

**ORGANIZATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
1942-2022**



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## **Foreword**

This book examines the organizational origins and evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff over the past eight decades. Established in January 1942 to expedite strategic coordination during World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been at the center of US military planning ever since. Composed of the nation's senior military officers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially operated under the direct authority and supervision of the President, performing whatever duties he assigned in his capacity as Commander in Chief.

After World War II, as part of the 1947 reorganization of the armed services under the National Security Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acquired statutory standing, with a list of assigned duties, and became a corporate advisory body to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Subsequent amendments to the National Security Act refined the composition and statutory organization of the Joint Chiefs and further clarified their authority and responsibilities. The corporate nature of the Joint Chiefs' advisory role ended upon passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which transferred the tasks and duties previously performed collectively by the JCS to the Chairman.

The Joint Staff continued to evolve during the first part of the twenty-first century. Through the Global War on Terror, countless crises around the globe, and a return to power competition among rival nations, the Joint Staff remained true to its mission of assisting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating military advice for the President and the Secretary of Defense.

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## CONTENTS

<b>1. Origin of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</b> .....	1
Establishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	1
The Wartime Reforms .....	5
<b>2. The National Security Act of 1947</b> .....	11
Postwar Plans for Defense Organization .....	11
Passage of the National Security Act .....	16
Organizing the Joint Staff.....	17
The Key West Agreement of 1948.....	19
<b>3. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949</b> .....	21
<b>4. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953</b> .....	27
<b>5. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958</b> .....	33
The President’s Plan .....	34
Implementing the President’s Plan .....	39
<b>6. Developments in the 1960s and 1970s</b> .....	45
Changes through 1967 .....	45
Organizational Consolidation, 1968–1976.....	47
Changes in the Carter Period .....	49
<b>7. The Reorganization of 1986</b> .....	57
The Jones and Meyer Proposals.....	57
Changes, 1981–1984 .....	58
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 .....	61
<b>8. Joint Staff Reorganization, 1989–2001</b> .....	67
After Goldwater-Nichols .....	67
Peacekeeping & Humanitarian Assistance.....	68
Proposals for Major Headquarters Reductions.....	71
<b>9. Joint Staff Reorganization, 2001–2011</b> .....	74
The Joint Staff After the 9–11 Attacks.....	74
Senior Enlisted Advisor to the CJCS .....	78
National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center .....	79
Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell.....	80
Wounded Warriors.....	80
Chief of the Guard Bureau Elevated to the JCS.....	81
Disestablishment of Joint Forces Command .....	82

<b>10. Joint Staff Reorganization, 2012–2022</b> .....	89
2012–2014 .....	89
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016.....	91
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017.....	92
Chairman’s Office of Re-integration (COfRe) .....	92
Other Changes .....	93
Global Integration.....	94
2019–2022 .....	95
<b>Appendix 1: Membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</b> .....	99
<b>Appendix 2: Authorized and Assigned Strength of the                   Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                   and the Joint Staff (1947–2021)</b> .....	108
<b>Appendix 3: CJCS Controlled Activities</b> .....	110
<b>Index</b> .....	112

## CHARTS

1. JCS Organization on 1 November 1942 .....	8
2. JCS Organization on 10 May 1943 (showing committee structure following reorganization).....	9
3. JCS Organization on 1 April 1945 .....	10
4. JCS Organization on 26 October 1947 .....	20
5. JCS Organization on 28 August 1949.....	26
6. JCS Organization on 30 June 1953 .....	32
7. JCS Organization on 30 June 1958 .....	43
8. JCS Organization on 30 June 1959 .....	44
9. JCS Organization on 1 September 1969 .....	53
10. JCS Organization on 31 December 1970 .....	54
11. JCS Organization on 31 December 1976 .....	55
12. JCS Organization on 31 December 1979 .....	56
13. JCS Organization on 30 June 1982 .....	64
14. JCS Organization on 30 June 1984 .....	65

<b>15. JCS Organization on 30 June 1987 .....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>16. JCS Organization on 30 March 1992 .....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>17. Joint Staff Transformation.....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>18. J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development.....</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>19. Transfer of JFCOM’s J-3 Functions to the Joint Staff.....</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>20. Joint Staff J-3.....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>21. JCS Organization on 30 June 2010 .....</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>22. JCS Organization on 1 June 2012 .....</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>23. JCS Organization 2022.....</b>	<b>98</b>



# **1. ORIGIN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) came into being during the early days of World War II to meet an immediate need. They functioned throughout the war as the corporate leadership of the US military structure under the immediate direction of the President as Commander in Chief. They were his principal military advisers and the primary agency for coordinating and giving strategic direction to the Army and the Navy. As the President's military advisers, they made recommendations directly to him on war plans and strategy, on logistical needs of the armed forces, and on matters of joint Army and Navy policy. As coordinators of the Army and Navy, they prepared joint war plans and issued directives to implement them, allocated critical resources, such as munitions, petroleum products, and shipping, and supervised the collection of strategic intelligence and the conduct of clandestine operations.

## **Establishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

With the entry of the United States into the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, some form of US-British military cooperation and coordination became necessary. The problem was addressed at the ARCADIA conference, held in Washington during the period 22 December 1941 through 14 January 1942, between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and their advisers. At the conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were established as the supreme military body for the strategic direction of the Anglo-American military effort in World War II.

As his military assistants at the ARCADIA Conference, Prime Minister Churchill had presented the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, a body consisting of the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff. In existence since 1923, this committee held a corporate responsibility for the command and strategic direction of the forces of the United Kingdom and for providing military advice to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet.

The United States had no comparable organization. A Joint Board of the Army and Navy had prepared joint war plans and dealt with questions of interservice coordination during the prewar years. Its membership of eight officers, however, did not fully encompass the chiefs of staff level of the US services as constituted in December 1941, but did include several officers of lesser rank. Primarily an advisory and deliberative body, the Joint Board was not suited to direct wartime operations.

The US delegation for the military discussions at ARCADIA consisted of the officers whose responsibilities most closely matched those of the members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. The US representatives were never specifically designated by the President or other authority. Their assumption of the duty was simply recognized as appropriate under the "opposite number" formula. General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff, US Army, held a position directly comparable to that of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The responsibilities of high command in the US Navy had recently been divided between two officers, Admiral Harold R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Ernest J. King, the Commander in Chief, US Fleet. Both appeared as US representatives in the military discussions as a dual counterpart to the British First Sea Lord. In arranging for US air representation, direct comparability was not possible. In the United Kingdom the Royal Air Force was an autonomous service, co-equal in all respects with the British Army and the Royal Navy; in the United States, air forces functioned as integral or subordinate elements of the Army and the Navy. The foremost spokesman available, however, was Lieutenant General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. It was recognized that, when sitting as a US representative, General Arnold could speak authoritatively only for the air forces of the Army and that he functioned always as a subordinate of General Marshall.

During the ARCADIA meetings the US and British officers mapped broad strategy and settled upon an organizational arrangement for the strategic direction of the war. They recommended establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the British Chiefs of Staff and their "United States opposite numbers." With the approval of the President and the Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff came into operation almost immediately, holding their first meeting on 23 January 1942.

The establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff had a profound influence on the evolution of the military high command of the United States. The four officers who represented the United States at ARCADIA continued to sit as the US members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In preparation for the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings, they had to consult closely and oversee the preparation of US position papers by subordinate staff agencies. Thus, establishment of a new organization, the "Joint US Chiefs of Staff," was implicit in the arrangement. The title followed the definition of terms agreed to at ARCADIA, under which "combined" signified collaboration between two or more nations while "joint" was used to designate the interservice collaboration of one nation.

The Joint Chiefs held their first meeting on 9 February 1942 to deal with agenda items associated with their Combined Chiefs of Staff duties. Brought together in an organized way to represent the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, these officers, as the JCS, began to function as a corporate

leadership for the US military establishment. By March 1942 this development was largely completed and the JCS absorbed the functions of the prewar Joint Board.

The functions and duties of the Joint Chiefs were not formally defined during the war period. They were left free to extend their activities as needed to meet the requirements of the war. The desirability of preserving this useful flexibility was the chief reason offered by the President himself for declining to issue a formal directive.

During March 1942 Admiral Stark left Washington for a new command in the United Kingdom. The two posts of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, US Fleet, were combined in one individual, Admiral King, and the JCS membership was reduced to three. Shortly thereafter, General Marshall became convinced that it would be desirable to have a fourth member, designated to preside at JCS meetings and maintain liaison with the White House. For this purpose, the President on 20 July 1942 appointed Admiral William D. Leahy to the new position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

The Joint Chiefs were directly responsible to President Roosevelt, who had assumed to the full his constitutional role as Commander in Chief. When dealing with strategy and military operations, President Roosevelt preferred to work directly with the uniformed chiefs of the services, rather than through the civilian leadership of the War and Navy Departments. The responsibilities of the Secretaries of War and the Navy were limited largely to matters of administration, mobilization, and procurement. In these circumstances the appointment of Admiral Leahy proved particularly valuable in facilitating the direction of the war. As Chief of Staff to the President he served as the normal channel for passing White House decisions and requirements to the Joint Chiefs and for presenting JCS views and recommendations to the President. This arrangement did not preclude direct consultation by President Roosevelt with Generals Marshall and Arnold and Admiral King, but it removed the need for such consultations for the routine exchange of opinions, information, and direction.

A supporting organization for the JCS evolved piece by piece during 1942, more in spontaneous response to need than in fulfillment of any conscious design. A number of joint committees were created to provide US representatives to sit with the British in combined committees subordinate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but they also supported the JCS in discharging responsibilities at the national level.

The most important component of the JCS organization was the Joint Staff Planners, a committee that provided the US representation on the Combined Staff Planners. By March its membership had been stabilized at five

officers: the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) of the Commander in Chief US Fleet Headquarters and two of his assistants; the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Operations Division; and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) of the US Army Air Staff. Thus, all the members had major primary responsibilities in the service staffs, and their assignment to the Joint Staff Planners was an additional, part-time duty.

Besides drawing assistance from their own service staffs, the members of the Joint Staff Planners were supported by a full-time working group, the Joint US Strategic Committee. A former Joint Board agency, it had been absorbed into the JCS organization and made subordinate to the Joint Staff Planners on 9 March. The Joint US Strategic Committee consisted of six officers on assignment from the war plans divisions of the Army and Navy staffs.

Another element of the initial JCS organization was the Joint Intelligence Committee, consisting of the US membership of the Combined Intelligence Committee. Like the Joint Staff Planners, it had a working level supporting agency composed of officers on full-time assignment from the service staffs. This body was the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, later called the Joint Intelligence Staff.

Other joint agencies established during the first months of 1942 included the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Meteorological Committee, Joint Communications Board, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and Joint New Weapons Committee. Of these, the first three provided US membership on Combined Chiefs of Staff committees with parallel titles, while the last two were strictly joint US organizations. The need for a committee at the JCS level to coordinate the efforts of the various agencies operating in the psychological warfare field had first been suggested by the Army G-2; the Joint New Weapons Committee grew out of a proposal by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, a White House organization. The Joint Chiefs were also served by a Secretary, who headed the Joint Secretariat.

Another component of the early JCS organization was the Office of Strategic Services, the World War II forerunner of the present Central Intelligence Agency. It had been formed in 1941 as the Office of the Coordinator of Information, a civilian agency directly responsible to the President. Investigation convinced the JCS that the Coordinator of Information was capable of making an important contribution to the war effort, but that its activities must be placed under military control to assure proper coordination with military operations. In March 1942 the Joint Chiefs supplied the President with a proposed executive order, drafted in collaboration with the office's director, that would make the agency responsible to the JCS. In June, as part of a broader reordering of government operations that also included establishment of the Office of War Information, President Roosevelt placed the

Coordinator of Information under JCS jurisdiction and redesignated it the Office of Strategic Services.

### **The Wartime Reforms**

During 1942 the vast majority of JCS business funneled through the Joint Staff Planners, an undermanned, part-time committee. The shortcomings of this committee became evident to the JCS in early 1943 at the Casablanca Conference. At this gathering of the President, the Prime Minister and their principal assistants, the US Joint Chiefs found themselves at a disadvantage when confronted by the large and smoothly functioning British staff, which had not only prepared thorough positions on every anticipated point but could quickly produce additional papers during the conference itself. The handful of officers making up the Joint Staff Planners was unable to match the skill and speed of this efficient planning organization.

Inadequate performance of the Joint Staff Planners stemmed from both their composition and the scope of their responsibilities. Already heavily burdened by their regular duties in the service staffs, the members constituted the sole agency for accomplishing most of the planning tasks required for the support of the Joint Chiefs in both their national and international roles. As a result, the agenda of the Joint Staff Planners was heavy and exceedingly varied.

The members of the Joint Staff Planners, still committed during this first year of the war to the traditional Army and Navy staff practices, were further handicapped by their methods of operation. The leading members of the Joint Staff Planners were reluctant to relinquish immediate and detailed control over the planning process in favor of a broader general supervision. The Planners assigned some subjects to their only permanent and full-time agency, the six-man Joint US Strategic Committee. Most of the subjects on the agenda, however, were assigned to ad hoc subcommittees composed of planning personnel and staff experts drawn from both services. All work returned to the Joint Staff Planners for review, and final decision on all matters required the personal approval of the two senior members.

The inadequacies of the JCS supporting organization revealed at Casablanca led to sweeping reappraisal and fundamental reform during the first half of 1943. Even before that time officers within the JCS organization and the service staffs had recognized the need for improvement and had successfully initiated two significant changes. These were the establishment of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, on 7 November 1942, and the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff on 11 December 1942. The former, consisting of three general and flag officers on full-time assignment but with no involvement in short-term operational problems, performed long-range planning and advised the JCS on current strategic decisions in light of the war situation and national

policy objectives. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff relieved the Joint Chiefs in the consideration of routine matters. They acted in the name of their superiors and interpreted and implemented policies already approved by the JCS.

These limited improvements were followed in early 1943 by a comprehensive reorganization of the supporting structure of the JCS. On 20 January the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff appointed a special committee, the Committee on War Planning Agencies, to conduct a thorough investigation of the problem, based on inputs from all the components of the JCS organization. The committee also completed studies on the British staff organization and on the workload of the Joint Staff Planners.

On 12 March 1943 the Committee on War Planning Agencies submitted its findings to the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Recognizing the overloading of the Joint Staff Planners, the committee recommended the shifting of a vast amount of administrative and routine planning detail to a new Joint Administrative Committee. It would consist of the Chief of the Logistics Branch of the Army Operations Division and the Director of the Logistics Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and would be supported by ad hoc groups from the service staffs. The Joint Staff Planners, with duties restricted to broad strategic and operational planning, would be limited to three members: the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), Commander in Chief, US Fleet; a representative of the Army Operations Division; and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, of the US Army Air Forces. The Joint Staff Planners would continue to receive support from the Joint US Strategic Committee, redesignated the Joint War Plans Committee and augmented by officers transferred from the service planning staffs in order to reduce the need for ad hoc committees. The Committee on War Planning Agencies also proposed broadening the Joint Intelligence Committee by adding to it the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.

After making minor changes, the JCS approved the recommendations of the Committee on War Planning Agencies at meetings during the period 4 through 10 May 1943. Specifically, they approved a set of revised charters for all JCS committees and agencies.

Later in 1943, the JCS redesignated the Joint Administrative Committee as the Joint Logistics Committee and strengthened its capabilities by adding a supporting Joint Logistics Plans Committee. This change resulted from an increasing awareness of the complexity of logistics in military planning and from recognition of the degree to which this field had already become the primary concern of the committee. The new supporting Joint Logistics Plans Committee, like the Joint War Plans Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff, was manned by officers on full-time assignment. From mid-1943 to the war's end several other joint committees were created to deal with matters that had assumed increased importance, such as the full-time Joint Production Survey


Committee and Joint Post-War Committee and the part-time Joint Civil Affairs Committee.

Charts 1–3 depict the evolution of the JCS supporting organization during World War II.

# CHART 1

# JCS ORGANIZATION

## 1 NOVEMBER 1942




NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN.



# CHART 2


# JCS ORGANIZATION

10 MAY 1943



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN.

# CHART 3 JCS ORGANIZATION 1 APRIL 1945



- |      |  |      |  |
|------|--|------|--|
| JDCS | - JOINT DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF                 | JPS  | - JOINT STAFF PLANNERS                 |
| JPSC | - JOINT PRODUCTION SURVEY COMMITTEE            | JWPC | - JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE            |
| JSSC | - JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE             | OSS  | - OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES         |
| JPWC | - JOINT POST-WAR COMMITTEE                     | JMAC | - JOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATION COMMITTEE |
| JCB  | - JOINT COMMUNICATIONS BOARD                   | ANPB | - ARMY-NAVY PETROLEUM BOARD            |
| JMC  | - JOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEE               | JCAC | - JOINT CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE        |
| JNw  | - JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT |      |  |
| JMTc | - JOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE      |      |  |
| JIC  | - JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE                 |      |  |
| JIS  | - JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF                     |      |  |
| JLC  | - JOINT LOGISTICS COMMITTEE                    |      |  |
| JLPC | - JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEE              |      |  |

JOINT AGENCIES SUPPLYING US MEMBERS FOR A COMBINED COMMITTEES OF SIMILAR PURPOSE.

JOINT AGENCIES HAVING NO COMBINED COUNTERPART.

NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN.

## **2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947**

By the end of World War II, there was widespread agreement among military and civilian leaders that the military establishment would have to be reorganized to meet the needs of the United States in the postwar era. During World War II the JCS had emerged as a corporate command and planning agency serving directly under the constitutional Commander in Chief, the President. The Army Air Forces had become virtually autonomous. There had been some centralization of intelligence collection and analysis; war production, prices, manpower, shipping, propaganda and scientific research had been subjected to control by civilian agencies. These wartime arrangements had worked well on the whole, but there was no certainty that they would be adequate in time of peace.

The JCS, as a central element of the military establishment, would be affected by any reorganization. Although few questioned the desirability of continuing some such agency in the national defense structure, there was authoritative opinion that improvements were needed, possibly involving a somewhat different conception of the JCS role. General Marshall observed that "the lack of real unity has handicapped the successful conduct of the war." In his view a system of coordinating committees, such as that embodied in the JCS organization, was not a satisfactory solution. It resulted in delays and compromises and was "a cumbersome and inefficient method of directing the efforts of the Armed Forces." Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson declared that the institution of the JCS was an "imperfect instrument of top-level decision" because "it remained incapable of enforcing a decision against the will of any one of its members." Others, recalling the record of difficulties encountered in Army-Navy cooperation in earlier times of peace, doubted that the Joint Chiefs could "continue to work together effectively for very long after the termination of hostilities."

### **Postwar Plans for Defense Organization**

Deliberation on the nature of the postwar military establishment began even before the termination of hostilities. A House committee under the chairmanship of Representative Clifton A. Woodrum conducted hearings on postwar military organization in the spring of 1944 and heard varying testimony from Army and Navy witnesses. The Army proposal, presented by General Joseph T. McNarney, called for a single military department under a secretary of the armed forces, who would supervise such matters as procurement and recruiting but have no authority over the military budget. The JCS, redesignated the United States Chiefs of Staff, would remain in existence and continue to be directly responsible to the President. Their central duty would still be that of making recommendations to the President on military

strategy, but they would gain the significant new power to recommend the military budget. The proposal called for adding to the membership of the JCS a director of common supply services. Further, the Chief of Staff to the President was to "head" the United States Chiefs of Staff. Navy witnesses made no specific proposals but cautioned against reaching any conclusion on the question of military organization without thorough study. At the conclusion of the hearings, the committee recommended that the Congress take no further action until the end of the war.

While the Woodrum hearings were in progress, the Joint Chiefs initiated their own study. They created a Special JCS Committee on Reorganization of National Defense to submit recommendations on postwar defense organization, including a recommendation on the advisability of continuing the JCS. As part of its survey, the committee spent the fall of 1944 touring the combat theaters and ascertaining the views of the major commanders. Fifty-six high-ranking officers were interviewed. The large majority of the Army officers and about half of the Navy officers favored a single military department.

On 11 April 1945 the committee submitted a report to the JCS. With the senior Navy member, Admiral J. O. Richardson, dissenting, the committee recommended the creation of a single military department presided over by a secretary of the armed forces. It would include a commander of the armed forces supported by an armed forces general staff, and a purely advisory United States Chiefs of Staff consisting of the secretary, the commander of the armed forces, and the service heads.

The JCS began serious consideration of the special committee's report shortly after the Japanese surrender. General Marshall, while he did not fully concur in the report, recommended that it be sent to the President along with a statement that the Joint Chiefs agreed in principle on a single-department system of organization. General Arnold supported this view, but Admirals King and Leahy opposed it on the grounds that a single military department would be inefficient, would weaken civilian control over the military, and was contrary to wartime experience that showed the superiority of a joint over a unitary system. The Joint Chiefs forwarded the report and their individual comments on it to the President on 16 October 1945. They set forth four possible options for his consideration:

1. Submit all the pertinent papers to Congress.
2. Appoint a special civilian board to study national defense organization.
3. Achieve a degree of unification by appointing a single individual as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.
4. Retain the existing organization, "with appropriate augmentation of the joint agencies."

With the end of World War II, congressional attention focused anew on defense organization. In October, the Senate Military Affairs Committee began hearings on the various defense organization plans produced up to that time. Several months earlier, Secretary of Navy James V. Forrestal, at the suggestion of Senator David I. Walsh, chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, had asked Mr. Ferdinand A. Eberstadt, a New York banker and personal friend, to study postwar military organization. Assisted by a committee of civilians and Navy officers, Mr. Eberstadt undertook the study and submitted his committee's report to the Secretary of the Navy in September 1945.

The Eberstadt committee concluded that "under present conditions unification of the Army and Navy under a single head" would not improve the nation's security. It favored a coordinated system, in which there would be three military departments—war, navy, and air—each with a civilian secretary of cabinet rank. The committee recognized serious weaknesses in the existing organization, particularly in the coordination of foreign and military policy and in the relationship between strategic planning and its logistic implementation. To counter these weaknesses, it recommended the creation of two important bodies directly under the President: a national security council and a national security resources board. The secretaries of war, navy, and air would be members of both organizations.

The Eberstadt committee believed that, irrespective of whether or not the separate military departments were ultimately unified under one department of defense, legislation should be sought to insure the continuation of the JCS. In the committee's opinion, the JCS had performed very satisfactorily during the war. The committee conceded that the Joint Chiefs had sometimes experienced delays in reaching decisions, but it found such delays preferable to the alternative of placing full military control in the hands of one officer at the head of a single armed forces general staff. Although it would be a more efficient instrument for reaching decisions, such an arrangement had the inherent danger that expert minority opinions might be overridden without sufficient consideration. The committee feared that, owing to inevitable limitations in the background, knowledge, and experience of the single superior officer, decisions might be reached that would prevent development of weapons, concepts, or command arrangements vital to fulfillment of the mission of one of the services.

Under the proposed organization for national security, the Joint Chiefs were to be part of and meet with the national security council. They would be charged with: a) preparing strategic plans and providing strategic direction for all US forces; b) furnishing strategic advice to the President, the national security council and other government agencies; c) preparing joint logistics plans and assigning logistic responsibilities to the services in accordance with such plans; and d) approving major service materiel and personnel programs in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

The Eberstadt committee proposed that the JCS consist of the three service chiefs, plus the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief if the President desired to continue that position. The committee had assessed the wartime experience as showing that full-time supporting groups such as the Joint War Plans Committee were more effective in producing a unified joint position than were the negotiations conducted in the part-time interservice committees. Accordingly, it recommended establishing a full-time joint staff to serve the JCS. It would be headed by a chief of the joint staff, who would function as an executive to the Joint Chiefs and perhaps sit as a JCS member.

As for the relationship between the JCS and the military departments, the committee merely noted:

In time of war the military strategists may be required to operate directly under the President. There does not seem to be any compelling reason for this during peace time. Approval of the Secretaries might well be required to render effective the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in periods of peace.

The Joint Chiefs were to maintain close liaison with other agencies within the proposed organization for national security, including a proposed central intelligence agency.

The Eberstadt proposal was presented to the Senate Military Affairs Committee by Mr. Forrestal on 22 October 1945. A week later Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins set forth the Army position. This so-called Collins Plan had been prepared by a board of senior Army officers convened only a month earlier. It proposed the establishment of a single department of the armed forces headed by a civilian secretary of cabinet rank. The JCS, renamed the US Chiefs of Staff, would continue in existence. Their functions, to be fixed by law, would be advisory on matters of military policy, strategy, and budget requirements. They would have specific authority to prepare and recommend to the President the military budget. The secretary of armed services could comment on but not amend these budget recommendations. The membership of the JCS was to be increased to five by the addition of a chief of staff of the armed forces, whose duties were not precisely indicated.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee adjourned its hearings on 17 December 1945. Two days later, President Harry S. Truman transmitted a message to Congress on reorganization of the armed forces in which he endorsed the main proposals of the Collins Plan: a single department with one cabinet-level secretary, a separate air force, a chief of staff of the armed forces, and a purely advisory JCS. This message, along with the testimony gathered at the hearings, was referred to a subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee headed by Senator Elbert Thomas. Major General Lauris Norstad

and Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford were assigned to assist the subcommittee in its deliberations.

