-7). Considers PSI exercises (stand-alone) or exercises with embedded PSI activities nominated by Combatant Commanders for inclusion in the JEP.

2. Military Services

a. Supports PSI activity planning and execution as requested.

b. Coordinates subordinate organizations’ participation in accordance with plans and procedures.

c. Provides personnel and assets in support of PSI activities in accordance with established procedures as requested.

d. Provides necessary operations, communications, and logistics support in accordance with established procedures as requested.

3. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction) (DASD(CWMD))

a. Serves as the office of primary responsibility for PSI strategic direction, policy, and interagency and international coordination for DoD.

b. Develops and coordinates policy and guidance with the Joint Staff, DTRA, and the interagency for PSI activities, including guidance on applicable international agreements related to WMD and counterproliferation.

c. In coordination with DOS, the Joint Staff, DTRA, Combatant Commands, and the interagency, develops PSI priorities for each region.

4. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

a. In accordance with the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (reference j), establishes a PSI Support Cell that supports PSI activities conducted in accordance with Enclosure A. The PSI Support Cell will work closely with the Joint Staff and DASD(CWMD) to perform these responsibilities:

   (1) Serves as the primary DoD organization providing support to DASD(CWMD), the Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands in the development,
planning, and execution of U.S.-hosted, U.S. co-hosted, and partner nation-hosted PSI activities.

(2) Ensures PSI and Combatant Command CWMD and building partner capacity objectives are incorporated in PSI activities.

(3) Coordinates U.S. interagency support for PSI activities.

(4) Supports foreign partners in planning and executing foreign-hosted PSI activities.

(5) Provides PSI and counterproliferation-interdiction subject-matter expertise to other CWMD programs.

(6) Maintains the PSI activities calendar.

(7) Supports PSI oversight meetings as requested.

(8) Subject to availability, supports Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) PSI activities with funding for discrete activities.

5. **U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as CWMD Coordinating Authority.** Maintains situational awareness of PSI activities to ensure they support the coordinated DoD effort for CWMD and the Functional Campaign Plan for CWMD (FCP-CWMD).

6. **Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs).** GCCs will be prepared to host/co-host PSI activities per Enclosure A. When planning and executing PSI activities, GCCs have the following responsibilities:

   a. Serve as the U.S. lead for U.S.-hosted and co-hosted PSI activities within their AOR, unless otherwise directed by DASD(CWMD). Per Enclosure A, DASD(CWMD) or DOS serves as the lead for PSI oversight meetings, regardless of location.

   b. Coordinate with subordinate commands and other participating organizations within the AOR to support PSI activities.

   c. Coordinate with DASD(CWMD) and Joint Staff, through DTRA, for U.S. interagency support for GCC-led PSI activities.

   d. Ensure that PSI activities support Combatant Command CWMD objectives, building partner capacity objectives, and DoD PSI objectives.
e. Ensure that PSI activities are considered in the context of how they achieve the related campaign objectives within the FCP-CWMD.

f. Request DTRA PSI Support Cell support as necessary to develop, plan, and execute PSI activities.

g. Support partner nation-led PSI activities within the AOR, including planning and execution support, logistics, and resources at the appropriate level.

h. Support PSI oversight meetings as requested.

7. Functional Combatant Commands (FCCs). FCCs support PSI activity planning and execution as requested.

8. Other Departments, Agencies, and Activities. In coordination with DASD(CWMD), DoD PSI activity planners will seek to incorporate major non-DoD departments and agencies into PSI activities, including planning, execution, and subject-matter expertise support, as appropriate.

   a. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP plays an integral role in the PSI and has historically provided support to DoD-related PSI activities. In addition to subject-matter expertise, CBP provides scenario development and tabletop discussion facilitation. CBP has contributed the majority of U.S. submissions to the library of PSI Critical Capabilities and Practices tools and resources. CBP technical experts assist with PSI capacity-building TTP exchanges and capability demonstrations. CBP also provides a direct link to international customs enforcement standards provided through the World Customs Organization.

   b. Military Academic Institutions. Organizations such as National Defense University (NDU), Naval War College (NWC), Naval Post-Graduate School, and the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies provide strategic-level advice and subject-matter expertise to the Joint Staff and DASD(CWMD). On occasion, these organizations may provide support to PSI activity planning and execution. NDU and NWC, in particular, possess substantial institutional knowledge through long-standing involvement in PSI.

   c. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG supports the PSI PORTEX through operational capabilities demonstrations and capacity building subject-matter expertise related to CWMD and interdiction operations in the maritime environment. The USCG also supports the PSI LIVEX with demonstrations of VBSS techniques.
d. U.S. Department of State (DOS). DOS serves as the U.S. lead for PSI policy, outreach, and diplomatic communications. DOS also serves as the lead for PSI policy oversight meetings.

e. Other Government Agencies (OGAs). When requested, several U.S. OGAs provide subject-matter expertise and other support to planning and executing PSI activities. OGAs include the following:

(1) Department of Justice

   (a) Federal Bureau of Investigation

(2) DHS

   (a) Homeland Security Investigations

(3) Department of Energy

   (a) National Nuclear Security Administration

(4) Department of Commerce

   (a) Bureau of Industry and Security

(5) Department of the Treasury

   (a) Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes

(6) Office of the Director of National Intelligence

   (a) National Counterproliferation Center
ENCLOSURE C

REFERENCES


b. PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, September 2003

c. National Security Strategy, December 2017


 g. Department of Defense Strategy for Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 2014


k. ASD(HD&GS) memorandum, “Proliferation Security Initiative Priorities for FY 2018–2020,” 6 December 2017
## GLOSSARY

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(HD&amp;GS)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security)</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CWMD</td>
<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>DASD(CWMD)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction)</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Functional Combatant Command</td>
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<td>FCP-CWMD</td>
<td>Functional Campaign Plan for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>HLPM</td>
<td>High-Level Political Meeting</td>
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<td>IWG</td>
<td>Interagency Working Group</td>
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<td>JEP</td>
<td>Joint Exercise Program</td>
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<td>LIVEX</td>
<td>live exercise</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>Naval War College</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operation and maintenance</td>
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<td>OEG</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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