On 9 April 1946 the committee reported out a bill combining elements of both the Navy and Army plans. Like the Eberstadt proposal, this bill (referred to as the Thomas bill after the committee chairman) called for a general reorganization of the entire national security structure and the inclusion of a national security council, a central intelligence agency, and a national security resources board. Like the Collins Plan, it called for a single department of common defense, a chief of staff of common defense, and a JCS consisting of the service chiefs and the chief of staff of common defense. However, the powers of the JCS in the Thomas bill were less than those proposed in the Collins Plan. The responsibility for preparing the military budget, which General Collins would assign to the Joint Chiefs, became the responsibility of the secretary of common defense. The Thomas bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, which conducted hearings on the bill early in May.

During the hearings Navy witnesses attacked the provisions of the bill calling for a secretary of common defense and a chief of staff for common defense and expressed their fears that the Thomas bill, if enacted, would permit removal from the Navy Department of its naval air arm and Marine Corps.

It soon became clear that the Thomas bill did not provide the compromise its drafters had intended. Therefore, President Truman on 13 May requested the Secretaries of War and Navy to submit for his review a list of points upon which they agreed and disagreed. He made it clear that, while not committed to either Department's position in the controversy, he no longer favored the establishment of a single chief of staff.

The Secretaries submitted their views to the President on 31 May. They listed eight points upon which they agreed and four on which they did not. The War Department had receded from its previous position on two points. First, it agreed to the establishment of a higher national security structure as proposed in the Eberstadt proposal. Second, in line with the President's wishes, it agreed not to press for a chief of staff of common defense. Instead, both Departments agreed that the Joint Chiefs would be retained and given responsibility beyond the purely advisory role depicted in the early bills that had proposed a chief of staff or commander of the armed forces. The Joint Chiefs were to:

formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate the military programs, to make recommendations for integration of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction of the United States military forces.

On 15 June, President Truman announced his resolution of the outstanding issues, none of which affected the JCS. The Thomas bill was appropriately amended, and hearings resumed. Navy witnesses, however, opposed this revised version, leading to a postponement of further consideration until the 80th Congress convened early in 1947.

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of Navy Forrestal chose not to wait. In view of points of agreement already reached, they appointed General Norstad and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman to develop a blueprint for unification upon which legislation could be based. On 16 January 1947, the conclusions reached by the two officers were forwarded to the President by the Secretaries of War and Navy as the plan under which the two departments could agree to unify under a single secretary of national defense.

President Truman accepted the proposal, and Admiral Sherman and General Norstad then drafted a bill based on their plan. On 26 February the President forwarded it to both houses of Congress.

### **Passage of the National Security Act**

Following several months of hearings and debate, the Congress passed the legislation in amended form as the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 80-253). It provided for a National Military Establishment, headed by the Secretary of Defense, that included the JCS and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The congressional amendments to the Norstad-Sherman bill placed further limitation on the powers of the Secretary of Defense and provided additional safeguards for the Navy air arm and the Marine Corps. Provisions relating to the Joint Chiefs, however, remained unchanged. They provided:

1. There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.
2. Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —
  - a. to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;
  - b. to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;



- c. to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;
  - d. to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;
  - e. to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;
  - f. to review major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and
  - g. to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

The functions assigned to the JCS were, in large part, those that had been agreed to by Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal in May 1946. There was, however, one significant deletion. In the Secretaries' version, the Joint Chiefs were to "make recommendations for integration of the military budget." The National Security Act made no specific provision for a budgetary function of the JCS.

The National Security Act did provide for a Joint Staff, a provision originally included in the Eberstadt proposal and revived by General Norstad and Admiral Sherman for inclusion in the draft act. The appropriate provision of the National Security Act, unchanged from the bill as originally introduced, was as follows:

There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### **Organizing the Joint Staff**

With President Truman's signature of the National Security Act on 26 July 1947, the Joint Chiefs began consideration of the implementation of the provisions affecting their organization. On 4 August, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed that the JCS continue the existing structure of part-time interservice committees, with their full-time

supporting groups incorporated in the new Joint Staff. Admiral Nimitz also recommended that the Joint Chiefs approve a directive to the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) spelling out his supervisory duties over the Joint Staff and imposing a specific limitation on his authority. The Director would be required, according to Admiral Nimitz's proposal, to forward all reports of JCS committees to the Joint Chiefs. In cases involving disagreements, however, the Director would be authorized to submit his own views along with those of the majority and minority members of the committee.

The Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, while he agreed with Admiral Nimitz on the need to proceed immediately with the reorganization of JCS agencies, proposed that the details be worked out by the officer selected to be the DJS. He accordingly recommended, and the JCS approved, that the Director be selected at once and be directed to recommend a statement of functions for the Director and an internal organization for the Joint Staff. In preparing his recommendations the Director would take into consideration the views of Admiral Nimitz.

Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, was named by the Joint Chiefs on 25 August to be the first DJS. After considering the opinions and recommendations of individuals both within and without the JCS organization, General Gruenther submitted his plan to the JCS on 26 September 1947. The plan encompassed a statement of functions for the Director, an organization for the Joint Staff, and a basic staff procedure. Underlying General Gruenther's proposals was the premise, based on the provisions of the National Security Act, that the JCS would function as a planning, coordinating, and advisory body, not as an operating or implementing group. The Joint Staff was therefore designed to support the JCS in this role. The Joint Chiefs approved the plan on 26 October 1947.

The new Joint Staff modified and added to the existing committee structure. It consisted of the office of the Director and three staff groups—the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint Strategic Plans Group, and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. These groups (redesignations for the existing Joint Intelligence Staff, Joint War Plans Committee, and Joint Logistics Plans Committee) continued to support the appropriate senior part-time interservice committees. The membership of these committees, however, had been broadened to include on each the director of the appropriate supporting joint staff group. In addition, while the Joint Intelligence Committee continued under the same title, the names of the other two were changed as follows: the Joint Staff Planners became the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint Logistics Committee became the Joint Logistics Plans Committee. The work of the other JCS committees, which were not part of the Joint Staff, also came under the general supervision and coordination of the Director. These were the Joint Communications Board, the Joint Civil Affairs Committee, the Joint

Military Transportation Committee, the Joint Meteorological Committee, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, and the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Secretariat, the Historical Section, and the US Delegation to the UN Military Staff Committee were placed outside the Joint Staff and directly under the JCS.

The functions of the DJS included supervising and coordinating the work of the Joint Staff, assigning problems and studies to appropriate components of the Joint Staff, and ensuring that the necessary reports were completed and submitted to the JCS. His supervisory functions did not include the authority to approve or disapprove the reports before submission. This power remained with the joint committees, but the Director was authorized to submit his own recommendations along with the committee reports.

The JCS organization resulting from the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 is shown in Chart 4.

### **The Key West Agreement of 1948**


In amplification of the National Security Act of 1947, the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, worked out with the Joint Chiefs an expanded functions statement for the JCS and the armed forces. The final details were resolved during a meeting of the Secretary with the Chiefs in Key West, Florida, during the period 11 through 14 March 1948.

The resulting "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," or the Key West Agreement as it was more popularly known, was issued on 21 April 1948. It set out in detail the functions of the JCS, the functions common to all the armed forces, and those of each individual service. The Key West Agreement made clear that the JCS responsibility for providing strategic direction of the armed forces included "the general direction of all combat operations." It also sanctioned the practice, begun during World War II, by which the Chiefs designated one of their members as executive agent for each of the unified and specified commands for certain operations; for the development of special tactics, techniques, and equipment; and for the conduct of joint training.

# CHART 4

## JCS ORGANIZATION

### 26 OCTOBER 1947



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN.

### **3. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1949**

A defense reorganization in 1949 was accomplished by legislation entitled the "National Security Act Amendments of 1949," which President Truman signed on 10 August 1949. This law strengthened the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the elements of the National Military Establishment, which was now redesignated the Department of Defense (DOD). The law also created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who was to preside over the meetings of the JCS and expedite their business (although he was prohibited from voting in their decisions). This new position replaced that of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, which had been allowed to lapse with the illness and subsequent retirement of Admiral Leahy early in 1949. The Joint Chiefs were designated as principal military advisers to the National Security Council as well as to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The maximum personnel strength allowed the Joint Staff was increased from 100 to 210 officers.

These amendments had their origin in the experience of the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, in administering the 1947 Act. Secretary Forrestal had soon found the need for a single officer to advise him on military problems and to provide liaison with the JCS. For this purpose, he turned to Major General Gruenther, the DJS. In the spring of 1948, Mr. Forrestal sought to have General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, US Army, assigned as his principal military adviser, but both General Bradley and Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall objected that the General was needed in his current position. Later in 1948, Secretary Forrestal arranged to have General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower recalled to active duty to serve as presiding officer of the JCS for a period of several months beginning in January 1949.

In his first annual report, Secretary Forrestal made clear his conviction that there should be a "responsible head" for the JCS. One of the JCS members might be selected for this purpose, or a fourth officer might be appointed to the position. In either event, the Chairman "should be the person to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense look to see to it that matters with which the Joint Chiefs should deal are handled in a way that will provide the best military staff assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense." Mr. Forrestal believed that the Joint Staff should be enlarged and that the provision for JCS membership for the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief should be deleted from the law. He also set forth his conviction that the Secretary's authority over the National Military Establishment should be clarified and strengthened.

Secretary Forrestal had another opportunity to present his views as a result of the creation of a commission to survey the operations of the Federal

Government. Mr. Forrestal had, in fact, been instrumental in instituting the legislation (the Lodge-Brown Act) under which this commission was established; he served as a member of it, but did not participate in the preparation of the commission's final report. Former President Herbert C. Hoover was named chairman and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, vice chairman. To carry out an intensive survey of the National Military Establishment, the commission set up a special committee, or "task force," headed by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt. The committee took testimony from Secretary Forrestal, from the members of the JCS, and from a long list of other military and civilian officials.

The Eberstadt committee's report unmistakably reflected the views of Secretary Forrestal. The members recommended that the Secretary be given clear authority over the defense establishment and that he be provided additional assistance, military and civilian. He should be authorized to designate one of the JCS members as Chairman, with the responsibility for "expediting the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for keeping their docket current," but with no command authority over his JCS colleagues. The report also recommended that the Secretary take advantage of a provision in the existing law to appoint a "principal military assistant or chief staff officer." This appointee should sit with the Joint Chiefs, but should not be a member thereof. He should be responsible, in the Secretary's absence, for presenting and interpreting the Secretary's viewpoint and also for bringing "split" JCS decisions to the attention of the Secretary. He would thus play somewhat the same role as that in which the DJS had been cast by Secretary Forrestal. The committee further agreed with the Secretary that the Joint Staff should be "moderately increased."

One of the members, former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, wished to go farther and combine the three military departments into one department of defense. The rest of the committee, however, did not endorse his views. Another member, John J. McCloy, urged the creation of a single, overall Chief of Staff, who would serve as the CJCS and have "at least the power of terminating discussion in that body after he had given full opportunity for discussion."

The Hoover Commission not only published and disseminated the report of the Eberstadt committee but also prepared one of its own on national security organization in which even greater status and authority was recommended for the Secretary of Defense. The commission desired to reduce the service secretaries to the status of undersecretaries of defense, without cabinet rank, recommendations that even Mr. Patterson had not made. The commission's report also endorsed the proposal for a JCS Chairman, apparently envisioning him as a fourth appointee and not as one of the three incumbents elevated above his colleagues. The vice chairman of the commission, Dean Acheson, supported by three other members, joined Mr. McCloy in urging a "single chief of staff," who would have control over the

Joint Staff and serve as principal adviser to the Secretary and the President. These conclusions went beyond the views of the majority of the commission.

President Truman incorporated the major conclusions of these two reports in a message to Congress on 5 March 1949. He recommended that the National Military Establishment be converted into an executive department, to be known as the department of defense, within which the existing Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be redesignated as military departments. The Secretary should be given clear responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the department of defense. He would be empowered to make "flexible use" of the JCS and the other agencies set up by the National Security Act of 1947, such as the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. Finally, there should be a CJCS, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who would take precedence over all military personnel and be the "principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense."

Shortly thereafter, Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, drafted a bill intended to carry out the President's proposals. In some ways it went beyond the President in the degree of authority proposed for the Secretary of Defense. For example, it would confer upon the Secretary the right to appoint the DJS. The duties of the JCS were enumerated as in the 1947 Act, but it was specified that the Joint Chiefs would perform these duties, or others, at the "discretion" of the Secretary of Defense. All statutory limits on the size of the Joint Staff were to be removed.

Secretary Forrestal sent a draft of this bill to the JCS for comment on 15 March 1949. Two months earlier, he had asked the Joint Chiefs whether, in their view, the functions assigned them by the 1947 Act should be revised.

The Chiefs replied to both requests on 25 March 1949. They voiced no major objections to the Tydings bill but suggested changes that would delimit more clearly the status and duties of the Secretary and the proposed JCS Chairman. The JCS believed that it should be specified that the Chairman would not, by virtue of his office, exercise military command over the other JCS members or the services. Moreover, it should be made clear that the Chairman, in giving advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense, would be acting in his capacity as JCS Chairman, not as an individual. The purpose of this JCS recommendation was to indicate that a Chairman would be expected to present the views of his colleagues, as well as his own, on any issue. The Joint Chiefs believed that they, and not the Secretary of Defense, should appoint the Director. They found no fault with the duties assigned by the 1947 law, but recommended that these continue to be prescribed by statute and not left to the Secretary's discretion.

This last recommendation was unacceptable to Secretary Forrestal, who reminded the Joint Chiefs that President Truman had expressed a firm desire to give the Secretary flexible authority. The other JCS proposals were acceptable, and he promised to submit them to Congress. Subsequently, his successor, Louis A. Johnson, sent Senator Tydings copies of the exchange of views between the Secretary of the Defense and the JCS.

The Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on the Tydings bill on 24 March 1949. The first witness was Secretary Forrestal, who was scheduled to leave office in a few days. He gave general approval to the measure, while admitting that minor amendments might later be found desirable. He explained why he had in some degree altered the views he had expressed prior to becoming Secretary of Defense. Concerning the proposal for a JCS Chairman, the Secretary explained that General Eisenhower's performance in this role had shown "how much more in the way of results can be attained by a man who is sitting over them directing and driving the completion of unfinished business." In his view, the Chairman's job would be to provide the agenda for JCS meetings, to see that the business of the Joint Chiefs was "vigorously prosecuted," to seek to induce agreements, to identify those issues on which no agreement was possible, and to advise the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman would not, however, exercise command, nor would he himself make any decisions when the other JCS members could not agree.

Subsequent witnesses included Messrs. Hoover and Eberstadt, former Secretary of War Patterson, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and Dan A. Kimball, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air (speaking in the absence of the Secretary, who was ill). None of these opposed the bill, although Mr. Patterson alone fully supported it as written. The strongest reservation came from Mr. Eberstadt, who believed that it would confer upon the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman a degree of power that would be dangerous. He believed that the law should stipulate that the Chairman would not outrank the other JCS members and would not exercise command or military authority over them and that he would serve a fixed term of office. He also urged that the JCS as a body, and not merely the Chairman, be named as advisers to the President and the Secretary. His viewpoint on the status of the Chairman was upheld by ex-President Hoover, who added the suggestion that the Chairman should be given no vote in JCS decisions. Secretaries Kimball and Royall, while not seriously objecting to the provisions relating to the Chairman, agreed that a limited term of office would be desirable (Mr. Kimball recommended two years).

All three members of the JCS were called upon to testify. Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, the senior member, acted as spokesman and presented the recommendations that he and his colleagues had made earlier to the Secretary of Defense. The senators were generally sympathetic to the JCS viewpoint. The question of a limitation on the size of the Joint Staff was introduced. Mr. Eberstadt, in his testimony, had suggested a ceiling of 200 officers. Admiral



Denfeld told Senator Tydings that the Joint Chiefs had discussed this question with Major General Gruenther, who had suggested 250 as a reasonable number.

In the end, the Senate and the House of Representatives modified the Tydings bill considerably in the direction recommended by the JCS, as well as by Messrs. Eberstadt and Hoover. The Chairman was to serve for two years and was to be eligible for one reappointment only, except in time of war when there would be no limit on his reappointment. He would take precedence over all other officers of the armed forces, but would not exercise military command over the JCS or the services. His duties were carefully prescribed as follows:

1. Serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
2. Provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable; and
3. Inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been reached.

The advisory function was assigned to the entire JCS membership, not merely to the Chairman. The JCS duties were listed, essentially as in the 1947 Act, in language that did not leave the assignment of these tasks to the Secretary's discretion. The Joint Chiefs were to continue to appoint the DJS, and a limit of 210 officers was set for the staff, organized as shown on chart 5.


The Senate approved the modified bill on 28 July and the House on 2 August. President Truman signed the bill into law on 10 August, and General Bradley was sworn in as the first Chairman on 16 August.

In summary, clearly the initiative for the 1949 reorganization came from Secretary Forrestal. The continuing debate over unification and the general demand for economy in defense expenditures created a favorable opportunity for seeking changes that the Secretary considered necessary to create an efficient, well-integrated defense organization. In Ferdinand Eberstadt and Herbert Hoover, he found influential (though only partial) allies whose reports helped to focus public and congressional attention upon the issues involved. President Truman, and subsequently Senator Tydings, sought to carry the reorganization somewhat beyond the objectives originally envisioned by Secretary Forrestal. But Congress was not receptive to the degree of centralization that would have resulted under the original Tydings bill. The desire of the Chiefs for a definite recognition of their corporate responsibility and a correspondingly circumscribed role for a Chairman found a ready response in Congress and was reflected in the provisions of the National Security Act Amendments as finally passed in August 1949.

# CHART 5

## JCS ORGANIZATION

### 28 AUGUST 1949



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN.

#### **4. REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6 OF 1953**

In April 1953 President Eisenhower proposed to Congress a reorganization of the machinery set up by the legislation of 1947 and 1949. The origin of President Eisenhower's 1953 reorganization plan could be traced to a statement that he had made during his successful campaign for the Presidency. On 25 September 1952, in a speech devoted entirely to the problems of national defense, he had called for the creation, "at the earliest possible date next year," of a commission composed of "the most capable civilians in our land" to study the operations, functions, and acts of the Department of Defense. He did not indicate the nature of the improvements that he considered necessary. The principal theme of his speech was criticism of waste and inefficiency as a result of "stop-and-start planning."

The President redeemed his promise soon after he took office. O. of Defense Charles E. Wilson appointed a committee headed by Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller to study the Department of Defense. Other members named to the committee were the former Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett; the President's brother, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower; Dr. Vannevar Bush; Dr. Arthur S. Flemming; Mr. David Sarnoff; and one military member, the CJCS, General of the Army Omar Bradley. General of the Army George Marshall, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, and General Carl A. Spaatz, USAF, served as military consultants.

Before the committee began operations, several of its members had placed on record their views regarding the changes needed in the existing defense organization. Particularly prominent in this regard was Dr. Bush, who, in two speeches made in September and October 1952, publicly advocated what was to become the cardinal feature of the President's reorganization plan: establishment of a purely civilian chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments. Indeed, he wished to go even farther than the President did later in circumscribing the role of the JCS. In his view, the Joint Chiefs should, as a body, issue no orders whatsoever, even in wartime. He favored empowering the Chairman to resolve disagreements among the Chiefs, though he expressed opposition to a "supreme military commander." Dr. Bush also criticized the JCS planning process for failing to make use of civilian specialists in various fields of knowledge.

Mr. Lovett's views were embodied in a long letter to President Truman on 18 November 1952, the result of a suggestion by Mr. Truman that he place on record his recommendations for the benefit of the incoming President. Mr. Lovett believed that the authority of the Secretary was still ambiguous in some ways and needed strengthening. He characterized the provisions regarding the

JCS as "one of the principal weaknesses of the present legislation." The statutory prescription of their functions was "excessively rigid." They were grievously overworked as a result of the numerous papers referred to them and, as a result, were "too deeply immersed in day-to-day operations" to do justice to their principal function, which was strategic planning. It was extremely difficult for the members of the JCS and the Joint Staff "to maintain a broad non-service point of view," owing to their connections with individual services.

Mr. Lovett's solution was to redefine the functions of the Joint Chiefs to confine them exclusively to the preparation and review of strategic and logistic plans. The Chiefs should create a strong planning division under their control; their other functions, and most of the Joint Staff, should be transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Each JCS member should be encouraged to delegate to his deputy his individual service responsibilities, and legislative authority should be sought for this purpose if necessary. Mr. Lovett's views regarding the chain of command from the President to the unified commands were identical with those of Dr. Bush. He believed also that the unrealistic prohibition of a vote for the Chairman should be dropped.

A more radical suggestion offered by Mr. Lovett was to assign to the JCS only senior officers who had completed terms as military chiefs of their respective services. The corporate JCS would be served by an advisory staff of officers under a separate promotion system. Mr. Lovett admitted that this suggestion would require careful evaluation before being put into effect and that it might involve the creation of an armed forces general staff, which had been specifically forbidden by the National Security Act of 1947.

General Bradley, the Chairman, did not go as far as Dr. Bush or Secretary Lovett, but he agreed that the JCS advisory function should be given more emphasis. His solution was to establish, at a higher level, a national military council. It would serve as a staff for the Secretary of Defense and be responsible for reviewing JCS decisions on strategic matters, for settling issues on which the Joint Chiefs could not agree, and for establishing and exercising operational direction of joint commands.

The report of the Rockefeller committee, submitted in April 1953, was based on extensive consultation with military and civilian officials in the Department of Defense and the military departments. Its recommendations, though unanimous, were clearly dominated by the Bush-Lovett viewpoint.

The Joint Chiefs were afforded no opportunity to review the report. The Chairman, General Bradley, however, was a member of the committee and the other JCS members had appeared before the committee. In any event, the President accepted the committee recommendations and used them in preparing his proposals for the Congress.

On 30 April 1953, President Eisenhower submitted to the Congress a message on defense organization, designating it Reorganization Plan No. 6. It could be implemented by executive order within 60 days unless formally rejected by Congress. As an old soldier, the President explained, he found the defense establishment in need of immediate improvement. He hoped to achieve an organization that was modern yet economical, while also strengthening civilian control and improving strategic planning.

To enhance civilian control, the JCS would be removed from the chain of command and confined to an advisory role. They would no longer designate one of their members to serve as executive agent for each unified command. Instead, the Secretary of Defense, after consulting the JCS, would designate one of the military departments for this purpose. The channel of responsibility would thus run from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then to the civilian secretaries of the military departments. However, "for strategic direction and for the conduct of the combat operations in emergency and wartime situations," the secretary of each designated department would authorize the corresponding military chief "to receive and transmit reports and orders and to act for such department in its executive agency capacity." In such cases, the order issued by the military chief would be "in the name and under the direction of the Secretary of Defense," and would clearly so state.

This scheme, President Eisenhower explained, would clarify the lines of authority in the DOD and strengthen civilian control of the military establishment. The 1948 directive on the functions of the armed forces, according to the President, had partially obscured the intent of the National Security Act of 1947 by inserting the JCS in the chain of command. The new arrangement, in the President's words, would "fix responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials as intended by the National Security Act."

Additionally, under the reorganization plan, the CJCS would receive additional authority. He would become responsible for managing the work of the Joint Staff and its Director, and the appointment and tenure of officers to the Joint Staff would be subject to his approval. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense would be empowered to approve the appointment of the DJS.

The enlargement of the Chairman's duties, according to the President, would relieve the Joint Chiefs of administrative detail, leaving them free to concentrate on their planning and advisory role. The overall objective was to improve the military planning process. With this end in view, the President declared that he would instruct the JCS to arrange for the participation of experts from OSD in the deliberations of the Joint Staff in order to make

certain that technological, scientific, economic, and other matters were properly integrated into military plans.

Later the President gave an additional explanation for empowering the Chairman to veto the appointment of officers for the Joint Staff. He hoped by this step to insure the choice of officers who could rise above narrow service partisanship. "My objective," he wrote in his memoirs, "was to take at least one step in divorcing the thinking and the outlook of the members of the Joint Staff from those of their parent services and to center their entire effort on national planning for the overall common defense of the nation and the West."

The President's explanatory remarks did not touch upon the role given the Secretary of Defense in the selection of the DJS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger M. Kyes, in explaining Reorganization Plan No. 6 to Congress, pointed out that the new requirement would regularize a practice informally followed in the past, when the Joint Chiefs submitted to the Secretary of Defense their nomination for the position of Director. Mr. Kyes also observed that the laws of 1947 and 1949 had been largely silent concerning the duties and responsibilities of the Joint Staff and the Director and that the new reorganization plan would remedy this deficiency. He remarked that "the one area which most concerns those who express fears about the emergence of a super-staff system is the one area which is the least carefully prescribed in the law."

Criticism of the reorganization plan quickly focused on the proposed new authority for the CJCS to approve the appointment and tenure of Joint Staff appointees and to manage the work of the Joint Staff. These provisions reawakened fears of the establishment of a "Prussian general staff" or of the rise of a "man on horseback."

Representative Clare E. Hoffman of Michigan, chairman of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, introduced a resolution providing that the plan would take effect except for the portions conferring additional authority on the CJCS. Hearings on the Hoffman resolution by the Committee on Government Operations were held during June 1953. Mr. Rockefeller, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes, and Budget Director Joseph M. Dodge testified at length in favor of the plan. Two letters from President Eisenhower, pointing out that the authorities of the CJCS would remain clearly circumscribed and subject to acceptable controls under the proposed plan, were also placed in evidence. Those witnesses favoring the Hoffman resolution included Ferdinand Eberstadt; Charles E. Bennett, a Congressman from Florida who was not a member of the committee; Thomas K. Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force; and others, including several retired Navy and Marine Corps officers. Most confined themselves to the matter immediately at issue—the authorities proposed for the Chairman. Several ranged farther afield, notably Mr. Finletter, who criticized the trend of events

since 1947 and urged a return to the original concept underlying the National Security Act, with the Secretary of Defense as a coordinator rather than an executive. Former President Herbert Hoover, though he did not appear as a witness, submitted a letter in which he supported the Hoffman resolution.

The arguments of witnesses hostile to the enlargement of the Chairman's authority proved convincing to the members of the Committee on Government Operations, which approved the Hoffman resolution on 22 June. Five days later, however, the House of Representatives rejected it by the substantial margin of 234 to 108. Accordingly, Reorganization Plan No. 6 took effect on 30 June 1953 in the form in which the President had submitted it. Subsequently, on 1 October 1953, the President and the Secretary of Defense promulgated a new directive governing the functions of the Armed Forces which revised the chain of command to accord with the President's announced intentions.


In July 1954, Secretary of Defense Wilson issued a directive to the JCS that was intended to give further expression to the principles enunciated by the President on 30 April 1953. It provided that "the Joint Staff work of each of the Chiefs of Staff shall take priority over all other duties," and that the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the military departments would be kept fully informed of JCS deliberations. It also required the CJCS to forward to the Secretary of Defense his own "views, advice and recommendations" whenever he found himself in disagreement with his colleagues.

Chart 6 shows the JCS organization on 30 June 1953, the date on which President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 became effective.

# CHART 6

## JCS ORGANIZATION

### 30 JUNE 1953



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN.



## **5. THE DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958**

In the several years following the reorganization of 1953, revolutionary advances occurred in military science and technology, particularly in missile delivery systems. The capabilities for ever-swifter delivery of long-range missiles being acquired by the Soviet Union as well as the United States underscored an increasingly urgent requirement for a more direct and responsive chain of military command with positive civilian control. Beyond this, the immense and rising costs of the national defense effort and the problems of allocating weapons systems and resources among the services brought into public question the adequacy of the existing defense organization. During 1956 and 1957 considerable discussion took place in the Congress and the press regarding the need for reorganization of the DOD. President Eisenhower at a press conference in mid-1957 expressed some dissatisfaction with current arrangements. General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, US Army, voiced the sentiment of many defense officials when he pointed out that dynamic changes in "weapons, transportation and techniques" indicated that studies of defense organization should be undertaken to "make it continually more responsive to requirements of national policy."

In December 1957 the Joint Chiefs established an ad hoc committee, headed by Major General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, to study Department of Defense organization, particularly with respect to the system for directing military forces in peace and wartime situations. This committee submitted interim findings to the Chiefs in early January 1958, but at that point the JCS effort was superseded by a broader consideration of defense reorganization instituted by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message to the Congress on 9 January 1958, revealed a deep concern over the potential effects on US deterrent power of the Soviet Union's growing missile delivery capability. He assured the Congress that he meant to make certain that military organization facilitated, rather than hindered, the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining the nation's security. "Recently," he continued, "I have had under special study the never-ending problem of efficient organization, complicated as it is by new weapons. Soon my conclusions will be finalized. I shall promptly take such executive action as is necessary, and in a separate message, I shall present appropriate recommendations to the Congress."

The President aimed to achieve "real unity in strategic planning and control" and what he described as "clear subordination of the military services to duly constituted civilian authority." Although the President remarked that the problem of defense organization was under special study, it was not apparent that any special study group had formed for this purpose at the time

of his address. More likely, he was referring to close consultations on the matter with his new Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy.

Following the President's message, Secretary of Defense McElroy, who had replaced Secretary Wilson in October 1957, formed a panel of consultants to assist him in studying the organization of the Defense Department and in preparing "any recommended changes." He named Charles A. Coolidge, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, as a full-time special assistant on defense organization. Members of the panel were: William C. Foster, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; Nelson A. Rockefeller, chairman, President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization; the current CJCS, General Nathan F. Twining, USAF; and two former Chairmen, General of the Army Omar Bradley and Admiral Arthur W. Radford. The Secretary of Defense planned to continue discussing defense organization with the President and to make formal recommendations to him as soon as practicable.

The panel met regularly with the Secretary of Defense in the next several weeks, reviewing various proposals by individuals and study groups. They examined, for example, a Rockefeller report published in early January. Other major proposals reviewed by the panel included those made by the Hoover Commission and by such knowledgeable men as Congressman Carl Vinson, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson Jr., Under Secretary of the Army Charles C. Finucane, Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates Jr., and former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter. The panel heard the testimony and opinions of many top officials in the Department of Defense, including the service chiefs and the secretaries of the military departments.

The panel made no written report. By the time it had completed its hearings the Secretary of Defense had developed his recommendations for the President. As General Twining expressed it in testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, "We did not know what the Secretary of Defense was going to recommend. He listened and made up his own mind."

Secretary McElroy had, however, discussed his proposed recommendations with the Armed Forces Policy Council at two separate meetings. This afforded all service secretaries and the members of the JCS, in their service capacities, an opportunity to comment and recommend changes. Some minor changes occurred as a result.

### **The President's Plan**

On 3 April 1958, President Eisenhower addressed a special message to the Congress, spelling out his decisions and recommendations on defense reorganization. "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever," the President stated. "Peacetime preparation and organization activity must conform to that fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely

unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service." Accomplishment of this, the President pointed out, was the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the JCS and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief. The President stated that he deemed certain revisions to be essential.

"We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our overall military objectives," he declared. The President informed Congress that all operational forces would be organized into truly unified commands unless personally exempted by the Commander in Chief. These commands would be in the DOD but separate from the military departments. "I expect these truly unified commands to go far toward realigning our operational plans, weapons systems, and force levels in such fashion as to provide maximum security at minimum cost," he explained. To allay the concern of those who might fear he was moving toward abolition or merger of the services, President Eisenhower emphasized that he had no such intention and that his proposals would have no such effect.

"We must clear command channels so that orders proceed directly to unified commands from the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense." The existing chain of command included the secretaries of the military departments—an arrangement the President had championed in 1953. Because of the changed situation, he now directed the Secretary of Defense to discontinue the use of military departments as executive agencies for the unified commands. He asked the Congress to repeal any statutory authority that vested responsibility for military operations in any official other than the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, he asked repeal of the provisions that the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, should command major units of the Air Force and that the Chief of Naval Operations should command naval operating forces.

With reference to the JCS, the President stated, "We must strengthen the military staff in the OSD in order to provide the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands." In furtherance of this, several improvements were needed in the duties and organization of the JCS. President Eisenhower believed the JCS concept to be essentially sound and that the Joint Chiefs should continue as presently constituted. "However," he said, "in keeping with the shift I have directed in operational channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will in the future serve as the staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of direction over unified commands. Orders issued to the commands by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense. I think it important to have it clearly understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff act only

under the authority and in the name of the Secretary of Defense. I am, therefore, issuing instructions that their function is to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in respect to their duties and not to perform any of their duties independently of the Secretary's direction."

The President went on to describe the current limitations on the strength of the Joint Staff and called attention as well to the committee system. He termed the operations of the existing system "laborious."

"With the operational channel now running from the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense directly to unified commanders rather than through the military departments," President Eisenhower informed the Congress, "the Joint Staff must be further unified and strengthened in order to provide the operational and planning assistance heretofore largely furnished by the staffs of the military departments." In order to accomplish this, he had directed Secretary McElroy to discontinue the JCS committee system and to add "an integrated operations division." The President asked that Congress remove or raise the statutory limit of 210 officers on the size of the Joint Staff and empower the CJCS to assign duties to the Joint Staff. Further, he proposed authority for the Chairman, with approval of the Secretary of Defense, to appoint the DJS and deletion of the provision denying the Chairman a vote in JCS decisions.

Because of the heavy duties imposed on the individual members of the JCS by the fact of their being chiefs of their services, the President asked the Congress to change the law to make it clear that each military chief might delegate major portions of his service responsibilities to his vice chief. "Once this change is made, the Secretary of Defense will require the chiefs to use their power of delegation to enable them to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff duties their principal duties," the President observed.

Two weeks after his 3 April message, President Eisenhower transmitted to the Congress draft legislation to implement the defense reorganization he had proposed. The House Armed Services Committee decided to hold general hearings on the President's proposals. Already pending before the committee were several bills sponsored by individual Congressmen proposing changes in defense organization and arrangements. These hearings, according to Representative Carl Vinson, chairman of the House committee, would not be aimed at a particular bill but at "organization of the Department of Defense to enable us to prepare whatever legislation we find to be necessary to strengthen the security of the nation. . . . We are convinced that certain changes must be made in the Department of Defense. The basic structure is, in my opinion, sound—but it can certainly be improved."

The House hearings began on 22 April 1958. Testimony was taken from all key defense officials, including members of the JCS. For nearly four months

the President's legislative proposals underwent detailed and critical examination by the Congress. The unusual prestige of President Eisenhower, particularly in military matters, did not prevent extensive questioning of the need for and motivation behind the proposed changes in defense organization. Some legislators, public officials, and private citizens questioned the need to broaden and strengthen the powers of the Secretary of Defense. They were concerned as well by the apparent intent to diminish the roles of the individual services, to centralize authority in the person of the CJCS and to enlarge the Joint Staff and widen the scope of its responsibilities. Some read into the proposals an effort to induce Congress to relinquish its authority and control of some aspects of national defense. There were others who feared that passage of the legislation would lead to a merger of the services or the abolition of the Marine Corps.

In the lengthy congressional hearings, proponents of the President's plan attempted to make it clear that there was no danger of the feared developments and that the reorganization was necessary in the interest of national security. The testimony before the congressional committees by key officials of the DOD was, with one exception, in full support of the legislation proposed by the President. Typical of the testimony offered by these officials was that of General Twining on 28 April.

General Twining spelled out for the House committee the specific military objectives being sought in the proposed reorganization. The first was to streamline the chain of command. A second was to strengthen and widen the authority of the field commanders. "We cannot afford to delay until after war starts the processes of assigning and reorganizing our major combat forces," he stated. The third major objective was greater flexibility in adjusting the functions, roles, and missions of the services. "I think it important," the Chairman told the committee, "that the Secretary of Defense have the authority which he needs in this area." The fourth objective was to make the JCS the "directing agency for the field commands." A fifth objective involved making certain minor changes in the role of the Chairman that would lead to more efficient management. "No sweeping realignment of the services is contemplated," General Twining said, "but we do want a better mechanism for providing for decision in areas which invite duplication, waste, or inefficiency. A man on a white horse cannot emerge from this legislation. Civilian control is clearly delineated; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, retains their present important powers; and numerous checks and balances will continue to exist."

To refute charges that a Prussian general staff would result if the Joint Staff were reorganized as proposed, General Twining presented information on the form and history of the Prussian staff system, pointing out its differences from the proposed Joint Staff. He also described the coordination procedures by which it was intended to insure that individual service viewpoints continued

to receive full consideration during the Joint Staff's development of reports for submission to the JCS.

Other Defense Department officials testifying generally in the same supportive vein for the President's plan included Secretary McElroy and JCS members General Taylor, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and General Thomas D. White, USAF. With respect to an enlarged Joint Staff, none of these witnesses prescribed a definite number of officers, although Secretary McElroy did state that no more than 400 would be needed.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph McCall Pate, did not support the proposed legislation completely and so informed the Congress. General Pate supported the general objectives and principles of the President's proposals, but had certain reservations. For example, he did not believe that the proposals relating to the unified commands were well-founded, since in his view "these commands are operating satisfactorily today." Principally, however, his objections lay in those features of the bill that would relax restrictions on the transfer, reassignment, abolition, or consolidation of "combatant functions" by the Secretary of Defense. He feared that such relaxation might be used as a mandate from Congress to "rationalize the Marine Corps out of a job." While he did not object to letting the Chairman vote, General Pate did oppose permitting him to select the Director and to assign work to the Joint Staff. He wanted both these things done by the corporate JCS.

The House hearings continued during the first three weeks of May. The overwhelming weight of the testimony in favor of the President's proposals gradually swung the balance away from the opposing views. The House committee reported the bill out on 22 May, strongly urging its enactment.

Following passage by the House, the legislation was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which held hearings from 17 June through 9 July. All of the defense officials who had appeared before the House committee testified before the Senate committee, presenting the same views. The Senate committee reported favorably on the bill on 17 July.

In its final form the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives on 24 July 1958 and signed by President Eisenhower on 6 August 1958. With respect to the JCS, all of the changes proposed by the President were given legislative approval. The statutory limit on the size of the Joint Staff was raised to 400 officers. The legislation further prescribed that "the Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized and may operate along conventional staff lines to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their assigned responsibilities."

## **Implementing the President's Plan**

Once the President had submitted his message to Congress on 3 April, planning for the reorganization began in the DOD. Secretary McElroy had informed the CJCS that he did not intend to give the Joint Chiefs a formal directive to carry out the applicable portions of the President's 3 April message to the Congress. He desired, instead, that the Chiefs, based on their study and analysis of the spirit and intent of the President's message, recommend to him the necessary implementing measures. Accordingly, the Joint Staff was requested to develop suitable recommendations.

One feature of the President's proposed reorganization, the abolition of the JCS committee system, required no enabling legislation. The President had already directed the Secretary of Defense to accomplish it. On 27 May, the Chairman announced the disestablishment of the committee system of the JCS, effective 7 June 1958.

The following committees of the JCS were disestablished on that date:

Committee for Joint Policies and Procedures, Permanent Logistics Reviewing Committee, Joint Munitions Allocation Committee, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Joint Logistics Plans Committee, Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Intelligence Committee and certain subcommittees thereof, Joint Communications-Electronics Committee, Joint Military Assistance Affairs Committee, Joint Subsidiary Activities Committee, and Ad Hoc Committee on Service Distribution of US Military Personnel Requirements of NATO Headquarters and Agencies.

The four committees that it was deemed necessary to retain in the JCS organization were redesignated. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee became the Joint Strategic Survey Council. The Joint Advanced Study Committee, the Joint Meteorological Committee, and the Joint Middle East Planning Committee were redesignated as groups.

Meanwhile the Joint Staff had submitted a draft plan to implement most of the expected reorganization provisions. The chief question remaining concerned the internal organization of the Joint Staff itself, which continued under JCS discussion until early August. The matter could not be settled in detail, in any event, until it was known what limitations the Congress would enact regarding the size and operating procedures of the Joint Staff, but the concept the reorganization would follow also required careful consideration. It was possible to view the President's brief reference to adding "an integrated operations divisions" as setting a limit on the scope of the Joint Staff reorganization. In light of Secretary McElroy's instructions to consider the

spirit and intent as well as the detailed provisions of the President's message, and with growing awareness of the dimensions of the new responsibilities to be assumed by the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs became convinced that a broader approach was necessary.

The reorganization plan that the JCS approved provided for a Joint Staff arranged in the numbered J-directorates of a conventional military staff. In this form it would be organized to work effectively with the similar staff structures of the unified and specified commands. Transition to the new arrangement would be accomplished by realigning and redesignating the existing Joint Staff groups, accompanied by a phased absorption of additional personnel. From this process would emerge a Joint Staff composed of the following elements:

- J-1 Personnel Directorate
- J-2 Intelligence Directorate
- J-3 Operations Directorate
- J-4 Logistics Directorate
- J-5 Plans and Policy Directorate
- J-6 Communications-Electronics Directorate
- Joint Military Assistance Affairs Directorate
- Joint Advanced Study Group
- Joint Programs Office

With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, implementation of the first stage of the JCS plan began on 15 August 1958. The existing Joint Strategic Plans Group was divided to form the nucleus of the new J-3 and J-5 Directorates. Similarly, the Joint Logistics Plans Group supplied the initial personnel for the J-1 and J-4 Directorates. The Joint Intelligence Group became J-2, and the Joint Communications-Electronics Group became J-6.

During this same period of organizational realignment, the JCS progressively assumed operational responsibility for the unified and specified commands, which passed from the control of the military departments that had theretofore served as executive agencies. Both this transfer of responsibility and the reordering and expansion of the Joint Staff were completed by 1 January 1959.

On 18 August 1958, General Twining had requested the Secretary of Defense to authorize a Joint Staff of 356 officers and 79 other personnel and an overall strength of 902 for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). Secretary McElroy did so on 23 August.

The 1958 reorganization required revision of the two DOD directives, 5100.1 and 5158.1, which prescribed the functions of the Joint Chiefs and their relationship with OSD. After extensive consultations, the JCS and OSD differences in draft revisions of the directives were reconciled in meetings of the



Armed Forces Policy Council. On 31 December 1958, Secretary McElroy issued the final version of both directives.

The formal statement of the functions of the JCS contained in DOD Directive 5100.1 reiterated their legislative designation as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs were designated the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense, serving in the chain of operational command extending from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The Chiefs were to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the establishment and force structure of unified and specified commands and the assignment to the military departments of responsibility for providing support to such commands; also, they were to review the plans and programs of commanders of unified and specified commands. The basic planning function of the JCS was directly related to the operational command responsibility by the following provision of the DOD directive:

To prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands and the discharge of any other function of command for such commands directed by the Secretary of Defense.

The remaining functions assigned to the JCS were to:

- (1) prepare integrated logistic plans and plans for military mobilization;
- (2) review major personnel, materiel, and logistic requirements of the armed forces in relation to strategic and logistic plans;
- (3) recommend the assignment of primary responsibility for any function of the armed forces requiring such determination and transfer, reassignment, abolition, or consolidation of such functions;
- (4) provide joint intelligence for use within the Department of Defense;
- (5) establish doctrines for unified operations and training and for coordination of the military education of members of the armed forces;
- (6) provide the Secretary of Defense with statements of military requirements and strategic guidance for use in the development of budgets, foreign military aid programs, industrial mobilization plans, and programs of scientific research and development;

(7) participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations;


(8) provide the United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations and, when authorized, on other military staffs, boards, councils, and missions.

The changes in the structure of the Organization of the JCS that resulted from the 1958 reorganization are reflected in Charts 7-8.

# CHART 7

## JCS ORGANIZATION

### 30 JUNE 1958




NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

# CHART 8

## JCS ORGANIZATION

### 30 JUNE 1959



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

## **6. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1960s AND 1970s**

For over two decades following the 1958 defense reorganization, JCS responsibilities and organization remained basically unchanged. The new J-staff structure proved sufficiently flexible to meet the expansion of the Vietnam War years and the subsequent contraction in the period of reduced defense budgets of the middle and late 1970s. There were nevertheless continuing adjustments in the internal JCS organization during the 1960s and 1970s in response to changing needs and situations.

### **Changes through 1967**

By 1962, JCS Chairman General Lyman L. Lemnitzer reported to the Secretary of Defense that the Joint Staff had experienced an immense increase in responsibility and work. Accordingly, Lemnitzer recommended the rank structure of the staff directors change to match the level of responsibility assigned. He proposed designating the directors of J-3 and J-5 as “positions of great importance and responsibility” (language specific in Title 10 of US Code that refers to a three-star [lieutenant general/vice admiral]). Lemnitzer’s argument was that doing so not only reflected the scope of their expanded duties, but also placed them on a par with their service counterparts and thus facilitated their working relationships. The Secretary concurred and forwarded the recommendation to the President who approved it. Two years later, in 1964, this designation expanded to include the director for logistics, J-4.

The period of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations brought a proliferation of new agencies and groups, both within and outside the Joint Staff. The Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Affairs (later redesignated Special Assistant for Arms Control), the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, and the Joint War Games Agency were all established in 1960 outside the Joint Staff. In February 1962 the Joint Chiefs established a Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities as part of the Joint Staff, and in October of that same year, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) began operating outside the Joint Staff but under the supervision of the Director for Operations (J-3). In the meantime, the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Council Affairs had been abolished in May 1961 and the Joint Advanced Study Group in October 1962, their functions absorbed into the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). On the latter date, the Joint Programs Office also transferred into J-5.

During this same period, the Secretary of Defense had established several organizations charged with responsibility for certain functions for the entire Department of Defense. These included the Defense Nuclear Agency (originally the Defense Atomic Support Agency) in 1959 and the Defense

Communications Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, both in 1961. The chief or director of each of these was responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. Subsequently, on 1 July 1963, the Joint Chiefs abolished the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) of the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency became responsible for providing intelligence staff support required by the JCS.

On 31 July 1964, the Joint Chiefs disestablished the Joint Strategic Survey Council, the last organizational remnant of the World War II structure. Its functions had, in practice, already been assumed by other JCS agencies. Later that year, during October 1964, a new Directorate of Administrative Services was established, incorporating certain divisions that had formerly been part of the Joint Secretariat. The Directorate of Administrative Services operated outside the Joint Staff but was responsible to the Director thereof.

Expansion to meet increasing JCS needs after the start of the Vietnam War took place outside the Joint Staff, which, by the 1958 legislation, was limited to 400 officers. New agencies were added to the OJCS, a usage that had evolved to encompass the entire organization supporting the JCS—the Joint Staff, the enlisted military and civilian personnel working for the Joint Staff, and the offices and agencies outside the Joint Staff. In December 1964 the Chairman's Special Studies Group (originally a part of the J-5 Directorate) was removed from the Joint Staff; in October 1965 the Office of the Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs was similarly removed; and in June 1967 the Office of the Special Assistant for Environmental Services was established in a similar status.

In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara directed a study on the “Adequacy of Mobility Planning.” In response to its conclusions and McNamara’s subsequent direction, the Joint Chiefs added a position dedicated to addressing concerns and issues related to strategic mobility, first as a deputy director for transportation under J-4, then later as a position external to J-4. The charter for this position, issued in 1966, designated a “Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Mobility” (SASM) and charged the SASM with the “analysis, evaluation, and monitoring of all aspects of strategic movement planning and operations” as well as identifying and solving “strategic movement problems.” The charter also directed that this assistant be a general or flag officer, a requirement met by 1967 with a two-star general.

Title 10 of the US Code was amended in 1967 to extend the term of the JCS members, other than the Chairman, to four years. Only in time of war or national emergency could JCS members be reappointed for a second term of not more than four years. The Chairman's two-year term, with right of reappointment for one term, remained unchanged.

## **Organizational Consolidation, 1968–1976**

By the late 1960s, there was a move to streamline the JCS organization, consolidating groups and agencies under existing staff directorates. This trend continued during the 1970s in response to continuing budget and congressional pressures for reduced defense expenditures. As part of a 1968 staff reorganization directed by JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler and effective 1 June 1968, the Director, J-3, assumed responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the work of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, the Special Assistant for Environmental Services, and the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group. At the same time, responsibility for the Special Assistant for Arms Control, the Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs, and the Joint War Games Agency was assigned to the Director, J-5. The Joint Chiefs also modified J-4's charter to formally install a second deputy position. While the charter did not specify the reasons for the addition or its duties, it reflected a military trying to manage the enormous scope of logistical demands, from supporting a "hot" conventional war in Vietnam to maintaining a large, worldwide force structure aimed at containing the Soviet Union. A year later, to consolidate logistics functions, the Joint Chiefs issued a new charter that moved the SASM responsibilities into J-4, assigning them to a "Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility" who was to coordinate mobility requirements between unified commands.

On 11 July 1968, as a result of President Lyndon B. Johnson's intention to begin negotiations for strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, the position of Special Assistant to the CJCS for Strategic Arms Negotiations was created. This Assistant was supported by officers on temporary duty until May 1970, when the Secretary of Defense approved personnel authorizations for a support staff within the OJCS. The Chairman, Army General Earle Wheeler, established this staff to provide a focal point for military preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and to supply the nucleus for the military representation at the negotiations.

In July 1969, President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird appointed a group of experts from outside government to review the organization and management of the Defense Department. This Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, headed by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, submitted its findings on 1 July 1970. It reported staffs within the Department that were too large and too layered. With specific regard to the JCS, the panel found their workload "excessive." Each member, other than the Chairman, had to perform three roles: supervise his military service; participate in the advisory and planning functions assigned to the JCS by statute; and participate, by delegation, as a member of the Secretary of Defense's staff for military operations in the chain of command to the unified and specified commands. Also noted was the additional responsibility given to the JCS since 1958 to supervise various Defense agencies, including the Defense Atomic Support,

Defense Communications, and Defense Intelligence Agencies. The panel believed the Joint Chiefs would be more effective in performing their important statutory duty as principal military advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense if relieved of the necessity of performing delegated duties in the field of military operations as well as supervision of the Defense agencies.

To that end, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended rescinding the responsibilities delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the JCS relating to military operations and the unified commands and eliminating all personnel in the OJCS who supported these functions. A deputy secretary of defense for operations would assume these functions. He would have under him a senior military officer to supervise a separate staff to support military operations and to serve as the channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the unified commands. All intelligence and communications functions of the Department of Defense would report to the Secretary of Defense through the deputy for operations as well. Further, the panel recommended that the OJCS be limited to the JCS and a reconstituted Joint Staff of not more than 250 officers augmented by professional civilian analysts as required.

The recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel for the JCS were not implemented, but General Wheeler directed several organizational changes, effective in April 1970. These continued the consolidation of organizational entities and reduced substantially the number of separate OJCS agencies as well as the number of assigned personnel. The Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities was transferred to J-3; the Special Assistant for Environmental Services was reconstituted as one of the deputy directors of J-3; the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group was abolished with its functions absorbed by J-3; the Office of the Special Assistant for Military Assistance Affairs was disestablished and its functions transferred to J-5, except for those aspects of follow-on support of approved programs for which J-4 had responsibility; the Joint War Games Agency and the Chairman's Special Studies Group were combined to form the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, which remained outside the Joint Staff, with the Director, J-5, charged with monitoring and coordinating its activities. In J-4, the duties of the strategic mobility position were consolidated into one of the two J-4 deputy billets, with one position becoming specifically the "Deputy Director for Logistics (Strategic Mobility)" and the other a more general "Deputy Director for Logistics."

In August 1971 the Special Assistant for Arms Control was reconstituted as a deputy director in J-5, heading a new International Negotiations Division. A year and a half later, in March 1973, the Special Assistant to the CJCS for Strategic Arms Negotiations and his support staff were inactivated. Thereafter the Joint Chiefs participated in international negotiations through separate representatives designated for each matter under discussion (SALT, Mutual



and Balanced Force Reductions, Law of the Sea). The JCS representatives were supervised by the DJS with staff support provided by J-5.

In the meantime, in January 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird had established the Defense Mapping Agency. As was the case for the Defense Nuclear, Defense Communications, and Defense Intelligence Agencies, this new agency reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS.

To accommodate a 15 percent manpower reduction imposed by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs tightened their organizational structure in 1974. No existing agencies were disestablished, with a few minor exceptions, such as the Deputy Director for Operations (Counterinsurgency and Special Activities) in J-3; his functions were transferred to the Special Operations Division at a lower echelon within J-3.

Personnel reductions in the Department of Defense continued, and at the beginning of 1976, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld ordered another 15 percent reduction in military and civilian personnel. The JCS could accomplish this action only through reorganization. Accordingly, as outlined in DJSM-109-76, two directorates of the Joint Staff, Personnel (J-1) and Communications-Electronics (J-6), were abolished. Functions and residual personnel of J-6 were transferred to J-3, those of J-1 to J-5 (except for prisoner of war matters, inspections, and data services, which went to J-3). Regional functions of J-3 and J-5 were consolidated within J-5. A Current Operations (now Joint Operations) Division was established in J-3. Internal reorganization also occurred within J-5; the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency; the Joint Secretariat; and the Directorate of Administrative Services. The position of Deputy Director, Joint Staff, was abolished. In addition, the position of Secretary of the Joint Staff was downgraded to an O-6 from a one-star general/flag officer.

### **Changes in the Carter Period**

Shortly after he entered office, President Jimmy Carter initiated reviews of several aspects of DOD organization, including resource allocation, the management structure, and the national military command structure. In regard to the last-named area, the President was particularly interested in the role and responsibilities of the JCS.

A group headed by Richard C. Steadman, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, conducted the study of the national military command structure and presented its report in July 1978. The group recommended no change in the JCS role in the national command structure or in JCS organization. It did, however, criticize the JCS staffing procedures and paper system. It was, the group said, "difficult for the Joint Staff to produce persuasively argued joint papers which transcend service positions and difficult

for the JCS to arrive at joint decisions in many important areas.” To remedy the situation, the Steadman group recommended revised procedures: to make the Joint Staff alone responsible for authorship of JCS papers; to present "comprehensive analysis of alternatives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of differing views"; and to supply the Joint Staff high-level guidance at the onset of the review of a given issue. In addition, the group urged that the military services should make their most outstanding and highly qualified officers available for assignment to the Joint Staff.

The Steadman group also saw a certain inability by the JCS to address effectively resource allocation and force structure issues because of conflict in their dual roles as both JCS members and heads of military services. Since the CJCS was the only military officer with no present or future service responsibility, the group believed that he was in a unique position to provide national military advice. Accordingly, it recommended that the Chairman be charged with supplying the Secretary of Defense advice on program, budget, and force structure issues, allowing him augmented staff support in the studies, analysis, and gaming area, as appropriate. Further, in order to enhance command management, the group recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate the Chairman as his agent to supervise the commanders of unified and specified commands.

The Steadman group anticipated that improvement in Joint Staff procedures and the added responsibility for the Chairman would improve the quality of military advice available to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If, however, implementation of these changes did not bring the required improvement, then the group suggested consideration of separating "the joint advice and command functions from those of Service administration." This could be accomplished by creating a body of national military advisers. Such a body would include a senior officer from each service, one of whom would be chairman and would serve the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the President, and the Congress much like the present JCS. The national military advisers would be responsible for joint planning, operations, and advice but would have no service assignments. Consequently, they could provide independent and objective military advice, uninhibited by conflicting service responsibilities.

No change in the JCS organization resulted from the Steadman recommendations, nor was any action taken to create a body of national military advisers. The Joint Chiefs did, on their own initiative, carry out various internal reforms to improve Joint Staff procedures and enhance both their own and the Chairman's role in resource and allocation planning and decisions.

Meanwhile, over a two-year period from 1976 to 1978, the Secretary of Defense had removed the JCS from the chain of command for the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense

Mapping Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency. Previously these agencies had reported to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS, but now the Secretary placed them under the direction, authority, and control of various assistant or under secretaries of defense. In each case, however, the agency was required to support the needs of the Joint Chiefs as appropriate. In addition, the Chairman (acting for the JCS) supervised the military aspects of the activities of the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency continued to provide the JCS intelligence support serving, in effect, as the J-2 of the Joint Staff. In August 1979, the JCS approved a clarification and enumeration of the responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency in its role as the J-2 of the Joint Staff. Theretofore, that role had not been defined in any detail.

In October 1978, the Congress enacted and the President signed legislation formally making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a member of the JCS. Since 1952, the Commandant had co-equal status with the members of the JCS when any matter directly concerning the Marine Corps was under consideration. In the subsequent years, the Commandant had attended virtually all JCS meetings, in effect participating as a member, and this legislation merely recognized what had long been the actual practice.


During 1978, the Defense Science Board reported that US command and control systems had not kept pace with changes in warfare or developments in weapons and in command and control technology. The board saw a need for a central organization to oversee the design and testing of systems, to allow commands initiative in evolving systems, and to insure interoperability among allied systems. Various solutions were considered including the creation of a Defense command and control systems agency or expansion of the Defense Communications Agency. The Joint Chiefs, however, favored the formation of an appropriate element within the Joint Staff, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown accepted their approach. Accordingly, on 30 May 1979, the JCS established the Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (C3S Directorate) as part of the Joint Staff. They charged the new directorate with developing policies, plans, and programs to ensure adequate command, control, and communications support for the commanders of unified and specified commands and the National Command Authorities for joint and combined military operations. The new directorate was also responsible for "conceptualizing" future command, control, and communications systems design and providing direction to improve command and control. At the same time, the Operations Directorate (J-3) was realigned to transfer responsibility for command, control, and communications systems to the C3S Directorate. Given the magnitude of the directorate's new responsibilities, the Joint Chiefs established the grade of the director position as a three star, putting the J-6 on a par with the J-3, J-4, and J-5.

The changes in the structure of the Organization of the JCS that took place between 1969 and 1979 are reflected in Charts 9–12.

# CHART 9

## JCS ORGANIZATION


### 1 SEPTEMBER 1969



# CHART 10

# JCS ORGANIZATION

## 31 DECEMBER 1970




NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

# CHART 11

# JCS ORGANIZATION

## 31 DECEMBER 1976




NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

# CHART 12

# JCS ORGANIZATION

## 31 DECEMBER 1979



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.



## **7. THE REORGANIZATION OF 1986**

By the late 1970s, there were increasing demands for reform of the JCS. The studies of defense reorganization in the last years of the decade had found the JCS military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense inadequate and the JCS organization and procedures in need of change. The abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980 fueled these criticisms. Then, in the spring of 1982, two sitting JCS members—the Chairman, General David C. Jones, USAF, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer—called for reform of the JCS. Critics in the Congress and the academic community quickly joined the call, and this debate launched an examination of JCS and defense organization that culminated over four years later in the defense reorganization of 1986.

### **The Jones and Meyer Proposals**

General Jones identified a number of persistent shortcomings in the JCS organization in an article published in February 1982. Based on almost eight years of experience as a JCS member (four as Air Force Chief of Staff and more than three as Chairman), he found inadequate cross-service and joint experience in the US military "from the top down" and a built-in conflict in the situation where the service chiefs also served as JCS members. He proposed changes in three areas. First, he recommended strengthening the role of the Chairman. He would make the Chairman, rather than the corporate JCS, the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council and would authorize a deputy to assist the Chairman. Further, he would make the Joint Staff responsible to the Chairman in lieu of the corporate JCS and would have the Chairman, in consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified commands, serve as the interservice spokesman on issues involving distribution of resources. The latter proposal would, in turn, require strengthening the role of those commanders with respect to their component commands. Second, General Jones proposed limiting service staff involvement in the joint process. He would accomplish this objective by requiring the Joint Staff to support the JCS members on joint matters and limiting the role of the service staffs in the joint process. Finally, General Jones hoped to broaden the education, experience, and rewards for joint duty.

General Meyer did not believe the Jones proposals went far enough. Several problems would remain, he said, including the divided loyalty built into the dual-hatting of the service chiefs as both service leaders and JCS members, the inadequate provision for a structure and procedures that could make a rapid transition to war, and insufficient involvement of the commanders of the unified and specified commands in the decision-making process. Accordingly,

General Meyer made additional proposals for reform of the joint system. He recommended in March 1982 the creation of a council of national military advisers, a body of full-time military officers with no service responsibilities to advise the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Chairman's position would continue and be greatly enhanced in the new council. He would direct planning and operations, be able to speak his own mind as well as disagree with the opinion of the council, and be supported by a strengthened joint staff to include an effective programming and budgeting capability. The service chiefs would be restricted solely to leading their individual services. General Meyer believed that such a division of responsibility between a council and separate service chiefs would bring major improvement in the timeliness and value of military advice in peacetime and would allow enhanced decision-making by both bodies in time of crisis.

The other members of the JCS did not believe such radical changes were necessary and, with the retirement of Generals Jones and Meyer in June 1982, the arena for discussion of reform moved to the Congress and the academic community. The Joint Chiefs, meanwhile, proceeded with various changes to enhance the functioning of their internal organization.

### **Changes, 1981–1984**

To enhance cooperation with the United States Coast Guard, the DJS approved the permanent assignment of a Coast Guard liaison officer to the Joint Staff. Such a move recognized increased contact and collaboration between the Coast Guard and the Joint Staff, particularly in contingency planning and exercises. The Director and the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard signed a memorandum of agreement on 10 April 1981, filed as DJSM 672-81, that authorized the assignment of a Coast Guard O-5 who possessed “broad background in Coast Guard missions, programs, and capabilities.” The officer remained administratively assigned to Coast Guard headquarters but worked in the Joint Operations Division of J-3 to represent the Coast Guard on matters involving that service, provide Coast Guard inputs to a variety of plans and orders, and serve on crisis action teams as required.

In April 1982, at the recommendation of General Jones, the JCS had approved a realignment of the Joint Staff. The realignment included transferring the operations plan review function from J-5 to J-3 with the creation of an Operations Plans Division in J-3, reestablishing a Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) in the Joint Staff, and establishing of a Program Budget Analysis Division within J-5. These changes were designed to improve the management of joint manpower and personnel matters, increase the effectiveness and responsiveness of the joint operational planning and execution system, and improve the staff support for the Chairman throughout all phases of the planning, programming, and budgeting system.

During 1983 and 1984 the Joint Chiefs made further refinements and adjustments to their organization in response to changing needs and circumstances. In January 1983, the DJS redesignated the Directorate of Administrative Services as the Directorate of Support Services only to change the name again two and a half years later (August 1985) to the Directorate for Information and Resource Management (DIRM). In October 1983 the Chiefs directed establishment of the Joint Special Operations Agency to advise them on all aspects of special operations and related military activities including strategy, planning, programming, budgeting, resource allocation, joint doctrine, readiness evaluation, and employment of forces. The new agency became operational on 1 January 1984 with the Special Operations Division, J-3, providing the nucleus for the staff. It was subordinate to the JCS with staff monitorship and coordination through the DJS.

Earlier, in November 1983, the FY 1984 DOD Appropriations Bill Conference Report had expressed concern over the ability of the CJCS to fulfill statutory responsibilities for review of materiel and personnel requirements of the US armed forces in accordance with logistics and strategic plans. To provide additional support in this area, the conference report agreed that the Secretary of Defense should provide the JCS an additional 20 military and 20 civilian billets. Accordingly, on 5 January 1984, the Chairman, General John W. Vessey Jr., USA, directed the formation of a separate staff element, the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency, to assist the JCS by providing independent analyses and recommendations on resource allocation matters and national military strategy. The Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency became a part of the OJCS, outside the Joint Staff, administered and supervised by the DJS.

During this same period, the Joint Chiefs were considering command arrangements for space and decided that a unified command for space should be established in the future. In the interim, they created, effective 1 February 1984, the Joint Planning Staff for Space to facilitate joint planning for space systems supporting the unified and specified commands and to develop a transition plan for a new unified space command. The Joint Planning Staff for Space was located in the OJCS and reported to the Joint Chiefs through the DJS. (With the establishment of the unified US Space Command (USSPACECOM) in September 1985, the JCS phased out the Joint Planning Staff for Space and disestablished it on 31 January 1986.)

In response to significant new demands for analytic support, the DJS approved on 3 March 1984 the reorganization of the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency as the Joint Analysis Directorate. The redesignated directorate remained outside the Joint Staff. It was responsible for conducting studies, analyses, net assessments, and evaluations of military forces, plans, programs, and strategies and for conducting joint war games. It performed these duties

under the authority and direction of the CJCS, but subject to the supervision of the DJS.

On 20 March 1984, the JCS established the Joint Requirements and Management Board to monitor the development and acquisition of joint programs. The board would evaluate potential joint military requirements; identify, evaluate, and select candidates for joint development and acquisition; oversee cross-service requirements and management issues; and resolve service differences arising after initiation of joint programs. The membership of the board comprised the vice chiefs of the services and the DJS. The chairmanship would rotate among the four vice chiefs with the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, designated as the first chairman for a term of one year. (Subsequently, in June 1986, the Joint Requirements and Management Board was renamed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.)

Later in 1984, proponents of JCS reform in the Congress succeeded in passing legislation making minor changes in the OJCS. The changes, which the President signed into law on 19 October 1984 were as follows:

1. Made the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the spokesman for the commanders of the unified and specified commands on "operational requirements";
2. Allowed the Chairman to determine when issues under JCS consideration would be decided;
3. Authorized the Chairman (vice the corporate Joint Chiefs) to select and remove officers assigned to the Joint Staff;
4. Removed the three-year restriction on the tour of the Director, Joint Staff, and eliminated the prohibition against former Directors being reassigned to the Joint Staff;
5. Raised the limit of Joint Staff officer tours from three to four years;
6. Required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman, to insure that military promotion, retention, and assignment policies gave appropriate consideration to Joint Staff assignment performance.

Even though the legislation of 1984 went beyond what the JCS thought was needed, the changes did not satisfy the advocates of reform either in the Congress or the academic community. In December 1984, for example, the Heritage Foundation published *Mandate for Leadership II: Continuing the Conservative Revolution* that included a chapter criticizing the JCS system and calling for defense reform. Two months later, the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University issued a report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, prepared by a panel of defense experts. The report was highly critical of defense organization in general and the JCS in particular and

contained specific recommendations to remedy the identified deficiencies of the JCS system. Then, after several years of hearings and preparation, the Senate Committee on Armed Services published a lengthy staff report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, in October 1985. The Senate report pointed out sixteen problem areas and made 91 recommendations for change. Among the more significant were a call to abolish the JCS to allow the service chiefs to devote all their time to service duties, a proposal to create in the place of the JCS a joint military advisory council free from service responsibilities, and a recommendation that the chairman of such a council be the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and that the chairman develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty.

In the hope of diffusing the growing criticism, President Ronald Reagan had ordered a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management to review defense organization in June 1985. The commission, headed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, heard testimony from a wide range of defense experts from both within and outside government, including the JCS. In an initial report of 28 February 1986, the commission concluded that both the defense decision-making process and the organization of the US military leadership could be improved, that US combatant forces could be better organized and commanded to attain national objectives, and that the entire acquisition system—including research, development, and procurement—could be streamlined. With specific regard to the JCS, the Packard Commission recommended the following: designation of the CJCS as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, representing his own views as well as those of the corporate Chiefs; placement of the Joint Staff and the OJCS under the exclusive direction of the Chairman and removal of the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff; and retention of the service chiefs as members of the JCS and creation of a four-star deputy chairman as the sixth member of the JCS to assist the Chairman. Thereafter, on 1 April 1986, President Reagan implemented those recommendations of the Packard Commission that did not require legislative action. Those affecting the JCS, however, awaited congressional attention.

### **The Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986**

By the late summer of 1986, Congress too was ready to act. Led by Senator Barry M. Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, the Congress passed in September an act named for the two leaders. President Reagan signed the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act on 1 October 1986. Now, four and a half years after General Jones had proposed reform of the JCS, the issue was finally resolved. The result was the first major reorganization of the JCS in almost 30 years and the most significant one since the National Security Act of 1947. The 1986 act greatly enhanced the authority of the Chairman at the expense of the corporate JCS, established the position

of Vice Chairman, bestowed wide new powers upon the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and provided for actions and procedures to increase the prestige and rewards for joint duty in an effort to improve the functioning of the joint system and the quality of joint military advice.

The new law designated the Chairman, in place of the JCS, the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, but included provision for the other JCS members to continue as military advisers, submitting their advice when they disagreed with the Chairman or when requested by the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. The act assigned all the functions previously the responsibility of the corporate Chiefs to the Chairman and also gave him additional ones. The Chairman's responsibilities under the 1986 law included assisting the President and the Secretary in the strategic direction of the armed forces; preparing strategic and logistics plans and net assessments; providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans; advising the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; developing doctrine for joint employment of the armed forces; formulating and coordinating policies for the training and education of the armed forces; providing US representation on the United Nations Military Staff Committee; and performing such other duties prescribed by law or by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Further, the act provided for a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) to assist the Chairman and to act for the CJCS in his absence or disability. The VCJCS would outrank all officers of the armed forces except the CJCS but would not exercise military command over the JCS or any of the armed forces. He could participate in all JCS meetings but would vote only when acting for the Chairman.

The 1986 act removed the 400-officer limitation on the Joint Staff and stipulated that, effective 1 October 1988, the total number of military (officer and enlisted) and civilian personnel assigned to the Joint Staff would not exceed 1,627. (This figure represented the actual size of the OJCS when the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed, and this provision, in effect, enlarged the Joint Staff to include the entire OJCS, a usage the DJS discontinued in September 1988.) The 1986 act placed the Joint Staff and its Director under the CJCS and gave the Chairman the authority to select or suspend any member of the Joint Staff. Finally, separate titles of the act spelled out the added authorities for the commanders of the unified and specified commands and a new joint officer personnel policy.

The 1986 act necessitated a restructuring of the JCS internal organization. Subsequently, on 6 November 1986 in CM-424-86, the Chairman, Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., USN, approved the following actions:


1. Redesignation of the Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate as the J-6, Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate;
2. Establishment of the J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, to consolidate responsibility for the functions of joint doctrine, tactics and techniques, exercises, and operational planning;
3. Establishment of the J-8, Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate, to combine responsibility for resource and force analysis;
4. Authorization of other adjustments in the internal organization, within the congressionally mandated size limitation, as necessary to facilitate responsiveness, efficiency, and ability to execute revised missions.

The restructuring proceeded and was accomplished within existing manpower resources. The J-7 Directorate was created by transferring the Operation Plans, Joint Exercise, Readiness Programs, and Joint Operational Planning and Execution System Divisions from J-3 together with some spaces from J-5 and the C3S Directorate and the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency. The Joint Analysis Directorate, the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency, and the Force Planning and Programming Division and part of the Policy Division of J-5 combined to form the J-8 Directorate. The C3S Directorate transferred five officers to J-1 for accomplishment of additional responsibilities required by the joint officer personnel policy portion of the 1986 reorganization act. The J-8 Directorate became operational on 15 December 1986 under the direction of a two-star general/flag officer; the C3S Directorate was redesignated as J-6 on 1 January 1987; and the J-7 Directorate became operational on 17 February 1987, headed by a two-star general/flag officer. In the meantime, General Robert T. Herres, USAF, had assumed the duties of Vice Chairman on 6 February 1987. Subsequently, with the establishment of the unified US Special Operations Command as directed by the Congress, the Joint Special Operations Agency was disestablished on 1 August 1987. Its functions were assumed by the new unified command or realigned within the Joint Staff, primarily in a Special Operations Division, J-3. With these actions, the internal restructuring of the JCS organization to comply with the Goldwater–Nichols Reorganization Act was essentially complete. The changes in organizational structure of the JCS that occurred between 1982 and 1987 are shown in Charts 13–15.

# CHART 13

# JCS ORGANIZATION

## 30 JUNE 1982




NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.



# CHART 14

# JCS ORGANIZATION


30 JUNE 1984



# CHART 15

# JCS ORGANIZATION

30 JUNE 1987



NOTE: ONLY MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES SHOWN. BY 1958, THE DESIGNATION "ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF" HAD COME INTO USE TO INCLUDE THE JOINT STAFF AS WELL AS THE OTHER OFFICES, AGENCIES, AND GROUPS SUPPORTING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

## **8. JOINT STAFF REORGANIZATION, 1989–2001**

Following passage of the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, successive Chairmen of the JCS worked to reshape and refocus the Joint Staff. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the prospect of a “peace dividend” led the President and Secretary of Defense to cut defense spending by reducing the manpower of the Joint Staff and the headquarters and field forces of the geographic and functional commands, even though the responsibilities of those organizations did not necessarily decrease. In place of the large staffs and force structures of the Cold War era, the service secretaries and the Chairmen relied on advanced technology and smaller, more integrated joint structures to compensate for the apparent mismatch between people and missions.

The Joint Staff attained its maximum strength in September 1990 with 1,607 authorized military and civilian personnel. Four years later, authorizations had dropped to 1,364, which was consistent with the overall force structure and military budget reductions of the 1990s. This gradual decline continued to around 1,250 authorizations by 2007.

### **After Goldwater-Nichols**

Initial implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms proceeded at an evolutionary not revolutionary pace. Admiral William Crowe made changes slowly to gain the service chiefs’ confidence in the new system. His adjustments were relatively minor and involved reshuffling existing offices and personnel. The Joint Staff continued to operate as it had in the past: as a long-range planning and strategic body. Admiral Crowe deferred to the Chiefs for their recommendation on issues that clearly lay in his or the combatant commander’s new authorities.

General Colin L. Powell, USA, was the first Chairman to assert the new authorities. He guided the development of doctrine for Joint Warfare and devoted considerable energy to promoting joint culture. This led to an expansion of the Joint Staff J-7 and J-8 despite the overall reduction on the Joint Staff. In January 1991, the J-2 was reconstituted as a full directorate of the Joint Staff. Additionally, in the aftermath of lessons learned during Operation DESERT STORM, General Powell directed a reorganization and expansion of responsibilities for the Joint Staff J-3. Powell also ordered the transfer of the Joint Warfare Center to become an “activity under [his] supervision” to continue providing simulation support for combatant commanders’ training and exercises. Powell’s wording also served as the first use of the term “Chairman’s controlled activity (CCA).”

The emerging role of the VCJCS was the most striking organizational development. As authorized by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Vice Chairman had no statutory duties other than to preside in place of the Chairman. The Vice Chairman did, however, serve as the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and vice chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)—setting requirements for major weapons, logistics, and information systems—that reinvigorated the JROC and put the requirements process back in the hands of the military and the Joint Staff.

In the late summer of 1990 the Vice Chairman, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN, directed the Joint Staff to rewrite the JROC charter to reflect the JROC chairman's increased authority in identifying major systems' requirements, assigning priorities to them, and sending them to the DAB for approval. After DAB review and authorization of the proposed concept, the JROC would validate performance goals and baselines before the final DAB review.

In June 1991, the DOD General Counsel forwarded to the Senate a proposed amendment to Title 10 of the *US Code* to designate the Vice Chairman a full member of the JCS, in part due to the responsibilities he had as chairman of the JROC and vice chairman of the DAB. Previously, the VCJCS could serve as a full member of the Joint Chiefs only when he was acting Chairman due to the absence or disability of the Chairman. Agreeing with DOD's rationale, on 26 March 1992 the Senate approved the amendment and declared the VCJCS a full member of the JCS.

### **Peacekeeping & Humanitarian Assistance**

Between 1992 and 2009, the Joint Staff organization shown on chart 16 remained virtually unchanged, though the staff conducted minor internal reorganizations and shuffled authorized personnel within directorates to deal with new or expanded functions like information technology or crisis management. President William J. "Bill" Clinton entered office in January 1993 and endorsed peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions to promote international stability when confronting post-Cold War problems. Internal adjustments in the J-4, J-5, J-6, J-8, and the DIRM reflected these new missions. On 1 July 1994, for example, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, and ex officio director of DIRM, realigned its divisions, placed its Operations Division within the Joint Secretariat, and renamed DIRM the Directorate of Management (DOM).

US military participation in peacekeeping and stability operations in Somalia (1992–1994) and Haiti (1994–1995) as well as the enforcement of no-fly zones over the former Yugoslavia (1992–1995) and Iraq (1992–2001) illustrated the complexities of regional operations. To address regional issues,

the J-3 created two deputy directorates, each headed by a one-star general officer: J-33 (Current Operations) and J-38 (Current Readiness and Capabilities). Emphasizing the regional focus, J-33 was organized into four branches: Western Hemisphere, European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. J-38 was organized along functional lines to accommodate special operations, counter-narcotics, and information special technical operations. Furthermore, the Joint Staff established a CCA named the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). It chartered JWAC to provide engineering, scientific, and intelligence data and to integrate that data with the deliberate and crisis action plans of the combatant commands to deal with their regional issues and conflicts.

In 1995, the J-5 established a Russian-Ukraine-Eurasia Division within the Deputy Directorate for International Negotiations and split the overburdened Deputy Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs into two separate deputy directorates for politico-military affairs, each headed by a general or flag officer: one for Europe and the Western Hemisphere and the other for Asia-Pacific (APAC)/Middle East and Africa (MEAF)/Global Issues (UN). The J-6 Director consolidated internal functions to improve the Global Command and Communications System and placed the new Information Warfare Division in the Deputy Directorate for Defense-Wide C4 Support. Additionally, to codify how the J-2 and Defense Intelligence Agency provided operational intelligence support to the CJCS and Joint Staff, the two entities signed a memorandum of agreement, formally designating the J-2 as the “national level focus” for intelligence support to military operations as well as joint intelligence doctrine and architecture.

During the 1990s the joint commands established information warfare cells to influence the decision-making of regional opponents. To integrate their efforts in command and control, including operations security, psychological operations, military deception, and information warfare, through both planning and execution, the Joint Staff established a CCA named the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center in September 1994. Later on, to provide staff support and oversight, J-38 expanded its functions to include information warfare on 5 September 1996. Owing to rapid technological advances, however, in early 1997, J-38 upgraded the division to Assistant Deputy Directorate for Information Operations, J-39.

In response to the June 1996 Hezbollah terrorist attack on a USAF billeting facility in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, the Secretary of Defense directed the Chairman on 15 September 1996 to “organize a portion of the Joint Staff for anti-terrorism and force protection.” That October, the Director, Joint Staff established within J-3 a Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, J-34, to lead counter-terrorism and force protection planning efforts worldwide and synchronize plans with State Department, the FBI, and the CIA. The J-34

became a mini-joint staff with branches for current operations; plans and policy; programs and requirements; and training, doctrine, and assessment.

In October 1996, the Joint Staff chartered a CCA named the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Battle Center (JBC). The intent was to provide an ability to experiment and test joint interoperability capabilities. This requirement stemmed from the fiscal year 1995 combatant commanders conference, where commanders identified a deficiency in interoperability and desired a way to rapidly develop and test concepts.

Six months later, the Joint Staff created another CCA by carving out a portion of J-8 to become a Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO). Chartered in March 1997, JTAMDO was to define joint theater and missile defense requirements, shepherd those through the acquisition process, and “enable fielding of an effective, netted, theater-wide air and missile defense capability.” Along with this added mission area, J-8 expanded its role in overseeing the development of capabilities as well as assessments of those capabilities. This increase of scope and responsibility for the director of J-8 prompted the Secretary of Defense to recommend that the position be upgraded to three-star general/flag officer billet, something the President approved that same year and was recorded in director of the Joint Staff letter FGO-384/57-96.

In late 1997 the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 1998 enjoined Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to create two new assistants for the Chairman, one for National Guard Matters and the other for Reserve Matters—each to be a two-star general or flag officer who would serve for two years. In May 1998, after asking the state governors to nominate the National Guard candidate and the services to propose the Reserve candidate, the CJCS, General Hugh Shelton, named two majors generals, one from the Army National Guard and one from the Air Force Reserve, to join the Office of the Chairman. Each officer would act as the Chairman’s personal liaison with his respective service and related associations. Within defense forums such as the Joint Review Board, however, either or both could participate when National Guard and/or Reserve issues were being considered.

A pattern of minor internal readjustments continued within the J-4, J-7, and J-8. Among other changes, in January 1999, the J-4 divided its International Logistics and Engineering Division into two separate divisions to manage the differing functions. That December the J-8 moved the War-fighting Analysis Division from his direct control into the Deputy Directorate of War-gaming, Simulation, and Operations, making it the Deputy Directorate for War-gaming, Simulation, and Analysis.

Military transformation also caused readjustments within directorates. The Joint Staff on 4 February 2000 established a steering group to “shape, accelerate, and focus [the Joint Staff] on joint transformation efforts.” In mid-July 2000, the J-7’s designation changed from the Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperability to the Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development. Other J-7 divisions reorganized to support transformation initiatives, culminating in the spring of 2001 with the creation of a Joint Vision Integration Cell. The new entity enabled the Chairman to monitor worldwide *Joint Vision 2010* implementation and all other DOD transformation initiatives.

### **Proposals for Major Headquarters Reductions**

For a decade the Joint Staff had reorganized at the margins, but the OSD leadership sought more thoroughgoing reforms. Among the recommendations of the first *Quadrennial Defense Review*, issued in May 1997, was a charge to the DOD to adopt better business processes in order to reduce forces and facilities while simultaneously dominating the battlefield. The following month the DOD Comptroller, John Hamre, called for downsizing staffs, reducing infrastructure, and decreasing funding for weapons systems. Included in his targets was a reduction of the Joint Staff. Two years earlier an ad hoc Joint Staff Reorganization Committee had noted that since Goldwater-Nichols the Joint Staff had become the central agency for managing a growing number of major and minor regional contingencies; yet the Staff remained small in size and relied on outdated technology. The study recommended improving Joint Staff technology and reallocating Joint Staff personnel and resources where they were most needed.

On 10 November 1997, Secretary Cohen directed Dr. Hamre, now the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to form the Defense Reform Task Force to find ways to modernize and save money within OSD and the Joint Staff by downsizing and restructuring both organizations. Within 18 days, Hamre recommended that many post-Cold War missions that had accrued to the Joint Staff be redistributed to OSD, the CINCs, and various joint agencies. The Deputy Secretary estimated that such restructuring would reduce the Joint Staff’s 1,441 billets (1,401 billets were authorized) by as much as 22 percent, which in his view was more than enough for the efficient performance of its core mission. As part of that restructuring, five CCAs—Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Communications Support Element, Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, Joint Battle Center, and Joint Warfighting Analysis Center—were to transfer to US Atlantic Command to shift approximately 640 positions to a lower echelon of control. Dr. Hamre made no comparable recommendation for downsizing OSD.

The Joint Staff contracted an independent study to evaluate the Deputy Secretary’s proposals. The report, submitted one year later, concluded that the Joint Staff suffered from excessive competing demands and was so preoccupied

with short term issues and management functions that it lacked the time needed for essential long range planning and restructuring. It prescribed three fixes: creation of a cross directorate management board, simplification and integration of the Joint Staff processes, and improved interoperability of the automated information management system.

During the interval, Congress had enacted the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2000 on 5 October 1999 (PL 106-65). One provision of the legislation specified a 15 percent reduction to headquarters staffs by 30 September 2002. At the time, the Joint Staff numbered around 1,300 personnel, already a significant drop from the 1,627 authorized in 1986, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act removed the 400 officer limitation on the Joint Staff. The latest personnel reductions, if implemented, would decrease staffing to just over 1,100 authorizations. To deal with the implications of such a reduction, on 28 March 2000 the Chairman established the Joint Staff Organizational Assessment (JSOA) Working Group to analyze and implement certain of the changes recommended in the various reorganization studies.


General Shelton also requested congressional relief from the proposed personnel reductions, but they remained in place. Furthermore, the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, hoped to consolidate overlapping Office of the CJCS functions such as Protocol, Legislative Liaison, and the Legal Counsel into OSD as he restructured the JCS organization. On the personnel front, the Secretary's August 2001 *Defense Planning Guidance Fiscal Years 2003-2007* restated the 15 percent headquarters reduction effective by 1 October 2002 with the resources saved directed to the Standing Joint Task Forces. No consolidations or reductions had been implemented by the time of General Shelton's retirement on 30 September 2001.



# CHART 16

# JCS ORGANIZATION

30 MARCH 1992



## **9. JOINT STAFF REORGANIZATION, 2001–2011**


### **The Joint Staff after the 9/11 Attacks**

The decade following 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States witnessed some of the most significant changes to the Joint Staff since its inception. The evolving nature of the threat caused numerous changes to the Joint Staff's Directorates and organization. Efforts to reduce the size of the Joint Staff forced in-house reorganizations. The J-6 would be disestablished only to quickly re-emerge as cyber warfare grew in importance. The disestablishment of US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) forced many statutory responsibilities of the Chairman back underneath the Joint Staff. This more than doubled the size of the Joint Staff with a significant number of assigned personnel now working outside of the Pentagon.

In the aftermath of the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the Joint Staff began reorganizing under the existing directorates adding new titles and responsibilities. The J-31 and four of the deputy directors—J-33, J-34, J-35, and J-39—became the Vice Director of Operations, the Deputy Director for Current Operations, the Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, the Deputy Director for National Systems Support, and the Deputy Director for Information Operations, respectively. The J-38 designation for the Deputy Director for Current Readiness and Capabilities was renamed the Deputy Director for Global Operations. This encompassed operational issues that overlapped multiple geographic areas. It gained several billets from the Deputy Directorate for Information Operations while ceding others to the NMCC. The director of J-5 first activated a Strategic Planning Cell on 16 October 2001, incorporating representation from a variety of Joint Staff directorates. To capitalize on the cross-functional expertise and to acknowledge that the war on terror would be a long-lasting event, J-5 expanded the cell a year later into a full-fledged deputy directorate to develop, coordinate, oversee, and provide military policy advice and strategy development for the war on terrorism.

Meanwhile the JSOA, created by General Shelton, sought to eliminate functions, not just reduce personnel, from the Joint Staff. The sweeping reorganization JSOA initially proposed in January 2002 and shown on chart 17 would remove the J-6, J-7, and the Director of Management, transferring their functions elsewhere on the Joint Staff or to OSD, JFCOM, and other commands. While neither was approved, subsequent iterations over the next three months offered various options for eliminating, reorganizing, or streamlining Joint Staff directorates.

# CHART 17



In early 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pushed to reduce the sizes of both the Joint Staff and the combatant commands (CCMDs). Despite the expanded missions for homeland defense and counter-terrorism, in August 2002, General Richard B. Myers, CJCS, approved this now congressionally mandated 15 percent reduction that eliminated 129 Joint Staff billets, with most coming out of J-3 (39 slots), J-5 (24 slots), and J-8 (23 slots). The J-3 transferred its nuclear operations functions to US Strategic Command (STRATCOM); the J-5 sent its security assistance and technology transfer functions to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and the J-6 transferred 13 information technology related functions to JFCOM, USSPACECOM, the ASD C3I, and DISA. Conversely, the J-5, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy received 12 manpower authorizations to establish a Strategic Planning Cell and the J-8's Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment received 8 billets to establish a joint planning cell/joint operations area. Much of the workload handled by J-7 was transferred to Joint Forces Command, and the downsizing of the directorate resulted in the director position being downgraded to a one-star billet.

In addition, the Joint Staff had to contribute 39 billets to the newly established US NORTHCOM, whose staff personnel, according to the terms of the 2002 Unified Command Plan, had to come from existing headquarters' billets. On 16 August, the DJS notified the J-Directorates of their respective reductions (129 total) and provided guidance on the external and internal realignment of the Joint Staff.

Joint Staff 15% HQ Reduction (as of 02 Oct 02)

FY 01-03 Cuts	FY 03 Billets	NORTHCOM Tax	Approved Cuts	Total	Billets (Post-cuts)	Add Back	Total
1,300-1,246	1,246	39	129	168	1,078	26	1,104

In the spring of 2003, internal realignments associated with the war on terror continued, and the Deputy Directorate for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, created in October 2002, moved from the Deputy Directorate for Global Operations to a new deputy directorate that integrated Homeland Defense with anti-terrorism and force protection. On 13 February 2003 the Joint Staff and the Army agreed to transfer the Army's Director of Military Support to the Joint Staff for more effective coordination of consequence management in the wake of future terrorist attacks. With the approval of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz on 25 March, the Army sent 13 billets to the Joint Staff as the Joint Directorate of Military Support Division that, together with the Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Division and a Homeland Defense Division, formed the Deputy Directorate for Anti-Terrorism/Homeland Defense. In April 2004, the Deputy Director for Special Operations designation was changed to J-37, Deputy Director for Special Operations, and the director billet rank elevated from colonel to brigadier general.

In 2003, the CJCS established Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRN) as a CCA under J-8 to coordinate with the CCMDs and services to develop CBRN defense requirements. In CM-749-03, VCJCS General Peter Pace tasked the new CCA to develop joint CBRN defense requirements, establish an overall architecture for such defense, define system interoperabilities, and draft a roadmap for joint CBRN capabilities.

By early August 2004, the Joint Staff crept back up to 1,219 authorizations, 1,011 military and 208 civilian billets. That December, Secretary Rumsfeld asked General Myers to review OSD's draft Pentagon Reorganization Study that consolidated functions to save manpower and

accelerate decision-making. As he had with General Shelton, the Secretary again singled out for consolidation specific areas of duplication between the OJCS and OSD staffs such as public affairs, legislative liaison, legal affairs, budget, training, and doctrine; and management of information, personnel, and logistics. General Myers believed that such specific recommendations would steer a study group to predetermined conclusions. He proposed instead that an independent contractor conduct a more generalized in-depth analysis of the DOD's organizational structure.

Almost a year later, in early June 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld again raised the functions and manpower issues, requesting General Myers to prepare "a list of people in all the J-directorates and what they think their charter is—what they think they do." The Vice Chairman, General Peter Pace, USMC, responded on 1 September by restating the current functions of each directorate and noting that the Joint Staff had 1,326 authorized personnel, although 1,268 were actually assigned.

Internal reorganizations of directorates using current authorizations were acceptable. The Vice Director of the Joint Staff (concurrently the Director of Management) reorganized the offices of Joint Staff Security and the Chief of Information consistent with the "no growth" restrictions. But J-8 efforts to augment the directorate by transferring several CCAs and 38 new slots to the Joint Staff were rejected because DOD remained in "a no growth mode" and the Joint Staff was implementing the second phase of the 15 percent personnel reduction.

After becoming CJCS, General Pace made several changes within the Office of the Chairman. In 2006, he established a council of colonels, with an O-6 level officer pulled from each of the services, which served as an internal think tank for General Pace on diverse issues ranging from service force structure to military strategy for Iraq. Headed by the Chairman's special assistant, it soon was formally designated as the Chairman's Action Group. Working in conjunction with OSD, General Pace established an Office of Strategic Communications, a short-lived effort merging public diplomacy, information operations, and public affairs.

The Global War on Terror continued to occupy a significant amount of the staff's resources and energy. As such, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered General Pace and the Joint Staff to examine ways to institutionalize lessons learned from the prolonged conflict so that as staff members rotated in and out, the amount of relearning might be kept to a minimum. One such mechanism was the creation of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) on 4 April 2006. Secretary Rumsfeld directed JCIFSA report to General Pace as a CCA and described its mission as capturing and analyzing security force assistance lessons-learned from the war on terror that could then be applied to future efforts as well as

the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Rumsfeld further designated the US Army Combined Arms Center commanding general to serve in a dual role as JCIFSA's director.

Two years later, an expansion of the responsibilities of another CCA, JTAMDO, resulted in Vice Chairman General James E. Cartwright approving a change to that organization's charter on 17 March 2008 in JROCM 066-08. Rather than addressing theater missile defense, Cartwright directed that the organization enlarge its scope to encompass integrated air and missile defense. Accordingly, the charter included a renaming of the organization to the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO). JIAMDO remained a CCA and was aligned under the J-8.

Pace's successor, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, imprinted his own changes to the Office of the Chairman. For example, the admiral added additional special advisors to the Chairman's Action Group, including a small office to aid him in Strategic Synchronization. The Chairman also elevated the Joint Staff Surgeon from a one-star to a two-star general/flag officer billet in October 2008 and realigned it to work directly for him rather than the J-4.

On 25 January 2011, the DJS recommended the Deputy Secretary of Defense approve the transfer of functions and manpower from the J-6 to the Office of the DOD Chief Information Officer and to STRATCOM/US Cyber Command beginning in FY 2012. Of the J-6's 144 personnel, 22 positions were transferred to OSD, US Cyber Command, and the Joint Staff, J-3. Another 50 were transferred to J-8. The 72 remaining slots were eliminated by attrition (31 military billets), personnel reductions (33 contractors), and position reviews (8 civilian positions). The Joint Staff J-6 Directorate was formally disestablished on 2 November 2011.

Upon becoming Chairman in October 2011, General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, added his own stamp on the Office of the Chairman. He expanded the size of the Chairman's Action Group to aid him in thinking about an international security environment that had become more dynamic and multi-dimensional. Additionally, General Dempsey accepted Secretary of State Hilary R. Clinton's offer to place a foreign service officer of at least the two-star rank to serve as a foreign policy advisor (POLAD) on his staff, reciprocating the effectiveness between the two departments that had begun with having the assistant to the CJCS (ACJCS) travel and work alongside the Secretary.

### **Senior Enlisted Advisor to the CJCS**

Faced with fighting two wars, General Myers believed that it was important for the Chairman to have the perspective from the enlisted ranks because warfare had become more joint at the lower levels. Based on an earlier suggestion by Representative Isaac N. "Ike" Skelton IV, in July 2005 General

Myers convened a senior advisory panel to assist him in selecting a senior enlisted advisor. General Myers wanted the position established by that September to ensure that the enlisted advisor's two-year, renewable term, coincided with that of his successor. General Myers then deferred appointing the new enlisted advisor in order to allow his successor, General Pace, to decide who would fill this new position.

On 1 October 2005, concurrent with General Pace's assumption of the Chairmanship, Command Sergeant Major William J. Gainey, USA, became the first Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SEAC). The House Armed Services Committee subsequently inserted language into the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act to provide the SEAC with appropriate pay and allowances. The SEAC was to advise both the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on all matters involving enlisted personnel.

After Gainey's retirement on 25 April 2008, the seventeenth Chairman, Admiral Michael Mullen, opted not to appoint a new senior enlisted advisor, believing there were sufficient senior non-commissioned officers already assigned to the Joint Staff and in the offices of each of the four service chiefs. The Chairman also believed senior enlisted advisors could best use their leadership and experience to address issues by being among the troops rather than serving on a staff.

Mullen's successor, however, was more favorably disposed towards the senior enlisted advisor. General Martin Dempsey revived the SEAC position and selected Marine Corps Sergeant Major Bryan B. Battaglia to fill it, starting 1 October 2011. Dempsey also codified the SEAC's responsibilities to include advising the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on all matters involving joint and combined total force integration, utilization, health of the force, and joint development for enlisted personnel.

### **National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center**

During the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Admiral Mullen was unable to assemble vital information quickly enough to provide the best possible military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. He concluded that the Joint Staff was not organized to anticipate or respond to a fast breaking crisis. The DJS, Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, offered a remedy for this deficiency based upon his recent operational experience in Special Operations Forces. He created a National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC) in January 2009. Approximately 25 field grade officers drawn from the various Joint Staff Directorates initially staffed NJOIC, whose mission expanded traditional (NMCC) functions. The NJOIC became the Joint Staff's focal point for national and strategic information fusion, providing round-the-clock organic resources and Joint Staff expertise to accelerate situational awareness in response to a developing crisis.

It serves as a hub around which all Joint Staff activities operate and provides outside elements (services, CCMDs, and the interagency) with clear access to the Joint Staff.

### **Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell**

In March 2009, the Chairman directed Lieutenant General McChrystal to review Afghanistan strategy. During meetings and discussions, McChrystal identified the value of a rear-element cell within the Joint Staff that focused exclusively on Afghanistan and Pakistan to support both the Chairman and the forward headquarters. On 22 May 2009, the Joint Staff activated the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) in the NMCC. The PACC Director reported through the DJS to the chairman. Field grade officers drawn from other directorates staffed PACC, which as of March 2011 had 39 military and 7 civilian billets. As the American military policy towards Afghanistan became more solidified following an increase in troop levels, the PACC followed suit. This was reflected in Admiral Mullen's direction on 1 May 2011 to realign the PACC under the J-5, rather than the DJS. Still headed by a brigadier general, the PACC retained its mission as a focus for concentrated, cross-functional regional expertise for Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this fashion, the PACC assumed a role similar to the other regional, geographical directorates within J-5.

### **Wounded Warriors**

Another change brought about by Admiral Mullen was the level of oversight for wounded warriors. On 18 April 2008, Mullen signed the charter for a "Wounded Warrior Integration Team" that brought together a variety of Joint Staff agencies to identify anything that hindered the provision of "effective, holistic care" of wounded warriors. Led by the J-5 director, with the Joint Staff surgeon serving as the vice chair, the team included members of J-1, J-4, J-7, Public Affairs, Chairman's Action Group, Legislative Affairs, Legal Counsel, Religious Affairs, and two CJCS special assistants. After identifying seams and gaps, the team was to help Mullen engage a variety of audiences, such as the OSD staff, Department of Veterans Affairs, or Congress, to fix them. Two years later, Mullen converted the team from being a cross-functional representation of the staff to an "Office of Warrior and Family Support," reporting directly to him. The office's charter included such as tasks as helping coordinate joint responses with the services related to wounded service personnel programs as well as exploring innovations in medical treatment for such injuries as brain trauma. Its mandate quickly expanded to serve as the focal point for the Chairman on supporting private sector donors to the needs of the military community. In what the Chairman dubbed a "sea of goodwill" that existed in the American public towards the military, the Warrior and Family Support Office encouraged and supported initiatives to build public awareness, encourage community support, and promote programs to help



servicemembers and their families, veterans, and the families of those killed on active duty. The office served as the advocate for wounded care and for the challenges faced by servicemen and -women returning from combat, and continued to do so after General Dempsey replaced Admiral Mullen as CJCS.

### **Chief of the Guard Bureau Elevated to the JCS**

The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq caused a major statutory change in the composition of the JCS. The post-9/11 conflicts relied heavily on the National Guard and Reserve. The continuous deployments and the operational use of the Guard led Congress to commission a bipartisan blue ribbon panel in 2005. Titled the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, its purpose was to recommend changes to Guard and Reserves forces based upon the ongoing needs of the war on terrorism. The commission's 2008 report made numerous wide-ranging recommendations, including elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from three to four stars based on the changing and expanding responsibilities of the position. The commission, however, recommended against the CNGB being a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs. The following year, Congress agreed with both recommendations and elevated the CNGB to four stars, but not as a formal voting member of the JCS. Nevertheless, the Chairman issued a standing invitation for the CNGB, General Craig R. McKinley, USAF, to attend meetings of the JCS on issues that affected the National Guard.

Congressional pressure grew to make the CNGB an official member of the JCS. The National Guard State Adjutant Generals strongly supported the idea, arguing that since the September 2001 terrorist attacks the National Guard had assumed substantial homeland security and homeland defense responsibilities. These new missions, in turn, required the CNGB to be a full member of the JCS to assure federal officials were fully informed about Guard matters. In May 2011, 68 members of the US Senate cosponsored a bill titled "The National Guard Empowerment and State-National Defense Integration Act of 2011." Section 3 of the proposed legislation would make the CNGB a full member of the JCS.

The Joint Chiefs again unanimously opposed the legislation. In October 2011, they stated their objections in writing to the Senate Committee on Armed Forces. The Joint Chiefs again voiced their unanimous opposition to such a reorganization during their testimony on the legislation in early November 2011, contending that the CNGB represented only Army and Air National Guards, leaving the other 46 percent of reserves unrepresented. The Guard could act either as a federal or state entity according to the situation, and in its state capacity the state governors were in command of Guard units. While each service chief was subject to civilian oversight of the Secretary of Defense, the CNGB was not, thus making him equal to the Chiefs but without commensurate accountability. The presence of the CNGB would also interfere

with unity of command because the CNGB did not represent a branch or service and was not responsible for organizing, manning, training, and equipping the National Guard. In sum, the CNGB as a member of the JCS would create unnecessary leadership duplication and could lead to divided or redundant force management, training, and funding.

The CNGB, General McKinley, disagreed with the Joint Chiefs. He testified that only full JCS membership would ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities of the non-federalized National Guard were considered in a manner that took into account the domestic mission of the Guard when making military contingency plans. Only statutory membership in the JCS guaranteed the CNGB a voice in JCS deliberations.

More than 70 senators agreed with the Guard's position and, overriding the Joint Chiefs' objections, Congress specifically expressed concern that the Title 32 non-federalized missions related to homeland security lacked adequate representation. That November Senate and House conferees attached the National Guard Empowerment Act to the 2012 defense authorization bill. The final authorization bill, agreed to by conferees in mid-December, became the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012 that made the CNGB a full, voting member of the JCS to address matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.

### **Disestablishment of Joint Forces Command**

In June 2010 the Chairman approved the reorganization of the Operations Directorate (J-3) by establishing the Deputy Directorate for C2 and Nuclear Operations (J-36) to provide focused oversight and standardized operational responsibilities for global/joint command and control and nuclear operations. It also improved Joint Staff guidance and support for global C2, the National Military Command System, and nuclear operations. This minor change preceded a sweeping reorganization of the Joint Staff and JCS that existed at that time as shown on chart 21.

One month earlier, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, concerned about the DOD's ability to sustain the current force structure and continue military modernization in an era of reduced defense budgets, directed the Defense Business Board to review personnel, organization, and operations to identify efficiencies and savings. In mid-July the board recommended a downsizing of the CCMDs, beginning with the elimination of JFCOM. On 9 August, Secretary Gates announced that he would recommend to the President JFCOM's closure and the assignment of its force management and sourcing functions to the Joint Staff. He also directed the elimination of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and the Joint Staff, J-6. Their functions would be transferred to the Under Secretary of

Defense, Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics. One week later, the Secretary officially notified the CJCS, among others, of a series of initiatives to reduce excess and duplication department-wide that would eliminate the J-6 and JFCOM.

Following President Barack H. Obama's approval of the recommendations on 6 January 2011, the Secretary of Defense decided to disestablish JFCOM effective 31 August 2011. Until that time, JFCOM would be responsible for executing its assigned missions and tasks.


On 9 February 2011, Secretary Gates announced his initial guidance and direction for JFCOM's disestablishment. The command's functions would be reassigned to other CCMDs, the Air Force, OSD, and the Joint Staff. A subsequent Defense Secretary memo, based on recommendations from a Chairman-led DOD working group (that included OSD, CCMDs, and the services), specified the redistribution of JFCOM organizations and functions to other CCMDs, services, OSD, and the Joint Staff to be accomplished not later than 31 August 2011.

While the VCJCS headed the DOD process, he delegated the responsibility of managing the Chairman's equities to the Vice Director and the Director, Joint Staff J-8, the latter heading the Joint Staff Efficiency Cell that worked the details of the disestablishment effort with JFCOM and OSD. JFCOM identified some 1,200 tasks and 77 functions that had to be executed based upon Unified Command Plan, JROC or legislative decisions. Many of these directly related to the responsibilities of the Joint Staff, especially under the J-7. Secretary Gates added his input by specifically tasking that the JFCOM's global force management function should be realigned under the J-3. From the outset, the planners understood that cost alone would necessitate maintaining a significant organizational presence in Suffolk, Virginia. At the heart of the plan would be the establishment of a smaller more efficient organization within the Joint Staff J-7 designed to synchronize joint training, doctrine, concept development, education, lessons learned, and experimentation.

The process of absorbing specific JFCOM functions produced substantial organizational and functional change on the Joint Staff. With the absorption of the majority of JFCOM functions, along with implementation of the Chairman's Joint Force Development program, which included overall responsibility for joint training, education, joint concepts, and doctrine, the significantly expanded scope of the J-7 directorate (chart 18) resulted in the director's billet becoming a three-star general/flag officer in 2011. One of the J-7's two Deputy Directors, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, was composed largely of elements of the former JFCOM's J-7, J-9, and Joint Center for Operational Analysis and was located in Suffolk. The other deputy directorate, Strategy and Policy, was in the Pentagon.

Also aligning under J-7 in 2011 was the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). DOD designated JPRA as a CCA, responsible for the operational implementation of joint personnel recovery policy and doctrine. JPRA also linked to the intelligence and acquisition communities to ensure personnel recovery requirements were properly addressed.

## CHART 18




The JFCOM disestablishment plan also eliminated two of the current eight JFCOM J-3/J-4 functions and aligned the rest under the Joint Staff J-3, as depicted on charts 19 and 20. To accommodate the increased responsibilities, in 2012 the J-3 added a Deputy Directorate for Joint Force Coordination (J-31), whose main element was located in Norfolk, Virginia. Its mission was to develop conventional force sourcing recommendations for the Chairman and to supervise the implementation of allocation decisions to support the COCOMs. J-31 also synchronized USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM sourcing recommendations with Global Force Management Allocation Plan processes. Joint Force Provider functions were located at Naval Support Activity in Norfolk.

## CHART 19

### Transfer of JFCOM's J-3 Functions to the Joint Staff

<u>Function</u>	<u>Short Title</u>	<u>New Alignment</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>CTR</u>	<u>RC</u>
J3_4-1	Joint Force Provider	JS J-3	Norfolk, VA	51	51	10	50
J3_4-2	GFM Continuous Improvement	JS J-3	Norfolk, VA	7	13	6	1
J3_4-3	Adaptive Planning and Execution system	JS J-3	Norfolk, VA	2	9	5	3
J3_4-4	Logistics Assessment/ Planning	Eliminated	0	0	0	0	0
J3_4-4a	Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements	JS J-4	National Capital Region	1	1	0	1
J3_4-5	Logistics Concept Development	Eliminated	0	0	0	0	0
J3_4-6	Integrated Joint Special Technical Ops	JS J-3	Norfolk, VA	2	1	0	0
J3_4-7	Command Support Enablers	JSSE	Norfolk, VA	0	0	0	0
Total				63	75	21	55

## CHART 20



An additional change with J-3 was the creation of a CCA named the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). In response to DOD's experience against both state and non-state adversaries who leveraged the information environment to combat the United States, the Defense Secretary named the Joint Staff as the joint proponent for Information Operations (IO). On 1 September 2011, the DJS published a CJCS instruction to align JIOWC under J-39 and to outline JIOWC's responsibilities. Those responsibilities included advising the Joint Staff and CCMDs on information operations, developing and maintaining a joint IO assessment framework, and advocating for IO capabilities and force development. Through these tasks, JIOWC was therefore designed to bolster DOD's capabilities, including operations security, military deception, and military information support operations.


The absorption of JFCOM personnel significantly increased the size of the Joint Staff. Initially, these numbers were combined with several other Secretary of Defense efficiencies, all of which landed temporarily under the Joint Staff's organization for budgeting. This caused the Joint Staff to appear larger than it was in actuality, with an authorized manning level on paper of 2,750 military and civilians. These artificial overages were programmed back out of the Joint Staff in planning, budgeting, and review 2013. But the inclusion of the JFCOM missions expanded the authorized size to the Joint

Staff to an all-time high of more than 2,500 military and civilians, although the actual assigned numbers remained considerably lower, between 2,000 and 2,200.

For almost 10 years following the 9/11 attacks, the Joint Staff had resisted OSD pressure to consolidate functions and reduce personnel. Until 2011, reorganizations were minor, leaving the Joint Staff directorates intact, although internally altered by numerous small realignments. That changed radically in 2011 with the disestablishment of JFCOM and the temporary elimination of the J-6. JFCOM's disestablishment forced the Joint Staff to assume many of the former CCMDs' responsibilities and that resulted in a much enlarged Joint Staff that had a major component distant from the Pentagon.

# CHART 21 JCS ORGANIZATION

30 JUNE 2010





## **10. JOINT STAFF REORGANIZATION, 2012–2022**

### **2012–2014**

Due to the increased importance and dependence on information technology and networks, the Joint Staff reestablished the J-6 Directorate on 29 March 2012 to better align and advance Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) and cyber capabilities within the Joint Force (chart 22). All functions previously under the Deputy Director for C4 were transferred to the director of J-6 to include the Chair of the Military Communications Electronics Board. The Chief Information Officer of J-6 became responsible for better aligning, integrating, and advancing C4 and cyber capabilities within the Joint Force. J-6 entities were located at the Pentagon; Norfolk and Suffolk, Virginia; and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Also in 2012, J-7 acquired management and oversight of Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). After recognizing the problems with having the commander of an Army-specific organization also overseeing a joint organization, the Joint Staff proposed the agency be realigned under its own purview. This move allowed for a better alignment of force development activities, particularly by keeping joint activities in a joint chain of command. VCJCS Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., in his capacity as acting Chairman, signed CM-0090-12 on 12 April of that year to implement the change.

The subsequent year, the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3) underwent a significant, but ultimately short-lived, reorganization that reduced the number of internal deputy directorates from six to three. In the twelve years since the 9/11 attacks, the Operations Directorate had expanded significantly with new compartmented capabilities and programs as well as to respond to the need for greater support to other agencies. The idea originated from a Chairman's "deep dive" focused on streamlining the US military. While the Chairman's effort looked at larger issues, such as the Unified Command Plan, an outgrowth of that effort was a similar examination within the J-3 to improve efficiency and reduce overlap of portfolios and functions. For example, both the J-37 Deputy Director for Special Operations and the J-39 Deputy Director for Global Operations had important portfolios related to non-DOD activities. Each deputy directorate was sending forward actions and recommendations on similar issues, unaware of the other's actions and the consequent duplication of effort. The J-3 director, Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, ordered an evaluation to reduce such redundancies and concurrently "do no harm" to ongoing operational responsibilities and support for the CJCS.

The resulting analysis recommended streamlining the Operations Directorate by combining existing portfolios and organizing the directorate into

sub-groupings centered on current operations, future operations, and special activities. In the process, it would reduce the number of J-3 personnel by approximately 10 percent, to include the elimination of two general officer/flag officer billets and one civilian Senior Executive Service position. Many of these personnel savings came from eliminating duplicate functions and reducing administrative staffs in the front offices. Concurrently, the Defense Department likewise mandated a 20 percent cut to the Joint Staff, CCMD headquarters, and OSD. The additional 10 percent of personnel savings—for a cumulative loss of 90 billets—was achieved through further refinements to the J-3 structure and normal attrition.

The consolidation of divisions unencumbered five O-6 billets. These billets, reassigned as new deputy director positions working for the O-7 in each operational team, provided additional experience and depth within the operational teams standing watch in the NMCC.

As approved by the Director in DJSM 0264-13, the J-3 restructuring also resulted in three deputy directorates: J-33 Homeland Defense, Nuclear, and Current Operations; J-35 Regional Force Management and Future Operations; and J-38 Special Activities and Operations.

J-33. The new J-33 Homeland Defense, Nuclear, and Current Operations Deputy Directorate amalgamated the old J-36's nuclear mission with the old J-34's anti-terrorism and homeland defense responsibilities. Additionally, it incorporated two new Joint Operations Directorates (JOD) working for Southern Command and Northern Command, which were removed from the old Regional Operations division and placed under a new Western Hemisphere division. Lastly, a new Reconnaissance, Missile Defense, and Space Division was established by combining the former J-39 Reconnaissance Operations Division with the former Space and Missile Defense Division. The logic behind merging the nuclear and homeland defense missions was that each was CONUS-centric, could require immediate action without forewarning, and involved US-based forces. Due to the importance of the nuclear mission, the Deputy Director, J-33, would always be an active-duty general or flag officer with a background in strategic operations, while the vice director would be a National Guard officer who was fluent in defense support of civil authorities' missions.

J-35. The existing deputy directorates of J-31 (Joint Force Coordination) and J-33 (Regional Operations) merged to become J-35. This new organization provided synergistic efficiencies in the Global Force Management process, combining the global force management and sourcing responsibility based in Suffolk, Virginia, with the four geographic CCMDs—Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command—and JODs most likely to generate the force requirements for contingencies and operational plans. The

validation, sourcing, and writing of orders fell under the same deputy directorate.

J-38. The new Deputy Directorate of Special Activities and Operations combined the former J-37 Special Operations and J-39 Global Operations deputy directorates. The two had similar responsibilities and overlapped in sensitive and comparted programs, especially those concerning information operations and support to non-DOD activities.

While these collective changes appeared to streamline operations, they in fact did the opposite. As a result, by the end 2014, J-3's structure reverted to what it was before, with six deputy directorates.

Additionally, on 19 December 2014, the Assistant to the CJCS for National Guard Matters and the Assistant to the CJCS for Reserve Matters produced an organizational charter for their office (collectively known as "NGRM" for National Guard and Reserve Matters) to clarify roles and responsibilities. The charter outlined six positions: an O-6 deputy who served both as deputy and strategic planner, an O-6 director of staff, a senior reserve component enlisted advisor, two strategic planners/action officers (one from each reserve component), and an administrative noncommissioned officer.

In CM-00197-15, General Dempsey established the Transregional Threats Coordination Cell (T2C2) by reorganizing the PACC under J-5. T2C2's role was to focus on strategy, policy, and plans to combat threats from non-state actors and transregional networks. Any PACC functions that did not align with T2C2's new mission were absorbed by the Middle East directorate of J-5. Dempsey also directed T2C2 to collaborate widely, from CCMDs and the OSD, to the National Security Council staff, and other federal government agencies as well as international partners.

### **National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016**

In late 2015, the National Defense Authorization Act for the following fiscal year directed the Defense Department to "share, consolidate, eliminate or otherwise streamline major headquarters activities" in order to achieve fiscal savings. The DJS approved several actions to achieve this goal, all of which transpired between calendar years 2017 and 2018. For J-1, he signed a memorandum on 17 January 2018 to approve the transfer of the Religious Affairs function to the office of the DJS. The J-4, as approved in DJSM 0245-18, consolidated maintenance, supply, and services into one division, then redesignated the Joint Logistics Operations Center as the Deputy Directorate for Current Operations. Also within J-4, the Knowledge Based Logistics Division became the Global Logistics Integration Division, and the realignment of the Joint Staff Surgeon to the Office of the CJCS made in 2008 was formally codified. For J-5, the director issued DJSMs 0150-18 and 0169-18 further

codifying the changes with the PACC and T2C2. Turning to J-6, the Director issued DSJM 0216-18 to authorize J-6's elimination of the Interoperability Division, transfer of functions to other J-6 divisions, and a reduction in manpower. Additionally, staff action 17-04086 outlined several J-6 division name changes. In DJSM 0135-17, the director approved J-8's reconfiguration to go from six deputy directorates to four, thus focusing on its four core competencies of resources, requirements, protection, and assessment.

### **National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017**

The following year's National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 legislated several additional changes for the Joint Staff. The first was the repeal of the requirement for two general/flag officer positions to represent NGRM. This dissolution of NGRM caused the Vice Director of the Joint Staff to reallocate NGRM's personnel throughout the Joint Staff and to distribute NGRM mission areas to the Joint Staff directorates already responsible for those functions.

Not only were the two general/flag officer NGRM positions among the 78 general/flag officer positions the legislation cut from across the Joint Force, also eliminated was the ACJCS position. That position had served as the Chairman's representative to the Secretary of State and ceased when the incumbent retired in 2017. Personnel changes on the National Security Council staff in 2018 resulted in a temporary reactivation of the ACJCS billet for a general officer who was reassigned from the council. The position remained filled past that officer's retirement and was slated to be deactivated in late 2022.

Lastly, the act changed the terms of appointment for both the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Scheduled to take effect 1 January 2019 to allow a phase-in period to align with the turnover of the incumbent CJCS and VCJCS, the legislation clearly delineated the length of time the officer in each position could serve. The CJCS would serve a four-year term (though Congress determined this would not apply in times of war), and the President could extend to "eight years the combined period of service of an officer as chairman and vice chairman" if the President believed doing so best served the national interest. The Vice Chairman's term of appointment became a single term of four years (though in time of war, this could be waived), beginning on 1 October of an odd-numbered year and not to begin in the same year as a Chairman. It also prohibits the Vice Chairman from advancing to become the Chairman.

### **Chairman's Office of Re-integration (CORe)**

In October 2014, General Dempsey changed the name of the Office of Warrior and Family Support to the "Chairman's Office of Re-integration

(CORE).” The name change reflected the office’s shift in focus toward addressing veteran reintegration into civilian society and was designed to eliminate confusion with other Joint Staff offices that addressed other veterans-related policy issues, such as wounded warrior programs. Dempsey tasked CORE to develop public-private partnerships to foster community solutions to veteran reintegration, serve as the Joint Staff focal point to facilitate coordination and unity of effort between the services and the inter-agency, and boost civilian community awareness about servicemembers, veterans, their family members, and the “return on investment for enabling successful reintegration of veterans and their families.”

While the work of CORE remained critical, the organization itself faced headwinds that ultimately resulted in its disbanding. Thanks in no small part to CORE’s work, veterans’ services with the Veterans Administration improved, Congress passed the Veterans Opportunity to Work Act, and DOD began providing other efforts, all of which provided veterans a much improved environment than existed either when Admiral Mullen first established the office or when General Dempsey revised its mission and name. While Dempsey recognized that even with such progress, the work of supporting veterans was far from complete, but it more properly belonged within the services and with the Department of Veterans Affairs. In addition, after Dempsey’s retirement, the Joint Staff determined it needed to focus energy and resources on its core missions of strategy development, combatant commander support, and joint force readiness. These factors collectively led General Dempsey’s successor to deactivate CORE in June 2016.

## **Other Changes**

On 10 January 2017, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter approved a charter that realigned National Defense University (NDU). As a result of funding changes begun in October 2015 under Resource Management Decision 700A2, NDU became a CCA. This change in status provided the Chairman direct management control and responsibility over NDU’s budgetary programming and execution. The Joint Staff subsequently placed NDU under the J-7’s cognizance because of the similarities between NDU’s mission and J-7’s role of providing oversight and guidance for joint force development.

That same year, the personnel and financial reductions in FY2016 Resource Management Decision 700 drove the Joint Staff to eliminate JIAMD as a CCA. Its mission remained unchanged, however, so Vice Chairman General Paul J. Selva issued CM-0111-17 to direct J-8 absorb JIAMD’s work.

Yet as two CCAs realigned, there emerged another. Approved by the Secretary of Defense on 9 November 2017, then codified into law with the fiscal

year 2018 DOD appropriations act, enacted as public law 115-91 on 12 December 2017, the Joint Staff established a CCA for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The responsibility of the Joint ISR Center, dual-hatted with a new J-32, was to synchronize ISR plans and strategies across CCMDs, the services, other DOD agencies, and allies.

Also within J-3, there emerged an effort to realign the Special Events branch to the Office of the Chairman's Public Affairs office from the Homeland Defense Division of J-33. The intent was to sharpen J-33's focus on its nuclear command, control, and communications duties as well as align more closely Joint Staff support to existing community outreach programs. The chief of Public Affairs non-concurred, however, saying that the Special Events branch's duties pertained more to logistics and finance, rather than public relations. Given that disagreement, and not wanting the branch to be orphaned or continually bounced between directorates, J-3 rescinded the effort and undertook an internal realignment to ensure the proper concentration on the nuclear mission.

J-5 also undertook an internal realignment. While the directorate shifted and consolidated mission areas between two deputy directorates in response to an earlier DOD directive on headquarters reduction, the effort was never formally written down or implemented. Thus in November 2017, even though it already had been functioning for three years, the deputy directorate for Global Policy and Partnerships (GPP) officially came in to being via DJSM 0169-18. To create the GPP, J-5 realigned and consolidated portfolios that had been spread between the deputy directorates for Partnership Strategy and for Transregional Policy. As part of that work, J-5 leadership merged space and missile defense into a single branch within the J-5 Strategic Stability deputy directorate. To eliminate an organizational seam and to more closely align policy portfolios that addressed DOD's work with the interagency on addressing the effect of criminal activities on American domestic security, J-5 fused the transnational crime portfolio from Transregional Policy with counternarcotics and placed the amalgamated portfolio into the Western Hemisphere deputy directorate.

## **Global Integration**

Another notable change found in the 2017 act was the addition of a requirement for the CJCS to advise the President and Secretary of Defense on how best to integrate military forces across the globe to address threats that ranged across regions, domains, and functions. Congress also directed that the Chairman include recommendations on how to allocate and transfer forces between CCMDs to best achieve strategic objectives. Collectively, this responsibility became known as "global integration."

To support the new global integration mission assigned to the CJCS, the DJS ordered several organizational shifts in DJSM 0026-19 issued on 11

February 2019. These included the transfer of several manpower authorizations from Joint Staff South in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Twenty-six of those physically relocated from Joint Staff South to the Pentagon, with the majority of those populating an Integrated Operations Division. That division, aligned under J-3, was tasked to develop recommendations that spanned regions and domains to address a multitude of threats. These recommendations would in turn aid the CJCS in meeting the statutory requirement to present globally integrated advice to the Secretary and President. In J-5, given the natural connection between global integration and countering terrorism, the T2C2 deputy directorate adapted its structure to include a global integration division in 2018. Shortly thereafter, a decrease in focus on counterterrorism and increased attention on global integration prompted J-5 leadership to completely transform T2C2, with it becoming the Global Integration Deputy Directorate by early 2020.

## **2019–2022**

The number of armed services increased by one on 20 December 2019. On that date, President Donald J. Trump signed the fiscal year 2020 Defense Authorization Act, creating the United States Space Force as an armed force under the Department of the Air Force. Its role, as announced by Secretary of the Air Force Barbara M. Barrett on the same day, is to serve as an “independent service singularly focused on protecting our interests and security in space.” Accordingly, the uniformed head of Space Force, known as the “Chief of Space Operations” (CSO), became a participating member of the JCS as directed by Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper. On 20 December 2020, the CSO, General John W. Raymond, became a full-fledged member of the JCS, fulfilling the requirement of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act that directed the CSO become a member of the Joint Chiefs one year after the creation of Space Force.

Meanwhile, the onset of the global pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus in early 2020 forced the majority of the Joint Staff to adapt to a work-from-home environment and to adjust to data sharing across physically separated entities. Such a shift highlighted the staff’s antiquated information and data structure. To help foster a common operating picture and integrate diverse data structures and systems, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff ordered the creation of a Chief Knowledge Officer position, aligned under the Secretary of the Joint Staff, on 13 July 2020. Rather than adding an additional manpower requirement, the position simply realigned a position from within the Directorate of Management (DOM). In addition to designating a lead to corral various efforts across the staff and consolidating knowledge management resources, the Vice Director’s order also brought the Joint Staff into alignment with the vast majority of CCMDs that already had established such a position for the same reasons.

In acknowledgement of the increased duties and responsibilities of the director for Joint Staff intelligence (J-2), the Joint Staff upgraded the director's billet by formal memorandum on 3 February 2021. The Joint Staff designated the position as one of "importance and responsibility" to be filled by a lieutenant general or vice admiral, reflecting the language in Title 10. Over the preceding years, the J-2 director's role had expanded. It continued to include its traditional role of informing and advising the CJCS of intelligence matters worldwide, providing intelligence assessments during crisis situations both to the CJCS and the Joint Staff, and leading the J-2 organization. In addition, the director of J-2 was tasked with serving as the functional manager for targeting, collection management, warning, and intelligence planning for the defense intelligence enterprise, a role that included certifying and advocating for joint intelligence planners. Lastly, the J-2 director became fully integrated in implementing the National Defense Strategy, managing such joint intelligence requirements as concepts, doctrine, capabilities, and assessment, as well as presenting such intelligence information to a variety of senior-level joint councils such as the JROC and the Intelligence Community Capabilities Requirement Council.


To capitalize on process improvements stemming from the 2020 directive establishing a Chief Knowledge Officer, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff ordered the creation of a Knowledge Management Division within the Secretary of the Joint Staff's organization. As directed in DJSM 0011-22 on 31 January 2022, the division was formed by amalgamating the Battle Rhythm Management Team and the Process Services Branch.

Later that year, J-1 took action to consolidate support to the Joint Staff. In a memorandum of agreement between J-1 and DOM signed in September 2022, J-1 transferred its Personnel Services Division to DOM in order to concentrate all "down and in" support to the staff within one directorate. Furthermore, the move afforded J-1 the ability to concentrate on providing "up and out" manpower and personnel guidance.


By mid-2022, the Joint Staff structure settled to what is depicted on chart 23.



# CHART 22 JCS ORGANIZATION 1 JUNE 2012



# CHART 22 JCS ORGANIZATION 2022



## APPENDIX 1

### MEMBERSHIP OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief  
of the Army and Navy<sup>a</sup>

	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
*Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy	20 Jul 42	21 Mar 49 <sup>b</sup>

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>c</sup>

*GEN of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA	16 Aug 49	15 Aug 53
*ADM Arthur W. Radford, USN	15 Aug 53	15 Aug 57 <sup>d</sup>
*Gen Nathan F. Twining, USAF	15 Aug 57 <sup>e</sup>	30 Sep 60 <sup>d</sup>
*GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	01 Oct 60	30 Sep 62
*GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	01 Oct 62	01 Jul 64 <sup>f</sup>
*GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA	03 Jul 64	02 Jul 70 <sup>g</sup>
*ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN	02 Jul 70	01 Jul 74 <sup>d</sup>
*Gen George S. Brown, USAF	01 Jul 74	20 Jun 78 <sup>d</sup>
*Gen David C. Jones, USAF	21 Jun 78 <sup>h</sup>	18 Jun 82 <sup>h</sup>
*GEN John W. Vessey Jr., USA	18 Jun 82 <sup>i</sup>	30 Sep 85 <sup>d</sup>
*ADM William J. Crowe Jr., USN	01 Oct 85	30 Sep 89 <sup>d</sup>
*GEN Colin L. Powell, USA	01 Oct 89	30 Sep 93 <sup>d</sup>
*Acting ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN	01 Oct 93	24 Oct 93
*GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA	25 Oct 93	30 Sep 97
GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA	01 Oct 97	30 Sep 01
Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF	01 Oct 01	30 Sep 05 <sup>d</sup>
Gen Peter Pace, USMC	01 Oct 05	30 Sep 07
ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN	01 Oct 07	30 Sep 11
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA	01 Oct 11	30 Sep 15
Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr., USMC	01 Oct 15	30 Sep 19
GEN Mark A. Milley, USA	01 Oct 19	—

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\* Deceased.

<sup>a</sup> President Roosevelt established this position on 20 July 1942 to provide an officer to preside over JCS meetings and maintain liaison with the White House. The position lapsed in March 1949 when Admiral Leahy was detached.

<sup>b</sup> Date detached. At the request of President Truman, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, while president of Columbia University, served as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and as presiding officer of the JCS, from February to August 1949.

<sup>c</sup> The position of Chairman was created by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 approved 10 August 1949. The Chairman is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Originally, the CJCS served a two-year term with eligibility for a second two-year term, except in time of war when there would have been no limit on the number of reappointments. On 1 October 1986, Congress changed the law such that after an initial two-year appointment, a Chairman could be reappointed for two additional terms, except in time of war when there was no limit on the number of reappointments. Additionally, an officer could not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman if his combined service in such positions exceeded six years. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act changed the term of appointment to a four-year term (though Congress determined this would not apply in times of war), and the President could extend to “eight years the combined period of service of an officer as chairman and vice chairman” if the President believed doing so best served the national interest.

<sup>d</sup> Date of retirement.

<sup>e</sup> Served as special assistant to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson from 1 July to 15 August 1957. He was formally sworn in as CJCS at the White House on 15 August 1957.

<sup>f</sup> Retired 1 July 1959; recalled to active duty 1 July 1961; relieved from active duty 1 July 1964; reverted to retired status 2 July 1964.

<sup>g</sup> Reappointed for a two-year term in 1966, for a one-year term in 1968, and an additional one-year term in 1969; retired 3 July 1970.

<sup>h</sup> His Presidential commission was dated 20 June 1978. General Jones became acting Chairman on 21 February 1978, when General Brown entered the hospital; he was sworn in publicly as Chairman at a ceremony attended by President Jimmy Carter at the Pentagon on 30 June 1978. He retired on 1 July 1982.

<sup>i</sup> Took oath of office privately on 18 June 1982; he was sworn in publicly at the White House on 21 June 1982.

<u>Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
*Gen Robert T. Herres, USAF	06 Feb 87	28 Feb 90
*ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN	01 Mar 90	28 Feb 94
ADM William A. "Bill" Owens, USN	01 Mar 94	29 Feb 96
Gen Joseph W. Ralston, USAF	01 Mar 96	29 Feb 00
Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF	01 Mar 00	30 Sep 01
Gen Peter Pace, USMC	01 Oct 01	12 Aug 05
ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr. USN	13 Aug 05	06 Aug 07
Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC	31 Aug 07	03 Aug 11
ADM James A. Winnefeld Jr. USN	04 Aug 11	31 Jul 15
Gen Paul J. Selva, USAF	31 Jul 15	31 Jul 19
Gen John E. Hyten, USAF	21 Nov 19	19 Nov 21
ADM Christopher W. Grady, USN	20 Dec 21	—

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\* Deceased.

<sup>a</sup> The position of Vice Chairman was created by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (PL 99-433) of 1 October 1986. The Vice Chairman is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and may not be a member of the same military service as the Chairman. Originally, the Vice Chairman served for a term of two years, with the possibility of being reappointed for two additional terms, except in time of war when there was no limit on the number of reappointments. The fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act changed the Vice Chairman's term of appointment to a single term of four years, beginning on 1 October of an odd-numbered year and not to begin in the same year as a Chairman.

<u>Chief of Staff, US Army<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
*GEN of the Army George C. Marshall	09 Feb 42 <sup>b</sup>	18 Nov 45
*GEN of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	19 Nov 45	07 Feb 48
*GEN Omar N. Bradley	07 Feb 48	16 Aug 49
*GEN J. Lawton Collins	16 Aug 49	15 Aug 53
*GEN Matthew B. Ridgway	15 Aug 53	30 Jun 55
*GEN Maxwell D. Taylor	30 Jun 55	01 Jul 59
*GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer	01 Jul 59	30 Sep 60
*GEN George H. Decker	01 Oct 60	30 Sep 62
*GEN Earle G. Wheeler	01 Oct 62	02 Jul 64
*GEN Harold K. Johnson	03 Jul 64	02 Jul 68
*GEN William C. Westmoreland	03 Jul 68	30 Jun 72
*GEN Bruce Palmer Jr. (acting)	01 Jul 72	11 Oct 72
*GEN Creighton W. Abrams	12 Oct 72	04 Sep 74 <sup>c</sup>
*GEN Fred C. Weyand <sup>d</sup>	03 Oct 74	01 Oct 76
*GEN Bernard W. Rogers	01 Oct 76	21 Jun 79
*GEN Edward C. Meyer	22 Jun 79	22 Jun 83
GEN John A. Wickham Jr.	23 Jun 83	22 Jun 87
GEN Carl E. Vuono	23 Jun 87	21 Jun 91
GEN Gordon R. Sullivan	21 Jun 91	20 Jun 95
GEN Dennis J. Reimer	20 Jun 95	21 Jun 99
GEN Eric K. Shinseki	21 Jun 99	11 Jun 03
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker	01 Aug 03	10 Apr 07
GEN George W. Casey Jr.	10 Apr 07	10 Apr 11
GEN Martin E. Dempsey	11 Apr 11	07 Sep 11
*GEN Raymond T. Odierno	07 Sep 11	14 Aug 15
GEN Mark A. Milley	14 Aug 15	9 Aug 19
GEN James C. McConville	9 Aug 19	—

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\* Deceased.

<sup>a</sup> Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22, approved 5 June 1967, which amended Section 3034(a) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Staff, US Army, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, is eligible for reappointment for a term of not more than four years.

<sup>b</sup> Date of first formal JCS meeting.

<sup>c</sup> Date of death.

<sup>d</sup> Acting Chief of Staff, 4 September to 2 October 1974.

<u>Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
*ADM Harold R. Stark	09 Feb 42 <sup>b</sup>	12 Mar 42
*Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King <sup>c</sup>	09 Feb 42 <sup>b</sup>	15 Dec 45
*Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz	15 Dec 45	15 Dec 47
*ADM Louis E. Denfeld	15 Dec 47	02 Nov 49
*ADM Forrest P. Sherman	02 Nov 49	22 Jul 51 <sup>d</sup>
*ADM William M. Fechteler	16 Aug 51	16 Aug 53
*ADM Robert B. Carney	17 Aug 53	17 Aug 55
*ADM Arleigh A. Burke	17 Aug 55	01 Aug 61
*ADM George W. Anderson Jr.	01 Aug 61	01 Aug 63
*ADM David L. McDonald	01 Aug 63	01 Aug 67
*ADM Thomas H. Moorer	01 Aug 67	01 Jul 70
*ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.	01 Jul 70	01 Jul 74
*ADM James L. Holloway III	01 Jul 74	01 Jul 78
*ADM Thomas B. Hayward	01 Jul 78	01 Jul 82
*ADM James D. Watkins	01 Jul 82	01 Jul 86
*ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost	01 Jul 86	29 Jun 90
*ADM Frank B. Kelso II	29 Jun 90	23 Apr 94
*ADM Jeremy M. Boorda	23 Apr 94	16 May 96 <sup>d</sup>
ADM Jay L. Johnson	16 May 96	21 Jul 00
ADM Vernon E. Clark	21 Jul 00	22 Jul 05
ADM Michael G. Mullen	22 Jul 05	29 Sep 07
ADM Gary Roughead	29 Sep 07	23 Sep 11
ADM Jonathan W. Greenert	23 Sep 11	18 Sep 15
ADM John M. Richardson	18 Sep 15	22 Aug 19
ADM Michael M. Gilday	22 Aug 19	—

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\* Deceased.

<sup>a</sup> Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 9-22, approved 5 June 1967, which amended Section 5081(a) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

<sup>b</sup> Date of first formal JCS meeting.

<sup>c</sup> At the initial JCS meetings both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Stark, and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet (CinCFleet), Admiral King, represented the Navy. By Executive Order 9096, the two positions were combined in one individual, Admiral King, who served as CinCFleet and CNO. In accordance with Executive Order 9635, Admiral King's title became simply CNO, and the title of CinCFleet ceased to exist.

<sup>d</sup> Date of death.

<u>Chief of Staff, US Air Force<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
*Gen of the Army Henry H. Arnold <sup>b</sup>	09 Feb 42 <sup>c</sup>	28 Feb 46
*Gen Carl A. Spaatz <sup>d</sup>	01 Mar 46	30 Apr 48
*Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg	30 Apr 48	30 Jun 53
*Gen Nathan F. Twining	30 Jun 53	30 Jun 57
*Gen Thomas D. White	01 Jul 57	30 Jun 61
*Gen Curtis E. LeMay	30 Jun 61	31 Jan 65
*Gen John P. McConnell	01 Feb 65	01 Aug 69
*Gen John D. Ryan	01 Aug 69	31 Jul 73
*Gen George S. Brown	01 Aug 73	30 Jun 74
*Gen David C. Jones	01 Jul 74	20 Jun 78
*Gen Lew Allen Jr. <sup>e</sup>	01 Jul 78	30 Jun 82
*Gen Charles A. Gabriel	01 Jul 82	30 Jun 86
Gen Larry D. Welch	01 Jul 86	30 Jun 90
Gen Michael J. Dugan	01 Jul 90	17 Sep 90
Gen John M. Loh (acting)	18 Sep 90	29 Oct 90
Gen Merrill A. McPeak	30 Oct 90	25 Oct 94
Gen Ronald R. Fogleman	26 Oct 94	01 Sep 97
Gen Michael E. Ryan	06 Oct 97	05 Sep 01
Gen John P. Jumper	06 Sep 01	02 Sep 05
Gen T. Michael Moseley	02 Sep 05	01 Aug 08
Gen Norton A. Schwartz	12 Aug 08	10 Aug 12
Gen Mark A. Welsh III	10 Aug 12	01 Jul 16
Gen David L. Goldfein	01 Jul 16	6 Aug 20
Gen Charles Q. Brown Jr.	6 Aug 20	—

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\* Deceased.

<sup>a</sup> Position created by the National Security Act of 1947. Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 approved 5 June 1967 which amended Section 8034(A) of Title 10, US Code) the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

<sup>b</sup> Served as member of the JCS as Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

<sup>c</sup> Date of first formal JCS meeting.

<sup>d</sup> Commanding General, Army Air Forces, until sworn in as the first Chief of Staff, US Air Force, on 26 September 1947.

<sup>e</sup> Acting Chief of Staff, US Air Force, from 21 to 30 June 1978.



<u>Commandant, US Marine Corps<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
*Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr.	28 Jun 52	31 Dec 55
*Gen Randolph McC. Pate	01 Jan 56	31 Dec 59
*Gen David M. Shoup	01 Jan 60	31 Dec 63
*Gen Wallace M. Greene Jr.	01 Jan 64	31 Dec 67
*Gen Leonard F. Chapman Jr.	01 Jan 68	31 Dec 71
*Gen Robert E. Cushman Jr.	01 Jan 72	30 Jun 75
*Gen Louis H. Wilson	01 Jul 75	30 Jun 79
*Gen Robert H. Barrow	01 Jul 79	30 Jun 83
*Gen Paul X. Kelley	01 Jul 83	30 Jun 87
Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr.	01 Jul 87	30 Jun 91
*Gen Carl E. Mundy Jr.	01 Jul 91	30 Jun 95
Gen Charles C. Krulak	01 Jul 95	30 Jun 99
Gen James L. Jones	01 Jul 99	13 Jan 03
Gen Michael W. Hagee	14 Jan 03	13 Nov 06
Gen James T. Conway	14 Nov 06	21 Oct 10
Gen James F. Amos	22 Oct 10	17 Oct 14
Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.	18 Oct 14	23 Sep 15
Gen Robert B. Neller	24 Sep 15	11 Jul 19
Gen David H. Berger	11 Jul 19	—

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\* Deceased.

<sup>a</sup> By Public Law 416, 82d Congress, approved 28 June 1952, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps was placed in co-equal status with the members of the JCS when matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps were considered. In 1978, Section 141 of Title 10, US Code, was amended by Public Law 485, 95th Congress, approved 20 October 1978, to provide full membership for the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the JCS.

Effective 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 approved 5 June 1967 which amended Section 5201(a) of Title 10, US Code) the Commandant of the US Marine Corps is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

<u>Chief of the National Guard Bureau<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Gen Craig R. McKinley, USAF	31 Dec 11	06 Sep 12
GEN Frank J. Grass, USA	07 Sep 12	03 Aug 16
Gen Joseph L. Lengyel, USAF	03 Aug 16	03 Aug 20
GEN Daniel R. Hokanson, USA	03 Aug 20	—

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<sup>a</sup> The Chief of the National Guard Bureau became a statutory member of the JCS when President Barack H. Obama signed the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.

Chief of Space Operations<sup>a</sup>

From

To

Gen John W. Raymond

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20 Dec 19

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<sup>a</sup> The Chief of Space Operations became a participating member of the JCS on 20 December 2019 when President Donald J. Trump signed the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, creating the United States Space Force. On 20 December 2020, the Chief became a full-fledged member of the JCS as directed by Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper. The Act also added section 9082 under chapter 908 (Space Force) in Title 10 of US Code to specify that the Chief of Space Operations is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

## APPENDIX 2

### AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF and THE JOINT STAFF (1947-2021)\*

<u>Date</u>	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>/Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>/Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>/Asgd</u>
30 Jun 48	238	257	170	151	408	408
30 Jun 49	282	257	218	184	500	441
30 Jun 50	310	272	200	177	510	449
30 Jun 51	333	308	222	192	555	500
30 Jun 52	334	325	200	190	534	515
30 Jun 53	339	323	197	188	536	511
30 Jun 54	345	338	192	183	537	521
30 Jun 55	300	310	185	187	485	497
30 Jun 56	314	312	180	173	494	485
30 Jun 57	315	322	180	173	495	495
30 Jun 58	308	328	175	199	483	527
30 Jun 59	588	594	326	303	914	897
30 Jun 60	559	635	309	311	868	946
30 Jun 61	884	654	329	317	1213	971
30 Jun 62	1068	645	398	385	1466	1030
30 Jun 63	1061	773	423	403	1484	1176
30 Jun 64	1154	1173	426	417	1580	1590
30 Jun 65	1192	1201	438	426	1630	1627
30 Jun 66	1288	1238	490	453	1778	1691
30 Jun 67	1349	1338	493	470	1842	1808
30 Jun 68	1480	1438	531	486	2011	1924
30 Jun 69	1485	1571	455	441	1940	2012
30 Jun 70	1293	1325	417	383	1710	1708
30 Jun 71	1299	1272	400	370	1699	1642
30 Jun 72	1314	1305	403	379	1717	1684
30 Jun 73	1321	1308	391	356	1712	1664
30 Jun 74	1251	1234	369	342	1620	1576
30 Jun 75	1130	1141	352	344	1482	1485
30 Jun 76	1131	1049	352	303	1483	1352
30 Sep 77	976	999	285	278	1261	1277
30 Sep 78	986	976	277	270	1263	1246
30 Sep 79	1023	996	286	257	1309	1253
30 Sep 80	1023	1017	281	261	1304	1278
30 Sep 81	1040	1039	281	271	1321	1310
30 Sep 82	1073	1077	286	274	1359	1351
30 Sep 83	1111	1132	301	272	1412	1404

<u>Date</u>	<u>Military</u> <u>Auth/Asgd</u>	<u>Civilian</u> <u>Auth/Asgd</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Auth/Asgd</u>
30 Sep 84	1157 1197	327 297	1484 1494
30 Sep 85	1223 1272	346 313	1569 1585
30 Sep 86	1282 1294	345 321	1627 1615
30 Sep 87	1295 1280	332 292	1627 1572
30 Sep 88	1315 1295	312 283	1627 1578
30 Sep 89	1319 1325	308 288	1627 1613
30 Sep 90	1323 1333	304 269	1627 1602
30 Sep 91	1260 1255	275 255	1535 1510
30 Sep 92	1203 1165	263 242	1466 1407
30 Sep 93	1153 1149	250 230	1403 1379
30 Sep 94	1131 1128	233 207	1364 1335
30 Jun 95	1132 1157	235 205	1367 1362
30 Sep 96	1157 1187	227 205	1384 1392
30 Sep 97	1182 1216	219 205	1401 1421
30 Sep 98	1139 1163	217 199	1356 1362
30 Sep 99	1095 1110	214 194	1309 1304
30 Sep 00	1073 1088	209 178	1282 1266
30 Sep 01	1059 1084	210 191	1269 1275
31 Oct 02	1003 1036	200 198	1203 1234
30 Sep 03	1013 1038	208 190	1221 1228
05 Oct 04	1040 1046	209 187	1249 1233
01 Oct 05	1004 996	212 191	1216 1187
01 Oct 06	1004 997	209 192	1213 1189
01 Oct 07	1007 1004	209 195	1216 1199
01 Oct 08	966 1002	247 208	1213 1210
01 Oct 09	1014 977	244 212	1258 1189
01 Oct 10	986 913	333 364	1319 1277
01 Oct 11	1482 1307	1003 1031	2485 2338
01 Oct 12	1355 1261	1221 1026	2576 2287
01 Oct 13	1302 1372	1030 1116	2332 2488
01 Oct 14	1267 1347	945 1052	2212 2399
01 Oct 15	1326 1351	969 1016	2295 2367
01 Oct 16	1231 1305	979 984	2210 2289
01 Oct 17	1353 1348	979 886	2332 2234
01 Oct 18	1198 1154	912 816	2110 1970
01 Oct 19	1204 1100	946 821	2150 1921
01 Oct 20	1091 1033	907 860	1998 1893
01 Oct 21	1100 1027	911 844	2011 1871

\* Figures supplied by Staff Management Branch, J-1. Data prior to 1948 is not available. These numbers do not include contractors.

## APPENDIX 3

### CJCS Controlled Activities

Name	Date Established as a CCA	Date Disestablished as a CCA
Joint Battle Center	22 October 1996 <sup>1</sup>	1 October 1998 <sup>2</sup>
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance	4 April 2006 <sup>3</sup>	
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center	15 September 1994 <sup>4</sup>	1 October 1998 <sup>5</sup>
Joint Communications Support Element	13 May 1972 <sup>6</sup>	1 October 1998 <sup>7</sup>
Joint Information Operations Warfare Center	1 September 2011 <sup>8</sup>	
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center	12 December 2017 <sup>9</sup>	
Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization	17 March 2008 <sup>10</sup>	5 May 2017 <sup>11</sup>
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency	25 November 2011 <sup>12</sup>	
Joint Requirements Office – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense	4 February 2003 <sup>13</sup>	
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Office	2 March 1997 <sup>14</sup>	Renamed Joint Integrated Theater and Missile Defense Organization, 17 March 2008 <sup>15</sup>
Joint Warfare Analysis Center	18 January 1994 <sup>16</sup>	1 October 1998 <sup>17</sup>
Joint Warfare Center	3 May 1991 <sup>18</sup>	1 October 1998 <sup>19</sup>
National Defense University	10 January 2017 <sup>20</sup>	

<sup>1</sup> Vice Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Memorandum for service chiefs, unified command commanders, and directors of Joint Staff directorates, “Charter of the Joint C4ISR Battle Center,” MCM-256-96, 22 October 1996.

<sup>2</sup> CJCS Message, “Realignment of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activities,” 011505Z Dec 97; Program Budget Decision-710, “Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) – Joint Programs,” 17 December 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al., “Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Charter,” 4 April 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5118.01, “Charter for the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center,” 15 September 1994.

<sup>5</sup> CJCS Message, “Realignment of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activities,” 011505Z Dec 97; Program Budget Decision-710, “Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) – Joint Programs,” 17 December 1997.

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief, US Readiness Command, “Joint Communications Support Element,” SM-221-72, 13 May 1972. This memorandum does not use the specific phrase “Chairman’s Controlled Activity,”

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but instead said the element “remain[ed] under the deployment control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” When such control transferred to the chairman of the JCS after the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act, it was inferred that the JCSE became a CCA, though there was never any document specifically associating that term with JCSE. Since PBD-710 of 17 December 1997 and DJSM 116-98 of 4 February 1998 refer to JCSE as one of five “Chairman’s Controlled Activities,” it has been included in this list of CCAs.

<sup>7</sup> CJCS Message, “Realignment of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activities,” 011505Z Dec 97; Program Budget Decision-710, “Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) – Joint Programs,” 17 December 1997.

<sup>8</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5125.01, “Charter of The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center,” 1 September 2011.

<sup>9</sup> James N. Mattis, memorandum, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Unified Command Plan Responsibilities for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” 9 November 2017.

<sup>10</sup> General James E. Cartwright, JROCM 066-08, “Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization Charter,” 1 March 2008.

<sup>11</sup> General Paul J. Selva, CM-0111-17, “Disestablishment of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization as a Chairman’s Controlled Activity,” 5 May 2017.

<sup>12</sup> Ashton B. Carter, memorandum, “Realignment of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency under the Department of the Air Force,” 25 November 2011.

<sup>13</sup> General Peter Pace, CM-749-03, “Charter for the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense,” 4 February 2003.

<sup>14</sup> John P. White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization, 2 March 1997.

<sup>15</sup> General James E. Cartwright, JROCM 066-08, “Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization Charter,” 1 March 2008.

<sup>16</sup> Major General Charles T. Robertson Jr., memorandum, “Joint Warfare Analysis Center,” 18 January 1994; Lieutenant General Walter Kross, memorandum for the Army Operations Deputy, “Joint Warfare Analysis Center,” DJSM-1366-95, 28 November 1995.

<sup>17</sup> CJCS Message, “Realignment of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activities,” 011505Z Dec 97; Program Budget Decision-710, “Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) – Joint Programs,” 17 December 1997.

<sup>18</sup> Donald J. Atwood, Jr, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 3 May 1991 endorsement to Christopher Jehn, memorandum for Secretary of Defense through Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Joint Warfare Center,” 12 April 1991; General Colin L. Powell, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, CM-802-91, “Joint Warfare Center,” 21 March 1991.

<sup>19</sup> CJCS Message, “Realignment of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activities,” 011505Z Dec 97; Program Budget Decision-710, “Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) – Joint Programs,” 17 December 1997.

<sup>20</sup> Ashton B. Carter, memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanders of the Combatant Commands, “National Defense University Charter,” 10 January 2017.

## INDEX

- Abrams, General Creighton W.: 102  
Acheson, Dean: 22  
Afghanistan: 80,81  
Allen, General Lew, Jr.: 104  
Amos, General James F.: 105  
Anderson, Admiral George W., Jr.: 103  
Anti-terrorism and force protection: 69, 74, 76, 92  
ARCADIA conference: 1–2  
Armed Forces Policy Council: 34, 41  
Army-Navy Petroleum Board: 19  
  charts: 9,10, 20  
Arnold, General Henry H.: 2, 3, 12, 104  
Assistant Deputy Directorate for  
  Information Operations: 69  
Assistant for Automation, charts: 54, 55, 56,
- Barrow, General Robert H.: 105  
Bennett, Charles E.: 30  
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense  
  Management: 61  
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel: 47, 48  
Boorda, Admiral Jeremy M.: 103  
Bradley, General Omar N.: 21, 25, 27, 28, 34, 99, 102  
British Chiefs of Staff Committee: 1–2  
Brown, General George S.: 99, 100, 104  
Brown, Harold: 51  
Burke, Admiral Arleigh: 38, 103  
Bush, Vannevar: 4, 27
- Carney, Admiral Robert B.: 103  
Carter, Ashton B.: 93  
Carter, Jimmy: 49, 100  
Cartwright, General James E.: 78, 101  
Casablanca Conference: 5  
Casey, General George W., Jr.: 102  
Center for Strategic and International  
  Studies, Georgetown University: 60  
Central Intelligence Agency: 4
- Chain of command  
  need for civilian control of: 12, 29, 33, 37  
  role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  
    Staff, in: 50  
  role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in: 28, 29,  
    30, 38, 50, 51  
  role of the Secretary of Defense in: 28,  
    29, 35, 37, 48, 50  
  for unified commands: 28, 29, 30, 34–35,  
    40, 41, 48, 50
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
  (CJCS): 21–25, 30–31, 36–39, 46, 50–  
    51, 57, 60–62, 77, 78, 92, 99  
  and development of doctrine for joint  
    operations: 63, 67  
  and global integration: 94–95  
  and management of the work of the Joint  
    Staff: 30–31, 37, 40  
  and officers for the Joint Staff: 25, 29,  
    30, 38, 40, 46, 48, 61, 62–63  
  as principal military adviser to the  
    President and the Secretary of  
    Defense: 21–23, 57, 61–62  
  relationship to other Joint Chiefs: 25, 28,  
    31, 37, 61, 62  
  relationship with the Secretary of  
    Defense: 21–23, 37, 40, 50, 57, 60-62  
  relationship with the services: 23, 25  
  responsibilities: 22–26, 30, 31, 37, 38,  
    50, 51, 57–62, 63, 74, 94  
  and the specified commands: 50, 51, 57,  
    60  
  and strategic planning: 33–35, 62  
  term of office: 24–25, 46, 92, 100  
  and the unified commands: 50, 51, 57, 60  
  voting by: 21, 24, 25,
- Chairman’s Action Group: 77, 78, 80  
Chairman’s Controlled Activity (CCA): 67,  
  71, 76–78, 84, 86, 93–9-4, 110–111
- Chairman’s Office of Re-integration  
  (CORe): 92–93



Chairman's Special Studies Group: 46, 48  
 Chapman, General Leonard F., Jr.: 105  
 Chief of Naval Operations: 2, 3, 16, 17, 35, 103  
 Chief of Staff, US Air Force: 16, 35, 104  
 Chief of Staff, US Army: 2, 16, 21, 33, 102  
 Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy: 3, 14, 16, 21, 99  
 Chief of the Army Air Forces: 2  
 Churchill, Winston S.: 1  
 Clark, Admiral Vern: 103  
 Clinton, William J.: 68  
 Cohen, William S.: 70–71  
 Collins, Lieutenant General J. Lawton: 14, 15, 102  
 Collins Plan: 14–15  
 Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1–4  
 Combined Intelligence Committee: 4  
 Combined Staff Planners: 4  
 Command, Control, and Communications Systems (C3S) Directorate: 51, 63  
     charts: 56, 64, 65,  
 Commandant, US Marine Corps: 38, 51, 105  
 Commander in Chief, US Fleet: 2, 3, 6, 103  
 Committee on War Planning Agencies: 6  
 Communications-Electronics Directorate: 40, 49  
     chart: 44, 53, 54  
 Conway, General James T.: 105  
 Coolidge, Charles A.: 34  
 Council of national military advisers, proposed: 58  
 Crowe, Admiral William J., Jr., USN: 62, 67, 103  
 Current Operations Division: 49  
 Cushman, General Robert E., Jr.: 105  
  
 Decker, General George H.: 102  
 Defense Acquisition Board: 68  
 Defense Atomic Support Agency: 45, 47  
 Defense Communications Agency: 45, 48, 49, 50, 51  
 Defense Intelligence Agency: 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 69  
 Defense Mapping Agency: 49, 50  
  
 Defense Nuclear Agency: 45, 49, 51  
*Defense Organization: The Need for Change*: 61  
*Defense Planning Guidance Fiscal Years 2003–2007*: 72  
 Defense Reform Task Force: 71  
 Defense Science Board: 51  
 Dempsey, General Martin: 78, 79, 81, 92–93, 99, 102  
 Denfeld, Admiral Louis E.: 24, 25, 103  
 Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958: 34–42  
 Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection: 74  
 Deputy Director for Current Operations: 74, 91  
 Deputy Director for Global Operations: 74, 76, 89, 91  
 Deputy Director for Information Operations: 74  
 Deputy Director for National Systems Support: 74  
 Deputy Director for Operations (Counterinsurgency and Special Activities): 49  
 Deputy Director for Special Operations: 76, 89  
 Deputy Director for Strategic Logistics: 48  
 Deputy Directorate for Anti-terrorism/Homeland Defense: 76  
 Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism: 69  
 Deputy Directorate for Current Operations: 74, 91  
 Deputy Directorate for Current Readiness and Capabilities: 69, 74  
 Deputy Directorate for War-gaming, Simulation, and Analysis: 70  
 Director of the Joint Staff (DJS): 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30, 36, 49, 58, 59, 60, 62, 76, 78, 79, 80, 86, 91, 94  
     charts: 20, 26, 32, 43, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 73, 88, 97, 98  
 Directorate for Information and Resource Management: 59, 68  
     charts: 66, 73

Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development: 63, 71  
 Directorate of Administrative Services: 46, 49, 59  
     charts: 53, 54, 55, 56, 64  
 Directorate of Management (DOM): 68, 95, 96  
     charts: 88, 97, 98  
 Directorate of Support Services: 59  
     chart: 65  
 DOD Appropriations Bill, Conference Report, FY 1984: 59  
 DOD Directive 5100.1: 40–41  
 Dodge, Joseph M.: 30  
 Dugan, General Michael J.: 104  
 Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr.: 99, 105

Eberstadt, Ferdinand A.: 13, 15, 17, 22, 24, 25, 32  
 Eberstadt committees: 13–14, 15, 16, 17, 22  
 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 21, 24, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34–39, 102  
 Eisenhower, Milton S.: 27

Fechteler, Admiral William M.: 103  
 Finletter, Thomas K.: 30, 34  
 Finucane, Charles C.: 34  
 Fitzhugh, Gilbert W.: 47  
 Flemming, Arthur S.: 27  
 Fogleman, General Ronald R.: 104  
 Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate: 63, 70, 75,  
     charts: 66, 73, 88, 97  
 Foreign military aid programs: 41  
 Forrestal, James V.: 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22–25  
 Foster, William C.: 34  
 “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff”: 19

Gabriel, General Charles A.: 104  
 Gainey, Command Sergeant Major William: 79

Gates, Robert M.: 82–83  
 Gates, Thomas S., Jr.: 34  
 Giambastiani, Admiral Edmund: 101  
 Global Command and Communications System: 69  
 Global Integration: 94–95  
 Global war on terror: 74, 76, 77, 81  
 Goldfein, General David L.: 104  
 Goldwater, Barry M.: 61  
 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986): 61–63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 101  
 Grass, General Frank J.: 106  
 Gray, General Alfred M., Jr.: 105  
 Greene, General Wallace M., Jr.: 105  
 Greenert, Admiral Jonathan W.: 103  
 Gruenther, Major General Alfred M.: 18, 21, 25

Hagee, General Michael W.: 105  
 Haiti: 68  
 Hamre, John: 71  
 Hayward, Admiral Thomas B.: 103  
 Heritage Foundation: 60  
 Herres, General Robert T.: 63, 101  
 Hoffman, Clare E.: 30, 31  
 Hokanson, General Daniel R.: 106  
 Holloway, Admiral James L., III: 103  
 Homeland Defense Division: 76, 94  
 Hoover, Herbert C.: 22, 24, 25, 31, 34  
 Hoover Commission: 22–24, 34

Information Warfare Division: 69  
 Intelligence Directorate (see J-2)  
 Intelligence operations: 79  
 International Negotiations Division: 48  
 Iraq: 68, 77, 81

J-1, Manpower and Personnel Directorate: 40, 49, 58, 63, 80, 91, 96  
     charts: 44, 53, 54, 64, 65, 66, 73, 88, 97, 99  
 J-2, Intelligence Directorate: 40, 41, 46, 51, 67, 69, 96

charts: 44, 73, 88, 97, 98

J-3, Operations Directorate: 40, 45, 47, 49, 51, 58, 67, 69, 74, 75, 82, 84, 85, 89, 90-91, 94, 95

charts: 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 73, 85, 88, 97, 98

J-4, Logistics Directorate: 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 68, 70, 78, 80, 84, 91,

charts: 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 73, 85, 88, 97, 98

J-5, Deputy Directorate for International Negotiations: 69

J-5, Deputy Directorate for Global Integration: 95

J-5, Deputy Directorate for Global Policy and Partnerships (GPP): 94

J-5, Deputy Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs: 69

J-5, Deputy Directorate for Strategic Stability: 94

J-5, Russian-Ukraine-Eurasia Division: 69

J-5, Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate: 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 58, 63, 68, 69, 74, 75, 80, 91, 93, 94, 95

charts: 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 73, 85, 88, 97, 98

J-6, Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate: 63, 68, 74, 75, 78, 82, 87, 91

charts: 66, 73, 88

disestablishment of: 78, 82, 87

re-establishment of: 89

J-6, Communications-Electronics Directorate: 40, 49

charts: 44, 53, 54

J-6, Interoperability Division: 91

J-7, Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development: 71, 74, 75, 80, 83

charts: 75, 88, 97

J-7, Joint Force Development Directorate: 83, 84, 89, 93

charts: 97

J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate: 63, 67, 70, 71

charts: 66, 73, 81, 82

J-8, Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate: 63, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 91, 93

charts: 66, 73, 88, 97, 98

J-31, Deputy Directorate for Joint Force Coordination: 84, 90

J-31, Vice Director of Operations: 74

J-33, Deputy Director for Current Operations: 69, 74, 94

J-33, Deputy Director for Homeland Defense, Nuclear, and Current Operations: 90

J-34, Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection: 74, 90

J-34, Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism: 69

J-35, Deputy Director for National Systems Support: 74

J-35, Regional Force Management, 90

J-37, Deputy Director for Special Operations: 76, 89

J-38, Deputy Director for Global Operations: 74

J-38, Deputy Directorate for Current Readiness and Capabilities: 69, 74

J-38 Deputy Director for Special Activities and Operations: 90, 91

J-39, Assistant Deputy Directorate for Information Operations: 69

J-39, Deputy Director for Global Operations: 89, 91

J-39, Deputy Director for Information Operations: 74, 86, 90

Jeremiah, Admiral David E.: 68, 99, 101

Johnson, General Harold K.: 102

Johnson, Admiral Jay L.: 103

Johnson, Louis A.: 24

Johnson, Lyndon B.: 47

Johnson administration: 47

Joint Administrative Committee: 6

chart: 9

Joint Advanced Study Committee: 39

chart: 32

Joint Advanced Study Group: 40, 45

charts: 43, 44

Joint Analysis Directorate: 59, 63

Joint Battle Center: 71, 110  
 Joint Board of the Army and Navy: 1, 3, 4  
 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA): 77–78, 89, 110  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)  
   abolition of the committee system: 39–40  
   and allocation of resources: 49, 50, 59,  
   channel to the President: 3  
   composition of: 2–3, 14–15, 16, 49–51,  
   61, 68, 81–82  
   and force structure: 41, 50, 68  
   and foreign military aid programs: 41  
   Historical Section: 19  
   and intelligence operations: 1, 41, 79  
   liaison with the Secretary of Defense: 17,  
   57–58, 60–62  
   and logistic planning: 13, 14, 17, 28, 41  
   and long-range planning: 5  
   and materiel and personnel needs of the  
   services: 17  
   members' responsibilities to individual  
   services: 30, 31, 36, 50, 57–58, 61  
   and the military budget: 11–12, 14–15,  
   17, 67  
   as military staff of the Secretary of  
   Defense: 21, 35, 41  
   and the National Security Act of 1947:  
   16–17  
   operational command responsibility: 41  
   and organization of the military: 12–13  
   as principal military advisers to the  
   National Security Council: 21, 41  
   as principal military advisers to the  
   President: 1, 17, 21, 23, 41, 48  
   as principal military advisers to the  
   Secretary of Defense: 17, 21, 25, 41  
   relationship with the military  
   departments: 14, 41  
   relationship with the Secretary of  
   Defense: 17, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 35, 41,  
   46, 47, 48, 62  
   representatives to international  
   negotiations: 48  
   and resource allocation: 33, 49, 50, 59–  
   60  
   responsibilities of: 1–3, 14–15, 16–17,  
   19, 23, 28, 32, 35–36, 40, 41, 42, 47–  
   48, 61, 62  
   role in the chain of command: 28, 29, 30,  
   38, 50, 51  
   and specified commands: 19, 49, 41, 47,  
   50, 51, 57, 59, 60, 62  
   staff with dual responsibilities: 5, 6, 29,  
   50  
   and strategic decisions on current  
   situations: 5  
   and strategic planning: 13, 14, 16, 28, 29,  
   33, 35, 41, 59  
   supervision of Defense agencies: 47, 48,  
   50, 51  
   supporting organization for: 3–4, 5–6, 18  
   term of office of members: 46, 100–105,  
   107  
   and training: 17, 19, 41, 62  
   and unified commands: 17, 20, 30, 31,  
   37–38, 41, 48  
   US Delegation to the UN Military Staff  
   Committee: 17, 19, 42, 62  
   workload of members: 49  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Assistant for  
   NSC Affairs, chart: 32  
 Joint Civil Affairs Committee: 7, 18  
   charts: 10, 20  
 Joint Command and Control Requirements  
   Group: 45, 47, 48  
   chart: 53  
 Joint Command and Control Warfare  
   Center: 69, 71, 110  
 Joint Communications Board: 4, 18  
   charts: 8, 9, 10, 20  
 Joint Communications-Electronics  
   Committee: 39  
   charts: 26, 32  
 Joint Communications-Electronics Group:  
   40  
   chart: 43  
 Joint Communications Support Element: 71,  
   110  
 Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff: 5–6  
   charts: 9, 10

Joint Directorate of Military Support  
     Division: 76  
 Joint doctrine: 59, 63  
 Joint Information Operations Warfare  
     Center (JIOWC): 86, 110  
 Joint Intelligence Committee: 4, 6, 18, 39  
     charts: 8, 9, 10, 20, 26, 32  
 Joint Intelligence Group: 18, 40  
     charts: 20, 26, 32, 43  
 Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, charts:  
     26, 32  
 Joint Intelligence Staff: 4, 6, 18  
     chart: 10  
 Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense  
     Organization (JIAMDO): 78, 93, 110  
 Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and  
     Reconnaissance Center: 110  
 Joint Intelligence Subcommittee: 4  
     charts: 8, 9  
 Joint Logistics Committee: 6, 18  
     chart: 10  
 Joint Logistics Plans Committee: 6, 18, 39  
     charts: 10, 20, 26, 32  
 Joint Logistics Plans Group: 18, 40  
     charts: 20, 26, 32, 43  
 Joint Meteorological Committee: 4, 18, 39  
     charts: 8, 9, 20, 26, 32  
 Joint Meteorological Group, charts: 43, 44  
 Joint Middle East Planning Committee: 39  
 Joint Military Assistance Affairs  
     Committee: 39  
 Joint Military Assistance Affairs  
     Directorate: 40  
     chart: 44  
 Joint Military Assistance Affairs Group,  
     chart: 43  
 Joint Military Transportation Committee: 4,  
     18, 39  
     charts: 8, 9, 10, 20, 26, 32  
 Joint Munitions Allocation Committee: 19,  
     39  
     charts: 10, 20, 26, 43  
 Joint New Weapons Committee: 4  
     charts: 8, 9, 10  
 Joint Operations Division: 58  
 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA):  
     84, 110  
 Joint Planning Staff for Space: 59  
     chart: 65  
 Joint Post-War Committee: 7  
     chart: 10  
 Joint Production Survey Committee: 7  
     chart: 10  
 Joint Programs Office: 40, 45  
     chart: 44  
 Joint Psychological Warfare Committee: 4  
     chart: 8  
 Joint Requirements and Management Board:  
     60  
 Joint Requirements Office for Chemical,  
     Biological, Radiological and Nuclear  
     Defense (JRO-CBRN): 76, 110  
 Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
     (JROC): 60, 68  
 Joint Secretariat: 4, 19, 46, 49, 68  
     charts: 20, 26, 32, 43, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56,  
     64, 65, 66, 73  
 Joint Security Control, chart: 8, 9  
 Joint Special Operations Agency: 59–60, 63  
     chart: 65  
 Joint Staff  
     authority of the Secretary of Defense  
         over: 24, 32  
     composition of: 18, 62  
     dual responsibilities of members to Joint  
         Staff and service staffs: 4, 5, 30, 57  
     military promotion of officers assigned  
         to: 28, 60  
     organization of: 18–19, 39–40, 68–72,  
         74–87, 89–96  
     procedures: 18–19, 37, 39, 49–50, 57,  
     relationship with the Office of the  
         Secretary of Defense: 29, 72, 77  
     reorganized into J-directorates: 40  
     responsibilities: 18–19, 31, 38, 41, 50,  
         57, 67, 71–72, 74  
     staffing of: 17, 21, 24–25, 36, 38, 40, 48,  
         49, 59, 62, 63, 67, 71, 72, 74–77, 78,  
         84, 86–87, 90, 94–95, 108–109

Joint Staff Organizational Assessment  
     (JSOA) Working Group: 72, 74  
 Joint Staff Planners: 3, 4, 5, 6, 18  
     charts: 8, 9, 10  
 Joint Staff Reorganization Committee: 71  
 Joint Strategic Plans Committee: 18, 39  
     charts: 20, 26, 32  
 Joint Strategic Plans Group: 18, 40  
     charts: 20, 26, 32, 43  
 Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 5, 19, 39  
     charts: 9, 10, 20, 26, 32  
 Joint Strategic Survey Council: 39, 46  
     charts: 43, 44  
 Joint Subsidiary Activities Committee: 39  
 Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, chart: 43  
 Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense  
     Organization (JTAMDO): 70, 78, 110  
 Joint US Chiefs of Staff: 2–3  
 Joint US Strategic Committee: 4, 5, 6  
     charts: 8  
 Joint Vision Integration Cell: 71  
 Joint War Games Agency: 45, 47, 48  
     chart: 53  
 Joint War Plans Committee: 6, 14, 18  
     chart: 10  
 Joint Warfare Analysis Center: 69, 110  
 Joint Warfare Center: 67, 110  
 Jones, General David C.: 57–58, 61, 99, 104  
 Jones, General James L.: 105  
 Jumper, General John P.: 104

Kelley, General Paul X.: 105  
 Kelso, Admiral Frank B., II: 103  
 Kennedy administration: 45  
 Key West Agreement of 1948: 19  
 Kimball, Dan A.: 24  
 King, Admiral Ernest J.: 2, 3, 12, 103  
 Krulak, General Charles C.: 105  
 Kyes, Roger M.: 30

Laird, Melvin R.: 47, 49  
 Law of the Sea, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
     representative to negotiations  
     regarding: 49

    chart: 55  
 Leahy, Admiral William D.: 3, 12, 21, 99  
 LeMay, General Curtis E.: 104  
 Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.: 45, 99, 102  
 Lengyel, General Joseph L.: 106  
 Lodge-Brown Act: 22  
 Logistics Directorate (see J-4)  
 Loh, General John M.: 104  
 Lovett, Robert A.: 27–28

*Mandate for Leadership II, Continuing the  
 Conservative Revolution:* 60  
 Manpower and Personnel Directorate (see J-  
 1)  
 Marshall, General George C.: 2, 3, 11, 12,  
 27, 102  
 McChrystal, Lieutenant General Stanley,  
     USA: 79–80  
 McCloy, John J.: 22  
 McConnell, General John P.: 104  
 McDonald, Admiral David L.: 103  
 McElroy, Neil H.: 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41  
 McKinley, General Craig R.: 81, 82, 106  
 McNarney, General Joseph T.: 11  
 McPeak, General Merrill A.: 104  
 Meyer, General Edward C.: 57–58, 102  
 Military budgets, authority over: 11–12, 14–  
 15, 17, 67  
 Milley, General Mark A.: 99, 102  
 Moorer, Admiral Thomas H.: 99, 103  
 Moseley, General T. Michael: 104  
 Mullen, Admiral Michael G.: 78–79, 80, 81,  
 93, 99, 103  
 Mundy, General Carl E., Jr.: 105  
 Munitions Assignments Board, charts: 8, 9  
 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions,  
     Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to  
     negotiations for: 48–49  
     chart: 56  
 Myers, General Richard B., USAF: 75–79,  
 99, 101

National Defense Authorization Act of FY  
 1998: 70

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2000: 72

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006: 79

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2012: 82, 106

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2016: 91

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2017: 92, 100, 101

National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2020: 95, 107

National Defense University (NDU): 93, 110

National Guard affairs: 70, 81-82, 90, 91

National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center: 79-80

National Military Command Center (NMCC): 45, 74, 79, 80, 90

National Security Act of 1947: 16-19, 23, 28, 29, 30, 61, 104, 100

National Security Act Amendments of 1949: 21-25, 30, 100

National Security Council  
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as principal military adviser to: 57, 61, 62  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military advisers to: 21, 41  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff role in: 13  
 proposals for the creation of: 13, 15  
 national security resources board: 13, 15

Neller, General Robert B.: 105

Nichols, Bill: 61

Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W.: 17, 18, 27, 103

Nixon, Richard M.: 47

No-fly zones, enforcement of: 68

Norstad, Major General Lauris: 14, 16, 17

Odierno, General Raymond T.: 102

Office of Strategic Communications: 77

Office of Strategic Services: 4-5  
 charts: 8, 9, 10

Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff: 70, 77, 78, 94

Office of the Coordinator of Information: 4-5

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)  
 duplication of Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, functions: 72, 77  
 military staff for: 21, 35, 41  
 provision of experts to the Joint Staff: 29  
 and reorganization of the Joint Staff: 74

Office of War Information: 4

Operation DESERT STORM: 67

Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (see J-7)

Operations Directorate (see J-3)

Operations Plans Division: 58

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS): 40, 46, 47-48, 59, 60, 61, 62, 77  
 charts: 43, 44, 53-56, 64-66

Owens, Admiral William "Bill" A.: 101

Pace, General Peter: 77, 78, 79, 99, 101

Packard, David: 61

Packard Commission: 61

Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell: 80  
 chart: 88

Palmer, General Bruce, Jr.: 102

Pate, General Randolph McCall: 38, 105

Patterson, Robert P.: 16, 17, 22-23

Peacekeeping and stability operations: 68

Pentagon Reorganization Study: 76

Personnel Directorate (see J-1)

Plans and Policy Directorate (see J-5)

Powell, General Colin L.: 67, 99

President of the United States  
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as principal military adviser to: 22, 23-25, 50, 57, 61, 62, 100  
 Joint Chiefs of Staff as military advisers to: 1, 17, 21, 23, 41, 48

Program Budget Analysis Division: 58

Psychological warfare: 4

Quadrennial Defense Review, 1997: 71  
 Radford, Admiral Arthur W.: 15, 34, 99  
 Ralston, General Joseph: 101  
 Reagan, Ronald: 61  
 Reimer, General Dennis J.: 102  
 Religious Affairs: 80, 91  
 Reorganization Plan No. 6: 27–32  
 Reserve forces affairs: 70, 81, 91  
 Richardson, Admiral J. O.: 12  
 Richardson, Admiral John M.: 103  
 Ridgway, General Matthew B.: 102  
 Robertson, Reuben B., Jr.: 34  
 Rockefeller, Nelson A.: 27, 30, 34  
 Rockefeller commission: 28, 34  
 Rogers, General Bernard W.: 102  
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 1, 3–5, 99  
 Roughead, Admiral Gary: 103  
 Royall, Kenneth C.: 21, 24  
 Rumsfeld, Donald H.: 49, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78  
 Ryan, General John D.: 104  
 Ryan, General Michael E.: 104  
 Sarnoff, David: 27  
 Schoomaker, General Peter J.: 102  
 Schwartz, General Norton A.: 104  
 Secretary of Defense  
     authority over the Joint Staff: 24, 32  
     authority over the military services: 33  
     Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as  
         principal military adviser to: 22, 23–  
         25, 50, 57, 61, 62, 100  
     Joint Chiefs as the military staff for: 41  
     Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military  
         advisers to: 17, 21, 25, 41  
     limitations on the powers of: 16  
     relationship with the Joint Chiefs of  
         Staff: 17, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 35, 41,  
         46, 47, 48, 62  
     responsibilities: 21–25, 29, 30, 31, 35,  
         36–37, 41, 45, 48  
 Secretary of the Joint Staff: 49, 95, 96  
 Secretary of the Navy  
     and organization of the military: 13, 15–  
         16  
     responsibilities: 3  
 Secretary of War  
     and organization of the military: 13, 14–  
         16  
     responsibilities: 3  
 Selva, General Paul J.: 93, 101  
 Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of  
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SEAC): 78–  
         79  
 Shalikashvili, General John M.: 99  
 Shelton, General Hugh: 70, 72, 74, 77, 99  
 Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr.: 105  
 Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.: 16, 17, 103  
 Shinseki, General Eric K.: 102  
 Shoup, General David M.: 105  
 Somalia: 68  
 Soviet Union: 33, 47, 67  
 Spaatz, General Carl A.: 27, 104  
 Space systems: 59  
 Special Assistant for Arms Control: 47, 48,  
     49  
     charts: 53, 54  
 Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and  
     Special Activities: 45, 47, 48  
     chart: 53  
 Special Assistant for Disarmament Affairs:  
     45  
 Special Assistant for Environmental  
     Services: 46, 47, 48  
     chart: 53  
 Special Assistant for Military Assistance  
     Affairs: 46, 47, 48  
     chart: 53  
 Special Assistant for National Security  
     Council Affairs: 45  
     charts: 32, 43, 44  
 Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint  
     Chiefs of Staff, for Strategic Arms  
     Negotiations: 47–48  
     charts: 53, 54  
 Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
     for Strategic Mobility: 46–47  
     chart: 53



Special Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Reorganization of National Defense: 12

Special operations: 59–60, 69

Special Operations Division: 49, 59, 63

Specified commands

- Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for: 19, 40, 41, 47, 50, 51, 57, 59, 60, 62
- responsibilities of commanders of: 57–58, 62

Stark, Admiral Harold R.: 2, 3, 103

Steadman, Richard C.: 49–50

Stimson, Henry L.: 11

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives to: 47–48

- charts: 53, 54

Strategic arms negotiations: 47, 48

Strategic Planning Cell: 74

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (see J-5)

Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency: 59, 63

- chart: 65

Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency: 48, 50, 59

- charts: 54, 55, 56, 64

Sullivan, General Gordon R.: 102

Taylor, General Maxwell D.: 33, 38, 99, 102

Thomas, Elbert: 14

Tidd, Vice Admiral Kurt W.: 89

*Toward a More Effective Defense*: 60

Transregional Threats Coordination Cell (T2C2): 91, 93, 95

Trost, Admiral Carlisle A. H.: 103

Truman, Harry S.: 14–17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 100

Twining, General Nathan F.: 34, 37–40, 99, 104

Tydings, Millard E.: 23–25

Unified Command Plan: 76, 83, 89

Unified commands (see also combatant commands)

- Eisenhower’s promotion of: 35–36
- Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for: 17, 28, 29, 35–36, 41, 47, 48, 51, 59, 60, 75–76, 82–84, 90, 94–95
- responsibilities of commanders of: 57–58, 62,
- Secretary of Defense and: 31, 35, 38, 48, 82–84

United Kingdom: 1, 2

United Nations, Military Staff Committee: 17, 42, 62

US-British military cooperation: 1–3

US Army, and military organization: 11–12, 14–16

US Congress

- hearings regarding military organization: 11–12, 13–16, 23–25, 27, 29–31, 34–38, 61–63
- and organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 61

US House of Representatives: 25, 31, 38

Armed Services Committee: 34, 36–38, 79

Committee on Government Operations: 30

US Marine Corps: 15, 16, 37, 38, 51, 79, 105

US Navy, and military organization: 12, 13, 15–16

US Northern Command (NORTHCOM): 76, 90

US Senate: 23, 25, 38, 68, 81, 82, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105

- Armed Services Committee: 23, 24, 38, 61, 81,
- Committee on Naval Affairs: 13, 15
- Military Affairs Committee: 13, 14–15

US Space Command: 59, 75

US Special Operations Command: 63

US Strategic Command (STRATCOM): 75, 78

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.: 104

Vessey, General John W., Jr.: 59, 99  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
(VCJCS): 62, 68, 76, 77, 78, 83, 89  
92, 93, 94, 100, 101  
Vice Director of Operations: 74  
Vice Director of the Joint Staff: 68, 77, 83,  
92, 95, 96  
Vietnam War: 45–47  
Vinson, Carl: 34, 36  
Vuono, General Carl E.: 102

Walsh, David I.: 13  
Watkins, Admiral James D.: 103  
Welch, General Larry D.: 104  
Westmoreland, General William C.: 102  
Weyand, General Fred C.: 102  
Wheeler, General Earle G.: 33, 47, 48, 99,  
102  
White, General Thomas D.: 38, 104  
Wickham, General John A., Jr.: 102  
Wilson, Charles E.: 27, 31, 34, 100  
Wilson, General Louis H.: 105  
Winnefeld, Admiral James A., Jr.: 89, 101  
Wolfowitz, Paul: 76  
Woodrum, Clifton A.: 11, 12  
World War II: 1–7, 11  
Wounded Warrior Integration Team: 80–81

Yugoslavia: 68

Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr.: 103